Scepticism

Resumen: La pretensión del autor es iluminar, en contraste con los dos proyectos que dominan el panorama filosófico contemporáneo: una reconstrucción de la filosofía de corte pragmatista e historicista y una reconstrucción en filosofía que acentúa su carácter sustantivo y autónomo; algunos de los aspectos, frecuentemente ignorados, del método desarrollado por Wittgenstein en su última producción, aspectos tan radicales como novedosos.
Pretendemos, por tanto: (i) Mostrar que, de acuerdo con Wittgenstein, la fuente de la inquietud filosófica es la existencia de imágenes inconscientes que funcionan como normas de representación absorbidas dentro de las formas de nuestro lenguaje y que excluyen posibilidades alternativas. Estos símiles fijan cómo las cosas deben y cómo no pueden ser. (ii) Demostrar que la finalidad del método filosófico diseñado por Wittgenstein es cambiar nuestras representaciones y reemplazar viejos hábitos de pensamiento, esto es, que su meta es la creación de nuevos objetos de comparación y la yuxtaposición de símiles con el objeto de quebrar la fascinación que una analogía única ejerce sobre nuestra inteligencia. (iii) Subrayar que los modelos de presentación carecen de valor de verdad; que la imaginación es esencial en la práctica del método wittgensteiniano; que su consecuencia es la libertad intelectual y que, en la medida en que al concebir como absurdo un problema filosófico se alcanza lo que podría denominarse “una suspensión de interés”, la estrategia de Wittgenstein es análoga a la formulada y ejemplificada por el pirronismo. 

Palabras clave: Actitud reformista en filosofía - Actitud revolucionaria en filosofía - Método de representación - Modelos alternativos - Normatividad - Pirronismo - Presentación perspicua - Suspensión de interés - Terapia - Wittgenstein.

Abstract: The author aims at shedding light, against the background of two projects which share the whole present philosophical landscape: a “reconstruction of philosophy” inspired by pragmatism and historicism and a “reconstruction in philosophy” defending the autonomous and substantive character of philosophical theses and methods; on some neglected aspects of Wittgenstein’s late method, aspects so much radical as novel.
Therefore, we pretend: (i) To show that, according to Wittgenstein, the source of philosophical disquiet is the existence of unconscious pictures which function as norms of representation deeply ingrained in our thinking and which exclude alternative possibilities. They fix how things must and cannot be. (ii) To demonstrate that the philosophical method Wittgenstein envisages tries to change someone’s way of looking at things and to replace entrenched habits of thinking by new ones, that is, it tries to create new objects of comparison and to juxtapose pictures with pictures in order to break the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of an unique analogy. (iii) To stress that analogies are not true or false; that imagination is essential to practising Wittgenstein’s method; that its consequence is intellectual freedom and that, because coming to see that a philosophical problem is meaningless we reach what might be called “a suspension of concern”, this purge of our philosophical anxieties resembles the persuasive use of arguments in Pyrrhonism.

Key words: Alternative Models - Method of Representation - Normativity - Perspicuous Presentation - Pyrrhonism - Reforming Attitude in Philosophy - Revolutionary Attitude in Philosophy - Suspension of Concern - Therapy - Wittgenstein.

Along with what J. McDowell has called the disjunctive conception of experience (DCE), and against a venerable tradition, the veridical experience that P and the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination that P are not type-identical mental states. According to McDowell, a powerful motivation for DCE is that it makes available the sole internalistically acceptable way out of a sceptical argument targeting the possibility of perceptual knowledge. In this paper I state in explicit terms the sceptical argument McDowell worries about, and show that DCE has not the epistemological merits that McDowell ascribes to it. To begin with, I join a series of commentators in arguing that the way out of the sceptical argument made available by DCE is not internalistically acceptable, and so argue that it is not a way out that an internalist about epistemic justification would have any special reason to prefer to a parallel externalist way out that does not commit to DCE. Secondly, I show that the internalist can resist the sceptical argument by denying a different premise of it that McDowell takes for granted. I conclude by maintaining that McDowell's epistemological motivation for DCE is undercut.

