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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Panic of 1825 was a stock market crash that started in the Bank of England, arising in part out of speculative investments in Latin America, including the imaginary country of Poyais. The crisis was felt most acutely in Britain, where it led to the closure of twelve banks. It was also manifest in the markets of Europe, Latin America and the United States. An infusion of gold reserves from the Banque de France saved the Bank of England from collapse.[1] The panic has been called the first modern economic crisis not attributable to an external event, such as a war, and so the start of modern economic cycles. The Napoleonic Wars had been highly profitable for all sectors of the British financial system, and the expansionist monetary actions taken during transition from war to peace brought a surge of prosperity and speculative ventures. The stock market boom became a bubble and banks caught in the euphoria made risky loans.[1][2]

Britain's financial system developed rapidly between 1770 and the end of the Napoleonic Wars, coinciding with the country's industrialization. In 1770, only five stocks had been available on the London Exchange. But by 1824, investors could choose from 624 joint-stock companies.

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  • Age of Jackson: Crash Course US History #14
  • Panic of 1837
  • The War of 1812 - Crash Course US History #11
  • Gilded Age Politics: Crash Course US History #26
  • The Market Revolution: Crash Course US History #12

Transcription

Hi I’m John Green. This is Crash Course U.S. history and today, after last week’s bummer on slavery, we turn to a happier topic: the rise of democratization in the U.S. This was also known as the Age of Jackson, no Stan, not that Jackson. No, no, Stan, come’on seriously. No not, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. YES. That Jackson. Andrew Jackson. intro ...Sorry, I just had to check my collar. Right, so you’ll recall that the initial democracy of the United States wasn’t terribly democratic—almost all voters were white male land owners. Mr. Green, Mr. Green. That’s just radically unfair. Exactly, Me from the Past. But, between 1820 and 1850, this started to change. State legislatures lowered, or else eliminated, the property qualifications for voting, which allowed many more people to vote, so long as they were, you know, both white and male. Mr. Green, Mr. Green. So, I’d be in, right? Yeah, that seems reasonable. Yeah, Me from the Past, quick privilege check. One of the reasons we study history is so that you can learn that people like you are not actually at the center of history, even though, you know, you’ve been taught that. But, anyway, the whole idea of owning land as a prerequisite for voting is sort of Jeffersonian— an individual who works his own land can be truly independent, because he doesn’t need to rely upon markets to acquire stuff or, God forbid, wages to give him money with which to buy stuff. No, he makes his own stuff and he doesn’t need anybody...except for slaves and also women to make shoes and clothes and to cook food and also make children. But, in light of the Market Revolution, the idea of excluding wage workers seemed very outdated. The idea of excluding women and non-white people, though, still quite popular. But, this defining characteristic of the Age of Jackson really had very little to do with Andrew Jackson himself because, by the time he became President in 1829, every state except for North Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island had already gotten rid of their property requirements. In fact, that’s probably why he got elected. Right so you’ll recall that America’s mostly fake victory in the War of 1812 and the subsequent collapse of the Federalist party ushered in the “Era of Good Feelings” which was another way of saying that there was basic agreement on most domestic policies. The American System was a program of economic nationalism built on (1) federally financed internal improvements, like roads and canals, what we would now call “infrastructure” (2) tariffs, to protect new factories and industries, and (3) a national bank that would replace the First Bank of the United States whose charter expired in 1811. You’ll never guess what we called this second bank, unless you guessed that we called it “The Second Bank of the United States.” The main supporters of this American System were our old friend John C. Calhoun and our new friend Henry Clay. Both were Jeffersonian Republicans, which isn’t surprising because that was the only political party, but it’s kind of surprising because the American System had nothing to do with the Agrarian Republic that Jefferson had championed. But whatever, this was the Era of Good