



MEDIUM-TERM PLAN FOR THE PERIOD FROM 2013 TO 2015

BACKGROUND

1. This revision of the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) for the period from 2013 to 2015 has been prepared to accompany the Draft Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2014 (EC-74/CRP.1, dated 12 July 2013). In accordance with Financial Regulation 3.8, this revision updates figures contained in paragraphs 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the MTP for 2013 to 2015, in order to reflect developments since its formulation. The objectives and programme priorities of the Organisation for the years covered by the MTP remain the same.
2. The starting point for this MTP was the plan for 2012 to 2014 (EC-66/S/1 C-16/S/1, dated 8 July 2011 and Corr.1, dated 30 September 2011); the results that States Parties want to achieve, as expressed in the core objectives that were approved as part of the Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2005 by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) at its Ninth Session (C-9/DEC.14, dated 2 December 2004); and the indicators of achievement proposed for the Draft Programme and Budget for 2013, as reflected in the annex to this MTP.
3. This revised MTP sets the context for the Draft Programme and Budget for 2014, and complies with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) and with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the OPCW.

CHALLENGES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 2013 TO 2015

The evolving global context

4. The global context in which the Convention operates is rapidly evolving. On the one hand, the threat of “traditional” chemical warfare with mass casualties has declined significantly, yet the possibility remains that some States not Party and non-State actors may be ready to resort to the misuse of toxic chemicals and even certain types of chemical weapons. Ever-advancing science and technology, coupled with growing interdependence of the world, are bringing about new security-related challenges that the OPCW should be ready to address.



5. The seven core objectives of the OPCW, namely, chemical demilitarisation, non-proliferation, assistance and protection, international cooperation, universality, national implementation, and organisational effectiveness, will remain unchanged.
6. As destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles continues to progress, the Organisation has entered a prolonged period of change that is likely to go beyond the end of the forthcoming medium-term period. The change process will be a gradual one and will focus on:
 - (a) reordering the priorities of the Organisation;
 - (b) reviewing internal processes that can be streamlined and made more efficient;
 - (c) identifying efficiencies in the allocation of staffing resources; and
 - (d) rearranging existing units of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”).
7. While discussions on the recommendations of the report of the Advisory Panel on Future OPCW Priorities are in progress, an Internal Review Committee has been set up to make recommendations in the above areas based on inputs from States Parties, independent experts, and OPCW staff members.
8. As the change process starts to take shape, the following areas of strategic emphasis will be explored in the medium term:
 - (a) how to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons and the hostile use or misuse of toxic chemicals;
 - (b) how to ensure an effective response to chemical-emergency situations;
 - (c) how to improve the full and effective implementation of the Convention; and
 - (d) how to further promote international cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of chemistry.

Other areas of strategic emphasis may also be explored in the years ahead, as the changes take on a clearer shape.

9. Key cross-cutting themes to help achieve the core objectives and to support the exploration of the four areas of strategic emphasis in the medium term include: robust analysis of science and technology; focused, integrated, and effective advice on chemical safety and security; tailored national implementation; and enhanced engagement with the widest range of stakeholders:
 - (a) Science and technology: In a time of rapid advances in science and technology, new chemical compounds and production methods are constantly being discovered and researched. This creates a need to review scientific developments and to consider possible policy implications. The close coordination between the Scientific Advisory Board and the Secretariat will be carried out by the Science Policy Adviser. This focal point will also work

with the wider scientific community and governmental experts to ensure that the Secretariat is well informed and able to respond to the current threats involving chemical weapons.

- (b) Chemical safety and chemical security: Articles VI, VII, X, and XI of the Convention together provide the rationale for OPCW to engage in chemical safety and security activities. The OPCW's contribution in this area needs to become more focused and better integrated. Because of the multitude of international instruments and lead agencies in chemical safety, the OPCW would be more suitable as a complementary partner in some aspects of safety. By contrast, the OPCW is well placed to be one of the lead international organisations in chemical security. Bearing this in mind, the anticipated focus would be to identify best practices, catalyse international partnerships, and promote national capabilities by providing advice that is integrated with other international players.
- (c) Tailored national implementation: National Authorities are responsible for the full and effective implementation of the Convention. Attention should be given to finding ways to encourage those States Parties that are lagging behind to accord priority to the implementation of the Convention. Similarly, ways should be sought to encourage all States Parties to increase their bilateral contacts with each other and address this matter in the context of their regional cooperation schemes. States Parties should also address security aspects when coordinating the implementation of the Convention at the national level. Therefore, a more tailor-made approach vis-à-vis individual States Parties, based on needs and capabilities, should be pursued. However, care must be taken not to lose sight of the comprehensive nature of the prohibitions covered by the scope of the "general-purpose criterion" of the Convention.
- (d) Enhanced engagement with the widest range of stakeholders: The OPCW will strive to promote public diplomacy, mindful of increasing recognition of its achievements, in order to engender greater confidence in its role as a security and disarmament organisation and to enhance its engagement with key stakeholder communities. This will increase its recognition as a trusted partner in the fields of multilateralism and international cooperation. Partnerships are essential for the OPCW in order to accomplish its mission and achieve its objectives. Success will depend not only on the OPCW's own capacity, but also on the effectiveness with which the OPCW acts in partnership with all its key stakeholders¹. The use of social media and e-learning tools should be increased to make outreach efforts more effective. In working more closely with the chemical industry it would be beneficial to emulate the spirit of engagement that was helpful during the negotiation of the Convention.