Da Pirrone a Rorty, passando per Socrate, Carneade, Cicerone, Giovanni di Salisbury, Guicciardini, Montaigne, Sorbière, Pascal, Bayle, Hume, Nietzsche, Russell, Rensi, Oakeshott e Popper: il volume offre per la prima volta un quadro completo della storia dello scetticismo politico, rappresentato da alcune delle figure intellettuali più influenti del pensiero occidentale ma ritenute politicamente “scomode” per la loro incessante critica alle ideologie, ai dogmatismi dei partiti, ai paradigmi normativi e ai mezzi di persuasione diversi da quelli improntati al buon senso, alla prudenza e alla moderazione. L’autore dimostra che a unire tutti gli scettici politici è uno “stile” che privilegia il saggio al trattato, l’ipotesi alla certezza infallibile, il pluralismo al monismo, la verità conversazionale alla soluzione finale. Benché quasi tutti siano stati additati dai loro contemporanei come infedeli, reprobi, esiliati e gretti, le loro posizioni si sono rivelate essenziali non solo per la teoria politica in senso proprio, ma anche per l’affermazione di idee “altre” di libertà, tolleranza e convivenza civile.

Aristotle is one of the important sources for studying pre-platonic Philosophers, among whom Heraclitus was the subject of Aristotle's main focus. His focus on Heraclitus was most importantly for the reason that Heraclitus was, as Plato states, the Intellectual godfather of Sophists and according to Aristotle, the Intellectual godfather of Plato himself. Aristotle therefore sought to make fundamental critiques of doctrines of Heraclitus and to thereby attack foundations of sophistic and platonic thoughts as well. This paper aims firstly to show the domains in which the doctrines of Heraclitus influence on doctrines of Sophists and Plato's thoughts. it seems that Heraclitus' attempt to reject authenticity of sensible and particular things convinced Sophists in their idea that there is no truth, and made Plato to claim that, since there is no truth in sensible and particular things, one should search for another container which would, based on doctrines of Parmenides, provide degrees of solidarity in order for one to acquire science and knowledge. Plato introduced the container to his theory of Ideas. After examining the influence of Heraclitus on Sophists and Plato, the paper then looks at Aristotle's critiques of two famous doctrines of Heraclitus, namely the doctrine of Universal Flux and that of Identity of Opposites, and demonstrates which particular thoughts of platonic ideas or sophistic paradoxes can be the target of the criticisms. it seems that criticisms endeavor to imply that sensible and particular things have some sort of solidarity. Sophistic doctrines will thereby be rejected altogether and platonic doctrines on his Ideas and his creation of their container will be pointless.

The absence of scholarship that takes seriously the progressive Jewish response to atheism and skepticism is not easy to explain. Historical accounts tend to follow the view that Reform Judaism was a “response to modernity” in the sense that it was an attempt to integrate secular learning into Jewish life in general and/or to emulate the newly encountered Christian response, both in thought and practice, which was viewed as a model in this regard. Much of the scholarship on this period has focused on the political ambitions of assimilationist lay Jews and, with respect to secular learning, has tended to concentrate on biblical criticism, which certainly had a defining impact in Germany, and also in the United States and United Kingdom even if not initially. There has also been considerable interest in the theological concerns of the religious leaders and intellectual pioneers of Reform, but these concerns have tended to focus on inward-orientated debates about the status of the Law or on the weight of traditional rabbinic authority. Insofar as historians have noted engagement with atheism or skepticism, the Reformers' interest in disbelief has been conflated with a more general concern with the dangers of assimilation. That is, the significance of engagement with atheistic or skeptical philosophies has been understood to lie in this engagement's strategic utility in countering the threat to religious Jewish continuity. This article will consider the case of US Reform Judaism and its engagement with the prominent infidels and unbelievers Robert Ingersoll and Felix Adler. In doing so, it will also offer an overview of changing attitudes toward scientific naturalism and philosophical materialism within the US Reform movement more broadly, drawn from sermons and writings of such prominent nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century religious leaders as Isaac Mayer Wise, Kaufmann Kohler, Emil G. Hirsch, Joseph Krauskopf, Aaron Hahn, and J. Leonard Levy. Together, these individuals' discussions represent a rich discourse of doubt important for understanding the history of Reform Judaism. Among other things, this discourse helps explain a unique cluster of US Reform interests, including a tendency toward panentheism and a pronounced interest in modernist justifications of immortality.

