Jcs Nationalpolicy PDF

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and
National Policy
19611964
ii
Department of Defense Photo (MSgt Frank Hall, USA)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in session, September 1961. Left to right: Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations, US Army (back to camera); General Clyde D. Eddleman, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army: Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief
of Naval Operations; General David M. Shoup, Commandant, US Marine Corps; Major General Frederick L. Wieseman, Deputy Chief of Staff
(Plans), US Marine Corps; Major General John W. Carpenter II, Deputy Director of Plans, US Air Force; General Curtis M. LeMay, Chief of
Staff, US Air Force; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Director,
Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Major General J. M. Reynolds, USAF, Deputy Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff; (top of head visible):
Rear Admiral Francis J. Blouin, USN, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Colonel Michael J. Ingelido, USAF, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Department of Defense Photo (MSgt Frank Hall, USA)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in session, November 1962. Left to right (clockwise): Lieutenant General T. W. Parker, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations, US Army; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, US Army; Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval
Operations; Vice Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Programs); Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (International Security Affairs); General David M. Shoup, Commandant, US Marine Corps; Major General C. H. Hayes, Deputy
Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs), US Marine Corps; Lieutenant General D. A. Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, US
Air Force; General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; General Maxwell D. Taylor,
USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Vice Admiral H. D. Riley, USN, Director, Joint Staff; Brigadier General M. J. Ingelido, USAF, Secretary,
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Colonel R. C. Forbes, USA, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

and
National Policy
Volume VIII
1961-1964
Walter S. Poole
Office of Joint History

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC 2011
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Watson, Robert J., 1920
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 19531954.
(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v.5)
Includes index.
1. United States. Joint Chiefs of StaffHistory. 2. United States
Military policy. I. Title. II. Series: Watson, Robert J., 1920
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.
UA23.W366
1986
355.330420973
86-4621
vi
Foreword
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic
direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
continued in existence after the war and, as advisers and planners, have played a
significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations
with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in
the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work.
An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States.
For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff
studies, will be readily recognized.
The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the
activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations in the footnotes are those that appeared in the original classified volume.
Volume VIII describes JCS activities during the period 1961-1964 except for
activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. Originally,
this volume was planned to cover the years 19611963. In accord with that plan,
during 19671971, Mrs. Anna C. Webb and Mr. Donald J. Boyle wrote preliminary
drafts for portions of what became Chapters 1, 2, and 3; Dr. Robert J. Watson prepared a draft for what became Chapter 5; Ms. Judith A. Walters prepared a preliminary draft of Chapter 16; Dr. Ronald H. Spector prepared a draft of Chapter 17 and
Ms. Kathleen S. Paasch prepared a draft for Chapter 18. Then, in 1973, the volume
was expanded to cover 1964 and assigned to Dr. Walter Poole. He developed a new
outline and wrote completely new chapters. These were reviewed by Mr. Kenneth
W. Condit and Dr. Robert J. Watson. Ultimately, Dr. Poole assumed full responsibility for the volume.
During 2008 and 2009, Dr. Poole reworked the classified manuscript to prepare
it for publication in its unclassified form. In addition to reorganizing it to conform
to the structure of earlier volumes in The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy
series, Dr. Poole took advantage of the great amount of material that had become
available as well as the perspective afforded by thirty years. Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the index, and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication.
This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official
vii
publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and
does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.
Washington, DC
January 2011
viii
JOHN F. SHORTAL
Director for Joint History
Preface
Throughout the early 1960s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confronted a series of
crises that touched nearly every part of the globe. Cuba, Berlin, the Congo, Saudi
Arabia, India, Indonesia, Laos, and South Vietnam all became areas of confrontation. The worldwide scope of these challenges created, among US policymakers, a
mindset in which failure anywhere would have repercussions everywhere.
What most concerned the JCS was an apparent erosion of US credibility that
emboldened communist leaders to pursue more adventurous policies. President
John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara pursued what
they conceived as more flexible approaches to strategy and crisis management.
The JCS, however, worried that civilian leaders might lack the determination to do
whatever became necessary to achieve success. McNamaras managerial reforms,
which centralized decision-making in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, added
to the friction in civil-military relations.
During 19611962, relations between the JCS and their civilian superiors were
often awkward and even confrontational. A failure in communications contributed to the Bay of Pigs debacle. The appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor
as Chairman, in October 1962, ameliorated the situation. Taylor expressed deep
regard for McNamara, which the Secretary reciprocated. From the civilians perspective, Taylors main achievements lay in controlling the Service Chiefs during
the missile crisis and securing their support for the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Yet
that improvement proved temporary and personal, not institutional and permanent.
This volume is the first in this series to have benefitted from meetings between
the author and some of the Chiefs whom he describes. These took place during the
middle and later 1970s. Interviews with Admirals Arleigh Burke and George Anderson exposed me to very strong personalities. General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman
during 1960-1962, had an office close to the JCS Historical Division, and I spent a
fair number of Friday afternoons listening to his recollections. Lemnitzer blended
command with congeniality, showing why he fit comfortably into joint and international postings. I interviewed General Taylor several times at his apartment on
Connecticut Avenue in the District of Columbia. He was more reserved, choosing
words carefully, yet unfailingly concise and articulate. These officers deserve credit for helping to illuminate and interpret the events described in this volume. They
must not, however, be held accountable for what appears in the final text. For any
errors or misconstructions, the author alone bears full responsibility.
Walter S. Poole
ix
LAM SON 719: The "Moment of Truth"
Contents
1. Entering the New Frontier: Men and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Young Men Meet the Old . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Methods: At the White House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Methods: At the Pentagon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adjusting the JCS Program for Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1
5
6
9
2. Strategic Priorities Undergo Major Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Conventional Capability Emphasized; Basic National
Security Policy Aborted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Focusing on Counterinsurgency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The SIOP: Striving for a Controlled Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Summation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Superiority

Versus Assured Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The Missile Gap Is Reversed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Force Planning in 1961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Summation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4. Continental Defense: Still Feasible?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
An Outdated Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5. Conventional Capabilities Expand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
At the Outset, Small Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Summation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
xi
JCS and National Policy 19611964

6. Disarmament Gives Way to Arms Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
The Creation of ACDA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Formulating a Disarmament Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Some Small Steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Examining an SNDV Freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Summation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7. Nuclear Testing: Start and Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
How Long to Abstain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Testing Resumed: Who Benefited More? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
More Drafts, More Disagreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
About Face. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
xii
8. The Cuban Debacle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Death. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Post-Mortems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
107
107
107
114
116
9. The Laotian Precipice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Nascent Crisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Alternatives Narrow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
To the Brinkand Back. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Detours along the Geneva Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Crisis Reprised. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
121
121
124
126
132
134
10. The Berlin Confrontation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Challenges Repulsed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Looming Showdown? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Credibility Issue Takes Center Stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Berlin Wall Is Built. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Accelerating the Buildup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Divided Counsels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Surprising Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
139
139
140
142
147
149
151
157
11. The Cuban Missile Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

More than Mongoose? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missed Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Air Strike versus Blockade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This Is No Time to Run Scared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Winding Down. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reflections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
159
159
161
165
175
182
184
LAM SON 719: The "Moment of Truth"

12. NATO: Advocating New Approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Emphasizing Conventional Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A NATO Nuclear Force?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Change of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
187
187
194
202
13. NATO: Initiatives Falter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rise and Demise of the Multilateral Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cutting Conventional Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Where to Build a Firebreak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Flawed Strategy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
203
203
207
211
215
14. Paring the Military Assistance Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FY 1962: An Uncertain Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The FY 1963 Program: Changes in Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The FY 1964 Program: Cut More, and Sooner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The FY 1965-1966 Programs: Leveling Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
217
217
218
221
222
15. Latin America: Containment and Counter-Insurgency . . . . . .

Focusing on Internal Security and Civic Action . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concentrating on Civic Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Case Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cuba: Threat and Target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
225
225
227
231
232
16. Middle East Kaleidoscope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supplying Arms to Israel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supporting the Saudi Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supporting the Shah of Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CENTO Staggers On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
237
238
241
245
247
17. New Africa and the Congo Entanglement. . . . . . . . . . . . .

What Arms for Africa?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Legacies of Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Congo: Coping with Chaos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The United Nations Battles Moise Tshombe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
251
251
252
256
258
18. South Asia: Contradictions of Containment. . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Sino-Indian Border War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
India Courted, Pakistan Offended. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Courtships Cool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Entering the Indian Ocean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
265
266
270
274
277
19. The Far East: Seeking a Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Regional Strategy: A Changing Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
xiii

Withdrawals from South Korea?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Japan and Okinawa: A Sluggish Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indonesia: A Falling Domino. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
284
289
292
296
20. Conclusion: Appraising Performances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Principal Civilian and Military Officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
xiv

and
National Policy
19611964
1
Entering the New Frontier:
Men and Methods
The Young Men Meet the Old
n 20 January 1961, John F. Kennedy delivered an inaugural address that was as

notable for its ambition as for its eloquence:
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any
foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
We dare not tempt [our adversaries] with weakness. For only when our
arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they
will never be employed.
In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted
the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink
from this responsibilityI welcome it.
And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you
ask what you can do for your country.1
The nations new leader was 43 years old, the youngest man yet elected to the
presidency. Kennedys governmental experience, however, consisted of six years
as a congressman and eight as a senator. The Cold War dominated international
relations; Kennedy came to office convinced that the Free World had been losing
and the communist world gaining ground. A confluence of crisesCuba, Laos,
the Congo, West Berlinconvinced him that fresh, more forceful policies must
be found. During the campaign, he had invoked the image of a new frontier
and pledged to get America moving again. In the first weeks, according to one
1

admirer, There was the excitement which comes from the injection of new men
and new ideas. . . . Not since the New Deal . . . had there been such an invasion of
bright young men . . . and a President who so plainly delighted in innovation and
leadership.2
The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, carried impressive credentials: Rhodes
scholar; college dean; staff colonel in World War II; Deputy Under Secretary of
State, 194950; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 195051; president of the Rockefeller Foundation, 195260. But Rusk was a relatively reserved
and introspective man. Under his leadership, the State Department never truly took
charge of foreign policy, as President Kennedy originally hoped that it would.
The new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, at the age of 44 had just
become president of the Ford Motor Company when he accepted this appointment. His military experience came from World War II when, rising to the rank of
lieutenant colonel, he had been deeply involved in logistical planning for the B29
campaign against Japan. McNamara was determined to be an activist, a prober,
an originator of ideas and programs. He brought a group of like-minded civilians,
many drawn from the RAND Corporation, to the Pentagon. Such men as Charles
Hitch and Alain Enthoven made cost effectiveness and systems analysis part of
the Defense Departments vocabulary.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff found that they had little in common with their Commander in Chief. They were considerably older and set great store upon orderly
procedures, thorough planning, and judgments born of experience. Civilian leaders
apparently looked upon them as tradition-bound and wedded to careful pacing at a
time when rapid innovation was imperative. Kennedy wanted, and McNamara fully
supported, an increased defense budget. Yet that situation did not translate into
harmonious relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD).
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, who had been Chairman of the JCS since
October 1960, possessed particularly broad experience in the traditional sense.
In 1942, he had been Plans and Operations Officer for the North African invasion.
Then in the Mediterranean theater he acted as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Harold Alexander, a British officer whom he much admired. Subsequently, Lemnitzer
directed the Military Assistance Program (194950) and commanded the 7th Infantry
Division in the Korean War (195152). He advanced to be Commander in Chief, Far
East (1955), Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (1957), Chief of Staff (1959), and finally
Chairman. Lemnitzers working methods closely paralleled those of President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, a former General of the Army, but did not mesh nearly so well with
the more free-wheeling approach of the Kennedy administration.
Admiral Arleigh Burke was completing his sixth year as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). He had earned a high reputation leading destroyers in South Pacific
battles and later serving as chief of staff to the commander of a fast carrier task
force. During 195051, Burke commanded a cruiser division in Korean waters and
2
Entering the New Frontier

then became a member of the United Nations truce delegation. In 1955, while still a
rear admiral, he was appointed CNO. In JCS deliberations, Burke was always well
informed, articulate, and ready to defend Navy prerogatives.
General George H. Decker, USA, who became Chief of Staff on 1 October 1960,
had spent 194445 in the Pacific as Chief of Staff, Sixth Army. Thereafter, his major
assignments included Comptroller of the Army (195255), Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command, Korea (195759), and Vice Chief of Staff (195960). General Thomas D. White, USAF, had served continuously in Pentagon assignments
from 1948 until his selection as Chief of Staff in 1957. An acerbic wit enlivened his
contributions to JCS discussions. General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the
Marine Corps since 1959, had won the Medal of Honor at Tarawa in World War II.
His postwar duties, for the most part, involved budgeting and training assignments.
At the JCS level, judging from a number of transcripts of discussions, the intricacies of policy and strategy were not his forte.
Between January 1961 and October 1962, JCS membership underwent an
almost complete turnover. The law then provided for two-year terms which were
renewable indefinitely. General White retired on 30 June 1961; the Vice Chief of
Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, succeeded him. LeMay carried a reputation unique
among his military contemporaries. He had been a driving force behind the firebombing of Japanese cities in 1945 and the 1948 Berlin airlift. Subsequently, his
nine-year tenure as Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, made him a
popular symbol of American power and preparedness. Blunt and outspoken as an
operational commander, he continued that practice in JCS deliberations where it
served his purposes less well.
Admiral Burke retired on 31 July 1961. The next CNO, Admiral George W. Anderson, had done a tour as executive assistant to the Chairman of the JCS, who at the
time was Admiral Arthur Radford. Spending much of his career in naval aviation,
Anderson most recently had commanded the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.
The most critical changes occurred on 1 October 1962. President Kennedy
selected a new Chairman. The Bay of Pigs fiasco had tainted all the Chiefs in Kennedys mind, and Lemnitzer did not share Kennedys conviction about the great
importance of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Accordingly, Lemnitzer became Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a post for which he
was eminently qualified and in which traditional military problems were still paramount. He retired and was immediately recalled to active duty.
Kennedys choice for Chairman, General Maxwell D. Taylor, had led the 101st
Airborne Division across Western Europe during 194445, commanded Eighth
Army in the Korean Wars closing months, and served as Army Chief of Staff from
1955 to 1959. After retiring, Taylor published The Uncertain Trumpet in which he
criticized the Eisenhower administrations reliance on nuclear weapons and so provided material for Senator Kennedys presidential campaign. In June 1961, after the
Bay of Pigs, Kennedy called Taylor to the White House as Military Representative
3

of the President. Here, he won the Chief Executives confidence to such a degree
that Kennedy decided to break the pattern of service rotation pursued by President
Eisenhower. The downside of Kennedys great confidence, which McNamara came
to share, was that service chiefs tended to regard Taylor as representing the civilian leadership to the Chiefs rather than the Chiefs to the civilians.
The administration wanted new leadership for the Army. General Decker,
whom civilians evidently judged insufficiently dynamic and innovative, retired on 1
October 1962. President Kennedy took a hand in choosing his successor, instead of
waiting (as was customary) to be presented with three names. Early in 1962, Kennedy asked his Military Aide, Brigadier General Chester V. Clifton, USA, to propose
candidates. Clifton, in turn, approached the JCS; Army and Navy members recommended General Earle G. Wheeler, who recently had completed a well-regarded
tour as Director, Joint Staff. Wheeler was relatively young at 53. He was going to
Europe where he hoped to succeed General Lauris Norstad, USAF, as SACEUR.
President Kennedy let him go but passed word that he should not unpack.3 Soon
afterward, the President chose him to be Chief of Staff. Since Wheeler succeeded
Taylor as Chairman in 1964 and stayed on until 1970, this was the pivotal JCS
appointment of Kennedys presidency.
Admiral Anderson and General LeMay found themselves increasingly out of
step with civilian leaders. LeMay clashed repeatedly with Secretary McNamara
and struck civilians as being too bellicose in times of crisis. Anderson apparently
ran afoul of McNamara during the Cuban missile crisis and irritated the Secretary
by giving critical public testimony about the F111 aircraft that McNamara prized
as an example of joint development. Kennedy considered replacing both men but
McNamara advised him that was one too many. Accordingly, on 6 May 1963 the
White House announced (1) that Admiral David L. McDonald, who was commanding the Sixth Fleet, would succeed Anderson on 1 August and (2) that LeMays term
would be extended for one year only. Anderson left his post embittered but did
accept the ambassadorship to Portugal.
A sudden, tragic transition took place on 22 November 1963. The JCS were in the
Pentagon conferring with their West German counterparts. General Taylor was taking
a post-lunch nap when an aide awoke him to say that President Kennedy, who was
in Dallas, had been shot and seriously wounded. The JCS assembled around 1400 in
Taylors office, where Secretary McNamara soon joined them. They discussed what to
do and finally instructed worldwide commands that this is the time to be especially
on the alert. Then the JCS rejoined the Germans. After telling them what he knew,
Taylor insisted that they resume their talks. Not long afterward, Taylor received a note
stating that the President was dead; he circulated this paper to his JCS colleagues surreptitiously without interrupting the discussion. The Germans may have been puzzled
as, one by one, the Chiefs excused themselves for a time and returned. Finally, late
that afternoon, Taylor gave the grim news to the Germans. I have rarely seen such
ashen faces, he relates, or heard such words of spontaneous grief.4
4

The new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, met the JCS on 29 November. He told
them of his firm and long-standing belief in a strong military establishment, and
assured each officer that he was needed and wanted. Each Service Chief advised the
President that his service was stronger and in better shape that at any time since the
Korean War. Johnson then asked each man to give him an inscribed picture to hang
in his study because he would be looking at them quite often in the future.5
On New Years Day 1964, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., became Commandant
of the Marine Corps. Greene kept a diary that portrays him as disgruntled with
his colleagues, and particularly with senior civiliansmore so, possibly, than was
actually the case. The Chief Executive extended General LeMays term until 1 February 1965. Critics said that Johnson wished to keep LeMay in uniform, and thus
silent, until the presidential election was past.
Unexpectedly, on 23 June 1964, General Taylor accepted appointment as
ambassador to the embattled Republic of Vietnam. The best explanation is that
President Johnson believed Taylors reputation would protect his Vietnam policy
from partisan attacks during the election campaign.6 Whether Taylor was aware of
this motive is unclear.
General Wheeler by then had been a JCS member longer than any of the Service Chiefs except LeMay, who obviously was not in the running for Chairman. So
Wheeler took Taylors position. To be Army Chief of Staff, the President named
Lieutenant General Harold K. Johnson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
44th in seniority. General Johnsons career path was unusual. During World War II,
he survived the Bataan death march and spent three hard years as a prisoner of
war. Subsequently, he saw combat service as a regimental commander in Korea
and thereafter earned rapid advancement. After a tour as Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, he became Deputy Chief of Staff. General Barksdale Hamlett, who was Vice Chief of Staff and Johnsons superior, probably would
have succeeded Wheeler. However, Hamlett suffered a major heart attack and had
to retire; thus, Johnsons elevation to Chief of Staff was accelerated by four years.
New Methods: At the White House
resident Kennedy promptly dismantled much of the National Security Council

(NSC) structure inherited from his predecessor. During the Eisenhower years,
a Planning Board prepared studies, policy recommendation, and basic drafts for
consideration by the NSC. The Planning Board included a JCS representative, and
JCS comments usually accompanied each paper that went to the NSC. Not so with
the Operations Coordinating Board, which worked at a higher level. Its members
included the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director
of Central Intelligence. While the Board did not make policies, it coordinated their
execution and could initiate proposals that fell within the framework of existing
5

policies.7 President Kennedy abolished both the Planning and Operations Coordinating Boards, largely because a Senate subcommittee chaired by Senator Henry M.
Jackson (D, Wash.) concluded that Eisenhowers organization had served to blur the
edges and destroy the coherence of specific proposals to the point where they do
the President a disservice.8
McGeorge Bundy left the deanship at Harvard to become Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. Under him, the NSC staff began extending its reach into day-to-day operations as ad hoc groups were created to deal with
specific problems. Sometimes, notably during the early months, informality only
exacerbated inexperience. According to an Army officer detailed to White House
duty, the NSC staff really seems to be an agglomeration of six to a dozen hearty
individuals picking up balls and running with them ad libitum as the President
or McGeorge Bundy directs. This is . . . manifestly 180 degrees removed from the
tightly, perhaps over-rigidly, organized system of the Eisenhower administration.
At times, for officers accustomed to disciplined staff procedures, policy-making
had the look of a helter-skelter intellectual parlor game.9 Formal meetings of the
NSC became less frequent. A statement of Basic National Security Policy, which
integrated military, diplomatic, economic, political and psychological factions and
was crucial throughout the Eisenhower administration, never won NSC approval.
But the ad hoc approach could count successes, particularly in the performance of an NSC Executive Committee that was created in October 1962 during
the Cuban missile crisis. The JCS Chairman, General Taylor, was a member. Six
months later, however, Bundy judged the ExComm not so good for lesser matters
of coordination, and . . . not . . . effective at all . . . in the process of forward planning. Accordingly, a Standing Committee of the NSC was created in March 1963.
With Bundy presiding and the Chairman of the JCS as a member, it was intended to
be alert to planning problems that are a little less ripe than todays required decisions: like Cuba a year from nowor China in 1965. The Standing Group also was
supposed to serve, among other things, as a ready medium for review of ongoing
programs with strongly interdepartmental aspects. Of the Groups fourteen meetings between April and September 1963, however, ten concerned Cuba in whole
or in part.10 Hindsight shows that, during those months, Vietnam should have been
the Groups primary concern. The ExComm did hold a few discussions about Vietnam, but ad hoc meetings were the rule and these failed to formulate a successful
approach.
New Methods: At the Pentagon
obert McNamara set about transforming the role of the Secretary of Defense.
Even before taking office, he asked the JCSindividually, not collectivelyto
tell him what force levels they wanted without regard to the fiscal ceilings that

President Eisenhower imposed. They each replied by reinserting precisely those
items that Eisenhower had deleted from the FY 1962 budget. Such responses may
seem reasonable and predictable, but McNamara wanted a completely fresh beginning. Accordingly, he determined to make a deeper, independent investigation.11
On 24 January 1961 Secretary McNamara commissioned four task forces, each
chaired by a civilian, to study (1) strategic retaliatory and continental defense forces, (2) limited war needs, (3) research and development, and (4) base and installation requirements. A month later, he forwarded four finished studies to the White
House. President Kennedy accepted practically all the proposals in them and, on
28 March, sent Congress a FY 1962 supplemental request. But this, he advised
Congress, dealt only with the most urgent and obvious problems. Already, on 8
March, Secretary McNamara had issued 96 queriessoon dubbed the 96 trombonesthat covered practically every defense program and policy.12
Rejecting President Eisenhowers emphasis upon fiscal ceilings, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara perceived a pressing need to improve the way in
which requirements were determined. During Eisenhowers last year, the Bureau
of the Budget had broken the DOD budget into functional categoriesstrategic
retaliatory, continental defense, ground and sea, supportso that it could detect
any duplicative or overlapping programs. Briefing the NSC on 1 February, Budget Director David Bell criticized existing procedures. First, a lack of correlation
between the militarys plans and the civilians budget limits often resulted in ambitious schemes that exceeded fiscal capabilities. Second, an absence of common
assumptions among the services created differing strategic doctrines and intelligence appraisals. Third, presenting the budget by departments and inputs (personnel, procurement, etc.) rather than by outputs (strategic deterrent, limited war
capability, and the like) made it difficult to determine exactly what results were
being achieved. Fourth, budget perspectives usually addressed short-term problems instead of focusing upon long-range goals.13
On 3 April, after winning Secretary McNamaras enthusiastic support, Comptroller Charles Hitch revealed how he intended to avoid the errors listed above.
Basically, for FY 1963, Hitch set about spanning the gap between planning and budgeting by introducing a new programming function. He directed the creation of
program packages, each comprised of those forces that contributed to the same
strategic purpose. The techniques of economic analysis or cost effectiveness would
then be applied to discover the best and cheapest force mix that could accomplish
each function.
As Hitch saw matters, military planners thought five years or more ahead, dealing with forces, weapon systems, missions, and the like. Civilian budgeteers, by
contrast, were concerned with appropriations categories (procurement, construction, etc.) and confined themselves to fairly short time periods. He intended to
bridge this gap through a continuous and dynamic process, not geared to a budget
cycle, but immediately responsive to changing circumstances and alternatives.14
7

