



Seventy-Seventh 7 – 10 October 2014

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NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME

- 1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the twelfth such monthly report.
- 2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".
- 3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 August to 22 September 2014.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

- 4. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. As reported previously, all declared chemicals have been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, while all declared stocks of the Category 1 chemical isopropanol have been destroyed within the Syrian Arab Republic. Progress achieved within the current reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling other obligations is described below:
 - (a) In accordance with the Council's decision on the combined plans for the destruction and verification of 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) in the Syrian Arab Republic (EC-M-43/DEC.1, dated 24 July 2014), as announced in the previous monthly report (EC-M-44/DG.2, dated 25 August 2014), a meeting was held in Beirut from 4 to 10 September 2014 between the Secretariat, representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Nations Office for

Project Services (UNOPS) (which is going to procure the required services, equipment, and materials), as well as commercial companies. The latter included representatives of a company identified by the OPCW to provide specialist technical advice to the Syrian Arab Republic and two companies identified by the Syrian Arab Republic which, if selected, will undertake destruction activities. Representatives of potential explosives and chemicals supplying companies were also consulted. The discussions led to the conclusion that the chemical expansion destruction method was not a viable method. Experts agreed that the three aircraft hangars expected to be initially destroyed "using chemical expansion destruction method, if feasible", could be destroyed using a combination of controlled detonation and mechanical destruction. With regard to the time frame, should the explosives be supplied accordingly and the contracts with the services and equipment providers be concluded under acceptable conditions for the OPCW, it is expected that the destruction activities will commence in October 2014 and that the first CWPF will be destroyed by 30 November 2014. A further meeting is planned from 24 to 26 September 2014 in Beirut with a view to streamlining the tasks, modalities, and costs incurred.

- (b) On 12 September 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a detailed plan for the destruction of the CWPF that was declared on 14 July 2014 as a result of the work of the Declaration Assessment Team. The plan has been submitted to the Council for consideration at its Seventy-Seventh Session (EC-77/P/NAT.2, dated 12 September 2014).
- (c) Following the submission by the Syrian Arab Republic of a destruction plan for the two items declared by its Government as abandoned chemical weapons, the Secretariat submitted a draft decision on the agreed detailed plan for the verification of their destruction (EC-M-44/DEC/CRP.1, dated 25 August 2014), together with the report (EC-M-44/P/S/1, dated 25 August 2014). However, consideration of these documents was deferred until a later session of the Council.
- (d) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs. The tenth such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 17 September 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-77/P/NAT.3, dated 14 September 2014).
- (e) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the Joint Mission in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

- 5. Following the complete removal of identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 June 2014, destruction activities are nearing completion. The following subparagraphs provide information on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons on board the United States vessel MV Cape Ray, at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, and at facilities sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2 (dated 17 December 2013):
 - (a) As reported previously, destruction operations on board the MV Cape Ray were completed on 18 August 2014. All liquid waste produced by the hydrolysis of the declared chemicals DF and HD was pumped directly into ISO tanks on the ship. The MV Cape Ray has now delivered the DF effluent to Ekokem's facility in Riihimäki, Finland, and the HD effluent to the GEKA facility in Münster, Germany, for disposal, and has now completed its involvement in the operation.
 - (b) As at the cut-off date of this report, 100% of the received Category 1 and 2 chemicals had been destroyed by Ekokem in Finland. Of the DF effluent delivered by the MV Cape Ray on 30 and 31 August 2014, a total of 4% had already been destroyed.
 - (c) As at the cut-off date of this report, Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC in the United States of America, the other commercial facility selected alongside Ekokem through the tender process organised by the OPCW, had destroyed 60% of the received chemicals.
 - (d) As reported in the previous monthly report, the Secretariat verified the completion of destruction activities at Veolia Environmental Services (UK) as announced by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 7 August 2014. Destruction activities at Mexichem UK Limited are planned for late 2014.
 - (e) The HD effluent produced by the neutralisation process on board the MV Cape Ray was delivered to the port of Bremen in Germany on 5 September 2014 and transported from there to the GEKA facility. As at the cut-off date of this report, 4.5% of the effluent had already been destroyed.
- 6. Taken together, the destruction activities described in subparagraphs 5(a) to 5(e) above mean that, as at the cut-off date of this report, 100% of the Category 1 chemicals and 87.8% of the Category 2 chemicals had been destroyed, representing a combined total of 97.6%, including the isopropanol previously destroyed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will continue to provide such information during briefings to States Parties in The Hague and through the monthly reports. Timelines for the completion of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons were provided in the overall report on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme (paragraph 25 of EC-76/DG.16, dated 4 July 2014), which was noted by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