The intended title was “Universe Oriented Ontology” or “Multiverse Oriented Ontology”, or “Universe or Multiverse Metaphysics”.
I mention this as it gives an idea about the meaning and intention of the title and the work as well as the titles I considered and why I moved away from them to the present one.
The sub-title provides a further hint towards the intentions of the work, namely: ” Beyond Earth- and Human-centricity’. I opted for ‘transcending’ rather than beyond, as I am still in the process of describing the process of transcending and many of the ideas I am obliged to use from our conceptual system and practices are still earth- and anthropo-centered, And, they have not yet gone to a state beyond those two -isms.
I say something about universe-centeredness, then about planet earth as point and frame of reference and anthropo-centricity.
The socio-cultural practice of philosophy and the doing of philosophy is merely one of many human, social and cultural practices. I post different notions of philosophy by a number of writers, some of them philosophers. These notions are about their perceptions of what philosophy is. Few of them go into detail about the subject-matter of philosophy. No one really deal with the aims, purposes and objectives of the discipline and none deal with the nature of the doing of philosophy or philosophizing. Activities that I suggest resemble certain features of the processes of theorizing.
I end with explorations of possible characteristics of original- and creative thinkers. I do this by mentioning a number of themes of meta-philosophy listed and described by Peter Suber. I make a number of comments in them and highlight aspects relevant to these type of thinkers.
One find them of course in all disciplines and socio-cultural [racticesand disciplines be they the arts,humanities, sciences, etc. I am of course specifically concerned with original andcreative thinkers inthe Western tradition of philosophy.
As I am a radical and absolute sceptic, I end with an article on this theme.
It is said by everyone, for example Hume, Russell and Pascal, that such a radical position is psychologically impossible and that it cannot be lived 24/7. Pascal for example opted for believe or faith and he and a number of writers suggest that that  is the only way out and the final position of radical sceptics. I disagree with him.

This paper presents the keys and reasons for Diogenes Laërtius' alleged scepticism, based on an analysis of the general design of his work The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. I believe that it would be manifestly erroneous to seek confirmation of this scepticism solely in Book IX without taking into account the overall structure of the work. A convincing explanation is also provided of one of the most enigmatic and most studied phrases in this work. What did Diogenes mean when he said that Apollonides of Nicaea was ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν ("one of us")?

Free download: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/y3DipH2m3WDBKSa2QB65/full

One of the most renowned pages of Pascal's Pensées offers an astonishing phenomenology of the all-powerful action of imagination in human life. This article retraces the genesis of this text and reassesses the sources of Pascal's conception of imagination. It argues that Pascal builds up his definition of the imagination as an ‘anti-theodicy’ which carefully recalls and then criticizes the Cartesian ‘theodicy of error’ and the foundation of the ‘general rule’ of truth proposed by the Fourth Meditation. In doing so, Pascal undermines the major aim of Descartes's Meditations, which is to secure human nature against any doubt as to its intrinsic perfection. Where, according to Descartes, human knowledge is finite yet perfectly secured in its accomplishments when we use the faculties of our mind correctly, Pascal describes imagination as a deceptive faculty that seems to have been given to us specifically to lead us into necessary error.

The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions
in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic’s answer is ‘not very much’ if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (possibly permanent) deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic’s move, but this book shows that the
radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don’t need to answer the radical sceptical problem ‘head on’, but rather to undermine the philosophical assumptions that it depends on. For without these assumptions, radical scepticism collapses all by itself. This result is highly significant, as it manages to dissolve one of the most intractable philosophical problems that has bedevilled some of the greatest minds until the present day.

The purpose of this research is to test and investigate The Effects of Work Experience, Independence, and Professional Scepticism on the Audit Quality in 12 public accountant firms. This study uses associative causal research. The technical questionnaire is purposive sampling. Data was obtained firms in East Jakarta a total of 80 sets of quetionnaires and samples are fit for use as much as 72 respondents .In this study the author used SPSS version 23 as a tool to test the normality data, the classical assumption test, descriptive statistics, t test analysis and test F and test the coefficient of determination with a significance level of 5% (0,05) which is an indicator of independently variable in this study is a work experience, independence, and professional scepticism while a dependent variable is Audit Quality.

