FBI Scores Itself Another Lawsuit For Using The No Fly List To Punish A Lebanese Man For Not Becoming An Informant

from the FBI's-carrot-still-mainly-just-laying-off-the-stick-for-a-bit dept

For years, the FBI has threatened brown people with a miserable existence unless they're willing to become informants. What should be illegal somehow isn't -- or at least hasn't generated enough courtroom precedent to force the FBI to knock it off.

The FBI routinely approaches Muslims and people traveling to and from countries the US government considers questionable and tries to intimidate them into ratting out their friends, family members, and colleagues. Whether or not there's actually any ratting out to do seems to be, at best, a secondary concern. The FBI has spent years using informants to radicalize people, which it then arrests the moment they become radicalized enough. The FBI's counterterrorism budget depends on a healthy stable of informants and so the pressure tactics continue unabated.

The stick deployed most often is placement on the "No Fly" list, which makes it impossible to travel around the country, much less overseas to visit family and friends. The other stick is abuse of the immigration process. Visas can be revoked, family members removed, and other unpleasantness inflicted should someone reject these very forward advances from FBI agents.

We're still waiting for the judicial hammer to come down. It looks like it may finally be on its way. A lawsuit filed in 2014 over these tactics was recently given the green light to proceed by the Supreme Court.

Another lawsuit has been filed against the FBI for its months of pressure tactics deployed against Ahmad Chebli, a Lebanese man who was first approached by the FBI in 2018, which utilized a local government agency to trick Chebli into having a "conversation" with them. From the lawsuit [PDF]:

The FBI’s initial contact with Mr. Chebli was deceptive. On August 21, 2018, Mr. Chebli received a call from an individual who identified himself as an employee of the Roseville, Michigan Building Department. The caller informed Mr. Chebli that a Roseville gas station that Mr. Chebli leased and helped to manage was in violation of city permit requirements and requested that Mr. Chebli come in to discuss the matter in person. Mr. Chebli was concerned about any such violation and wanted to clear it up.

On August 23, Mr. Chebli arrived at Roseville City Hall. He was led to a conference room where two men were waiting for him. They told Mr. Chebli that they wanted to talk to him and that he was free to leave whenever he wanted. The men then identified themselves as FBI agents. Mr. Chebli did not feel that he could voluntarily leave. The door to the conference room was closed during the entirety of the one and a half hour meeting. Mr. Chebli never heard from city officials about any city permit “violation,” and it never came up again after this meeting.

The agents asked Chebli to show them he was not recording the meeting. Once the agents were assured only their official version of this time-shares-but-for-terrorism pitch session would be the only version on record, they proceeded to threaten Chebli and accuse him of being a terrorist.

Chebli told the FBI agents he wasn't interested. He had a steady job, a good life with his family, and moral objections to befriending FBI targets just so they could get set up and arrested. That angered the agents, who baselessly accused him of being a "Hezbollah agent." They also told him lying to federal agents is a felony (which it is) and claimed they could make all of this trouble (they had instigated) "go away" if he would just work for the FBI.

Chebli again refused. The agents then stated Chebli and his family would be subjected to surveillance, an investigation would be opened, and that there was a good chance it might end in the arrest of Chebli and his wife. They also said refusing to work with the FBI would cause problems for his wife's immigration application. They also said they would issue a "blue notice" -- something that would be disseminated to other government agencies identifying Chebli as a suspected terrorist.

Since Chebli didn't want any of this to happen, he continued to meet with the FBI agents. But he continued to refuse to become an informant. Since he no longer felt his family was safe in the US, he sent them back to Lebanon. After they left the airport, the FBI called Chebli to let him know his wife had gone through security without any problems, which made it clear agents were engaging in the surveillance they had threatened.

After several more fruitless meetings, Chebli decided things might be better for him if he left the United States for a month. When he tried to return after failing to find a stable source of income in Lebanon, he finally understood why the agents were so willing to help him leave.

On November 24, 2018, Mr. Chebli attempted to fly back to the United States. When he arrived at the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, he handed his passport to the check-in agent, and noticed an alert come up on the agent’s screen. The agent called a supervisor, who informed Mr. Chebli that she had received an email from the United States government indicating that he could not board the plane, and he needed to consult the U.S. Embassy. When Mr. Chebli sought more information about why he was being denied boarding, the supervisor repeated that he should contact the embassy.

