TOWARDS AN ELITE THEORY OF POPULISM
Fedja Pavlovic
Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven [Master of Philosophy Thesis]
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................3
DEFINING POPULISM ..........................................................................................................................5
POPULISM AS STRATEGY .....................................................................................................................6
POPULISM AS DISCOURSE ....................................................................................................................9
POPULISM AS ‘THIN’ IDEOLOGY ........................................................................................................11
A CRITIQUE OF THE IDEATIONAL APPROACH ...................................................................................14
A NIETZSCHEAN TURN ....................................................................................................................18
THE SLAVE REVOLT – OUTLINE OF NIETZSCHE’S ACCOUNT ...........................................................18
‘THE PEOPLE’ VS. ‘THE ELITE’ – A NIETZSCHEAN APPROACH ........................................................21
PRIESTS AND SLAVES – A NIETZSCHEAN VIEW OF POPULIST POLITICS............................................24
ELITES AND ‘OUTSIDER-ELITES’ – THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NIETZSCHEAN APPROACH .................26
ELITE THEORY ...................................................................................................................................29
ELITE THEORY – CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY VARIANTS .......................................................29
LIONS AND FOXES – PARETO’S “ELITE CYCLES” ..............................................................................34
“ELITE CONFIGURATIONS” – CONTEMPORARY ELITE THEORY ........................................................37
THIS PAPER’S PROPOSED MODEL ......................................................................................................39
POPULISM AND ELITE CYCLES .....................................................................................................45
POPULISM VERSUS (PARTY) DEMOCRACY ........................................................................................46
THE CONSENSUS ‘THICKENS’ – CONVERGENCE AND TECHNOCRATIZATION ...................................49
CRISIS ENSUES – PARTY CARTELIZATION AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION ...........................51
THE CYCLE ENDS – POPULISTS AT THE GATES.................................................................................55
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................58
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................................59
2
In this paper, we offer a contribution to the ideational approach to populism.
Considering populism as a ‘thin’ ideology in whose conceptual core lie the notions
of the good ‘people’, the evil ‘elite’ and popular sovereignty, we propose a
theoretical articulation of populism that, in our view, encompasses two hitherto
inadequately articulated dimensions of the populist phenomenon – reactivity and
elitism. To this end, we draw from Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical account of
Slave morality, Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of elite cycles, as well as from John Higley
and Michael Burton’s notion of ‘elite configuration’ to construct a descriptive elitetheoretical model which we then apply in our interpretation of the populist
phenomenon. According to our proposed model, populism can be understood as the
ideological expression of an ‘outsider-elite’ whose aim is to renegotiate the
‘thickened’ ideological consensus of a consensually united political elite.
INTRODUCTION
In the case of populism, the frequency of the term’s usage in public discourse seems
commensurate to the degree of scholarly attention devoted to researching the phenomenon it
denotes. Cambridge Dictionary’s 2017 ‘word of the year’ has been, of late, subject of much
theoretical discussion, of which a significant part concerns the nature of the concept, its
definition and extension. 1 In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the understanding of the
nature of the populist phenomenon by bringing the its ideational features in relation to the
socio-political dynamics within which populist political organizations emerge.
What is populism? Is it best understood as a political strategy, a type of discourse or a
variant of ideology? In the first Chapter, we critically assess three dominant contemporary
ways to conceptualizing populism: Kurt Weyland’s ‘organizational’ approach, Pierre
Ostiguy’s ‘socio-cultural’ approach, and the ‘ideational’ approach championed by Mudde et.
al. (Weyland 2001) (Ostiguy 2017) (Mudde 2017). We find efforts to define populism in terms
of the structural features of populist political organizations, i.e. personalistic leadership and
weak organizational structure, ultimately inconclusive, due to the elusive meaning of these two
proposed criteria. We further contend that the primary connotation of the central notion of the
socio-cultural approach, namely, the so-called ‘high-low’ axis, remains unclear, suggesting, at
the same time, class affiliation and normative beliefs. Finally, while in the ideational approach
1
See: https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as-2017-word-of-the-year-by-cambridge-university-press
3
we recognize the greatest explanatory potential, we submit that the theories treating populism
as a type of ‘thin’ ideology fail to adequately emphasize what we identify as two salient features
of the populist phenomenon: the reactivity inherent in its conceptual core and the elitist nature
of its politics.
To complement the ideational approach so as to bring to the fore these two neglected
aspects of populism, in the second Chapter we draw from Nietzsche’s work, finding structural
parallels between Nietzsche’s account of Slave morality and the populist juxtaposition of the
good ‘people’ to the evil ‘elite’ (Nietzsche 1997). Relying on this framework, we posit that, in
the particular way in which populism antagonizes ‘the elite’ from the perspective of ‘the
people’, there is a distinct sense of what Nietzsche called ressentiment, harbored by the
powerless Slave towards an oppressive Master. Our employment of Nietzsche’s notions leads
us to consider the sociological framework within which Nietzsche puts forth his genealogical
account of Slave morality. In this respect, we invoke Nietzsche’s description of the tripartite
structure of early human societies (comprised of the Masters, the Slaves and the Priests) as a
useful heuristic device for interpreting populism’s broader socio-political dynamics. We argue
that, much like in the case of Nietzsche’s Priests and their relations towards the Masters, the
ambiguous position of populist leaders vis-à-vis the political elite informs the conceptual
architecture of the populism qua ‘thin’ ideology.
With the Nietzschean perspective in place, in the third Chapter we move to further
elaborate the links between the socio-political position of the populist ‘outsider-elite’ and the
broader political dynamics of populist phenomenon. In this respect, we provide an outline of
the so-called elite theory in its classical and contemporary forms, with a particular focus on
Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of elite cycles and John Higley and Michael Burton’s notion of elite
configurations. Following Pareto’s general idea about the cycles of historical change in the
composition of societies’ political elites, we endeavor to construct an account of elite change
that situates the rise of populism within the context of oligarchic struggle between the
(governing) political elite and the populist ‘outsider-elite’. To this end, we modify Higley and
Burton’s distinction between ‘ideologically united’ and ‘consensually united’ political elites,
introducing the notion of a consensually united elite’s ideological consensus. This consensus,
we argue, initially amounts to a ‘thin’ ideology but tends to ‘thicken’ over time. In our view,
this ‘thickening’ process manifests itself politically in ways that resemble Pareto’s description
of a governing elite’s progressive descent towards the end of an elite cycle.
4
Finally, the fourth Chapter of this paper contains the application of our proposed elitetheoretical model to the discussion of the most salient ideological and socio-political features
of populism. We note that, in recent literature, there seems to be a tendency to perceive
populism’s inherent anti-institutionalism as indiscriminately targeting all institutional facets of
the representative system; against this trend, we emphasize populism’s hostility towards
established political parties. We argue that what is commonly understood as the crisis of party
democracy can be construed as the outcome of the ‘thickening’ of a political elite’s ideological
consensus. Our argument is, further, that populism’s rallying cry to re-politicize hitherto
depoliticized policy issues manifests the ambition, on part of the populist ‘outsider-elite’, to
renegotiate (and, in effect, to ‘thin out’) the ‘thickened’ ideological consensus of the political
elite
5
DEFINING POPULISM
According to the “Oxford Handbook of Populism”, three distinct approaches to
understanding the concept of ‘populism’ dominate the contemporary theoretical discussion.
Following Kurt Weyland, we may think of populism as a political strategy (Weyland 2001)
(Weyland 2017). Alternatively, in line with Pierre Ostiguy’s approach, populism can be
conceptualized as a type of socio-cultural discourse (Ostiguy 2017). Finally, populism can be
defined ‘ideationally, as being a ‘thin’ (or ‘thin-centered’) ideology, as Cas Mudde and many
others do (Mudde 2004) (Mudde 2017), (Stanley 2008), (Abts and Rummens 2007),
(Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014). This tripartite typology of conceptualizations of
populism – namely, as a discourse, as a strategy, as a ‘thin’ ideology – is by no means the only
one.2 However, since it reflects the current scholarly consensus in the field, we employ it
throughout this Chapter as a frame of reference.
What follows is a critical outline of the three said ways of defining populism. Although
we posit that, of the three, the so-called ‘ideational’ approach championed by Mudde et. al.
seems the most promising, we nevertheless underscore some descriptive and explanatory
lacunae whose existence, in our view, calls for further theoretical articulation of the ideational
model.
Populism as Strategy
In his works on Latin American politics, Kurt Weyland develops a ‘political-strategic’
approach to defining populism. According to this approach, populism is best defined as a
“political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power
based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly
unorganized followers” (Weyland 2001, p. 14).
For an alternative classification of dominant conceptualizations of populism, see Davide Vittori’s paper (Vittori
2017). Vittori distinguishes between five approaches to defining populism: as (1) ‘political illiberalism’, (2) a tool
for political mobilization, (3) a ‘leader-led’ movement, (4) as a communicative/discursive tool and (5) as an
ideology. We found this classification comparatively wanting in terms of clarity of distinction, as (1) could
arguably be subsumed under (5), and (4) might, in a sense, be said to encompass (2).
2
6
Populism, according to Weyland, is essentially about power – in his view, to be
classified as a ‘political strategy’ means to comprise “methods and instruments of winning and
exercising power” (p. 12). As such, there are two elements to populism qua strategy: the type
of a political actor’s power structure, and its principal power capability. With regard to the
former, populism is said to rest on “personalistic” leadership, as opposed to the leadership of
an informal clique, or that of a formally structured hierarchy. (Weyland 2017, p. 12). The
distinctive feature of populist political actors is a preeminent, authoritative leading figure,
whose mass-media-facilitated bond with their voter base approaches cult-like intensity. Where
the latter is concerned, populist political actors tend to draw strength from numbers, rather than
from the ‘special weight’ of some specific source of power (p. 13). Hence, they seek to assert
authority by attracting large, amorphous masses of followers, rather than by securing access to
financial resources or control over military force. Moreover, Weyland posits that populist
political actors are inherently disorganized – by relying on a leader’s charismatic appeal to
attract support, they foster the leader’s unmediated, “quasi-direct” identification with the mass
(“Chavez is the People, and the People is Chavez”, as Bolivian populists used to chant), thereby
diminishing the role of party hierarchy as an intermediary in this process (pp. 14-15). For this
reason, populist organizations rise and fall with their leaders’ fate. Finally, in Weyland’s
account, the lack of regard for programmatic coherence in the populist strategy brings to the
fore the populists’ ideological vacuity and naked opportunism – thus, when in power, populist
leaders govern willfully and unpredictably, recurrently shifting ideological positions and selfservingly usurping institutional checks and balances (pp. 8, 18-19).
By Weyland’s own admission, the definition of populism given by the politicalstrategic approach has a comparably limited scope of extension. In fact, almost all Weyland’s
examples come from Latin America, and much of Europe’s so-called radical right – commonly
viewed as the powerhouse of populism on the continent – is left out and declared a “different
“political animal””, since these organizations do not necessarily exhibit ideologically vacuous
personalism and a weak formal structure (p. 18). These limitations are not disqualifying per se;
however, they give credence to Mudde’s contention that populism cannot only be about
charismatic leadership and loose organization (Mudde 2017, p. 15). That there are further
components to populism than Weyland lets on is persuasively argued by Ostiguy, who
maintains a leader’s “charisma” is insufficient to account for the populists’ “direct,
unmediated” rapport with their followers, and that an element of content must feature as well
7
in populism’s strategic toolbox (Ostiguy, p. 18).3 If this is so, then the narrow extension of
Weyland’s definitions, derived from his insistence on the two aforementioned criteria, seems
unwarranted.
Questions of possible false negatives aside, the fundamental problem with Weyland’s
approach is the fickleness of the categories of organizational strength and ‘personalistic’
leadership with which he operates.
What makes an organizational structure strong? It serves to note, with Ostiguy, the
distinction between a group’s organization and its formal institutionalization (Ibid). We might
further posit that a group’s ‘organization’ consists of the rules that govern such matters as
collective decision-making and internal division of tasks, and ask how the strength of these
arrangements is measured. If efficiency of political advocacy is our criteria, we might well
argue that, when it comes to a partisan organization, ‘the leaner the better’. Indeed, the
revolution in communication, brought by technological innovation, had its effects on
organizational functioning, allowing daily decision-making to bypass many arcane procedures
associated with rigorous formalization (nowadays, Conservative MP’s in UK’s House of
Commons discuss plenary strategy through a WhatsApp group chat). At any rate, Weyland
seems to ignore these nuances, assuming instead that strong partisan organization means oldfashioned procedural rigor.
Moreover, what does personalistic leadership mean? A leader’s preeminence as the
public ‘face’ of an organization should not be conflated with a monopoly over decisionmaking, as hubristic figureheads are all too often reminded by the proverbial powers behind
the throne. Unless one is a White House insider, it is hard to assess whether Donald Trump has
more say over his cabinet appointments than his predecessor did. In any case, the crowd’s
adoration at Trump’s mega-rallies is no benchmark for determining this. Weyland, however,
appears not to take this subtle distinction into account.
At one point, Weyland indeed suggests that populists “stimulate popular identification with their leadership by
[acting] in ways that embody and live out the dreams of the common man” (Weyland, 2001, pp. 12-14) in (Ostiguy
2017, p. 18). These ‘ways of acting’ are, of course, context-dependent – nevertheless, if they are part of the
populist strategy, then populism qua strategy does have a discursive feature that should be acknowledged.
3
8
For these reasons, in our view, the ambiguity of these conceptual tools renders the
overall political-strategic approach unable to meet the task.
Populism as Discourse
An alternative way of conceptualizing populism is to see it, as Pierre Ostiguy does, as
the “flaunting of the low” (Ostiguy, p. 2). Ostiguy’s definition of populism finds its place
within a modified version of the commonly employed two-dimensional (left-right/liberalconservative) ideological chart. Orthogonally to the horizontal left-right axis Ostiguy posits a
‘high-low’ scale, seeking to represent the cultural designations of different types of discourse,
modes of identification and patterns of behavior – in other words, of “different ways of being
and acting in politics” (p. 6). The high-low axis, we are told, is comprised of two components:
the social-cultural and the political-cultural. The former refers to that which is colloquially
described with the terms ‘high-brow’ and ‘low-brow’ – that is, “manners, demeanors, ways of
speaking and dressing, vocabulary, and tastes displayed in public” – as well as to the
configuration of nativist or cosmopolitan facets of identity – with more refined, worldly
dispositions associated with the ‘high’ pole, and the dominance of locally-based identities
prevalent on the ‘low’ (pp. 7-9). The latter, politico-cultural dimension seeks to map attitudes
towards authority – a proclivity for impersonal, sublimated, institutionally mediated forms of
rule being on the ‘high’ pole, and an inclination towards unmediated, personalized leadership
residing on the ‘low’ (pp. 10-11).
Within such left-right/high-low coordinate system, populism is itself a kind of
flaunting, that is, a self-assertion of the ‘low’ in the public sphere, that finds its expression in
discourse. Specifically, is an “antagonistic, mobilizational flaunting in politics of the culturally
popular and native, and of personalism as a mode of decision-making” (pp. 12). According to
Ostiguy, populists of all stripes position themselves as the unmediated, ‘ballsy’ champions of
the nativist, familial and unapologetically crass ‘low’ against the condescending, culturally
alien and politically out-of-touch snobbery of the ‘high’ and its impersonal institutionalism.
Populism is, thus, at the same time a “narcissistic affirmation” of the ‘low’ and the defiant
reaction to the perceived political hegemony of the ‘high’ pole (Ibid).
