Terrorist Radicalization

The focus of this book is ultimately to present a clear and succinct view of what psychological research has revealed about terrorists and terrorism. The results are often disturbing, sometimes surprising and frequently disheartening. Perhaps most worrying of all, is the extent to which this current level and range of knowledge has repeatedly been ignored and overlooked by those tasked with the responsibility of controlling terrorism. This book aims to provide a clear, intelligent and well-informed account of what psychology has learned in the past thirty years about issues relating to terrorism. It also aims to demonstrate just how one branch of social science can provide a powerful tool for insight and guidance on one of the most challenging problems facing the modern world.

Violent extremist groups from a wide variety of backgrounds have long been recognized to be making extensive use of the internet. However, assessments of the cyber-terrorist threat have often been wastefully focused on issues and concerns which do not match fully with the reality of how terrorists are currently interested in the internet or on what activities such individuals and groups are actually engaged in. Instead, the main concern has been on what terrorists might do, especially with regard to information warfare. Such a heavy focus on possibilities is misguided and overlooks the substantial manner in which the internet is already being exploited by various extremists. Rather, much more serious issues are raised by the way in which terrorist organisations are currently and demonstrably using the internet to recruit new members, generate international support, raise and launder funds, and to share information and knowledge with similar groups

Inevitably many terrorists and violent extremists end up in prison where they can pose formidable challenges.  Such prisoners are unusual and distinctive. As a consequence, their management can pose exceptionally difficult problems in prison and probation settings. However, our knowledge of managing and intervening with violent extremists in prison settings is very limited.  On many issues we currently have almost no published research, and much of what does exist is of poor quality. This deficiency unquestionably represents one of the most serious obstacles to developing effective strategies for promoting and facilitating disengagement from terrorism. This chapter provides an introduction to the problems and issues raised by terrorist and extremist offenders in prison settings. Critical issues around management strategies, radicalisation and deradicalisation, reform, risk assessment, as well as post-release experiences, are all explored.

Our understanding of the risk assessment of terrorist and extremist prisoners is in its infancy, yet this is clearly a critical issue. How can one tell if a prisoner is still dangerous or not? What are valid measures to assess risk and what type of evidence is worth examining? In considering risk assessment of terrorists and extremists in prison settings there are a range of essential issues to consider.  Crucially, not all terrorist and extremist prisoners are the same and factors which apply clearly to one individual will not apply equally strongly to others. As a result, effective risk assessment processes need to be nuanced. This chapter highlights the range of issues which are likely to be of most use when considering risk assessment in the context of a terrorist prisoner, and also identifies what sources of information can provide the necessary insight to inform this assessment.

Preoccupation with the effort to fight extremist propaganda in an increasingly complex information environment has produced an overwhelming amount of literature from professors, practitioners, policymakers, and pundits. The problem of terrorist messaging is easily defined; solutions, in the form of effective counter-narrative strategies and the tools to disseminate them, are much harder to come by. Kurt Braddock's "Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization" takes this on, providing well-researched and relatively jargon-free guidelines to the development of persuasive counter-narratives and the use of emerging communications technologies to fight back.

Most terrorists ultimately end up in prison, yet remarkably little is known about what happens behind the prison walls and even less about when those individuals are eventually released back into society. This book provides readers with an up-to-date, informed and accessible account of what is known about terrorists and extremists in prison, what are the genuine risks and dangers, and what are the critical issues and insights in terms of management and reform. In doing so, it strips away many of the myths and media panics which have so often dominated discussions of this vital issue.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