On 17 April, Hitch briefed McNamara, the service secretaries, and the JCS
about his intended reforms. A month later, he described to the services exactly
how his planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) would work. He divided
the FY 1963 process into three phases: estimating requirements during May and
June; determining the contents of program packages in July and August; and preparing the budget thereafter. Secretary McNamaras 96 questions were intended to
elicit requirements. Hitch anticipated (wrongly, as it turned out) that a statement of
Basic National Security Policy soon would win approval. Then, using this and other
guidance supplied by Secretary McNamara, the Services would prepare program
packages and forward them to the Comptroller for costing and analysis. Ten such
packages, each combining personnel, equipment facilities, and supplies, were to
be prepared. The Joint Staff, the Services, and OSD would collaborate in preparing
precise definitions of each one: Strategic Retaliatory Forces; Continental Defense
Forces; General Purpose Forces; Airlift and Sealift; Reserve and National Guard
Forces; Research and Development; Service-Wide Support; Military Assistance
Program; Classified Projects; and Department of Defense (e.g., retired pay, Defense
Agencies).15 This constituted the planning phase of the PPBS.
By then, the JCS had formulated a response. Lieutenant General Wheeler,
who was then Director of the Joint Staff, proposed (1) developing procedures for
a prompt, effective JCS review of the program packages and (2) having the Service Chiefs exchange budget and force planning data early in June.16 But General
White, believing that OSD was making a radical departure from past practice,
rejected this as inadequate. He wanted the JCS, instead, to agree upon a FY 1963
force structure against which the program packages could be measured.17 Adopting Whites approach, the JCS agreed on 10 May that each Service would submit
a force structure for FYs 196170, which General Wheeler would combine into an
overall tabulation. They also reminded Secretary McNamara of an understanding
that OSD would consult them before making tentative decisions about program
levels. They further advised him that they intended to examine program packages
from the standpoint of overall military posture.18
The service plans, collated by General Wheeler, appeared in July. Comptroller
Hitchs office analyzed them from the viewpoint of how they fit into program packages. This was the innovative programming phase. On 11 September, McNamara
gave the JCS and the services a timetable for finalizing the FY 1963 budget, suggesting strongly that trimming was in order. Eleven days later, he circulated tentative decisions that cut the total obligational authority proposed by the services by
about one-fifth.
Meantime, trying to project five years ahead, McNamara worked with Hitchs
people to write Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs) that described and justified the force levels and funding for each program package. The JCS had been
unable to reach agreement about the sizing of strategic retaliatory forces, so McNamaras analysts employed cost-effectiveness comparisons to select levels for vari8

ous weapon systems. Expanding in length and numbers over the next few years,
these DPMs would come to serve as the central, culminating feature of the PPBS.
On 6 October, McNamara sent President Kennedy his tentative recommendations about the FY 1963 budget as well as a program for 1963-67. On 23 October, the
services submitted their formal FY 1963 proposals, triggering a final round of budget
reviews and decisions. All told, McNamara held eighteen meetings with the JCS
about the FY 1963 budget.19 But OSD set the pace based on the JCS contributions.
Early in December 1961, McNamara presented a final budget to President Kennedy. The JCS customarily made what was wryly called a blood statement. McNamara asked them to say that this budget would greatly increase our combat effectiveness and provide forces far stronger than those of any other nation. They settled on
milder wording that this budget will further increase our combat effectiveness and
provide forces in a high state of readiness. General LeMay added that he retained
certain reservations, particularly as regards the program for Strategic Forces.20
On 3 January 1962 at Palm Beach, President Kennedy presided over a budget
review at which he polled each JCS member. Only the Air Force spokesman harbored serious reservations, and those concerned the strategic nuclear balance after
1965. General Shoup, in fact, said that this budget was better prepared than any he
had witnessed during the past seven years.21
Adjusting the JCS Program for Planning
ach year, according to their Program for Planning, the JCS were supposed to
approve a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS), and a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The JSCP, a shortrange fight plan, translated national policies into military tasks consonant with
actual capabilities and gave generalbut not detailed operationalguidance to
commanders of unified and specified commands for their conduct of cold, limited,
and general war operations. JSCPs, being the truly indispensable documents in
the Program for Planning, regularly appeared on schedule around the end of each
calendar year. JSCP-63, for example, was approved in December 1961; it applied to
the period between 1 July 1962 and 30 June 1963.22
The JLRSS provided planning guidance running eight to twelve years ahead,
helping to shape DODs research and engineering program. JLRSS71 was published in July 1962, JLRSS72 in August 1963. Evidently, though, the JLRSS made
only a modest impact upon the Office of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering. When civilians reviewed a draft of JLRSS73, early in 1964, they
rated it a great improvement over its predecessor but still harbored misgivings
about its purpose and utility. They deemed it practically impossible to prepare a
meaningful projection because the discovery of a new scientific principle might
drastically change a large portion of the technology or a radical engineering
9

development could change an uneconomical application into an efficient one.
They wanted some indication of priorities, too, since the entire technological
community could not attack more than a small fraction of the needs outlined
in the draft. Moreover, they detected a tendency to fasten upon and exaggerate
the potential of well-publicized technological advances (e.g., masers and lasers).
Joint Staff officers responded that OSD had not decided exactly what sort of
advice it wanted from the military. Until that occurred, it will be difficult . . .
to propose meaningful comments or improvements. Nonetheless, in July 1964,
JLRSS73 appeared on schedule.23
The JSOP, an instrument for mid-range planning, was defined in the Program
for Planning as beginning on 1 July of the fiscal year five years subsequent to the
fiscal year in which the plan is scheduled for approval, and extending for three
years thereafter. Thus JSOP67, which was approved in 1962, applied to Fiscal
Years 1967 through 1969; JSOP68 in 1963 covered FYs 196870; JSOP69 in 1964,
FYs 196971. That was about the time it then took to develop and field a weapon
system. Parts I through V of the JSOP included a broad strategic appraisal, a statement of basic US objectives, and a strategic concept. Part VI, containing forcelevel recommendations or force tabs, was the heart of the document. The JSOP
absorbed far more of the Chiefs attention than the other two documents. Part VI
in particular provided an arena for displaying, more often than for settling, interservice differences.
Completion of the Kennedy eras first JSOP had to be postponed repeatedly.
JSOP66 had been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in September 1960, but
because its force tabs contained inter-service splits about crucial issuesthe size
and mix of the strategic retaliatory force, the number of attack carriers, and the
rate of Army and Navy modernizationthe JCS agreed to reconsider JSOP66 after
the new administration had reviewed the FY 1962 budget.
According to the Joint Program for Planning, JSOP67 should have been completed by 31 May 1961. Instead, FY 1962 budget addendums that were put before
Congress in March, May, and July required revisions of JSOP66, and Secretary
McNamara was not able to issue preliminary FY 1963 guidelines until summer. A
looming confrontation over West Berlin took first place on the policymakers agenda.
Not until 20 September 1961 were the JCS able to give Joint Staff officers guidance
about preparing JSOP67. On 14 November, the Chiefs approved statements of the
strategic concept, objectives, and basic undertakings. But, as soon as the Joint Staff
began drawing up force tabs for JSOP67, the same inter-service splits that had
plagued JSOP66 reappeared. In February 1962, with agreement no nearer, the JCS
suspended work and asked the Chairman, General Lemnitzer, to suggest solutions.24
Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara opened the FY 1964 cycle by issuing 62
requirements studies, similar to the 96 trombones of 1961. His request for an
examination of general purpose forces, promising to prove particularly broad and
complex, prompted Lemnitzer to establish his own Special Studies Group in June
10

1962. The Director, J5, chaired this Group, which was large enough to undertake
three studies simultaneously.25 The Special Studies Group played an increasingly
important part in helping to define JCS positions, but its influence never came
close to matching that of the systems analysts in OSD.
During the spring of 1962, Secretary McNamara made notable refinements to
the PPBS. He established, as the official DOD position, a Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) derived from FY 1963 budget decisions and from service submissions made to Comptroller Hitchs office during February and March 1962.26 He
also instituted a device of Program Change Proposals (PCPs), through which
the FYDP might be amended at any time. PCPs could be submitted by the JCS, the
Military Departments, and OSD agencies; they would be reviewed by all concerned
DOD components and then presented to the Secretary for a decision. McNamara
wanted decision-making to be spread more evenly over the calendar year, so that
important issues need not be settled amid the rush of finalizing the budget. He
therefore decided that the FYDP, as it stood on 15 August 1962, would serve as the
basis for budget submissions.27
General LeMay worried that the FYDP, together with guidance from Comptroller Hitchs office, might become a substitute for what he termed mature military
judgment. He urged, accordingly, that action upon JSOP-67s force tabs be accelerated. General Lemnitzer finally secured agreement that postponed decisions about
force levels in the later or out years. At last, on 27 August 1962, the JCS sent
Secretary McNamara force tabs that generally, although not completely, accorded
with those in the FYDP. But, by then, Secretary McNamaras 15 August deadline
had passed. Moreover, JSOP67s force tabs were neither arranged according to the
program package format nor accompanied by supporting rationales. This failure to
speak the Secretarys language considerably lessened JSOP67s impact.28
When General Taylor became Chairman, he was well aware of complaints that
civilian whiz kids in OSD were wont to adopt positions without seeking military
advice. He also remembered how a former Chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford, had
tried to eliminate splits in JCS papers by pressuring the Service Chiefs to change
positionsand sometimes, in Taylors judgment, made matters worse. So, before
accepting the Chairmanship, Taylor won McNamaras agreement (1) that the JCS
would always have their day in court with him and (2) that the Chairman never
would be asked to try to compel unanimity.29
Introducing PCPs proved a two-edged sword, as the services flooded Comptroller Hitchs office with them and thus threw back deadlines for the FY 1964
cycle. Early in autumn 1962, through DPMs, Secretary McNamara circulated tentative budget and force-level decisions. The JCS critiqued each of them. For about
three weeks, from mid-October until early November, the Cuban missile crisis
completely absorbed the attention of senior officials. On 29 November, Secretary
McNamara issued his final decisions. On all the contentious issueslevels of
Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, deploying ballistic missile defenses,
11

moving ahead with a new manned bomber, numbers of Army divisions, tactical
fighter wings, and airlifthe rejected service reclamas and held to his original recommendations. It is noteworthy that the JCS were split over these issues, mostly
along service lines. LeMay, for example, wanted more missiles and a new bomber
but opposed the Armys plan for missile defenses.30
Secretary McNamara proposed a blood statement saying that although the
force structure does not contain all the forces recommended by each of the Services, the JCS agreed that it would further increase our combat effectiveness
and provide powerful forces in a high state of readiness. Anderson, Shoup, and
Wheeler concurred. LeMay did not, because of what he deemed serious deficiencies. On 3 December, they informed McNamara thatsubject to two alterations
the statement was acceptable. First, the program does not include all the forces
recommended by each of the Services or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively.
Second, Anderson, LeMay, and Shoup retain certain reservations, particularly as
regards the rate of modernization and growth in combat effectiveness of certain US
forces in relation to the Sino-Soviet threat.31
On 27 December 1962, again at Palm Beach, Secretary McNamara and the JCS
had their wrap-up conference with President Kennedy. Service reservations were
aired fully. But General LeMay, who had the deepest differences with McNamara,
began his presentation by stating that in his five years of budget planning this
had been the best, with the greatest amount of agreement among the Chiefs and
the best feeling of support from their civilian superiors, including the President,
that the Joint Chiefs had ever had. He hinted at deeper misgivings about JCS-OSD
relations by telling the President that war is not efficient, and its needs and plans
could not be run by computer efficiency measurements.32
For the FY 1965 cycle, the Chiefs main concern was integrating their JSOP
more effectively into the PPBS. Secretary McNamara, in fact, asked them to propose a method for correlating JSOP planning with development of his Five Year
Program, so that the JSOP would become a primary vehicle for obtaining the
decisions on force structure necessary for validating the ensuing budget year of
the five-year cycle. The JSOP, therefore, must contain justifications of its force
tabs, based upon an analysis of the requirements for contingency and general
war plans. Unified commanders, previously limited to commenting upon recommendations by their component commanders, now were directed to submit their
own estimates and justifications as inputs to the JSOPanother step in enlarging
their roles.33
On 4 December 1962, after getting General Taylors concurrence, Secretary
McNamara circulated an FY 1965 timetable that pushed the programming phase
forward by several months. On 1 March 1963 (changed at General Taylors request
to 12 April), the JCS would send him the force tabs and rationales of JSOP68.
Between April and June, the services would submit force structures, cost estimates, and PCPs. By 15 August, the Secretary of Defense would complete his
12

review and establish firm program guidelines. On 1 October, the services would
send in their submissions, along with five-year plans that adhered to the guidance
of 15 August.34
In January 1963, General Taylor told Joint Staff officers assigned to drafting the
JSOP that producing an agreed and effective rationale was imperative, no matter
how difficult that task might prove. This time, too, the JSOPs force tabs had to be
presented in the program package format.35
The resulting JSOP68 contained an analysis of missions, objectives, and operational requirements that, Taylor assured McNamara, was the most thorough of
any JSOP within my experience. The Joint Staff even copied the McNamara-Hitch
methodology to the point of preparing and assessing alternative packages for each
program. Nonetheless, the JCS split over some of the most important force tabs
(e.g., Minuteman, Army division, and tactical fighter aircraft levels). Taylor attributed
these splits to the wide range of major uncertainties inherent in the task as well as
[to] the existence of a number of hard issues of major and basic importance. The
major uncertainties, he said, included different estimates of US and Soviet missile
reliability, the Soviets capability to refire from missile silos and harden their missile
sites, the impact of possible Soviet ballistic missile defenses, and the possibility of
new weapon systems. Among the hard issues listed by Taylor were the efficacy
of retaliating against counterforce targets in nuclear war, the reliance of general
purpose forces upon reserve components, the role of attack carriers, and manpower
levels for each service.36 These were matters that went to the heart of each services
force structure. Very likely, as far as OSD was concerned, such serious splits more
than offset the advantages of adopting program package formats.
On 6 December, after receiving Secretary McNamaras final decisions, the JCS
agreed upon a blood statement practically identical to that of the previous year.
On 30 December, McNamara and the JCS briefed President Johnson at his LBJ
Ranch. General Taylor described the FY 1965 budget as over-all, a good one. He
said that, unlike 195559 when he was Army Chief of Staff, the Joint Chiefs now
spend a great deal of time on the overall defense budget and the force structure it
supports; their consideration goes beyond the parochial views of their Services.
They had, he added, taken part in 104 discussions of budget matters, force structures, or PCPs.37 Judging by JSOP68, however, a broader span of consideration
was not in itself enough to transcend parochialism.
For FY 1966, at Hitchs urging, Secretary McNamara proposed moving tentative decisions about force changes and logistics guidance forward three months,
from August to May, thereby allowing more time for review and discussion. The
JCS urged pushing back, by two weeks each, the deadlines for service force
changes, the JCS and service reclamas to OSDs tentative force guidance, and the
presentation of PCPs. Conversely, they wanted the period for OSDs review of service PCPs to be shortened by two weeks. McNamara did agree to some changes.
JSOP69 would be submitted on 1 March 1964, followed on 1 April by dollar and
13

manpower requests from the services which did not exceed JSOP69s force tabs.
That sequence, he hoped, would permit a broader examination than was possible
through examinations of individual PCPs. By 15 June, the JCS and the services
would assess OSDs tentative decisions and the services would submit all their
PCPs based upon them. By 15 August, McNamara would render his decisions about
the PCPs. All DOD components would complete their budget submissions by 1
October.38
In 1964, according to General Taylor, the JCS made a major effort to improve
their JSOP. Basically, they decided to buttress supporting rationales of the sort
used in JSOP68 with situational analyses, in which the Joint Staff and the services employed war gaming techniques to decide what forces would be needed during
the early stages of hypothetical crises. The final product, in Taylors judgment, was
better than its predecessors but not vastly so. The Joint Staff found that situational
analyses were more useful as a technique for testing force levels than as a method
of deriving force objectives. The Service Chiefs harbored many reservations
concerning the assumptions, factors, concepts of employment and conclusions of
these analyses. And JSOP69, encumbered by these situational analyses, grew to a
truly formidable length. Still, Taylor felt that this approach had proven to be of considerable value in rebutting some of OSDs cost-effectiveness calculations.39
In November 1964, as the FY 1966 cycle neared completion, the JCS advised
McNamara that the timetable had required them to submit JSOP69 before the
requirements studies commissioned by OSD had been completed. They also asked
that the time allotted to the services for reviewing tentative guidance and preparing PCPs rise from 30 to 60 days. In his FY 1967 schedule, Secretary McNamara did
lengthen the reviewing period to 75 days.40
Early in December, Secretary McNamara circulated final force and budget
decisions that, he believed, reflected in major respects . . . the views of the majority of the Chiefs. The JCS signed another blood statement virtually identical to
those of the past two years. On 22 December, at the LBJ Ranch, McNamara told
President Johnson that he and the JCS agreed on about 95 percent of the items
and believed that the FY 1966 budget would improve and strengthen US defenses.
The President asked General Wheeler, who was now Chairman, whether every JCS
member agreed; Wheeler replied that they did.41 In retrospect, with a war in Southeast Asia looming, what seems remarkable about these procedures and discussions
is their appearance of peacetime routine. During 1965, escalation in Vietnam would
disrupt force and budget planning, exposing major JCS-OSD differences.
By December 1964, Draft Presidential Memorandums had emerged as the most
important documents in the budget and force-planning process. This occurred
as much from default as from design. After expending nearly two years of work,
civilian leaders decided that a formal statement of Basic National Security Policy
was unnecessary. The State Department produced country and regional guideline papers, but the White House accorded these little weight.42 In 1964 the State
14

Department started publishing National Policy Papers which fared no better. The
JCS wanted JSOPs to shape the content of PPBS cycles and devoted considerable
efforts toward that end. Essentially, they failed. Civilian analysts may have been
predisposed to find fault with JSOPs, and they had no difficulty doing so. Persistent splits over force tabs and lowest-common-denominator language about strategic concepts more than offset any benefits from the preparation of alternative
program packages or the war gaming of situational analyses. Thus it was Secretary
McNamaras DPMs that articulated assured destruction for waging nuclear war as
well as a two-war capability for conventional conflicts. These, in turn, were the
foundations for OSDs statistically-based justifications of force levels.
15
2
Strategic Priorities Undergo
Major Changes
Conventional Capability Emphasized; Basic National

Security Policy Aborted
one of President Eisenhowers national security policies attracted more

criticism than his emphasis upon meeting aggression with nuclear retaliation. He believed that any conflict with the Soviet Union, no matter where or how
it occurred, would escalate rapidly into a general war involving an exchange of
blows by strategic nuclear forces as well as a global struggle by ground, sea and air
forces, probably employing tactical nuclear weapons. Eisenhower did allow for the
possibility of limited wars in which the USSR was not involved. His yardstick for
sizing US conventional forces was that of waging a renewed war in Korea. But general war requirements held priority, because limited wars might well escalate into
general ones.
The Kennedy administration came to power convinced that Eisenhowers
approach was outdated and ineffective. President Kennedy inherited a statement of
Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), which was a comprehensive document integrating military, diplomatic, economic, political, and psychological factors. President
Eisenhowers last BNSP was NSC 5906/1, approved in August 1959, which placed
main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons. On 4 February 1961, Secretary
of State Dean Rusk gave Secretary McNamara his view that raising the threshold
for nuclear response struck him as a matter of the greatest importance. He further
stated that our general war deterrent must be effective, invulnerable, and reliable.
But he also believed that a mobile, substantial, and flexible capability for operations
17

short of general war is essential. Forces of that kind should be deployed in forward
areas of the western Pacific. In Europe, Rusk argued, NATO needed enough conventional strength to enforce a pause long enough to allow the Soviets time to appraise
the wider risks they faced and provide an opportunity for negotiations.1
The J5, a bit surprisingly, judged Rusks paper to be generally consistent
with NSC 5906/1. General Decker, however, believed that the emphasis upon
conventional capability required significant revisions to it. On 11 March, in an
evident compromise, the JCS informed Secretary McNamara that they generally agreed with Rusks views and believed that NSC 5906/1 was broadly phrased
enough to fall within their compass. They noted that implementing Rusks intent
would require budget increases and, in Europe, modernization of US forces along
with a considerably expanded allied contribution. They added, though, that NATO
must not flinch from employing nuclear weapons if necessary and endorsed the
judgment of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe that selective use of atomic
firepower need not result in all-out war.2
On 28 March 1961, Secretary McNamara advised the President that the primary mission of our overseas forces should be made non-nuclear warfare. Eight
days later, President Kennedy informed Congress that our objective now is to
increase our ability to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons. On 21 April,
he approved a directive that assigned highest priority to creating a conventional
capability for halting Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to central Europe
for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risk of the
course on which they are embarked. The JCS had wanted highest priority softened to simply priority because they did not see a limited conflict in Europe as
being any more likely than a general war.3
It is noteworthy that Kennedy directed such a major change so quickly, with
nothing comparable to the Eisenhower administrations Project Solarium4 and its
follow-ups that consumed much of 1953. Civilian leaders may not have fully appreciated the ramifications of this change. NATOs strategic concept, MC 14/2, stated
that the alliance would respond with nuclear weapons, regardless of whether the
Soviets did so, in all situations except incursion, infiltration, or local hostile action.
European allies looked upon the threat of nuclear reprisal as the surest deterrent
and proved resistant to any other approach. The US Air Force had spent the 1950s
equipping itself for nuclear warfare. Thus the F105 Thunderchief, a mainstay of
the Tactical Air Command, was designed for low-level delivery of tactical nuclear
weapons. Many of the Air Forces senior officers came from the Strategic Air Command and were reluctant to reorient their services priorities. The upshot was that
changes promulgated swiftly in principle, spent much of the 1960s being worked
out in practice.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(ISA), made the first attempt to write a new BNSP. On 19 May 1961, ISA circulated
a draft calling for a capability to respond to local aggression locally, wherever it
18
Strategic Priorities
may occur and whatever form it may take. That meant placing main but not sole
reliance on non-nuclear weapons.5 Undoubtedly, these words were intended to
reverse NSC 5906/1.
On 5 July, the JCS completed their own draft of BNSP. It stated that US and
allied strength should be sufficient to provide for the military superiority of the
Free World and afford an adequate basis for essential operations to defeat aggressive communism at all levels. Limited war forces should be deployed so as to
retard aggressors long enough to allow the arrival of reinforcements, keeping the
conflict at a non-nuclear level wherever possible. Thus they were not willing to
go quite as far in emphasizing conventional capabilities. The Chiefs worried that,
if their draft went forward through normal channels, it might be rejected by ISA
and never reach McNamara and Kennedy in its original form. Accordingly, they
took the unusual step of deciding that General Lemnitzer would personally deliver
their paper to McNamara and Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric. Also, Lemnitzer
would say that the JCS wanted to discuss BNSP with them and the President at an
early date.6
Late in July, ISA circulated a revised draft stating that US strength should
be adequate to meet any military situation discriminately with sufficient, but
not excessive measures. After reviewing it, the JCS rejected a recommendation by their Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC) that they simply stand on
their 5 July paper. Instead, they directed the JSSC to specify the reasons for dissatisfaction with ISAs latest effort. Early in August, the JSSC submitted a talking paper that characterized ISAs draft as negative and inhibiting in nature,
tending to over-emphasize control of military forces, avoidance of casualties
and damage, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed. ISA appeared to be emphasizing
conventional weapons even more than NSC 5906/1 had emphasized nuclear
ones. Indeed, [a]n overly inhibited BNSP could permeate the whole structure
of a people and government to the point where the all-important will to win disappears. While military operations had to be controlled by constituted authority, such control should be covered broadly and succinctly in BNSP with specific details left to technical plans and policies.7
The JSSCs criticisms could be seen as foreshadowing the deep JCS-OSD differences that developed over waging the Vietnam War. Actually, in 1961, what they
mainly reflected was military unease over civilians intrusion into the details of
contingency planning for West Berlin, and with civilians insistence that any escalation of effort there be carefully graduated and controlled. Some civilians in OSD
likened war to a violent form of bargaining, in which military actions should send
an opponent messages about controlling and resolving the conflict. On 7 August,
the JCS met with McNamara but he decided to defer work on BNSP because the
Berlin confrontation and the FY 1963 budget deserved higher priority.8 An eightmonth hiatus followed.
19

