

**REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL****PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION  
OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME**

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.



5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. This, the eighty-eighth monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to the period from 24 December 2020 to 23 January 2021.

#### **Impact of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19)**

7. As previously reported, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to impact the Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat is maintaining its readiness for deployments, which are being conducted subject to the evolution of the pandemic. The travel restrictions notwithstanding, the Secretariat is continuing its mandated activities related to the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard.

#### **Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1**

8. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:
  - (a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.
  - (b) On 19 January 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its eighty-sixth monthly report (EC-96/P/NAT.4, dated 19 January 2021) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

#### **Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities**

9. As stated in previous reports, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

#### **Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5**

10. The Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) continues its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4, paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, and paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

11. The Secretariat reported to the Council on the activities and outcomes of the twenty-third round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority through a Note by the Director-General entitled “Report on the Work of the Declaration Assessment Team” (EC-95/HP/DG.2, dated 1 October 2020), an Addendum to this Note (EC-95/HP/DG.2/Add.1, dated 18 November 2020), and a further Note by the Director-General entitled “Report on the Work of the Declaration Assessment Team” (EC-95/HP/DG.3, dated 18 November 2020). In these Notes, it was reported that three outstanding issues related to the Syrian National Authority’s initial declaration were closed during these consultations, while 19 issues remained outstanding. One of the 19 outstanding issues pertains to a CWPF declared by the Syrian National Authority as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons. The review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014, including samples, indicates that production and/or weaponisation of chemical warfare nerve agents took place at this CWPF. The Secretariat has therefore requested the Syrian Arab Republic to declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced and/or weaponised at the site in question, in line with the relevant provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”). As at the date of this report, the Secretariat had not yet received a reply to this request from the Syrian National Authority.
12. At this stage, considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The DAT intends to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic in early February 2021 for the next round of consultations.
13. In accordance with paragraph 10 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is continuing to assess conditions for the conduct of inspections at the sites identified by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in its third and fourth reports. In doing so, the Secretariat is taking into account the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.
14. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat conducted the seventh round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) between 8 and 13 November 2020. The samples collected during this deployment were split at the OPCW Laboratory in the presence of a representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and were subsequently sent to designated laboratories for analysis. The outcome of these inspections will be reported to the Council in due course. The conduct of further deployments remains subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.
15. With regard to the finding of a Schedule 2.B.04 chemical that was detected during the third round of inspections at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Secretariat to close this issue.

**Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic**

16. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the OPCW, UNOPS, and the Syrian Arab Republic. This agreement facilitates the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to the full elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to any subsequent decision or resolution of the relevant organs of the OPCW or the United Nations, as well as any bilateral agreements concluded between the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic.
17. As at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

**Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

18. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015 and 23 November 2015, respectively), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the FFM continues to study all available information relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
19. The FFM is continuing its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States Parties with regard to a variety of incidents. Additionally, the FFM is continuing to analyse information collected from its most recent deployments. The conduct of further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. The FFM will report further to the Council on the results of its work in due course.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic**

20. Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018), adopted by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") at its Fourth Special Session, addresses, inter alia, the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
21. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat established the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.
22. The IIT is continuing its investigations, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic, and will issue further reports in due course.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2**

23. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat is monitoring the current security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for this purpose. The conduct of these inspections will also be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Supplementary resources**

24. The Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, which presently include the work of the DAT and the IIT, as well as the biannual inspections of the SSRC and the two sites identified in paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions to this fund stood at EUR 34 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.

**Conclusion**

25. The future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on the work of the FFM; the implementation of Council decisions EC-83/DEC.5 and EC-81/DEC.4, including declaration-related issues; inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah sites of the SSRC; the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3; and the implementation of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.