Khalistan movement

The Khalistan movement is a Sikh separatist movement seeking to create a homeland for Sikhs by establishing a sovereign state, called Khālistān ('Land of the Khalsa'), in the Punjab region. The proposed state would consist of land that currently forms Punjab, India, and Punjab, Pakistan.

This paper aims to explore various literary resources to showcase the role of Dr Jagjit Singh Chohan in the Sikh Homeland Struggle. Through various research methods including writings & speeches of Dr Jagjit Singh, foreign office correspondences and not limited to the oral interviews with associates of the late Doctor. Though Chohan spent over a decade living in London, England, his name has been forgotten in Sikh circles and hence, it is of great importance that a new study is carried out to provide clarity over a forgotten protagonist of the Khalistan Movement and to pinpoint his activities. The United Kingdom is home to a substantial number of Sikhs and as a direct result, has been intertwined with the ever-changing affairs in the Sikh Homeland namely East Panjab. This paper looks to identify the key events that took place in the United Kingdom & The Panjab in the struggle for an independent sovereign Sikh State in the late 60s & early 70s, with mention of 1984.

Introduction

When I first came across the name 'Dr Jagjit Singh Chohan,' I was researching the Anglo Sikh War period with emphasis on the personality named, General Sham Singh Attari.

'Sham Singh and Ranjodh Singh led the forces. Sham Singh Attariwala clad in white silks and riding a white steed, the grey bearded hero went into the field of action, pledged to victory or death. He rallied the ranks depleted by traitorous desertions. His courage inspired the Sikhs to make a determined bid to save the day, but the odds were against them. Sham Singh fell fighting in the foremost ranks. So did his dauntless comrades.' - Joseph Davey Cunningham

R. Bosworth Smith writes that Sham Singh Attari ‘among the faithless faithfully only found clothed in white and devoting himself to death.’ And it was this symbolism of white that I linked with Dr Jagjit Singh and his ever flowing white beard.

Where as General Sham Singh was trying to prevent the downfall of the Khalsa Raj, Dr Jagjit Singh was trying to once more establish a vision/version of the rule of the Khalsa Punth through the implementation of the Republic of Khalistan.

Gur Ratanpal Singh describes Dr Jagjit Singh's character as ‘energetic, witty, friendly' and was possessed of original ideas. Sardar Seva Singh Lalli who was assigned the role of Vice President of the Republic of Khalistan Government in Exile in 1984 describes Dr Jagjit Singh as very strange, whereby he was the friend of friends but also the enemy of enemies. John Marshall, a conservative MEP, though of Dr Chohan as simply a ‘nice old chap.’

At this crucial injunction, I knew there was something special about Dr Jagjit Singh, something I couldn’t quite fathom at the time. But after meeting with associates of the Doctor, searching archives and reading books, I was in a position to relay my findings on this forgotten man of iron.

On November 31st, 2019, I delivered a research lecture titled ‘The Political History of Dr Jagjit Singh Chohan and his role in the Sikh Homeland Movement' at the prestigious Kings College London. My research lecture consisted primarily of photographs, news clippings and speeches of Dr Jagjit Singh’s alongside my analysis of events and narrative.

During my presentation at Kings College, my presentation aroused much interest from attendees, many of whom were students who wished to know more about Dr Jagjit Singh. In the 20 minute allocated period, there was only so much I could include, but to reinforce some of my findings, I was happy to distribute two editions of the Khalistan Bulletin published by the Aston University Khalistan Society and edited by myself. Copies of this magazine were also submitted to the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Library, Southall.

The fire alarm rang twice in two intervals whilst I was delivering my lecture, and interestingly enough, the fire alarm rang in resonance when two different segments of Dr Jagjit Singh’s speech were aired.

‘Our final concept is nothing less than independent, sovereign state of Khalistan, the Republic of Khalistan’.

This bold statement ringed from the lecture theatre at Kings College, and once more were the bold words of Dr Jagjit Singh heard in Central London, a place he called home for 17 years after the Indian State revoked his Passport. 

At the beginning of my search for the lost Doctor, I had no idea what I would come across/be exposed to and my words will never do enough justice to his character, nor is it possible that my tongue will ever be able to praise this man enough, but here it goes.

