| Muse | Search | Journals | This Journal | Contents |

What is Democratic Consolidation?

Andreas Schedler

During the past quarter-century, the "third wave" of global demo-cratization has brought more than 60 countries around the world from authoritarian rule toward some kind of democratic regime. [1] This is no small achievement, of course, but it has also become apparent that sustaining democracy is often a task as difficult as establishing it. In the immediate aftermath of all these democratic transitions, pressing concerns have quickly arisen about how to strengthen and stabilize these new regimes. With the extension of democracy to additional countries now having slowed, political scientists--and political actors in new democracies--have been increasingly focusing on what has come to be called "democratic consolidation."

Originally, the term "democratic consolidation" was meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual "reverse waves." To this original mission of rendering democracy "the only game in town," countless other tasks have been added. As a result, the list of "problems of democratic consolidation" (as well as the corresponding list of "conditions of democratic consolidation") has expanded beyond all recognition. It has come to include such divergent items as popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of antisystem actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the **[End Page 91]** elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organization of functional interests, the stabilization of electoral rules, the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation of poverty, and economic stabilization.

At this point, with people using the concept any way they like, nobody can be sure what it means to others, but all maintain the illusion of speaking to one another in some comprehensible way. While "democratic consolidation" may have been a nebulous concept since its very inception, the conceptual fog that veils the term has only become thicker and thicker the more it has spread through the academic as well as the political world. If it is true that "[n]o scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common understanding of key terms in the field," [2] then the study of democratic consolidation, at its current state of conceptual confusion, is condemned to stagnation. The aspiring subdiscipline of "consolidology" is anchored in an unclear, inconsistent, and unbounded concept, and thus is not anchored at all, but drifting in murky waters. The use of one and the same term for vastly different things only simulates a shared common language; in fact, the reigning conceptual disorder is acting as a powerful barrier to scholarly communication, theory building, and the accumulation of knowledge.

I believe that we can order and comprehend the multiple usages and meanings of "democratic consolidation" by looking at the concrete realities as well as the practical tasks the term is meant to address. The meaning that we ascribe to the notion of democratic consolidation depends on where we stand (our empirical viewpoints) and where we aim to reach (our normative horizons). It varies

according to the contexts and the goals we have in mind.

Viewpoints and Horizons

When students of democratization seek to classify regimes, the key distinction, of course, runs between those that are democratic and those that are not (the latter often generically labeled as "authoritarian"). The most widely accepted criteria for identi-fying a country as democratic have been put forward by Robert Dahl--civil and political rights plus fair, competitive, and inclusive elections. [3] Dahl calls countries that meet these criteria "polyarchies," but they are more commonly referred to as "liberal democracies."

Two other subtypes of democracy have gained wide recognition in the scholarly literature on new democracies. On the one hand, there are all those borderline cases that possess some but not all of liberal **[End Page 92]** democracy's essential features, and therefore fall somewhere in between democracy and authoritarianism. I call such semidemocratic regimes "electoral democracies." This term is now generally used to describe a specific type of semidemocracy--one that manages to hold (more or less) inclusive, clean, and competitive elections but fails to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy. Here, however, I will use the term "electoral democracy" more broadly as a convenient shorthand for any kind of "diminished subtype" of democracy. [4]

On the other hand, there are those "advanced democracies" that presumptively possess some positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria of liberal democracy, and therefore rank higher in terms of democratic quality than many new democracies. This term risks idealizing and reifying the wealthy Western democracies, but even if we recognize that admiring references to "established Western democracies" often rely on stereotypes, we have to acknowledge that discursive constructs (such as "democratic normality") are social realities too.

This four-fold classification--authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, advanced democracy--basically corresponds to the way David Collier and Steven Levitsky have ordered the semantic universe of democracy and its subtypes. In their admirable effort to bring order to the chaos of innumerable subtypes of democracy that circulate in contemporary democratization studies (they stopped counting at 550), they have distinguished precisely these four broad regime categories (even if they label them differently). [5] I want to show that these broad categories also provide a basis for reordering the conceptual map of consolidation studies, and for comprehending the manifold ways students of democracy use the term "democratic consolidation."

Figure 1 presents this classification of regime families graph-ically along a one-dimensional continuum of "democraticness," with authoritarian regimes placed at one end and advanced democracies at the other. [6] It depicts in a graphical way how these four regime types define the empirical contexts as well as the normative horizons and practical tasks that characterize distinct conceptualizations of democratic consolidation. The two middle categories, electoral and liberal democracy, represent the empirical referents of all debate on democratic consolidation. In normative terms, authoritarianism forms the outer negative horizon that democrats in both these kinds of regimes try to avoid, and advanced democracy forms the outer positive horizon that they try to approach. In addition, electoral democracy and liberal democracy constitute normative horizons for each other. While electoral democracy appears as liberal democracy's proximate **[End Page 93]** horizon of avoidance, liberal democracy appears as electoral democracy's proximate horizon of attainment.

Now, those scholars who look (fearfully) from electoral or liberal democracy to authoritarianism equate democratic consolidation with avoiding an authoritarian regression, a "quick death" of democracy. Those who look (hopefully) from electoral or liberal democracy to advanced democracy equate democratic consolidation with democratic deepening, with advances in the quality of democracy. Those who look (with concern) from liberal democracy to electoral democracy equate democratic consolidation with avoiding a "slow death" of democracy, the erosion of certain funda-mental democratic features. And those who look (with impatience) from electoral democracy to liberal democracy equate democratic consolidation with completing democracy, with supplying its missing features.

We might say, tentatively, that those who are concerned with democratic stability and try to avoid regressions to either **[End Page 94]** nondemocratic or semidemocratic regimes support "negative" notions of democratic consolidation, while those who are concerned with democratic advances and try to attain progress toward either liberal or high-quality democracy sponsor "positive" notions of democratic consolidation. [7]

In a way, this contextual and perspective-dependent approach tries to reconstruct the concept's teleological core. Of course, I am not the first to note the teleological quality of democratic consolidation. Both Ben Schneider and Guillermo O'Donnell have repeatedly criticized the notion's "strong teleological flavor." [8] These critics are right. Democratic consolidation is indeed an intrinsically teleological concept. Yet I think there is nothing inherently wrong with teleology, provided that three conditions are met: First, we have to avoid veiling or obscuring it; hidden teleology is indeed bad teleology. Second, we have to dissociate teleology from any belief in inevitable progress: supporting some telos, some normative goal or practical task, is one matter; assuming "some kind of automatic or 'natural' progression" toward that goal is quite another. [9] Third, we have to acknowledge that the notion of democratic consolidation knows not merely one characteristic telos but many, and that this plurality of teloi accordingly defines a plurality of concepts of democratic consolidation.

Avoiding Democratic Breakdown

Once a transition from authoritarian rule in a given country has reached a point where (more or less) free, fair, and competitive elections are held, democratic actors usually cannot afford to relax and enjoy the "bounded uncertainty" of democratic rule. More often than not, regime-threatening "unbounded uncertainties" persist, and the democrats' fundamental concern shifts from establishing democracy's core institutions to securing what they have achieved. For these actors, consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of its breakdown to the point where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near (and not-so-near) future. This preoccupation with regime survival describes the "classical" meaning of democratic consolidation. It gives coherence to a broad and crowded semantic field where a wide range of semantic labels defines this telos in either positive or negative ways. In its positive formulations, this branch of consolidation studies speaks about reaching the goal of democratic continuity, maintenance, entrenchment, survival, permanence, endurance, persistence, resilience, viability, sustainability, or irreversibility. By contrast, negative formulations invoke the necessity of moving beyond democratic fragility, instability, **[End Page 95]** uncertainty, vulnerability, reversibility, or the threat of breakdown. Whatever the differences in nuance, the unifying purpose beneath this multifaceted vocabulary is straightforward: It is basically pre-occupied with keeping democracy alive, with preventing its sudden death.

In accordance with its focus on the danger of coups, this first notion of democratic consolidation is concerned above all with deviant or antisystem actors who harbor antidemocratic motives. In principle, the range of actors who actually or potentially fall into this category of dangerous elements is unlimited. In Latin America, with its recent history of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, fears of democratic breakdown have tended to focus on the professionals of state violence, as well as the business class, which had also acquired a solid antidemocratic reputation (until the latest cycle of democratization). But in fact, the list of (either suspected or convicted) assassins or gravediggers of democratic rule is much longer. It includes private men-at-arms (guerrillas, drug cartels, violent street protesters), elected presidents who stage military-backed *autogolpes,* and even disenchanted populations who may become tired of a democracy that has not delivered, in material terms, much more than economic hardship and social inequality. [10]

Eliminating, neutralizing, or converting disloyal players represents the primary task of democratic-breakdown prevention. Yet taming the enemy is by no means the only practical concern associated with the stabilization of democracy. Since democratic stability is a noble and uncontroversial goal, some scholars tend to invoke anything positively valued in the name of democratic sustainability. They discuss, for example, economic performance, nation building and state building, the creation of mass legitimacy, the diffusion of democratic values, the elimination of authoritarian legacies, the

33/

institutionalization of party systems, and so forth. The list is endless. Sometimes these items are accompanied by plausible causal theories about how they affect chances for democratic survival, though often only through indirect and long chains of causation. [11]

Avoiding Democratic Erosion

As students of democratic consolidation have been quick to recognize, focusing on the military and on classical coup politics as privileged objects of research may be morally, politically, and empirically questionable insofar as it diverts attention from other pressing issues. Moreover, it may even turn out to be a misleading perspective that looks for danger in the wrong places, and therefore overlooks real threats that hide at less traditional and less obvious sites. **[End Page 96]**

Many new democracies do face the threat of illegal or pseudo-legal overthrow by antidemocratic forces. But in addition to the risk of breakdown--of dramatic, sudden, and visible relapses to authoritarian rule--many new democracies have to contend with the danger of decay, of less spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression. While the former provokes a radical discontinuity with democratic politics (leading to open authoritarianism), the latter implies a gradual corrosion leading to fuzzy semidemocracy, to a hybrid regime somewhere between liberal democracy and dictatorship. If democratic breakdown is the dominant concern and defining horizon of avoidance of our first concept of democratic consolidation, democratic erosion occupies the same role with respect to this second concept of consolidation.

It was Guillermo O'Donnell who at the end of the 1980s put forward the first explicit formulation of this extended understanding of democratic consolidation. In his seminal essay "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," he drew attention to the threat of silent regressions from democracy to semidemocratic rule and incorporated the overcoming of this threat into his (broad) definition of democratic consolidation. Emphasizing the temporal dimension of his observation, he proposed to distinguish between "rapid deaths" and "slow deaths" of democracy. While the former referred to classical coup politics, O'Donnell described the latter as "a progressive diminuition of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the classic guarantees of liberal constitutionalism," as a "slow and at times opaque" "process of successive authoritarian advances," which in the end would lead to a *democradura,* a repressive, facade democracy. [12]

What has happened since the publication of O'Donnell's article? A cynic could make the point that a few new democracies no longer face the danger of retrogressing to semidemocratic rule because they have already arrived there. For such polities, democratic erosion is no longer a risk because it has become a reality. Irony aside, the continuing political relevance of the issue is quite evident. In a recent article, Samuel P. Huntington even went so far as to assert that with third wave democracies, "the problem is not overthrow but erosion: the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it." [13]

In recent years, students of democratic consolidation have improved their knowledge about different routes the "slow deaths" of democracies may take. The reassertion of military supremacy emphasized by O'Donnell is only one possibility, even if a very real one. Other forms of erosion attack other institutional pillars of democracy. For example, state violence as well as state weakness may subvert the rule of law; the rise of hegemonic parties may **[End Page 97]** suffocate electoral competition; the decay of electoral institutions may affect the honesty of vote counting; incumbents may use their privileged access to state resources and to the mass media in ways that violate minimum standards of electoral fairness and equal opportunity; or the introduction of exclusionary citizenship laws may violate democratic norms of inclusiveness.

Completing Democracy

While liberal democracies face the "negative" challenge of preventing democratic erosion and regression to semidemocratic rule, "electoral democracies" face the symmetrical "positive" challenge of democratic completion, the attainment of full dem-ocratic rule. Students of electoral democracies often associate the

notion of democratic consolidation with this task, with the telos of moving away from some "diminished subtype" of democracy toward a "nondiminished" democracy--or, as Guillermo O'Donnell once put it, with the accomplishment of a "second transition" from a democratic government to a democratic regime. [14] When they speak of democratic consolidation they tend to refer to the goal of completing a pending (i.e. incomplete) transition to democracy. In graphical terms, they tend to look not just backward to the dangers of authoritarian regression, but also forward to the promises of democratic progress. When such expectations of democratic pro-gress do not materialize, students of consolidation tend to express this frustrating institutionalization of semidemocratic rule with notions such as democratic "freezing" or "sclerosis."

Which are the basic actors, conflicts, and sites of democratic completion? It depends on the type of "electoral democracy" in place. In Latin America, three configurations have been of special relevance. To begin with, there are those countries where the outgoing authoritarian regime was able to write certain non-democratic rules into the constitution. In such cases of constitutional defects, full democratization requires these formal authoritarian legacies to be removed. The prototypical Latin American case of constitutional semidemocracy has been Chile after 1990, and the classical study that modeled a general notion of democratic consolidation along the Chilean fault lines was J. Samuel Valenzuela's "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings." [15] In his perspective, abolishing "tutelary powers," "reserved domains," and "major discriminations" in the electoral law appeared as necessary ingredients of democratic consolidation. Since then, this notion of democratic consolidation has received widespread scholarly attention. For instance, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan extensively analyze this constitution-centered type of **[End Page 98]** democratic completion under the heading of "constitutional consolidation." [16]

Another kind of semidemocracy that has raised peculiar challenges of democratic consolidation-as-completion is the hegemonic-party system in crisis. The Latin American cases are (or were) Mexico and Paraguay. In essence, the problem is how to tell at what point (authoritarian) hegemonic parties have become (democratic) dominant parties. Hegemonic parties, given their reliance on state patronage, media control, repression, and ("in the last instance") electoral fraud, do not and cannot lose elections. Dominant parties, by contrast, do not but can, in principle, lose at the polls. Yet as long as alternation in power, the ultimate proof of any democratic electoral system, remains a mere possibility and does not occur in fact, entrenched suspicions will persist as to whether the incumbent party would really accept losing a national election.

While the constitutional legacies of military regimes as well as the structural legacies of hegemonic-party systems pose formidable "threshold problems" to democratizers, they involve only a handful of cases. In comparison, a third variety of democratic completion appears of more general relevance for Latin American countries: the transformation of "illiberal democracies," where the rule of law is biased and selective (or even aleatory), into liberal democracies that effectively guarantee basic political, civil, and human rights. With the notable (and debatable) exception of the three Southern Cone countries, Latin America's contemporary democracies have not followed Western Europe's historical sequence of political development: first, state building; second, legal domestication of the state; and third, democratic domestication of the state. Instead, as with many "third wave" democracies in other regions, the sequence has been the reverse. Democracies have been created in the context of states whose presence looks partial and precarious (in both territorial and social terms) and with judicial systems in place that often cannot do much more than administer the rule of lawlessness. Correspondingly, the two keys to transcending "the illiberal nature of 'democracy' in Latin America today" [17] are "state reform" and "judicial reform"--both fashionable terms that have already entered the vocabulary even of international financial agencies.

Deepening Democracy

The notion of democratic consolidation just discussed--completing the democratic transition by traveling from electoral to liberal democracy--represents one progress-oriented, "positive" version of democratic consolidation. Moving further on the "continuum of democracy"--by deepening liberal democracy and **[End Page 99]** pushing it closer to advanced democracy--represents a second positive version. When we

compare Latin America's contemporary democracies with more or less rosy pictures of established Western democracies, the former seem to fall short on many counts. They appear to possess (or to be possessed by) "comparative dis-advantages" in virtually every field of democratic politics. The list of presumptive structural deficits covers fields as diverse as governmental performance, public administration, judicial systems, party systems, interest groups, civil society, political culture, and styles of decision making. In all these and many other areas, most Latin American democracies look "underdeveloped" by comparison with the "advanced democracies."

Most authors who write about democratic consolidation either think about our very first notion of democratic consolidation, the stabilization of democracy, or about this last notion of democratic consolidation, the deepening of democracy. These two concepts of democratic consolidation are by far the most popular ones. In fact, the academic popularity of the former comes as no surprise. Most of Latin America's aging new democracies still have to worry about their long-term survival. As rule, however, this is no longer an immediate concern, but just one issue among many others that command political attention. Today, issues of democratic quality tend to be much more salient in everyday politics than issues of democratic survival.

Organizing Democracy

The variants of "negative" consolidation that I have discussed try to prevent democratic regression toward feared horizons of avoidance. Symmetrically, the two variants of "positive" consoli-dation try to achieve democratic progress toward valued horizons of attainment. *Tertium non datur?* I do not think so. In between the two pairs of concepts one can distinguish, in an uneasy intermediate position, a "neutral" usage of democratic consolidation, which comprehends democratic consolidation as the "organization" of democracy.

From this perspective, consolidating democracy calls for more than institutionalizing democracy's basic ground rules. It demands establishing democracy's specific rules and organizations. In other words, this concept of consolidation turns its attention from the procedural minima that define democratic regimes to the concrete rules and organizations that define various forms of democracy. It switches the level of analysis from regimes to subsystems, or in Philippe Schmitter's terms, to "partial regimes." [18] Thus democratic consolidation comes to be synonymous with "institution building." **[End Page 100]** It implies constructing all those big organizations that make up the characteristic infrastructure of modern liberal democracies: parties and party systems, legislative bodies, state bureaucracies, judicial systems, and systems of interest intermediation.

While Schmitter, to my knowledge, deserves the credit for introducing and developing this concept of democratic consolidation, others have followed his track, especially subdisciplinary specialists to whom this notion of democratic consolidation provides an opportunity to link up their particular scholarly concerns with the general discussion on democratic consolidation. [19]

This fifth notion of democratic consolidation is "self-referential" insofar as liberal democracy serves as its point of both departure and arrival. It looks, so to speak, from liberal democracy to nowhere else. Some authors are emphatic in stressing its neutrality in normative terms. Yet rather than being normatively neutral, the concept appears to be normatively ambivalent. "Organizing" dem-ocracy may bring us closer to the normative goals of preventing democratic regressions and effecting democratic advances. But it may also pull us farther away. It all depends on the concrete forms in which democracy becomes organized.

Post-Transitional Blues

What picture emerges from this "teleological" reconstruction of coexisting and competing concepts of democratic consolidation? One basic finding is that the consolidation of democracy, as scholars use the term, represents a cluster concept with an intelligible structure but without a core, without a meaningful common denominator. All the notions in use part from some type or other of democratic regime, and they all aim at improving the democratic status quo. Yet their empirical context may be either liberal

("real") democracy or electoral ("semi-") democracy, and their normative horizon may be either democratic survival or democratic progress. In fact, these varying ideas of democratic consolidation do not have very much in common.

Thus the consolidation of democracy emerges as an omnibus concept, a garbage-can concept, a catch-all concept, lacking a core meaning that would unite all modes of usage. If it is indeed the case that it provides the foundation for what Schmitter has called "an embryonic subdiscipline" of political science, this discipline shares neither a substantive concern nor a methodological core. It is held together by no more than a shared domain of application. It covers all new democracies (including semidemocracies), which by definition enter the "phase of democratic consolidation" (or at least face the "problems of consolidation") as soon as they complete some **[End Page 101]** sort of democratic transition. In this sense, "consolidology" is no more than a label for the study of new democracies.

Worst of all, students of democratic consolidation tend to ignore the concept's irritating multiplicity of meanings. They tend to ignore the vagueness and inconsistency of usage. All use the term in whatever way best fits their own research purposes, funding needs, and advertising strategies, while the usage of the same key term maintains the illusion of a common theoretical enterprise, a common purpose, a common language, a common "dependent variable."

One can understand the practical reasons for the current situation but in terms of scholarly research, this uncontrolled coexistence of inconsistent meanings, this case of homonymity (one word meaning many things) running wild, is an unhappy state of affairs. It is not only inimical to theory building and the accumulation of knowledge, it even frustrates such elementary operations as case classification. In terms of democratic consolidation as the term is used today, countries such as Argentina and Poland may be ranked almost anywhere. Whether to describe them as "highly consolidated" or "persistently unconsolidated" depends entirely on the notion of democratic consolidation one chooses. As matters now stand, the concept's classificatory utility is close to zero. Its boundaries are fuzzy and fluid. It does not allow us to order reality in any reliable way.

How can we change this lamentable state of affairs? A minimal solution would be to practice "transparent toleration," to recognize the multiple meanings of democratic consolidation and to be clear and explicit about them. As Christoph Kotowski said about the concept of revolution, "If scholars do not attach the same meaning to the concept . . . they can at least specify which 'meaning' they 'mean.'" [20]

Such open recognition of differences may represent the only realistic way out of the conceptual mess. Perhaps democratic consolidation's "strange multiplicity" of meanings is here to stay. So long as the notion of democratic consolidation works as a generic label for the study of new democracies (and near-democracies), it would be surprising to see the scholarly community privileging one theme to the exclusion of others, and converging toward a more narrow and precise definition of the term. Most scholars would rapidly denounce such a one-sided agenda as empirically inappropriate, normatively annoying, politically unwise, and academically boring. As a consequence, any ambition to "legislate" the semantic field of democratic consolidation into unity may be doomed to failure.

In this spirit, the preceding "teleological" reconstruction of democratic consolidation would at least allow us to trace clear and **[End Page 102]** distinct melodies in the current Babylonian chorus of voices singing songs of democratic consolidation. Its farewell to "the consolidation of democracy" in the singular, and its corresponding embrace of "types of democratic consolidation" in the plural, would help us to compose our discordant songs of democratic consolidation in more conscious, more precise, and, in many cases, more modest ways.

Back to the Roots

The peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition of various concepts of democratic consolidation would be preferable to the status quo of conceptual confusion. The same would be true for another option: to abandon the concept and stop talking about it. Yet both alternatives are only second-best solutions. My first-order preference would be to exercise self-restraint and to stop using the term for whatever we

would like to see happen in new democracies ("the conditions of democratic consolidation") or for whatever we think is problematic in these polities ("the problems of democratic consolidation"). Rather than using the term in ambiguous and inconsistent ways, we should attach one clear meaning to it. As Giovanni Sartori declared about 15 years ago, "different things should have different names." [21]

I think we should return to the concept's original concern with democratic survival. We should restore its classical meaning, which is securing achieved levels of democratic rule against authoritarian regression. That means we should restrict its use to the two "negative" notions described above: avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic erosion. The term "democratic consolidation" should refer to expectations of regime continuity--and to nothing else. Accordingly, the concept of a "consolidated democracy" should describe a democratic regime that relevant observers expect to last well into the future--and nothing else. Why should one restrict the use of "democratic consolidation" in this particular way and not another? The main reason is that all other usages of democratic consolidation (completing, organizing, and deepening democracy) are problematic and can be replaced by superior alternative concepts.

First, the process (and the challenge) of putting a partial, blocked, derailed, or truncated transition back on track falls within the purview of transition studies. There is no need to confuse matters and introduce another term for it. In addition, in semidemocracies which face the task of democratic completion, any talk about "the consolidation of democracy" is misleading. It suggests that a democratic regime is already in place (and only needs to be "consolidated") when in fact the issue at hand is constructing a fully democratic regime. **[End Page 103]**

Second, the development of democracy's subsystems, collective actors, and working rules is clearly a timely and relevant topic. But confounding the consolidation of "partial regimes" with the consolidation of democracy as a whole deprives us of an important analytic distinction. It binds together by definition two things that in fact are only loosely coupled. For example, a democracy may be secure against reversals even if its party system is still inchoate and fluid; and conversely, a democracy may break down even if its party system is highly institutionalized. Moreover, if we fuse the two levels of analysis we cannot issue reasonable judgments anymore about the consolidation of democracy's core institutions or a democratic regime as such. For, from this perspective, as long as any subsystem of democracy (be it the party system, interest organizations, the parliament, the system of government) does not show the requisite degree of consolidation (which is difficult to define other than by reference to "best" or "normal" practices in advanced democracies), we have to classify the democracy in question as "unconsolidated." And as soon as any subsystem experiences radical structural change (as Italy's party system did in the early 1990s), we are compelled to describe the polity in question as "deconsolidating." This does not seem to make much sense.

Finally, the association of democratic consolidation with improvements in the quality of democracy or with democratic deepening represents the most popular "positive" notion of democratic consolidation. But it also seems to be the most problematic one. Both the concepts of "democratic quality" and "democratic deepening" are still unclear and controversial. While we have tons of literature as well as a great deal of consensus about liberal democracy's minimum standards, discussion about the standards of democratic quality is still very preliminary. Therefore, in the current state of debate, conceptualizing democratic consolidation as democratic deepening amounts to inviting a free-for-all. It permits importing into the definition of democratic consolidation, in a subjective and arbitrary way, any kinds of goals and criteria that one deems to be indispensable for a high-quality and thus "consolidated" democracy (which becomes just another vague label for "real" democracy). This cannot but lead, of course, to uncontrolled and incongruous conclusions about empirical states of democratic consolidation.

On a more fundamental level, "democracy precludes closure regarding its own identity." [22] It is a moving target, an open-ended, developmental kind of thing--and so is democratic deepening. Any fixed meanings we may attach to the concepts of democratic quality and democratic deepening, and any consensus we may reach about them, can only be "temporary equilibria" open to future revision. As a result, **[End Page 104]** if we associate democratic consolidation with democratic deepening, we get a concept of democratic consolidation that is open and boundless as well. In this sense, no democracy will

ever be "fully consolidated," and it is quite understandable that authors who support such a notion of democratic consolidation are highly reluctant to extend the "certificate" of democratic consolidation at all.

Andreas Schedler, a visiting professor at the Centro de Inves-tigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico, also teaches at the University of Vienna and FLACSO-Mexico. Previously he was assistant professor of political science at the Austrian Institute for Advanced Studies. His current research focuses on democratization and institutional change in Mexico.

Notes

1. See Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming), ch. 2.

2. Elinor Ostrom, "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions," *Public Choice* 48 (1986): 4.

3. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

4. On "diminished subtypes" of democracy, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," *World Politics* 49 (April 1997): 430-51.

5. See David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy 'with Adjectives': Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Research" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August-3 September 1995). This discussion does not appear in the published version of their paper, cited in note 4 above.

6. Positioning authoritarian and democratic regimes along a single continuum suggests that only quantitative differences separate these regime types. This is not a compelling assumption, however. For even if one thinks, as I do, that the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism is a qualitative one, a distinction of kind, a question of certain institutions being absent or present, one may concede that intricate problems of thresholds arise as soon as certain elements of democracy's institutional core package are either weak or absent. I should also note that the continuum looks closed on both sides while in fact it is closed only on its authoritarian side (by totalitarianism) but open on its democratic side (to future developments of democracy). In this sense, the metaphor of a horizon that I use below is "realistic" only for this open-ended side of the figure--a horizon, after all, can never be reached but recedes before the walker.

7. Note that this distinction between "positive" and "negative" consolidation is different from Geoffrey Pridham's. He associates "negative consolidation" with securing democratic survival and "positive consolidation" with legitimizing democracy at elite and mass levels. Yet the theoretical grounds of this distinction as well as the relation between the two types of democratic consolidation seem unclear. See Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective," in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 169.

8. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions About Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996): 38. See also idem, "Illusions and Conceptual Flaws," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (October 1996): 160-68; and Ben Ross Schneider, "Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments,"

337

Latin American Research Review 30 (1995): 215-34.

9. Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "O'Donnell's 'Illusions': A Rejoinder," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (October 1996): 155. When asked, anyone will agree with this cautious note against facile assumptions of linear progress. The literature is full of warnings that nothing is certain, that reversals can happen any time, and that even "consolidated" democracies are not immune to crises, "deconsolidation," and breakdown. However, "democratic consolidation" is one of those terms that refer both to a dynamic process (a consolidating democracy) and to its result (a consolidated democracy). And when authors use it to describe not the desired outcome--the telos--of democratic consolidation but the process that leads to its attainment, it is hard to avoid connotations of progressive certainties creeping into the language. For instance, common expressions such as "the process of democratic consolidation," "the dynamics of democratic consolidation," or "the logic of democratic consolidation" tend to suggest an underlying reality that propels itself toward the promised land of consolidation.

10. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Laurence Whitehead, "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), 76-95.

11. For a critique of causal concepts that mix up the definition of democratic consolidation with its explanation, see Andreas Schedler, "Expected Regime Stability: Rethinking Democratic Consolidation" (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Department of Political Studies, 1998, Working Paper 81).

12. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 17-56. The quotes are from pages 19 and 33.

13. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996): 9. Note, however, that Huntington's notion of democratic erosion is substantially wider than the one developed here and includes, for instance, executive-led coups.

14. See O'Donnell, "Transitions," 18-19.

15. See J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Mainwaring et al., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation,* 57-104.

16. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). However, Linz and Stepan's actual analysis is often inconsistent with their own term. For example, they classify Chile (correctly, I think) as an "incomplete democracy" and not as a "constitutionally unconsolidated" one (as their notion of "constitutional consolidation" would suggest). In essence, their idea of "constitutional consolidation" is at odds with their own prior assumption on pp. 3-6 that liberal democracy forms the indispensable starting point of democratic consolidation.

17. Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 73. It is instructive to take a look at the "Map of Freedom" published regularly in Freedom House's *Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.* In the 1995-96 report, of all Latin America, only Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Panama are colored white, indicating their status as "free" countries. All the remaining countries appear in gray shades, expressing their lower ranking as no more than "partly free" polities. See Freedom House, ed., *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1995-1996* (New York: Freedom House, 1996), 99.

18. See, for example, Philippe C. Schmitter, "Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," in Gunther et al., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 284-314. I think it is misleading to describe this change in the level of analysis as "disaggregation" (Schneider, *Democratic Consolidations*, 220-21). After all, the relation between fundamental rules and secondary rules is not a relation between sum and parts (as the term disaggregation suggests) but more a relation between, say, basis and superstructure.

19. See Schmitter, "Organized Interests." See also, for example, Geoffrey Pridham, "Political Parties, Parliaments and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives," in Ulrike Liebert and Maurizio Cotta, eds., *Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 225-48. This "organizational" notion of democratic consolidation often comes together with the idea that actors have to accept and become habituated to these meso- and micro-arrangements. Linz and Stepan, for example, see the "constitutional consolidation" of democracy accomplished when all political actors "become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process." See Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 6.

20. Christoph M. Kotowski, "Revolution," in Giovanni Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984), 440.

21. Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," in Sartori, *Social Science Concepts,* 50 (see also 37-40).

22. Laurence Whitehead, "The Vexed Issue of the Meaning of 'Democracy'" (unpublished manuscript, Oxford University, 1997), 17.

339

РАЗМЫШЛЕНИЯ О ГРАЖДАНСКОМ ОБЩЕСТВЕ И КОНСОЛИДАЦИИ ДЕМОКРАТИИ

Ф. Шмиттер

О т р е д а к ц и и . В рамках сотрудничества с Национальным демократическим институтом международных отношений (США) редакция публикует статью американского политолога с мировым именем, профессора Стэнфордского университета Филиппа Шмиттера. Он известен, в частности, как создатель теории неокорпоратизма, исследователь моделей перехода к демократии и институциональных аспектов современных политических систем. В основу статьи, которую автор передал в "Полис", положен нигде не публиковавшийся ранее доклад на конференции "Реконфигурация государства и общества" (Калифорнийский университет, Беркли, 1993 г.).

I. *Наличие гражданского общества (вернее, наличие гражданского общества определенного уровня, дистрибуции и типа) способствует консолидации (а затем — и сохранению) демократии.*

1. Гражданское общество содействует консолидации демократии, но не является ее непосредственной причиной. Само по себе оно не может породить демокра.. ̂̂ или обеспечить существование уже возникших демократических институтов и норм. Ergo, в демократическом процессе гражданское общество действует наряду с другими институтами, процессами и мотивациями.

2. Под "гражданским обществом" (далее — ГО) здесь понимается совокупность или система самоорганизующихся медиаторных (посреднических) групп, которые:

— относительно независимы как от органов государственной власти, так и от внегосударственных единиц производства и воспроизводства, т.е. от фирм и семей;

— способны планировать и осуществлять коллективные акции по защите/достижению своих интересов или устремлений;

— *не* стремятся при этом подменить собой ни государственные структуры, ни частных (вос)производителей или же принять на себя функции по управлению политией в целом;

— но *согласны* действовать в рамках уже сложившихся "гражданских" или правовых норм.

Таким образом, ГО предполагает наличие четырех условий или критериев:

а) двоякого рода автономии;

б) коллективного действия;

в) неузурпации чужих прерогатив;

г) гражданственности (civility).

Этими нормами должны руководствоваться посреднические единицы внутри ГО, но их должны соблюдать и органы государственной власти и частные (вос)произво-

дители. Са по себе медиаторные организации — необходимое, но недостаточное свидетельство существования ГО, ибо подобными организационными структурами могут манипулировать государственные или частные акторы или же они могут оказаться не более чем фасадом, прикрывающим деятельность социальных групп, стремящихся узурпировать власть легитимных государственных органов или "негражданскими" средствами осуществлять господство над другими социальными группами.

3. "Консолидацию демократии" можно определить как процесс, когда эпизодические соглашения, половинчатые нормы и случайные решения периода перехода от авторитаризма трансформируются в отношения сотрудничества и конкуренции, прочно усвоенные, постоянно действующие и добровольно принимаемые теми лицами и коллективами (т.е. политиками и гражданами), которые участвуют в демократическом управлении. При консолидации демократического режима происходит институционализация неопределенности некоторых ролей и областей политической жизни, но одновременно граждане получают уверенность, что борьба за государственные посты и/или влияние будет честной и не выйдет за пределы предсказуемого набора вариантов. Современная, представительная, политическая демократия покоится на такой "ограниченной неопределенности" (bounded uncertainty) и условном согласии (contingent consent) акторов принимать порождаемые ею результаты.

Таким образом, суть дилеммы консолидации связана с формированием институциональной структуры, с которой могли бы согласиться политики и которую готовы поддержать граждане. Добиться же устойчивого разрешения, особенно в атмосфере завышенных ожиданий, которыми обычно характеризуется переходный период, весьма непросто. Мало того, что существующие варианты решений *внутренне конфликтны* (поскольку каждая конкретная группа политиков отдает предпочтение тем нормам, которые обеспечат ей переизбрание или потенциальный доступ к власти, а всевозможные группы граждан хотели бы усиления ответственности своих "штатных" доверенных лиц), выбор того или иного варианта влечет за собой серьезные *внешние последствия*. Как только посредством механизмов электоральной неопределенности избранные нормы переносятся на уровень правительств, вырабатывающих политический курс государства, они начинают влиять на темпы экономического роста, инвестиционную активность, конкурентоспособность страны на внешних рынках, распределение доходов и богатств, доступность образования, степень распространенности чувства культурной ущемленности, рассове равноправие и даже сказываться на национальной идентичности. В какой-то мере наличие такого рода проблем осознается акторами и учитывается при заключении компромиссов относительно [демократических] процедур. Тем не менее, места для ошибок и непредвиденных последствий остается более чем достаточно. В краткосрочном плане консолидация демократии зависит от способности политиков и граждан найти пути разрешения существующих между ними внутренних конфликтов по поводу норм; в плане же долгосрочном она зависит от того внешнего воздействия, которое основанный на избранных нормах политический курс будет оказывать на различные группы общества, подающего надежды стать гражданским.

4. Говоря об "уровне" гражданского общества, я исхожу из того, что ГО никогда полностью не вбирает в себя все формы взаимодействия между индивидами/фирмами, с одной стороны, и государством — с другой, но действует параллельно их прямым контактам, разделяя на отдельные фракции разнородные усилия по оказанию влияния на политику государства. Чем больше подобных усилий преобразуют, пропуская через себя посреднические организации, тем выше уровень ГО и тем легче — при прочих равных — консолидировать демократию.

5. Введение такого параметра, как "дистрибуция", предполагает, что для выражения одних категорий интересов/устремлений механизмы ГО более приспособлены, чем для выражения других. Обычно основное внимание уделяется медиаторной роли групп, образуемых по линиям функциональных расколов общества, — классов, секторов, профессий — и желательности разрешения через каналы ГО тех наиболее бросающихся в глаза конфликтов, которые возникают между такого рода группами. Но поскольку основы конфликтов в каждом отдельно взятом обществе меняются, со временем может встать не менее острая необходимость в использовании аналогичных механизмов для представления и "других" разновидностей интересов или даже устремлений.

¹Национальный демократический институт международных отношений (НДИИ), штаб-квартира которого находится в Вашингтоне, является одной из ведущих организаций, занимающихся проблемами развития демократического процесса в странах, находящихся на переходном этапе от тоталитаризма к демократии. Основанный в 1983 г., НДИ проводит свои программы в более чем 70 странах, включая Россию, Украину, Казахстан, Киргизию, Грузию и др.

Программы НДИ, проводимые в России с августа 1989 г., разделены на несколько главных направлений: методическая помощь представителям политических партий; содействие депутатам парламента РФ и консультации с ними; сотрудничество с представителями гражданских общественных организаций; сотрудничество с представителями органов местного самоуправления.

В июне 1992 г. НДИ открыл постоянное представительство в России. Вы можете связаться с НДИ в Москве по телефону (095) 956-63-37, факс (095) 241-23-66; адрес: Москва, 1-й Колобовский пер., д. 17.

Данная статья продолжает цикл публикаций НДИ в журнале "Полис" (см. "Полис", 1993, №№ 2-6; 1994, №№ 1-6; 1995, №№ 1-6, 1996, №№ 1-4).

17

6. Категория "тип" предполагает, что принци   автономии, коллективного действия, неузурпации и гражданственности могут сочетаться абсолютно по-разному, создавая различающиеся по своим общим очертаниям гражданские об⹁⹁ства или особые "системы посредничества". Среди таких "систем" наибольшим вниманием исследователей пользуются *плюрализм* и *корпоративизм*, точнее, их идеал-типические различия. Предполагается также, что обе названные "системы" (равно как и некоторые промежуточные варианты) вполне совместимы с консолидацией демократии, но от того, какая именно из них наличествует, во многом зависят технические характеристики и "качество" формирующейся демократии, а также распределение приносимых ею благ.

II. *Существование гражданского общества не является необходимым предварительным условием крушения автократии, равно как и перехода к демократии. Лишь крайне редко подобное изменение режима осуществляется силами самих акторов ГО.*

1. И все же переход к демократии практически всегда сопровождается "воскрешением" ГО (даже там, где прежде его, возможно, и не было). Как правило, это происходит *после*, а не *до* начала процесса перехода.

. Чаще всего исходные побудительные импульсы к переходу выражаются в форме относительно спонтанных движений, но с обновлением первых выборов внимание, как правило, переключается на политические партии. И лишь после "учредительных выборов", по мере того как полития оснащается с существованием конфликтов, а те, в свою очередь, приобретают рутинный характер, обычно выявляется роль ассоциаций интересов.

Такая последовательность событий может вызвать определенную путаницу в понимании природы ГО в неодемократиях, ибо сразу же возникает соблазн определять его наличие или силу через спонтанность социальных движений и энтузиазм участвующих в них масс. Это недопустимо, поскольку:

— само установление демократии снимает некоторые из наиболее "пылких" оправданий существования подобных спонтанных социальных движений;

— процесс консолидации подталкивает индивидов и социальные группы к отстаиванию более "своекорыстных" интересов и "наживе" за счет других;

— механизмы современной демократии, как правило, более благоприятствуют выражению территориально и функционально обусловленных интересов (а следовательно — политическим партиям и ассоциациям интересов), нежели мероприятиям тематической направленности (т.е. "однопроблемным" ["single-issued"] движениям).

Важно помнить, что гражданское общество составляют медиаторные организации не одного, а многих типов; под влиянием изменений в существе и интенсивности конфликта, а также в зависимости от стадии демократизации их соотношение несомненно будет меняться.

III. *Наличие реально действующей партийной системы (любого типа) отнюдь не является бесспорным свидетельством существования ГО, ибо политические партии вряд ли способны полностью взять на себя функции организованного посредничества между частными лицами/фирмами и государственной властью.*

1. Наличие гражданского общества несомненно окажет благотворное влияние на функционирование жизнеспособной, состязательной партийной системы, но едва ли можно ожидать, что сама эта система в состоянии отразить весь спектр интересов и устремлений ГО, особенно в периоды (нередко долгие) между выборами. Партии попытаются проникнуть в стержневые институты гражданского общества, т.е. в ассоциации и движения, и даже подчинить их себе, однако есть основани⹁ ⹁умать, что ныне они уже в значительной мере утратили былую способность выражать в своих программах, платформах и идеологиях его интересы и устремления.

В прочно укоренившихся западных демократиях природа и роль партий претерпели за прошедшее время существенные изменения, и было бы а\\нахронизмом думать, что партиям нынешних неодемократий предстоит повторить все стадии,⹁⹁⹁⹁⹁⹁⹁

тия своих ⹁ ⹁шественниц, выполняя при этом все их функции. Даже в политиях, которые долго находились под властью авторитарных режимов и не имели в прошлом гражданского общества, граждане проявляют сегодня совсем иные организационные склонности: они менее охотно солидаризуются с узкопартийными символами и идеологией и отстаивают значительно более широкий набор интересов. К тому же новые режимы возникают в международном окружении, буквально напичканном всевозможными моделями эффективной организации коллективных действий. Все это не мешает партиям играть роль главного представителя гражданского общества, но вместе с тем предполагает, что в лице социальных движений и ассоциаций интересов они столкнутся с конкурентами, куда более серьезными, чем те, которые были у их предшественниц, а нам, соответственно, придется пересмотреть свои представления о демократизации.

2. Современная демократия — это сложнейшая сеть институтов с многообразными каналами представительства и центрами властного принятия решений. Ее главнейшая составляющая — гражданство (citizenship) — не сводится лишь к периодическому голосованию на выборах. Гражданство может выражаться и во влиянии на подбор кандидатов, и в участии в ассоциациях или движениях, и в обращении к властям, и в "нешаблонных" ("unconventional") акциях протеста и т.д. Точно так же и ответственность властей обеспечивается не только традиционными механизмами территориальных избирательных округов и законодательными процедурами. Она может реализовываться и в обход их, непосредственно фокусируясь — через функциональные каналы либо посредством процессов торга — на выборных или назначенных должностных лицах внутри государственного аппарата.

3. По этим причинам современную демократию следует рассматривать не как "режим", а как совокупность "частных (partial) режимов", каждый из которых институционализирован вокруг своего особого участка общества для представления той или иной социальной группы и разрешения свойственных ей конфликтов. В рамках такого рода частных режимов и происходит конкуренция и объединение партий, ассоциаций, движений, территорий и всевозможных клиентел и их борьба за государственные посты и влияние на политический курс страны. Властные органы, отличающиеся друг от друга по своим функциям и уровням, взаимодействуют с их представителями и имеют законные основания заявлять о своей ответственности перед особыми группами интересов (и устремлений) граждан.

Конечно, конституции в каком-то смысле являются попыткой установить единую всеохватную систему "метаправил" ("meta-rules"), которая связала бы эти частные режимы воедино, закрепив за каждым из них особые задачи и принудив их к определенной иерархии взаимоотношений, однако подобные формальные документы редко достигают желаемого результата в плане упорядочения всех этих отношений и контроля над ними. Хотя созыв конституционного собрания для разработки приемлемого проекта Основного закона и ратификация такого проекта путем парламентского голосования и/или плебисцита, несомненно, есть важный момент в процессе демократической консолидации, большинство частных режимов не получает при этом правового оформления. Ибо как раз по отношению к пограничным ситуациям, когда сталкиваются разные типы представительства внутри гражданского общества, конституционные нормы особенно расплывчаты и неконкретны. Попытайтесь, например, смоделировать — исходя из самой что ни на есть детализированной конституции (а они становятся все более детализированными), — как будут взаимодействовать партии, ассоциации и движения, чтобы повлиять на политический курс. Или же попробуйте распознать, как на основе подобных метаправил будет проходить торг между трудом и капиталом относительно долей доходов.

Если демократия представляет собой не режим, а совокупность режимов, наиболее подходящим методом изучения взаимосвязи демократической консолидации и гражданского общества будет, по всей вероятности, расщепление (disaggregation). Оно уместно и желательно не только в теоретическом плане — помимо прочего, оно сделает попытку анализа более выполнимой и в практическом отношении.

4. В связи с теми возможностями (и опасностями), которые несет с собой демократизация, отдельным ассоциациям, как правило, приходится серьезным образом менять свою внутреннюю структуру и повседневную практику. Некоторые ассоциации будут изо всех сил стремиться сохранить те организационные преимущества,

которыми обладали прежде в условиях автокра , другие воспользуются появившимся шансом, чтобы установить новые отношения со своими членами и включиться в качестве самостоятельных единиц в политический процесс. Ирония, однако, состоит в том, что именно тем группам ГО, которые более всего нуждаются в коллективных действиях и которые потенциально должны были бы вобрать в себя многочисленную категорию разобщенных и относительно обнищавших индивидов, похоже, сложнее всего вербовать членов на принципах рациональности и добровольности. У маленьких, сплоченных и привилегированных групп в условиях демократии будет гораздо меньше трудностей с привлечением ресурсов. Во-первых, такие группы не столь остро нуждаются в оных (т.к. их члены чаще всего имеют достаточно средств, чтобы действовать самостоятельно), а во-вторых, они обычно были привилегированными партнерами и бенефициариями прежнего автократического режима. Если предоставить событиям развиваться естественным образом, то вновь появившиеся "либеральные" возможности создания ассоциаций могут обернуться систематической гипертрофией представительства наиболее влиятельных классовых, секторальных и профессиональных интересов. Конечно, обретая возможность выбора между соперничающими партиями, менее значительные группы получают новое средство борьбы за достижение своих самых общих интересов, однако, когда приходит время отстаивать какие-то более специфические интересы, для того чтобы эффективно участвовать в демократической игре, им приходится полагаться на одобрение, санкционирование и финансовую поддержку со стороны государства, типичные для прежнего режима. Иными словами, практические соблазны неокорпоративизма могут перевесить идеологическую привлекательность плюрализма.

5. Обратимся прежде всего к некоторым *особенностям* (тем, которые в состоянии измениться с приходом демократии) *организаций с индивидуальным прямым членством*, представляющих интересы бизнеса, труда и сельского хозяйства.

а). *Численность*. Теоретически, при достижении двух свобод — ассоциаций и петиций, она должна быть неограниченной. Известная плюралистическая формула Джеймса Мэдисона была нацелена на увеличение потенциального числа организаций посредством умножения властных уровней, вокруг которых они могли бы формироваться, не создавая вместе с тем преград для их бесконечного дробления. Все же существует несколько факторов, способных сделать порог образования ассоциаций для тех или иных социальных групп более высоким или же ограничить доступ к сферам, где осуществляется процесс торга, тем, кому уже удалось организоваться. Решающую роль здесь, по всей видимости, будет играть политический курс государства, унаследованный от прежнего режима или сформировавшийся при новом, демократическом. Одновременно может иметь значение и то, являются ли рассматриваемые ассоциации действительно новыми или же это простая перелицовка ранее существовавших; возникли они спонтанно или же были спонсированы (и если да, то кем) на каком этапе переходного процесса они стали образовываться.

б). *Плотность членства* (member density). Согласно либерально-демократической теории, соотношение тех, кто потенциально готов присоединиться [к организациям с индивидуальным прямым членством] и участвовать в коллективных действиях, и тех, кто действительно это делает, зависит исключительно от рационального и независимого расчета отдельных индивидов. На практике же обычные социальные и экономические "фильтры" часто дополняются продуманными государственными и внегосударственными акциями. Здесь мы вступаем в темную сферу внешнего спонсирования со стороны политических партий, узаконенного косвенного принуждения со стороны государственных органов (вспомним хотя бы систему палат для промышленников и аграриев или закрытые магазины и профсоюзные ставки для рабочих), а также утонченных форм налоговой дискриминации, предоставления лицензий и экспортных сертификатов, кредитных услуг и прямого насилия — т.е. всего того, что способно привязать различные социальные и экономические категории к соответствующим организациям, причем такими средствами, которые не выбираются ими свободно, но считаются совместимыми с демократической практикой.

в). *Сфера представительства* (representational domain). Согласно устоявшимся канонам демократии, ассоциации интересов (старые или новые) должны иметь возможность самостоятельно определять, кого именно они хотели бы представлять. Они очерчивают круг лиц, среди которых рекрутируют своих членов, и обозначают

предметы, , торых намерены вести речь. На деле, однако, такое случается редко. В условиях госкорпоратистского покровительства — обычного наследия авторитарного правления — подобные вопросы определялись законом или административным регулированием. Интересам надлежало организовываться по секторам экономики или профессиям, принимать заданные территориальные очертания, ограничиваться определенным уровнем взаимодействия и выполнять предписанный набор задач. И напротив, некоторые сферы и виды деятельности находились под запретом, как, скажем, были запрещены определенные типы политических, идеологических и культурных объединений. Это стало своего рода организационной "привычкой", которая изживается крайне медленно даже после отмены прежних ограничений.

6. Очевидно, что независимо от наследия и инерции, модели разграничения сфер интересов, принятые в той или иной стране, весьма отличаются друг от друга. Для будущего демократии особенно важными представляются два параметра:

— *степень специализации* в функциональной (напр., отрасль производства, сектор, класс) и территориальной (напр., местный, региональный или национальный уровни) сферах, а также в области задач (напр., объединения наемных работников vs. объединений нанимателей; союзы, ориентированные на борьбу, vs. союзов, ориентированных на предоставление услуг);

— *степень дискриминации* в зависимости от таких характеристик отдельных членов, как размер фирмы, уровень мастерства, государственный или частный статус, конфессиональная, национальная, партийная принадлежность и т.п.

При сведении воедино "букета" характеристик, касающихся отдельных ассоциаций, выявляются два качества (их можно назвать "*стратегической компетентностью*" [strategic capacity] и "*емкостью*" [encompassingness]), которые могут решающим образом сказаться на процессе демократизации. Какой именно тип демократии сложится в ходе консолидации, будет во многом зависеть от того, насколько ассоциации ГО обладают данными качествами:

— достаточно ли вновь образованные и недавно перестроенные организации изобретательны и автономны, чтобы наметить и длительное время проводить курс, который не был бы связан лишь с сиюминутными предпочтениями их членов и при этом был бы независим от политики внешних по отношению к этим организациям партий и учреждений;

— и если да, то сколь широкий круг выраженных интересов может быть охвачен каждой конкретной организацией или же скоординирован головными в рамках существующей иерархии ассоциациями.

В политиях, где классовые, секторальные или профессиональные ассоциации стратегически компетентны и обладают достаточной емкостью, такого рода единицы ГО играют в консолидационных процессах более заметную роль, чем в политиях со множеством узкоспециализированных и дублирующих друг друга организаций, в значительной мере зависимых от своих членов и (или) партнеров. Иначе говоря, плюралистические ассоциации ослабляют значение посредничества в выражении интересов, корпоратистские — усиливают. От того, какой тип ассоциаций сложился, зависит также вероятность появления устойчивых частных режимов, а следовательно — и тип демократии. Например, возможность создания жизнеспособных *концертативных*, или согласованных, *режимов* (concertation regimes), связывающих ассоциации непосредственно друг с другом и/или с государственными структурами, по-видимому, определяется уровнем стратегической компетентности и емкости. И наоборот, начавшееся согласование (концертация) обычно усиливает стремление "ассоциаций-участников" к еще большей автономии от своих собственных членов и партийных партнеров и к расширению сферы охвата с тем, чтобы поставить под свой контроль все более широкие категории интересов. При развитии ситуации до ее логического предела, неодемократия может оказаться полем деятельности для череды правительств, отстаивающих "частные интересы" во всех чувствительных политических сферах, что будет иметь далеко идущие последствия для политических партий, местных клиентел, законодательного процесса, а также скажется на общей управляемости государства.

7. Второй ряд выявленных свойств имеет отношение к тому, что для краткости может быть обозначено *как система посредничества в выражении интересов*. Воздействие организованных интересов ГО на тип демократии нельзя измерить путем

простого суммирования ассоциаций и движений, существующих в данной политии; необходимо учитывать еще и те свойства, которые возникают в результате конкуренции и сотрудничества данных ассоциаций и движений. Чтобы не терять из виду главного, сосредоточимся вновь на трех наиболее важных параметрах:

а). Первый из них — *охват*. Какие социальные группы организуются в более широкую сеть коллективного действия, какие действуют исключительно сами по себе, а какие полностью остаются вне организационных рамок? Предпочтение обычно отдается классовым, секторальным и профессиональным группам, что связано с предвзятым мнением, будто среди всего разнообразия групп интересов внутри ГО именно такого рода группы в наибольшей мере способны принимать важнейшие решения, влияющие на консолидацию частных режимов и в конечном счете — на тип демократии. Если подходить к проблеме в ее узком понимании, то вопрос в том, действительно ли идентифицируемые сегменты и фракции подобных групп интересов (или, говоря языком плюралистов, — "потенциальные группы") не могут организоваться, — или же они прилагают в этом направлении явно меньше усилий, чем, по всей видимости, могли бы. Следствие ли это продолжительных репрессивных мер (напр., запрета создавать профсоюзы государственных служащих или низовые организации рабочего представительства) либо стратегического расчета, основанного на предположении, что для достижения/защиты своих интересов лучше использовать иные формы коллективного действия (напр., политические партии, закулисные соглашения, неформальные связи), либо же структурной неспособности действовать в новых условиях добровольности и конкуренции? Конечно, не имея фактических данных, трудно распознать наличие в обществе таких категорий интересов, которые "существуют, но не действуют", равно как и реконструировать логику, которой руководствуются сознательные и активные группы, отдавая предпочтение тому, а не иному способу представительства, однако взвешенная оценка сферы действия складывающихся систем интересов требует непременного в этом направлении, по крайней мере, некоторые усилия, — хотя бы в виду выдвижения гипотезы, предполагающей, что демократии, устраняющие (или попросту игнорирующие) потенциально активные социальные группы, могут столкнуться с серьезными проблемами легитимности и управляемости.

