The Politics of the Gaze: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty Author(s): Nick Crossley Reviewed work(s): Source: Human

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Human Studies ? 1993 Kluwer

16: 399-419, 1993. Academic Publishers.

Printed

in the Netherlands.

The politics of the gaze: Between Foucault and

Merleau-Ponty*

NICK CROSSLEY
Department Kingdom of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10, United

Introduction The work to find of Maurice is beginning, once

its way

resurgence texts which (and minor)

This theory/philosophy.1 of a number of of interest is indicated by the recent publication are devoted to a reappraisal of this French existentialist's major works 1991; (e.g., Dillon, 1986; and Whiteside, and Smith, 1990; Kruks, common concerns 1989). Two within these texts. On the one hand, existential-phenomeology and existentialism which Johnson

Merleau-Ponty in social into debates

(1908-1961) and political

again,

1990; Daunhauer, to a greater or lesser extent, manifest, to dissociate Merleau-Ponty's there is a concern straw models from the popular of phenomenology have and been and still are attacked

and repeatedly discredited in philosophical was not a philosopher circles: of e.g., Merleau-Ponty sociological a he was a critic of such philosophies; he did not advocate consciousness, notion of the transcendental it; he did not 'centre' the ego, he criticised or sociological in either philosophical terms, he decentred it; he was subject or political in either ontological terms; and although he a political he was critical of bourgeois liberal humanism in humanist, terms of both its political-ethical and in terms of its search for implications, or essence a sophisticated the 'inner' nature of humanity. His was which rhetoric does not disintegrate of the post-structuralists. in the face of the en vogue anti

not an individualist was

humanism humanist

* An earlier version of this nars, University of Sheffield, participants for their helpful Maurice Roche and Mich?le

paper was presented at the Theory and Society semi? England, on 7th February 1992. Thanks are due to all comments, especially Nick Stevenson. Thanks also to Davies for their help and comments.

400
The second common between theme in the above-mentioned work texts is the com?

plementarity thinkers and themes

Merleau-Ponty's popular of contemporary and (in some theory and philosophy, to surpass and add "new" insight cases at least) the ability of his philosophy to these contemporary themes and thinkers. Amongst the thinkers with has been critically 1989), Derrida compared and contrasted are

and that of the more

whom

1991; Madison, 1991; (Levin, (Dillon, 1990; and Flynn, 1984), Kristeva (Silverman, 1991), Lacan and Walzer 1991; and O'Neill, 1986), Rawls (Whiteside, 1989). (Levin, are far from comprehensive. Often These analyses they only comparative issues. Nevertheless deal with one or two out of a great many possible they Silverman, should the point that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to the history of "interesting but now defunct" ideas. They relegated to the concerns of the contemporary in relationship this work
agenda.

Merleau-Ponty Foucault,2 Habermas

serve

to make

not

be

situate theory

I rejoin the these theoretical this paper stirrings by considering work for a theoretical understand? of Merleau-Ponty's and value relevance the Panoptic mode of of the politics of the gaze, and more specifically, ing In

power described by Foucault (1974, 1979, 1980a) in his Discipline

and related papers. Punish, I begin by outlining Foucault's power. show how deficiencies, Panopticism During theorisation Panopticism. relationship "Panopticon" Then I criticise Merleau-Ponty's and how it deepens in the process. this account

and

this account,

and Panoptic of the Panopticon to its deficiencies. I Finally pointing us to overcome allows these philosophy our understanding of the Panopticon and

I will briefly Sartre's consider (1969: 252-302) analysis in terms of an understanding of "the look" and its value are two reasons the for this. In the first instance, There or possible between Sartre's "look" and Foucault's relationship of has been

but it has not been discussed; asserted elsewhere Jay stresses similarities be? the fundamental for example, 190-194), (1986: tween the two but only as an aside, whilst Kruks (1990: 187-189), again in as a necessary a brief note, suggests 'look' functions that Sartre's supple? I take up the idea of this possible of Panopticism. to the notion ment conceptual damental Panopticon". I stress the fun? but, contra both Jay and Kruks, relationship "the look" and "the between and incompatibility differences to our to make that Sartre has a minor contribution I conclude his "look" of mutual reason for

of but that the incommensurability of Panopticism understanding of the Panopticon with the concept any possibility precludes The second or synthesis the concepts. between reinforcement Sartre's "look" is that it was both a starting place and discussing criticism inMerleau-Ponty's understanding of gaze politics.

a target of In this respect

401
it has contextual relevance.

Foucault One within of

and

the Panopticon themes of Foucault's he calls and Punish is the Discipline the orders of 'visibility and invisibility'

the central reversal

historical

of what

of penal power. The use of the terms "visible" and the operation texts (e.g., and other of Foucault's is in this "invisible" 1970, 1973) it is these terms which Merleau in terms of this paper because interesting (1968a) uses to denote

to vision in his later the conditions pertaining of the issue. Merleau-Ponty (1968a) rejects the term analysis philosophical of consciousness, and he replaces because of its connotation "perception" and "the invisible". Given that the terms "the visible" the term with to and that he too was concerned Foucault was a student of Merleau-Ponty Ponty challenge frequent tion. But one might of consciousness, that his the philosophy speculate a deliberate use of these terms constitutes theoretical appropria?