‘Hegel and scepticism’ remains an intriguing topic directly concerning the logical and methodological core of Hegel’s system and its formation. Hegel’s thought evolved through his vivid involvement in the vigorous debates over scepticism that took place in Germany around 1800. His strategy did not consist of any fatal immediate confrontation with scepticism. On the contrary, he aimed to immunize philosophy against the threat of scepticism by integrating the latter into the former as its negative and free moment. Hegel’s interpretation of Sextus’ five tropes remains invaluable for his attempt to form a philosophical system that sublates both dogmatism and scepticism. A series of contributions is unfolding around a keynote paper by Klaus Vieweg – a prominent Hegel scholar who has devoted much of his academic work to the historical and systematic relationship between Hegel and scepticism – which tries to understand and restate the limits and the content of this relationship. Various Hegel readers with different theoretical concerns are dealing with Hegel’s strategy in a large range of areas from logic and epistemology to political philosophy, aesthetics and the history of science.

The communication of scientific hypotheses, and more broadly of the provisional and non-absolutist nature of science in general, to a lay audience is being increasingly compromised by the public’s distrust of experts. This distrust frequently takes the form of hyperskepticism, expressed in unfounded fears and moral panics, and is amplified by a clickbait driven media. Clickbait is a text or a thumbnail link that is designed to entice users to follow the link, where the linked piece of content is often simplistic, salacious or misleading. The sensational headlines and summaries are then widely shared on social media by users with pre-existing political and psychological biases. This “attention economy” can result in the “wisdom of the crowd” – as expressed on social media and clickbait driven websites – drowning out the views of subject experts, and allowing for fearmongering and skepticism or distrust of science to take precedence. This article discusses ways in which scientists and communicators of scientific and other complex topics can help laypersons to understand the ways in which they might be prone to being misled. It also introduces concepts that will contribute to their better understanding and communication of scientific claims in a polarised and politicised digital age.

This is a reading of Shakespeare’s Othello (1603) as an intellectual play about the ambiguities of self-knowledge. While acknowledging the influence of philosophical scepticism, exemplified primarily by the character of Iago, the chapter focuses on the non-sceptical characters’ fear of doubt as well as on the discord between their beliefs and Iago’s incredulity. A twofold understanding of fear of doubt is proposed: Its passive aspect, exhibited by the female characters in the play, involves radical suppression of doubt before it has reached conscious awareness; the active aspect of fear of doubt, epitomized by the character of Othello, can be described as the inability to tolerate disbelief and uncertainty and the need for a radical resolution. This approach to the play reveals some of the principles behind its paradoxical plausibility and elucidates the differences in its reception as a text and as a theatrical performance.

Key Words: Scepticism, doubt, tolerance of uncertainty, paradoxical plausibility, love, jealousy, Shakespeare, Othello.

In: Framing Fear, Horror and Terror through the Visible and the Invisible. Edited by Joseph Campos II and Kornelia Boczkowska. Oxford, United Kingdom: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2016, pp. 39-64. ISBN 978-1-84888-333-8.

The road to Hume's scepticism about practical reason - how Hume tried to save morality itself from scepticism.

To be moral is to be moved to act by reason; and to be moved to act by reason is to be moved by the good. But if reason moves us, what is the nature of its power to move? And what role does goodness play?

These questions about rational motivation became a matter of fierce contention in the early modern period. An established theory of how reason moves us – the theory defended by late scholastics such as Suarez – met destructive opposition, from Hobbes, and this opposition eventually put the very possibility of rational motivation in doubt. Two questions were debated. The first was about power. Was there a power of reason to move us or was all power ordinary causation? The second was about the relation between morality as a motivating source of direction, and morality as a set of appraisive standards. Is one of these two aspects of morality primary and explanatory of the other as secondary to it? Or is one of these aspects even an illusion? Hobbes’ answers to these two questions threatened a complete ethical scepticism. Hume avoided this complete ethical scepticism, but at the price of a scepticism about practical reason in particular.