9
The problem with understanding populism as a flaunting of ‘low’ ways of ‘being and
acting’ in politics pertains to the task of discerning the nature of that which is being flaunted.
What, exactly, does the high-low axis represent? Across its two sub-dimensions, the socialcultural and the political-cultural, sets of class-derived attributes seem to be lumped together
with clusters of normative beliefs in an implicit, and ultimately obfuscating manner.
For instance, Ostiguy is careful to stress that “the “low” in politics is not synonymous
with poor people or lower social strata” (Ostiguy, p. 7). To illustrate his point, Ostiguy notes
that George W. Bush and Ross Perot are ‘lower’ than Al Gore and John Kerry, despite being
richer than them. Now, as far as the ‘high-brow vs. low-brow’ sub-dimension of the ‘high-low’
axis is concerned, it is plainly derived from class – in this sense, to point out that some
aristocrats lack posh manners does not question the plain fact that posh manners have been
historically imposed by, associated with and maintained through the power of the aristocracy,
and that, as such, they are clearly an expression of class. On the other hand, preferences towards
different (charismatic or institutional) forms of leadership, delineating the political-cultural
dimension of the ‘high-low’ axis, seem primarily (and inseparably) linked to normative beliefs
about the comparative utility of authoritarian and liberal-democratic governance. As such,
these preferences are essentially ideological in nature, thus unrelated per se to class
affiliations.4 Finally, when the ‘nativism vs. cosmopolitanism’ spectrum is posited as a
component of the social-cultural ‘high-low’ divide, it is unclear to what degree the worldly
ways associated with cosmopolitanism are conjunct (or merely aligned) to a set of ideological
presuppositions about the proper place of the nation-state as a framework of political decisionmaking. While this question is certainly contested, in Ostiguy’s account it is circumvented.
Unless we adopt the Marxist view that ideological beliefs are expressions of class
identity, Ostiguy’s lack of distinction between the normatively charged and normatively neutral
dimensions of the proposed ‘high-low’ axis is deeply problematic. Does a ‘low-brow’ cultural
designation really go together with the dominance of nativist identity and an affinity towards
charismatic leadership? Is it warranted to place a preference for institutionalism alongside a
cosmopolitan identity and the property of being ‘high-brow’, as part of the same ‘pole’? These
4
While normative attitudes towards liberal-democracy and authoritarianism could, in specific contexts, be brought
into correlation with class affiliation, the history of modern authoritarianism offers a plethora of examples of
widespread upper-class support for fascist regimes (e.g. Francoist Spain and Salazar’s Portugal). Overall, it is
problematic to imply that people of ‘low brow’ culture tend to prefer forms of Führerprinzip to impersonal
institutional rule.
10
sweeping assumptions would appear to demand considerable empirical backing, lest they be
dismissed as manifestations of class prejudice. 5 Thus, in our view, a more promising approach
to understanding populism would be one that operates with a less ambiguous set of categories
– such, we believe, is the ideational approach.
Populism as Thin Ideology
The third and currently most popular way of conceptualizing populism – the so-called
ideational approach – finds its formulation in the works of Cas Mudde, Koen Abts and Stefan
Rummens, and Ben Stanley (Mudde 2004) (Abts and Rummens 2007) (Stanley 2008). In the
ideational approach, populism is considered not as a political strategy or a type of discourse,
but as a distinct ideology. Specifically, proponents of the ideational approach understand
populism to be a case of what Michael Freeden called ‘thin’ or ‘thin-centered’ ideology,
(Freeden 1998).
In his paper “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Freeden offers a succinct articulation
of his theory of ideology (Freeden 1998). Central to Freeden’s understanding of ideology is the
notion of interpretation (Stanley, p. 98). ‘Ideas’, he posits, are individual interpretations of
phenomena – to have an idea is to cognize one’s experience of the world in a certain way.
When ‘ideas’ are formulated in language, they become ‘concepts’. Now, political concepts,
being semantic formalizations of class of ideas, are inherently contestable – “the intension of
any political concept” we are told, “contains more components than any particular instance can
hold at a given time” (Freeden, p. 749). Due to this inherent indeterminacy of meaning, the
selected route of interpreting any political concept is essentially arbitrary – of the countless
possible meanings that could be assigned to a concept we select one, and this choice is not
logically mandated. To select a specific interpretation of a concept, i.e. to set its meaning, is to
decontest that concept. In this sense, Freeden defines ‘ideologies’ as interpretative frameworks,
namely, as “configurations of political concepts” where some concepts are decontested (Ibid).
Those decontested concepts, in turn, constitute an ideology’s conceptual ‘core’ that determines
its defining characteristics. Beyond this core lies a set of ‘adjacent’ or ‘peripheral’ concepts
that “color the core in different ways” – by way of these concepts, ideologies generate
5
Even if a statistically significant correlation between the presence of these attributes in the population could be
empirically established, for them to constitute distinct poles on a political frame of reference mere correlation
would appear insufficient. Indeed, one would have to posit a compelling logical link between them.
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ideology-specific answers to a range of political questions and, in so doing, “interact with, and
shape, the concrete world”, (Ibid).
In Freeden’s view, ‘full’ ideologies, such as liberalism, conservatism and socialism,
provide a “reasonably broad, if not comprehensive, range of answers to the political questions
that societies generate” (p. 750). A litmus test for assessing the width of this range is the
“famous “who gets what, when, how” question, seen to be central to politics” (Stanley, p. 106).
On the other hand, the conceptual structure of ‘thin’ or ‘thin-centered’ ideologies limited to
their ‘core’ – for this reason, ‘thin’ ideologies, such as nationalism, feminism or
environmentalism, are “limited in ideational ambition and scope”, being unable to offer
ideology-specific solutions to a comprehensive set of political issues (Freeden, p. 750-751). As
such, ‘thin’ ideologies require a host ideology to fill them with a breadth of content – thus we
speak of liberal nationalism, nationalist conservatism or nationalist socialism.
According to the proponents of the ideational approach, populism falls within the class
of ‘thin’ ideologies. As the earliest advocate of this classification, Mudde defines populism as
“a [thin] ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the […] general will of the people” (2004, p. 543). As the definition
suggests, in Mudde’s view, the core of populist ideology is comprised of three decontested
concepts: “the people”, “the elite” and the “general will” (2017, p. 6). In this account, “the
people” are a central category, an instance of Anderson’s “imagined [yet not imaginary]
community” (much like ‘nation’ or ‘class’) yet distinct for its complete lack of content – such
an empty construct is said to contain whatever the populist projects into it (p. 7). Derived ex
negativo from ‘the people’ is ‘the elite’ – the “corrupt” an “evil” group standing in a Manichean
juxtaposition to the “pure”, righteous ‘people’ (Ibid). This antagonism between ‘the people’
and ‘the elite’ is thus construed as being essentially ethical in nature, rather than ethnic,
religious or national. The third core concept, the Rousseauian ‘general will’, rests on the idea
that a homogenous ‘people’, as construed by populists, thinks with a single mind –
representations of this ‘general will’ are those “common sense” solutions that, in the populists’
narrative, get ignored by an out-of-touch elite and its “special interests” (p. 8).
Stanley’s account of the ‘thin’ ideology of populism runs along very similar lines. In
his view, populism’s conceptual ‘core’ is fourfold. It includes (1) the analytic imposition of a
12
dichotomy between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, (2) an antagonistic relation between the two
(3) the notion of popular sovereignty and (4) the “positive valorization of ‘the people’ and
denigration of ‘the elite’” (Stanley, p. 102). While Stanley follows Mudde in construing ‘the
elite’ as negatively derived from ‘the people’, he perceives their adversarial relationship in Carl
Schmitt’s terms – as an iteration of the friend/enemy distinction that, in Schmitt’s view, is
central to the constitution of a demos.6 The introduction of Schmitt’s distinction, with its
claimed place in the democratic logic, is a welcome move in the context of discussing populism
since, as Chantal Mouffe points out, the inability to adequately conceptualize Schmitt’s ‘us vs.
them’ frontier is a consequential blind spot of liberal political theory (Mouffe 1997, pp. 4-5).
Finally, Abts and Rummens define populism as a “thin-centered ideology which
advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogenous body” (p. 409). This definition, as
the authors note, is comparatively succinct – what Mudde and Stanley perceive as distinct
features of populism’s core (i.e. the dichotomy between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, their
Manichean antagonism and the Rousseauian notion of a ‘general will’) are, in Abts and
Rummens’s view, derived from the populist conception of ‘the people’. Drawing from Claude
Lefort’s theory of democracy, Abts and Rummens argue that populism represents a
degeneration of democracy’s original logic, according to which “the locus of power [cannot]
be embodied by anyone, but has to remain an empty place” (pp. 412-413). In a constitutional
democracy, this ‘empty place’ refers to the political stage in general and parliamentary
institutions in particular, where the conflicts generated by an inherently diverse society
transpose into political conflicts and get ‘resolved’ through institutionally mediated
deliberation (p. 416). In the populist logic, however, this ‘empty place’ is filled by a
“substantial image of the people as a homogenous body”. Now, the populists’ image of ‘the
people’ is not construed to include all people – rather, its reference is limited to the real or
common people (thereby excluding, for instance, immigrants or Muslims). It is a fictitious
ideological construct, whose boundaries populism itself, due to its ‘thinness’, cannot draw.
Instead, the image of ‘the people’ is colored according to the populists’ different
complementary ideological (e.g. nativist or religious) hues (p. 414). In line with Schmitt’s
‘friend/enemy’ distinction, the supposed homogeneity of the ‘people-as-one’ mandates the
exclusion of all that does not fit within its imagined boundaries – hence the “vertical
6
“[The Elite’s] fundamental distinguishing feature is its adversarial relationship with the people” (Stanley, p.
103).
13
antagonisms” downwards, directed at the outlanders to the ‘people’s’ commonness and
realness (e.g. the nativist’s immigrant, the Christian’s Muslim), as well as upwards, directed
at ‘the elite’ (p. 418).
A Critique of the Ideational Approach
The ideational approach is not without its critics. In this regard, we should note
Freeden’s own reservations about the applicability of the ‘thin’ attribute to populism qua
ideology (Freeden 2017).
Freeden contends that, while ‘thin-centered’ ideologies are “structured so as to rely
systematically on other ideological positions to fill [them] in”, populism exhibits, at best, a
“limited overlap with segments of other ideologies” – as such, it does not nest well within
established ideological families (p. 3). “A thin-centered ideology implies that there is
potentially more than the center,” he explains, “but the populist core is all there is; it is not a
potential center for something broader or more inclusive” (p. 4).
Freeden’s argument does not seem empirically persuasive. Where, for instance, rightwing populism in Western Europe is concerned, we do, in fact, observe that unquestionably
populist political parties successfully integrate recognizable bits of the right-wing conservative
cannon, such as free-market liberalism, fiscal conservatism and traditionalism (UKIP being a
case in point).
Nonetheless, we might discern two aspects of the populist phenomenon, the importance
of which, in our view, has not been adequately stressed by the three above outlined
representatives of the ideational approach. In the first place, due emphasis is not given to the
notion that populism is elitist. In the second place, the essentially reactive nature of populism
is neglected.
That there is something inherently elitist in the political phenomenon can be illustrated
with a simple observation – namely, is it not true that, nowadays, when we say that ‘X’ is a
14
populist, we invariably refer to a political figure?7 This, we posit, is not due to the frequent
(indeed, almost exclusive) use of the term in public discourse as a derogatory epithet – words
such as ‘xenophobe’ and ‘bigot’ are also employed as terms of abuse, yet the claim that ‘’X’ is
a xenophobe’ does not necessarily bring to mind a public figure. The connotation of ‘populism’
which we here describe is, rather, akin to that of ‘demagoguery’ – it evocates wooing an
audience in some way and, thereby, occupying an outstanding, elite position vis-à-vis the
crowd. The frequent conflation of populism with demagoguery and opportunism, to which
Mudde points out, might not be solely due to the widespread impression that populist leaders
are manipulative conmen (2004, p. 543). It could also be seen as hinting a dimension of the
multifaceted populist phenomenon that lies beyond the intension of populism qua ideology –
namely, an elitist dimension.
We can elaborate this point by considering Weyland’s criticism of the ideational
approach. In his paper, Weyland contends that, “by omitting the crucial role of leadership”, the
ideational approach “implicitly depicts populism as a bottom-up mass movement”, which, in
his account, populism is empathetically not (2017, p. 9). While, considered in Weyland’s terms,
this ‘omitted’ facet of populism pertains to its organizational structure, we should sooner
perceive it as pertaining to the overall character of the populist phenomenon – it is not so much
that populism is top-down in structure as that, for all its ideological anti-elitism, it is somehow
elitist in nature. As aptly put by Freeden: “right-wing populism is not a grassroots
phenomenon,” he writes, “in the real world populists actually inhabit, elites battle elites, as
distinct from the ‘real’ world populists conjure up in their imagination” (Freeden 2017, p. 5).
It is not incidental, we maintain, that populist leaders exhibit markedly elitist features
– Mudde himself makes note of this fact, albeit in passing. “Interestingly,” he posits, “the
populist leader is not necessarily a true outsider […] [populist leaders] would be best described
as outsider-elites: connected to the elites, but not part of them” (Mudde 2004, p. 560). Stanley,
Abts and Rummens might indeed find this assessment consistent with their theories of
populism. Nevertheless, the claim itself does not seem to be entailed by their conceptions of
populism qua ideology.
This was not always the case – as the US newspaper archive shows, the term “populist” was used to designate
supporters of agrarian populist movement in the US in the early XIX century (www.newspaperarchive.com).
7
15
Another aspect of populism that the ideational approach does not seem to adequately
address is a specific kind of reactiveness built into the core of the populist phenomenon. We
here recall Margaret Canovan’s view that, intrinsic to populism, there is a “revolt against the
established structure of power” – a retaliation against the power-holding elite and its values,
undertaken “in the name of the people” (Canovan, p. 3). Now, as to Canovan’s subsequent
claim that the reactive nature of populism makes populist beliefs too context-dependent to be
considered an ideology, this charge appears to be successfully rebutted by the ideational
approach. Populism, as previously explained, is a ‘thin’ ideology with anti-elitism in its
conceptual core. This anti-elitism, i.e. the positive valorization of ‘the people’ and denigration
of ‘the elite’, is couched in ethical terms – it is “moralistic”, as Mudde would have it, or
Schmittean, as Stanley, Abts and Rummens would remark (Mudde 2017, p. 4) (Abts and
Rummens, p. 415) (Stanley, p. 103). The antagonism between the two, we are told, is
“Manichean” – the struggle of ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ reflects the eternal opposition of
good and evil, purity and corruption (Mudde, p. 543).
Yet, on closer inspection, the anti-elitism depicted by ideational approach as part of
populism’s conceptual core is not exactly that to which Canovan points out. To explain this
difference, let us distinguish, for the purposes of this argument, two distinct types of
antagonism, derived from the power relations that obtain between subject and object. The first
type of antagonism is a contempt, emanating from a position of power, aimed at a powerless
object – such is the totalizing urge to extinguish the other in order to monopolize a shared space
of existence. The second type emerges from powerlessness and is directed towards power – to
resent an oppressor is to antagonize him in this way. The ‘underdog’ anti-elitism that Canovan
ascribes to populist movements falls squarely within the latter type. Could the same be said of
the kind of anti-elitism posited by the ideational approach?