Feelings, so we’re gonna go with it. By the way, this nationalism also extended to foreign affairs. And if they did, we would, like, do stuff. This so called “Monroe Doctrine” also said that the U.S. would stay out of European wars. Hahahaha that is hilarious! But, we did live up to the other end of it, you’ll remember that when the British came for the Falkland Islands, we were like, “This shall not stand.” Just kidding. We were like, “Go ahead.” The last Good Feelings era president was John Quincy Adams, who was quite the diplomat and expansionist. He actually wrote the Monroe Doctrine, for instance. But in fact, it turns out that all feelings were not good. There was significant disagreement over three main issues. First, many people felt that the federal government shouldn’t invest in infrastructure. Like, James Madison, who’d initially supported those bills, ended up vetoing one of them that included a big spending increase to finance roads and canals. Now, the roads and canals did get built, but, in the end, most of the financing fell to the states. There were also big problems with the Second Bank of the United States, which you know is why you can’t visit a branch of it these days. But we’ll get to that in a minute! And, lastly, there was the perennial issue of slavery. In this case the problem started, as so many problems do, in Missouri. So, in 1819 Missouri had enough people in it to become a state, but despite the fact that there were already more than 10,000 slaves there, a New York congressman, named James Tallmadge, made a motion to prohibit the introduction of further slaves into the proposed state. It took almost two years to work out the John C. Calhounstorm that blew up after this. Actually, it took more than that. It took until the end of the Civil War basically. But in the short run, Missouri was allowed to enter the union as a slave state, while Maine was carved out of Massachusetts to keep the balance of things. But the Missouri Compromise also said that no state admitted above the 36 30 line of latitude would be allowed to have slaves, except, of course, for Missouri itself, which as you can see, is well above the line. Anyway, this solution to westward expansion worked out magnificently provided that you enjoy Civil Wars. So, Thomas Jefferson, who was by the way was still alive, which gives you some context for how young the nation truly was, wrote that the Missouri Compromise was “like a fire bell in the night that awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once the death knell of the union.” Eventually, almost. But in the short term, it did mean the rise of political parties. So, America was becoming more democratic, but if there was only one political party, that democratic spirit had nowhere to go. Fortunately, there was a tiny little magician named Martin Van Buren. They really did call him the “Little Magician,” by the way. Also “The red fox of Kinderhook,” but we remember him as the worst-haired president. So, despite having been President of the United States, Van Buren is arguably more important for having invented the Democratic Party. He was first to realize that national political parties could be a good thing. So, I mentioned that Martin Van Buren was known as the “Little Magician, and I know this sounds a little bit silly, but I think it’s telling. You see, Van Buren was only the second American president with a well-used nickname. And the first was his immediate predecessor, Andrew Jackson, or Old Hickory. Why does this matter? Well when you’re actually having to campaign for office, as all presidential candidates did after the election of 1828, and you’re trying to appeal to the newly enfranchised “common man” what better way to seem like a regular guy than to have a nickname? I mean, if you think this is crazy, just think of the nicknames of some some of our most popular presidents. “Honest Abe,” “The Bull Moose,” “The Gipper.” Even our lesser known presidents had nicknames. “Young Hickory,” “Handsome Frank;” “Old Rough and Ready,” “Big Steve.” James Buchanan, and I am not making this up, was “Old Public Functionary.” Who’re you gonna vote for? Oh, I think the “Old Public Functionary.” He seems competent. As it happens, he wasn’t. So, by now you’re probably wondering, where does Andrew Jackson fit into all of this? When we last caught up with Jackson, he was winning the battle of New Orleans shortly after the end of the War of 1812. He continued his bellicose ways, fighting Indians in Florida, although he was not actually authorized to do so, and became so popular from all of his Indian killing that he decided to run for president in 1824. The election of 1824 was very close. And it went to the House, where John Quincy Adams was eventually declared the winner. And Jackson denounced this as “a corrupt bargain.” So, in 1828, Jackson ran a