On 26 March 1962, Walt Rostow (Director of the State Departments Policy Planning Staff) circulated a long, elegantly phrased BNSP draft that opened with quotations from Winston Churchill and Alexis de Tocqueville. It stated that conventional
forces should be substantial enough to contain anything short of an all-out Soviet or
Chinese attack and mobile enough to deal with two simultaneous crises in distant
parts of the world. If a balance had to be struck in training and equipping forces, that
balance should favor non-nuclear over nuclear combat. Thus conventional forces
should be so organized, trained, and equipped as not to be dependent on nuclear
weapons for their effectiveness in sustained combat. If nuclear weapons had to
be used, the primary purpose of firing a small number of them would be political,
rather than military, signaling US intent to widen the war if necessary.9
The JCS found this draft acceptable, subject to changes such as adding provisions for controlling vital sea lanes, protecting maritime commerce, and supporting
overseas forces. State did so but, in a 7 May draft, added tentative guidelines for
tactical nuclear weapons. The tactical nuclear arsenal, State said, should be sufficient (1) to allow employment selectively and profitably (notably at sea and in the
air) with little risk of escalation and (2) to permit very limited use against military
targets, primarily to demonstrate US determination. And until firm guidelines were
established, commitments to either produce tactical nuclear weapons or provide
them to non-NATO allies should be avoided.10
These tentative guidelines created a good deal of controversy. The JCS
opposed any prohibition upon production. McNamara, however, had very little
faith in the efficacy of tactical nuclear warfare. The difficulty of centralized control, the pressure to respond in kind, the great flexibility and enormous firepower
of nuclear weapon systems, the ease and accuracy with which such weapons could
be fired from distant basesall these suggested to him that local nuclear war
would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon. Whether the military
possessed a viable doctrine for employing tactical nuclear weapons became another bone of contention. McNamara believed there was none and should be one. General Lemnitzer, however, held that a war of movement would not permit the sort of
detailed planning and target selection embodied in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for strategic nuclear warfare. He argued that a doctrine existed and
proper training had been providedbut the scope and location of targets could
not be provided beforehand.11 To the JCS, conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear capabilities were elements in a continuum of warfare. By contrast,
McNamara wanted to build a firebreak because he grew certain that any escalation
above the conventional level would escalate rapidly into all-out exchanges.
In July 1962, thirty-one BNSP Planning Tasks were identified for further study
and probable referral in final form to the President. These, however, included such
critical topics as initiation of nuclear warfare and scale and role of conventional
forces. In mid-August, General LeMay told JCS colleagues that he was worried
about their apparent exclusion from this exercise. The nuclear warfare problem, for
20
example, had been assigned solely to Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry Rowen in
ISA; there was not even a JCS contact point. At the weekly meetings where BNSP
drafting efforts were coordinated, military personnel attended only as observers
and lacked authority to present and defend JCS positions. Since Rowen shared
McNamaras skepticism about the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, the military
were naturally apprehensive. On 20 August, the JCS communicated their concern
to McNamara, who promised that no final action would be taken without there first
being a JCS review.12
Meantime, the State Department prepared a short version that extracted
policy statements from previous drafts and omitted the supporting rationales. At a
State-JCS meeting on 5 October, General Taylor (who had just become Chairman)
said that the JCS had not seen the latest draft and wanted to do so. Deputy Under
Secretary of State Alexis Johnson proposed giving only the military portions to the
Chiefs. General Wheeler replied that this would be like having the Book of Revelation without ever having seen Genesis. Taylor remarked that BNSP should be like
the British constitutionunwritten. He repeated what he had said in The Uncertain Trumpet about BNSPs of the Eisenhower era: any document which gains the
acceptance of everyone must of necessity be so compromised that it will be used
by everyone to further his own ends. Subsequently, the Service Chiefs advised
McNamara that fragmentation and piecemeal submission might well lead to a dilution of the essential inter-relationship of the various elements of national policy
political, economic, and military. Therefore, a completely balanced version of
BNSP rather than a series of compartmented excerpts is urgently needed. Writing
separately, Taylor offered contrary advice. Another lengthy debate, he thought,
would precede presidential approval. The immediate need, Taylor counseled, was
a base on which the Chiefs could build their next JSOP. McNamara could provide
that simply by noting or approving the draft BNSP. But apart from that, Taylor concluded, I doubt the wisdom of pressing for higher action . . . at this time.13
Suddenly, the BNSP exercise ended. On 17 January 1963, President Kennedy
formally rescinded NSC 5906/1 which for all practical purposes had become a dead
letter on the day he took office. He directed that guidance be drawn from existing major policy statements of the President and Cabinet Officers, both classified
and unclassified. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric told General Taylor that he was not
overly concerned by failure to finalize a BNSP, because statements by senior officials constitute pragmatic policy guidance which can serve as a basis for military
planning. In June, ISA circulated such a compilation of speeches and statements.14
The JCS tried to salvage something from the BNSPs demise. In March 1963,
General Taylor ordered the JSSC to propose guidance for developing the basic
family of JCS plans. Early in June, the JSSC identified 21 areas in which policy
guidance appeared deficient and argued for a comprehensive BNSP. The JCS
discussed this three times and finally decided to defer action. At the last of these
21

meetings, General Taylor tabled a list of six questions covering matters on which
higher guidance should be sought.15
The JCS met with McNamara on 22 July and argued for a State-Defenseapproved BNSP. After some discussion, they agreed to submit a list of questions
andif McNamara approved themto supply suggested answers. McNamara was
willing to transmit those questions and answers to State and say that they constituted DODs planning guidance. The list would be General Taylors six questions,
each of which addressed a critical issue:
1. What should be the target-hitting capability of strategic retaliatory
forces?
2. How many contingencies should conventional or general purpose forces
be able to handle, and what should be their speed of reaction?
3. What should be NATOs capability for enforcing a non-nuclear pause
upon an aggressor?
4. What provision should be made for supporting a revolt in the Eastern
European satellites?
5. What level of military activity could the United States conduct between
Suez and Thailand? Was this adequate?
6. Should planners assume that the United States would not conduct largescale ground operations on the Asian mainland?
The JCS tasked J5 and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group with drafting
answers but decided against sending the six questions to Secretary McNamara.
When answers were submitted late in August, the JCS simply noted them. Perhaps they did so because, as General LeMay observed, preparing the next JSOP
would require them to consider many, if not all, of the subjects represented by
the proposed questions. . . . Crucial policy considerations addressed in any less
complete context seem likely to impinge adversely on our ability to satisfy the total
requirements of national security.16
The shift from massive retaliation to flexible response did find its way into the
JCS family of plans. JSCP63, circulated in January 1962, discarded NSC 5906/1
by foreseeing engagements between US and Soviet forces which, in themselves,
are not of such a nature as to constitute sufficient cause for the United States to
implement general war plans. The circumstances, location, and world climate
under which an engagement occurs would be major factors in determining what
our national response might be. According to JSOP68, issued late that same
year, general purpose forces should be able to frustrate, without using nuclear
weapons, major non-nuclear assault by Sino-Soviet forces where vital US interests
are involved . . . long enough to convince the communists of the risks involved . . . ,
thereby affording diplomacy a chance to end the conflict. Specifically, they should
be sufficiently mobile to respond promptly and simultaneously in needed numbers
to two substantial threats . . . , notably in Europe and Southeast Asia. JSOP69,
which appeared in September 1963, read that general purpose forces should be
22
sufficient . . . to meet the early reinforcement requirements of NATO and . . . the
estimated requirements of any one of the most likely contingency plans of the
commanders of the unified and specified commands.17 Thus a two-war capability
became the benchmark for planning conventional force levels.
For BNSP, the last gasp came in February 1965. A majority of the Chiefs
advised Secretary McNamara that, while compilation of a BNSP was desirable
in principle, the JCS do not lack policy guidance for the preparation of military
plans. The Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commandant of the Marine Corps did
recommend developing a BNSP and reactivating the NSC Planning Board. McNamara replied: I am inclined to the view that there is no pressing need for a BNSP
in single document form and, at the moment, am not persuaded that the NSC Planning Board should be reactivated.18
Hindsight strongly suggests that lack of a BNSP created problems more serious than civilian leadersand General Tayloracknowledged. Critical issues were
raised but not resolved, as Taylors six questions showed. To take an outstanding
example: Eisenhower BNSPs at least helped to identify what were vital US interests. If a country was not worth defending with nuclear weapons, it was not of vital
importance and therefore not worth waging a large-scale conventional war. Switching the emphasis to conventional capabilities blurred that threshold. In May 1961,
McNamara sent President Kennedy his assumption that a commitment of more
than 250300,000 American troops would reach the nuclear threshold. A month
later, Dr. Carl Kaysen of the NSC Staff put the transition point at 300350,000
and suggested that the ceiling might go higher.19 In 1963 the threshold issue, still
unsettled, was implicit in several of General Taylors questions. Subsequently, what
Gilpatric had characterized as pragmatic policy guidance did not prevent an
incremental buildup in Vietnam. By 1968, 549,000 US troops were committed there.
Focusing on Counterinsurgency
y the late 1950s, the Cold War had spread into the Third World where communists exploited wide discontent among the poor and oppressed of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. On 6 January 1961, Nikita Khrushchev extolled what he
called wars of national liberation. Citing Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam as examples
of successful popular uprisings, he pledged to support such wars wholeheartedly and without reservation. President Kennedy took Khrushchevs speech as an
authoritative exposition of Soviet intentions.20
In January 1961 Army Special Forces totaled only 1,800 personnel, trained for
guerrilla operations in communist-controlled areas. President Kennedy promptly
ordered an expansion and reorientation. At an NSC meeting on 1 February, he
asked McNamara to examine ways of emphasizing counter-guerrilla capabilities.
On 6 and 23 February, Kennedy met the JCS and asked for detailed rundowns of
23

what was being done in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Obviously, he told
them, there was going to be more guerrillas and counter-guerrilla activity in Africa
and Asia in the near future. Early in March, the JCS informed Secretary McNamara
of the steps being taken to improve training and instruction. They also recommended clarifying interdepartmental responsibilities in developing counterinsurgency
plans for threatened countries, with Defense taking charge of training the police
and internal security personnel. McNamara directed that JCS proposals be put into
effect with all possible vigor. On 11 April, the services and unified commands
were told to submit quarterly progress reports. High presidential interest meant
that the Joint Staff had to keep McNamara fully abreast of these matters.21
On 25 April, just after the Bay of Pigs debacle, the JCS were asked to prepare
proposals designed to increase influence and control in threatened areas through
pre-emption of communist infiltration. This was quite a challenge, and the steps
they recommended were modest. General White, in fact, was alarmed by what he
deemed a lack of any real capability to deal with subversion and indirect aggression. He recommended a master plan to marshal and organize US and Free World
resources into a tough hit-below-the-belt course of action. White stood alone
among JCS members in pressing this view. But on 28 June, through NSAM 55,
President Kennedy ordered the JCS to assume a role in Cold War operations similar to that which they bore for conventional hostilities, and to provide dynamic
and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of Cold War operations. He regarded the Chiefs as more than
military men and expected them to help fit military requirements into the over-all
context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government
is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.22
In December 1961, an NSC task force concluded that, while there was a clear
consensus about the magnitude and urgency of the problem, no single high-level
locus of authority and responsibility existed to coordinate interagency resources.
General Taylor, who was then working in the White House, asked for General Lemnitzers views about creating a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). Lemnitzer
concurred, with two caveats. First, confining the Groups responsibilities to places
where the communists already had a running start would preclude a fair test of
its capabilities and prevent it from concentrating on areas of the most strategic
significance. Second, Group members would be senior officials whose time already
was fully occupied; they could do no more than review thoroughly staffed recommendations. Therefore, the Group needed a small, highly qualified staff to draft
proposals and monitor their implementation. His first suggestion was accepted but
not his second. State, OSD, Central Intelligence, and the Agency for International
Development (AID) did not consider a staff necessary, and none was provided.23
On 18 January 1962, President Kennedy established the Special Group (CounterInsurgency (CI)) which would hold two-hour weekly meetings. Its main missions
included (1) insuring government-wide recognition that insurgency was a major
24
form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare, (2)
reviewing the adequacy of resources for coping with actual or potential situations
of insurgency or indirect aggression, and (3) insuring the adequacy of programs in
countries and regions assigned to the Group by the President. The Groups members were: General Taylor, Chairman; Attorney General Robert Kennedy; Deputy
Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson; Deputy Secretary Cyrus R. Vance; General Lemnitzer; Director of Central Intelligence John McCone; and AID Administrator
Fowler Hamilton. Initially, the President assigned South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to its cognizance. By September 1962, he had added seven more countries.24
President Kennedy still did not believe that the Defense Department, and particularly the Army, was devoting enough attention and effort to counterinsurgency.25 Accordingly, in January 1962, he ordered that the Army select one general officer to act as its focal point for counterinsurgency efforts. The choice fell on Major
General-designate William B. Rosson, who later held four-star rank. Major General
Victor H. Krulak, USMC, became Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, assigned to the Joint Staff. When these officers met the President on
5 March, Kennedy told them that counterinsurgency was the most pressing war
either at hand or in prospect.26
Lacking a BNSP, policy guidance existed in piecemeal, fragmentary form.
Accordingly, in April 1962 the JCS sent a draft of Joint Counterinsurgency Concept
and Doctrinal Guidance to Secretary McNamara and asked that he consider conveying it to the President. The draft divided programs into two broad categories: first,
nation-building entailing military contributions through civic actions; second, programs for military counter-insurgency support during military operations. Within
the second category, they identified three general phases of intensity. During Phase
I, problem spots would be indentified and a Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG), a military training mission, or a tailored counterinsurgency force introduced. In Phase II, if the insurgency grew to more serious proportions, increased
aid would be accompanied by military personnel providing operational assistance.
A new command, directly subordinate to the unified commander concerned, could
be created. Activated in February 1962, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV), was directly subordinate to Pacific Command. Guerrilla sanctuaries outside
the threatened country might have to be attacked. Phase III could see a combat commitment of tactical forces. The JCS then enumerated principles governing counterinsurgency operations. The most important of these were: seeking complete integration and coordination of effort through unity of command and centralized control;
making maximum use of indigenous forces; and fitting employment of US forces
to local conditions, avoiding commitment of large combat units.27 A critical issue,
of course, was whether indigenous capabilities were equal to the test. When the
Defense Department appraised eleven countries, only Pakistans paramilitary assets
were rated as good. The others varied between fair and poor. The Special Group (CI)
suggested, and the President approved, several corrective steps. With one or two
25

exceptions, there were no plans to unify and orchestrate internal defense plans for
threatened countries. The State Department would supervise the preparation of such
plans, and they would be submitted to the Special Group (CI).28
Meantime, the State Department drafted a National Counter-Insurgency Doctrine which the Special Group (CI) asked interested agencies to review. In July 1962,
an interdepartmental working group circulated US Overseas Internal Defense Policy
Guidelines which described three phases quite similar to those in the JCS guidance: Phase I ranged from an incipient threat to frequent incidents occurring in an
organized pattern; Phase II involved the initiation of organized guerrilla warfare; and
Phase III was primarily a war of movement between organized forces. The State
Department would bear responsibility for providing overall policy and coordinating
internal defense programs. The Special Group (CI) should assure a coordinated and
unified approach, verify progress in implementing programs, and render decisions
about inter-departmental issues. The JCS concurred with these guidelines, and President Kennedy approved them on 24 August 1962.29
As 1962 ended, the Army had almost 8,000 men organized into area-oriented
Special Forces. The Air Force had been authorized 184 aircraft and 2,167 personnel. In the Navy, fourteen Seabee Technical Assistance Teams had completed or
were undergoing specialized training. In the Military Assistance Program for FY
1962, $45.3 million had been allocated to counterinsurgency training and materiel.
The FY 1963 figure rose to $146.9 million; another $33.2 million was allocated for
civic action programs in seventeen countries.30
Should the services growing counterinsurgency assets be placed under
centralized control? In August 1962, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric suggested that
Strike Command (STRICOM) play a coordinating role in evaluating requirements,
selecting and integrating forces, and developing joint tactics and doctrines. The
JCS disagreed; each service should continue developing its own doctrine, tactics,
procedures, and equipment. They argued, in justification, that unified commanders
developed requirements and directed forces within their areas of responsibility;
assigning overall cognizance to STRICOM would conflict with those responsibilities. Army Special Forces Groups, for example, were area-oriented, and STRICOM
bore no area responsibilities.31 All they were willing to support was creating a STRICOM Joint Special Warfare Coordinating Group. That was done. Gilpatric asked
the Group to assess the advisability of co-locating the Army and Air Force Special
Warfare Centers. Early in 1963, STRICOM recommended against doing so and the
JCS agreed. This time, however, General LeMay recommended that STRICOM be
given operational control of all US-based Special Forces. Lemnitzer, Wheeler, and
Anderson would go no further than having such forces made available to the
maximum extent feasible. On 30 March 1963, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that service, JCS, and unified commanders responsibilities were properly
defined. Assets were being made available to STRICOM as necessary to conduct training and accomplish assigned tasks. As Special Forces expanded, the JCS
26
would review the desirability of giving STRICOM operational control of a working
force of Army and Air Force Special Warfare Units.32 So ended the first round of a
debate that would run for many years.
During 196162, South Vietnam became a veritable laboratory for applying counterinsurgency doctrines. In June 1962, the Central Intelligence Agencys
(CIA) Station Chief in Saigon submitted a report stating that regular military
forces would play only a secondary role in subversive warfare. General Lemnitzer
emphatically disagreed; he sent rebuttals to OSD and the White House rejecting it
as grossly erroneous. In his judgment, CIAs mismanagement of the failed Cuban
invasion in 1961 was proof of its unfitness for a leading role.33 Historically, Lemnitzer argued, regular forces had played a cardinal part in defeating insurgency.
They had done so in Greece and Malaya, and he saw every reason to suppose that
they would do the same in South Vietnam. There, in setting up and safeguarding
strategic hamlets, South Vietnamese regulars were playing the decisive military
role. In sum, said Lemnitzer, regular and paramilitary forces were equally essential
to successful counterinsurgency operations.34
In South Vietnam, however, nothing proceeded according to doctrine and
guidelines. During the critical months of AugustOctober 1963, integration and
coordination of effort were conspicuously lacking. Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge and General Paul D. Harkins were at loggerheads about what course to
pursue. Their differences were replicated in Washington, with General Taylor supporting Harkins. After President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed in a military coup, the
Saigon government remained unstable and counterinsurgency efforts in the countryside faltered badly. In the spring of 1963, a battalion of the North Vietnamese
army moved into the South. One year later, a second battalion and a division headquarters followed.35 By 1965, a faltering Army of the Republic of Vietnam faced Viet
Cong guerrillas and organized units as well as North Vietnamese regulars. Simultaneously, therefore, the United States and its weak ally had to conduct counterinsurgency and conventional operations.
The SIOP: Striving for a Controlled Response
he advent of long-range ballistic missiles created major problems and possibilities in planning for strategic nuclear war. In 1959, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Thomas F. Hickey, USA, the NSCs Net Evaluation Subcommittee
examined how a nuclear war in 1963 might be waged. Its tasks were to determine
(1) what targets must be destroyed or neutralized and (2) what retaliatory forces
would be required. Air Force planners favored a counterforce strategy which,
while targeting government, industrial, military, and communications control centers, awarded priority to strikes against Soviet nuclear delivery capabilities. Army
planners, however, held that governmental, industrial, and communications centers
27

should be the primary targets, with any additional effort allocated against military
targets. This was the countercity or critical control targets strategy. Naturally,
counterforce required greater resources because every addition to Soviet capabilities had to be matched by a corresponding US increase. Countercity targets, by
contrast, remained relatively constant. The Hickey Subcommittee compromised.
Study No. 2009 recommended a mix of military and industrial targets and enough
weapons carriers to achieve a 75 to 90 percent assurance of striking them. In February 1960, President Eisenhower approved this optimum mix along with a 75
percent assurance of delivering weapons.
In August 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates ordered that a National
Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan be promulgated and maintained. General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic
Air Command, became the Director of Strategic Target Planning. In that capacity, he organized and supervised a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at
Omaha, Nebraska. The Staffs first plan, SIOP62, was produced posthaste during
the Eisenhower administrations final months. The JCS announced that SIOP62
would become effective on 2 April 1961. General Lemnitzer considered production
of a SIOP to be among the most important achievements of this era. No military
man, he believed, was truly unhappy with the Plan; its existence created a whole
new aura of confidence.36
Dr. George Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, faulted SIOP62 for (among other things) redundancy in weapons
deliveries and damage criteria that ignored the effects of heat and fallout. Secretary
Gates, on his last day in office, asked the JCS to assess Kistiakowskys critique.37
The McNamara team reacted to initial briefings by characterizing SIOP-62 as
a spasm war plan, its greatest weakness being the lack of flexibility in its execution. Early in March 1961, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to draft a doctrine
that would permit controlled responses and negotiating pauses. Answering on
18 April, they advised him that these innovations were infeasible before the mid1960s. Immediate implementation would be premature and could gravely weaken
the current deterrent posture. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possessed the essential prerequisites: adequate missile warning and defense systems;
protected command and control facilities; and a secure retaliatory force capable
of conducting second strikes or controlled responses. But Lemnitzer believed, and
Secretary McNamara readily agreed, that the problem was important enough to
warrant further study.38
On 5 May, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric circulated a BNSP draft that delineated
a strategy for controlled, discriminating response. The JCS replied by setting out
their reservations more fully. By its very nature, they said, planning for nuclear
war militated against a plethora of options. Since a nuclear attack would cause
massive disruption, there was an overwhelming need for simplicity of response.
US forces labored under the liabilities of scarce intelligence and relegation to a
28
second-strike role. Effective retaliation depended upon the utmost exploitation
of military initiative, adroit timing, and effective targeting. The more complicated
a plan became, the longer would be the time required for its execution. Consequently, until our forces are endowed with sufficient invulnerability to permit
holding a portion in secure reserve, any limitations imposed upon striking all
elements of the enemys war potential must be responsive to military necessity.
In the near term, a sparing of urban-industrial, population, and governmental
control centers was impossible. Military targets intermingled with nonmilitary
resources, and nuclear weapons lacked the necessary selectivity. In sum, political
flexibility was tightly constricted by military technology.
Nonetheless, the JCS agreed that some improvements were feasible. Currently,
strikes could be withheld by every element except the alert forcewhich, however, comprised about two-thirds of all retaliatory strength. In the future, the JCS
would make certain (1) that all aspects of flexibility and selectivity became more
clearly and specifically identified and (2) that detailed procedures for exercising
more precise control were vigorously pursued. Also, they would try to see that a
reserve force could be either retained or quickly reconstituted.39
The JCS, meantime, had started critiquing SIOP62. Generals White and
Power made no major criticisms. General Decker noted that target systems and
priorities could not be altered to take account of whether conditions were retaliatory or pre-emptive. As target priorities stood, particularly for the Alert Force,
they struck him as optimal for neither setting. General Shoup was disappointed
that SIOP62 supplied a single list of targets for the entire Sino-Soviet bloc.
Admiral Burke observed that multiple deliveries of weapons upon Designated
Ground Zeros would raise damage levels further. He suggested a sliding scale of
damage criteria, based upon a targets relative worth. To him, the fact that a small
17-kiloton had devastated Hiroshima revealed the extremes to which we have
gone in the past 15 years. He and General Decker recommended a refinement
that would avoid so many multiple deliveries.40
On 7 April 1961, the JCS initiated the preparation of SIOP-63 and asked General Power to re-examine methodology, flexibility, damage and assurance criteria,
and target valuation. He responded with three studies. The first proposed, and
the JCS approved, a target weighting system that contained a few refinements
but no significant changes. The second set out damage criteria that did not differ significantly from those in SIOP-62. The third, on the methodology of target
selection, amounted to a refutation of Kistiakowskys criticisms. But Atlantic and
Pacific Commands representatives on the JSTPS agreed with Kistiakowsky that
requirements had been overstated. They held that it would be a serious mistake
to continue using a plan which in all ways inflates and exaggerates the size of the
target system which needs to be attacked . . . , which unduly stresses destruction of
targets instead of neutralization . . . , and which also maximizes estimates of enemy
29

capabilities at the same time that it assumes minimum probabilities of success of
our own delivery forces.41
These dissentions reappeared in the views about SIOP63 guidance that the
JCS sent to Secretary McNamara on 18 August. A sharp division developed over
damage and expectancy criteria. Admiral Anderson and Generals Decker, Lemnitzer, and Shoup supported the counter-city strategy. General LeMay, on the other
hand, supported the counterforce approach and argued for stringent standards:
Inadequate guidance can mean more than just an inadequate plan; it could mean
the difference between a credibly deterrent strategic posture, or should deterrence
fail, the difference between the destruction of the US and its survival as a viable
entity. Two months later, Secretary McNamara and the JCS finalized SIOP63 guidance, which then was disseminated to appropriate commanders.42
The NSCs Net Evaluation Subcommittee assessed long-range weapons requirements. Lieutenant General Hickey, who was still its director, reported in December
1961 that a controlled response could not be implemented until the late 1960s and
incompletely even then. For it to be feasible, capabilities not yet available would
have to exist. These included: first, highly survivable, reliable, flexible, and accurate weapon systems; second, a national command and control system that would
continue to function during nuclear war; third, effective intelligence before and
during a nuclear exchange; fourth, rapid and accurate damage assessment; and
fifth, active and passive defense sufficient to assure the nations survival. In 1962,
the Subcommittee calculated, a retaliatory strike launched under conditions of no
warning would be handicapped by a sizable deficiency in weapons carriersthe
equivalent of 156 B52s. This deficit would become twice as large in 1963 because
the weight of Soviet attack would grow heavier and 68 more missile sites would
have to be attacked. By 1964, however, enough weapons carriers would be available to satisfy all targeting requirements and to assemble a substantial reserve.43
After a review, the JCS advised the Secretary that the force available in the
early years lacks sufficient flexibility to provide for controlled response. They
urged intensive research and development of advanced systems that would speed
the coming of controlled response. Their specific recommendations included:
Deploying a mix of delivery systems as insurance against the appearance
of unforeseen Soviet capabilities.
Accelerating research and development of advanced strategic systems.
Fielding an Advanced ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] would accelerate the coming of controlled response.
Improving the availability of warning time by investigating alternative conditions, determining effects, and instituting corrective procedures.
Integrating the actual or potential contributions of aircraft carriers, theater air forces, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, and allied
forces.
Neutralizing rather than destroying enemy capabilities may be an alternative to the programming of an inordinately large number of weapons to
30
achieve a high theoretical probability of destruction.
Establishing a survivable command and control system, with rapid reconnaissance capability, appeared to be the absolute pre-requisite for controlled
response and selective, discriminating attacks.44
Assistant Secretary Hitch and his analysts reviewed the Subcommittees report
but reached very different conclusions. In their judgment, it underestimated the
feasibility of a controlled response and exaggerated its requirements. In fact, they
judged that controlled response could be attainable as early as mid-1963. By reanalyzing and recomputing requirements for 1963, they created a surplus instead of a
deficit in weapons carriers with only 10 to 15 percent less damage inflicted upon
urban-industrial areas. They reached this outcome by assigning many urban-industrial targets to protected missiles rather than to the more vulnerable bombers, as
the Subcommittee had done.45 The Subcommittee had assigned missiles to military
targets because it considered enemy military capabilities to have the highest priority, thus requiring the weapons that reach them most rapidly.
By June 1962, the JSTPS had finished drafting SIOP63. On 1819 June, the JCS
flew to Omaha and heard a briefing by General Power. They promptly approved
SIOP63, fixing 1 August as its effective date. SIOP63 was built around three
tasks, with options for executing combinations of those tasks. General Lemnitzer
congratulated General Power upon outstanding work, which permitted a much
higher degree of flexibility and responsiveness than was possible in previous
plans.46 As of June 1962, only liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan ICBMs were operational,
and they had to be programmed for fast reaction against nuclear-related targets.
By September 1963, solid fuel Minuteman ICBMs in hardened underground silos as
well as Polaris SLBMscould qualify for a protected reserve.
In November 1962, the JCS issued guidance for preparing SIOP64 that restated the basic philosophy expressed in SIOP63. The three tasks were unchanged
but the options underwent some changes. When SIOP64 took effect on 1 January
1964 its damage expectancies were lower, largely because testing and experience
had resulted in reduced reliability factors for missiles.47
Of course, if controlled response was to become viable, both sides would
have to adopt it. On 16 June 1962, speaking at Ann Arbor to the University of
Michigans graduating class, Secretary McNamara appealed for Soviet reciprocity.
The United States, he said, had concluded that strategy for general war should
be approached in much the same way that more conventional operations have
been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives . . . should
be the destruction of the enemys military forces, not of his civilian population.
It had become possible to retain a reserve sufficient to destroy an enemy society
if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest
imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.48 But that was not
the view from Moscow. At a Presidium meeting on 1 July, Nikita Khrushchev dismissed Secretary McNamaras argument: Not targeting citieshow aggressive!
31

