Clausewitz

Clausewitz è celeberrimo per la sua opera Vom Kriege (Della Guerra), unanimemente considerato uno dei classici imprescindibili dell'arte militare, ma pochi sanno che il Vom Kriege raccoglie solo i primi tre volumi dei lavori incompiuti del generale prussiano (Hinterlassene Werke über Krieg und Kriegführung), gli altri, secondo il principio, caro all'autore, che gli historische Beispiele machen Alles klar (gli esempi storici rendono tutto chiaro), essendone il complemento ed il sussidio. Infatti, nei volumi successivi, il riferimento corre continuamente alle enunciazioni dei primi tre volumi, per dimostrarne la validità e discutere i rischi della mancata applicazione dei princìpi, talvolta per emendarli, migliorarli ed adattarli alle situazioni specifiche, senza in ogni caso mai discostarsene. Questa opera, il primo dei restanti volumi, il quarto in generale, dunque non è solo il resoconto talvolta impietoso degli accadimenti militari e politici, ma una dettagliata ed acuta analisi dei processi decisionali e delle opzioni tattiche, degli errori e delle scelte corrette di entrambi i contendenti della prima Campagna d'Italia (1796-97). È anche un riconoscimento, spesso intriso di spunti polemici e malcelato odio, delle capacità del giovane generale Bonaparte, che al suo primo comando indipendente, trasformò un esercito di straccioni, indisciplinati e demotivati, privi di vestiario, vettovaglie e armamento, in un formidabile strumento di guerra, che non solo inflisse continue e ripetute sconfitte a due eserciti alleati, ma impose trattati di pace - qui riprodotti - con pesanti condizioni in termini economici, politici e territoriali a tutti gli altri stati italiani, cancellandone persino uno dalla mappa geografica. Nomi come Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Lodi, Lonato, Castiglione, Rovereto, Bassano, La Favorita, San Giorgio, Arcole, Rivoli, Mantova, non furono altro che le principali tappe di una delle campagne più decisive della storia e sancirono il mito di Napoleone come generale abilissimo, fortunato ed invincibile e l'inizio della sua parabola stupefacente, mossa da un'ambizione senza più limiti che portò guerra e distruzione, ma anche il fuoco inestinguibile dei valori rivoluzionari, in tutta l'Europa nel corso dei successivi vent'anni. In appendice, ad opera del curatore, una esaustiva cronologia, dieci ordini di battaglia, un dizionario dei principali protagonisti della campagna, una raccolta di trattati e armistizi, una corposa bibliografia.

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

War used to be easy to define. Once, we could say with confidence whether we were at war or peace. If the former, we could identify with whom we were fighting and where the front was. Americans, in particular, have for a long time had the good fortune of being able to say that the war—any war—was “over there.”

These concepts have deep roots—in the West, anyway. In ancient Rome, for example, a particular class of priests called fetiales officiated the onset of war by throwing a ceremonial spear into an enemy’s territory and opening the doors of the temple of Janus. Bringing war to an end has traditionally been just as ceremonial—think of Vercingetorix laying his sword at Caesar’s feet, Lee and Grant’s meeting at Appomattox, or Emperor Hirohito’s representatives signing documents of unconditional surrender on board the USS Missouri in 1945.

Things are certainly more complicated today. The United States and its allies have been “at war” for almost two decades, yet it is difficult at times to explain the who, the why, or at times even the where. What happened?

Many academics and policy-makers have misunderstood or ignored this trinity, however, and in different ways. Firstly, the the trinitarian analysis is a tool, not a ‘formula’ or doctrine, 3 secondly the trinity of the state – the ‘Summersian Trinity’ – has been misused,4 thirdly, that armies since the 1990s have attempted to forgo the trinity and its effects.5 This essay, elaborating on these misunderstandings and ignorance, will firstly illustrate where Clausewitz’s critics go wrong, then highlight how the trinity, both as a whole and in its individual elements, is still of such value in the twenty-first century.

Genezy obrony totalnej (total defence) należy szukać u klasyków myśli wojskowej. Carl von Clauzewitz poświęcił uwagę możliwości zaangażowania ludności cywilnej w wojnę prowadzoną przez państwo, odnotowując, że jest to potencjał, który należy umiejętnie wykorzystać. Kluczowym założeniem koncepcji obrony totalnej jest szybka i powszechna mobilizacja ludności zdolnej do walki w przypadku zaistnienia zagrożenia wojną.

Most military writing and doctrine focuses on the physical components of warfare, rather than the moral / psychological elements. Yet it is very rarely through the unadorned slaughter of the enemy's troops that victory is secured, but rather by bringing the opponent to acknowledge that they are defeated. The article examines the writings of Clausewitz to present an assessment of his understanding of the moral / psychological element of warfare, and to link this with (arguably) his greatest contribution to military theory-the recognition of the nature and central impact of 'friction'. It then explores the criticisms and extensions of Clausewitz's thinking in these two areas by Colonel John Boyd USAF. This analysis is used to inform and enhance further a model of command approaches, which sought to form a linkage between the characteristics of friction and the methods by which commanders attempt to control and direct their forces, with the different command approaches seen as methodologies to reduce the level of friction experienced by friendly forces and increase that affecting the enemy.

