Anguish

O presente estudo propõe uma reflexão sobre a compreensão da angústia na psicoterapia centrada na pessoa, tendo como ponto de partida básico algumas obras de Carl R. Rogers (1902-1987). A pesquisa desenvolveu-se a partir de inquietações oriundas desse tema e pelo interesse de conhecer como a psicoterapia centrada na pessoa compreende a angústia. Por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica, foi possível perceber uma concepção de angústia como um fenômeno inerente à realidade existencial, pertencendo, pois, ao campo fenomenal da pessoa. Com a produção de tal estudo, percebeu-se também que a angústia é invariavelmente associada a um estado de desadaptação, oriunda do desacordo vivido pela pessoa entre o " Eu " e sua experiência. Assim sendo, o processo terapêutico surge como um elemento que contribui para a diminuição da angústia, visto que a pessoa tende a atualizar-se ou, sob uma perspectiva organísmica, a funcionar plenamente.

Through the translation from Swedish to Italian of an excerpt of Ormen (“The Snake”) by Stig Dagerman, the paper aims at analysing the author’s point of view under two aspects: the existential one and the political one, which were two essential scopes in the life and the career of the Swedish writer, who in his debut novel managed to paint the anxiety and the concern of Sweden during the Second World War years, while maintaining a resolute opinion towards the period’s politics, society and art. After a brief overview of the entire novel, the Italian translation of the last chapter of the novel will scrutinize the style, the linguistic and stylistic distinctive traits and the results of social commentary which Dagerman expresses.

The purpose of this essay is to weave a conceptual reading of inhibition of action, which is based upon the formula that defines it as a restriction of an ego-function. This analysis is structured accordingly to the three axes that establish a metapsychological investigation: topological, dynamical and economical. The first chapter approaches the historical contextualization of the term ‘inhibition’ and its employment in Freud’s works. Further, a topological analysis of inhibition is deployed, focusing in the formulation that its agent and object coincide in the same psychic instance: the ego. The second chapter deals with the dynamic aspect of inhibition, of which fulfills the function of avoiding the actualization of a psychical conflict, the instauration of a new repression or the development of anxiety. The third chapter verses over the economical dimension; in this one, the inhibition is activated in situations of heightened reduction of the ego’s energy availability.

Heidegger’s theory of Being presents feelings as an important factor in what makes a human being. Many secondary scholars see Heidegger’s notion of the uncanny feeling as showing something fundamental about human essence. With references to French existentialism, this paper argues that as opposed to human life being fundamentally uncanny, the nature of material existence of human bodies and the external world feels strange to our conscious minds because our cultural history has constructed a narrative about human existence that does not fully appreciate the facticity of the external world and the inevitable implications of biological existence. People are not doomed to feel not at home in the world due to human essence, but due to historical construction of a certain cultural narrative, which present actions and existential choices can gradually change for future historicity.

This article aims to study and try to understand, from the vast work of the philosopher Franco-Algerian Albert Camus, the issue involving the study of absurdism in the history of philosophy and how this philosophy of the absurd is based in the eyes of the philosopher and it develops throughout history, not only of philosophy, but also, of literature. In addition, how the anguish reveals, through the Dasein, the possibility of be possible in the midst of his existential freedom as being in the world.
Keywords: Absurdism; Dasein; Literature; Anguish.

Este artigo pretende mostrar como a teologia da cultura de Paul Tillich,
em particular a sua teologia da arte, está intimamente relacionada com
a sua ontologia existencial e dinâmica. A experiência do absoluto ou
incondicionado que irrompe nas formas da cultura, afirmando e negando
ao mesmo tempo essas formas, é entendida por Tillich como experiência
ontológica fundamental, experiência do ser e do além-do-ser, que suscita
ao mesmo tempo angústia e coragem. Estes conceitos são conceitos
ontológicos, enraizados no poder do ser que resiste ao não ser. Podemos
dizer a mesma coisa dos principais conceitos que estruturam a teologia
da cultura, como forma, conteúdo substancial, demônico, teonomia,
alienação, estilo religioso. Ilustramos o nosso propósito com vários
exemplos tirados das artes existenciais, nos campos da literatura e das
artes plásticas.

This article intends to show how the theology of culture of Paul Tillich,
in particular its theology of art, is closely related to his existential and
dynamic ontology. The experience of absolute or unconditioned, that
breaks out in the forms of culture, affirming and denying at the same
time these forms, is understood by Tillich as fundamental ontological
experience, experience of being and beyond-of-being, which raises both anguish and courage. These concepts are ontological concepts, rooted
in the power of being that resists no-being. We can say the same thing
of the main concepts that structure the theology of culture, as form,
import, demonic, theonomy, alienation, religious style. We illustrate our
purpose with various examples taken from existential art, in the fields
of Literature and Visual Arts.