We might recall that, in the ideational approach, the notion of ‘the people’ occupies a
central place in populism’s conceptual core, whereas ‘the elite’ is a negatively defined
category.8 This means that, once ‘the people’ are posited, ‘the elite’ is construed as simply
being antithetical to, and therefore entirely derived from, whatever ‘the people’ are. However,
we should be careful to distinguish between the relationship that obtains between ‘the people’
Here we quote Mudde’s claim that the elite is “the anti-thesis of the people”, defined ex negativo (2017, p. 7).
We might also quote Stanley, who posits that “[the elite’s] fundamental distinguishing feature is its adversarial
relationship with the people” (p. 103).
8
16
and ‘the elite’ as two core concepts of populist ideology, and their relationship within the
“moralistic” paradigm of the ‘people vs. elite’ antagonism. The idea that the concept of ‘the
elite’ is derived ex negativo from the notion of ‘the people’ does not necessarily entail that the
ethical framework of ‘the good people vs. the evil elite’ is structured in such a way that ‘the
elite’s’ evilness is derived by negation from goodness ascribed to ‘the people’.
To illustrate the importance of this distinction, let us consider how the juxtaposition
between ‘the good people’ and ‘the evil elite’ might fit within our two postulated types of
antagonism. On the one hand, the positive valorization of ‘the people’ might be given in the
shape of narcissistic self-affirmation, and the denigration of ‘the elite’ construed as contempt
for the other, which, by its mere existence, hinders the totalizing assertion of ‘the people’s’
greatness. In this sense, ‘the elite’s’ evilness stems from ‘the people’s’ presumed ‘goodness’.
On the other hand, ‘the people’s’ antagonism vis-à-vis ‘the elite’ might take a more reactionary
form, the denigration of ‘the elite’ expressing resentment towards an oppressor that, by virtue
of being an oppressor, is ‘evil’. Accordingly, ‘the people’s’ ‘goodness’ here derives from ‘the
elite’s’ ‘evilness’.
In our view, the ideational approach fails to adequately address this distinction, and its
lack of clarity in this respect accounts for the overall inability of the ideational approach to pay
appropriate heed to the reactive character of populism’s inherent anti-elitism.
If the two outlined aspects of populism, reactivity and elitism, could indeed be
emphasized more adequately within the framework of the ideational approach, then our
intended contribution appears to be twofold. Namely, we ought to propose an account of
populism as ‘thin’ ideology that brings to the fore (1) the centrality (or, as we might put it, the
genealogical primacy) of ‘the elite’ in the structure of the moralistic antagonism between ‘the
people’ and ‘the elite’, (2) the elitist dimension intrinsic to the populist phenomenon. These
are the respective themes of this paper’s two following Chapters.
17
A NIETZSCHEAN TURN
To inquire into the structure of the moralistic antagonism between ‘the good, pure
people’ and ‘the evil, corrupt elite’ is, in a way, to venture into a hitherto unexplored domain
of populism’s conceptual core. As previously hinted, one of the two tasks that befalls us is to
articulate a conception of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, as ethical categories juxtaposed within a
framework of antagonism, in which ‘the elite’s’ evil exhibits genealogical primacy over ‘the
people’s’ good. That is, we need to show that, while the concept of ‘the elite’ is derived from
that of ‘the people’, ‘the people’ are ‘good’ and ‘pure’ because ‘the elite’ is ‘evil’ and ‘corrupt’,
and not vice versa. With our task thus construed, it is impossible to overlook a theoretical
framework that seems uniquely suited to serve as a heuristic device for our analysis – namely,
Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the development of the so-called “slave
morality”, as articulated in his “On the Genealogy of Morality” (henceforth, GM) (Nietzsche,
On The Genealogy of Morality 1997).
The Slave Revolt – Outline of Nietzsche’s Account
The aim of Nietzsche’s philosophical project in GM is to provide a genealogical
account of morality, that is, consider the conception of ‘the Good’ and its associated moral
values within the historical conditions and life-circumstances that determined their
contemporary, modern form. The necessity of such a genealogical account stems from
Nietzsche’s understanding of morality as a contingent historical phenomenon, with moral
values viewed as historically determined constructs, intimately related to the seeking and
attainment of power (May, p. 11). To that end, Nietzsche puts forth a number of etymological,
psychological and anthropological hypotheses to construct a compelling narrative about the
origins and consequences of central event in the history of morality, namely, the ‘Slave revolt’.
Nietzsche posits the Slave revolt as taking place within the tripartite structure of the
earliest historical communities. Atop of this structure stood a warrior caste, the ‘Masters’.
These were the strongest, the most forceful and domineering members of early societies, whose
qualities allowed them to establish their reign over the early societies by forming an aristocratic
elite.
18
As the Masters’ exclusive prerogative of conferring names naturally extended into the
normative domain, the ruling caste developed a normative understanding commensurate with
its elevated position, the so-called ‘Master Morality’. This moral framework, we are told, was
a spontaneous outburst of self-affirmation – to be “good”, in Master morality, meant to be the
way the Masters perceived themselves to be: powerful, chivalrous and “noble” (i.e. possessed
of strength and power authentically) (E1, §5, p. 14). To be “bad’, on the other hand, merely
implied a privation – ‘bad’ was what was weak, powerless, and plebeian, that is, “lower [than
us]” (§4, p. 13).
The designee of the ‘bad’ thus construed was the bottom caste of the early societal
hierarchies, namely, the ‘Slaves’ toiling under the Masters’ yoke. Importantly, the Masters are
said to “bear no grudge” towards the Slaves – there were no ill feelings on part of the dominant
towards the subjugated, any more than there are in the attitude of predators towards their prey
(§13, p. 26). The eagle, Nietzsche writes, does not antagonize the lamb – in fact, to the eagle
“nothing is tastier than a tender lamb” (Ibid).
In their subjugation, the Slaves are said to have come to an awareness of the oppressive
character of their predicament, and, with it, a reactive, antagonistic instinct towards their
Masterly oppressors. This sentiment, which Nietzsche terms ‘ressentiment’, is posited to be the
driving force behind the development of a new, rival framework of morality, i.e. Slave morality
(§11, p. 24).
The novelty of Slave morality, in Nietzsche’s account, consisted in its retaliatory
character – reacting to their suffering at the Masters’ hand, the lamb-like Slaves began to scorn
those “large birds of prey” for “carrying off the little lambs” (§13, p. 26). Consequently, a new
moral category was introduced to designate the Masters – evil. “These birds of prey are evil”,
the lambs would say, “and whoever is least like a bird of prey and most like its opposite, a
lamb, – is good” (Ibid). To be evil, then, meant to behave as the Masters did – aggressively,
forcefully, oppressively. To be good, in turn, was to be unlike the Masters. Hence, whereas
Master morality offered the dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, with ‘bad’ defined by negation,
Slave morality juxtaposed ‘good’ to ‘evil’, with ‘good’ derived from ‘evil’.
According to Nietzsche, for the Slaves to be able to construe the Masters as ‘evil’, it
was necessary that they perceive their predicament in normative terms, i.e. not as merely
19
unfortunate, but as deliberately imposed and therefore unjust. In other words, it was necessary
that the Masters be perceived as oppressors by choice. In Nietzsche’s view, this meant that
Slave morality assumed it possible “to ask strength not to express itself as strength”, that is, to
ask of the Masters not to act in accordance with their defining characteristics (Ibid).
This assumption, in turn, presupposes the duality of subject and deed, i.e. an
understanding of agency as existing autonomously of action. In the context of Slave morality,
this erroneous duality carries an important suggestion – namely, that “the strong are free to be
weak, and the birds of prey to be lambs” (p. 27). It is in virtue of this supposition that the Slaves
could find their Masters responsible for, and, consequently, guilty of exhibiting masterly traits.
Moreover, in Slave morality, the freedom of the strong to be weak translates into the notion
that the weak, likewise, are free to be strong. In Nietzsche’s view, it is “as though the weakness
of the weak were itself […] a voluntary achievement, something wanted, chosen, a deed, an
accomplishment” (E1, §13, p.27). This latter notion is a “sublime self-deception”, employed
by the powerless to moralize the grim reality of powerlessness (Ibid). In the same vein, Slave
morality’s disavowal of aggression, violence and dominance, and the corresponding JudeoChristian ideal of humility, is construed as a moralistic façade erected to conceal the fact that
Slaves are inherently weak, and could not be strong if they wished to.
Nietzsche maintains that the task of articulating such an elaborate moral paradigm
would have clearly surpassed the reflexive powers of the Slaves themselves. For this reason,
he ascribes conceptual authorship of Slave morality to members of third stratum of primordial
societies – the ‘Priests’ (§6-7, pp. 15-18). Occupying an ambiguous position within and, at the
same time, below the Master caste, the Priests are described as cerebral, low-ranking members
of the aristocracy, distinct for their great concern with purity (pp. 16-17).
It is the Priests’ confrontation with the Masters, in which the Masters overpowered the
Priests, that incited hate towards the Masters amongst the Priestly caste – in their
powerlessness, “the greatest haters in the world history, and the most intelligent” construed
Slave morality as a mechanism of revenge (pp. 17).9 Hence the theodicy of Slave morality’s
exhibits distinctly Priestly features – to account for the Slaves’ suffering, the category of ‘sin’
According to Nietzsche, the Priests’ conflict with the Masters’ is a real historical event – specifically, he
identifies the Jewish priests, whose masterly status was relegated to that of the slaves’ during the period of Judea’s
subjugation by Rome, as the architects of Slave morality.
9
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is postulated, as the kernel of Masterly evil that ‘corrupts’ the purity of the Slavish soul (§16,
pp. 94-95). Deliverance from sin, in the Priestly account, consists in pointing ressentiment
inwardly, towards that chamber of the soul possessed of masterly aggression, vitality and
strength (i.e. evil). In this act of self-denying, the ultimate goal is to arrive at what Nietzsche
calls ‘ascetic ideals’ – notions such as ‘ultimate Good’, ‘pure Beauty’, ‘absolute Knowledge’,
residing in a transcendent sphere beyond earthly existence and reflecting the Priestly obsession
with purity in its most extreme and sophisticated iteration (§11, p. 85).
In Nietzsche’s view, Slave morality’s scope of influence extends to all domains of
modern culture – in fact, all systems of evaluation wherein the value of something is defined
‘from the receiving end’, that is, by its effects it has on the receiver, are said to derive, in a
way, from Slave morality (§2, p. 11-12). Such is, for instance, the case with the omnipresent
“democratic idiosyncrasy of being against everything that dominates and wants to dominate”
(E2, §12, p. 52). As May observes, “slave reactiveness” is posited by Nietzsche as being the
“dominant form or structure of our thought and sensibility” (May 1999, p. 50).
‘The People vs. The Elite – A Nietzschean Approach
The outline offered in the previous section is, by no means, a comprehensive summary
of Nietzsche’s complex genealogical endeavor; rather, it is an attempt to present those aspects
of Nietzsche’s account that are most pertinent to this paper’s thesis. By analogy, this Chapter’s
aim is most certainly not to unreservedly transpose the populist phenomenon into Nietzsche’s
framework and depict the rise of populism as a contemporary Slave revolt. Rather, our ambition
is to employ Nietzsche’s framework as a heuristic device to articulate the anti-elitist facet of
populism’s conceptual core in such a way as to encompass the reactiveness that, in our view,
has so far been overlooked. Moreover, as we shall see, our reliance on the Nietzschean
framework will pave the way for a theoretically articulation of the broader dynamics within
which anti-elitism emerges a core facet of populism’s conceptual structure.
Our thesis, then, is simple: the specific kind of reactiveness which Canovan ascribes to
populism can be construed as Nietzschean ressentiment.
21
Earlier we distinguished between two types of antagonism within which populism’s
moralistic juxtaposition of ‘the people’ to ‘the elite’ could fit. To propose that, in populism,
this antagonism belongs to the second type, i.e. that it emanates from a position of
powerlessness and is directed towards a powerful object, suggests that, from the populist
perspective, ‘the elite’s’ evilness stems from its oppression of ‘the people’. Hence, in line with
Freeden’s observation that populism is commonly seen as “an ideology of the dispossessed”,
we maintain that the populist brand of anti-elitism carries a distinct bottom-up resentment
(2017, p. 5).
Now, while it may appear appealing enough to use the word ‘resentment’ without the
added Nietzschean connotation, Canovan’s point would thereby be missed. Let us recall that,
for Canovan, what distinguished populist politics from other anti-system movements is that
“populism challenges not only established power-holders but also elite values” (p. 3). In other
words, populists do not merely resent ‘the elite’ for oppressing ‘the people’ – by viewing ‘the
elite’s’ way of life as a threat to theirs, populists perceive ‘the elite’s’ oppressive character as
stemming from its peculiar ‘morality’. Indicative in this respect is Mudde’s citation of an
American conservative populist’s depiction of ‘the elite’ as “latte-drinking, sushi-eating,
Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading, Hollywood-loving [liberals]” (2017, p. 7). Said
attributes not merely tokens of socio-economic status – evidently, they testify to a system of
values that shapes the manner of ‘the elite’s’ oppression of ‘the people’. 10 For this reason, the
populist does more than resent ‘the elite’ qua oppressors. In populism, there is ressentiment –
at once a revolt against the Masters as well as, in itself, a refutation of Master morality.
In the populism’s ressentiment of ‘the elite’ we can recognize that “sublime selfdeception” that Nietzsche identified as the starting point of Slave morality (E1, §13, p.27).
Namely, in populist discourse, ‘the elite’ is not perceived as originally alien but rather as fallen
from grace – ‘the elite’, we hear, is corrupt, which implies that once it was pure, good and
decent (just like ‘the people’). As Mudde aptly puts it, “populism presupposes that the elite
comes from the same group as the people, but have willingly chosen to betray them” (2017, p.
4). Yet, in the populist logic, ‘the elite’s’ eventual corruption is not a necessary consequence
In this sense, the form in which ‘the elite’s’ perceived oppression of ‘the people’ is said to take place depends
on the manner of construing ‘the elite’s’ morality. Hence, for instance, an anti-religious ‘elite’ would oppress ‘the
people’ by waging War on Christmas, whereas a globalist ‘elite’ would subjugate ‘the people’ by tearing down
the nation-state.
10
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of an external cause, as Lord Acton’s dictum would suggest. 11 Rather, it is deliberate. This we
can infer from the “revivalist flavor” that Canovan observes in populist rhetoric – the populist
promise of a “great renewal” carries the suggestion that, in an imagined future, those in power
will once again possess their long-forsaken purity (p. 6).12 Hence, populism does, in fact,
imagine it possible that a ruling class be ‘pure’ (again). This is why in populism, unlike, for
instance, in socialism, anti-elitist sentiment stands in intimate connection to the tendency to
romanticize an imagined past, when ‘the people’ were led by ‘pure’ leaders (e.g. the
contemporary populist rallying cry “Make America great again!” is fittingly followed by
waxing lyrical about the virtues of Honest Abe). In the populist view, then, ‘the elite’ is held
responsible for its corruption, much like, in Slave morality, the Masters are blamed for
exhibiting Masterly traits.