After getting no useful answers from the FBI and the US Embassy, Chebli decided to contact the DHS. That's when he discovered what the FBI had done in retaliation for his refusal to cooperate.

On December 20, 2018, Mr. Chebli received confirmation from DHS TRIP that he was on the No Fly List. The DHS TRIP letter stated that Mr. Chebli could “request additional information about your placement on the No Fly List and have the opportunity to respond to any information provided if you believe that the above determination is in error.” The letter further stated that if Mr. Chebli wished to request additional information, he was required to contact DHS TRIP within 30 days.

Thanks to other lawsuits, the DHS now actually has some form of recourse for travelers on this list. But, like so many other things the government is forced to do by court decisions, the DHS wasn't all that interested in holding up its end of the agreement. It never provided Chebli with an answer about his No Fly status. The ACLU (which is representing Chebli) secured a waiver so he could fly back to the United State.

Almost two years later, Chebli tried to board a domestic flight. He was again informed he was on the No Fly list. He was subjected to multiple, lengthy searches and screenings. When he arrived back in Michigan, he was once again accosted by FBI agents.

Now fully aware of his rights and determined not to be coerced, Mr. Chebli answered the FBI agents’ questions about his travel but refused to respond to any other questions. The agents then asked Mr. Chebli who was taking care of his children. Mr. Chebli questioned why they were asking about his children. One of the FBI agents named a man Mr. Chebli did not know, and said, “You need to cooperate with us. He has two daughters similar in age to your kids, and they’re safe right now because he chose to cooperate with us.” The agents also asserted that they would denaturalize Mr. Chebli’s wife. Mr. Chebli knew they could not take this action because his wife was not yet a U.S. citizen, but he also knew that a decision on her naturalization application had been inexplicably delayed for months. Concerned about the FBI’s threats, Mr. Chebli asked if he was free to leave, and when he did not get a straight answer, he called his ACLU lawyer, who asked to speak with the FBI agents. At that point, the FBI agents told Mr. Chebli he could leave.

Chebli again tried to get some answers from the DHS about his No Fly status. He submitted his request in February 2021. As of the date of this filing (April 6), he still has yet to receive a response.

There's a long list of rights violations here. And none of this is going to change until the courts tell the DOJ the FBI cannot threaten and intimidate people to encourage them to become informants. Since these "meetings" are informal and unrecorded, the FBI can always argue it isn't doing this, even though there are dozens -- if not hundreds -- of people who've been subjected to the same coercive tactics described in this lawsuit. Applying pressure to create informants so the FBI can continue to rack up easy counterterrorism wins isn't making the country any safer. But it's definitely making the country worse.

Filed Under: ahmad chebli, fbi, informant, intimidation, no fly list, own plot, retaliation

FBI Informant Helped Out In Terrorism Stings While Running A 'Stranded Traveler' Scam

from the pros,-cons,-and-pro-cons dept

It's well known many confidential informants are criminals. Acting as informants is supposed to keep their criminal acts to a minimum while providing access to bigger criminal fish. The same goes for undercover officers and agents. Some illegality is presumed but those running CIs are expected to be making the world a better place, not ignoring vast amounts of criminal activity simply because the informant is now on their side. But that doesn't seem to be the case.

The DEA's informant program is being run with almost no oversight, according to an Inspector General's report. Money flowed to informants who were still under federal investigation and no one up top seemed too concerned about the program's bang/buck ratio. The FBI made abusable programs worse by hiding payments to informants and giving them a cut of forfeited property.

It's not that informants can't break the law. In some cases, they must. But the illegal acts must be done with permission and as an integral part of an investigation. But that's not how things work out. Trevor Aaronson of The Intercept tells the story of FBI informant Mohammed Agbareia, who participated in terrorism stings while making a healthy, illegal profit on the side.

According to court records, Agbareia began working for the FBI only after being convicted in U.S. District Court in Alabama for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

[...]

After pleading guilty to the wire fraud case in March 2006, Agbareia was ordered to report to immigration authorities for possible deportation. But instead of being removed from the United States, Agbareia signed up with the FBI.