Проблема приобретает еще большую остроту, едва ее фокус перемещается с узкоклассового и секторального аспекта к значительно более широкому вопросу об охвате других категорий интересов (не говоря уже об устремлениях) — интересов бедных; престарелых; больных; безработных; неграмотных; обитателей трущоб; иностранцев, оказавшихся в положении людей второго сорта, или коренных жителей — жертв этнической, языковой или сексуальной дискриминации; людей, обеспокоенных ухудшением окружающей среды, озабоченных проблемой сохранения мира на Земле и правами животных и т.п. Здесь изначально не может быть никакой уверенности, что коллективные действия непременно примут форму ограниченной и специализированной ассоциативности. Гораздо вероятнее, что названные категории граждан будут адресовать свои требования политическим партиям (если они обладают правом голоса), религиозным организациям (если они верующие), местным властям (если они проживают компактной массой) или государственным органам (если они находятся на социальном обеспечении). Они могут также сформировать свои собственные социальные движения, чьи программы и способы действий, вероятно, будут несовместимы с куда более жестко ограниченными целями и методами организаций по интересам.

б). Второй выявленный параметр — *монополизация*. Приход демократии должен подхлестнуть борьбу между группами ГО за членов, за ресурсы, за признание властью, равно как и за доступ к ней. Впрочем, это вовсе не императив или неизбежность. Принято считать, что прежний авторитарный режим если не подавлял полностью ассоциативную активность определенных групп, то, во всяком случае, принуждал их действовать в рамках какой-то одной монополистской организации, существующей с одобрения государства и чаще всего им же контролируемой. Сохранится ли такая ситуация после того, как авторитарный режим пал, зависит, видимо, от тех политических факторов, которые вступают в действие во время переходного периода и влияние которых может ощущаться довольно долго. Больше всего бросается в глаза (особенно когда речь идет о тред-юнионах) значение изменившейся специфики

конкурент. . борьбы среди политических партий. Соперничество идеологических "лагерей": коммунистов, социалистов, а порой и христианских демократов за влияние на рабочих часто предшествует краху авторитарного правления, но лишь только после того, как возобновятся реальные выборы, оно может стать столь явным, чтобы расколоть более или менее единое рабочее движение. Предпринимательские ассоциации, равно как и объединения лиц свободных профессий, всегда были организационно меньше подвержены расколам по идейным соображениям (даже если их члены отдавали свои голоса противоборствующим партиям), хотя порой они дробились из-за языковых или религиозных различий. Куда более сильным фактором раскола оказывается для них столкновение интересов мелких, средних и крупных предприятий — преодолеть такого рода разногласия столь же трудно, как удержать "белые и синие воротнички" в рамках единой рабочей ассоциации или выработать "пакт о ненападении" между союзами рабочих разного уровня квалификации. Толчок к борьбе — причем нередко отнюдь не"гражданскими" методами — за членов или за доступ к власти могут также дать регионализм и "микронационализм".

Как бы то ни было, в формирующейся поставторитарной системе всегда будет присутствовать та или иная степень "монополизации" представительства интересов, и это окажет решающее воздействие на формирование частных режимов. Весьма часто, однако, оценить уровень такой монополизации бывает крайне сложно, — по той простой причине, что ассоциации могут формально разграничить сферы своего охвата, так что создается видимость конкуренции между ними, тогда как на практике существуют скрытые договоренности, согласно которым ассоциации обязуются не переманивать друг у друга членов, делиться важнейшими ресурсами и даже лидерами, а также принимать участие в труднораспознаваемом "разделении труда" между потенциальными партнерами. Так, например, предприниматели стран Северной и Центральной Европы организованы в особые иерархии отраслевых и предпринимательских союзов, которые, на первый взгляд, конкурируют между собой за доступ к политической власти и лояльность членов. При ближайшем же рассмотрении (и несмотря на былые конфликты между отдельными организациями) эта конкуренция оказывается вполне устойчивым "разделением труда", обеспечивающим данному классу значительную гибкость и "дополнительные возможности" в защите своих интересов.

в). Третий системный параметр — *координация*. Зона действия отдельных ассоциаций обычно ограничена, ограничена и их способность выражать существующее многообразие интересов. Рабочие так и не смогли осуществить свою давнюю мечту и создать "один большой союз", хотя предпринимателям и фермерам несколько раз удавалось приблизиться к достижению подобной цели. Как правило, для того, чтобы представлять более широкий круг интересов, чем может охватить единичная ассоциация, образуются "ассоциации ассоциаций". Такие надорганизации (Spitzenverbande — это дословно не переводимое немецкое выражение обозначает "головное предприятие") могут пытаться координировать поведение субъектов в рамках единого сектора (напр., всей химической промышленности), целой отрасли производства (напр., всей тяжелой промышленности) или класса в целом (всех предпринимателей, рабочих или фермеров независимо от отрасли или сектора). Они способны действовать в масштабах какой-то определенной местности, провинции, региона, страны или даже наднационального объединения, подобного Европейскому сообществу. Неодинакова и их эффективность в плане объединения всех причастных групп и привлечения их к совместным действиям — это могут быть как весьма несовершенные свободные конфедерации, члены которых сохраняют финансовую и политическую автономию и включаются в коллективные акции лишь после уговоров или благодаря личному авторитету лидеров, так и сверхцентрализованные и иерархически структурированные образования, располагающие огромными ресурсами, а то и способностью приструнить любые классовые или секторальные интересы, отказывающиеся следовать согласованной политической линии.

Столь высокий уровень координации возникает не без борьбы или, как минимум, не без наличия серьезной угрозы тем интересам, которые предстоит координировать. Разумеется, достичь его легче тогда, когда речь идет о сугубо локальных масштабах и о сравнительно узком секторе общества, ибо здесь одновременно проявляются преимущества небольшой численности и тесного социального взаимодействия. Что-

бы добиться чего—то подобного в масштабах с.. .ны или класса, требуется куда больше усилий. Как правило, до этого доходит дело лишь после формирования первичных блоков, т.е. когда уже созданы местные и секторальные ассоциации с прямым членством, однако данное обстоятельство чаще всего осложняет задачу последующего подчинения ассоциаций. В некоторых случаях облегчить ее решение может централизаторский опыт, унаследованный от прежнего госкорпоратизма.

8. Если *стратегическая компетентность* и *емкость* представляют собой два наиболее существенных из выявленных свойств единичных ассоциаций ГО, то природу межорганизационных систем посредничества в выражении интересов лучше всего определяют такие свойства, как *классоуправление* (class governance) и *конгру-энтность* (congruence).

а). Клас⸂оуправление — это способность подвигнуть некую широкую социальную категорию в целом (напр., всех собственников средств производства, рабочих всех отраслей, всех работающих не по найму во всех сферах хозяйства) на действия в рамках единого долгосрочного курса и добиться, чтобы те, кого затрагивает такая политика, действительно следовали ей. Теоретически взять на себя решение этой задачи могли бы политические партии, однако логика продолжительной электоральной борьбы, как правило, лишает их возможности выполнять подобную функцию по отношению к работникам физического труда, — а по отношению к предпринимателям они в сущности никогда ее и не выполняли. Если классоуправлению суждено стать свойством гражданского общества и политического строя, то в современных условиях взять на себя практическую его реализацию придется сети ассоциаций интересов (или даже единой надассоциации).

б). Конгруэнтность показывает, в какой мере охват, степень монополизации и координаторские способности одного класса, сектора или профессии ГО схожи с названными свойствами других его классов, секторов и профессий. Здесь можно постулировать, что общей тенденцией в развитии ассоциаций — особенно кластеров ассоциаций, представляющих противостоящие интересы, — является усиление конгруэнтности. Тем не менее, если посмотреть на проблему в историческом разрезе, некоторые ассоциации могут выступать инициаторами использования новых форм самоорганизации (иногда заимствованных из-за рубежа), которые впоследствии перенимаются их соперниками и подражателями. Учитывая, что для переходного периода в принципе характерна крайняя неопределенность, нормальным для него состоянием будет, по-видимому, неконгруэнтность, и вопрос в том, будет ли она сокращаться в ходе демократической консолидации.

IV. *Наличие гражданского общества способствует консолидации демократии следующим образом:*

1. Оно стабилизирует ожидания внутри социальных групп, вследствие чего власть получает более обобщенную, достоверную и пригодную для практического применения информацию, на которую может опереться в процессе управления.

2. Оно прививает гражданские представления об интересе и гражданские нормы поведения, т.е. те, в которых учитывается существование общества в цел⸂⸂ и признается демократический процесс.

3. Оно обеспечивает такие каналы самовыражения и идентификации, которые наиболее близки людям и фирмам и которые, в данной связи, легче всего использовать при выдвижении требований, особенно требований, адресованных далеким чиновникам центральных государственных органов.

4. Оно регулирует поведение своих членов применительно к сфере коллективных обязательств, облегчая тем самым бремя правления как для властей, так и для частных производителей.

5. Оно представляет собой важный, хотя и не единственный, источник потенциального сопротивления произволу и тирании правителей — будь то незаконные узурпаторы или фанатичное большинство.

Тем не менее ГО не является для демократии абсолютным благом. Его воздействие на консолидацию демократической системы и ее последующее функционирование может оказаться негативным по целому ряду параметров:

1. Оно ⸂ет сделать процесс формирования большинства более долгим, трудным и случайным, тем самым снижая степень легитимности демократических правительств.

2. Оно (особенно в тех случаях, когда основано на строго либеральных принципах, т.е. на принципах индивидуализма и добровольности) способно породить постоянные перекосы в распределении влияний в политическом процессе. (Как сформулировал эту проблему один из американских аналитиков Е.Е.Шаттшнейдер: "Беда хора групп интересов в Соединенных Штатах состоит в том, что он поет на диалекте высших классов".)

3. Зачастую оно внедряет в политическую жизнь столь сложную и запутанную систему компромиссов, что в результате может быть принят такой политический курс, которого никто не желал изначально и с которым никто не может в дальнейшем солидаризоваться.

4. Оно может усилить тенденцию к разрешению всех проблем из "общественного котла", когда каждая ассоциация и каждое движение удовлетворяют свои интересы/устремления за счет общества в целом, что в конечном итоге приводит к неэффективной, инфляционной экономике.

5. Самое же опасное, — если "оно" оказывается не одним, а несколькими гражданскими обществами, которые охватывают одну и ту же территорию и одну и ту же политику, но организуют интересы и устремления в виде различных, а порой и полностью несовместимых, этнических или культурных сообществей. (В свое время в Западной Европе решением проблемы вертикальной расщепленности ("пиллериза-ции") гражданского общества стала консоциативность или Proporz-demokratie*, однако для большинства неодемократий такой вариант решения, скорее всего, не подойдет, и им, по-видимому, придется столкнуться с весьма болезненной перспективой сецессии.)

Каждое конкретное гражданское общество будет оказывать на демократию смешанное воздействие. Нет никаких гарантий, что позитивное возобладает над негативным, хотя в Европе на протяжении относительно долгого времени это было именно так. К сожалению, в современных неодемократиях акторы явно больше озабочены сиюминутной выгодой и потому не расположены делать ставку на возможные преимущества, которые вытекают из наличия действующего и жизнеспособного ГО.

Если предложенное понимание проблемы хоть в какой-то мере обоснованно, вероятный результат [воздействия ГО на демократию] можно просчитать на основе оценки степени проявленности в нем основополагающих свойств, возникающих в процессе смены режима: *стратегической компетентности, емкости, классоуправления* и *конгруэнтности*. Последние, в свою очередь, зависят от более дискретных характеристик, приобретаемых тогда же единичными ассоциациями и движениями, т.е. от *численности* таких ассоциаций и движений, *плотности членства* и *сфер представительства*, а также от макрохарактеристик формирующейся медиаторной системы: *охвата* ею интересов/устремлений, *степени монополизации* и *уровня координации*.

V. *Гражданское общество отнюдь не является непроизвольным или бездумным порождением капитализма, следствием урбанизации, грамотности, социальной мобильности и эмпатии, словом — прогресса, хотя все названное и способствует его укреплению. Напротив, для его появления требуется артикулированная политика со стороны государственной власти и определенные привычные нормы жизнедеятельности частных (вос)производителей.*

1. Государственная политика [о которой идет речь] затрагивает сложную сферу взаимопереплетающихся прав и обязанностей, существенным образом менявшихся по ходу истории, и потому дать ей обобщенное определение крайне трудно. Она включает в себя:
   — свободу ассоциаций, петиций и собраний;
   — юридическое признание и неприкосновенность;

---

* Proporz-demokratie — распределенная демократия. — *Пер.*

— особое налогообложение;
— установленные каналы функционального представительства;
— гарантии участия в принятии решений;
— предотвращение полной закрытости во внутренних делах;
— субсидирование из общественных фондов;
— обязательное членство и/или взносы;
— юридическое расширение [сферы действия] контрактов (Allgemeinverbindlichkeit*);
— перенесение ответственности за практическое воплощение политики;

2. Еще сложнее установить те привычные нормы частной жизнедеятельности, которые способствуют большему доверию к посредникам ГО, однако к ним несомненно относятся:

— классовое, секторальное, профессиональное или групповое сознание;
— готовность участвовать в коллективных акциях;
— "нравственность" или самоограничение в преследовании групповых интересов;
— удовлетворение от взаимодействия с равными, т.е. социальность;
— доверие к групповому руководству и равным;
— определенная доля "альтруистичности" ("other—regardingness") по отношению к обществу в целом;
— склонность принимать групповую дисциплину;
— готовность отказаться от преимуществ личностного свойства, иначе говоря — сопротивление клиентистским соблазнам;
— ощущение собственной силы;
— обладание достаточными организационными навыками.

VI. *В момент своего появления ГО может принять многообразные системные очертания, хотя диапазон форм, способных существовать в каждой конкретной политии, несомненно, куда более ограничен.*

1. Как уже отмечалось выше (см. тезис I), изменения в типе гражданского обще-ства (особенно в амплитуде между плюрализмом и корпоратизмом) скорее всего повлекут за собой значительные расхождения в распределении благ, общем функци-онировании экономики и управляемости демократии, которая в конечном итоге может сложиться.

2. Для понимания сути таких расхождений особенно важны две обобщенные характеристики единичных ассоциаций или движений: *стратегическая компетен-тность и емкость*, а так же две обобщенных характеристики систем посредничест-ва: *классоуправление и конгруэнтность*. Чем выше значения этих четырех показа-телей (а они обычно выше в более корпоратистских и ниже в более плюралистских системах), тем большим будет позитивный вклад гражданского общества в консоли-дацию демократии.

3. Трудно предсказать, какие именно очертания примет та или иная полития, а тем более понять — почему. И все же один структурообразующий фактор очевиден — это унаследованные от автократии институты и степень преемственности по отноше-нию к прежним порядкам, обусловленная формой перехода от авторитаризма к демократии. Наиболее благоприятный фон [для существования устойчивого ГО] возникает в тех случаях, когда речь идет о переходе от режимов с прочно укоренив-шимися госкорпоратистскими традициями, а сам переход осуществляется договор-ным образом (pacted transitions), тогда как резкие или насильственные переходы от личных автократий, опирающихся на патримониальные или клиентистские отноше-ния (для обозначения такого рода режимов Х. Линц предлагает использовать термин "султанические", хотя это и несколько оскорбительно для Оттоманской империи с ее сравнительно упорядоченной и бюрократизированной системой управления), по-видимому, если и создают условия для появления гражданских обществ, то лишь крайне слабых.

4. Вне всякого сомнения, имеется множество факторов, подспудно влияющих на формирование тех или иных очертаний гражданского общества. Высокий уровень доиндустриальной урбанизации; католицизм; небольшие размеры государства; за-

Allgemeinverbindlichkeit — общеобязательность. — Пер.

паздывающ , но относительно быстрое развитие капитализма; консервативные политические коалиции, руководящие ходом "Великого преобразования" (Great Transformation); устойчивость ремесленных форм производства; аграрный протек-ционизм и — особенно — мощная социал-демократия: в Западной Европе XIX — начала XX вв. все это работало на формирование более корпоратистских вариантов ГО, хотя отнюдь не ясно, по-прежнему ли данные факторы собраны в единый кулак и, если да, то сохранилось ли прежнее направление удара.

5. Сравнительно новый и потенциально весьма существенный момент — возник-новение некоего подобия "транснационального гражданского общества". Это сеть неправительственных организаций (НПО), большая часть которых имеет штаб-квартиры в устоявшихся гражданских обществах и пользуется финансовой и органи-зационной поддержкой их граждан, располагает довольно солидными возможностя-ми оказывать влияние на неодемократии. С 1974 г. каждый успех демократизации способствовал развитию НПО (и неформальных сетей передачи информации), заня-тых борьбой за права человека, защитой меньшинств, контролем за выборами, пре-доставлением консультаций по экономическим вопросам, поощрением культурного и научного обмена. Когда начиналась демократизация в Португалии, в Греции и в Испании, подобных инфраструктур практически не существовало. Но из опыта на-званных стран были извлечены принципиальные уроки, знание которых впоследст-вии пригодилось повсеместно. К настоящему времени уже имеется огромное множе-ство разнообразных транснациональных партий, организаций, ассоциаций, движе-ний и сетей, готовых вмешаться в дела [той или иной страны], чтобы поддержать и защитить демократию. В той мере, в какой упомянутые наднациональные объедине-ния отходят от использования привычных для них государственных и межправитель-ственных каналов влияния и делают ставку на привлечение общественных, непра-вительственных организаций, подобная международная обстановка содействия кон-солидации демократии способствует становлению национальных гражданских обще-ств там, где в противном случае они, вероятно, не возникли бы и где есть угроза поглощения их государством или частными (вос)производителями.

VII. *Хотя исторически ГО зародилось несомненно в Западной Ев-ропе, его нормы и повседневная практика имеют отношение к консо-лидации демократии в любом культурно-географическом регионе ми-ра, при условии, что акторы стремятся к демократии современного и либерального типа, иначе говоря — к конституционной, предста-вительной демократии, контролируемой посредством многопар-тийных, состязательных выборов, терпимой к социальным/этни-ческим различиям и уважающей права собственности.*

1. Волею ли провидения, а может, благодаря деятельности колонистов-переселен-цев из Европы или межнациональной диффузии нормы и практика ГО распростра-нились за пределы того региона, где они первоначально формировались. По общему признанию, данный процесс шел неравномерно, и заимствованные из Европы образ-цы накладывались на разнообразные "туземные" традиции. В некоторых неевропей-ских обществах уже имелись аналогичные институты (вспомним, хотя бы, гильдей-ские системы в Китае или Оттоманской империи), однако не ясно, насколько преем-ники такого рода институтов уместны в современных условиях.

2. Существуют ли другие жизнеспособные модели демократии, в большей степени отражающие культурные нормы и массовые ожидания соответствующих националь-ных сообществ, — вопрос дискуссионный. И не только потому, что утверждения о большей "аутентичности" разного рода африканских, азиатских ("конфуциан-ских"), латиноамериканских ("иберийских") или, попросту, незападных демокра-тий не раз использовались для маскировки автократической практики, — они, к тому же, редко подкреплялись какими-либо свидетельствами того, что граждане некоего конкретного сообщества и впрямь обладают настолько своеобразными ценностями и политической культурой, что для обеспечения подконтрольности их правителей требуются совершенно особые методы.

involved in establishing such systems, in *To Craft Democracies* (London: University of California Press, 1990), and P. Ferdinand argues that the global dynamics of the post-cold war era are undermining these systems, in 'The Party's Over: Market Liberalization and the Challenges for One-party and One-party Dominant Regimes: The Cases of Taiwan, and Mexico, Italy and Japan', *Democratization*, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp.133–50. The recent experience of the Mexican regime centred on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) may be good evidence for his argument.

52. Holm, op. cit., p.111.

53. For an analysis of the evolving party systems in eastern Europe, see M. Waller, 'Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-democratization', *Party Politics*, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.473–90, and for Taiwan, see H. Tien and Y. Chu, 'Building Democracy in Taiwan', *China Quarterly*, No.148 (1996), pp.1141–70.

54. Kong, op. cit. and E.M. Kim, 'Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations for the South Korea Case', *Social Problems*, Vol 40, No.2 (1993), pp.228–49.

55. R. Fatton, Jr., 'Africa in the Age of Democratization: the Civic Limitations of Civil Society', *African Studies Review*, Vol.38, No.2 (1995), pp.67–99; D. Rueschmeyer, E.H. Stephens and J. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

56. Fatton, op. cit., p.90.

57. This definition is defended and used for empirical purposes in White, op. cit. Since many intermediate organizations in the real world do not fully embody all these characteristics, this definition should be seen as an ideal-type.

58. D. Korten; *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1990); Landeli-Mills, op. cit.

59. B. Crisp, 'Limitations to Democracy in Developing Capitalist Societies: The Case of Vernezuela', *World Development*, Vol.22, No.10 (1994), p.1501.

60. T. Cheng and L.B. Krause, 'Democracy and Development: with Special Attention to Korea', *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (1992, Summer), pp.3–25.

61. For a review of this literature, see Shin, op. cit., pp.38–41. To the extent that the institutional arrangements which emerge from these elite-defined transitions reflect the interests of these very elites, one of the most urgent, and developmentally crucial, elements of democratic consolidation is to improve the political access of wider sections of society and involve them in the process of institutional 'crafting'. In the history of Western societies, for example, the role of labour parties based on an organized working class played an important role in providing the political impetus for designing the central features of their 'welfare states'.

62. See, for example, Geddes, op. cit.

63. Lijphart and Waisman, op. cit., p.244.

64. E. Huber, D. Rueschemeyer and J.D. Stephens, 'The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Democracy', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.29, No.3 (1997), p.338.

65. L. Whitehead, 'The Alternatives to "Liberal Democracy": A Latin American Perspective', *Political Studies*, Vol.XL, Special Issue (1992), p.151.

66. This does not just reflect a relationship based on quantitative levels of development, but on structural changes in the class system, as argued by E. Huber, D. Rueschemeyer and J.D. Stephens, 'The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol.7, No.3 (1993), pp.71–85.

67. This factor is stressed by many analysts. For example, Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., p.11 stress the need for 'encompassing coalitions' to counter poverty; Bartlett and Hunter, op. cit., pp.100ff. discuss the differential political implications of different class coalitions in the context of Latin America and Eastern Europe; and Holm, op. cit., p.111 cites the Botswana case as one which 'demonstrates that the primary need is to form a political coalition of elites committed to development'.

The Consolidation of Post-Autocratic Democracies: A Multi-level Model

WOLFGANG MERKEL

The mainstream of theoretical and empirical 'consolidology' speaks of consolidated and non-consolidated democracies. This crude dichotomy does not allow for more differentiated judgments about the stage of consolidation of newly democratized political systems. To overcome this shortcoming, a multi-level model of democratic consolidation is proposed, consisting of four interdependent levels. The particular configuration of each has specific impact on the consolidation of the other levels. The four levels are: constitutional, representative, behavioural, and civic cultural consolidation. This model helps us to understand why new democracies survive or collapse, to identify the degree to which they are consolidated and the levels on which they are most vulnerable to internal and external shocks. It helps us to locate the parts of the political system where reforms should be implemented, or stopped or reversed in order to consolidate and stabilize a new democratic regime.

Theoretical Considerations on Two Conceptual Problems

I. Conceptual Problem Number One: How to Define Democracy?

Studies of transition to democracy by political scientists are characterized by the fact that there has been virtually no intensive debate about democratic theory. The highly normative questions, which model of democracy should be preferred (direct or representative, elitist or participatory, procedural or substantial, weak or 'strong'), and whether Rousseau or Schumpeter, Dahl or Habermas supply the most appropriate theoretical orientation, were decided quickly and without discussion. Robert Dahl's 'procedural and institutional minimums', which draw on Schumpeter's 'realistic' democratic theory, has advanced to the common starting-point for almost all 'transitologists'. It is often neglected, though, that Dahl mentions two fundamental dimensions of democracy: public contestation and political participation.[1] The participatory dimension is narrowly understood solely according to the Schumpeterian tradition as 'the right to participate in election and office'.[2] Thus, Juan Linz is doing no more than paraphrase Dahl's' eight procedural and institutional minima when he wrote in his frequently quoted definition of democracy that a political

Dr Wolfgang Merkel is Professor of Politics at the Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.

system is only then democratic

> when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competitions between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non violent means their claim to rule,... without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference.[4]

Di Palma has narrowed the definition of democracy down even more: 'political democracy, as the issue in the transitions, is understood in the conventional Schumpeterian or representative sense'.[5] Adam Przeworski's definition of democracy is, however, the most bewildering. The social scientist from the critical left is actually able to underbid Schumpeter's minimal definition. For him the constituent property of democracy comprises the contingent results of the constitutionally defined political decision-making process. Consequently, he defines democracy as 'a system of ... organized uncertainty'.[6] Looking at it this way, democracy is nothing more than an abstract system of rules for dealing with social and political conflicts. Contrary to authoritarian systems, the political results are *ex ante* indeterminate; they only come about through the actions of competing political forces. Political strategies and behaviour are only defined and channeled through a priori determined and democratically legitimated procedures. The normative elements and problems of democracies are not discussed.'

There are, of course, important exceptions who do not just assume a democracy definition that narrowly relies upon Schumpeter or sum up Dahl's procedural minimums in their studies of transition to democracy. The first, Philippe Schmitter, criticizes the *reification* of such a set of well-established procedures and institutions. It is not just a matter of how complete the minimal list is, it is also important which relationship develops between the state institutions, the intermediate structures for aggregating and articulating societal interests (parties, organizations, movements, and the media), and the mechanisms of political decision-making. The entire network of relationships between the citizens and the rulers must be reflected in the definition of democracy. In regard to the concepts of democracy applied without considering time, space, and cultural constraints, he warns: 'Most important, the conceptualization of democratic consolidation must carefully avoid adopting a historically or culturally peculiar *Gestalt* as the standard against which to measure the progress of contemporary nascent democracies'.[8]

How justifiable the warning is, has been recently demonstrated by Claus

Offe, (the second exception), in relation to the specific challenges facing the democratization of post-communist eastern Europe. His main argument is as follows: faced with the unusual accumulation of economic, social, ethno-nationalistic, and presidential-populist problems and threats, the liberal minimalist conceptions of democracy are not enough. If this minimal version of democracy were made up of established procedures but only contingent results, the question would be whether the political and social outcomes, with all their uncertainty, would not exceed the citizens' limits of tolerance.[9] Put another way, there is a risk that the results of the democratically achieved economic and social policy will place too many burdens on a large part of the population, who, because of this, will abandon their active and passive loyalty to the democratic procedures and institutions or will not even bother to develop such loyalties in the first place. Therefore, the East European post-communist societies are not granted the same amount of time that the capitalist democracies of the West were given for their historical evolution. In their case, three great thrusts of political modernization formed the rule of law, democracy, and the welfare state in a sequence of rather long periods. Here we can see the plausibility of Offe's argument that 'the liberal-democratic regimes', because of the turbulent economic situation of the post-communist transformation in eastern Europe, 'can only count on stabilization, if democracy and capitalism are accompanied simultaneously by an extensive institutionalization of social welfare'.[10] This argument can also be validly applied to Latin American societies.[11]

Offe's argument, at least implicitly, amounts to the fact that democratic structures in post-communist societies need a 'normative bite', which will prevent democratic institutions from producing morally unacceptable results. This is for Offe simultaneously a normative request with a functional purpose, since the socio-political safeguard in his argumentation promotes a 'functional prerequisite' of democratic consolidation. It still remains open, though, whether such social security nets can be forced simply through the constitutional determination of state goals.[12] If it were possible to establish an economic and social 'existential minimum' as a fundamental right, then certain political options would be removed from possible democratic reexamination. According to the liberal perspective this would lead to the limitation of democratic choices. Democracy would paradoxically be saved from self-destruction through undemocratic means. This is a perception of democracy that goes beyond the concepts of democratic theory of the minimalists Schumpeter and Dahl.