Chapters

Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. Abstract
Chapter 3. The Past is not Dead
Chapter 4. The Polish Government in Exile
Chapter 5. The Doctor’s Early Political History
Chapter 6. 1966
Chapter 7. 1967-68
Chapter 8. 1969
Chapter 9. The Immortal Martyr
Chapter 10. The Sardar of Kapurthala
Chapter 11. 1970
Chapter 12. 1971
Chapter 13. The Doctor’s First Exile
Chapter 14. Giani Bakshish Singh’s Incarceration
Chapter 15. The Sardars Rebel (1975-77)
Chapter 16. The Doctor & The Prime Minister
Chapter 17. The Sikhs of the Panjab & The Indian State
Chapter 18. Conclusion

These notes raise some key points about the place of memory and forgetting in Sikh ethno-nationalism. They do so by reassessing my earlier volume on the 'Punjab problem', Ethnic Conflict in India: a Case-Study of Punjab. The general argument is that memory and forgetting with reference to traumatic and critical events are a central component of Sikh ethnonationalism, its self-definition, and its ability to negotiate the future. Recognising this fact with reference to 1984 will help us to understand why it is likely to become the Sikhs' chosen trauma and enable us to provide a more contextual and meaningful reading of the phenomenon than is available hitherto.

"In Iraq and Afghanistan western military forces have been trying to impose an alien political culture on a population that is not very receptive to it. The exercise power over the indigenous population, follow fairly permissive rules of engagement, and enjoy immunity from the laws of the host country. Whatever their noble motivation, their mission is very close to those of colonial forces in the 19th century.

If (when?) western security forces are required to handle an insurgency within their own borders, they will find, that their Iraki and Afghan experiences do not suffice. They have to face fellow citizens, friends, brothers instead of aliens. They will be subject to the laws of their homeland, and their rules of engagement are likely to be quite restrictive.

In this environment the successful suppression of the Sikh insurgency in the Punjab a far more appropriate model, than anything they have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan."

This is an age for 'difficult histories' and museums dedicated to them. The 'success' of Holocaust museums in memorialising and spreading information about the Jewish community's traumatic past creates the desire for similar institutions in other communities. Here, I examine two institutions in India that were inspired by Holocaust Museums; the sponsoring communities -- Sikh and exile Tibetan -- wished for monuments to their own difficult histories. But the pushes and pulls of their specific circumstances altered the museum's narratives. This paper examines when it is that a difficult history can be told and when this is a history that must be muted.

Forthcoming, in Museum Transformations, Eds. Ruth Philips and Annie Coombes, Blackwell, Oxford.

It is difficult to disentangle religion from politics in the troubled history of intercommunal relationships in Punjab. This entanglement is most apparent in the Sikh call for statehood and identity. This dissertation seeks to identify the processes by which religion became ethnonationalism in the Sikh context. It argues that the call for self-determination and statehood, sometimes expressed by the idea of ‘Khalistan’ is rooted in religion but expressed as a political aspiration shaped by the context of the rise of Hindu nationalism through Hindutva politics. Punjab has a long history of rule by external powers, most notably the Mughal Empire and the British Raj. The Sikh community experienced both flourishing and oppression at different points in these Empires, but this dissertation argues that the last act of the British Empire; namely, Partition; was catastrophic for the identity of the Sikh community. It argues that the rise of Hindu nationalism post-Partition, though an understandable reaction to Colonialism, has had significant negative consequences for the Sikh community; a minority in India, which now finds itself in many ways disenfranchised in what is left of its homeland.  These and associated events have combined to generate the shift from the apolitical religious practice of the past to identity politics and ethnonationalism for contemporary Punjabi Sikhs.

There are two ideas being presented: first is that a new leader would need to pick up where Bhindranwale left off. The transition from Bhindranwale to this yet-unnamed commander acts as a microcosm for the progression of Sikh martial character from the peaceful Guru Nanak to Maharajah Ranjit Singh. The progression in martial character among Sikh leadership will give credit to the idea that a leader who is seasoned in tactical objectives will resonate with Sikhs, as a reminiscence of Ranjit Singh, and parallels will be drawn between the distant past’s evolution of leadership tactics, and the evolution from those of Bhindranwale to his successor. It will be evinced that a new leader would likely look past Bhindranwale’s sant persona and instead focus on succeeding Ranjit Singh’s position as the new Maharajah of a new Sikh State. The second part of this essay will be a bit of war gaming, putting forth that a coup d’état is the most probable course of action for such a leader. A coup is logical for many reasons: it aligns with the ideology of a dharam yudh, or just war;  as will be shown, a coup is the most probable conclusion that Sikh militant factions will ultimately come to; the idea of militant factions uniting for a mission is not new; and a new commander with military and political savvy will be needed to organize a coup. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of the evolving Sikh identity through the centuries. This essay can be viewed equally as both an academic investigation and security analysis.