The threat of removal and/or the dangling of citizenship is a powerful motivator. This is why multiple federal law enforcement agencies have turned the nation's borders into unofficial recruitment posts.

But old habits die hard. The Intercept reports Agbareia has again been indicted for the same criminal activity.

According to a new wire fraud indictment handed down in Florida on June 27, Agbareia has continued to swindle people with his stranded traveler scheme. He received six Western Union wire transfers from 2012 to 2017 from victims in Texas, Colorado, New York, Ohio, and Germany. Two of the wire transfers — one for $1,414.26 from Berlin and another for $1,000 from Brooklyn — occurred around the time he was working undercover in the FBI’s ISIS sting.

The government is trying to bury this damaging information. It has already asked for evidence of Agbareia's illegal sideline to be placed under a protective order, supposedly for national security reasons. The government is also refusing to turn over information of Agbareia's criminal efforts to one of the accused, despite two of three suspects targeted in the sting having already pled guilty.

Federal prosecutors’ position has been that they do not have an obligation to provide information about the FBI’s informant so far in advance of a trial, since Hubbard’s is not scheduled until October 30. “In a national security case at this point, I mean, we understand our obligations to turn it over, but the trial is in late October,” federal prosecutor Edward Nucci said in the March 14 hearing.

The remaining suspect's defense lawyer has been asking for this information since 2016, pointing out that the proactive nature of sting operations should result in proactive delivery of evidence by the government.

Agbareia is now in the awkward position of having government demands for secrecy work both for him and against him. In the terrorism stings, the government is playing keep-away with anything that might damage his status as a source of evidence. In his wire fraud prosecution, the government is looking to bury info he might use in his defense. National security-related suppression is being asked for in this case as well.

Agbareia’s lawyer, Murrell, noted in a June 30 filing that federal prosecutors haven’t specified the level of classification — top secret, secret, or confidential — the evidence involves, raising questions that the information “is not ‘classified’ simply because it might embarrass law enforcement or in some way hinder prosecution of this or other cases.”

Federal prosecutors have requested Agbareia’s witnesses disclose up front the testimony they intend to offer, giving the U.S. Attorney’s Office an opportunity to agree to the release of “a stipulated, declassified summary of that information.” In other words, federal prosecutors want to use claims of classified evidence to control the information Agbareia can use in his defense

If the government succeeds in this evidence suppression, it might be able to run the prosecutorial table -- convicting a suspected terrorist and the crooked informant it used to rope him in.

Filed Under: fbi, informant, mohammed agbareia, scams, wire fraud

Did The FBI Get Confused And Arrest One Of Its Own Informants For Helping Create One Of Its Own Plots?

from the wtf? dept

For a few years now, we've been writing about how the FBI has been arresting a ton of people for "terrorism" who were really guilty of little more than being gullible and naive and pushed by FBI undercover agents and informants into taking part in a plot that wouldn't exist but for the FBI itself. These so-called own plots seem to be a huge part of what the FBI does these days. Somewhat ridiculously, courts have (mostly) allowed these, claiming that if, eventually, the accused person expressed some support for terrorism or terrorist groups, it shouldn't be considered entrapment. But, over and over again, you see cases where it's clearly the FBI doing not just the majority of the plotting, but also pushing and pushing targets to "join" the plot, even when they show sustained resistance. The more details you read about these cases, the more ridiculous they get.

However, in just the latest example of this -- the arrest of Erick Hendricks for supposedly trying to recruit people to carry out attacks for ISIS -- there's been something of an odd twist. Hendricks claims he has no idea why he was arrested because he's been an FBI informant for years, helping the FBI find other gullible souls to entrap in these "own plots." As Marcy Wheeler notes, it's possible the FBI lost track of one of its own informants and ended up having him "caught" in one of the plots where he thought he was helping the FBI find possible terrorists. Wouldn't that be something.

Has the FBI simply lost track of who are real and who are the people it is paying to play a role? Or is it possible someone from another agency, claiming to be FBI, recruited Hendricks (don’t laugh! That’s one potential explanation for Anwar al-Awlaki’s curious ties to US law enforcement, a story that wends its way through a related mosque in VA)?