Philip Larkin's poetry is deceptive. It gives the impression of stark simplicity. Beneath this, however lies a skilful talent for conciseness and for an exposition of a terse reality that disturbs and stimulates the mind. His inspiration is found in a train journey, two horses grazing in a remote meadow and a photograph album of a coveted female. These do not seem to be suitable starting points for a humanist manifesto. On the other hand, his humanism seems to be ambiguous since he appears rather condescending towards some unpretentious social strata. Yet, in his poetry, he gradually identifies with these simple creatures and sometimes becomes one of them. One important aspect of his poetry is his minimalistic prosaic content that resists metaphor, ornamentation and reference to myth, and focuses on the reality of life. He acknowledges both by implication and by statement that life is all we have and that there is no beyond. In acknowledging this reality, the form of humanism that he approaches most closely, as I shall contend below, is secular humanism. Secular humanism has found a working model based on doubt rather than dogma, global democracy rather than imperialist domination and secular happiness rather than an incomprehensible divine purpose. This implies a respect for all living things, especially humans, with no prejudice related to sex, ethnicity or culture and without any reliance on belief in supernatural entities.

Объектом исследования является проблематика интроспекции в философии сознания. С целью выяснить эпистемологические возможности интроспекции применялся метод теоретической реконструкции, а также сравнительный и исторический. Новизна работы состоит в том, что она предлагает фундаментальное теоретическое переосмысление проблематики интроспекции в условиях невозможности принятия как позиции, наделяющей ее абсолютной достоверностью, так и точки зрения, полностью отрицающей ее исследовательские возможности. Практическая значимость исследования состоит в том, что его результаты могут быть применены в преподавании курсов гносеологии, философии психологии, проблем современной философии сознания.

In this study, a distinction that shows itself especially in several texts of al-Ghazzâlî is argued. According to this, the way of knowing truth is not reason because for the reason everything is equally possible. The sole way to understand the truth is revelation which is given to human being. The distinction causes functional interpretation of reason that is in the path of truth. Saying that there is another perception way above reason which cannot find a way for solving incompatibility between the reason and the life, al-Ghazzâlî does not oppose to reason, but rather a more objective opportunity. By remembering the examples of contemporary philosophy, it seems possible to make it more understandable. This situation is very revolutionary for modern readings of al-Ghazzâlî. Thus al-Ghazzâlî connects functional reason to knowledge and truth to divination.
Keywords: al-Ghazzâlî, Philosophy, Theology, Reason, Knowledge, Truth.

"Sobre la base de una norma creacionista, en Dayton (Tennessee, EEUU), en el verano de 1925, se celebró un juicio que tuvo una gran repercusión pública, y que fue conocido como el juicio del mono, en el que se acusaba a John Thomas Scopes, un profesor de biología de Instituto de sólo 24 años de edad, de la práctica ilegal de la enseñanza de la evolución según la teoría de Darwin."

Genel olarak modern felsefenin kurucu filozofu olarak kabul edilen Fransız filozof Rene Descartes'in "felsefe yapma" biçimi, kendisinden önceki gelenekten belirgin şekilde farklıdır. Bu yüzden ona bu "kurucu" ünvanının verilmesinde en büyük payın söz konusu özgün yöntemine ait olduğu söylenebilir. Felsefe literatüründe kısaca "metodik kuşku" olarak adlandırılan bu yöntem onun bilgi ve varlık hakkındaki görüşlerini baştan sona belirlemiş, kendinden sonraki felsefelerin "sorgulama biçimlerini" de büyük ölçüde etkilemiştir.Descartes'in bilgi kuramı bilginin doğası ve neliğinden çok, elde ediliş yolu ve kesinlik derecesi üzerinde yoğunlaşır. Bu felsefede ağırlıklı olan, doğru bilginin hangi yol ile mümkün olduğu şeklindeki metodik kaygıdır. Söz konusu metodik yaklaşım doğrultusunda ortaya koyduğu varlık kuramında da Descartes varlık kavramının içeriği ya da varlığın neliği sorunuyla değil, neyin hangi temel özellikleriyle var olduğu ve var olanların birbirlerine göre konumları konusuna ağırlık vermiştir.

Cet article tente de rétablir à sa juste proportion le débat entourant l’ufologie et surtout de le situer par rapport au stade de développement des recherches contemporaines. Malgré leur littérature ufologique abondante, les «Sceptiques du Québec» sont restés en deçà de la réflexion proprement ufologique qui anime les chercheurs de pointe, se contentant de caricaturer l’ufologie. Pistes de solution proposées.

