



**OPCW**

**Executive Council**

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Ninety-Seventh Session  
6 – 9 July 2021

EC-97/CRP.1  
17 May 2021  
Original: ENGLISH

**DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,  
PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION IN 2020**



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## INTRODUCTION

1. The OPCW continued to work under sustained international attention throughout 2020, particularly in relation to its efforts to respond to the use of chemical weapons. Despite restrictions associated with the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, progress continued to be made in destroying the remaining declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. Subject to these restrictions, the Organisation was active in implementing and enhancing industry verification as well as international cooperation and assistance activities. The challenge posed by chemical terrorism, and the broadening and sustaining of the OPCW's education and outreach efforts, continued to be addressed.
2. In the process of the destruction of declared chemical weapons in 2020, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") verified the destruction of 592.142 metric tonnes (MT) of Category 1 chemical weapons.
3. Between entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") and 31 December 2020, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of 69,330.060 MT<sup>1</sup> of declared Category 1 chemical weapons, representing 98.35% of the total amount of declared agent. The remaining possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed, the United States of America, continued to work towards its target date of September 2023 for the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stocks.
4. China and Japan have continued bilateral consultations in relation to the destruction, excavation, and recovery of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. Owing to restrictions related to COVID-19, all inspections regarding abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) were suspended in 2020. The Secretariat, in consultation with relevant States Parties, conducted five inspections concerning old chemical weapons (OCW), while ensuring the health and safety of inspectors and State Party site personnel.
5. The OPCW carried out 82 inspections of industrial facilities in 2020. Sampling and analysis activities were carried out during one Schedule 2 inspection. The reduced number of Article VI inspections resulted from the significant challenges posed by restrictions related to COVID-19.
6. The Secretariat continued the development of the next version of the Electronic Declarations Tool for National Authorities (EDNA)—the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS).
7. Work continued to clarify the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and to address the use of chemical weapons in that country. The Secretariat's efforts in that regard focused in large measure on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") at its Fourth Special Session (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018), including the operation of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) established pursuant to that decision, as well as on implementation of the decision adopted by the Executive Council (hereinafter

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<sup>1</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter "the Verification Annex").

“the Council”) at its Ninety-Fourth Session (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) continued its activities in 2020, guided by the relevant decisions of the Council and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), aimed at resolving outstanding issues identified in relation to the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration and related submissions, continued throughout 2020.

8. In 2020 States Parties implemented the two decisions adopted by the Conference in 2019 (C-24/DEC.4 and C-24/DEC.5, both dated 27 November 2019) to amend Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention (hereinafter “the Annex on Chemicals”).
9. In 2020, despite the operational restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretariat continued to implement capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties’ implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 48 activities and programmes for 1,550 participants from around the world.
10. The full and effective implementation of the Convention continued to underlie the OPCW’s contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. The Council’s Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism focused on strengthening legal frameworks to counter chemical terrorism, and on cooperation with international organisations. Several capacity-building initiatives focused on areas relevant to countering chemical terrorism, such as legislation and chemical security.
11. The three advisory bodies of the OPCW, namely the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF), and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), continued to provide advice to the OPCW according to their respective mandates.
12. Public interest in the work of the OPCW remained strong, despite the COVID-19 restrictions. The OPCW’s social media platforms experienced an average growth rate of 13% in 2020, while the OPCW website was visited by approximately 385,000 users, a 6% increase on 2019. Although in-person visits were suspended in March 2020, the Secretariat adapted its operations by expanding digital outreach using tools such as virtual group visits, live presentations, and a video information initiative.
13. In 2020, the number of States Parties to the Convention remained at 193. Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party during the course of the year.

## 1. VERIFICATION

- 1.1 A summary of the inspections carried out in 2020 is provided in Table 1 below. The OPCW conducted 125 inspections in 2020, of which 35% were related to chemical weapons. Operations connected with non-routine missions accounted for a further 829 inspector days in 2020.

**TABLE 1: INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN 2020**

Type of Facility	Number of Inspections	Number of Facilities or Sites Inspected	Number of Inspector Days
<b>Chemical weapons-related inspections</b>			
CWDF <sup>2</sup>	29	3 <sup>3</sup>	3,798
CWSF <sup>4</sup>	4	2	54
CWPF <sup>5</sup>	5 <sup>6</sup>	5	25
OCW	5	5	47
ACW <sup>7</sup>	0	0	0
Non-routine missions	n/a		829
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4,753</b>
<b>Article VI inspections</b>			
Schedule 1	7	7	189
Schedule 2	16	16	234
Schedule 3	4	4	31
OCPF <sup>8</sup>	55	55	452
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>906</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>5,659</b>

- 1.2 As at 31 December 2020, eight States Parties (a State Party,<sup>9</sup> Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America) had declared a combined total of 72,304.339 MT<sup>10</sup> of Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons, as well as 417,833 items of Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3 to this report.

<sup>2</sup> CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility.

<sup>3</sup> All in the United States of America.

<sup>4</sup> CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

<sup>5</sup> CWPF = chemical weapons production facility.

<sup>6</sup> This includes visits to the five underground structures of CWPFs declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

<sup>7</sup> This includes ACW storage and destruction facilities.

<sup>8</sup> OCPF = other chemical production facility.

<sup>9</sup> As the State Party in question has requested that its name be regarded as highly protected information, for the purposes of this report it is hereinafter referred to as “a State Party”.

<sup>10</sup> This total does not include the weight of the thickening agent declared by the Russian Federation or the remnants of chemical weapons declared by Iraq.

- 1.3 Progress continued with respect to OCW and ACW. States Parties that declared possession of OCW continued to carry out their destruction in a safe and effective manner. China and Japan continued to cooperate in the field of ACW and their destruction, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at its Sixty-Seventh Session (EC-67/DEC.6, dated 15 February 2012). Furthermore, in 2020, China and Japan continued to cooperate on implementing the “Destruction Plan Beyond the Year 2016 for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People’s Republic of China”, submitted to the Council at its Eighty-Fourth Session (EC-84/NAT.6, dated 2 March 2017), which contains updated information on destruction facilities and time frames for destruction.

### **Chemical weapons destruction**

- 1.4 During the reporting period, three CWDFs located in the United States of America were involved in the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons<sup>11</sup> (see Annex 2). Through a combination of the continuous presence of inspectors, the use of monitoring and dedicated recording equipment, as well as the review of relevant documentation, the Secretariat in 2020 verified the destruction of 592.142 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons.
- 1.5 As Annex 3 shows, between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2020, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 69,330.060 MT,<sup>12</sup> or 98.35% of declared Category 1 chemical weapons; 1,810.703 MT, or 100% of declared Category 2 chemical weapons; and 417,833 items, or 100% of declared Category 3 chemical weapons.
- 1.6 In 2020, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 592.142 MT of chemical weapons in the United States of America, the only remaining possessor State Party with declared Category 1 chemical weapons. As at 31 December 2020, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of a total of 26,606.252 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by the United States of America, or 95.81% of its declared stockpile. All of the United States’ Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons had previously been destroyed.
- 1.7 The Secretariat verified the destruction of removed energetics components from the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) at the non-contiguous Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) site at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and the destruction of hydrolysate from the PCAPP at the non-contiguous Veolia treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) at Port Arthur, Texas.
- 1.8 In its detailed annual plan for destruction of chemical weapons for 2021, the United States of America informed the Secretariat that a total of 497.296 MT<sup>13</sup> of Category 1 chemical agent is planned to be destroyed.

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<sup>11</sup> Not counting OCW or ACW, or the CWDF under systemisation in the United States of America (Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) (see Annex 2)).

<sup>12</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex.

<sup>13</sup> The rounding rules have been applied to this quantity.



- 1.9 In addition to those noted above, the United States of America made the following submissions in 2020:
- (a) a letter regarding the measures to be taken for inspections during the COVID-19 pandemic;
  - (b) a detailed facility information (DFI) addendum for the testing and destruction of M417 fuses at the Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF);
  - (c) a revision to addendum 2 to the PCAPP DFI for the Veolia TSDF;
  - (d) addendum 3 to the PCAPP DFI for the three added SDCs;
  - (e) a letter with proposals to conduct the 2020 annual recovered chemical weapons destruction review on 16 and 17 November 2020 at the Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky, using the on-site inspection team from the BGCAPP;
  - (f) amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at the PCAPP;
  - (g) amendments and modifications to the facility agreement for the PCAPP; and
  - (h) two amendments to its initial chemical weapons declaration to revise the Pueblo Chemical Depot CWSF site diagram and building list.
- 1.10 The Secretariat conducted a final engineering review from 19 to 21 October 2020 at the three SDCs newly installed at the PCAPP in Pueblo, Colorado. The PCAPP facility agreement and agreed detailed plan for verification were accordingly amended and modified, and these documents were submitted to the Council for approval.
- 1.11 On 16 and 17 October 2020, the Secretariat conducted an inspection to review the documents related to the destruction of one item recovered and destroyed at the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, and of 30 M417 fuses at the Anniston Army Depot SDC of the PDTDF in 2020. Based on the review of destruction documentation, including video recordings made available by the inspected State Party, the Secretariat confirmed the destruction of the aforementioned items.

### **Chemical weapons storage facilities**

- 1.12 In 2020, the Secretariat conducted four inspections at two CWSFs in the United States of America. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, each inspection was conducted by the inspection teams deployed at the collocated CWDFs. The two CWSFs remained subject to systematic verification.

### **Chemical weapons production facilities**

- 1.13 By 31 December 2020, all 97 CWPFs declared to the OPCW by 14 States Parties had been certified by the Director-General as having been destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (74 had been certified as destroyed and 23 as converted).
- 1.14 In 2020, the five underground structures declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as CWPFs had been destroyed. The Secretariat conducted the final visits to these CWPFs. During the visit, the remote monitoring systems installed at four of the underground structures were dismantled.

### **Abandoned chemical weapons**

- 1.15 As at 31 December 2020, three States Parties had reported ACW on their territory. One State Party, Japan, had reported ACW on the territory of another State Party, China. In 2020, all ACW destruction operations and related activities, such as excavations and recoveries in China, were suspended because of COVID-19 restrictions.
- 1.16 The Secretariat continued to engage, in virtual format, with Japan and China on ACW. The Secretariat was informed that construction projects at the Haerbaling ACW destruction facility had proceeded as planned in 2020, with pandemic-related health and safety measures employed.
- 1.17 As at 31 December 2020, 83,700 items had been declared as ACW to the Secretariat. Of these, 57,701 items of ACW had been destroyed.

### **Old chemical weapons**

- 1.18 As at 31 December 2020, 18 States Parties had declared over 149,300 items of OCW produced either before 1925, or between 1925 and 1946. Approximately 75% of these were reported as destroyed. In 2020, the Secretariat conducted five OCW inspections: in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

### **Changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention**

- 1.19 Following the adoption at the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals, the Secretariat circulated a Note entitled “Guidance for States Parties on Article VI Declaration Obligations and Inspections Following Entry Into Force of Changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention” (S/1821/2019/Rev.1, dated 14 January 2020). The Secretariat further issued an addendum to this guidance (S/1821/2019/Rev.1/Add.1, dated 20 May 2020) in order to assist States Parties with the implementation of changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(g) of Article XV of the Convention, changes to the Annex on Chemicals entered into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of the Director-General’s notification of those changes. In this case, the changes entered into force on 7 June 2020.

### **Challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use**

- 1.20 No challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) under the Convention were requested in 2020. The Secretariat focused on improving its preparedness for IAUs. The Secretariat conducted a remote workshop on this topic with more than 60 participants.

### **OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

- 1.21 A summary update of the activities carried out by the FFM in 2020 was provided in a Note by the Secretariat (S/1922/2020, dated 21 December 2020).
- 1.22 Prior to the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the FFM deployed a number of times in 2020 in order to gather relevant facts. After the introduction of the restrictions, the FFM continued the analysis of all information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic and gathered by the team, while maintaining its readiness to deploy.
- 1.23 In 2020, the FFM issued its final report regarding an investigation into the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Saraqib, the Syrian Arab Republic on 1 August 2016 (S/1901/2020, dated 1 October 2020). According to the conclusion of the report, “[t]he results of the analysis of all available data obtained up until the issuance of this report did not allow the FFM to establish whether or not chemicals were used as a weapon in the incident that took place in Saraqib, in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 August 2016”.
- 1.24 In 2020 the FFM also issued the final report regarding an investigation into the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Aleppo, the Syrian Arab Republic (S/1902/2020, dated 1 October 2020). According to the conclusion of the report, “all the information obtained and analysed, the composite summary of the interviews, and the results of the laboratory analyses did not allow the FFM to establish whether or not chemicals were used as a weapon in the incident that took place in the neighbourhood of Al-Khalidiyah and its surroundings in North-West Aleppo on 24 November 2018”.
- 1.25 In July 2020, the FFM finalised the pilot transfer of FFM material to the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM). The transfer was implemented pursuant to:
- (a) paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, which requires that the Secretariat preserve and provide information to the IIIM, the investigation mechanism established by the United Nations General Assembly through resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations; and
  - (b) the memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the IIIM regarding the provision of access and storage of information, as well as the handling of information and evidence. This transfer also took place in view of the health and safety restrictions related to COVID-19.

### **Declaration Assessment Team**

- 1.26 In 2020, the Secretariat continued its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in order to clarify all identified gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies noted in its initial declaration and related submissions. Owing to the restrictions occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, the DAT conducted one round of consultations during the reporting period, in September 2020.
- 1.27 Through these consultations, the Secretariat generated additional information about all aspects of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The Syrian Arab Republic had, by the end of 2020, submitted a total of 17 amendments to its initial declaration. These amendments contained previously undeclared elements, including: one additional CWPF; four additional chemical weapons research and development facilities; activities involving five previously undeclared chemical warfare agents; a substantial amount of previously undeclared chemical munitions; and other supplementary information about all the segments of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
- 1.28 In October 2020, the Secretariat shared its assessment with the Syrian Arab Republic regarding one CWPF declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons. The review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014, including samples, indicates that production and/or weaponisation of chemical warfare nerve agents took place at this CWPF. Accordingly, the Secretariat requested the Syrian Arab Republic to declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced and/or weaponised at the site in question, in line with the relevant provisions of the Convention.
- 1.29 The Director-General continued to report all unresolved issues regarding the Syrian declaration and related submissions through his Notes circulated to the Council at its Ninety-Third, Ninety-Fourth, and Ninety-Fifth Sessions.<sup>14</sup> In the last Note issued in 2020, the Director-General concluded, as in previous Notes on the matter, that “the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate or complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013)”.

