Cyberwar

Livro, em recurso eletrônico (eBook), publicado em 2011 em parceria com a Editora Delpos. Avalia os aspectos sobre a (in)segurança virtual no Brasil, desde o contexto da guerra cibernética, o cibercrime e os incidentes na Internet e como eles são/deveriam ser avaliados sob a ótica da atividade de inteligência. Obs.: não autorizo a colocação em outros sites para download.

Over the last years there is a growing body of literature over exploiting cyberspace for offensive and defensive purposes. Cyber-conflict is after all the newest mode of warfare and cyber-weapons have been described as weapons of mass disruption. Although the attention on the technical and military dimensions of cyberspace is justifiable, one needs also to look into the legal and ethical aspects of cyber-conflict, in order to comprehend the complex nature of cyberspace. The lack of an international legal framework that defines the use of force in cyberspace, operational difficulties in deterring and identifying cyber-attacks as well as the asymmetric dimension of cyber-conflicts pose without a doubt, great pressure on both theorists and practitioners of warfare. This paper will highlight the legal and ethical dilemmas regarding the use of force in cyberspace and question how the Law of War can be applied to cyber-threats.

In August 2008, the Russian Army invaded georgia. numerous, coordinated cyber attacks accompanied the military campaign. this represents the first instance of a large-scale computer network attack (CNA) conducted in tandem with major ground combat operations. The attack had no direct connection to the Russian government, but had a significant informational and psychological impact on Georgia: it effectively isolated the Caucasus state from the outside world.

Cyber-security has been approached by various disciplines. Information technology experts, lawyers, strategists and state officials have enriched the debate about the nature of cyber-security. The dominant trend - regardless of its theoretical origin - is state-centric. This approach is to a large extent legitimate, but at the same time inadequate. Cybersecurity relates directly to the threats posed to the nation’s critical infrastructure, but should not be limited to the traditional concept of national security. The militarization of the cyber-security discourse has produced a security dilemma, which is not addressing sufficiently the needs of the people. The purpose of this paper is to highlight this shortcoming and view cybersecurity, through a human-centric prism. The paper will address the way state and non-state practices violate human rights in cyberspace. Over the past years, the development of internet censorship techniques and Edward Snowden revelations about the global surveillance carried out by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), vividly demonstrate that Internet freedom, anonymity and data protection are constantly under attack. The challenge ahead is to establish a governance regime for cyberspace that successfully addresses human rights norms and standards.

Com a crescente securitização do ciberespaço e o atrelamento cada vez maior de Infraestruturas Críticas às tecnologias de informação, pesquisas acadêmicas acerca de conflitos cibernéticos se tornam indispensáveis para o equilíbrio internacional. Assim, em que pese questões sobre operações defensivas e ofensivas no ciberespaço surjam com maior frequência na seara acadêmica, não existe um consenso sobre como otimizá-las. Nesse sentido, o presente artigo, se propõe a mostrar alternativas para a otimização do Ciclo OODA (Observação, Orientação, Decisão e Ação) no ciberespaço de forma a alcançar Superioridade de Informação na realidade brasileira. Em outras palavras se buscará propostas para tornar o processo de tomada de decisão mais eficiente, para que já nos primeiros estágios a informação obtida seja pertinente e processada rapidamente, possibilitando a obtenção de vantagens operacionais resultantes do processo de coleta, processamento e disseminação dos fluxos de informação, conforme expresso na Doutrina Militar Brasileira. O problema de pesquisa é o que segue: como se pode otimizar o Ciclo OODA a fim de se obter a Superioridade de Informação, no contexto brasileiro? Para tanto, buscar-se-á apoio em documentos oficiais brasileiros como a Política Cibernética de Defesa (2012) e a Doutrina Militar de Defesa Cibernética (2014). Ademais, serão usados como base o pensamento de John Boyd, e a revisão bibliográfica de artigos acadêmicos que versem sobre o assunto. Assim, o artigo divide-se em três partes: primeiramente há uma análise do Ciclo OODA na obra de Boyd e a explicação de como ele se encaixa na questões dos conflitos cibernéticos. Em seguida elenca-se algumas alternativas na literatura sobre busca da Superioridade de Informação, que entrem no escopo do Ciclo OODA. Por fim, faz-se um compilado dessas ideias para o panorama brasileiro, de forma a não esgotar os debates sobre manobras cibernéticas, mas sim, incentivá-los e abri-los a comunidade acadêmica nacional.