It is most likely an act of pragmatic thinking that has kept the mainstream studies of 'transitologists and consolidologists' from discussing this presupposed paradox in democratic theory. Therefore, their analyses are

based on Schumpeter's elitist-minimalist concept of democracy. This is a useful starting point. However, as will be pointed out later, it is a necessary but not sufficient analytical framework to evaluate the stage, progress, risks, chances and prospects of concrete processes of democratic consolidation.

II. Conceptual Problem Number Two (How to Define Consolidation?

Even more controversial than the term democracy in the study of transformation is the definition of (democratic) consolidation. Minimalist[14] conceptions compete here with those of the maximalists.[15] The controversial point mainly concerns the amount of time needed for the consolidation of post-authoritarian democracies. First of all, the scientists studying transformation cannot agree on which political, social, and economic institutions have to be consolidated before one can consider a democratic system stable enough to stand up to future crises. Moreover, the question of which path will lead to the most expedient democratic consolidation is heavily disputed. Finally, the debate continues over which institutional arrangements and which values, attitudes and behaviour by both the general public and the elite favour consolidation and which ones are more likely to hinder consolidation.

Philippe Schmitter has presented the most influential classification of the different phases of system transformation so far. He distinguishes the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system ideally between the phases of liberalization, democratization, and consolidation.[16] These last two phases, however, tend to overlap; that is, consolidation begins before democratization has been concluded. Thus, the precise separation of these two phases in reality is quite impossible. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to speak of a concluded transition to democracy, when the pattern of behaviour developed *ad hoc* during the change in regimes becomes a stable structure in the new system, and when the admittance of political actors into the system as well as the process of political decision-making proceed according to previously established and legitimately coded procedures. How this process develops, which path the consolidation follows, how long it takes, and whether it can be concluded successfully or not, depends on a series of endogenous and exogenous factors. The most important endogenous factors are: what kind of pre-authoritarian experience with democracy can be fallen back on? What were the character and duration of the authoritarian system? How did the collapse of the old regime occur, and how did the phase of transition transpire? What strategies did the decision-making elite follow during the transition and consolidation phases, and how were these decisions perceived by the people?[17] The most important exogenous factors are: the democratic stability of the neighbouring states, the inclusion in supranational and international economic and political

associations, international support services, the means of inclusion in international participation, and economic cycles.[18]

From the perspective of the observer, though, the duration of the consolidation process depends above all on the definition of what a consolidated democratic system actually looks like. Przeworski, for example, considers a democracy consolidated when a certain system of institutions has 'become the only game in town'.[19] This means the case where all relevant actors act according to the rules set up by the democratic institutions. This also means that those who have lost their political power only try to regain this power within the bounds of those democratically legitimate rules and regulations that removed them from power.[20] According to this, the behaviour of the actors (especially the political elite) is the deciding factor in democratic consolidation.[21] This is especially clear from the action theory point of view, although this at first hides the relation between the opportunity structure (that is, institutions, norms, economic restrictions and so on) and political action.[22] Geoffrey Pridham implicitly takes up this concept when he speaks of a 'negative consolidation'.[23] The consolidation is called negative since it refers to the fact that relevant actors avoid breaking the democratic rules because, in their specific historical situation, they do not see any alternatives to democracy. In contrast to this 'negative' definition of consolidation, Pridham relates 'positive consolidation' to the establishment, credibility, and legitimacy of the entire system. He does not just confine his concept of democratic consolidation to the behaviour of the elite, for he also includes the attitudes of the public in judging the level of consolidation. The term positive consolidation extends the focus of analysis by considering the political institutions, the behaviour of the elite and the decision-making patterns in the public according to their respective relationships.[24] Such a consolidation concept expects the stabilization of a post-authoritarian democracy to take much longer than a 'negative consolidation', which merely refers to the elite.

A concept of consolidation located between the two extremes was developed by Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle in their analysis of the democratic consolidation in southern Europe.[25] They consider a democratic regime consolidated when all of the politically relevant groups regard all of the central political institutions as the only legitimate arenas of competition for political power. This concept primarily refers to political institutions and behavioural norms. What it lacks, however, are the patterns of political culture in the general public, which are exactly what Samuel Huntington deems to be the core of every democratic consolidation. He asserts that the public has to learn that democracy does not primarily mean solving all the problems of society but rather the ability to remove the government from power through elections. He writes: 'Democracies become consolidated

when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else'.[26] This learning process, which ultimately decides on the consolidation of democratic systems, lasts, of course, much longer than the adjustment of the elite to the democratic decision-making procedures. Huntington, therefore, expects longer periods of democratic consolidation than the advocates of minimalist consolidation. Thus, he considers the consolidation of German and Japanese democracies after the Second World War to have been completed only after the post-1945 political generation had taken over the political and cultural leadership and made up the numerical majority in society.[27] One very important consolidation indicator regarding both the elite as well as the general public, according to Huntington, is for the government to change hands twice.

First of all, this shows that the country's two most important political blocs accept the loss of power through electoral defeats. Secondly, this demonstrates that the people want a new government, not a new (non-democratic) system of government.[28] Of course according to this criterion, the Federal Republic of Germany would not have become fully consolidated until 1982, and even more strikingly the post-Second World War Japanese democracy would have to be considered unconsolidated until the 1990s. Italy passed the two-times 'turnover test' in 1994 at the same time as considerable waves of deconsolidation were posing shocks to the democratic system. These examples show that Huntington's criteria were not systematically chosen and are unable to satisfy the complexity of the democratic consolidation process.

At this point it will be helpful to introduce a comprehensive and distinctive concept of consolidation. It is not *maximalistic* in its normative-democratic aspects. It is, however, *maximalistic* in its understanding of *consolidation* and, therefore, makes distinguishing statements about the specific system levels or partial regimes of successful and unsuccessful consolidation that are possible. Drawing on concepts of legitimacy it attempts to explain the stabilization of the entire system through the respective interdependencies among political institutions (structures), elite behaviour (actors) and the general public's attitudinal patterns. Not until these specific reciprocal consolidation and obstruction effects are observed, can the dynamics and progress of successful and failed transitions to democracy be conceived more precisely.

Democratic Consolidation as a Multilevel Model

The construction of a multilevel model of democratic consolidation developed here draws on some systematic considerations developed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. Linz and Stepan[29] specify three essential

dimensions within a political system undergoing democratic consolidation: elite behaviour, public attitudes and constitutional structure. With regard to behaviour, Linz and Stepan consider a democracy consolidated when no relevant political, military, or economic actor is able to mobilize any serious resources against the democratic regime. According to the perspective of public attitude, a democratic system is considered to be consolidated when a 'strong majority' of the population believes that the democratic institutions and procedures are the best 'way to govern collective life in a society'.[30] Finally, a democratic regime is structurally consolidated when no more 'reserve domains' exist, which are exempt from the contingency of democratic decisions and controlled by powerful corporative actors (such as the military, church, large landowners, financial and business oligarchies) acting outside the democratic decision-making arenas. In spite of their sensible differentiation of democratic consolidation, Linz and Stepan do not specify a temporal or causal sequence for these processes nor do they indicate more precisely the interdependency of the different dimensions (respectively, deconsolidation). Conclusions about the sequence and course of the consolidation process, therefore, cannot be made in general.

For these reasons an analytical sequencing of the consolidation levels is recommended here and complemented by adding the fundamental levels of interest intermediation between the society and the state decision-making arenas to the model. Such a multilevel model comprises four levels of consolidation, all of which can begin simultaneously. The time it takes for them to be completed, however, varies from level to level. The four levels are:

(1) *Constitutional consolidation:* In contrast to Linz and Stepan, I refer to this narrowly as the consolidation of the central constitutional organs and political institutions, such as the head of state, government, parliament, judicial and electoral systems.[31] These have an effect on the second level of interest intermediation (as well as the following levels) through their normative and structuring properties as well as their ability to limit the range of possible action.

(2) *Representative consolidation:* This involves the level of territorial (parties) and functional (interest groups) interest representation. The degree of consolidation that levels 1 and 2 have attained as well as their common configuration decide together the success of democratic consolidation on the third level.

(3) *Behavioural consolidation* refers to reducing the attractiveness for powerful actors (the military, large landowners, businessmen, radical

movements, clandestine groups, or populist, charismatic leaders) to pursue interests outside the democratic institutions and against the democratically legitimated representatives. When these first three levels are essentially consolidated, decisive impulses for the formation of a civic culture supportive of democracy will emerge.

(4) The *consolidation* of *civic culture* and *civil society* completes the stabilization of the socio-political substructure of democracy. As we know through the studies on the 'second wave of democratization' (1943–62), this consolidation may last for decades and only be complete after a change of generations. Only after all four phases of consolidation have been completed is it possible to characterise consolidated democracy as largely resistant to endogenous crises and exogenous shocks.

In the conceptual framework advanced here these four dimensions are *levels*. However, it should be mentioned that from another analytical perspective these four levels can also be seen as a temporal sequence of stages in the process of democratic consolidation. This means that stage I (institutional consolidation) is completed – as an empirically proven rule – before the consolidation of stage 2 (parties and interest groups) or stage 4 (attitudinal consolidation of the masses) has come to an end. Only 'stage 3' (behavioural consolidation of potential veto actors) does not exactly fit in such a temporal sequence of stages, since this 'behavioural consolidation' of veto-elites can be reached and sometimes is reached even before the 'representative consolidation' has made significant progress. However, the more the party system and the interest groups are consolidated, the less are the incentives and opportunities that are provided for any interventionist action by powerful veto actors.

The inclusion of levels 2, 3 and 4 arrives at a *maximalist* concept compared to the mainstream studies of democratic consolidation. This minimizes the risk of having to explain a possible collapse of an already 'consolidated' democratic system through voluntary and not conceptionalized descriptions of 'deconsolidation'. This comprehensive and distinct definition of consolidation allows the collapse of the inter-war democracies in Italy, Germany and Austria to be explained more precisely than they are when the minimalist concepts of consolidation and deconsolidation are used. In the countries just mentioned, only the first level had become consolidated. The second level of *representative* interest mediation – especially the party systems – was unable to consolidate. Due to this unconsolidated level, incentives were supplied on the third level (behavioural consolidation) to the 'informal political actors' to pursue their own corporative interests outside and against the democratic institutions. Moreover, in the Weimar Republic the completely unconsolidated fourth

FIGURE I

MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

level of democratic mass support was unable to develop adequately enough to be able to protect the first level of democratic polity from the antidemocratic actors, due to the legitimacy-eroding form and substances of politics and policy.

In spite of how impressive a democracy consolidated on all four levels may sound, it is still not totally immune to potential deconsolidating tendencies. Even democracy in 'developed societies' is neither unavoidable nor irreversible. Nevertheless, a democracy consolidated on all four levels contains a high potential for resisting exogenous destabilizing shocks that might develop through dramatic crises in the economy or foreign relations. In this case, the deconsolidation process would have to continue for a long period of time and affect all four levels before authoritarian tendencies could destroy the democratic character of the regime."

Yet, even with this distinction of the concept of democratic consolidation, there are still important questions to be answered:

- Is there a hierarchy among the levels of consolidation?

- What arrangements promote the partial and which the comprehensive consolidation of democratic systems?

- What interdependencies exist between the single levels that might influence the democratic consolidation as a whole?

- What 'external factors' favour the consolidation of a post-authoritarian democracy?

These questions can be answered through a middle range basic approach, which at first isolates the development and consolidation of levels 1 and 2 in the analysis and conceptualizes them as 'partial regimes.' Secondly, the interdependencies between the individual consolidation levels can be worked out, so that a systematic topography of interdependent partial regimes becomes visible. The successful consolidation of each partial regime, as well as the stabilization or obstruction effects caused by their interdependencies and independence, determine in the end whether the consolidation of the entire political system is successful or not.

I. Constitutional Consolidation

The constitutional, intermediary, behavioural and attitudinal levels of consolidation in this order can be seen as a sequence, according to which the entire socio-political system completes its democratic consolidation. This is of course purely an analytical sequence because the second to fourth phases of consolidation may begin even when the core constitutional institutions

have not yet been completely stabilized. Moreover, it sometimes occurs that the third phase of consolidation has already been completed, even while the organizations of interest intermediation (parties and interest groups) are still undergoing fluctuations or have been rooted in society in only a rudimentary way. This is currently the case in the eastern European countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Nevertheless, the logical and historically proven beginning of the democratic consolidation outlined here is without doubt the constitutional foundation of democracy. This is normally accomplished before anything else. Even stronger than the democracy's founding elections, the fixed constitutional norms represent the first step in the process of democratic consolidation. These norms provide the informal patterns of behaviour for social and political contestation, which were developed or negotiated during the transition process, with their well-established power of standardization. In this sense I endorse the thesis 'polity first'.

'First' has a double meaning here, that is in the temporal as well as the hierarchical sense. The drafting of the constitution occurs at the beginning of the democratic consolidation, and, therefore, already begins to mould the chances for consolidation at the next levels. The constitution can be given a hierarchical position because it leads to the first drastic reduction of contingency concerning political action in the transformation of political systems. The strategic actions of the political actors are committed through the constitution to a basic consensus and, therefore, prevent excessive mutual distrust. Thus, the constitution guarantees the fixed procedures of political decision-making." It defines the norms and procedures of conflict mediation for the partial regimes, which are overarched by a 'constitutional set of meta-rules'. Of course the ideal case of rapidly transforming the written constitution into constitutional reality does not simply occur with the ratification of the constitution. Whether and how fast this transformation takes place depends on the drafting process itself," the character of the constitution," and the historical development of 'social capital' in the socio-cultural environment embedding the constitution.

However, the thesis 'polity first' has to be supplemented by the thesis 'elite behaviour matters'. It matters considerably because the elites are responsible for negotiating the rules for drafting the constitution and respecting the constitutional procedures in the daily political game. Moreover, only the elites dispose of sufficient economic and political resources to veto the democratic development. Therefore, the elites' behaviour is essential for providing legitimacy to the new democratic constitution. An 'elite settlement' regarding adherence to the democratic rules of the game supports the empirical legitimization of any constitution.

Post-authoritarian constitutions should endow the new democratic

arrangement with the legitimacy and stability that it still needs to achieve. How, then, does a young democratic constitution acquire the necessary sovereignty in such a paradoxical situation? The discussions in political science and constitutional law have stressed two sources of legitimacy in this case: 'formal' and 'empirical' legitimacy.

(i) Formal Constitutional Legitimacy[43]

In constitutional law, the legitimacy of a democratic constitution is derived primarily from the method of its own enactment, which can be differentiated into three levels:[44]

- **Legitimacy from above**: The constitution can only be credited with legitimacy if the constituent assembly is formed according to democratic principles.

- **Internal procedure legitimacy**: The decision-making process within the constituent assembly must proceed according to democratic principles.

- **Legitimacy from below**: The constitutional draft must be ratified by the people through a referendum.

These three levels of procedural legitimacy can be systematized, according to Böckenförde,[45] and the actual constitutional history of democratic countries[46] divided into four different types of procedures. The four types are ranked below according to their democratic compatibility (from type 1: very democratic to type 4: very doubtfully democratic):

(1) An assembly or convention, independent from the current parliament, is elected by the people to draft a constitution, which is then ratified by the people (*pouvoir constituant*) through a referendum.[47] The constitution of the Fourth French Republic is a good example for this three-level legitimization process.[48]

(2) A constituent assembly (*Constituante*) is elected democratically. It drafts a constitution and ratifies it all on its own. The people (the citizens) are not given the opportunity to show their approval or disapproval through a referendum. The Weimar constitution in Germany after the First World War serves as an example of this.

(3) The constitution is drafted by a *state institution* (for example the current parliament or government), which is then ratified by the parliament (as a rule but not always). No assembly independent from the current parliament or government is elected. The constitutional draft is then put to a referendum for the people's approval. The best example for this procedure is the constitution of the Fifth French Republic.

(4) An *institution* of the state drafts a new constitution or revises the old one, which is then ratified by the current parliament. There is *no* popularly elected constitutional assembly and *no* popular referendum takes place. This procedure is most common in post-authoritarian democracies of the 'third wave'.

TABLE 1

CONSTITUTION MAKING IN SOUTHERN EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA

Area/Mode of constitution drafting	Southern Europe	Eastern Europe	Latin America	East Asia
Constitution drafted by an elected constitutional assembly with referendum	(Spain 1978)			
Constitution drafted by an elected constitutional assembly without referendum	Portugal (1976)	Bulgaria (1991)	Paraguay (1992) Honduras (1981) El Salvador (1984) Guatemala (1985) Nicaragua (1987)	Taiwan (1991 1994)
Constitution drafted by a state organ and adopted by referendum		Russia (1993) Romania (1991) Lithuania (1992)	Brazil (1988) Chile (1980/1981) Ecuador (1978)	Philippines (1987) South Korea (1987)
Constitution drafted by a state organ and adopted without referendum	Greece (1974)	Albania (1991) Czech Republic (1992) Belarus (1994) Hungary Latvia (1992) Poland (1997) Slovakia (1992) Slovenia (1991)	Argentina (1983) Uruguay (1984) Peru (1980)	Thailand (1992)

Note: Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay went back to the pre-authoritarian constitution. The constitutional assembly in Greece was only meant to revise the constitution of 1952. The following referendum of 1974 was only to determine whether Greece remained a monarchy or became a republic. 69.2 per cent of the votes were in favour of a republic. In Chile a fundamental revision of the authoritarian constitution of 1980 has been thwarted by a lack of a majority in parliament. The constitutions of Albania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary are all provisional constitutions.

In Table 1, the countries of the 'third wave' of democratization are classified according to region and which of the four types of constitutional drafting and ratification was used. It was only Spain after 1975 which came close to the most democratic mode of constitution-making.[49] But with the exception of Spain none of the 'third wave' democracies followed the ideal democratic procedure (type 1). This can be traced back to the urgency often involved in dramatic transitions to democracy (regime collapse).

In this case the drafters of the constitution have to compare on the one side the costs and benefits of drafting and ratifying a constitution by way of an ideal democratic procedure with the disadvantage of having a rather long interim period without a legitimate constitution, and on the other side the costs and benefits of adopting a faster but far less democratic constitution making process. Klaus von Beyme's comment referring to eastern Europe that the actual democratizers generally have many urgent problems and do not have time for the people's participation in both electing a constitutional assembly and ratifying the constitution[50] also holds true for all those transitions to democracy which occur through replacements or transplacements of the old authoritarian regime elites.

Turning next to the countries that followed the second mode of constitution making, which is still quite demanding, we see that only Portugal can be considered consolidated. Out of the countries that made use of the least democratic constitution-making procedure (type 4), however, five (Greece, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Uruguay) enjoy a rather high level of legitimacy among the citizens. Contrary to Bruce Ackerman[51] and the prevailing opinion in the field of constitutional law, it can be argued that the democratic mode of constitution-making plays only a secondary role in the consolidation, stability, and democratic quality of the post-authoritarian governments. Not only the examples from the 'third wave' of democratization but also the constitutional development of west European countries since 1945 increase the doubtfulness of the theory that the most democratic form of constitution making is especially good for creating 'constitutional patriotism' (Habermas). Two examples in particular show how poor this argument is. First, the process of drafting and ratifying the constitution of the Fourth French Republic was the 'most democratic use of the *pouvoir constituant* in European history'.[52] Nevertheless, it was never truly popular with the French citizens and only lasted 11 years. The making of the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, which lacked most of the democratic procedural requirements and was only meant to bridge the time while the two Germanys were divided, has created a strong 'constitutional patriotism',[53] which has given post-war Germany a sustainable consolidation, in addition to its '*Wirtschaftswunder*'.

How does this formal deficit, which is referred to in Germany as the

'Birthdefect Theory',[54] affect the legitimacy and therewith the stability of a democratic constitution? Gert-Joachim Glaeßner judges, with reference to C.J. Friedrich, that it is not the practically sacred act of '*creatio ex nihilo*', where the *pouvoir constituant* creates the constitution, that gives a political system enduring legitimacy. Instead it is 'the new system itself, which builds the foundation of the new authority'.[55] In eastern Europe, there is actually an empirical basis for this. It is doubtful that the new constitutions, which Romania (1992), Lithuania (1992), Estonia (1992), and Russia (1993) were given with the blessing of the *pouvoir constituant* through a plebiscite, have a greater democratic legitimacy and approval rating than the constitutions of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

As problematic as this may be to the normative-constitutional and participatory-democratic theoretical perspectives, the merit of the formal constitutional legitimization is only of secondary importance, if not completely irrelevant to the consolidation, stability, and quality of the democratic system. This is not only reflected quite accurately in the cases mentioned above, but even a theoretical argument supports this assertion: namely the general inadequacy of plebiscite procedures to reduce complex thematical concepts into a simple yes-no dichotomy.

In post-communist eastern Europe, the seriousness of the dilemma would have been increased because every constitutional discussion preceding each referendum would not only have been pressed for time but also hampered by the underdeveloped civic culture present in these countries. The conditions in eastern Europe were far removed from that kind of conceptual structure of public discourse that lifts the referendum out of the mire of manipulative ratification and on to the solid plane of 'deliberative politics', which Jürgen Habermas justifiably called for in this case.[56] Should the constitutional plebiscite, however, take place in unenlightened, manipulative, or even violent surroundings like those in Romania (1992) or Russia (1993), then they will at best have no effect on the democratic quality of the system and its symbolic normative force. In the worst case, however, they may actually destroy these. Bruce Ackerman[57] underestimated the delicacy of the dilemma that emerges when there is not much time available for drafting a new constitution, and when the citizens lack any foundation of civic culture. For one he stressed (correctly) that the window of opportunity for the constitutional protection of a liberal revolution is much smaller than generally assumed. For another he underestimated the difficulty of conducting a meaningful democratic, public, and constitutional debate in underdeveloped civil societies under rigid time constraints.

(ii) Empirical Constitutional Legitimacy

An empirical constitution is a constitution that accrues a sufficient amount of 'popular belief in its legitimacy'[*] or in other words 'specific and diffuse support'[*] through its effect on actual politics and social relations. The chances for the *'Legitimitätsglaube'* are very good when these three principles are included in the constitution:

* *social and political inclusion*: no 'structural' minority group (racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities) as well as relevant political minorities should be barred from or be at a disadvantage in gaining institutional access to political power;

* *institutional efficiency*: the political institutions must allow for efficient decision-making and policy implementation;

* *political effectiveness*: the political decision-making must be seen to contribute to the solutions of societal problems.

The problems of inclusion, efficiency and effectiveness have been discussed at two levels by 'transitologists' since the end of the 1980s:

* The government level: which form of government (parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential) is better suited to the specific consolidation demands of new democracies?

* The decision-making level: which type of democracy (majoritarian, consensus or intermediary) is most conductive to democratic consolidation with regard to the specific societal conditions surrounding the political system?

The question of the most appropriate type of government has been accompanied by considerable debate, which, however, is too comprehensive to be discussed in full here.[60] Those who hold parliamentary systems to be most appropriate[61] are opposed by those who favour the presidential systems.[62] In the middle, semi-presidential systems are advocated by Giovanni Sartori.[63] Especially Linz's 'ideal-typical deductive'[64] argumentation has been criticized[65] for neglecting the concrete institutional and socio-cultural environments in which the constitutional institutions operate. The critics argue that the more important factor for democratic consolidation is the way the core political institutions harmonize with the electoral and party systems, the interest groups, the state administration, and the recruitment of elites.[66] For the most part this *caveat* concerning the 'abstract debate' on parliamentary and presidential systems is valid. However, it does not devaluate Linz's core arguments and it does not extend to the different variations of semi-presidential systems.[67] Their internal construction permits the conclusion,

even without regard to specific political and institutional contexts, that they burden young unconsolidated democracies with very unfavourable institutional arrangements.

Should the president and the majority in parliament belong to opposing parties (*cohabitation*), the institutional competition between the president and prime minister as well as the often unclear division of power between the executive and legislative branches obstruct the decision-making ability in semi-presidential systems. Urgent solutions are delayed, and paralysing conflicts take place inside the executive and between the legislative and the presidential part of the executive. This can very quickly lead to a loss of citizens' 'specific support'. South Korea from 1988 to 1990, Poland from 1990 to 1994, and Russia after 1991 provide good examples of this. If the president and the majority in parliament belong to the same party, as in Croatia, Romania (1990–96), Lithuania (1994–96) and Poland (after 1995), the internal competition within the executive may be alleviated, but the power available to head of state is much greater than the power available to prime ministers in parliamentary systems or to presidents in pure presidential system. Thus, there are very few checks and balances that can protect the unconsolidated democracy from degenerating into a 'delegative democracy'.[68] In such democracies the elected president, hardly checked by the constitution, governs by way of plebiscite authority.

Dieter Nohlen's criticism of Linz and Stepan's abstract argumentation in favour of parliamentary governments illustrates once again the necessity of analytically connecting the consolidation levels 1 (constitutional institutions; types of government) and 2 (institutions of interest intermediation) mentioned above. Only after these two levels are linked can the contours of power and communication relationships between the interdependent institutions and actors be recognized.

II. Representative Consolidation

In almost all concepts of democratic consolidation the level (or partial regime as Schmitter would put it) of representative consolidation has been neglected. This is true of Linz and Stepan's brilliant book on democratic transition and consolidation as well as the conceptual framework in the most comprehensive study of the politics of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe, edited by Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle.[69] However, despite this conceptual flaw the second does contain two excellent articles on representative consolidation, one by Leonardo Morlino (parties) and one by Philippe Schmitter (interest groups). The editors of this volume implicitly pay an adequate tribute to the extraordinary importance of the representational level between state and society, and between constitutional

consolidation and the attitudinal consolidation among the masses, without integrating it systematically into their theoretical concept of democratic consolidation.

The necessity to include the level of representative consolidation in a comprehensive concept of democratic consolidation can also be supported by Sartori's work on parties and party systems[70] and Linz's seminal study on the breakdown of democracies in 1978. Both highlight the challenge posed to democracies by 'anti-system-parties', 'ideological polarization' and 'centrifugal tendencies' within party systems (Sartori) and 'disloyal' and 'semi-loyal' parties and elites (Linz). It must be stressed that ideology, structure and behaviour of the parties are not only of utmost importance for the survival or breakdown of young democracies but they also constitute critical factors determining whether democracies consolidate or instead remain in a grey zone of 'delegative democracies'[71] or 'defective democracies' (Merkel), that is, somewhere between functioning liberal democracies and plebiscitarian authoritarianism.

Therefore the questions that will be addressed here are: which social and political influences shape the configuration of the new emerging post-authoritarian systems of parties and interest groups, and which configurations are particularly conducive or detrimental to democratic consolidation? The institutional configuration and openness of the state, the type of electoral system and the legal framework for interest groups have, alongside the societal cleavage structures, an early and lasting but not determinant influence on the developing configuration of interest representation structures. The forms of interest intermediation between society and the decision-making arenas of the state can be divided into territorial and functional dimensions. The first is determined by political parties and the second by interest groups and other organized interests.