### **Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre**

- 1.30 In accordance with paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016), the Secretariat is to conduct inspections, including sampling and analysis, twice a year at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), and twice a year at the Jamrayah SSRC facilities “on dates to be determined by the Secretariat with full and unfettered access to all buildings at these sites and all rooms within these buildings”.

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<sup>14</sup> EC-93/HP/DG.1 (dated 6 March 2020); EC-94/HP/DG.2 (dated 29 June 2020); EC-95/HP/DG.2 (dated 1 October 2020) and Add.1 (dated 18 November 2020); and EC-95/HP/DG.3 (dated 18 November 2020).

- 1.31 The Secretariat conducted the seventh round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC between 8 and 13 November 2020. As in previous cases, samples were taken for analysis during the inspection.

### **Implementation of Conference Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3**

- 1.32 On 8 April 2020, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled “First Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’, Ltamenah (Syrian Arab Republic), 24, 25, and 30 March 2017” (S/1867/2020, dated 8 April 2020). On the same day, the Director-General and the Coordinator of the IIT introduced the report to States Parties via a recorded video statement. The report was provided to the Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General, for their consideration, in a Note entitled “First Report of the Technical Secretariat Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-94/S/5, dated 8 April 2020).
- 1.33 In the report, the IIT concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
- (a) at approximately 6:00 on 24 March 2017, an Su-22 military airplane belonging to the 50th Brigade of the 22nd Air Division of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Shayrat airbase, dropped an M4000 aerial bomb containing sarin in southern Ltamenah, affecting at least 16 persons.
  - (b) at approximately 15:00 on 25 March 2017, a helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Hama airbase, dropped a cylinder on the Ltamenah hospital; the cylinder broke into the hospital through its roof, ruptured, and released chlorine, affecting at least 30 persons.
  - (c) at approximately 6:00 on 30 March 2017, an Su-22 military airplane belonging to the 50th Brigade of the 22nd Air Division of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Shayrat airbase, dropped an M4000 aerial bomb containing sarin in southern Ltamenah, affecting at least 60 persons.
- 1.34 The conclusions of this report are based on the combination, consistency, and corroboration of the obtained information, after a careful assessment of its probative value through a widely shared methodology in compliance with best practices of international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. In its investigations, the IIT adhered to applicable OPCW procedures, including with respect to chain of custody, supplemented as appropriate.
- 1.35 On 12 May 2020, at the invitation of the Estonian Presidency, the Director-General and the Coordinator of the IIT briefed the United Nations Security Council on the findings of the report via videoconference.
- 1.36 The IIT continues its investigation into several other incidents identified in Annex 2 to the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019).
- 1.37 As previously reported, in exchanges of letters between the Director-General and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab

Republic has indicated its refusal to recognise decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 and to accept any of the implications and effects of the decision. On 3 July 2020, the Director-General sent a further letter to the Deputy Minister, reiterating that cooperation from the Syrian Arab Republic is expected in regard to the decision, and inviting the Syrian authorities to provide the IIT with relevant information.

- 1.38 As laid out in paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat has further put in place appropriate measures to preserve and provide information to the body established by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations. In this regard, the Secretariat has signed a memorandum of understanding with the IIIM regarding the sharing of information with this body. Information related to IIT investigations was transferred from the Secretariat to the IIIM in October and November 2020, and other transfers are being prepared. These transfers have been implemented in a manner consistent with the applicable OPCW rules and policies on confidentiality.
- 1.39 IIT personnel further worked with other units and offices to enhance the forensic and investigative capabilities of the Secretariat in providing States Parties with technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, as decided in paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3.
- 1.40 In 2020, voluntary contributions and pledges to support the IIT's work were received from Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

#### **Technical assistance to a State Party**

- 1.41 At the request of Germany, on 20 August 2020 the Secretariat deployed a team to perform a technical assistance visit (TAV) in relation to the suspected poisoning of a Russian citizen. The TAV was restricted to the collection of biomedical samples. The samples were dispatched to two OPCW designated laboratories. The biomarkers of the cholinesterase inhibitor found in the blood and urine samples were found to have similar structural characteristics to the toxic chemicals belonging to schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15, which were added to the Annex on Chemicals at the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference in November 2019.

#### **Industry verification**

- 1.42 States Parties to the Convention provide declarations related to the production, import, export, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are listed in the three schedules of chemicals contained in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals, as well as declarations related to OCPFs producing discrete organic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Table 2 below provides information about such chemical industry declarations received by the OPCW as at 31 December 2020.

**TABLE 2: DECLARED FACILITIES BY TYPE, AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020**

Type of Facility	Declared Facilities	Facilities Subject to Inspection <sup>15</sup>	States Parties Having Reported Declarable Facilities <sup>16</sup>	States Parties with Facilities Subject to Inspection
Schedule 1	27	27	23	23
Schedule 2	492	212	35	23
Schedule 3	410	353	35	33
OCPF	4,419	4,262	81	80
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,348</b>	<b>4,854</b>	<b>81<sup>17</sup></b>	<b>80<sup>18</sup></b>

1.43 Table 3 below shows that the Secretariat carried out 82 Article VI inspections in 2020. This reduced number, compared to the planned 241 inspections, was a result of the restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. These 82 inspections comprised seven Schedule 1 facilities, 16 Schedule 2 plant sites, four Schedule 3 plant sites, and 55 OCPFs (respectively 26%, 8%, 1%, and 1% of the total of inspectable facilities). No uncertainties were recorded. Eleven inspections resulted in issues requiring further attention, and 55 inspections recommended further information to be provided in declarations. In addition, two inspections were carried out at plant sites that were found during those inspections not to be inspectable, because of declaration errors.

**TABLE 3: ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS**

Number of Article VI Inspections by Year								
2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
219	229	241	241	241	241	241	241	82

1.44 For the OCPF and Schedule 3 sites inspected in 2020, the site selection was performed as described in the “Alternative Approach to Verification at Mixed Plant Sites” (S/1202/2014, dated 23 July 2014). If a Schedule 3 or OCPF mixed plant site has already been inspected under one Article VI verification regime, the plant site is, for the purpose of the random selection of Schedule 3 and OCPF plant sites for inspection, considered as previously inspected. As a result, this plant site should, statistically, be selected for inspection less often.

1.45 In 2020, the Secretariat continued its efforts to maximise the number of sequential inspections as a way of saving resources. Although the overall number of inspections and sequential inspections was greatly reduced in 2020, the percentage of inspections that were part of a sequential mission remained consistent with 2019 at approximately 25%. With the continuation of inter-country sequential inspections in 2020, three of the 20 pairs of sequential inspections shown in Table 4 were carried out in two different countries.

<sup>15</sup> Above the threshold for verification through on-site inspections.

<sup>16</sup> Includes annual declarations on anticipated activities (ADAAs) and annual declarations on past activities (ADPAs).

<sup>17</sup> Eighty-one States Parties declared having at least one Article VI facility.

<sup>18</sup> Eighty States Parties declared having at least one inspectable Article VI facility.

**TABLE 4: SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS**

Number of Sequential Inspections by Year								
2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
48	57	51	59	54	58	58	60	20

- 1.46 In 2020, the Secretariat continued the work of a cross-divisional team to perform a thorough review of inspection practices, inspection report templates, inspection tools, and inspection training to identify further options to optimise the conduct of inspections. The results of this work have been and will continue to be reported to States Parties through the Industry Cluster.
- 1.47 In 2020, sampling and analysis activities were conducted during one Schedule 2 inspection. This inspection occurred before the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic were fully felt. For the remainder of 2020, sampling and analysis activities during Article VI inspections were suspended in order to reduce the burden on National Authorities and plant site personnel, as well as to keep inspection teams as small as possible. The annual numbers of inspections carried out using sampling and analysis are shown in Table 5 below.

**TABLE 5: SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS AT INDUSTRY PLANT SITES**

Number of Inspections Completed with Sampling and Analysis by Year								
2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
9	8	9	11	11	10	9	6	1

### **Declarations**

- 1.48 In 2020, 57 of the 85 States Parties (67%) that submitted ADPAs did so by the deadline imposed by the Convention. In the year under review, 81.3% of the States Parties with declarable OCPFs fully updated the lists of OCPFs in their ADPAs, with the result that 98.61% of declarable OCPFs were updated. By providing full, annual updates to their OCPF lists, States Parties greatly facilitate the operation of the verification regime.
- 1.49 In addition, in 2020 further efforts were made to assist the remaining State Party that had yet to submit its initial declarations under Articles III and VI of the Convention.

### **Transfers of scheduled chemicals**

- 1.50 Fifty transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals were declared by 20 States Parties in their ADPAs for 2019. Forty-seven of these transfers were notified and declared by both the sending and receiving States Parties, two were notified by both but declared by only one State Party, and one was notified and declared by only one State Party.
- 1.51 ADPAs for 2019 indicated that 63 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 11,653 MT of Schedule 2 chemicals, and that 123 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 528,186 MT of Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.52 Seven States Parties declared the export of five Schedule 3 chemicals to two States not Party.



### **Transfer discrepancies**

- 1.53 In 2020, ADPAs for 2019 indicated a total of 1,603 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. Of these, 817 transfers were declared with quantities above the declaration threshold, of which 581 involving 92 States Parties showed discrepancies.
- 1.54 The Secretariat continued to follow up with the States Parties involved and also continued to work closely with other international organisations to support States Parties in the reduction and resolution of these transfer discrepancies.

### **Cooperation with the World Customs Organization**

- 1.55 Within the framework of cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO), the Secretariat initiated the Harmonized System (HS) Project for the identification by customs authorities of the most traded scheduled chemicals under the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. The project allocates unique international six-digit HS codes to the most traded scheduled chemicals, to identify globally traded scheduled chemicals and, ultimately, to ensure complete and accurate trade declarations crucial to the resolution of transfer discrepancies.
- 1.56 The second (currently ongoing) phase of the HS Project focuses on the allocation of unique HS codes to an additional 13 most traded scheduled chemicals in the next edition of the HS nomenclature in 2022. Despite the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the OPCW continued to cooperate closely with the WCO Secretariat in 2020 towards the successful completion of this second phase.

### **Update of OPCW tools for the identification of scheduled chemicals**

- 1.57 In 2020, the Secretariat released an updated version of the Online Scheduled Chemicals Database, which includes eight specific Schedule 1 chemicals that reflect the adopted changes to the Annex on Chemicals.

### **Electronic declarations and the Secure Information Exchange system**

- 1.58 In 2020, the Secretariat continued the development of EDIS, the new electronic declarations platform. The first official version of EDIS was released to States Parties in February 2020. Following the initial release, additional developments have been made, such as the inclusion of the new Schedule 1 chemicals and performance improvements. EDIS will further strengthen the verification regime by bringing usability enhancements and new functions to the declaration preparation and submission process.
- 1.59 The Secretariat continued its efforts to promote the Secure Information Exchange System (SIX), which has been available to States Parties since 2014 (S/1192/2014, dated 1 July 2014). The new SIX web portal was deployed in May 2020, and improves the user-friendliness and security of the system. By the end of the reporting period, 116 users from 60 States Parties had registered to use the system.
- 1.60 In 2020, the Secretariat provided EDIS training as a component of various Article VI-related training activities. In addition, the Secretariat provided on-demand virtual training and consultations on EDIS and SIX to requesting States Parties.

### **Analytics platform and business intelligence**

- 1.61 As part of its ongoing efforts to modernise and improve its analytical capabilities, the Secretariat has continued to work on a new analytics platform, which includes a data warehouse, consolidating the different data sources available in the Verification Division, and a new business intelligence tool (Qlik Sense). Qlik Sense is currently replacing the existing tool (Cognos) by delivering dynamic dashboards and visualisations.

### **Electronic inspections tool**

- 1.62 In 2020, the Secretariat initiated the development of the electronic inspections tool, which is a joint effort between the Verification and Inspectorate Divisions. Subject to consultations with States Parties, this project will allow inspectors to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of Article VI verification. Strengthening implementation will be achieved by means of structured data flows between inspectors and the Verification Information System (VIS). The initial phase of this project focuses on OCPF inspections.

### **Verification Information System**

- 1.63 The Secretariat completed the preparatory work for the modernisation of the VIS in 2020. The objective of this project is to develop a new version of the existing system, based on modern architecture and using the most recent technological platform. The new platform will allow the implementation of user requirements that are not possible in the legacy platform.

### **Riot control agents**

- 1.64 At the end of the reporting period, 138 States Parties had declared the possession of riot control agents (mainly tear gases), and 52 States Parties had declared that they do not possess such agents. One State Party had not yet provided an initial declaration, and two other States Parties had not provided information on riot control agents in their initial declarations. Accordingly, reconciliation letters were once again sent in 2020 in this connection. Additional information on the possession of riot control agents is provided in Annex 4 to this report.

### **Informal consultations**

- 1.65 Three informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections (Industry Cluster consultations) were conducted in 2020. Owing to the restrictions occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, meetings were held virtually. States Parties undertook consultations on a number of verification-related topics, including:
- (a) summary of industry verification in 2019;
  - (b) performance of the methodology for the selection of OCPF plant sites for inspection in 2019;
  - (c) Schedule 2 inspections;

- (d) guidance for States Parties on Article VI declarations obligations and inspections following entry into force of changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals;
- (e) enhancing Article VI implementation;
- (f) preparations to resume Article VI inspections; and
- (g) resumption of Article VI inspections.