Over the last years there is a growing body of literature over the role of states in cyberspace, over the need for the westphalian state system to adjust in a globalised and borderless world. The purpose of this article is to examine the ways in which a transition from the westphalian state system to a cyber-westphalian one, can take place. The westphalian state system is based on state sovereignty and borders, so the question that inevitably arises is whether states can define virtual borders and eventually construct an international legal framework that determines state sovereignty in cyberspace. A closer look at recent developments like the Chinese attempt to build their own internal internet, the role of internet filters in authoritarian regimes, the creation of the US Cyber Command and the debate for a global cyber-treaty, mark that the transition is already underway.

L'elaborato spiega nel modo più dettagliato possibile cosa sia il cyberwarfare, illustrandone i concetti e le metodologie, offrendo esempi storici e spunti per ulteriori approfondimenti. Infine, è presente un'analisi delle dottrine e delle modalità di approccio al cyberwarfare, in particolare alla cyber difesa, del sistema Paese italiano, evidenziandone l’evoluzione temporale, le eventuali criticità e i modelli vincenti.

The technological transformation story of Azerbaijan is marked by the popular embrace of digital banking, implementation of centralized e-government services, and the automation of critical energy infrastructure. However, this march towards modernization brings with it inherent vulnerabilities, which make cybersecurity an emerging critical frontier. Cybersecurity is a new paradigm, where traditional concepts of security falter as national boundaries blur and perpetrators often remain shrouded in anonymity. In this new territory Azerbaijan confronts three primary challenges: the difficulty in establishing clear cyber trigger lines akin to physical borders, the near impossibility of attributing attacks and assigning responsibility, and the daunting task of developing proportionate countermeasures in an evolving and unregulated domain. This paper argues how through a comprehensive and proactive cyber-defense strategy, Azerbaijan can not only shield its critical infrastructures and government databases but also establish a resilient digital presence in the global arena.

• Provides a multidisciplinary approach to Cyber Warfare analyzing the information technology, military, policy, social, and scientific issues that are in play.
• Presents detailed case studies of cyber-attack including inter-state cyber-conflict (Russia-Estonia), cyber-attack as an element of an information operations strategy (Israel-Hezbollah,) and cyber-attack as a tool against dissidents within a state (Russia, Iran)
• Explores cyber-attack conducted by large, powerful, non-state hacking organizations such as Anonymous and LulzSec
• Covers cyber-attacks directed against infrastructure such including but not limited to water treatment plants, power-grid and a detailed account on Stuxent"""

A excitação das massas pode ser produzida como resultado do recurso às novas tecnologias da comunicação de massa, para além da via farmacológica? E aqui chamamos de “novas tecnologias” de comunicação de massa as tecnologias digitais ligadas à hipermídia, que muitas vezes mesclam falas, escritos e imagens sob a forma de artefatos semióticos capazes de ser disseminados na superfície da grande rede e nos seus dutos. Neste ensaio desenvolvo algumas reflexões sobre a possibilidade de se provocar excitação/convulsão de massas sem o uso de fármacos dialogando com dois textos de Domenico Losurdo: “Resistência Falsa e Manipulações Verdadeiras – A Geopolítica da Internet” (2010)1 e “Estende-se o domínio da manipulação: o que se passa na Síria?” (2011)2.

Today, our entire modern way of life, from communication to commerce to
conflict, fundamentally depends on the Internet. Technological advances have
profoundly impacted everyday life by introducing creative inventions that were once
confined to the realm of science fiction and are now common use. The exponential
growth of cyberspace has also changed the dynamics of the joint operating environment.
The modern threat environment is a world that is less contained by boundaries and one
that allows a shadow war, known as cyber warfare, to occur. Adversaries of the United
States and allies are using the cyberspace domain as a platform for warfare where rule of
law is abstract and limitations are mostly self-imposed. While there are technically no
“rules of engagement” for cyberspace, the United States has self-imposed restrictions that
make it more difficult to conduct discrete levels of cyber operations. This form of
warfare is currently working for our adversaries because they don’t limit themselves,
much less allow someone else to limit them.
The ARSOF Operating Concept calls for the use of the cyber domain to facilitate
surgical strikes and intelligence operations (Cleveland 2014, 27). Rapidly defining
capabilities, methodologies, and authorities (without containing out-of-the-box thinking
is a way to show what cyber warfare is. Another way to define cyber operations is by
showing a reflection of current cyber operations, that is, by giving some empirical
examples. These can be seen in the recent events in Crimea and the operationalization of
the Stuxnet virus in Iran. Hybrid warfare is the use of political, economic, technological,
and informational tools that together make up the phenomenon of social infrastructure.
One particular element of this type of event – human political protest - is now known to
be a very important component in what we are learning about hybrid warfare. This is
supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions
of informational conflict, combined arms tactics, cyber operations and the actions of
Special Operations Forces. I intend to explain how SOF can employ technological
advances in cyber tools and networked social media to coerce, disrupt, or deter
adversaries. This information will be of particular use to the SOF community. In an
increasingly globalized and interconnected world, Special Operations must recognize,
learn, adapt, understand and examine new and innovative ways to modernize irregular
warfare fighting capabilities.