(i) The Party System

The party systems in post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies are formed in particular by three main influences:

- the transformation conflict between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition[72]

- social cleavage structures[73]

- the electoral system[74]

The mode of democratic transition ('transformation conflict') between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition has only a transient impact. The 'platform-parties' of the opposition tend to fractionalize along ideological, social or even personal lines as democratic consolidation

progresses.[75] Social, and to some extent personal conflicts have a more enduring impact on a party system's structure and its competitive dynamic. Electoral systems, however, can contribute considerably to the 'rationalization' of the party system, so that the requirement of social inclusion is not neglected, while at the same time the formation of stable governing majorities is promoted. It depends on the type of electoral system, though. Both the relative and absolute plurality electoral systems and the pure proportional representation (PR) (without significant thresholds) endanger democratic consolidation, or are at best suboptimal. Plurality systems are detrimental because they do not fulfil the social inclusion requirement. They often discriminate against relatively large social and political groups by denying them fair access to political power (as in Macedonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Philippines). They can exacerbate regional hegemony, practically eliminate smaller parties of the opposition, and lead to the development of dominant or even hegemonic party systems that minimize the possibility of alternation in government.[76] Especially in heterogeneous societies with multiple social cleavages, plurality elections obstruct social integration and contain an institutional potential for exacerbating social and ethnic conflicts in young democracies.

The PR electoral systems, on the other hand, hamper the formation of stable governing majorities, illustrated by the examples of the Weimar Republic, Italy after 1948, Poland from 1990 to 1993 and Thailand at various times since 1946. The electoral systems that promote consolidation, however, range from the PR system with significant thresholds to mixed electoral systems (Grabensysteme). The mixed electoral systems are an almost equally weighted combination of PR and plurality election elements.[77] Hungary's mixed electoral system, where about 45 per cent of the parliamentary seats are determined by the absolute majority in single districts and about 55 per cent according to PR principles, seems to be a positive example of this type of electoral system. It favours stable government majorities, does not cause any flagrant discrimination against 'structural' minorities and favours alternation in government. Of course post-authoritarian electoral systems do not primarily originate from neutral considerations with regard to democratic consolidation, but rather from partisan power-seeking motives. These motives also mark the limits of an institutional engineering favourable for consolidation. Yet, the elections in Spain (PR with thresholds), for example, and in Hungary (mixed electoral system) show that the electoral systems favourable for consolidation are located somewhere between the pure plurality and pure PR electoral systems.

The next question is which types of party systems favour and which endanger democratic consolidation? With regard to the criteria of inclusion

and governmental stability, and in accordance with Sartori's typology of party systems (1976), the systems favourable to democratic consolidation are as above, namely systems that lie somewhere between the two-party system and extremely polarized multi-party systems.[78] Put more precisely, this means that party systems promote democratic consolidation when they possess the following properties:

Degree of fragmentation: Party systems with a low or moderate degree of fragmentation have a positive effect on democratic consolidation. In democratic theory and empirical studies, systems with a high fragmentation index[79] are considered as threats to the consolidation of the entire political system.[80] This is especially true when they – which is usually the case – are accompanied by ideological polarization, weak and heterogeneous government coalitions and frequent alternations in government (Weimar Republic, Fourth French Republic, Italy 1948–95, Poland 1990–93). One of the factors that led to the quick consolidation of the post-authoritarian democracies in Greece, Portugal, and Spain was the low degree of fragmentation of their party systems. It was already below the average West European degree of fragmentation just ten years after their transition to democracy began.[81] The eastern European democracies, however, have not yet reached this point. Only in Hungary was the fragmentation index for the first and second legislative periods equal to that of the West European average. In Czechoslovakia, it exceeded this level by a great deal. Even after Czechoslovakia's break up, the party systems of the Czech and Slovak Republics still have an above average degree of fragmentation. The fragmentation in Poland until 1993 was by far the highest of all liberal democratic systems.[82] Even after the reform of the electoral system in 1993, it is still much higher than the West as well as eastern European averages.

Polarization and anti-system parties: Party systems that have only moderate ideological differences between the right and left-wings and do not have any anti-system parties provide favourable conditions for democratic consolidation. Out of all the parties in the three young democracies of southern Europe, only the Communist Party of Portugal can be labelled as a relevant anti-system party.[83] The extreme right-wing of the southern European party systems remained completely vacant. The situation in El Salvador and Guatemala is different. Here the political right operates both openly and subversively against the democratic systems. This is not the case for East Asia. In East Asia, there are no anti-system parties that threaten democratic consolidation. In eastern Europe, and especially Russia, Latvia and the Slovak Republic, however, the democratic consolidation has been hampered by the existence of two antagonistic anti-system parties.[84]

Volatility:[85] Party systems with low and medium volatility are conducive to the consolidation of the entire democratic system. Post-authoritarian party systems usually exhibit high volatility directly after the transition phase. The decrease in volatility indicates that a stabilizing element of party identification has developed. It shows that parties have established themselves as intermediary structures in the society, which makes interest intermediation between state and society meaningful. Moreover, with decreasing volatility, turbulence accompanying alternation in government and U-turns in government policy are unlikely. The comparatively high volatility has been and is a persistent consolidation problem in practically all post-authoritarian democracies of the 'third wave', with a few exceptions such as Greece and Chile.

A system of consolidated, responsive, and socially anchored parties strengthens political efficiency and effectiveness with regard to policy-making and policy implementation . This in turn has a positive effect on the voters, strengthens the competitive position of the parties, and improves their relationship with the civic associations and interest groups. It also strengthens the incentives for parties to accustom themselves to the new institutions and norms of the democratic system. In such situations, conditions are created so that the relevant political actors choose the sure awards received for following the rules over the potential benefits to be had by breaking them.[86] Ideally this can initiate a self sustaining and mutually strengthening consolidation cycle based on the solid self-interests of the actors involved. For these reasons a consolidated party system plays a significant role in democratic consolidation.

(ii) Interest Groups and Organized Interests

Parties alone, however, cannot guarantee the intermediation of interests between state and society. The territorial representation must be complemented by the functional representation of organized interests. It is exactly this level of intermediary structures, however, that is chronically underdeveloped in post-authoritarian societies. This is due to the fact that the monopolization of power by the state in most authoritarian systems leaves behind a weak civil society. Social spheres shielded from the state, where business interests, social groups, civic associations, or cultural movements can organize and express themselves, hardly exist in authoritarian regimes, and if they do, only in supervised niches. This left behind an enormous burden for the post-communist democracies of eastern Europe[87] and also troubled to a lesser degree the post-dictatorial societies in Portugal, Greece, and Spain,[88] as well as younger democracies in East Asia.

The growing differentiation and pluralization of post-authoritarian societies can by no means automatically resolve the democratic and

functional problems of social interest intermediation within the society or between society and the state. 'The society', writes Jacek Kuron (one of the prominent dissidents of the Polish transformation) 'can be unbelievably differentiated, but what matters is whether it is organized or not, because only then can it be integrated'.[89] Only the mutual acceptance and organization of a society's social and economic interests enable the citizens to act collectively against other conflicting interests and those of the state. Interest groups ensure this collective action and provide commercial, social and state actors a minimum of reciprocal certainty regarding their expectations. The self-organization of the social interests ensures effective room for action independent of state intervention. It also means that the state is relieved of some of its regulatory responsibilities improving conditions for the economy. Without working systems of functional interests, immature political institutions and parties suffer from the 'Damocles Sword' of systematic, exorbitant demands.[90]

The complexity of economic, social, and political transition problems is out of balance with the low professionalism of the political elite and the routinization of administrative decision-making and implementation that are typical for unconsolidated post-authoritarian democracies. Appealing to a powerful state or reliance on a pure market economy would not be very desirable under the conditions of political uncertainty and proliferating private interests characteristic of post-authoritarian societies. Interest groups, however, contain a significant potential for relieving the state's political agenda and for consolidating a pluralistic and civil society. Moreover, the formation of 'intermediary organizations and organizing networks between state and society is not only a rational reaction to the regulatory loopholes but also the last farewell to the autocratic or paternalistic understanding of the state'.[91] Interest groups and association networks, therefore, fulfil an important democratic and executive function for the state and society as well.

Which configurations of organized interests in the field of industrial relations promote and which constrain democratic consolidation? The same criteria mentioned above for constitutional institutions also apply here: interest groups in industrial relations should be inclusive and efficient. They are inclusive when they are representative, and efficient when they act co-operatively. If the large associations such as workers' and employers' associations are representative, then the pursuit of their own interests will not conflict as much with the general interests of society.[92] The more comprehensively the respective interests of the society can be organized, the more likely it is that they will be inclined to co-operate with their social opponents and the state. Co-operation, in turn, means efficient economic decision-making and implementation.[93] This way interest groups provide a

political system with not only 'specific' but also 'diffuse' support, to use David Easton's terms.

Of course such forms of co-operation (for example neo-liberal policy-making) are extraordinarily difficult to achieve even for established democracies. And newly organized interest groups in unconsolidated democracies possess even less often the necessary degree of organization and centralization, as well as the resulting 'self-disciplined' members necessary for collective action. However, that is an important requirement for co-operation with other associations and the state. Therefore, it is not surprising that interest groups generally play a secondary role in the early phases of democratic consolidation.[94] In certain cases of regime change like those in eastern Europe, where radical economic reforms triggered their economic transition, the absence of strong interest groups with economic and social veto powers can have a positive effect on the reform's success. As a result of such poorly organized social associations (particularly the trade unions), the basic institutions of the new market economy can be set up hierarchically by the state without the difficult and time consuming coordination of the functional 'partial regimes' and powerful corporate actors, such as was the case in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1991.[95]

As democratic consolidation progresses, however, the democratic, economic, and social importance of the organized interests grows. Without them societies are neither secure from a statist supremacy nor from the Social Darwinian effect of a pure free market economy. The highly pluralistic and fragmented system of industrial relations with their relatively large number of competing associations in post-communist eastern Europe[96] are presently far from eliminating these two dangers. Even in the successfully consolidated democracies of southern Europe, the large employers' and workers' associations are still too weak to protect their autonomy from the state (Greece) or to coordinate the social interests into symmetric-co-operative arrangements. In eastern Europe, the poorly functioning structure of societal interest intermediation led to a 'overparliamentarization' and 'overpartitization'[97] of the consolidation process, overburdening the territorial representation. As a direct consequence the parliaments and parties suffered a loss of political legitimacy[98] and were held solely responsible for all of the unpopular decisions that had to be made. These post-authoritarian trends show that the emergence of an asymmetric structure of interest intermediation contains a latent potential for deconsolidation of a single partial regime (such as industrial relations) and the democratic system as a whole.

III. Behavioural Consolidation of 'Veto-Actors'   N3!

How do the development of institutional regime structures (polity) and the new collective actors (politics) affect the elite loyalty and mass support of the new democratic system? The introduction of democratic structures does not yet mean their institutionalization. The structures are not institutionalized until, on the one hand, these structures are able to regulate political activity and social behaviour, and on the other hand, until they develop a 'symbolic-integrative effect'[99] on the actions of the elite and the attitudinal patterns of the general public. The realization of both effects depends on the concrete constitutional arrangements as well as on the way the actors (government, president, parties and interest groups) interpret and accept the room for action defined by the institutions. The stability of a political system depends greatly on whether the social and political elites follow the constitutional rules and accept the legitimacy of the new democratic system. If the political leaders and powerful elites (military, capital, large landowners) do not perceive their own interests as sufficiently protected, they will not accept the legitimacy of the new democratic system. In such a precarious situation democracy will be seriously endangered.[100]

The military coups in Latin America throughout the twentieth century, and the repeated military interventions of the army in domestic politics in South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines in the second half of this century clearly demonstrate the veto power of the military. But the financial and industrial elites can also threaten the survival of democracy. If they perceive the political order or disorder as a threat to their interests they may no longer invest at home and organize huge capital flights out of the country. Both scenarios can become a deadly threat to any young and unconsolidated democracy. Therefore it is of vital interest for the newly established democracies to integrate the military and business elites into a stable framework of efficient democratic institutions which do not threaten their interests. Thus, the thesis of *polity first* mentioned earlier must always be seen in connection with *politics* in general and the behaviour of the elites specifically. The interplay of system structures and elite action has a decisive influence on the growth of a still unconsolidated democracy's legitimacy . Legitimization or rather its result, legitimacy, becomes the key factor of democratic consolidation.

IV. Attitudinal and Behavioural Consolidation of the Masses

New democracies can, and probably would, survive if the political structures and the elite behaviour of the levels 1 to 3 are consolidated. Paradoxically democratic consolidation requires up to this point the active

participation of the *demos* to only a marginal degree. However, in the long run democracy needs for its consolidation the passive obedience and active support of the citizens, otherwise it runs the risk of degenerating into some sort of *defective democracy* where the executive hollows out important checks and balances of the democratic and constitutional political order. Therefore each stable and continuous support for democracy has to be rooted in a solid civic culture and vital civil society which accepts the democratic order independently of the actual material output as the least defective type of political systems. Such a stable democratic support possesses two closely intertwined dimensions: civic culture and civil society.

Concerning civic culture the seminal work of Almond and Verba stresses the cognitive, evaluative and affective attitudes of the citizens which are required for stable democracies, and combines them into one ideal type of democratic political culture, which they call civic culture. Such a civic culture should be made up of a threefold societal balance:

- a balance between the ideological subcultures of society;

- a balance between parochial, subjective, and participatory political cultures within society;

- a balance between parochial, subjective, and participatory political culture within each individual.

This ideal-type of democratic political culture has often been criticized as too conservative, since it underestimates the importance of the participatory elements of the citizens' political behaviour. That is a valid point of view. However, we should ask what kind of 'participation' needs democracy at what stage during the process of democratic consolidation? The concept of civil society provides us with answers.

The literature on civil society is abundant, complex and sometimes contradictory. But to cut the discussion short, we distinguish between four streams: the Lockean tradition, the Pluralists, the Tocquevillian heritage, and Critical Theory.

(1) The Lockean tradition stresses civil society as a societal sphere independent from the state. Civil society has to protect the individual rights of liberty and property against the state. However, the pressing question of the intermediation between society and state has been neglected.

(2) The pluralists[101] argue that a dense network of intensive communication within society and overlapping memberships in and between social

organizations reduces social conflicts and cleavages. Therefore, society is supposed to provide important contributions to a less conflictual non-authoritarian political order.

(3) Already 100 years prior to this Tocqueville went even further in arguing that civil associations are 'schools for democracy', where the citizens learn democratic thinking and acting. The citizens in associations learn to exercise tolerance, mutual acceptance, a willingness to compromise and exercise trust and cooperation. Civil society provides the political society with a normative and participatory potential, thereby stabilizing the democratic political order.[102]

(4) The concepts of civil society influenced by Critical Theory go even further normatively.[103] Civil society has to influence the political agenda setting and to put forward those social needs and political interests that are difficult to organize. Without the support of 'informal public opinions'[104] all political organisations and institutions including parliaments and political parties, degenerate into state agencies. Habermas and Cohen/Arato stress specifically the participatory and emancipatory function of civil society.

All four theoretical traditions emphasize the positive functions of civil society for democracy, from different points of view. However, with regard to the specific needs of not yet consolidated democracies it could be argued, that positions 2 and 3 (pluralists and Tocqueville) can be considered as fully conducive to democratic consolidation, whereas position 1 (Locke) and 4 (Critical Theory) carry some risks. From the Lockean perspective the autonomy of the individual citizen and society from the state has been unilaterally stressed. In authoritarian political systems this is meaningful. However, in newly established democracies, the individual and societal *distrust* against the authoritarian state has to be converted into societal *control* of the democratic state. Therefore, the Lockean concept alone does not meet the specific needs of young, not yet consolidated democracies.

On the other hand the ideal type of a participatory and emancipatory civil society in Critical Theory also contains certain risks for the still fragile political institutions of representative liberal democracies. If some civic associations or social movements go so far as to challenge the political decisions of authoritative democratic institutions such as parliaments, and claim a higher legitimacy on normative grounds, then they could also threaten democratic consolidation more generally. Massive civil disobedience against authoritative decisions of the (democratic) state could possibly trigger disloyal or semi-loyal behaviour among the masses and

elites, and provoke anti-democratic interventions by *veto actors*. Intensive civic actions which lead to intensive political conflicts might destabilize or even disrupt the process of democratic consolidation. Only after democracies are consolidated can emancipatory civil societies contribute fully and without major risks to the 'democratization of democracy'. However, prior to the consolidation of democracy all actors of civil society should be aware of the specific risks, and should exercise self-restraint whenever the existence of democracy is at stake.

Conclusion: System Structures, Elite Behaviour and Mass Loyalty: Legitimacy as the Key to Democratic Consolidation

Without a sufficient degree of legitimacy (which will vary from case to case), democratic systems remain unconsolidated and unstable. Of course, the term political legitimacy has to be defined more precisely, since its meaning is understood differently by normativists, legal positivists and functionalists. The term 'legitimacy' is unproductive and has little operational value for comparative studies of political systems so long as it is defined as 'basic norms, constitutional procedures and the "legitimacy belief" of the people (Legitimitätsglaube)'.[105] Norms are not completely justifiably by reason or science, as legal positivists such as Kelsen[106] or functionalists such as Luhmann[107] have rightly pointed out. In addition, the relation between basic norms and constitutional procedures remains unclear in many definitions. Kielmansegg, though, has been able to avoid this conceptual vagueness. 'Legitimacy', he explains, 'is social authority by law' accepted by those who are governed by these laws.[108] This defines legitimacy as the firm belief of the ruled in the authority of the rulers.

Legitimate, then, is 'whatever is deemed legitimate by those who the claim of authority is aimed at.'[109] Therefore a political system is legitimate 'when it is considered legitimate by those who are the object of its claim to authority.[110] Kielmansegg's definition comes close to Luhmann's functionalist understanding of legitimacy. Luhmann defines legitimacy solely as the willingness of the citizen to accept the decisions of the political system.[111] The most significant formulation, however, was provided by Seymour Martin Lipset even before Luhmann developed his concept: 'Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society'.[112]

Luhmann and Lipset's understanding of legitimacy is followed here and the legitimacy of a political system is defined not normatively but in value-free terms: legitimacy is the belief that the ensemble of existing political institutions and procedures is better than all others available. No matter

organizations reduces social conflicts and cleavages. Therefore, society is supposed to provide important contributions to a less conflictual non-authoritarian political order.

(3) Already 100 years prior to this Tocqueville went even further in arguing that civil associations are 'schools for democracy', where the citizens learn democratic thinking and acting. The citizens in associations learn to exercise tolerance, mutual acceptance, a willingness to compromise and exercise trust and cooperation. Civil society provides the political society with a normative and participatory potential, thereby stabilizing the democratic political order.[102]

(4) The concepts of civil society influenced by Critical Theory go even further normatively.[103] Civil society has to influence the political agenda setting and to put forward those social needs and political interests that are difficult to organize. Without the support of 'informal public opinions'[104] all political organisations and institutions including parliaments and political parties, degenerate into state agencies. Habermas and Cohen/Arato stress specifically the participatory and emancipatory function of civil society.

All four theoretical traditions emphasize the positive functions of civil society for democracy, from different points of view. However, with regard to the specific needs of not yet consolidated democracies it could be argued, that positions 2 and 3 (pluralists and Tocqueville) can be considered as fully conducive to democratic consolidation, whereas position 1 (Locke) and 4 (Critical Theory) carry some risks. From the Lockean perspective the autonomy of the individual citizen and society from the state has been unilaterally stressed. In authoritarian political systems this is meaningful. However, in newly established democracies, the individual and societal *distrust* against the authoritarian state has to be converted into societal *control* of the democratic state. Therefore, the Lockean concept alone does not meet the specific needs of young, not yet consolidated democracies.

On the other hand the ideal type of a participatory and emancipatory civil society in Critical Theory also contains certain risks for the still fragile political institutions of representative liberal democracies. If some civic associations or social movements go so far as to challenge the political decisions of authoritative democratic institutions such as parliaments, and claim a higher legitimacy on normative grounds, then they could also threaten democratic consolidation more generally. Massive civil disobedience against authoritative decisions of the (democratic) state could possibly trigger disloyal or semi-loyal behaviour among the masses and

elites, and provoke anti-democratic interventions by *veto actors*. Intensive civic actions which lead to intensive political conflicts might destabilize or even disrupt the process of democratic consolidation. Only after democracies are consolidated can emancipatory civil societies contribute fully and without major risks to the 'democratization of democracy'. However, prior to the consolidation of democracy all actors of civil society should be aware of the specific risks, and should exercise self-restraint whenever the existence of democracy is at stake.

Conclusion: System Structures, Elite Behaviour and Mass Loyalty: Legitimacy as the Key to Democratic Consolidation

Without a sufficient degree of legitimacy (which will vary from case to case), democratic systems remain unconsolidated and unstable. Of course, the term political legitimacy has to be defined more precisely, since its meaning is understood differently by normativists, legal positivists and functionalists. The term 'legitimacy' is unproductive and has little operational value for comparative studies of political systems so long as it is defined as 'basic norms, constitutional procedures and the "legitimacy belief" of the people (Legitimitätsglaube)'.[105] Norms are not completely justifiably by reason or science, as legal positivists such as Kelsen[106] or functionalists such as Luhmann[107] have rightly pointed out. In addition, the relation between basic norms and constitutional procedures remains unclear in many definitions. Kielmansegg, though, has been able to avoid this conceptual vagueness. 'Legitimacy', he explains, 'is social authority by law' accepted by those who are governed by these laws.[108] This defines legitimacy as the firm belief of the ruled in the authority of the rulers.

Legitimate, then, is 'whatever is deemed legitimate by those who the claim of authority is aimed at.'[109] Therefore a political system is legitimate 'when it is considered legitimate by those who are the object of its claim to authority.[110] Kielmansegg's definition comes close to Luhmann's functionalist understanding of legitimacy. Luhmann defines legitimacy solely as the willingness of the citizen to accept the decisions of the political system.[111] The most significant formulation, however, was provided by Seymour Martin Lipset even before Luhmann developed his concept: 'Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society'.[112]

Luhmann and Lipset's understanding of legitimacy is followed here and the legitimacy of a political system is defined not normatively but in value-free terms: legitimacy is the belief that the ensemble of existing political institutions and procedures is better than all others available. No matter

what kind of defects such a system might have, it is legitimate so long as it is perceived by the governed to be the most realistic alternative imaginable. This belief, however, is not necessarily based on normative value judgments. Therefore, the view of Ernesto Garzón Valdés[113] and many others that judgments about legitimacy are always of a normative nature, and are ultimately based on a moral justification, is rejected here. From a rational-choice perspective the term legitimacy can be understood as the reversible perception that a certain political system provides more long-term advantages than disadvantages, compared to other systems. From such a perspective, the normative content of a judgment about legitimacy is subjected to the rational cost-benefit calculation. Similarly, Linz writes, 'Ultimately democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular juncture no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals'.[114]

The legitimacy of a democratic system is not static. It is not solely generated by the legality and democratic quality of the constitution making, and it is by no means permanent. Instead, the people's belief in legitimacy has to be constantly fed and reproduced from various sources. This process of legitimacy production was differentiated by Easton[115] according to the different objects receiving support and the different kinds of support. The various objects are organized in a hierarchical order: the political community, political regime, and the political authorities. For each of these three objects or for the political system as a whole, two different kinds of support can be found: specific and diffuse support. The specific or utilitarian support of the citizens is based on the actions of the political authorities and/or the performance of the government with regard to the political decisions (output). The diffuse support is more fundamental and deeply established. It focuses on all three objects and/or on the entire political system without specific regard to the system's output. Diffuse support is also bestowed (in the intermediate term) upon a political system, even if the individual citizen perceives a concrete political decision to be unpopular or contrary to his or her own material interests: '... diffuse support is support that underlines the regime as a whole and the political community'.[116]

A political system, therefore, accrues different kinds of support for different reasons at different levels. According to the same pattern of differentiation, the system can just as easily lose legitimacy. If the citizens believe that a certain constitutional structure is unfair and inadequate, they will feel that their interests are not sufficiently represented by the territorial and functional interest intermediaries. Furthermore, if this leads to a negative perception of the government's performance (for example, in economic policy, social legislation or domestic safety), the source of diffuse

and specific support will dry up. Such a system will not be able to consolidate. If it is already consolidated, it will be destabilized by massive deconsolidation tendencies. In this worst case scenario alternative political systems become more attractive to the elite or powerful corporate actors such as the military, big business, bankers, trade unions, and to disappointed citizens as well.

If the constitutional order is accepted, if parties and interest groups enjoy an abundant degree of trust, and if the policies deliver those collective and individual goods the citizens desire, the alternative types political regimes will have no chance (best case scenario). As a political system's legitimacy grows, the attractiveness of alternative regimes dwindles (and vice versa). The chances for success and the rewards for anti-system strategies by the political, military and business elites are low – such strategies are irrational and, therefore, become less likely to be pursued. Adam Przeworski's view that what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives falls short of the mark. That is because it does not reflect the connection between legitimacy and the attractiveness of competing systems of government. But it is exactly the amount of legitimacy a political system possesses that decides whether 'preferable alternatives' play a role in the elite's calculations or the people's perceptions. No real 'preferable alternatives'[117] will be able to develop in a system based on a solid foundation of legitimacy. On the other hand, the attractiveness of alternative regimes will increase when the legitimacy of a system deteriorates or the system is unable to build up its legitimacy. Legitimacy is, therefore, a necessary if not irreplaceable long-term requirement[118] for the stability of democracy.

The foundation of legitimacy in post-authoritarian democracies can be typically characterized as being somewhere between the best and the worst case scenarios. Young and not yet consolidated democracies often receive a high level of trust in the beginning due to the preceding autocratic regime's loss of legitimacy. This original level of trust can then be lost or added to depending on the institutional configuration of the government, the constitutional norms, and the performance of the government, parties and interest groups.

The legitimacy of a political system can also be lost or attained at different rates on each of the different levels mentioned above. Legitimization or de-legitimization rarely occur simultaneously at all four levels. Therefore a multi-level model of democratic consolidation when held in connection with a theoretically differentiated and empirically operable concept of democratic support can supply more specific information about where, why and how far the success or failure of

democratic consolidation has progressed. It enables a dynamization and specification of the concept of democratic consolidation. The problems caused by speaking of consolidated democracies and unconsolidated democracies in general terms, could be solved by using a differentiable form of judgment, which makes statements about the degree of consolidation reached in each partial regime and its relation to the stability of the entire system. Only then can well-founded conclusions be made about a democratic system's prospects for stability.

The multi-level model outlined in this article clearly shows that elements of action and system theory can and must be combined with a middle-range research approach typically used in political science. The reciprocal exclusion of both theoretical paradigms would result in a considerable and unnecessary loss of analytical differentiation for studies of transitions to democracy.

NOTES

1. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), p.6.
2. See ibid.; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.7; Juan J. Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol.I (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1975), pp.182–3; Guiseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies. An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), p.16; Peter Kraus, 'Elemente einer Theorie postautoritärer Demokratisierungsprozesse im südeuropäischen Kontext', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol.31, No.2 (1990), pp.191–213; Samuel J. Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and Samuel J. Valenzuela (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: the New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspectives* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p.60.
3. Dahl's eight criteria are: freedom to form and join organizations; freedom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; institutions for making government policies dependent on votes and other expressions of preference. See Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, p.3.
4. Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', op. cit., pp.182–3.
5. Di Palma, op. cit., p.16.
6. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1991), p.131.
7. Even Jon Elster's minimalist definition of democracy is surprising. This critical social scientist, who based his social scientific reflections above all on 'analytical Marxism', writes: 'Democracy I shall understand as simple majority rule, based on the principle one person one vote'; see Jon Elster, 'Introduction', in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.1.
8. Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America)', unpublished paper (Firenze, 1985).
9. Claus Offe, *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundungen der politischen Transformation im Neuen Osten* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1994), p.86.

