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OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Latest findings and emerging threats



UNODC Research Brief
November 2022

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Contact: UNODC, PDMU: unodc-pdmu@un.org

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

Since the takeover by the Taliban in August 2021:

1. Opium cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 32% over the previous year to 233,000 hectares – making the 2022 crop the third largest area under opium cultivation since monitoring began.
2. Opium prices have soared following the announcement of the cultivation ban in April 2022.
3. The income made by farmers from opium sales tripled from USD 425 million in 2021 to USD1.4 billion 2022 - the equivalent of 29% of the 2021 agricultural sector value. The sum still represents only a fraction of the income made from production and trafficking within the country. Increasingly larger sums are further accrued along the illicit drug supply chain outside the country.
4. Seizures of opiates around Afghanistan indicate that trafficking of Afghan opium and heroin has not stopped. Afghanistan supplies 80% of global opiate demand.
5. Most of the 2023 opium crop must be sowed by early November; farmers will take decisions on whether and how much opium poppy to plant amid severe economic disruption and humanitarian crisis, continued high prices for opium and uncertainty about how the de facto authorities will enforce the cultivation ban.

Since the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021, opium cultivation increased by 32%, or 56,000 hectares, compared to the previous year. This represents the third largest area under cultivation since the beginning of systematic monitoring.

The area under opium poppy cultivation in the 2022 cropping season was estimated at 233,000 hectares. Opium cultivation continued to be concentrated in the south-western parts of the country (accounting for 73%), where the largest increases took place, followed by the western provinces (accounting for 14%). In some regions opium poppy cultivation occupied a significant proportion of overall agricultural land. For example, in Hilmand province one-fifth of arable land was dedicated to opium poppy, and in some districts the proportion was even higher – taking away fields from vitally important food crops, including wheat.

Following drought conditions in early 2022, opium yields declined from an average of 38.5kg/ha in 2021, to an estimated 26.7 kg/ha in 2022, yielding an opium harvest of 6,200 tons (10% less than the 6,800 tons in 2021).

The 2022 opium harvest can be converted into 350 – 380 tons of heroin of export quality (50 – 70% purity).

Area under opium cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan, 1994-2022



Opium prices soared after the announcement of a ban on opium cultivation and other narcotics in April, making the 2022 opium harvest the most profitable for farmers since 2017

The Taliban de facto authorities announced a ban on opium poppy cultivation in April 2022, just as the opium harvest was about to begin. However, a grace period of two months was granted, and this year's harvest was largely unaffected by the ban, although some eradication was reported to have taken place.[1 2] The ban caused prices to increase dramatically, with per-kilogram prices nearly doubling from USD 116 in March 2022 to USD 203 after the announcement. This came on top of already elevated prices which had spiked following the takeover in August 2021. Recent years have been marked by depressed prices since the record harvest of 2017 and continued abundant supply, but political upheaval and uncertainty over the future of the market have seemingly decoupled prices from broader market dynamics.

The high prices during harvest time in 2022 tripled the income made by farmers from opium sales, from USD 425 million in 2021 to USD 1.4 billion in 2022.

However, the increase in income did not necessarily translate into purchasing power as inflation has soared during the same period. The price of food increased on average by 35 percent, with the poor spending 60-70 percent of their income just to eat. Recent reports indicate that overall inflation increased from 4.2 percent in August 2021 to 17.9 percent in June 2022.[3]

Prices of dry opium (USD/kg), 2019-2022



Without inflation adjustment.

1 United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ", Report of the Secretary-General, A/76/862-S/2022/485.
2 According to anecdotal reports from rural areas, eradication only affected the minor, second crop in the season. Eradication efforts were not verified by UNODC and were not considered in the area estimates.
3 UNDP, One Year in Review: Afghanistan since August 2021: A Socio-Economic Snapshot, October 2022.