as for it to say that for Foucault, Suffice this is just speculation. or the order of visibility is what 'the visible' is seen, and Merleau-Ponty, is the processes and the practices in the making' involved the invisible visible of the visible which are not to which themselves visible. This reversal definition will be clarified through and invisibility, of visibility In the ancient regime, a consideration Foucault of the historical of the orders

I have just referred. functioned its notes, power through a spectacle to be observed by The operation of power constituted visibility. and (individually) the largely anonymous invisible masses. of Ceremonies and torture provide the proof and the illustration of this. public execution Foucault notes, effect a power relation ceremonies, their spectacular instil into the observing displays masses. The immediate victims of such ceremonies (i.e., Such which executed) Foucault, through the fear but unobserved the tortured and

in this process; visible to are, of course, made but, according is only their visibility to the process instrumental of making when visible. Moreover, the power they are not being used to display excesses are (literally) hidden away. A dark and of power, these victims secures their invisibility. secluded dungeon This ordering of the visible and the invisible, within the power relation, no longer holds in the modern era according to Foucault - or at least not in to penal power. In the modern era it is power which is invisible relationship and anonymous, and it is those who are subjected to it who are visible.

Power those

ensemble

in part, by making functions, people of practices which individualise individuals within a field of visibility,

visible.

It involves

and which persons such that they can be observed

a complex constitute

402
and kept under surveillance. The functional value of

such surveillance, within modern power com? no means or homogenous is by unified to Foucault's plexes, according are identified as having at least however. Surveillance analysis techniques in Discipline four functions and Punish. In the first instance, they effect a and punishment deviants and are amongst potential in achieving what we might term, a deterrent effect. thereby service the observational effected the Secondly, they exigencies by which "correctional Foucault discusses in Discipline and techniques" certainty Punish: if they are to work, i.e., correctional techniques, require a careful and examination and meticulous observation of subjects, and surveillance in the form of examina? (and particularly techniques provide for this. Thirdly they provide a basis for the creation of knowledge to identify an intrinsic Foucault appears Finally, relationship in this paper, is most itself. This effect, discussed which about power is to be of capture instrumental

tion techniques) human subjects. effect within the central

the surveillance concern

in Foucault's directly It is to this description that Iwill now turn. of the Panopticon. description is an architectural The Panopticon plan for a prison, which was produced and prison reformer, Jeremy Bentham. in 1791 by the philosopher Foucault In the first instance he identifies is interested in it for two reasons. the extent of its influence. architectural eighteenth Foucault second model was never actually built but as an The Panopticon it had considerable influence upon the architecture of late

plan and early nineteenth (Foucault, 1980a). century public buildings as a historical in "the Panopticon" force then. In the is interested as an ideal or perfect understands the Panopticon instance, Foucault in modern relations involved of of the surveillance technologies is an important heuristic It is this of power. device second

In this sense the Panopticon penal power. the modern for understanding functioning dimension interest with which of Foucault's At the most basic

I am concerned in this paper. the Panopticon consists of a circular arrangement level, From this watchtower of cells, all of which open onto a central v/atchtower. to observe any prisoner, at any time. The lighting arrangement it is possible a prisoner the possibility of blind spots through which in the cells prevents render him or herself might side walls of the cell make invisible prisoners to the watchtower invisible (largely) between them. communication any prevent straightforward certainly and the use of of the watchtower the architectural Furthermore, arrangement ensures is that the watchtower Venetian blinds on its windows occupant invisible he is the object Power, to the prisoner. The prisoner never of information, in this sense, is "visible then is, "...seen but he does a subject in communication" but unverifiable" (ibid., not see; (1979: The occupant. And the to each other and

200). p. 201).

403
visibility sibility of the tower and its windows informs the prisoner and structure the pos? of the tower of

but the blinds that they are being watched or not this actually whether from ascertaining is the the prisoner prevent to Foucault, ex? case. The result of this, according is that the prisoner periences a feeling of constant surveillance. And this power is the effect achieved power. Panoptic Panoptic tion that one is subjected to the gaze. It is important to stress at this point that, for Foucault, power in the Panopticon. Human automatically beings are the vehicles They of bricks, arrangement lights and spaces, and and invisibility which these effect, actually intervene visibility them and rendering them asymmetrical: relations, structuring relations. do not hold it nor constitute its source. is the very basis of through the realisa? functions

of power the complex Thus, the relays and relations of into human

seen dyad: in is a machine for dissociating the see/being The Panopticon one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central the peripheral ring, ever being seen (Foucault, without 1979: tower, one sees everything

202).
And the effect a situation wherein the surveyed subjects to the power effect, through their very awareness or of the possibility that they could be being watched: of this is to create

subjects knowledge

him or herself

to the field of visibility, is subjected and who knows it, assumes for the constraints of power; he makes them play spon? responsibility he inscribes in himself the power relation in upon himself; taneously which he simultaneously the principle of plays both roles; he becomes his own subjection 1979: 202-203). (Foucault, He who not matter, in thise sense, who occupies the watchtower. It does not "what motive animates him" (ibid.) Indeed the more numerous and these anonymous the greater the prisoner's "anxious temporary spectators, awareness of being observed" it does not matter if the (ibid.). Moreover, It does

matter

or not. Occupancy is actually being watched of the watchtower and prisoner the apparition of a surveyor which are sufficient this effects, to alone, secure the panoptic effect. A final point which should be noted in this respect is that the watchtower as well as being a vehicle of is also subject to it. occupant, Panoptic power, can be subject to frequent, Prisons and unannounced irregular inspections by an external body (this was Bentham's plan at least) and the field of effected of the Panopticon ensures that through the architecture can be hidden from any such Within minutes of her/his nothing inspector. the whole of the prison and everything arrival, an inspector could observe that is happening within it. Bad or cruel management, like the deviance of visibility

404
the prisoner, has no hiding place in the Panopticon.