### **OPCW proficiency tests and designated laboratories**

- 1.66 Each year, the OPCW carries out proficiency tests for institutions that wish to be a part of the OPCW's network of analytical laboratories. The reporting period saw the completion of the forty-sixth, the holding of the forty-seventh, and the start of the forty-eighth official OPCW proficiency tests for environmental analysis. Additionally, the fifth proficiency test for biomedical sample analysis was conducted. At the end of the reporting period, 21 laboratories from 18 Member States had been designated for environmental analysis (five of which had had their designation temporarily suspended), and 18 laboratories from 13 Member States had been designated for biomedical sample analysis. Annex 5 to this report shows the status of each designated laboratory as at 31 December 2020.
- 1.67 A confidence-building exercise for the analysis of biologically derived toxins was finished at the beginning of 2020, and a fifth exercise began in December 2020. These exercises were specifically targeted at the analysis of the protein toxin ricin. The biological toxin saxitoxin was included in the third exercise.

### **Project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology**

- 1.68 In 2020, significant progress was made in the project to build a Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre). The draft, preliminary, final, and technical designs were completed in 2020. The application for the construction permit was submitted in October 2020 to the Municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp, which is the permitting authority for the project, resulting in the granting of the revocable construction permit in December 2020. The preselection phase for the main construction tender was completed in August 2020, and the selection phase started in October 2020. The preselection phase for the security tender was completed in November 2020. During the reporting period, approximately EUR 4.2 million was pledged or provided to the project. As at the end of 2020, a total of EUR 33.4 million had been raised from 46 countries, the European Union, and other donors.
- 1.69 A regular update on project progress was provided in Notes S/1859/2020\* (dated 9 March 2020), S/1881/2020 (dated 30 June 2020), and S/1912/2020 (dated 16 November 2020), all entitled "Progress in the Project to Upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology". Briefings were provided to States Parties on multiple occasions, including a pre-recorded briefing in April 2020 to present the preliminary design. The Secretariat has continued with other communication and outreach activities related to the project. These include the updating of the ChemTech Centre webpage on the OPCW website, the production and display at OPCW Headquarters of the donor wall and a physical model of the

ChemTech Centre, the production and sharing on the ChemTech Centre webpage of a 3D virtual reality tour video, and a brochure on the ChemTech Centre's final design.

### OPCW Central Analytical Database

- 1.70 Table 6 below reflects the number of chemicals covered in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) for each technique for the last five years. Only the gas chromatography (retention index) and mass spectrometry data were used in on-site analysis.

**TABLE 6: NUMBER OF CHEMICAL SPECIES IN THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE**

Status at the Beginning of	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Infrared (IR)	726	734	734	745	756	775	775
Gas chromatography (retention index) (GC(RI))	3,740	3,866	3,878	4,089	4,439	4,482	4,543
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)	n/a	298	298	298	298	299	300
Mass spectrometry (MS)	3,898	4,003	4,022	4,225	4,566	4,602	4,647
Tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	38

### Training provided by the Inspectorate Division

- 1.71 In 2020, the Capacity-Building and Contingency-Planning Cell (CBCP) coordinated or delivered 1,227 training days. The training programme comprised 31 individual training courses offered over 47 calendar weeks of training. Half of the training courses in 2020 were delivered online, with the remainder conducted in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The United States of America assisted in the delivery of Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) training courses online. The CBCP also continued to provide the mandatory inspector refresher courses to keep inspectors abreast of technological and verification policy developments, as well as refresher courses on the use of protective equipment and on the OPCW confidentiality regime. An induction training course for inspectors, newly promoted as inspection team leaders, was also conducted.
- 1.72 The new group of inspectors (Group S) underwent a 14-week mandatory initial training programme. Despite the restrictions occasioned by COVID-19, this training programme commenced in August and finished in November 2020, with toxic chemical training mock inspections and on-the-job training elements postponed until they can be feasibly conducted. Despite the constraints, the new chemical weapons munitions specialists underwent reconnaissance and storage training, OCW and ACW training, and ordnance field identification training.
- 1.73 Training activities included the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) course and a hosted hostile environment awareness training programme that are required for Secretariat personnel deployed to high-risk areas. Additional

specialised courses for OPCW staff comprised non-destructive evaluation (NDE) training, to help them maintain certification and improve knowledge and skills of the OPCW NDE-approved methods.

### **Knowledge management**

- 1.74 In 2020 the Secretariat continued to advance its efforts to implement continuous knowledge management by maintaining existing activities and implementing new ones. These aimed at identifying, retaining, developing and sharing knowledge pertinent to the work of the Organisation, while prioritising core knowledge in the Verification and Inspectorate Divisions. Three new or upgraded digital tools were launched: a new OPCW Intranet (OrgNet); an upgraded Integrated Library System (ILS); and a new Correspondence Management System based on a modern software platform. In addition, cross-divisional training was held on knowledge transfer issues.
- 1.75 Throughout 2020, the Verification Division consolidated its knowledge focal point staff across the Division, initiated a process of core knowledge identification, and developed collaborative working areas. The Division improved its knowledge transfer activities for separating staff and worked to better align the transfer process to new organisational developments in the knowledge area. Furthermore, the Division continued its work to preserve relevant knowledge following the conclusion of chemical weapons stockpile destruction programmes, with the planning of activities aimed at the identification and retention of knowledge in this area.
- 1.76 In 2020, the Inspectorate Division made significant progress in the implementation of knowledge management-related structures, documents, tools and activities. This included the development of the first ever standard operating procedure (SOP) on knowledge management by a team representing all divisional cells and branches. The SOP lists the specific knowledge areas core to the activity of the Inspectorate and defines the rules and responsibilities to ensure that this core knowledge is properly captured, maintained, developed, and shared. The Inspectorate also enhanced its knowledge transfer and sharing capabilities through the reinforcement of its Continuous Improvement Platform (a tool structuring the capture and sharing of knowledge derived from inspection missions), the implementation of several communities of practice, and participation in internal and external knowledge management training activities.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

- 2.1 In 2020, despite the operational restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretariat continued to provide technical assistance through a wide range of capacity-building programmes and outreach activities in support of States Parties' efforts to effectively implement the provisions of the Convention.
- 2.2 During the reporting period, the OPCW carried out 48 training courses, workshops, seminars, and other capacity-building programmes, such as support to conferences, individual research projects, fellowships, and equipment exchange, involving 1,550 participants in total from all regional groups.
- 2.3 Of these events, 39 were convened virtually, allowing for engagement with and among State Party experts and other stakeholders to continue. To that end, the Secretariat strived to continually enhance its tools and methodologies for online learning, which it hopes will contribute in the longer term to strengthening the overall effectiveness and efficiency of its capacity-building support as a complement to the traditional in-person format.
- 2.4 In 2020, the Secretariat continued to pursue targeted efforts to address the specific needs and priorities of African Member States through the OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Africa Programme"). On 1 January 2020, the Secretariat launched the fifth phase of the Programme, covering the period 2020 to 2022, in partnership and coordination with a wide range of stakeholders. Despite the aforementioned restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretariat carried on with the implementation of activities addressing the eight objectives outlined under the fifth phase. In total, 22 capacity-building activities were organised by the Secretariat under the Programme in 2020. These activities involved 398 participants from 36 African States Parties.

### **National implementation and technical assistance**

- 2.5 In 2020, the Secretariat continued to provide capacity-building support to States Parties in their efforts towards full and effective national implementation of the Convention. Support for the National Authorities and stakeholders focused on building their institutional capacity to meet State Party obligations under the Convention. A total of 579 participants from 114 States Parties participated in 13 capacity-building and technical assistance activities related to national implementation of the Convention.
- 2.6 As of 31 December 2020, 158 of 193 States Parties had adopted national implementing legislation covering all or some of the required initial measures. The slight decrease compared to 2019 is attributable to the revised legislation assessments reported by the States Parties to the Secretariat. A total of 119 States Parties had reported the adoption of comprehensive legislation covering all required initial measures, while 39 had reported on the adoption of implementing legislation covering some of the required initial measures. The remaining 35 States Parties had yet to report on the adoption of

implementing legislation. Detailed information is contained in the Secretariat's annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention.<sup>19</sup>

- 2.7 During the reporting period, the Secretariat piloted an online platform to facilitate the submission of State Party responses to the Secretariat's request for updates on the status of implementation of Article VII. The online submission platform is intended to support States Parties' knowledge management and streamline the reporting process.
- 2.8 A lessons-learned workshop on the Mentorship/Partnership Programme for National Authorities was held at OPCW Headquarters in The Hague on 30 and 31 January 2020. The workshop aimed at reviewing and assessing the impact of the Programme, sharing best practices, and discussing measures to enhance its overall effectiveness. The event was attended by 16 States Parties that had previously participated in the Programme.
- 2.9 An online training course on declarations and inspections obligations under Article VI of the Convention was held for States Parties in South-East Asia from 15 to 24 June 2020. A total of 14 participants from seven States Parties completed the training course. Nine participants represented National Authorities of States Parties, three represented chemical industry, and two were from other governmental departments.
- 2.10 Two general training courses on the Convention for the personnel of National Authorities and relevant stakeholders were held online in 2020. The first was held from 29 June to 1 July 2020 for Spanish-speaking representatives of National Authorities and stakeholders in the Latin America and Caribbean region. A total of 32 participants from 16 States Parties attended the course. The second general training course was held from 7 to 9 September 2020 for French-speaking representatives of National Authorities. Twenty-two participants from 12 States Parties from the African region and Western European and Others Group attended the course. General training courses aim to enhance the basic knowledge and skills of participants to support effective national implementation.
- 2.11 Four regional meetings of National Authorities of States Parties were held online between July and August 2020. The virtual sessions provided participants with the opportunity to engage with other National Authorities in their respective regions to address specific aspects of national implementation and to promote networking and collaboration between States Parties. Meetings were held for the Asian, African, Eastern European, and Latin American and Caribbean regions.
- 2.12 A training course on the enforcement of the Convention's scheduled chemicals transfer regime was held online from 25 August to 18 September 2020. The course was attended by 130 customs officers from 38 Member States representing all regional groups, and was organised in cooperation with the WCO. Participants enhanced their knowledge of the relevant provisions of the Convention, learned about the tools to identify toxic chemicals, and discussed approaches to handling suspicious chemical cargoes.
- 2.13 Two national legislative review forums were held in 2020. The Secretariat held the pilot forum with a representative of the National Authority of Armenia on 27 October 2020.

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<sup>19</sup> Annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention in 2020: EC-95/DG.8 C-25/DG.6 (dated 4 September 2020) and Corr.1 (dated 2 October 2020); EC-95/DG.9 C-25/DG.7, (dated 4 September 2020) and Corr.1 (dated 2 October 2020); and EC-95/DG.10 C-25/DG.8 (dated 4 September 2020) and Corr.1 (dated 2 October 2020).

The second forum was held on 11 December 2020 with seven delegates from the National Authority of Cambodia. Participants completed a preparatory online training course prior to the live session with the Secretariat. Through these forums, the Secretariat works with State Party delegates to review the scope of their national legislative framework related to the Convention, to identify potential gaps, and to discuss legislative and regulatory approaches to implementation.

- 2.14 The Secretariat organised an online training course on legislative and regulatory issues related to chemical security from 13 to 20 November 2020. The course aimed at enhancing the capacities of participants from States Parties in Asia to analyse respective national legal and regulatory frameworks, including identifying gaps and potential means to address them, and to develop appropriate chemical security measures. Participants completed specific training modules, provided information on respective national legal frameworks on chemical security, and attended an interactive online session. In addition, participants learned about the existing international legal framework on chemical security and the scope for a comprehensive national legislative and regulatory framework on chemical security. The course was attended by 49 participants from 19 States Parties as well as technical experts from relevant international organisations, scientific laboratories, and industry and trade associations.
- 2.15 The Seventh Annual Meeting of Representatives of Chemical Industry and National Authorities was held online on 17 and 18 November 2020. The annual meeting was attended by 65 participants, including 16 chemical industry representatives, from 37 States Parties representing all regional groups. The meeting was attended by representatives of the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) and, for the first time, by representatives of the International Chemical Trade Association (ICTA). Delegates discussed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on means of collaboration among national stakeholders as well as chemical safety and security and chemical production, storage, and transportation issues.
- 2.16 The Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of National Authorities was held online from 23 to 25 November 2020, with over 175 participants from 95 States Parties in attendance. Attendees received briefings on the current status of the OPCW's implementation support activities, considered their needs and priorities, and discussed the plan for capacity-building events in 2021. National Authorities had an opportunity to share, discuss, and learn from the experiences, good practices, and strategies from each of the five OPCW regions. They also received briefings on recent developments under Articles VI, VII, X, and XI of the Convention, and were provided with updates on policy-related issues.

#### **Assistance and protection**

- 2.17 In 2020, 76 States Parties made annual submissions regarding their national protective programmes against the use of chemical weapons pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X.
- 2.18 The Secretariat launched a new, user-friendly online tool facilitating the collection and submission of information required under paragraph 4 of Article X. This online tool has been incorporated in the updated version of the Protection and Assistance Databank (PAD). The PAD is now accessible to States Parties via the OPCW login platform.
- 2.19 The core components of the capacity-building activities run by the Secretariat under Article X are based on a three-component training cycle that comprises a basic,



advanced, and exercise course. In 2020, training cycles were disrupted because of COVID-19 restrictions and were instead converted to an online format adapted to cover their core theoretical components and promote exchange of knowledge and experience among stakeholders. In 2020, 15 capacity-building events took place, of which 12 were delivered online.

