YALE UNIVERSITY
YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ST. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA
AND THE REPRESENTATION OF CYRILLINE CHRISTOLOGY
IN THE CHALCEDONIAN DEFINITION
SUBMITTED TO CHRISTOPHER BEELEY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
REL 672 (S16) PATRISTIC CHRISTOLOGY
BY
MALENE HASBERG KJAER
MAY 10, 2016
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................................1
THE ANTI-ANTIOCHENE CHRISTOLOGY OF CYRIL .................................................................................3
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL UNION .....................................................................................................3
THE SINGLE SUBJECT OF THE UNION ...........................................................................................7
THE COMPROMISE WITH ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGIANS .......................................................................10
THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON ...............................................................................................................13
THE REPRESENTATION OF CYRILLINE CHRISTOLOGY IN THE CHALCEDONIAN DEFINITION ...........15
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................................................................19
INTRODUCTION
The Christology of St. Cyril of Alexandria is developed throughout a wide span of time during
his lifetime from 376-444 AD. Before the conflict with Nestorius, which started in 428, Cyril had
begun his career in opposition to the Antiochene Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, being
highly inspired by Gregory Nazianzen.1 However, the outset of his most concrete Christological
considerations is attributed to the conflict with Nestorius,2 with whom Cyril debated about the
union of Christ and about the importance of accepting the human and divine equally, in order to
draw up the soteriological implications of the incarnation. 3 What started the conflict was
Nestorius’ insistence on not referring to the virgin mother as Theotokos, God bearer, because of
the impossibility for a human being to give birth to God. Nestorius instead proposed the title
Christotokos, which he found to be closer to the scripture, and which he believed preserved the
divinity of Christ. Cyril responds to this and engages in a great disputation of the Christological
union and the single-subjectivity among other things. These considerations from the Nestorian
controversy constitute what this paper considers to be the Christological doctrine of Cyril, which
he later in his life returns to in his work, On the Unity of Christ.
In 433 Cyril signs the Formula of Reunion in order to reconcile with the Antiochene
theologians. This happens after the first council of Ephesus, in 431, condemned both John of
Damascus’ and Nestorius’ views as heretic. Cyril and John work out their theological
1
Beeley, Christopher, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2012, p. 258. To understand Cyril as inspired mainly by Gregory Nazianzen is not the only way to
perceive Cyril’s inspiration and relation to the fathers of the church, however, I will follow Beeley in this reading, in
so far as the inspiration by Athanasius seems more clear in the writings from 433-38, in which he tries to adjust to
the Antiochene position. For a reading of Athanasius as the primary source of inspiration see e.g. Susan Wessel,
Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic, Oxford, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2004, pp. 15-73, and John A. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological
Controversy, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004, pp. 175-226.
2
McGuckin states that the earlier works of Cyril have a more abstract presentation of his Christology, but it is clear
that Cyril’s mind has been shaped before the conflict with Nestorius. McGuckin (2004: 176).
3
Russel, Norman, Cyril of Alexandria, London, US: Routledge, 2002, p. 35.
1 of 19
differences, and the writings from the period 433-c.438 thus represent, what Beeley calls, “an
accommodating interlude.” 4 What we find in these writings from the ‘middle-period’ is a
Christology different from the one appearing in the Nestorian controversy and in On the Unity of
Christ.
In 451 the council of Chalcedon makes the famous definition of the two natures in Christ.
This definition is meant to be in line with the Christology of Cyril, but it shall become clear from
this paper, that Cyril would not approve of the definition that disrupts his stress on the singlesubject and the union of Christ. The fact is that the Cyrilline Christology that the council claims
to follow is not the ‘real’ Christology of Cyril, but rather taken from the accommodating middleperiod of his writings, where, to some extent, he complies with the Antiochenes understanding of
the two natures in Christ.
The goal of this paper is first and foremost to analyze the Christology of Cyril that
emerges from the writings from the period of the Nestorian controversy, 428-433, and from the
final period of his authorship from 438-444. These writings combined will be treated as
demonstrating Cyril’s ‘real’ Christology. Secondly, I will analyze the position he takes in the
middle-period, where he reconciles with John of Antioch, in order to accentuate the differences
in his Christological perception that appear in these writings, from those of the other two periods.
