Being

Authors/Szerzők: Végh László, Varga Levente, Gál lászló, Berszán Lídia, Lovas Borbála, Bilibók Renáta, Fleisz Katalin, Serestély Zalán, Dimény Hajnalka, M. Bodrogi Enikő, Szabó-Reznek Eszter, Murádin János Kristóf, Petki Pál, Gorbai Gabriella Márta, Püsök Sarolta, Veress Károly
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Veress Károly (ed.): Uniqueness and Contingence. Interdisciplinary Dialogue 4 ‒ The volume contains the presentations held at the 4th international interdisciplinary conference organized by the Bolyai Society at the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, held on 6-7 November 2015.
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A kötet a Bolyai Társaság és a kolozsvári Babeș-Bolyai Tudományegyetem közös szervezésében tartott IV. nemzetközi interdiszciplináris konferencia (2015. november 6-7.) előadásait tartalmazza.

This paper seek to correlate the search for self and knowledge in Okpokam Ngun with Antonin Artaud's articulated idea of a philosophical theatre calibrating it with Martin Heidegger's critique of consciousness. Artaud's vision of the 'Theatre of Cruelty' provides an inquiry into consciousness in that he saw theatre as a way of uncovering Being. He stressed a radical return to experience in artistic practice. For him, this was also the overcoming of metaphysical thinking. While for Heidegger consciousness is not even the right word for human existence and experience of the world. He asserts that the task of philosophy is to investigate the meaning of Being. Thus suggesting an alternative methodology to the scientific model of understanding consciousness, a methodology founded in experience. Okpokam concedes to Artaud and Heidegger's notion by presenting in Ngun a comprehensive re-examination of the journey to self though played out in the confines of man's imitation of life. Ngun projects a theatre that creates a metaphysics of gesture, and expression, in order to rescue it from its servitude to psychology and human interest; all these done with some kind of real metaphysical inclination, an appeal to certain unhabitual ideas, which by their very nature cannot be limited or even formally depicted.

Ilya Dvorkin. In search of personality. Philosophical and mystical sources of the concept of a Person in the philosophy of dialogue (I, Thou, He, It, We) (in Russian)

The objective of this article is to study the origin of philosophical concepts expressed by personal pronouns in religious thinking and their transformation into rigorous concepts of rational philosophy. The central concepts of the philosophy of dialogue, denoted by personal pronouns (I, Thou, He, It, We) have come into philosophy relatively recently; they are absent in antiquity and in medieval philosophy. Back then the prevailing ontological tradition places at the basis of the world the notion of an impersonal universal being. In the 17th century, the concept of “I” (Ego) entered into philosophy, followed by other pronominal structures. Determination of the sources of pronominal concepts that have become fundamental in the philosophy of dialogue is important from the historical as well as philosophical point of view. Historically, the concepts expressed through personal pronouns were part of religious and mystical thought as early as antiquity. In Middle Ages personal pronouns became important mystical categories, at least in Sufism and Kabbalah. The real discovery of personality in philosophy begins with Cohen, Rosenzweig, Buber, Ebner and others. All of them draw their inspiration from religious and mystical thoughts.

La thèse paraît unanime et indiscutable au sein de la famille thomiste : « l’esse – le plus souvent traduit par "exister" – est l’acte dont l’essence est la puissance ». La paternité de cette thèse est attribuée à Thomas d’Aquin. C’est par là, dit‐on, qu’il dépasserait profondément Aristote et rejoindrait la Révélation faite à Moïse : « Je suis celui qui est ». C’est aussi avec elle que la philosophie thomiste se présenterait aujourd’hui comme un meilleur existentialisme et un meilleur heideggerianisme que l’existentialisme et Heidegger eux‐mêmes.