- 2.20 In early 2020, before the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretariat completed three scheduled Article X activities: a regional table-top exercise on chemical emergency response for States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean was held for emergency management personnel in Ecuador; medical first responders received training on the care of victims of chemical attacks during an international course on pre-hospital medical care for chemical casualties, held in Qatar; and, pursuant to a request from the Government of Rwanda, the Secretariat supported national stakeholders during a basic training course on assistance and protection against chemical weapons for Rwanda's airport, border, and police personnel. Several experts trained since 2016 under the Secretariat's programme for the East African Community supported this training course as instructors.
- 2.21 Later in 2020, the Secretariat conducted online basic training courses for States Parties in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, covering theoretical material related to chemical emergency response. These activities will allow the participating first responders to move rapidly to practical face-to-face training once circumstances permit. Five such courses were held in English, French, Spanish (2), and Russian, with technical support provided by relevant institutions in Malaysia, Morocco, Costa Rica, Peru, and Belarus.
- 2.22 The Secretariat offered a range of tailored online training courses and other activities to suit the protective needs of States Parties. The Secretariat also continued its Instructor Development and Exchange Programme. This programme involves the international exchange of expertise and the fostering of best practices to enhance States Parties' response capacities, both nationally and regionally. It will also continue to improve the OPCW's readiness to respond to a request for assistance. The success of this programme allowed the Secretariat to quickly leverage suitable and qualified instructors to support the range of online programmes developed over the course of 2020.
- 2.23 The Secretariat convened an online meeting of training centres from the Asia region to discuss assistance and protection training and other Article X issues for Asian States Parties. The meeting allowed participating training institutions to share best practices regarding the continuation of training during the pandemic, and resulted in the development of an online training plan for Asia, as well as the identification of the training centres that would support it.
- 2.24 The basic training for States Parties in the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) was augmented with an online course covering decontamination techniques, with the support of the Government of Argentina. Building on the basic theoretical skills of the training, this course covered important aspects for safely extracting personnel and equipment from a chemical incident site.
- 2.25 Within the fifth phase of the Africa Programme, further progress was made with regard to establishing and strengthening national and regional capacity to respond to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. As a follow-up to the

- recommendation of the Third Review Conference<sup>20</sup> to make the best use of regional and subregional capacities and expertise, the Secretariat continued to work with the regional economic communities in Africa to coordinate the delivery of capacity-building outputs for States Parties in each region.
- 2.26 In order to maintain the progress achieved in the East African Community, an online refresher course was held for instructors and experts in the region. The course was aimed at reinforcing their acquired knowledge of chemical emergency response, planning, and management. This refresher course once again benefitted from the ongoing support of the Czech Republic.
- 2.27 In addition to the aforementioned refresher and the national training course for Rwanda, the project for the East African Community was supplemented by the development of a new online training course designed to introduce first responders to the Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER) and the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG). This course was developed and delivered with the valuable support of the Population Protection Institute of the Czech Republic.
- 2.28 Building on the success of this first course, a subsequent iteration of WISER and the ERG was held for first responders of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. This activity was delivered with the valuable support of the Sudanese National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
- 2.29 The Secretariat continued to engage with States Parties of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to develop their national capacities to respond to chemical incidents. While practical training that was planned to begin in 2020 had to be postponed, the Secretariat was able to organise an inaugural virtual table-top exercise on chemical emergency response for ECOWAS States Parties. This event permitted national emergency management stakeholders to apply their response plans to a realistic scenario, identify areas for improvement, and incorporate lessons learned from their regional peers and other participating experts. This exercise was supported by the *Institut Supérieur d'Etudes de Protection Civile* (ISEPC) of Burkina Faso.
- 2.30 In order to support the development or improvement of national protection programmes, the Secretariat initiated a pilot assistance and protection needs assessment project with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The project includes the development of an online self-assessment tool that participating States Parties will use to assess their current framework, which aims to help an expert team organised by the Secretariat to assess the needs of the country and assist with the drafting of a plan of action to address those identified needs. Once the Secretariat has proven the concept with this pilot, it plans to offer this support to States Parties in other regions. Currently, this project benefits from the support of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and experts from the World Health Organization (WHO).
- 2.31 Activities within the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons continued to support the objectives of the network. Wider participation in the funding of its activities, in accordance with the relevant decision of the Conference (C-16/DEC.13, dated 2 December 2011), has been encouraged in support of future

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Review Conference = Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

projects. In December 2020, the balance of the Trust Fund for Victims stood at EUR 120,000. The Secretariat coordinated the formation of an expert group to undertake the drafting of a companion to the Practical Guide for Medical Management of Chemical Warfare Casualties. The preparation of the second guidebook for medical practitioners, focusing on long-term care of victims, will begin in early 2021.

- 2.32 For its part, the Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X of the Convention, reached a balance of EUR 1,565,000, with 47 States Parties offering assistance in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Article X.

### **Economic and technological development**

- 2.33 In 2020, the Secretariat continued to deliver capacity-building programmes and to facilitate international cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. The programmes focused on integrated chemicals management, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge. The COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on the implementation of all three thematic areas of Article XI. In an effort to accommodate the needs of States Parties and to minimise to the extent possible the impact of this situation on the implementation of Article XI programmes, various activities were offered through online modalities.
- 2.34 During the year under review, 20 capacity-building programmes on integrated chemicals management (including chemical safety and security management), enhancement of laboratory capabilities (analytical skills development courses), and chemical knowledge promotion were carried out by the Secretariat for 510 participants. In addition, the Secretariat continued to implement four standing programmes, namely the Fellowship Programme, the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Conference Support Programme, and the Equipment Exchange Programme. In 2020, the Secretariat also organised a workshop on the implementation of Article XI.
- 2.35 The Secretariat organised the fifth edition of the Review and Evaluation Workshop of the Components of an Agreed Framework for the Full Implementation of Article XI (C-16/DEC.10, dated 1 December 2011) online on 2 November 2020. Ninety participants from 51 States Parties representing National Authorities, Permanent Representations, and relevant stakeholders participated in this workshop. The aim of the workshop was to facilitate discussion and the exchange of views among States Parties and relevant stakeholders to further the full implementation of Article XI of the Convention. The Secretariat and panel experts disseminated information on current OPCW international cooperation programmes. Delegates reviewed the obstacles and identified opportunities for expanding capacity-building programmes and enhancing their effectiveness, generating a wide range of ideas and proposals.
- 2.36 The twenty-first edition of the OPCW Associate Programme was scheduled to commence on 24 July 2020 and conclude on 25 September 2020. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the Associate Programme was recalibrated and rescheduled to 2021. From 21 September to 2 October 2020, 26 participants selected from interviews took part in the mandatory and certified intersessional online training for the Associate Programme 2020. Building on the knowledge gained and momentum maintained through this virtual engagement, these participants will participate in the full Associate Programme in 2021. In addition, another 14 candidates on the reserve list were also invited to participate voluntarily in the online training. At the end of the reporting period, the

Alumni Network of the Associate Programme featured a dynamic group of 545 alumni from 121 Member States.

- 2.37 In the area of integrated chemicals management, the Secretariat organised a series of 12 global and regional capacity-building events. This included two face-to-face events held in Qatar (seminar on the Convention and chemical safety and security management for Member States of the OPCW in the Asia Region, 4 to 6 February 2020) and in Croatia (chemical security workshop, RACVIAC – Centre for Security Cooperation, 24 and 25 February 2020), and 10 online training events.
- 2.38 The Secretariat organised the “Online Forum on the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry: New Norms on OPCW Capacity-Building Programmes After the COVID-19 Pandemic” on 1 July 2020. The overall objective of the forum was to create a platform for States Parties to share lessons learned and best practices related to capacity building, and to identify ways forward and potential areas for international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of chemistry in the future. The forum was attended by 29 experts from 16 States Parties representing governmental agencies, chemical industries, academia, and laboratories. Representatives from ICCA and ICTA also attended and shared their experience.
- 2.39 The Secretariat organised the “Online Executive Programme on Integrated Chemicals Management and Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the OPCW in the Africa Region” on 19 August 2020. The event brought together the participants from the two programmes with the aim of strengthening synergies and providing platforms for stakeholders at all levels and fronts to cross-learn and share best practices in chemical safety and security management. Participants ranged from government agencies and academia to chemical industry representatives dealing with chemical management in their countries. The events also gave participants an opportunity to identify needs, gaps, and suggestions on the platform for new OPCW approaches to capacity-building programmes after the COVID-19 pandemic.
- 2.40 The “Wuppertal Online Course – Explosion Protection and Error Management 2020” took place from 7 to 30 September 2020, benefiting 24 participants from OPCW Member States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. This course was offered as a mandatory prerequisite for attendance and in preparation for the full, in-person Wuppertal Course to be held in 2021.
- 2.41 Within the framework of enhancing the capabilities of analytical laboratories, six training courses on the analysis of chemicals related to the Convention were held in 2020. Three face-to-face training courses were organised in Finland, Spain, and at the OPCW Laboratory in The Hague, and three were held online.
- 2.42 To further enhance the capacity of laboratories in the African and GRULAC regions, the first phase of the “Project on Assessing and Enhancing the Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African and GRULAC Member States: Towards OPCW Designation” was completed on 31 March 2020. The project, funded from a voluntary contribution from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was renewed until 31 March 2021, with the Secretariat and the United Kingdom Government having signed a memorandum of understanding on 19 August 2020. The activities within the project continue to focus on building the capacity of seven

analytical laboratories in the African and GRULAC regions which had been identified as the recipients of support under the first phase of the project.

- 2.43 A workshop under the Project referred to above was held online from 2 to 3 June 2020. This event, opened by the Director-General, was the first online capacity-building workshop hosted by the International Cooperation and Assistance Division. The workshop summarised the progress made in the Project and brought participants together to discuss the way forward in the second phase of the Project (2020–2021). The workshop was attended by 27 participants from the following seven OPCW Member States: Brazil, Chile, Finland, Kenya, Nigeria, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 2.44 The Secretariat organised two parallel online laboratory skills enhancement courses in collaboration with the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention from 6 to 11 September 2020. The two courses covered liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry and laboratory quality management and benefitted seven participants from seven OPCW Member States.
- 2.45 Under the Equipment Exchange Programme, the Secretariat facilitated one equipment transfer between Germany and the United Republic of Tanzania, including one analytical near-infrared system, one automated distillation device, 10 desktop computers, a flame photometer, and one continuous flow analyser system.
- 2.46 In promoting chemical knowledge and exchange, the Secretariat has continued to provide support for scientists to participate in events related to the peaceful uses of chemistry. Five events in total were supported by the Secretariat under the Conference Support Programme, two in-person and three online.
- 2.47 Under the Fellowship Programme, the Secretariat continues to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical information between fellows and institutions, while at the same time strengthening the institutions in the targeted countries through capacity building. Twelve fellows were selected for sponsorship under the Fellowship Programme. Six fellowships, two from Algeria (hosted in Finland), two from Cameroon (hosted in Switzerland and Belgium, respectively), one from Serbia (hosted in Brazil), and one from Uganda (hosted in the United States of America), were completed during the period under review. In addition, six other fellowships selected for sponsorship have been postponed until 2021 and will take place in France, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.
- 2.48 Under the Research Support Programme, the Secretariat continued to extend its support to small-scale research projects in OPCW Member States in order to promote the development of scientific and technical knowledge in chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes relevant to the Convention. The Secretariat also continued supporting 20 ongoing research projects funded by the OPCW.

- 2.49 Furthermore, the importance of enhancing capacity-building needs assessments for the delivery of pertinent and effective programmes was underlined. In this context, during the reporting period, the Secretariat continued to conduct needs assessments in the area of integrated chemicals management. The Secretariat also invited the States Parties, on a voluntary basis, to submit assessments of their specific needs in chemical safety and security management, as well as information on existing tools, guidance, and best practices in chemical management in their respective countries.
- 2.50 The programme review and lessons-learned approach and techniques were substantially institutionalised during the reporting period. The assessment of programme effectiveness was based on structured feedback from the various stakeholders, including participants, relevant institutions, and National Authorities of States Parties, and also on regular follow-up on participants' career progression and academic development vis-à-vis the intended impact of the respective programmes in which they participated. During the reporting period, the Secretariat carried out a comprehensive survey on the Associate Programme covering the 20 years since its inception (2000–2019) and an impact review of the Enhancement of Laboratory Capabilities Programme.

### **The OPCW Programme for Africa**

- 2.51 Addressing the specific needs of the Africa region in relation to the Convention continued to be a strong priority for the Secretariat in 2020. On 1 January, the Secretariat initiated the fifth phase of the Africa Programme (covering the period from 2020 to 2022), in coordination with the African States Parties and with the support of a diverse range of partners. Since the beginning of the year and despite the physical constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, various projects, including online capacity-building events, have been organised, steadily advancing the eight objectives set under the Programme.
- 2.52 A total of 398 African participants representing 36 African States Parties benefitted from 22 activities conducted throughout the year under the Africa Programme. These activities included the provision of online training in diverse Programme areas, including fostering national implementation of the Convention, enhancing National Authorities' effectiveness, improving control over cross-border transfers of scheduled chemicals, streamlining assistance and protection capabilities against chemical threats and incidents, educating on chemical safety and security management, developing laboratory competencies, and promoting knowledge of peaceful chemistry and its exchange on the continent. In addition, as part of the promotion of knowledge in peaceful chemistry in Africa, the Secretariat has provided sponsorship to 12 African research projects (including eight projects co-funded with the International Foundation for Science), and sponsored the participation of 109 African scientists in three major international scientific events (the Green Chemistry Postgraduate Summer School, held online in July 2020 by Ca' Foscari University of Venice, the Conference on Chemistry and its Applications, held online by the University of Mauritius in August 2020, and the Second Scientific International Conference on CBRNe,<sup>21</sup> held online in December 2020 by the University of Rome, Tor Vergata). In addition, as mentioned above, the Secretariat granted five fellowships for the benefit of African chemical scientists and

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<sup>21</sup>

CBRNe = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives.

also funded a transfer of laboratory equipment from Germany to the United Republic of Tanzania.