This will serve to analyze the Christological Definition of the Council of Chalcedon, and from
this I will, finally, discuss how the Cyrilline Christology is represented in this Definition. I will
argue that the council misreads the Christology of Cyril and thus selects his most tractable views
from the middle-period of his authorship in order to end up with a primarily Antiochene suiting
definition, however, claiming it to be in agreement with a Cyrilline understanding of the nature
of Christ.
4
Beeley (2012: 259).
2 of 19
THE ANTI-ANTIOCHENE CHRISTOLOGY OF CYRIL
The Christological Union
In order to comprehend the Christology of Cyril, two things are crucial to understand – the union
of the divine and human nature in Christ, and the single-subjectivity of the Incarnated. We will
begin with an analysis of how Cyril understands the Christological union, by looking at texts
from two periods of his life: from the Nestorian controversy, 428-33, and On the Unity of Christ
from the last period from 438-444.
In the spring of 429 Cyril writes a letter to the monks of Egypt in which we find most of
the themes, which he will later develop.5 This includes the treatment of the Christological union,
which he develops in order to prove how it is possible to perceive Christ as being both divine and
human in one man. In Cyril’s Letter to the Monks of Egypt he quotes Athanasius, in defense of
the theotokos, and underlines the twosome relationship in the union: “[…] that he is eternally
God, and that he is the Son being the Word, the Radiance, and the Wisdom of the Father, and
secondly that later for our sake he took flesh from the virgin Mary the Mother of God and so
became man.”6 It is clear that Cyril establishes a defense against the Nestorians and that he is
ever careful not to enter into other heresies, but from this we can extract his ideas of the
Christological union. Cyril states that the scriptural saying – that the Word of God became flesh
– means that “he was united to flesh”7, and he continues, “he is Lord and God by nature, even if
he did come with us economically and in our condition.” 8 When Cyril uses the word
‘economically’ he has in mind “a practical exercise of the Logos who assumed a human bodily
5
Russell (2002: 35).
Cyril, Ep. 1.4. in McGuckin (2004: 245-261).
7
Cyril, Ep. 1.9.
8
Cyril, Ep. 1.11.
6
3 of 19
life not pointlessly but in order to work out the salvation of the human race in and through that
bodily condition.”9 This means that the statement of the union in flesh is a concrete event, which
unites the Logos with the human in the incarnation, thus establishing a human nature for the
Logos to become a paradoxical instrument of omnipotent power.10 And this concrete existence of
the union is vital to understand – it is literally the Second Person of the Trinity, who has been
united to human flesh. Cyril explains this by stating that, in the scripture, the Spirit speaks of
Emmanuel as lord “because he knew that he was not simply a God-bearing man, nor someone
assumed in the order of an instrument, but truly God made man.”11 That it is the divine son of
God who is united is made clear on several occasions, as here in the First Letter of Cyril to
Succenus: “And so, we unite the Word of God the Father to the holy flesh […] in an ineffable
way that transcends understanding, without confusion, without change, and without alteration,
and we thereby confess One Son, and Christ, and Lord.”12 The stress is here on divinity, but it is
also clear that Cyril makes mention of the other nature – humanity. In the following passage, he
elaborates this: “As I have said, if we understand the manner of the incarnation we shall see that
two natures come together with one another, without confusion or change, in an indivisible
union.”13 Cyril thus uses the language of two natures, which we will now make a short excursus
to look at.14
It is important to understand that Cyril’s union does not only enhance a single-natureChristology, but also allows for a Christology where the two natures becomes one in the union as
we just saw in the quote above. Beeley writes that Cyril’s notion in the most basic sense is that
9
McGuckin (2004: 184).
McGuckin (2004: 185).
11
Cyril, Ep. 1.19.
12
Cyril, Ep. 45.6 in McGuckin (2004: 352-358).
13
Cyril, Ep. 45.6.
14
Although The First Letter to Succenus is from the period of Cyril’s life, which in this paper is conceived as a
compromise of his ‘real’ Christology, the quotes used in this section above, however, does not compromise the
Christology of the first and third period, as it is aligned with his primary thoughts of the nature of Christ.
