Rawls, John (1921–)

Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, John Rawls received his undergraduate and graduate education at Princeton. After earning his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1950, Rawls taught at Princeton, Cornell, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and, since 1962, at Harvard, where he is now emeritus.

Rawls is best known for *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and for developments of that theory he has published since. Rawls believes that the utilitarian tradition has dominated modern political philosophy in English-speaking countries because its critics have failed to develop an alternative social and political theory as complete and systematic. Rawls's aim is to develop such an alternative: a contractarian view of justice, derived from the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and especially Kant.

Rawls carries social contract theory to a "higher order of abstraction" by viewing the principles of justice themselves as the objects of a social contract. Justice is the solution to a problem, which arises in this way: Society, as it is conceived in a liberal democracy, is a cooperative venture between free and equal persons for their mutual advantage. Individuals participate in it in order to implement their conceptions of the good life. Cooperation makes a better life possible for everyone by increasing the stock of what Rawls calls "primary goods" - things which it is rational to want whatever else you want, because they are required for any conception of a good life. Primary social goods include rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. But society is also characterized by conflict, since people disagree not only about how its benefits and burdens should be distributed, but also about conceptions of the good. Principles of justice are used to evaluate the distributions of benefits and burdens and the institutions which effect them. Rawls's idea is to identify an acceptable conception of justice by asking what principles it would be reasonable for the members of society to agree to, which is to say, what principles would be fair. Accordingly, he calls his account "justice as fairness."

A voluntary cooperative arrangement is fair when the participants agree to the principles which govern their association, and when those principles are applied consistently. The task of achieving fairness in political society is made difficult by two facts. First, society is not actually a voluntary arrangement. We are born into it, and have little real choice whether to participate. Second, people are born into different social positions, with different expectations and

opportunities. As Rawls sees it, an array of starting places is created by the "basic structure" of society, that is, its political, social, and economic institutions. The effects of one's starting place on one's expectations are pervasive, yet this place is neither voluntarily adopted nor deserved. If society is to approximate a fair voluntary arrangement, then, the principles of justice must govern its basic structure, and the resulting institutions and distributions must be acceptable to each person no matter what social position she is born into.

Rawls therefore proposes that we envision the principles of justice as chosen by members of society themselves in a specially designed standpoint, which he calls "the original position." To guarantee a choice which is both rational and fair, Rawls incorporates special conditions into the original position. First, the parties in the original position are under a "veil of ignorance." They have no knowledge of their individual places in society. They do not know their race, gender, social class, personal characteristics, or conceptions of the good life. They can reason only on the basis of general knowledge. Second, the parties in the original position are mutually disinterested "moral persons." A moral person is characterized by two "moral powers." The first is the capacity for the sense of justice: she can understand, apply, and act from a conception of justice. The second is the capacity to formulate, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls emphasizes that the parties are motivated to advance their particular conceptions of the good, although they do not know exactly what these are. In later works, this motive is supplemented by their higher-order desire to exercise the two moral powers. These motives, together with the restriction on information, guarantee that the parties will serve as unbiased representatives of every member of society when selecting the principles of justice.

The original position is designed to represent the autonomy of citizens in a democracy, and the resulting conception of justice is an ideal one. Rawls believes that the problems generated by the mentally incompetent or ill, and by the noncompliant who refuse to obey the accepted conception of justice, require special principles which should be generated after, and in light of, an ideal conception. Since the principles chosen in the original position are designed to govern the basic structure of a society in which there are no prior claims on property or power, non-ideal theory is also needed to govern the transition from an unjust society to a just one. These issues are treated separately; we begin by choosing principles for an ideally just society.

It would be best if we could reason directly from the situation of the parties in the original position to a formulation of the principles it would be rational for them to choose. Short of that, we may imagine that various conceptions of justice are proposed to them, among which they choose. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls argues that the parties would prefer his own conception of justice to the principle of utility. Rawls's conception of justice consists of two principles:

(i) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties compatible with a similar scheme for everyone.