Platon ve Aristoteles’in felsefenin başlangıcına thouma (hayret/merak) kavramını yerleştirmiş olması bir tesadüf değildir. Uyuklamakta olan bir geleneğin dışarıda tutmaya çalıştığı hayret uyandıran bir unsuru içeriye çağıran ve böylece de düşünceyi yeniden uyandıran şey, daima felsefe olmuştur. Bu nedenle, “hayret edilecek bir Yeni”ye izin vermeyen her düşünce dizgesinin, felsefeyi daimi bir uyuklama içine hapsedeceğini, diğer bir deyişle onu kapatacağını söyleyebiliriz. Bu çalışmada ilkin, Hegel’in “geçmiş”, “Mutlak Tin” ve “geçmiş ile Mutlak Tin arasındaki ilişki”yi ele alışının, felsefeyi ne bakımdan kapatmakta olduğunu ortaya koyacağım. Ardından, Hegel’in bahsi geçen kapatma eğiliminin, onun “Varlık”, “gerçeklik” ve “olanak” kavramlarına çizdiği ontolojik sınırdan kaynaklandığını belirgin kılmayı deneyeceğim. Son olarak da, Aristotelesçi madde kavrayışına sırtını yaslamış olan iki isim Bruno ve Bloch’un geliştirdiği ontolojiler üzerinden, Hegel’in kapatan-Oluş’unun karşısında, nasıl bir açan-Oluş düşüncesinin geliştirilebileceğini göstereceğim.

If metaphysics is to have a future, then Haas argues, ontology--the traditional teaching and learning of the question of the meaning of being--must be suspended: being cannot simply mean essence or existence, presence or absence, or some combination thereof. Rather, being's way of being-neither present nor absent, but implied-shows what it always already was, an implication. But being, as we know, also implies unity and time and aspect. And this has implications for teaching and learning the history of philosophy as metaphysics (and all other areas of philosophy, as well as knowledge in the arts and sciences, and for any being whatsoever), if it is to have a future. And it also has implications for us-for the traditional names by which we know ourselves, from human being to Da-sein, must then also be suspended, at least if metaphysics is to have a future. Or, as the Spartans say: if.

En réactualisant la question de la présence du platonisme dans les écrits de jeunesse de Heidegger (1919-1929), cet ouvrage comble une lacune importante dans les recherches heideggériennes, qui, jusqu’à présent, ont surtout souligné son anti-platonisme. L’auteur défend au contraire la thèse selon laquelle le rôle de la critique heideggérienne du platonisme est de préparer une réappropriation originale de Platon.
Dans un premier temps, il se penche sur la déconstruction heideggé-rienne des formes modernes du platonisme, que Heidegger appelle «platonisme tout à fait banal» à cause de leur caractère ahistorial, théorique et formel. Il met ensuite en lumière l’influence structurelle de la République de Platon sur l’ontologie fondamentale de Etre et Temps. Mais au Bien que Platon introduit dans l’allégorie, Heidegger substitue la temporalité comme horizon ultime du sens de l’être. Finalement, l’étude met en relief une présupposition latente dans l’œuvre de Heidegger selon laquelle le Sophiste et le Théétète contiennent en germe les idées principales de l’analytique existentiale et de l’ontologie fondamentale.
La réappropriation heideggérienne de Platon consiste ainsi dans le passage d’un platonisme théorique à un platonisme pratico-existential.

Why does Heidegger reawaken the question of Being? It is for Heidegger the main question of philosophy, indeed science, and a pressing and destabilizing concern for a being that is confronted with its own mortal being. Dasein is thus fleeing a confrontation with its sheer temporality. It is this temporality of Dasein and Being that Heidegger wishes to bring back to the fore.

It is not easy to understand the nature of the guru and understanding the nature of the guru can be bewildering. There is often bewilderment about the guru. One source of the bewilderment is that people think that the guru is an individual person and for most people the understanding that the guru is not a person has been foreclosed. The guru is not a person. And when people see and believe the guru is a person, such a belief will create illusions about the person whom they think is the guru, and their own relationship with the person whom they see as the guru will fall into various forms of the psychology of transference. Moreover, the true and pervasive nature of the guru will be concealed and the power of the guru limited and anthropomorphized, and politicized. To use Heideggerian language the ontic dimension will become the focus and the ontological dimension becomes foreclosed. In fact, the guru is not an entity, the guru is not a thing, and the guru is not even a being. The guru is the field of Being. The guru is the field of Being's manifestation of understanding, manifestation of protection and manifestation of self-revelation. The guru is the radiance of primordial awareness. The contemporary master of Kashmir Shavism, Swami Muktananda would teach, using the language of theology, " the guru is the grace bestowing power of God. " He would also say " The guru is your own innermost awareness and you must get beyond your mind to experience the guru as your own awareness. " Vehicle-ness It is also equally true that a person can be vehicle of the guru. Even you and I can be a vehicle for the guru. The light of the guru can manifest and shine forth through you and me, and through everyone. The power of the guru does not manifest only through institutional religious teachers as some would like you to think, but most often this manifestation is through