10
4 of 19
there is only one divine nature in Christ, but it “includes the admission that God and human
existence are different things without confusion, and it allows that one can also say that Christ
has two natures.”15 What is clear is that Cyril’s miaphysite approach states that, after the
incarnation, you can only speak of One divine nature in union, and it is thus only possible to
speak of the union as ‘out of’ two natures.16 However, the Chalcedonian definition, which we
will look at below, underscores the one being in two natures, which is thus different from what
Cyril had in mind speaking of a duality of natures. Cyril does not understand the two natures as
being active together in Christ, but rather as having come together in unity in a single subject,
being the divine Logos.
It is critical to understand that it is Cyril’s goal to explain the unity of Christ from two
natures, and this becomes a challenge to express without destroying or mixing the distinct
natures of the human and divine. In order to explain this, he draws up a number of analogies. The
most recurring image is the analogy of the body and soul, which is, for instance, found in
Explanation of the Twelve Chapters where he argues against division of the hypostases after the
union, he says:
[…] we say that the Word of God the Father was united in a wonderful and ineffable
manner to a holy body endowed with a rational soul and this is how we understand that
there is One Son; although of course even in our own case it is legitimate to observe that
the soul and the body are of different natures, or rather that both are composited in one
living being.17
15
Beeley (2012: 262).
In his book, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria van Loon argues that Cyril is not the miaphysite
theologian he is often described as, as van Loon understands the language as dyophysite. He argues that expressions
like natural union and natural unity are dyophysite, because they denote the coming together of two natures, and
does not imply that it should result in one nature, but rather that they are combined into a separate reality, thus
making Cyril’s Christology dyophysite. I, however, chose to follow McGuckin’s reading of the Christology as being
a miaphysite theologian. Van Loon, Hans, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, Boston, MA: Brill,
2009, pp. 578-79. McGuckin (2004: 207-12).
17
Explanation of the Twelve Chapters in McGuckin (2004: 285-286).
16
5 of 19
The body and soul analogy allows Cyril to affirm that the two distinct natures have in fact
become one single nature in Christ without compromising any of the former natures, just as the
body and soul are two different realities co-existing in the same fleshly body. What is more, this
analogy also serves to show how the two work together in one, as McGuckin writes:
An individual human being could not do any single act which was either purely spiritual
or psychic (only a soul-act) or purely physical (merely a body-act). Everything a human
did consciously involved the body and soul in a continuous and unbroken union,
everything was, thus, a body-soul act.18
This equally existing union is exactly what Cyril has in mind when speaking about the union in
Christ. This is not a change or transformation of any of the natures, but Cyril rather explains it as
“the Word, in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner, ineffably united to himself flesh
animated with a rational soul”, and, “[…] while the natures that were brought together into this
true unity were different, nonetheless there is One Christ and Son from out of both.”19 The unity
is, thus, defined as the coming together of the two in one, and he expresses this further:
And so we confess One Christ and Lord. This does not mean we worship a man alongside
the Word […] rather that we worship one and the same because the body of the Word,
with which he shares the Father’s throne, was not alien to him. Again this does not mean
two sons were sharing the throne, but one, because of the union with the flesh. But if we
reject this hypostatic union as either impossible or unfitting, then we fall into saying there
are two sons, and in that case we will be compelled to make a distinction and say that one
of them was really a man […] while the other was the Word of God who enjoyed the
name and reality of Sonship by nature.20
The striking point for Cyril is obviously the union, but also that the incarnation made a real
difference; the relationship between the natures shall not be perceived as the same as before,
since the relationship has clearly been redefined. The hypostatic union reflects the union of the
natures in one new separate reality: seeing that it connotes the single-divine-subjectivity that
constituted the incarnation. The union was, thus, according to McGuckin, based and founded on
18
McGuckin (2004: 199).
Ep. 4.3 in McGuckin (2004: 262-265).
20
Ep. 4.6.
19
6 of 19
the singleness of hypostasis, which for Cyril meant the individual reality.21 The one hypostasis
thus serves to underscore Cyril’s point of the single subject in the union, as McGuckin writes:
What this amounts to is that Cyril’s doctrine of the single divine hypostasis insists that
although Christ is entirely human, he is not a man, rather he is God made man, God
enfleshed, God assuming humanity, or however else one cares to express it so as to bring
out the centrally important notion that it was none other than the eternal Word of God
who was the sole active subject of the human life of Jesus of Nazareth.22
Seeing that the single subjectivity is a key element in Cyril’s Christology, we shall now turn to a
review of how Cyril expresses and understands the single subject in the union of the Incarnated.