(ii) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are:

(a) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

(b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

This is a special case of Rawls's "general conception of justice": "All primary social goods are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to the benefit of everyone." An intuitive argument shows how parties in the original position would arrive at this conception. Because they wish to advance their own conceptions of the good, but do not know what these are, each finds it rational to maximize his share of primary goods. Knowing that this motive will be the same for everyone, each finds it reasonable neither to ask for more nor settle for less than any other. So an obvious initial idea is equal shares. But because the stock of primary goods is not fixed, it is possible that some arrangements would increase the total in ways that make everyone better off, although some more than others. In the absence of irrational envy, such arrangements should be acceptable to all. Thus the obvious second step is to agree to the general conception of justice.

To move to Rawls's two principles or "special conception," three additional points are needed. First, Rawls argues for the "difference principle." Among the arrangements that make everyone better off (ones that are efficient, or Pareto optimal, relative to equality), the parties in the original position would prefer those that make the position of the least advantaged members of society as good as possible. Under the difference principle, for example, members of professions requiring unusual talents may claim a higher income only if this arrangement

redounds to the advantage of those who will have the lower incomes. Second, Rawls argues for the "priority of liberty." The special conception in effect divides primary social goods into two categories, liberties and opportunities on the one hand, economic goods on the other. Liberties and opportunities must be equal for all, so that it is impossible to trade them for economic gains. This reflects the preference of moral persons who wish to protect their autonomy: that is, their liberty to advance any conceptions of the good consistent with justice. Finally, Rawls argues that the equal opportunity provision must be understood as a requirement that society take active measures to ensure that opportunities remain open to all members of society. Otherwise, permissible inequalities will give rise to arbitrary ones over time.

Parties in the original position prefer Rawls's two principles to the principle of utility for a variety of reasons. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls gives apparent prominence to the argument that they would find it rational to use the "maximin" rule of choice under uncertainty. Not knowing what their social positions are, eager to advance their particular conceptions of the good, and aware that this is a one-time gamble on which everything depends, the parties try to ensure that even the worst position in society is as good as possible. But in later works, Rawls places more emphasis on arguments from the parties' motivation to exercise the two moral powers. The guarantees of liberty and opportunity embodied in the two principles ensure one's autonomy in formulating, revising, and pursuing one's conception of the good.

Additional points in favor of Rawls's two principles, particularly the difference principle, are drawn from the considerations of "stability" developed in Part Three of *A Theory of Justice*. A conception of justice is stable when it generates its own support. This means that, in a "well-ordered society," that is, one in which the conception of justice is both publicly acknowledged and successfully implemented, people tend to develop the disposition to act from its principles autonomously and for its own sake. The two principles would be stable for several reasons. Unlike the principle of utility, which may require some persons to have a less good life simply to maximize welfare - that is, so that others may have a better life - the two principles do not require that the worst off members of society be the most benevolent. Since the difference principle allows those favored by nature to make special claims on society only when their gifts are used for the benefit of all, it embodies a conception of reciprocity. Under the two principles, then, no one is asked to accept less than an equal prospect in life because of unfortunate natural endowment or because of the benefit to others. In this sense, all persons are valued as *persons*,

and are treated as ends in themselves. Because people tend to become loyal to institutions and identified with principles which publicly affirm their worth, the two principles will be stable.

The claim to stability is reenforced by the "congruence" argument also developed in Part Three. Congruence is achieved when judgments made from distinct normative standpoints cohere. In Rawls's theory, the right is prior to the good, in two senses. First, the theory of right is developed independently of any particular theory of the good, except for the relatively uncontroversial notion of primary goods. Second, people in a just society are expected to constrain their pursuit of what is good within the limits of the right. We are not to violate justice to pursue good ends, nor to value as good what is intrinsically unjust. But the concepts of the right and the good are distinct, and therefore the question of their congruence arises. We may ask whether a commitment to justice is likely to conflict with our good.