- 2.53 The Africa Programme has continued to be funded essentially through the OPCW regular budget. In order to further enhance its reach and effectiveness, in July the Secretariat designed and published eight project proposals to be funded from extrabudgetary resources from interested donors. These projects focus on laboratory capacity development, chemical safety and security, and the national implementation of the Convention. Since the publication of the projects, the Secretariat has been actively seeking voluntary funding.
- 2.54 The Secretariat also took specific initiatives in 2020 to enhance the Africa Programme's visibility and stakeholder engagement. These initiatives included setting up a thriving online OPCW Africa Network and the publication of the first OPCW Africa Bulletin. The two initiatives were well received by stakeholders in Africa.
- 2.55 During the reporting period, and for the first time in the history of the Programme since its inception in 2007, the Secretariat conducted a targeted exercise to gauge, review, and learn from the results of the Programme at the outcome level. The feedback received through this exercise has confirmed the continued relevance of the Programme to the region's needs and the positive and concrete results it has yielded in enhancing the Convention-related capacities of African States Parties.
- 2.56 An Africa Programme Steering Committee has been constituted, and is made up of members from Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and the Sudan, with the Czech Republic, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union as observers. Chaired by the Sudan, the Committee held its first biannual meetings online on 26 June and 16 November. The meetings focused on reviewing progress in Programme execution and providing valuable guidance and support to the implementation of its various components.

### 3. POLICY-MAKING ORGANS

#### Activities of the Conference of the States Parties

- 3.1 The work of the Conference was adapted to the operational restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference was split into two parts: Part I was held from 30 November to 1 December 2020, with Part II scheduled to be held by the end of April 2021. Part I was attended by representatives of 164 States Parties, a signatory State, and 13 international organisations, specialised agencies, and other international bodies. Seventy-three non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and three bodies representing the global chemical industry and scientific community also registered to attend. Baroness Annabel Goldie, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, submitted a video statement to the Conference as a high-level speaker.
- 3.2 States Parties marked the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare on 1 December 2020.
- 3.3 During Part I of its Twenty-Fifth Session, the Conference reviewed administrative and financial matters of the OPCW for 2021, including submission of the 2020 Financial Statements to the External Auditor, and decided to defer to Part II of the session consideration of the status of implementation of the remaining aspects of the Convention, including chemical disarmament, destruction-related issues, national implementation measures, assistance and protection, international cooperation, and activities related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
- 3.4 The following decisions were among those adopted by the Conference at Part I of its Twenty-Fifth Session:<sup>22</sup>
- (a) OPCW Financial Regulations (C-I/DEC.3/Rev.3, dated 30 November 2020);
  - (b) Scale of Assessments for 2021 (C-25/DEC.4, dated 30 November 2020);
  - (c) Submission of the 2020 OPCW Financial Statements to the External Auditor (C-25/DEC.5, dated 30 November 2020);
  - (d) Amendments to the OPCW Financial Regulations and Rules (C-25/DEC.6, dated 30 November 2020); and
  - (e) Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2021 (C-25/DEC.7, dated 1 December 2020).

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<sup>22</sup> Other (unclassified) decisions can be found on the public website of the OPCW.



### **Activities of the Executive Council**

- 3.5 In 2020, the Council considered a number of reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and the implementation of Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.
- 3.6 The Council also:
- (a) reviewed progress in and adopted a number of decisions on the destruction of chemical weapons;
  - (b) reviewed the work of the DAT;
  - (c) considered a summary update of FFM activities (S/1798/2019, dated 3 October 2019) and two reports of the FFM (S/1901/2020 and S/1902/2020, both dated 1 October 2020);
  - (d) reviewed progress in the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 and received the first report of the IIT;
  - (e) approved facility agreements and modifications or amendments to facility agreements between the OPCW and States Parties;
  - (f) considered the work done in the context of the Africa Programme;
  - (g) considered the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) for 2019;
  - (h) adopted decisions on administrative and financial matters; and
  - (i) forwarded its recommendations on a number of matters to the Conference at its Twenty-Fifth Session.

### **Activities of subsidiary bodies**

- 3.7 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (hereinafter “the Confidentiality Commission”) held its Twenty-Second Meeting on 3 and 4 November 2020.
- 3.8 The ABAF held its Forty-Eighth Session from 2 to 5 June 2020, and its Forty-Ninth Session from 28 to 31 July 2020.
- 3.9 The SAB held its Twenty-Ninth Session on 1 and 2 September 2020 and its Thirtieth Session from 10 to 12 November 2020.
- 3.10 The ABEO held its Ninth Session on 11 December 2020.

## 4. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

### Universality

- 4.1 In 2020, the number of OPCW Member States remained at 193. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention.
- 4.2 Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party throughout 2020. Although the COVID-19 pandemic presented challenges for the Secretariat's universality activities, the Secretariat maintained its practice of inviting representatives of States not Party and the signatory State to participate in selected OPCW activities, virtually or in-person as conditions allowed, including Part I of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference.
- 4.3 Six representatives of Israel registered to participate virtually in Part I of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference. The Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of Israel in the Netherlands throughout the year. On 5 August 2020, the Ambassador of Israel met with the Director-General at the OPCW Headquarters to pledge a voluntary contribution in support of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology.
- 4.4 A representative of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs registered to attend the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference virtually.
- 4.5 The Director-General continued to underline the importance of achieving universality in his contacts with representatives of States not Party, the signatory State, senior officials of States Parties, and in his interactions with international organisations, academic institutions, and think tanks.

### External engagement and outreach activities

- 4.6 As set out below, the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to meet with high-level officials of States Parties at the OPCW Headquarters, while in compliance with COVID-19 restrictions. In addition, the Director-General conducted one official visit.
- 4.7 The Secretariat also continued its activities to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations, as well as to enhance relations with other international organisations, with a view to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation issues relevant to the OPCW.

### High-Level visits to the OPCW Headquarters

- 4.8 In 2020, the Director-General hosted a number of high-level visitors at the OPCW Headquarters, including H.E. Mr Enrique A. Manalo, Undersecretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs for Policy of the Philippines; H.E. Ms Sylvie Lucas, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg; H.E. Mr Axel Kenes, Political Director and Director-General for Multilateral Affairs and Globalisation of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr Thomas DiNanno, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Policy, Emerging Threats and Outreach of the United States of America; H.E. Mr Philippe Goffin, Minister of Defence and of

Foreign Affairs of Belgium; H.E. Mr Bogdan Aurescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania; and H.E. Dr Anže Logar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia.

- 4.9 To advance relations with the Host Country, on 2 October the Director-General met with H.E. Mr Simon Smits, Ambassador for International Organisations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. On 27 November, the Director-General met with Mr Jan van Zanen, Mayor of The Hague.

#### Visits and virtual briefings by the Director-General

- 4.10 In September 2020, the Director-General paid an official visit to Madrid, Spain, where he had an audience with H.M. King Felipe VI, followed by a visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of Spain, H.E. Ms Arancha González Laya.
- 4.11 On 12 May 2020, the Director-General gave a virtual briefing to the United Nations Security Council following the release of the first report of the IIT. On 11 December, the Director-General again gave a virtual briefing to the United Nations Security Council on the Organisation's activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 13 November, the Director-General delivered virtually the keynote speech to the European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference organised by the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. On 18 November, the Director-General gave a virtual briefing to Permanent Representatives based outside The Hague, as part of the Secretariat's efforts to keep non-resident Permanent Representations apprised of developments within the Organisation, in advance of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference.

#### **Protocol and privileges and immunities support**

- 4.12 The External Relations Division continued to provide support to senior management and other members of the Secretariat for protocol services, as well as for the administration of privileges and immunities related to the Headquarters Agreement and relevant rules and regulations of the Host Country. In all, 32 Permanent Representatives presented their letters of credentials to the Director-General in 2020.

#### **OPCW-The Hague Award**

- 4.13 Owing to the ongoing restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the OPCW-The Hague Award was not awarded in 2020.

#### **Other activities**

- 4.14 The Twentieth Induction Workshop for diplomatic personnel was convened virtually on 17 September 2020. A total of 107 delegates registered to attend.

## **Public affairs and media profile**

### New OPCW public diplomacy resource

- 4.15 In light of COVID-19, the Secretariat moved online as many of its outreach and public affairs activities as possible. A series of 11 short videos covering the fundamentals of the Convention and the OPCW's work was launched on 12 October 2020 under the name "OPCW Basics". The videos, viewed more than 25,000 times from launch to the end of 2020, are featured on the OPCW website and social media channels, with subtitles available in all six official languages of the OPCW, as well as in Dutch. While created principally for the general public, the series is also used to enhance the Secretariat's education and outreach activities, trainings and workshops, and to help onboard new staff. The resource was shared with Permanent Representations and National Authorities and was also presented during the annual meeting of National Authorities, and during Part I of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference.

### OPCW website

- 4.16 The core content of the OPCW website was published in all the Organisation's official languages in the second half of 2020. This is a significant development in ensuring that key information about the OPCW's work is accessible to a broader audience. The website was visited by approximately 385,000 users in 2020, a 6% increase on 2019.

### Digital outreach

- 4.17 The OPCW participated in the online version of The Hague International Open Day (20 September 2020 to 24 October 2020) using the OPCW Basics series of introductory videos.
- 4.18 Groups of students and other members of the public continue to enquire about visiting OPCW Headquarters. Before in-person visits were suspended on 13 March 2020, the OPCW had already received requests for and scheduled 60 group visits for 2020. Of these, 21 were completed prior to 13 March and 39 had to be cancelled because of the restrictions related to COVID-19. While in-person group visits remain suspended, the Secretariat continues to adapt its operations while expanding its digital outreach to key stakeholders. Virtual group visits were piloted in late 2020, using the OPCW Basics videos, live presentations, question and answer sessions, and an online quiz and feedback survey. These will be further developed and actively promoted in 2021.

### T.M.C. Asser Institute

- 4.19 The eleventh edition of the T.M.C. Asser Institute's Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction took place from 28 September to 2 October. Fifty early and mid-career professionals from 21 States Parties participated in this fully online version of the course, increasing their knowledge about the diplomatic, legal, and technical aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The Director-General addressed the participants of the Programme virtually. The OPCW, with financial support from the European Union, awarded nine scholarships to representatives of NGOs from Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Malawi, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Slovakia.

Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

- 4.20 Seventy-three civil society organisations represented by 227 individuals were approved to participate in the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference. Owing to COVID-19 restrictions, approved NGO participants were not able to attend Part I in person, but instead were invited to submit written or video statements. These are available via the OPCW website.
- 4.21 The Secretariat provided a live webcast of Part I of the Conference, which attracted over 3,300 viewers.

Social media growth

- 4.22 The Secretariat’s digital communications capacity continued to increase significantly according to metrics for social media platforms, as shown in Table 7 below. Each social media post and campaign is designed to increase awareness and to enhance stakeholder understanding of the work and activities related to the Organisation and the Convention. Overall, the OPCW’s social media platforms experienced an average growth rate of 13%.

**TABLE 7: SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH**

<b>Social Media</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>Change 2019/2020</b>
Facebook followers	18,674	19,067	5%
Twitter followers	32,312	34,218	6%
YouTube followers	1,340	1,636	23%
LinkedIn followers	12,383	17,611	42%

## 5. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

### Administrative and budgetary matters

- 5.1 The 2021 Programme and Budget (C-25/DEC.7) was formulated with a view to securing the resources required for the Secretariat to carry out its functions in the context of the current challenges confronting the OPCW, including the constraints of zero nominal growth. One-off provisions included the establishment of the COVID-19 Variability Impact Fund, and additional funding allocated to major capital funding mechanisms, including the Major Capital Investment Fund, the Special Fund for the OPCW Equipment Store, and the Special Fund for OPCW Designated Laboratories and Laboratory Equipment. For the preparation of the 2021 Programme and Budget, the Administration Division continued to further develop templates and costing sheets for the use of zero-based budgeting and standard costing, and to improve the linkages between objectives, strategies, activities, and resources.
- 5.2 Through sustained efforts in 2019 and 2020, the Secretariat has readied for the transition to and preparation of the first biennial programme and budget for the 2022–2023 biennium, as decided by the Conference in decision C-24/DEC.11 (dated 28 November 2019). These preparations have included amended OPCW Financial Regulations and Rules (C-25/DEC.6), effective 1 January 2021, development of detailed and integrated templates and costing sheets to support biennial budget formulation for programme managers, and also the development of internal structures to further entrench major capital investment planning and the integration of major capital funding.
- 5.3 The Administration Division continued to closely monitor and actively address the Organisation's tenuous cash situation throughout 2020, apprising States Parties of the financial position on a monthly basis, including the status of payment of assessed contributions and reimbursements of Article IV and Article V invoices. These steps, together with close oversight of budgetary expenditure, including the assessment of the impact brought by International Civil Service Commission's mandated staff cost increases and the impact of COVID-19 on programme implementation and expenditures, proved effective in controlling the cash situation of the Secretariat in 2020, noting also the requirement to utilise the Working Capital Fund in the last quarter of the year owing to delayed payments by some States Parties of assessed contributions and Article IV and Article V reimbursements.
- 5.4 The 2019 Financial Statements for both the OPCW and the Provident Fund were audited and certified by the External Auditor of the OPCW in May 2020 (EC-95/DG.3 C-25/DG.4, dated 17 August 2020); both received unqualified audit opinions. The 2019 Financial Statements of the OPCW continued with the inclusion of a comprehensive introduction and commentary by the Director-General, highlighting for the financial year key trends and issues of importance for the readers of the Financial Statements, including States Parties.
- 5.5 Strengthening and further integrating internal control monitoring to support the Director-General's Statement of Internal Control continued in 2020, building upon the progress made in 2019, as noted by the External Auditor.