Cartesian scepticism seeks to exploit what it sees as a gap between the subjectivity of experience and the objectivity of the world which it purports to represent.In this chapter I examine whether the philosophical context within which the ancient Pyrrhonisst worked was one which took subjectivity to be a feature of perceptual experience, and I shall try to show that, in so far as it does not, the motivation for ancient scepticism rests on a different understanding of the problem of justification than that identified by Nagel as the problem for epistemology. If this contention is correct, then some light will be shed on, amongst other things, the unwillingness of ancient scepticism to bring into doubt the existence of the external world.

Cet article montre comment Jean Meslier reconfigure plusieurs considérations faites par Michel de Montaigne dans ses Essais, en donnant une orientation différente de l'original, mais non moins légitime. Meslier aurait utilisé les prémisses d'incrédulité postulées par Montaigne pour obtenir des conclusions irréligieuses. Cet article est présenté comme la première ébauche d'une étude à venir, dont la fin est de montrer, à travers quelques exemples, certaines de ces réécritures effectuées par le curé d'Étrépigny.

A Meta-Philosophy exploration of immanent and non-immanent  features of  first-order philosophy in terms of the values of non- values or negative values of Radical Scepticism, Nihilism and Minarchy, executed to show how philosophizing is done.

It misleadingly seems as if there is no progress in philosophy as, like in visual art, literature and music, each original thinker re-invents the entire discipline, its aims, purposes, values, methods,
etc
The nature of philosophical tools, methods, techniques and skills will be investigated and applied in terms of radical scepticism.

This approach, set of values and attitude restrict the nature and the style of the meta-philosophizing. It will for example prevent the traditional development of a general, all-encompassing and all-inclusive metaphysical system. It also demands the focus on context-specific investigation of questions and the dealing of a particular problem in a certain context.

These limits require the re-interpretation of any philosophical tool
being employed as well as the underlying assumptions and any pre-suppositions.

As far as possible philosophizing as an aspect of the processes of theorizing will be adhered to and realized. In chapter THREE I illustrate many-leveled and multi-dimensional thinking, that are to me as a visual artist as well, of extreme importance. These are the types of things employed by radical skepticism and that should be the form of philosophizing instead of and replacing traditional one-leveled and one-dimensional thinking, argumentation and reasoning

This paper looks at philosophical accusations of talking nonsense from the perspective of argumentation theory.  An accusation of this sort, when seriously meant, amounts to the claim that someone believes there is something she means by her utterance when in fact she means nothing whatsoever by it.  Such accusations may indeed be peculiar to philosophy.  They also involve the claim that there can be ILLUSIONS OF ARGUMENTATION, both inter- and intra-personal.  The problem of how one could possibly diagnose such illusions is raised and I suggest that, if there is a way, it will require a therapeutic rather than a polemical approach.  This suggestion is of course made by Wittgenstein and some of his followers but, in my view, it has remained undeveloped.  It often takes the form of a comparison with psychoanalysis.  I note that the more like psychoanalysis it becomes, the less like traditional argumentation, philosophical or otherwise, it will be.

The tools employed might appear appropriate, the reasoning sound and argumentation valid, but the subject-matter, well one wonders what that has to do with philosophy, if anything at all? 

Viewing some of the topics one really wonders of the notion of philosophy is not stretched too far?

So much that is passed off as philosophy itself or some kind of so-called interdisciplinary issues really appear as irrelevant.

Topics from the grievance studies especially fall under this. It seems as if individuals have personal issues, obsessions and psychological, social and cultural problems that they attempt to interpret, perceive and treat as if they are philosophical and/or philosophically related.

I wish to suggest that those issues are treated as disciplines or subjects in their own right, for example racism, feminism and gender studies, but not as ifthey have anything to do with philosophy or should be treated in a philosophical manner. As if they inform us about profound philosophical issues or concerns. Perhaps aspects of them can be dealt with as psychological, anthropological, sociological, biological, political, etc, but dealing with them as if they provide us with some kind of profound philosophical ideas and insights might be stretching the notion of philosophy a bit too far.

I’ve wondered about the seeming dichotomy of materialism/physicalism and panpsychism and  if they are really the only possible consciousness explanatory positions?How about biologism? That is as if all living biological matter or organisms are conscious, as well as that consciousness (the many types of it) can be explained best by the nature of those phenomena. A biologically restricted form or modification of pan-psychism?