10. In April 2013, the OPCW held the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Third Review Conference"). As the Secretariat needed to provide overall support and cooperation in the areas of substantive and logistical matters for

¹ Governmental authorities, regional and international organisations, civil society, scientific communities, and—not least—the chemical industry.

the Third Review Conference, an internal task force was appointed to assist the open-ended working group created by the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) to prepare for the event. The activities related to the preparation of the Third Review Conference and the Third Review Conference itself are important for the development and future of the Organisation and for the continued implementation of the Convention.

Key risks in the medium term

11. The Secretariat has begun to take an Organisation-wide approach to risk management to ensure that uncertainties (both risks and opportunities) are identified and managed at the strategic, programme, and, as necessary, operational levels. The Organisation will introduce a coherent and consistent approach to better identify, assess, and act upon risks as well as opportunities that could have either a positive or negative impact on its performance. A straightforward but effective risk-management approach increases the success rate of achieving both OPCW programmes and core objectives.
12. While effective risk management is a key component in determining the success of the Organisation in achieving its stated outcomes in the context of results-based management (RBM), it is also important in ensuring that programme managers are held accountable for identifying and managing the uncertainties associated with their respective programmes. In this regard, the Secretariat is in the process of developing a programme monitoring and reporting system (PMRS), which incorporates a risk-assessment tool.
13. The following is a general overview of the main risks identified during the risk-management process.

Inability to respond to the verification mandate under the Convention

14. As the complete destruction of chemical weapons will not be concluded during the period covered by the current MTP, destruction activities will need to continue. The pace of destruction, however, is uncertain, as new discoveries continue to be made (especially of old and abandoned chemical weapons (OACWs)), and any new States Parties acceding to the Convention could conceivably possess chemical weapons that would need to be verifiably destroyed. This uncertainty could lead to a reduced capability of the OPCW to respond to its verification mandate under the Convention.
15. The Organisation will therefore need, within existing resources, to retain the competence, staff, and technical expertise to manage the verification of destruction activities at declared chemical weapons facilities and the verification of the destruction of OACWs. At the same time, it will need to have the capacity to respond to potential declarations from States not yet Party to the Convention, and to conduct challenge inspections (CIs) and investigations of alleged use (IAUs). The Secretariat’s inability to calibrate its inspection- and verification-related staff resources in a way that allows it to respond to a surge in requirements when needed (while not retaining redundant capacity on a routine basis) could pose a significant risk of failure to carry out the primary mandate under the Convention.

Re-emergence of chemical weapons and/or the misuse of toxic chemicals

16. Another major challenge in the coming years will be to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons and, equally importantly, to ensure that toxic chemicals are not misused by individuals or members of non-State groups to inflict terror or cause social or economic instability.
17. The Secretariat will maintain a robust regime of inspections under Article VI. This will be coupled with data analysis and monitoring of declarations received from all States Parties. In addition, Member States will be provided with assistance to respond to the possible misuse of toxic chemicals. In collaboration with the international scientific community, the chemical industry, and Member State governments, the Secretariat will develop the necessary guidelines to ensure the responsible management of toxic chemicals.
18. As is the case for the risk outlined above, the Secretariat will need, within existing resources, to retain the competence, staff, technical expertise, and information-systems capability in order to have the capacity to manage the Article VI regime and to respond to requests for assistance from Member States.

Reduced interest by States Parties in implementing the Convention

19. Despite the achievements to date in implementing the Convention and the increasing efforts by the Secretariat to reach out to States Parties to offer assistance in this field, many States Parties still do not have adequate national implementing legislation. This is mainly due to the lack of legal technical capacity and/or of the political will to pass Convention-related legislation through legislative bodies. Understandably, some States Parties have other domestic legislation priorities, and at the same time the benefits of implementing the Convention are not always evident in terms of enhancing chemical safety and security, and promoting trade and cooperation for the peaceful use of chemistry.
20. In the forthcoming years, given the progress made towards the complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles by possessor States and the possible increase in the perception that the burden of implementing the Convention outweighs the benefits, there is a possible risk of a reduced interest by States Parties in implementing the Convention. This could, in turn, compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime.
21. To mitigate this risk, the Organisation is in the process of reviewing its plan of action regarding the implementation of Article VII obligations, with the aim of providing more agile, needs-based assistance to States Parties that will lead to the more effective and broader implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat is also designing new cooperation-and-assistance activities, making use of best practices in Member States. All of these activities will be part of a sustained programme of engagement with States Parties that are not chemical weapons possessors, are not industrialised, and which have a comparatively low level of potential declarations or inspections, but form an integral part of a robust and sustainable non-proliferation regime.