33 YEARS AFTER 1984 SIKH MASSACRE
THE RSS/BJP RULERS CONTINUE THE FAÇADE OF SEARCHING FOR PERPETRATORS
RSS claims to have always stood for Hindu-Sikh unity. It occasionally expresses its gratitude to Sikhism for saving Hinduism from the Muslim aggression. It may not be irrelevant to note here that RSS does not treat Sikhism as independent religion which discarded Casteism and Brahmanical hegemony but part of Hinduism. The RSS/BJP leaders blamed Congress for anti-Sikh violence Modi while addressing a public rally during last parliamentary elections at Jhansi, UP (October 25, 2013) asked Congress leaders to explain who "killed thousands of Sikhs in 1984" and "has anyone been convicted for the Sikh genocide so far". Modi during Punjab elections and 2014 general elections kept on referring to 'qatl-e-aam' or genocide of Sikhs.
Modi after becoming PM in a message (October 31, 2014) said that anti-Sikh riots in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi's assassination were like a "dagger that pierced through India's chest…Our own people were murdered, the attack was not on a particular community but on the entire nation." Hindutva icon, RSS whole-timer and PM Modi lamented the fact that culprits were yet to be booked and tried for this massacre. However, Modi did not tell the nation what NDA governments which ruled this country from 1998 to 2004 did to persecute the culprits. Modi also forgot to share the fact that as per the autobiography of LK Advani (page 430); it was his Party which forced Indira Gandhi to go for army action named as Blue Star which killed large number of Sikh pilgrims.
Renowned journalist Manoj Mitta, author of book When a Tree Shook Delhi: The 1984 Carnage and Its Aftermath straight forwardly tells that "Despite the BJP rule, there has hardly been any will to enforce accountability for the massacres that took place under the Congress. It’s as if there is a tacit deal between the sponsors of 1984 and 2002".
This is not what outsiders or critics of the RSS have been telling. The perusal of the contemporary RSS documents show that major focus was on condemning the Sikh extremism, eulogizing Indira Gandhi and welcoming the crowning of Rajiv Gandhi as new prime minister.
READ THE FULL STORY...

The Khalistani terrorists and their apologists, in a bid to hoodwink the masses, often keep on harping that "their Sikh struggle is not directed against any race, religion or community" but it is for "smashing the chains of slavery from around the necks of sikhs" and is directed against "the tyrannical brahmanical rulers at the centre." But as the saying goes: the deeds are stronger than the words, the hundreds of cold-blooded mass murders of Hindus and ordinary toiling masses, their venomous communal tirade against the Hindus and Nirankaris (an off shoot of Sikhism), the forcible closure of all Nirankari Bhawans throughout the state, a spree of lootings, extortions, rapes and beatings let loose on the common people, the various fascist edicts aimed at crippling the democratic rights, aspirations and the lives of people of Punjab and numerous such other acts, all deride their pious exhortations. Let us examine them, albeit briefly, through their own words and deeds.

The Sikh conflict, whose apogee fell on the 1980s of the last century, is one of the most severe conflicts in independent India. Today associated with it are primarily two tragic events: the brutal operation codenamed Blue Star against terrorists who had captured the Golden Tempie in Amritsar, and the death of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from the hands of her two Sikh bodyguards. Although these events, without doubt, have had a political undertone, the key to understanding the character of the Sikh conflict are really histori­cal and cultural issues - a strong sense of the Sikh identity, built upon fostering of religious and social distinctiveness from Hinduism and Islam, which contributed to radicalisation of attitude amongst a part of the Sikh minority. This text therefore presents an analysis of various aspects - political, religious and social, amongst which one should look for causes of the conflict, and provides general characteristics of Sikhism and Sikh communities.

Problems and prospects of the use of the methodology in oriental CMCL comparative legal studies.
In article problems and prospects of use of the methodology chrono-discrete mono-geography comparative law in Oriental comparative legal studies are analyzed. Conclusions are made about the prospects of research not only Eastern state and legal institutions, but also ideas and conceptual models, based on the methodology CMCL. For example, the evolution of the concept of a Sikh independent state illustrates the specificity of the epistemological and pragmatic function of research from the standpoint CMCL.

Historia sikhizmu to nieustanna walka o niepodległość własnego państwa – Khalistanu, obejmującego Pendżab, czyli ich ziemię ojczystą. W toku licznych wojen i zaborów Sikhowie utracili własne państwo, a Pendżab ostatecznie został podzielony pomiędzy Pakistan oraz Indie. Pomimo tego tożsamość narodowa wśród Sikhów stanowi jedną z podstawowych wartości. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie sikhijskiej drogi do wolności Khalistanu, jak i funkcjonowania tej grupy etniczno-religijnej w dobie globalizacji.

We constructed a novel dataset of violent Khalistani terror incidents perpetrated in the last decade to demonstrate the resurgence of a movement that ended in 1992. Pakistan’s notorious intelligence agency (ISI) has long supported Khalistanis and continues to do so, propping up perduring support in the Sikh diaspora. Pakistan has engineered connections among Khalistani activists, those operating in Kashmir, and narcotics traffickers. We argue that the renaissance of Khalistan is part of Pakistan’s strategy to wage proxy warfare under the its nuclear umbrella as a substitution strategy as Pakistan’s use of Islamist proxies has become more constrained by international pressure.