The populist perception of ‘the elite’ as being corrupt stands in sharp contrast to the socalled ‘elitist’ view of ‘the people’. Described by Mudde as a “mirror-image of populism”,
elitism is said to share populism’s Manichean division between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’,
with the difference of valorizing ‘the elite’ as the pure, virtuous “the moral majority” whilst
denigrating ‘the people’ as “amoral” and “impure” (Mudde 2004, pp. 543-544) (2017, p. 9). In
Mudde’s view, elitism is as anti-democratic and averse to compromise as populism is – in the
elitist understanding, politics should express the will of an enlightened “moral majority”, not
‘the people’ (Ibid). These parallels between populism and elitism notwithstanding, we contend
that there is an important difference in their respective perceptions of the ‘impurity’ embodied
by the denigrated other. For elitists, ‘the people’ are impure because they are unenlightened,
backwards-looking, narrow-minded, ignorant, inept and therefore susceptible to prejudice and
bigotry. Their amorality, in the elitist view, stems from a deficiency, i.e. a lack of rationality,
education, expertise and worldly sophistication. In other words, ‘the people’ do not measure
up to ‘us’. Considered in Nietzsche’s terms, does this not resemble the notion of ‘bad’ in Master
morality? Comparing elitism and populism’s respective perceptions of the other’s vice, we can
discern two radically different modes of moral evaluation. In our view, they correspond to
Nietzsche’s distinction between the workings of Master morality and Slave morality.
Here I refer to Lord Acton’s famous remark in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton: “power corrupts and
absolute power corrupts absolutely”.
12
This is not to say that, for instance, the aforementioned American populist expects members of ‘the elite’ to
abandon their latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving ways, but that, in an imagined future, those who govern
will be expected to exhibit the American populist version of purity.
11
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Priests and Slaves – a Nietzschean View of Populist Politics
Our reliance on Nietzsche’s theoretical framework in exploring the different facets of
populism’s conceptual core invites us to consider the broader dynamics of populist politics
through the same lens.
As previously noted, Nietzsche’s account of Slave morality can only be understood in
view of the specific historical context within which it is situated, namely, in view of the
tripartite structure of early historical communities. Now, by positing the populist antagonizing
of ‘the elite’ as Slavish ressentiment, we do not suggest that the structure of contemporary
societies, within which populist movements emerge, is in any way divisible along Nietzsche’s
lines. Our argument is simply that, where the ideological production of populism is concerned,
the rapport between populist leaders and their supporters mirrors that of the Slaves and the
Priests in Nietzsche’s description of Slave morality.
Before we elaborate this point, it serves to observe that the ‘thin’ ideology of populism,
unlike its more established, ‘full’ counterparts, exhibits a distinct lack of systematicity. As
Stanley notes, there is no canon of populist texts, nor are there any shared philosophicalpolitical institutions that transcend individual populist movements, parties and leaders (p. 100).
Hence the point that ideology is constantly in the making, shaped by a myriad of contingent
ideational, cultural and socio-economic currents, holds especially true in the case of populism.
In spite of that, it does not seem unwarranted to maintain that, even in the case of populism,
the distinction between the ideology’s primary producers and consumers obtains. By and large,
supporters of populist organizations who identify with ‘the people’ can be said to consume the
ideology, rather than contribute to its articulation in a meaningful way. As argued in Chapter
I, populist politics are a top-down affair, ideationally as well as structurally – populism’s strong
association with demagoguery implies not only the elitist character of populist public figures,
but also the passivity and essential lack of agency of the populists’ audience. In this sense,
populism is of ‘the people’ and for ‘the people’ without necessarily being by ‘the people.
With the supporters of populist organizations construed as mere consumers of ideology,
how might we account for its production? As previously suggested, the absence of recognizable
political-philosophical institutions that systematically frame the populist creed makes it
24
difficult to single out, amongst the plethora of indistinct voices that generate the populist
Zeitgeist, any one original ideological ‘workshop’. Nonetheless, we posit that, however topsyturvy the ideological production of populism may be, the class of populist leaders can be
discerned as perhaps the only concrete, identifiable agent in the process of articulating
populism qua ideology.
To ascertain this point, let us recall that the preferred rhetorical tool employed by
populist leaders to legitimize their agendas refers to what Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann termed
the ‘spiral of silence’. 13 By professing to “say out loud what everyone’s thinking”, populist
leaders present themselves as the megaphones of a supposed majority (‘the people’) that feels
uncomfortable expressing its political views publicly, due to the perceived stigma attached to
these views by the mainstream. In positing themselves as the sorely needed voice of that ‘silent
majority’, populist leaders seductively offer to break the spiral and empower ‘the people’s’
long-silenced political expression. Yet, in this transaction, ‘the people’ get more than they
bargained for. Populist leaders do not merely transpose ‘the people’s’ discretely held beliefs
onto the public stage – in the process, they bind these beliefs together within a single narrative
structure, thereby formulating them as a ‘thin’ ideology.
This dynamic can be illustrated by considering Mudde’s study of the populist radical
right in Europe (2010). Defining the populist radical right as an ideological mixture of
populism, nativism and authoritarianism, Mudde cites various EU-wide public opinion surveys
to argue that the prevalence of strongly populist, nativist and authoritarian attitudes among
respondents is far from marginal (pp. 1175-1178).14 Yet these figures, by themselves, do not
suggest that such-and-such a percentage of EU citizens are radical right-wing populists – at
best, they might indicate a propensity for supporting the populist radical right. There is a long
road between ‘silently’ holding stigmatized views that Nigel Farage vows to voice and buying
into UKIP’s ideological shtick. On that road, the decontested meanings of the concepts in the
populist core are adopted and bound with the thread of populism’s peculiar structure. Our
For a succinct elaboration of Noelle-Neumann’s notion of ‘the spiral of silence’, see (Noelle-Neumann 1974).
Specifically, according to the 2003 European Social Survey, 19% of respondents opine that ‘immigrants should
not have the same rights as everyone else’, while, according to the 2003 Special Barometer 181, 78% of EU-15
citizens believe that ‘young people would commit less crime if they were taught better discipline by their parents
or at school’ (Mudde, 2010, p. 1176). Moreover, a 1999 Eurobarometer survey shows 40% of EU-15 respondents
were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their national democracy (p. 1177). These figures are amongst
those employed by Mudde’s analysis of the prevalence of nativist, authoritarian and populist attitudes in the EU.
13
14
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contention is that, in this process, the narrative peddled by populist leaders plays a crucial part,
albeit heuristically and unsystematically.
If there is truth to this account of the relationship between the supporters of populist
organizations qua consumers and populist leaders qua producers of populist ideology, does it
not resemble Nietzsche’s description of the Priests and the Slaves’ respective roles in the
workings of Slave morality? According to Nietzsche, while Slave morality innovatively adopts
the perspective of the lamb-like Slaves, its architects are members of the Priestly caste, in
whose hands Slave morality becomes an instrument of revenge against the Masters. In this
sense, are populist leaders not, by analogy, the Priests of populism?
Admittedly, it may be difficult to imagine the likes of Donald Trump as the High Priests
of anything. Yet, paradoxically, the Priestly obsession with ‘purity’ in Nietzsche’s account
finds its direct analogy in the behavior of populist leaders. As is often noted, populists like to
present their policy solutions as disarmingly simple, in contrast to their opponents’
unintelligible proposals. This is not solely due to the ambition, shared by all politicians, to
portray themselves as straight-talkers and their opponents as evasive – for populists, policy
simplicity is itself a sign of virtue. As Canovan observes, populists depict “[policy] complexity
[as] a self-serving racket perpetuated by professional politicians” to conceal the elite’s
unwillingness to rock the boat (p. 6). In the populist rationale, ‘complex’ equals ‘elitist’ equals
‘fraudulent’. Accordingly, real solutions are invariably posited as exercises in plain, oldfashioned common sense – as Mudde points out, “for populists […] the consciousness of the
people, generally referred to as common sense, is the basis of all good (politics)” (2004, p.
547). ‘Simple’, then, equals ‘commonsensical’ equals ‘popular’ equals ‘pure’ – to uphold
simplistic policy solutions is to stay true the ‘common sense’ of ‘the people’ whom the populist
politician claims to represent on the public stage. In populism, ‘common sense’ thus construed
is akin to a moral precept, by which original purity is kept and elitist corruption is avoided. In
this sense, as an arch-practitioner of simplistic policy-talk, Donald Trump can indeed be
considered the High Priest of populist purity.
Elites and Outsider-Elites – The Implications of a Nietzschean Approach
26
In our analysis of populism’s conceptual core and the broader dynamics that informs
its constitution, Nietzsche’s theoretical framework offers further insights into that which, in
Chapter I, we identified as the neglected elitist dimension of contemporary populism.
When identifying the populist leaders as important agents in the continuous process of
populism’s constitution as a ‘thin’ ideology – a function that we compared to that of the Priestly
caste in Nietzsche’s account of Slave morality – we are reminded of Mudde’s description of
populist leaders as “outsider-elites: connected to the elites, but not part of them” (2004, p. 560).
Indeed, contemporary populist figures fit this description remarkably accurately – Thierry
Baudet is practically an embodiment of the Dutch upper class, Marine Le Pen is a political
aristocrat, Beppe Grillo is a multimillionaire, and Trump nowadays rallies against the same
Hollywood ‘elite’ whose top echelons he had spent decades courting as a second-rate celebrity
socialite. Considered as private individuals, these populist champions of ‘the people’ would
doubtless be classified as ‘the elite’ from the perspective of that ‘people’ whom they claim to
represent. In this sense, the ambiguous social status of populist leaders bears striking
resemblance to that of the Priests in Nietzsche’s account.
In another sense, however, the comparison does not hold – according to Nietzsche, the
position of the Priestly caste within the tripartite structure of early historical societies is
determined by qualitative distinctions (i.e. an obsession with purity and a lack of Masterly
traits). Surely, populist ‘outsider-elites’ cannot be said to exhibit distinguishing character traits
– in fact, quite a few contemporary populist figures could have easily been imagined as fitting
with the crème of ‘the elite’. Rather, then, populist leaders become perceived as ‘outsiderelites’ at the point when they, in their own way, begin to rebel against ‘the elite’.
A further inadequacy of Nietzsche’s sociological framework can be identified by
contrasting the previously described anti-elitism in populism’s conceptual core with the way
the populist ‘outsider-elite’ antagonizes ‘the elite’. Whereas, in the populist narrative, ‘the
elite’ and its peculiar ‘morality’ are resented for their hegemonic oppression of ‘the people’,
the portrayal of ‘the elite’ by the populist ‘outsider-elite’ suggests a somewhat different power
dynamics. In addition to vilifying ‘the experts’, ‘the Eurocrats’ and ‘the mainstream media’
qua ‘elite’ in the above-mentioned way, populist leaders often deride ‘the elite’ as emperors
with no clothes. These experts, we are told, are deluded; the Eurocrats are incompetent, and
the mainstream media is blinded by political correctness. Decadence, weakness, worthlessness
27
– these are the attributes used by ‘outsider-elites’ to depict their ‘elite’ counterparts, thereby
expressing a sentiment perfectly encapsulated by Peggy Noonan’s fulmination: “We are being
patronized by our inferiors”.15 The populist ‘outsider-elite’s’ stance vis-à-vis ‘the elite’ is, then,
too daringly bullish to be described as Slavish ressentiment.
These two last contentions emphasize the fact that, as a heuristic device, Nietzsche’s
theoretical framework has its limitations. Nonetheless, in assessing what a Nietzschean
perspective can and cannot relate about the nature of the populist phenomenon, we are
reminded that underlying Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the Slave revolt there is a view
of moral frameworks (and morality itself) as contingent historical phenomena, whose
genealogy is taken to reflect the power structures wherein they emerged.
Following this idea, we posit that, in a similar vein, the semiotics of the core features
of populism as a ‘thin’ ideology is intimately related to the power dynamics that obtain between
‘the elite’ and the populist ‘outsider-elite’. Consequently, and consistent with the ideational
approach, we attempt to develop an account to populism that encompasses both planes on
which the populist phenomenon can be perceived. To elaborate this suggestion, we (1) propose
a descriptive model of the dynamics of ‘the elite’ and the ‘outsider-elite’s’ interaction, and (2)
offer an account of the constitution of populism, qua ‘thin’ ideology with a view of that
dynamics.
To fulfill our twofold task, in the following two Chapters we consider the theoretical
framework of the so-called ‘elite theory’, wherefrom we extrapolate a model of elite change
with which we attempt to provide an account of the populist phenomenon.
15
See: https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-decadent-leadership-class-1476400544
28
ELITE THEORY
‘Elite theory’ refers to a broad and heterogeneous intellectual tradition in
political sociology which has exerted substantial, if somewhat unacknowledged influence in
many domains of political theorizing. Elite theory found its initial expression in the works of
the so-called classical elite theorists of the interbellum period, the most notable of which were
Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels. Thenceforth, elite theory has been
reformulated by Joseph Schumpeter and eventually developed into its contemporary form –
known as the new elite paradigm or new elitism – articulated today by political theorists such
as John Higley and Jan Pakulski (Higley 2008) (Higley and Pakulski 2009) (Pakulski 2012).
Elite Theory – Classical and Contemporary Variants
Central to all elite theories, classical and contemporary, is the notion of the
inevitability of elites. Elite theory begins by postulating that, in any organized human
collective, decision-making largely lies in the hands of a relatively small group of individuals,
designated as the governing or ruling elite. For elite theorists, the inevitability of elites is a
“social fact” – an empirically undeniable proposition about the nature of society. Yet, while it
serves as a basis for much elite theorizing, this ‘social fact’ is not postulated as a first principle
– in fact, the premises from which the inevitability of elites is derived, as well as the ways in
which the concept of ‘elite’ is construed, vary across different classical and contemporary elite
theories.
For Pareto, the term ‘elite’ refers to a normatively neutral, wholly meritocratic category.
Leaving aside considerations “as to the good or bad, useful or harmful, praiseworthy or
reprehensible character of the various traits in individuals”, Pareto maintains that the ‘elite’ is
composed of those individuals whose abilities score high, on a 1-10 scale, in some determinate
activity (Pareto, The Circulation of Elites, §2026-§2027). Therefore, for Pareto, the elite is
purely an “elite of achievement”, as Kolegar puts it (Kolegar, p. 367). Moreover, Pareto
differentiates between two types of elite. Those members of the elite who “directly or indirectly
play some considerable part in government” Pareto calls the ‘governing elite’, whereas the rest
(such as, for instance, the ablest surgeons or chess players) comprise the ‘non-governing’ elite
(§2032).
29
This conception of the elite, like many of Pareto’s other sociological views, is strongly
influenced by his economic theory of the dynamic equilibrium – as Christensen notes, Pareto’s
treatment of wealth inequality as an economic given (i.e. his belief that “unequal distribution
of wealth is a constant feature of economic systems”) translated into the view that the unequal
distribution of capabilities brings forth, as a matter of ‘social fact’, the elite/non-elite distinction
(Christensen, p. 8).
On the other hand, according to Mosca, the distinction between elite (the ‘ruling class’,
as he terms it) and non-elite has nothing to do with the distribution of some quantifiable
individual capabilities; instead, it rests on a fundamental relation of “esteem” and “influence”.
Elites, we are told, distinguish themselves by being the most “esteemed and influential” in their
societies, in virtue of some “real or apparent attribute” they possess (Kolegar, p. 362). Yet,
while such attributes seem to make elite status contingent upon perception, there is one
positively held feature that Mosca bestows on the elite to account for its existence – namely,
the predisposition towards organization.
As Kolegar notes, Mosca posits that all societies exhibit an inherent need for order, and
that this need translates into the demand for a “classe dirigente” that would bring order about
(Ibid). The non-elite is, by definition, disorganized – as soon as a group of individuals organizes
around a certain purpose, it ceases to belong to the non-elite and becomes a minority qualified
to compete for leadership (Christensen, p. 5). Hence, for Mosca, political power can only ever
lie in the hands of an organized minorities, “which have had, and will have, the means, varying
as the times vary, to impose their supremacy on the multitudes” (Mosca, p. 326).