The Single Subject of the Union
To Cyril, the idea of the single-subjectivity is closely connected to the idea of the union, but it
becomes necessary for him to describe how the action of the union is to be perceived from out of
two natures. The question in hand is thus, how it is possible for the divine Logos and the
humanity in one, to act together without any of the natures being diminished. More than that, the
presence of a human soul in Christ had long been debated after Apollinaris’ single-subjectdoctrine, which claimed that the divine logos replaced the soul of Jesus. This presented Cyril
with the problem of explaining the presence of a human soul, thus making Christ a truly human
person, and the divine Logos in one subject without admitting two persons in the Incarnated.23
With this as the background he lays out an exposition of the single-subjectivity of the union.
In his second and third letter to Nestorius we find the single-subject-doctrine outlined
against what, according to Beeley, he “perceives as the dualist tendency of Nestorius’ biblical
interpretation.”24 Cyril writes as follows: “We do not divide out the sayings of our Savior in the
21
McGuckin (2004: 212).
McGuckin (2004: 216).
23
McGuckin (2004: 180-182).
24
Beeley (2012: 264).
22
7 of 19
Gospels as if two hypostases or prosopa. The one and only Christ is not twofold even though he
is understood as compounded out of two different elements in an indivisible unity”, and
continues, “we must maintain that both the manly as well as the godly sayings were uttered by
one subject.”25 The single-subjectivity becomes quite clear from these passages, but he extends
the explanation to emphasize that the one subject is indeed the Word of God: “This is why all
sayings in the Gospels are to be attributed to one prosopon, and to the one enfleshed hypostasis
of the Word, just as according to the scriptures there is One Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor.8.6).”26 As
Beeley writes, this thought is consistent throughout all of his works, thus also present in On the
Unity of Christ where Cyril writes: “For there is only one Son, the Word who was made man for
our sake. I would say that everything refers to him, words and deeds, both those that befit the
deity as well as those which are human.”27 Having established this definition of the oneness of
the Incarnated, Cyril is presented with the problem of the divine impassibility. If the two are
indeed united in one, being the divine Word of God, how is the scripture to be understood when
it speaks of things like Christ suffering, starving, and doubting?
This constitutes the issue of the exchange of properties – Communicatio Idiomatum –
which is the problem of applying the different properties to a single subject, consisting of both
the divinity and humanity. Cyril argues that a free exchange of attributes is possible. Because
God is the single personal subject of the incarnation we can conclude that God suffered.
McGuckin states that this constituted a paradoxical nature, since God is understood as
impassible, and he argues that the following is Cyril’s solution to the problem:
The realization that the statement ‘God suffered’ is only apparently self-contradictory,
because the word ‘God’ is being used in a different way to normal. In fact in all
25
Ep. 17.8 in McGuckin (2004: 266-275).
Ep. 17.8.
27
McGuckin, John A., On The Unity of Christ: St. Cyril of Alexandria, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary
Press, 1995, p. 107.; Beeley (2012: 264).
26
8 of 19
incarnational language Cyril says that it is being used as a synonym for ‘God-in-theflesh’, and this crucial qualification is given in the very paradox itself, since all Christians
will, or ought to, admit that suffering, death, sorrow, and suchlike, are inapplicable to
‘God-in-himself’, but no longer inapplicable to God-made-man, in so far as he has
appropriated, along with a human body, all that goes to make up a human life, that is
soul, intellect, emotion, fragility, even mortality.28
Further he states, “that a single subject Christology means a dynamic union of different
conditions in the one life of God.”29 The fact that Cyril genuinely saw the incarnated Word as
suffering is clear in his twelfth anathema where he writes: “If anyone does not confess that the
Word of God suffered in the flesh […] let him be anathema.”30 In the explanation of this
anathema he states his awareness of the impassibility of the Word, saying again that the Word
could never suffer in respect of its own nature, but he argues:
For he made the passible body his very own, the result of which is that one can say that
he suffered by means of something naturally passible, even while he himself remains
impassible in respect of his own nature; and since he willingly suffered in the flesh, for
this very reason he is called, and actually is the Savior of all.31
What becomes clear here is that to Cyril the main task, in drawing up his Christology, is to
explain the soteriological implications of the incarnation, and that is exactly what we see here. It
is vital for the understanding of Christ as savior that he did in fact suffer in the flesh he was
united to, only not in his impassible deity. But since he has appropriated the humanity as his
own, he does indeed suffer, and thus becomes the supreme redemptive principle for Cyril.32 In
On the Unity of Christ he spells this out:
No, the mystery was accomplished quietly, and for this reason (that is economically) he
allowed the limitations of the manhood to have dominion over himself. This was so
arranged as part of his ‘likeness to us,’ for we advance to greater things little by little as
the occasion calls us to assume a greater stature and a concomitant mentality. The Word
28
McGuckin (2004: 191).
