Making Progress:
Epictetus on Habituation
JOHN SELLARS
1. Training Students
Habituation is a central theme in the work of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus.1
His Discourses, based on classroom discussions in his school at Nicopolis, often
comment on how best to overcome bad habits and how to cultivate better, new
ones.2 These remarks were directed primarily at students who had come to study
philosophy. As we shall see, Epictetus was insistent that philosophy is a lifechanging activity, a task of self-transformation, and the way it does this is by
attending to our habits. With this in mind, Epictetus was particularly concerned
by students of his who happily talked about philosophy but never moved on to
the next stage of transforming their habits in the light of the philosophical ideas
they had embraced. In a chapter of the Discourses entitled ‘To those who set out
to become lecturers without due thought’, he says:
Those who have taken in philosophical principles (theôrêmata) raw
and without any dressing immediately want to vomit them up again,
just as people with weak stomachs bring up their food. (Diss. 3.21.1)
Instead, he advises:
Digest them first, and then you won’t vomit them up in this way.
Otherwise they do indeed become nothing more than vomit, foul
stuff that isn’t fit to eat. (Diss. 3.21.2)
Abbreviations: LS = Long and Sedley 1987; SVF = von Arnim 1903-24. Ancient texts are
referred to using standard abbreviations, many of which are listed in the Oxford Classical
Dictionary.
1
Epictetus’s Discourses (Diss.) are edited in Schenkl 1916. Schenkl’s text is reprinted with minor
modifications and a facing translation in Oldfather 1925-28. The most recent complete
translation into English is in Hard 2014, which I quote from, occasionally amended.
2
2
This process of digestion or assimilation is essential, says Epictetus, if one is to
make any philosophical progress, for it is only through such a process that one
is able to benefit from the content of philosophical principles. He continues:
But after having digested them, show us some resulting change in
your ruling centre (hêgemonikon), just as athletes show in their
shoulders the results of their exercises and diet, and those who have
become expert craftsmen can show the results of what they have
learned. A builder doesn’t come forward and say, ‘Listen to me as I
deliver a discourse about the builder’s art’, but he acquires a contract
to build a house, and shows through actually building it that he has
mastered the art. And you for your part should follow a similar
course of action: eat as a proper human being, drink as a proper
human being, dress, marry, have children, perform your public
duties […]. Show us these things to enable us to see that you really
have learned something from the philosophers. (Diss. 3.21.3-6)
All of this is built on Epictetus’s view that philosophy is, like building, an art or
craft: something that one can talk about but also, primarily, something that one
does. In particular he thinks philosophy is the art of living, a skill that enables us
to live well (Diss. 1.15.2).3 The master of this art – the Stoic sage – will display
his or her mastery not in words but in actions. By contrast, the beginning student
remains wedded to words:
‘Come and listen to me reading out my commentaries.’
Away with you, look for someone [else] to vomit over.
‘Yes, but I’ll expound the teachings of Chrysippus to you like no
one else can, and analyse his style with perfect clarity, and even mix
in some of the brio of Antipater and Archedemus.’ (Diss. 3.21.6-7)
This is one of many passages in the Discourses in which Epictetus warns his
students against getting lost in textual interpretation for its own sake (cf. Diss.
1.4.6-7). As a number of commentators have noted, that this warning was
deemed necessary might indicate that Epictetus and his students in fact devoted
a good deal of time to reading and analysing the works of Chrysippus in the
classroom.4 Epictetus does not seem to have had a problem with the activity of
3
On the Stoic claim that philosophy is an ‘art of living’, see Sellars 2009.
4
See, for example, Barnes 1997, 48, and Cooper 2007, 10-11.
3
close textual analysis; his concern was with what one does with the results of
such work. The goal, he insists, is ethical self-transformation. Students may well
become experts the analysis of philosophical texts, but:
Shouldn’t they return home as people who are patient and helpful
towards others, and have minds that are free from passion and
agitation, and are furnished with such provisions for their journey
through life that they’ll be able, by that means, to face up well to
everything that comes about, and draw honour from it? (Diss.
3.21.10)
Epictetus goes on to compare the student who becomes so infatuated by
philosophy that they think it might be a good idea to try to teach it, to someone
who thinks they are qualified to work as a doctor simply because they have
acquired a supply of medicines, even though they don’t know how to administer
them (Diss. 3.21.20-21).5 To such people who want to rush into the profession
of talking about philosophy all day, Epictetus counsels the following:
But if philosophical principles hold a fascination for you, sit down
and reflect on them within yourself, but don’t ever call yourself a
philosopher, and don’t allow anyone else to apply that name to you.
(Diss. 3.21.23)
Instead of launching into a career of teaching philosophy, the student serious
about the subject ought to take some time out to reflect privately.