Sure, maybe Hendricks is making all this up (at the very least, it may necessitate the BoP to protect him in prison since he has now publicly claimed to be a narc). But FBI’s network of informants sure is getting confusing.

Either way, if Hendricks really was an informant, it appears that the "plots" he was engaged in may have been all confidential informants or undercover agents (and possibly one mentally disturbed internet troll).

This sounds like the plot to a potentially entertaining movie -- but back in the real world, it seems pretty fucked up. And it's yet another reminder of just how stupid these FBI "own plots" really are. It doesn't seem to really be about keeping people safe from attacks. Instead it seems to be about figuring out ways to push gullible and naive people to agree to do something stupid so that the FBI can get headlines for "keeping us safe" from attacks that would never actually happen.

Filed Under: erick hendricks, fbi, informant, own plot, terrorism, undercover

Senator Feinstein Brings Back Horrible Bill Forcing Internet Companies To Report On Your 'Suspicious' Behavior

from the it-was-a-bad-idea,-drop-it dept

Earlier this year, Senator Dianne Feinstein, who seems to be an endless well of bad ideas around surveillance, started pushing a bill that would require internet companies to report to the government any content they suspected was posted by terrorists. This bill has all sorts of problems, not the least of which is that most of the major internet companies already alert the government to any terrorist-related content that they come across. But, by mandating such reporting, it will only lead to these companies filing a bunch more reports -- much of which will be bogus, flooding the government with useless information, just to avoid running afoul of the law.

Back in September, Senator Wyden successfully forced Feinstein to drop the bill...

But, of course, in the wake of the Paris and San Bernardino attacks all bad ideas are back on the table, and Feinstein is bringing this one back as well. She's teaming up with the intelligence committee's other biggest cheerleader, Intelligence Committee boss Senator Richard Burr, to reintroduce the idea, and they put out a completely bogus statement that plays up the fearmongering angle as much as possible, about those darn ISIS people using social media.

“We’re in a new age where terrorist groups like ISIL are using social media to reinvent how they recruit and plot attacks,” Senator Feinstein said. “That information can be the key to identifying and stopping terrorist recruitment or a terrorist attack, but we need help from technology companies. This bill doesn’t require companies to take any additional actions to discover terrorist activity, it merely requires them to report such activity to law enforcement when they come across it. Congress needs to do everything we can to help intelligence and law enforcement agencies identify and prevent terrorist attacks, and this bill is a step in the right direction.”

“Terror groups have become adept at taking advantage of social media platforms to spread their message,” Senator Burr said. “Social media is one part of a large puzzle that law enforcement and intelligence officials must piece together to prevent future attacks. It’s critical that Congress works together to ensure that law enforcement and intelligence officials have the tools available to keep Americans safe. The stakes have never been higher and having cooperation with these outlets will help save lives here and abroad.”

Neither of those quotes makes any sense. Again, most companies already report stuff, and mandating it will only lead to more bogus reports to avoid liability for the companies, while potentially leading to less active monitoring since they only have to report stuff if they come across it. As for Burr's assertion that this is necessary to give law enforcement "the tools" to find this information -- that's a totally different issue. Doesn't law enforcement have computers? Can't they go to Twitter and Facebook and YouTube themselves and do searches?

Senator Wyden has already spoken out on what a bad idea this is, and how it would do the exact opposite of what Feinstein and Burr are claiming:

Let’s make sure the record is clear: The Director of the FBI testified a few months ago that social media companies are ‘pretty good about telling us what they see.’ Social media companies must continue to do everything they can to quickly remove terrorist content and report it to law enforcement.

I’m opposed to this proposal because I believe it will undermine that collaboration and lead to less reporting of terrorist activity, not more. It would create a perverse incentive for companies to avoid looking for terrorist content on their own networks, because if they saw something and failed to report it they would be breaking the law, but if they stuck their heads in the sand and avoided looking for terrorist content they would be absolved of responsibility.

I’m for smart security policies. If law enforcement agencies decide that terrorist content is not being identified quickly enough, then the solution should be to give those agencies more resources and personnel so they know where to look for terrorist content online and who to watch, and can ensure terrorist activity is quickly reported and acted upon.