Farm-gate value of opium, 2008-2022

The illicit economy is thriving as the licit economy contracts sharply

After August 2021 the licit economy contracted by nearly USD 5 billion, or 21%, compared to 2020.[4] Annual per capita income declined by 14-28%.[5] The illicit economy, by contrast, has continued to function and gain in significance as the licit economy falters. The 2022 farmers' income from opium (farm-gate value) amounted to some 29% of the country's 2021 agricultural output; in 2021 the farm-gate value of opiates was only worth some 9% of the previous year's agricultural output. The transformation of the opium into morphine and heroin, together with their trafficking out of Afghanistan, generate considerably higher levels of income compared to the amounts that the farmers earn; the value of the total illicit opiate economy in the country will be estimated once data for 2022 are available.

Illicit drug markets account for a larger share of the national economy



4 National Statistics and Information Authority, Afghanistan, "Statistical Yearbook 2021."
5 UNDP, One Year in Review: Afghanistan since August 2021: A Socio-Economic Snapshot, October 2022."

Seizure activity has been ongoing without interruption since August 2021, indicating continued supply of opiates from Afghanistan

Seizure events collected in UNODC´s Drugs Monitoring Platform suggest that opiates trafficking activity has continued unabated since August 2021, indicating that the global Afghan opiate market has not been disrupted since the Taliban takeover. Afghanistan supplies some 80% of global opiate demand.[6]

Past seizure data have shown that it can take between 1 and 1½ years for opiates originating in Afghanistan to reach destination countries, depending on the distance from Afghanistan and the mode of transport used. Any drastic changes in cultivation or trafficking activity in Afghanistan can be expected to be seen within the same year in the Near and Middle East and South-West Asia, and a year later in Europe.

Opiate seizure events around Afghanistan since August 2021



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

6 UNODC, Drug situation in Afghanistan, 2021, Latest findings and emerging threats.

OUTLOOK

Most of the 2023 opium crop must be sowed by early November 2022; farmers will take decisions on whether and how much opium poppy to plant amid severe economic disruption and continued humanitarian crisis, continued high prices for opium and uncertainty about how the de facto authorities will enforce the cultivation ban.

Afghanstan opium poppy calendar



INTRODUCTION

The Afghanistan Opium Surveys are implemented under the project "Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan" (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC by remote sensing, through surveys and other tools; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC, annual report questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021 and 2022.

The results provide a detailed assessment of the outcome of the current year's opium season and together with data from previous years, enable the identification of medium- and long-term trends in the evolution of the illicit drug problem. This information is essential for planning, implementing and monitoring the impact of measures required for tackling a problem that has far-reaching implications for Afghanistan and the international community.

The opium survey is implemented within the framework of the UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP), established in 1999 upon request of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in its resolution 42/3, Monitoring and verification of illicit cultivation. The objective of ICMP is to assist the international community in monitoring the extent and evolution of illicit crops and to compile reliable and internationally comparable data. Currently, UNODC carries out and supports monitoring activities in seven countries affected by illicit crop cultivation: coca surveys in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru; and opium poppy surveys in Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Mexico and Myanmar.

OPIUM CULTIVATION INCREASED BY 32% IN 2022

The area under opium poppy cultivation in 2022 was estimated at 233,000 (215,000 - 250,000) hectares. This was a 32 per cent or 56,000 hectares increase from 2021.[1]

The survey results reflect the situation of the opium crop season 2022, which started with the sowing of poppy seeds in most parts of the country in late October and November 2021 and ended with the harvest in April to July 2022. It thus presents the results of the first cropping season after the takeover of the Taliban in August 2021 and reflects planting decisions made by farmers before the de-facto authorities announced a ban on all illicit drug cultivation, manufacture and trafficking in April 2022.

Increases in opium cultivation were observed in almost all major opium poppy cultivating provinces; most importantly in Hilmand and Kandahar provinces (+ 12,300 ha) in the south-west and in Badghis province (+9,200 ha) in the west. There was no change in the number of poppy free provinces (provinces with less than 100 ha poppy), which remained at 11 out of 34 provinces.

