Social Choice Theory

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.

This chapter looks into two paradoxes of the post-Soviet Russian gender order and post-Soviet Russian masculinities. The first paradox is a large-scale, well documented structural contradiction which has persisted throughout the entire post-Soviet period of Russian history: despite the fact that military service remains a constitutional duty of male citizens in Russia, only a minority of men in the draft pool end up serving in the armed forces. The second paradox, commonly known but underexplored, relates to the symbolic dimensions of gender relations in Russia. I addressed this issue in my relatively small-scale qualitative research project on contemporary Russian masculinities: I found that despite harsh criticism of the contemporary Russian army and personal unwillingness to serve in the military, only a small number of the research participants expressed consistent antimilitary sentiments and/or considered military service as unnecessary and pointless. My research also showed that the military and militarism remain a crucially important gendered terrain on which Russian masculinities are contested and achieved. This is evident even in the context of a severe crisis of the national military, and even for men who have no experience of military service.

The public health problem of obesity is addressed. It is proposed that visual images of ready-to-eat calorific highly palatable foods (herein “fast food”) be prohibited; necessitating fast food purveyors to resort to the textual depictions of food offerings in lieu of visual images. It is predicted that the textual as opposed to visual presentation of fast food will have the effect of modifying the “choice architecture” of consumers in that it will tactically interrupt the decision-making process thereby (i) mitigating against mindless or uniformed choices, encouraging consumers to make more reflective decisions about fast food consumption; including inter alia considering type, properties and quantity and (ii) contributing to informed decision-making concerning fast food consumption generally; as a result of the increase in quality and quantity of information provided through a textual medium as well as encouraging consumers to consider textual health warnings such as calorie or recommended portion size labelling.

This survey article (in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) offers an introduction to the field of social choice theory. It covers: (i) the history of social choice theory; (ii) three formal arguments for majority rule (procedural, epistemic, and utilitarian); (iii) preference aggregation; (iv) welfare aggregation; (v) judgment aggregation; and (vi) other topics.
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/

The aim of this study is to examine the role of fulfillment level of university students’ basic needs
in predicting the level of their subjective well being. The participants were 627 students (56%
female, 44% male) attending different faculties of Pamukkale University. In this study, subjective
well being was measured with Life Satisfaction Scale and Positive Negative Affect Scale. Students’
perceptions about basic needs satisfaction were measured with University Students Basic Needs
Scale (USBNS). Results show that, students’ basic needs satisfaction is predicting subjective well
being significantly for all dimensions of basic needs. Besides, freedom, fun and power needs are
seen as stronger predictors of subjective well being in university students than the other basic
needs.

בעולם התורני של ימינו הקדשת החיים לתורה אינה ברירה הנתונה לבחירת האדם, וודאי לא לנדבת לבו. אברכות היא הנורמה החברתית המקובלת והמחויבת. תופעה זו נוטלת מהמעשה הנאצל של הקדשת החיים לעבודת ה' את ממד הבחירה. אולם מותר האדם ותכליתו היא היותו בוחר, וכל תכלית עבודת ה' היא לבחור בטוב ולעשותו קניין בנפשנו. קל וחומר ביחס לתלמוד תורה, שעיקר עניינו הוא גילוי רצון לדבקות בדרך ה'.

Resumo: Este trabalho tem por objetivo a compreensão da ação em Aristóteles. Para este fim será utilizado o livro III da Ética a Nicômaco, passando antes por uma breve definição da virtude, tal como aparece no livro II, a qual, pode-se dizer ser o bem para a ação, na medida em que é aquilo que se deve alcançar com ela. No campo específico da ação será visto como ela pode ser distinguida entre voluntária, involuntária e não-voluntária. Neste espectro insere-se igualmente a discussão sobre o que significa agir por e na ignorância. Além disso, se abordará também a questão relacionada à deliberação e à escolha.

The Action in Nichomachean Ethics, Book III
Abstract: This study aims to understand the action in Aristotle. For this purpose, we will use the book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, after doing a brief definition of virtue, as it appears in the Book II, which can be said to be the good for the action, as that is what should be reached by her. In the specific field of action, it will be seen how she can be distinguished between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary. This spectrum is also part of the discussion about what it means to act by and in the ignorance. In addition, the study will also address the issue related to deliberation and choice.