“What Can We Say About Cyberwar Based on Cybernetics?” article examines the basics of cyberwar, mostly cybernetics. It also deals with cyberspace as a new global infrastructure
and cyberwar as a global level of warfare. The focus of the article is also on the types and levels of cybernetic information and their importance in cyberwar. It also studies the human
and the computer as cybernetic systems and as targets of cyberwar. Ahvenainen points out eight logical types of cyberwar and claims that essentially Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s understandings of warfare similar to the cybernetic process and that John Boyd’s OODA loop is a cybernetic process. According to him, computer programs and integrated chips combined with human understanding comprise the heart of cyberwar.

Cyber-attacks are often viewed in academic and military writings as strategic asymmetric weapons, great equalizers with the potential of leveling the battlefield between powerful nations and those less capable.  However, there has been little evidence to suggest that cyber-attacks are a genuine military option in a state-on-state conflict. In instances of actual military operations (e.g., Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Israel/Gaza), there is little
accompanying evidence of a military conducting cyber-attacks against either a civilian or military target.  Given that some of the nation states that have been involved in military conflict or peacekeeping missions in hostile areas are believed to have some level of offensive cyber capability, this may be indicative. More substantive examples demonstrate that cyber-attacks
have been more successful in non-military activities, as they may serve as a clandestine weapon of subterfuge better positioned to incapacitate systems without alerting the victims, veiling the orchestrator's true identity via proxy groups and plausible deniability. Consequently, this paper provides a counter argument to the idea that cyber tools are instrumental military weapons in modern day warfare;  cyber weapons are more effective options during times of nation state tension rather than military conflict, and are more serviceable as a signaling tool than one designed to gain military advantage. In situations where state-on-state conflict exists, high value targets that need
to be neutralized would most likely be attacked via conventional weapons where battle damage assessment can be easily quantified. This raises the question: are cyber weapons effective military tools?

Ciberseguridad Nacional en México y sus desafíos RESUMEN 1 Debido a los avances tecnológicos los Estados enfrentan nuevos desafíos en la llamada Era de la Información. Estos desafíos están ligados a la falta de protección y al mal uso del ciberespacio, que se ha convertido en el quinto ámbito de la guerra. Visto desde la perspectiva de la seguridad nacional, la dependencia en las tecnologías de la información y comunicaciones (TIC) ha acelerado los procesos, pero aumentado las vulnerabilidades. Por ello, los Estados han buscado salvaguardar la ciberseguridad a través de medidas políticas, tecnológicas y estratégicas que incluyen claridad en los conceptos y atribuciones de los actores. Es decir, el concepto de seguridad ha evolucionado para incluir los aspectos tecnológicos que hoy predominan bajo el termino de ciberseguridad nacional. Por ello, los Estados han diseñado ciberestrategias para contrarrestar las diversas amenazas del ciberespacio y los desafíos que deben enfrentar en cuestiones de estrategia, recursos humanos y desarrollo tecnológico. Abstract Due to technological advances, States face new challenges in the so-called Information Age. These challenges are linked to the lack of protection and misuse of cyberspace, which has become the fifth domain of war. Seen from the perspective of national security, reliance on information and communication technologies (ICT) has accelerated processes, but it has also increased vulnerabilities. Therefore, States have sought to safeguard cybersecurity through political, technological and strategic measures that include clarity in the concepts and attributions of the actors. In other words, the concept of national security has evolved to include the predominant technological aspects of today´s world under the term of national cybersecurity.

