Uncle Remus and Mr. Professor Discuss Self-Coercion in the Milgram Experiment Peter John Stone Franciscan University of Steubenville Philosophy of the Human Person June 29, 2012 Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 2 Abstract A dialogue between two fictitious characters regarding self-coercion and the “Behavioral Study of Obedience” by Stanley Milgram (attached). It considers whether or not the experiment can establish philosophically the existence of self-coercion. In the progress it concludes some uncommon interpretation of the experiment by applying philosophy rather than strict empiricism to the findings. This features Uncle Remus in the Socratic role as analogous in the present to Socrates’ high esteem for Aesop (teller of anthropomorphic fables, slave). The author establishes this from the start with Uncle Remus almost exclusively asking the questions. The character of Mr. Professor is entirely fictitious and is not intended as a comment on any academic or academia in general. The name was the author’s own nickname in his adolescence. The form of the dialogue was inspired by actual conversations the author had with his best friend Tracy “Boo” Steed during two graduate courses of study besides the current course of study. Mr. Steed is a high school educated African American, and a veteran of the Navy. While the Dialogue follows the style of these conversations, it does not represent their content. Only the simple definitions of objectivity and subjectivity at the top of page 7 resulted from such discussions, and in different context then. All other content is unique to this Dialogue. Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 3 Uncle Remus and Mr. Professor Discuss Self-Coercion in the Milgram Experiment One day Uncle Remus and his old buddy Mr. Professor get to talking about the Nazis and the Holocaust. Now this may not be the kind of thing that people normally think of Uncle Remus talking about, but it matters more to him than to most, coming from slavery and all. He gets more good ideas from chats with Mr. Professor than he ever tells Joel Chandler Harris. “So, Mr. Professor,” Uncle Remus asks, puffing on the apple tobacco in his pipe, “How you figure so many normally decent folks helped in killing so many others in those Nazi death camps, anyway?” “Well, Remus,” says Mr. Professor, “I maintain, in simple terms, that they coerced themselves into it by surrendering their subjectivity, violating their own irreducibility, and in short submitting themselves to be a means to an end,” and he took a deep puff off his own pipe and held it. Uncle Remus just stares with his jaw dropping, and says, “What you smokin’?” as Mr. Professor coughs. “You know I ain’t got much formal learning. What you mean by subjectivity? Irreduciwhatchasaid? Now, I know what self-coercion sounds to mean, but I can’t rightly say it makes much sense. Got any proof of it?” Mr. Professor chuckles, and with a silly grin gets ready for the long discussion. “Answering your last question first, we’ve talked before about Stanley Milgram’s experiment at Yale in 1963. He specifically cites the atrocities of World War II as a reason for studying the limits of human obedience.” “I recollect that,” says Uncle Remus, “So what does that have to do with your reckoning that self-coercion let the holocaust happen?” “Why quite simply, everything!” says Mr. Professor. “You know that in the Milgram Experiment 26 out of 40 subjects chose to administer the highest level shock possible (as they believed) as punishment to a long unresponsive ‘learner’. They did this against their own Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 4 personal better judgment, just because they followed orders. The orders could not really constitute coercion, as there was no penalty associated with their disobeying them. Since they administered those high level shocks unwillingly, with demonstrated cognitive dissonance, it must have been coerced; but since the orders alone did not bring any real threat of consequence, the coercion had to have arisen from a conflict between acting out of subjectivity or objectivity, with objectivity coercing the subjective self into compliance. It demonstrates that when two moral intuitions …” “Listening to conscience?” “Essentially.” says Mr. Professor, “In this case when the moral intuitions of treating other people and obeying orders conflict, they obey first and ask questions later – but that choice does not come easy. “ ‘F you say so,” says Uncle Remus, shaking his head. “But it seems a leap. Can you break that down into smaller steps?” So Mr. Professor says, “I am sure you recall our prior discussions about basics in philosophy of the human person – the basic ideas that no person can be merely a part of anything else, which is the irreducibility you asked about.” “Now, see? Do you just eat alphabet soup and spit words back out? Why use a ten dollar word when a few nickel words can do the job?” “Well, that involves specificity … “ “There you go again,” says Uncle Remus, his eyes a-twinkling. “I reckon you mean it takes just the perfect word so there is no confusion with any other word?” “Well, if you understand me, you need not construct an artificial issue out of it!” says Mr. Professor. Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 5 Uncle Remus chuckles, “Well, to get this talk a-goin’, I recall that the idea is trying to understand what it is that makes each of us a person, apart from those parts of us common to animal nature …” “That goes to incommunicability.” “… and that means that what makes someone an individual person can’t just be transferred to someone else. It means that one person can’t just be swapped out for another …” “Irreplacibility.” “… because that treats them as if they only exist to do what another person with similar skills or nature can do, so they’re just a part of something bigger, rather than themselves for their own reasons …” “That’s your irreducibility.” “… and because of all this, treating anyone as only worth something as a tool to achieve something else violates their human dignity. Folks can even violate their own selfhood by allowing themselves to be used that way. Does that sum up what we’ve talked about before?” “That is right. Because every human person is by nature irreducible, incommunicable and irreplaceable, treating anyone as merely a means to an end constitutes a violation of their humanity, and a violence against their person even if there is no physical assault at all, and we can commit violence against ourselves.” Mr. Professor summarizes. “So,” asks Uncle Remus, “Where does this subjectivity come in?” “That involves our responsibility for individual actions, our own acting and being acted upon. If someone forces me to do something I would rather not do, that is not an action of my own. It is an action of someone else, and I become a mere tool to achieve it. For something to truly constitute an act of one’s own it must be completely intentional. So if they only respond to acts directed at them, they are mere objects. For their actions to have any intentionality they must act from informed subjectivity.” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 6 “Can you explain that a little more? Aren’t folks supposed to reckon things objectively to make good choices, instead of subjectively?” “You are thinking of the idea of being objective in things like science and journalism. Think of this as a different way of applying the same words. You refer to separating actual observations of facts from personal interpretation of facts.” “So saying that Brer Bear slugged Brer Fox is objective, while saying Brer Bear got angry with Brer Fox is a conclusion, so it is subjective. I may be wrong about what was goin’ through Brer Bear’s head, but that does not affect what he actually did. He mayhap took it in his noggin that he just had to slug someone, Brer Fox happened to be there. And mayhap Brer Bear warn’t angry about nothing nohow.” “That’s right – and I will accept anthropomorphism for the purpose of this argument …” “There you go again. Why not just say using animals as symbols for people?” “… and that is not the kind of objectivity I mean. What I refer to involves more a framework for action. Now I know you remember a microscope has an objective lens at the bottom and a subjective lens at the top. The objective lens focuses on the “object” being studied, while the subjective lens takes the image to the person studying the object.” “So that means that when we look at how someone acts they are the object. The basic observation still means objectivity, but we decide what we think an act means about moral intuition from subjectivity?” “That will do for now. So turn that idea around to describe it from the inside, to how each of us experiences life for ourselves. Think of objectivity as experiencing one’s own life from the outside looking in …” “I get it,” says Uncle Remus. “Living in subjectivity means going through life from the inside looking out, instead of the outside looking in. A whole lot of folks never get past that way of living.” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 7 “That’s a simple way to put it.” “Well,” says Uncle Remus, “Why didn’t you just say so? So it means that if Brer Rabbit did not worry about how it looked from the outside when the Tar Baby ignored him, he never would have gotten tangled up in it?” “That sounds right. He still acted for himself, but he let the impressions of others direct those actions. But it doesn’t mean we should neglect objectivity altogether. Think of the whole story from Brer Fox’s perspective.” “Well,” says Uncle Remus, “Brer Fox understood how Brer Rabbit would react to the Tar Baby, but in the end Brer Rabbit understood Brer Fox more. He knew that Brer Fox would want to be as mean as possible. So when he said, ‘Whatever you do, don’t throw me in the Briar Patch!’ he counted on Brer Fox only thinking of how to hurt him, and not reckoning that the Briar Patch was where he lived.” “That makes simple sense.” “So at first Brer Fox throwing Brer Rabbit into the Briar Patch was an intentional choice, but throwing him into his home was not – though in a longer look, Brer Rabbit actually coerced the choice to throw him at all, since Brer Fox had actually intended to do all kinds of mean and nasty things to Brer Rabbit. It was coerced because Brer Rabbit – without actually fibbing – convinced Brer Fox that it would do him the most harm. Does that sound right?” “Yes,” says Mr. Professor, “But more than that, Brer Fox really coerced himself, out of his own perceptions, to throw Brer Rabbit into the Briar Patch. Brer Rabbit never made any threats – never even lied. He implied, Brer Fox inferred, and marginalizing his own subjectivity chose to throw Brer Rabbit into the Briar Patch. His own ignorance that Brer Rabbit lived there was his own fault. Brer Rabbit had no responsibility to disclose this.” “So do I understand correctly that intentional action means acting out of subjectivity, but that folks need some amount of acting in objectivity if only to reckon why others act … “ Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 8 “… and to understand their own actions.” “’Cause if they don’t know their own thinkin’, then other people can coerce them more easily. That makes sense. So what does this have to do with self-coercion and the Milgram experiment?” “Well, let’s extend your metaphor into reality, one step at a time. The subjects of the Milgram experiment had several crucial choice points along the way. To determine whether their actions were externally coerced, first we have to consider if any individual choices were so coerced.” “Then you assume that since their behavior suggests they would rather not have administered such high shocks in the experiment, that degree of obedience had to be coerced, and if the experimenters did not coerce them it had to have come from themselves?” “That seems obvious.” “Well let’s talk it through and see if that holds out,” says Uncle Remus. “So the first choice was even taking part in the experiment. Was that coerced by the money?” “I think not. It was only $4.50 after all.” “Yes,” says Uncle Remus, “but back then that could fill a gas tank a couple of times, or take a family out for a night at the movies.” “Still not significant. It would not make or break them for participating. In fact they were told they got paid just for showing up at the laboratory. So that may have been an incentive to get them in the door, but it did not coerce their participation.” “Still, they took the money, and doesn’t that put them in a position of feeling they should return a favor?” “Aw,” says Mr. Professor, “A reciprocity heuristic! In nickel words, a heuristic is a rule of thumb – actually set up in our brain structure rather than learned – that people use to make Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 9 quick decisions. While not always valid logically, they result in the best course of action most of the time. The reciprocity heuristic means helping someone to return a perceived favor.” “Exactly! So how come that ain’t coercion?” “If it is, it certainly qualifies as self-coercion already.” “Or is it manipulation?” asks Uncle Remus, “Like Brer Fox throwing Brer Rabbit into the Briar Patch? Like I said, he chose to throw Brer Rabbit there, but not to send him home, and his own ignorance produced the inference that it would hurt Brer Rabbit to put him there. But in the experiment the participants were intentionally deceived about the nature of the experiment. Even the ‘experimenter’ they met was an actor, and the real experimenters observed without getting involved.” “Good point,” says Mr. Professor. “Given that, and the fact that every detail of the room was designed to make the experiment look legitimate, I must concede that they were overtly coerced into participating in the specific experiment involved, but not in participating in some experiment. However, none of that affects their actions during the experiment.” “How you figure?” “We accept that once in the door, and choosing to proceed with the experiment they think happens, their role is set. They are coerced by the extensive detail of the setting to believe the experiment as actually what it was described, right down to receiving a small shock themselves. This serves for the false experiment purposes to reassure the ‘teacher’ that the ‘learner’ only receives minor shocks to start out. Its real purpose is to convince the ‘teacher’ – as the actual subject of the experiment – that by pressing that button he actually administers shocks.” “So how does that make giving such high shocks self-coerced instead of coerced from the outside?” asks Uncle Remus. “Once the experiment actually starts, all things are equalized as a matter of perception. The ‘teacher’ knows that he gets to keep the money whether he participates or not. He believes Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 10 he actually administers shocks to the ‘learner’ for wrong answers. He believes fair random selection makes him the ‘teacher’, so it might as easily have been himself getting shocked. One would think he might even ask himself if he would want the teacher to continue were roles reversed – and that alone should suffice to end the experiment. However, when he expresses doubts the experimenter offers escalating prompts ranging from neutral to more authoritative to encourage he proceed.” “So,” Uncle Remus asks, “Why ain’t that coercion?” “Because there ai – ahem – because there are no penalties attached for noncompliance. The ‘experimenter’ has no actual authority or power over the person of the ‘teacher’. He is free to follow his conscience. The reciprocity heuristic can only go so far.” “But the ‘teacher’ ain’t just paying the experimenter back no more,” says Uncle Remus. “He has also bought into participating himself by the time the shocks get bad and the ‘learner’ starts screaming. Hasn’t he already put something of himself into it?” “Aw!” says Mr. Professor, “The escalation of commitment heuristic! The more people have put into something, the more they are likely to continue pursuing a desired result even when the anticipated outcome is established as futile.” “Like playing those slot machines?” “Exactly!” says Mr. Professor. “Gambling depends on the escalation of commitment heuristic – and there is my point exactly! Everything in fancy casinos is designed to frame someone’s mind to part with their money. A wall with a million dollars in hundred dollar bills simply says that money is wallpaper. Artwork encourages people surrender themselves to chance, or even suggests that nothing but chance matters. They even get invited with free chips to play – just the way Milgram’s subjects found their ways into his lab. Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 11 “However,” Mr. Professor continued, “nobody makes them play in the first place. They could just cash in those free chips and walk away with more money than they brought in. Instead they play it, and some go on to lose all their money. Was that their intent?” “No,” says Uncle Remus, “and I have to agree it was their choice. It sure seems they’re coercing themselves. I mean, we can’t really call persuasion or enticement – or even temptation – coercion. They had all sorts of encouragement to play, but nobody stuck a gun to their head and said, ‘play, or else!’ Nobody – in most casinos – tricked them or cheated them. Oh! Thanks for pointing out about the million dollar wallpaper. I never thought about that, and you’re absolutely right.” “Thank you.” “And I also see how those bells and whistles make it sound like someone’s winning all the time, even though more folks are losing – and how about the way they notice people cashing in piles of chips, and not all those folks walking out with empty pockets – or those folks I see come back from Vegas to get PayDay loans, saying they won all kinds of money, but not talking about how much they lost?” “Yes!” says Mr. Professor, “Confirmation bias! They pay attention to those things which support their premise while ignoring those which do not – even when it stares them in the face! All these things are things they do themselves. Their neurology may predispose them to so respond to such stimuli, and those encouraging their participation for profit may take advantage of that predisposition, but they make the choices themselves. They suffer no penalty for not participating, they have potential rewards if they do.” “Interesting,” says Uncle Remus. “So don’t you think you have a confirmation bias in this whole question yourself?” Well, Mr. Professor’s jaw kind of drops at that. “Surely you can’t be serious?” “I am serious, and stop calling me – Nah. I can’t say it.” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 12 “I’ll stop calling you Shirley,” says Mr. Professor, and they both laugh. “So how do you think I have a confirmation bias?” “Well, first I reckon that while the casino makes a good example of that confirmation bias, and that commitment rule of thumb, it really don’t compare to the Milgram Experiment.” “And why not?” “Because it ain’t the same kind of coercion. Didn’t we both agree that Milgram coerced his subjects to play with him?” “Yes. Milgram went to great ends to convince subjects they were doing something different than they actually were – which had a lot to do with later claims the experiment was unethical.” “Well, Casinos do not lie about what to expect, but do they count on making their profit from every person who gets those free tokens – or dinners, or hotel stays?” “No. They know that out of every ten guests accepting their free offers, maybe one will end up gambling compulsively.” “So ain’t that kind of like roping in all the folks you can for a foot race, and then only racing against the ones with a bum leg?” “It certainly is predatory. But is that coercion?” “It ain’t to nine out of ten of ‘em, but the Casinos don’t give a hoot about them nine nohow. A shopkeeper might call them loss leaders – makin’ all ten of those folks just a means to an end. Don’t folks who keep losing and losing, and coming back anyway, suffer from a handicap?” “I see your point. Intentionality requires that the person making the choice be fully capable of choosing in the first place. A disability – physical, cognitive, or social – diminishes a person’s capacity for intentional action. Even if the casino never lies or forces a hand, it exploits a disability among compulsive gamblers. Exploitation is then a form of coercion!” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 13 “I reckon so,” says Uncle Remus, rocking a little and taking a long draw of apple tobacco. “Then what about the scientific method, and how it relates to your claim of selfcoercion in the Milgram Experiment?” “What do you mean?” “Well, how do scholars like you go about conducting experiments anyway?” “First we observe things that happen, and this raises questions about their causes. Then we pick out one thing to study, come up with a hypothesis about it, and design an experiment to see if the hypothesis is correct.” “And how many questions can you study at a time?” “Well, only one in each experiment. We select one variable that we think may cause a response, and we observe how changing that variable may change the outcome.” “So what is Milgram’s variable?” “Oh, that’s easy. The level of shock subjects administer before disobeying.” “And to test this everything has to stay the same?” “Correct, at least as much as possible. Granted, men of different ages and backgrounds respond. He even tests on only males, to make certain gender is not a variable.” “And he only finds these men by using that promise of $4.50 for coming to the lab like a net to find them?” “Correct.” “And,” says Uncle Remus, “if one man coming in is as good as any other, ain’t they replaceable?” “Well, of course! They have to be … Oh! I see!” “Do you?” “Oh, yes. By treating the subjects as replaceable – as any experiment must – the experiment already violates their selfhood – except that they agreed to participate.” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 14 “Which means…?” Uncle Remus asks. “… having allowed themselves to be used as a mere means to an end, they have committed a violence against their own person already, just by agreeing to participate.” “And we have already agreed that decision was coerced, so they have already been coerced into self-violation. Now, how about that ‘random’ selection of ‘teacher’ and ‘learner’?” “Well, the subject already submits to being replaceable. Selecting roles further emphasizes this – in his perception he and the other man could easily replace each other in either role.” “So what would he think of the other guy?” “If they could easily replace each other in either role, and he perceives himself as replaceable, then he must also perceive the other person as replaceable as well?” “And is that an intentional choice?” “Since he has been coerced into participation up to this point, it cannot be.” “And do the actual folks running the experiment care at all about anything distinctive of him as an individual that can’t be transferred to someone else?” “No. Those would be variables and need to be isolated … Ah!” Mr. Professor pauses, and his eyes light up. “Any experimentation requires isolating incommunicable characteristics of the subject being studied. Experimentation would be pointless otherwise. Incommunicable characteristics offer no communicable application – no general use. That renders them of little or no use. So, altogether such experiments treat the human person subjects as replaceable, render them reducible, and disregard their incommunicability!” “That’s easy for you to say,” Uncle Remus chuckles. “So what does that mean to the subject?” “It means that by submitting to the experiment the subject may have already committed a violence against himself – but since that submission was coerced then the experimenter has Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 15 actually coerced him into committing that self-violence. It means that the experimenter not only treats him as a means to an end, but as a weapon against himself.” “That makes sense,” says Uncle Remus. “So what would he think of the ‘learner’?” “Since he believes the ‘learner’ came under the same circumstances as he did, the experimenter coerced into perceiving in the ‘learner’ all those violations he has taken upon himself. Coerced into self-violating his irreducibility, he is also coerced into perceiving the other as reducible – and this may even be stronger toward the other than toward himself. He knows nothing of the other but what he sees in the lab. Even before the experiment starts he has been coerced into seeing the other as reducible, communicable, and replaceable. He accepts himself as a