In his essay entitled The Logic of Preference, G. H. von Wright characterizes in broad terms one of the meanings we ascribe to the expression 'individual preferences'. On the basis of this concept, he introduces two notions of 'individual indifference', a 'weak' notion and a 'strong' notion. Indifference in the strong sense is a relation of equivalence (reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive). Indifference in the weak sense is not transitive.
I intend to show that there are good reasons for the use of a notion of 'social indifference' analogous to von Wright's notion of indifference in the weak sense, instead of considering social indifference as a relation of equivalence. It is also shown that a non transitive notion of social indifference has the advantage of allowing of collective choice rules that meet Arrow's conditions.

We suggest that the celebrated Impossibility Theorem of Arrowian social choice theory is after all not such a negative result since it can be interpreted as an axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules of a decision maker with state-dependent rankings of alternatives. We provide examples to show that there are meaningful choice functions which are not state-salient decision rules.

Se explica, en primer lugar, la mecánica de los diferentes métodos de votación mayoritarios cuando existen múltiples alternativas disponibles, señalando sus virtudes y deficiencias a la luz de la teoría de la elección social.  En segundo lugar, se hace una evaluación de los mismos a la luz del cometido epistémico de seleccionar la “mejor” alternativa, para lo cual se apela al criterio “MLE” (máximum likelihood estimation). Se concluye que el método Llull/Copeland ofrece el mejor estimador estadístico de la “mejor alternativa”, así como  el único método que cumple con la condición –que aquí llamaremos, en honor a su descubridor- la condición “Miller”, que exige que las alternativas seleccionadas siempre se sitúen dentro del conjunto de alternativas no cubiertas.

Social choice theory is a formal analysis of aggregating information in making choices or social choices. Social Choice Theory (SCT) was applied in the social welfare, sports competitions, human rights-based approach to development, and more. This paper dismantling the framework adopted in making social choice theory. In addition, this paper makes an attempt to study the social choice theory based on the operating definitions derived from a number of different studies and sources, advantages and disadvantages of social choice theory, social choice theory perspective on the relationship in decision making and scenarios using social choice theory.  Author also predict and identify challenges faced by social choice theory. Other than that, this study also give effect to the whole of knowledge.

This chapter explores the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze in order to understand classroom management in terms of the moving power-structure(s) in the teaching and learning context. The classroom dynamic presents a form of affective literacy or literacies in the framework of Multiple Literacies Theory (Masny, 2006). This is because the ways in which communication happens in the classroom demonstrates an affective map of the power flows in that context; and in this chapter this power differential is dealt with through ‘affectus’. The affective interactivity of literacies in classroom management is complementary to and congruent with the conceptual framework of this writing. This piece will focus on the Deleuze-Guattarian concepts of ‘anti-production’ (as presented in Anti-Oedipus) and the ‘order words’ (in A Thousand Plateaus), that will be unpacked and analysed in the specific educational context of classroom management and as pertaining to teacher education.

Frente a problemas de decisión colectiva de cierta complejidad, distintos métodos de votación pueden considerarse igualmente democráticos. Ante esta situación, argumento que es posible investigar cuáles de esos métodos producen mejores resultados epistémicos sobre asuntos fácticos. Comienzo ilustrando la relación entre democracia y métodos de votación con un sencillo ejemplo. Muestro cómo el uso de modelos idealizados permite descubrir algunas propiedades de los métodos de votación; varios de estos descubrimientos muestran que, frente a problemas de cierta complejidad, no hay una respuesta clara acerca de cuál es el resultado de una elección democrática. Frente a esto, sugiero que deberíamos tomar en cuenta un rasgo epistémico instrumental de varios métodos de votación: su capacidad para generar respuestas correctas ante varias situaciones. Esta intuición ofrece lecciones importantes para el diseño de instituciones electorales.

Síntesis para presentación en clase de la prueba del Teorema de la Imposibilidad presentada por Kenneth Arrow en "Los Valores y la Toma de Decisiones Colectivas". Ver el libro de Frank Hahn y Martin Hollis Filosofía y Teoría Económica publicado por el FCE en 1979.

