



Don't Bring A Knife To A Gun Fight: The Hacker Intelligence Initiative

OWASP

Robert Rachwald

Imperva
Director, Security Strategy

Copyright © The OWASP Foundation
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
under the terms of the OWASP License.

The OWASP Foundation
<http://www.owasp.org>

Agenda

- The state of application security
- Studying hackers
 - ▶ Why? Prioritizing defenses
 - ▶ How? Methodology
- Analyzing real-life attack traffic
 - ▶ Key findings
- Technical Recommendations



Why Data Security?

DATA IS HACKER CURRENCY

The Underground Markets

Overall Rank		Item	Percentage		Range of Prices
2009	2008		2009	2008	
1	1	Credit card information	19%	32%	\$0.85-\$30
2	2	Bank account credentials	19%	19%	\$15-\$850
3	3	Email accounts	7%	5%	\$1-\$20
4	4	Email addresses	7%	5%	\$1.70/MB-\$15/MB
5	9	Shell scripts	6%	3%	\$2-\$5
6	6	Full identities	5%	4%	\$0.70-\$20
7	13	Credit card dumps	5%	2%	\$4-\$150
8	7	Mallers	4%	3%	\$4-\$10
9	8	Cash-out services	4%	3%	\$0-\$600 plus 50%-60%
10	12	Website administration credentials	4%	3%	\$2-\$30

Table 5. Goods and services advertised on underground economy servers

Source: Symantec

The Underground Markets



The screenshot shows the SSN-DoB.Biz forum interface. At the top, there are logos for Visa and MasterCard, the site name "SSN-DoB.Biz", and the tagline "REAL FORUM FOR GOOD STUFFS". Navigation links include "Chat", "Board index", "FAQ", "Register", and "Login". A search bar is visible on the left. The main content area displays a thread titled "Sell CW2 Fresh:" with the following text:

US CW \$2 Visa,US CW \$3 Master,US CW \$5 Amex,US CW \$6 Discover
Uk CW \$6 Amex/Disc,Uk CW \$4 Master/Visa

EU CW \$8 Disc/Amex,EU CW \$6 Master/Visa
CA CW \$3 Master/Visa ,CA CW \$6 Disc/Amex

Below the thread text, there are links for "FAQ", "Register", and "Login". A "Login" form is partially visible on the left, with fields for "Username" and "Password".

Website Access Up for Sale

Website Hacking
LR ID: 555

Offers Services Proofs Free Logins Payment method

Site	Details	Level of Control	Traffic	Price
http://gs.mil.al/	ARMY Forces of republic of albania	Full SiteAdmin Control + High value informations	unknown	\$499
http://www.scguard.army.mil/	Souce Carolina National Guard	MySQL root access + High value informations	unknown	\$499
http://cecom.army.mil/	The United States Army CECOM	Full SiteAdmin Control/SSH Root access	unknown	\$499
http://pec.ha.osd.mil/	The Department of defense pharmaco-economic Center	Full SiteAdmin Control/Root access, High value informations!	unknown	\$399
http://www.woodlands.edu.uy/	Woodlands School Uruguay.	Full SiteAdmin Control!	5200	\$33
http://s-u.edu.in/	Singhania University	Full SiteAdmin Control.	unknown	\$55
http://www.nccu.edu.tw/	National Chengchi University.	Students/Exams user/pass and full admin access!	56093	\$99
http://www.terc.tp.edu.tw/	Taipei City East Special Education Resource Center	Full SiteAdmin Control.	74188	\$88
http://itcpantaleo.gov.it/	Italian Official Government Website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://donmilaninapoli.gov.it/	Istituto Statale Don Lorenzo Milani	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://itcgcesaro.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://itimarconi.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://primocircolovico.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://www.utah.gov/	American State of Utah Official Website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	173146	\$99
http://www.uscb.edu/	University of South Carolina Beaufort.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	1123	\$88
http://michigan.gov/	American State of Michigan Official Website.	MySQL root access/Valuable information.	205070	\$55