The Discourses were, according to the prefatory letter that has been transmitted
with them, written down by Arrian, one of Epictetus’s students, who went on
to become a noted historian (Diss. Praef. 1-2). Arrian is also credited with
compiling the Handbook, a much shorter collection of material that summarizes
the key ideas running through the Discourses (Simplicius, in Ench. Praef. 4-9).6
Compare this with the comments of Musonius Rufus, Diatr. 5 (Hense 1905, 19-22), which
stress the importance of practical experience: ‘Suppose there are two doctors. One of them can
talk about medical matters as if he had the greatest possible acquaintance with them, but has
never actually cared for sick people. The other is not able to talk about medical matters but is
experienced in healing in accordance with medical theory. Which one would you choose as your
doctor if you were ill?’. The interlocutor responds, ‘The one who is experienced in healing’. This
passage is discussed further below. See also the discussion in Stephens 2013.
5
The Handbook (Ench.) is edited and translated in Boter 1999. Simplicius’s commentary on the
Handbook (in Ench.) is edited in Hadot 1996 and translated in Brennan and Brittain 2002.
6
4
Towards the end of the Handbook there is one chapter that picks up on the same
theme. It opens with similar advice:
Do not call yourself a philosopher on any occasion, and do not talk
much about philosophical principles in the presence of nonphilosophers, but practise what follows from those principles. For
instance, at a banquet do not say how people should eat, but eat as
people should. (Ench. 46.1)
The vomit is not far behind, so to speak:
And when a discussion arises about some philosophical principle
among non-philosophers, keep silent for the most part; for there is
a fair risk that you will vomit up immediately what you have not
digested. (Ench. 46.2)
Once again, Epictetus insists on the importance of digestion of philosophical
principles (theôrêmata). Whereas in the Discourses he used builders as his example,
emphasizing his idea that philosophy is an art or craft (technê), here in the
Handbook he takes digestion more literally:
For sheep, too, do not bring their food to the shepherds to show
them how much they have eaten, but after they have digested their
food within themselves, they produce wool and milk outside
themselves; you too, therefore, do not show the philosophical
principles to the non-philosophers, but show them the deeds that
result from the principles as digested by you. (ibid.)
At first glance, then, Epictetus’s view seems fairly clear: students of philosophy
are all too keen to talk about philosophy, vomiting up what they have just heard.
Instead, they ought to focus their attention on assimilating philosophical
principles in order to affect self-transformation. The ideal wise person or sage,
by contrast, will be less concerned with talking about philosophical ideas, and
more concerned with behaving in accordance with them. They will demonstrate
their excellence of character through actions rather than words.7
We shall qualify this claim later. To be more precise, the sage will be able to express their virtue
through both their actions and their words, which will be in complete accord with one another.
Having said that, given that the goal is ultimately act virtuously rather than merely talk about it,
it is not unreasonable to give actions priority here.
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5
2. Making Progress
While this distinction between sages and beginning students captures something
of what Epictetus says, it cannot be the whole story, in part because Epictetus
himself complicates this dichotomy. According to early Stoic doctrine,
humankind divides into two categories: the wise (sophoi) and the non-wise or
foolish (phauloi).8 The wise, we are told, are exceedingly rare, so almost every one
falls into the category of the non-wise.9 Those who make progress towards
wisdom, no matter how far they come, nevertheless remain firmly among the
non-wise until some moment of transition at which they attain wisdom.10 As
Plutarch reports it, somewhat sarcastically, ‘the sage changes in a moment or a
second of time from the lowest possible inferiority to an unsurpassable character
of virtue’.11 In a memorable image, Chrysippus is reported by Plutarch to have
said that approaching wisdom is like drowning in a few feet of water: one might
be close to the surface, but one is still drowning.12 As Cicero put it, ‘when
submerged in water one can no more breathe if one is just below the surface and
on the verge of getting out, than one can in the depths’.13 One of the reasons
why the Stoics insisted on this sharp division is because they took virtue or
excellence (aretê) to be something that does not admit of degrees. It is, according
to them, a completeness (teleiotês) and the perfection (teleiôsis) of a thing.14 As
Chrysippus put it in another image, a stick is either straight or bent; likewise, one
can be either virtuous or vicious.15 One of the central doxographical reports says
the following:
They [the Stoics] hold that there is nothing in between virtue and
vice, whereas the Peripatetics say that between virtue and vice there
See Stobaeus 2,99,3-5 (SVF 1.216, LS 59N). I cite Stobaeus according to the volume, page,
and line numbers of Wachsmuth and Hense 1884-1912. This passage come from the epitome
of Stoic ethics attributed to Arius Didymus, which is also edited and translated in Pomeroy 1999.
Here, Arius refers to spoudaioi rather than sophoi.
8
9
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 199,14-22 (SVF 3.658, LS 61N).
10
For an extended discussion of this topic, see Brouwer 2014, 51-91.
11
Plutarch, De prof. in virt. 75c (SVF 3.539, LS 61S).