در این مطالعه مفهوم تابع رفاه اجتماعی و مولفه های اصلی آن معرفی می شوند. از آنجا که دانشمندان در خصوص اهمیت نسبی مولفه های تابع رفاه اجتماعی توافق نظر ندارند، در این مطالعه کوشش می شود دیدگاه های مختلف در نحوه تصریح تابع رفاه اجتماعی معرفی شود. علاوه بر این تلاش می شود ویژگی های مطلوب تابع رفاه اجتماعی توضیح داده شود. برای تحقق اهداف این مطالعه و پاسخ به سوالات مطرح شده از رویکرد توصیفی- استنباطی و روش کتابخانه ای استفاده شده است. یافته های این تحقیق دلالت بر آن دارد که تابع رفاه اجتماعی یک مفهوم دقیق و معین نبوده و به ارزش ها و معیارهای اخلاقی تصریح کنندگان وابسته است و این باعث می شود توابع رفاه در روی قطبنمای سیاسی جایگاه های مختلف قطبی دست راستی، دست چپی و میانه رو پیدا کنند.

This work intends to prove that "social welfare" can coexist with the capitalist economic model but if based on a "tri-polar" (instead of bipolar) perception of any interaction between people, local communities, organizations, states, blocs Member ...including the Community (The Intermediate Community- the "C" factor), in 3D space,  with the community as “rainbow” synthesis/analysis It is the “rainbow concept”    If it is true, then it will be feasible a social welfare policy in a new world that will not resemble the current (centralized structure) It also is about the classification of  the simplest singular theoretical  points on an hypothetic surface C (all bargaining behaviors) that do not depend on the orientation of C in space. This scientific proposal, once recorded as such, classified and analyzed a number of other theories and models, tried to put down a "new" concept of an alternative approach of "socio-economic welfare" for the sole purpose to demonstrate that it is possible a new tri- polar concerning  instead of bipolar crumbling over time, producing increasingly more injustice, inequality, misery, depression This is able:
a. By defining and analyzing the set theory(Cantor ,  and Zemelo ), Principal –Agent  theory  the Ultimatum theory  and the bargaining Nash theory , , ,
b. by demonstrating and analyzing  the incompatibilities of 5 famous theorems ant 3 theories:
It is a set theory (or an application of the set theory) because it is included in SET THEORY: Set theory is the mathematical theory of well-determined collections, called sets, of objects that are called members, or elements, of the set. Pure set theory deals exclusively with sets, so the only sets under consideration are those whose members are also sets. it also  obeys in the axioms of extensionality, regularity (also called the Axiom of foundation), schema of specification (also called the axiom schema of separation or of restricted comprehension), pairing,  union schema of replacement infinity power set Well-ordering theorem The theory of "win-win-win” is included in the in ZFC set theory because it obeys the basic axioms of ZFC Set Theory (Axiom of extensionality, Axiom of regularity (also called the Axiom of foundation), Axiom schema of specification (also called the axiom schema of separation or of restricted comprehension), Axiom of pairing Axiom of union Axiom schema of replacement Axiom of infinity Axiom of power set Well-ordering theorem 
The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, consists from discrete and independed “parts” with independed will and way of thinkings.These are fundamental prequisitions of a SET
From this point of view, win-win-win theory may be seen as “agency theory”, in the frame of “SET theory” (Cantor)  (ZFC) : The concept here is that the "set theory" deals with sets which informally are collections of objects. Any type of object can be collected into a set From this point of view, the win-win-win perception includes “sets of behaviors” that obey in common rules (axioms)
 
It is an “Agency Theory” (or an application of the agency theory) because the individual must go beyond narrow personal interest and thought about the man who is to him and negotiates with him. This is the core of the suggestion Due to agency theory win-win-win papakonstantinidis “theory” help the researchers and University students to think twice (a) as the principle and (b) as agent of the whole community so to win So, “agency theory” introduces us to the double thinking leading thus, in limit, to a triple pole win (win-win-win) Furthermore, the "agency theory" produces “behaviors” of a double direction: one for him/her/self and the other for the "principle" The third part of negotiations (even under-informed) can induce the other party to reveal their information. They can provide a menu of choices in such a way that the choice depends on the private information of the other party .

It is finally a bargaining theory (or an application of bargaining theory) as it relates to each infinitesimal agreement or disagreement that people have when dealing with each other and produce results fairly, or (most times) unjustly and even inequalities
The aim of this theoretical contribution (if it exists) is to highlight the "SENSITIZATION ability" that everyone of us either relates to refugees, or in countries, whether in claiming or even in our daily transactions It is time to stop  looking only personal interest or “individual defense”

