The Polytheism of the Epicureans

Paul T M Jackson

Epicureans have been branded atheists since antiquity, but although they might have held unorthodox beliefs about divinity, they did nevertheless believe in gods, however unorthodox their beliefs about them were. They did not believe in the Olympians that Hesiod and Homer had depicted, but anthropomorphic yet bizarre gods: although these were compounds of atoms, they were immortal, unlike any other compound in the Epicurean universe, and there was quite possibly an infinite host of such deities, all alike and all nameless. These gods were not considered figments of the imagination by the Epicureans, but as real, living entities that actually existed, remotely, somewhere out there in the cosmos, doing very little aside from maintaining their supremely peaceful, painless, and tranquil dispositions. And these gods needed to be considered real in order to be genuine, ethical models for mankind to follow, which was their main function within the Epicurean world-view. The atoms of these gods, like everything in existence, were held to be perpetually in motion, constantly being emitted from their bodies as images that then travelled directly to the minds of mankind and thereby presented a true depiction of divinity, of peacefulness, and above all, of happiness, which would then be examples for individual Epicureans to follow on their individual journeys towards ἀταραξία, tranquillity.

The Polytheism of the Epicureans By Dr Paul Terence Matthias Jackson Abstract Epicureans have been branded atheists since antiquity, but although they might have held unorthodox beliefs about divinity, they did nevertheless believe in gods, however unorthodox their beliefs about them were. They did not believe in the Olympians that Hesiod and Homer had depicted, but anthropomorphic yet bizarre gods: although these were compounds of atoms, they were immortal, unlike any other compound in the Epicurean universe, and there was quite possibly an infinite host of such deities, all alike and all nameless. These gods were not considered figments of the imagination by the Epicureans, but as real, living entities that actually existed, remotely, somewhere out there in the cosmos, doing very little aside from maintaining their supremely peaceful, painless, and tranquil dispositions. And these gods needed to be considered real in order to be genuine, ethical models for mankind to follow, which was their main function within the Epicurean world-view. The atoms of these gods, like everything in existence, were held to be perpetually in motion, constantly being emitted from their bodies as images that then travelled directly to the minds of mankind and thereby presented a true depiction of divinity, of peacefulness, and above all, of happiness, which would then be examples for individual Epicureans to follow on their individual journeys towards ἀταραξία, tranquillity. 2 The Polytheism of the Epicureans Epicurean Resistance to Orthodoxy Greek religion almost certainly predates the eighth century B.C. epic poems of Homer and Hesiod, but nevertheless these seem to have been a common source for future orthodoxy, with Farrington (1967, 66) writing that “hitherto the Greeks had relied on Homeric and Hesiodic myth”. Despite the decentralisation of Ancient Greece, with poleis, or city-states, often at odds with one another, and despite local variations, Kearns (in Hornblower & Spawforth, 2003, p1300) concludes that this orthodoxy “presented a recognisable picture throughout the Greek world” and had “enough in common to be seen as essentially one system, and [was] generally understood as such by the Greeks”. But in the sixth century B.C. there was a marked shift away from reliance upon Homeric and Hesiodic mythologies and their supernatural explanations for natural phenomena. In Asia Minor, Thales was perhaps the first to think in this more scientific way, reasoning and rationalising, trying to make sense of the universe for himself rather than merely accepting what others told him. Thales paved the way for other philosophers who would share his resistance to orthodoxy and his rationalistic approach, and DeWitt (1954, p107) argues that it was against the likes of Homer and Hesiod that Epicurus came to position himself: “as for the poetical components of the traditional curriculum, Homer, Hesiod, and Theognis, there can be no doubt that his [Epicurus’] attitude was hostile. With the genealogies of the gods he could have had no patience”. Indeed, Diogenes of Oenoanda captures the Epicurean criticism of Homer: 3 [Let us then contradict Homer, who] talks all sorts of nonsense about them [the gods], [representing them sometimes as adulterers, sometimes as] lame, [sometimes as thievish, or even as being struck by mortals with a spear,] as well as introducing the craftsmen to produce inappropriate portrayals. Some statues of the gods shoot [arrows and are produced holding] a bow, [represented] like Heracles in Homer; a bodyguard of wild-beasts attends others; others are angry at the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion.1 Epicurean Atheism Bearing in mind such criticism, it might not seem so surprising that Epicureanism came to be seen as atheistic, and indeed Gordon (1996, p100) writes that by the second century A.D. it had become conventional among non-Epicureans to regard Epicureans as atheists. An example of this type of attitude is evident in Lucian’s parody Zeus Rants. The parody shows the conflicting Stoic and Epicurean ideas about the nature of the gods, with the Stoic Timocles and the Epicurean Damis debating their very existence. Timocles attests that Damis does not think that gods, asking, “Damis, you sacrilegious wretch, why do you say that the gods do not exist and do not show providence on behalf of men?”2 But there are at least two good reasons for this charge of atheism against Epicureans, with neither being a genuine belief that Epicureans did not believe in the existence of gods. Firstly, Gordon (1996, p101) argues that it had its “roots in philosophical discourse”, which amounted to rival schools of philosophical thought purposefully misrepresenting Epicureanism as atheistic, and Obbink (1989, pp220-22) specifies that the alleged atheism of Epicureanism was actually a Sceptical Academic invention, with the polemical representation of Epicurus as an atheist really a distortion of historical fact. And secondly, Obbink (1989, pp188-90) also admits “atheism in the ancient world was never a well-defined or ideologically fixed 4 position”. In the ancient world, the meaning of ἄθεος could be broader than ‘the theory or belief that God [or gods] does not exist’, as the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (2001, p105) defines the term ‘atheism’, for Philodemus in his On Piety classifies atheists, which Obbink summarises as follows: 1. Those who say that it is unknown whether there are any gods or what they are like. 2. Those who say openly that the gods do not exist. 3. And those who clearly imply it. And so Obbink concludes “this scheme implies that the charge of atheism could be incurred for something less than an outright denial of the existence of the gods”. Epicurean Theism And Obbink (1996, pp4-6) does stress the importance of gods to the Epicureans: One of Philodemus’ main contentions in On Piety is that Epicurus had no doubts about the necessity of giving an account of the gods. Epicurus does seem to have placed theology first in his system: the gods are the subject of the first of the Principal Doctrines and stand first in the Letter to Menoeceus, where Epicurus asserts that the gods exist […] the first book of Philodemus’ On Gods deals with the irrational fear of the gods as a basic philosophical problem. The gods also have pride of place in the first colon of the Epicurean fourfold remedy. Indeed, Epicurus himself confirms that “gods there are, since knowledge of them is by clear vision”. In Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, his Epicurean spokesman Gaius Velleius states that “such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, which is a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing”, and explains that prolepsis: Is perceived not by the senses but by mind […] by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams to us from the 5 gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of a being both blessed and eternal.3 Furthermore, Diogenes Laertius writes that prolepsis was a standard of truth in Epicureanism: “in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconception and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations to also be standards”.4 And so it seems clear that Epicureans actually did believe in gods, and that prolepsis revealed not only their nature but also their homes and lives. 