Financial constraints of States Parties

22. Governments are expected to continue to tighten public expenditure in light of the continuing fragility of the global economy. The austerity cutbacks being imposed domestically by many governments are likely to limit the resources being made available to the Secretariat for the fulfilment of its mandate.
23. The Secretariat will, therefore, need to manage this reality by becoming more efficient in its day-to-day operations within the available appropriations. It will also need to address with Member States their obligations under the Convention to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

POLICY ORIENTATION AND STRATEGY

24. The issues outlined above and their relationship to the core objectives are set out in the following paragraphs.

Core objective 1

Elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) subject to the verification measures provided for in the Convention

25. As provided for by the Convention and the relevant decisions of the Conference, Member States that have declared possession of chemical weapons or CWPFs, or both, are responsible for their elimination within the prescribed time frames, and for meeting the costs of related inspections.
26. Verification of destruction activities will continue to be the major priority for the OPCW in the coming years. The role of the Secretariat is to provide assurances, through verification, regarding the identity and quantities of chemical weapons that have been declared, destroyed, or have yet to be destroyed, and the number of CWPFs that have been declared, that have been destroyed or converted, and that have yet to be destroyed or converted. Verification of the conversion of CWPFs will continue for a 10-year period following conversion. The nature of continued verification measures at converted facilities for which 10 years have elapsed after the Director-General's certification of their conversion will take place in accordance with the relevant decision of the Council (EC-67/DEC.7, dated 16 February 2012). The Secretariat will continue to conduct verification, through on-site inspections, in respect of declared OACWs, and of the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs).
27. There is a continuing need to retain an adequate level of core expertise related to chemical weapons. Due to the technical requirements associated with OACWs, CIs, and IAUs, expertise in these areas must be maintained in order to meet operational needs. This will also be necessary to be able to respond to requests for assistance from States Parties in situations of misuse or release of toxic chemicals. Attention should also be given to the resource requirements associated with the possible accession of new possessor States Parties.² An appropriate level of expertise to verify the destruction of

² Any additional requirements for inspector days due to the possible accession of new possessor States Parties are not included in the projections contained in this MTP.

chemical weapons is needed, in the event that such inspections become necessary in the future as a result of new declarations from States not Party to the Convention.

28. The Secretariat must be able to fulfil its responsibilities in a timely manner at the requisite levels. Table 1 shows the projected number of inspectable facilities under Articles IV and V for each year covered by this MTP.

TABLE 1: PROJECTED NUMBER OF ARTICLE IV AND V INSPECTABLE FACILITIES³

Type of Facility ⁴	2013 ⁵	2014	2015
CWDF	7 ⁶	5 ⁷	8 ⁸
CWPF	22	27 ⁹	27
CWSF	9	9	9
OACW sites	45	45 ¹⁰	45

29. The number of inspections to be conducted during the year and the number of inspector days required to undertake them are calculated based on, inter alia: the planned schedules of destruction operations as submitted by States Parties¹¹; the recommendations for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections of CWSFs (C-I/DEC.10, dated 14 May 1997); the risk assessment to determine the frequency of inspections needed at each individual CWPF and the nature of continued verification measures at converted facilities for which 10 years have elapsed after the Director-General's certification of their conversion as established by EC-67/DEC.7; the agreed frequency of inspections at ACW destruction sites, as reflected in facility arrangements; and other specifically tailored circumstances in the case of old chemical weapons (OCW) inspections. Furthermore, the Secretariat has to take into account the inspection-team sizes agreed with States Parties following the implementation of optimisation measures. The projected requirements for ranges of inspector days are shown in Table 2 below.

3 Declared facilities, which are subject to systematic verification under Article IV and V.

4 CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility; CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

5 These data are similar to the ones approved in the Programme and Budget for 2013 and were confirmed by the States Parties at the beginning of 2012.

6 One CWDF in Iraq for three months; one CWDF in Libya for 10 months; and four CWDFs in the Russian Federation for 12 months and one for nine months.

7 Five CWDFs in the Russian Federation for 12 months.

8 One CWDF in Iraq for 12 months; one CWDF in Libya for 12 months; five CWDFs in the Russian Federation for 12 months; and one CWDF in the United States of America for one month.

9 This figure from 2014 includes the facilities declared by Iraq being converted or under destruction.

10 The maximum number of inspectable OACW sites, which is subject to changes depending on the recovery of OACW in the States Parties.

11 The planned schedules of destruction activities as submitted by the States Parties concerned do not take into consideration additional delays caused by unexpected technical challenges or periods of inactivity, or further rescheduling with respect to the start of operations at facilities/units under construction. In view of this, while revising Table 2 of the MTP for 2013 to 2015, the Secretariat has taken into account previous experience with regard to destruction and verification activities and, therefore, anticipated ranges of inspector days are presented for each year. The comparisons in the revised paragraphs 30 and 31 have been made on the basis of the averages of the number of anticipated inspector days for each year. Each total presented for the range is rounded off to the nearest 100.