- Daily updated -

[Click here to check for proof of the hacked sites.](#)

Email me or add me in MSN at: 555@gmail.com

Website Access Up for Sale

Website Hacking
LR ID: 5.5.5

Offers Services Proofs Free Logins Payment method


Site	Details	Level of Control	Traffic	Price
http://gs.mil.al/	ARMY Forces of republic of albania	Full SiteAdmin Control + High value informations	unknown	\$499
http://www.scguard.army.mil/	Souce Carolina National Guard	MySQL root access + High value informations	unknown	\$499
http://cecom.army.mil/	The United States Army CECOM	Full SiteAdmin Control/SSH Root access	unknown	\$499
http://www.woodlands.edu.uy/	Woodlands School Uruguay.	Full SiteAdmin Control!	5200	\$33
http://s-u.edu.in/	Singhania University	Full SiteAdmin Control.	unknown	\$55
http://www.nccu.edu.tw/	National Chengchi University.	Students/Exams user/pass and full admin access!	56093	\$99
http://www.terc.tp.edu.tw/	Taipei City East Special Education Resource Center	Full SiteAdmin Control.	74188	\$88
http://itcpantaleo.gov.it/	Italian Official Government Website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://donmilaninapoli.gov.it/	Istituto Statale Don Lorenzo Milani	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://itcgcesaro.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://itimarconi.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://primocircolovico.gov.it/	Official Italian gov website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	292942	\$99
http://www.utah.gov/	American State of Utah Official Website.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	173146	\$99
http://www.uscb.edu/	University of South Carolina Beaufort.	Full SiteAdmin Control.	1123	\$88
http://michigan.gov/	American State of Michigan Official Website.	MySQL root access/Valuable information.	205070	\$55

- Daily updated -
[Click here to check for proof of the hacked sites.](#)

Email me or add me in MSN at: [Gmail icon]@gmail.com

THE CURRENT STATE OF WEB APPLICATION SECURITY

WhiteHat Security Top 10 - 2010



Percentage likelihood of a website having at least one vulnerability sorted by class

Situation Today

of websites : 357,292,065
(estimated: July 2011)

of vulnerabilities : X
230

1%

821,771,600

vulnerabilities in active circulation

Situation Today

of websites : 357,292,065
(estimated: July 2011)

of X

But which will be exploited?

821,771,600

vulnerabilities in active circulation

Studying Hackers

- Focus on actual threats
 - Focus on what hackers want, helping good guys prioritize
 - Technical insight into hacker activity
 - Business trends of hacker activity
 - Future directions of hacker activity
- Eliminate uncertainties
 - Active attack sources
 - Explicit attack vectors
 - Spam content
- Devise new defenses based on real data
 - Reduce guess work



Understanding the Threat Landscape - Methodology

1. Tap into hacker forum



2. Analyze hacker tools and activity




3. Record and monitor hacker activity



What are Hackers Hacking?


PART I: HACKER FORUMS

General Topics: Hacker Forum Analysis




Dates: 2007- 2011

Top 7 Attack Techniques: Hacker Forum Analysis



Dates: July 2010 -July 2011


Growth of Discussion Topics by Year



Dates: 2007- July 2010


Mobile (in)Security

Popularity of Mobile Platform (# Threads)
12 Months vs. More than a year ago



Dates: July 2010-July 2011

Qualitative Analysis



The screenshot shows a forum post on the Black Hat World forum. The forum is titled "Black Hat World" and is a "Black Hat Seo Forum". The post is titled "Signing up on CPA Networks???" and is a reply to a thread. The user "arbydee2" is the author of the post. The post content includes a tip for newbies and a list of steps to create a fan page. The forum interface includes a search bar, a main menu, and a navigation bar.

Black Hat World
Black Hat Seo Forum

Easily Build Quality BACKLINKS 21 day FREE TRIAL REGISTER NOW
textlinks.com

Black Hat Forum Black Hat SEO > Black Hat SEO > Social Networking Sites > FaceBook
Monetize This NOW!