much more negative campaign—one of campaign slogans was “Vote for Andrew Jackson who can fight, not John Quincy Adams who can write.” Adams’ supporters responded by arguing that having a literate president wasn’t such a bad thing and also by accusing Jackson of being a murderer, which given his frequent habit of dueling and massacring, he sort of was. So as you can see, the quality of discourse in American political campaigns has come a long way. Anyway, Jackson won. Jackson ran as the champion of the common man and in a way he was. I mean, he had little formal schooling and in some ways he was the archetypal self made man. Jackson’s policies defined the new Democratic party, which had formerly been known as the Jeffersonian Democratic Republicans. It’s very complicated, so here, I made you this chart. So who were these new Democrats? Well generally, they tended to be lower to middle class men, usually farmers, who were suspicious of the widening gap between the rich and the poor that was one of the results of the Market Revolution. And they were particularly worried about bankers, merchants and speculators, who seemed to be getting rich without actually producing anything. Stop me if any of this sounds familiar. This vision probably would have carried the day except a new party arose in response to Jackson’s election: the Whigs. No, Stan, the Whigs. Yes. The American Whigs took their name from the English Whigs, who were opposed to absolute monarchy. And the American Whigs felt that Andrew Jackson was grabbing so much power for the executive branch that he was turning himself into “King Andrew.” So, the Whigs were big supporters of the American System and its active federal government. You know, tariffs, infrastructure, etc. Their greatest support was in the Northeast, especially from businessmen and bankers who benefitted from those tariffs and the stability provided by a national bank. And they also thought the government should promote moral character because that was necessary for a person to act as a truly independent citizen. So Jackson’s policies must have been pretty egregious for them to spawn an entire new political party. What did he actually do as president? Well, let’s go to the Thought Bubble. Let’s start with Nullification. So, in 1828, Congress passed the Tariff of 1828 because they were not yet in the habit of marketing their bills via naming them with funny acronyms. Jackson supported this in spite of the fact that it benefitted manufacturers. The tariff raised prices on imported manufactured goods made of wool and iron, which enraged South Carolina because they’d put all their money into slavery and none into industry. Unlike northerners, who could avoid the higher prices by manufacturing sweaters and pants and such at home, South Carolinians would have to pay more. They were so angry at this “Tariff of Abominations” that the South Carolina legislature threatened to nullify it. Jackson didn’t take kindly to this affront to federal power, but South Carolina persisted, and when Congress passed a new tariff in 1832 – one that actually lowered the duties -- the Palmetto State’s government nullified it. Jackson responded by getting Congress to pass the Force Act, which authorized him to use the army and navy to collect taxes. A full blown crisis was averted when Congress passed a new tariff in 1833 and South Carolina relented. This smelled a bit of dictatorship – armed tax collectors and all – and helped to cement Jackson’s reputation as a tyrant, at least among the Whigs. And then we have the Native Americans, much of Jackson’s reputation there was based on killing them, so it’s no surprise that he supported southern states’ efforts to appropriate Indian lands and make the Indians move. This support was formalized in the Indian Removal Act of 1830, which Jackson supported. The law provided funds to re-locate the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creek and Seminole Indians from their homes in Georgia, North Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama. In response, these tribes adopted a novel approach, and sued the government. And then, the Supreme Court ruled that Georgia’s actions in removing the Cherokees violated their treaties with the federal government and that they had a right to their land. To which Jackson supposedly responded by saying, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it.” So, Jackson set the stage for the forced removal of the Cherokees from Georgia to Oklahoma, but it actually took place in the winter of 1838-1839 under Jackson’s successor Van Buren. At least ¼ of the 18,000 Indians died during the forced march that came to be known as the Trail of Tears. Boy, Thought Bubble, you do know how to end on a downer. But, thank you. But Andrew Jackson also changed our banking system. Just as today, banks were very