TABLE 2: PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR RANGES OF INSPECTOR DAYS FOR ARTICLE IV AND V INSPECTIONS

Type of Facility	2013		2014		2015	
CWDF	10,100	13,000	9,000	10,100	13,700	14,700
CWSF	550	600	550	600	550	600
CWPF	160	190	160	170	170	180
OACW sites	740	780	710	730	710	730
Totals	11,700	14,600	10,500	11,500	15,200	16,100

30. The variations in projected requirements for inspector days for Article IV and V inspections are triggered primarily by the requirement to verify the destruction of chemical weapons. Therefore, the number of CWDFs in operation during any given year will have a significant bearing on the overall requirement for inspector days. In comparison with 2013, the Secretariat anticipates a 16.3% reduction in 2014 in terms of the average number of inspector-day requirements for verification of Article IV and V inspections. The level of inspector days reached in 2014 would then increase by 42.3% in 2015.
31. A fluctuation in the average number of inspector days ranging between a reduction of 5.7% in 2014 and an increase of 6.1% in 2015 is currently projected for verification at CWPFs. In comparison with 2013, the Secretariat anticipates a 5.3% reduction in 2014 in the number of OACW-related inspections, and this number is expected to remain stable until 2015. Verification at CWSFs is also expected to remain stable from 2013 to 2015.
32. The Secretariat will continue its efforts to optimise the use of verification resources, notably by implementing an optimised verification approach at CWDFs and through the continuation of the scheme for on-call inspectors, whereby such inspectors work under a special-service agreement.

Core objective 2

Non-proliferation of chemical weapons, through the application of the verification and implementation measures provided for in the Convention, which also serve to build confidence between States Parties

33. In accordance with the Convention, the Secretariat provides assurances regarding the non-proliferation of chemical weapons through timely and effective verification.
34. Due to the dynamic nature of the chemical-production industry, the verification of Article VI sites will become more important to the integrity of the Convention. Currently, the number of newly declared other chemical production facilities (OCPFs) is greater than the number of annual OCPF inspections. The OCPF inspection regime encompasses over 80% of the inspectable facilities.
35. In order to strengthen the internal capabilities of individual States Parties, it is important to ensure that the National Authorities are capable of monitoring their domestic chemical industries. The security of States Parties requires that the inspections be distributed among as many States Parties as possible, in keeping with the stipulations of the Convention.

36. The number of inspectable industry facilities (those covered by Article VI) producing scheduled or unscheduled chemicals is not expected to change significantly during the period covered by this MTP. Their geographical distribution is expected to continue to shift towards emerging economies. As a consequence, the number of States Parties that declare these types of facilities is expected to remain stable or decrease slightly, and the technical complexity is expected to increase, particularly for OCPFs, as new technologies are introduced. As decided by the Conference at its Sixteenth Session, the number of Article VI inspections will increase in 2013 and 2014, compared to 2012 (C-16/DEC.12, dated 2 December 2011). Therefore, the Secretariat expects to perform 229 inspections in 2013, and 241 in 2014. From 2015 or earlier, the situation with regard to the number of Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemical facility inspections will be reviewed. Schedule 3 inspections will need particular evaluation in light of the completion of initial inspections of Schedule 3 plant sites in all States Parties but one. The total number of Article VI inspections is expected to be reviewed in 2014 to decide the number of inspections to be conducted in 2015.
37. As a confidence-building measure and to verify the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals, the number of Article VI inspections involving sampling and analysis is likely to be in the region of eight to 12 inspections per year.
38. Establishing a credible level of assurance for non-proliferation remains a priority for all Article VI inspections and, in particular, for OCPF inspections, due to, inter alia, the large number of plant sites that have yet to be inspected. The revised OCPF site-selection methodology will continue to be employed as an interim measure until States Parties reach agreement on how to incorporate the provisions of subparagraph 11(c) of Part IX of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter the "Verification Annex") into the selection methodology.
39. The Secretariat will continue to maintain its readiness to conduct a CI or IAU under Articles IX and X of the Convention, through various activities, namely, conducting training, implementing lessons identified in mock exercises, improving methods for on-site analysis, and conducting headquarters and field exercises to demonstrate/benchmark preparedness and identify any further areas to improve. The Secretariat will continue to rely on the support of States Parties. Efforts related to IAUs will also contribute towards core objective 3.
40. The Verification Information System (VIS) and the electronic declarations tool for National Authorities (EDNA) have become key enabling software applications for the attainment of core objectives. Priority will be given to the maintenance and continuing improvement of these systems, accompanied by work to enhance capabilities for data governance and analysis, data-quality management, and business-continuity and risk management. Further work will also be undertaken to investigate options for the direct secure transmission to the Secretariat of declarations by States Parties.
41. Since the VIS has come into use, it has been possible to conduct more in-depth data analysis of declarations as part of the Secretariat's routine data-monitoring activities. Initial work on the transfers regime has been extended to examine trends in aggregate national data as potential indicators of additional declarable activities. These analyses

have had significant success in assisting a number of States Parties to identify additional declarable activities (both plant sites and imports/exports). Work will continue to extend and refine the scope of the Secretariat's data-monitoring activities, while supporting efforts by States Parties to address the high level of transfer discrepancies.