Like Husserl, the young Heidegger was preoccupied with the a-priority of phenomenology. He also incorporates hermeneutics into phenomenology, though Husserl was convinced that the a-priority of phenomenology removed all interpretation from its analyses. This paper investigates how the early Heidegger is able to make hermeneutics a general condition of understanding while maintaining, in line with Husserl, that phenomenology is an a-priori science. In this way, the paper provides insight into key debates in the history of phenomenology. I examine two places in which Heidegger departs from Husserl’s phenomenology—the doctrine of categorial intuition and the “as-structure” of understanding—to show that a-priority and hermeneutic understanding come together, ontically, in facticity as the only possible starting point for phenomenology. Ontologically, however, a-priority and hermeneutics come together in the co-affection of Dasein as understanding and being as pre-given. This co-affection is itself dependent on Temporality as “the condition of any possible earlier.” In this way, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, characterized as rigorous science grounded in intentionality, becomes with Heidegger’s hands a hermeneutic, though no less rigorous, science, one grounded in the Temporality that brings together Dasein and Being.

Meditations like “The Hypostasis” in De l’existence à l’existent make possible the arguments about the adverbial “autre-ment,” which modalizes the unfolding of being as unnameable verb and dynamism. Like the hypostasis and its mobility, the “otherly” or “otherwise than” being depends on the possibility that sensation precede itself even if it comes to coincide with itself in consciousness. The time, supplemented by something “out of joint,” ties sensibility and affectivity to Being even as it suggests that they are prior to the intimacy of time-and-being. As preconscious and conscious, sensibility (and with it the embodied hypostasis) inflect and modalize intentionality without changing “ontology” as the verbality of Being. We see this clearly in his discussion of “la fonction du verbe” in “The Meaning of the Hypostasis,” p. 140 (Eng 82).
In this talk, I clarify clarify the complex origin of the hypostasis as one rooted in an emanationist logic that is not ecstatic; one that is formal but not precisely phenomenological, nor dialectical, because it is attempting to think life as coming out of itself. In the 1940s, Levinas was pondering, among other philosophers, Schelling and his own logic of self-generation in the Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom. On the basis of Existence and Existents, and notes from the Carnets de Captivité, I here show certain parallels between Levinas's observations on the hypostasis and Schelling's birth of the Absolute from itself.

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced.

Carl Jung describes how the human unconscious is the hidden cosmological archetypal dimension of our being in the world. There is the personal unconscious that reflects personal history and experience either forgotten or foreclosed. There is another unconscious that is more primary, pre-reflective and cosmological in origin. In the language of the ancient Phenomenological Dzogchen tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, this existential dimension of archetypal manifestation is called the Sambogakaya realm of experience. This is the subtle realm of lucid forms of light and energy and vortices. These forms of light and energy field configurations become everything and anything. The Sambogakaya dimension manifests the Nirmanakaya dimension. The Nirmanakaya dimension is the actual experience of our self in contextual situations, unfolding through time and space as well as our unfolding of our personal psychological experience. Nirmanakaya is the dimension of our ordinary life world. Nirmanakaya is our being in the world. There is one more dimension. This dimension is the primordial foundational ground of everything and anything. In the ancient tradition of Dzogchen this is named as the Dharmakaya. Dharmakaya is the existential dimension of pure potentiality, pure creativity from which everything and anything manifests. Dharmakaya manifests the Sambogakaya. Dharmakaya is ground awareness, the ground of being. Dharmakaya is Being. Being is not a being but Being manifesting being as infinite numbers of numerous beings. All beings are the manifestation of Being. Dharmakaya is not an entity but manifests infinite numbers of entities.

Introduction to Hermeneutics ‒ Monographic reference volume, which can also be used as a university textbook; an outline and exposition of the antecedents, formation process, and content of philosophical hermeneutics, based on the interpretive hermeneutic procedure.
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Egyetemi tankönyvként is használható, monografikus igénnyel megírt szakkönyv; a filozófiai hermeneutika előzményeinek, kialakulási folyamatának és tartalmának az értelmező hermeneutikai eljárás alkalmazásával történő felvázolása és kifejtése.