Parmi les différentes conceptualisations dont le phénomène de la guerre a pu faire l’objet, l’œuvre de Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) et celle de Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) se sont souvent trouvées rangées, depuis le développement du champ disciplinaire des relations internationales en particulier, parmi des auteurs dits « réalistes » tels que Thucydide ou Machiavel notamment. Or leur pensée respective semble échapper à toutes les formes de catégorisation : ni pur « réalisme », ni bellicisme, ni pensée de la « raison d’État », d’une part, ni idéalisme, « pacifisme », ou pensée de la guerre juste, d’autre part, l’œuvre de Hobbes et celle de Clausewitz occupent une place à part parmi ceux qui, semblablement à eux, ont pris la guerre pour objet de leur réflexion. Malgré les deux siècles et bien d’autres choses qui les séparent, une pensée hétérodoxe de la guerre se fait ainsi écho à travers elles. Hobbes comme Clausewitz s’efforcent en effet d’appréhender la guerre, non point en juristes, tel Hugo Grotius, ni même en spécialistes de l’art de la guerre, comme Machiavel, ou bien encore en moralistes, tel Juste Lipse, mais bel et bien en tant que théoriciens soucieux de saisir la logique présidant aux rapports conflictuels entre les êtres humains, c’est-à-dire à la fois la suite des causes et des effets conduisant à la guerre et l’ensemble des règles commandant le déroulement de cette dernière une fois enclenchée. Le tableau de la guerre qu’offrent par conséquent Hobbes et Clausewitz à leurs lecteurs, bien qu’il puisse paraître sombre ou cynique, n’est pas celui de la déraison ou d’une hybris totalement déchaînée : loin de présenter la guerre comme un phénomène inextricable, chacun s’efforce, à sa façon, de rendre intelligible le phénomène guerrier, d’en mettre à nu les principes et les ressorts à la fois passionnels et rationnels, nécessaires et contingents.

O livro tira do esquecimento a origem da disputa entre China e Estados Unidos pela autonomia da Coreia do Norte, da balança de poder da Ásia e do status quo político internacional. A Guerra Sino-Americana entre 1950 e 1953 foi travada por três milhões de soldados de vinte e seis diferentes nacionalidades. Os desenvolvimentos das operações militares e negociações diplomáticas na Península Coreana entre a coalizão de países formada por China, Coreia do Norte e União Soviética e a coalizão de membros dos cinco continentes das Nações Unidas liderada pelos Estados Unidos alteraram as relações internacionais da Guerra Fria e as relações políticas e de segurança regionais da Ásia e da Europa.

A Guerra Sino-Americana é o caso exemplar do tipo de guerra limitada - em que se luta enquanto se negocia - e das consequências da falta de apropriados arcabouços conceituais, organizacionais e doutrinários para trava-la. Ambos os países tiveram que aprender sobre ela enquanto conduziam suas campanhas, e seus oficiais militares, exércitos e países sofreram com as graves discórdias entre suas respectivas lideranças políticas e comandantes, resultando em desgastes de suas instituições e maiores e menores graus de expurgos de suas forças armadas.

O livro executa uma metodologia de análise crítica de guerras contemporâneas a partir da Teoria da Guerra de Carl von Clausewitz sobre fontes primárias e secundárias ocidentais e orientais e estudos de campo na Coreia do Sul e na Zona Desmilitarizada (DMZ). Como resultado, ele infere minuciosamente as condições e instituições políticas, as possibilidades estratégicas, o teatro de operações coreano, os comandantes e as forças combatentes envolvidas, os planos de guerras, as negociações diplomáticas entre e dentro das duas coalizões, as campanhas e as batalhas dessa guerra.

In his famous handbook on war, written in the context of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, Carl von Clausewitz argues that military contlict is the continuation of politics with other means. To highlight the irresolvable antagonism that will continue to be played out once soldiers have returned from battle, Michel Foucault, in his series of lectures, "Society Must Be Defended", takes this definition a step further to suggest that if war merely continues political power struggles, this is so because power is anchored in the particular relationship of force established in and through war. To claim that politics is the continuation of war by other means implies that the political system merely reinscribes an adversarial relationship of force by sanctioning
and reproducing the disequilibrium of forces manifested in scenes of war, where a combat decides that the day after battle one party will have triumphed over another party. Far from being averted in times of peace, Foucault claims, war should be thought of as presiding over its birth; "indeed the laws of peace are born in the blood and mud of battles". Not, he adds, in some ideal sense of battles and rivalries dreamed up by philosophers and jurists, however, but of "real battles, victories, massacres, and conquests which can be dated and which have their horrific heroes". Not only does confrontation sustain political power even after a concrete war has come to an end. Foucault goes a step further to suggest that law itself "was born in burning towns and ravaged fields. It was born together with the famous innocents who died at break of day."1 The critical metaphors deployed by Foucault in themselves resonate with the poetic language of Shakespearean history plays and yet, by the time Foucault reaches the acme of his argument, we have also - thus my wager - entered the dark logic of Shakespeare's problem plays. War, Foucault concludes, is the "motor behind institutions and order". Even in a world after battle, it continues to persist as a force beneath peace, because "peace itself is a coded war [...] a battle front runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other". There is no such thing as a neutral subject, he adds, because in our social relations "we are all inevitably someone's adversary".