42. Work will also continue, as resources permit, to support States Parties through the provision of direct and indirect support, including bilateral assistance, support to training and outreach activities, the development of e-learning tools, the review and updating/improvement of information on the OPCW website and extranet, and updates and improvements to chemical databases provided by the Secretariat to assist in the identification of scheduled chemicals, such as the Handbook on Chemicals and the online scheduled chemicals database. Many of these activities will also contribute towards the attainment of other core objectives, in particular 3, 4, 5, and 6.
43. An efficient and secure information centre is fundamental to the operation of the verification and non-proliferation regimes. Work will continue towards the adoption of "best practice" within this area of operations, including improvements to information-management systems, the ongoing development of retention schedules, and policies for the long-term conservation of holdings.

Core objective 3

Assistance and protection against chemical weapons, their use, or threat of use, in accordance with the provisions of Article X of the Convention

44. During the period covered by this MTP, the preparedness of the OPCW to provide emergency assistance in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons will continue to be a key priority. The lessons drawn from the ASSISTEX 3 exercise, which was held in Tunisia from 11 to 15 October 2010, will be followed up and taken into consideration when planning for ASSISTEX 4 in the medium term. Further deliberations will be conducted with States Parties to continue to strengthen the existing measures for emergency assistance.
45. Cooperation with other relevant international organisations on emergency response to the use or threat of use of chemical weapons will continue to be further developed. The Secretariat will work on enhancing cooperation with international organisations in the field of delivery of assistance and will participate in joint exercises in order to improve interoperability and coordination.
46. The Secretariat will also promote the utilisation of the formats and procedures approved by the Conference for facilitating Member States' fulfilment of their obligations under Article X of the Convention. The provision of the information by Member States will be used to improve the Secretariat's efforts to provide expert advice on this and other core objectives of the Convention.
47. The Secretariat will continue to support Member States in the development and/or improvement of their protective programmes against chemical weapons in accordance with the requirements stipulated in Article X. Technical assistance and expert advice will be provided to Member States upon request or by means of the analysis of requirements through training courses, workshops, and exercises, and by continuing to

improve and update the data bank on assistance and protection established in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article X.

48. In order to provide expert advice to Member States in a more systematic and cost-effective manner, the Secretariat has developed a regional assistance-and-protection concept (S/984/2012, dated 7 February 2012). This concept is intended to encourage the Member States to establish regional and/or subregional Chemical Weapons Convention Assistance-and-Protection Centres (CWCAPCs) and networks in order to improve their ability to deal with and respond to a possible chemical attack.
49. The Secretariat will play a facilitating role by providing assistance to States Parties wishing to establish CWCAPCs. It will provide relevant expert and technical support and will, within the resources available, jointly organise and sponsor training activities for CWCAPC instructors, as well as for participants from the Member States in the region in question. The OPCW will be also able to provide training curricula used in its capacity-building programmes under Article X.
50. In addition, the OPCW will strengthen cooperation with other relevant organisations involved in the development of CBRN¹² protection capabilities, including regional centres of excellence, in order to avoid duplication of effort and to increase States Parties' capacities.
51. The Conference at its Sixteenth Session endorsed a proposal for the establishment of the international support network for victims of chemical weapons and the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for this purpose (C-16/DEC.13, dated 2 December 2011).
52. The Secretariat will continue to encourage the States Parties to actively support the network by, inter alia, providing financial contributions to the trust fund and medical treatment to victims of chemical weapons in their countries; organising events to raise awareness at the national level about victims of chemical weapons; exchanging information on experiences related to treatment of victims of chemical weapons; and facilitating materials- and equipment-related assistance to States Parties to assist and support the victims of chemical weapons (S/1000/2012, dated 3 March 2012).
53. The Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism will continue to serve as a forum for sharing information and best practices among Member States, as well as for substantive discussions on the issue of the OPCW's contribution to the global efforts against terrorism. The Secretariat will strengthen contacts and exchanges with relevant international, regional, and subregional organisations in the field of counter-terrorism and will support the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by participating in the work of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

¹² CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.

54. States Parties have expressed a renewed interest in the ability of the OPCW to assist in the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to incidents involving the misuse or release of toxic chemicals. In response, the Secretariat has created a Chemical Safety and Security Task Force (CSSTF). Among its tasks, the CSSTF is considering potential roles for the OPCW to contribute to chemical safety and security in the international framework by identifying best practices, enhancing cooperation with international partners in the field, and assisting in national capacity-building. The OPCW is well placed to become one of the leading international repositories of expertise in chemical security.