“Rivoluzionario professionista” convertito all’Islam, Carlos ha dedicato la sua vita combattendo “per la liberazione del mondo dallo sfruttamento imperialista e della Palestina dall’occupazione sionista”. Le armi gli “sono state imposte dalle circostanze, determinate dalla violenza stessa del nemico”, e il “terrorismo” è una fatalità imposta “dal rapporto di forze cui nessun resistente, musulmano o meno, può sfuggire, poiché è di fronte a un nemico potentissimo, senza freni né limiti in arroganza e ambizione di conquista”. Il terrorismo “è l’arma dei poveri”, “un’arma di prima scelta per ristabilire una parvenza di equilibrio contro la sproporzione dei mezzi di informazione, il cui monopolio assoluto è del nemico”, ovvero degli americani. In questo libro autobiografico commentato da Marco Marsili, Ilič Ramírez Sánchez ricostruisce le tappe della carriera che ne ha fatto il terrorista più famoso e ricercato nel mondo, dai primi attentati degli anni ‘70, all’amicizia con Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein e Mùammar Gheddafi, fino all’arresto avvenuto in Sudan nel ’94. Carlos svela la verità sugli attentati dell’11 settembre, e spiega, con una lucida analisi, la strategia statunitense della “guerra preventiva”, motivata dalla necessità di mantenere il controllo sul prezzo del petrolio, scambiato sui mercati internazionali in dollari. Una feroce critica ai media occidentali, al capitalismo, al consumismo, all’Onu, e alla sinistra occidentale, accusata di essersi adagiata “sugli allori della borghesia convertendosi al liberalismo californiano”.

The fight that Europe and the West must wage against jihadist terrorism will take some time, but if we live up to our values of integration and democracy, we will come out of it soon. As Giovanni Falcone, the Italian judge killed by the Mafia, once said about the Mafia: " It is a human phenomenon, and as all human phenomena has a start and an evolution, it will have also an end ". Jihadis have been using Twitter at least since 2010, with the Shabaab joining the site in December 2011, but never before to this extent. One early adapter of Twitter, the Afghan Taliban, began to establish their social media presence in December 2010, through which they issued brief bulletins about their actions and alerts for forthcoming communiqués. Many of the most prominent jihadi groups have followed the same path, including the Shabaab al-Mujahideen, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The content of these Twitter accounts has tended to closely mirror material released to jihadi forums. For example, the Afghan Taliban may post the text of a communiqué to their website, to a jihadi forum, and to the Twitter account of one of their spokesmen. Mirroring jihadi groups, elements of the online jihadi community have also migrated to social media sites, with prominent forums such as Shumukh al-Islam and Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum creating Twitter accounts to publicise notable releases and discussions. Concurrently, many individual jihadis and jihadi supporters have joined Twitter, enthusiastically circulating propaganda among themselves and promoting it to potential recruits. Yet, the benefits conferred by social networking come with a substantial cost: social networking platforms can sow great confusion if known official accounts are deleted and re-established or if there are multiple accounts claiming to represent a specific jihadi group. In order to reach the new official accounts, followers must be able to distinguish 70 the legitimate social media accounts of jihadi groups from non-authenticated users, which is a level of ambiguity that is not found on jihadi forums.

The scope of this doctorate is to combine the theoretical science with the practical science. This combination is due to the fact that the thesis uses the practical innovation of games theory and the principals of john Nash in order to use the results in the phenomenon of suicide terrorism.
The conclusion of this PhD is that no matter in which place, no matter in which geographical region the social blockage of person or a team or even a country will definitely turn in disturbance and terrorism attacks. 
During the examination of this project there was a resource in different countries that faced the problem of terrorism. This examination is based on the idea of case studies, this provides the opportunity to combine the results and also help us to find ways to reduce and delete the problem.


Η υποστήριξη ή η αντίθεση στη βία και στις επιθέσεις αυτοκτονίας είναι φυσικά θέμα πολιτικής προτίμησης. Οι κοινωνίες εκδηλώνουν τις πολιτικές τους προτιμήσεις όλη την ώρα. Υποστηρίζουν την ειρηνευτική διαδικασία ή υποστηρίζουν τη βία. Εάν επιλέξουν τη βία, υποστηρίζουν τη βία εναντίον στρατιωτικών στόχων ή τη βία κατά αμάχων.
Το ερώτημα που τίθεται είναι τι είναι αυτό που καθορίζει τις πολιτικές προτιμήσεις; Γιατί οι άνθρωποι υποστηρίζουν ή αντιτίθενται στη βία και τις επιθέσεις αυτοκτονίας;
Ο βασικός προσανατολισμός του βιβλίου είναι η εξέταση, η ανάλυση και η κατανόηση του φαινομένου των επιθέσεων αυτοκτονίας, ως μορφή της τρομοκρατίας, καθώς και η εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων τα οποία θα βοηθήσουν στην καταπολέμηση του φαινομένου αυτού. Στην προσπάθεια αυτή αξιοποιήθηκε η Θεωρία Παιγνίων.