Foucault Foucault's

criticised

is open to many criticisms and objections. His sweeping analysis a powerful and rhetorical whilst communicative aid, style, for example, an inattention to historical often conceals and logical detail. The notion of a in the orders of visibility literal reversal and invisibility within the power

for example, is both historically and logically It insustainable. relationship, in the ancient regime must have utilised could be argued that power the some means of subjects and must have involved of achieving this visibility ever been punished have otherwise because nobody would visibility, they would never be identified for deviance. The Frankpledge system would be a possible contender for such ancient it could era, respect eye of power" cannot be completely means its effect: people can't be affected of securing own identification aware of its presence. Foucault's unverifiable" example tedly less
complete

to the modern

surveillance with systems. Moreover, be argued on logical grounds that "the if it is then it has no invisible because by it if they are not of the "visible but

of the surveyor presence of this. In this sense, it would

literary and less evocative, relations within power visible-invisible

reversal.

in the Panopticon is the historical be more accurate, though undoub? to refer to a shift in the balance of practices, rather than referring to a

Of more

concern

the internal working the prisoner becomes effects

of power to Foucault's relationship In the first instance Foucault's

in this paper however, is Foucault's of analysis his assertion and particularly of the Panopticon, that of his own subjection" "the principle the by making statement in This is problematic, "play upon himself. in two respects. philosophy, there is a problem of inconsistency, and incoherency as I will show in a moment, of the Panopticon, analysis

to me

aporia.

as to be a subject and posits human subjectivity the prisoner presupposes at the time to and necessary for the exercise of power, when Foucault, prior and Punish, claimed not to presuppose of writing Discipline any substantial could be ex? that subjectivity notion of the subject, and in fact claimed plained upon in terms of that which of power. Foucault and relies presupposes to explain the subject which then. Moreover, is unex? in this analysis remains unelaborated, fundamentally In particular, in terms of Foucault's philosophy. inexplicable the effects he claims and as capable

presupposed and plained Foucault

two stable aspects of subjectivity. presupposes In the first instance he presupposes the subject as sentient This point requires explanation: of visual meaning.

405
to Foucault's is achieved, in effect, according Panoptical analysis, awareness first instance, the prisoner's that s/he is being through is in turn achieved and this awareness of the watched, through the visibility The the central watchtower the and its windows. In this sense is capable of sight. Moreover, subject "sight", amount to more than a mere sense impression. Itmust then it is presupposed that in this context, must amount to a meaning? as a as

see the watchtower as a watchtower, The prisoner must ful experience. I can be seen'. Foucault 'the point from which presupposes effectively of perception here then, and he constitutes the prisoner phenomenology

the subject of such a perceptual phenomenology. The issue of the sentient the subject of visual perception, it subject, is not explicitly should be noted, dealt with in any of Foucault's works. Whilst he does analyse the constitution of a new field of visibility and a in The Birth of the Clinic the gaze (Foucault, 1973), this or meaningful account for the possibility of sentience analysis a unitary subject vision. As Deleuze (1988: 13) notes, it simply presupposes of perception. Foucault's of the sentient in the presupposition subject not only constitutes an incoherency of the Panopticon in his analysis structuring of does not account unable then, it raises questions to address. and issues which Foucault's philosophy is

and the instance, Foucault presupposes intersubjectivity of intersubjectivity. this point needs to be explained: subject Again In his analysis of Foucault's to French "anti-ocular dis? relationship that Foucault's course", Martin Jay (1986) stresses "gaze" is objectifying I want to suggest that, with respect to the Panop? and not intersubjective. an ticon, the reverse is in fact the case; i.e., that the Panopticon presupposes an objectifying rather than has two gaze. This argument intersubjective Firstly, effect Panoptic be noted that the gaze which the operationalises is not the gaze of the surveyor but is, in fact, the gaze of the The Panopticon does not require that the prisoner is actually surveyed. looked at but only that s/he feels that s/he is, and this as I being feeling, have said above, is secured own perception. the prisoner's This through steps. does not rule out the possibility that a given prisoner, at a given moment in be objectified in the gaze of the watchtower time, may occupant, but it rules that such objectification is neither necessary nor sufficient for the Panop? ticon to be effective. Now then if we are concerned that we with it is clear cannot the gaze of the surveyed, of the prisoner, be dealing with an objectifying gaze. The that s/he is being watched, and to be aware of of another subject, not of an object. if it constituted be no awareness If the the of it must