Core objective 4

Economic and technological development through international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article XI

55. The decision on components of an agreed framework for the full implementation of Article XI taken by the Conference at its Sixteenth Session (C-16/DEC.10, dated 1 December 2011) has provided a new set of priorities, in addition to endorsing the current activities with a view to implementing the promotion of peaceful uses of chemistry.
56. During the coming years, the Secretariat will focus on implementing activities in the area of international cooperation for economic and technological development in accordance with the aforementioned decision. The main measures identified have been classified into the following four categories:
- (a) national capacity-building for the research, development, storage, production, and safe use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under the Convention;
 - (b) promoting networking and exchange among scientific communities, academic institutions, chemical-industry associations, non-governmental organisations, and regional and international institutions;
 - (c) enhancing the effectiveness of current international-cooperation programmes of the OPCW; and
 - (d) measures by States Parties and the OPCW to facilitate States Parties' participation in the full exchange of chemicals-related, equipment-related, and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
57. The proposed strategy for the medium term will be to implement the decision on Article XI (C-16/DEC.10) within the existing financial and human resources and voluntary contributions, as well as with the support received from Member States through the participation in and contribution to regional and national resource partnerships and centres of excellence. The concept of "resource partners" will be developed to identify, on a voluntary basis and with the assistance of National Authorities, international, regional, and national institutions that would provide support and collaborate in implementing the activities identified in the agreed

framework. These initiatives will be developed to implement the strategy and to integrate activities on a regional basis.

58. The aforementioned measures would be complemented by the ongoing activities in the areas of integrated chemical management, enhancing laboratories' capabilities, chemical knowledge promotion and exchange, and industry outreach. The emphasis in these activities will be on streamlining processes to maximise efficiency, while obtaining the widest possible geographical involvement. In the area of industry outreach, increased attention will be paid to issues related to chemical safety and security.
59. International-cooperation programmes will continue to be evaluated in order to enhance efficiency and to further refine future activities accordingly. Furthermore, the Secretariat will continue to develop relations with relevant international organisations with regard to the planning and formulating of projects for the promotion of the peaceful uses of chemistry.

Core objective 5

Universal adherence to the Convention

60. While recognising the significant progress achieved over the past years towards the goal of universal adherence by all States Parties to the Convention, with the number of Member States having reached 188 in 2009, the Secretariat is aware of the critical importance of achieving complete universality as enshrined in the Convention to "exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons" for the sake of mankind.
61. Guided in this respect by successive decisions of the Conference and the Council, and by the universality action plan in particular, the Secretariat will continue to encourage the remaining States not Party to join the Convention at the earliest opportunity. The Secretariat will intensify its efforts towards implementing the decisions of the policy-making organs through undertaking various activities, including communicating and reaching out to States not Party, providing technical assistance, and offering opportunities to participate in OPCW activities in order to create awareness of the Convention and of the benefits and incentives that are provided to Member States. These activities will be carried out in consultation with States Parties in order to increase the membership during the medium-term period.

Core Objective 6

Full and effective implementation by States Parties of the provisions of Article VII of the Convention

62. The provision of implementation support to States Parties will remain one of the highest priorities of the OPCW, in accordance with numerous decisions of the policy-making organs. During the period covered by the MTP, the Secretariat will continue to assist those States Parties that have yet to fully implement their Article VII obligations, on the basis of a mutually developed and agreed programme of implementation assistance. The programme will particularly take into account the needs of new States Parties that would require assistance to establish their National

Authorities, as well as to draft and enact legislation for national implementation. The Secretariat will work with the States Parties towards establishing a tailor-made approach to the adoption of regulatory- or administrative-level instruments that will address all of the fundamental requirements of the Convention, while taking into account the extent and structure of individual States Parties' chemical industries, trade profile, and national security requirements.

63. The Secretariat will also provide support to those States Parties that are still in the process of finalising their legislation and will facilitate the adoption of those of which the final drafts continue to be pending before the respective legislative bodies. Furthermore, assistance with the drafting of subsidiary regulations that are necessary to provide the framework for successful domestic implementation of the Convention will be provided to those States Parties that so request. With regard to the latter, the Secretariat will implement and evaluate a pilot programme of legal internships that will bring legal drafters from States Parties working on their legislation or regulations to OPCW Headquarters for a period of a week at a time, where they will have the opportunity to work directly with the Secretariat's legal advisers and other experts on finalising their drafts.
64. While realising that full and effective national implementation of the Convention will also enhance national security, States Parties are increasingly seeking advice on formulating practical measures in regard to how they can comply with particularly complex technical-implementation issues, such as those relating to Article VI. The Secretariat will continue to build capacity among the customs authorities of States Parties to work together with National Authorities to monitor the trade and transfer of scheduled chemicals and to facilitate the submission of required declarations to the Secretariat in this regard. The Secretariat will also continue to provide tailor-made technical evaluations and support to States Parties, where possible through regional and/or subregional approaches, in order to facilitate effective national implementation.
65. The Secretariat will explore options to facilitate and assist National Authorities to work cooperatively with one another in further developing their capacities and to share experience and knowledge among themselves. In this regard, the Secretariat will implement and evaluate a pilot mentorship programme that will see an expert from well-established National Authorities being seconded by the Secretariat, for a week at a time, to National Authorities for which the expertise is still developing, so as to assist them in the development of structures and work methods designed to improve their functioning. Reciprocal visits by developing National Authorities' staff members to higher functioning National Authorities are also envisaged as part of the programme.
66. Furthermore, as part of its blended learning strategy, the Secretariat will continue to develop a series of e-learning modules (initially six modules are intended) covering the basic aspects of national implementation. These e-learning modules are expected to enable the Secretariat to provide fundamental and background information about the Convention to National Authorities, associated stakeholders, and the general public. It is expected that by providing such training electronically, the Secretariat will be able to make more effective use of the face-to-face training opportunities.