Classical Approach Versus Systematic Approach?: Military Theoretical Interpretation on the U. S. Offset Strategies By reviewing the Jomini's and Clausewitz's military theory, this paper provides the analytical framework for assessing the impact of the military innovations on the nature of warfare. The debates in military theory can be sorted into three dimensions according to the types and degree of idealization. With the analytical framework, the paper reviews ongoing debates on the military innovations carried out under the first and second US offset strategies. Furthermore, the paper evaluates the implications and limits of technological gambit of the third offset strategy to the future warfare.

(2019) M. Ertan Kardeş

PİNHAN YAYINCILIK

Yönsüzleşmiş Savaşlar kitabı, günümüzün yıkıcı ve hukuk kurmayan savaşlarını konu edinmektedir. Yaşadığımız çağ ne taş çağıdır ne bronz ne de demir…Yaşadığımız çağ plastik çağdır. Her şey hızlıca şekil değiştirebilir ve toprağa yabancıdır. Böyle bir çağda savaşlar da yönsüzleşmiştir. M. Ertan Kardeş, “politik felsefenin bir sınır meselesi olarak” günümüzün yönsüzleşmiş savaşlarını tartışmaya açarak kavramaya çalışmaktadır.

Çalışma, çağdaş politik felsefenin tanınma, kriz, çatışma gibi konularını savaş kavrayışından hareketle düşünmeye davet ediyor. “Felsefe ya da politik felsefe” açısından savaşları tarihselliği bağlamında tanımak ve savaşın kendisini şiddet olarak yeniden üretme biçimlerini düşünmek kaçınılmaz durmaktadır. Kitap çağın semptomlarını Hobbes, Rousseau, Clausewitz, Hegel, Schmitt ve Aron etrafındaki çapraz okumalarla deşmekte ve yönsüzleşmiş savaşların dünyasında tüm toplumsal tasarımlarımızın yeniden düşünülmesinin zorunlu olduğunun altını çizmektedir.

As a social phenomenon, is war subordinate to politics, as Carl von Clausewitz argued in the early nineteenth century, or, instead, is it the product of an instinctive ‘warrior culture’, common to all peoples and times and beyond politics, as John Keegan suggested in the late twentieth? Should we emphasize ‘essential historical elements in the search for a tem-poral continuum in warfare? In this article, we stress the relevance of the ‘perennity of war’ thesis, and the impropriety of a dichotomy between political rationality vs. instinct. The results of the clash between these two strands of thought about the origins of warfare face limitations due to the absence of a temporal ‘play of scales’, so that short-term approaches emerge as incompatible with macro-historical views. We suggest that a deep understanding of the phenomenon of warfare must consider the interaction and the feedback between processes at different time scales.

O objetivo da presente reflexão é responder às seguintes questões.
Em que grau a leitura de Maquiavel pelo general prussiano Carl von
Clausewitz credencia uma influência do primeiro sobre o segundo? Se não há influência, qual a natureza de um eventual parentesco intelectual entre
os dois autores? Qual a natureza da definição da guerra nos dois autores e
como elas podem estar relacionadas de alguma forma?

The definition of terrorism and its differentiation from war and guerrilla warfare has been a problem for science, international relations and legal systems for decades. This article posits that defining terrorism requires also the definition of other warlike phenomena, so as not to conflate the acts or events. Therefore, the proposed criteria for defining terrorism and guerrilla warfare are presented as a means to differentiate their definitions from that of war. The methodology is a review of the concepts of the nature and essence of war, as described in the Carl von Clausewitz book, Vom Kriege (in the standard German edition of Hahlweg and its widely accepted English translation by Howard and Paret). These concepts were cross-analyzed with recent scientific discoveries about the behavior of social animals, with a focus on humans. The resulting classification allows historical or contemporary events to be evaluated to determine what kind of conflicts they are. Keywords: Definition of terrorism. Definition of guerrilla warfare. Definition of war. Carl von Clausewitz. International law.

A Clausewitzian analysis of the Imperial Roman Army.

Using the Year of the Four Emperors (69 AD) as a case study, the Roman Army of the Principate is examined in its ability to live up to the standards laid down in Karl von Clausewitz's seminal military manual, 'On War'. This is done in an attempt to establish, as objectively as possible, whether the Roman Army lived up to its professional reputation.

Formatting is all messed up on 'View' but works after downloading.