1. The Homes of the Gods Philodemus argues in his On Gods that observed phenomena “demonstrate that every nature has a different location suitable to it. To some it is water, to some air and Earth. This is also the case for animals as well as for plants and the like. And for the gods especially there has to be [a suitable location]”.5 According to the source material, the suitable location of their homes lies distant from those of mankind. Diogenes of Oenoanda strenuously argues that immortals could not live alongside mortals, for he asks, “moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea that he needed a city and fellow-citizens?”6 And then he answers his own question: Add to this the absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have human beings as fellow-citizens. And this is the further point too: if he had created the world as a habitation and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created; I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people 6 was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate man – I do not say god – having neither city nor fellow-citizens, he was destitute and roaming about at random. If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, all this is absurd; and if for the sake of men, there are yet more absurd consequences.7 Therefore according to Diogenes it is implausible to even think that the gods dwelt upon the Earth, which is what Diogenes must mean by κόσµος in the context, as the Earth had been created. The gods though, who are immortal and therefore had not been created, having existed for an infinite amount of time, must accordingly have existed before the Earth. Following this line of argument, those who claim that the gods live on the Earth would have to accept that this means the gods had previously lived elsewhere, and had at some point relocated here, which is a premise that Diogenes simply cannot accept. More specifically, in On the Nature of the Gods Cicero introduces his Epicurean spokesman in the following way: Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus!8 ‘Intermundane spaces’ is Rackham’s translation of intermundia. Now Epicurus in his Letter to Pythocles had written: And that such worlds are infinite in number we can be sure, and also that such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void, and not in a large empty space quite like void, as some say: this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in from a single world or interworld, or from several.9 It is µετακόσµιον that Bailey translates as ‘interworld’. It seems clear then that intermundia is Cicero’s translation of Epicurus’ µετακόσµια. Epicurus himself defines 7 µετακόσµιον as µεταξὺ κόσµων διάστηµα, “a space between worlds”, but in order to grasp what exactly is meant by a ‘space between worlds’, one has to first appreciate what is being meant by a ‘world’. Bailey translates κόσµος as a ‘world’, but this can be misleading because ‘world’ suggests a celestial body such as the Earth, whereas κόσµος can also refer to the universe. Indeed, the transliteration of κόσµος, cosmos, refers specifically to the universe rather than a celestial body. But Epicurus does again help the reader by giving his own definition of κόσµος: “a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an Earth and all the heavenly phenomena […] it is a piece cut off from the infinite”.10 Therefore with κόσµος Epicurus seems to mean a region of the universe that contains heavenly bodies. By extension then, a µετακόσµιον, a space between those regions of the universe that contain heavenly bodies, must be a region of the universe that does not contain heavenly bodies, though Epicurus does also says that it is not entirely empty. The nature of these interworlds is rather vague, but the important thing that the Epicureans try to convey is that the gods live remotely, away from mankind, in a potentially infinite number of such interworlds, each of which are quiet and are apart from celestial bodies, though they are not entirely empty. In the sixth book of his De rerum natura (DRN), Lucretius further elaborates upon the homes of the gods: Another thing it is impossible that you should believe is that any holy abode of the gods exists in any part of the world. For the nature of the gods, being thin and far removed from our senses, is hardly seen by the mind’s intelligence; and since it eludes the touch and impact of the hands, it cannot possibly touch anything that which we can touch; for that cannot touch which may not be touched itself. Therefore their abodes also must be different from our abodes, being thin in accord with their bodies.11 8 This is a crucially important reference, as not only does Lucretius here state that the homes of the gods lie apart from the Earth, as mundus ought to be understood here, but he also gives further details about their composition: these interworlds are composed of such fine material that they cannot be touched or thereby be destroyed, like the gods who live within them. These interworlds are “hardly seen by the mind’s intelligence” because of the extremely fine nature of such places. And yet however fine this material is, it must be composed of atoms and void, for Lucretius maintains, “there is nothing which you can call wholly distinct from body and separate from void, to be discovered as a kind of third nature”.12 2. The Nature of the Gods Epicurus claims in his Letter to Menoeceus that the gods “are not such as the many believe them to be”.13 So what were they thought to be like? Firstly, in the same letter, Epicurus states emphatically that the gods were immortal: First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality.14 However, this is problematic: Lucretius maintains that all things are composed of atoms and void that can be broken down to these constituent atoms, meaning that compounds themselves cannot be immortal. It would follow that this should include gods. Sextus Empiricus captures this paradox when writing, “according to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of god, but in expounding the physical nature of things he does not allow it”.15 So Brown (1984, 201) concedes “the Epicurean gods, though material, were, unlike the world and its inhabitants, [the gods 9 being] eternal and indestructible”. Bailey (1947b, p1343) suggests, “Epicurus conceived them [gods] as atomic compounds, but of a texture far more subtle (tenuis) than anything included in our world. Tenuis: ‘subtle’, ‘fine’, ‘tenuous’ in the character of the atoms which compose it and in the way in which they are united”. The Epicurean gods were composed of material so fine and elusive, like the interworlds that they inhabit, that they could potentially avoid fatal collisions and thereby be rendered immortal. But it is Philodemus’ On Piety that helps most of all to make sense of the paradox. Here he explains, “for the most part they [gods] come about when they are formed from an aggregation of various similar particles”.16 Therefore, gods are composed of similar atoms, perhaps with regard to their fineness. Such a composition would be distinctive to the gods, and it is this composition of fine and elusive material that allows the gods to avoid potentially destructive collisions. Yet Lucretius writes that all compounds are always in motion,17 which should make them unstable and liable to lose material, even if they were to avoid potentially destructive collisions. However, it is perhaps the similarity of the atoms that the gods are composed of, thereby being mutually compatible, that curbs this instability and strengthens rather the unity of such compounds. Lucretius explains how atoms actually cohere with one another: “whatever seems to us hardened and close set must consist of elements more closely hooked and held knit deeply together by branch-like shapes”.18 Therefore these fine, elusive, and similar atoms that the gods are composed of perhaps also have a special type of bond that enhances their cohesion and unity. And so Aëtius claims, “the same philosopher [Epicurus] says elsewhere that there are four existences immortal in their kinds, namely, the atoms, the void, the 10 universe, the similarities”.19 Philodemus in his On Piety had considered what these ‘similarities’ are: [A god’s] constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified entity. For it is possible for beings constituted out of similarity for ever to have perfect happiness, since unified entities can be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements and both kinds of entity are recognised by Epicurus as being exactly the same things, for example in his book On Holiness. The demonstration that this involves no contradiction may be passed over. Therefore, he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike. And that for the most part they came about when they are formed from an aggregation of various similar particles.20 However, these gods do lose material, as images, which must also be material, constantly stream from the gods to the minds of mankind and spark preconception. If this material was not replenished, there would surely come a point when the gods would lose all of their material and thereby no longer exist. And yet Velleius proclaims that “if the causes of destruction are beyond count, the causes of conservation also are bound to be infinite”,21 and indeed gods might preserve their immortality in another way. According to Lucretius, the nature of the gods and the interworlds in which they reside is also similar. Therefore there would be a readily available store of similar material to replenish the gods, replacing any displaced atoms. Further, in a universe of infinite size, there are a potentially infinite number of interworlds, and so the images that the gods constantly lose might stream to the minds of mankind, but they might also happen upon other interworlds instead and thereby replenish these interworlds and the gods within them. Indeed, when images happen upon the minds of mankind and spark preconception, similar material might also be displaced. And so, with an endless interchange such as this, the amount of similar material would always be enough, and equilibrium would be maintained, and indeed, Lucretius does state that although there is an infinite store of material in the universe, the proportions of atoms and void always remain the same.22 And so Bailey (1947a, 11 p990) argues that there is a “constant supply of atoms moving in the void [which] maintains their [gods’] bodies, which are everlasting because the form [of the gods] remains the same, but the substance changes”. It is Lucretius who most probably influences him: “there was always a succession of visions coming up in which the shape [of gods] remained the same”.23 And yet, if a god constantly loses material by giving off images, and this displaced material is constantly being replaced, there must surely come a point when, although the god still exists, all of its original atoms have been lost, bringing into question whether it is still the same god anymore. This evokes the famous Ship of Theseus paradox: in his Parallel Lives, Theseus, Plutarch recalls, The Athenians down to the time of Demetrius Phalereus preserved the ship on which Theseus sailed with the youths and returned in safety, the thirty-oared galley. They took away the old timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that the vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same vessel.24 It could be argued that the god remains the same by continuity, as not all of its atoms had been exchanged at the same time. However in his On the Form of God Demetrius Lacon writes, “memories are kept”25 despite the constant interchange of atoms, and indeed that, beyond memories, “it is possible for a certain number of bodies to be kept”,26 and so the gods could also retain original material and thereby their identity. If images were lost from their surface layer, as would be most likely, a god’s core could indeed remain intact. 