means to an end, and perceives the same of the learner.” “So how about once the experiment gets going?” asks Uncle Remus. “Whatcha say we just think about how he chooses whether to continue the experiment or quit?” “Hmm,” Mr. Professor pauses. “Well. I am not sure that any of this changes my initial conclusions. While we have determined everything has been coerced to this point, they have still surrendered their subjectivity – objectifying themselves and the other participant. They have violated their own irreducibility. They have submitted themselves as a means to an end.” “But you associated that with self-coercion. If they have been coerced to this point how can self-coercion still apply?” “Well, they have to choose between two moral intuitions, one of obedience, and one of treating others properly.” “So why did Milgram not describe the choice as a matter of conscience, but as a matter of learning?” “That would involve Behaviorism,” Mr. Professor explains, “the dominant psychological paradigm then. It claims the mind starts out a blank slate, and every behavior results from Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 16 learning through stimulus and response. What we call ‘moral intuition’ in Philosophy must still be something learned in Behaviorism.” “And how solid is that today?” “While behavioral modification as a practice is still useful, Behaviorism no longer dominates psychology. The tendency to make language, the need for affection in young, and various other unlearned traits of humanity have been established.” “Okay,” says Uncle Remus. “Now babies, early on, do what their mommas want, and learn to backtalk later, right?” “To varying degrees,” says Mr. Professor. “some may be more naturally compliant than others.” “And the same way most folks don’t need to be told to feel sorry for someone who is hurt, or to try and help them. Learning just affects which other folks we help, when, and how much.” “That makes sense – and any of these could be the topic of whole other discussions.” “I’m sure,” says Uncle Remus, “But the Sun is hangin’ low over the mountains. And I’m a-runnin’ out of ‘baccy, so we need to finish this. Don’t it make more sense that the roots of obedience and decency grow out of our conscience, and learning trims the branches for better or worse?” “So you’re saying that while Milgram concludes objectively, studying a conflict of learned behaviors, subjectively the ‘teachers’ experienced a conflict of moral intuitions. The experiment could not have accounted for that under the psychological paradigm of the day.” “And were those folks able to hear their conscience?” “We already agree them coerced out of their subjectivity. They became mere objects even to themselves. Milgram did study how they prioritized in a crisis over two different things they were taught, but by coercing their participation and setting up the experiment he isolated their Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 17 moral intuition! It would have been an uncontrolled variable, and by the very nature of empiricism it had to be isolated. The subject had to be forced to objectify himself, and when that happened he could only consider learning, not moral intuition.” “He could not attend to his conscience,” says Mr. Professor. “It was like studying a fish out of water. Of course it’ll flip-flop in a panic.” “Correct!” says Mr. Professor. “So that means there is no self-coercion.” “Does it? Or does it just mean the Milgram experiment ain’t proof?” “Ha!” Mr. Professor laughs. “You should be a scientist. Perhaps it could be proved someplace else but not here. You can’t prove a negative thesis. This only fails to prove that selfcoercion exists, but cannot prove that it does not exist.” “But if it does there’d be no end to it,” says Uncle Remus. “Think about it. Rich and powerful people could arrange all sorts of things, manipulate folks into poverty and servitude – like those casinos – and always argue that it was the folks’ own fault.” “ So what does that mean about the Holocaust?” Mr. Professor asks. “Well,” says Uncle Remus, “What is different about compulsive gamblers, or Milgram’s subjects, from the folks who carried out the Holocaust. Forget them Nazi Big Boys who might’ve just been mean and vicious out of the gate. We ain’t talkin’ about them. Since Milgram eyeballed obedience, we’re a-talkin’ about all them soldiers and guards following orders, lots convicted of war crimes however low their rank.” “I fail to follow,” says Mr. Professor. “Compulsive gamblers have a handicap, and Milgram handicapped his subjects to study them. In either case they found themselves acting in ways they would rather not, but was anyone pointing a gun at their heads?” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN 18 Mr. Professor pauses a long time and shakes his head. “I get you. Soldiers’ training would already have isolated their subjectivity even more than Milgram’s experiment, and they had a gun to their head besides …” “And that don’t justify it happenin’,” Uncle Remus cuts in. “No it does not,” says Mr. Professor. “Even before the war they would have been subject to escalation of commitment, reciprocity, and confirmation bias as Milgram’s subjects. Their training – even before things got bad – would isolate their subjectivity, and coerce their selfobjectification as well as the objectification of others. Many would not even have a choice about serving, and as soldiers they might have been executed for disobeying orders themselves.” “That’s right,” says Uncle Remus. “But that means a lot of people – not necessarily innocent people – were punished for war crimes coerced out of them beyond the range of common sense – wrong actions, but effectively the actions of others using them as tools. They were judged for violating basic moral intuitions with a gun at their heads.” “”Yep,” says Uncle Remus, watching the Sun drop behind the mountains. “Put that in your pipe and smoke it.” Running head: UNCLE REMUS AND MR. PROFESSOR DISCUSS SELF-COERCION IN APPENDIX A: Stanley Milgram’s “Behavioral Study of Obedience” 19 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 1963, Vol. 67, No. 4, 371-378 BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF OBEDIENCE1 STANLEY MILGRAM 2 Yale University This article describes a procedure for the study of destructive obedience in the laboratory. It consists of ordering a naive S to administer increasingly more severe punishment to a victim in the context of a learning experiment. Punishment is administered by means of a shock generator with 30 graded switches ranging from Slight Shock to Danger: Severe Shock. The victim is a confederate of the E. The primary dependent variable is the maximum shock the S is willing to administer before he refuses to continue further. 26 Ss obeyed the experimental commands fully, and administered the highest shock on the generator. 14 Ss broke off the experiment at some point after the victim protested and refused to provide further answers. The procedure created extreme levels of nervous tension in some Ss. Profuse sweating, trembling, and stuttering were typical expressions of this emotional disturbance. One unexpected sign of tension—yet to be explained—was the regular occurrence of nervous laughter, which in some Ss developed into uncontrollable seizures. The variety of interesting behavioral dynamics observed in the experiment, the reality of the situation for the S, and the possibility of parametric variation within the framework of the procedure, point to the fruitfulness of further study. Obedience is as basic an element in the structure of social life as one can point to. Some system of authority is a requirement of all communal living, and it is only the man dwelling in isolation who is not forced to respond, through defiance or submission, to the commands of others. Obedience, as a determinant of behavior, is of particular relevance to our time. It has been reliably established that from 1933-45 millions of innocent persons were systematically slaughtered on command. Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, daily quotas of corpses were produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only be carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of persons obeyed orders. Obedience is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that binds men to systems of authority. Facts of recent history and observation in daily life suggest 1 This research was supported by a grant (NSF G-17916) from the National Science Foundation. Exploratory studies conducted in 1960 were supported by a grant from the Higgins Fund at Yale University. The research assistance of Alan C. Elms and Jon Wayland is gratefully acknowledged. 2 Now at Harvard University. that for many persons obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior tendency, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy, and moral conduct. C. P. Snow (1961) points to its importance when he writes: When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich." The German Officer Corps were brought up in the most rigorous code of obedience . . . in the name of obedience they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large scale actions in the history of the world [p. 24]. While the particular form of obedience dealt with in the present study has its antecedents in these episodes, it must not be thought all obedience entails acts of aggression against others. Obedience serves numerous productive functions. Indeed, the very life of society is predicated on its existence. Obedience may be ennobling and educative and refer to acts of charity and kindness, as well as to destruction. General Procedure A procedure was devised which seems useful as a tool for studying obedience (Milgram, 1961). It consists of ordering 371 372 STANLEY MILGRAM a naive subject to administer electric shock to a victim. A simulated shock generator is used, with 30 clearly marked voltage levels that range from IS to 450 volts. The instrument bears verbal designations that range from Slight Shock to Danger: Severe Shock. The responses of the victim, who is a trained confederate of the experimenter, are standardized. The orders to administer shocks are given to the naive subject in the context of a "learning experiment" ostensibly set up to study the effects of punishment on memory. As the experiment proceeds the naive subject is commanded to administer increasingly more intense shocks to the victim, even to the point of reaching the level marked Danger: Severe Shock. Internal resistances become stronger, and at a certain point the subject refuses to go on with the experiment. Behavior prior to this rupture is considered "obedience," in that the subject complies with the commands of the experimenter. The point of rupture is the act of disobedience. A quantitative value is assigned to the subject's performance based on the maximum intensity shock he is willing to administer before he refuses to participate further. Thus for any particular subject and for any particular experimental condition the degree of obedience may be specified with a numerical value. The crux of the study is to systematically vary the factors believed to alter the degree of obedience to the experimental commands. The technique allows important variables to be manipulated at several points in the experiment. One may vary aspects of the source of command, content and form of command, instrumentalities for its execution, target object, general social setting, etc. The problem, therefore, is not one of designing increasingly more numerous experimental conditions, but of selecting those that best illuminate the process of obedience from the sociopsychological standpoint. Related Studies The inquiry bears an important relation to philosophic analyses of obedience and authority (Arendt, 1958; Friedrich, 1958; Weber, 1947), an early experimental study of obedience by Frank (1944), studies in "authoritarianism" (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Rokeach, 1961), and a recent series of analytic and empirical studies in social power (Cartwright, 1959). It owes much to the long concern with suggestion in social psychology, both in its normal forms (e.g., Binet, 1900) and in its clinical manifestations (Charcot, 1881). But it derives, in the first instance, from direct observation of a social fact; the individual who is commanded by a legitimate authority ordinarily obeys. Obedience comes easily and often. It is a ubiquitous and indispensable feature of social life. METHOD Subjects The subjects were 40 males between the ages of 20 and 50, drawn from New Haven and the surrounding communities. Subjects were obtained by a newspaper advertisement and direct mail solicitation. Those who responded to the appeal believed they were to participate in a study of memory and learning at Yale University. A wide range of occupations is represented in the sample. Typical subjects were postal clerks, high school teachers, salesmen, engineers, and laborers. Subjects ranged in educational level from one who had not finished elementary school, to those who had doctorate and other professional degrees. They were paid $4.50 for their participation in the experiment. However, subjects were told that payment was simply for coming to the laboratory, and that the money was theirs no matter what happened after they arrived. Table 1 shows the proportion of age and occupational types assigned to the experimental condition. Personnel and Locale The experiment was conducted on the grounds of Yale University in the elegant interaction laboratory. (This detail is relevant to the perceived legitimacy of the experiment. In further variations, the experiTABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF AGE AND OCCUPATIONAL TYPES IN THE EXPERIMENT Occupations 20-29 years 30-39 years 40-50 years Percentage of total (Occupations) Workers, skilled and unskilled 4 5 6 37.S Sales, business, and white-collar 3 6 7 40.0 Professional 1 S 3 22.5 20 40 40 Percentage of total (Age) Note.—Total N = 40. OBEDIENCE ment was dissociated from the university, with consequences for performance.) The role of experimenter was played by a 31-year-old high school teacher of biology. His manner was impassive, and his appearance somewhat stern throughout the experiment. He was dressed in a gray technician's coat. The victim was played by a 47-year-old accountant, trained for the role; he was of IrishAmerican stock, whom most observers found mildmannered and likable. Procedure One naive subject and one victim (an accomplice) performed in each experiment. A pretext had to be devised that would justify the administration of electric shock by the naive subject. This was effectively accomplished by the cover story. After a general introduction on the presumed relation between punishment and learning, subjects were told: But actually, we know very little about the effect of punishment on learning, because almost no truly scientific studies have been made of it in human beings. For instance, we don't know how much punishment is best for learning—and we don't know how much difference it makes as to who is giving the punishment, whether an adult learns best from a younger or an older person than himself—or many things of that sort. So in this study we are bringing together a number of adults of different occupations and ages. And we're asking some of them to be teachers and some of them to be learners. We want to find out just what effect different people have on each other as teachers and learners, and also what effect punishment will have on learning in this situation. Therefore, I'm going to ask one of you to be the teacher here tonight and the other one to be the learner. Does either of you have a preference? Subjects then drew slips of paper from a hat to determine who would be the teacher and who would be the learner in the experiment. The drawing was rigged so that the naive subject was always the teacher and the accomplice always the learner. (Both slips contained the word "Teacher.") Immediately after the drawing, the teacher and learner were taken to an adjacent room and the learner was strapped into an "electric chair" apparatus. The experimenter explained that the straps were to prevent excessive movement while the learner was being shocked. The effect was to make it impossible for him to escape from the situation. An electrode was attached to the learner's wrist, and electrode paste was applied "to avoid blisters and burns." Subjects were told that the electrode was attached to the shock