In the second

to reiterate, is aware prisoner, this is to be aware of the presence gaze watchtower of the prisoner ocucpant were

gaze, objectifying as an object, then there could

an

406
being of watching and are not capable are capable of watching and of meaning Only subjects capable onself as 'being watched' is to experience the and to experience therefore, an intersubjective It is to exist within of other subjects. relation? existence watched because objects of meaning. ship. Moreover, of Foucault's and this might properly be regarded as a third presupposition this intersubjective involve a clear analysis, relationship must to between self and other. It does not suffice, differentiation experiential secure the Panoptic that the gaze of the surveyed is non effect, subject by another is to be are not

as being watched to experience my-self objectifying; self and other. between of a distinction capable It may be objected here

that my argument concerning intersubjectivity to the practical can be challenged of the through reference invisibility or in not be watching and the fact that s/he may watchtower occupant be to miss the prisoner. To argue this would the with anyway engaging point never see the watchtower the prisoner may Although is indicated of this occupant the presence (either truly or falsely) occupant, is an index of The watchtower WATCHtower. the watchtower qua through maintain that the prisoner is "an Foucault human presence. Whilst may it is clear that and never a subject of communication", object of information however. the watchtower effective). that s/he clearly does communicate to the prisoner It communicates to the prisoner (if it is to be that s/he is under surveillance, this substructure of intersub? Without

'object of information'. the feeds off and manipulates, the Panopticon which jective meaning, of bricks. The power than a collection be nothing more would building it is effected within is effected which through the interhuman precisely and communicates. it embodies which meanings As with the issue of the sentient subject, itmust be noted that Foucault's of intersub? cannot provide for an explanation of the possibility philosophy his presupposi? or of the subject of intersubjectivity. then, Again jectivity in terms of his philosophy, tions are not only incoherent they are inex? plicable also. In pointing I am not subjectivity, or affected of subjectivity that aspects transformed, may denying to this point. Foucault effected through Panoptic power. I have no objection seems to suggest, for example, that Panoptic relations may effect an (1980a) internal policing mechanism (a super ego?): to Foucault's presuppositions of be There Just a constraints. is no need for arms, physical violence, material gaze which each individual under its weight will end gaze. An inspecting eachindividual thus to the point that he is his own overseer, interiorising 1980a: this surveillance over, and against himself (Foucault, exercising 155).

is an

407
in terms of my critique, why this should not be the to be recognised case. it would have that in describing But this can the subject who Foucault presupposes actually 'subjectification', it as "inspecting". In an-other gaze, and who can experience experience and there I have just described. the subject whom to my first central point then, Foucault's of the understanding a subject when Foucault it presupposes because is inconsistent Panopticon a subject and, in fact, to explain the subject as an claims not to presuppose other words, To return an that this presupposition constitutes of power. It is clear, moreover, account: it raises the question of a subject which his in Foucault's aporia own philosophical cannot account framework for: namely, the subject of effect (non-objectifying tivity. I will return but meaningful) perception, and the subject of intersubjec? I do so shortly. Before account of Panopticism is at" of is no reason,

however, should be discussed. The

to the question of this subject the second major problem with Foucault's

second major problem with Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon answer the question of why looked that it raises but fails to "being or as controlling. Foucault's should be experienced anxiously analysis the Panopticon quite served" or "knowing" very central principle is said to make power clearly posits that one is subject of power. the "anxious awareness to "the field

of being ob? as the of visibility"

It is precisely in this way that the prisoner him/herself and thus become "the principle play upon never And of his own Foucault such yet subjection". explains why or awareness or should have this effect. Why should knowing knowledge being aware that one is being looked the effect being described here? How at have a controlling effect? What is is it achieved? Again Foucault's work raises questions for which it does not, and perhaps cannot, provide answers. to the question of the "weight"of In relationship the gaze, or its controll? Sonia Kruks has suggested that Foucault's effect, (1990: 184-189) ing or informed by Sartre's could be supplemented analysis (1969: 252-302) analysis of "the look". This point should be considered.

detailed

Sartre's Sartre effected Foucault,

look can be the anxiety and tension which quite vividly, the awareness that one is being looked at. Moreover, like through he is clear that one need not be able to see one's surveyor to be He cites the breaking of a branch or the sight of an as possible indices of human presence which could it could quite easily be the Panopticon watchtower

describes,

subject to this effect. unobfuscated window secure the effect, but

408
which with The he describes. an indication effect "the All that is important, for Sartre, is being watched. is that one is presented

that one look"

is described To by Sartre in terms of alienation. as no longer belonging is to experience oneself to experience as an object, oneself but as belonging, in the project of the other. This in our very structure. We are not normally objects of our involves a change own rather awareness, in Sartre's view. We "do" and live our The them as objects of our than having tears us away from this however. Through selves as objects of our own contemplation thought. it we come look of life and actions, the other

of the look

to experience our and awareness. We are divided

have

and estranged. a meaning control

neither

we are aware that our actions and experiences Moreover, in the project of the other, which we can and a significance, nor necessarily have access to. We (at least not completely)

experience the project possessed Sartre novels

our being as not belonging to us therefore. We belong, in part, in of the other, as an object of his/her thought and designs. We are by the other. And we are thereby (again) estranged. finds a literary illustration and elaboration of this effect in the