This report focuses on the case of Greece, where the phenomenon of radicalisation has been present throughout the period from the mid-1970s. Greece displays one of the most persistent problems of terrorism in Europe, raising anew the question of why extremist and revolutionary organisations continue to emerge and be active in democracies. Since the 2010, right wing and left wing extremism and radicalisation have intensified, especially in the context of a deepening social and economic crisis. The report provides a background study on radicalisation in Greece and the various forms that it takes, as a basis to bridge existing knowledge gaps on the subject. It provides and overview of past and current radicalisation trends. The national background study aims to first, identify and assess the legal and institutional responses to the processes of radicalisation that may lead to acts of violence and second, to review and analyse trends (ideas, actors, actions, motivations and root causes) in three strands of radicalisation (right and left wing, Islamist radicalisation and football hooliganism).

This article seeks to answer the question of who were the women of the Provisional IRA and to assess any demographic patterns of PIRA involvement. We use a multi-method approach to describe the many roles and functions of female members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1970 to 1998. Drawing on a sample of 61 convicted or deceased PIRA members, we outline the shifting socio-demographic and operation profile of these women and how structural, tactical and strategic needs of PIRA accounted for those changes. Women in the Provisional IRA played crucial operational roles throughout the period both front-line and behind the scenes. From the outset of the conflict, women consistently took part in violent operations. We also provide a historical case study of Mairéad Farrell's PIRA career to provide further illustrations of these themes in greater detail.

Our understanding of how people become involved in terrorism and violent extremism has transformed since the turn of the century. That transformation occurred at the same time that ‘radicalisation’ took over as the dominant framework for considering questions around terrorist psychology, motivation and recruitment. Today, radicalisation is typically seen to refer to a complex and dynamic process which results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a political or religious cause. The concept of radicalisation has become an almost universal element in contemporary efforts to understand and combat terrorism. This chapter outlines the rise and development of theoretical models and research on radicalisation. It highlights some of the major research breakthroughs but also focuses on where very significant gaps remain in our understanding. The chapter cautions that we need to be careful in terms of how we think about the broader role of radicalisation. A subtle – and dangerously unquestioned - assumption has spread that ‘radicalisation’ as a phenomenon is the major root cause of terrorism. When different radicalisation models are used to design or justify a variety of counter-terrorism policies and programmes, care is needed to look beyond the headline banner of radicalisation and pay attention to the factors identified within those models as key drivers.

During the last two decades, the growing threat of Islamic terrorism has raised numerous security challenges for both states and non-state actors. Cyberspace is weaponized by actors who conduct malicious activities, in order to achieve their goals. Terrorist organizations reflect the darker side of cyberspace. Terrorists use cyberspace to collect data, raise funds, conduct propaganda, spread radical ideologies and hate speech as well as for the purposes of radicalization, recruitment and operational planning. Social media platforms provide a fertile ground to extend the radical ideologies, to spread terror and to connect with people who share the same views. ISIS is considered a pioneer in utilizing the benefits that cyberspace offers. The Western Balkans is a region where ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters and lone-wolves. The European Union is the driving force for the activation of Western Balkans in countering cyberterrorism and developing relevant strategies.

Diversas organizaciones internacionales han puesto de manifiesto la necesidad de combatir más eficazmente la amenaza del terrorismo internacional introduciendo reformas en la legislación interna de los estados miembros. Sin embargo, estas iniciativas han tenido algunas repercusiones negativas en el ejercicio de derechos fundamentales. Este trabajo se analiza en qué medida las respuestas políticas y legislativas adoptadas en Derecho español han entrañado restricciones injustificadas en el libre ejercicio de la religión por parte de individuos y grupos.