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls develops a theory of the good, "goodness as rationality." This theory explains how an individual can move from her existing desires and interests to a more comprehensive rational plan of life, and it defines a person as happy, and so as leading a good life, when she is successfully executing such a plan. The goodness of ends is defined in terms of their inclusion in a person's rational plan. Rawls argues that most of the standard candidates for human goods - love, friendship, community, culture, and the development of our talents and powers - would turn out to be elements in most rational plans, and so are rationally valued as ends by most persons. Finally, Rawls explains why justice itself is among these human goods - why it is something which, at least in a well-ordered society, the individual has reason to value as an end. Being a just person expresses one's autonomy and reenforces one's ties to the community and one's sense of participation in the culture. For these reasons, we may expect congruence between our judgments of what is right and of what is good for us.

Subsequent to *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls called his method of justifying the two principles "Kantian Constructivism." It has two distinguishing features. First, the constructivist regards moral and political philosophy as disciplines which are practical all the way down. The aim is not to discover transcendent truths about an independent moral order, but to provide reasonable principles for solving problems conceived in a practical way. Second, the constructivist solves problems with the aid of a conception of the person whose standpoint represents both an ideal and a problem to which that ideal gives rise. In Kant's own philosophy, the problem is the most general one of what the free rational individual ought to do. Both the

ideal and the problem of freedom are captured by the situation of the negatively free rational agent, who must autonomously choose her own principle of action. The solution rests in showing that this agent would choose to follow the categorical imperative as her principle. Rawls uses the same method, but on a less universal problem: that of generating principles for the basic structure of a liberal democracy. This problem is represented by the situation of the free and equal moral persons in the original position, who must choose principles to govern the terms of their cooperation. Here, the solution rests in showing that they would choose Rawls's two principles.

But Rawls also proposes that the whole argument be checked by a method of "reflective equilibrium," in which all parts of the argument are viewed as revisable. The implications of the principles of justice chosen in the original position should match our most deeply held convictions about what is just. If they do not, we may wish to reconsider our account of what the parties in the original position would choose or even our description of their situation and motives. It is possible that we have not constructed the standpoint from which the solution is to be found correctly, although it is also possible that we will change our minds about what is just. Because it aims at reasonable practical principles rather than theoretical knowledge, the constructivist method yields a tentative result: more reasonable principles may always be found. But at any given moment, reflective equilibrium may be achieved. If we recognize the ideal of a liberal democracy in the situation of the moral persons in the original position, and if we believe that they would choose Rawls's two principles to govern their association, then Rawls's conception of justice is the most reasonable one for us.

Rawls' second book, *Political Liberalism* (1993), grows out of a problem with the Kantian argument for the stability of justice as fairness present in *A Theory of Justice*. The stability of a conception of justice requires showing reasonable and rational persons that they have sufficient reason to comply with requirements of justice. The idea of congruence says that it is rational for citizens of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness to act on principles of justice for their own sake. For in doing so citizens enjoy the good of moral community by taking part in a "social union of social unions"; moreover, they realize their nature as free and equal moral persons, and thereby realize the supremely regulative good of autonomy. A well-ordered society is then stable since, whatever their different conceptions of their good, citizens all endorse as essential to their good the intrinsic values of autonomy and participation in a community of justice. The problem with this argument is that, because of the basic liberties of

conscience, thought and association, people in a liberal society inevitably will have different philosophical, religious, and moral views. So even if all endorse the same liberal principles of justice, they will not accept them for the same reasons. So in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness, it is highly likely that there will be many citizens who, because of their religious, philosophical and moral views, do not accept autonomy as an intrinsic good. Indeed some, such as liberal Catholics or members of other faiths, might reject autonomy as a conceit of human reason, since it obscures what they regard as the true source of morality and the good in God's will or in an independent order of being. Given these and other non-Kantian doctrines in a well-ordered society, it is too much to expect that the case for the stability of justice as fairness can rest on the congruence of the Right and the Good. Some other grounds for stability must be located, due to the "fact of reasonable pluralism" of comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good.