Numerous aspects of Pareto’s conception of the ‘elite’ immediately strike one as
problematic. For instance, if excellence is quantifiable on a 1-10 scale, is the ‘cutoff’ score for
elite status (e.g. an 8/10) not arbitrarily determined? Moreover, how does one go about
objectively quantifying someone’s ability – what is the proper measure of an ‘excellent’ artist,
as opposed to a mediocre one? Do judgments of an individual’s excellence in a specific field
not depend, to a large degree, upon the perspective from which they are made? History is full
of figures whose merit is periodically questioned and rehabilitated.
30
Another obvious problem of Pareto’s understanding of the ‘elite’ in the broader sense
(i.e. encompassing both the governing and the non-governing elite) can be exposed if Pareto’s
meritocratic criteria are applied to that infamous ability commonly associated with the
contemporary politician – namely, the ability to take credit for others’ achievements. If,
according to Pareto, even a good con man may claim elite status based on his excellence in
deceptiveness and misrepresentation, would then a thoroughly mediocre public official belong
to an ‘elite of achievement’ if he managed to convince his constituents that others’ successful
policy initiatives were, in fact, his own? If Pareto’s notion of ‘merit’ is to encompass even to
those who skillfully emulate merit, then the notion itself becomes too vague to serve its
intended differentiating function.
A crucial and broadly criticized shared feature of Pareto’s ‘governing elite’ and
Mosca’s ‘ruling class’ is aptly summarized by Carl J. Friedrich, according to whom both
theorists are guilty relying on two unproven assumptions, namely, “(a) that those who play a
role in government constitute a coherent group, and (b) that they possess distinguishing
characteristics” (Zuckerman, p. 332).16 Indeed, if one accepts that ‘those who govern’ cannot
be treated as a sufficiently coherent unit of analysis, not much elite theory remains to be
discussed. The latter charge, however, is one that contemporary elite theories manage to avoid,
as they radically depart from Pareto and Mosca in their understanding of what elites are and
why they are inevitable.
Contemporary elite theories offer a number of competing definitions of the term ‘elite’.
For some, the ‘elite’ is taken to mean ‘the power-holders’; for others, it is ‘the decisionmakers’; for others still, a ‘preference-imposing minority’, or, alternatively, ‘those who wield
actual authority’ – to note but a few prominent definitions of the term covered by Zuckerman’s
survey of contemporary elite theories (Zuckerman, p. 326). In all cases, membership in the
‘elite’ is not construed as being held in virtue of some inherent personal trait, but rather as
being a description of one’s relative standing in society. In this sense, contemporary elite
theories narrow the scope of their explanatory ambitions: while Pareto and Mosca sought to
The former charge can be understood as part of Friedrich’s more general criticism of all elite theories, whose
denial of the “common man’s” subjectivity, in his view, rendered them incompatible with the democratic creed
(Friedrich, p. 422).
16
31
account for (1) why elites exist and (2) which inherent features indicate an individual’s elite
status, contemporary thinkers such as John Higley limit themselves to the former question. 17
In line with this general understanding of the term, Higley defines (political) elites as
persons “who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations
and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley
2008, p. 3).18
There are at least three reasons to select Higley’s conception of the political elite as a
working definition for the purposes of this analysis. First, Higley’s wording tactfully avoids
employing the elusive concept of “power”, thus preempting the persuasive lines of criticism
leveled against attempts to account for a semiotically muddy explanandum with an even
muddier explanans.19 Second, Higley’s definition escapes the problems of the formalinstitutional approach that, due to its privileging of wielding formal decision-making over
exerting (informal) influence, struggles to account for the proverbial ‘power behind the throne’.
In this sense, to describe one’s position as having a ‘strategic location in large or otherwise
pivotal organizations and movements’ seems altogether more flexible than simply to say that
one holds public office.20 Third, it would be overly demanding to criticize Higley’s use of
indeterminate attributes (‘regular’ and ‘substantial’) in describing the political elite’s influence
of political events – as most other sociological notions, the notion of a ‘political elite’ is an
inherently imprecise one, and its definition can hardly be expected to be semiotically watertight. For these reasons, our discussion will henceforth adopt Higley’s definition of the political
elite.
17
John Higley has been widely recognized as a leading contemporary proponent of elite theory (Lopez, p. 1).
An initial reason for selecting this particular definition is that it represents the most complete attempt Higley
has made to define elites. In earlier writings, Higley conceives of elites as “people who are able, through their
position in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes individually, regularly and seriously”
(Burton and Higley 1987, p. 296). Apart from raising numerous additional problems – e.g. are elites not able to
affect transnational politics as well? Can they not exert influence collectively, and not just individually? – this
prior definition is susceptible to the subsequently cited critique of the formal-institutional approach.
19
One typical instance of a definition problematic in such a way, provided by Zuckerman, is that of T. B.
Bottomore, according to whom the ‘political elite’ refers to a small group within the ‘political class’, which
“comprises those individuals who actually exercise political power in a given society at a given time” (Zuckerman
p. 326). Bottomore’s definition has been criticized for sneaking in an undefined concept (i.e. how does one
construe ‘power’?), for the empirical problem it poses (that of “identifying those individuals who in fact exercise
political power in that society”), as well as for its susceptibility to infinite regress (i.e. what if “the ‘real’ political
elite is so powerful as to be hidden from view”?) (p. 327).
20
Indeed, Higley’s notion of ‘elite’ thus construed is said to encompass “not only prestigious and “established”
leaders – top politicians, important businessmen, high-level civil servants, senior military officers – but also
[leaders of] trade unions, important voluntary associations, and politically consequential mass movements”
(Higley 2008, p. 3). Importantly, Higley’s ‘elite’ includes “counter-elites”, which will be discussed later (Ibid).
18
32
A second respect in which contemporary elite theories differ from their classical
counterparts concerns the underlying causes of the ‘social fact’ of elites. While, for Pareto, the
inevitability of elites is derived from the principle of unequal distribution, which obtains in the
social sphere as well as in economics, for Higley, the “fundamental and universal fact of social
life” causing the existence of elites is “the absence in any large collectivity of a robust common
interest” (Higley, p. 2). According to Higley, the survival of a sufficiently large polity demands
constant decision-making that ‘transcends’ individual interests to attain the ‘common good’.
Since such decisions cannot be borne out of popular consensus, they fall into the hands of a
small group of strategically located decision-makers, able to bend the community towards their
vision of the ‘common good’, and this group thereby forms the polity’s elite (Ibid, p. 3).
Paradoxically, this contemporary account of the inevitability of elites is less contemporary then
its classical counterpart – while in Pareto’s postulation of the unequal distribution of abilities
a whiff of social Darwinism can be discerned, the notion that elites exist because the
constituents of a commonwealth require a ‘common power to keep them all in awe’ is as old
as Hobbes.
The baggage that comes with deciding to refer to the frequently problematized notion
of the ‘common good’ makes this latter aspect of Higley’s elite theory less attractive for
employment than the former. Therefore, while subscribing to a contemporary understanding of
the political elite as articulated by Higley, this paper does not accept Higley’s account of the
elite’s raison d'être. Instead, on this matter we hold to classical elite theory and suggest,
following Robert Michels, that, in any organized collective, an “iron law of oligarchy” can be
said to obtain – that, if organization entails division of labor and therefore specialization, and
if specialization entails expertise, then stratification (initially along the lines of expertize)
follows and hierarchy necessarily develops (Michels 1915/2009, pp. 27-28, 58, 64-65).
Hence, with the main features of classical and contemporary elite theory thus outlined,
what follows is an exploration of two pertinent aspects of Pareto’s and Higley’s respective
theories, which will be employed in this paper’s proposed analytical model: Pareto’s notion of
‘elite cycles’ and Higley’s typology of ‘elite configuration’.
33
Lions and Foxes – Pareto s Elite Cycles
“History,” Pareto wrote, “is the graveyard of aristocracies” (Pareto, The Circulation of
Elites, §2053). Given Pareto’s previously outlined meritocratic conception of the governing
elite, this oft-cited thought points to an obvious explanatory challenge. Namely, if the
governing elite is truly composed of the best and brightest, how does one explain its inevitable
eventual downfall (Kolegar, p. 358)?
Pareto was keenly aware of this challenge – to account for the manifest historical
changes in the structure and composition of governing elites, he put forth an ambitious and
theoretically consequential description of the “circulation of elites” (Pareto, §2026-§2054).
According to this thesis, every major political occurrence, such as a regime change, a
revolution or a significant turn of the political tide, reflects a change in the structure and
composition of the elite, and this evolutionary process unfolds through history in a cyclical
manner – in consecutive long elite cycles, each of which is said to encompass several short
elite cycles. While the end of a short elite cycle may manifest itself in something as ordinary
as an electoral landslide and may take place within a generation, long elite cycles are said to
define entire epochs, marked by great tectonic shifts.
To fully understand the dynamics of Pareto’s elite cycles, we should make note of two
pertinent aspects of Pareto’s thought, namely, his anti-positivism and his Machiavellianism.
In stark contrast to the (still) prevalent rational choice theory in neoclassical economics,
Pareto maintains that most human behavior – elite and non-elite alike – is ‘non-logical’
(Pareto, On Logical and Non-Logical Action, §154).21 While, for Pareto, ‘logical’ actions
originate in ‘reasoning’, he locates the origin of ‘non-logical’ actions in “definite psychic
states, sentiments, subconscious feelings, and the like” (Pareto, §161). Thus, in Pareto’s view,
the chimeric pull of sentiment, impulse and instinct plays a determining role in individual
action and, by aggregation, in charting the course of societal life, more so than individual
economic or preference-maximization interests. Combinations of such sentiments, impulses at
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘rational choice theory’ is a descriptive model of decision-making
based on the assumption that individuals choose a course of action that is most in line with their personal
preferences (Amadae 2017). Inherent in this model is the view of preference as quantifiable in terms of utility.
The rational choice theory remains an important pillar of much neoclassical economic thinking.
21
34
the collective level Pareto calls “residues”. These ‘residues’ of a group’s behavior tend to be
formally codified by way of theoretical frameworks, traditions, social mores and political
ideals; such codifications of ‘residues’ Pareto terms “derivations” (Christensen, p. 9).
Where the behavior of elites is concerned, Pareto emphasizes two classes of residues
that play a dominant role in shaping an elite’s worldview (Higley and Pakulski 2009, p. 116).
These are the residues of combination, or “propensities to combine things in an innovative
way” associated with rationality and progressivism (Class I), and residues of grouppersistence, or “propensities to keep or restore things to traditional forms and ways”, associated
with traditionalism and forcefulness (Class II) (Ibid). In a distinctly Machiavellian fashion,
Pareto relates a governing elite’s Class I and Class II residues to, respectively, ‘foxlike’ and
‘leonine’ qualities of Princes. 22
Governing elites amongst which Class I residues dominate tend to be ‘speculators’ –
such elites, we are told, act in cunning, innovative and manipulative ways, much like
Machiavelli’s fox (Pareto, §2235). On the other hand, elites in whose ranks Class II residues
prevail are ‘rentiers’ – they behave in a forceful, bellicose, dutiful and idealistic manner, akin
to Machiavelli’s lion (Ibid). As Femia notes, one important difference between leonine and
foxlike elites concerns their preferred methods of maintaining power: whereas lion-like elites
easily resort to force and violence to quash dissent, foxlike ruling classes tend to rely on deceit,
bargaining and manipulation (Femia, p. 291).
With the behavioral patterns of elites thus construed, Pareto follows Machiavelli in
positing that a governing elite’s long-term ability to maintain, much like the virtuous Prince, a
proper balance between foxlike and leonine propensities is a recipe for lasting reign. However,
as Pareto contends, throughout history no governing elite has managed to do that. Hence
Pareto’s grim dictum about the ‘graveyard of aristocracies’, as the inevitable eventual
misbalance in governing elites’ two classes of residues necessarily spells their doom.
22
Machiavelli famously compared the behavioral features of rulers with the symbolic traits of a fox (cunning,
duplicitous, manipulative) and a lion (charismatic, bold, valiant). According to Machiavelli, a Prince possessed
of virtu will be endowed with the qualities both of a lion and of a fox, knowing intuitively when to manifest either
of them.
35
In Pareto’s view, an ‘elite cycle’ begins when one or the other class of residues comes
to dominate a governing elite’s collective outlook and behavior. When this happens, a
governing elite becomes closed off and self-centered, uniform and narrow-minded. Such an
elite falls prey to groupthink, encapsulates itself in a proverbial echo-chamber and develops an
increasing intolerance of individuals with sensibilities different than its prevalent one.
Moreover, the prevalent class of residues is codified, by way of ‘derivation’, into a doctrine to
which the elite then rigorously adheres.
As a result, what Pareto calls “routine elite circulation” becomes dangerously low
(Pareto, §2056). According to Pareto, while society’s elite/non-elite stratification is itself a
given, there is nevertheless a constant flow of between the elite and the non-elite. In line with
Pareto’s meritocratic principles, non-elite individuals with appropriate talents and propensities
may make their way into the elite, while elite members destitute of commensurate qualities
eventually descend into the non-elite (Ibid). Thus, an elite is, even at its most static, in a state
of “slow and continuous transformation” (Ibid).
As the pathways of elite/non-elite circulation are obstructed, two things ensue. On the
one hand, the encapsulated elite deteriorates – having clogged the mechanisms of positive
selection, it soon becomes filled with mediocrities, syncopates and narrow minds whose
intellectual nullity assures utter conformity to the dominant paradigm (Pareto, §2054-2057).
On the other hand, frustration builds among the growing class of able and meritorious non-elite
aspirants to the governing elite, whose advancement is denied by the cliquish closure of the
powers that be (Ibid).
What usually follows from these two developments is some sort of crisis, marked by
(1) a challenge eventually mounted against the governing elite, and (2) the governing elite’s
inability to adequately respond to that challenge (Pareto, §2365). Importantly, in reacting to a
crisis, governing elites blunder and miscalculate according to their character – as Femia puts
it, the leonine elites’ aversion in innovation and inability to compromise ultimately fails to
avert the masses’ uprising, while the foxlike elites’ preference for ‘wheeling and dealing’ over
direct confrontation sooner or later erodes its authority (Femia, p. 291-292). Or, as Higley and
Pakulski see it, the crises that spell the end for leonine elites usually feature military overextension and fiscal ruin, whereas, for foxlike elites, the symptoms include institutional
gridlocks and insufferable cronyism (Higley and Pakulski, 119).
36
Ultimately, then, this process results in the governing elite’s eventual downfall fall and
replacement with new, vigorous class of successors through whom Pareto’s meritocratic
principles are renewed. As a period of elite renewal follows a period of elite degeneration, one
elite cycle is completed and another one begins. This, in summary, is the story of Pareto’s elite
cycles.
Elite Configurations – Contemporary Elite Theory
To state the obvious: Pareto’s theory of elite cycles cannot stand – at least, not in its
original form – apart from its encompassing elite theory. The dynamics of elite cycles is guided
entirely by the principles that inform Pareto’s meritocratic conception of the elite – elite change
is all about the deterioration and reinvigoration of a governing elite’s abilities, its classes of
residues and corresponding derivations. If, in defining what an elite is, one rejects Pareto’s
initial framework in favor of a more contemporary one – as this paper has done – it becomes
hard to find explanatory use in Pareto’s notion of elite cycles. Yet this paper does attempt to
find an adequate way to salvage and utilize the original idea behind the theory of elite cycles.
