Chantal Mouffe

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

In this paper I compare political theories of Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe in three important aspects - the conceptualization of the political, their attitude towards liberal democracy and the conception of political process - and point to significant discrepancies. Schmitt's concept of the political is deeply existential and essentially involves real possibility of death, whereas Mouffe's is more domesticated, centered around the struggle, not physical elimination. Schmitt sees liberal democracy as inherently contradictory, because it is grounded on contradictory principles: democratic equality and particularism, and liberal freedom and universalism. Mouffe perceives this contradiction as a locus of tension with emancipatory potential. I trace these differences to their different perception of history. Schmitt's vision of history is marked with ruptures created by the political emergencies, which correlates with his eventual, decisionistic conception of politics. Mouffe's processual conception of politics corresponds rather with the conception of the end of history.

What is the relationship between metaphysics and political revolution? Despite being two of the most widely discredited concepts in contemporary European philosophy, this chapter argues that we are witnessing the return of both in the work of French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. Their return, however, is no mere repetition of the previous forms of classical metaphysics and modern revolution- defined by totality and the state. Rather, it is a differen- tial return: a return that changes something fundamental about these concepts and breathes into them a desperately needed new life. Many contemporary Eu- ropean philosophers have announced the "end of metaphysics" and the "death of philosophy." They have buried the ideas of metaphysics and revolution many years ago, but continue to pursue the endless task of vilifYing them- Jest their specters return from the grave.

Inhalt:
     
1. Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen
1.1 Recht und Macht
1.2 Der Staat
1.3 Der Einzelne oder „‘stirb und werde‘“

2. Der Begriff des Politischen
2.1 Bonapartistische Politik
2.2 Aporien des Feindbegriffs
2.3 Die Bejahung des Naturzustandes
2.4 Der Ernst des Lebens
2.5 Die Ewigkeit personaler Herrschaft

3. Substanzieller Dezisionismus – Verfassung, Verfassungssubstanz und Volkssouveränität
3.1 Existentieller Verfassungsbegriff
3.2 Faschistische ‚Demokratie‘
3.3 Kommissarische als souveräne Diktatur
3.4 Repräsentation und Identität
3.5 Naturrecht des Stärkeren

4. Resümee

The way in which societies institutionalize “collective memory” is one of the most important aspects of contemporary politics, feeding directly into the constitution of individual and communal identities, and creating sources of discord and dialogue. This essay explores some of the most significant issues at stake in debates over the political uses of the past. I suggest that it is important to distinguish between three modes of historical consciousness, memory, mythology, and critical history. I then offer a critique of Avishai Margalit’s "The Ethics of Memory" (2002), arguing that in failing to allow space for “acknowledging” the plurality of communal myths his strong communitarian conception of mnemonic ethics leaves room for the perpetuation of asymmetric power relations and the imposition of hegemonic identities. Developing this line of thought, the essay then explores some of the ways in which agonistic democratic theorists might think through the relationship between past and present, myth and history. I argue that it is necessary to avoid procedures and institutions that entrench diverse identities while simultaneously establishing conditions in which different communities can freely propound their historical identity-constitutive claims.

In this chapter I give an overview of “Post-Marxism.” Primary attention is paid to what should be considered the core of Post-Marxism in relation to Marxist and Non- Marxist critical theory, namely, its conception of the social. This shift is of importance for the overall post-Marxist philosophical vision of society, theory, and politics. Theorists discussed include Badiou, Honneth, Ranciere, Laclau/Mouffe, Foucault, Gorz, and Hardt/Negri.