Radicalization of youth is an international problem and a growing concern in the USA. Extremist, racist, criminal, and conspiracist, groups seek to recruit young and impressionable teenagers who are struggling with biological, cultural, and social factors that contribute to their being susceptible to its reach. The ease of internet use, the vast supply of information, and the coordinating efforts of recruiters to facilitate membership, also makes controlling the negative

Тази статия разглежда проявите на радикализация в българските училища. Тя започва с преглед на европейския опит, а в последствие представя резултатите от теренно изследване, проведено с директори и заместник директори на училища от три области на България. Основният метод за набиране на информация бяха фокус групите (3 фокус групи по 20 човека), но също така като методи за събиране на информация бяха използвани наблюдения на екипа, разговори с учители и други дейци от образованието

This article seeks to answer the question of who were the women of the Provisional IRA and to assess any demographic patterns of PIRA involvement. We use a multi-method approach to describe the many roles and functions of female members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1970 to 1998. Drawing on a sample of 61 convicted or deceased PIRA members, we outline the shifting socio-demographic and operation profile of these women and how structural, tactical and strategic needs of PIRA accounted for those changes. Women in the Provisional IRA played crucial operational roles throughout the period both front-line and behind the scenes. From the outset of the conflict, women consistently took part in violent operations. We also provide a historical case study of Mairéad Farrell's PIRA career to provide further illustrations of these themes in greater detail.

Using an encounter from Alice In Wonderland as a metaphor, this article examines the long-running attempt to apply a psychopathology label to terrorists. The disorders of greatest interest to researchers (antisocial, narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders), are described in order to highlight their attraction for theorists. A review of evidence follows. The critique finds that the findings supporting the pathology model are rare and generally of poor quality. In contrast, the evidence suggesting terrorist normality is both more plentiful and of better quality. However, in response to a failure to find any major psychopathology, a trend has emerged which asserts that terrorists possess many of the traits of pathological personalities but do not possess the actual clinical disorders. This development has effectively tainted terrorists with a pathology aura, without offering any way to easily test or refute the accusations.

Si la question des liens entre une croyance et un passage à l’acte a toujours été l’objet de nombreuses réflexions, les motivations de ceux qui rejoignent les groupes djihadistes lui donnent une actualité particulière. Le nombre de personnes qui croient aux valeurs de ces groupes est bien plus important que celui des personnes qui les rejoignent. L'analyse du lien entre les croyances et l’enrôlement effectif implique à la fois d’étudier les profils et les parcours des recrues du djihad, les modes et les lieux de recrutement suivant les pays, mais aussi les formes de sociabilité et les valeurs qu’elles transmettent. L’ensemble de ces analyses doit être mis en rapport avec les spécificités et les évolutions des organisations, des re ́seaux et des conflits en Irak et en Syrie.

Interviewer: Oliver J. Smith (psychology student at Cambridge University) //

Prof Roger Griffin is one of the world’s foremost experts on the socio-historical and ideological dynamics of fascism, as well as the relationship of various forms of fanaticism, and in particular contemporary terrorism, to Modernity. He has made a number of contributions to a humanistic understanding of terrorist radicalisation and the identification of the processes involved in de-radicalisation. Prof Griffin wrote a book called Terrorist’s Creed, published in 2012, which outlines a lot of his thinking on this subject; Oliver Smith asked him about the relevance of cults to terrorist groups, when considered as devices for achieving meaning, in particular.

The Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation was set up by a European Commission Decision of 19 April 20061 to provide policy-advice to the European Commission on fighting violent radicalisation. The members of the Group and its Chairman were subsequently appointed ...