Nietzsche has a word to say in most of the areas of philosophy. In ontology, there is the idea of becoming, in epistemology he talks about perspectivism and truth, and his ethics has the morality of the Overman. However, although enough has been said about Nietzsche’s philosophy in general, not much emphasis has been given to how his views about perspectivism, morality, and truth relate to the ontology of becoming. The aim of this paper is to shed light on this important connection. Accordingly, first, the paper examines his ontology of becoming and contrasts it with the Parmenidean ontology of being. Later, the paper follows Nietzsche’s footsteps in deconstructing the commonsense understanding of Truth and shows how he reconfigures the truths with his perspectivism in connection with the ontology of becoming. Towards the end, it presents Nietzsche’s criticism of morality as being-in-itself that—the paper argues—follows the Parmenidean ontology of being. Finally, by emphasizing the order of value differences in some valuations, meanings, truths, and focusing on Nietzsche’s denial of nihilism, the paper argues against the claim of Nietzsche being a moral relativist.

This paper is informed by experiences and observations made while participating in the Open University Second Life Teen Grid education project (Schome), and reflections on
observations made on the various educational islands facilities on Second Life Main Grid. The paper explores the role of participant observation as a research tool within Second Life. It acknowledges that Second Life is a knowable social reality with customs and norms that should interest the ethnographer. However, the researcher is increasingly uncertain about the applicability of ethnographic concerns of ‘authentic experience’, ‘dwelling’, or ‘going native’ . One is always aware of a sense of ‘betweenness’, always drawn back to a body and a keyboard, in a room on your own. The physical and embodied experience of being in between worlds is considered as a challenge and an opportunity for ethnographers. The paper concludes by acknowledging that the authors sense of betweenness is a function of his personal attachment to the concept of embodied experience.

La cuestión de la distinción real entre el ‘ser’ y la ‘esencia’ en el seno del ‘ente’ constituye el corazón de la ontología tomista. Si bien hay una primacía del ser sobre la esencia, como la de lo fundante sobre lo fundado, no se deben descuidar en los análisis ambos aspectos y la relación trascendental actopotencial que los vincula. En el presente escrito pretendemos mostrar, a través de un escueto recorrido histórico, el modo en que la noción fundamental del ‘ser’ tomista ha sido paulatinamente distorsionada y oscurecida por la noción fundamental de ‘esencia’, hasta llegar a ser sustituida por la noción misma de ‘existencia’. Para ello, nos remontaremos a lo ocurrido en los años siguientes a la muerte del Aquinate, cuando esta cuestión pasó a ser discutida por sus discípulos, pasando luego revista por los autores más significativos que han tratado el tema en la modernidad y en la contemporaneidad filosófica.

The paper argues that Sergej Bulgakov’s sophiology was an attempt, via antinomism or the philosophy of antinomies, to overcome the rationalism, monism, and determinism (in a word, “pantheism”) of Vladimir Solov’ëv’s philosophy of the Absolute understood as an abstract Trinitarianism. After detailing Solov’ëv’s thought on the Trinity and Bulgakov’s criticisms of it, the study then describes Bulgakov’s antinomism and its application to the doctrine of God. However, it is contended that Bulgakov’s antinomism ultimately falls into the same problems with pantheism found in Solov’ëv and so the last part of the paper tentatively proposes resources in his work, stated in the form of a suggested “fourth (Bulgakovian) antinomy” between ousia (divine Being as such) and Sophia (the revelation in God and the world of the divine Being), that might help to avoid a collapse of God and the world by making the divine Being proper utterly transcendent and unknowable.

TO READ THE PREVIEW SCROLL DOWN TO READ THE PREVIEW SCROLL DOWN

The living symphony of life sounds from deep within the microphysical, representing the veritable completion of the fabled Great Chain of Being. This sketch from 2015 can be coordinated with a much more concrete, recent description of the fundamental physical system of living motion and psychical reality at issue (especially the chirality that deeply informs musical thematics) now to be found in the author's 'Carlyle and the Idea' (2018) at Academia.Edu, toward which interested readers of this rough sketch are directed as a kind of paved road ahead.

This article develops Leonardo Polo’s attempt to overcome objectivity as a way to attain being, an attempt which characterized many ambitious projects in the history of metaphysics. In Polo’s view, there cannot be a mental presentation or an intuition of being offered to the human mind. Metaphysics cannot start from the notion of entity or being. Many attempts to follow the direction of the universal and unlimited notion or pre-notion of being are deemed to failure. The notion of entity is only a rational compensation in the effort of approaching being through mental operations (concepts, judgment). Only the total abandonment of the mental limit is capable of noticing the act of being as persistent and extra-mental existence. Being as an act cannot be thought.