El Siglo XXI nos obliga a repensar conceptos, objetos y amenazas en materia de Defensa y Seguridad, así como también las herramientas y métodos con los que respondemos a estas nuevas amenazas.
Ante todo, es pertinente aclarar que este breve escrito no abrevará en lo que se conoce como la corriente de securitización, de la escuela Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp de Wilde y Lene Hansen (1998; 2009), en la que nuevos temas y sujetos entran a la agenda de seguridad (obteniendo así novedosos conceptos como seguridad alimentaria o seguridad medioambiental). Por el contrario, este artículo se enfoca en la agenda de seguridad tradicional, esto es, aquella que tiene el foco puesto en la guerra y las amenazas militares “convencionales” (Walt, 1991), pero lo hace adoptando temáticas, objetivos y desafíos propios del nuevo milenio.
Dentro de esta agenda de seguridad convencional aggiornada (si se me permite la expresión), la ciberdefensa y la ciberseguridad deben tener un lugar central, puesto que la ciberguerra es uno de los medios de ataque más poderosos en nuestra época, así como también uno de los más subestimados. Puesto de otro modo, si bien el objetivo principal sigue siendo poner en jaque a un Estado enemigo, atacando el corazón mismo de su infraestructura crítica y sus reservorios de poder nacional, los métodos usados y los blancos de ataque cambian de manera radical al considerar el caso de la ciberguerra.

The dimensions of warfare have evolved over the centuries from Land and Sea to encompass Air and Outer Space in the 20th Century. With the heavy dependence on networks in the 21st Century, Cyberspace is emerging as an increasingly contested domain, with critical importance for the projection of military force. Here, in a two-piece write-up, we discuss the emergence of Cyberspace as an operational domain of warfare, deliberate on types and classifications of cyber-attacks/ cyberwar, briefly describe some real-world examples of cyberwar over the past decade, and finally dwell upon certain doctrinal aspects related to offensive cyberwar strategies as well as some legal implications of conducting cyberwar.

The term Advanced Persistent Threats (APT, APTs) has a relatively short history – originated in the United States' government spheres and as such was referred to cyber attacks waged by a state actor. The emergence of such threats has been linked to the evolution of the hacker underground that took place after 2000. The activity of specialists swelling the Black Hat ranks had the nature of criminal offences, targeting data collected by corporations and state institutions. Despite a dozen or so years of experience with APTs, they continue to be a dynamic category of contemporary cyber security threats, with many evolving components beyond simple classification. Their unambiguous identification as a strictly separate type is obstructed mainly by the complex structure of such attacks, prompting analysts to locate them in a catalog containing various known vulnerabilities, mechanisms, cycles and variables. The analysis of the problem and the evolution of attacks to date has led to the hypothesis that Advanced Persistent Threats are now in the phase of their further modification and testing as a means of offensive action in interstate and asymmetric conflicts. Armed forces and special services of states saw in them not only a tool per se to achieve economic and military advantage, but a theoretical basis for further research on the development of advanced cyber weapon.

Cyber warfare figures conspicuously on the motivation of policymakers and military pioneers far and wide. New units to guarantee cybersecurity are made at different levels of government, incorporating into the military. Be that as it may, cyber activities in equipped clash circumstances could have possibly intense outcomes, specifically when their impact isn't restricted to the information of the focused on PC framework or PC. Undoubtedly, cyber tasks are generally expected to have an impact on 'this present reality'. For example, by messing with the supporting PC frameworks, one can control an adversary's airport regulation frameworks, oil pipeline stream frameworks, or atomic plants. The potential helpful effect of some cyber activities on the non-military personnel populace is colossal. It is along these lines vital to examine the principles of International humanitarian law(IHL) that represent such activities since one of the primary destinations of this collection of law is to shield the non-military personnel populace from the impacts of warfare. The article provides an understanding of cyber-crime as a non-state cyberwarfare by analyzing and identifying the terms and catches in cyber-crime and cyberwarfare, while comparing different cases and studies around the globe, challenges, issues and the precautions in the implementation of an international humanitarian law. The article goes ahead to take a gander at probably the most essential standards of IHL overseeing the lead of dangers and the translation in the cyber domain of those guidelines, in particular, the standards of qualification, proportionality, and safety measure. As for these principles, the cyber domain suggests various conversation starters that are as yet open. Specifically, the interconnectedness of cyberspace represents a test to the most key commence of the tenets on the direct of dangers, to be specific that regular citizen and military articles can and should be Cyber-Terrorism as A Non-State Cyber Warfare: An Overview http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp 860 [email protected] recognized constantly. In this way, regardless of whether the customary standards of IHL will give adequate security to regular citizens from the impacts of cyber warfare stays to be seen. Their understanding will positively need to consider the specificities of cyberspace. Without better learning of the potential impacts of cyber warfare, it can't be barred that more stringent standards may be essential.