Meanwhile, CDT has gone much further in explaining why this is such an astoundingly dumb idea:

Why is this proposal such a bad idea? As we described in July, it would create a requirement for all electronic communication services – social media companies, as well as Internet service providers, web hosts, cloud services, and public libraries or coffee shops that offer WiFi access – to make reports about their users’ activity based on a completely opaque set of criteria. Creating such an obligation, with its vague parameters, would drive Internet companies to one of several likely responses. Some would decide to significantly over-report their customers’ information and private communications to the US government to ensure that the company stays on the right side of the law. Others would refuse to review any content that was flagged to them, for fear that doing so would mean they obtain the “actual knowledge of any terrorist activity” that triggers the reporting obligation.

Either of these outcomes pose major problems for the free expression and privacy of Internet users. It’s also far from clear that this would generate actionable information for law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Further, this type of reporting obligation would undermine any sense of trust between Internet users and the companies that provide the service providers that enable them to access information, conduct transactions, and share their perspectives online. The proposal would essentially deputize US-based Internet companies to act as agents of the government, including potentially requiring entities such as email services to turn over the contents of private communications if they are part of the “facts and circumstances” of alleged terrorist activities – for their users both in the US and abroad.

It's a bad idea and Feinstein knows it's a bad idea, because all of this has been explained to her multiple times in the past. So why is she still proposing it?

Filed Under: dianne feinstein, freakout, informant, richard burr, ron wyden, terrorism
Companies: facebook, google, twitter, youtube

FBI Paid Off Wikileaks Insider To Be An Informant: Imagine If It Was The NY Times

from the that's-insane dept

People like to debate whether or not Wikileaks is or is not a "media property," but I can't see any definition of a media property under which Wikileaks would not fall. Yes, it publishes leaked documents, but so do many other media properties. Yes, it has a strong ideological viewpoint, but so do many other media properties. So it's rather stunning to read about the fact that a Wikileaks insider apparently spent some time as a paid informant for the FBI, handing over a variety of internet information on things happening within Wikileaks. Imagine if this was the NY Times or the Wall Street Journal, and it came out that an employee was getting paid by the FBI to reveal what those newspapers were working on. People would be up in arms, just like they were over the DOJ's spying on AP reporters and a Fox News reporter. Except, this wasn't just spying on a reporter, this was flat out paying off an insider to share internal information. That's incredible.

The entire story from Kevin Poulsen at Wired is worth reading, about how Icelandic teen Sigurdur Thordarson was taken under Julian Assange's wing and given a fair amount of autonomy within Wikileaks. The details suggest that Thordarson abused that position in many ways, including setting up a t-shirt sales site, supposedly to benefit Wikileaks, but where all the money went directly to his own bank account. But, that's really minor considering the key point: that the FBI actively worked with and continued to push Thordarson to get more info from Wikileaks, even after he'd left the organization. The DOJ is supposed to have rules about investigations of media properties for a variety of reasons, and paying off an insider seems like it goes way, way beyond what's appropriate.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, informant, journalism, julian assange, media, paid informant, sigurdur thordarson, surveillance, wikileaks
Companies: wikileaks

Yet Another Of The FBI's Own Terrorist Plots... Involves A Group Of Senior Citizens

from the grump-old-terrorists dept

The latest Radiolab "shorts" episode, entitled Grumpy Old Terrorists, seems like a bit of a departure in subject matter for that program -- but fits right in with something we've been talking a lot about lately. Over the past few years, we've noticed the rather disturbing trend in how the FBI keeps publicly celebrating stories about stopping terrorist plots -- but in almost every case the details show that it was actually just stopping its own terrorist plots that it feeds to hapless individuals, often nudging them and pushing them down the road to "become" terrorists, despite commonly displaying little to no aptitude for actual terrorism.

In the last few weeks, the mainstream press has started to notice this as well, with stories about it appearing in both the NY Times and Rolling Stone. However, the Radiolab episode highlights a similar, but slightly different story, that was actually covered in great detail in an article in Esquire a few months back, entitled Waffle House Terrorists -- which includes the mugshots of the four "terrorists."

The youngest one of that bunch is 65-years old. The oldest is 73. As the Radiolab episode and the Esquire piece detail, while these guys do seem hateful, they also seemed absolutely unable to do anything... until an "FBI informant" joined their pack and pushed and prodded them along, introducing them to the "contacts" to get weapons and even providing "the money" to buy said weapons. The Esquire article goes into great detail about the "informant" and his rather questionable legal history (he first contacted the FBI while in jail for molesting his wife's daughter from a previous marriage).

