

# Discussion of “Markets, banks, and shadow banks” (by Martinez-Miera & Repullo)

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These are my private views and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem

# Main message

Does capital regulation lead to more shadow banking?

Yes

Flat requirement → shadow banks finance medium risk firms

Risk-based (VaR) → shadow banks finance high risk firms

Other results


Current regulation too tight

Welfare optimal requirement → no shadow banking

Low safe rate, high cost of equity → more shadow banking

# Importance of EU shadow banking

(€ trillions; Q4 2012, Q4 2015 and Q4 2016)



ESRB (2017) "EU Shadow banking monitor"

# Main ingredients

Bank screening lowers cost of borrowing

More equity increases banks' incentive to screen

→ Risky firms borrow from banks

Equity is more costly for shadow banks

“Private certification is more costly”

But they do not have to hold a minimum amount

# Intuition (flat requirement)

Medium-risk borrowers are driven to shadow banks

They want some screening to reduce cost of borrowing

Regulated banks have to hold a lot of capital

Screen a lot (capital and screening are complements)

Too costly for medium-risk borrowers

(Higher cost of equity for shadow banks ok, they do not screen much)

# Optimal capital regulation

Welfare analysis is nice!


But why have capital regulation?

Does market equilibrium coincide with  $k_p^*$ ?

If not, what is the externality?

# Do shadow banks intermediate credit?

- money market funds
- equity funds
- bond funds
- mixed funds
- real estate funds
- hedge funds
- other funds
- total investment funds



ESRB (2017) "EU Shadow banking monitor"

Credit intermediation is

$$\frac{\text{Loans} + \text{Debt}}{\text{Assets}}$$

For euro-area banks

$$\frac{18 \text{ tn} + 4 \text{ tn}}{31 \text{ tn}} = 71\%$$

# A word on the model

Screening...?

Types are observable

Each type knows that it can obtain cheaper funding if bank screens (?) more

Would be nice to have outside equity

Here equity pays cost of capital/certification even if firm fails

Why does  $k$  need to be certified?

How exactly does the market “certify” capital?



# Summary

Very creative model

Novel take on shadow banking

Needs better intuition

Better motivation of “certification”

Does it apply to all shadow banking?