The primary question of *Political Liberalism* is: How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?   Rawls' main aim is to show how justice as fairness (or any liberal view) can be affirmed as a public conception of justice by reasonable and rational persons given the fact of reasonable pluralism.   Rawls sets forth three primary conditions in response to this question. First, a just and stable society must be regulated by a *political* conception of justice that is generally accepted by the members of society and which is realized in its laws and basic institutions. A political conception is "freestanding" of the various religious, philosophical and moral doctrines that exist in society. It is grounded, not in concepts or principles peculiar to any particular doctrine, but in ideas that are shared and implicit in the political culture of a democratic society. Primary among these are the idea of free and equal citizens who are reasonable and rational, and the idea of social cooperation as involving not just mutual advantage, but reciprocity and fair terms. A political conception must be freestanding if it is to be justifiable to and serve as a shared public basis for deliberation and justification among people who have different and conflicting doctrines and conceptions of the good. It is necessary for the conception of justice that regulates a liberal society to be justifiable to citizens on terms they can reasonably accept, if citizens are to be respected as free and equal. To carry through this basic idea of liberal and democratic thought, Rawls redefines the basic features of justice as fairness, freeing it from its earlier basis in the Kantian interpretation.

The second feature of a just and stable society is that it must be "stable for the right reasons," This rules out not only stability established on the basis of unjustifiable coercion, manipulation, or deceit, but also stability founded on a <u>modus vivendi</u>, the fortuitous balance of forces among competing conceptions of the good. A well-ordered society is stable for the right reasons when its citizens affirm and want to comply with its principles of justice for moral reasons that are integral to their conscientious beliefs and conceptions of the good. This requires that there be an *overlapping consensus* on the political conception of justice among different religious, philosophical and metaphysical views. An overlapping consensus exists when the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that gain adherents in a well-ordered society all affirm the liberal political conception of justice, each for the particular reasons implicit in their comprehensive views.   So, assuming justice as fairness is the liberal political conception for a well-ordered society, Kantians can affirm it because it realizes autonomy, utilitarians affirm it since it best promotes overall utility at this time in history, liberal Catholics and others affirm this liberal conception since they see it as part of divine law, and pluralists can affirm it because they see the political conception as justifiable on its own terms.   Since each reasonable doctrine affirms the public political conception for its own reasons, then those who hold these doctrines can accept the political conception as compatible with their good.

The third condition for a just and stable society is that its government and its laws must have political *legitimacy*. The need for legitimacy stems partly from the fact that, even in a perfectly just society, some laws and regulations are bound to be occasionally unjust; for no political procedure is perfect. So even in a just society, citizens need reasons to obey laws they believe unjust, for the sake of stability. The *liberal principle of legitimacy* says that coercive political force is legitimate only when exercised according to a constitution whose essentials are reasonably acceptable to all on the basis of their common human reason. This principle implies a *duty of civility*: free and equal citizens, when voting or when exercising political power as government officials, are to act only in ways that can be reasonably justified to others in terms of *the political values of public reason*. Public reason is the reason of free and equal citizens in their capacity as democratic citizens. It is reason that is guided by considerations of the common good among citizens. The common good is specified by the political values of public reason. These are the considerations that promote and maintain the basic interests of free and equal citizens. Among such political values are justice, the public welfare, domestic tranquility, the

basic liberties and their priority, economic efficiency and fairness, and so on. These political values are to guide the deliberations of legislators, judges and administrators, in deciding and applying the laws. Moreover citizens, when they vote, have a duty to justify their decisions in terms of the political values of public reason. Laws that cannot be justified in these terms are not legitimate; coercive force of government is then being used in ways that deny citizens their political freedom, and which does not respect others as equal citizens. One role of a political conception of justice is to provide "content" to public reason. It is only when a liberal political conception is publicly recognized that the justification of laws in terms of the political values of public reason can be "complete." Public recognition of a liberal political conception is then a condition of the legitimacy of political power in a constitutional democracy.