- 5.6 The General Support Services maintained uninterrupted availability of the full range of support services for all the divisions of the Secretariat, despite the difficulties associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, including travel facilitation, transportation and fleet maintenance, visa and travel documentation services, building maintenance and management, conference and meeting infrastructure support, asset and property management, supplies and inventory, facility support services, and mail and courier services.
- 5.7 Secretariat procurement reached a total volume of EUR 21.7 million in 2020. This amount was reached through 277 contracts or purchase orders raised centrally by the Procurement Section for a total value of EUR 20.5 million, and 521 purchase orders raised at the individual Secretariat unit level (for low-value procurements), for a total value of EUR 1.2 million.
- 5.8 Significant work was undertaken in 2020 by the Human Resources Branch to support staff in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretariat developed and delivered a range of interventions to help staff adjust to the requirement for working from home, including in the areas of staff well-being and engagement. Learning and development activities were moved to remote delivery. Preparations for moving a number of critical organisational processes to the new System of Record Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solution were also undertaken during the period under review.
- 5.9 In 2020, the Secretariat continued to work at proactively sourcing the best candidates for positions under recruitment and at positioning the Organisation as an appealing place to work. This included improving the style of vacancy notices and developing a webinar to help applicants improve the quality of applications. To meet urgent staffing needs, the Secretariat actively pursued loan agreements with entities of the United Nations system, with two currently concluded and a third being explored in 2020. This modality provides a valuable source of short-term staff to fill crucial gaps while corresponding fixed-term posts are under recruitment.
- 5.10 The Secretariat continued to develop its approach to the onboarding of new staff in 2020, including through the use of a mobile phone application. Work also continued on implementing a revised approach to performance management, focusing on continuous feedback between staff and managers, and obtaining feedback from key stakeholders. Training to develop coaching skills for current and prospective supervisors was also organised.
- 5.11 The Secretariat continued in 2020 to support States Parties in the possible adaptation of the tenure policy, including through contributing workforce and data analysis, presentations, and research to support informal consultations.
- 5.12 The Secretariat continued to participate in the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Programme in 2020. Arrangements were made for two new JPOs to join the Secretariat in the Administration and Verification Divisions. Despite difficulties related to COVID-19, work began to explore further placements for 2021 and 2022. With the first JPOs completing their placements in 2020, a formal exit procedure was developed with the intention of learning from their experiences.

- 5.13 Building on the Director-General's commitment as an International Gender Champion, the Secretariat undertook a gender and diversity audit in 2020. The audit aimed to verify the level of institutionalisation of gender equality, diversity, and inclusion within the Secretariat, analysing policies, practices, and programmes, and taking into consideration the composition of personnel, while also capturing employee experience and the views of senior management. Significant investment was made in delivering training on diversity and inclusion.
- 5.14 The work plan and focus of the Information Services Branch (ISB) in 2020 was heavily driven by the critical need to support the shifting operational requirements resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The shift to remote work necessitated urgent changes to the Organisation's information technology infrastructure. In addition to addressing the critical business continuity needs, the Secretariat made significant progress in 2020 towards a modern landscape of systems. In addition, the System of Record ERP solution was developed to launch in 2021.
- 5.15 During the first two months of the pandemic, the ISB focused on implementing a corporate communication and collaboration tool so that designated aspects of the Secretariat's work could continue efficiently from beyond the Headquarters facility, in the form of the Microsoft Teams platform and other supporting systems. The ISB also developed a modern and secure laptop configuration, which was subsequently and safely deployed to more than 450 Secretariat staff members.
- 5.16 Following this, the Organisation moved to a more strategic approach, and in July 2020 the OPCW Information Technology Strategic Advisory Committee (ITSAC) endorsed a 12-month strategic plan focused on critical improvements to the broader digital resilience of the Secretariat, with three strategic pillars of systems: secure, resilient, and collaborative by design.
- 5.17 The first six months of this project focused on some large-scale information technology projects that have broad organisational impact, specifically: migration to an improved email platform with significant information security benefit, completed in January 2021; a new OPCW Intranet (OrgNet), launched in October 2020; and an online official document management system, launched in November 2020.
- 5.18 In addition to internally focused systems, the Secretariat improved its ability to engage with external stakeholders via online streaming capabilities for meetings of the policy-making organs supporting all official languages; online remote systems options for International Cooperation and Assistance Division training and outreach events; utilisation of a remote simultaneous interpretation platform for the Confidentiality Commission in November 2020; and development of a new Extranet to be launched in early 2021.
- 5.19 As stated above, the Knowledge Management Section continued to coordinate activities related to the identification, development, and retention of knowledge at the OPCW, guiding staff to implement processes to ensure continuous knowledge management. It also continued to manage the archives, the Correspondence Management System, and the OPCW Library. The Knowledge Management Advisor reported to States Parties through presentations at facilitation meetings on the Programme and Budget, as well as at briefings related to knowledge management and its aspects pertinent to the tenure policy.



### **Internal oversight**

- 5.20 During the period under review, the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) conducted its audits in conformity with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of the Institute of Internal Auditors–United States of America. The United Nations Evaluation Group Norms and Standards for evaluation were also observed.
- 5.21 In 2020, the OIO’s Strategic Master Plan for 2020 to 2024 was approved by the Director-General following consultations with the ABAF. The plan focuses on three pillars: people, processes, and technology, so as to keep the Office fit for purpose and to add value to the Organisation. In accordance with the plan and in keeping with the principles of agile auditing, the OIO modified its work plan in 2020 in view of the disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the OIO conducted the following audits/evaluations in 2020: Management of Cash Advances; Review of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology Project; and Audit of the Inspection Planning Process for Routine Missions. It also issued an advisory report on Review of Segregation of Duties in the ERP System. The OIO also supported Management in updating the Code of Conduct and in its review of the OPCW confidentiality regime. In addition, the OIO performed two certifications of the process leading to the testing, preparation, and packing of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry equipment.
- 5.22 To manage the quality management system (QMS) of the OPCW, the OIO performed four QMS internal audits, provided secretarial support for the QMS Technical Committee, and prepared management reviews of accredited areas. These enabled the OPCW to maintain certification in the accredited processes.
- 5.23 The OIO continued to receive requests for advice in 2020 related to, among other issues, the revision of administrative directives, the improvement of internal controls, risk assessment, the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality, and IT governance and business continuity matters. Further, OIO auditors participated as observers in meetings of the Investment Committee, the Property Survey Board, the Committee on Contracts, the ITSAC, the Information Services Steering Committee, the ERP Project Board, the ERP Project Steering Committee, the Risk Management Committee, and the COVID-19 Task Force.
- 5.24 In 2020, the OIO continued to follow up on the status of the implementation of recommendations contained in all of its audit and evaluation reports, in order to assess the actions taken by Management in implementation of the audit recommendations. The outcome of the follow-up exercises was reported periodically to the Management Board and to the States Parties in the OIO’s Annual Summary Report.

### **Legal affairs**

- 5.25 In 2020, the Office of the Legal Adviser (LAO) provided legal advice to the policy-making organs, States Parties, the Director-General, and units of the Secretariat.
- 5.26 This legal advice pertained to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention and its verification regime; the negotiation of international agreements, including voluntary contribution agreements and technical agreements on the conduct of trainings; cooperation with other international organisations; administrative policies and procedures; and financial questions, including commercial contracts for the

procurement of goods and services. The LAO represented the OPCW before judicial and other quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, including the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal.

- 5.27 The Secretariat registered 37 international agreements in 2020 and six amendments to international agreements (see Annex 8 to this report).

## **Strategy and policy**

### Countering chemical terrorism

- 5.28 In 2020, the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism remained the primary platform for the States Parties to interact with international experts and to exchange their views on challenges posed by terrorism and on how the OPCW could further address this subject through the full and effective implementation of the Convention. The focus of the discussions throughout 2020 was on strengthening legal frameworks to counter chemical terrorism and on cooperation with the United Nations and other international organisations in countering the threat of CBRN terrorism. Owing to the restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, only two meetings of the Working Group were held in 2020, on 9 March and 2 October respectively. The October meeting was held in an online format under the newly appointed Chairperson, H.E. Ambassador Vusimuzi Philemon Madonsela of South Africa.
- 5.29 In 2020, the OPCW continued to actively participate in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to which it became a signatory in 2018. Under the Compact's auspices, the Organisation acts as a Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection, which is chaired by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). In this framework, the third phase of a project to enhance interagency interoperability and public communications in the event of a chemical or biological attack, jointly developed by the OPCW along with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the WHO, INTERPOL, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, was modified in light of the COVID-19 pandemic with a new implementation schedule to begin in 2021 that re-prioritises many of the in-person activities in favour of activities achievable online.
- 5.30 The Secretariat and the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continued to collaborate in strengthening States Parties' awareness of their relevant obligations, and to offer practical assistance in the areas in which the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control.

### Engagement with chemical industry associations

- 5.31 The OPCW and the chemical industry continued efforts to strengthen their cooperation in accordance with the relevant recommendations of the Third Review Conference. In May 2020, the OPCW formalised relations with ICTA, thereby broadening its dialogue with chemical industry associations. ICTA joined the Chemical Industry Coordination Group (CICG), which has so far served as a platform for dialogue between the OPCW and ICCA.
- 5.32 Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic only one meeting of the CICG took place during the reporting period, in September 2020. During the meeting, the representatives of ICCA, ICTA, and the Secretariat exchanged information on the latest developments and continued their discussion on practical steps for improving the efficiency of industry inspections and on joint capacity-building activities, in particular in the area of chemical safety and security. In 2020, representatives of ICCA and ICTA participated in a number of the Secretariat's activities, which contributed to promoting the importance of the industry's support for implementation of the Convention. The Director-General submitted a Note to the Conference at its Twenty-Fifth Session entitled "Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations" (C-25/DG.14, dated 12 November 2020), which provided a detailed account of the OPCW's engagement with industry associations since the previous session of the Conference. The report covers activities related to verification, education and outreach, and chemical safety and security.

### Education and outreach

- 5.33 In spite of the restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, members of the ABEO conducted multiple activities in 2020, both individually and as a group. Their work continued to focus on e-learning, active learning, and the creation of new education and outreach materials. In order to ensure that the work of the Board continues to be aligned with the OPCW's needs, the ABEO drafted a strategic plan, a document that comprises a SWOT<sup>23</sup> analysis and reflects the Board's mission, goals, and objectives. The Board submitted inputs regarding the OPCW's contribution to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education.<sup>24</sup>
- 5.34 On 25 September 2020, the Director-General established a Temporary Working Group (TWG) on e-Learning within the ABEO. The Group is chaired by Professor Rocael Hernández Rizzardini of Guatemala and comprises 10 experts, including its Chairperson. It held its first meeting virtually on 10 and 12 November 2020 and has started to review the current e-learning offer of the Secretariat.
- 5.35 The ABEO, through a pre-recorded video statement, participated in the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of National Authorities held in November 2020.
- 5.36 The Board held its Ninth Session on 11 December 2020, through an online platform. At the Session, Dr Johannes-Georg Weinig and Mr Shahab Ud Din were elected as Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson, respectively.

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<sup>23</sup> SWOT = strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.

<sup>24</sup> A/75/127, dated 26 June 2020.

### **Confidentiality and security**

- 5.37 In the period under review, the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS) worked to ensure a persistent and appropriate level of security for OPCW personnel, facilities, operations, missions, and information, using a risk management-based approach aligned with the risk appetite of the Organisation and with international best practice.
- 5.38 In response to the persistence and sophistication of cyberattacks, a strategic review of cybersecurity resilience was performed by the OCS, resulting in a strategic plan for the modernisation of technology and physical and personnel security controls, taking into account best practice and assessed risks. Delivery of this plan will continue throughout 2021, with significant steps already taken through technical change and infrastructure investment.
- 5.39 The OCS continued to provide training and awareness to personnel on security and confidentiality, physical security services, and support for major events. A key focus during the year was to further imbue staff with the skills necessary to protect their cybersecurity activities from a personal perspective, which results in better overall defence of the OPCW more generally.
- 5.40 The OCS also supported the annual meeting of the OPCW Confidentiality Commission, delivered ad hoc classified briefings, and coordinated security for OPCW missions, frequently in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. Security investigations were undertaken into cyber events, security incidents, and potential breaches of confidentiality.

### **Health and safety**

- 5.41 There was a general decrease in accident reporting because of the lower level of activities and missions in 2020. On 8 February, the Secretariat recorded the death, from natural causes, of an inspector while on duty at the command post in Damascus, the Syrian Arab Republic.
- 5.42 The Health and Safety Branch (HSB) continued to assist other branches in delivering inputs for routine work, training, as well as for regular and high-risk inspection missions. The HSB continued to support fact-finding missions and other non-routine operations from a risk assessment and mitigation point of view.
- 5.43 The annual workplace inspection in 2020 showed that the Secretariat is a safe workplace. Issues that had been highlighted in the 2019 report were at various stages of being addressed. All reports, including the facility inspection, radiation safety, and incident reports, were filed as required.
- 5.44 No radiation safety-related issues, excessive noise level issues, or poor air quality issues were reported or identified in the course of the year.

## 6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

### **The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board**

- 6.1 The year 2020 presented numerous challenges because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the SAB was still able to perform its duties in providing scientific advice to the Director-General, the Secretariat, and States Parties.
- 6.2 In September 2020, the Board met for its Twenty-Ninth Session (SAB-29/1, dated 2 September 2020), which it used to become acquainted with its seven new members and the new Secretary to the SAB. In addition, the SAB continued to identify priority topics and develop a road map for the next scientific review process. Also at that session, a briefing was held on the final report, and recommendations, of the TWG on investigative science and technology. The Director-General's response to the report of the session was issued in October 2020 (EC-95/DG.26, dated 2 October 2020).
- 6.3 The SAB met virtually for its Thirtieth Session in November 2020 (SAB-30/1, dated 12 November 2020). The Board received updates from Secretariat staff, as well as from a number of external experts who spoke on topics relevant to the SAB's work. As of the end of 2020, the Director-General's response to the report of the session was still in preparation.
- 6.4 At the Thirtieth Session of the SAB, the Director-General announced his agreement to the SAB's recommendation to establish a new TWG on the analysis of biotoxins. The SAB began its work on compiling a list of world experts who could contribute to the TWG and to develop terms of reference for it.
- 6.5 The SAB's collaboration and engagement across scientific communities continued to grow throughout 2020 in spite of the pandemic. Although all activities were moved to a virtual format, SAB members attended, presented at, and chaired conferences, continued with their leadership of professional chemistry societies, and continued to partner with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and to issue publications in scientific literature. SAB involvement in these activities ensures that the Secretariat stays abreast of developments in chemistry, maintains visibility and credibility among scientists, promotes responsible and ethical scientific practices, and supports education and outreach activities.