User Name User Name Remember Me?
Password Log in

Home Register iTrader Forum Rules FAQ Donate Chat Live Invite Your Friends Staff Application Members List

Signing up on CPA Networks???

Search Go

▼ Main Menu

- Home
- Main Forums
- Black Hat SEO
- White Hat SEO
- Cloaking
- Blogging
- Email Marketing
- Black Hat Tools
- Social Networking
- Downloads

▼ Making Money

- Affiliate Programs
- Making Money
- Google Adsense

postreply

Today, 03:01 AM

arbydee2
BHT CEO
Donor

Monetize This NOW!

Just a tip to the newbies starting out:

1. Create A Fan Page - Something like Osama Bin Laden Dead - Rot in hell
2. Start inviting people
3. Watch it go viral. You'll probably get 90% USA FB users.
4. Save it so you can promote a product later on

5/1/2011 - This is one of those rare opportunities that can build you a great list and a a couple of zeros in your profit. Use it while the news of Bin Laden killed by US forces is hot.

I just started one and it had 600 likes in 2 minutes.

LinkBack Thread Tools Search this Thread Display Modes



#1 (permalink)

Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: 127.0.0.1
Posts: 371
Thanks: 125
Thanked 141 Times in 63 Posts
Reputation: 29
iTrader: (3)

What are Hackers Hacking?

**PART II: ATTACK
TECHNOLOGIES**

Example: SQL Injection Attack Tools




SQLMap


Havij



Attacks from Automated Tools



Low Orbit Ion Cannon





Low Orbit Ion Cannon



HOW TO JOIN THE F [REDACTED] HIVE DDoS LIKE A PRO

-Anon

1. Get the latest LOIC from: [REDACTED]
2. **FIX YOUR GODDAMN INTERNET**
THIS IS VERY F [REDACTED] IMPORTANT.
Although your ION cannon is showing thousands of connections per second, the truth is that Windows is allowing only a limited amount of these connections to pass through to the internet.
2. A Download TCP-Z, A TCP/IP Patch for windows from: [REDACTED]
This will patch your tcpip.sys in memory, or directly on the hard disk.

 2. B Use the patch in memory, or directly on the hard disk.
(hard disk method requires reboot)
 2. C Don't forget to set a higher f [REDACTED] value than before. 2000 is a good choice for starters.
3. **SET UP THE LOIC F [REDACTED] HIVE MIND**
THIS IS ALSO VERY F [REDACTED] IMPORTANT
LOIC now has a very neat feature which unites every f [REDACTED] LAZER with each other.
This will **AUTOMATICLY** set the target, message, method and ALL OTHER **HARD-CORE STUFF** for you!
This way, an operation has way more chance to succeed, as we are *legion* now.
3. A - PROTIP: F [REDACTED] HIVE MIND settings are found here: [REDACTED]




Low Orbit Ion Cannon

The image shows a screenshot of the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) application interface. The window title is "Low Orbit Ion Cannon | When harpoons, air strikes and nukes fail | v.1.0.0.0". The interface includes a "1. Select your target" section with a "URL" field containing "127.0.0.1" and a "2. Ready" section with a "Lock on" button. A "Low Orbit Ion Cannon" logo is visible on the left side.

Overlaid on the LOIC interface is a screenshot of an IRC chat window. The window title is "mIRC - [#OperationPayback (AnonOps.net) (2307) [FCM] | OPERATION PAYBACK | TARGET: api.paypal.com port:443 | See: #Setup #VIRULEAS...". The chat log shows several users joining and quitting the channel, including "smokebatz", "pristine", "cyner", "jaminman", "Finn-Riggins", "Gends", and "shlrps". A message from "@evilworks" is highlighted in a red box:

```
<@evilworks> Any of you running your own (BIG) botnets and want to be in sync with command? PM me.
```

HOW TO JOIN THE F██████████ HIVE DDoS LIKE A PRO


1. Get the latest LOIC from:

2. FIX YOUR GODDAMN INTERNET


THIS IS VERY F██████████ IMPORTANT.
Although your ION cannon is showing thousands of connections per second, the truth is that Windows is allowing only a limited amount of those connections to



DDoS 2.0



DDoS 2.0




1 Compromised Server =
3000 PC- Based Bots

What are Hackers Hacking?