12 But regardless of the amount of material that is lost and replenished, Merlan (1960, p54) wonders how a god can remain happy, which Epicureans claims they are, if they lost any material at all: If the atomic complexes which are gods admittedly exchange their atoms for others which are only specifically identical, how can we still say that the happiness of the gods is an uninterrupted condition, i.e. that the gods are always happy? And the answer seems to be that an atomic complex does not lose its identity by exchanging atoms for others only specifically identical with the ones it lost. Merlan’s main point is that gods can remain happy despite losing material because the lost material is always replenished, and it is always replaced by similar material, so a god does not lose identity. And yet Lucretius writes that “the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed and separated from our affairs; for without any pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own resources, needing us not at all, is neither propitiated with services nor touched by wrath”.27 The loss and replenishment of atoms must be negligible as to be painless, quite possible given the fineness of their material, and this must also be how these gods can remain happy. Moving on now to the faculties that these gods possess, Demetrius Lacon in his On the Form of God claims that the gods possess mind and soul: “[god] has in common with man soul. For that reason, if certain living creatures have a form made in this way, god must also be made in this way; but he will have the rational faculty and indeed together with common properties he will also have many other properties to the highest degree”.28 The gods have a body that is finer than the human mind, and therefore must possess an even finer mind and soul. Demetrius Lacon is also 13 indicating that the gods share properties with humans, though the divine properties are enhanced. Philodemus in his On Methods of Inference argues, That nothing prevents a god from being similar to man in the use of practical wisdom, since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of practical wisdom. A god cannot be perceived of as lacking practical wisdom but can be perceived of as not having been generated and yet being composed of soul and body; with this he will be living and deathless.29 Philodemus like Demetrius Lacon indicates that the gods share properties with humans, like soul and body, and that this makes the gods not only rational but also alive. Indeed in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods Velleius also argues that “god is a living being […] supremely happy, and no one can be happy without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason”.30 Philodemus in his On Methods of Inference does however distinguish between gods and other living beings: “if while saying that all living things among us are destructible, we say that the gods are indestructible”.31 Lucretius in the third book of his DRN reasons that the soul also makes perception possible. After explaining that the soul is a composite of breath, heat, air, and a fourth, nameless nature, he continues, The fourth nature must therefore be added to these [breath, heat, and air]; this is entirely without name; nothing exists more easily moved and thinner than this, or made of elements smaller and smoother; and this first distributes the sense-giving motions through the limbs. For this is first set in motion, being composed of small shapes.32 The suggestion is then that gods possess soul, so are alive, and so are endowed with sensation. 14 Philodemus in his On Piety says, “in allowing perception and pleasure”33 to the divine, or in other words, divinity is capable of perception and pleasure, which is in keeping with the gods’ happiness. But he also writes, According to Epicurus, in On Gods, that which does not have in its nature the sensitive constitution is consistent with its divinity; and divine nature appears to be that which is not of the nature that partakes of pain [so that it [pain] necessarily creates many weaknesses] and to be a kind of divinity [i.e. sharing in pains would necessarily be a source of weakness, so that an entity that did so could be neither imperishable nor divine].34 Therefore although the gods can perceive pleasure, they cannot perceive pain, for this would not be in keeping with their immortality as gods are entirely insusceptible to harm. However in his On the Form of God Demetrius Lacon makes the comment that “the divine […] will differ from the sensitive units and from those that do not last forever and change themselves”35: sensitive immortals differ from sensitive mortals because the former cannot perceive pain whereas the latter can, and in fact this is what renders these mortal. The gods only perceive pleasure and not pain, as they are composed of matter that is so elusive that they evade all potentially harmful material that would inflict pain and only interact with similar, beneficial material that would thereby induce pleasure. Accordingly Philodemus claims that the gods would survive even if any potentially harmful material chanced upon their interworld: “if they [people] inquire accurately, he [Epicurus] says, he thinks that it is possible for their [gods’] nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it [their nature]”.36 The anthropomorphic nature of the gods is described throughout the Epicurean corpus. Demetrius writes, “and so, after these arguments have been dealt with 15 accurately, it is not difficult to demonstrate also, on account of these inferences, that we admit god to be anthropomorphic; it is clear that we attribute a human form to god”.37 However, this anthropomorphic nature might not be entirely consistent with the inactivity of the gods: Epicurus writes of the bliss that the gods enjoy, however in On the Nature of the Gods Cicero’s Academic Sceptic spokesman Gaius Cotta argues that such bliss results from these gods being “entirely inactive”,38 and that “even divine [happiness] involves being bored to death with idleness”.39 And Cotta also asks, “what need is there for feet without walking?” 40 For indeed in his DRN Lucretius indicates that the gods have limbs. Demetrius Lacon tackles this argument in his On the Form of God: ‘If indeed’- he [some Stoic or Peripatetic philosopher] says – ‘he [god] has human form, it is clear that he will also have eyes and so will also suffer from ophthalmia. The same [god] will also suffer in his other senses’. But this objection also contains within itself a logical inconsistency almost equal.41 Demetrius’ argument seems to be that although the gods are anthropomorphic they do not necessarily share every single property and condition. Indeed, Epley, Waytz & Capioppo (2007, pp864-66) argue, “anthropomorphism is […] a process of inference about unobservable characteristics of a nonhuman agent, rather than descriptive reports of a nonhuman agent’s observable or imagined behaviour”. Therefore although gods and humans might resemble one another it does not necessarily mean that they resemble each another in every single way. 16 Even so, although these gods might have many properties in common with humans, the gods would possess these at the highest level, which would then mean that they are not exactly the same. And these properties might not be used in the same way either, or indeed even be used, for in his DRN Lucretius says mysteriously: “do not suppose that the clear light of the eyes was made in order that we might be able to see before us”.42 In his On Piety Philodemus suggests that there could be a multitude of such gods: “that [it is possible even] for many eternal and immortal gods to exist”.43 And in his On the Nature of the Gods Cicero also indicates that Epicureans believed in an infinite number of deities: Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals.44 A scholion to Diogenes Laertius reads: “elsewhere he [Epicurus] says that the gods are discernible by reason alone, some being numerically distinct, while others result uniformly from the continuous influx of similar images directed to the same spot and in human form”.45 The suggestion is that although there might be a multitude of such gods, they are all similar to one another, which would correspond to their material and interworlds. In Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods Cotta goes further, claiming that the Epicurean gods “are all exactly alike […] without names”.46 Cicero here perhaps influences Merlan (1960, p56) when the latter argues that for Epicureanism “popular 17 religion would be correct in assuming the existence of a Zeus […] but mistaken in assuming that there is only one Zeus”. However, Cicero’s language is too strong, as these gods could not be exactly alike, as Rackham translates una, but rather similar. 3. The Life of the Gods Lucretius beseeches: Put far away from you thoughts unworthy of the gods and alien to their peace, their holy divinity, impaired by you, will often do you harm; not that the supreme power of the gods is open to insult, so that it should in wrath thirst to inflict sharp vengeance, but because you yourself will imagine that they, who are quiet in their placid peace, are rolling great billows of wrath, you will not be able to approach their shrines with placid heart, you will not have the strength to receive with tranquil peace of spirit the images which are carried to men’s minds from their holy bodies, declaring what the divine shapes are.47 And yet the Epicureans cannot have thought that the gods did absolutely nothing, for by merely existing these gods were doing something. Moreover, Epicurean physics holds that all atoms are constantly in motion, and furthermore these gods would be constantly undergoing replenishment of their own atoms. Philodemus in his On Gods gives an insight into what the Epicureans thought the life of these gods was like. He claims that the gods “are friends to one another, even if their friendship, unlike that of human beings, does not reciprocate in mutual aid”.48 However Essler (in Fish & Sanders, 2011, pp131-31) adds, “Philodemus rules out the possibility of friendship proper between humans and gods”. Seneca, in his On Benefits, does later write that Epicurean divinity “dwells alone, without a living creature, without a human being”,49 but here he is only trying to stress the Epicurean belief that the gods live far away from the affairs of mankind. 