What is their aim? To get the population used to the idea that nuclear war will
take place. McNamara, the Soviet leader suspected, was trying to lay the groundwork for a rapid increase in the US arsenal: How many bombs do they need?49
In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States perhaps unavoidably
departed from a spare the cities strategy by dispersing some bombers to civilian airfields that lay quite close to major American urban centers.
The year 1963 marked a milestone in the evolution of US strategic thinking. On
31 August, through a draft presidential memorandum, Secretary McNamara articulated the concept of deterrence through assured destruction. He defined assured
destruction as the ability to absorb a well planned and executed Soviet attack
and still be able to inflict unacceptable losses on the attacker. The alternative, a
damage-limiting force large enough to destroy some Soviet delivery vehicles and
disrupt coordination of the rest, would require twice as many Minuteman ICBMs
but save relatively few American lives. Consequently, McNamara decided to use
assured destruction as his yardstick for sizing strategic retaliatory forces.50
General LeMay, alone among JCS members, voiced serious reservations
about what he called this apparent shift in basic US military strategy. Assured
destruction impressed him as only half a strategy because it failed to stress the
fundamental necessity of limiting damage to the United States. LeMay still favored
counterforce targeting, basing force requirements upon the more stringent criteria
for damage limitation.51
Interestingly, when Secretary McNamara presented his program to Congress
in January 1964, he testified that a damage-limiting strategy appears to be the
most practical and effective course for us to follow. . . . [Such a force] should be
large enough to ensure the destruction . . . of the Soviet Union, Communist China,
and the Communist satellites . . . and, in addition, to destroy their warmaking capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our
allies.52 Perhaps the Secretary spoke about damage limitation rather than assured
destruction in order to make his program more palatable politically. In any case,
his testimony triggeredor perhaps provided the pretext foranother JCS debate
over counterforce versus countercity targeting. Early in 1964, during the drafting
of JSCP-65, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planners argued that inflicting urban/
industrial damage should be the priority objective. General LeMay insisted, instead,
that damage limitation should be the major mission. Strategic retaliatory forces
could not carry out both tasks, and he saw no reason why the basic military principle of priority application of force against enemy force should be reversed. Both
he and the service planners maintained that Secretary McNamaras statements supported their opposing positions. General Taylor offered a compromise which, after
some amendment, won JCS acceptance. JSCP65, approved on 24 February and
applicable between 1 July 1964 and 30 June 1965, stated that US forces:
1. Will defend the United States and assist its allies against enemy attack.
2. While providing the ability to accomplish (3) below, will, when directed,
32
destroy or neutralize, on a selective basis if required, the military capabilities
of the enemy, as necessary to limit damage to the United States and its allies to
the maximum extent practicable.
3. Will maintain an assured capability, under all conditions, . . . [to] destroy
on a selective basis, the war supporting and urban/industrial resources of the
enemy. When directed, this undertaking may be carried out concurrently, or
separately with (2), above.53
Summation
he redirection of strategic thinking and priorities created rifts between the JCS
and the civilian leadership. General Lemnitzer, and General Decker even more,
thought that President Kennedy was overdoing counterinsurgency. General LeMay
strongly opposed replacing a capability for damage limitation with assured destruction. An undercurrent of unease, which all the Chiefs shared to some degree, was
best expressed by the JSSC in 1961: New approaches tended to over-emphasize
control of military forces, avoidance of casualties, defense, survival, without comparable concern for combat effectiveness, the offensive, or the will to succeed.
33
3
Strategic Nuclear Forces:
Superiority versus Assured
Destruction
The Missile Gap Is Reversed
he Kennedy administration took office on the cusp of a major change in how

the strategic nuclear balance was perceived. In August 1957, the Soviet Union
successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile. Two months later, the Soviets orbiting of the first man-made satelliteSputnikastonished the world. Those
achievements, as yet unmatched by the United States, seemed to demonstrate a
commanding Soviet lead in missilery. In 1958, a National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) described mid-1961 as a time of maximum danger. Talk of a missile gap
dominated public discourse. By 1960, however, American progress and evidence
of Soviet difficulties had greatly eased the worries of knowledgeable officials. 1
Nikita Khrushchev boasted of missiles being turned out like sausages, but their
few ICBMs on launch pads were really laboratory models. The first generation of
US ICBMs, Atlas and Titan, were liquid-fuelled, took hours to prepare for launching, and were not very reliable. Late in 1960, however, two fleet ballistic missile
submarines each carrying sixteen Polaris missiles joined the fleet. The Soviets had
nothing comparable. President Eisenhower, in his last budget message, stated that
the bomber gap of several years ago was always a fiction, and the missile gap
shows every sign of being the same.2 On 1 February 1961, a Minuteman ICBM
35

underwent a fully successful flight test. This was crucial because Minuteman was
solid-fuelled and therefore much easier to maintain in alert status, to disperse, and
to place in hardened underground silos. Minuteman ICBMs could, in fact, be turned
out almost like sausages.
During the 1960 presidential race, the missile gap was a staple of Democratic
campaign oratory. Late in January 1961, just after President Kennedy took office,
General Lemnitzer laid widely-spread estimates of Soviet missile strength before
the House Appropriations Committee: 50 to 200 in mid-1961, 125 to 450 in mid1962, and 200 to 700 in mid-1963. Lemnitzer said that he was inclined to accept the
mean figures, showing that the missile gap actually could favor the United States.
Under Eisenhowers program, which Kennedy was about to expand and accelerate,
there would be 132 in mid-1961, 310 by mid-1962, and 579 by mid-1963. The Committee chairman, Representative George Mahon (D., Texas), was outraged. After
the hearing ended, Lemnitzer learned, Mahon telephoned Secretary McNamara to
say that the Chairman of the JCS had made President Kennedy and the Democratic
Party look like liars!3
McNamara, however, sided with Lemnitzer. On 56 February, the Secretary visited Strategic Air Command headquarters at Omaha. On the evening of 6 February,
he gave reporters an off-the-record briefing in which he stated several times that
there was no destruction gap and no deterrent gap. Furthermore, he saw no
signs of a Soviet crash program to produce ICBMs. Around mid-year, the missile
gap was officially interred when a National Intelligence Estimate indicated that the
United States could look forward to growing superiority during the early 1960s. As
the JCS advised Secretary McNamara, Our strengths are adequate to deter enemy
deliberate and rational resort to general war and, if general war eventuates, to permit the United States to survive as a nation despite serious losses, and ultimately to
prevail and resume progress toward its national objectives.4
Force Planning in 1961
cNamara promptly charged a task force led by Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) Charles Hitch with reviewing strategic retaliatory and continental
defense programs.5 Hitchs work with the RAND Corporation had made him familiar with these problems, and the task force drew upon a report recently completed
by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). A draft completed in mid-February 1961 recommended accelerating both solid-fuel Minuteman and Polaris programs. Solid-fuel missiles were much easier to maintain in alert status, to disperse,
and to place in hardened silos. Polaris, while more costly and less accurate than
Minuteman, seemed virtually invulnerable and could form a post-attack reserve, for
long periods if necessary, threatening strikes against surviving urban centers. Minutemans lower cost made it the weapon of choice for rapid deployment during the
36
Strategic Nuclear Forces

early years of the missile race.6 On 1617 February, the JCS discussed the report
with McNamara and apparently found no disagreements.
The findings of a Research and Development (R&D) task force, chaired by
OSDs Director of Defense Research and Engineering, did lay groundwork for some
controversy. It recommended restoring the funds that had been cut from Skybolt,
a bomber-launched missile; but it also concluded that a B70 bomber, being developed as the B52s successor and designed to fly 2,000 miles per hour at 70,000
feet, failed the test of cost-effectiveness when measured against the Minuteman.
Therefore, B70 appropriations should be reduced by one-third, tooling to meet a
firm date discontinued, development of subsystems slowed, and aircraft purchases
cut from twelve to six.7
Secretary McNamara approved virtually all these recommendations and forwarded them to the President, who did the same. Through a special message to
Congress on 28 March, President Kennedy requested an additional $1.945 billion in
new obligational authority for FY 1962. He would increase the Polaris force from
19 to 29 submarines but cut B70 funding by $138 million. Testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on 4 April, McNamara explained his objections
to the B70. Considering how surface-to-air missiles had improved, its speed and
altitude no longer offered an important advantage. The B70 could not carry Skybolt missiles and would have to deliver low-level attacks at subsonic speeds. The
bomber also would be more vulnerable when grounded than hardened ICBMs and
did not lend itself to airborne alert measures.
General White, testifying several days later, explained why Air Force felt so
strongly about the B70: To abolish the use of the manned bomber, you have to
abolish aircraft. The B70 could be recalled or retargeted; it could detect and
destroy mobile or imprecisely located objectives; and it could perform pre- and
post-strike reconnaissance.8 White found much support among members of Congress, who would not allow the manned bomber to die. In fact, for the planning of
strategic retaliatory forces, this was the most contentious issue of the early 1960s.
Thus far, the administration had been making quick fixes. When the planningprogramming-budgeting system (PPBS) began functioning, the JCS tried to produce a single viewand failed. In fact, the memorandum that they sent Secretary
McNamara on 3 August contained splits over every strategic retaliatory program.
A major difference, which would persist over years, was whether the deterrent
should be primarily land-based or sea-based. At the Secretarys urging, they reconsideredand, on 15 August, advised that each JCS member had reaffirmed his
position.9 Here, it seems clear, they lost an important opportunity to impress OSD
by showing that they could rise above service parochialism.
Secretary McNamara relied upon his own programmers and systems analysts,
who prepared a paper on Recommended Long-Range Delivery Forces, 19631967.
After reviewing it, the J5 could not find common ground between the Secretary, the
Chairman, and the Service Chiefs on any major program element. But J5 also noted
37

that JCS-OSD differences dealt mainly with force levels in later years. Most of OSDs
proposals for FY 1963 would reduce lead time if production was authorized later. In
fact, only the proposals for Titan ICBMs and B52s would foreclose the question
of final levels by denying further procurement. So, Titan excepted, the J5 recommended concurring with all OSDs procurement proposals for FY 1963.10
The JCS did not accept J5s advice. This time, apparently by agreeing that
the Air Force and the Navy each should have the force levels they wanted, the
JCS were able to form a common front. On 11 September, they sent Secretary
McNamara a recommendation about FY 1963 procurement that called for more
submarines, bombers, and missiles than OSD was proposing.11 Ten days later,
they explained why. Broadly, the JCS invoked the deepening world crisis and
increasing evidence of overt Soviet military preparations. The Chiefs pointed
to the degree of confidence in their relative military position which the Soviets
have demonstrated in their deliberate provocation of the current Berlin crisis.
Consequently, the funds allotted to strategic nuclear delivery forces had to be
higher than in previous years. Specifically, producing more bombers would
be the quickest way to improve the retaliatory force. Replacing B52Bs with
B52Hs, which had a much greater attack radius and penetrative ability, would
materially increase flexibility and credibility, particularly in the critical period
until missiles have proven their reliability. Titan ICBMs with large warheads
could reach and destroy deep, hardened targets that soon might be shielded by
ballistic missile defenses. Since the Soviet missile force appeared to be superior
in total warhead yield, the programmed number of Minuteman ICBMs in hardened and dispersed silos should increase. Funding another eight Polaris boats in
FY 1963, raising the total to 37, would contribute to the best mix of missiles and
make possible a continued orderly production program.12
The JCS justifications probably came too late, because only forty-eight hours
later, on 23 September, Secretary McNamara circulated his proposed five-year program. The bomber force, by 30 June 1967, would consist of 630 B52s with 1,150 Skybolts; B-47s would be phased out by mid-1965, B58s by mid-1966. (The B70 did not
appear because, even if the Air Force got full funding, the first two squadrons would
not become operational until FY 1968.) The ICBM arsenal, on 30 June 1967, would
comprise 117 Atlas, 114 Titan, 900 Minuteman (Hardened and Dispersed (H&D)) and
100 Mobile Minuteman launchers. There would be 41 Polaris submarines carrying
656 missiles. Procurement for FY 1963 would include 92 Skybolts, 100 H&D and 50
Mobile Minuteman ICBMs, and six fleet ballistic missile submarines.
In justification, Secretary McNamara said that he was steering between the
extremes of minimum deterrence, meaning the ability to destroy most Soviet
cities, and full first strike capability, which he defined as the power to reduce
Soviet retaliatory forces so greatly that US population and industry would not
suffer severe damage. He had chosen force levels sufficient to (1) retaliate
against and reduce Soviet follow-on forces and (2) provide a protected reserve
38

capable of destroying urban centers in a controlled and deliberate manner. Estimates of Soviet missile strength in mid-1964 ranged from 200400 (CIA) to 850
(Air Force). Even at the highest level, US missile strength would equal that of the
Soviets, with a substantial superiority in other types of delivery systems. If the
most likely estimate proved correct, US forces should possess a substantial
military superiority over the Soviets even after they have attacked us.
Secretary McNamara opposed procuring any more B52s because the alert
force already could carry 1,500 bombs and 1,000 air-launched missiles, and because
most targets (and all those with highest priority) were best attacked by ICBMs,
and because bombers were vulnerable and expensive. He accepted Skybolt on
grounds that it would enable bombers to overcome almost any defense, but he
wanted no more Titans, because that missile was four times more expensive than
Minuteman. As for Minuteman, McNamara agreed that a Hardened and Dispersed
mode was clearly the preferred way to buy more ICBMs. He saw no justification,
however, for spending $2.75 billion to buy 600 missiles in FY 1963 as the Air Force
wished; 100 in the H&D mode were quite enough. He was willing to hold Mobile
Minuteman as a hedge against Soviet advances; it might later be cancelled. (Several
months afterward, the Air Force did decide to drop Mobile Minuteman on grounds
that costs were high, logistical problems numerous, and attractive alternatives
available.) McNamara recognized that Polaris possessed the highest potential for
survival of any delivery system. Yet, since the force already programmed appeared
adequate, he would start six hulls rather than eight.
Secretary McNamaras analysts had computed the degrees of destruction that
US forces could inflict when retaliating under optimistic, median, and pessimistic circumstances. The great weight of likelihood, they believed, fell between
the optimistic and median cases. Their findings led McNamara to conclude that
the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against
strongly diminishing returns and yields very little by way of extra target destruction. Under the median case in FY 1965, for example, the percentage of expected
kill against urban-industrial floor space was 80 percent for both OSD and Service
programs. Against hardened ICBM sites, the percentages were 16 for OSD and 19
for Service programs.13
The B70 was a special case. For FY 1962, the administration had asked for
$220 million and Congress appropriated $400 million. The White House asked
for service appraisals of the airplane; these were provided on 12 September.
General Decker believed that scarce funds might better be spent elsewhere,
with B70 development limited to demonstrating feasibility of the aircraft and
of its bombing and navigation subsystems. Admiral Anderson judged the B70s
efficiency uncertain but believed that technological benefits might prove useful
to other programs. He wanted a weapons mix maintained until the efficacy of
the missile is an accomplished fact. General Shoup bluntly characterized the
B70 as giving every indication of being an obsolete weapon by the time it can
39

be expected to be in the operational arsenal. He favored continuing development for the benefits that might flow to commercial aviation. Thus, General
LeMay stood alone in arguing that the B70 provided unique capabilities and,
during the late 1960s, may represent our most effective means of demonstrating our national strength and determination to our allies as well as to our enemies. Deploying even one B70 wing, he claimed, would compel the Soviets to
spend $2040 billion on air defense. Full development, LeMay argued, would be
quicker, smoother, and ultimately cheaper than continuing a partial prototype
program. In his opinion, failure to follow through means that we will forfeit
our lead in aeronauticsand possibly in air power itselfto some other power,
probably the Soviet Union.14
On 5 October, shortly after President Kennedy was briefed on the SIOP, the
JCS provided him with a comparison of US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. In
ICBMs, the American lead as of 1 October was thought to be 42 versus 10 to 25;
two years hence, it would be 382 versus 75 to 125. General LeMay recorded some
reservations, putting the Soviet figures at 65 in October 1961 and 250 by October
1963. Despite General LeMays reservations, nonetheless, the JCS advised the
President that the US enjoys a military superiority over the USSR in both 1961
and 1963. Thanks to the accelerated construction of hardened missile sites slated
to start late in 1961, that margin would be relatively greater in 1963 than in 1961.
During the critical period of decision between [now] and mid-1962, the decisive
superiority of US nuclear delivery capability [should] strongly influence the Soviet
Union not to deliberately initiate general war. 15 Khrushchev, in fact, gradually
eased away from a confrontation over West Berlin.
On 9 October, Secretary McNamara circulated tentative recommendations that
repeated his earlier proposals and asked the JCS to advise him of any changes that
they considered absolutely essential. Not long afterward, he announced that the
administration would not spend additional funds voted by Congress to continue
B52 production and expand the B70 program.16
On 30 October, the JCS tried to decide what changes were absolutely essential.
Before Secretary McNamara entered the JCS tank, they debated at length without
agreeing. When McNamara arrived, General Lemnitzer told him that JCS comments
would be pretty close to the positions stated on 11 and 21 September, but he added
that the impoundment of B52 appropriations had complicated matters. McNamara
asked whether the Chiefs had assessed his memo on Long Range Nuclear Delivery
Forces, and especially the assumptions upon which optimistic, median, and pessimistic cases had been framed. There followed a great difference of opinion between
McNamara and LeMay over whether the Secretarys recommendations would raise
or lower strategic capability over the long term. Lemnitzer promised that the Chiefs
would reexamine the question posed by McNamara and provide comments.17
On 17 November, the JCS advised the Secretary that they found generally valid
the target system and the survivability, reliability, and penetration factors from
40

which his force-level recommendations flowed. There was, however, one essential
point of difference: While your analysis estimates that the situation at the outset
of war would [fall] . . . between the optimistic and median cases, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff consider the median case more likely. Applying the median factor to 1965
force levels, for example, would produce a requirement for another 125 weapons.
The question, then, was whether increased costs mattered more than reduced
risks.18 Subsequently, Secretary McNamara raised his Minuteman goal from 750 to
800 for FY 1965 and from 1,000 to 1,100 for FY 1967.
On 3 January 1962, President Kennedy presided over a final budget review.
General Frederick H. Smith, representing LeMay, argued that McNamaras program
would dangerously reduce US superiority after 1965. He wanted, in FY 1963, another 100 Minuteman ICBMs and full-scale development of the B70. President Kennedy replied that he would be happy to hear an Air Force presentation but warned
that it would have to show exactly how more forces would improve the overall US
military posture vis--vis the USSR. He and Secretary McNamara stressed that their
decisions were not being dictated by fiscal constraints.19
arly in 1962, Secretary McNamara asked General Lemnitzer to outline the factors that contributed to nuclear superiority. In reply, Lemnitzer characterized
nuclear superiority as the ability, regardless of an adversarys actions, to disarm
enemy nuclear forces, conclude the conflict on favorable terms, and prevail as
a viable nation. So far, he said, the USSR had shrunk from initiating general war
primarily because the United States possessed a clear capability to accomplish
those things. Thus the United States currently enjoyed a strategic advantage and
would, by 1963, be assured of a decisive retaliatory capability. Yet, in their recent
atmospheric tests, the Soviets had registered advances in nuclear technology well
beyond that commonly anticipated. They would exploit this progress to the fullest extent. Therefore, any relaxation of US efforts to maintain its superiority eventually would culminate in irreparable damage.20
In 1962, the Joint Chiefs first effort at formulating force-level recommendations was through JSOP67, which proved a very difficult beginning. In February, the J5 submitted Service splits for resolution by the JCS. Unable to resolve
those splits, they extended the tabulations through FY 1967 and asked the Services to try again for an accommodation. In June, with differences still unresolved,
General Lemnitzer proposed his own solution. General LeMay argued that Lemnitzer had cut the Air Forces Minuteman program much more drastically than
some equally controversial Army and Navy programs. Minuteman, he insisted,
provides more surviving missiles (and greater targeting effectiveness) per dollar
invested than does Polaris. On 2 August, Lemnitzer offered a new compromise.
41

First, add an FY 1966 acceleration package for Minuteman and delay a decision
about FY 1967 until the FY 1965 budget took final shape. Second, procure enough
long lead-time items so that the hulls of Polaris submarines 42 through 44 could
be completed during FY 1967, rendering a final decision during the FY 1964 budget cycle.21
On 27 August, the Joint Chiefs finally submitted an agreed JSOP67. Twelve
days earlier, Secretary McNamara had circulated his own proposals for a fiveyear program covering FYs 196468. General LeMay apparently anticipated that
JSOP67 would reach the Secretarys desk too late. Accordingly on 27 July the Air
Force submitted a Program Change Proposal raising the levels programmed for
Minuteman, its justification being that extensive counterforce targeting would limit
damage to the United States. If LeMay was attempting an end run, he failed. On 18
August the JCS advised McNamara that, while there was an identifiable military
requirement for more missiles, they had not yet analyzed additional needs. McNamara ruled against additional Minuteman procurement at this time but promised
a review prior to completing the FY 1964 budget.22
Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara requested a study of the requirements for
strategic nuclear weapons. This task fell to the Chairmans Special Studies Group.
It set about assessing OSD and Service proposals for 1968, matching them against
high and median Soviet postures. In the median case, with tactical warning,
the Group concluded that OSD forces would furnish good coverage for everything except hardened targets. The United States would emerge with a four-to-one
advantage in delivery vehicles and 40 percent more deliverable yields. Without
adequate warning, however, coverage would be inadequate. Against the high
case, moreover, OSD forces would be inadequate with or without timely warning.
The United States would gain no clear strategic advantage, possess no adequate
reserve, and sustain greater losses than the Soviets. Service forces, in the Groups
judgment, would offer major improvement. Retaliating with warning against
median or high Soviet forces, the United States would emerge with a sustainable . . . advantage in nuclear strength and national viability. Even without tactical
warning, there would be enough residual strength to deter attacks against urbanindustrial targets. And Service forces, unlike OSD forces, allowed a comfortable
margin for error if important assumptions (e.g., missile defenses, missile accuracy,
target intelligence) proved wrong.23
The Service Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that these findings reinforced their JSOP-67 recommendations, which aimed at maintaining a clear
margin of superiority over potential adversaries. General Taylor, who was now
Chairman, voiced general agreement but criticized the Special Studies Group
for underestimating US capabilities (by excluding theater nuclear forces) and
overrating those of the Soviets (by using high estimates, notably in the area of
available megatonnage). He also criticized as artificial the Groups decision to
calculate adequacy by a combination of post-attack megatonnage, population
42

loss, and industrial damage. Like any living organism, he argued, a human
society will die if too many of its members are destroyedbut the necessary
level of destruction to assure death is beyond proof. He believed that a population loss of much over 10 percent would destroy a nations will to resist; more
destruction would be meaningless. (His choice is interesting, since about 10
percent of the Soviet population was killed or wounded in World War II.) Taylor
concluded that in a retaliatory situation, there would be great risk in attacking
only military targets. Counterforce targeting struck him as feasible only in a preemptive strike.24
The manned bomber remained highly controversial. Early in 1962 Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, pushed
for legislation directing the administration to spend more money on the B70.
Vinson and President Kennedy compromised, dropping mandatory language
in return for a pledge to study the problem again.25 In early September, the Air
Force submitted a Program Change Proposal (PCP) about the B-70, now changed
to the RS70 reconnaissance/strike aircraft. According to the PCP, an RS-70 force
was vitally needed to fill voids in reconnaissance, reconnaissance/strike, damage assessment, and combat reporting capabilities during the trans-attack phase
of conflict. The Air Force wanted $591.4 million in FY 1964 to build eight experimental RS70s, operationally configured so that they could enter the inventory
after full production was authorized. (McNamara had limited the B70 to three
prototypes.) On 29 September, the JCS gave the Secretary their advice that there
is a military requirement for an armed reconnaissance capability. They recommended (1) reorienting the B70 to the RS70 concept and (2) approving those
portions of the PCP needed to demonstrate feasibility of the RS70 and its associated subsystems.26
However, Secretary McNamara reached a different conclusion. In a 28 September memorandum, he stated that approving the RS70 would waste . . . many billions of dollars that are urgently required elsewhere. The Air Force estimated that
35 RS70s would cost $8.2 billion. Recalling the long history of overruns, McNamara put the figure $3 billion higher. He was skeptical of claims that the fleet could
stay on 75 percent alert when widely dispersed. The Air Force assumed that system
reliability would remain high, that complex route planning and in-flight reprogramming could be accomplished, that reliability specifications for air-launched missiles could be met, that bombing accuracy within 600 feet would be realized, and
that RS70 radar could assess the outcomes of air-launched missile strikes. If even
one of these factors was degraded, McNamara believed, the RS70s effectiveness
would be greatly reduced.
The Secretary believed that less expensive systems than the RS70 were
equally effective in deterring or waging a thermonuclear war. He anticipated
that by the early 1970s, satellites would pinpoint nearly all potential targets.
The RBX aircraft, an OSD favored project, plus indirect mechanisms (e.g.,
43

atomic strike recordings of the electromagnetic signals from nuclear detonations) would provide damage assessment. Destroying residual systems, a
favorite Air Force justification, struck him as pointless. If the Soviets expanded
their fleet of missile submarines, the RS70 would add little to our counterforce capabilities. If their force consisted largely of bombers and unprotected
missiles, the RS70 would increase only insignificantly the effectiveness of a
US missile strike. Extremely hard targets, such as nuclear storage sites, could
be made unusable simply by radioactivity. Discriminating attacks designed to
minimize civilian casualties could be carried out by a special mix of Minuteman
warheads almost as well as with RS70s. Accordingly, McNamara proposed
spending not more than $1.3 billion to complete three B70s, continuing work
on some components, looking at alternative applications of manned aircraft
(e.g., serving as either a command post or a stand-off missile launcher), and
starting development of a much cheaper RBX.27
On 6 November, after lengthy exchanges among themselves, the Service
Chiefs gave the Secretary their view that future capabilities should not be frozen
by current projections; alliances and even enemies might change. The only certainty, they claimed, was that there is a continuing requirement for flexible and
responsive strategic forces, superior to those of the enemy and clearly capable
of inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy, as an essential element of deterrence for the foreseeable future. McNamaras position would preclude investigation of the RS70 concept and terminate the program; the Air Forces PCP would
amount to approval of an operational force before feasibility was proven. So the
Service Chiefs settled upon a compromise: Fabricate and test five aircraft to test
the RS70s effectiveness, leaving the production of additional aircraft for a future
decision.28 It is noteworthy that they did not try to rebut, point by point, McNamaras lengthy list of the RS70s supposed shortcomings.
General Taylor agreed with Secretary McNamara rather than the Service
Chiefs. He saw a requirement for reconnaissance alone. In his judgment, the
ability to send a few score bombers in search of residual targets was simply not
worth several billion dollars. Even if the RS70 did achieve a total technical triumph, the existence of mobile Soviet missiles would stymie the complete success of a mop-up mission. Further, Taylor observed that the RS70 was not a
deterrent but rather a hedge against the failure of deterrence. For that reason,
it lacked the broad applicability which alone would justify such an allocation
of resources.29
On 5 November, the Secretary circulated his recommendations for FYs
196468. The bomber force would stay at 80 B58s and 630 B52s, with the last
B52Hs coming off the production line in November. He planned the missile
force as follows:
44