12
Plutarch, De comm. not. 1063a (SVF 3.539, LS 61T).
13
Cicero, Fin. 3.48 (SVF 3.530).
14
See Galen, PHP 5.5.39 (SVF 3.257) and Diogenes Laertius 7.90 (SVF 3.197) respectively.
15
Simplicius, in Cat. 237,31-238,1 (SVF 2.393, LS 47S).
6
is moral progress. For according to the Stoics, just as a piece of
wood must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either
just or unjust (not more just or more unjust), and likewise with the
other virtues. And Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, whereas
Cleanthes says that it cannot be lost, the former maintaining that it
can be lost as a result of drunkenness and melancholy, the latter that
it cannot, owing to the virtuous person’s firm cognitions. (Diog.
Laert. 7.127, SVF 3.536, LS 61I)
Despite the minor difference of opinion between Chrysippus and Cleanthes
reported here, the association of virtue with straightness as two things that do
not admit of degrees remained current throughout the Stoa right through to the
Roman period, with Seneca commenting that just as a straight line cannot be
improved by any further change, so too in the case of virtue: ‘it too is straight; it
does not admit of curvature’ (Ep. 71.20; cf. Ep. 66.8). As Graver and Long note
(2015, 537), the same Latin word, rectus, means both ‘straight’ and ‘right’, so there
is something of a play on words here. In both cases these are all or nothing
affairs.
This stark division in the early Stoa between the wise and the non-wise looks
like it might map on to the division in Epictetus between sages and beginning
students. The matter is complicated, however, by the fact that Epictetus places
great weight in his Discourses on an intermediate category: those who are making
progress (prokopê).16 As we have just seen, Diogenes Laertius reports that this
was a Peripatetic idea, not a Stoic one; indeed, he explicitly contrasts it with the
Stoic view. Whether Epictetus was influenced directly by the Peripatetic
tradition, or by what have been called ‘Peripateticizing Stoics’,17 the figure of the
person ‘making progress’ is ubiquitous throughout the Discourses. Such a person
is no longer a beginning student; they have started to make genuine progress
towards wisdom, even if strictly speaking they remain drowning a couple of feet
under the surface. This more advanced student focuses their efforts on the
assimilation and digestion of philosophical principles in order to develop the
appropriate character.
See, among other places, Diss. 1.4, which is devoted to the notion of making progress (prokopê).
For a full list of places where Epictetus discusses this and the prokoptôn, the person who is making
progress, see Schenkl 1916, 670. For further discussion see Roskam 2005, 103-24.
16
For this phrase, see Bonhöffer 1894, 227, where he refers in particular to Panaetius, citing
Cicero, Off. 3.17. On Panaetius’s relative disinterest in the perfect wise person, see Seneca, Ep.
116.5 (LS 66C). On his debt to the Peripatetic tradition, see Cicero, Fin. 4.79.
17
7
In his commentary on the passage from the Handbook quoted earlier, the
Neoplatonist Simplicius suggests that:
He [Epictetus] addresses these comments to the person still making
progress (not to the complete philosopher, who would no longer
need such advice; nor would he say to a complete philosopher
‘there’s a great danger that you will immediately vomit up material
that you have not digested’) because people still making progress are
troubled by the emotion of love of honour or showiness.
(Simplicius, in Ench. 64.3-7)
Simplicius is surely right to note that this advice is directed to those who are
making progress (prokopê). The complete philosopher (teleios philosophos), by
which Simplicius presumably means a sage, need not worry about discord
between their words and their actions, and so Epictetus’s admonitions regarding
talking too much about philosophy do not apply.
3. Contrary Habits
So, Epictetus says that those who want to make ethical progress, but are caught
in the habit of merely talking about philosophy, ought to cultivate the habit of
silence. One might wonder whether this advice to remain silent is somewhat
excessive. Epictetus answers this concern elsewhere (Diss. 1.27.3-6; 3.12.6): if
someone has developed an unfortunate habit, the most effective way to remedy
this is to replace it with a contrary habit (enantion ethos). For someone in the
precarious state of making progress, mere moderation is not enough, he
suggests; only going to the opposite extreme will do the work of undermining
the engrained bad habit. In this he might be seen to be echoing the advice of
Aristotle, who had recommended sometimes aiming at the contrary extreme of
a vice in order to end up in the appropriate virtuous intermediate state (Eth. Nic.
1109b4-6).