18 Philodemus elaborates upon the type of friendship these gods enjoyed, that it involved the mutual conversation of the kind engaged in by Epicurean sages, about divination and its implications for divine omniscience.50 Indeed Rist (1972, p153) says, “Philodemus even supposes that their language is Greek or something very like it”.51 And Essler (in Fish & Sanders, 2011, pp131-32) conveys that the gods not only speak and engage in conversation but also respire. And Mansfield (in Algra et al., 2010, p456) conveys the explanation from the Epicurean philosopher Hermarchus as to why the gods breathe: because gods are living beings, and all living beings breathe. Merlan (1960, p18) mentions “the well-known Epicurean assertion that the gods eat”, and Masson (1907, pp276-77) goes further, that “the gods require both food and drink as men do”, undoubtedly also because the gods are living beings. And yet their consumption and respiration might simply amount to replenishment of atoms. But aside from doing what is absolutely necessary for a living being, as well as philosophising, all the evidence indicates that the Epicurean gods were thought to do very little. Indeed in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods Cotta says that Epicurean divinity is engaged “in ceaseless contemplation of his own happiness, for he has no other object for his thoughts”.52 And yet these gods were not thought to sleep. Philodemus in his On Gods proposes, “let us consider whether one should suppose that the gods fall asleep”.53 He then remarks, “at first sight it seems inappropriate, because in these kinds of circumstances there is a violent change in living beings and one that bears close 19 resemblance to death”.54 Therefore, as sleep was identified with death in antiquity, both would be inappropriate for an immortal. Idealism or Realism However, even when it is accepted that the Epicureans were theists, scholars continue to query what these gods actually amounted to. Some argue that these deities do not have to actually be biologically alive, dwelling somewhere in the universe, to be models for mankind to emulate: the Epicureans could have constructed gods in their minds to be such models. Sedley (in Fish & Sanders, 2011, p29) puts this debate between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ in the following terms: Epicurean theology has come to be viewed as a battleground between two parties of interpreters, the realists and the idealists. Realists take Epicurus to have regarded the gods as biologically immortal beings […] idealists take Epicurus’ idea to have been, rather, that gods are our own graphic idealisation of the life to which we aspire. 1. The Idealist Interpretation Sedley (1998, p66), an advocate of the ‘idealist’ interpretation, refers to the Epicurean gods as thought-constructs, holding that the Epicurean gods were conceptual or purposeful thoughts created by mankind so as to be their own ethical models. Sedley (in Fish & Sanders, 2011) develops and elaborates upon his earlier work, now with two main thrusts to his argument. Firstly, he (p29) argues, “once that [governing] role was eliminated and god’s relevance to us was reduced to that of an ideal model, the need for him to exist objectively was likely to seem less pressing”. 20 Sedley’s point is essentially that if the Epicurean gods are inactive and not interested in mankind, they do not need to exist objectively so as to be an ideal model for human emulation. Secondly, Sedley (p31) analyses the Epicurean theory of preconception in close detail, making use of Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods in particular. Here Velleius argues that gods exist “since we [everybody] possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them [the gods]”.55 Sedley draws attention to Velleius’ correction of himself, replacing insitas, ‘instinctive’, with innatas, ‘innate’. And indeed Cicero’s Stoic spokesman Quintus Lucilius Balbus later uses innatum rather than insitum when he says “hence the main issue is agreed among all men of all nations, inasmuch as all have engraved in their minds an innate belief that the gods exist”.56 Sedley prefers ‘implanted’ as a translation of insitas, which is indeed the first sense of insero, and so argues, “knowledge of the gods then really is […] ‘inborn’ rather than ‘implanted’ in us subsequent to birth”. Sedley (pp40-41) acknowledges, “it could then be that, on the one hand, the preconception of god is ‘innate’ in the sense that we are from birth programmed to acquire it […] our full realisation of that predisposition occurs […] only when images of divine beings have frequently entered our consciousness from outside”. But Sedley (p48) thinks rather that humans “fill out their innate preconception […] they had themselves visualised […] [it is] not the nature of the object that determines the preconception, but the ‘innate’ predisposition of the human subject”. Therefore according to Sedley the images of gods are not implanted in mankind subsequent to 21 birth, and do not originate in any gods, but rather that they come from man’s own mind, for mankind is born with a predisposition to mentally construct images of gods. Sedley (p38) also wonders, “are we born already possessing some kind of awareness of the gods?” However he immediately concludes that this “idea can be quickly eliminated” as (p48) “it cannot have been hardwired into us by any divine creator”. Preconception is rather an “innate religious disposition […] to think of beings that possess precisely those capacities” that mankind aspires for. Sedley (pp4849) continues that preconception is “an innate desire to maximise their [mankind’s’] own pleasure […] each of us has an innate propensity to imagine […] the being [a god] we would ideally like to become”. And indeed Sedley argues that the Epicurean gods are anthropomorphic so as to facilitate such emulation, and also because the images of gods are essentially manmade. 2. The Realist Interpretation Konstan (in Fish & Sanders, 2011), an advocate of the ‘realist’ interpretation, argues against the likes of Sedley, that the Epicureans thought that the gods are biologically alive, dwelling somewhere in the cosmos. He (p53) also analyses the Epicurean theory of preconception in close detail, making use of Philodemus’ On Gods, countering Obbink’s (2002, p215) definition of preconception as “psychological processes […] with the human soul”. Rather, Konstan (in Fish & Sanders, 2011, p60) writes that according to Philodemus mind Is said to receive συµπλοκαί, or tangles, of the gods,57 from where it received also the first thoughts of them […] ‘from the first moments of birth’ […] gods are conceived [or perceived by mind] as being at the same distances as certain stars. In fact, however, they do not dwell and circulate together with the stars: rather, it 22 is the interminglings [συµπλοκαί]58 that occur in the middle space, however far away the gods’ constituent atoms [γεννητικά]59 may be. Konstan understands that these συµπλοκαί the human mind perceives from birth are the images of the gods, whereas the γεννητικά refer to the gods themselves, from which those συµπλοκαί originate, and that the γεννητικά lie much further away as the συµπλοκαί had been travelling towards mankind from those gods. This refutes Sedley’s proposal that man is born with an image of divinity that he has himself constructed. And so although one might think that they perceive gods in the vicinity of stars, they are actually only seeing the gods’ images in transit. Konstan elaborates upon his own understanding of preconception. He (p67) argues, “preconceptions are formed over time, as a result of repeated sensory (or mental) impressions – they do not come ready formed at infancy, but are acquired through experience”. Konstan’s understanding is that preconception of the gods is not a single event, but that the conception of the gods is enhanced after numerous preconceptions. This would explain why Epicureanism encouraged continued contemplation of the gods. Konstan (pp67-68) also responds to Sedley’s point about Velleius’ correction of insitas to innatas. Konstan argues that “the basic meaning of innatus, an adjective derived from the past participle of innascor, is not so much ‘innate’ or ‘inborn’ as ‘grown up’ or ‘developed’”, and indeed Lewis & Short (1917, p957) translate the root verb innascor as ‘to grow or spring up in’. And so Konstan thinks Velleius means that the conception of the gods grows upon individuals, rather than that this conception is ‘innate’ or ‘inborn’ in them. Konstan also translates insitas as “‘growing’ […] ‘implanted’ on a thing”, and indeed Lewis & Short (1917, p966) include ‘an 23 ingrafting’ as a translation for insitus, and (1917, p964) to ‘plant in, ingraft’ as a translation for its root verb insero. And so Konstan does not think that Velleius is correcting himself when he replaces insitas with innatas but that he is merely clarifying himself. Konstan and Sedley are also in disagreement over another passage from Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, where Velleius says that preconception is made possible “because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods”. 