important to the industrial and mercantile development of the U.S. And at the beginning of Jackson’s Presidency, American banking was dominated by the Second National Bank, which you’ll remember, had been established by Congress as part of the American system. Oh it’s time for the Mystery Document? The rules here are simple. When I inevitably fail to guess the author of the Mystery Document, I get shocked with the shock pen. “The powers, privileges, and favors bestowed upon it in the original charter, by increasing the value of the stock far above its par value operated as a gratuity of many millions to its stockholders … Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the public which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank must come directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American people … Stan, I know this one! Is it not conceivable. It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of Government. Should [the bank’s] influence become concentrated, as it may under the operation of such an act as this, in the hands of a self-elected directory … will there not be cause to tremble for the purity of our elections[?]” It is Andrew Jackson’s veto of the charter of the Second Bank of the United States. YES. So in 1832 bank leader Nicholas Biddle persuaded Congress to pass a bill extending the life of the Second US Bank for 20 years. Jackson thought that the Bank would use its money to oppose his reelection in 1836, so he vetoed that bill. In fact, the reason I knew that was from the veto message is because it talks about the bank as an instrument to subvert democracy. Jackson set himself up as a defender of the lower classes by vetoing the bank’s charter. Now, Whigs took exception to the idea that the president was somehow a more democratic representative of the people than the legislature, but in the end Jackson’s view won out. He used the veto power more than any prior president, turning it into a powerful tool of policy. Which it remains to this day, by the way. So the Second Bank of the U.S. expired in 1836, which meant that suddenly we had no central institution with which to control federal funds. Jackson ordered that money should be disbursed into local banks, unsurprisingly preferencing ones that were friendly to him. These so-called “pet banks” were another version of rewarding political supporters that Jackson liked to call “rotation in office.” Opponents called this tactic of awarding government offices to political favorites the spoils system. Anyway, these smaller banks proceeded to print more and more paper money because, you know, free money. Like, between 1833 and 1837 the face value of banknotes in circulation rose from $10 million to $149 million, and that meant inflation. Initially, states loved all this new money that they could use to finance internal improvements. But, inflation is really bad for wage workers. And also, eventually, everyone. So all this out-of-control inflation, coupled with rampant land-speculation eventually lead to an economic collapse, the Panic of 1837. The subsequent depression lasted until 1843. And Jackson’s bank policy proved to be arguably the most disastrous fiscal policy in American history, which is really saying something. It also had a major effect on American politics because business-oriented Democrats became Whigs, and the remaining Democrats further aligned with agrarian interests, which meant slavery. So the Age of Jackson was more democratic than anything that came before and it gave us the beginnings of modern American politics. I mean, Jackson was the first president to really expand executive power and to argue that the president is the most important democratically elected official in the country. One of the things that makes Andrew Jackson’s presidency so interesting and also so problematic is that he was elected via a more democratic process, but he concentrated more power in the executive in a thoroughly undemocratic way. In the end, Andrew Jackson probably was the worst American president to end up on currency, particularly given his disastrous fiscal policies. But the Age of Jackson is still important. And it’s worth remembering that all that stuff in American politics started out with the expansion of democracy. Thanks for watching. I’ll see you next week. Crash Course is produced and directed by Stan Muller. The script supervisor is Meredith Danko. Our associate producer is Danica Johnson. The show is written by my high school history teacher, Raoul Meyer, and myself. And our graphics team is Thought Cafe. If you have libertage caption suggestions, please leave them in comments, where you can also leave questions about today’s video that will be answered by our team of historians. Thanks for watching Crash Course and as we say in my hometown, don’t forget to be awesome...WHAT.