generator in the adjoining room. In order to improve credibility the experimenter declared, in response to a question by the learner: "Although the shocks can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage." 373 Learning task. The lesson administered by the subject was a paired-associate learning task. The subject read a series of word pairs to the learner, and then read the first word of the pair along with four terms. The learner was to indicate which of the four terms had originally been paired with the first word. He communicated his answer by pressing one of four switches in front of him, which in turn lit up one of four numbered quadrants in an answerbox located atop the shock generator. Shock generator. The instrument panel consists of 30 lever switches set in a horizontal line. Each switch is clearly labeled with a voltage designation that ranges from IS to 450 volts. There is a 15-volt increment from one switch to the next going from left to right. In addition, the following verbal designations are clearly indicated for groups of four switches going from left to right: Slight Shock, Moderate Shock, Strong Shock, Very Strong Shock, Intense Shock, Extreme Intensity Shock, Danger: Severe Shock. (Two switches after this last designation are simply marked XXX.) Upon depressing a switch: a pilot light corresponding to each switch is illuminated in bright red; an electric buzzing is heard; an electric blue light, labeled "voltage energizer," flashes; the dial on the voltage meter swings to the right; various relay clicks are sounded. The upper left-hand corner of the generator is labeled Shock Generator, Type ZLB, Dyson Instrument Company, Waltham, Mass. Output IS Volts4SO Volts. Details of the instrument were carefully handled to insure an appearance of authenticity. The panel was engraved by precision industrial engravers, and all components were of high quality. No subject in the experiment suspected that the instrument was merely a simulated shock generator.3 Sample shock. Each naive subject is given a sample shock on the shock generator, prior to beginning his run as teacher. This shock is always 45 volts, and is applied by pressing the third switch of the generator. The shock is applied to the wrist of the naive subject, and has its source in a 45-volt battery wired into the generator. This further convinces the subject of the authenticity of the generator. Shock instructions. The subject is told to administer a shock to the learner each time he gives a 8 A related technique, making use of a shock generator, was reported by Buss (1961) for the study of aggression in the laboratory. Despite the considerable similarity of technical detail in the experimental procedures, both investigators proceeded in ignorance of the other's work. Milgram provided plans and photographs of his shock generator, experimental procedure, and first results in a report to the National Science Foundation in January 1961. This report received only limited circulation. Buss reported his procedure 6 months later, but to a wider audience. Subsequently, technical information and reports were exchanged. The present article was first received in the Editor's office on December 27, 1961; it was resubmitted with deletions on July 27, 1962. 374 STANLEY MILGRAM wrong response. Moreover—and this is the key command—the subject is instructed to "move one level higher on the shock generator each time the learner flashes a wrong answer." He is also instructed to announce the voltage level before administering a shock. This serves to continually remind subjects of the increasing intensity of shocks administered to the learner. Preliminary and regular run. Pretests revealed that the procedure of reading words and administering shocks requires some practice before it can be handled smoothly. Therefore, immediately preceding the regular run, the teacher is given a preliminary series of 10 words to read to the learner. There are 3 neutral words in the. practice series (i.e., words that the learner answers correctly), so that shocks are administered for 7 of the words, with the maximum shock at 105 volts (moderate shock). Almost all subjects master the procedure by the time the preliminary run is over. Subjects are then presented with a second list, and are told that the procedure is the same as for the first list; the experimenter adds, however: When you get to the bottom of the list, repeat it over again, and continue giving shocks, until the learner has learned all the pairs correctly. The experimenter instructs the subject to, start from 15 volts and increase the shock level one step each time the learner gives a wrong answer. Feedback from the victim. In all conditions the learner gives a predetermined set of responses to the word pair test, based on a schedule of approximately three wrong answers to one correct answer. In the present experimental condition no vocal response or other sign of protest is heard from the learner until Shock Level 300 is reached. When the 300-volt shock is administered, the learner pounds on the wall of the room in which he is bound to the electric chair. The pounding can be heard by the subject. From this point on, the learner's answers no longer appear on the four-way panel. At this juncture, subjects ordinarily turn to the experimenter for guidance. The experimenter instructs the subject to treat the absence of a response as a wrong answer, and to shock the subject according to the usual schedule. He advises the subjects to allow S-10 s«conds before considering no response as a wrong answer, and to increase the shock level one step each time the learner fails to respond correctly. The learner's pounding is repeated after the 315-volt shock is administered; afterwards he is not heard from, nor do his answers reappear on the four-way signal box. Experimenter feedback. At various points in the experiment the subject may turn to the experimenter for advice on whether he should continue to administer shocks. Or he may indicate that he does not wish to go on. It was important to standardize the experimenter's responses to these inquiries and reactions. If the subject indicated his unwillingness to go on, the experimenter responded with a sequence of "prods," using as many as necessary to bring the subject into line. Prod Prod tinue. Prod tinue. Prod go on. 1 : Please continue, or Please go on. 2: The experiment requires that you con3: It is absolutely essential that you con4: You have no other choice, you must The prods were always made in sequence: Only if Prod 1 had been unsuccessful, could Prod 2 be used. If the subject refused to obey the experimenter after Prod 4, the experiment was terminated. The experimenter's tone of voice was at all times firm, but not impolite. The sequence was begun anew on each occasion that the subject balked or showed reluctance to follow orders. Special prods. If the subject asked if the learner was liable to suffer permanent physical injury, the experimenter said: Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on. [Followed by Prods 2, 3, and 4 if necessary.] If the subject said that the learner did not want to go on, the experimenter replied: Whether the learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned all the word pairs correctly. So please go on. [Followed by Prods 2, 3, and 4 if necessary.] Dependent Measures The primary dependent measure for any subject is the maximum shock he administers before he refuses to go any further, In principle this may vary from 0 (for a subject who refuses to administer even the first shock) to 30 (for a subject who administers the highest shock on the generator). A subject who breaks off the experiment at any point prior to administering the thirtieth shock level is termed a defiant subject. One who complies with experimental commands fully, and proceeds to administer all shock levels commanded, is termed an obedient subject. Further records. With few exceptions, experimental sessions were recorded on magnetic tape. Occasional photographs were taken through one-way mirrors. Notes were kept on any unusual behavior occurring during the course of the experiments. On occasion, additional observers were directed to write objective descriptions of the subjects' behavior. The latency and duration of