novels describe and utilise this very (1953, 1957). Kafka's of Joseph K. in The Trial, notion of alienation. The actions and experiences in The Castle, Sartre notes, have meaning and of the Land Surveyor for are also aware that they are objects but the protagonists those protagonists, in the eyes of others, and that their actions have a different meaning and which for these anonymous different surveyors, significance they them? their life and actions, selves do not and cannot know. They experience to them. They feel estranged in belonging completely to their actions and experiences do not understand because they relationship or know the meaning as they exist for the of those actions and experiences therefore, other. This anonymous the characters. Sartre's gives being would account fills which a name and a more secures the alienation of the gap (which Kafka describes) of as not

of Kafka

something detailed Foucault

in Foucault's never

work. elaborates

It at least of I upon. as a useful Sartre's

accept and take this name and this description are problems to Foucault's with There analysis. supplement account however. In the first instance has been the

observed", therefore

description refers to but

to that "anxious

awareness

ontology sometime

This it rests, ultimately, upon a problematic ontology. not least by Sartre's of much subject critique,

and colleague, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: pt. 3, ch. 3; 1968a: ch. 2; 1973: ch. 5). I do not have the space to consider these ontologi? is important however, is that Sartre's cal problems here. One point which which reduces 'the look', and interper? is an anti-social ontology ontology more generally, to the basic constitution sonal conflict and objectification of friend

409
the human understands secured condition. What Sartre feature describes of human in "the relations look" is what he

to be an inevitable

and not an effect

of an interactional such as is encounter, through the particularities for in the Panopticon. The specificities of the Panopticon, and provided indeed the machine itself, would be largely irrelevant in Sartre's terms then. There is an incompatibility here between Sartre and Foucault because Foucault of being looked at" quite clearly regards the "anxious awareness as being induced by the particularities of the Panoptic mechanism: i.e., "the seen dyad" and consequent of the see/being dissociation situation of the but never a "subject in communica? prisoner as "an object of information" Sartre may provide for a better description of the Panop? tic effect, he does not allow us to understand the Panoptic mechanism. It could of course be that Sartre is right and that the Panopticon is an tion". Thus whilst irrelevance work because all human on the assumption, is wrong, of practices in any case. I will inMerleau-Ponty's various critiques of supported and that "the look" is secured through a specific relations relations, of which the Panopticon is our ex? are estranging

him, ensemble
ample.

that he

and

Merleau-Ponty Hitherto account account

and

the gaze

in this paper I have been engaged in a critique of Foucault's of the Panopticon. have fallen into two categories. criticisms In My I have examined the first instance the presuppositions which Foucault's of the Panopticon involves. I noted a subject of that he presupposed a subject of intersubjectivity a subject with the capability

that he presupposed meaningful perception, and communication, and that he presupposed

of self/other distinction of perspectives which goes with (and the reciprocity this - i.e., recognising 'other' as subject). These were presuppositions deemed problematic for two reasons. In the first instance, with the possible of the issues of self, Foucault's exception these presuppositions. It cannot elaborate stance, Foucault uses cannot account philosophy upon them. In the second for in?

this subject qua prisoner, with all that this presup? to account for the operation of power, when, to his poses, according at the time of the analysis of the perspective, power is supposed Panopticon, to constitute and explain Foucault that subjectivity. actually presupposes to explain which he claims a stable subject (of therefore; he presupposes sorts). Foucault The second why is therefore account was that it failed to explain problem or controlling being looked at should be anxiety producing, (such as he is criticised here then, for not fulling exploring the says that it is). He logically of Foucault's incoherent.

410
of Panoptic mechanics as a possible solution look" was useful manner power. Sartre's theory of "the look" was examined to this problem but whilst his description of "the said to elaborate upon our description of the Panoptic effect in a

Panoptic of the Panopticon. In this

for a phenomenology of the (one might say that it provided was deemed unsuitable his ontology for an analysis experience), section I will show how Maurice existential Merleau-Ponty's the problems of Foucault's account, our understanding of Panopticism. As a noted that Merleau-Ponty's terms of the Panopticon, nor do in In involve such a notion. sociology be

allows phenomenology and deepen and thus strengthen it should remark here, brief prefatory of the gaze was not conducted

us to overcome

analysis and political his political philosophy of power is extremely weak and his politics fact his understanding seldom a consideration moves of basic capital-labour I am not relations.3 beyond for a new means that Merleau-Ponty of political provides analysis arguing then. He strengthen said I will sentient does not and cannot. I am an account begin. that we already

that his analysis arguing might have: viz. that of Foucault. With this

can account for meaningful and the That Merleau-Ponty perception and the inter subjective for intersubjectivity subject, and for subject, I can fully address self and other, is not an issue which of the experience and I would themes of his philosophy here. These are principal suggest that he deals with Merleau-Ponty more space made in which but a proper account of the manner them adequately and theorises these issues would understands require much than I have here. A few brief points on these issues must be

however.

is often charged, (1983: 196; 1980a: 117; by Foucault Phenomenology the notion with of a constituting 1980b: 176) amongst others, positing in particular and it is suggested, Foucault consciousness; by (e.g., the practices 1989: 46), that we might do better to examine through which and meaning this criticism "teaching presuppose to Merleau-Ponty, In relationship the subject are produced. to amounts and the accompanying corrective is misdirected not how to suck eggs". Merleau-Ponty does your grandmother

a constituting in any of his analyses consciousness (e.g., of nor does he presuppose a transcen? of linguistic meaning etc.), perception, or a Cartesian In his early work dental ego/subject consciousness/subject. and surpasses of consciousness the philosophy he criticises it, (1962) some of its language, and in his later work (1968a) although he maintains and rejects the very language of the his project, deepens he radicalises it, indicate the English of consciousness (n.b. the above dates philosophy touch etc., according There is sentience, i.e., there is vision, publication4). to a substantive to Merleau-Ponty does not amount but such sentience

411
or involve and neither does it presupose consciousness either a mind/body or a thinking In particular, any notionof subject. thought is identified as a property of the body (qua is rejected. Sentience dualism in reversibilities of sensible-sentience; it sees "flesh"5). The body consists can be seen, touches and can be touched, hears and can be heard etc. and notion of Moreover, through
"done".