Bank improvements

Seventy banks failed. The current view puts much of the fault of the crash on the banks for not collecting quality information, for performing inadequate surveillance, and for not doing simple due diligence on ventures. The usual list of causes of the crisis are:

  • Latin American debt issues
  • Ease of issuance of banknotes from country banks led to unscrupulous partners investing in high-risk, high-return ventures
  • Bank of England's actions of rapidly increasing the money supply, then rapidly tightening it, initiating bank runs and finally refusing to act as lender of last resort until too late.

At the time, the Bank of England was not a central bank but a public, for-profit bank with three loyalties: its shareholders, the British government, and its correspondent commercial bankers. The Bank of England raised the lending rate to protect its investors, instead of lowering it to protect the public. The self-interest of the Bank of England thereby caused additional failures. Although banker Henry Thornton described in 1802 the proper lender of last resort actions to be taken by a central bank in such a crisis, it was not until the Overend Gurney crisis of 1866 that the Bank of England would take action to prevent widespread panic withdrawals.[1] Inaction by the Bank of England led to a systemic stoppage of the banking system, and was followed by widespread bankruptcies, and unemployment.[2]

Background

A number of historical developments were at play in bringing Britain's panic of 1825 to fruition. Along with the industrial revolution came rapid developments in finance and banking. Also in the period leading up to the crisis, Britain remained heavily involved in the enormously expensive French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.[3]

The crash occurred after a period of wartime finance in which Britain suspended the gold standard as a temporary wartime measure. Expansionary monetary policy proved profitable for the entire financial sector.[2] But when the war ended, and the government moved to reinstate the gold standard and resume cash payments, the economy contracted.

In preparation for resuming convertibility, the Bank of England raised interest rates, amassed a stock of gold, and recalled notes from circulation. This caused deflation but allowed the Bank to resume full convertibility in 1821.[4] And while economists and historians generally provide non-conflicting accounts of the events which lead up to the crash, a number of different arguments have been made over what the most important factors were, with varying weight assigned by different experts.

Theories

William Ackworth's 1925 study on Financial Reconstruction in England, 1815–1822, argued that it was the government and the Bank of England's severe deflationary policy which exacerbated the troubles associated with the shift from a wartime to a peacetime economy.[2]

Economists like David Ricardo criticized the Bank's actions as the result of ignorance.[2]

However, later academics have maintained that the Bank was not ignorant, but angry over the government's effort to restrict its autonomy and limit its control over its level of liabilities.[5]

Other analysts have emphasized not the war-to-peace transition but the role of British speculation, under expansionary monetary policy, in Latin American markets.[1]

Alexander Dick emphasizes that the crisis was unique in that it was not solely caused by external events like war or speculation in foreign markets, although those certainly played a role. Instead, he maintains that the crisis stemmed from the diversification of the financial economy.[6]

Larry Neal's notable analysis of the crash argues that neither speculation nor the Bank of England nor the country banks alone are responsible. Instead, he argues that all problems arising from the transition from a war to a peacetime economy can be traced back to the vast and increasing "informational uncertainties" in existing institutions.[2]

Country banks

One factor cited by many analysts is the rapid spread of country banking during the industrial revolution and Victorian period. Beginning in 1780, country banking spread rapidly across England and Wales. By 1810, there were over 800 licensed and unlicensed banks who both issued small notes and provided small workshops, mines, and other new industries with loans for working capital. Some scholars point out that without these banks, the Industrial Revolution would have likely been strangled by lack of capital before it could have begun.[6]

French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars

Europe remained embroiled in the far-reaching French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars from 1789 to 1815.[7] By early 1793, Britain became involved. Though the countries did form an uneasy treaty in the Peace of Amiens in 1802, hostilities would resume again when Napoleon regained power in 1803.[8] Great Britain would remain involved until the British victory at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

The soon-to-be emperor Napoleon made it known that he intended to invade Britain, amassing troops on the nearby shores of Calais and prompting Britain to invest in increasing its army and navy. The British government built additional defences along England's southern coast and strengthened old ones, but these military investments came at a high cost.[8]

Financing war

Britain implemented some additional taxes in wartime, but they were unpopular,[9] failed to raise as much as hoped,[9] and ultimately thought to be unnecessary since Britain not only had good standing with creditors and could afford to finance war costs by issuing debt, but also had abandoned the gold standard in 1797, enabling it to issue additional un-backed notes.[6]

Debt

Britain generally funded its wars by issuing debt rather than raising taxes. This was a strategy Britain had employed in funding its wars since the early 18th century.[1] Britain financed its war expenditures by issuing a combination of unfunded and funded debt. Unfunded debt, short-term obligations not funded by interest payments on the part of the borrower, included army, ordinance, navy, and exchequer bills and was more costly for the treasury to repay than longer-term debt. Funded debt, long-term obligations funded through interest payments made by the borrower over the term of the loan, was primarily used to retire more costly, short-term debt. This helped to lengthen the term of the debt and reduce the government's debt service payments.