Opium poppy cultivation continued to be concentrated in the south-western provinces of the country (Nimroz, Kandahar, Hilmand, Uruzgan and Zabul) which accounted together for 73% of the total area under opium poppy cultivation.

FIG. 1: Opium cultivation in Afghanistan



1 In some provinces in Afghanistan, opium poppy is harvested two times in the year. This estimate only considers the main season, as the second harvest is marginal in comparison, based on the evidence available.

FIG. 2: Regional distribution of area under opium poppy cultivation, 2022

TABLE 1: Opium-poppy cultivation in provinces in Afghanistan

PROVINCE	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	CHANGE (%) 2021-2022	CHANGE (HA) 2021 - 2022	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Hilmand	136,800	90,700	115,600	109,800	122,000	+11%	+12,300	52%
Kandahar	23,400	14,000	20,600	17,000	29,200	+72%	+12,300	13%
Badghis	7,000	7,600	22,400	4,900	14,100	+188%	+9,200	6%
Uruzgan	18,700	11,600	13,400	9,700	14,600	+49%	+4,800	6%
Farah	10,900	7,100	10,500	11,500	15,800	+38%	+4,400	7%
Nangarhar	17,200	3,100	2,200	2,000	5,200	+159%	+3,200	2%
Balkh	8,500	7,000	5,900	2,200	4,500	+109%	+2,400	2%
Faryab	8,200	6,600	13,100	4,800	6,900	+45%	+2,200	3%
Badakhshan	7,700	4,700	6,400	3,600	4,300	+21%	+700	2%
Nimroz	9,100	2,000	2,900	2,300	2,400	+5%	+100	1%
Remainder	15,100	9,000	10,600	8,800	13,700	+55%	+4,800	6%
Rounded Total	263,000	163,000	224,000	177,000	233,000	+32%	+56,000	100%

Estimates are rounded, percentage changes have been calculated based on precise figures.

MAP 6: Density of opium poppy cultivation in agricultural land, 2022



Source: National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

MAP 7: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan (by district) 2021-2022



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MAP 8: Change of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan (by district) 2022



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OPIUM PRODUCTION WAS ESTIMATED AT 6,200 TONS OR 10 PER CENT LESS THAN IN 2021, POTENTIALLY YIELDING SOME 350-580 TONS OF HEROIN OF EXPORT QUALITY

The 2022 increase in cultivation was offset by a decrease in opium yield per hectare due to drought conditions in the country. Opium yields declined from an average of 38.5kg/ha in 2021, to an estimated 26.7 kg/ha in 2022. Estimated opium production in 2022 was 6,200 tons or 10 per cent less than in 2021. In absence of a field based survey, UNODC used information retrieved from satellite imagery to estimate yields, which increased the uncertainty around the yield estimates.[2]

Opium yields can vary strongly from one year to the next, depending on amount and timing of precipitation, temperature, the absence or presence of crop diseases or pests, and changing agricultural practices such as the use of fertilisers. The impact of changing conditions can differ regionally too, for example, exclusively rain-fed areas in the north are more sensitive to drought conditions than irrigated areas in the south-west, which retrieve water from snow-cap fed rivers such as the Hilmand river or ground water from deep bore-wells.[3] UNODC has conducted intensive research to improve remote-sensing based yield measurements, but using indirect data sources to model yields retain some limitations in reflecting annual variations. The production estimates are therefore considered to be less robust than in years where field measurements were possible.