**PART III: MONITORING
TRAFFIC**

Lesson #1: Automation is Prevailing



Lesson #1: Automation is Prevailing




- Example: Google Dorks Campaign




80,000




Lesson #1: Automation is Prevailing



Lesson #2: The Unfab Four



Lesson #2A: The Unfab Four, SQL Injection




Lesson #2A: The Unfab Four, SQL Injection


		Average	Min	Max	Median	Standard Deviation
Attacks / hour	Since December 2010	53	1	7950	9	197
	Since July	71	1	4937	8	259
Attacks / day	Since December 2010	1093	44	21724	600	1909
	Since July	1589	106	8204	1162	1508

Table 1 : Statistics of SQLi occurrences

Lesson #2B: The Unfab Four, RFI




Lesson #2B: The Unfab Four, RFI




Analyzing the parameters and source of an RFI attack enhances common signature-based attack detection.


Lesson #2C: The Unfab Four, Directory Traversal




Lesson #2C: The Unfab Four, Directory Traversal



Lesson #2D: The Unfab Four, XSS




Lesson #2D: The Unfab Four, XSS




Lesson #2D: The Unfab Four

XSS: Zooming into Search Engine Poisoning



Lesson #2D: The Unfab Four, XSS



New Search Engine Indexing Cycle

LulzSec Activity Samples

Addressing the public on Thursday, LulzSec said that a single SQL Injection flaw [led](#) them to more than one million clear text passwords, 3.5 million "music coupon" codes, and 75,000 "music codes".

Tool #1: Remote File Include

The relevant snippet from the chat log (emphasis ours):


lol - storm would you also like the RFI/LFI bot with google bypass i was talking about while i have this plugged in?

lol - i used to load about 8,000 RFI with usp flooder crushed most server :D


In 2009, a XSS vulnerability was [found](#) on the Sun website. A LulzSec member found an old server still online and running an old version of the newspaper website being still vulnerable to the same attack! Once pwned, this server was used as a jump-host to go deeper into the infrastructure. Finally the content management system used to publish the breaking news was also pwned: A simple line of JavaScript code injected in all published news was enough to redirect all the visitors to the fake page hosted somewhere else.

Lesson #3: Repeating Offenders

- The average number of attacks a single host initiated



Lesson #3: Repeating Offenders




MITIGATION

Step 1: Dork Yourself (for SQL injection)

- Put detection policies in place (using the data source monitoring solution) to depict move of sensitive data to public facing servers.
- Regularly schedule “clean ups”. Every once in a while, a clean-up should be scheduled in order to verify that no sensitive data resides in these publicly accessible servers.
- Periodically look for new data stores that hold sensitive data. Tools exist today to assist in the task of detecting database servers in the network and classifying their contents.

Step 2: Create and deploy a blacklist of hosts that initiated attacks



- Blacklisting of: compromised servers, botnet Command and Control (C&C) servers, infected devices, active spam sources, crawlers to acquire intelligence on malicious sources and apply it in real time
- Participate in a security community and share data on attacks
 - Some of the attacks' scanning is horizontal across similar applications on the internet.
- Sort traffic based on reputation
- Whitelisting of: legitimate search engine bots, aggregators

Step 3: Use a WAF to detect/block attacks



- Can block many attacks
- Relatively easy
- Can accelerate SDLC
- Not all WAFs created equal

WAFs in Reality

The following table details the summary of the results from both tests:

Title	Weight	Barracuda 660	Citrix NetScaler	DenyAll rWeb	F5 ASM	Imperva SecureSphere	ModSecurity	SourceFire 3D	Unnamed IPS
Solution Type		WAF	WAF	WAF	WAF	WAF	WAF	IPS	IPS
Blocking Accuracy: Baseline Tuned	75%	64.71%	78.15%	60.50%	84.87%	88.24%	36.97%	16.81%	26.05%
Blocking Accuracy: DAST (NTODefend)	75%	N/A*	N/A*	78.15%	N/A*	89.08%	75.63%	82.35%	80.67%
Setup Time:	5%	70	70	70	50	60	70	70	60
# Hours		3	3	3	5	4	3	3	4
Custom Filter Capabilities:	20%	100	85	85	100	100	85	85	85
Supported	50	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Graphical Interface	15	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Advanced Syntax Or Regex	15	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DAST Integration	20	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calculated Score: Baseline Tuned		72	79	66	86	89	48	33	40
Calculated Score: DAST (NTODefend)		N/A*	N/A*	79	N/A*	90	77	82	81
Grade: Baseline Tuned		C-	C+	D	B	B+	F	F	F
Grade: DAST (NTODefend)		N/A*	N/A*	C+	N/A*	A-	C+	B-	B-

* These solutions are not yet supported by NTODefend so that test was not able to conduct test

Figure 6

WAFs in Reality

The following table details the summary of the results from both tests:

Title	Weight	Barracuda 660	Citrix NetScaler	DenyAll rWeb	F5 ASM	Imperva SecureSphere	ModSecurity	SourceFire 3D	Unnamed IPS
Solution Type		WAF	WAF	WAF	WAF	WAF	WAF	IPS	IPS
Blocking Accuracy: Baseline Tuned	75%	64.71%	78.15%	60.50%	84.87%	88.24%	36.97%	16.81%	26.05%
Blocking Accuracy: DAST (NTODefend)	75%	N/A*	N/A*	78.15%	N/A*	89.08%	75.63%	82.35%	80.67%
Setup Time:	5%	70	70	70	50	60	70	70	60
# Hours		3	3	3	5	4	3	3	4
Custom Filter Capabilities:	20%	100	85	85	100	100	85	85	85
Supported	50	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Graphical Interface	15	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Advanced Syntax Or Regex	15	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
DAST Integration	20	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calculated Score: Baseline Tuned		72	79	66	86	89	48	33	40
Calculated Score: DAST (NTODefend)		N/A*	N/A*	79	N/A*	90	77	82	81
Grade: Baseline Tuned		C-	C+	D	B	B+	F	F	F
Grade: DAST (NTODefend)		N/A*	N/A*	C+	N/A*	A-	C+	B-	B-

* These solutions are not yet supported by NTODefend so that test was not able to conduct test

Figure 6

Step 4: WAF + Vulnerability Scanner

“Security No-Brainer #9:
Application Vulnerability Scanners
Should Communicate with
Application Firewalls”

—Neil MacDonald, Gartner

Source: http://blogs.gartner.com/neil_macdonald/2009/08/19/security-no-brainer-9-application-vulnerability-scanners-should-communicate-with-application-firewalls/

Step 4: WAF + Vulnerability Scanner

- Apply SecureSphere policies based on scan results
- Monitor attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities
- Fix and test vulnerabilities on your schedule




Step 5: Stop Automated Attacks



- Detecting protocol anomalies even if they are not considered malicious
- Slowing down an attack is most often the best way to make it ineffective (e.g. CAPTCHA, computational challenges)
- Feed the client with bogus information (e.g hidden links)

Step 6: Code Fixing



- Positives:
 - Root cause fixed
 - Earlier is cheaper
- Issues
 - Expensive, time consuming.
 - Never-ending process.

Summary: The Anti-Hack Stack

Dork Yourself

Blacklist

WAF

WAF + VA

**Stop Automated
Attacks**

Code Fixing



QUESTIONS?

THANK YOU!