The country could pursue this strategy because creditors considered Britain's stable parliamentary government reliable, which allowed it to issue a substantial quantity of debt. Britain followed this traditional funding method — funding 90 per cent of its expenditures through borrowing — until 1798, but as the Napoleonic wars dragged on, Britain's massive expenditures rose to unprecedented levels. Britain was forced to adopt additional funding methods.[1]

Taxes

To help with wartime bills, William Pitt the Younger implemented Britain's first Progressive income tax in 1798 as a temporary measure. The tax remained in place until 1802 when it was briefly repealed during the Peace of Amiens, before being reinstated in 1803 when hostilities resumed.[9] After Britain's victory at Battle of Waterloo in 1815 and Napoleon's defeat, Chancellor Nicholas Vansittart wanted to retain some form of the tax, favouring a reduction rather than complete abolition. He feared that without the revenue, the government would have difficulty making its debt payments and supporting public credit.[10] But he met with fierce opposition from the public, and in 1816 the income tax was again repealed.[9]

Expansionary monetary policy

Suspending the gold standard

In February 1797, Britain passed the Bank Restriction Act of 1797. This suspended the convertibility between gold and banknotes as a necessary wartime measure.[6] In March the same year, the Bank of England also lifted a ban against issuing small notes, to enable expansionary monetary action.[2]

Foreign markets

Although the banks were no longer constrained by the gold standard, several economists have argued that banks remained relatively prudent. However, record exports with the Americas between 1808 and 1810 and relatively easy credit led to more speculation in foreign markets. The boom ended with a crash in the summer of 1810, bringing a series of commercial failures and merchant insolvencies. The commercial crisis quickly spread to the financial sector, as merchants dragged down bankers who had extended credit to them.[4]

Falling exchange rates

Throughout the period, expansionary monetary policy and easy credit also caused Britain's currency to depreciate and its exchange rate to fall. Concerned by this, the government appointed a committee to determine if convertibility should be resumed soon, regardless of whether the war was still going on.[4] This Bullion Report of 1810 became influential in monetary policy for its analysis of how bank policy influences exchange rates.[4]

The Bullion Report of 1810

This influential report argued that the central bank's credit policy influenced prices and exchange rates. It suggested that the central bank's discretion in credit policy should be limited by a gold standard. This not only sparked controversy between 1810 and 1811 on the link between monetary policy and exchange rates, but also brought the Bank's prosperity under scrutiny and undermined the authority of Bank directors. In practice, though, the Bank's power remained intact so long as the government still relied on it for managing remittances and issuing debt during the war. The Treasury defended the Bank by arguing that war necessitated a fall in exchange rates.[2]

Wartime prosperity

Through these wartime finance policies — which emphasized expansionary monetary policy and debt issuances rather than relying solely on taxation — the entire British financial system prospered while the hostilities continued.[2]

The Treasury benefited from increased taxes, the income tax, and an expanded market for debt.[2]

While convertibility remained suspended, the Bank of England, acting as a public bank, not a central bank, profited by issuing unbacked banknotes.[1] The Bank also profited in its role as mediator during the wars. It worked with the Treasury as the agent mediating fiscal transfers home and abroad during one of history's most expensive wars up to that time.[2]

London's private banks and foreign merchants fleeing extortion expanded business within the city.