As to how one goes about developing a new opposed habit, Epictetus suggests
that it is all very simple. All of our habits are the product of the relevant type of
action. Again, this might be taken as an echo of Aristotle’s advice that the best
way to learn something is simply by doing it (Eth. Nic. 1103a33-b2). Epictetus
puts it like this:
8
Every habit (hexis) and capacity (dunamis) is confirmed and
strengthened by the corresponding actions, that of walking by
walking, that of running by running. If you wish to be a good reader,
read; if you wish to be a good writer, write. (Diss. 2.18.1-2)
The term translated in this passage as ‘habit’ is hexis, whereas when Epictetus
talks about opposing habits with contrary habits he uses the word ethos. These
two terms are both regularly translated as ‘habit’ by his recent English
translators, although early modern Latin translations keep the distinction clear
by using consuetudo for ethos and habitus for hexis, while the very first translation of
the Discourses into English, by Elizabeth Carter, used ‘custom’ for ethos and ‘habit’
for hexis.18 I follow recent translators in using ‘habit’ for both terms, and there
are, I think, reasonable grounds for doing this, not least because Epictetus
himself slides between the two terms in the chapter from which this passage
comes. However, it is also worth noting that for the Stoics hexis is a technical
term in their physics, referring to a level of pneumatic tension in objects that
generates cohesion and gives them certain qualities.19 Plutarch reports the
following:
In his books On Hexis, he [Chrysippus] again says that the hexis are
nothing but currents of air: ‘It is by these that bodies are sustained.
The sustaining air is responsible for the quality of each of the bodies
which are sustained by hexis; in iron this quality is called hardness,
in stone density, and in silver whiteness. (Plutarch, St. Rep. 1053f,
SVF 2.449, LS 47M)
In this context hexis is sometimes translated as ‘cohesion’, ‘condition’, or
‘tenor’.20 It is responsible for qualities that can vary in intensity, such as hardness,
density, or whiteness. It forms one part on the Stoic Scala naturae, in which
differing qualities in the physical world are explained by reference to varying
degrees of tension (tonos) within the pneuma that permeates all things. Within this
For English translations that translate both hexis and ethos as ‘habit’, see e.g. Long 1887,
Matheson 1916, Oldfather 1925-28, and Hard 2014. For early modern Latin translations that
render hexis as habitus and ethos as consuetudo, see Scheggio 1554, Wolf 1595, Upton 1741, and
Schweighauser 1799-1800. For Elizabeth Carter’s use of ‘habit’ and ‘custom’, see Carter 1758.
18
19 Hijmans 1959, 64, contrasts this narrow use of hexis in Stoic physics with a broader one used
in ethical contexts.
Pomeroy 1999 translates hexis as ‘condition’; Long and Sedley 1987 translate it as ‘tenor’, while
Cherniss 1976 opts for ‘habitudes’.
20
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continuum, hexis is the lowest level of tension, binding together physical objects
and giving them their qualities. Next comes phusis, a more complex degree of
tension generating life in organisms; then psuchê, giving powers of perception and
movement to animals; and finally, logikê psuchê, producing reason within
humans.21 The notion of hexis is thus firmly embedded within Stoic physics.
The Stoics contrast this variable hexis with a diathesis, sometimes translated as
‘disposition’ or ‘character’, which is invariable.22 These are sometimes referred
to as scalar and non-scalar properties.23 Thus, in Chrysippus’s earlier example,
the straightness of a stick is a diathesis, because it cannot vary in intensity: the
stick is either straight or not.24 Similarly, virtue is a diathesis, an all or nothing
affair that is invariable.25 By contrast, the hardness of iron can vary in intensity,
they claim. It is worth noting that this is the terminological reverse of the view
of Aristotle, who, in the Categories, says that virtue is a hexis, a state, which is
stable, and not a diathesis, a condition, which is changeable.26 Simplicius, whom
we met earlier, is one of our key sources here, writing in his commentary on the
Categories:
It is worthwhile to understand the Stoics’ usage in regard to these
terms. In the opinion of some people, they reverse Aristotle by
taking character (diathesis) to be more stable than habit (hexis). […]
For they say that habits can be intensified and relaxed, but
characters are not susceptible to intensification or relaxation. So
they call the straightness of a stick a character […]. For the
straightness could not be relaxed or intensified, nor does it admit of
more or less, and so it is a character. For the same reason the virtues
21
See Philo, Leg. alleg. 2.22-3 (SVF 2.458, LS 47P).
22 On hexis and diathesis in Stoicism, see Stobaeus 2.70,21-71,4 (SVF 3.104, LS 60L); these are
translated as ‘condition’ and ‘disposition’ respectively in Pomeroy 1999, 31, and as ‘tenor’ and
‘character’ in Long and Sedley 1987. On this distinction, see further Brouwer 2014, 31-2.
23
See e.g. Graver 2007, 135-8.
24
See Simplicius, in Cat. 237,25-238,20 (SVF 2.393, LS 47S).
See Diogenes Laertius 7.127 (LS 61I) and 7.89 (LS 61A): ‘virtue is a consistent character
(diathesis)’. For further discussion of Stoic virtue as a diathesis, see Jedan 2009, 58-65.