Rawls' third main book, *The Law of Peoples*, is his account of international justice. (Rawls refers to "peoples" rather than "states," "governments," or "nations," since the latter are simply the political representatives of peoples.) The law of peoples is worked out within political liberalism; it presupposes a politically liberal society, which confronts other societies governed by their own constitutions. Its aim is to provide a basis for the foreign policy of a liberal people, for interacting and cooperating with both liberal and non-liberal peoples. Rawls argues that a liberal people is to cooperate with decent non-liberal people according to the same laws as it recognizes in its relations with other liberal peoples. It is to recognize both liberal and decent peoples as equal members in a society of peoples, respecting their political autonomy and independence. A people is decent so long as it recognizes and respects human rights, enforces a common-good conception of justice, and provides some kind of political representation for all its members through a "decent consultation hierarchy." A people does not have to be liberal or democratic to be decent; human rights do not include the full panoply of liberal-democratic rights (such of equal political rights) protected by Rawls' first principle of justice. Instead human rights are the especially urgent rights that must be respected if people are to be treated decently. Rawls lists as human rights the rights to life and to the security of the person, the right to liberty (including freedom from slavery and forced occupation), the right to hold personal property, the right to freedom of conscience sufficient to secure freedom of religion and of thought, and the right to formal equality under law. The right to life includes a right to the means of subsistence: a decent people does not allow its members to starve to death.

The law of peoples allows a people go to war only in self-defense against a territorial aggressor, or in order to defend the human rights of other peoples. A people also has a duty of assistance to other peoples in distress. This includes a duty to provide distressed peoples with economic assistance if they are unable to provide for their own members. The aim of the duty of assistance among peoples is not to create conditions of dependence, but to sustain a people during emergencies or so long as required for them to become self-sufficient and economically independent. Rawls argues for these and other principles on grounds of an original position whose parties consist of representatives for independent peoples. He contends that both liberal and decent non-liberal peoples would agree to the same principles of the law of peoples.

Bibliography

Works by John Rawls

"Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." *Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 177-197.

A review of Axel Hägerstrom's *Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals* (translated by C.D. Broad) *Mind* 64 (1955): 421-422.

A review of Stephen Toulmin's *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 572-580.

"Two Concepts of Rules." *Philosophical Review* 64 (1955): 3-32.

"Justice as Fairness." The first version of this paper was published in *Journal of Philosophy* 54 (1957): 653-662. An expanded version appeared in *Philosophical Review* 67 (1958): 164-194. It is this version that is most frequently anthologized. Another revised version was translated into French by Jean-Fabien Spitz as "La Justice comme équité" *Philosophie* 14 (1987): 39-69.

Review of Raymond Klibansky, ed., *Philosophy in Mid-Century: A Survey. Philosophical Review* 70 (1961): 131-132.

"Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice." in *Nomos VI: Justice*, ed. C. Freidrich and John W. Chapman, pp. 98-125. New York: Atherton, 1963.

"The Sense of Justice." *Philosophical Review* 72 (1963): 281-305.

"Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play." in *Law and Philosophy*, ed. Sidney Hook, pp. 3-18. New York: New York University Press, 1964.

Review of *Social Justice*, ed. Richard Brandt. *Philosophical Review* 74 (1965): 406-409.

"Distributive Justice." The first version of this paper was published in *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*. Third Series. ed. P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, pp. 58-82. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967. Rawls later published "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda" in *Natural Law Forum* 13 (1968): 51-71. These two essays were combined in a second "Distributive Justice" in *Economic Justice*, ed. E. Phelps, pp. 319-362. London, Penguin Books, 1973.

"The Justification of Civil Disobedience." in *Civil Disobedience*, ed. Hugo Bedau, pp. 240-255. New York: Pegasus, 1969.