In this paper, we wish to delineate the indispensability of the principle of identity in evaluating the cultural content of what makes the African who he/she is and what are their expectations in the 21st Century. The principle of identity upholds non-duality, asserting that an object is one and significantly only that particular being. A " being " cannot be one thing and another at the same time. Thus formulating Naturalized Metaphysics offers the further opportunity for research. But for the African of the 21st Century, cultural is the most emphatic expression of who he/she is in reality. Thus it is our intention in this essay to expose how, why and what makes the African unique in his/her cultural outlook, expressions and convictions st

Te article discusses the role of metaphor in the new poetic response to reality which emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, specially in the work of some Anglo-American poets and critics, known as imagists. The new trends, which the poets were part of as well as helped define, drew on the philosophy of T. E. Hulme who claimed that the future poetry will consist of dry and sophisticated images, which is in striking contrast to rich romantic imagery. The interpretive part of the article draws attention to imagistic anthologies in which the poets expressed new sensibility through several visually striking poems, most of them forgotten by now, as well as to the handling of metaphor in some poems by Ezra Pound and Wallace Stevens.

By not giving a definition of being,  on his «new» ontology - which is a copy, in some sense, of the unknown being of dominican philosopher Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) - Heidegger allows thought of slipping on ice of inconsistency. Heidegger is not a dialectical thinker, he hasn´t enough precision: he does not distinguish being-essence from  being-existence and this capital error  allows him to produce an ambiguous discourse about being. Because of this ambiguity, he will get an immense prestige among readers of his work. On mystic, talking about being with indeterminacy is acceptable, not in philosophy.

Новое время отвергло представление о Боге как воплощении Света. Его носителем стал Разум, который, реализуясь как Просвещение и Прогресс, дал человечеству огромные блага. И принес угрозы. В критике разума непреходящее значение имеет работа М. Хоркхаймера и Т. Адорно «Диалектика Просвещения». За 70 лет их идеи не устарели, напротив, инструментальная рациональность переросла в технологизацию всех сфер жизни. Проанализированы попытки Ю. Хабермаса примирить рациональность модерна и коммуникативность постмодерна. Методом творческого мышления, включающего кроме логических абстракций интуицию и образные аналогии, критикуется отождествление коммуникации с общением, когда онтологизированная коммуникация поглощает даже рациональность. Став субстанцией, коммуникация превращается в коммутацию и ведет к подавлению вещного бытия как «темной формы» человеческой реальности. Победа коммуникационизма будет означать «конец света» (нашего), его замену информационно-виртуальными (транс=сверх=гипер=свет) формами инобытия. Вялотекущий Апокалипсис мира как процесс его технологической глобализации наиболее адекватно выражается по-русски – Светопреставление.

In this paper, I discuss Damascius’ theory of knowledge in his work Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles. According to my analysis, he does not accept the skeptical consequences that might result from his apparent rejection of the thesis that the knower (an intellect) and the object of
knowledge (an intelligible object) are identical in the act of knowing. I argue that Damascius’ account of causality, according to which causes not only produce their effects but also change themselves in order to establish a relationship with them, can explain how intellect can infallibly apprehend the
objects of thought.

What should we make of the passage in the Sophist at 247d-e, in which the Eleatic Stranger declares that being is whatever has the power (du-namis) to act or be affected, even if only once, in the smallest way? Does this proposal about being, the dunamis proposal, express the view of the Stranger's interlocutors, the giants, or is the Stranger speaking in his own voice and so representing Plato's view? If the latter, how could the proposal be seen to survive the encounter with the 'friends of the Forms', and be applicable to immutable Forms? Is the employment of 'horos' and 'horizein' at 247e3 meant to indicate that a mere mark of being is offered in the proposal, or the very definition of being? Contemporary readers of the dialogue have argued either that the Stranger is simply articulating the giants' ontology in the dunamis proposal, or that he is presenting his own (and so Plato's) view of a mark or criterion of being, though not one that is significant to the puzzles about being and not-being from 254c onwards. An alterative reading is that Plato endorsed the dunamis proposal and subsequently developed it and put it to work in the later sections of the dialogue. In this paper my aim is to show that the case for this alternative view is considerably stronger than has generally been supposed, and moreover, to suggest that the proposal expresses a definition of being. I shall argue that in the Sophist Plato has the Stranger forge the definition — that whatever has the power to act or be affected is a being — by distinguishing relations of causation (or poiesis) from relations of change.