« La guerre, écrivait Clausewitz , n’est rien d’autre qu’un duel amplifié […] son but immédiat est de terrasser l’adversaire et de le rendre ainsi incapable de toute résistance.» En ce sens, la guerre est «un acte de violence engagé pour contraindre l’adversaire à se soumettre à notre volonté. » (I, 1, 2) Raymond Aron commente cette définition en rappelant que, dans son concept pur, la guerre est le « choc entre des forces opposées » . Mais ce choc a ceci de particulier qu’il est également une action réciproque des forces et des volontés vers une poussée aux extrêmes. Il n’y a pas de limites intrinsèques à la violence belliqueuse : « puisque chacun des lutteurs cherche à imposer sa loi à l’autre, puisque chacun des deux ne peut faire moins que l’autre, ils seront amenés logiquement à faire l’un et l’autre le maximum. »  Chaque adversaire serait animé d’une profonde haine féroce de sorte que même les sociétés les plus civilisées pourraient se laisser emporter dans la spirale. (I,1 ,3) Mais alors, comment se fait-il que toutes les guerres ne soient pas des guerres d’anéantissement ?  Qu’est-ce qui empêche la guerre de devenir absolue ?

+ Appendice: Gabriel Tarde et l’immanentisation du problème
Après avoir étudié la Répétition pendant plusieurs années, Gabriel Tarde tente dans L’opposition universelle de détricoter et reconstruire un concept d’opposition. Une fois le concept créé, il s’agit en suite d’en suivre les transformations en parcourant les séries divergentes à travers des domaines aussi variés que les mathématiques, la mécanique, la physique, la vie, la psychologie et la société. Cependant, dans toutes ces variations autour du thème de l’opposition « c’est toujours, au fond, la question sociale qui est en cause […] toutes les antinomies de la nature sont pour ainsi dire convoquées et rassemblées pour résoudre ensemble le problème de la guerre » . Plus particulièrement, Tarde vise le débat qui opposait, à l’époque, les socialistes et les économistes. L’opposition, sous les traits de la guerre ou du conflit, tendait à se généraliser aux différents domaines de l’être.

Resumen: Quienes sostienen que la teoría clausewitziana ha perdido su valor en el presente, probablemente se equivoquen tanto como aquellos que pretendan atribuirle un carácter dogmático e imperecedero. Mientras la tecnología ha transformado la vida, la economía y la forma de combatir en términos instrumentales e ingenieriles, una buena parte de las nociones de Clausewitz parecen guardar validez. Por su parte, Raymond Aron es uno de los autores prominentes en el estudio de la estrategia y la política preconizadas por el noble alemán, aunque dentro del contexto de la Guerra Fría de mediados del siglo XX, y con un pensamiento geopolítico eurocéntrico. La propuesta consiste en reexaminar a Clausewitz para comprobar la vigencia de sus opiniones, y determinar en qué medida impacta en la realidad presente. Así, este trabajo tendrá por objetivos el análisis de la condición política o filosófica de De la guerra, la consideración sobre la validez de la dialéctica entre moderación y violencia, la utilidad presente acerca de la disquisición entre teoría y doctrina aportada por Clausewitz, y dirimir sobre la pertinencia del concepto trinitario de la guerra en el conflicto de hoy, entre otros aspectos. Todo ello en clave de respuesta para el uso de la fuerza legítima en manos de los Estados a la hora de resolver sus controversias. Abstract: ose who argue that the Clausewitzian theory has lost its value in the present, probably make mistake as well as those intending to give it a character that is dogmatic and evergreen. While technology has transformed life, the economy and the way to fight in instrumental and engineering terms, a good part of the notions of Clausewitz seem to save validity. For his part, Raymond Aron is one of the prominent authors in the study of the strategy and the policy advocated by the German noble, although within the context of the cold war of the mid-20th century, and with a Eurocentric geopolitical thought. e proposal consists of reexamine to Clausewitz to check the validity of their opinions, and determine to what extent impact on the present reality. us, this work will have by objectives analysis of the political or philosophical condition of war, the consideration on the validity of the dialectic between moderation and violence, the utility present about the discussion between theory and doctrine provided by Clausewitz, and settle on the relevance of the Trinitarian concept of war in the conflict today, among other aspects. All this in terms of response to the use of legitimate force in the hands of States to resolve their disputes. Introducción La densidad del discurso clausewitziano conlleva tanta riqueza como dificultad interpretativa. Esto ocasiona no pocas distorsiones en el sentido de sus conceptos, a veces por prejuicios, otras por conveniencia y muchas, quizás la mayoría, por la incapacidad para leer y entender al gran texto de polemología que De la Guerra (Clausewitz, 1983 [1832]) propone. En este sentido, fue Raymond Aron quien, a través de dos obras señeras como Sobre Clausewitz (2009 [1987]) y Pensar la Guerra, Clausewitz(1987 [1976]), introdujo un punto de vista centrado en el liberalismo europeo del siglo XX, que permitió descifrar el tratado en clave política, tal como Clausewitz lo hubiera pretendido. Si bien los textos de Aron se sitúan en la lógica amigo-enemigo que entrañaba la disuasión nuclear como producto de la Guerra Fría, las ideas acerca del pensamiento ARTÍCULO/ARTICLE

El artículo muestra cómo la teoría de la guerra de Clausewitz –en particular, lo que respecta a la cuestión de la sublevación popular– se inserta en el desarrollo de las condiciones históricas y políticas de una época caracterizada por un proceso simultáneo de consolidación del Estado como principio de inteligibilidad de lo político y la conformación de un espacio nacional. Este proceso va a otorgarle una cierta especificidad y sentido a la política moderna: como racionalidad que tiene por objeto la conducción política de un pueblo.