En esta tesis se mostrará el lugar de preeminencia que ocupan los estados de ánimo de angustia y aburrmiento para Martin Heidegger en el período que se recorreddesde 1927 a 1930 y tal como se aprecia desde "Ser y Tiempo", la conferencia  "Que es Metafisica" y "Conceptos Fudnamentales de la Metafísica".Teniendo en cuenta la caracterización heideggeriana de fundamentales se mostrará que dicha determinación obedece a diversos motivos. Los principales se reducen principalmente al lugar estratégico que ocupan metodológica y temáticamente,  pero también a quer ambos llevan al Dasein a su propiedad  y por lo tanto a atravesar el plano óntico para llegar al ontológico. Por último se argumentará que la nada desempeña un papel central y permite la vuelta al Dasein a si mismo

PREPRINT VERSION: This chapter offers a revision of the concept of ignorance discussed in recent models of abduction. Both ignorance preservation (GW-schema) and the tentative explanationism (AKM-schema) will be reanalyzed from an ecological and distributed perspective on cognition, instead coherent with the so-called EC-Model of abduction. We are convinced that a successful revision of the notion of ignorance in both AKM-schema and GW-schema of abduction can be exactly realized thanks to the EC-model. These theories present ignorance as an absence that occurs when the agents cannot reach useful explanations of a phenomenon in their epistemic environment. This absence surprises them, and this emotion triggers agents' abductive reasoning, which, in turn, mitigates their ignorance. Abduction offers the agents a guessed "provisional" hypothesis capable to solve the ignorance-problem. However, both the state of being ignorant of something and the mitigation of not-knowing are complex processes. If we describe the agents as parts of cognitive systems, we can see them as engaged with the so-called affordances, which always provide qualitative and procedural information capable to help and trigger abductive inferential processes. We will argue that when a possible relation with the fact which is investigated is unknown, and so affordances are absent-and consequently "unknown"-the lack of available knowledge is absolute. When this happens, the agent is compelled to abduce from an unknown affordance: in this case it is the agents' self-awareness of their ignorance that plays a role of a helpful tool. The reached full self-awareness of the complete ignorance at stake triggers unusual chances that favor exceptional abductive inferential processes capable to manage the cognitive situation. At the same time, the agent may experience these cases characterized by unknown affordances with a high degree of anguish. Indeed, the hypothesis will be

This essay is mainly made of excursions into Continental philosophy, art and literatures, with special reference to a relationship between philosophical imagery and philosophy moods. Reliably wonder, melancholy, boredom and other feelings, were by no means extraneous to rational reflection. Nay, it is a reasonable guess that European philosophy could not even be born and grow up without a contribution from an affective background like that.

This paper will use selected precepts from American Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and French Existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) to explore the dynamics of disintegration in Kerouac’s Big Sur. The demise of the narrator in the novel is articulated through a writing strategy that cripples the occurrence of ex-stasis, understood in the context of Kerouac’s work as the experience of visions of a transcendental nature that are fundamentally ontological. I will argue that it is this sudden inability to generate visions – and thereby realise a form of transcendental being from an Emersonian perspective – that greatly contributes to the narrator’s decay in the novel.
One of the reasons, I will show, lies in the inwardness of Duluoz’s look, which is maintained through the constant monitoring of his downfall and fostered through Kerouac’s writing technique. Duluoz, as he indulges in excessive drinking, scrutinises his own mortification: I will demonstrate that the narrator’s inward look produces a reflexive consciousness that engenders a type of anguish, which will be apprehended in Sartrean terms. This obsession with self-reflection is conveyed throughout Big Sur to the detriment of a more fluid expression of various spontaneous experiences; it dismantles the realisation of the intuitive and transcendental self. This barred access to intuition will be envisaged as hindering the continuum between Duluoz’s being and the self-creative principle of the universal mind ingrained in the individual (Emerson), which as an effect impedes the emergence of visionary states and precipitates his self-destruction.

The occurrence of poor patient care is emerging as one of the most significant, challenging, and critical issues confronting contemporary nursing and those responsible for the provision of health care more generally. Indeed, as a consequence of the increased recognition of the manner in which nurses can be implicated in the occurrence of poor patient care, there has been sustained critical debate that seeks to understand how such healthcare failings can occur and, in particular, why nurses seemingly fail to intervene, raise concerns, and effectively respond to prevent the occurrence and continuation of such poor patient care. In seeking to contribute to this critical discussion, and in contrast to those “situational explanations” that maintain that the failure to raise concerns is a consequence of the contextual factors and challenging conditions to which nurses can be subject in the clinical setting, this paper will provide a resolutely philosophical analysis of that failure. In particular, it will draw upon the work of Jean-Paul Sartre—the French philosopher generally regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century—in order to propose that his work can be productively recontextualized to provide a detailed, challenging, and provocative critical analysis of the occurrence and continuation of poor patient care and the role of individual nurse practitioners in such healthcare failings.