Merleau-Ponty habituated body result

is keen practices.

to

stress

It is a

that perception is effected socio-cultural It is practice.

The meaning

predate not amount

of perception, for Merleau-Ponty, of the practices is visual The subject of perception and a subject of perception. does not but is effected does through it. This subject's perception perception

to thought or "thought about perception", and it however, nor the cogito. Perception is a realisation involves neither objectification of or opening within Being, which effects It is a separation the visible. (?cart) and a seen. The is haunted

who is effected subject of perception, through an anonymous visual meaning but this meaning is by perception, or thought-out meaning. It is not a reflective It is only 'physiognomic'. that a subject of thought may be (or practices) through linguistic praxis to this experience and this subject of thought, in turn, must be grafted from an experience of self, since the language of young distinguished children indicates that they do not distinguish for between the first self and other (Merleau-Ponty, account This 1979). of perception of

a seer

provides

Ponty's understanding our encounter with

intersubjectivity. for Merleau-Ponty is perceptual. And his others, as objectifying, as thought, or as of the notion of perception rejection the possibility en? that the primordial thought of perception, precludes counter can consist or in its being in some way in alterity being objectified to thought. Perception reducible is an opening and thus myself and the other open onto each other and onto the same world. Each of us is, in relation to the other, (1968a) "carnal This a visible-seer, audible-listener, tangible-toucher. Merleau-Ponty as "intercorporeal" or (1964: 159-181) refers to this relationship reversibility one sees which holds as

The most

stage of Merleau fundamental level of

intersubjectivity". carnal bond, the sensible-sentient affords access to the other. When

between

the other, inMerleau subjects, one sees meaningful behaviour. And this meaningful terms, Ponty's access to the other, it is important to stress here that behaviour is, in effect, the carnal bond is not, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, a front behind which

minds (or "true" subjects) might be lurking.He quite explicitly (1962: 352)
rejects example: the basis the notion to the other is achieved for by analogy i.e., he rejects the notion that I am a mind with a body and that on of seeing bodies which look and act like mine I assume that they that 'access'

412
too must contain minds. instance, Two by his does points distance Merleau-Ponty from this view. of a distinction between rejection body and not that behaviour is an outer accept that behaviour is what we are,

In the first mind,

Merleau-Ponty of an inner state. He maintains representation

it is subjectivity:
We must reject the prejudice which makes "inner realities" out of love, to one single witness: hate or anger, leaving them accessible the person who feels them. Anger, facts hidden shame, hate and love are not psychic at the bottom of another's consciousness: or they are types of behaviour are visible from the outside. They exist on this of conduct which styles not hidden behind face or in those gestures, them. Psychology did ot until the day it gave up the distinction between mind begin to develop and body... 1971: 52-53). (Merleau-Ponty, The here with such thinkers as Wittgenstein (1953) and Ryle comparison is important is that (1949) is quite apparent. But that is another issue. What access to each other (as subjects) because subjects have immediate subjec?

in inner states but rather in perceptible tivity does not consist "styles of conduct". The second point which Merleau-Ponty to make in (1962) wants or conduct of the other effects to this issue is that the behaviour relationship or conduct of the other, for me. The behaviour meaning as im? is experienced maintains, (in the natural attitude) Merleau-Ponty or at least it is insofar as it assumes a commonly mediately meaningful, a (physiognomic) held the behaviour cultural form. One does not first experience of the other to it. The other is not and then, by some secondary action, attribute meaning to (my) thought of him/her. reduced then, ? la Descartes, as a public The existence of language, is crucial for both institution, in this respect. Language and intersubjectivity is an interworld, subjectivity

terms. It consists inMerleau-Ponty's in cultural rules and resources which are shared by a community. And it is through participation in this inter? of linguistic rules nad utilisation of linguistic world, through application is born, and that its thoughts can be that the thinking resources, subject is not simply the clothing known both to its self and to the other. Language in Merleau-Ponty's of thought or a tool for thought, (1962) philosophy. force or subject which determines Neither is it an external thought from is the very means, the very mode of structured praxis, without. Language is achieved. And is always therefore, thought thought, through which 'social' Much in character. of of 7; (1971: ch. Merleau-Ponty's language analysis Indeed it was Merleau is based upon the work of Saussure. 1964: 39-97) to the French philosophy circuit the work of Saussure Ponty who introduced of the later disciples of Saussure 1983: 198). Unlike many Foucault, (cf. however, Merleau-Ponty placed considerable importance on 'parole' or