Como fenômeno social, a guerra está subordinada à política, como defende Clausewitz, ou, ao contrário, é produto de uma "cultura guerreira" instintiva, comum a todos os povos e tempos e para além da política, como sugere Keegan? Devemos enfatizar "elementos históricos essenciais" na busca de um contínuo intertemporal para a guerra? Neste artigo, enfatizamos a relevância do postulado da "perenidade da guerra" e a impropriedade de uma dicotomia entre racionalidade política versus instintividade. Os resultados do choque entre essas duas correntes de pensamento sobre as origens da guerra enfrenta limitações devido à ausência de um "jogo de escalas" temporal, de modo que as abordagens de curta duração emergem como incompatíveis com visões macro-históricas. Sugerimos que uma compreensão profunda do fenômeno da guerra deve considerar a interação e a retroalimentação entre processos em diferentes escalas de tempo, do episódico ao evolucionário.

As a social phenomenon, is war subordinate to politics, as Clausewitz argues, or, instead, is it the product of an instinctive 'warrior culture', common to all peoples and times and beyond politics, as Keegan suggests? Should we emphasize 'essential historical elements' in the search for a temporal continuum in warfare? In this article, we stress the relevance of the 'perennity of war' thesis, and the impropriety of a dichotomy between political rationality vs. instinct. The results of the clash between these two strands of thought about the origins of warfare face limitations due to the absence of a temporal 'play of scales', so that short-term approaches emerge as incompatible with macro-historical views. We suggest that a deep understanding of the phenomenon of warfare must consider the interaction and the feedback between processes at different time scales.

В статье рассматривается теория войны Карла фон Клаузевица в связи с вопросом о современности войны. Эта связь проблематизируется двояко: через философские источники и эпистемологический статус теории, но также через ее рецепцию в советской «военной философии». Первая часть статьи посвящена вопросу о влиянии на Клаузевица «немецкого идеализма». Во второй части анализируется оригинальный способ построения теории, необходимый для работы с войной, понятой как сложный, изменчивый, не поддающийся исчерпывающей концептуализации объект. Клаузевиц предлагает новый способ теоретизирования: релятивистский (противостоящий абстрактному или «абсолютному» мышлению), исторический (противостоящий самотождественности логических категорий) и прагматический (противостоящий философской «незаинтересованности»).
В заключение реконструируется место Клаузевица в советской военной теории. В 1920–1930-е годы Клаузевиц — признанный классик; в конце 1940-х Сталин разоблачает его как «прусского реакционера», писавшего о «мануфактурном периоде войны»; в 1960–1980-е, несмотря на завершение борьбы с «низкопоклонством перед Западом», исторические или теоретические исследования Клаузевица не возобновляются, от него остается только упоминаемое по случаю имя и формула «Война есть продолжение политики другими средствами». Автор рассматривает это «поражение Клаузевица» как победу сталинизма, результат воспроизводства смысловых и силовых отношений, ментальных и профессиональных структур, сложившихся в позднесталинское время. Милитаризованный режим сталинской науки отчасти сохраняется в военно-научных структурах до сих пор. «Военные философы» воспроизводят устойчивые схематизмы в символическом пространстве, определяемом борьбой за «наследие Великой Победы».
/
This article discusses Сarl von Clausewitz’s theory of war in relation to war’s modernity. This relation is analyzed in two ways: by tracing its philosophical sources and the epistemological status of the theory, but also by following how it was received in Soviet “military philosophy.” The first part of the article looks into the influence of German idealism on Clausewitz. In the second part, it analyzes his original way of constructing a theory of war, which understands war as a thing that is complex, changeable, and not amenable to comprehensive conceptualization. Clausewitz offers a new way of theorizing: relativistic (as opposed to abstract or absolute modes of thinking), historical (as opposed to the invariance of logical categories) and pragmatic (as opposed to philosophically disinterested).
In conclusion the author reconstructs Clausewitz’s place in Soviet military theory. In the 1920s-1930s Clausewitz was a regarded as an authoritative thinker; in the late 1940s, Stalin denounced him as a “Prussian reactionary” who wrote about the outdated “manufacturing period of war” rather than its modern machine age. In the 1960s-1980s even though the struggle against “kneeling before the West” was over, historical or theoretical studies of Clausewitz were not resumed. Only his name and his famous aphorism that “war is a continuation of politics by other means” were occasionally mentioned. The author considers this “overthrow of Clausewitz” as a victory for Stalinism, the result of ta replication of semantic and power relations and of mental and professional structures that were formed in late Stalinism. The militarized regime of Stalinist science has been perpetuated to some extent in current military-scientific institutions. “Military philosophers” tend to reproduce the same symbolic schemes of thought which are determined by their struggle over the “legacy of the Great Victory.”