Since 2012, several European countries have seen the rise of conservative and, in part, fundamentalist social movements against the perceived threat of what they call (depending on the context) 'gender ideology', 'gender theory', or 'genderism'. The movements mobilizing against 'gender ideology' are frequently understood as a conservative backlash against achieved levels of equality between women and men and/or LGBTQ rights. This perspective of 'the patriarchy/heteronormativity fighting back' seems as tempting as it is simplifying. I discuss the transnational movements against 'gender ideology' in the context of the rise of right-wing populism and on the basis of considerations seeking to explain their demand side. On one hand, I argue that the study of this phenomenon provides important clues for understanding the reasons behind the rise of populist forces in Europe and beyond. On the other hand, I propose that 'gender' is not the final target for these movements and that they should not be understood primarily as mobilizations against equality. Rather, I see the emergence of these movements as a symptom of a larger systemic crisis. 'Gender ideology' in this sense embodies numerous deficits of the so-called progressive actors, and the movements or parties that mobilize against the perceived threat of 'gender ideology' react to these deficits by re-politicizing certain issues in a polarized language. Based on Chantal Mouffe's critique of the established hegemonic idea of consensus in liberal democracy, I discuss two consensuses that are characteristic of the so-called progressive actors (including the feminist and LGBTQ actors), namely, the neoliberal consensus and the human rights consensus, and their contribution to the rise of the movements against 'gender ideology'.

Chantal Mouffes gemeinsam mit Ernesto Laclau erarbeitete ‚postmarxistische‘ Theorie des Politischen ist derzeit der wohl meistdiskutierte Beitrag zum Thema Populismus. Mouffes und Laclaus Theorie stellt ein sowohl für den akademischen als auch den politischen und feuilletonistischen Diskurs attraktives Angebot dar: Sie gibt dem stets nach ‚Paradigmenwechseln‘ und Neologismen hungernden akademischen Betrieb eine neue ‚Beschreibung‘ der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit; sie gibt der politischen Verunsicherung angesichts des vermeintlichen Scheiterns bürgerlicher wie kommunistischer Emanzipations- und Fortschrittsideen sowie des Untergangs ihrer Träger (des rationalen Individuums bzw. der proletarischen ‚Klasse für sich‘) einen ‚kontingenztheoretischen‘ Ausdruck; sie bietet aber zugleich das Versprechen neuer politischer Handlungsfähigkeit, indem sie die mit Ohnmacht assoziierbare Kontingenz und ‚Intransparenz des Sozialen‘ sowie das Fehlen des einen adressierbaren, politisch gestaltenden Subjekts als Möglichkeit neuer ‚hegemonialer Projekte‘ und sozialer Bündnisse begreift. Dieses Versprechen politischer Handlungsfähigkeit ist besonders für eine Linke attraktiv, die sich von der pluralen Version einer neoliberalen Einheitspartei in den Metropolen abwenden und sich zugleich das Erstarken nationalistischer, autoritärer und faschistischer Kräfte erklären will, das unter dem Label des ‚Aufstiegs des Rechtspopulismus‘ gerade in aller Munde ist. Beide Tendenzen – die ‚There is no Alternative-Politik‘ von Sozialdemokratie und klassischen Neokonservativen und das Erstarken der populistischen Rechten – werden insbesondere von Mouffe in einen ursächlichen Zusammenhang gebracht. Als Heilmittel empfiehlt sie eine ‚antiessentialistische‘ linkspopulistische Strategie, die gegen ‚die neoliberalen Eliten‘ und die völkische Rechte zugleich gerichtet sein soll.
Im Folgenden werde ich diesen postmarxistischen Zugang zum Phänomen des Populismus darstellen und einige seiner Grundannahmen einer Kritik unterziehen. Die Grundthese lautet, dass der postmarxistische Ansatz eine irrationalistische Sozialontologie und ‚essentialistische‘ Massenpsychologie impliziert, die es nicht gestatten, den gegenwärtigen Populismus zu begreifen. Stattdessen bewegt sich Mouffe reflexionslos in populistischen Denkformen und Carl-Schmitt’schen Ideologemen, deren rationale Erklärung einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie in der Tradition der Kritischen Theorie obliegt. Es handelt sich dabei um eine Querfront von linken Theoretikern und Rechtsradikalen auf der Ebene der grundlegenden Beschreibung gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse, die mit einer Ablehnung von Vernunft und moralischem Universalismus einhergeht und auf der politischen Ebene im Ressentiment gegen den Westen im allgemeinen, gegen die USA im Besonderen, besteht.