25
See Aristotle, Cat. 8, 8b25-9a13. The translations of hexis and diathesis as ‘state’ and ‘condition’
respectively come from Ackrill 1963, 24. Note also Eth. Nic. 1106a10-12 on virtue as a hexis. The
difference is merely terminological; the Stoics agree with Aristotle that virtue is a stable state or
condition. See further Rist 1969, 3.
26
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are characters […] because they are not susceptible to intensification
or increase. (in Cat. 237,25-238,1, SVF 2.393, LS 47S)
Despite this apparent difference in kind, it is also worth noting that the Stoics
define character (diathesis) as an unshakeable habit, that is, a special kind of hexis
that is invariable and does not admit of degrees.27 In other words we ought to
understand hexis in two senses: i) a broad category encompassing properties that
both can and cannot be varied, and ii) a narrower sub-category restricted to
properties that can be increased or decreased, in contrast to the other subcategory of unchanging diathesis.28 The important point in the present context is
that for Epictetus there is a contrast between the sage who has the diathesis of
virtue, which is an invariable, and the person who is making progress, who has
a variable hexis that can be strengthened or weakened through processes of
habituation.
Returning to our passage from Epictetus after this lengthy detour, a hexis or habit
can be strengthened by the relevant actions. Similarly, refraining from an action
will weaken any corresponding habit (Diss. 2.18.2-3). This leads Epictetus to
argue that actions always have a twofold impact. Every good action is both good
in itself but also beneficial in a further way, in so far as it contributes to the
maintenance or development of a good habit. Likewise for bad actions, which
damage us both immediately and in the longer term, in so far as they perpetuate
a bad habit (Diss. 2.18.5-12). Consequently every action we undertake will
potentially contribute to either a virtuous or a vicious circle. Given this,
Epictetus suggests that it is essential at all times to remain in a continual state of
vigilance, for even a tiny slip can have greater negative consequences than one
might expect. Not only that, once one stops paying attention to one’s actions,
one will also develop a habit of not paying attention, making it much harder to
maintain one’s fragile state.29 He writes:
When you relax your attention (prosochê) for a little while, do not
imagine that whenever you choose you will recover it, but bear this
in mind, that because of the mistake which you have made today,
27
On this point see Brouwer 2014, 59.
28 So Sambursky 1959, 85, who sees diathesis as ‘a special case of hexis’, and Graver 2007, 136-7,
who describes hexis as a broad class encompassing both diathesis, which is nonscalar, and hexis
proper, which is scalar.
29
On the topic of attention (prosochê) in Epictetus, see Sellars 2018.
11
your condition must necessarily be worse as regards everything else.
For, to begin with – and this is the worst of all – a habit (ethos) of
not paying attention is developed. (Diss. 4.12.1-2)
So, one must remain vigilant in order to avoid developing bad habits, but also
vigilant about remaining vigilant, in order to avoid developing a habit of
inattention. As Epictetus’ teacher Musonius Rufus put it, ‘to relax the mind is to
lose it’.30 Epictetus likens these processes of habituation to physical damage and
recovery (Diss. 2.18.11). The mistaken judgement one makes that leads to a bad
action leaves a mark on the mind, just as a whip might leave a weal on the flesh.
Unless that mark is able to heal completely, the next time it will become a deeper
wound.31 Repeated bad actions damage the mind just as the whip cuts into the
flesh. In the terms of Stoic physics, the hexis that is the state of one’s soul is
weakened by a reduction in its pneumatic tension. To someone who is easily
provoked to anger, Epictetus says two things: keep quiet and remain vigilant
(Diss. 2.18.12-14). Count how many days in which one has not got angry. The
longer one can go without getting angry, the weaker the habit (hexis) will become
until eventually it will be destroyed (Diss. 2.18.13). Thus, the positive counterpart
to the vicious circle he warns about is that every tiny success will have a twofold
virtuous impact, with the potential quickly to snowball into significant progress
towards wisdom.
4. Negative Influences
So far we have seen Epictetus advocate the overcoming of existing bad habits
by cultivating new ones that are diametrically opposed to them. While, as noted
earlier, this might be taken to echo Aristotle’s advice of aiming at an opposed
extreme in order to land at the virtuous mean, it might equally follow the
example of Diogenes the Cynic, who claimed that his own extreme behaviour
deliberately set the note a little too high, in order to ensure that everyone else
would hit the right note (Diog. Laert. 6.35), and it is worth noting that Epictetus
nowhere mentions Aristotle in the Discourses, while his admiration for Diogenes
is quite explicit. Indeed, Epictetus’s most important extended discussion of
Cynicism (Diss. 3.22) is in the chapter of the Discourses that comes immediately
after the one with which we opened about those who wish to become lecturers
30
Musonius Rufus, fr. 52 (Hense 1905, 133), from Aulus Gellius, NA 18.2.1.
One might compare this with Marcus Aurelius, who in Meditations 11.8 draws an analogy
between a person cut off from society and a branch broken off a tree. Both can be grafted back
on, but the more often this occurs, the weaker the bond will become.