60 Rackham (1961, p50) thinks that ad deos, ‘towards the gods’, is a scribal error and offers ad eos, a deo, ad nos, a diis, and ad nos as suitable and more likely corrections. He suggests that the sentence is “probably to be altered into ‘streams to us from the gods’”, which is indeed how he translates it. Konstan (in Fish & Sanders, 2011, p70) points out that Sedley prefers not to correct the original and that he uses this reference to support his thesis that the Epicurean gods were thought-constructs: “‘by converging on our [human] minds they [manmade images] become our gods’”. Konstan contends that, whether the images come towards or from the gods, the existence of actual gods that are distinct from mankind is still indicated. In conclusion here, Sedley (p52) remarks that Epicurus would not have been “all that disconcerted” whether people adopted the ‘realist’ or ‘idealist’ interpretation. However, I argue that he would, for this is a vitally important point: the objective of Epicureanism was the acquisition of tranquillity and happiness, which Epicurean doctrine, preconception, and contemplation and emulation of the divine form made possible. The Epicureans had to believe that their gods actually existed as biologically 24 alive entities for them to be worthy of emulation, and if they were not, they could not have been worthy ethical models. The ‘idealist’ interpretation is complex and ambitious, but there is no explicit evidence that the Epicureans believed the gods were thought-constructs, and indeed the cumulative weight of the evidence supports the ‘realist’ interpretation. Epicurean Piety In his On Piety Philodemus argues vigorously in defence of the theism and piety of the Epicureans, and indeed for the rationale behind each. In its first section he reveals that Epicurus himself even criticised others for not believing in gods: “those who eliminate the divine from existing things Epicurus reproached for their complete madness, as in Book 12 [of On Nature], he reproaches Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias amongst others, saying that they rave like lunatics”.61 Furthermore, Philodemus defends the sincerity of Epicurean belief in the following way: If he [Epicurus] had said that gods exist for the sake of social convention, they [the Epicureans] would certainly not have offered demonstrations, since there were not even any objections to tell against them, nor would they [the Epicureans] have fought against those who do away with the divine, nor would they [the Epicureans] have advanced proofs in such extensive argumentation and in the other matters connected with them [the gods] in their [the Epicureans’] books.62 In its second section Philodemus claims that the Epicureans observed traditional cult and worshipped and were thereby pious, and he further writes that Epicurus himself participated in the mysteries and festivals,63 and that all acts of worship were to be conducted properly and lawfully, 64 employing objects for 25 worship.65 Indeed, having analysed Philodemus’ On Piety, Festugière (1946, p92) concludes, “Epicurus, then, observed the forms of the state religion not only so as to ‘obey the law’, but from genuine feeling. Nevertheless his religion was not that of the common people”. 66 Of course being lawful was no bad thing, but as has been demonstrated the Epicureans genuinely believed in gods anyway. And yet the Epicurean gods were not the gods of state religion, and Festugière elegantly captures this curiosity. So, the Epicureans might have attended the festivals of the gods of orthodoxy, but they did so in order to contemplate their own gods, as well to be lawful. And in its third section Philodemus explains the Epicurean position, further defending and justifying their worship on psychological grounds, that the gods have beneficial and harmful influences upon mankind, though they do not intentionally interfere with humans, writing that “we [the Epicureans] all regard our views [about gods] as the true cause of our own tranquillity”.67 He further explains the benefit of contemplating the divine nature at such occasions: Those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness in so far as mortals can, so that, since it was seen to come from doing no harm to anyone, they will endeavour most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power.68 Festive occasions allow particular focus upon divinity, perhaps facilitating preconception, so Epicureans would then be in a better position to emulate the gods. Indeed Festugière (1946, p98) writes, “it is on festal days, when we approach the altar of sacrifice or contemplate the divine statue, that the influence of the gods makes itself more strongly felt and produces the greatest joy”.69 26 Philodemus also cites the Epicurean Metrodorus as saying that it is both fitting and beneficial to emulate the gods,70 which is made possible through worship and contemplation of them. Throughout his On Piety Philodemus stresses that the benefits of worship are for the worshipper rather than those worshipped: the gods have all they need and thereby do not require worship; they are forever peaceful so cannot be moved to anger if they are not worshipped, and do not need to be appeased either; and they have no interest in the affairs of mankind, and are thus not benevolent towards them. And yet worship of gods is fitting for such superior beings. However, perhaps the most important reason for worship is a physical one: the gods constantly, albeit incidentally, emit images that mankind can preconceive and emulate, which in turn can result in a tranquillity and happiness like that of the gods. Cicero might mock the Epicureans for emulating laziness, but this misses the point: the qualities that the Epicureans admired in their gods were their peacefulness, harmlessness, and happiness, and these were the qualities that they wanted to emulate, and it was in this way that they could be like their gods. In such a way, not only could gods be happy, but so too could individual Epicureans, and indeed society at large, though the gods could of course be harmful towards mankind, albeit incidentally, if mankind did not emulate them and thereby did not receive the incidental benefits on offer. Epicureanism makes it clear that preconception of the divine nature is important for the happiness of mankind, but this ought not to be confused with reliance upon gods. The onus is rather on humans to facilitate preconception by attending festivals and worshipping and to act upon the images of divinity thereby 27 received by emulating the gods. Ultimately, mankind is empowered: the gods are not benevolent, so mankind must obtain its own happiness. Epicureanism can assist, but individuals must want the assistance on offer. Indeed, Obbink (1995, p193) writes that mankind can expedite “the benefits which Epicurus thought the gods provided to humans”. Gale (2001, pp12-13) speaks of Epicurus in this way: Despite the fact that we cannot affect the gods in any way, however, Epicurus still (somewhat paradoxically) recommends that his disciples take part in the public rituals of the state religion. Contemplation of the divine, he argues, is good for us: the perfect peace enjoyed by the gods can be a source of inspiration to us in our pursuit of the same goal. Indeed, the aim of the Epicurean is to become like the gods, to imitate their calm detachment; thus, while religious ritual cannot please the gods, it can be of great [though indirect] benefit to the worshipper. Similarly, Santayana (1935, p30) writes that “the gods were too remote and too happy, secluded like good Epicureans, to meddle with earthly things. Nothing ruffled what Wordsworth calls their ‘voluptuous unconcern’. Nevertheless, it was pleasant to frequent their temples”. And Santayana (p62), influenced most probably by Philodemus, writes, “Epicurus himself was so sincere in this belief in gods, and so much affected by it, that he used to frequent the temples”. Lucretius also admits the importance of worship: Unless you spew all these errors out of your mind, and put far from you thoughts unworthy of the gods and alien to their peace, their holy divinity, impaired by you, will often do you harm; not that the supreme power of the gods is open to insult, so that it should in wrath thirst to inflict sharp vengeance, but because you yourself will imagine that they, who are quiet in their placid peace, are rolling great billows of wrath, you will not be able to approach their shrines with placid heart, you will not have the strength to receive with tranquil peace of spirit the images which are carried to men’s minds from their holy bodies, declaring what the divine shapes are.71 28 Here Lucretius suggests that one ought to approach the shrines of the gods, to facilitate preconception, and that this can only be done if one adopts a peaceful disposition, which will allow contemplation of divinity and in turn peace of mind for the worshipper. Therefore one should enter upon worship in the right state of mind, free of false beliefs of fearsome deities, ready to receive the real images of peaceful gods, and in this way preconception and contemplation of divinity can be facilitated. Indeed Godwin (2004, pp16-17) understands Lucretius in the following way: “Lucretius depicts the wise man approaching the temples of the gods ‘with a peaceful heart’ and imbibing this peace of the gods into his own heart”. This reference stands as the best example of Lucretius encouraging piety. The Religion of Epicureanism Such was the piety of the Epicureans, it would perhaps not be wrong to refer to Epicureanism as a religion. Indeed, Farrington (1947, pp91-92) cites Gassendi: In the seventeenth century it was evident that Epicurus had taught a singularly pure religion, if a defective one. Drawing a distinction between the filial and servile elements in religion, the servile being those concerned with the interchange of services between men and gods, the filial with pure devotion, Gassendi emphasised the fact that it is only the servile elements of religion that are lacking in Epicurus. Therefore, according to Gassendi at least, Epicureanism was a religion, a religion of pure devotion once all servile elements had been stripped away. Farrington (p99) also cites Sallustius’ On Gods: All this care of the world, we must believe, is taken by the gods without any act or will or labour. As bodies that possess some power produce their efforts by merely existing: e.g. the Sun gives light and heat by merely existing: so, and far more so, the providence of the gods acts without effort to itself and for the good of the objects of its forethought. This solves