Country banks expanded rapidly across Britain between 1780 and 1810. After the Bank of England suspended convertibility and lifted restrictions against issuing small notes in 1797, small country banks could profit by issuing small denomination notes to replace circulating coins.[2]

From war to peace

Treasury

Emerging from war and deprived of taxation revenue, the Treasury found itself struggling to service the massive government debt accumulated during war.[2]

Bank of England

To compensate for the depletion of its own profitable wartime revenue streams, the Bank of England had to find ways to replace the revenue previously brought in through wartime bond issuances.[2]

Capital markets

London's capital markets responded to the retirement of high-yielding government bonds by producing what Larry Neal refers to as a "bewildering array" of new financial assets.[2]

Private banks and customers

Private London banks, their corresponding country banks, and their consumers in industries ranging from agriculture to trade and manufacturing, lacking information on these new financial products, found it difficult to cope with the resulting confusion.[2]

Rapid financialization

Britain's financial system developed rapidly between 1770 and the end of the Napoleonic Wars, coinciding with the country's industrialization. In 1770, only five stocks had been available on the London Exchange. But by 1824, investors could choose from 624 joint-stock companies.[11]

Effects of the crisis

Business

The reinstatement of the gold standard entailed a contraction of the money supply and a tightening of bank lending which made it difficult for merchants to raise capital. Bankruptcies increased significantly during the remainder of 1825 and nearly doubled in 1826.[12]

Publishing industry

The crisis also had a direct effect on the publishing industry. While the crash did not reduce the number of publishers in Britain between 1825 and 1827, it did radically alter the nature of the industry. Publishers who followed the Romantic-era traditions of offering authors handsome advances were often in debt to banks and other creditors, and this practice left them vulnerable during the crisis. Like many businesses, many major publishing houses were forced to declare bankruptcy. Older publishers such as John Murray, Constable and Ballantyne, Hurst and Robinson, and Taylor and Hessey suffered during the crisis, and some even collapsed entirely.[6]

The setback of the established publishing houses allowed newer and less-reputable publishers to change the market. High end works were in declining demand, but the market for cheaper productions, pamphlets, and children's books was rapidly developing. Smaller publishers bought up the stocks of their former competitors at a discount and issued cheap editions. This led to a demand for cheap fiction and inspired the trend of serialization.[6]

Regulation

The crisis of 1825, although it did shake public confidence, did not destroy the market but ultimately worked to strengthen and centralize it.[6]

Many believed at the time that the crash, along with a series of subsequent, less serious crises, highlighted the need for improved regulation. The Limited Liability Act of 1855 and the Companies Acts of 1856 and 1862 attempted to regulate the market better, with the effect of making investment more accessible to individuals and investors.[13]

The crash led to such a frenzy that London bankers and their clients called for the government to protect their credit by suspending convertibility, as it had with the Bank Restriction Act of 1797. This the government, worried by falling exchange rates and in an effort to maintain credibility, refused to do.[6] But to help alleviate public panic, the government implemented a series of reforms which addressed the crisis as it was perceived at the time.

Small banks would be replaced by branches of the Bank of England.[6]

London banks would be allowed to compete for government contracts and business,[6] removing the monopoly the Bank had enjoyed during the Napoleonic Wars.

The gold standard would be extended to Scotland to help rein in reliance on fiat money.[6] These reforms helped to centralize the financial industry and shaped the way that the public understood money, the economy, and culture. While writers of the time like James McCulloch had at first intimated that the problems arose because of the decision to imprudently abandon the gold standard, he later experienced a shift in perspective which was evident in his writing.[6] By the time he published "The Late Crisis in the Money Market Impartially Considered", he began to think that the crash was not attributable to greed-driven bankers but to a diversified financial system.[6]

Public opinion

While the crisis is now thought to have been caused by the transition process between war and peacetime economies, it was – at the time – blamed primarily on weak small country bankers speculating unwisely.[6]

Christian economics

The crash caused many families significant hardship and left them confused about what had happened. Their sentiments fuelled the growth of Christian economics, which became the most popular economic theory of the 1830s. The theory presumed that human action, motivated by individual desire, entailed some degree of suffering.[6]

The business cycle

The application of this doctrine of "atonement" led to the idea of the business cycle. Excess production will, it was believed, inevitably lead to higher prices and eventually – economic downturn.[6]

Literature

Harriet Martineau's Illustrations of Political Economy maintains that there is no perfect solution to financial cycles. Rather, her work — along with many others of the period — seems to suggest that one should steel themselves for inevitable confusion and collapse.[6]

Thomas Babington Macaulay alludes to the country's on and off gold standard in his "Review of Southey's Colloquies". He refers to the currency being "imprudently debased, and imprudently restored".[14]

In fiction

A historical novel by Stanley J. Weyman, Ovington's Bank, published almost a century later (1922), is centred on the Panic of 1825.

