Strategy and Strategic Theory

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defense community in
the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic
documents of NATO, EU, and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy
papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it approaches hybrid warfare from
the perspective of strategic theory, which assumes that all wars throughout history have shared certain
common characteristics. Analyzing​ hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory, this
paper argues that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory
instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach
contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under
the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare.

Since the 1990s, systems concepts have been used to enhance military theory. Such fusion assumes a strong relationship between systems thinking and military theory. This assumption underpins military concepts such as Effects-Based Operations, which was influential in planning the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. The military failures in these wars led scholars to criticise systems-based concepts within military theory and practice. Nevertheless, practitioners and academics continue to use systems concepts to inform contemporary military doctrine and education. Such education shapes military professionals’ thinking on how to plan for, and conduct, war.

This thesis investigates the relationship between contemporary Western military theory, systems thinking, and their key schools-of-thought. The thesis identifies that the assumed relationship is founded on a belief that the world is made up of systems. This worldview, known as ‘hard systems thinking’, is held by both advocates and critics. There appears to be little consideration of the alternative systems worldview: ‘soft systems thinking’. This second school-of-thought views the world as complex and uses systems as frameworks to enhance understanding. The thesis explains how these systems paradigms have similarities with the two military theory worldviews of ‘war as science’ and ‘war as art’, respectively. Investigating how these schools-of-thought influence systems concepts may help explain when and how to use systems thinking to enhance military theory.

The investigation finds a strong relationship between military theory and systems thinking. This relationship is underpinned by the complementary use of both hard and soft systems thinking schools-of-thought. The thesis reviews the works of twelve military writers from across recorded history to find this relationship. The 2003-2011 Iraq War provides an illustrative case study. This case study corroborates the investigation’s findings, and provides initial insight into how paradigms can influence military thinking and practice.

The investigation indicates that each level of war preferences a school-of-thought. For example, the strategic level of war prefers soft systems thinking and war as art. Hard systems and war as science thinking are relevant to the tactical level of war. Another finding is that systems thinking, when used appropriately, appears to enhance the explanatory and descriptive power of military theory. The thesis found little support for using systems thinking to reinforce the predictive power of theory. The analysis of the theory-based and Iraq War case studies also sheds initial light on how the paradigms military practitioners hold can influence how they think about and execute war. Where practitioners hold paradigms not aligned with the findings in this thesis, military planning and action may risk strategic failure.

The thesis finds that Effects-Based Operations, and similar hard systems concepts, appear inappropriate at the strategic and operational levels of war. Next, the thesis identifies a set of principles that may help guide future military warfighting concept development. Another observation is that pre-war military education may be important in shaping pre-war thinking and in-war adaptation. Further research is likely to shed light on how to reduce the hard systems/war as science bias often seen in military thinking and planning. With the contemporary surge in great power competition, limiting these biases may help reduce the likelihood of great power competition becoming great power war.

This study uses strategic theory to examine China’s pursuit of key objectives in northern Myanmar and the impact on the ongoing conflict in the region. The conflict in Myanmar is long standing and ongoing, but has evolved significantly since independence in 1948. Additionally, China’s strategic interests in Myanmar have expanded as its economic development has progressed. Comparative case studies of the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Organization, and a short case study of the Arakan Army are presented to assess how China’s engagement has impacted conflict at the local level. China’s strategic behavior is operationalized using the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic model of the instruments of national power, which generates evidence statements regarding China’s strategic behavior. These are assessed against various hypotheses regarding China’s impact on the conflict through the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses analytical framework. China’s impact has been mixed with some diplomatic efforts showing promise of reducing conflict intensity. However, engagement with key conflict actors has indirectly facilitated expansion of the conflict.

In strategy as practice the basic question, what is strategy-making? is of increasing significance. Moreover, what makes the practice of strategy-making-which subsumes the notions of strategizing and strategy work-distinctively strategic is a central aspect of this questioning. This paper seeks the meaning of specifically managerial strategy-making by posing a different question, the study of which contributes to understanding strategy-making, more generally, as a distinctive practice. From an early-Heideggerian perspective, the prevailing question form, what is managerial strategy-making? is re-cast as, what is the toward-which of managerial strategy-making? Managers are held to account and must justify what they do and say, yet, they must do so under ineradicable contingency. The tensional relation, between the imperative of managerial justification and the condition of contingency, is the teleoaffective structure in which managerial strategy-making shows up as a crucial coping practice. The more or less distal, purposive concern for organizational effectiveness may affect all managerial strategy-making. However, it is the teleoaffective demand of contingent justification that effects managerial strategy-making and conditions it as the sociomaterial practice of contingent justification-its proximal, fundamental toward-which. This is illustrated in an interpretative study of a variety of strategy texts of the South African Post Office that were presented to a Parliamentary oversight committee. The metaphor of the alibi helps to describe the practice of contingent justification as the accomplishment of a dynamic intertext that always encompasses the discursive resources for explaining both success and failure, both prospectively and retrospectively. The interpretation of contingent justification reveals a new practice-based, discursive notion of managerial control.