On Radiolab, they play the audiotapes the guy made of the plotting -- and there's obviously some crazy stuff being said. But, as they look deeper into the role of the informant, the Radiolab hosts conclude the episode by noting that the whole situation doesn't really make them feel any safer. Yes, these old guys were hateful and helped join in this plan to cause lots of death and destruction. But, so much much of the plot and the participation of these guys really does seem driven by the "informant," who does not seem like the most credible of guys. And it's this exact scenario that we keep seeing over and over again. It may not reach the level of entrapment, and it may put some people really ignorant and crazy people in jail -- but is this really the best use of the FBI's time and efforts? Creating bogus "terrorist" plots involving people who had no real means to actually do anything?

Filed Under: entrapment, fbi, informant, terrorism

NYTimes Realizes That The FBI Keeps Celebrating Breaking Up Its Own Terrorist Plots

from the not-quite-as-impressive dept

Over the last few years, we've noticed that nearly every victory the FBI celebrates against terrorism is actually about stopping its own terrorist plots that it feeds to hapless individuals, often nudging them and pushing them down the road to "become" terrorists, despite commonly displaying little to no aptitude for actual terrorism.

Add the NY Times to the newspapers who are beginning to question the FBI's penchant for setting up its own plots for the sake of a high profile arrest of some clueless individuals.

The United States has been narrowly saved from lethal terrorist plots in recent years - or so it has seemed. A would-be suicide bomber was intercepted on his way to the Capitol; a scheme to bomb synagogues and shoot Stinger missiles at military aircraft was developed by men in Newburgh, N.Y.; and a fanciful idea to fly explosive-laden model planes into the Pentagon and the Capitol was hatched in Massachusetts.

But all these dramas were facilitated by the F.B.I., whose undercover agents and informers posed as terrorists offering a dummy missile, fake C-4 explosives, a disarmed suicide vest and rudimentary training. Suspects naïvely played their parts until they were arrested.

As the article makes clear, claims of entrapment rarely work in these cases, but it certainly raises questions about whether the FBI is actually protecting us from real plots or spending time creating publicity stunts that leave some people in jail. No doubt, some of these setups bust people who could potentially be interested in taking part in attacks if they had any real opportunity to do so. But, in most cases, it doesn't seem like they would ever have the opportunity (unless the FBI was helping). In one case, the judge -- even as she was sentencing the guy to decades in prison -- admitted that the guy wouldn't be a "terrorist" if it weren't for the FBI:

"Only the government could have made a 'terrorist' out of Mr. Cromitie, whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in its scope...."

This is the same guy who laughed at earlier attempts by an FBI informant to get him to get involved in a plot.

There's no doubt that there are real plots being attempted. But wouldn't the FBI be better off focusing on those, rather than play acting all the time?

Filed Under: fbi, informant, terrorism

FBI Sent Informant Into Mosque To Find Terrorists... Mosque Gets Restraining Order And Reports Him To The FBI

from the these-are-the-people-protecting-us? dept

A few weeks back, we wrote about the FBI celebrating that they stopped a terrorist plot that appeared to have been mostly planned by the FBI itself -- basically encouraging one guy, who had no actual terrorist connections, to think he was a part of a terrorist plot where none actually existed... and then arresting the guy. As we noted at the time, we knew of at least two other very similar stories, where US law enforcement appeared to set up people in such a manner. Rich Kulawiec points us to a Washington Post story that's even more ridiculous, involving a guy hired as an FBI informant to spy on mosques in Southern California. As part of his "job," he also talked up terrorism and jihad in an attempt to "find" potential terrorists. Instead, the folks at the mosque were so freaked out by the guy that they took out a restraining order on him and (you guessed it) reported him to the FBI. I really would like to believe that the FBI and other aspects of federal law enforcement have a better grasp on actual plots against the US, but stories like this (which seem to come straight out of stories for bad Hollywood movies) suggest an FBI with way too much time on its hands, trying to manufacture plots so they can save us.

Filed Under: fbi, informant, mosque
Companies: fbi