- 7. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organisations and between the offices in The Hague, New York, Damascus, and Cyprus. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission, Ms Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. Ms Kaag briefed the Forty-Fourth Meeting of the Council on 28 August. As at the cut-off date of this report, two OPCW staff members were deployed as part of the Joint Mission in Damascus, and one logistics officer in Beirut.
- 8. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties hosting a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat has continued to provide regular information briefings to States Parties in The Hague on behalf of the Director-General.
- 9. As reported in document EC-77/S/3 (dated 12 September 2014), the Secretariat has received a number of communications from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding attempts by certain armed groups to manufacture and use toxic substances against civilians and the Syrian Arab Army. These include the chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as abandoned chemical weapons and taken possession of from armed groups (see subparagraph 4(b) above); the origin of these items has yet to be established. Samples collected during the hydrolysis of DF and sulfur mustard agent on board the United States vessel MV Cape Ray have been transported to the OPCW Laboratory. Similarly, samples of the Syrian chemical materials being destroyed at commercial facilities have been retained under OPCW seal at those facilities, with the intention to transport them to the OPCW Laboratory. As another confidence-building measure in the joint efforts to eliminate the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat has sought the consideration and decision of the Council to retain, at the OPCW Laboratory, samples of chemicals from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic for future reference, if so required. The Secretariat intends to retain the samples referred to in this paragraph, pending a decision by the Council. A draft decision on this matter has been submitted to the Council for consideration and approval at its Seventy-Seventh Session (EC-77/DEC/CRP.2, dated 12 September 2014).
- 10. As stipulated by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session (paragraph 6.17 of EC-76/6, dated 11 July 2014), the Secretariat and the Syrian authorities continue to cooperate on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian declaration. The latest meeting took place in Beirut from 17 to 19 September 2014. At the Seventy-Seventh Session of the Council, the Secretariat will make a follow-up presentation for States Parties on the activities of the Declaration Assessment Team, coupled with a report to States Parties on the activities of the Team, which will also be made available to delegations at the same session. The consultations on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian declaration continue.
- 11. OPCW inspectors are carrying out periodic inspections at the commercial facilities to verify destruction activities and also observed the off-loading of the DF and HD

effluent from the MV Cape Ray in Finland and Germany respectively. The Secretariat receives weekly updates on the progress of the destruction of Syrian chemicals weapons and, as instructed by the Council in paragraph 4 of decision EC-M-38/DEC.1 (dated 30 January 2014), reports on such progress through these monthly reports. In the interests of transparency, the OPCW is also reporting on the progress in destruction through its public website.

- 12. As stated in the previous report, the United Nations Secretary-General's office sent a letter to the Director-General, recommending arrangements for the provision of logistical, administrative, and security support to the OPCW through a partnership with UNOPS, in the wake of the expected transition on 30 September 2014 when the Joint Mission will conclude its work. An agreement between UNOPS, the OPCW, and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the Scope of Requirements concerning future joint activities, was consequently signed on 9 September 2014 during the aforementioned meeting in Beirut. Another meeting was held on 19 September 2014 at the UNOPS Headquarters in Copenhagen, with a view to finalising the Contribution Agreement between UNOPS and the OPCW, taking into account the finances that are currently available to the OPCW. As at the cut-off date of this report, discussions are continuing.
- 13. With regard to the implementation of additional special monitoring measures as specified in the Note EC-M-43/DG.1/Rev.1 (dated 21 July 2014), initial discussions have been held with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to benefit from its experience. A team from the Secretariat travelled to the IAEA Headquarters in late August to determine the suitability of the IAEA monitoring equipment. Contacts have been established with commercial companies for the purchase, installation, and maintenance of such monitoring equipment.

Supplementary resources

14. As at the cut-off date of this report, the total contribution received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 50.3 million. Contributions have been received from Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

Conclusion

15. Finalising the Cooperation Agreement between the OPCW and UNOPS is being pursued as a matter of priority. At the time of writing this report, discussions are also under way in Beirut, aimed at finalising the selection of companies that will carry out work relating to the destruction of the 12 remaining CWPFs in the Syrian Arab Republic. The OPCW is seeking to finalise these arrangements while remaining within the available budgetary resources. Should, however, the need arise for a

review of the adequacy of funds, the Director-General will refer the matter to the Council.

16. The second report of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), including its key findings, was circulated to States Parties on 10 September 2014 (S/1212/2014, dated 10 September 2014). Based on witness testimonies and the data collected by the FFM, the report concludes that this information "constitutes a compelling confirmation that a toxic chemical was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly, in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta in northern Syria. The descriptions, physical properties, behaviour of the gas, and signs and symptoms resulting from exposure, as well as the response of the patients to the treatment, leads the FFM to conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that chlorine, either pure or in mixture, is the toxic chemical in question". The Director-General condemns the use of toxic chemicals as weapons by anyone and considers it expedient for the FFM to continue its work, which will include transcribing the recorded evidence and data that it has obtained, as well as continuing to look into other alleged incidents.

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