In particular, the proposal deals with the collecting, classifying and comparing the theoretical material from various sources on the functioning of Social Welfare Function (SWF), towards building a strong case with logical and coherent arguments, towards the one Triple Pole (A-B-COMMUNITY) Equilibrium (TPE), different from N.E, that leads to the Social Bargaining Solution” (SBS) and coincide with the "optimal" Community Collective Choice (CCC) in order to create a highly versatile tool, “the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” of well-formed formulas (wffs),
Based on this model, in practical level, the ambitious is to create a series of new policies to strengthen social welfare, despite the "impossibility theorem" (K. Arrow 1955)
I supported with arguments, that through "a simultaneous, reflective, strong effective (Pareto), Flexible, fair (Rawls), collective (Amartya Sen) Social Welfare Function (SWF) in the frame of a General  Equilibrium (Walras), incompatibilities that  incorporate the values of equality, justice, harmony, symmetry, and the hypothesis, of self-organization (Papakonstantinidis) as well as the hypothesis of self-supporting bargaining solution in a community level, should exist and be the only one: the win-win-win equilibrium  Win-win-win papakonstantinidis situation is proposed  as an extension of  both  “non-cooperative game”  and the  principal–agent problem (also known as agency dilemma or theory of agency)  under the constrains put by the five theorems Especially, Pareto efficiency , as an economic state where resources are allocated in the most efficient manner Pareto efficiency is obtained when a distribution strategy exists where one party's situation cannot be improved without making another party's situation worse. Pareto efficiency does not imply equality or fairness. Also known as "Pareto optimality” (INVESTOPEDIA) Also, the theory of justice focus on the "veil of ignorance", along with the original position, is a method of determining the morality of a certain issue (e.g., slavery) based upon the following thought experiment: parties to the original position know nothing about their particular abilities, tastes, and position within the social order of society. When such parties are selecting the principles for distribution of rights, positions, and resources in the society they will live in, the veil of ignorance prevents them from knowing about who they will be in that society. The question in which the paper gives answers is if it possible and how to focus on social welfare (as the Arrow’s (1951) “Impossibility Theorem” today disputed. We believe that the proposed (from the present work) and routed (by the original applications in the Greek countryside) "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" (since 2002), succeeds in "passing" of economic forms, and giving a welfare’s perspective
In practical level, the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis theory” produces results that may be measured by application of the Central Limit Theory (CLT) .  Applying the CLT on a series of answers from 512 people given to specific "closed" questions (questionnaire), -concerning their appreciation for themselves negotiating behavior, enhances the theoretical structure of the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”, adding a direct practical utility to it  Since thousands of negotiations that we do every day with other people who realize that "winners" - "losers" converge as the number of negotiations (N) tends to infinity and from this point they would accept a "third pole (Community)" above their own forces as long as necessary for this pole should ensure fairness, equality, respect, self-organization over people
Finally, “win-win-win” may be suggested for CONTRASTING the dual systems’ (i.e Boolean Algebra as well as Pirahã" linguistic recursion) transformation into a unique 3-pole system of MIND
To strengthen the arguments in favor of a triangular perception of things, we will try to bring it in Set Theory and see how the qualities of the "win-win-win” 'correspond 1-1 to basic Axioms
Keywords:
“win - win- win”, social welfare,  the Impossibility Theorem (Arrow) the Incompleteness Theorem (Gödel) Pareto Efficiency, Nash Equilibrium, the Rawls Theorem on Justice, Caratheodory (one case) “umbilical points” sensitization, team psychology, The “Principle-Agent Theory”, Egalitarianism, Utilitarianism

Abstract: This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining a realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow’s theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for  emocracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable.

The Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy is a ground-breaking work in democratic theory. We argue that it is of continued relevance today, due both to its methodological innovations and its use of those innovative techniques to solve the fundamental problem of democratic justification. In Calculus, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock fuse economic methods, political theory and the normative project of showing how democratic institutions of a particular sort can be justified contractually, creating a unique form of democratic contractualism that came to be known as “Constitutional Political Economy” and the more general research program of “Public Choice Theory.” Although these pioneering techniques have been integrated into mainstream political theory, the interest of their normative project has not been similarly appreciated.

In many cases, when an agent faces a choice between alternative courses of action, there are reasons both for and against each of these alternatives. How are these reasons to be aggregated, to yield an overall verdict on how much reason all-things-considered (ATC) there is for each of these alternatives? Given plausible assumptions about the aggregation of reasons, we can derive an analogue of a well-known theorem from social choice theory.  According to this theorem, the aggregation of reasons is, in a certain sense, essentially additive. This conception of the aggregation of reasons is explained and defended against objections.