McGuckin (2004: 192).
30
Ep. 17. Anathemas, 12.
31
A Defense of the Twelve Anathemas against Theodoret p. 129 in Daniel, King, St. Cyril of Alexandria: Three
Christological Treatises, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014.
32
McGuckin (2004: 202).
29
9 of 19
who is from the Father, then is entirely perfect and needs nothing whatsoever, since he is
God, yet he makes what is ours his own since he became as we were.33
The soteriology that becomes apparent from this is a striking emphasis on the full divine
engagement in the Incarnated. As McGuckin writes, this is Cyril’s point: “that the divine Lord
truly experiences all that is genuinely human, in order to transform that which is mortal into the
immortal.”34
Returning to the question of the single-subjectivity we can now see, how Cyril fits
together the two natures in a single subject, that being the divine Word. As stated above, the
single-subjectivity is vital for his entire Christological understanding of the union, and the two
together thus mould his Christology. A partial conclusion for now, can thus state that, to Cyril,
the humanity in the incarnated is inseparable from the Word in all aspects as he sees the divinity
and humanity as “One and the same”.35
THE COMPROMISE WITH ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGIANS
After the council of Ephesus in 431, where Nestorius is condemned on the basis of Cyril’s
writings, the church relations are extremely tense, and the imperial court thus urges for a higher
grade of agreement within the church. This leads to an attempt to attain a reconciliation between
Cyril and John of Antioch in 433, which results in both of them signing the Formula of Reunion.
The reconciliation is seen in Cyril’s Letter to John of Antioch, where also the formula is found.
What is interesting about the formula is how the Christology of Cyril seems to differ from what
we saw in the earliest and latest period of his writings. As stated in the introduction, this suggests
that the doctrine of the two other periods is actually the ‘right’ Christology, whereas Cyril here
33
Un.Chr. 110, in McGuckin (1995: 110).
McGuckin (1995: 34).
35
Ep. 4.6.
34
10 of 19
adjusts it in order to attain some kind of ceasefire with the Antiochenes.
In the letter, the Formula of Reunion states that “there was a union of the two natures”,
which is perfectly in line with Cyril’s former and later view on the union, and it is followed by
“this is why we confess One Christ, One Son, One Lord.” All this is not surprising to find in a
formula signed by Cyril, however, it changes direction, and it becomes clear that Cyril has made
a radical compromise. The formula reads:
As for the evangelical and apostolic sayings about the Lord, we are aware that
theologians take some as common, as referring to one prosopon, but distinguish others as
referring to two natures; that they interpret the God-befitting ones in accordance with the
Godhead of the Christ, and the humble ones in accordance with the manhood.36
What is seen here is a distinction between how the scripture talks about the two natures after the
incarnation. It is ambiguous if these two natures are still perceived as a union, however, it is clear
that the formula here balances between a one-subjectivity and two-subjectivity. It seems, that it is
still a union at the end, but Cyril is compromising on his stress on the single-subject, which, as
we saw above, was so vital to his Christology. In this statement Cyril accepts the contribution of
different phrases to the divine and to the humanity of the incarnated. The referent, to whom these
things are applied, is here described as ‘prosopon’. This is not the single divine subject of Cyril’s
incarnated Word, but rather the favorite term of the Antiochenes, which differs in meaning from
the one divine hypostasis, which Cyril preferred. Prosopon rather has the sense of a character, or
in Latin persona, thus referring to the unity of persons in Christ, and not as much to the concrete
Second Person of the Trinity as Cyril’s ‘hypostasis’ does. It is also the favorite term of Nestorius,
who according to Russell, “put forward the idea of prosopic union – two different πρόσωπα, or
roles, the human and the divine, forming a union by conjunction (συνάφεια) in the single
36
Ep. 39.5 in McGuckin (2004: 343-348).