This review article takes the publication of four new volumes by, and on, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as an opportunity to revisit their work and consider its contemporary relevance. After introducing the four volumes, I explain how Laclau and Mouffe's work has developed since Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, highlighting three key developments: the incorporation of psychoanalysis, rhetoric and passions. Having done so, I turn to consider Laclau's and Mouffe's respective works on populism, connecting these to the emergence of left-wing populism in Europe today, with particular attention to the case of Podemos. Given the relevance of Laclau's and Mouffe's works for contemporary left populism, I show how the key elements from their theory on hegemony inform their argument that populist discourse is a fruitful strategy for the left today. It is because identities are contingent that a progressive collective will does not need to be articulated around class, but can be articulated around the figure of " the people ". Moreover, since rhetoric, antagonism and passions are inherent to politics, populism is not necessarily opposed to democracy, but can be articulated in a way so as to reinvigorate democratic politics.

Texto de la presentación realizada en el SEMINARIO CRISIS DE REPRESENTACIÓN Y POPULISMO (UNED, 14 de diciembre de 2017). Se trata de la versión en castellano del artículo “The outraged people. Laclau, Mouffe and the Podemos hypothesis”, Constellations. An International Journal of Democratic and Critical Theory, vol 24, issue 3, 2017, pp. 296–309.

Este trabajo se centra en el intercambio intelectual entre el grupo impulsor del partido político Podemos y la teoría democrática radical de la hegemonía desarrollada por Ernesto Laclau y Chantal Mouffe. Entre el enfoque de Mouffe y Laclau sobre la democracia radical y su uso por parte de Podemos existe un movimiento bidireccional. Por un lado, la teoría se utiliza para explicar e influir en el proceso de cambio político en España; por otro lado, la teoría choca con este uso particular y sus intérpretes políticos discrepan sobre la cuestión de cómo construir un pueblo democrático. Para examinar este concurso entre teoría y práctica, primero, se considera brevemente el contexto en el que Podemos surgió. A partir de ahí, se explica el proyecto de Podemos de acuerdo con la teoría del populismo de Laclau y la llamada “hipótesis Podemos”. Luego, abordamos una serie de desafíos que surgen del caso de Podemos con respecto al proyecto democrático radical de Laclau y Mouffe, dado su fundamento en el enfoque populista.

Resumen Este artículo se pregunta por la identidad política de Podemos, formación que junto a otras ha transformado el sistema de partidos en España. Podemos surgió como partido que rechazaba el eje izquierda-derecha y se definía según la contraposición abajo-arriba. A diferencia de otros análisis, aquí consideramos que esa dicotomía es insuficiente para definir una identidad política, y que hay dos formas de plantearla: la antagonista, de Laclau, y la agonista, de Mouffe. El antagonismo implica una relación de enemistad con el orden político y así su impugnación, mientras el ago-nismo representa una relación adversarial y, por tanto, de regeneración del orden. Considerando esta distinción clave para comprender la identidad política de Podemos, este artículo ofrece un análisis discursivo de la formación morada desde sus inicios hasta octubre de 2016. El objetivo es examinar, con un criterio formal más que de contenido, si para Podemos el orden existente cons-tituye un obstáculo insalvable para realizar sus demandas o, al contrario, representa un terreno fértil para conseguir esos fines. En las conclusiones se argumentará que hacia enero de 2015 la relación antagonista inicial se transformó en otra agonista. La creciente adaptación del discurso de Podemos al orden no debe entenderse como una moderación, sino como una negociación con el sentido sedimentado, la cual no es incompatible con la búsqueda de una nueva hegemonía. Abstract This article explores the political identity of Podemos which, along with other political forces, has transformed the party system in Spain. Podemos emerged as a party that rejected the 1. Agradezco los comentarios de los evaluadores anónimos. He tratado este tema en otros trabajos que abarcan un período menor e incluían otros problemas: Franzé (2015, 2016).

"In Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical theory, there is a precise place for Marx in relation to psychology. It is the place of truth in opposition to capitalism. It is also the place of subversion against adaptation. According to Lacan, psychology adapts people to the capitalist system, while Marx reveals the subversive truth that underlies the system. This truth emerges as the real symptom of a purely symbolic system. It is the symptom of a proletarianized subject reduced to the workforce that makes the work of the system. If this work can be psychoanalytically conceived as the work of the unconscious, its force can be Lacanianly conceived as the enunciating workforce that expresses the discourse articulated by the Other. This suffering workforce is a symptom that implies frustration and reasonably motivates workers’ struggle against
liberal capitalism."