31
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in philosophy (Diss. 3.21). I do not think this is by accident, for Epictetus takes
Cynicism to be the archetypal example of a philosophy expressed in actions
rather than words, and also the one where the potential for dissonance between
actions and words is at its greatest.32 Another common theme in the Discourses is
Epictetus attacking his students for merely playing the part of the Cynic – such
as not washing before coming to lectures – rather than acting in accord with
Cynic principles (e.g. Diss. 3.22; 4.11.25-30).
As well as recommending this, Epictetus goes on to suggest that a particular
danger for those trying to make progress is the influence of other people,
especially given that almost every person that one is likely to encounter will be
foolish, without virtue, and riddled with bad habits. He suggests that if two
people spend time together, one will inevitably end up being influenced by the
other: you will start to be shaped by their influence, or they will be shaped by
you (Diss. 3.16.1-3). As he puts it rather bluntly, if you get too close to someone
covered in dirt, you will end up covered in dirt yourself (Diss. 3.16.3).
He goes on to analyse an encounter between someone trying to make progress
and a typical non-wise person (Diss. 3.16.7). In a social encounter the non-wise
person will be much stronger than the student of philosophy in two ways: first,
their views will be based on firm judgements, albeit incorrect ones, and, second,
their actions will be in accord with their beliefs, even if the actions are vicious
and the beliefs are false. The student of philosophy, by contrast, will still be
unsure about their judgements and won’t yet act fully in harmony with their
professed commitment to virtue. In short, the fool is secure in his ignorance
while the student remains in a fragile state. Thus Epictetus argues that in such
an encounter it will always be the student who is trying to make progress who
will suffer the negative influence of the non-wise, and never the other way
around (Diss. 3.16.6).
Epictetus’s solution to this is to counsel withdrawal from social situations where
one might come into contact with non-philosophers. He writes:
Whether this is due to Epictetus or Arrian is impossible to know. It is conceivable that the
existing discourses that have come down to us reflect the order in which they were recorded and
so reflect the order in which Epictetus himself addressed these topics. It is equally possible that
the order of the discourses was determined by Arrian himself as he sorted through his lecture
notes and prepared them for publication. Either way, I suggest that this is not a random
juxtaposition.
32
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Until these fine ideas of yours are firmly fixed within you, and you
have acquired some power which will guarantee you security, my
advice to you is to be cautious about joining issue with the non-wise
(idiôtês). (Diss. 3.16.9)
Or, as he puts it elsewhere, ‘flee far away from things that are too strong for you’
(Diss. 3.12.12). Of course, spending time with the wise will cause no problems;
in fact it will only benefit, but the wise are few and far between (Diss. 2.18.21).
So Epictetus’s advice for students of philosophy trying to make progress is to
avoid social situations in order to avoid the harmful influence of other people’s
bad habits. He also recommends a complete dislocation from one’s past life in
order to break free from past habits and unhealthy influences (Diss. 3.16.11).
And he chastises philosophy students who, having left home to study
philosophy, persist with their old habits as soon as they step outside of the
classroom (Diss. 3.16.14). Real philosophical progress requires a complete break
with the non-wise lives of other people and with one’s own past non-wise way
of life. A common theme in Epictetus’s Discourses is the image of the philosopher
as a doctor, the classroom as a hospital, and the student as a patient in need of
treatment (Diss. 3.22.30). We might extend that medical analogy further by saying
that bad habits are contagious and so the most appropriate treatment for those
in recovery is quarantine. It is also worth noting, though, that the Stoics claimed
that by nature people are disposed towards virtue, a point stressed by Epictetus’s
teacher, Musonius Rufus.33 Despite the rarity of the sage, everyone, it is claimed,
has an innate moral sensibility, and, left to their own devices, will develop
towards virtue. Thus bad habits that lead us away from virtue are contrary to our
natural state, and so in this sense they are a sickness or illness, perverting us from
our natural, healthy state of progress towards virtue. Hence the medical analogy.
This also means that the sickness of bad habits is often the product of some
external influence, and so the one definitive way to avoid them is via social
isolation. The student of philosophy should avoid all non-philosophers, for the
health of their soul depends on it. It may be that Epictetus is deliberately setting
the note a bit too high here, but his point is clearly made.
5. Non-Cognitive Training
All of this hopefully gives a good sense of the processes by which Epictetus
thought one might transform one’s habits for the better. Much of this is what
33
See Musonius Rufus, Diatr. 2 (Hense 1905, 6-8).