The link between cyberspace and national security is often presented as an unquestionable and uncontested ‘truth’. However, there is nothing natural or given about this link: it had to be forged, argued, and accepted in the (security) political process. This article explores the constitutive effects of different threat representations in the broader cyber-security discourse. In contrast to previous work on the topic, the focus is not solely on discursive practices by ‘visible’ elite actors, but also on how a variety of less visible actors inside and outside of government shape a reservoir of acceptable threat representations that influence everyday practices of cyber-security. Such an approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of the diverse ways in which cyber-security is presented as a national security issue and of the consequences of particular representations

Cyber security is seen as one of the most pressing national security issues of our time. Due to sophisticated and highly publicised cyber attacks such as Stuxnet, it is increasingly framed as a strategic issue. The diffuse nature of the threat, coupled with a heightened sense of vulnerability, has brought about a growing militarisation of cyber security. This has resulted in too much attention on the low probability of a large scale cyber attack, a focus on the wrong policy solutions, and a detrimental atmosphere of insecurity and tension in the international system. Though cyber operations will be a significant component of future conflicts, the role of the military in cyber security will be limited and needs to be carefully defined.

Cyberspace is erroneously characterized as a domain that transcends physical space and thereby is immune to state sovereignty and resistant to international regulation. The purpose of this paper is to signify that cyberspace, in common with the other four domains (land, sea, air and outer space) and despite its unique characteristics, is just a reflection of the current international system, and thereby is largely affected by the rules that characterize it. The issue of state sovereignty in cyberspace is critical to any discussion about future regulation of cyberspace. Although cyberspace is borderless and is characterized by anonymity and ubiquity, recent state practices provide sufficient evidence that cyberspace, or at least some components of it, are not immune from sovereignty. The increasing use of Internet filtering techniques by both authoritarian regimes and democracies is just the latest example of attempting to control information flows. Cyberspace is non‐territorial, but in sharp contrast to the land, sea, air and outer space, cyberspace is not a part of nature, it is human‐made and therefore can be unmade and regulated. States have continuously emphasized their right to exercise control over the cyber‐infrastructure located in their respective territory, to exercise their jurisdiction over cyberactivities on their territory, and to protect their cyber‐infrastructure against any trans‐border interference by other states or by individuals. As a result, states are filtering and monitoring cyber‐bytes. Over the past years, there is a growing number of states that is publishing national cyber‐policies and establishing cyber‐centers that aim to protect the national cyber‐infrastructure and control their citizens’ access to information. The issue of state sovereignty in cyberspace raises critical questions about the need to regulate the cyber domain and gradually reach an international cyber‐order.

En el presente trabajo se aborda la cuestión de la ciberseguridad, una disciplina que atiende las amenazas que surgen y se despliegan en el "quinto dominio" o ciberespacio. Su objetivo principal consiste en determinar si en esta cuestión de tanta importancia dentro de la agenda de la Seguridad Internacional contemporánea, la comunidad internacional ha desarrollado instituciones que permitan alcanzar acuerdos y reducir los niveles de conflictividad. Desde el punto de vista metodológico, se utilizó un abordaje lógico deductivo, el análisis fluctuó entre los niveles descriptivo y explicativo, y se utilizó información cualitativa obtenida de fuentes secundarias. El trabajo permitió identificar los aspectos centrales de la ciberseguridad, su grado de institucionalidad desde el punto de vista teórico de las relaciones internacionales y, finalmente, la situación de un área específica de la ciberseguridad: la ciberguerra. Se concluye que el grado de institucionalización en materia de ciberseguridad, en el plano internacional, es limitado. No existe una convención multilateral que aborde el tema de manera integral y se articulan mecanismos alternativos de gobernanza para mejorar la situación en diferentes aspectos de esa cuestión. En el caso de la ciberguerra, la utilidad de los mecanismos de gobernanza es controversial, pues no resulta claro si son empíricamente aplicables los consensos alcanzados en el plano nominal.