30 Jun 64
Atlas
126
Titan
108
Minuteman
600
Polaris Boats
18
30 Jun 66
120
108
950
35
30 Jun 68
99
108
1,300
41
Air Force proposals, argued Secretary McNamara, aimed at achieving a full

first-strike capability which he considered extremely costly and almost certainly infeasible. In 1968, under very favorable circumstances, a US attack could
reduce Soviet forces to 100 ICBMs and 100 submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs)yet even these few survivors could inflict 150 million casualties. Also, a
full first-strike capability would not deter non-nuclear aggression. So he remained
satisfied with a second strike capability, which he defined as a secure, protected
retaliatory force able (1) to survive any conceivable attack and then destroy Soviet
urban society and (2) deny an enemy the prospect of achieving military victory
by attacking US forces. As before, his calculations showed only small differences
between the destructive power of OSD and Service forces. For hardened strategic nuclear targets of high urgency, OSD forces would destroy 262 compared to
313 for Service forces. The percentage of industry destroyed would be 55 by OSD
and 60 by Service forces. McNamara also looked to cancel the Skybolt which, he
said, combines the disadvantages of the missile with those of the bomber. Like
a bomber, it was vulnerable on the ground and slow to reach its target. Like a missile, it was relatively inaccurate and contained a low payload. Even for suppressing
air defenses and opening paths for bombers, Skybolt failed the test of cost-effectiveness. The objective, after all, was to destroy a necessary number of targets at
minimum cost and not simply to prolong the lives of bombers.30
In their critique, the JCS denied favoring a first-strike capability in the
sense of indemnifying the United States completely from serious consequences.
But they did favor a first-strike so powerful that the United States and its allies
would emerge with a relative power advantage over the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Having a pre-emptive option would provide increased latitude within the total
spectrum of military possibilities. Equally, it could confine and prevent the escalation of lower-level conflicts. Such a capability was essential, they argued, if
NATO allies were to be convinced that the United States would employ its strategic nuclear forces to prevent the Warsaw Pact from overrunning Western Europe.
The JCS challenged Secretary McNamaras argument that a first-strike capability
would not deter limited aggression. Thus far, they argued, the Soviets had shown
restraint in their actions and carefully avoided direct involvement in limited
aggression. Who could say what they might have done, had not the United States
possessed such a powerful arsenal? The Joint Chiefs reasoned that, if a first
strike capability was absolutely impermissible, then we . . . must face fully the
costs of other alternatives, such as matching the Soviets in non-nuclear fields
45

where they now possessed a clear superiority. They were attracted by the alternative of a coercive strategy, meaning the ability to threaten such a great destruction of population (after most of the Soviets nuclear arsenal had been expended)
that the Soviets would be willing to end hostilities on US terms. They wanted that
to be recognized as an available option under pre-emptive circumstances.
Specifically, the Joint Chiefs repeated their JSOP67 recommendation for 900
Minuteman ICBMs in FY 1965, 100 more than Secretary McNamara was proposing. The Service Chiefs opposed cancelling Skybolt, denying that 400 Hound Dog
air-to-ground missiles and 100 Minuteman ICBMs were equivalent to 1,012 Skybolts. General Taylor, however, agreed with the Secretary. Basically, he doubted
whether bombers could play an effective part in the missile age. In responding to
a surprise Soviet attack, they probably would contribute little. In a pre-emptive
US attack, they would be unnecessary. Bombers might strengthen a retaliatory
strike launched with tactical warning, Taylor conceded, but in that case Minuteman
would be just as effective as Skybolt.31 While it is worth noting that Taylor sided
fairly often with the Secretary, it is doubtful whether a solid JCS front would have
led McNamara to reverse his positions.
McNamara made no changes and, on 23 November, President Kennedy
approved his recommendations to deploy 950 Minuteman ICBM in FY 1966, canceling Skybolt, and starting six Polaris boats, completing the planned total of fortyone. General LeMay made a final, futile protest at the budget wrap-up session on
27 December, but the President sided with the Secretary, so the five-year program
came out exactly as McNamara had proposed.32
hatever hopes the Joint Chiefs may have had about influencing McNamara
through their next JSOP came to naught. Completed in April 1963, JSOP68
was weakened by a Navy dissent over Atlas and Titan levels and by a four-way split
over Minuteman totals. General Taylor, who stood at the low end of the Minuteman
split, justified his position by arguing that the growing Soviet arsenal of SLBMs
and hardened ICBMs was fatally weakening the Air Forces case for counterforce
targeting and the ever-higher force levels that it required. Even in a pre-emptive
attack, the price of destroying one Soviet ICBM in a hardened underground silo
would be four to eight US missiles. In retaliation, US forces could hit only aborts,
reserves, and refires. Therefore, Since we will not know where these residual
missiles are found, we will have to attack many empty sites and expend scores of
missiles in the hope of killing one residual missile. Clearly, at some point it will
become futile to destroy the Soviet missile system either in pre-emption or retaliation. The Joint Staff, likewise, estimated that larger forces would achieve little in
terms of damage limitation. General LeMay, alone once again, assailed the idea that
46

no improvement is better than significant improvement, if the latter is not total in
effect. This time, LeMay did try to fortify his argument with a substantial methodological critique.33
In September McNamara circulated a DPM that proposed, by mid-1969, reducing Atlas ICBMs to 72 and retiring half the Titans, keeping 54 Titan IIs with their
multi-megaton warheads. Since there were signs of delay in developing Minuteman II, which would have greater accuracy and retargeting capability, Secretary
McNamara decided to slow the rate of silo-building in FY 1967:

30 June 65 30 June 66 30 June 67 30 June 68 30 June 69
Minuteman
800
950
1,000
1,100
1,200
According to intelligence estimates, Soviet ICBMs in mid-1969 would number
between 400 and 800a serious underestimate, as things turned out.
The Secretary described three possible strategic postures. The first, assured
destruction of the USSR was predicated on the ability to absorb an attack and
then inflict significant losses on USSR cities and industrial capacity. In 1969, even
allowing for improved enemy defenses (particularly fallout shelters), larger or
more effective Soviet offensive forces, and unanticipated US losses, McNamara
and his analysts concluded that about 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs could fulfill assured
destruction objectives. The second option, a larger damage-limiting force, saves
no lives unless the Soviets delay attacking our cities, and in that case the life-saving
potential appears to be less than 10 million. The third option, a full first-strike
capability, would cost an additional $84 billion and could reduce US fatalities to
30 million. Yet if the Soviets reacted with a similar buildup, as almost surely they
would, the US would have to outspend the Soviets by three to one. Therefore,
McNamara concluded, 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs would provide us with both an
assured destruction capability under very pessimistic assumptions, and, under
the most likely assumptions, a very substantial counter-military force as well.34
Under an assortment of names, assured destruction would influence the planning
of strategic retaliatory forces well beyond the 1960s. This probably was Secretary
McNamaras most significant contribution to nuclear strategy and force planning.
Every JCS member endorsed McNamaras program except General LeMay,
who still wanted larger damage-limiting levels. Secretary McNamaras final DPM
contained no changes of any consequence. On 30 December, at the LBJ Ranch,
LeMay said that all the Air Forces studies showed US strategic superiority shrinking rapidly, to the point where a nuclear exchange in 1968 would cause more damage to the United States than to the USSR. LeMay also worried about the shrinkage
of research and development (R&D) activities and particularly about the absence
of a new manned bomber. President Johnson did express concern over the trend
toward exclusive reliance on missiles and asked about alternatives. LeMay admitted that the B70, now reduced to two prototypes, was dead. He recommended
47

spending $55 million to begin design studies, program definition, and advanced
development of long lead-time items for a new bomber. McNamara remarked
that what the Air Force wanted was not a bomber but an airborne platform from
which to launch missiles. Such a low-level penetrator would be very expensive and
extraordinarily complex. Even if it proved reliable, Secretary McNamara continued, the Air Force had no plans for its employment. Therefore, he was absolutely
against appropriating $55 million. General Taylor added that the JCS had been
unaware of LeMays proposal and were not prepared to accept it without careful
study. President Johnson approved McNamaras program in toto.35
he JCS completed JSOP69 in March 1964. It differed from McNamaras fiveyear program in two ways. First, all the Chiefs recommended having 37 rather
than 35 Polaris boats in FY 1966. Second, General LeMay pressed for 1,500 rather
than 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs. A situational analysis, prepared by the Services and
the Joint Staff, examined general war outcomes in 1969 under all conceivable conditions. It concluded that US and Soviet forces each could absorb an attack and
still retain enough power to inflict high levels of damage and fatalities. There was a
lack of agreement among the Service Chiefsthe Air Force foresaw 1,256 ballistic
missile aiming points and wanted to cover them; the Navy anticipated fewer aiming points; the Army did too, adding that the Air Forces reliability requirement was
so high because it included in-flight as well as on-launch unpredictability. General
Taylor supported McNamara, largely because he was still impressed by the uncertainties regarding the value of a more extreme counterforce effort.36
In his tentative force-planning guidance, circulated on 16 May, Secretary
McNamara recommended that assured destruction could be achieved with fewer
than the programmed number of missiles. Since higher levels must be justified
in terms of damage limitation, they could not be considered apart from bomber,
missile defense, and civil defense programs. But the administration had not
decided whether to deploy the Nike-X and build fallout shelters. And, even if
more Minuteman missiles could be justified as part of a damage-limiting program, production would have to be time-phased to match the availability of other
elements. On 5 November, the Secretary issued a DPM that capped the Minuteman force at 1,000 launchers, slightly reduced B52 levels, and increased Polaris
boats from 35 to 38 in FY 1966. McNamara intended to retire all Atlas and Titan
Is but authorized the retrofitting of Minuteman IIs into Minuteman I silos. He
maintained that, in 1970, about half the planned force of Minuteman and Titan IIs
alone could inflict assured destruction.37
The JCS told Secretary McNamara that his program, in their view, falls short
of providing a balanced or optimum force mix. He wanted to retire 45 B52s; they
48

recommended phasing out only the aircraft used for crew training. By a separate
memorandum, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, (who had replaced Taylor as Chairman) said that reducing the Minuteman level would dangerously erode the relative
superiority of the United States. McNamaras final DPM, circulated on 7 December,
contained one concession: he retained two B52B squadrons through FY 1966, after
which the B52 force would fall to 600. But he held Minuteman at 1,000 launchers.38
Out of the B70s funeral pyre emerged the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft
(AMSA). In January and again in March 1964, the JCS recommended proceeding with
project definition and starting design work on propulsion and avionics. On 19 August,
Air Force officers gave the JCS a briefing that covered cost effectiveness, concept of
employment, and specific targets to be attacked. The JCS and the new chairman, General Wheeler, (Taylor having accepted the ambassadors post to Saigon) then recommended unanimously to proceed with project definition and advanced technology.39
Secretary McNamara remained as opposed to AMSA as he had been to the
B70. The Air Force asked for $15 million in FY 1965 and $77 million in FY 1966;
he would support only $5 million and $3 million. Because most B52s could stay in
the force through 1975, he believed that a decision about AMSAs project definition
could be delayed for two years. Instead, he proposed initiating project definition
of a short-range attack missile (SRAM), modifying newer B52 models and retiring
older ones. In terms of cost effectiveness, McNamara continued, AMSA would be
more expensive than Polaris, Minuteman, or a B52/SRAM combination. A bomber
threat did compel the Soviets to spend more on air defense, he conceded, but they
would have to spend about the same amount whether the force was small or large,
because they could not know which targets the bombers would attack. A new
bomber would not greatly complicate the Soviets offensive problem, since they
already had to contend with a missile force that was very well protected and substantially larger than their own. McNamara felt sure that Minuteman and Polaris
would be ready and reliable. Also, in his judgment, protected ICBMs were more
survivable than dispersed bombers. Compared to Polaris, AMSA was much more
vulnerable and would have to be committed far sooner.
Turning to damage limitation, Secretary McNamara insisted that buying
more offensive missiles along with active and passive defenses would do more to
reduce US casualties than buying AMSAs. In an offensive role, bombers were too
slow in reaching enemy striking forces while missiles were preferable (or at least
competitive) against the whole spectrum of targets. For a demonstrative attack,
missiles were faster, could be fired singly, and could penetrate area defenses. In
fact, rapid reprogramming of the coded tapes that were put into warheads made
missiles more flexible than bombers. As to AMSAs reusability, dependence on vulnerable tankers, airfields, and extensive ground support made it unwise to leave
the destruction of targets to a second mission. As for AMSAs value in a show of
force, McNamara noted two limitations. First, the US might not want to brandish
its nuclear weapons very often. Second, the effect of adding a few bombers to the
49

alert force might be slight. In sum, then, the primary weight of attack during 1965
75 would be best borne by missiles.40
Once more, the JCS recommended proceeding with propulsion and contract
definition as well as developing SRAMs. General Wheeler provided a rationale for
contract definition. Considering the uncertainty about how long a B52s life could
be extended and the fact that ten years must pass before AMSAs entered the operational inventory, he wanted to minimize the risk of a hiatus in bomber capability.
AMSA, in his judgment, had greater speed and dispersal potential than the B52,
and needed less tanker support than would a bomber variant of the F111 tactical
aircraft.41 Secretary McNamara disagreed.
During the wrap-up at the LBJ Ranch, on 22 December, General Wheeler voiced concern about stopping Minuteman at 1,000. Secretary McNamara
explained, and the President agreed, that a final decision could be postponed.
When General LeMay brought up AMSA, McNamara said it was the Chiefs view
that it is too early to say that we dont need a new bomber and it is too early to say
that we do need one. His own approach, he claimed, would delay a decision about
project definition by only about five months.42 As before, President Johnson sided
with Secretary McNamara on all significant issues.
Summation
n 31 December 1964, the US arsenal included: 391 B47 and 626 B52 bombers; 128 Atlas, 105 Titan, and 698 Minuteman ICBMs; and 21 Polaris submarines (9 in the Atlantic, 8 in the Mediterranean, 4 in the Pacific) carrying 336 missiles.43 The program projected for FY 1970 contained 600 B52s, 54 Titan II and
1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, and 41 Polaris boats.
In 1961, the JCS believed that the United States had achieved strategic superiority, which they were determined to preserve. That superiority, in their judgment,
was what had deterred and would deter Soviet adventurism. Secretary McNamara
agreed in 1961, but by 1963 he concluded that assured destruction would achieve
the same end. This was more than a matter of semantics. To the JCS, numbers
mattered because numbers shaped perceptions. To Secretary McNamara, what
mattered was our destructive capability, which the Soviets surely understood. During the early 1960s, the US numerical lead was clear. The differences between the
Secretary and the JCS were mainly about force levels in the later 1960s. As the US
numerical edge began to diminish after 1965, the differences between them would
widen.
50
4
Continental Defense:
Still Feasible?
An Outdated Posture
n mid-1960, sizeable assets were dedicated to continental air defense. These

included: 52 interceptor squadrons, mainly the Century series of F101s,
F102s, and F106s; 56 battalions of Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air
missiles; a Distant Early Warning Line running along the northern edge of Alaska
and Canada; a Mid-Canada Line; picket ships in the Atlantic and Pacific; and gapfiller radars in the United States. Intelligence estimates put the Soviet bomber fleet
at 135 heavies, much less than predicted a few years earlier, and about 1,000 mediums. Strategic Air Command in December 1960 contained 1,178 medium-range
B-47s and 538 intercontinental B52s. Evidently, the Soviets had de-emphasized
bombers in favor of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Their first ICBMs were
expected to become operational during 1960.1
Against ICBMs, the United States had as yet no protection at all. Construction of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was fairly well
advanced. The first station in Greenland began limited operation in September
1960; two more in Alaska and England were supposed to follow. By early 1960,
a Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was nearly ready to be tested
against moving targets. 2 Whether to move Nike-Zeus into production would
become the focus of debate within the JCS and then between the Joint Chiefs and
Secretary McNamara.
Early in February 1961, the JCS sent conflicting recommendations to Secretary McNamara. General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, and General Decker
51

favored limited production so that some Nike-Zeus units could be deployed by
early 1965. Lemnitzer described ABMs as an indispensable element in deterrence; Burke and Decker saw an urgent requirement for them. Deploying
Nike-Zeus would offset the psychological impact of a Soviet ABM system,
which might appear as early as 196364. Also, Nike-Zeus would protect against
accidental attacks and possible threats from Communist China. General White,
on the other hand, opposed deploying what he called a costly and inadequate
system. Progress in ICBM warheads, he contended, was running several years
ahead of ABM development. Indeed, Nike-Zeus might already have reached the
point of maximum technical growth. White wanted to accentuate the development of sophisticated warheads that could easily penetrate Soviet defenses.
Meanwhile, he agreed, research and development for a truly effective ABM
system should be pursued.3
Concurrently, an OSD task force under Comptroller Hitch reviewed continental
defense programs. Fighter interceptors, it found, were deployed mainly to protect
urban centers. However, if ICBMs destroyed about ten Semi-Automatic Ground
Environment (SAGE) control centers, those interceptors would be rendered
essentially useless and follow-on Soviet bombers could penetrate practically
unopposed to US missile bases.4 Thus a devastating bomber attack could be delivered directly after a selective missile strike. So, the task force argued, anti-bomber
forces should be reoriented to defend against such tactics. On 28 March, President
Kennedy asked for and Congress later approved extra funds for improving US ability to cope with a combined attack.5
As one of his 96 questions, Secretary McNamara asked for a complete reassessment of ABM projects. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
who still was Dr. Herbert York, reported that expenditures on Nike-Zeus would
total $2.4 billion by the close of FY 1961. Nonetheless, he concluded that the
prospect of protecting urban centers effectively is bleak, has always been so,
and there are no great grounds for believing that the situation will markedly
improve in the future, no matter how hard we try. By putting penetration aids
on missile warheads, an attacker could ensure success more cheaply than a
defender could counter such moves. Without fallout shelters, the Soviets could
kill populations through radioactive fallout even if effective missile defenses
did exist.6
On 24 April, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara some summary observations
about Yorks report. First, they all agreed that the United States must try to build an
ABM system, regardless of the apparent obstacles, at a pace commensurate with
technological advancement. Second, they reported that their split over moving
Nike-Zeus into production still stoodwhich explains why their first observation
was so carefully qualified. Third, they re-emphasized the importance of BMEWS
but described it as a complementary part of a future early warning system rather
than a complete solution to the problem.7
52
Continental Defense
n September, the JCS asked Secretary McNamara to take three major steps. First,
produce 200 interceptors, either F106s or F4s, as replacements for F102s which
were similar to but less capable and much slower than the F106s. Second, authorize
research and development for an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI). Third, initiate a
minimum production program for Nike-Zeus so that twelve batteries would be operational by FY 1967.8 They reasoned that, in the context of the Berlin confrontation and
renewed Soviet nuclear testing in the atmosphere, this decision would have certain
psychological impact, and other possible second-order benefits.9
Secretary McNamara agreed about Nike-Zeus but not about 200 interceptors.
Surprise missile attack, he reasoned, had replaced mass bomber raids as the main
danger. The largest likely air attack would total only about 200 to 300 bombers.
Hence the interceptor forces, control of which was concentrated in 22 unprotected
direction centers, should be dispersed, cutting their capability to deal with bomber
raids but enhancing their ability to survive ICBM attacks. As for Nike-Zeus, he
contemplated twelve batteries protecting six cities and about 39 million people.
Technical evaluations, he acknowledged, indicated that any likely missile defense
could be defeated by apparently reasonable enemy tactics. But he found other
arguments in Nike-Zeus favor. Soviet ICBMs might display unforeseen shortcomings (as in fact, for the next few years, they did). Missile defenses should complicate the Soviets attack strategy and so lower their confidence of success. Deploying Nike-Zeus would offset the psychological impact of a similar Soviet effort, and
later technological advances could be incorporated into it. Even a limited ABM
capability, he claimed, could inhibit blackmail by secondary powers such as China
and Cuba. Finally, Secretary McNamara proposed allocating a major portion of the
$400 million budgeted for civil defense to fallout shelters.10
As 1961 ended, Secretary McNamara and the JCS had no significant disagreements about continental defense. Apparently, the topic was not even broached at
the final wrap-up with President Kennedy. In the spring of 1962, however, preproduction funds amounting to $76.2 million were cut from the budget, pending a demonstration of Nike-Zeus effectiveness.11
ilitary planners again focused upon ways to cope with a missile attack followed by bomber sorties against ICBM sites. The Air Force proposed dispersing one-fifth of the interceptor force to 26 bases. The Army recommended
repositioning one-third of its Nike-Hercules units. The Commander in Chief, North
American Air Defense Command, wanted to build 200 Improved Manned Interceptors and replace SAGE with a semi-automatic control system called TRACE
53