10. Ibid., p.93.
11. Dieter Nohlen und Bernhard Thibaut, 'Trotz allem: Demokratie Zur politischen Entwicklung Lateinamerikas in den neunziger Jahren', in Detlef Junker, Dieter Nohlen and Hartmut Sangmeister (eds.), *Lateinamerika am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts* (München: C.H. Beck, 1994), p.257.
12. I owe this expression to Ernesto Garzón Valdés; see also Norman P. Barry, 'Unanimity, Agreement, and Liberalism: A Critique of James Buchanan's Social Philosophy', *Political Theory*, Vol.12, No.4 (1984), p.595.
13. Not to mention the fiscal and industrial burdens, which will be greater in the short run as the socio-political results themselves are transformed into a productive force.
14. Di Palma, op. cit., pp.138–40.
15. Huntington, op. cit., pp.163–5.
16. P.C. Schmitter, 'The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America').
17. Schmitter, *Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe*, p.93.
18. Ibid., p.64.
19. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, p.26.
20. Ibid.
21. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.1–37.
22. In other places, though, Przeworski brilliantly works out these exact narrow democratic constraints for the political logic of economic reforms in post-communist Eastern Europe, see Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, pp.171–3.
23. Geoffrey Pridham, 'The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective', in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.168.
24. Ibid., p.169.
25. Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, op. cit., p.7.
26. Huntington, op. cit., p.263.
27. This perspective is supported by the studies by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) and *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1980).
28. Huntington, op. cit., p.266.
29. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.6.
30. Ibid.
31. I use here a narrow definition of political institutions, which includes above all the central constitutional organs and the electoral system, but not the political and societal organizations such as parties, organizations, or mass media. I follow, herewith, the understanding of institutions as formulated by Douglass North: 'Institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are the players', see Douglass C. North, 'Institutions and Credible Commitment', unpublished paper (Wallerfangen, Saar, 1992), p.4.
32. Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Von der Autokratie zur Demokratie. Zwölf Überlegungen zur politischen Transformation', *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 6 (1995), p.47.
33. The step-by-step dismantling of democracy in Uruguay between 1967 and 1973 is one of the few examples of the deconsolidation of an originally stable democracy. Italy in the 1990s currently offers an example of deconsolidation tendencies. Of course, the loss of legitimacy at the levels of interest mediation (level 2) and the mass support (level 4) are not so massive and enduring that authoritarian system alternatives could be more attractive than democracy for the potential veto powers (level 3) and the public. The level of the polity still possesses, therefore, a somewhat solid foundation in the Italy of the 1990s, see

Wolfgang Merkel, 'Restriktionen und Chancen demokratischer Konsolidierung in postkommunistischen Gesellschaften. Ostmitteleuropa im Vergleich', *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, Vol.3, No.4, pp.463–84; Leonardo Morlino, 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe', in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (eds.), pp.37–8.

34. Because of their importance these questions should be mentioned at this point. There can be no doubt that the level of socio-economic development, insertion in international trade, networks of international supports and regional integration strongly influence the chances, risks, and speed of democratic consolidation (see Figure 1). Due to the limited space available they will have to be left unanswered in the following discussion. But see here *inter alia* Laurence Whitehead, 'International Aspects of Democratization', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.3–46; G. Pridham (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy. The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

35. A 'partial regime' is to be understood as a partial sphere of the political system that closes itself off through the development of a relatively stable set of structures, rules, communication principles, and actions from other partial regimes, see Schmitter, 'Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America)', p.10.

36. Burton, Gunther and Higley, p.13.

37. Wolfgang Merkel, Eberhard Sandschneider and Dieter Segert, 'Einleitung. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie', in Merkel, Sandschneider and Segert (eds.), *Systemwechsel 2. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996), p.18.

38. Philippe C. Schmitter 1995, 'Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe', in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (eds.), op. cit., p.286.

39. See Klaus von Beyme, *Die Verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1968); Bruce Ackermann, *Ein neuer Anfang für Europa* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993); Ernst Böckenförde, 'Die verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes – ein Grundbegriff des Verfassungsrechts', in Ulrich K. Preuß (ed.), *Zum Begriff der Verfassung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994); Jon Elster, *Die Schaffung von Verfassungen: Analysen der allgemeinen Grundlagen*, in Preuß, pp.37–57.

40. Arend Lijphart, 'Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-91', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol.3, No.4 (1992), pp.207–33; W. Merkel, 'Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Ostmitteleuropa', in Merkel, Sandschneider and Segert, *Systemwechsel 2*, pp.73–113.

41. Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

42. Burton, Gunther and Higley, op. cit., pp.20–21.

43. For general question about constitutional legitimacy regarding the democracies of the 'third wave' see Merkel, Sandschneider and Segert, op. cit., and for Eastern Europe in particular see W. Merkel, 'Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratie'.

44. Elster, *Die Schaffung von Verfassungen*, pp.43–4.

45. Böckenförde, op. cit., p.67.

46. Klaus von Beyme, *Die Verfassungsgebende Gewalt*; Klaus von Beyme, *Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa* (München: C.H. Beck, 1971).

47. Karl Loewenstein called this procedure in agreement with the 'doctrine of popular sovereignty and the original *pouvoir constituant* of the sovereign people' a 'generally accepted and even stereotypical procedure for the drafting and ratifying of a written constitution'. See Karl Loewenstein, *Verfassungslehre* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1969), p.139.

48. The French citizens rejected the first constitutional draft in the referendum of 1946, which has otherwise never happened in the history of modern democracy.

49. Linz, Stepan, op. cit., pp.91–3.

50. Klaus von Beyme, *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), p.236.

51. Ackermann, op. cit., p.77.

52. von Beyme, *Verfassungsgebende Gewalt*, p.16.

53. Dolf Sternberger, *Verfassungspatriotismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).

54. Karlheinz Merkel, *Die verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes. Grundlagen und Dogmatik des Artikel 146 GG* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996).

55. Carl Joachim Friedrich, quoted by Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, *Demokratie nach dem Ende des Kommunismus* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1994), p.209.

56. Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp.367–9.

57. Ackermann, op. cit., p.46.

58. 'Legitimitätsglaube' (Max Weber).

59. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979, first published 1965).

60. For a brief summary of this debate see Merkel, Sandschneider and Segert, op.cit., pp.25–7.

61. Linz, 'The Virtues of Parliamentarism', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.1, No.1 (1990), pp.84–91; Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1994); A. Lijphart, 'Democratization and Constitutional Choices'; A. Lijphart, 'Presidencialismo y democracia de mayoria', in Oscar Goday Arcaya (ed.), *Hacia una democracia moderna. La opción parlamentaria* (Santiago de Chile, 1990), pp.109-28; Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism', *World Politics*, Vol.46, No.1 (1993), pp.1–22.

62. Donald L. Horowitz, 'Comparing Democratic Systems', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.127–33.

63. Giovanni Sartori, 'Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism', in Linz and Valenzuela (eds.), op. cit., pp.106–18.

64. Bernhard Thibaut, 'Präsidentialismus, Parlamentarismus und das Problem der Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Lateinamerika', *Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv*, Vol.18, No.1/2 (1992), pp.107–49.

65. Ibid.; Dieter Nohlen (ed.), *Descentralización política y consolidación democrática* (Caracas, 1991); Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', *American Sociological Review*, Vol.59 (1994), pp.1–22.

66. Dieter Nohlen, *Institutional Reform in Latin America from the Perspective of Political Engineering*. Paper presented to the XVIth World Congress of IPSA, Berlin 1994.

67. Friedbert W. Rüb, 'Schach dem Parlament! – Über semi-präsidentielle Regierungssysteme in einigen postkommunistischen Gesellschaften', *Leviathan*, Vol.22, No.2 (1994), pp.260–92; W. Merkel, *Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Ostmitteleuropa*, p.104.

68. O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.5, No.1 (1994), pp.55–70.

69. Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (eds.), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*.

70. Sartori, *Party and Party Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

71. O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy'.

72. Herbert Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe', *Politics and Society*, Vol.20, No.1 (1992), pp.7–52.

73. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967); Sartori, *Party and Party Systems*.

74. Dieter Nohlen, *Wahlrecht und Parteiensysteme* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1990).

75. von Beyme, *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa*, p.296.

76. Dieter Nohlen, 'Wahlsysteme und Wahlreform: eine Einführung' (unpublished paper, Heidelberg, 1995), p.25.

77. The division of Eastern European electoral systems into ten types can be seen in Mirjana Kasapovic and Dieter Nohlen, 'Wahlsysteme und Systemwechsel in Osteuropa', in Merkel, Sandschneider und Segert (eds.), *Systemwechsel 2*, pp.9–36.

78. Klaus von Beyme, *Parteien in westlichen Demokratien* (München: C.H. Beck, 1982).

79. The fragmentation index (or fractionalization index) measures the fragmentation of the party system by the number of parties weighted by their per cent of the vote. The

fragmentation index is calculated according to Rae by totaling the squares of each party's per cent of the vote and then subtracting it from 1, see Douglas Rae, 'A Note on the Fractionalization of some European Party Systems', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.1, No.4 (1968), pp.413–18.

80. See Giovanni Sartori, *Party and Party Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); J. Linz, 'Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration', in J. Linz and A. Stepan (ed.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp.14-124; W. Merkel, 'Parteien und Parteiensysteme im Transformationsprozeß: ein interregionaler Vergleich', in W. Merkel and E. Sandschneider (eds.), *Systemwechsel 3. Parteien im Transformationsprozeß* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997), pp.337–72.

81. W. Merkel, 'Vom Ende der Diktaturen zum Binnenmarkt 1993. Griechenland, Portugal und Spanien auf dem Weg zurück nach Europa', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 51 (1990), pp.3-14; Morlino, 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation', p.324; José María Maravall, *Regimes, Politics and Markets* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

82. W. Merkel, 'Restriktionen und Chancen demokratischer Konsolidierung', p.475.

83. Morlino, 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation', p.365.

84. von Beyme, *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa*, pp.301–3; Dieter Segert and Czilla Machos, *Parteien in Osteuropa* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1995).

85. The concept of volatility totals the net gain in votes as well as the net loss for each relevant party from election to election.

86. North, *Institutions and Credible Commitment*.

87. Gerd Schienstock and Franz Traxler, 'Von der stalinistischen zur marktvermittelten Konvergenz? Zur Transformation der Struktur und Politik der Gewerkschaften in Osteuropa', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, No.3 (1993), pp.484–506; Offe, *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts*, p.121.

88. Schmitter, 'Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation', p.287.

89. Jacek Kuron, Interview, *die tageszeitung* (taz), 15 March 1991.

90. Helmuth Wiesenthal, *Die 'Politische Ökonomie' des fortgeschrittenen Transformations-prozesses und die potentiellen Funktionen intermediärer Akteure*, Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft), AG Transformationsprozesse, Working Paper, No.1 (1993), p.15.

91. Ibid., p.16.

92. Mancur Olson, *Die Logik kollektiven Handelns* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1968).

93. David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiesence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.143–78.

94. One exception is Spain. In Spain the weakly mobilized unions in particular played a part in the formation of a series of political, economic, and social 'pacts' from 1978 to 1986, which contributed to the political stabilization of the young democracy during a period of high unemployment and economic crisis. See W. Merkel, 'Sozialdemokratische Politik in einer postkeynesianischen Ära? Das Beispiel der sozialistischen Regierung Spaniens', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol.30, No.4 (1989), pp.646–8.

95. H. Wiesenthal, *Die Krise holistischer Politikansätze und das Projekt der gesteuerten Systemtransformation* (Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft), AG Transformationsprozesse, Working Paper, No.10 (1994), p.21.

96. Schienstock and Traxler, op. cit., p.501.

97. Attila Agh, 'The Role of the First Parliament in Democratic Transition', in Attila Agh and Sándor Kurtán (ed.), *The First Parliament* (1990–1994) (Budapest, 1995), pp.251.

98. Ibid., p.252; José R. Montero and Leonardo Morlino, 'Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe', in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (eds.), op. cit., p.259.

99. Helmuth Fehr, 'Probleme der Gründung politischer Institutionen in Ostmitteleuropa', in Gerhard Göhler (ed.), *Die Eigenart von Institutionen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), p.344.

100. Graf Kielmansegg refers justifiably to the Weimar Republic. This thesis is also reinforced by the examples of Portugal in the 1920s, some Latin American democracies in the 1960s and most of the states that emerged from the former Soviet Union in the 1990. See Peter Graf Kielmansegg, 'Legitimität als analytische Kategorie', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*,

Vol.12, No.3 (1971), p.398.

101. David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951); Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*.

102. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (London: Fontana, 1968); Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.

103. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung*, op. cit.

104. John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London: Verso, 1988); Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung (Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy)*.

105. See Hella Mandt, 'Legitimität', in Dieter Nohlen und Rainer-Olaf Schultze (eds.), *Pipers Wörterbuch zur Politik*, Vol.1 (München: Piper, 1985), p.503.

106. Hans Kelsen, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Bad Homburg, 1968).

107. Niklas Luhmann, *Legitimation durch Verfahren* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1969).

108. Kielmansegg, op. cit., p.367.

109. Ibid., p.368.

110. Ibid., p.389.

111. Luhmann, op. cit., p.35.

112. S.M. Lipset, *Political Man. The Social Basis of Politics* (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, 1960), p.68; Lipset's and Luhmann's concepts are based on Max Weber; see Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972).

113. Ernesto Garzón Valdés, *Die Stabilität politischer Systeme* (Freiburg), p.17.

114. Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, p.18.

115. D. Easton, *Systems Analysis of Political Life*, p.176.

116. D. Easton, 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol.5, No.4 (1975), p.445.

117. Przeworski, 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Vol.2. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.51.

118. The lack of legitimacy (which can be based on various ideological, material, and political sources) can only be substituted by repression over the short and medium term, since political repression generates too many 'unintended consequences' detrimental to the stability and longevity of any regime (particularly in more advanced societies).

INTRODUCTION:
IN SEARCH OF CONSOLIDATION

Larry Diamond

World politics have changed radically in the past two decades. At the beginning of 1975, there were only some 40 democracies in the world, and they were predominantly the rich, industrialized nations of the West.[1] Few states in what was then termed the Third World had democratic systems of government. Communist dictatorships were firmly entrenched—or so it seemed—in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In 1975, communist forces took control of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as well. That year, Marxist governments also came to power in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and, soon thereafter, in Ethiopia. Military or one-party dictatorships held sway in most of Latin America, Africa, and Asia; only three countries in Central and South America had democratically elected leaders. Indeed, the mid-to-late 1970s seemed a low-water mark for democracy in the world, and the empirical trends were reified by intellectual fashions dismissing democracy as an artifice, a cultural construct of the West, or a "luxury" that poor states could not afford.

Yet even as authoritarian trends were expanding and deepening in most parts of the world, a countertrend was taking shape. In 1974, the 48-year-old dictatorial regime in Portugal was deposed by a military coup, and three months later the Greek military dictatorship collapsed. Elected, civilian democratic government took hold in Greece first, but by late 1975 democrats had bested radical forces at the polls in Portugal as well. That same month of November 1975, the 36-year-old dictatorship of Francisco Franco in Spain ended with his death, and a transition to democracy ensued. Over the following three years, Spain crafted a new democratic regime while the process of military withdrawal began in Latin America and military regimes gave way to civilian, elected governments in Ghana and Nigeria.

The latter two democracies did not last long, but in a grand process that Samuel P. Huntington has dubbed the "third wave" of global democratization, a democratic *Zeitgeist* swept the globe.[2] As the return

to at least formally democratic, civilian rule was becoming the norm in Central and South America, democracy was restored in Turkey in 1983, in the Philippines in 1986, in South Korea in 1987, and in Pakistan in 1988. By then, Hungary was already in transition to a multiparty system. In 1989, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, and a regional wave of democratic transitions ensued there, followed in 1990 by the beginning of a "second liberation" on the African continent. By the end of 1994, 38 of the (then) 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had held competitive multiparty elections for at least the national legislature,[3] and the number of electoral democracies in Africa had increased to 18 from just 3 in 1988.[4] Communism collapsed in the Soviet Union as well, and new democracies emerged in many of the former Soviet states, including, most significantly, Russia.

In two decades, the third wave of democratization has transformed the balance of political regimes in the world. This transformation has been especially dramatic since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the former East bloc. Between 1990 and 1996, the number of electoral democracies in the world increased from 76 to 118. Even with the increase in the total number of countries in the world during this period, this trend established democracy as the typical form of government. The percentage of countries with at least an electoral form of democracy—in which multiple political parties regularly compete for power through (relatively) free and fair elections—increased from 27.5 percent in 1974 to 46 percent in 1990 and to 61 percent in 1996.

On closer examination, however, the scope of democratic progress in the world is partly illusory, for regular, free, and fair elections do not ensure the presence of other important dimensions of democracy. A more comprehensive conception—what I have elsewhere termed "liberal democracy"—encompasses extensive protections for individual and group freedoms, inclusive pluralism in civil society as well as party politics, civilian control over the military, institutions to hold officeholders accountable, and thus a strong rule of law secured through an independent, impartial judiciary.[5] Although it is not articulated in these precise terms, the distinction between the minimal framework of electoral democracy and the deeper institutional structure of liberal democracy figures prominently in many of the theoretical and empirical chapters in our two volumes, entitled *Themes and Perspectives* and *Regional Challenges*. Indeed, as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan insist in their contribution to *Themes and Perspectives,* "If freely elected executives (no matter what the magnitude of their majority) infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies."

The number of "liberal" democracies has also increased during the third wave, although not nearly as sharply as the number of electoral

democracies. Taking the Freedom House rating of "free" as a rough indicator of liberal democracy, the number of such states jumped from 39 at the start of the third wave to 52 in 1980 and then to 76 in 1990.[6] In proportional terms, the increase is even more moderate, from 27.5 percent of all states in 1974 to 41.5 percent in 1990. Moreover, in recent years the number of free states has more or less stagnated (as have freedom levels in general). In fact, the number of free states dipped slightly in 1992 and 1993, edging back up to 76 in the following two years and increasing to 79 in 1996. In proportional terms, liberal democracies were no more common in 1996 (41.4 percent of the world's regimes) than in 1991.[7]

The juxtaposition of these two trends—steady expansion in the number of electoral democracies, but recent stagnation in levels of political and civil freedom in the world—signals a growing gap between the two standards. In 1990, 86 percent of all the formally democratic states in the world were "free," or liberal democracies. Since 1993, only about two-thirds have been. And over the past decade, freedom levels have actually declined in many third wave democracies, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, and Zambia, as well as in some older democracies, including India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Venezuela.

Regional differences are also much more apparent in the prevalence of liberal democracy than of electoral democracy. By the end of 1996, all 24 West European countries were "free" (with most of them well above the threshold dividing "free" from "partly free"). By contrast, only 57 percent of the countries in the Americas, a third of those in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, 42 percent in the Asia-Pacific region, 17 percent in Africa, and one (Israel) of 14 states in the Middle East were free.[8] In the proportion of states that are electoral democracies, however, other regions came much closer to the West European standard of 100 percent: 89 percent in the Americas, 69 percent in the former East bloc, 63 percent in the Asia-Pacific region, and 34 percent in Africa.

Clearly, the third wave of democratization has had much greater breadth than depth. As a number of the essays in this two-volume collection demonstrate, democracy may be the most common form of government in the world, but outside of the wealthy industrialized nations it tends to be shallow, illiberal, and poorly institutionalized. If there are no immediate threats of democratic collapse in most of those countries, neither are there clear signs that democracy has become consolidated and stable, truly the only viable political system and method for the foreseeable future. In fact, of the more than 70 new democracies that have come into being since the start of the third wave, only a small number are generally considered to be deeply rooted and secure. The remainder appear for now "'condemned' to remain democratic" while they "muddle through as 'unconsolidated democracies,'"[9] with militaries

unwilling to seize power even in the classic circumstances of political stalemate and crisis that were used to justify past coups.[10] But there are clear signs of erosion of the quality and stability of democracy in many of these third wave regimes—abuses of power and even "self-coups" by domineering executives, constraints on the press and independent organizations, assassinations of crusading journalists, and mounting corruption, criminality, political violence, and civil strife. There are even growing doubts, reflected in some of our chapters, about how long the constitutional structures of democracy can survive amid prolonged economic suffering, severe inequality, rampant crime, venal and feeble judicial systems, growing vigilante movements, and chronically weak and ineffectual political institutions. From this perspective, the greatest challenge still lies ahead: to consolidate and make permanent the extraordinary democratic gains of the past two decades.

There is more at stake here than the quality and stability of new (and, in countries like Sri Lanka and Colombia, old) democracies. The future status of democracy in the world could itself be in question. As Huntington emphasizes in his book *The Third Wave,* each of the previous two waves of global democratization ended in a "reverse wave" of democratic breakdown. And each of these reverse waves was a traumatic time for human freedom, international peace, and liberal values, giving rise to fascist and communist regimes in the interwar period and to numerous insurgencies and brutal military dictatorships in the 1960s and early 1970s. Today, human rights abuses, genocide, aggression, warfare, and insecurity are still generated by nondemocratic states; generally, the more repressive these states are, the more they threaten their neighbors as well as their own people.

As Huntington observes in the opening chapter of *Themes and Perspectives,* the euphoria generated by the collapse of communism has long since worn off, and we must now recognize that "this great third wave of democratization . . . may be losing its outward dynamic" of expansion, and even that "a new reverse wave may be gathering which could lead to the erosion of some third wave gains." It is vitally important to preempt this third reverse wave. And this can be done only if the third wave democracies become consolidated.

What Is Democratic Consolidation?

Our two companion volumes, and the 1995 conference that spawned them, were organized in the belief that consolidation is an important concept in the study of democracy, and a vital political goal for new democracies. This view is not without its critics, one of whom, Guillermo O'Donnell, offers a thoughtful challenge here. Yet the bulk of our contributors have converged on an understanding of democratic consolidation as a discernible process by which the rules, institutions,

and constraints of democracy come to constitute "the only game in town," the one legitimate framework for seeking and exercising political power.

In *Themes and Perspectives,* Linz and Stepan offer a conceptual framework for consolidation that has already become widely influential and that informs many of the other chapters in this collection. They posit overlapping behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions of consolidation, through which "democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success." In consolidated democracies, they argue, there may be intense conflict, but no significant political or social actors attempt to achieve their objectives by illegal, unconstitutional, or antidemocratic means. Further, though there may be severe problems of governance and widespread disapproval of the government of the day, elites and the public at large overwhelmingly believe "that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life." At bottom, then, the consolidation of democracy represents a kind of mirror image of the process of democratic breakdown that Linz and Stepan studied a generation ago.[11] While democratic breakdowns feature the erosion of democratic legitimacy and the rise of disloyal and semi-loyal political actors, consolidation is buttressed by a deep and widespread legitimation of democracy. And this legitimation—internalized, practiced, and transmitted across political generations—involves more than a commitment to democracy in the abstract; it also entails adherence to the specific rules and constraints of the country's constitutional system.[12]

It is this broad, unquestioning embrace of democratic procedures that produces a crucial element of consolidation—a reduction in the uncertainty of democracy, regarding not so much the outcomes as the rules and methods of political competition. As P. Nikiforos Diamandouros observes in his case study of Southern Europe in *Regional Challenges,* this regularization of politics promotes democratic stability by safeguarding the rights of political oppositions and minorities, containing conflict within institutional channels, and thus reducing the intensity of conflict. As consolidation advances, "there is a widening of the range of political actors who come to assume democratic conduct [and democratic loyalty] on the part of their adversaries," a transition from "instrumental" to "principled" commitments to the democratic framework, an increase in trust and cooperation among political competitors, and a socialization of the general population (through both deliberate efforts and the practice of democracy in politics and civil society).[13] As Robert A. Dahl notes in *Themes and Perspectives,* the consolidation of democracy thus implies, and indeed requires, the emergence of a democratic political culture. Democratic cultures may vary across countries in many of their particulars, but unless democratic institutions are braced by such broadly

shared norms as political trust, tolerance, willingness to compromise, and, most of all, belief in democratic legitimacy, those institutions will be vulnerable to breakdown in times of crisis.[14] In the cases examined in this study, progress toward democratic consolidation is closely correlated with the growth of democratic culture. In this respect, our Southern European cases are the most advanced; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have seen the rapid emergence of democratic values; and such value change has been significant but uneven in Latin America, East Asia, and especially Russia (where Michael McFaul notes some recent slippage in support for democracy).

Democratic consolidation is fostered by a number of institutional, policy, and behavioral changes. Many of these improve governance directly by strengthening state capacity; liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures; securing social and political order while maintaining basic freedoms; improving horizontal accountability and the rule of law; and controlling corruption. Others improve the representative functions of democratic governance by strengthening political parties and their linkages to social groups, reducing fragmentation in the party system, enhancing the autonomous capacity and public accountability of legislatures and local governments, and invigorating civil society. Most new democracies need these types of institutional reform and strengthening, especially those that O'Donnell has labeled "delegative democracies" precisely because of their particularism, lack of horizontal accountability, and hence tendency toward corruption.[15] Some also require steady efforts to reduce military involvement in nonmilitary issues and subject the military and intelligence establishments to civilian control and oversight. And some require legal and institutional innovations to foster accommodation and mutual security among different ethnic and nationality groups.

Underlying all of these specific challenges, however, is an intimate connection between the deepening of democracy and its consolidation. Some new democracies have become consolidated during the third wave (and there are also some older consolidated democracies in the "Third World"), but none of the "nonliberal" electoral democracies that have emerged during the third wave has yet achieved consolidation. To do so, they must become *more* democratic, making more progress in protecting individual rights, ensuring a rule of law, representing citizen interests, incorporating marginalized groups, institutionalizing "horizontal accountability" of different branches of officeholders to one another, and eliminating the "reserved domains of power" enjoyed by the military and other social and political forces that are not accountable (directly or indirectly) to the electorate.[16] Put in slightly different terms, as Abraham Lowenthal does in his contribution to *Themes and Perspectives*, before democratic institutions can become consolidated, they must first fully exist. From this perspective, "talk of consolidating democracy is premature and misleading" in much of Latin America and the Caribbean

because so many of the essential institutions of democratic governance remain to be "solidly constructed."[17]

In some cases, becoming more democratic may involve completing the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Linz and Stepan argue in their essay here (and at greater length in their *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*) that a democratic transition is completed only when the freely elected government has full authority to generate new policies, and thus when the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the new democracy are not constrained or compelled by law to share power with other actors, such as the military. Chile's interlocking system of prerogatives for the military and its civilian appointees, embedded in the 1980 Constitution that General Augusto Pinochet left to the new civilian regime, so constrains the authority of elected governments and so insulates the military from democratic control that until it "is removed or greatly diminished, the Chilean transition cannot be completed, and, by definition, Chilean democracy cannot be consolidated."[18]

An important issue in the conceptual debate on consolidation is: How do we recognize it? Certainly no single indicator will do. And it is easier to recognize the phenomenon in its absence: the signs of fragility, instability, and nonconsolidation (or *de*consolidation). These include all the manifestations of "disloyalty" that Linz has noted: explicit rejection of the legitimacy of the democratic system—or of the nation-state and its boundaries—by (significant) parties, movements, or organizations; willingness by political competitors to use force, fraud, or other illegal means to acquire power or influence policies; "knocking at the barracks door" for military support in a political struggle; refusal to honor the right to govern of duly elected leaders and parties; abuse of constitutional liberties and opposition rights by ruling elites; and blatantly false depiction of democratically loyal opponents as disloyal ("instruments of outside secret and conspiratorial groups"). Fragility may be further indicated by "semi-loyalty": intermittent or attenuated disloyal behaviors; a willingness to form governments and alliances with disloyal groups; or a readiness to encourage, tolerate, or cover up such groups' antidemocratic actions.[19]

At the elite level, consolidation may be discerned from the behavioral patterns (and mutual interactions), symbolic gestures, public rhetoric, official documents, and ideological declarations of leaders, parties, and organizations.[20] At the mass level, public-opinion survey data are needed, not only to assess the degree of support for the legitimacy of democracy (in principle and in the regime's specific form), but also to determine its depth and its resilience over time. In Spain, support for democracy remained high and even increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s, even as unemployment rose dramatically. This durability of public support, fostered by effective "political crafting" on the part of political

elites, was surely evidence of democratic consolidation, and most scholars consider that Spain became a consolidated democracy by 1982, only seven years after the start of its transition.[21] Yet in South America, democratic regimes have persisted for a decade and longer, through much more crushing economic depressions that have dramatically lowered living standards and increased rates of urban poverty, as Edgardo Boeninger notes in his chapter in *Regional Challenges*. These developments have (in most cases) generated no new antisystem parties or movements, yet regional and country specialists still regard most of these regimes (with the exception of Uruguay) as unconsolidated. Why?