11 of 19
πρόσωπον of Christ.”37 Cyril rejected this idea, as he understood the human prosopon to be a
single human hypostasis, promoted to divine status by a merely external union with the Word.38
What becomes clear from this is that the Formula of Reunion clearly represents a
deviation from Cyril’s strict single-subject-hermeneutic, on the grounds that Cyril now suddenly
accepts the application of different statements to the single prosopon. He thus allows for a
distinction between the lofty and lowly statements, which can then either be understood as
referring to the one prosopon or to two subjects – neither of these being especially reflective of
Cyril’s hermeneutics from the other periods, which stresses that the single subject of all biblical
statements refers to the Word; either purely divinely or in his incarnated form.
This new acceptance of the Antiochenes distinction between expressions appropriate to
God and the human is also seen in Cyril’s Letter to Eulogius, which he writes after the Formula
of Reunion in order to defend his support of document. He writes: “It is necessary to reply to
such critics that we must now feel obliged to flee from and contradict every single thing that the
heretics might say. For there are many things which they confess which we do too.”39 He
continues to state that the flaw of Nestorius was to deny to admit the union along with them, but
that acknowledging the difference of natures is not the same as dividing the union of Christ into
two.40 What this letter, however, presents is something new to the Cyrilline Christology. He
stresses again the union of the One Christ, and diminishes again Nestorius’ understanding of the
union, but in doing so he justifies the distinction in biblical expressions appropriate to either the
human or divine, or to both. He writes:
37
Russel, Norman, Oxford Early Christian Studies: Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 199.
38
Russel (2006: 199).
39
Ep. 44. p. 349, in McGuckin (2004: 349-351).
40
Ibid.
12 of 19
[The Orientals] only tried to distinguish the terms. They make the distinction in such a
way as to say that there are some terms appropriate to the Godhead, some to the
manhood, and some which are referred in common as being appropriate both to the
Godhead and the manhood, except that they are attributed to one and the same person.41
What is presented here is thus a new perception of the division of expressions, as Beeley writes:
“The first two categories (divine and human) appear in the fourth anathema and the late Unity of
Christ; however, the third (both divine and human is new to Cyril’s work and does not recur in
his final treatment of the subject”42 and he continues, “The threefold scheme differentiates the
limited categories of divine, human and common sayings from the Son of God, who utters them
all, thus suggesting that the human (and possibly the common) statements do not refer to the one
and only divine Son.”43 The question in hand is thus, that if Cyril introduces this perception of
the single-subjectivity, does he sufficiently underscore the unity of Christ or does he in fact pave
the way for a division of the natures?
The letters to Eulogius and John of Antioch offer little help in answering this question.
Cyril obviously wished to reconcile without compromising on his own Christological perception,
but even though he returns to his ‘real’ understanding of the unity and single-subjectivity, these
letters stand out as an ambiguous appreciation of the Antiochenes’ division of expressions into,
what can be easily understood as, two subjects. The Council of Chalcedon, as we shall now see,
welcomed Cyril’s Christology from this exact period, ignoring his most true and fair writings
from the Nestorian controversy.
THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON
In 451 the council makes the Definition that, for a long time, should serve as one of the definitive
statements for many churches, but at the same time it produced a major schism among the
41
Ep. 44, p. 351
Beeley (2012: 265).
43
Ibid.
42
13 of 19
Eastern churches. The council can be seen as the victory of the Antiochenes, rectifying the
favoring of Cyril’s Christology from the council of Ephesus in 449.44 From a Cyrilline point of
view, the problem of the Chalcedonian Definition was the texts on which the bishops founded
the Definition. It was only the Second letter of Cyril to Nestorius and the Formula of Reunion
that represented the Christology of Cyril, thus leaving out the Twelve Anathemas from the third
letter.45 This does thus, as we have seen in the analysis above, leave out some of the most
fundamental documents of Cyril’s Christology, and as Beeley writes, this means that Definition
of Chalcedon represents the most “Antiochene” period of Cyril’s writings, namely his letter to
John of Antioch.46 The other document presented was Leo’s Tome, which to some extent was
perfectly aligned with Cyril’s thoughts, but it also presented some very non-Cyrilline passages.