### **Engagement with the scientific community**

- 6.6 The Secretariat's engagement with global scientific communities continued in 2020. Among these activities, the Secretariat engaged across divisions of IUPAC with a view to deepening collaboration and invited the American Chemical Society and IUPAC leaders to attend OPCW events. Secretariat staff members continued to serve on IUPAC committees, and the IUPAC President delivered a virtual statement on 27 November 2020 to the Conference at its Twenty-Fifth Session.
- 6.7 The Secretariat and members of the SAB continued to maintain a visible presence among technical communities in 2020, participating in a workshop on biotoxins organised jointly by the Robert Koch Institute and the OPCW in Berlin, Germany in January 2020, delivering presentations at the Conference on Chemistry and its Applications, organised by the University of Mauritius (virtual, August 2020), participating in an OPCW workshop on green chemistry (virtual, August 2020), and co-organising and participating in a joint workshop on toxic chemicals in the environment with the International Foundation for Science (virtual, November 2020).

- 6.8 The Secretariat also launched its Plant Biomarker Challenge initiative in 2020. This initiative, backed by the European Union, will fund up to five research projects that describe a method or system by which a specific type of vegetation could act as an indicator of exposure to chemicals that are toxic to humans and/or animals. As vegetation is always present in areas of human habitation, plants are well suited as potential sentinel species. The proposal submission period started in early December 2020.

**Activities at the science-security interface**

- 6.9 The Secretariat and the SAB continued to engage with other security-focused organisations, contributing to discussions on science advice and science diplomacy in international treaties, and participated in a number of events focused on science-security.
- 6.10 The Secretariat remained engaged with international organisation partners, participating in scientific and technical discussions, including with INTERPOL, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. In addition, scientific briefings were delivered at the Asser Institute's Eleventh Annual Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (virtual, September 2020) and at the OPCW's Twentieth Annual Induction Workshop for diplomats.

## Annex 1

**STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020<sup>25</sup>**

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
1.	Afghanistan	14-01-93	24-09-03	24-10-03
2.	Albania	14-01-93	11-05-94	29-04-97
3.	Algeria	13-01-93	14-08-95	29-04-97
4.	Andorra		27-02-03[a]	29-03-03
5.	Angola		16-09-15[a]	16-10-15
6.	Antigua and Barbuda		29-08-05[a]	28-09-05
7.	Argentina	13-01-93	02-10-95	29-04-97
8.	Armenia	19-03-93	27-01-95	29-04-97
9.	Australia	13-01-93	06-05-94	29-04-97
10.	Austria	13-01-93	17-08-95	29-04-97
11.	Azerbaijan	13-01-93	29-02-00	30-03-00
12.	Bahamas	02-03-94	21-04-09	21-05-09
13.	Bahrain	24-02-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
14.	Bangladesh	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
15.	Barbados		07-03-07[a]	06-04-07
16.	Belarus	14-01-93	11-07-96	29-04-97
17.	Belgium	13-01-93	27-01-97	29-04-97
18.	Belize		01-12-03[a]	31-12-03
19.	Benin	14-01-93	14-05-98	13-06-98
20.	Bhutan	24-04-97	18-08-05	17-09-05
21.	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14-01-93	14-08-98	13-09-98
22.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16-01-97	25-02-97	29-04-97
23.	Botswana		31-08-98[a]	30-09-98
24.	Brazil	13-01-93	13-03-96	29-04-97
25.	Brunei Darussalam	13-01-93	28-07-97	27-08-97
26.	Bulgaria	13-01-93	10-08-94	29-04-97
27.	Burkina Faso	14-01-93	08-07-97	07-08-97
28.	Burundi	15-01-93	04-09-98	04-10-98
29.	Cabo Verde	15-01-93	10-10-03	09-11-03
30.	Cambodia	15-01-93	19-07-05	18-08-05
31.	Cameroon	14-01-93	16-09-96	29-04-97
32.	Canada	13-01-93	26-09-95	29-04-97
33.	Central African Republic	14-01-93	20-09-06	20-10-06

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For each State Party listed, the date in the “Signature” column is that on which it signed the original of the Convention, which was received by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary, while the date in the “Deposit” column is that on which the Secretary-General received an instrument of accession or ratification by the State Party. Throughout the table, “[a]” means “deposit of instrument of accession”, “[A]” means “deposit of instrument of acceptance”, and “[d]” means “deposit of instrument of succession”.

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
34.	Chad	11-10-94	13-02-04	14-03-04
35.	Chile	14-01-93	12-07-96	29-04-97
36.	China	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
37.	Colombia	13-01-93	05-04-00	05-05-00
38.	Comoros	13-01-93	18-08-06	17-09-06
39.	Congo	15-01-93	04-12-07	03-01-08
40.	Cook Islands	14-01-93	15-07-94	29-04-97
41.	Costa Rica	14-01-93	31-05-96	29-04-97
42.	Côte d'Ivoire	13-01-93	18-12-95	29-04-97
43.	Croatia	13-01-93	23-05-95	29-04-97
44.	Cuba	13-01-93	29-04-97	29-05-97
45.	Cyprus	13-01-93	28-08-98	27-09-98
46.	Czech Republic	14-01-93	06-03-96	29-04-97
47.	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14-01-93	12-10-05	11-11-05
48.	Denmark	14-01-93	13-07-95	29-04-97
49.	Djibouti	28-09-93	25-01-06	24-02-06
50.	Dominica	02-08-93	12-02-01	14-03-01
51.	Dominican Republic	13-01-93	27-03-09	26-04-09
52.	Ecuador	14-01-93	06-09-95	29-04-97
53.	El Salvador	14-01-93	30-10-95	29-04-97
54.	Equatorial Guinea	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
55.	Eritrea		14-02-00[a]	15-03-00
56.	Estonia	14-01-93	26-05-99	25-06-99
57.	Eswatini	23-09-93	20-11-96	29-04-97
58.	Ethiopia	14-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
59.	Fiji	14-01-93	20-01-93	29-04-97
60.	Finland	14-01-93	07-02-95	29-04-97
61.	France	13-01-93	02-03-95	29-04-97
62.	Gabon	13-01-93	08-09-00	08-10-00
63.	Gambia	13-01-93	19-05-98	18-06-98
64.	Georgia	14-01-93	27-11-95	29-04-97
65.	Germany	13-01-93	12-08-94	29-04-97
66.	Ghana	14-01-93	09-07-97	08-08-97
67.	Greece	13-01-93	22-12-94	29-04-97
68.	Grenada	09-04-97	03-06-05	03-07-05
69.	Guatemala	14-01-93	12-02-03	14-03-03
70.	Guinea	14-01-93	09-06-97	09-07-97
71.	Guinea-Bissau	14-01-93	20-05-08	19-06-08
72.	Guyana	06-10-93	12-09-97	12-10-97
73.	Haiti	14-01-93	22-02-06	24-03-06
74.	Holy See	14-01-93	12-05-99	11-06-99
75.	Honduras	13-01-93	29-08-05	28-09-05
76.	Hungary	13-01-93	31-10-96	29-04-97
77.	Iceland	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97



	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
78.	India	14-01-93	03-09-96	29-04-97
79.	Indonesia	13-01-93	12-11-98	12-12-98
80.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	13-01-93	03-11-97	03-12-97
81.	Iraq		13-01-09[a]	12-02-09
82.	Ireland	14-01-93	24-06-96	29-04-97
83.	Italy	13-01-93	08-12-95	29-04-97
84.	Jamaica	18-04-97	08-09-00	08-10-00
85.	Japan	13-01-93	15-09-95	29-04-97
86.	Jordan		29-10-97[a]	28-11-97
87.	Kazakhstan	14-01-93	23-03-00	22-04-00
88.	Kenya	15-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
89.	Kiribati		07-09-00[a]	07-10-00
90.	Kuwait	27-01-93	29-05-97	28-06-97
91.	Kyrgyzstan	22-02-93	29-09-03	29-10-03
92.	Lao People's Democratic Republic	13-05-93	25-02-97	29-04-97
93.	Latvia	06-05-93	23-07-96	29-04-97
94.	Lebanon		20-11-08[a]	20-12-08
95.	Lesotho	07-12-94	07-12-94	29-04-97
96.	Liberia	15-01-93	23-02-06	25-03-06
97.	Libya		06-01-04[a]	05-02-04
98.	Liechtenstein	21-07-93	24-11-99	24-12-99
99.	Lithuania	13-01-93	15-04-98	15-05-98
100.	Luxembourg	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
101.	Madagascar	15-01-93	20-10-04	19-11-04
102.	Malawi	14-01-93	11-06-98	11-07-98
103.	Malaysia	13-01-93	20-04-00	20-05-00
104.	Maldives	04-10-93	31-05-94	29-04-97
105.	Mali	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
106.	Malta	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
107.	Marshall Islands	13-01-93	19-05-04	18-06-04
108.	Mauritania	13-01-93	09-02-98	11-03-98
109.	Mauritius	14-01-93	09-02-93	29-04-97
110.	Mexico	13-01-93	29-08-94	29-04-97
111.	Micronesia (Federated States of)	13-01-93	21-06-99	21-07-99
112.	Monaco	13-01-93	01-06-95	29-04-97
113.	Mongolia	14-01-93	17-01-95	29-04-97
114.	Montenegro		23-10-06[d]	03-06-06
115.	Morocco	13-01-93	28-12-95	29-04-97
116.	Mozambique		15-08-00[a]	14-09-00
117.	Myanmar	14-01-93	08-07-15	07-08-15
118.	Namibia	13-01-93	24-11-95	29-04-97
119.	Nauru	13-01-93	12-11-01	12-12-01
120.	Nepal	19-01-93	18-11-97	18-12-97
121.	Netherlands	14-01-93	30-06-95	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
122.	New Zealand	14-01-93	15-07-96	29-04-97
123.	Nicaragua	09-03-93	05-11-99	05-12-99
124.	Niger	14-01-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
125.	Nigeria	13-01-93	20-05-99	19-06-99
126.	Niue		21-04-05[a]	21-05-05
127.	North Macedonia		20-06-97[a]	20-07-97
128.	Norway	13-01-93	07-04-94	29-04-97
129.	Oman	02-02-93	08-02-95	29-04-97
130.	Pakistan	13-01-93	28-10-97	27-11-97
131.	Palau		03-02-03[a]	05-03-03
132.	Palestine (State of)		17-05-18	16-06-18
133.	Panama	16-06-93	07-10-98	06-11-98
134.	Papua New Guinea	14-01-93	17-04-96	29-04-97
135.	Paraguay	14-01-93	01-12-94	29-04-97
136.	Peru	14-01-93	20-07-95	29-04-97
137.	Philippines	13-01-93	11-12-96	29-04-97
138.	Poland	13-01-93	23-08-95	29-04-97
139.	Portugal	13-01-93	10-09-96	29-04-97
140.	Qatar	01-02-93	03-09-97	03-10-97
141.	Republic of Korea	14-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
142.	Republic of Moldova	13-01-93	08-07-96	29-04-97
143.	Romania	13-01-93	15-02-95	29-04-97
144.	Russian Federation	13-01-93	05-11-97	05-12-97
145.	Rwanda	17-05-93	31-03-04	30-04-04
146.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16-03-94	21-05-04	20-06-04
147.	Saint Lucia	29-03-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
148.	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	20-09-93	18-09-02	18-10-02
149.	Samoa	14-01-93	27-09-02	27-10-02
150.	San Marino	13-01-93	10-12-99	09-01-00
151.	Sao Tome and Principe		09-09-03[A]	09-10-03
152.	Saudi Arabia	20-01-93	09-08-96	29-04-97
153.	Senegal	13-01-93	20-07-98	19-08-98
154.	Serbia		20-04-00[a]	20-05-00
155.	Seychelles	15-01-93	07-04-93	29-04-97
156.	Sierra Leone	15-01-93	30-09-04	30-10-04
157.	Singapore	14-01-93	21-05-97	20-06-97
158.	Slovakia	14-01-93	27-10-95	29-04-97
159.	Slovenia	14-01-93	11-06-97	11-07-97
160.	Solomon Islands		23-09-04[a]	23-10-04
161.	Somalia		29-05-13[a]	28-06-13
162.	South Africa	14-01-93	13-09-95	29-04-97
163.	Spain	13-01-93	03-08-94	29-04-97
164.	Sri Lanka	14-01-93	19-08-94	29-04-97
165.	Sudan		24-05-99[a]	23-06-99

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
166.	Suriname	28-04-97	28-04-97	29-04-97
167.	Sweden	13-01-93	17-06-93	29-04-97
168.	Switzerland	14-01-93	10-03-95	29-04-97
169.	Syrian Arab Republic		14-09-13[a]	14-10-13
170.	Tajikistan	14-01-93	11-01-95	29-04-97
171.	Thailand	14-01-93	10-12-02	09-01-03
172.	Timor-Leste		07-05-03[a]	06-06-03
173.	Togo	13-01-93	23-04-97	29-04-97
174.	Tonga		29-05-03[a]	28-06-03
175.	Trinidad and Tobago		24-06-97[a]	24-07-97
176.	Tunisia	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
177.	Turkey	14-01-93	12-05-97	11-06-97
178.	Turkmenistan	12-10-93	29-09-94	29-04-97
179.	Tuvalu		19-01-04[a]	18-02-04
180.	Uganda	14-01-93	30-11-01	30-12-01
181.	Ukraine	13-01-93	16-10-98	15-11-98
182.	United Arab Emirates	02-02-93	28-11-00	28-12-00
183.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
184.	United Republic of Tanzania	25-02-94	25-06-98	25-07-98
185.	United States of America	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
186.	Uruguay	15-01-93	06-10-94	29-04-97
187.	Uzbekistan	24-11-95	23-07-96	29-04-97
188.	Vanuatu		16-09-05[a]	16-10-05
189.	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14-01-93	03-12-97	02-01-98
190.	Viet Nam	13-01-93	30-09-98	30-10-98
191.	Yemen	08-02-93	02-10-00	01-11-00
192.	Zambia	13-01-93	09-02-01	11-03-01
193.	Zimbabwe	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97

**Annex 2**

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES  
IN SERVICE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 2020**

<b>Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities by State Party</b>	
United States of America	Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant Static Detonation Chamber (BGCAPP-SDC) Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF) Chemical Transfer Facility/Munition Assessment Processing System (CTF/MAPS)* Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF)*

\* The facility remained in service in 2020, but no destruction operations took place.