The U.S.-China bilateral agenda is dominated by issues like trade, intellectual property rights, monetary policy, human rights and security issues. However, given the fact that critical national infrastructures and the private sector are increasingly dependent on digital assets, cyberspace has become an important aspect of their bilateral relationship. The purpose of this paper is to define the nature of U.S.-China relationship in cyberspace and identify issues that cause conflict between Washington and Beijing. For both sides, cyberspace is a realm where they exercise power politics in order to pursue their national interests. The two global competitors have different positions on most of the issues that relate to cyberspace. Fear and uncertainty are present in cyberspace for both Washington and Beijing. Nevertheless, they also have common goals. The level of interdependence between them is high and avoiding misperception and escalation is a mutual priority. Therefore, both sides are trying to avoid mistrust and conflict in cyberspace and establish some cooperative mechanisms. Based on previous practice from nuclear diplomacy, both sides are in the process of identifying diplomatic tools (e.g. confidence building measures, Track II diplomacy and simulations) in order to avoid unnecessary tension in cyberspace.

The article presents the nuances of cyber espionage versus cyberattacks that are becoming more pervasive in the national security context. It defines the differences between the two, and proposes a method of analyzing cyber operations to properly categorize them. Then, using an extended hypothetical and several real-life examples, it illustrates how dangerous cyber operations can be, and the need to properly define them so as to respond most effectively.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Frage, ob ein Krieg im Cyberspace möglich ist. Dazu stütze ich mich auf die Kriegs-Definition die Clausewitz aufgestellt hat und wende diese auf die aktuelle Cyberwar-Diskussion an. Ich stelle die aktuellen technischen Möglichkeiten für Cyberattacken in einem kurzen Überblick vor und zeige, wie sich durch die ausbreitende Technik Angriffsvektoren für Cyberattacken öffnen. Außerdem zeige ich, welchen Einfluss die gegenwärtige Entwicklung auf militärische Strategien hat.

Cyberspace is a socio-political and technological domain with unique characteristics. It is a human made domain
that offers universal reach and access to its users. Its decentralized nature and the fact that it is mostly owned and managed
by the private sector, raise a number of questions regarding the limits of state sovereignty and the most effective form of
governance. Viewing cyberspace as a global commons, balancing between state sovereignty and the fragmentation of
cyberspace and debating between multilateral governance and multi-stakeholderism, illustrate the difficulty of regulating
human activities behind keyboards and computer screens. The cases of ITU, ICANN, IGF and NETmundial offer us a pragmatic
insight into the power politics of cyberspace. Reducing uncertainty between the various stakeholders, developing norms,
advancing law-making efforts and matching geopolitics with technology are all pieces of the complex puzzle of cyberspace
governance.

The following article presents an alternative critical perspective of the cyber security research agenda. The article opens with criticism of the securitization discourse that uses analogies of historical events with events in cyber space. The author argues that such an approach is inappropriate, and that events of such impact are very unlikely to take place. The events that have already shaped our way of thinking – such as the Estonian attacks – caused significant damage to the respective country; nevertheless, the very same attack today would not do the same harm, thanks to the different level of critical infrastructure in Estonia. Another example, Stuxnet, is also an event of high impact, but with alow probability of happening in the future. Due to the complexity of the supporting operation of the attack, it would not lead to a cyber world war. The future will bring more complex, less visible, completely covered and precise operations that will take advantage of all cyber space features, rather than a cybergeddon comparable to some historical event or a nuclear scenario. The author proposes three directions of desired research agenda in the cyber security field. Firstly, the development of normative framework aimed at a better understanding of cyber events; secondly, a thorough research of cyber space leading to appropriate space conceptualization; and thirdly, the reevaluation of cyber warfare concept in the light of the cyber space novelty.

The dimensions of warfare have evolved over the centuries from Land and Sea to encompass Air and Outer Space in the 20th Century. With the heavy dependence on networks in the 21st Century, Cyberspace is emerging as an increasingly contested domain, with critical importance for the projection of military force. In the first part of this two-piece write-up, the emergence of Cyberspace as an operational domain of warfare, as well as the types and classifications of cyber-attacks/ cyberwar were discussed. In this part, some real-world examples of cyberwar over the past decade will be described, and certain doctrinal aspects related to offensive cyberwar strategies as well as some legal implications of conducting cyberwar will be dwelt upon.