the problem of the 29 Epicureans, who argue that what is divine neither has trouble itself nor gives trouble to others.72 This further helps to explain how the Epicurean gods, thought they are not benevolent, can still bequeath benefits, incidentally. Farrington (pp110-11) conveys that religion “it is that constrains and holds together all humane society, this is the foundation, prop, and stay of all laws”, though the “Epicurean religion could not perform what was for them an essential function of religion. Gods that took no heed whatever of bad men were useless to police the state”. Importantly, Farrington also refers to Epicureanism as a religion himself, albeit a defective one. However, this misunderstands the Epicurean belief, that social harmony could actually be improved if fear was removed and individuals were empowered. Indeed Festugière (1946, pxiii) comments, “it is noticeable that both [Stoic and Epicurean] doctrines touch on matters of religion. The Stoic lives in accord with the Cosmic god, the Epicurean banishes the fear of the gods and of Hades. Therefore these two systems of morality fundamentally imply a religious attitude”.73 Festugière (pp94-95) describes the Epicurean religion in the following way: Since the gods are indescribably happy, to praise them in prayer, to draw near to them on those solemn occasions when the city offers them a sacrifice, and to rejoice with them at the arrival of festivals is to take part in their happiness. That is why the disciple of Epicurus would be faithful to the prescriptions of religion. And so, the Epicureans worshipped the gods as it was beneficial for them, for they could partake in divine happiness merely by contemplating it, for Festugière (pp95-96) also writes, “this religion of Epicurus is related to Plato’s. Both put the goals of religious activity in the contemplation of beauty […] the divine being, 30 whatever its essence, is a being of perfect beauty, who lives a life of harmony and serenity […] likewise the gods of Epicurus are filled with beauty”.74 Indeed, in his On Gods Philodemus writes, “it [divinity] possesses beauty in plenitude”.75 Festugière (pp98-99) also provides a piece of evidence from the Oxyrhynchus Papyri. He introduces this as a Letter written by the sage [Epicurus] to an unknown friend, discovered in an Egyptian papyrus, recognised as belonging to Epicurus […] this dogma, far from abolishing religion, should purify it; the truly pious man does not approach the gods to appease them or to obtain some favour from them, but to unite himself to them by contemplation, to rejoice in their joy, and so to taste for himself, in this mortal life, their unending happiness.76 So Festugière also refers to Epicureanism here as a religion of pure devotion. He (pp99-101) then translates the letter itself: <It is no proof of piety to observe the customary religious obligations – through the offerings of sacrifices> on suitable occasions may be, as I have said, in keeping with nature – nor is it, by Zeus, when someone or other goes about repeating, ‘I fear all the gods, and honour them, and want to spend all my money in making sacrifices, and consecrating offerings to them’. Such a man is perhaps more praiseworthy than other individuals, but still it is not thus that a solid foundation for piety is laid. You, my friend, must know that the most blessed gift is to have a clear perception of things; that is absolutely the best thing that we can conceive of here below. Admire this clear apprehension of the spirit, revere this divine gift. After that, <you should not honour the gods because you think thus to gain their favour>, as people will think when they see you performing acts of piety, but only because, in comparison with your own happiness, you see how the condition of the gods is infinitely more august, according to our doctrine. And certainly, by Zeus, <when you practise> this doctrine – the doctrine most worthy of belief, <as your reason should tell you – it is of course open to you to offer sacrifices to the gods. By doing so you perform> an act which gives confidence and is a pleasure to see, if it is done at the proper time, because you honour your own doctrine by enjoying those pleasures of the senses which befit such occasions and besides you conform in some sense to religious traditions. Only be careful that you do not permit any admixture of fear of the gods or of the supposition that in acting as you do you are winning the favour of the gods. For indeed, in the name of Zeus, [as men affect to say] what have you to fear in this matter? Do 31 you believe that the gods can do you harm? Is not that, on any showing, to belittle them? How then will you not regard the divinity as a miserable creature if it appears inferior in comparison to yourself? Or will you rather be of the opinion that by sacrificing thousands of oxen you can appease god if you have committed some evil deed? Can you think that he will take account of the sacrifice and, like a man, remit at some time or another a part of the penalty? No doubt men tell each other that they should fear the gods and honour them with sacrifices, so that, restrained by the tribute they receive, the gods will not attack them; as a result they think that if their surmise is correct they will altogether escape injury and if it is not, all will be well because they pay homage to the power of the gods. But if these close relations <between gods and men were really to exist it would be a great misfortune, for the effect would make itself felt even beyond the grave>, after the funeral ceremonies, as soon as a man was cremated. For then men would suffer injury even beneath the earth and everyone would have to expect punishment. Moreover, I need not describe how men would have to beg for signs of favour from the gods in their fear of being neglected by them (for they would think to induce the gods in this way to communicate with them more readily and come down into their temples), any more than I can tell of the methods they would employ because of their fear of harm and so as to guard against punishment. For to speak the truth all this seems pure illusion of these people when compared with the doctrine of those who think that a life of happiness exists for us in this world and do not admit that the dead live again – a marvel not less unlikely than those which Plato imagined.77 The author of the letter is insisting that true piety involves obtaining a clear perception of the gods through worship and contemplation, as this is a gift from the gods that constantly, though incidentally, give off images that can then be perceived by mankind through preconception. However, simply participating in religious observance is no piety if this clear perception of the gods is not obtained, especially if participation results from fear or expectation of favour. Religious observance is acceptable, but only if a clear perception of the gods is obtained. Indeed, Summers (1995, p33) cites Bailey (1947) as writing that “it is not the act of worship that the Epicurean thinks wrong, but its motive”. This all helps to further explain how the Epicureans could participate in state religion despite believing in deities who were very different from those that the state advocated. 32 Hadzsits (1908, p74) says that the Epicureans had “no thought of dropping religion out of life”. Rather, Hadzsits (p145) argues that “Lucretius […] espoused a system of religious and ethical philosophy”, and (p160) refers to Epicurus’ “philosophy of religion”. Summers (1995, p57) concludes that “Lucretius retains a genuine religious sensibility throughout his poem”, and refers to “his [Lucretius’] religion” as “mystical-transcendental contemplation”. Conclusion Despite Epicurean resistance to orthodoxy, and indeed despite their own unorthodox beliefs, Epicureans were not atheists on the modern sense of the word. They believed in gods, presented evidence for their existence, described their nature, homes, and their lives. And these gods were considered to be real, living beings rather than as figments of the imagination, so important were they to Epicureans and their own individual journeys towards tranquillity and happiness. Indeed, so pious were the Epicureans that, beyond a philosophy, Epicureanism might perhaps be regarded as a religion in its own right. About the Author Dr Paul Terence Matthias Jackson completed his thesis on the theology of the Epicureans in 2015, when it was examined by A.G. Leventis Professor of Greek Culture at the University of Cambridge Tim Whitmarsh and Dr Carolyn Price, passing with no corrections. His publications include The Gods of Philodemus and Dreams, Visions, and Epicurean Gods, and he has reviewed for Classical Review and OCR/Bloomsbury Academic UK. 33 Contact details Address 259 Cascade des pins, Domaine de l’etoile, 06610 La Gaude, France Email Address [email protected] Works Cited Algra, K., Barnes, J., Mansfield, J. & Schofield, M. (2010). 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Demetrius Lacon: La Forma del Dio, Naples: La Scuola di Epicuro 17. Sedley, D. (2011). ‘Epicurus’ Theological Innatism’ (in Fish, J. & Sanders, K.R., Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, pp29-52), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M.F. (trans.) (1993). Diogenes of Oenoanda: The Epicurean Inscription, Bibliopolis. Smith, M.F. (trans.) (2003). Diogenes of Oenoanda: Supplement to Diogenes of Oenoanda: The Epicurean Inscription, Bibliopolis. Summers, K. (1995). ‘Lucretius and the Epicurean Tradition of Piety’ (in Classical Philology, vol.90, no.1, pp32-57), University of Chicago Press, retrieved September 25, 2014 from http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/270690?uid=3738032&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid= 21104235269361 Usener, S. (1887). Epicurea, Teubner. Notes 1 “[εἴπωµεν δ' οὖ]ν πρὸς τὸν [Ὅµηρον, ὃς π]ερὶ αὐτῶν [παντοδαπὰ] λαλεῖ λα[λήµατα, τοὺς] µὲν αὐ[τῶν ἀποφαίν]ων µοι[χούς, τοὺς δ]ὲ χωλούς, [τοὺς δὲ κλεπ]τικούς, [ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ θνητ]ῶν παιο[µένους δόρατι], πρὸς τῷ [προάγειν τοὺ]ς δηµιουρ[γοὺς ποιεῖν ἃ µὴ π]ρέπει. τὰ [µὲν θεῶν ξόανα β]άλλει [βέλη καὶ γέγο]νε τόξον [ἔχοντα, ποιο]ύµενα ὡς ὁ Ἡρακλῆς παρὰ τῷ Ὁµήρῳ τά δ' ὑπὸ θηρίων δορυφορεῖται, τὰ δ' ὀργίζεται τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ Νέµεσις τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ” (fr. 19 = NF 115). Translations from Diogenes of Oenoanda with my own amendments and the original are from Smith (1993; 2003). 