## Annex 3

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DECLARED, DESTROYED, AND WITHDRAWN<sup>26</sup>  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020**

<b>Common Name of Chemical</b>	<b>Number of MT Declared</b>	<b>Number of MT Destroyed<sup>27</sup></b>
<b>Category 1</b>		
Sarin (GB)	15,047.041	14,769.102
Soman (GD) + viscous soman	9,057.203	9,057.203
Tabun (GA) + GA with UCON	2.283	2.283
VX/Vx + viscous Vx	19,586.722	19,471.323
EA 1699	0.002	0.002
Sulfur mustard (sulfur mustard, H, HD, HT, sulfur mustard in oil product)	17,439.877	16,642.684
Mixtures of sulfur mustard and lewisite (including HD/L mixture in dichloroethane)	344.679	344.679
Lewisite	6,746.876	6,746.875
DF	1,024.765	1,024.765
QL	46.174	46.173
OPA	730.545	730.545
Unknown	3.859	3.817
Toxic waste	1.705	1.705
Hexamine	78.231	78.231
IZO	133.325	133.325
Substance A	112.300	112.300
Substance B/BB	97.879	97.879
Substance B salt	40.170	40.170
<b>Total Category 1:</b>	<b>70,493.636</b>	<b>69,330.060</b>
<b>Category 2</b>		
Adamsite	0.350	0.350
CN	0.989	0.989
CNS	0.010	0.010
Chloroethanol	323.150	323.150
Thiodiglycol	50.960	50.960
Phosgene	10.616	10.616
Isopropanol	114.103	114.103
Phosphorous trichloride	154.056	154.056
Pinacolyl alcohol	19.257	19.257
Thionyl chloride	100.834	100.834
Sodium sulfide	246.625	246.625
Sodium fluoride	304.725	304.725
Tributylamine	238.655	238.655
DIPA ethanol	8.356	8.356

<sup>26</sup> Chemical warfare agents and precursors declared as Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons.

<sup>27</sup> Including Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks (2.913 MT). The rounding rule has been applied.

<b>Common Name of Chemical</b>	<b>Number of MT Declared</b>	<b>Number of MT Destroyed<sup>27</sup></b>
DMP	5.725	5.725
Hydrogen fluoride	31.850	31.850
Hydrogen chloride	44.500	44.500
Methanol	1.480	1.480
Monoisopropylamine	36.120	36.120
Butanol	3.792	3.792
Phosphorous pentasulfide	11.250	11.250
Phosphorous oxychloride	13.500	13.500
TEA	34.000	34.000
TMP	55.800	55.800
<b>Total Category 2:</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>72,304.339</b>	<b>70,548.620</b>

**Annex 4**

**NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED  
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, BY TYPE OF AGENT  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020<sup>28</sup>**

<b>Name of Riot Control Agent</b>	<b>Number of States Parties That Have Declared Possession</b>
CS	121
CN	65
OC	24
PAVA	13
CR	14
Other types	11

Total number of States Parties that had declared possession of riot control agents: 138

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<sup>28</sup>

The CAS nomenclature for riot control agents listed in this chart is as follows:

CS: CAS number 2698-41-1;  
CN: CAS number 532-27-4;  
OC: CAS number 8023-77-6;  
PAVA: CAS number 2444-46-4; and  
CR: CAS number 257-07-8.

Other types include mixtures of chemicals mentioned in the table or older types of riot control agents.

## Annex 5

## LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020

## (ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS)

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
1.	Belgium	Belgian Defence Laboratories (DLD)	12 May 2004
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	17 Nov 1998
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology Academy of Military Medical Sciences	14 Sept 2007
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN )	17 Nov 1998
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques*	29 Jun 1999
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection	29 Jun 1999
7.	India	Vertex Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	18 Apr 2006
8.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defence Chemical Research Laboratory	3 Aug 2011
9.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	17 Nov 1998
10.	Pakistan	Analytical Laboratory, Defence Science Technology Organisation	18 Apr 2018
11.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CB Department, Agency for Defence Development	3 Aug 2011
12.	Romania	Scientific Research Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis and Special Synthesis Laboratory*	15 Apr 2018
13.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre*	4 Aug 2000
14.	Russian Federation	Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, "State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology"*	15 Apr 2015
15.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	14 Apr 2003
16.	Spain	Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA), INTA Campus La Marañosa	16 Aug 2004
17.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	17 Nov 1998
18.	Switzerland	Spiez Laboratory Swiss NBC Defence Establishment	17 Nov 1998
19.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	29 Jun 1999
20.	United States of America	U.S. Army, Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM Chemical Biological Center) - Forensic Analytical Laboratory	17 Nov 1998
21.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	14 Apr 2003

\* This laboratory remained suspended at the end of the reporting period because of its performance in a recent OPCW proficiency test. This laboratory will not be considered for receipt of samples taken for off-site analysis until it performs satisfactorily in a future OPCW proficiency test.



**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020****(BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS)**

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	1 Aug 2016
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	1 Aug 2016
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	1 Aug 2016
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	1 Aug 2016
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques	1 Aug 2016
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology	1 Aug 2016
7.	India	Vertex Biochemistry Division Defence Research and Development Establishment	1 Aug 2016
8.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	1 Aug 2016
9.	Republic of Korea	CBRN Research Center, Republic of Korea CBRN Command	2 Dec 2020
10.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	1 Aug 2016
11.	Russian Federation	Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (RIHOPHE)	1 Aug 2016
12.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	1 Aug 2016
13.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	1 Aug 2016
14.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	1 Aug 2016
15.	United States of America	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	11 Jul 2017
16.	United States of America	Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center	1 Aug 2016
17.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
18.	United States of America	US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense	19 Aug 2019

Annex 6

SUMMARISED FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 2020<sup>29</sup>

STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING PROGRAMME AND SUBPROGRAMME  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2020

Funding Programme	Final Appropriation	Total Expenditure	Balance of Appropriations
1	2	3	4 (2-3)
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>			
1. Verification Programme	9,549,414	9,183,361	366,053
2. Inspections Programme	21,213,428	19,441,788	1,771,640
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>30,762,842</b>	<b>28,625,149</b>	<b>2,137,693</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>			
3. International Cooperation and Assistance Programme	6,915,700	4,907,415	2,008,285
4. Support to the Policy-Making Organs	4,928,795	4,869,950	58,845
5. External Relations Programme	2,023,643	1,771,626	252,017
6. Executive Management Programme	9,496,644	9,279,862	216,782
7. Administration Programme	15,081,168	15,024,784	56,384
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>38,445,950</b>	<b>35,853,637</b>	<b>2,592,313</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>69,208,792</b>	<b>64,478,785</b>	<b>4,730,007</b>

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Source: "Report by the Director-General: OPCW Income and Expenditure for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2020 (Fourth Quarter of the Financial Year Ending 31 December 2020)" (S/1948/2021, dated 13 April 2021) (unaudited).

**BANK BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020**

Fund	Balance	
	As at 31 December 2020 <sup>30</sup>	As at 31 December 2019
General Fund	13,094,708	3,980,862
Working Capital Fund	633,388	7,336,791
Special ERP Fund	917,021	2,249,158
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,567,950	1,562,975
OPCW special accounts	1,883,705	2,105,243
OPCW trust funds	32,779,871	29,615,495
<b>Total</b>	<b>50,876,643</b>	<b>46,850,524</b>

<sup>30</sup>

The bank balances of funds will usually differ from the status of fund balances owing to timing differences.

Annex 7

STATUS OF FUND BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2020

Fund Balances

Working Capital Fund, Special Funds, Voluntary Fund for Assistance, Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2020	2020 Income	Refunds/ Transfers During 2020	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2020	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2020
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Working Capital Fund	8,140,791	2,382	-	-	-	8,143,173
Special funds	4,312,812	441	2,340,729	965,071	3,038,756	4,580,297
Voluntary fund for assistance (Article X)	1,562,974	5,000	-	-	-	1,567,974
Trust funds	27,184,416	12,653,735	(121,036)	327,671	8,294,790	31,749,998

Syria Trust Fund Balances

Syria Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2020	2020 Income	Refunds/ Transfers During 2020	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2020	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2020
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Syria trust fund for the destruction of chemical weapons	172,133	-	-	400	17,294	155,239
Trust Fund for Syria Missions	8,054,514	3,746,645	-	162,586	5,236,078	6,727,667

Annex 8

**INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS REGISTERED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT  
FROM 1 JANUARY 2020 TO 31 DECEMBER 2020**

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 601	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	30-12-19 20-12-19	07-01-20
IAR 602	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	30-12-19 20-12-19	07-01-20
IAR 603	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	05-11-19 05-11-19	03-12-19
IAR 604	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	03-12-19 02-12-19	04-12-19
IAR 605	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Angola and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Angola	14-01-20 22-01-20	22-01-20
IAR 606	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Peru	21-01-20 17-12-19	21-01-20
IAR 607	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat People's Democratic Republic of Algeria	14-01-20 17-01-20	17-01-20

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 608	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Principality of Andorra	20-01-20 13-01-20	20-01-20
IAR 609	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Lawrence Livermore National Security LLC, USA concerning Sample Preparation for the 5 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Lawrence Livermore National Security LLC, the United States of America	30-01-20 14-02-20	14-02-20
IAR 610	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Islamic Republic of Pakistan	06-03-20 08-07-19	06-03-20
IAR 611	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Switzerland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Swiss Confederation	20-12-19 15-11-19	20-12-19
IAR 612	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Federal Republic of Germany	13-03-20 13-03-20	13-03-20
IAR 613	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	23-01-20 22-01-20	03-02-20
IAR 614	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	23-01-20 22-01-20	03-02-20

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 615	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) Chemical Biological Center, Forensic Analytical Laboratory, the United States of America concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 47 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) Chemical Biological Center, Forensic Analytical Laboratory, the United States of America	05-03-20 18-03-20	18-03-20
IAR 616	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Analysis Laboratory of the Agency for Defense Development of the Republic of Korea Regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat Chemical Analysis Laboratory of the Agency for Defense Development of the Republic of Korea	09-05-20 02-06-20	02-06-20
IAR 617	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Cyprus	16-12-20 10-12-20	16-12-20
IAR 618	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Malta	14-12-20 11-12-20	14-12-20
IAR 619	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the Trust fund for Security and Business Continuity	OPCW Technical Secretariat Federal Republic of Germany	02-12-20 02-12-20	02-12-20
IAR 620	Grant Arrangement between the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the United States of America and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the United States of America	28-10-20 30-09-20	30-09-20
IAR 621	Ad Hoc Privileges and Immunities Agreement	OPCW Technical Secretariat Federal Republic of Germany	04-09-20 04-09-20	04-09-20

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 622	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, China concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 48 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Academy of Military Medical Sciences, People's Republic of China	17-07-20 03-08-20	03-08-20
IAR 623	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Lithuania	12-10-20 12-10-20	12-10-20
IAR 624	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	26-02-20 14-02-20	02-03-20
IAR 625	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	26-02-20 14-02-20	02-03-20
IAR 626	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Hellenic Republic	28-09-20 28-09-20	28-09-20
IAR 627	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Malaysia	14-10-20 14-10-20	14-10-20
IAR 628	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Minister of Defence of the French Republic Concerning Evaluation of the Results of the 5 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Minister of Defence, French Republic	14-01-20 20-01-20	20-01-20



<b>International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 629	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Switzerland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Swiss Confederation	30-10-20 Undated	30-10-20
IAR 630	MoU between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	06-11-20 06-11-20	06-11-20
IAR 631	MoU between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	06-11-20 06-11-20	06-11-20
IAR 632	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry, Research Institute of Chemical Defence, China concerning Evaluation of the results of the 6 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Research Institute of Chemical Defence, People's Republic of China	Undated	Undated
IAR 633	Land Reservation Agreement (Grondreserveringsovereenkomst)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp, Kingdom of the Netherlands	14-12-18 14-12-18	14-12-18
IAR 634	Land Purchase Agreement (Koopovereenkomst Bedrijvenpark Horen)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp, Kingdom of the Netherlands	19-12-19 19-12-19	19-12-19
IAR 635	Non-Disclosure Agreement between the OPCW and the Municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp	OPCW Technical Secretariat Municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp, Kingdom of the Netherlands	06-11-20 29-10-20	06-11-20

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 636	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	02-10-20 02-10-20	02-10-20
IAR 637	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Regional Seminars	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	02-10-20 02-10-20	02-10-20

<b>Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2020</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 381(m)	Amendment No. 13 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Nations Office for Project Services Syrian Arab Republic	12-12-19 18-12-19 31-12-19	31-12-19
IAR 381(n)	Amendment No. 14 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Nations Office for Project Services Syrian Arab Republic	09-03-20 22-03-20 29-03-20	29-03-20
IAR 381(o)	Amendment No. 15 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Nations Office for Project Services Syrian Arab Republic	17-09-20 22-09-20 27-09-20	27-09-20
IAR 427(c)	Amendment 3 to the Administrative Arrangement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Republic	20-01-20 20-01-20	20-01-20
IAR 546(a)	Amendment No. 1 to Grant Arrangement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to support OPCW's activities under CWC with the establishment of a New Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada	24-09-20 22-09-20	24-09-20
IAR 532(a)	Amendment to the Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France concerning the Provision of Junior Professional Officers	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Republic	02-10-20 09-09-20	02-10-20

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