Eastern Europe

Slovakia’s relations with the states of Eastern Europe not only have a bilateral impact, but contain geopolitical, security and economic dimensions as well. This article analyzes the domestic, bilateral and multilateral aspects of relations between Slovakia and Russia before and after the parliamentary elections of 1998, when Slovakia adopted a pro-Western course aimed at EU and NATO membership. The article also focuses on bilateral relations with Ukraine, where Slovakia is among the most active supporters of Ukraine’s future EU membership. The final sections analyze the Eastern policy of Slovakia – particularly within the framework of the EU’s Eastern Partnership and the Visegrad Group – as well as Slovakia’s relations with the new Eastern European partners, such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia, as target countries of Slovakia’s “soft power.”

This paper focuses on the specific role of mid-range universities in knowledge transfer and explores the knowledge flows from these mid-range universities which face a number of additional constraints in transitional Central Eastern European (CEE) regions. The first part focuses on the theoretical framework of knowledge transfers and on the types of university–industry linkages involving knowledge transfer in the case of mid-range universities. The next section examines the development path and specific trajectories of universities in post-communist countries. The following sections draw on the findings of the ERAWATCH research and focus on cases from the non-metropolitan regions of Hungary and the Czech Republic in order to examine the specific barriers to knowledge transfer and explain the reasons behind the traditionally weaker role of mid-range universities. The paper argues that ambitious university-based developmental models have to be revised in CEE regions and the future development role of universities has to be reconsidered from a more realistic perspective.

This study analyzes controversies and public attitudes concerning the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine. The research question is: Which factors affect attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera in contemporary Ukraine? This article employs comparative and regression analyses of surveys commissioned by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2009 and 2013 to determine the effects of regional and other factors on attitudes toward these organizations and the OUN-B leader. The study shows that regional factors and perceptions of these organizations' involvement in mass murder were the strongest predictors of the views concerning the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera. Their public support is strongest in Galicia and weakest in the East and the South, in particular, in Donbas and Crimea, two major conflict areas since the “Euromaidan.”

This study examines the role of political factors in attitudes toward World War II in contemporary Ukraine. The question under examination is which factors determine public views of the principal warring sides and their leaders in Ukraine. This paper uses a representative national survey specifically designed for this research project and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2012. It analyzes the roles of regionalism, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, age, and sex in attitudes toward the Red Army, Soviet partisans, the German Army (Wehrmacht), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the war, as well as toward the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the UPA. The analysis of the survey data shows that regional values, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on views of the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and attitudes toward the wartime activities of Joseph Stalin and Roman Shukhevych. Public perceptions of the German Army and Adolf Hitler in Ukraine do not vary much across regions, political parties, and ethnic, language, age, and sex groups.

This article, which introduces a Special Issue of the JCES on the challenges of EU enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans, critically examines the geopolitical turn of the EU’s institutional thinking on enlargement since 2017. After several high-ranked EU officials and leaders of member states more or less explicitly voiced their concerns about the declining influence of the EU in the Western Balkans, the European Commission – which has traditionally been responsible for carrying out administrative-technical aspects of the accession process – adopted a more geopolitical approach to enlargement policy in February 2018, and has since sought to advance Western Balkan accession more decisively. However, this geopolitical turn to the EU’s institutional thinking on enlargement has so far failed to translate discourse into concrete results. The article argues that the main reasons for this failure can be found in a lack of support by EU members, which either do not share the Commission’s sense of urgency, or are eager to use enlargement policy and the accession process to advance their national interests. The article concludes with a brief presentation of the structure of the special issue and introduces the contributing articles.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

What determines a country's ability to compete in international markets? What fosters the global competitiveness of its firms? And in the European context, have key elements of the EU strategy such as EMU and enlargement helped or hindered domestic firms' competitiveness in local and global markets? We address these questions by calibrating and simulating a conceptual framework that, based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), predicts that tougher and more transparent international competition drives less productive firms out the market, thereby increasing average productivity as well as reducing average prices and mark-ups. The model also predicts a parallel reduction of price dispersion within sectors. Our conceptual framework allows us to disentangle the effects of technology and freeness of entry from those of accessibility (i.e. the ease for local firms to reach local and foreign consumers). On the one hand, by controlling for the impact of trade frictions, we are able to co...

The paper aims at presenting and evaluating the conditions of access to the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the coming into force of the new Fundamental Law and Constitutional Court Act on 1 January 2012. The abolition of actio popularis and the concomitant introduction of full constitutional complaint opened a new scenario for the Hungarian Constitutional Court in which a shift of emphasis from abstract to concrete review may be expected. More than one year after the entering into force of the new scheme it is possible to make an early evaluation of the practice based on the new framework. How are these new forms being used by the complainants and interpreted by the Court? Can we already delineate the new trends of case-law?