[Transportable Control Environment]. Secretary McNamara accepted some of
these steps but not others. His DPM, circulated on 13 November 1962, stated that
existing systems provided negligible defenses against a missile strike followed by
a bomber attack. He recommended: adding thirty dispersal bases (i.e., recovery
or turn-around airfields) and ten austere single-squadron facilities at existing airfields; repositioning twenty Nike-Hercules batteries away from Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber bases to hardened missile sites and control centers; retiring
during FY 1965 eight regular and eleven Air National Guard interceptor squadrons;
deferring until 1963 a decision about the Improved Manned Interceptor; retiring
ten SAGE centers as more survivable Backup Interceptor Controls (BUIC) became
available; and disapproving TRACE on grounds that requirements for the IMIs control system were not yet thoroughly understood.12
The JCS disputed a number of points. First, they claimed that the statement
about defenses being negligible was overdrawn. Second, if the temporary dispersal facilities were made permanent, the ten single-squadron bases could be
eliminated. Third, the twenty Nike-Hercules batteries should stay at urban-industrial locations. The only ICBM sites requiring bomber defenses would be those
held in post-attack reserve. Soon, also, hardened ICBM silos would become too
numerous for Soviet bombers to destroy. Fourth, retirement of the 19 interceptor
squadrons should be delayed until an IMI began entering the inventory. The JCS
was again divided in their advice on the IMI: General LeMay proposed procuring
196 of them by FY 1969; General Wheeler and Admiral Anderson opposed doing
so because they believed that lower-performance interceptors could deal with
the threat.13
On 3 December, Secretary McNamara circulated a revised DPM that characterized defenses as inadequate rather than negligible. He accepted the JCS
recommendation to eliminate ten single-squadron bases and retain the 19 interceptor squadrons. He still intended, however, to use Nike-Hercules batteries to
protect missile silos and control centers. He had doubts, as did several members
of the JCS, about the IMI with its limited endurance and dependence on special
fuels. Moreover, McNamara foresaw little danger of a mass bomber attack. In
order to do that, the Soviets would have to move several hundred bombers to
Arctic bases, thus jeopardizing surprise for the missile strike that would precede
the bombers attack. He calculated, therefore, that a bomber attack probably
would involve fewer than 200 aircraft arriving at their targets over a period of
several hours. McNamara proposed carrying out (1) a war game evaluating the
bomber threat and the effectiveness of defense weapons and control systems as
well as (2) a study of surveillance, detection, identification, and control requirements. These would constitute the appropriate first steps toward a rational longrun air defense system.14
Secretary McNamara addressed the ABM issue separately, distributing a DPM
on 6 October. Three months earlier, a Nike-Zeus missile fired from Kwajalein Island
54
Continental Defense
in the mid-Pacific had intercepted a target vehicle launched from California. Even
so, McNamara concluded that Nike-Zeus should continue only in a restricted manner. Instead, he recommended full development of a more advanced Nike-X which
added a high-acceleration Sprint missile for close-in defense and a Multifunction
Array Radar able to track many objects simultaneously. A deployment decision
could be deferred until mid-1964, with the first batteries becoming operational in
1969 and their numbers growing to 26 by 197273.
The significant point, however, was Secretary McNamaras growing pessimism
about ballistic missile defense. Manifold technical problems might be overcome but,
in his mind, solving them would not justify deployment. The basic stumbling-block
was that the cost of building an ABM system would be at least twice the cost of
offensive improvements needed to overcome it. Hence, McNamara doubted whether
Nike-X would be deployed. He recognized, though, that anti-missile defense is so
important in the strategic equation that we must be willing to make very substantial
development expenditures even if the probability of deployment is rather low.15
McNamaras memorandum had been written just before the Cuban missile crisis
erupted. The JCS reply was dated 10 November, while the crisis was not yet wholly
resolved. It opened what would become a long-running disagreement with the Secretary. General Wheeler and Admiral Anderson labeled lack of missile defense as the
most glaring deficiency in the US military posture. They wanted to begin deploying
Nike-Zeus in 1967, with an advanced capability comparable to Nike-X following by
1971. The Soviets, apparently, had begun to build an ABM shield around Leningrad
(now St. Petersburg). Wheeler and Anderson feared that, if the Soviet Union was
first in acquiring a missile defense, Moscow would gain a major military advantage
and US prestige would suffer enormously. They also brought in McNamaras earlier
argument, now much more relevant, that lack of a missile defense might subject the
United States to significant damage or public humiliation at the hands of minor
powers. General Taylor, using what was for him strong language, agreed that it is
of vital national importance to embark at once upon a production and development
program. General LeMay supported developing both Nike-Zeus and Nike-X but
opposed deploying Nike-Zeus until its effectiveness could be fully established.16
On 20 November, Secretary McNamara forwarded to President Kennedy his
views and those of the JCS. He rebutted the Chiefs argument for deploying NikeZeus with two points. First, there would almost surely be a Soviet reaction. Judging by US experience, penetration aids able to overcome a defense could be produced quicker and for one-tenth to one-half the cost. Second, minor powers could
still threaten cities with a population of around one million that are not defended.
Late in December at Palm Beach, Kennedy, McNamara, Taylor, and Wheeler held
a lengthy discussion about missile defense. The President adopted McNamaras
approachdevelopment but no production. Kennedy ruled that, with a $9 billion
deficit looming in FY 1964, it would just be too expensive to buy the proportionate
share of $19 billion spread over ten years for Nike-Zeus at this stage.17
55
SOP68, completed in April 1963, recommended bringing eighteen IMIs and one
Nike-X battery into the active inventory during FY 1969. General LeMay dissented,
saying that Nike-X needed further definition. More importantly, scientific opinion
was lining up against ABM deployment. The Presidents Special Assistant for Science
and Technology, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, discounted fears about the sudden appearance
of a Soviet ABM system. There was a long lead-time involved and US intelligence
would supply early warnings. Using calculations even more pessimistic than McNamaras, he concluded that defense would cost ten to thirty times more than offensive
missiles. He warned that, if both sides deployed missile defenses, both might overestimate their opponents capabilities and overbuild their striking power.18
In a DPM dated 9 October, McNamara said that the choice lay between creating a balanced defense and relying solely on offensive forces for deterrence. A
low program would consist, in FY 1969, of 456 interceptors, surface-to-air missiles placed around selected hardened ICBM sites, minimal surveillance, warning,
and control, and Nike-X kept in the developmental stage. A high program would
add 216 advanced interceptors by FY 1970, ABM defense of the 22 largest urban
areas by FY 1973, and expanded civil defense. McNamara thought it too soon to
make an intelligent choice . . . between these fundamental alternatives. The Air
Force recently had evaluated five advanced air defense systems, including IMI, and
found them about equally effective. McNamara agreed that Nike-X would be very
effective against small attacks and would significantly reduce the damage of a large
attack. Yet Nike-X might provide only negligible protection against high altitude,
very high yield detonations. Again, therefore, a production decision should be postponed until major uncertainties were resolved. Moreover, he emphasized, strategic
defense had to be considered in its totality. Improved air defense, ABM deployments around urban areas, and a nation-wide fallout shelter program all were
equally necessary. So he proposed an interim program containing only those elements that were common to the high and low alternatives: reduce interceptors
from 829 to 456; relocate some surface-to-air missiles from urban areas to hardened ICBM sites; modernize, to a limited degree, warning and surveillance systems;
and maintain ABM research and development near current levels.19
The JCS wanted a war-winning as well as a war-deterring capability. They criticized this interim program as insufficient because it (1) placed premature reliance upon unproven surveillance, warning, and control systems and (2) postponed
the development, procurement, and deployment of ABMs and advanced interceptors. A phase-down of current warning and control systems should await the availability of an improved BUIC system, highly sophisticated airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) aircraft, and integration with civil radar coverage. They
repeated JSOP68s position about interceptors, which would mean having in FY
1969 not 456, but 648 aircraft. McNamara assumed that the interceptors could not
56
Continental Defense
escape quick destruction, but the JCS believed that dispersal would give Century
interceptors as well as IMIs adequate survivability. Finally, they recommended
proceeding with Nike-X development as a matter of priority, with production
and operational deployment to follow if justified by R&D progress. As a result,
Secretary McNamara did agree to maintain the FY 1964 force of 829 interceptors,
adjusted for attrition, through FY 1969.20
On 30 December, during the budget review with President Johnson, General Wheeler described the absence of ABMs as the most serious deficiency in our
defense posture. He emphasized that, for the first Nike-X unit to become operational in September 1969, a deployment decision would have to be rendered by the
fall of 1964. General LeMay depicted the air defense picture as dismal, with capabilities going downward. Developing the IMI impressed him as an urgent requirement. McNamara replied that the basic issue was not whether to develop IMI but
whether to produce and deploy it. If the administration decided against deploying
Nike-X, going ahead with IMI production would be pointless. Deputy Secretary
Gilpatric added that a decision about whether to press forward with civil defense
preparation also would affect the IMI. Unfazed, General LeMay argued that IMI
should be considered independently of these issues. Without IMI, for instance, US
air space could not be protected once supersonic transports began flying.21 But the
President again supported Secretary McNamara on all major points.
ith currently programmed forces, according to JSOP69s situational analysis, a Soviet attack in 1968 would cost the United States 34 to 48 percent of
its industrial plant and 65 to 73 percent of its population. A larger intermediate
force, JSOP69 continued, would bring those figures down to 13 to 25 percent and
37 to 50 percent respectively. With a high force level, they would fall to 9 to 23
percent and 33 to 49 percent. Clearly, the gain in capability was greater between
programmed and intermediate forces than between intermediate and high forces.
Whether SAC bombers survived, for example, was mainly a matter of timely warning and dispersal. Similarly, the number of civilian casualties would be determined
by the adequacy of fallout shelters as well as by the efficiency of active defenses.
General LeMay wanted to cut back surface-to-air missiles and establish IMI as
the nucleus of bomber defense. General Wheeler, conversely, believed that surfaceto-air missiles provided the best protection for strategic retaliatory forces and for
command and control facilities. Sole reliance on IMI struck him as unsound; the
best interceptor and the best aircraft/missile mix had yet to be determined. General
Taylor, Admiral McDonald, and General Greene sided with Wheeler.22
In his tentative guidance, appearing on 21 May, Secretary McNamara voiced
doubt about the value of a large interceptor force. He asked the JCS to compare
57

the damage-limiting effectiveness, in 1967, of 782 versus 372 aircraft. Like the
JCS majority, he did not believe that IMIs superiority over other alternatives
had been proven. In any case, he reasoned, IMI should proceed only in conjunction with deployment of Nike-X, construction of nationwide fallout shelters,
and the addition of other elements making up a balanced defense. So the Secretary opted once again to postpone major decisions about producing IMI and
deploying Nike-X and the building of nationwide fallout shelters. For the time
being, he preferred a somewhat reduced active defense force and an augmented development program.23
Most of the JCS, with the exception of General Johnson, opposed any reduction of interceptors. In justification, they cited studies by the Continental Air
Defense Command (CONAD) and the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA) showing
that the larger force might destroy as many as fifty bombers with several multimegaton weapons apiece, thereby saving up to several million lives. General Johnson, on the other hand, argued that the CONAD and JWGA studies contained major
methodological errors. In his judgment, interceptor reductions could be largely
offset by redeployments, reduced co-locations, efficient use of dispersal bases,
and modernization of the Air National Guard.24
Secretary McNamara did not alter any of his positions. As he informed General Wheeler, OSD studies indicated that a larger interceptor force would only cut
fatalities from 100 million down to 94-99 million. The CONAD exercise, likewise,
showed a difference of only 1 to 3 million out of 70 million deaths. True, the JWGA
study showed a larger force lowering fatalities by 9.4 million. But, like General
Johnson, McNamara believed that faulty assumptions invalidated this finding. The
JWGA wrongly assumed that increasing the number of interceptors invariably
increased the number of bombers destroyed; that adding megatons always raised
the number of fatalities; and that no relocation of the interceptor force would
occur. Using more realistic assumptions, McNamaras staff concluded that the
difference in the two forces overall effectiveness was relatively trivial. It was
wiser, therefore, to assure the strategic deterrents adequacy and to reduce our
dependence on the first use of nuclear weapons by raising conventional capabilities. The JCS, in turn, reviewed the issues and reaffirmed their views.25
On 5 November, McNamara circulated a DPM that seemed to denigrate, at
least implicitly, the very concept of continental defense. Without any protection, he
foresaw about 160 million fatalities. A civil defense program costing about $5 billion could cut that to around 120 million. A balanced $30 billion effort might reduce
urban fatalities to 80 million. Beyond that, however, the United States would have
to spend much more for damage limitation than the Soviets would have to spend
for damage creation. McNamara proposed: reducing Century interceptors to 330
by FY 1970; phasing out Distant Early Warning Line extension aircraft and radar
picket ships; and reorganizing the surveillance system. On IMI, he would spend only
$5 million for developing an F12A. He remained uncertain whether the F12A or a
58
Continental Defense
modified F111 was most suitable and whether a new surface-to-air missile might
be preferable to a new interceptor. In any case, bomber, missile, and civil defenses
would have to proceed in parallel. As to Nike-X, he recommended $390 million for
development but only $10 million for production planning because so many uncertainties remained. For civil defense, he urged a major effort at public education but
expenditure of merely $51 million for a fallout shelter survey and evaluation.26
In their critique, the JCS stressed that the measure of cost versus effectiveness cannot portray the full range of essential considerations. Balanced development, naturally, was the soundest course, but delaying fallout shelters, for example, should not cause deferral of Nike-X or IMI. Again the JCS was divided on the
way ahead. Excepting General Johnson, all opposed phasing down the interceptor
force. On IMI, they sought enough funds to preserve an option for future deployment. In technical terms, that meant moving beyond the advanced development
approved by McNamara into engineering development. General Wheeler went a
bit further, proposing procurement of either 18 F12As or 18 modified F111s in
FY 1966. As for phasing out Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line aircraft and ships,
only Admiral McDonald and General Wheeler agreed. The others recommended
retaining them as long as Soviet bombers remained a sizeable threat. For Nike-X,
they all urged allocating an additional $200 million for preproduction, so that initial
deployment could occur in October 1969. General Wheeler, finally, favored a larger
appropriation for fallout shelters.27
On one point, Secretary McNamara bowed to the JCS majority, delaying F-102
retirements from 1966 to 1968. He made no further concessions because, according
to the latest National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets evidently were not building
a new bomber.28 McNamara also disapproved, as unnecessary, Army proposals to
redeploy Nike-Hercules batteries around hardened missile silos and control centers.29 Possibly he was unwilling to challenge Southern members of Congress, from
whose districts many of those units would have to be removed.
During the pre-Christmas conference at the LBJ Ranch, General Wheeler
requested more money for fallout shelters, claiming that a $5.3 billion program
could cut civilian fatalities by more than 50 percent. (That was a good deal more
optimistic than McNamaras calculation, cited above.) The Secretary, in rebuttal,
said that shelters would have little value unless accompanied by ABM deployments. So Wheeler argued for $200 million in Nike-X preproduction funds. McNamara asked Generals Wheeler and Johnson whether they agreed that the ABM and
fallout shelter programs should move forward in tandem. Wheeler did. Johnson
did not; he wanted Nike-X to advance as rapidly as possible. McNamara then said
that missile defenses appeared to have value only as protection against Communist
China. Against a Soviet attack, he argued, ABMs would not save enough lives to
justify their cost. Since the Chinese apparently would not have ICBMs before 1972
at the earliest, he could find no justification for accelerating Nike-X. Lastly, General
LeMay urged approval of project definition for the F12A. Secretary McNamara
59

suggested that fallout shelters should be built first, ABMs deployed next, and IMIs
produced last. Since IMI was the most advanced of these three programs, he saw
no need for extra effort.30
In sum, Secretary McNamara was holding continental defense programs at the
developmental stage. To him, IMI seemed pointless by itself; fallout shelters were
valueless without Nike-X, which he rated as being of very doubtful value. As they
had with strategic retaliatory forces, the JCS based their case for ABM deployment
on the claim that perception was a vital part of deterrence. Secretary McNamara
justified his deferrals on cost-effectiveness studies, which by 1964 led him to conclude that the best defenseindeed the only feasible defensewas a powerful
offense.
60
5
Conventional
Capabilities Expand
At the Outset, Small Steps
lthough the Eisenhower administration placed main reliance on nuclear weapons, it was prepared to carry out limited, non-nuclear operations. During the
summer of 1960, representatives from Defense, State, and Central Intelligence
assessed US and allied capabilities to defend South Korea, the offshore islands of
Quemoy and Matsu, Southeast Asia, Iran, and West Berlin. They concluded that
US strength was sufficient, if buttressed by a partial mobilization, to wage a limited war in any one of these areas. Dealing with two or more crises concurrently,
however, would degrade the general war posture to an unacceptable degree. The
NSC, on 5 January 1961, rejected a radical reallocation of resources to strengthen
conventional capabilities. President Eisenhower doubted whether it was possible to prevent large-scale conventional combat from escalating into general war.
Therefore, maintaining the nuclear deterrent should still be the primary mission,
with other forces relegated to supporting roles.1
The forces relegated to supporting roles were substantial: 14 Army divisions
and three Marine division/wing teams; 14 attack and nine anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) carriers, 14 cruisers, 225 destroyers, and 112 attack submarines; 55 USAF
tactical fighter and 30 transport squadrons.2 The Kennedy administration promptly
made known that a strategy of massive retaliation would be replaced by one of
flexible response. Having no program for translating that strategy into a force posture, it proceeded to create one piecemeal.
61

Secretary McNamaras first recommendation was to improve airlift capability.
At the time, 90 percent of transports were propeller-driven; jet C141s would not
enter the inventory until mid-1965. McNamara proposed several steps, the most
important being to double monthly output of C130 turboprops to eight, and accelerate the switch in production from C130Bs to longer-range C130Es.3
Immediately, the new administration faced challenges in Laos and the Congo
that could lead to armed intervention. On 1 February 1961, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary (International Security Affairs) told the JCS to assume that two aggressions began concurrently: by not more than five lightly armed divisions in Laos and
by another five in the Congo. What additions to US forces would be required? The
J5 recommended adding 45,000 personnel in FY 1961 and another 74,000 in FY
1962, the main augmentations being one Army infantry division, two attack carriers, 21 amphibious ships, and 41 transport squadrons. The JCS was divided in their
response to the J5s report. General Decker, Admiral Burke, and General Shoup
endorsed those proposals. General White, however, declared himself greatly disturbed by their apparent assumption that the United States should be prepared to
wage limited wars at all points of the globe against the full power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. If so, the US military establishment would have to be quickly and massively reoriented at a cost of well over $60 billion annually.4 Arguing that preservation
of US nuclear superiority still was the most pressing military requirement, White
claimed that available strength was more than adequate to the tasks set forth in
this study, with the possible exception of some additional airlift.5
Concurrently, in connection with a reappraisal of the FY 1962 budget, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze asked the JCS to compare deployment capabilities (excluding forces already in place) of the United States and the communist
powers at several crisis points. Replying on 9 February, they listed the following
figures for 90 days after fighting began: 10 US versus 43 communist divisions in
Central Europe; three US versus four communist in the Congo; five US versus 14
communist in Iran; and three US versus 23 communist in South Vietnam. Therefore, they said, The United States does not have forces in being adequate to cope
with large-scale limited war situations. The fact that in any limited war situation
there is a requirement to initiate partial mobilization, augment lift capabilities,
expand the war production base and to lift expenditure limitations, substantiates
this fundamental conclusion.6
The impact of these JCS findings seems to have been rather slight. Late in
January, Secretary McNamara had created a limited war task force headed by
Assistant Secretary Nitze. Its report, issued on 17 February, recommended adding 3,000 men to Army Special Forces, 2,000 men to raise the 1st Infantry Division toward combat-ready status, and 2,000 Marines to bring divisional strengths
closer to authorized levels. The task force saw no need for additional funding in
FY 1961 but did recommend adding $775 million in FY 1962, chiefly to expand
readiness and training exercises, improve airlift capabilities, and increase pro62
Conventional Capabilities Expand

curement of ammunition and equipment. President Kennedy put these proposals
into a special message to Congress, presented on 28 March.7
A number of Secretary McNamaras 96 questions, or defense policy projects
which he had assigned to the JCS and Service Chiefs on 8 March, pertained to general purpose forces. Two of them are described here because they illustrate how
often, at the JCS level, single-service perspectives proved stronger than joint ones.
The first was McNamaras directive to develop a plan for integrating the Strategic
Army Corps and the Tactical Air Command into a unified command, and consider
when such a plan should be implemented. Significantly, the Secretary spoke of
when and not whether a unified command should come into being. The J5 prepared such a plan. Generals Decker and White endorsed it, provided that the new
command eventually included Navy and Marine units. But Admiral Burke favored
nothing more than a joint task force that would train air-ground teams for augmenting existing commands. General Shoup argued that simply developing a doctrine
for joint Army-Air Force operations would be enough. On 1 May, the JCS (minus
General Lemnitzer, who was in Southeast Asia) forwarded their views to Secretary McNamara. He, in turn, asked them to assess several alternatives. This time,
Lemnitzer joined Decker and White in endorsing a unified command, while Shoup
accepted a joint command with limited responsibilities.8
On 21 August, Secretary McNamara settled matters by telling the JCS to nominate an officer who would head the unified command. Their choice was Lieutenant
General Paul D. Adams, USA. President Kennedy approved his appointment on 19
September. One month later, US Strike Command (STRICOM) opened its headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. STRICOM comprised the combat-ready
forces of Tactical Air and Continental Army Commands, which by January 1962
amounted to eight divisions, 42 tactical and 19 troop carrier squadrons. Navy and
Marine officers were assigned to STRICOMs staff. Strike Commands responsibilities included training, developing joint doctrines, providing a general reserve and
reinforcements for unified commands, and planning for and executing contingency
operations in response to global crisis.9
The second question was Secretary McNamaras directive to review antisubmarine warfare research projects and determine whether increased emphasis
was desirable. The JCS already were addressing one portion of this problem. For
many months, General White had worried that Soviet capability to deliver submarine-launched ballistic missiles was increasing faster than US defenses. Early in
April, he suggested two steps that would cut across service lines. First, appoint a
Director of ASW Planning, who would be provided with a joint staff and directed
to develop a national ASW policy. Second, have the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering look at the desirability of creating a centralized agency for ASW
research and development.10
General Decker disagreed. He wanted to consider ASW in a world-wide context, not just as a continental defense problem. Any evaluation should cover all
63

defenses against SLBMs, including the Armys ABM systems. Admiral Burke, going
farther, argued that the greatest threat stemmed from our reliance on fixed-base,
vulnerable retaliatory force, and not from inability to intercept SLBMs. This being
so, the best solution lay in progress toward a preponderance of mobile strike forces [i.e., Polaris submarines] that cannot be targeted by the SLBM or ICBM. Burke
denied that Whites single integrated scheme would prove superior to existing
ASW efforts, which he claimed already had achieved optimum integration under
Navy direction. On 3 May, after discussing their differences at great length, the JCS
agreed to await results from the ASW analysis requested by McNamara.11
Separately, at Secretary McNamaras direction, the Navy Department and a
DOD working group assessed ASW capabilities. Currently, in the Navys judgment,
ASW forces could defeat any effort to close the sea lanes. War games showed close
to two submarines being sunk for every ASW or escorted ship lost. Under projected funding levels, however, ASW capabilities would become inadequate by
1966 and more seriously so by 1971. The DOD working group separately reached
roughly similar conclusions.12
After reviewing these reports, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara some summary findings. At present, they said, ASW deficiencies resulted in a marginal
capability to counter the Soviet submarine force. Correcting those shortcomings depended upon vigorous implementation of the highest priority currently
accorded ASW, including additional funding. Immediate increases were needed to
avert the serious deficiency anticipated for 196667. The JCS advocated renewed
study of management and coordination, which might uncover ways of effecting
significant improvements more swiftly.13 Three years later, however, intelligence
indicated that the submarine threat had been over-rated.
pring 1961 proved a grim time for the administration. On 12 April, the Soviets
gained a propaganda victory by orbiting the first astronaut around the earth.
One week later, at the Bay of Pigs, Fidel Castro crushed an invasion by US-backed
Cuban exiles. A worsening situation in Laos made intervention distinctly possible.
On 20 April, the President asked for a determination of whether more conventional
strength was needed. Secretary of the Navy John Connally, who was given charge
of this project, told the JCS that they should not merely submit a shopping list of
new equipment. Rather, they should provide an over-all perspective of available
resources, develop new methods and techniques for using them, and determine
actions needed to create capabilities for applying these techniques. McNamara further instructed the JCS to include specific add-ons for the FY 1962 budget.14
This was a tall order with a tight deadline, so it is not surprising that the JCS
response fell short as far as new methods and techniques were concerned. On 5
64

May, they advised Secretary McNamara that available forces were highly trained,
ready and competent to accomplish tasks which are assigned to them by the Basic
War Plan. Eleven Army and three Marine division/wing teams were combat-ready;
three more Army divisions could become so between mobilization (M)+60 and
M+150. The Air Force had a 382-plane Composite Air Strike Force available for
rapid deployment. The Navy had 352 warships either at sea or readily available.
Deployment capabilities were adequate, with certain exceptions; available stocks
would support combat operations for six months.
Separately, the services proposed sizeable augmentations totaling 104,960
personnel and costing $2.641 billion. The Army wanted 69,260 personnel to form
a new division in the continental United States (CONUS) as well as one airborne
brigade in Okinawa and one in Europe. The Navy wanted 18,500 more personnel
to improve readiness and amphibious lift. The Marine Corps wanted 12,000 more
personnel to bring units to full strength. The Air Force wanted 11,500 personnel to
retain eleven fighter and five transport squadrons slated for inactivation.15
On 8 May, Secretary McNamara met the JCS and told them that the services
figures were too high for him to support in full. Two days later, he informed the
President that Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Connally and I considered conventional forces
to be adequate for their purpose. They had analyzed service proposals under
the following assumptions: more than one large conventional commitment at any
one time was unlikely; commitment of more than 250 to 300,000 US troops would
reach the threshold for using nuclear weapons; and resorting to nuclear weapons
would stem the requirement for additional combat forces. Within the framework
of those assumptions, we have a substantial capacity for waging non-nuclear warfare. Our capacity for strategic mobility . . . is satisfactory, except during the first
1030 days of a large-scale, rapidly developing limited war.
Secretary McNamara did recommend several steps: form an airborne brigade
on Okinawa;16 reactivate 22 transports, increasing amphibious lift from 1 to 2
Marine divisions; and accelerating production of certain equipment and ammunition. All these things could be done without additional funding, by reprogramming
available appropriations. The only FY 1962 addition would be $100 million to begin
restructuring Army divisions. The pentomic divisions, organized in the late 1950s
for mobility and dispersion on tactical nuclear battlefields, would be replaced by
ROAD divisions with more firepower, personnel, and flexibility.17
President Kennedy, on 25 May, asked Congress for $100 million to fund ROAD as
well as $138 million for Army and Marine equipment. He included a service proposal
that McNamara had rejectedraise Marine Corps strength from 178,000 to 190,000
to provide the nucleus for a fourth division.18 While the changes over these first four
months were not trivial, they really amounted to adjustments at the margin. A major
expansion lay just ahead, but this was entirely unforeseen when Kennedy spoke.
During the summer, as tensions over Berlin rose, having enough conventional
strength to avoid rapid escalation into nuclear warfare became a prime concern.
65