One could point to pervasively weak political institutions (parties, legislatures, judiciaries, and so on); a general lack of horizontal accountability; and the prevalence of delegative democracy. But this may be to confuse the phenomenon (nonconsolidation) with some of its causes (or facilitating factors). In fact, it is precisely because these third wave democracies—particularly Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador—have persisted for some time now in the face of weak institutionalization of formal democratic structures that O'Donnell, in his contribution to *Themes and Perspectives*, vigorously questions the utility of the concept of "democratic consolidation": "All we can say at present is that, as long as [competitive] elections are institutionalized [as they are in the above countries], polyarchies are likely to endure."

O'Donnell challenges the equation of consolidation with political institutionalization in general. In principle, countries can have weak, volatile party systems but highly stable and legitimate democracies (though some degree of political institutionalization appears to be important for democratic consolidation). Or established party systems can dissolve into considerable turbulence (as in Italy today) with no visible sign that democracy itself is losing legitimacy and becoming less viable. The strength of formal democratic institutions and rules—as opposed to the informal practices of clientelism, vote buying, rule-bending, and executive domination—no doubt facilitates the endurance (and consolidation) of democracy, but as O'Donnell notes, the two are not the same, and other factors "have strong independent effects on the survival chances of polyarchies."

To respond to O'Donnell's important challenge, it is necessary to step back and ask: If these South American (and other third wave) democracies have persisted through serious adversity for a decade or more, why are they not considered consolidated? How can we tell when consolidation occurs? And what does it matter, if the democracies continue to persist? Without satisfactory answers to these questions, the concept of consolidation does indeed lose its utility.

The key factor may be the pattern of behavior (and beliefs, if we could find a reliable way to measure them) of major players in these systems. There may be no significant, explicit antisystem players, but

there are military and police establishments that remain, or have again become, unaccountable to civilian authority and contemptuous of legal and constitutional norms. There are presidents—a rather extraordinary succession of them across the South American continent in recent years—who are not just "delegative" but have so openly abused the laws and constitution that they have been driven from office, or have done so with such political cunning and economic success that (as with Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Carlos Menem in Argentina) they have thrived politically. There are corrupt and oligarchical local bosses, and deeply corrupted legislatures and judiciaries. There is, in short, precisely what O'Donnell observes—"another," very different, institutionalization, of informal, indeed illegal and even unconstitutional, practices, especially between elections. Of course, the degree and distribution of these "informalities" vary across countries. Where such departures from the democratic framework are not just one feature of the system (as they are to some degree in virtually every complex democracy) but a recurring and defining feature, they signal a lack of commitment to the basic procedural framework of democracy: democratic disloyalty, semiloyalty, frailty, in other words, *nonconsolidation*.

The implications of these behavioral signs of uneven, ambivalent, or deteriorating democratic commitment are twofold. First, in those cases where powerful officials (elected and unelected) and powerful persons and groups outside the state behave in this way, civil liberties get abused, opposition forces get harassed, elections may get violent (and even fraudulent), and democracy gets hollowed out. The second implication is more speculative, but follows logically. If these abusive elites do not act against the constitutional form of democracy, their commitment to it nevertheless appears to remain contingent and instrumental rather than routinized, internalized, and principled. And a good deal of the instrumental value they derive from sustaining the democratic form (or facade), one may speculate, owes to the international system, which imposes costs on countries that overturn democracy. If this international pressure (or the perception of it) ever recedes, the viability of frail democracies will also diminish. International, and especially European regional, constraints ultimately helped to consolidate democracy in Southern Europe, and are doing so today in some countries in East Central Europe, because they quickened and reinforced enduring changes in elite and mass political culture. Such cultural changes are not occurring among key elites in many third wave democracies, even though those democracies have persisted.

Political Institutions and Institutional Design

As summarized above, the first part of *Themes and Perspectives* traces the evolution and character of the new democracies of the third

wave and advances the theoretical debate about the meaning and importance of democratic consolidation. The rest of our two-volume study pursues two additional goals: to identify and explore the factors that facilitate (or obstruct) democratic consolidation, and to assess the progress made toward consolidation by some of the principal countries and regions in the third wave.

Increasing scholarly attention has been paid in recent years to the strength and character of political institutions as a key factor affecting the viability and stability of democracy. If democracy is to be consolidated, it must garner broad and deep legitimacy among all significant political actors and the citizenry at large. Such legitimacy may accrue in part in reaction to the failures and abuses of the authoritarian past, or it may derive from a historic cultural commitment to democratic values and norms that—as in the Czech Republic—has been revived after a long period of authoritarian rule. It may be stimulated or reinforced by incorporation into regional and international networks dominated by democratic states (such as the European Union) and liberal values. But legitimation is unlikely to be fully and lastingly achieved without some degree of effective governance on the part of the new democratic institutions.

As several of our chapters demonstrate, economic performance remains an important part of the governance challenge. But it has tended to be overemphasized, to the neglect of other, more political, dimensions of governance. Citizens of new democracies form judgments about their political systems based not only on what they deliver economically, but also on the degree to which they deliver valued political goals: freedom, order, a rule of law, accountability, representativeness, and overall efficacy. In other words, citizens expect their democracies to govern democratically, in compliance with the constitution and the laws, and to govern efficaciously, in terms of choosing and implementing policies that address the most important problems the society confronts. Among the most frequent causes of democratic alienation, delegitimation, and breakdown have been the abuse of democratic procedures and norms by government officials and political leaders themselves, so that democracy comes to be seen as a sham; the turn toward political violence on the part of significant actors who are either marginalized from the democratic process or impatient with its procedures; and the incapacity of governments to decide and act as a result of political fragmentation, polarization, and stalemate.[22]

Sometimes democracy seems simply overwhelmed by the weight of insoluble problems, or is destroyed by the incompetence, venality, and stubbornness of failed political leaders. Yet, at some point in their lives, most democracies confront crises that appear (at least for a time) overwhelming and insoluble. And a key challenge for democratic constitutions is to anticipate the flaws and foibles of potential leaders.

If democracies are to weather the storms of history and limit the self-aggrandizing impulses of human actors, they need strong and well-designed political institutions.

The most basic institution is the state itself. In their chapter in this collection, Linz and Stepan argue that a state of law—a *Rechtsstaat*—is vital to the consolidation of any democracy. Unless the behavior of public officials is effectively constrained by "a network of laws, courts, semiautonomous review and control agencies, and civil-society norms" of transparency and accountability, democracy will be diminished by political abuse and cynicism, and actors will fail to commit themselves to a consensus on the rules of the game. Beyond this, however, a consolidated democracy also requires what they term "a usable bureaucracy," a state that has the administrative capacity to perform the essential functions of government: to maintain order, adjudicate disputes, construct infrastructure, facilitate economic exchange, defend the national borders, and collect the taxes necessary to fund these activities. Where state structures have been historically weak, or state decay has accompanied the decomposition of the authoritarian regime, state-building emerges as a central challenge for democratic consolidation. In particular, McFaul shows in *Regional Challenges* how Russia's dual transition—from communism and from empire—left a huge vacuum in state political authority, administrative capacity, and judicial efficacy. The result has been a sense of anarchy, which poses one of the most formidable threats to democracy in Russia in the near term. Where the state-building challenge is compounded by significant ethnic or nationality divisions (as in many postcommunist and African states), democratic consolidation is also fostered by the construction of an inclusive state that gives all citizens political equality, with "a common 'roof' of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights," as Linz and Stepan explain.

One of the most important institutional arenas for democracy is the party system. Even with the growing prominence of civil society, political parties remain important if not essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective governments, and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process. Institutionalized party systems thus increase democratic governability and legitimacy by facilitating legislative support for government policies; by channeling demands and conflicts through established procedures; by reducing the scope for populist demagogues to win power; and by making the democratic process more inclusive, accessible, representative, and effective.[23]

Many of our chapters demonstrate the obstacle to democratic

democratic stability, a view confirmed by the statistical analysis of Adam Przeworski and his colleagues in their contribution to *Themes and Perspectives*. They find (as have other empirical studies) that presidential democracy is particularly vulnerable to breakdown when it is joined to a fragmented party system, and most of all under conditions of "legislative deadlock" (in which the largest party has between one-third and one-half of the seats in parliament).[27]

In *Themes and Perspectives*, John M. Carey assesses some of these issues and trade-offs in institutional design that affect the quality and stability of democracy, and hence the prospects for consolidation. But he does so by examining finer-grained issues than the choice between PR and SMD plurality or parliamentary versus presidential government. Carey focuses on two key factors affecting regime support and governability: the degree of fragmentation in the party system and the degree of cohesion within each major political party. In a presidential system, the degree of party fragmentation in parliament, he shows, can be heavily influenced by the formula used to elect the president and the timing of presidential and legislative elections. Where a candidate must win an absolute majority to be elected (rather than a simple plurality in a single-round election), many more parties compete for the presidency, since they expect to secure more bargaining strength by forming coalitions after the first round. Where such a presidential election is held concurrently with legislative elections, the greater party fragmentation in the presidential election carries over into the legislature. A plurality rule can produce a less fragmented legislature. Carey shows (and our case studies of Russia and Latin America confirm) that, independent of whether a majority is required, legislatures also tend to be more fragmented when their elections are not fully synchronized with presidential ones, but occur either at mid-term or on an entirely different timetable.

The importance of holding elections concurrently is also emphasized by Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, but for a rather different reason. For them, democratic governance is most stable and effective within an *integrated* political system in which politicians of different branches and levels are dependent on one another and therefore inclined to cooperate and coordinate—rather than incessantly compete and bargain—on jurisdictional and other issues. Such interdependence is fostered, argue Niou and Ordeshook, by the presence of large numbers of elective offices, at various levels of governmental authority, all of which are contested simultaneously. In such systems, autonomous local party structures mobilize crucial support for the national party ticket but in turn depend on the national party label (and the coattails of the national party leader) to help elect their local candidates. Where elections for different levels of authority are not concurrent, as in Russia and Taiwan (and many other third wave democracies), and where

relatively few offices are filled through elections, politicians in the various branches and levels of government have far fewer incentives to cooperate. Russian president Boris Yeltsin's 1991 decision to postpone elections for governors, mayors, and regional legislatures stifled party-system development and democratic consolidation in Russia, McFaul concludes. In Taiwan, the centralization of internal party politics further complicates the quest for an integrated polity.

Like Niou and Ordeshook, Carey considers party coherence a crucial dimension of governability, but his concern is with the extent to which legislators are encouraged to support their party's program rather than cultivate an independent, personal constituency (with all of its implications for wasteful pork-barrel politics). A key factor is whether electoral rules require candidates of the same party to compete against one another; this can be the case under presidential or parliamentary, and SMD or PR, systems. In closed-list PR systems, the higher the district size, the greater the tendency toward party coherence; however, in open-list systems like that of Brazil or in the single nonstranferable vote (SNTV) system in Taiwan, where voters choose a single candidate among many, the more candidates per district, the more intense the competition. Overall, the incentives for party cohesion in the legislature are shaped to a great degree by a complex mix of institutional factors: district size, the number and types of votes citizens cast, party leaders' control over nominations, and the degree to which the votes for one candidate may help other candidates of her party (vote-pooling).[28]

The fragmenting effect of the SNTV electoral system is emphasized both by Teh-fu Huang in his contribution to *Themes and Perspectives* and by Hung-mao Tien in his case study of Taiwan in *Regional Challenges*. The SNTV system has produced a fairly proportional distribution of seats among parties in Taiwan, but within the two principal parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), it has fostered severe factionalism that has undermined the governing effectiveness of the KMT, hampered the competitiveness of the DPP, and facilitated the birth of new splinter parties. In South Korea, the problem—as Huang shows—has been excessive top-down organization of parties, but on the very shallow institutional basis of personal loyalty to an individual leader. This extreme personalization of both the ruling and opposition parties has combined with powerful regional ties, frequent changes in electoral rules and constitutional structure, and the long disruption of democratic politics by authoritarian rule to produce breathtaking instability and weakness in the Korean party system, with parties constantly changing names and identities. (These same problems have plagued democracy in Thailand and the Philippines.) Huang thus concludes that democratic consolidation would be advanced by implementing electoral reforms: in Taiwan, terminating SNTV by increasing the currently small proportion of seats elected

through PR and converting the remaining seats into single-member districts (a reform now under discussion); in South Korea, by increasing the number of PR seats while decreasing or eliminating the proportion of seats automatically awarded as a premium to the leading party.

Our contributors do not entirely agree on the most desirable institutional designs. But their analyses do suggest that, because major institutional decisions (especially that of presidentialism versus parliamentarism), once made, are very difficult to change, a democracy seeking consolidation is probably best off pursuing specific institutional reforms that address specific problems. Stronger, more effective party systems could be fostered by reforms that increase the number of elected officials, enhance the autonomy of local party branches (and of local and regional government more generally), and synchronize the timing of elections for most offices. In particular, if a country is to have an elected president with significant executive authority, it makes sense, as Carey argues, to synchronize presidential and legislative elections and to make it more likely for a president to be elected on a first ballot—if not by plurality, then by a "double complement rule" that requires the leading candidate to have a substantial margin over his or her closest competitor.

Civil-Military Relations

By definition, democracy cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order. More specifically, as Felipe Agüero puts it in *Themes and Perspectives,* "civilian supremacy" gives democratically elected governments unquestioned authority over all policy arenas, including defining the goals and overseeing the organization and implementation of national defense. In such a system, the military role is limited to matters of national defense and international security—with the military relieved of all responsibility for internal security—and governmental structures (such as a civilian ministry of defense) are put in place to enable civilians to exercise effective oversight and control of the military (as well as the intelligence services). A key element in the rapid progress toward consolidation of the new democracies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece was the establishment (facilitated in part by integration into NATO) of such norms and structures.

One reason why several new democracies of East Central Europe have been able to make such rapid progress toward consolidation is that they inherited and maintained traditions of firm civilian control over the military. This, ironically, has been one of the few positive legacies of their communist past. Many Latin American and Asian third wave democracies have not been so fortunate. As Agüero details for South America and Harold Crouch for Thailand and the Philippines, most of

these new regimes have had to struggle to overcome deeply entrenched structures and traditions of military autonomy and even impunity. So has South Korea, where President Kim Young Sam's initiatives to enhance civilian control and purge the dominant military faction may rank among his more important accomplishments. Like the new democracies of postcommunist Europe, those in Spain, Portugal, and Taiwan benefited from the military's lack of direct involvement in authoritarian governance (although the extensive penetration of the military by Taiwan's long-dominant party, the KMT, does complicate democratic consolidation there).[29] As Diamandouros argues, the nature of prior military rule also matters: where, as in Greece, the military as a hierarchical institution did not administer the regime and the military did not rule for long, the consequences for future civil-military relations are less serious.

Where the military as an institution has a long tradition of political intervention and where it retains extensive political and economic prerogatives, democracies face a particularly difficult and dangerous challenge. In such circumstances, as Agüero and Crouch show, establishing civilian supremacy is a complex and typically protracted process, requiring many of the factors that promote democratic consolidation in general: skilled political leadership, unity among civilian political forces (across partisan and other divides), and civilian expertise (both within and outside of government) on national-security matters, as well as luck (in the form of divisions within the military and the failure of military rebellions). Successful reform also requires a long-term policy vision. Typically this involves gradually reducing the size of the military (and hence its capacity to seize and exercise political power) while increasing the military's capacity to perform its defense mission, keeping salaries at a respectable level, and preserving the honor of the military as an institution.[30]

Good leadership involves knowing when and how far to push reform, as well as how to forge proreform coalitions both in the legislature and among rising military officers. Presidents Fidel Ramos in the Philippines and Carlos Menem in Argentina were able to implement reforms in part because of their political skills (in sharp contrast to their predecessors, Corazon Aquino and Raul Alfonsín). Yet Ramos benefited considerably from his prestige and connections as the former head of the military, and Menem purchased military acceptance of reforms at the cost of sweeping immunity for past human rights abuses. Unfortunately, civilian supremacy can rarely be achieved through systematic punishment of human rights abuses under military rule. Most cases in which those abuses were serious and recent are precisely the ones in which the military retains too much power for civilians to risk a polarizing confrontation over the issue. Still, as Agüero stresses, immunity for past crimes need not and should not carry over into the current and future conduct of security forces.

The strength and legitimacy of civilian political institutions—the president, the legislature, and political parties in general—can also greatly affect the ability to narrow military prerogatives and restructure military commands without inviting resistance or rebellion. As Crouch emphasizes, one reason the Thai military was able to seize power again in 1991 was that the massive corruption of the civilian politicians had broadly discredited them in the eyes of the public. In Latin America, weakened and discredited presidents have been unable to achieve policy reforms of any kind, including those involving civil-military relations.[31]

Finally, civilian supremacy requires the wisdom and the will to remove the military fully from matters of domestic policy. As Agüero notes, the growing demand for participation in international peacekeeping activities opens up a new, appropriate mission for the armed forces. But the growing pressure on Latin American militaries to go to war against drug production and trafficking takes them in the wrong direction, toward a new involvement in internal security and in the corruption that invariably surrounds the drug trade.

Civil Society

Perhaps no single factor more readily evokes the romance, excitement, and heady possibilities of democracy's third wave than the image of resurgent civil societies mobilizing peacefully to resist, discredit, and ultimately overturn authoritarian rule. Although democratic transitions are typically inaugurated and negotiated by political elites in both the regime and the opposition, civil society has played a crucial role in building pressure for democratic transition and pushing it through to completion. This is an important and sometimes neglected insight of a famous work on democratic transitions by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, reiterated by Schmitter in his contribution to *Themes and Perspectives*.[32] The role of civil society in bringing down authoritarian rule was seminal in the democratic transitions in East Central Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, as Aleksander Smolar and E. Gyimah-Boadi show here. Social movements and organizations were also among the leading forces behind democratization in South Korea and Taiwan, as Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Hagen Koo explain. Yet as all these contributors emphasize, the democratic spirit and capacity of civil society may decline precipitously after the transition.

Civil society—the realm of organized intermediary groups that are voluntary, self-generating, independent of the state and the family, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules—may contribute to democratic consolidation in numerous ways: by stabilizing expectations and social bargaining, generating a more civic normative environment, bringing actors closer to the political process, reducing the burdens of governance, and checking potential abuses of power. Yet as Schmitter

notes, civil society can also impede consolidation by making political majorities more difficult to form, exacerbating ethnic divisions and pork-barrel politics, and entrenching socioeconomic biases in the distribution of influence. Civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation only if other institutions are also favorable, and if actors in civil society behave in a "civil" way, respecting the law and other social and political actors while accepting and not seeking to usurp or conquer democratic political authority.

Viewing democracy as a composite of "partial regimes," Schmitter is particularly concerned with the *way* in which the interests of various social groups are politically articulated and represented, and how their conflicts with one another and with the state are resolved. A key dimension is the degree to which interest associations have encompassing scope, strategic capacity, and broad authority to speak and bargain for an entire class or sector. Civil society will tend to advance democratic consolidation more under such corporatist arrangements, he believes, than under pluralist ones, "where a great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and overlapping organizations emerge with close dependencies upon their members or interlocutors."

A key post-transition dilemma, Schmitter notes, is that the "primacy" of social movements and other democratizing civil society actors inevitably declines after the transition, as the authoritarian state disappears, political parties and more established interest groups take center stage, and people turn to more private concerns. Civil society must adapt after the transition, writes Smolar of postcommunist Europe, because "revolutionary civil society is by definition a transient phenomenon, even though it remains deeply embedded in the minds of its participants as a myth and an ideal." As McFaul's chapter on Russia also shows, democratic adaptation is especially difficult for postcommunist civil societies, because the all-encompassing nature of state control over (and penetration of) society under communism precludes the smoother passage from authoritarian state corporatism to democratic societal corporatism that has occurred in Southern Europe and is now in progress in Taiwan.

What has followed the democratic revolutions in East Central Europe, Russia, and Africa has not been adaptation so much as retreat and dissipation of civic energy. The broad fronts of religious, professional, student, labor, and other associations broke up once their common goal of bringing down a despised regime had been achieved. Class and ethnic divisions once again fragmented society, and the leadership ranks (and thus operational capacities) of civil society organizations were rapidly depleted as activists were drawn into politics, government, or business. The social inheritances of communism in Europe and neopatrimonial statism in Africa also reasserted themselves in the forms of renewed dependence on the state, co-optation, mistrust, and societal atomization,

revealing the paucity of social capital and, in Smolar's words, "the lack of a culture of free collective activity." In fact, "preliberal," illiberal, and uncivic cultural orientations constitute a major obstacle to democratic consolidation in much of Africa and the postcommunist world. In both regions as well, civil society has been further hampered after the transition by the harsh economic conditions of the 1990s, which have driven people to preoccupation with the exigencies of daily survival, and have rendered African associations in particular much more vulnerable to the compromising blandishments of domineering states.

A rich, dense, vibrant, institutionalized, and highly "civic" civil society is not strictly necessary for democratic consolidation, but democracy will be more likely to achieve consolidation, and will undoubtedly be of higher quality, to the extent that such a society emerges. Thus in a great many third wave democracies, and especially in Africa and the postcommunist world, a great task of social construction and civic empowerment lies ahead. Precisely because of the financial and political weakness of civil society in these countries, direct international assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the cooperative linkages that Schmitter terms "transnational civil society" loom increasingly large in the quest for democratic consolidation. Such international support and linkages have been especially important in encouraging new types of NGOs (and critical media) that seek to reform and deepen democracy as they "foster group and individual autonomy from the state," in Gyimah-Boadi's words. This underscores the importance of the types of initiatives Michael Pinto-Duschinsky discusses in his contribution to *Regional Challenges*.

Socioeconomic Development

The contributors to this collection are more or less unified in rejecting structurally deterministic explanations of democratic consolidation and persistence. Democratic consolidation is largely a matter of political crafting, the design and maturation of political institutions, and the spread of democratic norms and values. The opportunity for democratic development and consolidation is not ruled out for any country, however poor. Yet the comprehensive statistical analysis of Adam Przeworski and his colleagues does show the powerful impact of economic development and economic performance.

Like O'Donnell, Przeworski and colleagues diverge from the consensus that consolidation is a discernible process and a useful concept. Because older democracies (when economic development is controlled for) do not enjoy any immunity against democratic breakdown, they conclude that consolidation is "an empty term" and that it is more useful simply to examine "what makes democracies endure."[33] Their findings are striking. Confirming the classic thesis of Seymour

Martin Lipset, they demonstrate a strongly positive relationship between the affluence of a nation and the likelihood of democratic persistence. During the period of their study (1950–90) democracy (understood simply as electoral democracy) had a 12 percent chance of breakdown in any given year among the lowest-income countries. The expected life of democracy increases with per-capita income up to the highest income level of over $6,000 (in 1985 purchasing-power-parity U.S. dollars). At that level of affluence—now exceeded not only by Spain, Portugal, and Greece, but by South Korea and Taiwan (and probably Argentina and Chile) as well—"democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever."

In less affluent countries, and especially in the poorest ones, annual economic performance becomes critical. Democracies are significantly more likely to persist when they experience real economic growth (especially rapid growth, in excess of 5 percent annually). High inflation—above 30 percent annually—is also toxic to democracy (though moderate inflation is associated with somewhat improved prospects for democratic survival). And, despite the scantiness of data on inequality, Przeworski and colleagues find that democracy is much more likely to endure in countries where income inequality declines over time than where it increases. It appears that the ability to meet popular expectations for better income distribution improves the prospects for democracy.

One major way that socioeconomic development has been thought to increase the likelihood and stability of democracy is through changes in the class structure. From Aristotle to Lipset, a large middle class has been considered conducive to political moderation and democracy. Major historical analyses of class actors have pointed either to the bourgeoisie or to the organized working class as the driving force behind democratization.[34] Hsiao and Koo show instead the need for a more disaggregated class analysis. In the cases of South Korea and, especially, Taiwan, the most important social force for democratization has been the "new middle class" of professional, technical, and white-collar workers and especially its intellectual elements (writers, professors, journalists, lawyers, religious leaders, and so on). Organized labor played an important role as well, but—especially in South Korea, where it was very strong—this role cut both ways, provoking a conservative reaction when labor mobilization became too intense. The "old middle class" of small entrepreneurs and the self-employed was less active on behalf of democracy, and has been more inclined (again, especially in Korea) to support the status quo. As the quest for democratic consolidation unfolds in each country, it is the middle class in general and its professional and intellectual elements in particular that are leading civil society movements for democratic deepening and reform. Their economic, political, and demographic weight in the body politic—the product of three

decades of rapid economic development—is one of the most important positive factors for democratic consolidation in these two very promising East Asian third wave democracies.

In Diamandouros's analysis of the three success stories of Southern Europe, we find an important additional reason why socioeconomic development facilitates democratic consolidation. Rapid economic development (particularly in Spain and Greece) in the two decades before 1975 transformed not only social structures but values as well. As these societies became more secularized and educated, and as class, gender, and urban-rural inequalities attenuated, values and belief systems became more "open-ended and positive-sum," more flexible, moderate, conciliatory, and tolerant of different interests. This in turn facilitated an essential feature of consolidated and stable democracy, the predominance "of dialogue and compromise in the daily practices, tactics, and strategies of both individual and collective actors." Here again we see the centrality of change in political culture to the consolidation of democracy.

International Factors

One of the distinguishing features of the third wave of democratization has been the salience of international influences. As Huntington emphasizes in *The Third Wave*, international and especially regional demonstration effects played a crucial role in stimulating and providing models for subsequent democratic transitions. No less influential were a variety of more tangible international pressures and inducements, including the growth of governmental and nongovernmental forms of assistance to democratic actors, and the increasing emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in the foreign policies of established democracies, especially the United States. As Diamandouros shows, regional and international assistance efforts (especially through the West German party foundations) were particularly crucial in bolstering democratic forces in Portugal during the first 18 months after the April 1974 revolution, when the authoritarian Left threatened to prevail.