Concretely, this paper aims to propose a theoretical model that describes the dynamics of elite
change in accordance with Pareto’s cyclical account, yet with the variables redefined – that is,
with the contemporary notion of ‘elite configurations’ operating in place of Pareto’s original
concepts. In this endeavor Higley and Burton’s theoretical model of the dynamics of elite
change – the so-called new elite paradigm – provides a fitting starting point. 23
Much like Pareto, Burton and Higley seek to describe the ways in which elites’
structures and behaviors vary between different societies and at different points in time (Burton
and Higley 1987, p. 296). Yet, instead of classes of residues and derivations, they speak of
three distinct configurations of elites (p. 295-296).24
23
The new elite paradigm or new elitism is a theoretical model, principally developed by John Higley and Michael
Burton – see (Burton and Higley 1987) and (Higley and Burton 1989) – is widely regarded as having provided
the basis for much contemporary elite theorizing (Lopez, p. 4).
24
While the initial empirical scope of Higley and Burton’s study was quite limited – specifically, they focused on
four countries (17th cent. England, 19th cent. Sweden, and 1950’s Colombia and Venezuela) – their subsequent
study covered significantly more ground (Higley and Burton, pp. 20-22).
37
According to Burton and Higley, throughout history, as well as in much of the
contemporary world at the time of writing, national elites could be described as being in a
disunited configuration (p. 295). Such elites, we are told, share few preconceptions about the
properties of political conduct – deeply hostile to (and mistrustful of) one another, they are
hardly able to establish even the minimal common ground for political coexistence (Higley and
Burton 1989, p. 19). Consequently, the rein of disunited elites is inherently unstable – since
they are no ‘rules of the game’, warring elites seek to exterminate their competitors, stopping
at nothing to hold on to their reign, thus rendering peaceful transitions of power far less likely
than coups, juntas and violent upheavals (Ibid).
Hence, in Burton and Higley’s view, stable regimes can only result from united elites,
of which they discern two types: ideologically united (“totalitarian”, “monocratic”), and
consensually united (“pluralistic”, “competitive-coalescent”) elites (Burton and Higley, p.
296).
The former type, of which the Soviet Politburo is an example, is described as rigid,
doctrinaire and authoritarian in its hierarchy – if an elite is ideologically united, its outward
appearance is that of an ideological monolith whose members dare not publicly challenge the
official doctrine (p. 297).25 Such an elite tends to rule with an iron fist – through repressive
mechanisms it disciplines its members, resolves conflicts internally, suppresses dissent and
ensures the stability of its regime.
Finally, the latter type – namely, the consensually united elite – is one whose members
share a tacit understanding of the rules of acceptable political conduct, amounting to the norm
of “restrained partisanship”, thus assuring peaceful competition and equitable access to office.
(Higley and Burton 1989, p. 19). A consensually united elite is pluralistic, in the sense that its
members are free to publicly support different policies, and cooperative, meaning that, for its
members, occasionally crossing the lines of factional separation is not taboo (Ibid). According
to Higley and Burton, a consensually united elite is a necessary if insufficient condition for the
development of stable democratic politics (p. 297).
Other examples of ideologically united elites are “Russia 1917-1921, Italy 1922- 1925, Germany 1933-1934,
North Korea 1946-1948, China after 1949, Cuba 1959-1961, and Iran 1979-1981” (Higley 2008, p. 6)
25
38
Higley and Burton stipulate that consensually united elites can come about in two ways.
First, through what they term “elite settlements” – grand historical occasions in which elite
factions, hitherto locked in costly and unresolvable conflict, agree on a minimal modus vivendi
(p. 295).26 Second, through anticolonial uprisings, during which native elites unify around a
common cause (pp. 297-298). Finally, Higley elsewhere posits a third possible course of
development, one especially applicable to contemporary post-industrial societies in democratic
transition, namely, “elite convergence” (Higley, p. 8) As Higley explains, elite convergence
obtains when a formerly hostile minority faction gradually comes to recognize the given
institutional framework provides the only viable path to power – as it renounces its radical antisystemic pretensions, such a faction acquires the status of a legitimate political contender and,
with it, access to office (Ibid).
This Paper s Proposed Model
The three above outlined types of elite configurations and the three mentioned paths of
a consensually united elite’s formation make up the conceptual foundation of Higley and
Burton’s theoretical scheme and, by extension, of the new elite paradigm. Thus construed, their
model has inspired numerous critical efforts, the most pertinent of which being the one
articulated by Paul Cammack (Cammack 1990). One of the lines of criticism developed in
Cammack’s essay is directed against Higley and Burton’s account of elite settlements.
Why is it, asks Cammack, that divided elites decide to reach a settlement (p. 417)? As
he notes, Higley and Burton present elite settlements as instances when elites manage to
“compromise on questions of principle without strong pressures to stand firm” (p. 418). Hence,
in Higley and Burton’s account, parties to an elite settlement presumably possess some
pragmatic interests that outweigh whatever (disinterested) principles they hold. Yet what,
exactly, might those interests be? If weariness of permanent, destructive conflict and thirst for
peace are the pragmatic incentives for elites to settle, how come elite settlements are so rare (p.
418)? Since continuous strife is said to be the inherent state of divided elites, should we not
Elite settlements are defined as “relatively rare events in which warring national elite factions suddenly and
deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements” (Burton
and Higley 1987, p. 295). A strong emphasis is placed on the deliberate nature of elite settlements – they are “the
result of relatively autonomous elite choices and thus cannot be predicted or explained in terms of social,
economic, and cultural forces” (Burton and Higley, p. 304).
26
39
expect all divided elites to be equally disposed to settle? For Cammack, it appears that “no
account is taken of the substantive interests of elites, although it is assumed that after a
settlement those interests are assured” (Ibid).
Cammack’s point about the lack of clarity in Higley and Burton’s account of elites’
motivation (i.e. their interests) in achieving consensual unity, persuasive as it is, hints at deeper
problem residing in the very conception of a ‘consensually united’ elite. Namely, in Higley and
Burton’s model, consensually and ideologically united elite types are juxtaposed. The former,
we are told, are assembled by interest and held together by common adherence to previously
outlined mutual arrangements (most importantly, to the norm of ‘restrained partisanship’),
whereas the latter originate in revolutions and persist through disciplined, authoritarian
dogmatism (Higley 2008, p. 6). The clear-cut division between interest and ‘ideology’, implicit
in the juxtaposition of the two types of elite unity, is problematic.
Higley and Burton seem to call ‘ideology’ what is, in fact, merely political doctrine –
hence, in their view, the tendency of all elite members to publicly advocate the same policies
connotes that elite’s ideological unity.27 Yet, as we adopt Freeden’s understanding of ideology,
we may observe that one’s ideology does not primarily refer to one’s political positions, but to
a set of concepts decontested in an ideology-specific way, of which one’s policy preferences
are surface manifestations.2829 Moreover, ideology construed in this more fundamental manner
informs one’s worldview – it dictates which notions are core and which are not, how ‘interests’
are perceived and what can be settled for.
Following Freeden, then, we posit that the stark distinction between the ideological and
the consensual does not hold. Rather, we claim, (1) that the formation of consensually united
elites necessarily involves consensus over a ‘thin-centered’ ideology, (2) that, in the long term,
the ideological consensus of consensually united elite ‘thickens’ to the point of becoming a
full-fledged ideology, formally expressed by a political doctrine, and that (3) this ‘thickening’
process generates a crisis, which, in turn, demands a reconstitution of a consensually united
In fact, even on Higley and Burton’s terms, the lack of public dissent does not necessarily imply the existence
of homogenous political doctrine – it merely suggests that a tyrant rules by fear.
28
To reiterate, Freeden understands ideologies as configurations of decontested concepts, that is, frameworks
wherein “particular interpretations of each constituent concept have been selected out of an indeterminate range
of meanings they may signify” (Freeden, 1998 p. 749)
29
Hence, for instance, persons sharing the same exact conceptual framework might well disagree about the merits
of a particular policy decision, such as the appropriate tax rate.
27
40
elite. This proposed model, as we show, employs the concepts associated with contemporary
elite theory while remaining true to the cyclical dynamics of Pareto’s theory of elite change.
1. In Higley and Burton’s account, the formation of consensually united elites is presented as
a process led primarily, if not exclusively, by pragmatic (i.e. self-interested, normativelyneutral) considerations. Elite settlements, we are told, are essentially “arrangements for
sharing power” (Higley and Burton 1989, p. 24). Likewise, elite convergence is said to
commence when a hostile minority realizes that “there is nothing approaching majority
support for their programs and no real chance of taking power forcibly”, and succeed when
the majority becomes assured “that their basic interests are no longer threatened (Burton
and Higley 1987, p. 297). Yet to claim that a process is driven by motives that revolve
around power is not to say that the process itself is only about power. In fact, Higley and
Burton’s own account gives cause to infer that there is more to elite settlements than simple
actuarial work. Reflecting on a historical example of an elite settlement – namely, the end
of the English civil war in 1689, formalized by the adoption of the Declaration of Rights –
Higley and Burton observe that the parties to the settlement had to agree on a number of
questions, such as “Who would be king, or queen? What would be the line of succession?
What would be the relative powers of the monarchy and parliament? What would be the
nation’s religious posture?” (p. 299). Now, considered in their historical context, these are
all ideological issues, pertaining to the ways in which a concept (e.g. a ‘king, or queen’) is
decontested.30 In this sense, negotiation on any of these issues is an ideological affair, and
the resulting elite settlement is an ideological settlement. In the same vein, if elite
convergence is said to involve a “gradual attenuation of radical, antisystem stances” on part
of the hostile minority, then the nature of this convergence clearly involves an ideological
shift (p. 297). Therefore, the formation of consensually united elites inalienably involves
the attainment of an ideological consensus. Now, the subject-matter of this consensus is, of
course, minimal, as it is built of mutual concessions (and concessions are, by their nature,
minimal, since no side concedes more than it must). Thus, the ideological consensus that
accompanies elite settlements does not amount to a full-fledged ideology – the Declaration
of Rights of 1689, the Swedish Constitution of 1809 or Colombia’s 1957 Pact of Sitges are
In this case, the consensus on “who would be king, or queen” involves decontestation of the long-contested
notion of a reigning monarch– a notion historically associated with much theoretical debate and different doctrines
(e.g. the divine rights of kings) pondering the monarch’s rightful place and prerogative. In this sense, the cited
question is a heavily ideologically charged one.
30
41
far from comprehensive blueprints for governance.31 Rather, in line with Freeden and
Stanley’s understanding, the result is a framework of decontested concepts limited in
ambition and scope – a ‘thin’ ideology.
2. According to Higley and Burton, the norm of ‘restrained partisanship’, being the basis of
an elite’s consensual unity, is prima facie procedural. Restrained partisanship, they write,
is “an agreement on the rules of the political game” in virtue of which parties “refrain from
pushing their disagreements to the point of violent conflict” (Higley and Burton 1989, p.
19). Yet this norm clearly pertains to more than procedure – it allows consensually united
elites to form a “flexible joint hegemony’, that is, to “quietly cooperate on the big issues
while publicly competing with each other on the smaller issues” (Burton and Higley 1987,
p. 303). How might this ‘cooperation’ go about? The so-called norm of restrained
partnership, as originally construed by John F. Manley, stipulates that, in committee work,
members of the US Congress should not let their evaluation of legislative proposals be
influenced by partisan affiliation, but should, instead, be guided by “a thorough study and
complete understanding of the technical complexities of the bills they consider” (Manley
1965, p. 929). Underlying this principle is the assumption that, beyond the realm of
combative, ideology-laden ‘partisanship’, there exists a domain of backroom committee
meetings, supposedly ideologically neutral, where policies are deliberated objectively, that
is, factually and rationally, and where decision-makers speak the same language – the
language of cooperation. As the pitfalls of the “rationalist-universalist” approach,
encapsulated in this underlying assumption, will be discussed in detail in subsequent
Chapters, at this point we limit ourselves to positing that the outlined principle is colorblind to the richness of ideology that permeates all political deliberations – especially those
of congressional committees (Mouffe 2000, p. 63).32 Our claim is, then, that, in addition to
manifesting attained ideological consensus, agreement on the proverbial ‘rules of the game’
(e.g. the norm of restrained partnership) facilitates space for widening the initial scope of
consensus – that is, for the ‘thickening’ of the initially ‘thin’ common ideological
denominator of a consensually united elite. We can observe that the reign of any political
elite is marked by the proliferation of institutions created by that elite. Institutions are an
elite’s peculiar creation and legacy – elites govern by designing and administrating a web
31
These are three examples, provided by Burton and Higley, of legal and political documents through which
respective elite settlements were formally articulated (Burton and Higley 1987, p. 299).
32
For a comprehensive, scathing criticism of the “rationalist-universalist” approach, see (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 6267). Mouffe’s critique of the ‘rationalist-universalist’ conception of justice as universally intelligible and
discernable by way of ‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ deliberation will be discussed in subsequent Chapters.
42
of institutions that increases in complexity with each new challenge, crisis or strategic goal
their societies face. This continuous expansion, in turn, demands the adoption of additional
concepts whose meaning is, in Freeden’s sense, decontested – as the proverbial ‘game’
becomes more complex, the number of its ‘rules’ increase. 33 Consequently, the initially
‘thin’ ideological consensus of consensually united elites inevitably develops into a ‘fuller’
ideology. Freeden’s theory seems to anticipate this course: “[ideological] fullness”, he
writes “exists either by design, or by default as a reaction to the challenges of ideological
rivals” (Freeden 1998, p. 750). To his claim, we here add the precipitating causes of said
‘fullness’ are not limited to ideological rivalries, but include events themselves – the
invention of the internet, for instance, opened the possibilities for the development of
liberal and conservative stances vis-à-vis internet freedoms and, thus, for further
‘thickening’ of these ideologies.
3. The ‘thickening’ of the ideological consensus accompanying the consensual unity of a
political elite is not an indefinite process – conceivably, at some point an elite’s common
ideological denominator attains the status of a ‘full’ ideology.34 At that point, the minimal
set of ideological commitments required for legitimate participation in political life
becomes a comprehensive ideological construct. As soon as this happens, the ideological
nature of this construct is denied, presented instead as the “common sense” of a liberaldemocratic society, while the resulting status quo is naturalized and “made into the way
'things really are'” (Mouffe 2000, pp. 5-6). Hence the 10-point Washington Consensus of
1989, unanimously embraced by the political elite of the time, was not seen to be a clearcut expression of neoliberalism, but – in the words of its author – a set of neither-left-norright commonsense proposals for “hopefully no-longer-political issues” (Williamson 1993,
p. 1329). Now, a consensually united elite’s ideological ‘closure’ narrows the sphere of
acceptable political competition – as this process advances, an increasing number of
prospective members of the political elite is disqualified from access to governance. Hence,
much like in Pareto’s narrative, with the closure of an elite’s ranks frustration builds among
Interestingly, a similar rationale can be found in Mosca’s writings (Mosca, pp. 116-117). According to Mosca,
“ideologies” serve the purpose of legitimizing the fundamental relation between the rulers and the ruled. As forms
of legitimation, ideologies must be based on some moral principle or ideal that facilitates the group’s cohesion by
restraining the centrifugal force of the respective ‘selfish impulses’ of the rulers and the ruled. In modern societies,
these legitimizing principles are expressed through a system of institutions that formalize moral restraint (such is,
for instance, a country’s judiciary).