413
an intersubjective to be a structure, language Speech. He understood so as to avoid reification of that structure, and objectification structure, but, recreated and modified that it is created, he stressed i.e., through praxis, structure it is a is not a thing for Merleau-Ponty, qua speech. Language are of central and speakers The community process. speech regulated recreate and modify then. They create, both for Merleau-Ponty importance as a social as thinking subjects and the structure of language their speech. institution, through with the activity of speech, that It is in connection qua dialogue, his notion of intersubjectivity and inter further develops Merleau-Ponty themselves worlds. The thought to the other because and of the other, as I have said, can occur to me as well as language is the necessary means of thought. Moreover, the listener are both dependent upon the same source for

and as to the thought of the speaker (i.e., the spoken utterance), such they may both find out "what the speaker thinks" in the same way and summon the thoughts of the speaker may at the same time. Furthermore, forth thoughts from the listener that s/he has never produced before (or that "I did not know that I knew" to use a rather more mentalistic turn of can forge a strong inter subjective In this sense, dialogue bond, an phrase). to participants. And interworld, which has a logic that is strictly irreducible can become wholly in this process. absorbed participants into each other, and we exist through a common Our perspectives merge I am freed from myself, In the present dialogue, world. for the other are certainly his: they are not of my making, persons thoughts though I come into being, or even anticipate do grasp them the moment them. they which my I say And interlocutor raises to what indeed, the objection so that at the I had no idea I possessed, draws from me thought which same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life and make in my private history... of it an episode (1962: 254). Such which harmonious social relations are not inevitable and perhaps and the social not even

the speaker their access

however. relations coexistence, Intersubjective can be both conflictual it involves, and alienating. Merleau-Ponty this possibility of conflict and alienation in two ways. In the first explores in his political writings the instance, (1964, 1969, 1971, 1973), he discusses manner are objectified in which the concrete social subjects through relations and practices which are constitutive of capitalism and other forms of economic-political domination. In the second instance he considers the effect of "the look" or "the gaze". It is this second point which is of concern in this paper. Merleau-Ponty generally adopts Sartre's definition of the look in terms

common

414
and "capture" in the perspective of alienation, of the qua self-estrangement of "the look" differs from that of Sartre however, other. His understanding and it is these differences of which constitute the basis of his contribution to the understanding The problem of Panopticism. 'the look' and

indeed the general problem of others, is for the child, Merleau-Ponty 1968b; argues (1962: 346-365; and more 1979). Drawing upon the work of Piaget, generally specifically of "the mirror that (1989) understanding upon Lacan's stage", he notes for the child because children do not posit a others cannot be a problem not a problem then, the child can from self nor captured by the other because neither feel estranged they do on this In his various writings not experience and alterity. self-hood 'moments' for the birth of the Merleau-Ponty posits different phenomenon, is important but, as I have already of self. Obviously language possibility distinction between self and other. In terms of 'the look' noted, the egocentric qua linguistic and detailed consideration of Merleau-Ponty, as the the mirror the issue however, Merleau-Ponty (1968b) posits stage or imaginary me" (ibid., p. 136). point of the birth of the "ideal, fictitious with the specular image of self in the mirror turns the perceiv? Identification a "fictitious me". ing subject back upon itself and gives it an image of self, toMerleau This concept of me, is further relationally according developed, the to others. But this self-other distinction in relationship prepares Ponty, way for conflict: ... this alienation for the benefit of of the immediate me, its confiscation in the mirror, the me that is visible already outlines what will be the look at him (Merleau of the subject by the others who "confiscation" language of the child do not distinguish beings, sustained 1979). In his most suggests between that young children, self and other (cf.

Ponty, 1968b: 137).

This and it point is perhaps the least relevant to the issue of Panopticism, a simple reiteration of the point which I made to some extent, to amounts, the gaze ("the look" or the Panop? that alienation earlier: namely, through between self is dependent ticon effect) upon a subject who distinguishes other. considering formed, through Panoptic Even Merleau-Ponty the operations can be seen to these add to this through which these distinctions visible self-other however, distinctions by are

and

and by linking "the look". He makes

to the possibility operations

of alienation through which

the prior

a feasible possibility. power becomes other processes which after the mirror stage and the various the effect of the look is not of self-hood however, the experience constitute is it necessarily in Merleau-Ponty's inevitable view, and neither likely if we are with those whom we know. The "moral" structure of

particularly

415
interhuman in Merleau-Ponty's is view, subjects, between and, as such, involves mutual recognition subjects. address or "hail" (as Althusser, 1976: 47), puts it) each other as i.e., each regards the other as a communicative subject and this relations between

communicative Subjects

subjects: to the other in the form of verbal regard both consists and is made available and non-verbal the gestures ("styles of conduct"). One does not experience other as inaccessible and "capturing" then. mutual this is not individuated recognition in the gaze of the other, when we feel that our actions and and objectified are "not taken up and understood, as if they were but observed expressions an insect's" (1962: 361). The look "takes the place of a possible communica? tion" (ibid.). One party to the encounter as him or herself constitutes "inaccessible" cate, although, communication" the world or as an "inhuman of course, "The The effect of "the look" is achieved, for Merleau-Ponty, realised; when we feel that we are when