The 2022 opium harvest could be converted into some 240-290 tons of pure heroin base or 350-580 tons of heroin of export quality (50-70 purity). These estimates do not consider seizures or other losses along the supply chains from source to destination countries; the amount of heroin that potentially reaches international markets is therefore lower than these estimates.[4]

TABLE 2: Opium production, by region, 2021 and 2022

Region	Production 2021 (tons)	Production 2022 (tons)	Production 2022 as % of total
Central	43	38	1%
Eastern	146	268	4%
Northern	256	555	3%
North-eastern	149	181	9%
Southern	5	6	0.1%
South-western	5,569	4,496	73%
Western	623	656	11%
Weighted national average.	6,800	6,200	100%

Detailed yield estimates and a description of the methodology can be found online [6]

2 The estimation followed the approach developed in 2020. A representative sample of opium poppy fields was visually ranked according to the quality of crops on the field. For each rank (low, medium, and high) a specific range of yields was estimated based on field measurements collected since 2015. These estimates were applied to the respective field qualities in 2022 (sample-based), which yielded a production estimate. See online methodology: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/drug-cultivation-production-and-manufacture.html

3 NSIA/UNODC "Afghanistan opium survey 2018 Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security", July 2018.

4 See UNODC "Afghanistan opium survey 2021 – Cultivation and Production", UNODC 2022 for a detailed description of demand estimates and conversion ratios.

OPIUM PRICES AND FARMERS' INCOME FROM OPIUM PRODUCTION

Opium prices sharply increased in April 2022 at the beginning of the harvest time and remained at high levels throughout it. The average opium price traffickers paid to farmers was 3.5 times higher in 2022 than in 2021, leading to a record income from opium sales of farmers.

Opium prices typically follow market dynamics and are correlated to supply – years with high levels of production have been accompanied by decreasing prices and vice versa. For example, prices increased after a failed harvest in 2010 and decreased in the period 2017-2021 where high levels of production followed the 2017 record harvest. The 2021 Afghanistan Opium Survey recorded the lowest prices at harvest time since beginning of systematic monitoring (this was prior to the takeover of the Taliban in August 2021), and linked it to the sustained high levels of production since 2017 which seemed to have saturated the opium market.[5]

The most recent price developments are not driven by such market dynamics: at 6,200 tons the 2022 harvest was estimated at similar levels as in the years before. The sudden price hike in 2022 is therefore linked to uncertainty around the future of opium supply in light of the drug ban rather than levels of demand and supply.

The estimated farmers' income from opium production (farm-gate value) in 2022 amounted to US$ 1.4 million, the highest value since the record harvest of 2017. Farmers in Hilmand, the country's largest opium-producing province, earned some estimated US$ 733 million, which was

FIG. 3: Monthly opium prices and opium production in Afghanistan, 2006-2022



Without adjustment for inflation

5 See as well UNODC, Drug Situation in Afghanistan 2021 – Latest findings and emerging threats, UNDOC 2021.

equivalent to 54% of the total farm-gate value of opium production in Afghanistan in 2022.

The increase in income did not necessarily translate into increased purchasing power as inflation has soared during the same period. The price of food increased on average by 35 percent, with the poor spending 60-70 percent of their income just to eat.

Recent reports indicate that overall inflation increased from 4.2 percent in August 2021 to 17.9 percent in June 2022.[6]

Opium farmers have reported consistently in UNODC village surveys that food, medical expenses, and debt repayment are the three most common uses of opium income.[7]

TABLE 3: Average dry opium prices at harvest time (April-July)

REGION	AVERAGE DRY OPIUM PRICE (US$/KG) 2021	AVERAGE DRY OPIUM PRICE (US$/KG) 2022	CHANGE 2021-2022 (%)
Central	NA	NA	NA
Southern	NA	NA	NA
Eastern	113	232	105%
North-eastern	43	155	261%
Northern	53	170	221%
Southern-western	57	226	296%
Western	108	226	109%
National average weighted by production	63	219	248%

Without adjustment for inflation

6 UNDP, One Year in Review: Afghanistan since August 2021: A Socio-Economic Snapshot, October 2022.

7 See for example, NSIA/UNODC, "Afghanistan opium survey 2019 - Socio-economic survey report: Drivers, causes and consequences of opium poppy cultivation", February 2021.