Carl von Clausewitz produced what is widely recognised as the greatest book on war.  Less commonly appreciated is the nature of the approach he adopted which enabled him to arrive at his central theoretical conclusions.  In the course of his studies Clausewitz confronted a number of central methodological dualisms.  He believed the tensions inherent in these pairs could not be ignored and ultimately sought to reconcile their apparent contradictions through a dialectical process of intense reflection and study.  Knowledge of such issues offers students of war and strategy a valuable methodology in coming to grips with such a vast and complex subject.

This paper presents an analysis of the thought of such authors as Lenin, Ludendorff, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, and eventually René Girard who all reversed the famous Clausewitz’s “Formula” : “War is the continuation of politics by other means” (in his essay Vom Kriege). Everything seems to differentiate those authors, starting from their position on the political and ideological scene in the XXth century. Two theses combine however, to provide an explanation for their inclination to reject the Clausewitz model when analysing the relationship between war and politics. On the one hand, from an ideological point of view, those five thinkers all doubt the fact that the liberal philosophy will ever be able to free man from the torments of the war. Not only because liberalism is for them unable to ever reach this utopian objective, but also because, in a liberal environment it becomes impossible to wage war, as the necessary decisions cannot be made in a situation of crisis. On the other hand, from an anthropological point of view, those thinkers consider that violence is in a way the unsurpassable horizon of politics: what politics has achieved over a long period, war, and more generally violence may destroy in no time. Thus politics is but a matter of fighting and wrestling, and it runs behind war and violence with no chance of ever catching up.

"Neste livro, o leitor encontra reflexões de especialistas sobre diferentes assuntos relacionados à Guerra e à Formação dos Estados Nacionais Contemporâneos. Prevalecem os artigos sobre a influência militar na formação e reconfiguração do Estado brasileiro, nos séculos XIX e XX, mas há outros sobre aspectos teóricos e, ainda, sobre a própria emergência do Terceiro Mundo no ambiente da Guerra Fria. São trabalhos importantes, quer por sua atualidade teórica, quer pela pesquisa em arquivos e a aplicação do método histórico de crítica a fontes". Do Prefácio de Francisco Doratioto.

São autores: Thiago Tremonte; Marco Antonio Cunha; Williams Gonçalves; Rentao Restier e Marcello Loureiro; Fabíola Chagas; Adriana Barreto de Souza; José Miguel Arias Neto; Dirceu Casa Grande Junior; Gilberto da Silva Guizelin; Paulo Ribeiro Rodrigues da Cunha; Fernando Loureiro; e Renato Luis do Couto Neto e Lemos. 

Apresentação de Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva.

Prefácio de Francisco Doratioto.

Organização de Luiz Carlos Carneiro de Paula; Renato Jorge Restier Paranhos Junior; Marcello José Gomes Loureiro; e Fabíola Chagas.

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français ci-après):
This article (as all my other articles on Clausewitz) isn’t a discussion “around” the thoughts of Clausewitz, which would be first based on Clausewitz – an attractive name! – in order to speak thereafter in a prospective manner, as we see quite often. My article is an analysis focussed on what Clausewitz actually wrote in his lectures on the “kleinen Krieg” [I would say here “small war” to be short, even if I don’t like this translation]. The aim is, first, making a synthesis of the thoughts of Clausewitz on the relations between the “kleinen Krieg” and insurrectional wars; and, second, explaining the context of that days which underlain his thoughts, in order to better understand them: the context related to 1) the wars on which Clausewitz bases his speech, 2) the military culture of the officers of that days (and also the military culture of Clausewitz) and 3) the reflection of his time on the “kleinen Krieg” and on insurrectional wars.

Indeed, Prussia's military defeats in 1806 led in this country to a reflection on national defence, on the question of armed citizens, and on the “petite guerre” as the appropriate tactic for popular uprisings. The lecture upon the “petite guerre” that Clausewitz delivered at the War College in Berlin between 1810 and 1812 is part of this framework. Moreover, the Revolutionary War, which was an insurrection against the British homeland, is one of the examples Clausewitz did choose to feed his thinking, just like the Wars of the Vendée and the Tyrolean events during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars – which were other uprisings with insurrectional characteristics. In his lecture, Clausewitz doesn’t distinguish between the two words and the two realities of “petite guerre” and “guerrilla warfare”; however, he shows from time to time the particularities of the civil wars and of the wars with armed citizens. Our article studies the lecture on the “petite guerre” from Clausewitz with a new point of view, in order to point out the parts which are related to the popular wars and to the insurrections; indeed, as Raymond Aron expresses it, the thinking of Clausewitz has been built on watching how the extreme violence of passions could not be separated from people's wars.