"Justice as Reciprocity" (written in 1958) in *Mill: Text with Critical Essays*, ed. Samuel Gorovitz, pp. 242-268. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971. *A Theory of Justice* has been translated into Chinese, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, and Spanish, and twelve other languages. For the first of these, the German translation of 1975, Rawls made some revisions, which have been incorporated into all of the translations. *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999 is a publication of the revised text used for all translations.

"Reply to Lyons and Teitelman." *Journal of Philosophy* 69 (1972): 556-557.

"Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion." *American Economic Review* 64 (1974): 141-146.

"Reply to Alexander and Musgrave." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 88 (1974): 633-655.

"The Independence of Moral Theory." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 48 (1974): 5-22.

"A Kantian Conception of Equality." *Cambridge Review* (1975): 94-99.

"Fairness to Goodness." *Philosophical Review* 84 (1975): 536-554.

"The Basic Structure as Subject." The first version was published in the *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14 (1977): 159- 165. A revised and expanded version appears in *Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard B. Brandt*, pp. 47-71. ed. A. Goldman and J. Kim. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978.

"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980." *Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1980): 515-572.

"Social Unity and Primary Goods." in *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, pp. 159-185. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

"The Basic Liberties and Their Priority." *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Volume III, pp. 3-87. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1982.

"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 (1985): 223-251.

"On the Idea of an Overlapping Consensus." *Oxford Journal for Legal Studies* 7 (1987): 1-25.

"The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 17 (1988): 251-276.

"Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy." in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions*, ed. E. Förster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.

"The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus." *New York University Law Review* 64 (1989): 233-255.

Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, revised Paperback edition, 1996

"The Law of Peoples," in *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, 1993*, ed. by Steven Shute and Susan Hurley, (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 41-82

"Reply to Habermas," *Journal of Philosophy*, 93:3 (March 1995)

"Fifty Years After Hiroshima," *Dissent*, (Summer 1995): 323-327

"The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," *University of Chicago Law Review*, 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807

Collected Papers, edited by Samuel Freeman, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, edited by Barbara Herman, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000

Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, edited by Erin Kelley, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001

Works about John Rawls

Response to *A Theory of Justice* among philosophers, lawyers, political scientists, economists, and others, has been overwhelming. A selection:

Arrow, Kenneth J. "Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice." *Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1973): 245-263.

Barry, Brian. *A Treatise of Social Justice; Volume I: Theories of Justice*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989.

Barry, Brian. *The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of Justice, by John Rawls*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1973.

Blocker, H. Gene and Smith, Elizabeth (eds.). *John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980.

Daniels, Norman (ed.). *Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell and New York: Basic Books, 1975. Among many noteworthy contributions are H.L.A. Hart's "Rawls on Liberty and its Priority," which influenced Rawls in "The

Basic Liberties and their Priority"; Thomas Nagel's "Rawls on Justice," to which Rawls replied in "Fairness to Goodness"; and T.M. Scanlon's "Rawls' Theory of Justice."

Freeman, Samuel, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to John Rawls*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2001, articles by T.M. Scanlon, T.Nagel, S.Scheffler, B.Herman, J. Cohen, M.Nussbaum, A.Gutmann, F. Michelman, and others

Harsanyi, John C. "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls' Theory." *The American Political Science Review* 69 (1975): 594-606.

Nozick, Robert. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia,* Chapter VII. New York: Basic Books, 1974.

Sandel, Michael J. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. One of the most influential communitarian critiques of liberalism, written directly in response to Rawls.

Sen, Amartya. "Equality of What?" in *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Volume I. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980.

Symposium on Political Liberalism in *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, 69:3 (1994), A special issue devoted to Rawls' *Political Liberalism.*

Symposium on Rawlsian Theory of Justice: Recent Developments. *Ethics* 99 (1989). A special issue devoted to work Rawls published after *A Theory of Justice*.

Wellbank, J.H.; Snook, Denis; and Mason, David T., *John Rawls and His Critics: An Annotated Bibliography*. New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1982.

Christine M. Korsgaard
 Samuel Freeman