THE ILLICIT ECONOMY GAINS IMPORTANCE

The production of opiates (opium, morphine, and heroin) is arguably Afghanistan's largest illegal economic activity, providing a sizable share of income to the rural populations. In some regions, opium poppy cultivation occupied a significant proportion of the overall agricultural land. For example, in Hilmand province 20 per cent of the land was dedicated to opium poppy, and in some districts the proportion was even higher. Results from earlier surveys revealed that in more than 35 per cent of all villages in Afghanistan opium is cultivated, and in the south-western region in more than 80 percent of villages.

Opiates have become a crucial pillar of Afghanistan's economy and permeate the rural society to the extent that many communities – not only farmers – have become dependent on the income from opium to sustain their livelihoods. From cultivation and production to local distribution and international trade, all activities related to drug supply chains yield financial benefits for those involved.

The value of the opiate economy, including domestic use and the manufacture and export of heroin, exceeds the farm-gate value of opium by far. For 2022, no estimates are available yet, as no updated prices of heroin in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan have been made available. Past data have shown that it can take between 3-6 months until price increases in Afghanistan are translated into price increases in neighbouring countries.[8] In 2021, it was estimated that the total Afghan opiate economy, including domestic consumption and exports, stood at between 9-14% per cent of the country's GDP. With a shrinking GDP in 2022, the 2022 opiate economy is likely to represent an even higher share of the total economy.

FIG. 4: Share of Income from opiates by activity (2021)



FIG. 5: Beneficiaries of Income from opiates by activity (2021)



8 UNODC calculations.

The largest share of Afghan income from opiates is earned from their manufacture and international export. The domestic use market and the income made by farmers are much smaller. Opiates bring benefits to a multitude of actors, including through taxation. Taxes on opiate cultivation, production and trafficking have long represented a lucrative potential source of financing in Afghanistan, including in the past for non-state actors such as the Taliban.[9]

9 NSIA/UNODC "Afghanistan opium survey 2019 - Socio-economic survey report: Drivers, causes and consequences of opium poppy cultivation", July 2017.

OUTLOOK

Afghanistan is in a state of constant crisis, with a precarious economy and wider instability enabling illicit markets. After the takeover of the Taliban, the country faces numerous political, security-related, human rights and economic challenges. The available economic data paint a picture of a greatly weakened Afghan economy, with rampant inflation, reduced economic output and loss of employment opportunities – by June 2022, one in three businesses were temporarily closed since August 2021, firms and households continued to face challenges in accessing cash from bank accounts and nearly 700,000 jobs were estimated to have been lost.[10] [11] Nearly 20 million people were classified under high and critical levels of food insecurity in March – May 2022.[12]

The challenges faced by the Afghan population impede the ability to lessen its dependence on income generated from opium, which remains its main export product with well-established markets and trafficking networks. The current contraction of licit economic opportunities makes households even more vulnerable to engaging in illicit activities such as opium and cannabis cultivation, and heroin and methamphetamine manufacture and trafficking.

Most poppy farmers are taking the decision whether to cultivate opium poppy in late October/November. There are always multiple factors that drive farmers decisions on their crops, but an assessment of the likelihood that the drug ban will be effectively enforced and of the risk of eradication will likely be the major driver of the decision of farmers between cultivating opium versus legal crops. The current high opium prices provide an additional incentive for farmers to risk cultivating opium poppy, despite the ban by the de facto authorities.

The extent of opium cultivation in the 2023 cropping season will therefore likely depend on the perception of the ban's enforcement and the socio-economic status of rural areas where opium can be cultivated.

