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REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (the Council) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.



5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference), at its Twenty-Fifth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). In paragraph 8 of this decision, the Conference decided that the Director-General shall regularly report to the Council and States Parties on whether the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.
7. This, the 129th monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council and Conference decisions and includes information relevant to the period from 24 May to 23 June 2024.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

8. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:
 - (a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.
 - (b) On 14 June 2024, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its 127th monthly report (EC-106/P/NAT.4, dated 14 June 2024) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

9. As stated in previous reports, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5

10. The Secretariat, through the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), continues its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention), paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4, paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, and paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

11. The twenty-seventh round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place in Damascus in May 2024. During this round of consultations, the DAT conducted technical meetings with experts from the Syrian National Authority, visited three declared former chemical weapons-related sites, collected a total of eight samples, and interviewed three individuals involved or potentially involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The details of this round of consultations will be reported to the Council through the Director-General's report on the work of the DAT at the forthcoming meeting of the Council.
12. As reported previously, the Secretariat has serious concerns regarding the presence of unexpected chemicals in the samples collected by the DAT between 2020 and 2023 at two declared sites. The DAT has engaged with the Syrian National Authority on these matters since the results of the analysis were shared with the Syrian Arab Republic, in February 2021 and in October 2023, respectively. The Secretariat requested verifiable and scientifically plausible explanations of the results of sample analysis.
13. As at the date of this report, three rounds of consultations have taken place and several notes verbales have been exchanged on these matters.
14. Most recently, through a note verbale dated 11 June 2024, the Secretariat reiterated its earlier requests to the Syrian Arab Republic to provide additional scientifically plausible and verifiable explanations to clarify these results by 21 June 2024, in order for the DAT to properly study and reassess the Syrian technical experts' explanations and report the current status of these matters to the Council.
15. Through the same note verbale, the Secretariat reminded the Syrian National Authority that failing to provide additional verifiable and substantiated explanations, or providing insufficient or scientifically implausible explanations, may result in opening further outstanding issues.
16. On 21 June 2024, the Syrian National Authority provided its response to the Secretariat's request, which will be translated and analysed by the DAT. Further details will be reported accordingly.
17. The Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration obligations under the Convention, decisions of the policy-making organs, and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
18. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1, EC-81/DEC.4, EC-83/DEC.5, and EC-94/DEC.2, as well as Conference decisions C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018) and C-25/DEC.9, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).
19. In accordance with paragraph 10 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is continuing to assess conditions for the conduct of inspections at the sites identified by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in its third and fourth reports.

20. As mandated by paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is planning the 2024 rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC).
21. With regard to the presence of a Schedule 2.B.04 chemical in the sample collected during the November 2018 inspection, and to the origin and usage of a chemical of a dual-use nature observed by the inspection team during the September 2022 inspection at the SSRC Barzah facilities, the Secretariat has not received any new information that might resolve these matters, and will further engage on them with the Syrian National Authority during the next round of SSRC inspections.

Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

22. In a note verbale to the Secretariat dated 9 July 2021, the Syrian National Authority also reported the destruction in an attack on a former CWPF of, inter alia, two chlorine cylinders used in the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018. In its reply dated 15 July 2021, the Secretariat requested the Syrian Arab Republic to, inter alia, provide all relevant information regarding the unauthorised movement of the two cylinders from the site where they had been stored and inspected in November 2020, 60 kilometres away from the site where the cylinders had allegedly been destroyed. As at the date of this report, the Secretariat had not received a response to this request. The Secretariat will keep the Council informed of further developments on this matter.
23. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the OPCW, UNOPS, and the Syrian Arab Republic. This Agreement facilitates the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to the full elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to any subsequent decision or resolution of the relevant organs of the OPCW or the United Nations, as well as any bilateral agreements concluded between the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic. The current extension of the Tripartite Agreement remains in force up to and including 30 June 2024. As at the date of this report, the finalisation of a further extension of the Agreement is in progress.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

24. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015 and 23 November 2015, respectively), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the FFM continues to study all available information relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
25. On 11 June 2024, the Secretariat issued a report (S/2295/2024) by the FFM entitled "Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding Incidents of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Qalib al-Thawr, al-Salamiyah, on 9 August 2017, and al-Balil, Souran, on 8 November 2017, in Hama Governorate, the Syrian Arab Republic".

26. The information obtained and analysed is not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for the FFM to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents that occurred on 9 August 2017 in Qalib al-Thawr and on 8 November 2017 in al-Balil, Hama Governorate, the Syrian Arab Republic.
27. The report was shared with all States Parties to the Convention and transmitted to the United Nations Security Council through the United Nations Secretary-General.
28. The FFM is continuing its work and will issue further reports in due course.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

29. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat established the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.
30. The IIT is continuing its investigations in accordance with the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course. In accordance with paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat will continue to preserve and provide information to the mechanism established by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations. Further, the Secretariat will continue to integrate knowledge and expertise from the IIT, in line with the Convention and decisions adopted by the policy-making organs, into standard operations.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2

31. In paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2, the Council decided:
 - to request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:
 - (a) declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;
 - (b) declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and

- (c) resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme.

- 32. At the end of the 90 days, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.
- 33. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat is monitoring the current security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for this purpose.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Conference of the States Parties decision C-25/DEC.9

- 34. In paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9, the Conference decided, after careful review, and without prejudice to the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 21(k) of Article VIII and paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention, to suspend several rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.
- 35. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference decided, inter alia, that the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic suspended in accordance with paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9 are reinstated by the Conference once the Director-General has reported to the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.
- 36. The Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to the completion of said measures and will continue to report to the Council as mandated.

Decision on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use

- 37. As previously reported, at its Twenty-Eighth Session, the Conference adopted a decision entitled "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use" (C-28/DEC.12, dated 30 November 2023). The Secretariat is reporting on the elements in the decision concerning the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons dossier in accordance with existing reporting obligations.

Supplementary resources

- 38. The Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, which presently include the work of the DAT and the IIT, as well as the biannual inspections of the SSRC and the two sites identified in paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to this fund stood at EUR 43.8 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.

Conclusion

39. The future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on: the work of the FFM; the implementation of Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1, EC-81/DEC.4, and EC-83/DEC.5, including declaration-related issues; inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah sites of the SSRC; the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3; the implementation of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2; the implementation of Conference decision C-25/DEC.9; and the implementation of Conference decision C-28/DEC.12.

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