George Eliot's novel Middlemarch, written in 1870 but set in 1830, alludes to the crisis as well as the impact of the crash on the lives of individuals in Victorian England.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b c d e f g Bordo, Michael D. (May–June 1998), "Commentary" (PDF), Review, 80 (3), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, doi:10.20955/r.80.77-82, retrieved 20 June 2012
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Neal, Larry (May–June 1998), "The Financial Crisis of 1825 and the Restructuring of the British Financial System" (PDF), Review, 80 (3), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, doi:10.20955/r.80.53-76, retrieved 20 June 2012
  3. ^ "The impact of the Napoleonic Wars in Britain". The British Library. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
  4. ^ a b c d Narron, James; Skeie, David; Morgan, Don (5 September 2014). "Crisis Chronicles: The British Export Bubble of 1810 and Pegged versus Floating Exchange Rates". Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
  5. ^ Huch, Ronald K. (1 March 1979). "Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815–1830. By Boyd Hilton. New York, Oxford University Press, 1977. Pp. xii + 338. $19.50". Business History Review. 53 (1): 121–122. doi:10.2307/3114710. ISSN 2044-768X. JSTOR 3114710. S2CID 155337086.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Dick, Alexander J. Felluga, Dino Franco (ed.). ""On the Financial Crisis, 1825–26″ | BRANCH". BRANCH: Britain, Representation and Nineteenth-Century History. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
  7. ^ "Timeline: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815)" (PDF).
  8. ^ a b Mather, Ruth. "The impact of the Napoleonic Wars in Britain". The British Library.
  9. ^ a b c d "A Tax To Beat Napoleon". The National Archives. UK Government Web Archive. Archived from the original on 17 February 2013. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
  10. ^ William, Carr. "Vansittart, Nicholas, first Baron Bexley (1766-1851)". A Web of English History.
  11. ^ Poovey, Mary (2002). "Writing about Finance in Victorian England: Disclosure and Secrecy in the Culture of Investment". Victorian Studies. 45: 17–41. doi:10.2979/VIC.2002.45.1.17. S2CID 145134212.
  12. ^ Turner, John D. (10 July 2014). Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to the Present. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781139992336.
  13. ^ Itzkowitz, David C. (1 January 2002). "Fair Enterprise or Extravagant Speculation: Investment, Speculation, and Gambling in Victorian England". Victorian Studies. 45 (1): 121–47. doi:10.2979/VIC.2002.45.1.121. ISSN 1527-2052. S2CID 144846842.
  14. ^ Macaulay, Southey's Colloquies on Society.

Further reading

  • Bordo, Michael D. Commentary May/June 1998. St. Louis Federal Reserve Review.[1]
  • Fetter, Frank W. A Historical Confusion in Bagehot's Lombard Street Economica, New Series, Vol. 34, No. 133 (February 1967), pp. 80–83. [2]
  • Haupert, Michael (1997). "Panic of 1825". In Glasner, David; Cooley, Thomas F. (eds.). Business cycles and depressions: an encyclopedia. Garland Publishing. pp. 511–13. ISBN 0-8240-0944-4.
  • Kynaston, David (2017). Till Time's Last Sand: A History of the Bank of England, 1694–2013. New York: Bloomsbury. pp. 119–122. ISBN 978-1408868560.
  • Read, Charles. (2023). Calming the Storms: The Carry Trade, the Banking School and British Financial Crises Since 1825. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 91−111.
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