14
might be called non-cognitive training. It involves a clear contrast between the
study of philosophical theory, which his beginning students have completed, and
separate acts of training designed to digest that theory, which they have not. This
was a distinction that Epictetus inherited from Musonius. In one of Musonius’s
lectures a contrast is drawn between theory (logos) and habit (ethos): theory tells
us what is right (orthôs), while habit is concerned with acting in accordance with
theory.34 Musonius goes on to insist that in practical contexts such as medicine,
navigation, or music, one would always choose someone accomplished in action
over someone who had only mastered theory. Surely the same applies in the case
of virtuous action, he adds: ‘is it not much better to be self-controlled and
temperate in all one’s actions than to be able to say what one ought to do?’.35
Yet like Epictetus, Musonius does not reject the value of theory altogether, for
it is after all the foundation of the entire enterprise:
Theory (logos) which teaches how one should act is related to
application, and comes first, since it is not possible to do anything
really well unless its practical execution be in harmony with theory.
In effectiveness, however, practice (ethos) takes precedence over
theory (logos) as being more influential in leading humans to action.
(Diatr. 5, Hense 1905, 21,22-22,3)
To some, this focus on habits might seem out of place within the context of
early Stoic philosophy. The early Stoics have a reputation for being cognitivists
in ethics and moral psychology.36 According to a fairly standard view, the early
Stoics argued that an individual’s actions are determined by impulses (hormai)
that are, in turn, determined by beliefs (doxai), which are the product of giving
assent (sunkatathesis) to impressions (phantiasiai).37 Once a belief has been
generated by an assent, the impulse automatically follows, leaving no obvious
room for weakness of will. If that is so, what role is there for habituation? If one
believes that a certain course of behaviour is the right or desirable thing to do,
then on this Stoic model the individual will surely simply do it, their impulses
being determined by their beliefs.
34
Musonius Rufus, Diatr. 5 (Hense 1905, 19,19-20-3).
35
Musonius Rufus, Diatr. 5 (Hense 1905, 21,11-14).
See e.g. Lloyd 1978, 237, and Inwood 1985, 52, as just two established examples. For some
scepticism, see Sorabji 2000, 44-5.
36
On impulses and assents, see Stobaeus 2,88,1-7 (SVF 3.171, LS 33I); on impressions and
assents, see Cicero, Acad. 2.145 (SVF 1.66, LS 41A).
37
15
Epictetus’s focus on a variety of non-cognitive practices of habituation might at
first glance seem to call into question his orthodoxy as a Stoic. As we have seen,
his concern with this kind of practical training was inherited from his teacher
Musonius. Traditionally Musonius has been taken to be a Stoic, although
recently that view has been challenged and he has instead been presented as
simply a generic (and potentially eclectic) philosopher.38 This raises the
possibility that his focus on training may have come from some other, non-Stoic
philosophical source. Roughly contemporary with Musonius, we also find an
interest in non-cognitive habituation in Seneca. In Seneca’s case the non-Stoic
influence is quite explicit: he quotes from the Pythagorean Golden Verses and he
reports that he learned at least some of these practices from his teacher Sextius,
who operated a philosophy school in Rome.39 The school of Sextius was known
for being eclectic in outlook, drawing on Stoic and Pythagorean ideas among
others.
All this might lead one to wonder if the stress on non-cognitive practices of
habituation by Roman Stoics such as Epictetus, Musonius, and Seneca was the
product of non-Stoic influences that drew them away from the purely cognitive
approach to human action associated with the early Stoa. If that were the case,
it would make Epictetus a heterodox Stoic. Yet the standard view of Epictetus
is that, despite his own distinctive approach, he remained a thoroughly orthodox
follower of the early Stoa. Over a century ago, Bonhöffer argued that Epictetus
paid little or no attention to the supposedly heterodox ‘middle Stoics’, instead
confining his points of reference to the early Stoics, especially Chrysippus.40
More recent commentators have reiterated this view, even where they have
highlighted the distinctive and original aspects of Epictetus’s approach.41
So, on the one hand, Epictetus is widely held to be an orthodox Stoic while, on
the other, his focus on non-cognitive practices of habituation appear to take him
away from core Stoic teaching about the cognitive basis for human action. To
complicate matters further, Epictetus himself seems to express agreement with
the orthodox Stoic view when, for instance, he says that ‘it is impossible to judge
one thing to be advantageous and yet desire another’ (Diss. 1.18.2). If that is the
38
See the case set out in Inwood 2017.
39
See esp. Seneca, De ira 3.36.1-3, with further discussion of Seneca and Sextius in Sellars 2014.
40
See Bonhöffer 1894, iii-iv.
41
See e.g. Long 2002, 7-8; Cooper 2007, 10; Klein 2020.
16
case, then why does he also think that we need to engage in non-cognitive
processes of habituation?