RESUME en français :
Cet article (comme tous mes autres articles sur Clausewitz) n’est pas une discussion « autour » de la pensée de Clausewitz, qui partirait de Clausewitz – un nom porteur ! – pour parler de façon prospective, comme on le voit souvent. C’est une analyse centrée exclusivement sur ce que Clausewitz a écrit dans son "Cours sur la petite guerre". L’objectif est, premièrement, de saisir et de synthétiser la pensée de Clausewitz sur les rapports entre petite guerre et guerre insurrectionnelle ; et, deuxièmement, d’expliciter le contexte de l’époque qui a nourri cette réflexion, pour mieux la comprendre : le contexte concernant 1) les guerres sur lesquelles Clausewitz appuie son discours, 2) la culture militaire des officiers de ce temps (donc la sienne) et 3) la réflexion de son temps sur la petite guerre et la guerre insurrectionnelle.

Les défaites subies en 1806 engendrèrent en effet, en Prusse, une réflexion sur la défense nationale, sur l’armement du peuple, et sur la petite guerre comme tactique du peuple soulevé. Le « Cours sur la petite guerre » donné par Clausewitz à l’École supérieure de guerre de Berlin, entre 1810 et 1812, s’inscrit entres autres dans le fil de cette impulsion. Au reste, la guerre d’Indépendance américaine, insurrection contre la métropole anglaise, est au nombre des exemples choisis par Clausewitz pour alimenter sa réflexion, comme les guerres de Vendée et les épisodes tyroliens de la Révolution et de l’Empire, autres soulèvements à caractère insurrectionnel. Si Clausewitz n’opère pas pour ses auditeurs la distinction entre « petite guerre » et « guérilla », il pointe de temps à autre les particularismes des guerres civiles et des contextes guerriers avec armement du peuple. Cet article revisite le Cours sur la petite guerre de Clausewitz pour y relever la part redevable aux guerres populaires et aux insurrections, si tant est que, comme l’exprime Raymond Aron, la pensée de Clausewitz sur la guerre s’est construite en considérant le déchaînement des passions inhérent aux guerres populaires.

The notion that Sun Tzu represents the multifaceted brilliance and timeless appeal of Amadeus to Clausewitz’s dour and overwrought Salieri maintains a powerful grip over our collective imagination. But does this accurately reflect the state of contemporary Sun Tzu analysis? Have we truly figured this text out to the point where we have reached consensus over its relevance? Dissenting from the majority opinion, which seems to effortlessly commune with this enigmatic founding father of military strategic thought, I argue that we haven’t yet come close to fully cataloguing the good, the bad, and just plain ugly within this endlessly fascinating, but ultimately flawed document.

Despite the enduring interest in the written work of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) there appears to be shortage of studies focusing specifically on what he had to say about the matter of civilians or non-combatants in war. After extensive consultation with primary and secondary sources this dissertation will argue that Clausewitz wrote a lot more on this subject than is commonly acknowledged. He was aware that civilian suffering was not simply an accidental by-product of war but also the result of deliberate strategic intent to compel an enemy to do one’s will. Clausewitz did not endorse such methods because he had a moral and theoretical preference for decisive battles between conventional armed forces. He tended to dismiss violence against civilian persons and property as morally wrong, militarily ineffective and politically counter-productive.

Many military professionals and academics outline the importance of military theory and the need to study it. Some, like Colin Gray, even highlight how understanding it allows the profession of arms to better adapt in war. Given these wise words, would it not seem important to know ‘what’ military theory is? Is it not significant to know who has shaped it? How do we, as professionals, tell if something is military theory, or just opinion and conjecture? Knowing what military theory is, and what it is not, is vital. It helps identify what writings further our understanding of war and warfare, and guides professional military education and research for future doctrine and training. This work answers the questions of what military theory is, where it sits within the wider context of the study of conflict, and which theorists are key in defining its body of knowledge.

The work first defines what military theory is. Military theory is a field of study that seeks to understand the phenomena of war and its links to wider conflict; and provides a framework for the valid creation and dissemination of the knowledge of war and warfare. In other words, military theory is the epistemology of war. This definition highlights that research into military theory is grounded in the philosophy of scientific inquiry and, much like applied history, must use broad scientific methods – using hypothesis and empirical data based in history; not just a single incident, war or technological advancement – to develop its concepts. Understanding this also provides a guide to test whether a new or modern idea is effective ‘military theory’, or merely ‘military notion’. The definition also indicates that the focus of military theory is the development of first principles knowledge about war and warfare. It is this knowledge that allows planners, commanders and senior decision makers to adapt their know-how of war fighting to changing situations, environments and political objectives. It is also this knowledge that can be enhanced through wider study.