John Rawls’s strict theory of perfectionism would have more appeal if it were reconstructed by balancing it with moderate cultural perfectionism. In his work, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls framed the modern idea of legal perfectionism. In his thought experiment, Rawls gave different players various theories of justice that contrast with his “original position,” in which principles of justice are decided from behind a veil of ignorance. The first of the theories, strict perfectionism, argued society should be structured in a way that produces the utmost levels of excellence in someone, but not everyone. The second theory, moderate perfectionism, asserted that society should be arranged to achieve excellence, but not at the expense of meeting society’s basic needs. Rawls created these theories solely to be rejected, rejecting them primarily because of the controversies inherent in defining excellence. Rawls endorses political liberalism, which pursues the good through an overlapping consensus while avoiding the trappings of the controversy he sees in perfectionism. However, there is no reason Rawls’s preferred method of pursuing the good be applied to a reconstructed theory of perfectionism. Rather than relying on a comprehensive definition of “the good,” excellence can be defined by an overlapping consensus promoting both social and personal maximization, allowing “the good” to be encompassed by a set of pursuits toward excellence.

In the postwar USSR, there were a few scattered research groups engaged in research most closely resembling “Western” mainstream economics. Inspired by the new sciences of the artificial, these groups were able to make important contributions to various fields of economic theory. This article focuses on the story of one group created by the control engineer Mark Aizerman at the Institute of Control Sciences in Moscow. It discusses the origins and the outstanding diversity and dynamics of the group’s research agenda, reconstructs the factors that made Aizerman turn from the cybernetics of mechanical or biological systems to the abstract theory of choice and rationality, and demonstrates how the group was related to—and communicated with—the scholars doing work in social choice, mechanism design, and formal political theory. It also speculates on one missed research opportunity of doing experimental economics—something that, given the ideological and intellectual constraints Aizerman was facing, was hardly possible in the Soviet context, but could have been a synthesis of economics and engineering. The article also discusses a research culture Aizerman created and nurtured in his lab by encouraging research collaboration, sharing ideas, and freely moving across various disciplines.

The aim of the research is to give a contribution and an insight on the complex field of stakeholder involvement in transport planning, by analysing the role of decision-support methods and agent-based modelling in guiding a participation process.
The approach is twofold: from one side it is about to deeply understand the process of making a collective decision, by studying how the interaction among different actors can lead to a convergence of opinions towards a shared collective decision. From the other side, it is based on finding appropriate decision-support methods to help the group decision-making process.
Agent-based modelling and simulations have been used, in order to guide real participation processes and predict the results of an interaction process, and group multi criteria decision-making methods, to help taking consistent decisions based on several judgment criteria. The results of the research should help decision-makers and practitioners in dealing with multiple stakeholders and complex decisions and guiding the participation process.

"Corruption has become one of the most popular topics in the social scientific disciplines. However, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication about corruption. Models developed by different
academic disciplines are often isolated from each other. The purpose of this paper is to review several major approaches to corruption and draw them closer to each other. Most studies of corruption fall
into three major categories: (i) rational-actor models where corruption is viewed as resulting from cost/benefit analysis of individual actors; (ii) structural models that focus on external forces that determine corruption; and (iii) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks among corrupt actors. Focusing on actors’ behavior and the social context, this article explains corruption concepts taken from sociology, economics, organization studies, political science, social anthropology, and social psychology."

This paper crosses the borders of human geography to bring back two related bodies of work from experimental psychology that investigate, in an unusual and refreshingly precise way, long-standing human geographical concerns with tem-porality, place and subject formations, meaning-making and well-being. It is argued that the traffic of ideas and empirical findings between human geography and experimental psychology can be mutually profitable if, and only to the extent that, it encompasses a sustained epistemological, methodological and political critique of the disciplinary practices that have yielded those ideas and findings.

This paper is a bibliography of press releases from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about charter school corruption and fraud from 2009 to 2016 across the United States. Both references and the actual press releases obtained from the FBI databases are included.

This paper is a contribution to the development of an ontology of conflict. In particular, we single out and we study a peculiar notion of group conflict, that we suggestively label ‘social contradiction’. In order to do so, we shall introduce and discuss the methodology of social choice theory, since it allows for defining the notion of collective attitude that may emerge from a number of possibly divergent individual attitudes. We shall see how collective attitudes lead to define a specific notion of group and therefore a specific notion of group conflict. As a conclusion, we shall present our abstract analysis of group conflicts and we shall position social contradiction with respect to other types of conflicts.