34
The point at which the threshold is crossed is not set in stone, because Freeden’s criteria for ideological
‘fullness’ are not exact. A ‘full’ ideology, in his view, “[provides] a reasonably broad, if not comprehensive,
range of answers to the political questions that societies generate” (Freeden, 1998, p. 750). What, in this context,
constitutes reasonable breadth is anyone’s a matter of individual assessment.
33
43
its aspirant class, and this growing discontent eventually generates a political crisis that
presents a challenge to the ruling elite.35 Here the ‘fullness’ of a consensually united elite’s
ideological consensus becomes a double-edged sword – having depoliticized its “big
issues” and naturalized its ideology as (rationally evident) common sense, such an elite will
lack the capacity to effectively engage its opponents. As it happens, exempting a range of
ideological positions from contestability has the inadvertent effect of rendering those who
adhere to them incapable of defending them credibly on ideological grounds. Hence, when
faced with political questions that have the potential to uncover the existence of an
alternative to the postulates of the elite’s ideological consensus, a ruling elite will tend to
dodge the question – that is, to “distort, partially suppress, or simply confuse [problematic]
issues if doing so seems necessary to maintain institutional stability” (Higley 2008, p. 10).
Of course, such an elite cannot indefinitely deny the legitimacy of its challenge. Eventually,
in the verse of W.B. Yeats, “things fall apart/the centre cannot hold” – the political elite’s
‘thick’ ideological consensus becomes unsustainable and a period of intensive elite change
ensues. This change in the political elite’s composition is followed by the emergence of a
new ‘thin’ ideological consensus, one that reflects the newcomers’ ideas and aspirations.
This has been the outline of this paper’s proposed model of elite change. In the
remainder of this paper, this model will be applied to the contemporary phenomenon of
populism.
While Pareto uses the term “non-elite’s elite” to describe this aspirant class, Mosca talks of “plebeian leaders”,
a group hostile towards the ruling class, that, in the eventuality of a conflict, seek to position themselves as the
lower classes’ champions (Mosca, pp. 116).
35
44
POPULISM AND ELITE CYCLES
Within the contemporary academic discussion of populism, there is broad agreement
about an anti-institutional property intrinsic to the populist phenomenon. In one way or another,
the logic of populism and its associated normative ideas are consistently juxtaposed to the core
liberal-democratic notion of institutional mediation.
This juxtaposition is manifest in the works of the proponents of the afore-mentioned
ideational approach to populism. According to Mudde, populism exhibits an attraction to
majoritarian tyranny – an “extremist interpretation of majoritarian democracy” – that makes it
“inherently hostile to the idea and institutions of liberal democracy and constitutional
democracy” (2004, p. 561). Populists, we are told, have little regard for an independent
judiciary, an autonomous central bank, or a sovereign parliament, as these institutions
constitute the systematic guarantee of the sort of liberal pluralism to which populism stands
opposed (Ibid). Similarly, in the view of Abts and Rummens, populism’s fixation with ‘the
People’ and the supremacy of vox populi (i.e. the “phantasmal image of the organic unity of
the political community”) carries a proto-totalitarian strain (p. 414).36 In this sense, populism
is averse to all mediate modes of collective deliberation – for populists, an authentic expression
of ‘the people’s’ will can only ever be immediate (i.e. not by representation but by popular
acclamation). Hence a populist critique of liberal-democratic governance does not target the
contingent features of the representative system, but “the representative system as such” (p.
416).
The same juxtaposition can be found in Chantal Mouffe’s model of “agonistic
pluralism”, according to which liberal-democratic societies encompass the tension between
two mutually opposed traditions: the liberal and the democratic (1999, p. 745) (2000, p. 9).
With the liberal tradition having, at its core, the values of individual liberty and protection of
diversity, and the democratic tradition emphasizing popular sovereignty the preservation of a
collective identity of the demos, Mouffe’s proposed model represents an attempt to
acknowledge the paradox constitutive of liberal democracy and reconcile the two traditions
As Abts and Rummens explain, “the crucial difference between [populism, as proto-totalitarian, and
totalitarianism proper] is that populism still respects differences between the political domain and other domains
such as the economy, law, education or culture” (Abts and Rummens, p. 414).
36
45
(2000, pp. 112-126). In this context, populism’s anti-institutionalism is brought to the fore as
a reaction against the preeminence of the values associated with the liberal tradition in
contemporary politics.
Canovan, too, posits anti-institutionalism as being an important feature of the populist
phenomenon (1999). Following Oakeshott’s distinction between ‘the politics of skepticism’
and ‘the politics of faith’, Canovan maintains that populism thrives on the tension between two
traditional ways of understanding democracy, namely, between the so-called pragmatic and
redemptive ‘faces’ of democracy (p. 8). In the pragmatic understanding, the purpose of
democratic politics pertains to ensuring peaceful resolutions of conflicting interests in society
through an elaborate web of rules and institutions – construed in this way, “democracy means
institutions” (p. 11). In the redemptive approach, democratic politics is more of an
emancipatory enterprise, carrying the “promise of a better world through action by the
sovereign people” (p. 10). Populism, in Canovan’s view, is clamant to democracy’s
‘redemptive’ vision, stymied by untampered pragmatism and its “grubby business of
[pragmatic] politics” (Ibid). As such, populism exhibits a “romantic impulse to directness” that
informs its hostility towards the liberal-democratic web of mediating institutions (Ibid).
Populism versus (Party) Democracy
With the afore-mentioned interpretative thread present throughout the contemporary
discussion of populism, we deem it important to point out that the extension of populism’s antiinstitutionalism is rarely specified. Which institutions, exactly, are populists said to disdain?
Parliaments? Judiciaries? Governmental bodies? It appears that populism’s indiscriminate
hostility to any and all forms of institutional mediation, which Abts and Rummens explicitly
contend, is elsewhere tacitly assumed.
There are two problems with this assumption.
First, it does not square with the observable behavior of populist parties in the political
arena. Populist leaders do not exactly rally their followers around the idea of burning the
Reichstag, and empirical evidence to suggest that, when in power, populists invest systematic
46
efforts in dismantling the institutions of governance is inconclusive at best.37 Whether or not
there be a kernel of proto-totalitarianism in populism’s ideational core, empirically speaking,
it seems far more appropriate to maintain that populist actors seek to subdue and exploit the
power of liberal-democratic institutions, not do away with them in a (proto)totalitarian fashion.
In this sense, we argue, with Mudde, that populists are “reformist rather than revolutionary”
(2004, p. 546).
Second, the tendency to perceive the populist hostility towards the system of
representative institutions as indiscriminate runs the risk of depicting the populist phenomenon
as an iteration of Ortega y Gasset’s ‘revolt of the masses’, thereby summoning to the discussion
the contentious elitist notion of ‘the mass’ (1993 (1930)). The mass, according to Ortega y
Gasset, is the antithesis of civilization, the enfant terrible of a ‘self-satisfied’ age that takes for
granted its unprecedented economic, scientific, cultural and socio-political achievements. An
intellectual barbarian, the mass-man is the ‘spoilt child of history’, defined by his aversion to
all standards of authority and hierarchy – he has no regard for truth, no patience for discussion
and no ability to think, other than consume ready-made ideas. Such an amorphous mass is the
supreme destructive force of our time – its sole mode of political expression is to tear down all
institutional constrains to the assertion of its power. Hence, “when the mass acts on its own, it
does so only in one way, for it has no other: it lynches” (p. 116).
Construed in this way, Ortega y Gasset’s mass resembles Gustave Le Bon’s ‘crowd’ –
an amorphous collective defined by its negation of individualistic qualities associated with
civilized forms of life (e.g. rationality, logical reasoning, critical reflection, self-control) (Le
Bon 2018(1895)). Without an (institutional) buffer protecting the individual from the crowd,
the crowd swallows the individual, dragging him down “several rungs in the ladder of
civilization” (Le Bon, p. 8). In a similar vein, Ortega y Gasset’s mass disdains the institutional
barriers that prevent it from reducing civilized society to its own cultural nothingness.
37
There are various governmental institutions that populist elected officials would, technically, be able to
eliminate, were that their policy priority. However, we do not see this happening in practice. For instance, upon
his election to the U.S. Presidency, Donald Trump had the constitutional authority and sufficient political capital
to dismantle the U.S. Department of Education – as of the time of writing, there is no indication that the Trump
Administration is considering anything of the sort. See: https://www.newamerica.org/educationpolicy/edcentral/how-trump-could-abolish-department-education/
47
In our consideration of populism’s anti-institutional feature, we seek to avoid the line
of thought that would lead us in Ortega y Gasset’s direction, lest we fall prey to an elitist
oversimplification of the populist phenomenon that carries the whiff of class disdain. 38 Instead,
we posit that the populist anti-institutional ire is not evenly spread among the various facets of
the liberal-democratic system of mediate representation, but concentrated, in large measure,
upon one particular set of institutions, namely, political parties.
Populists typically disdain the mainstream media; they usually nurture a strong distaste
for the academia and a dose of contempt for supra-national organizations (e.g. the European
Commission) – yet, virtually without exception, populists absolutely abhor political parties.
This, we submit, is not only due to the exceptional unpopularity of political parties, which
makes them the easiest targets of anti-establishment vitriol – in a sense, the populist hostility
towards the various liberal-democratic institutions can be said to stem from the populists’
perception of political parties. In the populist narrative, these institutions are all, to some
degree, corrupted by the influence of the ‘partitocrazie’, or the ‘party-cartel’ – hence the
populists’ task is to purge them of that corruption by infusing them with populist purity, to
‘drain the swamp’, as Trump would say, not of the Congress per se, but of Democrats in
Congress. This is not to suggests that populists oppose the party system as such – as Mudde
aptly puts it, populists “oppose the established parties, not parties per se” (2004, p. 546).
There is a further reason why, when considering populism’s anti-institutionalism, an
emphasis on populism’s stance vis-à-vis political parties might be warranted. Namely, in a long
and influential tradition of contemporary political theory, political parties are considered the
central pillar of the liberal-democratic institutional system.39 Within this tradition, political
parties are understood either as being the primary institutions of intra-societal mediation, or as
the mechanisms enabling the functioning of all other liberal-democratic institutions. Hence
William Riker speaks of liberal democracy as “party democracy”, juxtaposing it to the notion
of “populist democracy”, while Katz and Mair place political parties along civil society and
the State as essential constituents of the liberal-democratic deliberative framework (Weale
Throughout his treatise, Ortega y Gasset takes great pains to stress that ‘the mass’ is a culturally based category
entirely unrelated to class. Nonetheless, around page 1 it becomes obvious that ‘the mass’ has an unmistakable
class connotation, as Ortega y Gasset begins his argument by lamenting the full occupancy of theaters and other
halls of high culture that were once exclusive to the (wealthy) few (p. 1-2).
39
In Chapter I of their book, Muller and Narud provide an outline of this intellectual tradition encompassing a
plethora of thinkers ranging from Bryce (1921), Kelsen (1929) and Friedrich (1946) to Neumann (1956), Sartori
(1976) and Ware (1987) (M̈ller and Narud, p. 1-12).
38
48
1984) (Katz and Mair 1995). At any rate, there seems to be general agreement in contemporary
political theory about the indispensability of political parties for the liberal-democratic system
(M̈ller and Narud, p. 2). Therefore, focusing on populism’s attitude towards political parties
might offer important insights into populism’s broader evaluative perception of the liberaldemocratic institutional framework.
The Consensus Thickens – Convergence and Technocratization
In his discussion of populism and political parties, Kenneth M. Roberts brings the rise
of populism in relation to a “representational deficiency” – a sense of political exclusion
widespread among European and Latin American electorates (pp. 6-7). According to Roberts,
this democratic deficit is caused by three interrelated phenomena: programmatic convergence
between established political parties, cartelization of partisan organizations and a set of
performance failures on the governing elites’ part (Ibid).
Programmatic convergence, as understood by Roberts, refers to the gradual alignment
of policy platforms of established political parties in Europe and Latin America (pp. 10-11).
Namely, political parties, whose traditional mission was to articulate meaningfully different
sets of political preferences, have become too similar, converging on an increasingly narrow
set of policy choices. This process said to have begun in the 1980s (in Latin America) and in
the 1990s (in Europe) (Ibid). In Roberts’s view, programmatic convergence seemed to have
intensified in the wake of the 2008 Recession, with a strong consensus among the Governments
of EU Member States on the merits of fiscal austerity policies.
In their paper on the changing models of party organization, Richard S. Katz and Peter
Mair describe a very similar development (1995). According to them, during the 1945-1970
period, a new model of partisan organization, the so-called ‘catch-all party’ had gradually
replaced the hitherto dominant ‘mass party’ model (Katz and Mair, pp. 10-12).
Itself a result of mass enfranchisement and radical expansion of civil society’s domain
in the 1880-1960 period, the ‘mass party’s’ mission was to mobilize a class-based
demographic, and advocate reforms preferable to its class of supporters. In this context, mass
parties were understood as being the principal links between their respective class-based
49
factions and the State. Due to a variety of socio-economic developments, including the
economic boom and expansion of the welfare system, the post-WWII period brought with itself
the weakening of traditional class identities in Western societies (p. 13). This held important
ramifications for political parties - to win elections, parties had to come up with strategies to
reach beyond their traditional bases of support and, rather than emphasizing class homogeneity,
generate support through policy proposals designed to reach across the ideological spectrum
(Ibid). This led to the rise of the ‘catch-all party’ – a model of party organization less
ideologically distinct than its ‘mass’ counterpart. Catch-all parties drew support from a loose
and heterogeneous coalition assembled around widely appealing policy proposals, staking their
political capital on the effectiveness of its policies (p. 18). Elections, in turn, became more the
business of choosing the right leaders, instead of rallying behind the purported advocates of
one’s class-defined interests.
With respect to these two mirror processes, namely, the programmatic convergence of
which Roberts speaks and the rise of the catch-all party observed by Katz and Mair, we may
put forth an uncontroversial suggestion: the above outlined systematic alignment in policy
positions indicates growing ideological alignment among political actors. Consistent with
points (1) and (2) of the model proposed in the previous Chapter, in the writings of Roberts,
Katz and Mair we see the description of the ‘thickening’ of an initially ‘thin’ ideological
consensus of European and Latin American consensually united elites. In the 1930s,
Roosevelt’s Democrats and Hoover’s Republicans in the U.S. could be said to have shared an
understanding of the ‘rules of the game’ (a ‘thin’ ideological consensus); in the 1970s, Carter’s
Democrats and Ford’s Republicans shared an immensely greater set of beliefs about
governance.40 In other words, the governing elite’s ideological consensus ‘thickened’ over
time.
As ideological consensus between the factions of the political elite ‘thickens’, issues
encompassed by it become depoliticized. This process, as Bickerton and Accetti-Invernizzi
define it, amounts to “the progressive relegation of contentious policy issues outside the remit
of party politics, and into the hands of “neutral” or “independent” bodies, such as central banks
40
With respect to the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. this trend of programmatic convergence
continued well into the 2000s, with the candidates’ substantial policy differences playing a historically marginal
role in the 2000 Bush vs. Gore contest (https://news.gallup.com/poll/2929/little-difference-between-gore-bushimportant-dimensions-election.aspx).
50
and other “expert” authorities.” (p. 10). Simply said, there is no reason to debate issues on
which all debaters agree – these issues are, instead, left to the administration of “actors and
institutions drawing legitimacy from their technical competence and administrative expertise”,
that is, to the class of technocrats (p. 2). Technocracy, as Jan-Werner Muller observes, remains
“curiously apolitical” in its general belief that “there is only one correct policy solution” (Ibid).