Readers are advised that an up-to-date discussion of the author's fundamental thesis (’The Idea’), on the origin, operation, and destiny of the World, is now found at the top of the main page under the rubric, Thematic Evolution and Prospect of 'The Idea.'

A substantial part of our work attempts to construct an adequate Theory of the Face. See 'The Soul of Life' (below) and other studies on the page, some of which remain in draft and others merely projected. (Five papers on this difficult subject are planned.)

Progressive and substantial concretion of the thesis has been recently demonstrated through focused studies (2018-2020), whose URLs are conveniently grouped below:

'The Spirit of War'
https://www.academia.edu/36536128/The_Spirit_of_War

'Carlyle and the Idea'
(https://www.academia.edu/37362600/Carlyle_and_the_Idea)

'The Last Day (Illustrated Essay)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41144933/The_Last_Day_Illustrated_Essay_)

'How the German Spirit Died (A History)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41745763/How_the_German_Spirit_Died_A_History_)

'How the Human Spirit Died (Meta-Analysis)'
(https://www.academia.edu/41985864/How_the_Human_Spirit_Died_Meta-Analysis_)

'Three Malefactors of the Communist Idea (Meta-Analytical Note)'
(https://www.academia.edu/42052811/Three_Malefactors_of_the_Communist_Idea_Meta-Analytical_Note_)

Our gradual (and still incomplete) conceptualization of absolute cosmogony, cosmology, and eschatology in its modern (often microphysical) aspects, which has arisen quite organically over several years of detailed study, may be briefly encapsulated and characterized (A-T) for the reader as follows:

A. The Idea is the fundamental reality of the World, whose existence was clearly intuited (as “hypodoche”) by Plato, operationally defined by Boehme (first as “das Rad Gottes” and subsequently as “Eternal Nature”), organically articulated by Hegel (as “the Idea”), and finally discovered to be the locus of proto-being and foundation of living motion by means of 20th century microphysics (and accurately named by it “the color vacuum”). The electron is its projection into the finite. Field theory is its "physical" basis.

B. This definition of “substance” as a completely immaterial and literally infinite, self-related, hebdomadic-triadic system of actuality within the Idea at the fundament or basis of reality constitutes the greatest discovery of the human mind which, before the end of the 21st century, upon full comprehension, will completely revolutionize religion and therefore geopolitics, as well as pedagogy, paleontology, and biophysics.  The seat of the animating principle in organisms can now be described and explained.

C. Briefly, the research for this book involves the cosmology, cosmogony, and eschatology (destiny) of the world as the finite projection of the Eternal Idea. The Idea itself was created by the Triune Absolute Spirit as a finite-infinite field to manifest, reward, and punish moral, aesthetic, and intellectual performances in a Living Matrix.

D. Through the vast and distributed powers of its microphysical basis, the Idea as the created conduit of Absolute Power has autonomously generated a pseudo-history in geology and astronomy. The powers of Light and Darkness guided by Eternal Life deep within the fundament sustain the finite living motion of which we are aware through biology and empower conscious awareness in animals. Biopsychological functioning and all positive intellectual achievement in Mankind have their roots in the Idea.

E. Moreover, though unseen, the silent workings of a vast cosmological Absolute Hebdomad (deduced through study of the Idea in the 17th century) mercifully overarch and limit the Inchoate Life of the Sinister Itself--a Cosmic Disruptor also previously unsuspected that is responsible for the nocturnal Dream Life of animals. Is this a conceptual solution to the mysterious phenomena of telepathy and clairvoyance?

F. Biological and psychic life thus have always been suspended between two great cosmological powers representing a generalized War Between Infinite and Finite Life that began with King Lucifer, and which in its present form continually tests, through Contention, War, and Worldly Contrariety, the whole of Living Being as it follows a tortured and fateful course between Life and Death according to the much-lamented plan chosen by the Mind ("Gemüt") of Adam.

G. Finally, the hidden existence of the Idea necessarily implies a universal negative unity as the ideal origin of all gravitational and inertial phenomena, offering to science a solution at last to storied and continuing, completely beguiling conundrums (e.g., "Dark Matter" and "Dark Energy") involving the ultimate structure of the cosmos.

H. By tracing the Idea's manifold determinations of physical, biological, and psychic being, then, the present study seeks to explicate the final, and heretofore unsuspected, links in the fabled Great Chain of Being for the edification of Mankind. Inherently opposing it, pathetically and even insanely, is guileless materialism.