Leo writes: “Each aspect performs its own acts in co-operation with the other; that is, the Word
what is proper to the Word, the flesh pursuing what pertains to the flesh”,47 and again, “there
remained in Him the particular qualities of both the divine and human natures, and that we might
thus realize that the Word is not the same as the flesh […]”.48 What is seen in these two
quotations is an engagement with a two-subject perception of the union, thus moving away from
Cyril, and this alteration from the Cyrilline Christology is what finally leads Leo to the opinion
which should later become the crossroads of the supporters of Cyril and the supporters of
Chalcedon. Leo writes: “The fact is that it was as impious to say that the only-begotten Son of
God had two natures before the Incarnation as it was blasphemous to assert that He had a single
nature after the Word was made flesh.”49 From this it becomes clear that Leo condemns the
44
Beeley (2012: 276-70).
McGuckin (2004: 234).
46
Beeley (2012: 281).
47
Leo the Great, Letters, ed. Hunt, Edmund, Baltimore, US: Catholic University of America Press, 1957, Ep. 28, p.
98.
48
Leo the Great, Ep. 28, p. 101.
49
Leo the Great, Ep. 28, p. 103.
45
14 of 19
position of Cyril, and thus also Gregory Nazianzen, and adopts an extreme position, denying that
there can be any orthodox sense in the miaphysite Christology of Cyril.50 This position became
decisive for the final Definition, which stated that Christ was conceived as a continuing duality;
it reads:
One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures which
undergo no confusion […] and comes together into a single person and a single subsistent
being; he is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-begotten
Son […]51
What we see here is the terminology, which Cyril would not accept in so far as it defines the
incarnated as being in two natures (ἐν δὐο φύσεσιν), thus not stressing the union as Cyril does.
But what is more, the notion that the two natures are brought together in one single person and a
single subsistent being involves some problems, not only in respect to the Cyrilline Christology,
but also in the discussions to come. The Greek text reads εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον και µίαν ὑπόστασιν,
thus talking about the one prosopon and the one hypostasis, which is translated as ‘single person’
and ‘single subsistent being’. It is quite difficult to see how the ‘in two natures’ can be reconciled
with Cyril’s thought of ‘out of two natures’, and therefore we will now engage in a discussion of
how the Cyrilline Christology is represented in the definition of the council of Chalcedon.
THE REPRESENTATION OF CYRILLINE CHRISTOLOGY IN THE CHALCEDONIAN DEFINITION
It has become clear from the analysis of Cyril’s Christology and the Definition of Chalcedon that
there are some discrepancies between the two Christologies presented. A recapitulation of the
Cyrilline doctrine, and thus a conclusion on his Christological thoughts, will serve to pave the
50
Beeley (2012: 275).
Tanner S.J., Norman P., ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, Nicea I to Lateran V, Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1990, p. 86.
51
15 of 19
way for a discussion of the differences between Cyril’s position on the nature of Christ and that
stated in the Chalcedonian definition.
In the analysis, we saw how the union and the single subject were vital to Cyril’s
understanding of the incarnated. To Cyril, the union subsists of the fully divine and the fully
human, the human, which the Word of God has united itself to, thus making it its own. This is
the hypostatic union out of two, where the one hypostasis now literally is the Word of God. We
saw how the single-subjectivity was of the utmost importance for this Christological union, as all
biblical utterances refer to the one Word – which is the union itself. The problem of
Communicatio Idiomatum is resolved in Cyrilline Christology by the fact that the Word has
appropriated the humanity as its own, thus participating in all actions, including suffering,
because it has fully united with the flesh, thus suffering by means of the flesh’s passibility. This
was also vital to Cyril’s soteriology, thus making the Word participate fully in the humanity.
In his middle-period Cyril was, as we saw, indulgent to the Antiochenes in so far as he
accepted the appropriation of expressions to different natures after the incarnation. The word
‘prosopon’ which was used in the Formula of Reunion represents the referent, but this persona is
not coherent with the strict single-subjectivity-hermeneutic which Cyril usually stresses in other
documents. The middle-period’s indulgence towards the strict union and single-subjectivity thus
paved the way for the Chalcedonian definition of the two natures in Christ.