2 “τί φής, ὦ ἱερόσυλε Δᾶµι, θεοὺς µὴ εἶναι µηδὲ προνοεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων;” (fr. 35). 3 “non sensu sed mente cernantur [...] imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillumarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad deos adfluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegentiam capere quae sit et beata natura et aeterna” (Nat. D. I.49). Translations from On the nature of the gods with my own amendments and the original are from Rackham (1961). 4 “ἐν [...] τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας” (DL X.31). Translations from DL with my own amendments and the original are from Hicks (1931). 5 “ἅπερ ἔδειξε[ν] ἄλλους ἄλλαις φύσεσιν οἰκείους (εἶναι) κ(αὶ) τοῖς µὲν ὑγρά τοῖς δ' ἀέρα καὶ γῆν. τ[ο]ῦτο µὲν ζώιων, τοῦτο δὲ φυτῶν κ(αὶ) 'τῶν' ὁµ[οί]ων, µάλιστα δὲ τοῖ θεοῖς δεῖ” (On Gods III.8.203). Translations from Philodemus’ On Gods with my own amendments and the original are from Essler (in Fish & Sanders, 2011). 6 “τίς δὲ κα[ὶ θεός, εἰ] ἦν τὸν ἄπειρ[ον χρόνον], ἡσυχάσας χι[λιάδας ἐτῶν], οὕτως εἰς ἔν[νοιαν ἂν 36 ἦλ]θεν τοῦ πόλεως αὐτῷ χρείαν ὑπάρχειν καὶ συµπολιτευοµένων;” (NF 127 and fr. 20 = NF 39). “πρὸς τῷ καὶ γελοῖον εἶναι θεὸν ὄντα ζητεῖν συµπολιτευοµένὰς ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ κἀκεῖνο· εἰ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἰκητήριόν τι καὶ πόλιν ἑαυτῷ τὸν κόσµον ἐδηµιούργησε, ζητῶ πρὸ τοῦ κόσµου ποῦ διέτριβεν· οὐ γὰρ εὑρίσκω κατὰ γοῦν τὸν τούτων λόγον ἕνα τοῦτον ἀποφαινοµένων κόσµον εἶναι. τὸν οὖν ἄπειρον ἐκεῖνον χρόνον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἄπολις ἦν καὶ ἄο[ι]κος ὁ τούτων θεὸς καί, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀτυχής - οὐ λέγω θεός - µήτε πόλιν ἔχων µήτε συµπολιτευοµένὰς, [...] ἔρηµος ἐπλανᾶτο ὁπουδήποτε. εἰ µὲν οὖν ἑαυτῆς χάριν ἡ θεία φύσις δεδηµιουργηκέναι δόξει τὰ πράγµατα, ταῦτα πάντα {τὰ} ἄτοπα· [...] εἰ [δὲ] τῶν ἀνθρώπων, [...] ἄλ[λα] πάλιν ἀτοπώτερα” (fr. 20 = NF 39). 8 “Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset” (Nat. D. I.18). 9 “ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι κόσµοι εἰσὶν ἅπειροι τὸ πλῆθος, ἔστι καταλαβεῖν, καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος δύναται κόσµος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν κόσµῳ καὶ <ἐν> µετακοσµίῳ, ὃ λέγοµεν µεταξὺ κόσµων διάστηµα, ἐν πολυκένῳ τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν µεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ, καθάπερ τινὲς φασίν, ἐπιτηδείων τινῶν σπερµάτων ῥυέντων ἀφʹ ἑνὸς κόσµου ἢ µετακοσµίου ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ πλειόνων” (Ad Pyth. 88-9). Epicurus also writes that that there are an infinite number of worlds in his Letter to Herodotus (45). Translations from Epicurus with my own amendments and the original are from Bailey (1926). 10 “ἐστὶ περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόµενα περιέχουσα [...] ἀποτοµὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου” (Ad Pyth. 88). 11 “Illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes / esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis. / tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota / sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur; / quae quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum, / tactile nil nobis quod sit contingere debet; / tangere enim non quit quod tangi non licet ipsum. / quare etiam sedes quoque nostris sedibus esse / dissimiles debent, tenues de corpore eorum. ” (DRN V.146-54). Translations from DRN with my own amendments and the original are from Rouse & Smith (2006). 12 “nil est quod possis dicere ab omni / corpore seiunctum secretumque esse ab inani, / quod quasi tertia sit numero natura reperta” (DRN I.430-2). Cf. also DRN I.511ff. 13 “οἵους δʹ αὐτοὺς <οἱ> πολλοὶ νοµίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσίν” (Ad Men. 123). 14 “πρῶτον µὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ µακάριον νοµίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, µηθὲν µήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον µήτε τῆς µακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ προσάπτε· πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάµενον τὴν µετὰ ἀφθαρσίας µακαριότητα περὶ αὐτὸν δόξαζε” (Ad Men. 123). 7 15 “καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κατ' ἐνίους ὡς µὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει θεόν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγµάτων οὐδαµῶς” (Adv.Math. IX.58). Translations are from Inwood et al. (1994, p96). Original Greek is from U (p238). 16 “τὰ πολλὰ [µὲ]ν ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς ὁµοίων {ἄλλων} [κἄλ]λων [ἐπι]συγκρί[σεως ἀ]τόµ[ων γέ]νηται πο[...]” (13). Translations from On Piety with my own amendments and the original are from Obbink (1996). 17 DRN II.89-90; Ad Her. 43. 18 “quae nobis durata ac spissa videntur, / haec magis hamatis inter sese esse necessest / et quasi ramosis alte compacta teneri” (DRN II.444-6). 19 “ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἄλλας τέσσαρας φύσεις κατά γένος ἀφθάρτους τάσδε, τὰ ἄτοµα, τὸ κενόν, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὰς ὁµοιότητας” (1.7.34 = Dox. Graec. P. 306 (U 355)). Translations are from Inwood et al. (1994, p96). Original Greek is from Diels (1965, 306). 20 “στοιχ[είω]σις ὁµ[οίων οὖσα] φαίνο[ιτ'] ἂ[ν ἕν]ότης· δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁµοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι διαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εύδαιµονίαν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐχ ἧττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁµοίων στοιχείων ἑνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι δύνανται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καταλείπονται καθάπερ ἐν τῶι Περὶ ὁσιότητος αὐτότατα· τ[ὸ δ]ὲ µηδεµίαν ὑπε[ναν]τιολογίαν εἶναι παρα<ιτη>τέον ὑποδεικνύειν. εἴωθε τοίνυν [πά]νθ' ὁµῶς ταῦτα φύ[σι]ν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν· τὰ πολλὰ [µὲ]ν ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς ὁµοίων {ἄλλων} [κἄλ]λων [ἐπι]συγκρί[σεως ἀ]τόµ[ων γέ]νηται πο[...]” (13). 21 “si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere” (Nat. D. I.50). 22 DRN I.370ff. 23 “quia semper eorum / subpeditabatur facies et forma manebat” (DRN V.1175-6). 24 “Τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ᾧ µετὰ τῶν ἠϊθέων ἔπλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἐσώθη, τὴν τριακόντορον, ἄχρι τῶν Δηµητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως χρόνων διεφύλαττον οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι, τὰ µὲν παλαιὰ τῶν ξύλων ὑφαιροῦντες, ἄλλα δὲ ἐµβάλλοντες ἰσχυρὰ καὶ συµπηγνύντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἰς τὸν αὐξόµενον λόγον ἀµφιδοξούµενον παράδειγµα τὸ πλοῖον εἶναι, τῶν µὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτό, τῶν δὲ ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ διαµένοι λεγόντων” (Parallel Lives I, Theseus, XXIII.1). Translations from Parallel Lives with my own amendments and the original are from Perrin (1967). 25 “τὰς µνήµας φυλάττεσθα[ι]” (XIII). Translations from Demetrius Lacon’s On the Form of God are my own. Original Greek is from Santoro (2000). Of course, memories are also atomic, like everything else in Epicurean physics. 26 “δυνατόν ἐστι φυλάττεσ]θαι ποσὰ τῶν σωµάτων” (XII). 37 27 “divom natura necessest / inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur / semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; / nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, / ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri, / nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira” (DRN I.44-9). 28 ἐν]ψυχίαν ἔχει κοινήν. ὅθεν οὐκ εἴ τινα ζῶ<ι>α µορφὴν τοιαύτην ἔχει καὶ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι δεῖ τοιοῦτον· τὸ δὲ λογιζ[ό]µενον καὶ ἄκρως γε σὺν ταύταις ταῖς κοινότησ[ι]ν καὶ ἄ[λλ]ας πολλὰς [ἕξει]” (XVII). 29 “οὐδὲν [κωλύειν µὴ τῶι φρονεῖν µ]ὲν ἀνθρ[ώποις] ὡ[µοιωµένον] τὸν θεὸν ὑπ[ά]ρχ[ειν] δ[ιὰ τὸν] ἄνθρωπον φρον[ή]σε[ως µόνον τῶν] παρ' ἡµῖν ζµῖν ζώιων δεκτικ[όν, φρ]ονήσεως δὲ χωρὶς µ[ὴ νοεῖσθ', ἀλλ]ὰ µὴ γεννᾶσθαι συνεσ[τηκένα]ι δ' ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώµα[τος· καὶ ἔσ]ται ζῶιον οὑν τούτωι [καὶ ἀθ]ά[νατον]” (37). Translations from On Methods of Inference with my own amendments and the original are from De Lacy (1978). 30 “deus autem animans est [...] deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare” (Nat. D. I.48). 31 εἰ δὴ τὰ παῥ ἡµῖν ζῶια πά[ντ]α λέγοντες εἶναι φθαρτὰ τ[οὺς] θεοὺς ἀφθάρτους ὑπάρχειν λέ[γο]µεν” (34). 32 “quarta quoque his igitur quaedam natura necessest / adtribuatur. east omnimo nominis expers; / qua neque mobilius quicquam neque tenvius exstat, / nec magis e parvis et levibus ex elementis; / sensiferos motus quae didit prima per artus. / prima cietur enim, parvis perfecta figuris” (DRN III.2416). 33 “ἀ[πολεί]π[οντες τὴ]ν αἴσθη[σιν] καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν” (5). 34 “[Ἐπι]κούρωι δ' ἐν [τῶι Περὶ θ]εῶν τὸ µὴ [τῆι φύσ]ει τὴν α[ἰ]σ[θανοµέν]ην σύγκρ[ισιν ἔχον] σύ[µφ]ω[νον τῷ θείῳ·] καὶ τὸ µὴ τῆς [φύσεως ὂν] µετεχού[σης τῶ]ν ἀλγηδό[νων, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀν]άγκης µα[λακίας πολ]λὰς ποῆσαι, [ἡ θεία φύ]σις οὖσα [φαίνεται] καί τις [δαιµόνιος·]” (7). 35 “τὸ θεῖον [...] παραλλάξει τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑνοτήτων, [καὶ τ]ῶν µ[ὴ πρὸ]ς τὸν αἰῶ[να] διαµενουσῶν τε κα[ὶ ἀ]λλαττοµένω[ν]” (VIII). 36 “εἴ γ' εὐ[σκοποῦσίν] φησιν φύσιν τούτων πραγµάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων δοξ[άζειν ἐξεῖναι]” (3). 37 “καὶ τούτων δ' οὖν περ[ι]ωδευµένων οὐ δύσκολον προσαποδοῦναι καὶ διὰ τίνας ἐπ[ι]σπασµοὺς ἀνθρωπόµορ[φ]ον καταλέιποµεν τόν θεόν· δῆλον δ' ὡς µ[ορφὴν τ]ὴν [ἀνθρώ]π[ο]υ συ[νάπ]τ[ωµεν τῷ θεῷ” (XIV). 38 “Nihil enim agit” (Nat. D. I.51). 39 “ne in deo quidem esse [...] nisi plane otio langueat”(Nat. D. I.67). 