The analysis of what military theory is, also demonstrates where military theory fits within wider academic disciplines. Although other humanities disciplines like history can support military theory, its focus on applied theory gives it strong links to other applied social sciences like political science, international relations and economics. These other disciplines overlap with military theory, and provide an avenue to potentially advance military theory’s understanding of power, influence and war’s wider links to conflict. Such links assist in broadening the military theory body of knowledge – a body of knowledge that is not codified, but is instead shaped by foundational theorists.

Who these foundation theorists are, or who is most influential, is also answered by this work. By analysing the curriculums of staff colleges around the world, this work has identified the top 20 theorists currently accepted as most influential. The analysis also suggests a normalising of military theory across the globe, including a possible convergence between the conceptual Eastern and Western ways of war.

Overall, this work provides a definition for military theory and highlights the key theorists that shape our views on it now and into the future. This is supported with guidance that allows us to test future theories. Understanding what military theory is and who shapes it lays the foundation to allow the profession to debate where future advancements in military theory should focus to best support planners, commanders and senior decision makers.

SEE PUBLICATION
STATS
Clausewitz, Marx, Engels e Lenin: Rupturas, Continuidades ou Parentescos Intelectuais na Relação entre Guerra e Revolução? Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Lenin: continuity or intelectual connection in the relationship between war and revolution?

CHAPTER · NOVEMBER 2015
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.5134.2804
In book: Lenin: Teoria e Prática Revolucionária, Edition: 1st, Chapter: 11, Publisher: Cultura Acadêmica; Oficina Universitária, Editors: Anderson Deo, Antonio Carlos Mazzeo, Marcos Del Roio, pp.299-314

1st Rodrigo Passos
5.28 · São Paulo State University
ABSTRACT

O ponto de partida do texto toma o pensamento de Clausewitz no que concerne à sua formulação sobre a guerra e a política. A sua definição de política não considera uma continuidade ou descontinuidade absoluta no que se refere à paz e à violência. Tal relação dialética entre ações pacíficas, como a diplomacia, e as violentas, como a guerra, dão o ensejo para a discussão da validade de pontos da guerra para a política, levantando a discussão sobre a pertinência não somente da tipologia clausewitziana de guerra real e guerra absoluta, como também sobre a política real e a política absoluta, ainda que estas últimas não tenham aparecido explicitamente no pensamento do autor de "Da Guerra". Esta última teria na revolução um de seus exemplos. Dado que Clausewitz foi lido e estudado por Marx, Engels e Lenin, que também se debruçaram sobre o tema da revolução, o texto busca refletir sobre eventuais parentescos intelectuais e ecos que o general prussiano possa eventualmente ter proporcionado nos autores anteriormente arrolados. Isso posto, a questão central a ser respondida por esta comunicação é a seguinte: a relação dialética entre guerra e política no pensamento de Clausewitz possibilita identificar uma influência direta, um parentesco intelectual ou uma formulação distinta sobre o pensamento de Marx, Engels e Lenin? Os objetivos da presente reflexão são: a) efetuar uma leitura orientada pela hipótese de validade de pontos fundamentais da guerra para a política na perspectiva de Clausewitz, apontando alguns vínculos entre revolução e guerra como pontos altos da política; b) demonstrar que há ao menos um parentesco intelectual de Marx e Engels em alguns aspectos com as formulações de Clausewitz tanto no que confere à guerra como também no tocante à política e à revolução; c) Elaborar análise sobre a proximidade (com as devidas particularidades) entre Clausewitz, Marx e Engels e Lenin nos escritos sobre a guerra e da revolução. Tais objetivos são sustentados pelo tratamento de Marx, Engels e Lenin do tema da política e da revolução como guerra ao longo de todas as suas obras.

The text´s starting point takes the thought of Clausewitz with regard to its formulation on war and politics. His policy setting does not consider a continuation or absolute discontinuity with regard to peace and violence. Such dialectical relationship between peace actions, such as diplomacy, and violent, like war, gives the opportunity for the discussion of the validity points from war to politics, raising the discussion not only for the relevance of Clausewitzian type of real war and absolute war, but also about the real political and absolute policy, even if the latter have not explicitly appeared in the thought of the author of " On War". The war would have in the revolution one of its examples. Since Clausewitz was read and studied by Marx, Engels and Lenin, who also turned to the subject of the revolution, the text seeks to reflect on possible intellectual kinship and echoes the Prussian general could possibly have provided the authors listed above. In this way, the central question to be answered by this reflexion is as follows: the dialectical relationship between war and politics at the thought of Clausewitz possible to identify a direct influence, an intellectual kinship or a distinct formulation of the thought of Marx, Engels and Lenin? The objectives of this reflexion are: a) make a reading guided by the assumption of validity of key points from war to politics in Clausewitz's perspective, pointing out some links between revolution and war as highlights of the policy; b) demonstrate that there is at least an intellectual kinship of Marx and Engels in some respects with Clausewitz formulations both concerning the war but also with regard to politics and revolution; c) Prepare analysis of proximity (with the necessary particulars) from Clausewitz, Marx and Engels and Lenin in the writings on war and revolution. These objectives are supported by the treatment of Marx, Engels and Lenin's political theme and revolution as war over all his works