This theoretical study aims to contribute to the literature dealing with populism from a transnational perspective. I will apply the post-structuralist concept of Empire and Multitude developed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to theorize transnational populism. This is not the usual way of thinking about populism, because there are several internal debates and tensions between Hardt/Negri and Laclau/Mouffe (Hardt, Negri: 2017). Although there are very important trends (Kioupkiolis, Katsambekis: 2014; Kioupkiolis: 2014) in the critical literature to reconcile the populist and post-hegemonic tendencies as the hegemony of the multitude. This study relies on these tendencies. In the first part I am investigating the nature of the neoliberal world order as the Empire in the context of hegemony and populism. As it has been analysed in the first part of this paper, with the crisis of liberal democracy we have entered the era of populist democracy and there is a fierce struggle between the left and the right to define and maintain the core nature of democracy. It will be argued in the third part that right-wing nationalist populism can be seen as a manifestation of populism in the context of the Empire. I will emphasize the multitude as a counter-populist concept compared to the Empire. In the fourth part I put forward that the multitude as an empty signifier can achieve some reconciliation between Laclau/Mouffe and Hard/Negri. I will also argue that transnational populism needs to have its transnational political subject which should be based on the multitude reinterpreted in populist context.

A problem for political realists is to show how political norms can be generated without recourse to pre-political moral values.  Call this the Political Normativity Problem (PNP).  In this article, I assess the capacity of Chantal Mouffe's theory of radical democracy to respond to PNP.  This response, I argue, consists of two key aspects: first, a series of descriptive claims about the nature of conflict between human beings; and second, a series of normative claims that follow from these descriptive claims.  After outlining each of these stages in detail, I suggest that there are two serious problems with this response to PNP.  First, it is unlikely that these descriptive claims are entirely free of moral claims.  Second, it is also unlikely that the normative claims actually follow from the descriptive claims at all.

In this paper, we offer a contribution to the ideational approach to populism. Considering populism as a ‘thin’ ideology in whose conceptual core lie the notions of the good ‘people’, the evil ‘elite’ and popular sovereignty, we propose a theoretical articulation of populism that, in our view, encompasses two hitherto inadequately articulated dimensions of the populist phenomenon – reactivity and elitism. To this end, we draw from Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical account of Slave morality, Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of elite cycles, as well as from John Higley and Michael Burton’s notion of ‘elite configuration’ to construct a descriptive elite- theoretical model which we then apply in our interpretation of the populist phenomenon. According to our proposed model, populism can be understood as the ideological expression of an ‘outsider-elite’ whose aim is to renegotiate the ‘thickened’ ideological consensus of a consensually united political elite.

Not published yet.
It is argued that agonistic democracy fails to fully distinguish itself from delibertive democracy and so it shares similar shortcomings. basically, agonistic democracy is unable to think about conflict as radical contestation of power.

"It is Chantal Mouffe’s contention that the central weakness of consensus-driven forms of liberalism, such as John Rawls’ political liberalism and Jurgen Habermas’ deliberative democracy, is that they refuse to acknowledge conflict and pluralism, especially at the level of the ontological. Their defence for doing so is that conflict and pluralism are the result of attempts to incorporate unreasonable and irrational claims into the public political sphere. In this context, unreasonable and irrational claims are those that cannot be translated into universalizable terms. However, for Mouffe, it is this intentional exclusionary act itself that is detrimental to a well- functioning democratic polity. It is only through the inclusion of a diverse body of subject positions that a democratic polity can be said to be truly representative of the polity, and therefore constitute a functioning and inclusive democracy.

This paper will examine Mouffe’s account of agonistic pluralism. In doing so, it will demonstrate that instead of being a source of instability within the democratic discourse and therefore relegated into the private non-political sphere, passions and values that are constitutive of these subject positions ought to be incorporated into the public political sphere. Mouffe’s rationale for doing so is that it is precisely through their incorporation that citizens will retain their allegiance to the democratic polity. However, as part of this examination, this paper will also draw attention to an under-developed aspect of Mouffe’s account of agonistic democracy, specifically problems regarding both participation and exclusion. Whilst Mouffe does provide a robust counterpoint to both Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative democracy, it is my contention that she fails to explain adequately what it is that persuades participants to act democratically and adhere to the requirements of agonal respect, nor what should happen when the ethico- political principles of liberty and equality are not accepted."