I. The war of materialism against idealism eventually culminated in the death of the German Spirit (1918). The main intellectual cause of German spiritual morbidity, however, is traceable to events within the Reformation (1517-1546). This did not prevent a period of optimism within Prussian education and science (1800-1840).

J. The theft of Silesia (1946) was an intentionally demoralizing spiritual crime against Germany with major consequences for the spiritual life of the world. The German Spirit's whole turbulent career constituted a vacillation on renunciation of self-will, and this latter always was the essential content of the Absolute Mind in Germany.

K. Germany's fatal spiritual debility can be considered to be a world "contagion" that spread centrifugally from the center of Europe to the whole Human Race which, therefore, is itself now in the throes of an analogous spiritual death, self-contemplation, and deliverance from the finite. The Zero-Hour is imminent.

L. Each of the Six Days (in Moses) is now fundamentally understood to mean a thousand-year period. Thus, Creation has all along been continuous and--after 6,000 years--will soon be completed (the argument proposes a means to confirm or deny the asserted beginning of 3,970 B.C.). Thus, the Day of Rest (for the Community of Heaven) will soon arrive for the self-elect of Mankind.

M. This tortured path was, of course, divinely foreseen but nevertheless represents an accommodative posture which was not at first understood. The Creator's response achieves a wise and just outcome despite the wreck and pain arising from myopic creatural assertion and pathetic gratification, as recounted in the mosaic story of old.

N. In fact, Talmudic commentators reached this conclusion in the 2nd or 3rd century A.D.--amending (in 'Sanhedrin 97a') the original mosaic interpretation of once-and-for-all Creation in favor of Continuous Creation with a clear Limit or End, specified as 6,000 years (each "day of creation," as mentioned above, being 1,000 years).

O. Thus, Moses (properly cogitated) was right but his dicta were for a long period taken wrongly--perforce leading the Christians astray through an accident of church history that remains a stumbling block up to the present day. See the author's 'The Last Day (Illustrated Essay).'

P. We know from modern physics that the "physical" world at the fundament is sustained by completely immaterial field relations that never cease, or else creation-in-process would not maintain itself. The creative motion is mathematically and physically infinite but disguises its own infinity--the chief insight, credited to Dirac, supporting Absolute Physics.

Q. Hence, it is now clear that the Creation--continuous since the beginning--is approaching its End and Goal. The Last Day is thus imminent and will arrive within the present decade, according to the wisest Christian view, this actually having been announced four centuries ago in German idealism.

R. The Eternal Word's role has always been to Shine Divinely (inwardly) in the gloom and darkness of the outward finite (the "Field of the Reprehensible") for salvation's sake (see 'Carlyle and the Idea'). It is this that Jesus of Nazareth spoke of, and it is this his followers embody, when they speak of the "true bread from heaven," etc..

S. This is why Christians can claim that the finalized ("Third") Temple of God is already in existence and is composed of living stones (minus the winnowed Condemned and Damned) whose essence will endure forever in God.

T. Our thesis is only now emerging in its final form. This is because the horizon of knowledge keeps receding as the true depth is revealed--the world is a set of nested dolls and the innermost doll is God, who is unknowably deep (but friendly, since we are Him in disguise when we abandon our finite wills).

Slightly longer draft (though not as long as the full version) of a text published in The Philosopher, Spring 2018.
It concerns the relation between breath and being, an etymology traced by Nietzsche and Renan, among others.
It thus opens up an exposition of the two main senses of being in Aristotle, the proposition, the mediaeval debate regarding universals, and Heidegger's rethinking of being beyond the Aristotelian delimitation.

I will critique Roy Bhaskar’s concept of the “epistemic fallacy” from the standpoint of Bernard Lonergan’s critical realism. In the first part I will walk through the first chapter of the first stage of Bhaskar’s philosophical project looking at how, by reflecting on the efficient causality of scientists, we are led to realism. Along the way I will tease out the inchoate presence of something akin to final causality in this account. In the second part I will indicate three reasons why Bhaskar’s focus tends to lack generality: knowing specifically regards the other; the causality specified is efficient; the epistemology critiqued is truncated. This will provide a springboard for a glance at Lonergan’s epistemology which, it is suggested, is free from Humean truncation. I will present what we might call the “epistemological theorem” in which being is presented in terms of knowing, a thesis that might be somewhat shocking to Bhaskarian ears. In view of the summary treatment in this note I will end by offering to locate further elaboration and support of these ideas in papers that may be easily accessed.