Before trying to respond to that question directly, it is worth noting the way in
which Stoics in general responded to the problem of weakness of will. Because,
on their account, there can be no inner conflict between competing faculties in
the mind, they needed to give some other explanation for situations in which
people appear to act against their judgements. They did so by suggesting that
such cases can be explained in terms of an inconsistency of judgement,
understood as an oscillation: ‘a turning of the single reason in both directions,
which we do not notice owing to the sharpness and speed of the change’.42 It is
not, on their view, the case that someone can believe one thing while at the same
time acting against that belief. Instead, the apparent akratic has such unstable
judgements that they might believe and act one way in a given moment, only to
change their mind in the next, continually oscillating back and forth, unable to
settle on a stable judgement. Indeed, this is one of the states that the Stoics
thought ought to be avoided: Zeno’s initial formulation of the Stoic telos was to
live consistently (to homologoumenôs zên), and consistency is one of the hallmarks
of the Stoic sage.43
In the light of this, one would expect Stoic practices of habituation to be directed
towards the cultivation of more stable and consistent judgements. The problem
is not, according to the Stoics, that people act against their judgements; it is that
their judgements oscillate between existing habitual patterns of judgement and
newer ones that have not yet become fully embedded. Indeed, this is no doubt
why Epictetus advised his students who were beginning to make progress to
avoid contact with other people whose negative influence might contribute to
an ongoing state of instability.
Another aspect of the Stoic account of action relevant here is their
understanding of impulse (hormê). Unfortunately, this is especially complex and
only the basic outlines can be given here. Impulse is something shared by all
animals and humans. In animals and children this is non-rational, but in adult
humans this develops into what the Stoics call rational impulse (logikê hormê).44
42 Plutarch, Virt. mor. 446f (SVF 3.459, LS 65G). For further discussion of the Stoic response to
the problem of akrasia, see Gill 1983.
43
For Zeno’s telos formulation see Stobaeus 2,75,11-12 (SVF 1.179, LS 63B).
44
See e.g. Stobaeus 2,86,17-87,13 (SVF 3.169, LS 53Q).
17
Impulse is thus something that can develop, in this case from something nonrational and instinctive into something rational. An ideal process of development
would see a human being mature into a fully rational agent with perfectly rational
impulse. But, of course, things rarely work out that way: the process of
development towards perfect rationality is often impeded or diverted. The
important point to note in the present context is that impulse is something that
can develop and improve. Indeed, Epictetus lists it as one of the objects of his
programme of philosophical training. There are, he says, three areas (topoi) in
which someone who wants to be good must be trained. The second of these is
concerned with hormê and aphormê, so that one ‘behaves appropriately, in an
orderly way, with good reason, and not carelessly’ (Diss. 3.2.2).
One of our main sources for the early Stoic account of impulse (hormê) lists a
number of different types, and one of these is hexis hormetikê, which one might
translate as ‘dispositional impulse’,45 or, in the present context, ‘habitual
impulse’. It is unclear at first glance where this ought to fit into the Stoic account
of action: if impulses are produced by beliefs that are, in turn, produced by
judgements, how can they also be underlying dispositions or habits? It has been
suggested that in order to make sense of this the Stoics must have been
committed to two different types of impulse: there are i) underlying dispositional
or habitual impulses already in place before we make judgements, and ii) the
impulses directly produced by our judgements.46 It has been argued that the first
type have a strong influence on the second type, in so far as our underlying
dispositions or habits will shape the sorts of propositions presented to the mind
for assent.47 For example, a person at the beginning of a new diet may judge that
they ought not to eat cake any more, but if their underlying disposition
persistently presents to their mind the thought ‘I really like cake’, it is perhaps
unsurprising that their still inconsistent judgement sometimes endorses that
statement and they succumb to eating cake. The task at hand for such a person
is to try to alter their underlying dispositional or habitual impulse (hexis hormetikê)
in order to change the sorts of propositions presented to the mind for assent.
45 Stobaeus 2.87,9-13 (SVF 3.169). The text reads tês hexeôs tês hormêtikês, which Pompery 1999,
55, translates as ‘the condition which is able to impel’. Annas 1992, 91 opts for ‘impulsory state’.
I take ‘dispositional impulse’ from Klein 2020.
46
See the helpful discussion in Annas 1992, 100-01.
47
Ibid.
18
This is why Epictetus pays so much attention to habituation. It is in order to
transform these underlying dispositional or habitual impulses. For someone
trying to transform their way of life, this often involves trying to overcome
engrained habits of thinking that are at odds with a newly embraced set of
beliefs. But how does one do this? Epictetus has already given us an answer.
Each time someone manages to act in accordance with their new belief, they
contribute to the inculcation of a new habitual way of thinking. Every time the
person who habitually thinks ‘I really like cake’ manages to avoid assenting to
this, and so resists eating cake, that underlying habitual way of thinking is
weakened. If they resist eating cake often enough, they may eventually fall out
of the habit of thinking about cake at all. The habitual impulse will be reshaped
by a virtuous circle of the sort we saw Epictetus describe earlier. This will
contribute to reaching the goal where one’s habitual impulses are fully in line
with one’s professed beliefs. It is much easier to resist the temptation of cake if
one is not continually thinking ‘I really like cake’!
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