From this analysis and conclusion of the ‘real’ Christology of Cyril it thus seems that the
council of Chalcedon did not represent, what we call, the actual opinion of Cyril. It appears to be
taken from his compromise-seeking thoughts in the middle-period of his writings – especially
those found in the letter to John of Antioch. This position is enhanced by the fact that the council
left out a major portion of Cyrilline documents, which enforces the single-subjectivity and union
16 of 19
of the incarnated. What, however, has to be noticed is that Cyril did not intend to loosen his
stress on the single-subjectivity in the middle-period, rather he wanted to be flexible in the terms
that described the incarnation. He therefore eased away from the emphasis on miaphysis as long
as the union was preserved in the dyophysite comprehension of the incarnation.52
It seems quite evident that the council of Chalcedon did not understand it this way,
however, the Definition still contains almost all of Cyril’s concepts of the incarnation. And since
the Tome of Leo, with which Cyril’s documents were merged into the Definition, was widely
disputed as irreconcilable with Cyril’s stress on the union, it might be possible to regard the
council as being coherent with the Christology of Cyril. McGuckin argues that this is the case.
He states that the affirmation of the enduring identity of the two natures, was safeguarded by use
of the adverbs that Cyril himself used in his letter to Succenus: “The adverbs of Cyril they had in
mind were that the two natures endured in the one Christ: unchangeably, undividedly, and
unconfusedly.”53 Moreover McGuckin states that the key sentence of Leo, in two natures, was
inserted in a sea of Cyrilline citations which all represented Cyril’s writings.54 In this way he
understands the Definition as aligned with the Christology of Cyril from the entire context of the
Definition, thus seeming to ignore the very un-Cyrilline statement of ‘in’ two natures. The
question that has to be asked is whether McGuckin is right, and the Definition actually represents
the ‘real’ Christology of Cyril as it is presented in this paper, or if it rather represents the
Christological compromises from the middle-period?
I find a convincing argument of the council ignoring the ‘real’ thoughts of Cyril in the
denial to include the third letter to Nestorius and the Anathemas, as these clearly represent some
of his clearest Christological statements. However, the definition does include a lot of Cyril’s
52
McGuckin (2004: 227).
Ibid. 236.
54
Ibid. 238.
53
17 of 19
overall ideas except from the phrase ‘in two natures’. As was made clear in this paper, Cyril
would accept speaking of ‘out of two natures’ but never ‘in’. It is far to diverging from the union
of the Incarnated and the single-subjectivity, which constitutes the key positions for his
Christological perception. Although the Definition states that the two natures are in one prosopon
and one hypostasis, this does not make the deviance from Cyril much better – it rather raises
another question of how the two natures in the incarnated can be just one prosopon or hypostasis.
The Definition of Chalcedon thus seems to be causing more problems than it solves. The
council, which was meant to meet in order to reconcile the church, thus ended up producing a
serious schism. As for the representation of Cyrilline Christology in the definition, it can be
concluded that although it was used to a wide degree it ignored the central parts of the
Christological statements, which has become clear from this paper. I will argue that the
Definition of the council of Chalcedon in the end represents the duality of Christ found in Leo’s
Tome, and that this understanding of a continuing duality in Christ became determinative for the
Definition. It thus makes a nonreturnable deviation from Cyril’s undeniable key positions of the
union and single-subjectivity in the Incarnated.
18 of 19
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beeley, Christopher, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012.
King, Daniel, St. Cyril of Alexandria: Three Christological Treatises, Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2014.
Leo the Great, Letters, ed. Hunt, Edmund, Baltimore, US: Catholic University of America Press,
1957, Ep. 28, pp. 92-105.
McGuckin, John A., Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy, Crestwood,
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004.
––––– On the Unity of Christ: St. Cyril of Alexandria, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary
Press, 1995.
Russel, Norman, Cyril of Alexandria, London, US: Routledge, 2002.
––––– Oxford Early Christian Studies: Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Tanner S.J., Norman P., ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, Nicea I to Lateran V,
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990.
Van Loon, Hans, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, Boston, MA: Brill, 2009.
Wessel, Susan, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of
a Heretic, Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004.
19 of 19
Malene Kjær