On 26 July President Kennedy asked Congress for another $3.2 billion, the purpose
being to give the US the capability of deploying as many as six additional divisions and supporting air units to Europe at any time after January 1, 1962. Army
strength would grow from 870,000 to about 1,000,000; the Navy and Air Force
would add 29,000 and 63,000 respectively.19
The services proceeded to revise and enlarge their force objectives. On 15
September, the JCS informed McNamara that they judged these new objectives
to be fundamentally sound. The Army should contain 16 divisions through FY
1967. Low funding levels during the Eisenhower years had led to serious deterioration vis--vis the Soviet bloc, and implementing ROAD would require considerable capital outlays. Therefore, the JCS recommended a $3.5 billion procurement program for the Army in FY 1963, up from Eisenhowers $2.2 billion. They
proposed 15 attack (the Navy wanted 16) and 10 ASW carriers in FY 1963, leaving
numbers for later years to be decided during future planning cycles. As for tactical aircraft, they endorsed the service plan to maintain a steady figure of 1,300.20
On 18 September, as the Berlin confrontation neared its peak, Kennedy
ordered the activation of two National Guard divisions. Four days later, Secretary
McNamara circulated a tentative five-year program for general purpose forces. He
proposed steady levels of 14 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, and
15 attack and nine ASW carriers. The number of Air Force tactical fighters would
rise from 1,278 in mid-1963 to 1,588 in mid-1966.
In a DPM dated 9 October, Secretary McNamara explained why he had revised
several JCS recommendations. The Berlin mobilization, involving unready divisions
as well as many obsolescent ships and aircraft, was yielding only small improvements in effectiveness. Consequently, he chose to emphasize quality rather than
quantity. For the Army, he intended to improve equipment and reserves readiness
instead of increasing the number of regular divisions above 14. The six CONUSbased active divisions, plus the priority National Guard divisions, constituted an
adequate strategic reserve. An enlarged training establishment would allow rapid
expansion. As for procurement, he prescribed $2.6 billion which was $900 million
below the JCS request but $1 billion above Eisenhowers FY 1962 budget.
For the Navy, Secretary McNamara recommended against retaining most of
the reactivated ships. Enough should stay in service, however, to be able to transport and assault-land one Marine division in each ocean. He also wanted to begin
construction of an oil-fired attack carrier in FY 1963. The Navy wanted a nuclearpowered ship, but he found no increase in effectiveness to justify the added cost.
Those choices made McNamaras arguments about tactical air power all the
more surprising. The Air Force proposed a tactical fighter force of 1,329 by FY 1966;
the Secretary wanted 1,588. McNamara noted, in justification, that a Marine division/
wing team had about 180 aircraft. The Air Force, by contrast, allocated only 80 aircraft to support an Army division. Besides close air support, furthermore, Tactical
66

Air Command had the missions of air superiority and long-range interdiction. McNamara also increased funding for conventional ordnance by $500 million.21
Strategic mobility, on the verge of a great improvement, had become a vital element of conventional capabilities. The services developed and Secretary McNamara,
through his DPM, defined ambitious goals: airlift one airborne brigade with its essential combat equipment anywhere within three days; airlift one division (including
the brigade) in seven to ten days, followed by another division within four weeks.
Sealift then would deliver complete equipment for the two divisions within 45 days.
In 1961, the basic tools of the airlift fleet were the piston C124 and the turboprop
C130. McNamara and the JCS agreed upon FY 1967 goals of 448 C130s with a
range around 1,500 nautical miles (nm) and 160 jet C141s with about 4,000 nm
range. As to sealift, the JCS wanted to start building roll-on roll-off cargo ships for
handling heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles. They also recommended modernizing
the cargo, tanker, and transport fleets. McNamara judged airlift to be quicker and
cheaper than sealift; he could not foresee a situation where strategic sealift of troops
would be necessary or desirable. He rejected modernizing the cargo, tanker and
transport fleets because the heavy expense completely outweighed the benefit of
faster cruising speed. But he did agree to start one roll-on roll-off per year and, as
the JCS urged, postponed the retirement of 16 troopships.22
In November, Secretary McNamara reviewed the merits of 14 versus 16 regular
Army divisions. General Taylor, working in the White House as Military Representative of the President, strongly supported 16 and had Kennedys ear. The issue was
whether, when the two National Guard divisions were released, two new regular
divisions should replace them. On 1 December, the JCS advised McNamara that
16 were required to conduct contingency operations in two areas simultaneously
while maintaining an acceptable general war posture. Here their unanimity ended.
General Decker wanted 16 regular divisions. General Shoup concurred, on condition that the Armys personnel ceiling did not exceed 960,000. But Admiral Anderson and General LeMay believed there would be enough time to mobilize two wellorganized and well-equipped divisions. The Chairman sided with General Decker.
Traditionally, Lemnitzer told McNamara, regulars bore the burden until the immediacy or actuality of a shooting war requires declaration of a national emergency.
Highly publicized complaints by recently mobilized National Guardsman were
much on General Lemnitzers mind (and may have been on the Presidents as well):
To mobilize and demobilize significant numbers of reservists with each crisis will,
in my view, be considered an unacceptable burden by the American public, the
Congress, and eventually by the reservists themselves.23
A conference on 2 January 1962, attended by Kennedy, Vice President Johnson,
General Taylor, McNamara, and Gilpatric, settled the matter. No JCS members
were present. Here President Kennedy approved the immediate activation of two
new regular divisions. The press statement, he instructed, should stress that organizing these units would permit release from federal service of the 32nd and 49th
67

National Guard divisions.24 Next day, at the last budget review, General Decker
assured Kennedy that the Army had been done well by, although a ceiling of
960,000 left little leeway. Admiral Anderson said that the FY 1963 budget supported
a better Navy, although maintenance and personnel would remain tight.25
In its final form, the program for FYs 19631967 would maintain 16 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, 15 attack and nine ASW carriers, 14 cruisers, a little more than 250 destroyers, and about 100 attack submarines. The tactical fighter force would be 21 wings, with aircraft numbering 1,575 in FY 1963, 1,593
in FY 1964, and 1,545 thereafter.26
he drafting of JSOP67 witnessed a protracted dispute over the numbers of

Army divisions and Navy carriers. The Army advocated 18 divisions; the Air
Force and Navy, 16. The Navy wanted 16 attack carriers; the Army, 15. The Air
Force would reduce attack carriers to 10 but build ASW carriers up to 16. General
Lemnitzer suggested compromises that the other Chiefs finally accepted. On 27
August, the JCS recommended mid-1967 levels of 17 Army divisions, 15 attack and
11 ASW carriers, and 25 tactical fighter wings.27
In mid-August, Secretary McNamara proposed a five-year program with steady
levels of 16 Army and three Marine divisions, 15 attack and 9 ASW carriers, and 21
tactical fighter wings, fourteen of which would have F4C Phantoms by mid-1967.28
His DPM of 31 October repeated those recommendations. In justification, he cited
findings of the Chairmans Special Studies Group which had analyzed requirements
in Central Europe, Iran, Southeast Asia, and Korea. McNamara interpreted the
Groups findings as follows:
Central Europe: A force of 34 NATO divisions (six of them US) could
contain a Warsaw Pact attack at its outset. A force of 55 to 60 divisions (15
of them US), if available in 30 to 60 days, could probably hold indefinitely
because air interdiction would prevent the Warsaw Pact from supporting more
than 60 divisions in combat. NATO aircraft were equal to the enemy in quantity
(4,020 versus 4,000) and superior in quality. NATO ground forces, however,
were deficient in equipment, support units, and reserves; active divisions were
poorly positioned. McNamara saw no reason to assign more US forces; the
allies could and should correct their own shortcomings.
Iran: Nine US divisions and 800 aircraft would be needed to hold a line
along the Zagros Mountains. Instead of stationing US troops there, McNamara
recommended pre-stocking equipment and improving strategic lift.
Thailand-Vietnam: Six US divisions, combined with allied and indigenous
forces, could stop an attack by 21 Chinese and North Vietnamese divisions.
S outh K orea : Thirteen US divisions, together with the Republic of
Koreas army, could repulse a Chinese-North Korean invasion.
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From this data, Secretary McNamara concluded that there already were enough
active divisions to cope with the initial stages of one large contingency outside
Europe. Priority reserves would have to be called up, though, to provide non-divisional support and reconstitute the strategic reserve.
The Secretary then dealt with Service proposals. He disapproved the Armys
request for another infantry division, possibly to be stationed in the Philippines.
Back in April, however, McNamara had ordered the Army to examine ways of
achieving quantum increases in mobility. What emerged was the concept of
an air assault division equipped with 459 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
enough to lift the entire division in three movements. McNamara agreed to activate
a provisional air assault division. If field tests went well, it could either become a
permanent division or merge with one of the airborne divisions.29
Many surface warships, particularly destroyers, dated from World War II.
McNamara emphasized prolonging their lives through the Fleet Rehabilitation and
Modernization Program. The Navy preferred more new construction and fewer
conversions.
The Air Force again asked for 25 wings. McNamara held the line at 21, up from
16 in mid-1961. Modern munitions, he was convinced, would at least double the
number of kills per sortie. The Secretary recommended spending $600 million for
aviation ordnance, which was $180 million more than the Air Force proposed and
$275 million above the FY 1963 level.30
The JCS critique, sent on 21 November, discerned fundamental qualitative
and quantitative differences between the Secretarys force recommendations and
those of the Services. Basically, they argued, he had been misled by the findings of
the Special Studies Group:
Central Europe: The Secretarys force levels were derived from a strategy of retiring to the Rhine. The JCS, however, believed in containing the
enemy well forward and preventing him from seizing substantial amounts of
territory before negotiations began. The Group, they believed, had been overly
optimistic about allied contributions. Further, they saw no clear support for
McNamaras statements that 34 divisions could contain an attack and that 55
to 60 probably could hold indefinitely. Most importantly, the JCS calculated
enemy aircraft at 4,925 (with 600 more medium bombers probably available)
which was well above the NATO figure of 4,020. They saw little likelihood,
therefore, that NATO could achieve air superiority and wage an effective interdiction campaign. In that case, the Warsaw Pact could maintain considerably
more than 60 divisions in combat.
Iran: Not 800 but 1,650 aircraft would be needed.
Thailand-Vietnam: Airlift and sealift requirements would be considerably greater than those programmed.31
The JCS critique did not sway the Secretary. McNamaras DPM of 3 December
showed no changes in force-level recommendations. He deemed these sufficient to
counter a wide spectrum of likely Sino-Soviet Bloc aggressions in regions outside
69

of Europe. He included the Joint Chiefs statement that, if simultaneous largescale attacks occurred, the US would have to choose between nuclear escalation
and possibly losing large areas of the Free World. In Europe, conventional forces
were inadequate but remedies should lie primarily with the allies. The Chiefs,
McNamara continued, state that until adequate forces are available, NATO must
be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons early.32
President Kennedy met with Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs at
his Palm Beach, Florida, residence over the Christmas holiday on 27 December
1962, to hear their opinion of the budget. The Service Chiefs took this offering to
express their frustration. Admiral Anderson asked for more personnel, more funds
for operations, spare parts, and maintenance, and more autonomy in decisionmaking. Cuts in the Navys shipbuilding proposals (e.g., from eight nuclear attack
submarines down to six) would leave the fleet in 1970 with a larger percentage of
over-age ships than was desirable. General Wheeler also wanted more personnel. A
ceiling of 960,000 meant that the Army would have to depend on the reserves earlier in a war than they would really like to. General LeMay sought second-source
production of F4Cs as well as 60 more C130s.33 It would be wrong, though, to
presume that their mood was combative. Wheeler stated that his service would
be in the best shape it has been since Korea. General Shoup said that the Marines
were the best they had ever been in peacetime.
President Kennedy responded to LeMays request by ordering a review of strategic mobility requirements. Already, McNamara had increased C141 objectives
from 160 in FY 1967 to 208 in FY 1968 and, with reluctance, postponed the retirement of 16 troopships. After the review, he raised the FY 1965 objective for C130s
from 448 to 540.34
As finalized, the five-year program listed 16 Army divisions, plus the provisional air mobile division; three Marine division/wing teams; 15 attack and nine ASW
carriers; 14 cruisers; 196 destroyers and escorts in FY 1964, falling to 161 in FY
1968; 78 diesel and 25 nuclear attack submarines in FY 1964, changing to 57 diesel
and 48 nuclear by FY 1968; 21 tactical fighter wings, with numbers of aircraft rising
slightly from 1,518 in FY 1964 to 1,545 in FY 1968.35
his year, McNamara and his staff subjected conventional force planning to
unprecedented scrutiny. The Secretary used ten DPMs to set out his views on
general purpose forces, each about as long as the single paper that he had circulated in 1961.36 With far greater amounts of systematically analyzed information at
hand, McNamara could delve into details of the force structure. He examined Navy
requirements in depth, something that no Secretary of Defense had done before.
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The JSOP formally opened the cycle, but its influence bore little relation to the
large amount of time devoted to its preparation. Splits in JSOP68, completed on
13 April 1963, very much resembled those in JSOP67a testament to the continuing power of service over joint perspectives. General Taylor told Joint Staff officers
that the President and Secretary McNamara wanted enough strength to cope with
two simultaneous crises, such as Berlin and Cuba. The Joint Staff concluded that
17 Army divisions would be enough. General Wheeler opted for 18, arguing that two
crises would require sending nine divisions overseas and the CONUS general reserve
had only seven. Taylor voiced the majoritys view that 16 were enough, under certain
conditions: Will it be necessary to deal with more than one situation with precise
simultaneity? If a delay in reaction time of a few months can be accepted, we can
rely on mobilizing reserve units.37 Taylor had taken a different view when he was
Army Chief of Staff, showing how he adopted a broader, more joint, perspective as
Chairman.
In a DPM distributed on 10 October, McNamara argued that 16 divisions (plus
the provisional Air Assault Division) could fulfill North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirements and cope with one emergency elsewhere. The key unresolved issue, he related, was the size and strength of enemy ground forces. McNamara then set out to destroy what was, in his opinion, the myth of overwhelming
Warsaw Pact superiority. His tool was the Index of Combat Effectiveness (ICE),
which he said was being applied in studies and war gaming of tactical situations.
Using the ICE to compare manpower, firepower, mobility, and command and control, he concluded that US divisions were about twice as powerful as Soviet ones.
Thus the 58 to 75 active Soviet divisions equated to 29 to 38 US ones. Improved
aerial ordnance showed great promise of offsetting Soviet advantages in armor and
artillery. With 30 daily sorties per division, for example, 7,500 Soviet tanks could
be destroyed over 30 days. These calculations led the Secretary to conclude that,
in Europe, the central fronts vulnerability stemmed from the imbalance and inefficiency among NATO forces. Well-equipped and well-stocked NATO forces, with
little more than the current number of divisions, should be quite sufficient to hold
a forward position without the use of nuclear weapons for some time.38
The Service Chiefs and the Chairman all took umbrage with use of the Index
of Combat Effectiveness. General Wheeler wanted the DPMs rationale to be
extensively rewritten. The ICE, he argued, was unsuited for application on a
strategic scale. Granted, a US corps was stronger, more mobile, and could outshoot a Soviet Combined Arms Army. As an average, Wheeler allowed, one US
division equaled between 1.2 and 1.7 Soviet divisions. Yet divisions did not fight
one another in isolation; weather, terrain, missions, and logistics all would affect
the outcome. Hence his conclusion was more restrained, that programmed NATO
forces should be capable of delaying and defending on the line of the Rhine . . .
without requiring use of nuclear weapons.
71

General Taylor, Admiral McDonald, and General Shoup recommended not
revising but completely replacing Secretary McNamaras 58-page rationale with
eight pages that were generally worded, eliminating all ICE references and NATOSoviet comparisons. They proposed saying simply that US deployments to Europe
have proved over the years to be about right. Although the Soviets were hobbled
by many deficiencies in equipment and logistical support which offset the somewhat illusory strength of their numbers, they still could achieve surprise and mass
their forces at a desired point.39
Praising this penetrating and highly informative approach, General LeMay
suggested applying the same methods to other areas of general purpose forces. But
he had a number of doubts, particularly whether trying to create conventional parity would be worthwhile, since the Soviets would enjoy the advantages of surprise
and selectivity in attack.
Through a separate memorandum, General Taylor registered what probably
was the sharpest criticism of his Chairmanship. Bluntly, he told Secretary McNamara that the ICE has no practical validity because no one seriously believes
that the outcome of battle is calculable in mathematical terms. He continued: If
as most soldiers believe, in war the moral is to the physical as three is to one, only
about a fourth of the determinants of victory are susceptible to the coefficient
approach and they are variables undergoing constant change. He doubted, in fact,
whether Allied Command Europe could conduct a successful defense without early
recourse to nuclear weapons: I believe this to be the unanimous judgment of the
military leaders of NATO, US and European, and I would be loath to have the President receive a different impression. Admittedly, it was difficult to defend the validity of forces that faced an apparently overwhelming enemy. Nevertheless, Taylor
concluded, general purpose forces did appear adequate when placed in the total
context of our defense preparations.40
The final DPM, holding the Army to 16 divisions, incorporated a number of
JCS criticisms. McNamara still believed that a US division possessed 1.75 to 2.3
times the combat capability of its Soviet counterpart. Nonetheless, since the
Army placed US superiority between 1.2 and 1.7, he agreed to use those figures,
although quite evidently there is room for further study, and I am directing the
Army to pursue this matter. Adopting Wheelers words, Secretary McNamara
now stated that NATO forces should be able at least to delay to and defend on
the line of the Rhine without using nuclear weapons. He included, as an appendix entitled Criteria for the Capabilities Required of General Purpose Forces,
the rationale proposed by Taylor, McDonald, and Shoup. McNamara quoted Taylors critique of the ICE in a footnote, without comment. He did not include Taylors words about the unanimous judgment of military leaders concerning early
use of nuclear weapons.41
The Secretary proved ready to increase tactical air wings. The Berlin mobilization had raised the number to 23 in FY 1962. Deactivations lowered the
72

total to 20 in FY 1963, with a return to 21 planned for FY 1964.42 On 9 November
1962, before the Cuban missile crisis was fully resolved, President Kennedy
asked McNamara to assume that there were concurrent crises in Cuba, Central
Europe, and the Far East. Would fighter interceptor and tactical air capabilities
be adequate? What about Central Europe alone? Would planned production meet
requirements in 1964 or 1965? The JCS proposed saying that air, ground, and
naval forces would be inadequate for a three-front crisis. Even in Central Europe
alone, NATOs strength would prove insufficient if the Warsaw Pact chose to
commit the bulk of its tactical air forces. Planned production was not designed
to provide numerical world-wide superiority, since there were no plans to fight a
protracted conventional war in Europe.43
McNamaras staff, however, calculated that the Free Worlds tactical air inventory would exceed that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc: by 15,328 to 12,150 in 1963, and by
12,125 to 7,200 in 1968. The JCS protested that measuring numbers alone was not
enough. Range might be paramount in one situation, numbers in a second, performance in a third. The circumstances in which an attack occurredthe degree of
surprise and the weight of initial effortalso were critical to success. The Defense
Intelligence Agencys figures, furthermore, showed Sino-Soviet superiority in 1963
and a less pronounced Free World lead in 1968.44
In May, after a good deal of back-and-forth, Secretary McNamara sent an
answer to the President. He began by citing the JCS caveat that many things
besides numbers must be taken into account. He believed, however, that it was
fair to say that we have sufficient aircraft programmed to cope with the kind of
military conflict that we are likely to encounter anywhere in the world. McNamaras numbers now showed a Sino-Soviet edge in 1963 (12,965 versus 11,564) changing to a Free World advantage in 1968 (10,367 versus 6,980).45
Meantime, through JSOP68, LeMay and Anderson recommended expanding to
25 tactical fighter wings, while Taylor and Wheeler favored staying at 21. Wheeler
cited the studies above indicating that, by 1968, NATO would be quantitatively and
qualitatively superior to the Warsaw Pact. The Chairman considered 25 an inflated
figure because it wrongly excluded reserves.46
Secretary McNamara opted for increasing to 24 which, like his 1961 jump from
16 to 21 wings, cannot be ascribed to JCS influence. LeMay still wanted 25 but all
his colleagues endorsed 24. McNamaras program provided for 22 wings with 1,599
aircraft in mid-1965, rising to 24 with 1,740 aircraft by mid-1968. With these forces
plus reduced vulnerability on the ground and faster deployment, according to his
December DPM, all evidence points to the conclusion that we can gain air superiority in a non-nuclear conflict in Europe or anywhere else.47
As for strategic mobility, JSOP-68 listed an increase to 480 C130s and 272
C141s for FY 1969. It calculated that two concurrent crises would create an airlift shortage equivalent to 658 C141s; one crisis, a deficit equal to 64. Eliminating
the two-crisis shortfall obviously was infeasible, but 64 C141s should be added
73

by 1968, raising the total from the 208 currently programmed up to 272. General
Wheeler called this increase questionable, asking that a decision be deferred
until Army levels were determined and airlift organization studies completed.48
McNamara wanted to emphasize airlift at the expense of sealift. Compared
to JSOP68, he projected more aircraft (844 versus 776) and fewer ships (88 versus 102). He proposed acquiring more C141s, cancelling the procurement of 96
C130s (thus annulling the additions made a few months earlier), and starting
studies for a supercargo CX4.49 McNamara acknowledged that these steps would
slightly reduce deployment capabilities during FYs 196567 but claimed that airlift
capacity by FY 1969 would be 25 percent greater than previously planned.50
The JCS protested that McNamaras program put too much emphasis on older
equipment and on unproved developments like the CX4. During FYs 196567,
under McNamaras plan, general war requirements for D-Day through D+10 could
not be met until D+25. They opposed reducing C130 procurement because C130s
would furnish more flexibility and versatility than C141s in meeting specialized tactical airlift requirements. In fact, they recommended a small reduction
in the C141 goal. Even if the CX4 came into extensive use, they did not want to
rely upon airlift alone; sixteen troopships should stay in service through FY 1969.
McNamara decided to cut only 32 instead of 96 C-130s, slightly reduced C141
totals, and retained the troopships for another year. Thus there would be 504
C130s and 16 C141s in mid-1965, 494 C130s and 304 C141s by mid-1969.51
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also split over naval forces. For attack carriers, JSOP68 became another repetition of JSOP67. Admiral Anderson wanted to stay steady
at 15; Taylor and Wheeler favored a gradual reduction to 13; LeMay would cut
down to 10. Anderson based his case upon the Soviets growing ability to employ
air power against shipping. LeMay, as before, assigned primary importance to
destroying submarines; hence, the number of ASW carriers should rise from 10 to
14. Wheeler observed that three US and three UK carriers were slated for water off
northern Europe, where the threat consisted of submarine bases and 150 aircraft.
Since missiles and land-based aircraft already were targeted against the submarine
bases, Wheeler felt that the Navy was assigning a solution to a non-existent problem. Taylor reasoned that the high cost of carrier-based aviation, combined with
its shrinking role in nuclear war, justified reducing attack carriers while increasing
ASW ones to 11.52
Tentatively, Secretary McNamara proposed keeping 15 attack carriers through
FY 1969, then paring to 14 in FY 1970 and 13 in FY 1972. He planned, furthermore,
to defer the construction of attack carriers scheduled to start in FY 1965 and FY
1967. His justifications were: the much greater capabilities of the new Forrestalclass carriers compared to the Essex-class they replaced; the introduction of longrange missiles that vitiated a need for dual-purpose carrier aircraft; the growing
mobility of land-based tactical aircraft; and the vulnerability of carriers to nuclear
attack, meaning that their aircraft could not be part of a protected reserve.53
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The JCS agreed that attack carriers should be removed from the Single Integrated Operational Plan, but they remained divided over force levels. All except
LeMay recommended advancing up to FY 1967 the carrier construction slated to
begin in FY 1969. That way, when the level fell to 13, every attack carrier would
post-date World War II. McNamara agreed to move the construction date forward,
but cancelled the carrier originally scheduled for FY 1967 and deferred until FY
1970 the start originally scheduled for FY 1969.54
In other naval categories, Secretary McNamara proposed funding six nuclear
attack submarines, cutting ASW patrol aircraft from 30 to 25 squadrons, and starting
16 destroyer escorts so that the Navys plan to build 125 escorts between FYs 1965
and 1969 could be fulfilled if circumstances so required. Except for the Chairman,
all of the Service Chiefs advocated building nine submarines, but the Secretary was
unchanged in his view. They also wanted to keep all 30 ASW squadrons; McNamara
changed his recommendation to 29. Finally, for amphibious assault forces, McNamara recommended and the JCS endorsed funding 67 ships between FYs 1965 and
1967 so that, by 1970, lift would be available for 1 Marine divisions.55
On 30 December 1963, the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the
President at the LBJ Ranch for a last look at the defense budget. General Wheeler
voiced concern that Army procurement funds would drop from $2.9 in FY 1964 to
$2.08 billion in FY 1965. He particularly wanted higher production rates for M60
tanks and for rifle and artillery ammunition. McNamara acknowledged some possibility that stockpiling standards were not being met but stressed how much had
been done to correct the tremendous inventory imbalances that he inherited in
1961. Admiral McDonald was unhappy about three things: canceling the conversions of 15 destroyers; stopping the procurement of 48 A4E attack aircraft; and
lengthening to three years the time between ship overhauls. General Shoup supported him on overhauls. Secretary McNamara stood firm on conversions and
A4Es but said he was willing to reconsider overhaul time.56
As 1964 opened, the five-year program showed steady levels of 16 Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, 15 attack and nine ASW carriers. Air
Force tactical wings would stand at 22 in mid-1965, 23 in mid-1966, and 24 in mid1968. There would be 77 diesel and 27 nuclear attack submarines in mid-1965,
changing to 49 and 53 by mid-1969. ASW escorts would number 215 in mid-1965
and 211 in mid-1969. The corresponding figures for anti-air fleet escorts, cruisers as
well as destroyers, would be 58 and 77.57
his year saw the JCS submitting many of the same recommendationsseparately
more than collectivelyand the Secretary repeating many of the same force-level
decisions. Thus, for Army divisions, JSOP69 showed the Army favoring 18, the Air
75