The Sedlec Ossuary is a small Roman Catholic chapel, located beneath the Cemetery Church of All Saints (Czech: Hřbitovní kostel Všech Svatých), part of the former Sedlec Abbey in Sedlec, a suburb of Kutná Hora in the Czech Republic.
The ossuary is estimated to contain the skeletons of between 40,000 and 70,000 people, whose bones have, in many cases, been artistically arranged to form decorations and furnishings for the chapel.

Four enormous bell-shaped mounds occupy the corners of the chapel. An enormous chandelier of bones, which contains at least one of every bone in the human body, hangs from the center of the nave with garlands of skulls draping the vault. Other works include piers and monstrances flanking the altar, a coat of arms of the House of Schwarzenberg, and the signature of František Rint, also executed in bone, on the wall near the entrance.

In 1278, Henry, the abbot of the Cistercian monastery in Sedlec, was sent to the Holy Land by King Otakar II of Bohemia. He returned with a small amount of earth he had removed from Golgotha and sprinkled it over the abbey cemetery. The word of this pious act soon spread and the cemetery in Sedlec became a desirable burial site throughout Central Europe.

In the mid 14th century, during the Black Death, and after the Hussite Wars in the early 15th century, many thousands were buried in the abbey cemetery, so it had to be greatly enlarged.

Around 1400, a Gothic church was built in the center of the cemetery with a vaulted upper level and a lower chapel to be used as an ossuary for the mass graves unearthed during construction, or simply slated for demolition to make room for new burials.

After 1511, the task of exhuming skeletons and stacking their bones in the chapel was given to a half-blind monk of the order.

Between 1703 and 1710, a new entrance was constructed to support the front wall, which was leaning outward, and the upper chapel was rebuilt. This work, in the Czech Baroque style, was designed by Jan Santini Aichel.

In 1870, František Rint, a woodcarver, was employed by the Schwarzenberg family to put the bone heaps into order, yielding a macabre result.
The signature of Rint, also executed in bone, appears on the wall near the entrance to the chapel.

Авсюк А.А. Сравнительная характеристика индустриальных парков в Беларуси и Китае /А.А. Авсюк // Новые горизонты: cборник материалов Белорусско-Китайского молодежного инновационного форума / БНТУ. – Минск, 2017. - T. 2. С.33-35.

Abstract. The article deals with comparative characteristics of industrial parks of Belarus and China. Problems and peculiarities were allocated of activities of the Belarusianand Chinese technology parks. The conclusion about the necessity of using the Chineseexperience in the policy of formation of technology parks structures in Belarus.

Eight community mental health care centres (initiated by the South-Eastern Europe Stability Pact) in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Romania were evaluated. Characteristics of patients, patient reported outcomes and patient views of care were assessed in 305 psychiatric patients. Patient characteristics varied across centres, with most patients having long term psychotic disorders. Treatment satisfaction and therapeutic relationships were rated favourably. Subjective quality of life mean scores were rather low, with higher satisfaction with health and dissatisfaction with the financial and employment situation. Being unemployed was the only factor associated with poor quality of life and lower treatment satisfaction. Most developing centres target patients with persistent psychotic disorders. Care appears highly valued by the patients. The findings encourage establishing more centres in the region and call for employment schemes for people with mental illnesses.

This article emphasizes the contribution of International Framework Agreements (IFAs) to collective bargaining within multinational companies (MNC). For this purpose, we used various data, including content analysis of 42 IFAs and interviews with representatives of the five Global Union Federations (GUFs) involved in the negotiation of these IFAs, in order to assess the content and efficiency of these agreements. Our

The fall of communism left some of the most polluting and wasteful energy sectors of the World in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). After 15 years of restructuring, eight of these countries have joined the European Union (EU), closing an era of economic transitions. What progress has been made in these countries in the field of energy from the perspective of sustainability? Has the transition agenda been completed, or do any of the socialist energy sector legacies prevail?The purpose of this paper is to review the period of economic transition in the energy sector, focusing on sustainability, in three selected CEE countries, and to use Russia as a comparison. First, the paper argues that at the core of the unsustainability of energy sectors at the end of the communist era were among the highest energy intensities in the world. Then, we identify the legacies of the centrally planned economy that contributed to these high-energy intensities. We outline a policy agenda for the transitions which addresses the identified legacies. Next, we look at the energy landscape at the end of the restructuring, and review the developments in energy intensities during the period of economic transitions. We conclude that, while energy and economic restructuring is very important to bring down the high-energy intensities of former communist countries, a sizeable gap remains in intensity levels between CEE countries and the old EU states. Therefore, economic and energy system reforms alone will not close the gap, and targeted policies and measures are needed to improve energy efficiency levels. Beyond a more serious governmental commitment, a concerted effort is needed from regulators, corporations, utilities, consumer organisations and the civil sector to catalyse the remaining progress to be made in combating the socialist legacy in the field of energy efficiency.