Core objective 7

Full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention by the OPCW

67. The Director-General, with the support of his Senior Management team, is responsible for ensuring that the Organisation performs to the highest standards of efficiency and economy in order to meet its core objectives.
68. As part of his strategic management role, the Director-General will continue to provide guidance and direction, effective governance and accountability, and organisational management and leadership within the OPCW to support the Secretariat's wider activities.
69. With regard to RBM, the Secretariat will continue to institutionalise the principles of RBM in its management processes and practices. The aim is to ensure that the work of the Secretariat effectively contributes to the achievement of clearly defined results and, thus, to the core objectives of the Organisation.
70. As mentioned in paragraph 12 above, further to the capacity already built on RBM, the Secretariat is developing the PMRS, which will draw on consistent and reliable data from various databases and other sources in the Secretariat to better track programme implementation and overall organisational performance. It will also incorporate a risk-assessment tool. In an initial phase, the most essential functions will be incorporated in the PMRS. The focus for the period covered by this MTP is twofold. Firstly, the Secretariat will seek to strengthen the principles of RBM through the continuous and harmonised utilisation of the PMRS. Secondly, further enhancement of the system will take place through the addition of other functionalities that will contribute to improved effectiveness and efficiency in programme delivery.
71. The size of the overall Programme and Budget for a given year, and the size of its individual components, will continue to be kept to the minimum required level. Budget appropriations must continue to provide the resources needed to achieve the desired results. For its part, the Secretariat must, therefore, continue to demonstrate to States Parties that requests for resources are reasonable and that those resources are being efficiently used.
72. For their part, States Parties must ensure that assessed contributions and reimbursements under Articles IV and V are paid in full and on time.
73. The managerial and administrative challenges for the Organisation in the medium term lie in defining and institutionalising an organisational structure that is suited to the evolving priorities of the OPCW as defined by the policy-making organs.
74. In parallel, the Organisation as a whole must review its processes with the aim of making them more efficient, user-friendly, and cost-effective. Amongst others, this will include improving recruitment procedures, performance and post management, and automation of procedures for entitlements and benefits.
75. Regular updating of the information-services strategic plan will play a key role in the medium term, in which *SMARTStream* will continue as the OPCW's

enterprise-resource-planning software and will be proactively maintained and upgraded periodically, to integrate business processes. The update will include an assessment of the necessity to replace the existing enterprise-resource-planning software. Other specific projects include:

- (a) support for the completion of the different VIS modules (core objectives 1 and 2), and the proactive support of the security-critical network;
 - (b) the development of subsequent phases of the EDNA (core objectives 1 and 2); and
 - (c) the proactive support of the data bank on assistance and protection (core objective 3), and of the National Implementation Profile System—until the latter is phased out and replaced by the Event Management System (core objective 4).
76. With a view to continuing the implementation of cooperation agreements, the OPCW will continue to participate in meetings and provide support and expertise to the United Nations and its relevant agencies as may be required. The Secretariat will organise joint activities and events (i.e. related to chemical safety and security) within the framework of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW. Promotion of the goals and objectives of the Convention through the United Nations and its agencies will be continued and intensified.
77. The Secretariat is also aware of the importance of cultivating the necessary institutional environment for the OPCW to operate in and benefit from. Such an effort primarily involves close engagement with all Member States and their relevant domestic authorities and core stakeholders, as well as with regional or international organisations, the media, civil society, non-governmental organisations, and academic and research institutions that make up the general landscape. The Secretariat will continue to maintain and, where possible, increase the level of participation of stakeholders in the OPCW's activities. Towards this end, voluntary contributions from Member States will be encouraged in order to increase the level of bilateral activities.
78. The Secretariat will continue to raise the public profile of the OPCW globally by delivering core messages on its mission, capabilities, and historic achievements. These efforts will build on the OPCW's successful record in eliminating chemical weapons and preventing their re-emergence, and on the mandate entrusted to the Member States, in line with the goals and objectives defined by the OPCW's public diplomacy initiative. The Secretariat will intensify the use of social media, internet, and e-learning tools to interact with States Parties, other stakeholders, and the general public.
79. The Secretariat will also continue to extend high-quality and efficient support to the States Parties in respect of accreditation and conference assistance, by introducing tools such as office automation.