Following the last 15 years’ war on terror, radicalisation as a perceive precursor to terrorism, is currently one of the most debated topics in Danish security discourse and high on the political agenda. However, there seems to be a gap between the dominant conceptualisation of radicalisation as something ambiguous, complex, contextually relative, and uncertain, compared to its practical implementation in counter-radicalisation. The Danish counter-radicalisation approach sits within a preventive frame based on predictive logic. This leads me to examine how the conceptualisation of radicalisation influences security risk policy-making and practice, and what this reveals about underlying governing logics of risk and security. To this end, I first design an analytical strategy of second order observation, based on Koselleck’s socio-historical analysis, supported by cultural and governance theory. Second, I apply this strategy in a conceptual analysis of the conceptualisation of radicalisation, using academic and policy-making literature as empirical data, revealing the impact that the cultural and socio-political context as well as the discourse itself, has on the conceptualisation of radicalisation. The main findings will subsequently be used as analytical tools in the second part of my analysis, where I explore Danish counter-radicalisation practices. Third, I will use my analytical findings to discuss the reasons for the dominant conceptualisation’s limited influence on practice. Finally, I conclude that the differences can be explained by a shift in governing logics of risk and security; and, how this is empirically and theoretically significant to radicalisation in particular and the governance of security risks in general.

This special issue of the Journal of Strategic Security is a timely response to something of a modern mystery. It is timely because it is difficult to read or watch television these days without coming across some reference to drone warfare or
the complex questions revolving around unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It is a bit of a mystery, however, because despite this pervasiveness of drones in the news there are relatively few scholarly efforts to rigorously and comprehensively
cover the issues that flow from their use.

Recent scholarship has called for additional research into the role of charismatic authority in terrorist groups and the process of radicalization. However, the sociological concepts of charisma and charismatic authority are being widely misused in terrorism studies. Current radicalization research often indirectly flirts with core concepts of charismatic authority, but fails to properly tap into its analytical utility. This article proposes to begin addressing this gap in knowledge in three ways, with: (1) a synthesis of social scientific research on charismatic authority, (2) a critical analysis of how charismatic authority is being misused and overlooked in the terrorist radicalization literature, and (3) an exploration of challenges and opportunities for future research concerning charismatic authority and terrorist radicalization.

The Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation was set up by a European Commission Decision of 19 April 20061 to provide policy-advice to the European Commission on fighting violent radicalisation. The members of the Group and its Chairman were subsequently appointed ...

This concise Report was prepared to outline the current state of academic research on violent radicalisation. Radicalisation to any form of violence, including terrorist violence, is a gradual or phased process. The Report finds that there are remarkable similarities between radicalisation to current Islamist or jihadist terrorism and radicalisation associated with left-wing, right-wing or ethno-nationalist terrorism in Western Europe since the 1960s. The Report also concludes that radicalisation leading to acts of terrorism is context-specific. Past and present waves of violent radicalisation which lead to terrorism among mainly young people share certain structural features. There is not any single root cause for radicalisation leading to terrorism but a number of factors may contribute to it. Precipitant (‘trigger’) factors vary according to individual experience and personal pathways to radicalisation. Personal experiences, kinship and bonds of friendship, as well as group dynam...

In understanding Houthism as it stands today, history, geography and dogma are but factors of many.
The first part of the study under the title 'The Rise of Houthism in the Happy Yemen' discussed the birth of Houthism and its history was presented through the different stages of its initial growth.
The study has yet to explain external, regional and international, pressures, interceptions, affiliations and performers that independently, collaboratively or simultaneously, played a role in certain adaptations, or adoptions, even, in some cases.
Throughout the second part of the study of this cult, more and more information keeps unraveling. Therefore, this second part of the study will focus on Iranian engagement alone.

The Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation was set up by a European Commission Decision of 19 April 20061 to provide policy-advice to the European Commission on fighting violent radicalisation. The members of the Group and its Chairman were subsequently appointed ...

Understanding why individuals engage in terrorism remains a challenging and multi-dimensional problem. Evolutionary psychology, however, does offer a new approach to understanding one potentially critical factor for engaging in terrorism: the human propensity for altruism and punishment. We discuss the emerging evolutionary framework for understanding altruistic behaviour in humans, identifying its impact on prosocial behaviour, punishing, morality, and how recent developments have revealed human inclinations to police the behaviour of others. We then use this framework to explore the existing terrorism literature for relevance of the framework.