shocks were measured by accurate timing devices. Interview and dehoax. Following the experiment, subjects were interviewed; open-ended questions, projective measures, and attitude scales were employed. After the interview, procedures taken to assure that the s'uoject ' would leave the RBoratory in a state of well being. A friendly reconciliation was arranged between thejubject and 5ie~vlctimj and an effort was made to^Feduce any tensions that arose as a result of the experiment. OBEDIENCE RESULTS Preliminary Notions Before giving an account of the experimental results, it is instructive to consider how persons predict others will perform when commanded to administer powerful shocks to another person. Fourteen Yale seniors, all psychology majors, were provided with a detailed description of the experimental situation. They were asked to reflect carefully on it, and to predict the behavior of 100 hypothetical subjects. More specifically, they were instructed to plot the distribution of obedience of "100 Americans of diverse occupations, and ranging in age from 20 to SO years," who were placed in the experimental situation. There was considerable agreement among the respondents on the expected behavior of hypothetical subjects. All respondents predicted that only an insignificant minority would go through to the end of the shock series. (The estimates ranged from 0 to 3%; i.e., the most "pessimistic" member of the class predicted that of 100 persons, 3 would continue through to the most potent shock available on the shock generator—450 volts.) The class mean was 1.2%. The question was also posed informally to colleagues of the author, and the most general feeling was that few if any subjects would go beyond the designation Very Strong Shock. Result of Experiment I Subjects accept situation. With few exceptions subjects were convinced of the reality of the experimental situation, that they were administering shocks to another person, and the most potent shocks were extremely painful. In the post-experimental interview subjects were asked: "How painful to the learner were the last few shocks that you administered to him?" Subjects were instructed to indicate their answers on a printed 14-point scale ranging from "Not at all painful" to "Extremely painful." The modal response was 14 (Extremely painful) with the mean at 13.42. Signs of extreme tension. Many subjects showed signs of nervousness in the experimental situation, and especially upon administering the more powerful shocks. In a 375 large number of cases the degree of tension reached extremes that are rarely seen in sociopsychological laboratory studies. Subjects were observed to sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan, and dig their fingernails into their flesh. These were characteristic rather than exceptional responses to the experiment. One sign of tension was the regular occurrence of nervous laughing fits. Fourteen of the 40 subjects showed definite signs of nervous laughter and smiling. The laughter seemed entirely out of place, even bizarre. Full-blown, uncontrollable seizures were observed for 3 subjects. On one occasion we observed a seizure so violently convulsive that it was necessary to call a halt to the experiment. The subject, a 46-year-old encyclopedia salesman, was seriously embarrassed by his untoward and uncontrollable behavior. In the post-experimental interviews subjects took pains to point out that they were not sadistic types, and that the laughter did not mean they enjoyed shocking the victim. Distribution of scores. It had been conjectured that persons would not, in general, agree to administer shocks beyond the level designated as Very Strong Shock. The distribution of maximum shocks for this experiment is shown in Table 2. The obtained distribution of scores deviates radically from the prediction. Upon command of the experimenter, each of the 40 subjects went beyond the expected breakoff point. No subject stopped prior to administering Shock Level 20. (At this level —300 volts—the victim kicks on the wall and no longer provides answers to the teacher's multiple-choice questions.) Of the 40 subjects, 5 refused to obey the experimental commands beyond the 300-voIt level. Four more subjects administered one further shock, and then refused to go on. Two broke off at the 330-volt level, and 1 each at 345, 360, and 375 volts. Thus a total of 14 subjects defied the experimenter. It is instructive to reprint their remarks at the point of defiance, as transcribed from the tape recordings: [0124] I think he's trying to communicate, he's knocking. . . . Well it's not fair to shock the guy . . . these are terrific volts. I don't think this is STANLEY MILGEAM 376 TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION or BREAKorr POINTS Verbal designation and voltage indication Slight Shock IS 30 45 60 Moderate Shock 75 90 105 120 Strong Shock 135 150 165 180 Very Strong Shock 195 210 225 240 Intense Shock 255 270 285 300 Extreme Intensity Shock 315 330 345 360 Danger: Severe Shock Number of subjects for whom this was maximum shock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 1 1 375 390 405 420 1 0 0 0 XXX 435 450 0 26 very humane. . . . Oh, I can't go on with this; no, this isn't right. It's a hell of an experiment. The guy is suffering in there. No, I don't want to go on. This is crazy. [Subject refused to administer more shocks.] [0123] He's banging in there. I'm gonna chicken out. I'd like to continue, but I can't do that to a man. . . . I'm sorry I can't do that to a man. I'll hurt his heart. You take your check. . . . No really, I couldn't do it. These subjects were frequently in a highly agitated and even angered state. Sometimes, verbal protest was at a minimum, and the subject simply got up from his chair in front of the shock generator, and indicated that he wished to leave the laboratory. Of the 40 subjects, 26 obeyed the orders of the experimenter to the end, proceeding to punish the victim until they reached the most potent shock available on the shock generator. At that point, the experimenter called a halt to the session. (The maximum shock is labeled 450 volts, and is two steps beyond the designation: Danger: Severe Shock.) Although obedient subjects continued to administer shocks, they often did so under extreme stress. Some expressed reluctance to administer shocks beyond the 300-volt level, and displayed fears similar to those who defied the experimenter; yet they obeyed. After the maximum shocks had been delivered, and the experimenter called a halt to the proceedings, many obedient subjects heaved sighs of relief, mopped their brows, rubbed their fingers over their eyes, or nervously fumbled cigarettes. Some shook their heads, apparently in regret. Some subjects had remained calm throughout the experiment, and displayed only minimal signs of tension from beginning to end. DISCUSSION The experiment yielded two findings that were surprising. The first finding concerns the sheer strength of obedient tendencies manifested in this situation. Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, 26 subjects abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who has no special powers to enforce his commands. To disobey would bring no material loss to the subject; no punishment would ensue. It is clear from the remarks and outward behavior of many participants that in punishing the victim they are often acting against their own values. Subjects often expressed deep disapproval of shocking a man in the face of his objections, and others denounced it as stupid and senseless. Yet the majority complied with the experimental commands. This outcome was surprising from two perspectives: first, from the standpoint of predictions made in the questionnaire described earlier. (Here, however, it is possible that the remoteness of the respondents from the actual situation, and the difficulty of conveying to them the con- OBEDIENCE crete details of the experiment, could account for the serious underestimation of obedience.) But the results were also unexpected to persons who observed the experiment in progress, through one-way mirrors. Observers often uttered expressions of disbelief upon seeing a subject administer more powerful shocks to the victim. These persons had a full acquaintance with the details of the situation, and yet systematically mated the amount of obedience that subjects would disglay. Thr Mrnnd unanticipated effect was the extraordinary tension generated by the procedures. One might suppose that a subject would simply break off or continue as his conscience dictated. Yet, this is very far from what happened. There were striking reactions of tension and emotional strain. One observer related: I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and twisted his hands. At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered: "Oh God, let's stop it." And yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter, and obeyed to the end. Any understanding of the phenomenon of obedience must rest on an analysis of the particular conditions in which it occurs. The following features of the experiment go some distance in explaining the high amount of obedience observed in the situation. 