80. The Secretariat will continue to implement the new United Nations Laissez-Passer with biometric features introduced by the United Nations, in a manner that will not affect the operational requirements of the Organisation.
81. The Secretariat will continue to provide high quality security-management services in the maintenance and management of the stringent confidentiality regime mandated by States Parties. It will also further develop its higher-level security-risk-management capability. In this regard, the Secretariat will ensure that it is able to provide competent risk-based security advice, mitigation, and options for further improvement. The Secretariat will also ensure that it is able to support OPCW activities on missions with the provision of competent operational security advice and security liaison capabilities.
82. The Office of Internal Oversight will continue, as it has in the past, to provide high standards of audit recommendations in order to support Management in identifying opportunities to improve the functioning and performance of programmes and operations and in maintaining accreditation of the Quality Management System of the Organisation.

Annex:

Core Objectives and Indicators of Achievement, as Presented in the Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2013

Annex

CORE OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT, AS PRESENTED IN THE PROGRAMME AND BUDGET OF THE OPCW FOR 2013

1. The OPCW's programmes and resourcing are directed towards its *core objectives* (or corresponding "outcomes") reflecting the mandates and required results established by the Convention.
2. These core objectives and indicators of their achievement are listed in the table below:

**TABLE 3: CORE OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT
FOR THE PROGRAMME AND BUDGET OF THE OPCW FOR
2013¹³**

Core Objectives	Indicators of Achievement
1. Elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and CWPFs subject to the verification measures provided for in the Convention.	(a) Results of all destruction activities related to elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities, as confirmed by systematic verification in accordance with the Convention. (b) Results of destruction activities of ACWs and OCWs, as confirmed by verification in accordance with the Convention. (c) Results of conversion of CWPFs for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as confirmed by verification in accordance with the Convention. (d) No undetected removal of chemical weapons except for destruction takes place CWSFs, as confirmed during systematic verification of these facilities.
2. Non-proliferation of chemical weapons, through the application of the verification and implementation measures provided for in the Convention, which also serve to build confidence between States Parties.	Assessment of the extent to which the relevant verification and implementation provisions of the Convention are met, and in particular: (a) Assessment of the extent to which the inspection aims of systematic inspections of Schedule 1 facilities stipulated in the Convention were attained, taking into account the factors provided for in Part VI(E) of the Verification Annex; (b) Assessment of the extent to which the inspection aims of inspections of Schedule 2 facilities stipulated in the Convention were attained, taking into account the factors provided for in Part VII(B) of the Verification Annex;

Core Objectives	Indicators of Achievement
	<p>(c) Assessment of the extent to which the inspection aims of inspections of Schedule 3 facilities stipulated in the Convention were attained, taking into account the factors provided for in Part VIII(B) of the Verification Annex; and</p> <p>(d) Assessment of the extent to which the inspection aims of inspections OCPFs stipulated in the Convention were attained, taking into account the factors provided for in Part IX(B) of the Verification Annex.</p>
<p>3. Assistance and protection against chemical weapons, their use, or threat of use, in accordance with the provisions of Article X of the Convention.</p>	<p>(a) Number, nature, and results of responses to requests for expert advice and/or assistance under paragraph 5 of Article X.</p> <p>(b) Assets and assistance items ready to be dispatched within 24 hours.</p> <p>(c) Percentage of States Parties that have protective programmes or are in the process of their development pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X.</p>
<p>4. Economic and technological development through international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article XI.</p>	<p>(a) Quantity, quality, and results of cooperation relating to peaceful uses of chemistry.</p> <p>(b) Qualitative response to requests for international cooperation for economic and technological development in the field of chemical activities.</p>
<p>5. Universal adherence to the Convention.</p>	<p>(a) The number of States that are Party to the Convention.</p> <p>(b) The percentage of States not Party that have reached each of two stages of interest/participation; the first level indicated by requests for information and participation, the second by requests for assistance and/or active consideration of membership by national bodies.</p>
<p>6. Full and effective implementation by States Parties of the provisions of Article VII of the Convention.</p>	<p>The percentage of States Parties reaching each of three defined levels of implementation, which are based on an assessment of each State Party's national implementation profile.</p>

Core Objectives	Indicators of Achievement
7. Full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention by the OPCW.	Efficient and effective operation of the policy-making organs, the Senior Management, and the Secretariat at large in accordance with the Convention, including through: (a) delivery of programme outputs and all functional services on time, in the best achievable quality and within the agreed budget; (b) timely and efficient preparation and conduct of meetings; (c) assured provision of all possible facilitation to States Parties for their engagement in OPCW conferences, including sessions of the policy-making organs, and other activities; and (d) assured tools, platforms, arrangements for outreach activities, media management, and information provision, through the execution of the public-diplomacy strategy.