Born into a Muslim family in Spain’s North-African exclave of Ceuta, Asia Ahmed Mohamed is just one of several women who have traveled to Iraq or Syria to join the Islamic State or another jihadist militia. She became connected to the militant group when she was searching for information about her brother, who had already traveled to the Middle East to fight and was killed. While looking for information about his death, she met another jihadist, “Kokito Castillejos,” and married him before traveling to join the Islamic State in late 2014. A teacher by training, her case confirms Ceuta as a hotbed of Islamism. The city, strategically located a few miles from Gibraltar right in a major maritime chokepoint, being increasingly under the influence of Jihadists, who impose their social control.

This article juxtaposes anti-radicalisation policy in the United Kingdom, one of the pioneers in the field, with Greece, one of the latecomers. Drawing on localisation theory, our aim is to understand how ‘common knowledge’ of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation has materialised in the United Kingdom and Greece by exploring the development and use of radicalisation-related risk and vulnerability assessment tools. We argue that the radicalisation ‘knowledge’ was localised more seamlessly in the United Kingdom, which can be attributed to the country’s ‘norm producer’ status on the field of European counter-radicalisation. By contrast, the ‘knowledge’ was subjected to significant ‘re-framing’ and ‘stretching’ to fit with the Greek context. This is associated with the country’s ‘norm adopter’ status on the field of European counter-radicalisation, as well as with a ‘spill-over effect’ from a national context of deeply polarising and contentious counter-terrorism policies. We maint...

The Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation was set up by a European Commission Decision of 19 April 20061 to provide policy-advice to the European Commission on fighting violent radicalisation. The members of the Group and its Chairman were subsequently appointed ...

This paper analyses the phenomenon of a group of Portuguese citizens and Portuguese-descendants who went to fight alongside the Islamic State (IS) organization and other extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. Based on the empirical evidence from this exploratory case study, the aim is to explain jihadists' radicalisation and mobilization into violence, by emphasizing the importance of group-level factors as the main mechanisms that lead converts to involvement in extremism and terrorism. It also points to the socioeconomic explanations, such as a sense of failure and the problems of individuals with an immigrant background.

History and psychology give us some powerful tools for understanding suicide terrorism. History quickly teaches that this tactic is not the reserve of any one religion and there are many examples from the past of individuals with very different motivations who are willing to sacrifice their life in an effort to kill others. Thus it is a mistake to see modern suicide terrorism as inherently an ‘Islamic problem’. Similarly, history also teaches us that perspective is important. The more you sympathise with the perpetrators’ cause, then the more you tend to explain the perpetrators’ decisions and motivations in very different (and usually much more positive) ways. If we disagree with the aims, then explanations begin to cluster around issues such as brainwashing, indoctrination, grooming, and radicalisation of vulnerable personalities. The truth almost certainly lies somewhere in between. The lesson from psychology is that there is no obvious suicide terrorist personality. Individuals reach the point of carrying out a suicide attack through a process which generally has more to do with social psychology then with the tenets of clinical or abnormal psychology. Used effectively, these insights can be tremendously helpful in stripping away many of the myths and assumptions which surround debates on suicide terrorism and leave us with a more realistic assessment of the perpetrators, who they are, how they see themselves and what forces motivate and drive them. A realistic understanding here is a vital first step in developing more effective approaches for both countering and preventing suicide terrorism.

At no time in the past 50 years has there been as much interest in the idea of deradicalizing terrorists as today.  Programs to deradicalize individuals linked to al-Qa`ida have been established in multiple countries, with the hope that reforming these extremists is possible.  Nevertheless, serious doubts remain over the effectiveness of these programs. This uncertainty is only heightened by the chronic lack of proper evaluations on almost any of the programs involved. Adding to the difficulty is confusion over how to define the goals of the programs. Should they seek to merely disengage subjects from violence and other illegal activity? Or should they actually “deradicalize” a subject, which would mean a complete shift in the prisoner’s mindset, sympathies and attitudes? This article assesses the differences between disengagement and deradicalization. It suggests that deradicalizing prisoners—which requires changing their mindsets and ideological beliefs—is exceedingly difficult and finds that disengagement is likely a more possible outcome.