If we understand the depolitization and consequent ‘technocratization’ of hitherto contentious
political issues as consequences of programmatic convergence, the curiosity disappears.
Namely, the technocrat holds that there is one correct policy solution precisely because all
established political parties have agreed on it; technocracy is apolitical because the issues
delegated to its jurisdiction have been divorced of their political dimension.
Therefore, in our analysis, programmatic convergence, the development of the catchall party model, depolitization of contentious political issues and the rise of technocracy are all
positively correlated facets of the same process, i.e. of the ‘thickening’ of the ideological
consensus of contemporary political elites.
Crisis Ensues – Party Cartelization and The Crisis of Representation
Throughout the contemporary literature on party democracy, there is a popular notion
that political parties are facing some sort of ‘crisis’. Modern democracy, we are told, “has
somehow been hollowed out”, with political parties drifting away from the voting public and
losing their capacity to serve as mediators between the civil society and the State (Katz and
Mair 2009, p. 762). Overall, it seems that in contemporary political theory there is an
established belief that citizens are less inclined to affiliate themselves with political parties,
participate in partisan activities or care about the differences between them (Invernizzi-Accetti
and Wolkenstein, p. 98). This notion seems to find strong support in empirical research:
OECD’s 2013 report showed that, between 2005 and 2013, in OECD countries the level of
trust in political parties has generally been lower than in national Governments, while the
European Social Survey found that, in the 2002-2010 period, party membership and party
identification in Europe have steadily declined (OECD 2013, p. 30) (Hooghe and Kern, p. 8).
As Katz and Mair succinctly put it, “the parties do not act as agents of the voters. But then the
voters appear to have little interest in acting as principals of the parties” (2009, p. 762).
51
Where might the roots of this crisis lie? In their paper, Accetti-Invernizzi and
Wolkenstein consider the crisis of party democracy in terms of demand-side and supply-side
causes, the former concerning the voters’ incentives to support political parties, the latter
pertaining to what parties offer to the voting public (p. 99). On the demand side, these authors
point to the trends of depolitization, construed as the growing retreat of the individual from
participation in political affairs into private (material) pursuits, and cognitive mobilization,
denoting to the contemporary preeminence of individualistic modes of judgment formation at
the expense of collectivist outlooks (pp. 99-100). Put in this way, these demand-side causes
manifest themselves in what Bickerton and Accetti-Invernizzi define as the individualization
of voters that once firmly belonged to the established parties’ voting bases (p. 9). On the supply
side, Accetti-Invernizzi and Wolkenstein emphasize the emergence of new media as an
alternative to the mainstream media outlets traditionally aligned with the established parties of
government, as well as the challenge posed by globalization to the national parties’ capacity to
single-handedly address an increasing number of political problems with local pertinence and
a global dimension (Ibid). In addition, the crisis of ideologies is included in the set of supplyside causes, referring to what Roberts meant by programmatic convergence (Roberts, pp. 6-7).
This compilation of proposed causes for the crisis of party democracy, we should note,
is methodologically disparate – some appear to be derived from a sociological or
anthropological analysis, others from political science. Moreover, they are presented as being
empirically coincidental, without positing a clear link of mutual contingency obtaining between
them. By applying our proposed model of elite change, we attempt to provide this link,
subsuming the above identified phenomena under what, in point (3) of our model, we defined
as the closure of a consensually united elite, brought about by the ‘thickening’ of its ideological
consensus.
Namely, we submit that the common theme running through most of the above
described processes is closure. Depolitization and cognitive mobilization can be taken to
represent the closure of an individual within his private sphere; similarly, programmatic
convergence among political parties is a kind of ideological closure on part of the political
elite. As suggested in the previous Chapter, the ‘thickening’ of an ideological consensus runs
parallel to its “naturalization” into the way “things really are'” (Mouffe 2000, pp. 5-6). As a
political elite’s consensus ‘thickens’, the scope of depoliticized issues, the approach to which
has been ‘naturalized’, expands. Accordingly, the domain of legitimate contestation within the
52
political elite narrows. Hence, when this ideological consensus ‘thickens’ to the point of
becoming a ‘full’ ideology, what ensues is a complete ideological closure of a political elite –
what Chantal Mouffe identified as the inviolable “rational consensus [of the center]” or, in
Philipe Merliere’s words, the “circle of neoliberal thought” (Mouffe 2000, p. 7) (Merliere
2013).
This ideological closure, we maintain, triggers the closure of a political elite’s ranks –
an increasing strictness of ideological criteria of admission to the political elite, accompanied
by a hostility towards those prospective elite members who would deviate, ever so slightly,
from the naturalized ideological consensus. This development is clearly manifested in notion
of the ‘cartelization’ of political parties, introduced by Katz and Mair (1995) (2009).
‘Cartelization’, as Katz and Mair explain, refers to a set of strategies employed by
political parties to heighten the barriers to entry to partisan politics. In order preserve a shared
monopoly over the privileges associated with having a share in government, political parties
are said to adopt collusive tactics to keep ahead of the competition (1995, pp. 16-18). Katz and
Mair argue that, in many European countries, the deepened embeddedness of political parties
in the State yielded the institution of State-sponsored financial support for political parties established parties, effectively, designed for themselves a welfare system that would serve as
a new primary source of funding, thereby making themselves less dependent on (mass)
membership contributions. This, in turn, lowered the financial stakes of winning or losing
elections (pp. 16-17). Furthermore, numerous European democracies saw the increase in the
number of parties that could be said to partake in governance at a given point – as Katz and
Mair observe, “almost all substantial parties may now be regarded as governing parties” (Ibid).
In the view of Katz and Mair, this continuous cling to power erodes the parties’ anchoring in
society – such parties, in Roberts’s words, resemble a “closed and powerful political cartel that
shares in the spoils of public office and excludes alternative voices from effective
representation” (Roberts, p. 8).
In the cited literature on political parties, there is disagreement on whether the rise of
cartelization is a cause of the crisis of party democracy, as Roberts would suggest, or a coping
strategy adopted by parties facing a crisis of legitimacy, as Bickerton, Accetti-Invernizzi and
Wolkenstein maintain. According to our proposed model, the cartelization of political parties
53
is a direct consequence of what we identified as the ideological and compositional closure of
political elites.
Namely, in the process of depolitization that follows the ‘thickening’ of a political
elite’s ideological consensus, the political class cedes policy-making authority to the
technocratic class. As a result, the domains of government and governance diverge, with the
politician’s role relegated to occupying elected office with an ever-narrowing policy-making
mandate. With the tasks thus divided between the politician and the technocrat, what is left for
the political class to do? The answer, we suggest, is cartelize. 41 Insofar as the extent of the
ideological consensus is concerned, the relationship between technocracy and the political class
is symbiotic, since both sides effectively get what they desire.
Now, this symbiotic relationship is not without its tensions. In this sense, the
technocratic critique of liberal-democratic procedures and its trivialization of the political
process, to which Bickerton and Accetti-Invernizzi point, can be understood as a display of
technocratic hubris, commensurate to the increasing decision-making authority wielded by
technocracy (p. 9). Nonetheless, in the presence of external challengers, the political and the
technocratic class find themselves aligned in jealously guarding the established ideological
consensus and the corresponding status quo.
It is within this framework, we suggest, that the crisis of party democracy (or, in
Roberts’s terms, the ‘crisis of representation’) should be understood – not as a contingent
outcome of a variety of largely independent developments, but as a necessary consequence of
a political elite’s ‘thickened’ ideological consensus. We might emphasize two reasons why that
should be so.
For one, this fact is empirically plain – whatever ideological consensus a political elite
may establish, there will always be a share of the voting public whose political beliefs are not
With respect this point, perhaps the clearest contemporary illustration of the diminution of the politician’s
mandate was provided by WikiLeaks’s 2016 publication of Hillary Clinton’s e-mail correspondence during her
tenure as Secretary of State (2012-2014). Interestingly, the exuberant media coverage of this e-mail archive
neglected to emphasize the truly shocking fact about Mrs. Clinton’s correspondence – namely, a large majority
of the 30.000 published e-mails contained discussions of political tactics, while very few bits of her daily e-mail
conversations featured thoughts on the merit of specific policies. See: https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/
41
54
encompassed by it. The ‘thicker’ the ideological consensus in terms of presupposed policy
positions, the larger the number of those excluded from the consensus.
For another, the existence of a ‘thick’ ideological consensus represents in itself a denial
of what Mouffe identified as the ‘agonistic dynamics’ intrinsic to democratic societies (1999).
Democratic communities, as Mouffe persuasively argues, are composed of ineradicably
different ideological camps without a ‘common (ideological) denominator’ – these camps, we
are told, base their worldviews on unique sets of ideological presuppositions, akin to different
languages. Hence, in Mouffe’s view, it is impossible to establish a universal ‘language’ of
collective deliberation, intelligible to all participants in the public sphere, since any such
language is determined in an ideology-specific way (pp. 60-80). In this sense, the formation of
any ideological consensus presupposes a common, ideological language of deliberation, which
can never be everybody’s language – that is to say, by virtue of the agonistic nature of
democratic societies, no ideological consensus can be universally representative.
The Cycle Ends – Populists at The Gates
The notion of an ideological consensus that obtains within a political elite runs against
that which, following Mouffe, Dzenovska and De Genova articulated as the inalienable liberaldemocratic “desire for the political” (Dzenovska and De Genova 2018). In liberal democracies,
the public sphere does not merely serve to facilitate the exercise of collective decision-making
– it is a forum where the identity of the demos is continuously reinterpreted and reaffirmed. 42
Thus the desire for exercising contestation in the public sphere – i.e. the desire for the political
– sustains a society’s liberal-democratic identity; without it, the demos is no more. The ‘thicker’
the ideological consensus, the narrower the sphere of political contestation, and the greater the
suppression of the community’s desire for democratic self-affirmation.
Due to the defining role of the desire for the political in the life of a liberal democracy,
no liberal-democratic community can afford to renounce this desire altogether, no matter how
appealing or, indeed, how naturalized an elite’s ‘thick’ ideological consensus may appear to
be. Therefore, a crisis of representation, entailed by the political elites’ exclusionary
As Abts and Rummens put it, “the political stage refers to the non- substantial political unity of the community
and provides the common symbolic space in which democratic conflicts can be represented and integrated” (p.
419).
42
55
ideological consensus, is bound to provoke a reaction. Katz and Mair make this suggestion:
“attempts at exclusion may prove counter-productive, offering to the excluded neophytes a
weapon with which to mobilize the support of the disaffected” (1995, p. 24).
Consistent with point (3) of our proposed model, we suggest that the crisis of
representation yields the constitution of an increasingly potent ‘outsider-elite’, gathering at the
gates to demand a share of power denied to it by the governing elite. Today’s populists, we
claim, play the role of that ‘outsider-elite’.
According to our model, the principal political goal of populist parties and movements
is to break the ‘thick’ ideological consensus and negotiate a new, ‘thinner’ one. To clarify this
point: that prospective, ‘thinner’ ideological consensus does not amount to the ‘thin’ ideology
of populism – rather, populism, qua ‘thin’ ideology, contains a rallying cry for the reversal of
the depolitization process and the ‘thinning’ of the political elite’s ‘thick’ ideological
consensus. This interpretation corresponds to Mouffe’s understanding of the populists’ mission
– populists, she argues, seek to re-politicize hitherto ‘depoliticized’ questions of public life –
“in many cases they are the only ones denouncing the 'consensus at the center' and trying to
occupy the terrain of contestation deserted by the left” (2000, p. 7) In other words, populists
fill the gap of representation generated by the political elite’s ‘thick’ ideological (i.e. ‘rational’)
consensus. As this consensus ‘thickens’, the gap widens and populist movements gain ground.
Drawing from the elite theory perspective, we perceive these ideological features of
populism within the framework of elite change – in this sense, populism’s aim to “cash in
democracy’s promise of power to the people” finds its analogy in the populist ‘outsider-elites’’
reliance on the democratic logic as a source of legitimation in front of a political elite that is
unwilling to cede some ground to its demands (Canovan, p. 2).
As indicated in the previous Chapter, the political elite’s default reaction to the populist
challenge of the established consensus is to discard it – that is, to “distort, partially suppress,
or simply confuse [problematic] issues” for the sake of maintaining institutional stability
(Higley 2008, p. 10). Is this not exactly how elitist anti-populist discourse, prevalent in much
of the U.S. and Western European media, approaches the substance of populism’s challenge?
From the elitist standpoint, populists are acknowledged as a threat for their political strength,
but consideration of that threat is confined to the question of how to respond to it, suppress it
56
and protect from it, without really engaging with the substance of the populist challenge. In the
elitist view, populism is a term of abuse, and populist ‘outsider-elites’ are depicted as
barbarians at the gates, retrograde agents that seek to plunge society back into a dark past of
which they are remnants – that is, into a time before the ideological consensus had ‘thickened’.
This process, we contend, cannot go indefinitely, as the crisis of representation ensures
the gradual erosion of the governing elite’s authority. We can see this dynamic reflected in the
rhetoric of populist parties – while the ‘party-cartel’ and the ‘technocrats’ are equally vilified,
the political elite is invariably depicted as being ‘in the pocket’ of the technocratic elite, and
calls are made to elect politicians that will ‘stand up to Brussels/Eurocrats/bankers/etc.’. This
rhetoric indicates that the populist view of the governing elite’s ideological consensus
differentiated between an active and a passive agent in the maintenance of the consensus – the
political class being the passive, and the technocratic class the active counterpart of the duo.
Another case in point are the populists’ constant lamentations about the political elite’s
obsession with political correctness, which serves to stress the political elite’s weakness vis-àvis different interest groups (minorities, etc.), whom mainstream politicians are afraid to
confront. Hence populism’s rallying cry for politicizing ‘depoliticized’ issues, for ‘thinning’
the ‘thick’ ideological consensus, for reclaiming “democracy’s promise of power to the people”
is, paradoxically, at the same time a plea for re-empowering the authority of the political class
vis-à-vis the technocratic class.
In view of these considerations we may conclude that, according to our model,
populism is a ‘thin’ ideology of an ‘outsider-elite’ that seeks to claim its place within the
political elite by renegotiating a ‘thinner’ ideological consensus. Venturing into the area of
sociological prediction, we might further suggest that the rise of populism heralds the end of
an elite cycle and the beginning of a new one.
57
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have attempted to chart an interpretative route towards an elite theory
of populism.
To this end, we have outlined three dominant contemporary approaches to the nature
of populism, selecting the ideational approach to populism as the most promising of the three.
In our critical assessment of this approach, we have identified two aspects of the populist
phenomenon which, in our view, were inadequately stressed by the proponents of the ideational
approach: namely, the reactivity inherent in populism’s conceptual core and the elitism intrinsic
to the socio-political dynamics of populist politics.
In an attempt to provide an adequate articulation of these neglected features of
populism, we have borrowed from Nietzsche’s theory of morality and employed the notions of
the Slave revolt and ressentiment to articulate the kind of reactivity that we found inadequately
emphasized by the ideational approach. Moreover, we have drawn from classical and
contemporary elite theory – in particular, from the works of Pareto and Higley – to construct a
model of elite change that we could apply in interpreting the various salient features of the
populist phenomenon.
In this endeavor, we hope to have contributed an initial step towards developing an elite
theory of populism, acknowledging full well that the demands of adequately articulating such
a theoretical perspective widely surpass the limited scope of this paper. In order to make a
compelling case for an elite theory of populism, significant empirical research, as well as work
on further developing the notions introduced in this paper, remains to be done.
58
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