Una de las cuestiones más debatidas en el pensamiento político contemporáneo es la de cómo articular una noción de comunidad democrática capaz de integrar inclusivamente a la diversidad de realidades identitarias coexistentes en las actuales sociedades democráticas y pluralistas. La moderna concepción del Estado democrático-liberal, vinculada prioritariamente a la garantía de derechos individuales y a una anémica ingeniería institucional de elección de gobernantes, es cuestionada desde distintos frentes teóricos y políticos que pujan por una profundización del aspecto democrático de aquella dupla conceptual. En este contexto, buena parte de los estudios sobre la democracia parecen encaminarse hacia la búsqueda de alternativas a los enfoques minimalistas, agregativos o economicistas, hegemónicos durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX. El presente trabajo focaliza en dos de estas teorías que, aceptando los pilares fundamentales del liberalismo político, procuran radicalizar el carácter democrático del Estado moderno, a saber: la democracia deliberativa, promovida por Jürgen Habermas, y el pluralismo agonístico, que defiende Chantal Mouffe.

Infinidad de autores han tratado de definir la hegemonía desde una perspectiva que va más allá del concepto y  se traslada a un plano real de efectivo uso y comprensión. Dependiendo de la situación en la que se ubique cada autor con respecto al tiempo y espacio, es que esta palabra se trata de concretizar con el objetivo de formular una valoración acertada.  En el presente trabajo se enfatiza el término de hegemonía basándonos en tres autores principales: Ernesto Laclau y Chantal Mouffe por un lado; y Antonio Gramsci por el otro.

This article develops a comparative and recursive approach to political ontology by drawing on the ontological turn in anthropology. It claims that if ontological commitments define reality, then the use of ontology by recent pluralist political theorists must undercut pluralism. By charting contemporary anthropology's rereading of structuralism as part of a plural understanding of ontology, it will be shown that any political ontology places limits on the political, and thus cannot exhaust political experience. This position will be established through an analysis of the role of Claude Lévi-Strauss in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and a comparison with the political ontology represented by perspectivism and potential affinity. Anthropology's lesson for political theory is that ontology cannot simply be revised and treated in the singular, but that political ontologies must be analysed comparatively to reveal the shortcomings of, and recursively alter, one's own political frame of reference.

Over the last 20 years, cosmopolitan theories have been benefiting greatly from the dialogue between defenders and critics of world citizenship. Yet, the decidedly polemic aspect of this debate, while allowing for intellectual progress, is also responsible for overdrawn generalizations. Instead of entering into the debate directly, this article attempts to refute a specific anti-cosmopolitan claim raised by Chantal Mouffe. Her realist objection to cosmopolitanism, derived from the conceptual framework of agonistic pluralism, is mistaken at a crucial point: a firm dichotomy between politics and morality cannot provide an alternative to theories of world citizenship, because Mouffe’s embrace of multipolarity as a principle of global politics must equally appeal to a set of universal norms governing international relations. This article argues that even the realist model of multipolarity needs to conceive of a minimal morality to create the symbolic ground on which various power centres can be held accountable.

The aim of this article is to investigate “antipopulism” as a distinct discursive repertoire that marginalizes “the people” as the legitimizing cornerstone of democracy. After providing an account of the Greek post-democratic transition from the mid-nineties onwards, I will then delve into what could be described as the “populism/anti-populism” ideologicopolitical divide, as it manifests in the Greek political system and also on the European level during the past few years, and especially withinthe ongoing crisis. The main hypothesis is that “anti-populism” can be seen as a crucial aspect of post-democracy, introducing what could be described as a peculiar Ideological State Apparatus in the Althusserian sense; a way to marginalize disagreement and democratic dissensus and discipline a public sphere in an age dominated by technocratic virtue, expert knowledge and ‘consensus politics’.