1. The experiment is sponsored by and takes place on the grounds of an institution of unimpeachable reputation, Yale University. It may be reasonably presumed that the personnel are competent and reputable. The importance of this background authority is now being studied by conducting a series of experiments outside of New Haven, and without any visible ties to the university. 2. The experiment is, on the face of it, designed to attain a worthy purpose—advancement of knowledge about learning and memory. Obedience occurs not as an end in itself, but as an instrumental element in a situation that the subject construes as significant, and meaningful. He may not be able to see its full significance, but he may properly assume that the experimenter does. 377 3. The subject perceives that the victim has voluntarily submitted to the authority system of the experimenter. He is not (at first) an unwilling captive impressed for involuntary service. He has taken the trouble to come to the laboratory presumably to aid the experimental research. That he later becomes an involuntary subject does not alter the fact that, initially, he consented to participate without qualification. Thus he has in some dgeree incurred an obligation toward the experimenter. 4. The subject, too, has entered the experiment voluntarily, and perceives himself under obligation to aid the experimenter. He has made a commitment, and to disrupt the experiment is a repudiation of this initial promise of aid. 5. Certain features of the procedure strengthen the subject's sense of obligation to the experimenter, For one, he has been paid for coming to the laboratory. In part this is canceled out by the experimenter's statement that: Of course, as in all experiments, the money is yours simply for coming to the laboratory. From this point on, no matter what happens, the money is yours.4 6. From the subject's standpoint, the fact that he is the teacher and the other man the learner is purely a chance consequence (it is determined by drawing lots) and he, the subject, ran the same risk as the other man in being assigned the role of learner. Since the assignment of positions in the experiment was achieved by fair means, the learner is deprived of any basis of complaint on this count. (A similar situation obtains in Army units, in which—in the absence of volunteers—a particularly dangerous mission may be assigned by drawing lots, and the unlucky soldier is expected to bear his misfortune with sportsmanship.) 7. There is, at best, ambiguity with regard to the prerogatives of a psychologist and the corresponding rights of his subject. There is a vagueness of expectation concerning what a psychologist may require of his subject, and when he is overstepping acceptable limits. 4 Forty-three subjects, undergraduates at Yale University, were run in the experiment without payment. The results are very similar to those obtained with paid subjects. 378 STANLEY MILGRAM Moreover, the experiment occurs in a closed setting, and thus provides no opportunity for the subject to remove these ambiguities by discussion with others. There are few standards that seem directly applicable to the situation, which is a novel one for most subjects. 8. The subjects are assured that the shocks administered to the subject are "painful but not dangerous." Thus they assume that the discomfort caused the victim is momentary, while the scientific gains resulting from the experiment are enduring, 9. Through Shock Level 20 the victim continues to provide answers on the signal box. The subject may construe this as a sign that the victim is still willing to "play the game." It is only after Shock Level 20 that the victim repudiates the rules completely, refusing to answer further. These features help to explain the high amount of obedience obtained in this experiment. Many of the arguments raised need not remain matters of speculation, but can be reduced to testable propostions to be confirmed or disproved by further experiments." The following features of the experiment concern the nature of the conflict which the subject faces. 10. The subject is placed in a position in which he must respond to the competing demands of two persons: the experimenter and the victim. The conflict must be resolved by meeting the demands of one or the other; satisfaction of the victim and the experimenter are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the resolution must take the form of a highly visible action, that of continuing to shock the victim or breaking off the experiment. Thus the subject is forced into a public conflict that does not permit any completely satisfactory solution. 11. While the demands of the experimenter carry the weight of scientific authority, the demands of the victim spring from his personal experience of pain and suffering. The two claims need not be regarded as equally pressing and legitimate. The experimenter seeks an abstract scientific datum; the victim 5 A series of recently completed experiments employing the obedience paradigm is reported in Milgram (1964). cries out for relief from physical suffering caused by the subject's actions. 12. The experiment gives the subject little time for reflection. The conflict comes on rapidly. It is only minutes after the subject has been seated before the shock generator that the victim begins his protests. Moreover, the subject perceives that he has gone through but two-thirds of the shock levels at the time the subject's first protests are heard. Thus he understands that the conflict will have a persistent aspect to it, and may well become more intense as increasingly more powerful shocks are required. The rapidity with which the conflict descends on the subject, and his realization that it is predictably recurrent may well be sources of tension to him. 13. At a more general level, the conflict stems from the opposition of two deeply ingrained behavior dispositions: first, the disposition not to harm other people, and second, the tendency to obey those whom we perceive to be legitimate authorities. REFERENCES ADORNO, T., FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, ELSE, LEVINSON, D. J., & SANTORD, R. N. The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper, 1950. ARENDT, H. What was authority? In C. J. Friedrich (Ed.), Authority. Cambridge: Harvard Univer. Press, 1958. Pp. 81-112. BINET, A. La suggestibility. Paris: Schleicher, 1900. Buss, A. H. The psychology of aggression. New York: Wiley, 1961. CARTWRIGHT, S. (Ed.) Studies in social power. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1959. CHARCOT, J. M. Oeuvres completes. Paris: Bureaux du Progres Medical, 1881. FRANK, J. D. Experimental studies of personal pressure and resistance. /. gen. Psychol, 1944, 30, 23-64. FRIEDRICH, C. J. (Ed.) Authority. Cambridge: Harvard Univer. Press, 19S8. MILGRAM, S. Dynamics of obedience. Washington: National Science Foundation, 25 January 1961. (Mimeo) MILGRAM, S. Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority. Hum. Relat., 1964, in press. ROKEACH, M. Authority, authoritarianism, and conformity. In I. A. Berg & B. M. Bass (Eds.), Conformity and deviation. New York: Harper, 1961. Pp. 230-257. SNOW, C. P. Either-or. Progressive, 1961 (Feb.), 24. WEBER, M. The theory of social and economic organization. Oxford: Oxford Univer. Press, 1947. (Received July 27, 1962)