Russell clearly adopts the position of Plato: the universals are placed as essences in a supersensible world, out of the time. The position of Russell is contrary to dialectical thinking whereby one divides into two, ie, in this case, the universal exists simultaneously in the world of static being  and in the world of mental and material becoming. Russell argues that the universal property exists only in the world of static being. It is a misconception.

In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute.
The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer look at Heidegger’s alternative, true finitude, leads finally to a reflection on some difficulties in Heidegger’s critique of Hegel.

I examine here Theory and Scholarship (taken to be formalized social scientific frameworks that seek to map out the real world and social actions in an objective fashion) via an autoethnographic lens. Chiefly, I ask how autoethnography as a research method reconfigures them: how may we extend knowledge using autoethnography? While much critique has centered on the “doing ” (dispassionately?) versus “being ” (going native?) of autoethnography, I argue that such a dichotomy is inherently false. Instead, doing is located within the ethnographer’s very being, so that a closer look at the autoethnographic research process is required, from conception to implementation to introspection. I attempt such a processual analysis here: drawing on an earlier social scientific project, I relate the intellectual and social process whereby it was translated into an autoethnography. Using a performative lens to illustrate the dialectical mode of doing and being in the research process, I intersperse ...

In this article I attempt to present Heidegger's conception of the ontotheology in his late thought. I based mainly on his famous book "Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)." In ontotheology Heidegger needs the figure of "the last god" to show the very path to being itself. It is not the God of religion, but the proper god of metaphysics, the god of other beginning, which using a sign (Wink) points Dasein the right direction. It seems to be a key to the meaning of ontotheology itself. The problem of ontotheology is presented against the backdrop of several of the most important contexts of Heidegger's thought manifested in "Contributions...": the problem of being itself and the path to it or the problem of the last god and his sign.

In dialogue and confrontation with Kant, Heidegger discovers elements which allow him to deepen in his understanding of the co-pertinence of Dasein and being. This is a non-transcendental understanding, which arises in the midst of the unending debate with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Heidegger considered that a transformation had come about in metaphysics of the ὑποκείμενον-οὐσία into the «apophantic subject». This should have reached its culmination with Kant, but in discussion with Kant, Heidegger changed the course, allowing a redefinition of the relationship between subject
and object, identifying thinking with being, thus definitively reaffirming his thesis by which being and Dasein are co-pertinent.

This paper defends Schelling's position against Hegel's argument for the immanence of reason.

Hegel never felt the need to go beyond the concept of being; on his view, the concept of being was adequate to its object (being itself). Schelling argues, to the contrary, that reason inadvertently presupposes transcendence. Although it is always already in operation, reason posits an "unpreconceivable being" [unvordenkliches Sein] prior to itself.

This essay attempts to express the point that in Martin Heidegger’s thought, the primordial relationship between man and the world is constituted through action. In the field of action, man, because of his being situated inside the tool-structure of the world, is provided with meaning, but is not too absorbed in theoretical contemplation. As soon as some kind of interruption is introduced in this structure and relationship, when things are detached from their underlying nexus of relations, an opportunity is opened for theoretical thinking. This theoretical tendency results in the mediation on tools, regardless of their relationships, which bestows meaning.
Ethics, as Heidegger understands, is based on care. It is dependent on the existential understandings of the thinkers in different historical eras, which is then systematized. Ethical systems in the time of crisis, i.e. in a time of the lack of existential meanings, are severed from their tenets, and thus lose any kind of obligatory quality. Accordingly, establishing new ethical imperatives depends on a being liberated from the crisis and renewing the bind with being.
Intercultural philosophy, through its rejection of absolutism and egoism, can have a close intimacy with Heidegger’s ideas on the relationship between theory and praxis.

In 2014 was published the 2004 dialogue between Raimon Panikkar and Emanuele Severino, which took place in Venice. In this dialogue, the two philosophers talks about their philosophical systems, thanks to Luigi Vero Tarca, but there is a statue in their feast: Parmenides, whose presence in Severino’s thought is well known – but equally strong in Panikkar’s, even if not equally investigated. In order to study properly how fundamental the reference to Parmenides is for Panikkar, this paper will try to show the most important parmenidean loci in Raimon Panikkar’s Opera Omnia. Will result immediately evident how Panikkar’s critique to Western contemporary civilization starts from the rejection of what he refers to as «parmenidean dogma», which is the identity between Being and Thought. This acknowledgement can offer new challenging research prospects on Raimon Panikkar’s philosophy and theology.