(ibid.). Such of the carnal-intersubjective, the inner world, and it is only in this way surveyed subject that they are not being as an object. It is only in constituted being surveyed subject

gaze" (ibid.). They refuse to communi? refusal to communicate is still a form of refusal is a "style of conduct", to it belongs not to a mythical intercorporeal, that it can communicate to the

can experience the refusal to communicate, and the objectification Furthermore, to Merleau-Ponty involves the (surveying) other, according into their "thinking being" their (ibid.): i.e., it involves retreating ment culture "the in the qua linguistic intersubjective and more

as a subject but are recognised this way, in other words, that the and capture. estrangement objectification, of an? subject involve?

that for Merleau-Ponty,

reflective of their specifically practices interworld. The necessary caveat to this point is as for Sartre and Foucault, there is no reason why

look" cannot be secured through an indices of human presence rather than through an actual other. For Merleau-Ponty the fact that it involves the then, the look, despite of objectification, is intersubjectively It is a cultural situated. experience effected in the action of a surveyor and communicated practice, (by virtue of its visible/cultural to a surveyed. It is not an absence of intersubjec? form) the intersubjective fabric. Furthermore, in tivity but a tension or knot within contrast within quence to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty maintains that "the look" is constituted the particularity of a given situation. It is not an inevitable conse? of a given state of the human condition.

Merleau-Ponty In pinning the

and

the Panopticon of the look to such specific interactional cir

effect

416
for a more suitable understanding of cumstances, Merleau-Ponty provides we might what call the human infrastructure of the Panopticon, than Sartre. Merleau-Ponty's our encounters the and understanding of "the look", in terms a far cry from the vastness is admittedly strangers, which and houses individualises hundreds machine, with illustration of of

of Panoptic alienates and controls in a Fordist mass produc? prisoners. The Panopticon of "the look", as Merleau-Ponty tion fashion. But the specificities describes Foucault accord with those described and Merleau-Ponty allows them, by us to understand them. The Panopticon effects and then systematically an intersubjective relation. It places (or knots) subjects within distance but then, as Foucault notes, the (the carnal-intersubjective) seeing seen dyad" is dissociated 1979: 202). (Foucault, by the machine "see/being is effected and stabilised here because the surveyor, qua surveyor, Power is subverts inMerleau-Ponty's and at the same terms, as an "inaccessible" constituted, the blinded window time "inhuman" of the watchtower gaze; precisely an inaccessible an and communicates and assumes constitutes surveyor, "inhuman" of the possibility form. This effects a permanent6 that negation can be hailed or addressed as a subject of communica? the surveyed-subject of a sustainable the conditions alienation of that tion, and thus secures subject. As information, Foucault never the (1979: 200) notes, a subject in communication". surveyed is "the object of

Conclusion Foucault at describes as a machine. the Panopticon secures in which it its effects He marvels

(1979, 1981) of human independently In this paper, whilst not denying Foucault's intention or will. claim, I have to the Panopticon that there is a human which infrastructure argued that we examine does not and cannot account for. I have suggested Foucault the manner the human of bricks. relations And which make in particular a Panopticon the Panopticon and not a pile to the perceptual I have called attention and character of these relations and this infrastruc?

intersubjective-intercorporeal ture. Such notions are, to some extent at least, inconsistent with Foucault's for an his philosophy does not and cannot provide Certainly philosophy. I have that Foucault's of them. Furthermore, argued understanding account which it awareness" cannot actually for the "anxious philosophy refers that to and depends the philosophy recasting of our understanding a deepening and extension in facilitating ticism, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy upon. In respect of Merleau-Ponty I have suggested of these problems, and for a rethinking provides I would also add to this that of Panopticism. of Panop? of our understanding a deepening and extension for provides

417
of our understanding of the politics of the gaze more generally.

Notes 1. My observations are limited to the field of Anglo-American publications. The Belgian philosopher, Rudi Viskar, made similar observations with regard to continental Europe however, at a recent seminar series (on the work of at the held in the department of philosophy Foucault and Merleau-Ponty), of Essex, England. University My own present work concerns a comparative analysis of the work of Foucault on the issue of "politics and subjectivity". Other brief and Merleau-Ponty comparisons can be found in the following publications: Levin (1989, 1991), Kruks (1990), Whiteside (1989), Watson (1984), and Cohen (1984). Humanism and Post-Marxism See my paper Merleau-Ponty, (forthcoming) for a critical analysis of this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's political philosophy. The original date of (French) publication for The Phenomenology of Percep? in France, tion is 1945. The Visible and the Invisible was first published in 1964. posthumously, that a rejction of is concerned, throughout his writings, Merleau-Ponty dualism should not dissolve into an objectivistic reduction of the mind/body human subject qua body. The rejection of mind/body dualism, he notes, not only calls for a rethinking of those phenomena which are conventionally understood to be "mental", it also calls for a rethinking of the body. In his later work (1968), this rethinking takes the form of a theorisation of "the flesh". This concept posits an elemental Being which is neither material or ideal but which includes the dimensions conventionally associated with both sides of this coin. The body, with its reversible aspects of sensible and sentient, is
"flesh", embodiment. 6. This situation may, of course, be subverted if the watchtower occupant were to as is language, with its reversibility of meaning, structure, and

2.

3. 4.

5.

break down the blinds on the window and communicate to the prisoner. The effect of the Panopticon is only permanent insofar as the architectural condi?
tions of the Panopticon are sustained.

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