International factors also figure as never before in the quest to consolidate the third wave democracies, as the two concluding chapters of *Regional Challenges* make clear. Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-in Moon explore how regional and international factors fueled the transitions and now shape the prospects and challenges for consolidation in two of the third wave's more externally threatened new democracies, South Korea and Taiwan. With the reunification of Germany, these two democracies are now unique in their status as divided countries, facing threats to their very existence from communist regimes of the same nationality that claim sovereignty over them. It is only on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait that the Cold War continues. The

resulting threats to the national security of the two democracies have slowed efforts to democratize civil-military relations and to dismantle the vestiges of authoritarian national-security laws and structures. At the same time, the quest for international legitimacy and Western (especially U.S.) support has driven forward the process of democratization in many other respects, including most recently Taiwan's presidential elections in 1996. As Chu, Hu, and Moon stress, the dilemma is particularly acute for Taiwan, given mainland China's economic dynamism and substantially greater size and power. Yet precisely because Taiwan is so threatened—and by one of the world's most authoritarian states—democracy has become a resource and a legitimating symbol in its quest for an accepted place in world affairs, and democratic procedures have forged a growing pragmatic consensus on the national-identity question that is beginning to bridge the old divides.[35]

Chu, Hu, and Moon also show how the export dependence of Korea and Taiwan has pushed political development in a democratic direction. Closer economic and political integration with the advanced industrial democracies—which has become an ever more valued goal as Korea and Taiwan have crossed the threshold of national affluence themselves, and have grown culturally closer to the democratic West—will become virtually impossible if these two countries cannot implement and maintain democratic systems. At the same time, however, middle classes aware of the need for socioeconomic stability to maintain international competitiveness have not been sympathetic to militant mobilization by labor and other organized groups. Thus the high degree of involvement in the world economy also generates a bias for stability and moderation that tends to limit the potential for polarizing conflict over socioeconomic issues (to which South Korea, with its strong labor unions and "hyperactive" civil society, is particularly prone).

At somewhat earlier stages of their development, Korea and Taiwan also benefited from various forms of private and semipublic assistance to their nascent civil societies. As Pinto-Duschinsky shows in the final chapter of *Regional Challenges*, such democracy-promotion efforts have expanded dramatically in scope and scale during the third wave and now constitute an important factor in democratic consolidation, even though their impact is difficult to measure precisely and their effects can only complement and reinforce favorable domestic factors. Following the model of the West German party foundations—which since the early 1960s have received public funding to support democratic parties, trade unions, and civic activities around the world—the United States and seven additional European countries have by now established party foundations to promote democracy abroad using public funds. In a few countries, these efforts are part of a larger program of nongovernmental but publicly funded assistance, as exemplified by the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, created in 1983. The growing international-

ization of democracy-building efforts has had numerous other institutional manifestations discussed by Pinto-Duschinsky: the redirection of many official development-assistance agencies toward goals and programs concerned with democracy, human rights, and "good governance"; increasingly explicit conditionality of official aid on standards of human rights and democracy; an expanding architecture of formal declarations and conventions entrenching international standards of democracy and human rights; and growing involvement of the United Nations and various regional bodies (such as the European Union, the Commonwealth, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of American States) in election monitoring and other forms of democratic assistance, especially to transitional regimes.

These external influences have probably contributed greatly to the scope and dynamism of the third wave. As Pinto-Duschinsky cautions, however, excessive zeal, inflated ambitions, and "unwise triumphalism" can undermine the effectiveness of democratic-assistance programs. If such programs are to work, he argues, they must have circumscribed goals that are consistently pursued. At the same time, they cannot rest content with the role of midwife in the birth of a new electoral democracy, but must address with equal vigor problems of human rights and democratic governance after the transition. They need to share and disseminate information about their activities and coordinate their programs and strategies more effectively. And they need to appreciate the inherent uncertainties of trying to foster democratic institutions. As Pinto-Duschinsky states, "Democracy promotion should be a process of sowing a considerable number of seeds in the hope that a small proportion of them will take root."

Democratic Consolidation: Progress and Prospects

The third wave democracies examined in this study display considerable variety in their progress toward consolidation, and in the factors that have inclined them toward or away from it. As Diamandouros shows, Southern Europe represents the most unambiguous (and rapid) instance of democratic consolidation in the third wave. Many of the factors that facilitated consolidation in the three Southern European cases have been noted above: the preceding decades of rapid development, the consequent transformation of class structure and values, the lack of highly politicized militaries, the favorable regional context, and timely international assistance. In addition, Diamandouros calls attention to the nature of the transition itself and the vital role of political leadership. Democratic consolidation in Spain and Greece was facilitated by the absence of extensive mass mobilization and violence during the transition. In Spain it was also helped by the centrality of elite

negotiations in the transition, and, in Greece, by the weakness of the military as it withdrew from power. The more violent and revolutionary nature of the Portuguese transition "severely complicated democratization . . . and significantly retarded the advent of consolidation."[36] In contrast to most postcommunist regimes (especially in the former Soviet Union), the emergence of limited political and social pluralism in the later, softer phase of the Spanish dictatorship helped (as in Taiwan) make for a less disruptive and conflictual transition to democracy. Political learning from the mistakes of previous democratic attempts, and resurrection of their positive legacies and memories, enabled political actors to adjust more quickly and effectively to the give-and-take of democratic politics. Finally, in all three Southern European cases, democratic consolidation was clearly advanced by the "vision and tactical acumen" of strong, democratically committed leaders like Mário Soares, Adolfo Suárez, and Constantine Karamanlis.

In many respects, the Russian case stands as a mirror image of the Southern European ones. As McFaul shows, Russia inherited at its rebirth as a state in 1991 a sweeping array of "major impediments to democratic consolidation from the Soviet era, including an ambiguous set of constitutional rules, a weak state, a collapsing economy, a lack of political parties, and virtually no rule of law." Almost every aspect of the political and economic system—including the territorial boundaries and federal structure of the Russian state—remained to be defined or transformed. In addition, Russia's sharply confrontational and revolutionary mode of transition generated acute polarization and uncertainty, with "many of the rules of the game ambiguous, uncodified, and subject to constant manipulation." In contrast to Portugal, political-leadership choices in Russia—particularly President Boris Yeltsin's fateful decision to defer constitutional reform and founding elections—further confounded these inherited problems. Only with the adoption of a new constitution in 1993 and the subsequent holding of legislative, presidential, and then regional elections has the political framework of democracy begun to gel. As McFaul emphasizes, the new constitutional structure is flawed in important respects, but it at least clarifies institutional powers and provides a framework in which elections can become institutionalized and parties can begin to take shape. Thus while democracy remains endangered, Russia may now have a chance to make progress toward consolidation if it can meet the other challenges that McFaul identifies: building a state that can control crime and corruption while generating new social classes and civil society organizations that are independent of the state and capable of articulating and aggregating their interests. These tasks require further progress in market reforms to create the economic foundations for a modern system of interests and interest intermediation. But all of this hinges, finally, on the establishment of a "rule-of-law state."

The picture that Boeninger paints locates Latin America's new democracies somewhere between the extremes of Southern Europe's rapid consolidation and Russia's torturous path. Progress toward democratic consolidation has been tentative and uneven in Latin America (with the exception of Uruguay and, to some extent, Chile, where the reserved powers of the military now seem the chief obstacle). As O'Donnell also emphasizes in his contribution to *Themes and Perspectives*, Latin America's renewed democracies have persisted for well over a decade now, and they have at least institutionalized the principle of electoral competition for power. This is rather limited progress, Boeninger concedes, but for countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay, it is nevertheless a historic breakthrough. Throughout Latin America, polarization has eased greatly and political culture has been transformed as the Left has recognized the necessity of democracy's political procedures and more or less resigned itself to capitalism. Economic culture has also changed profoundly in other ways, as free-spending populism has been discredited, privatization programs (and other liberalizing reforms) have gained momentum in many countries, and all sectors have come to appreciate the necessity of permanently controlling inflation. Militaries remain powerful in many countries, but in most cases—even in Chile—their prerogatives have been reduced.[37] And U.S. policy and the entire regional context have never been more favorable. As a result of these sweeping and probably enduring changes, Boeninger concludes, Latin America's prospects for democracy and development "look indisputably better than ever before."

Yet democracy is far from complete—much less secure—in the Americas. Three diffuse challenges lie ahead; they can be effectively addressed only through far more extensive reforms. At bottom lie the interrelated economic and social challenges. No region touched by the third wave has more massive and embedded social and economic inequalities. And while economic growth has been rekindled in most Latin American countries, it is still typically far from producing the level of prosperity of, say, Southern Europe. Thus much remains to be done to improve social equity and the structural foundations of economic growth. As the East Asian miracles have taught, the two are not unrelated: raising the level of human capital, especially through expanding mass access to high-quality education, extending social insurance (especially through social-security reform), and expanding the tax base are clear imperatives for growth and equity. These will in turn entrench the fragile and fraying social consensus around market-oriented policies. Yet economic and social progress in turn require major reforms of political institutions. Most Latin American party systems need to become less fragmented and more institutionalized. Boeninger believes that higher electoral thresholds (of at least 5 percent) or even more majoritarian electoral systems would help, as would simultaneous election of

presidents and parliaments and public financing of election campaigns. Further devolution of power to state and local government and the private (or nonprofit) sector is also called for, but Boeninger warns of the corruption and fiscal chaos that can result when power is devolved hastily and excessively, as with Brazil's "regional feudalism." Moreover, the state needs to be reformed in many other ways, through comprehensive modernization and professionalization of judicial systems, greater autonomy for legislatures, stronger central banks, greater technical competence in macroeconomic management, and institutionalized mechanisms of the kind that the administration of Patricio Aylwin implemented in Chile for consultation among government leaders, party and legislative leaders, and top-level economic technocrats. The key, stresses Boeninger, is to accelerate the pace of state-building and institutional reform.

Positive trends may be discerned in East Asia as well, but, again, progress toward democratic consolidation has been tentative and mixed. Among the four third wave democracies that Cotton examines (the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), only the Philippine regime failed to inherit a dynamic economy and a strong state bureaucracy. Yet it has the benefit of a more substantial prior democratic history than the other three regimes have. While problems of inequality are significant in the Philippines and to a lesser extent in Thailand (and are growing in Taiwan), the key challenges are political and institutional. As Cotton stresses, a distinctive feature of East Asian democracies is the weakness of political opposition. All four regimes may be considered at least electoral democracies, but democracy is "contained" by the dominance of ruling parties and by controls on civil society and the mass media. The Philippines and Thailand have more competitive party systems, but they are fragmented to a degree that renders political opposition a rather fluid and shallow phenomenon. Moreover, personalism, clientelism, vote buying, and scant linkages of parties to issues and organized interests contribute to the weak, inchoate character of party systems, which are dominated in all four regimes by "money politics." Only in Taiwan are parties substantially defined, and, as Hung-mao Tien shows (as does Huang in *Themes and Perspectives*), its party system is still evolving. Democracy in East Asia requires political and institutional reforms to strengthen parties, streamline party systems, and reduce the role of money in politics. Prospects for consolidation appear brightest in Korea and Taiwan, given their economic dynamism and recent political reforms aimed at controlling corruption and increasing judicial independence. But political liberalization must go further to dismantle the legal architecture of the national-security state and provide more space for dissent and independent organization. If the reform process continues and democracy survives without interruption, political parties seem likely to develop institutional strength, and electoral politics to become more competitive.

For Cotton, the weakness of political opposition and constraints on democracy prevalent in East and Southeast Asia derive in large part from the collectivist, elitist, and uncompromising features of "Asian values" (whether of Confucian or other origin). But this interpretation—which has been more forcefully asserted by some Asian political leaders, and accepted by many intellectuals in both Asia and the West—is largely rejected by other contributors to this study, including the elected political leaders on Taiwan. In *Regional Challenges*, the president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, notes the considerable political pluralism and freedom that have emerged in Taiwan during its gradual and peaceful political transformation. Independent observers agree: Taiwan is now counted among the 40 percent of the world's regimes that Freedom House rates as "free." Rather than viewing Taiwan's Confucian cultural heritage as an obstacle to democracy, President Lee identifies its significant continuities with basic democratic principles. These include benevolent (rather than corrupt and abusive) governance and responsiveness to the will of the people—and thus popular sovereignty. He argues that classical Chinese civilization, untainted by the monarchical politics of later centuries, can actually be a resource and inspiration for the development of democracy.

The compatibility of democracy and Confucian culture is echoed here by the vice-president of the ROC, Lien Chan. Stressing the widespread support for democracy among the Taiwanese people, Lien suggests that the "experience with democratic reform in Taiwan could be called a Confucian cultural renaissance, in that it involves remolding and refining an ancient Oriental civilization, while extending Western thought and institutions." Ying-shih Yü takes a similar approach in rebutting the culturalist argument that Confucianism limits democracy in Asia: "Confucian education often inculcated in the minds of the young a sense of justice, social responsibility, human equality, and the well-being of people, which are some of the closest Confucian equivalents to Western civic virtues. It was this Confucian public-spiritedness that disposed many Chinese intellectuals [such as Sun Yat-sen] to Western democratic ideas at the turn of the century."

Neither of our case studies of Taiwan, by Hung-mao Tien and Thomas B. Gold, views traditional political culture as a significant obstacle to democratic consolidation. Gold does see in Confucian Chinese cultural traditions a largely unfavorable legacy, featuring a "zero-sum, moralistic view of political disagreements," a heavy stress on "obedience to distant authority," and suspicion of autonomous organizations. But these cultural constraints on democracy have been heavily eroded by the breathtaking pace of socioeconomic development, which has produced a host of more powerful favorable conditions: widespread affluence, relatively low inequality, growing opportunities for women, high educational levels, increasing political sophistication, a greater

disposition to compromise, a burgeoning civil society full of issue-based movements and think tanks, and a flourishing pluralism in the mass media. The latter trends have been further facilitated by the liberalizing reforms of political leaders such as presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, who have transcended cultural traditions to embrace accommodation and initiate reform at decisive moments in the country's political evolution.

As Tien demonstrates, the obstacles to democratic consolidation in Taiwan are primarily institutional and geopolitical in nature: the extensive vestiges of the KMT's longtime hegemony over politics, society, the military, and even the economy; the profoundly contrasting visions of national identity and the related ethnic divisions between "mainlanders" and "native Taiwanese"; the continuing threat of force from the People's Republic of China (PRC); the factionalism and the increasingly large role of money in party and electoral politics; and the long shadow that the party and state have cast over civil society. Yet each of these factors contains or is balanced by positive elements. The KMT's unquestioned dominance permitted a gradual and elite-centered mode of transition that fostered stability and the growth of democratic practices and norms. The impressive degree of negotiation and consensus-building underlying this transition is detailed here by one of its key architects, James C.Y. Soong. The threat of aggression—which surfaced anew with the PRC's offshore firing of missiles in the preludes to the 1995 and 1996 elections—has fostered moderation on the national-identity question, undermining support for advocates of both overt independence and near-term reunification. The political disenfranchisement of trade unionism has weakened civil society but checked an important source of political instability and economic vulnerability (as seen in Korea). And, for all its problems, factionalism did generate a new splinter party from the KMT that has helped to produce a more competitive and less polarized party system, as well as a legislature that is more independent of the government.

Taiwan's 1996 presidential election—by all accounts a victory for the democratic process and for the political center on the national-identity question—marked an important step on the road to democratic consolidation. Completing that journey will require, as in so many other third wave democracies, further institutional reforms to modernize political structures, alter the electoral system, control organized crime and its infiltration of electoral politics, and complete the extrication of the ruling party from the state, society, and economy. Even with such reforms, consolidation may not be clearly achieved until control of government passes smoothly to the political opposition through the electoral process. Yet in such key respects as its economic prosperity, sizeable middle class, favorable mode of transition, civilian supremacy over the military, pragmatic and competitive politics, and visionary national leadership,

Taiwan now bears a striking resemblance to the Southern European cases of successful consolidation. Clearly, these parallels augur well for its prospects for consolidation. Yet, more than any other third wave democracy, Taiwan finds its political future still clouded by the escalating power and increasingly unpredictable behavior of the authoritarian colossus on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.

A Fourth Wave?

Even if the third wave is drawing to a close, a democratic recession is not inevitable. The chapters in these two volumes paint a sober but largely hopeful picture of the prospects for consolidating the extraordinary democratic gains of the past two decades. Some new democracies are clearly entrenched, and many more (especially in East Asia and Latin America) should achieve consolidation soon as long as the necessary institutional changes and growth-inducing economic reforms are implemented. If the democratic expansion of the third wave is deepened and secured in this way, the first decades of the next century could bring a political reality that seemed virtually unimaginable just a decade ago: a world composed mainly of stable democracies.

But "mainly" would still refer to states rather than population. According to Freedom House at the start of 1997, 40 percent of the world's people still live in the most authoritarian class of regimes: "not free." And half of these 2.2 billion people live in one country: mainland China. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, no other country's politics will more heavily determine the scope for democratic expansion in the world. If a "third reverse wave" does not ensue but is instead preempted by widespread democratic consolidation, the development of a fourth wave of global democratization will hinge primarily on events in one country: China.

Is the democratization of China a wildly distant and implausible dream? In the years of political freeze that have followed the June 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square, the conventional assumption has been yes. But in *Regional Challenges* Minxin Pei and Andrew J. Nathan give us empirical grounds for questioning that assumption. Ying-shih Yü stresses the shallow and very tentative nature of the trends Pei and Nathan identify. Still, the latter two show that political liberalization has at least begun, and that thinking about political reform in China has advanced significantly.

The kinds of incremental and endogenous institutional changes that initiated regime opening in other East Asian autocracies (notably Taiwan) are now taking place in China (and, to different degrees, in Indonesia and Vietnam as well), Pei argues. A system of law is gradually taking shape to buttress economic reform, protect property rights, and constrain the arbitrary power of the state. The community of

private legal practitioners is growing in size and becoming more assertive. Both the National People's Congress (NPC) and the local people's congresses are exhibiting more autonomy and initiative. Power is becoming more decentralized in "a nascent federalist structure," allowing economic and political reforms to advance more rapidly in some regions and then diffuse to others. A growing number of villages are experimenting with direct and sometimes vigorously competitive elections. A key part of the Chinese Communist Party's structure of domination—its grassroots organizations in the countryside—is crumbling, while peasant political awareness and activism mount. In addition to these political changes, China's rapid economic development and integration with its Asian neighbors are producing a more sophisticated, open, secular, and aware society, as David S.G. Goodman observes here.[38] China's political reforms have been modest to date and carry risks, not least of which is the danger, in Pei's words, of "an accelerating crisis of governability" if the old system collapses "before the new institutions take root." Thus, Pei warns, China's leaders in the post–Deng Xiaoping era are in a race against time.

A key imperative, writes Pei, is for China to adopt a new constitutional framework to codify and clarify the evolving boundaries of political authority. This, argues Nathan, is not a far-fetched prospect. He notes numerous calls for constitutional revitalization and reform under Deng, and a growing need of Communist Party leaders to "limit government by law" for two reasons: to reinforce their sagging popular legitimacy and to "institutionalize power relations among agencies and levels of the vast party-state." Gradually, an agenda for "transition from lawlessness to constitutionalism" is taking shape, focusing on four broad goals: professionalizing and empowering the NPC while reducing Communist Party authority over it; instituting direct and meaningfully competitive (even possibly multiparty) elections for the national and provincial people's congresses (the two highest levels); establishing a specialized body (perhaps even a constitutional court) to interpret the Constitution and supervise its implementation; and increasing the independence of judges while improving their professional capacity. All of these changes (and others that are being discussed) entail a progressive separation of party and state. Such a program of "constitutionalization" would not make China a democracy, but it would greatly diminish the central obstacle to democratization, the pervasive, Leninist hegemony of the Communist Party.

As communist politicians jockey for power in the post-Deng era, some are likely to promote constitutional reforms in order to advance their own political influence. Elsewhere in the world, precisely such divisions, calculations, and functional needs for regime adaptation have spawned real political liberalization—and ultimately transitions to democracy. Nathan's scenario of an incremental, smooth, regime-led

transition from a Leninist party-state "to a Chinese brand of constitutional democracy" is striking in its parallels with the Taiwan experience. It would be ironic and fitting if what Gold calls "the great imponderable" for Taiwan's democratic consolidation—Beijing's potential for belligerence—were neutralized by the "creeping democratization" of China itself. For the future of democracy and peace in the world, there is no higher long-term priority than to encourage this trend.

NOTES

1. See Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, as reported in the January–February 1975 issue of *Freedom in the World.* Freedom House classified only 39 countries as "free" at the end of 1974; that is a reasonable measure of the number of democracies at the time. Today, there are many political systems that are not "free," or liberal (in the sense of enforcing a rule of law and protecting individual rights) but are nevertheless formally democratic in that they have reasonably open and competitive elections involving multiple political parties. In 1975, however, there were few if any countries that met the latter standard but not the former. The distinction between electoral and liberal democracy is elaborated later in the body of this introduction.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

3. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

4. Larry Diamond, *Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa* (Hoover Institution Essays in Public Policy No. 74) (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), Appendix.

5. On the distinction between liberal and electoral democracy, see Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 20–37.

6. "Free" states are those with an average score of 2.5 or less on the twin Freedom House scales of political rights and civil liberties. Each scale ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free. The methodology of the survey is described in the annual Freedom House publication *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House) and in the January–February issue each year of the Freedom House periodical *Freedom Review* (formerly *Freedom in the World*).

7. See Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 27–28, Tables 2 and 3; and *Freedom Review*, January–February 1997.

8. *Freedom Review*, January–February 1997.

9. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democracy's Future: More Liberal, Preliberal, or Postliberal?" *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995): 17.

10. A classic example was the political crisis in Ecuador in February 1997, when the Congress declared the recently elected president, Abdalá Bucaram, "mentally unstable," and three different officials claimed the presidency. Instead of seizing power, the military persuaded Bucaram to step aside, with the vice-president assuming power briefly, followed by the president of Congress. Similarly, during two other recent political crises—in Guatemala in 1993 following the attempted *autogolpe* ("self-coup") of President Jorge Serrano and in Pakistan in 1996–97 following the ouster (for corruption) of the government of Benazir Bhutto—the military remained on the sidelines and constitutional procedures, however controversial, were observed.

11. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

12. This theoretical perspective on consolidation is elaborated and applied in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Richard Gunther, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

13. Laurence Whitehead, "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations," in Robert Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), 79; on the contributions of civil society in this process, see Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (July 1994): 4–17. In a seminal formulation, Dankwart Rustow gave the name "habituation" to this process, in which contingent and instrumental elite commitments to democracy become rooted in values and beliefs at both the elite and mass levels through the continuous, successful practice of democracy. See his "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 357.

14. For further elaboration of the relationship between political culture and democratic stability, see, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 124–62; J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 236–59; and Larry Diamond, "Political Culture and Democracy," in Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 1–15.

15. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994): 55–69. See also O'Donnell's essay in *Themes and Perspectives.*

16. A seminal discussion of reserved domains appears in J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 64–66. See also Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 10; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Summer 1991): 81; and O'Donnell's essay in *Themes and Perspectives.*

17. Indeed, as Lowenthal observes, even the electoral process has been "marred by gross irregularities" in such formally democratic systems as those of the Dominican Republic and Paraguay. For more comprehensive assessments of the status of democracy in the region and the challenges confronting consolidation, see Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 52–104; and the various essays in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

18. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 210. For their conceptual treatment of the problem, see 3–5 and 207–11. On Chile, see also Felipe Agüero's chapter in *Themes and Perspectives.*

19. Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 28–38.

20. Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 13.

381

21. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South American Comparisons," in Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas*, 41–61, and *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, ch. 6.

22. See the essays in Linz and Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, and particularly Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*.

23. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 1–34; *Political Parties and Democracy* (report of a conference sponsored by the International Forum for Democratic Studies in Washington, D.C., on 18–19 November 1996) (Washington, D.C.: International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1997).

24. See also Leonardo Morlino, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 315–88.

25. Although Tóka finds no evidence among his four cases of a relationship between party-system strength and policy effectiveness, or between support for parties and support for democracy among the populace, other evidence does identify features of the party system (in particular, fragmentation and polarization) as having an important relationship to policy effectiveness. With respect to economic reform, see Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

26. Andreas Schedler, "Under- and Overinstitutionalization: Some Ideal Typical Propositions Concerning New and Old Party Systems" (Working Paper No. 213, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame, Ind., March 1995).

27. On the debate over presidentialism versus parliamentarism, see (in addition to the sources cited by Przeworski et al.) Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pt. 2.

28. Niou and Ordeshook do not differ as sharply from Carey on the structural inducements to party coherence as it may appear at first glance. Carey's concern is for coherence (or integration) among a party's *national* legislators, and among those legislators and their national leadership (or president) outside of parliament. For Niou and Ordeshook, the key issue is vertical autonomy of party branches at subnational levels of power—their freedom to choose their own candidates and craft their own campaigns. Both hypotheses may be right; party coherence may be maximized when different levels of party organization (e.g., state and local branches) have the freedom to choose their own nominees, but, within each level, party officials exercise some top-down control over who those nominees will be. Here again, democratic effectiveness implies a certain balance, in this case between undercentralization and overcentralization.

29. In both Taiwan and South Korea, the legacy of divided nationhood—which poses grave threats to national security—complicates the quest to develop more democratic and institutionalized control over the military. See the essay by Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-in Moon in *Regional Challenges*.

30. With the disastrous decline in the physical and economic conditions of the armed forces in Russia—as military readiness collapses and salaries plummet to below-poverty levels, if they are paid at all—it may seem a wonder that no military coup has been attempted. On the other hand, when military capacity collapses almost entirely, the ability to stage a successful coup may go down with it. On strategies and conditions for democratizing civil-military relations, see Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil*

and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), chs. 6–8; Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 231–53; Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," 86–91; and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

31. In part, this underscores the importance of the design of political institutions. As Agüero notes, where political institutions incline democracy toward fragmentation and stalemate (as in Brazil), structural improvements in civil-military relations are difficult to achieve.

32. See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 48–56.

33. They do acknowledge that consolidation is not "just a matter of time." Indeed, theorists of consolidation, in this study and elsewhere, do not argue that consolidated democracies will last indefinitely, but only that their breakdown (as Linz and Stepan put it here) "would be related not to weaknesses or problems specific to the historic process of democratic consolidation, but to a new dynamic" of insoluble problems and shifts to disloyal or semi-loyal norms and behavior on the part of key political actors. Neither do theorists of consolidation rule out the possibility that unconsolidated democracies may persist for some time, but usually in a state of lower-quality democracy.

34. See, respectively, Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966); and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

35. In fact, as party politics and democratic elections gather momentum, a new line of cleavage relating to the issue of socioeconomic justice is beginning to cross-cut and soften the longstanding national-policy divide of reunification versus independence and the once-polarizing ethnic divide of mainlander versus Taiwanese. On this important trend, see Tse-min Lin, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis," *World Politics* 48 (July 1996): 453–81.

36. For seminal statements of the relationship between the mode of transition and the subsequent nature and stability of democracy, see Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990): 1–21; and Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 128 (May 1991): 269–84. Both Diamandouros and Karl and Schmitter recognize that elite-pacted transitions that excessively marginalize mass actors run the risk of generating their own "birth defects" by narrowing the base of democracy.

37. An important step in Chile, Boeninger notes, has been the transfer of domestic-intelligence functions to civilian bodies accountable to the executive. The improvement in civilian control and the declining scope for military coups appear to be part of a broader global trend. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Diamond and Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, 3–12.

38. Goodman sees these various economic, social, and political changes in China as probably leading to a much more controlled and authoritarian form of Asian "democracy," perhaps on the model of Singapore. For a view that sees rising income and educational levels impelling China more strongly toward democracy in the next quarter-century, see Henry S. Rowen, "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," *The National Interest* 45 (Fall 1996): 61–70.