40 “Quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu?” (Nat. D. I.92). 41 “‘εἰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου’ φησίν, ‘µορφὴν ἕξει, δῆλον ὡς ἕξει καὶ ὀφθαλµοὺς οὕτως <δὲ> καὶ ὀφθαλµιάσει. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν αἰσθήσεων πείσεται’. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ λῆρον [ἔ]χει παραπ[λ]ήσιον” (XVIII). 42 “lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata, / prospicere ut possimus” (DRN IV.825-6). 43 “πολλ[οῖς ἀϊ]δίοις [θεοῖς κἀθα]νάτο[ις εἶναι” (3). 44 “summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est, in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc ἰσονοµίαν appellat Epicurus, id est aequabilem tributionem. Ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non minorem” (I.50). Cf. DRN II.569-80. 45 “ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς µὲν κατ' ἀριθµὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ καθ' ὁµοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁµοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσµένων ἀνθρωποειδῶς” (DL X.139). Mansfield (1993, p203) writes that “λόγῳ θεωρητός is a standard expression denoting ‘entities not available to the senses but discoverable in thought’”. 46 “una est omnium facies [...] sine nominibus” (Nat. D. I.80-4). However, Cotta then contradicts himself, writing that “the gods are male and female”, “et maris deos et feminas esse” (Nat. D. I.95). There is also no precedent for this in the Epicurean corpus, that the Epicureans thought that there were male and female deities. 47 “longeque remittis / dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum, / delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta / saepe oberunt; non quo violari summa deum vis / possit, ut ex ira poenas petere inbibat acris, / sed quia tute tibi placida cum pace quietos / constitues magnos irarum volvere fluctus, / nec delubra deum placido cum pectore adibis, / nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur / in mentes hominum divinae nuntiae formae, / suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis” (DRN VI. 68-78). 48 On Philodemus, On Gods III. 83-6.1-3. 49 “desertus sine animali, sine homine” (IV.19.2). Translations from On Benefits with my own amendments and the original are from Basore (1935). 50 On Gods III.4. 38 51 On Gods III.14.4-6. “cogitat [...] adsidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud quod agitet in mente” (Nat. D. I.114). 53 On Gods III.11.40. 54 “ἄτοπον µὲγ γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ προχείρως διὰ τὸ µετακόσµησιν νεανικὴν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις καταστάσεσι γίνεσθαι περὶ τὰ ζῷα κ(αὶ) πολλὴν ἔχουσαν θανάτωι πρ(οσ)εµφέρειαν” (III.12.2-5), from Essler (in Fish & Sanders, 2011). 55 “quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus” (Nat. D. I.44). 56 “Itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos” (Nat. D. II.12-13). 57 III.8.36. 58 III.9.21. 59 III.9.24. 60 “cum infinita simillumarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad deos adfluat” (Nat. D. I.49). 61 “καὶ πᾶσαν µ[ανίαν Ἐ]πίκουρος ἐµ[έµψα]το τοῖς τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]ροῦσιν, ῶς κἀ[ν τῶι] δωδεκάτω[ι Προ]δίκωι καὶ Δια[γόραι] καὶ Κριτίαι κἄ[λλοις] µέµφ[εται] φὰς πα[ρα]κόπτ[ει]ν καὶ µ[αίνεσ]θαι” (19). 62 “εἴ γε κα[τὰ συµ]περιφορὰν [ἔλεγε]ν εἶναι θεούς, [οὐκ] ἀποδείξεις ἔ[φερον ο]ὐδ' ὑπεξαιρέτων ἀντιπιπτόν[των, οὐ]δ' ἂν ἐπολέ[µουν τ]οῖς ἀναιροῦ[σιν, οὐδ]ὲ διὰ τοσούτων ἠργάζοντο [καὶ τοι]ούτων λόγων [πίστε]ις καὶ τῶν [ἄλλων τ]ῶν περὶ αὐ[τῶν συµ]βαινον[των ἐν βυ]βλίοις” (17). 63 27. 64 31. 65 32. 66 “Ce n’est donc pas seulement pour «suivre la loi», mais par un sentiment vrai, qu’Epicure observe les rites du culte. Néanmoins, sa religion n’est pas celle du vulgaire” (translated by Chilton, 1955, p61). 67 “ἡµεῖς δὲ π[άν]τες ὡς ἀληθῆ τὰ δόγµατα καὶ παρ[α]σκευασ[τικ]ὰ τῆς ἡµῶν αὐτῶν ἀτα[ραξ]ίας” (47). 68 “οἱ δὲ πει<σ>θ[έν]τες οἷς ἐχρησµω[ι]δήσαµεν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον µὲν ὡς θνητοὶ µιµε[ῖσ]θαι τὴν ἐκείνων εὐδαιµονίαν θελήσουσιν, ὥστ', ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ἀβλαβίας ἐθεωρεῖτο το[ῖ]ς πᾶσιν ἐρχοµένη, µάλιστα φιλοτιµήσονται πᾶσιν αὑτοὺς παρέχειν ἀλύπους, ὅσ[ον ἐφ'] ἑαυτοῖς” (71). 69 “Néanmoins c’est aux jours de fête, quand on approche l’autel du sacrifice ou contemple la statue divine, que l’influence des dieux se fait sentir avec plus de force et produit la plus grande joie” (translated by Chilton, 1955, p63). 70 34. 71 “sed quia tute tibi placida cum pace quietos / constitues magnos irarum volvere fluctus / nec delubra deum placido cum pectore adibis / nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur / in mentes hominum divinae nuntiae formae, / suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis” (DRN VI. 73-78). 72 Translation by Murray (1925). 73 “L’une et l’autre doctrine, on le voit, touche aux choses de la religion. Le stoïcien vit en accord avec le dieu cosmique; l’épicurien bannit la crainte des dieux et de l’Hadès. Dès lors ces deux morales, en leur principe même, impliquent une attitude religieuse” (translated by Chilton, 1955, pxi). 74 “Cette religion d’Epicure s’apparente à celle de Platon. Tous deux mettent le terme de l’acte religieux dans la contemplation de la beauté [...] .L’être divin, qu’elle qu’en soit l’essence, est un être parfaitement beau, qui mène une vie harmonieuse et sereine [...] De même les dieux d’Epicure sont remplis de beauté [...] ‘il possède la beauté en plénitude’” (translated by Chilton, 1955, p62). 75 I.2.7ff. 76 “Une lettre du sage à un ami inconnu: découvert dans un papyrus d’Egypte, rapporté à Epicure [...] ce dogme, loin de supprimer la religion, doit la purifier: l’homme vraiment pieux ne s’adresse pas aux dieux pour les apaiser ou en obtenir quelque grâce, mais pour s’unir à eux par la contemplation, se réjouir de leur joie, et goûter ainsi lui-même, dans cette vie mortelle, à leur bonheur sans fin” (translated by Chilton, 1955, pp63-65 ; P.Oxyrh. II. 215 (p30) = Diels, Ein Epikureisches fragment über Gotterverehrung, Sitz. Ber. Berlin, 1916, pp886ff (text pp902-4)). Grenfell & Hunt (1899, p30) also examine the fragment, writing that “the principal topic discussed in the fragment is the popular idea of religion and especially of the gods, which is severely criticised by the writer [...] the author was probably an Epicurean philosopher, possibly Epicurus himself”. 77 “<Il n’y a point piété quand on observe les obligations religieuses habituelles – bien que l’offrande de sacrifices> aux occasions convenables soit, comme je l’ai dit, chose propre à la nature – ni non plus, par Zeus, quand l’un ou l’autre va répétant: ‘je crains tous les dieux, et je les honore, et je veux dépenser toute ma fortune à leur offrir des sacrifices et à leur consacrer des offrandes’. Un tel homme est peut-être plus louable que d’autres particuliers, toutefois ce n’est pas encore ainsi qu’on pose le 52 39 fondement solide de la piété. Toi, mon ami, sache que le don le plus bienheureux, c’est d’avoir une claire perception des choses: voilà le bien absolument le meilleur que nous puissions concevoir ici-bas. Admire cette claire appréhension de l’esprit, révere ce don divin. Après cela, <tu ne dois pas honorer les dieux parce que tu penses, par ce moyen, gagner leur faveur>, comme on se l’imaginera quand on te verra faire des actes de piété, mais seulement parce que, en comparaison avec ta propre béatitude, tu vois combien, d’après notre doctrine, la condition des dieux est infiniment plus auguste. Et certes, par Zeus, <quand tu mets en pratique> cette doctrine, la plus digne de foi <comme ta raison doit te l’assurer, il t’est bien permis d’offrir des sacrifices aux dieux. Tu accomplis ainsi> une chose qui donne confiance et qui est vue avec plaisir, si elle vient en son temps, puisque tu mets en honneur ta propre doctrine en usant des plaisirs sensibles qui se trouvent convenir en ces occasions, et qu’en outre tu t’accommodes de quelque façon aux traditions religieuses. Veille seulement à n’y mêler ni crainte des dieux ni supposition qu’en agissant ainsi tu t’attires la faveur des dieux. Car, en vérité, au nom de Zeus (comme on se plaît à dire), qu’as-tu à craindre en cela? Crois-tu que les dieux puissent te faire du tort? N’est-ce pas là, ne regarderas-tu pas la divinité comme quelque chose de misérable si, en comparaison avec toi, elle apparaît inférieure? Ou bien serais-tu d’avis que, par le sacrifice de milliers de bœufs, tu peux, si tu as commis quelque mauvaise action, apaiser le dieu? Ou qu’il tiendra compte du sacrifice et, comme un homme, te fera remise une fois ou l’autre d’une partie du dommage? Sans doute, les hommes se disent qu’il faut craindre les dieux et les honorer par ces sacrifices, afin que, retenus par le tribut qu’on leur porte, les dieux ne s’attaquent pas à eux: dès lors, pensent-ils, si cette conjecture est juste, de toute façon ils ne subiront aucun dommage, et, si elle n’est pas juste, comme ils rendent honneur à la puissance des dieux, tout ira bien. Mais si ces étroites relations <entre dieux et hommes existeraient vraiment, ce serait un grand malheur, car l’action s’en ferait sentir jusque par delà la tombe>, après les cérémonies des funérailles, une fois qu’on a été incinéré. Car alors, même sous la terre, on subirait un dommage et tout homme devrait s’attendre au châtiment. Outre cela, je n’ai pas à dire comment les hommes devraient mendier les signes de la faveur des dieux, dans leur crainte d’être négligés par eux (car ils penseraient amener ainsi les dieux à communiquer plus volontiers avec eux et à descendre dans leurs temples), non plus que la diversité et le grand nombre de leurs comportements eu égards à la crainte du dommage et pour se mettre en garde contre le châtiment. Car tout cela, au vrai, apparaît comme une pure illusion de ces gens-là, comparé à la doctrine de ceux qui estiment que, dès ici-bas, il existe une vie bienheureuse, et qui n’admettent pas que les morts recommencent à vivre, – prodige non moins invraisemblable que ceux que Platon a imaginés” (translated by Chilton, 1955, p65).

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