An effectively enforced opium ban, such as in 2001, can lead to a substantive reduction in opium production in the country. The impact of such a ban can be manifold. Within the country it would exacerbate the already dire situation of the rural population by drastically decreasing the already limited economic opportunities. It would thus strongly increase the need for humanitarian aid to mitigate the effects of the income lost on the short run. Those who lost their income from opium production may turn towards other illicit activities, such as methamphetamine manufacture, unless they are equally effectively banned.[13]

Outside of Afghanistan, the effects may be less visible on the short run. The opium ban of 2001 was enforced for one year; the resulting market shock was short-lived and was felt more in Afghanistan than elsewhere. Seizures of heroin linked to opiates originating in Afghanistan exhibited a smooth decline in the years following 2001, suggesting that the effects of the drastic decline in opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan were smoothly absorbed along the trafficking chain. A long-term, sustainable reduction of opium production in the country, however, may lead to a displacement of opium production to other countries, to overall decreases in opiate use or replacement of heroin or opium by other substances at the user level, some of which may be even more harmful than heroin or opium (such as fentanyl and its analogues).[14]

Addressing the global opiate problem remains thus a shared responsibility. With reduced volumes of international aid, sanctions and restricted access to international payment systems, there are few drivers of sustained economic recovery in the legal sphere and a sustainable reduction of opiate production can only be achieved if accompanied by country-wide and long-term development support.

10 United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ", Report of the Secretary-General, A/76/862-S/2022/485.
11 See as well, UNDP, One Year in Review: Afghanistan since August 2021: A Socio-Economic Snapshot, October 2022.
12 IPC, Afghanistan: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Snapshot, March-November 2022.

13 See World Drug Report 2022.
14 See World Drug Report 2022, Booklet 3 pp. 92 ff.

STATISTICAL ANNEX

TABLE 4: Opium poppy cultivation (2018-2022) in Afghanistan (Hectares)

PROVINCE	CULTIVATION (HA)					ESTIMATION METHOD 2022
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	
Bamyan	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	T
Day Kundi	747	583	550	792	837	T
Kabul	484	197	284	216	216	T
Kapisa	386	Poppy-free	178	216	184	T
Logar	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	V
Panjshir	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	T
Parwan	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	V
Wardak	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	S
Central Region	1,617	780	1,011	1,223	1,236	
Kunar	1,732	967	595	626	822	S
Laghman	2,092	908	723	987	1,102	S
Nangarhar	17,177	3,067	2,225	2,027	5,241	S
Nuristan	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	T
Eastern Region	21,001	4,942	3,543	3,639	7,165	
Badakhshan	7,703	4,702	6,395	3,561	4,305	S
Baghlan	1,076	271	572	188	615	T
Kunduz	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	T
Takhar	251	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	T
North-eastern Region	9,030	4,973	6,967	3,750	4,920	
Balkh	8,532	7,042	5,946	2,177	4,542	S
Faryab	8,175	6,621	13,083	4,778	6,929	S
Jawzjan	338	1,332	1,124	708	1,359	S
Samangan	238	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	141	132	T
Sari Pul	660	2,134	2,607	1,975	3,454	S
Northern Region	17,944	17,128	22,760	9,780	16,415	
Hilmand	136,798	90,727	115,597	109,778	122,045	S
Kandahar	23,410	13,954	20,555	16,971	29,229	S
Nimroz	9,115	2,002	2,931	2,304	2,429	S
Uruzgan	18,662	11,578	13,444	9,746	14,557	S
Zabul	2,581	183	408	980	1,531	S
South-western Region	190,565	118,444	152,935	139,780	169,791	
Ghazni	373	123	290	127	163	T
Khost	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	V
Paktika	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	T
Paktya	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	V
Southern Region	373	123	290	127	163	
Badghis	6,973	7,631	22,402	4,904	14,110	S
Farah	10,916	7,113	10,483	11,461	15,829	S
Ghor	3,574	1,960	2,848	1,451	1,784	S
Hirat	595	349	455	290	1,337	T
Western Region	22,059	17,053	36,188	18,107	33,059	
Total (rounded)	263,000	163,000	224,000	177,000	233,000	

Area estimation method: S=remote sensing sample survey, T=remote sensing target survey, V=village sample survey and field observation. A province is defined as poppy-free when it is estimated to have less than 100 hectares of opium poppy cultivation and are not included in the regional estimates.

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/drug-cultivation-production-and-manufacture.html