Key words: the people – populism – anti-populism – post-democracy – Greece

Resumen

El propósito del artículo es investigar el “antipopulismo” como un repertorio discursivo diferenciado que marginaliza a “el pueblo” como la piedra angular legitimadora de la democracia. Luego de dar cuenta de la transición postdemocrática en curso en Grecia desde la mitad de los 90, ahondo en lo que puede describirse como la división ideológica-política “populismo/antipopulismo” tal como se ha manifestado en el sistema político griego, y también a nivel europeo, en los últimos años y especialmente en la crisis en curso. La principal hipótesis es que el “anti-populismo” puede ser visto como un aspecto crucial de la postdemocracia, introduciendo lo que puede ser descripto como un peculiar Aparato Ideológico del Estado en el sentido althusseriano; una manera de marginalizar el desacuerdo y los disensos democráticos y de disciplinar la esfera pública en una época dominada por la virtud tecnocrática, el conocimiento experto y los “consensos políticos”.

Palabras clave: pueblo – populismo – antipopulismo – postdemocracia – Grecia

Çağdaş Felsefe ve Kültür Bilimleri Atölyesi 2
ÇAĞDAŞ POLİTİK FELSEFE FELSEFE OKUMALARI KİTAPÇIĞI
Doç. Dr. M. Ertan KARDEŞ
Künye
Çağdaş Politik Felsefe Atölyesi Kitapçığı
Yayına Hazırlayan: M. Ertan Kardeş
Yazarlar: M. Ertan Kardeş
Ateş Uslu
Mustafa Poyraz
Gökhan Orhan
Yavuz Odabaşı


1. Baskı: Temmuz 2017
ISBN 978-605-67608-1-5

As both academic literatures and political demands, global justice and populism look at first like competing ways of diagnosing and addressing neoliberal inequality. Populism seeks to mobilize national popular sovereignty while global justice calls the boundaries of the nation into question. Global justice judges from the perspective of the world’s poorest while populists give voice to the Global North’s precarious middle and working classes. However, both suffer from the same flaw: neither has an adequate understanding of neoliberalism. To the extent populists want to resist neoliberalism, they need to reckon with the ways that neoliberalism does not just break down political and social hierarchies, but also relies on and sustains them. Otherwise, they will find that assertions of sovereignty do more to reinforce neoliberalism and reproduce its hierarchies than to resist them. And while global justice advocates provide incisive critiques of the economy’s injustice, they lack an account of people’s emotional investment in its institutions. Recognizing neoliberalism as not simply corrosive of solidarity but also producing its own affective ties suggests that global justice advocates need to develop a critique of individual attitudes that egalitarian liberals have often seen as private and been hesitant to judge. In short, if either populism or global justice hope to take advantage of neoliberal’s failures to advance an egalitarian politics, they need to reckon more carefully with the way they are themselves entangled with neoliberalism’s hopes and hierarchies.

Das, was Carl Schmitt für eine Theorie des Pluralismus zu bieten hat, ist überschaubar. Hingegen hätte Mouffe alles, was sie meint, aus Schmitt herausdestillieren zu müssen, einsatzbereit bei Fraenkel finden können.
Mouffes souveräne Schmitt-Rezeption führt zu einer Reihe von Inkonsis­tenzen, die Zweifel daran aufkommen lassen, wie pluralistisch der agonistische Pluralismus tatsächlich (gemeint) ist.
Der Mehrwert von Schmitt für Mouffes politisches Denken liegt weniger daran, dass er eine scharfsinnige Kritik der liberalen Demokratie vorgelegt hat, als vielmehr darin, dass sein Begriff des Politischen und dessen Semantik des Ernstfalls attraktiv ist für eine postmarxistische Linke, die sich von der Revolution verabschiedet hat. Der emphatische Begriff des Politischen wirkt in diesem Kontext auch als ein Mythos.

Chantal Mouffe’s conceptualization of a deliberatively forged consensus as a hegemony and her assertion that adversarial politics best nurtures the conditions of freedom have had a profound influence on contemporary democratic thought. This article takes a critical view of this trend, arguing that a norm of consensus is a very precondition, rather than impediment, for the kind of pluralistic democracy Mouffe and other agonists wish to promote. It is asserted that Mouffe’s dehistoricized refutation of consensus lacks causal or explanatory relevance to how concrete actors embedded in empirical situations relate to one another and that the very preparedness to find something acceptable about another is at the heart of what it means to treat others justly.