The Internet has become a essential tool in the everyday conduct of commercial life and its security has become a topic of growing importance since 9/11. The ability of terrorists to conduct cyberwarfare is largely unknown, but the potential for the disruption of life worries many policymakers. In searching for precedent to anticipate the potential impact of a cyberwar, it is important to identify modes of conflict that are useful against asymmetrically matched opponents and conflict that strikes at the economy. I suggest that an effective model for looking at cyberwarfare is that of maritime “guerre de course” or commerce warfare. Moreover, the maritime paradigm provides a useful dialog with which to examine possible future trends in cyberwarfare beyond effects including the impact of technological innovation, sociological and historical trends, and tactics.

Este artigo argumenta sobre a emergência da ciberguerra como nova forma de conflito internacional. É feita uma introdução à temática da guerra no ciberespaço, seguida de uma contextualização histórica que abrange o nascimento da ARPAnet1 e a sua evolução até à Internet que conhecemos hoje.
São analisados dois exemplos reais e paradigmáticos desta realidade: os ciberataques à República da Estónia e o ciberataque à central de produção de material nuclear de Natanz, no Irão, executado pelo Stuxnet2.
São, ainda, argumentadas questões que demonstram que as ICT 3 estão a fornecer às sociedades novas ferramentas para práticas antigas e a possibilitar a distribuição de poder (empowerment) pelos novos intervenientes desta emergente forma de guerra, seguidas da conclusão.

This article is dedicated to the emergence of the cyber war as a new form of international conflict. The topic of cyberspace war is introduced, followed by an historical background covering the birth and evolution of DARPA’s ARPAnet to the Internet we know today.
Two paradigmatic and real examples of this new reality: the cyber attacks to the Republic of Estonia and the cyber attacks to Iran’s Natanz nuclear material production facility, executed by Stuxnet, are analysed.
The issues about ICT allowing the use of new tools to perform old practices and the distribution of power (empowerment) among new actors in this emerging way of war, are also discussed, followed by the conclusion.

English: The security of cyberspace has not only gained importance for individual computer users in recent years, but has also become a much discussed topic among states, who see cyber threats as a major threat to their national security. This chapter examines the technical basics and historical development of the problem and undertakes an assessment of the current and the future risk. It becomes apparent that cyber security is a major challenge for state actors, who have to redefine their role as guarantor of security in the information age.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics/article/digital-protectionism-and-national-planning-in-the-age-of-the-internet-the-case-of-iran/C740355C5661D17B64A2C1C15123C2BA
Abstract:
What do regulations in the developing world tell us about the internet economy? In this paper, we argue that the ways in which developing nation states adjust to and legislate the internet depends upon whether they possess a national planning strategy for international data traffic. Focusing our attention on the global trade of intangible goods in Iran, we aim to demonstrate that digital protectionism causes, to varying degrees, suppression, censorship, and the violation of freedom of speech and other civil rights on the internet. Our results show that digital protectionism generated an emergence of domestic start-ups, with companies, such as Facenema and Soroush, operating in the Iranian market in the absence of global rivals such as Facebook and WhatsApp. Yet, digital protectionism and sanction-induced barriers have triggered social problems, besides the emergence of parastatals, securing the economy to an inefficient social and economic path towards digital development.

Cyber-attacks are often viewed in academic and military writings as strategic asymmetric weapons, great equalizers with the potential of leveling the battlefield between powerful nations and those less capable. However, there has been little evidence to suggest that cyber-attacks are a genuine military option in a state-on-state conflict. In instances of actual military operations (e.g., Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Israel/Gaza), there is little accompanying evidence of a military conducting cyber-attacks against either a civilian or military target. Given that some of the nation states that have been involved in military conflict or peacekeeping missions in hostile areas are believed to have some level of offensive cyber capability, this may be indicative. More substantive examples demonstrate that cyber-attacks have been more successful in non-military activities, as they may serve as a clandestine weapon of subterfuge better positioned to incapacitate systems without alerting ...

This book critiques mainstream beliefs about cyberwarfare and forges a new path in the way of defining this largely misunderstood concept. Rather than outlining cyberspace as a new technology applied in military operations, here, Tsirigotis rallies against this technocentric account and establishes how cyberspace, first and foremost, should be categorized as a new way to understand war and military power in the Information Age. Using genre analysis and Corpus Linguistics, the author scrutinizes how cyberspace has changed the way the UK comprehends war and military power, and how the cybernetisation of war has manifested itself in Britain's approach to national defense and security.