Force 14, and the Chairman, Navy, and Marine Corps 16. General Wheeler claimed
that, in view of increased US mobility and reduced estimates of Soviet ground strength,
there was an alternative to nuclear war. General LeMay countered that, in terms of
resources expended, more divisions would buy proportionally little time and would not
contribute significantly to Western Europes defense.
The Joint Staffs situational analysis did nothing to nurture a consensus. It
stimulated so much inter-service disagreement that their influence on OSD was
minimal. The analysis for a 1968 war in Europe assumedwrongly, in the eyes of
Wheeler, Greene, and McDonaldthat a surprise attack would occur thirty days
after an invasion of Southeast Asia. Postulating a Soviet reinforcement capability
of two divisions daily, 26 divisions would be needed to defend the Weser River line
on D-Day and 30 by D+11. In both cases, the US contribution would be five divisions. For a prolonged defense, 51 divisions would be required by D+30; only 42,
eleven of them US, were projected as becoming available. Aircraft requirements
for the first thirty days totaled 6,661, creating a deficit of 969. Wheeler and Greene
challenged many assumptions and comparisons, particularly the continued reliance on the Index of Combat Effectiveness. They made a similar complaint about
the analysis for Southeast Asia.58
Early in October, Secretary McNamara proposed maintaining 16 Army divisions, disbanding the Air Assault Division in mid-1965, and providing about $2 billion for procurement. By his reckoning, the Army and Marine Corps could mobilize
1.5 million men in six months and 2.5 million in twelve. Equipment was the main
constraint upon the size of combat forces and greater pre-positioning seemed
the least expensive solution. The Army, as McNamara saw it, was consolidating
improvements made since 1960. These included: increasing combat-ready divisions
from 11 to 16; converting from pentomic to the more robust ROAD organization;
introducing more armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery; expanding aviation and counterinsurgency assets; and improving tactical nuclear capabilities. This large investment had occurred partly at the expense of air defense
weapon systems, tactical vehicles, and ammunition reserves. Now the Army should
strive for better balance instead of embarking on further expansion.
When comparing combat effectiveness, however, the Secretary was surprised
by studies that a US infantry division contained 45 percent more personnel and
cost 50 percent more than its Soviet opposite but had only perhaps 20 percent
more firepower. In comparing mechanized and armored divisions, the differences
were less pronounced but still present. A five-division US corps cost $18 billion
over five years. The Soviets, for the same price, could field ten divisions with 30
percent more firepower. As a result, McNamara ordered the Army to examine organizational changes that would produce comparability.
Secretary McNamaras scheme for deploying 16 divisions ran as follows:
five in Germany, two in Korea, one in the Western Hemisphere, four in CONUS
as the NATO-committed reserve, and four more to conduct an initial defense of
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either South Korea or Southeast Asia. Mobilizing two or three reserve divisions
could meet most of the other contingencies. In any one of these eventualities,
he maintained, several divisions in the theater of operations would not actually
be fighting. Reserves could be sent to a quiet sector and complete training there,
releasing regulars for combat.59 Here OSD was extending its reach into concepts
of operational employment.
General Johnson held out for 18 divisions,60 but the other Chiefs accepted 16.
LeMay argued that better airlift and air interdiction capabilities, coupled with a
resolution of the current situation in Southeast Asia, should allow deactivation of
one division in South Korea and one in CONUS. Not surprisingly, McNamaras final
DPM stayed with 16 divisions.61
The discussion of tactical fighter wings broke along the same service parochial lines as the previous year: Air Force, 25 by mid-1970; Chairman and Navy,
24; Army, 21.62 By October, Secretary McNamara had found no reason to change
his objective of 24 wings. He did reduce the F4 program from 14 wings to 12,
on grounds that the US posture was strong enough to retain F-100s and F105s
somewhat longer. Intelligence now projected for NATO a substantial margin of
qualitative and quantitative superiority over the Warsaw Pact: 4,100 versus 3,800
in 1965, 5,683 versus 4,520 in 1968. Globally, the Free World in 1965 would have
9,210 aircraft compared to 7,759 for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The 1968 comparison
would be 9,321 versus 6,595.
Secretary McNamara did seek one major change in tactical air missions. He
saw no point in holding these aircraft back to conduct nuclear strikes, because
conventional capability would be reduced just when it was most needed. Why
not release these Quick Reaction Alert aircraft and replace them with Pershing
tactical missiles?63
General LeMay supported the Secretarys force levels at this time. His qualification, presumably, referred to the fact that planning for a bombing campaign
against North Vietnam was well under way. Wheeler and Greene agreed to 1,740
aircraft but wanted them organized into only 23 wings. But Admiral McDonald
joined General Johnson in seeing no need for more than 21. The Chiefs united,
though, in challenging the Secretarys argument that tactical aircraft were unsafe
and unsuitable as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles. They recommended retaining
Quick Reaction Alert aircraft until Pershing tests had been completed.
On a broader plane, the JCS used this occasion to make known their unease
about tendencies that permeated McNamaras memorandums. First, the Secretary
was judging NATO and Warsaw Pact forces on the basis of cost-effectiveness comparisons. Decisions about reorganization, they believed, should be based instead
upon operational criteria. Second, he was becoming ever more prone to making theoretical tradeoffs between basically dissimilar types of forces. The JCS deemed it a
fundamental precept that forces should be complementary and properly balanced.
Third, the Secretary tended to equate differences in levels of training with disparities
77

in combat capability. In their judgment, training provided merely a transient advantage and was significantly affected by such factors as personnel retention, environment, and acceptable personnel and materiel losses. Fourth, Secretary McNamara
believed that qualitative improvement of a weapon system assigned an equivalent
qualitative advantage to the force possessing it. But this, they countered, would
occur only in the unlikely eventuality that the enemy made no comparable advances.64 Judging by subsequent DPMs, these criticisms made little impression upon OSD.
As regards strategic airlift, the JCS agreed that a requirement for the C5A did
exist, alternatives having been reviewed and rated inadequate. Wheeler, Johnson and
LeMay wanted the first C5As available by December 1969. General Greene called
the decision premature, and Admiral McDonald would not endorse moving beyond
the phase of project definition. The Secretary agreed with Wheeler, Johnson, and
LeMay. He judged it significantly more economical to stop C141 production at 208
and apply the $1 billion in savings to the C5A, bringing the first ones into service
during FY 1969. The C141, he noted, had been conceived in an era when air movement was contemplated only for small rapid reaction forces drawn from airborne
divisions. Further, the C5A could land on a shorter airstrip and so bring its cargo
closer to the battlefieldan important advantage in difficult, primitive terrain. In its
final formulation, McNamaras program for mid-1966 envisaged 504 C130s and 80
C141s; for mid-1970, 456 C130s, 208 C141s, and 32 C5As.65
The 16 troopships again became a bone of contention. In his tentative guidance, Secretary McNamara proposed retiring them during FYs 196667. All the JCS
except LeMay opposed that move, on grounds that they were needed to meet the
Marines follow-on requirements. In his November DPM, the Secretary still favored
a phase-out. The JCS again asked for retention, and McNamara agreed to keep
them in active and ready reserve status through FY 1970.66
Moving to attack carriers, JSOP-69 contained force levels and supporting arguments that were basically unchanged from those in the last two JSOPs. In October,
McNamara proposed: reducing levels from 15 in FYs 196669 to 14 in FY 1970 and
13 in FY 1973; modernizing two Midway-class carriers between FYs 1966 and 1969;
deferring two carriers from FYs 1970 and 1972 to FYs 1973 and 1975; and planning
the FY 1967 carrier to be conventionally powered but build a nuclear power plant
to retain that option. Comparing land-based with sea-based air, he could not make
a clear-cut case for either side. (This was an issue that put the Navy and the Air
Force at loggerheads in every JSOP.) For example, air bases and aircraft carriers
appeared to be about equally vulnerable. Land-based air could deploy more rapidly
from CONUS, reach more targets, and maintain continuous engagement. Sea-based
air was adaptable; a task force could operate as reliably in one ocean as in another.
Secretary McNamara also looked upon the utility of nuclear propulsion as an open
question, with drawbacks that offset every apparent advantage. All JCS members
endorsed McNamaras force levels except LeMay, who recommended the number
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be reduced to nine by mid-1970. The Chiefs could not reach consensus about starting a carrier in FY 1967, but they did endorse building a nuclear power plant.67
In assessing antisubmarine warfare, Secretary McNamara programmed substantially lower levels than those in JSOP69. New intelligence, he said, showed
that the threat had been overestimated. The Soviets were building fewer submarines than anticipated. Their submarines were noisier, and thus more vulnerable,
than supposed. Their ASW aircraft and surface ships did not seem designed for
open ocean warfare. Recent studies indicated that, through 1970, we could defeat
simultaneous Soviet attacks in the Atlantic and Pacific. For FY 1966, therefore, he
proposed: starting only ten destroyer escorts and four nuclear attack submarines,
compared to 16 and six in FY 1965; maintaining the patrol aircraft at 30 squadrons;
and cancelling plans to modernize 12 diesel submarines.68
The JCS also disputed parts of the intelligence assessment. They detected a
qualitative improvement in the Soviet submarine force as a whole, and observed
that the number capable of reaching the US coast was increasing. They rejected the
intelligence communitys assessment of any Soviet submarine more than 14 years
old as second line; they still represented a valid military capability and should
be so rated. Consequently, the JCS urged that attack submarine starts continue at
six per year. General LeMay excepted, they also recommended starting 16 destroyer escorts annually through FY 1970.69
In his November DPM, the Secretary stated that successful prosecution of the
War-at-Sea is within our grasp and stood by his recommendations for four submarines
and ten destroyer escorts. For mid-1970, therefore, ASW levels would be nine carriers,
49 diesel and 56 nuclear submarines, 138 destroyers, and 63 destroyer escorts.70
The Navy wanted to begin building five nuclear-powered guided missile frigates between FY 1966 and FY 1969. Secretary McNamara disagreed, recommending that a much cheaper solution would be to install surface-to-air missiles on the
nuclear carrier USS Enterprise. Effective defense against a nuclear attack, he concluded, was almost impossible. Against a conventional threat, however, available
systems would provide good protection for several years.71
All the JCS sided with the Navy. General LeMay apart, they rejected the Secretarys argument that defense against a nuclear attack was virtually impossible. And
even LeMay agreed that weapon systems should not be designed solely to counter
a conventional threat. In their judgment, an all-around defense capability should be
maintained. But the program that McNamara presented to Congress early in 1965
contained no funds for nuclear frigates.72
The budget session with President Johnson on 22 December devoted hardly
any time to general purpose forces. So the last peacetime proposals, it can be
inferred, met with JCS approval. For FY 1965, these included 16 Army divisions,
three Marine division/wing teams, 22 tactical fighter wings, 15 attack and nine
ASW carriers.73
79
Summation
he Joint Chiefs recommendations remained riddled with inter-service splits,

which often were the same from one year to the next. After the administration
muddled through its first months, Secretary McNamara essentially took charge,
and the directions along which the growth of conventional capabilities proceeded
were largely his doing. He emphasized tactical air power and strategic airlift, areas
in which the US advantage appeared greatest. The Army, he decided, needed reorganization more than expansion. However, the argument over the Index of Combat
Effectiveness was a harbinger of future disagreement as the Vietnam War escalated.
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6
Disarmament Gives Way
to Arms Control
The Creation of ACDA
et us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate. So spoke
John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address. In his first message to Congress,
the President promised that the olive branch and the arrows would receive equal
attention. He promptly appointed John J. McCloy, a Republican who had been US
High Commissioner for Germany and president of the World Bank, to be his personal adviser on disarmament. In May 1961, McCloy proposed establishing a new
agency, considerably larger than the US Disarmament Agency (USDIS) operating
within the State Department. He recommended that its head report to the Secretary of State but have a right of direct access to the President. On 25 May, Kennedy
informed Congress that he wanted to establish an Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA).1
Meanwhile, McCloy circulated this proposal for interdepartmental comment.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, while generally concurring, wanted
ACDAs director also to prepare recommendations for the President through the
NSC. The JCS made more fundamental criticisms. The director of ACDA would
be equivalent to an under secretary but his proposals would be coordinated at the
cabinet level. They worried that existing arrangements for coordination, which
struck them as entirely satisfactory, would be disrupted and DOD views slighted.
The Chiefs suggested reorganizing and strengthening USDIS, pending conclusion
of statutory action. Evidently, though, the JCS knew that their objections were a
formality. During the drafting of their memorandum, Admiral Burke had argued
81

against defending USDIS on grounds that the JCS should not place themselves in
the position of backing a dead horse.2
On 29 June, Kennedy sent Congress a draft bill wherein ACDAs director would
report to the Secretary of State, retain the right of direct access to the President,
and attend all NSC meetings dealing with disarmament. Congress acted and, on 26
September, Kennedy signed the legislation establishing ACDA. To be its Director,
the President named William C. Foster, a Republican who had headed the Economic Cooperation Administration (19501951) and served as Deputy Secretary of
Defense (19511953). Soon afterward, McCloy returned to private law practice.3
However, the JCS did gain a larger voice. The forum for reviewing and debating
arms control proposals was a Committee of Principals. Created in 1958, its membership consisted of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Presidents
Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Kennedy added the Chairman of the
JCS as well as the Directors of ACDA and the US Information Agency.4
Formulating a Disarmament Plan
Ten Nation Disarmament Conference, conducted at Geneva under UN auspices, provided the forum for great-power negotiations. The last US proposal, presented on 27 June 1960, called for balanced, phased reductions down
to minimal levels, with on-site inspection applied during each step. The main
points in Stage One read as follows: Institute on-site inspection of air bases, missile launching pads, and submarine and naval bases. Fix initial US and Soviet
force levels at 2.5 million each5; contingent upon verification and the adherence
of other militarily significant nations, reduce to 2.1 million. Conditional upon
satisfactory progress in conventional disarmament, cease production of fissionable materials and transfer agreed quantities to peaceful purposes. Nothing
followed because, in the wake of a failed summit meeting in Paris, the Soviets
recessed the Conference.
Early in 1961, USDIS drafted a new proposal, which McCloy organized consultative groups to assess. The groups recommended extensive revisions, many
of which USDIS apparently rejected. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked for JCS
comments. Their reply, dated 10 June 1961, claimed that the new proposal would
confer significant advantage on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. USDIS proposed, as independent separable steps in Stage One, fixing US and Soviet limits at 2.1 million,
placing zonal restrictions on armed forces, reducing the numbers of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs),6 establishing nuclear-free zones, imposing an
uninspected ban on transferring nuclear weapons, ceasing fissionable materials
production and shifting quantities to peaceful purposes. The JCS considered these
changes a serious erosion of the position presented on 27 June 1960, which they
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Disarmament Gives Way to Arms Control

still preferred. The consultative groups, they noted, had suggested an initial ceiling
of 2.5 million, opposed nuclear-free zones, and voiced reservations about separately proposing either a cessation of fissionable materials production or a reduction of
nuclear stockpiles. Gilpatric passed their comments to McCloy, recommending that
interagency representatives discuss redrafting.7
USDIS made changes but the JCS remained unsatisfied, basically because
there were independent rather than interrelated measures in Stage One. After the
Committee of Principals reviewed a draft on 3 August, the JCS submitted views
about three unresolved issues in Stage One. First, arms reductions should precede
a stoppage of fissionable materials production. A stoppage would be difficult to
verify, hard to reverse, and dangerous unless communists conventional superiority
was reduced. Also, continued production of tritium (excluded under the US definition of fissionable materials) struck them as being absolutely essential. Second,
Soviet and Chinese men under arms should each be pared to US levels, and so verified, before reductions to 2.1 million began. Third, no limits or prohibitions should
be placed upon anti-ballistic missiles. Gilpatric told McCloy that he agreed with the
JCS on the first two issues but not the third. On 17 August, when the Committee
of Principals discussed USDISs plan, President Kennedy said he didnt see why
all the fuss about language linking cuts in SNDVs and fissionable materials with
conventional reductions. If serious negotiations got under way, though, he would
re-examine that issue.8
The President was planning to address the UN General Assembly in September. Suggestions circulated that, should there be an agreement about Berlin and a
reopening of the Geneva talks, he could announce two proposals. First, the United
States and the USSR would start transferring medium bombers to a third country
for their eventual destruction. Second, the two powers would each transfer 300
kilograms of fissionable material to UN control and later put it to peaceful purposes. The JCS advised that reducing nuclear strength, at a time when the Berlin
confrontation was worsening and the Soviets had just resumed atmospheric testing, would be most inappropriate. That was precisely why B47 retirements
were being delayed. Also, definitions might differ, with the Soviets listing their
obsolescent Beagle light bomber as equivalent to our medium B47. More importantly, the absence of any inspection or control over retained weapons would set
a dangerous precedent. Similarly the fissionable material proposal was seriously
deficient because it did not require Soviet agreement to a verified stoppage of
production. Addressing the General Assembly on 25 September, Kennedy offered
eloquenceLet us call a truce to terror. . . . Together we shall save our planet, or
together we shall perish in its flamesbut kept proposals in very general terms.
Concurrently, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson did table a draft Declaration on Disarmament with specifics. Stage One differed from the 27 June 1960 position mainly
in prescribing a separate measure to reduce, through equitable and balanced steps,
SNDVs in specified categories as well as agreed types of defensive weapons.9
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Meantime, a panel led by ACDAs Director Foster concluded that immediate
progress was necessary to reduce and control SNDVs. Foster proposed amplifying
the Declaration on Disarmament as follows:
Stage A: The United States and the USSR each would deposit and destroy
30 medium bombers, continuing to deliver 30 planes per month until the next
stage took effect.
Stage B: NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce their SNDV inventories
to 1,000 each, an SNDV being defined as a missile with more than 300 kilometers in range or a bomber of more than 15 or 25,000 kilograms empty weight.
Military production of fissionable materials would stop. NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries would be divided into zones, and inspectors placed at key points in
all of them. Periodically, each side would select one zone in the others territory
throughout which inspectors would enjoy unimpeded access.10
On 6 December, the JCS explained why they wanted to retain the Declaration
on Disarmament and scrap the Foster plan. Unless Soviet conventional superiority
was eliminated, giving up the US nuclear advantage could upset the uneasy balance. Accepting numerical parity in SNDVs would: prevent the US from delivering
a substantive second or retaliatory strike, and so tempt the Soviets toward making a pre-emptive attack; raise the threshold of provocations, thereby encouraging
aggressive Soviet behavior; and spark a quality race in nuclear weaponry. Moreover, before NATOs nuclear sword was shortened, its conventional shield would
have to be made stronger. Gilpatric sent the JCS critique to Foster, along with
comments of his own. He agreed that the Soviets must give up their conventional
lead if the United States gave up its nuclear advantage. But he believed that, even
with nuclear parity, the United States probably would still have a second-strike
force adequate for deterrence. Perhaps, he speculated, a quality race could be
averted by placing limitations not upon the vehicles themselves but upon warheads
or megatonnage.11 It is noteworthy that this brief exchange brought up many of the
issues that would be debated for the next quarter century.
An Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference was scheduled to convene in
March 1962, eight neutrals having been added to the five NATO and five Warsaw
Pact participants. Both the JCS and OSD deemed numerical parity in SNDVs an
unacceptable proposition. Late in February, ACDA suggested conducting separate
negotiations during Stage I for a 30 percent reduction in SNDVs, which it now
defined as aircraft of more than 25,000 kilograms empty weight and missiles with
ranges exceeding 200 kilometers. Cutbacks could be carried out by types, categories, total numbers of vehicles, and total megatonnage either according to delivery
capacity or within certain categories. The JCS still objected to separating SNDVs.
They wanted linkage with conventional cutbacks, acceptance of an adequate
inspection system, and adherence by Communist China at a very early stage.
Also, ACDAs proposal to transfer 40,000 kilograms of fissionable material should
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be held in abeyance until renewed US testing permitted a re-evaluation of nuclear
stockpile requirements.12
On 1 March, the Committee of Principals debated ACDAs plan. The broad
question, according to Secretary Rusk, was whether to move toward parity or
toward proportional reductions. Secretary McNamara brought up another basic
issue. Should initial US proposals apply to all armaments or to SNDVs alone? If
parity was to be sought, he wanted linkage between nuclear and conventional
cuts. General Lemnitzer recited the JCS positions above. McNamara stated that
a 30 percent cut in all weapon categories would leave the United States in a
stronger position than if the Soviets continued closing the nuclear gap. Conferees agreed that it would be best to work for an across-the-board cut of about
30 percent spread over three years. McNamara considered such reductions possible without involving China, but nothing more. On 9 March, President Kennedy
approved this approach.13 Thus DODs argument for proportionality and linkage
won acceptanceor so it seemed.
The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference opened on 14 March. The Soviets tabled a treaty providing for complete disarmament by stages but allowing only
for inspection of what armaments were eliminated and not of what armaments
were retained. ACDA suggested refinements in the US position to which the JCS
strongly objected. Despite the Presidents decision, they protested, ACDA kept
emphasizing SNDV reductions and singling out ABMs for complete elimination.
Our best posture for the present and immediate future, they reaffirmed, is one of
nuclear superiority.14
Discussions in the NSC and the Committee of Principals narrowed interagency
differences to the way which we specify for reducing armaments. All, save
ACDA, wanted to organize a draft treaty in terms of reducing by individual types
of weapons and limiting production by categories of weapons. ACDA would use
categories for reductions as well. Lemnitzer, Gilpatric, and Rusk argued that the
military balance was very sensitive to the boundaries of the force mix; reduction
by types would permit only changes that were small and relatively predictable. At
a White House meeting on 12 April, President Kennedy decided to go ahead with
reduction by types.15
An Outline of Basic Provisions was presented at Geneva six days later. During Stage I, parties would reduce armaments by 30 percent in illustrative types
that included: SLBMs and ICBMs with ranges greater than 300 and 5,000 kilometers
respectively; aircraft with empty weight exceeding 40,000 kilograms; anti-ballistic
missiles; tanks; artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers with calibers of 100 millimeters or more; and combatant ships with standard displacements of 400 tons
and above. Parties would divide their territory into zones and declare the number
of armaments and forces within each that were subject to verification. An International Disarmament Organization would enjoy unimpeded access within an agreed
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number of zones. Since the Soviet draft required that all SNDVs and foreign bases
be eliminated during Stage I, the two sides were very far apart.16
Nonproliferation became a topic of interagency discussion. After some
Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, ACDA proposed seeking agreement with
the Soviets not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. In mid-September 1962, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that potential disadvantages
far outweighed possible benefits. Why, they wondered, was ACDA pushing for
immediate action?17 The Soviets would not want to bestow nuclear arms upon
their unreliable allies. Probably, they hoped to foster friction within NATO and
weaken western solidarity over Berlin. A non-diffusion agreement would violate the fundamental principle that adequate safeguards must accompany disarmament measures. Moreover, many nations eventually would acquire nuclear
capability. The United States might wish to assist friendly powers in such
fields as security, storage, permissive links, and alert procedures. The difficulties involved in abrogating an unenforceable agreement might make such steps
impossible. 18 Nonproliferation remained under active review and high-level
exchanges took place, but these years passed without any real progress.
Early in September 1962, the stagnant Geneva conference recessed for two
months. ACDA took this opportunity to start a reassessment. Learning of this, the
JCS protested to Secretary McNamara that while the Soviet position on disarmament has remained practically unchanged since June 1960, the US position has
been in a constant state of evolution, generally moving towards accommodation of
Soviet views. They cited several examples. First, the Declaration of September
1961 singled out SNDVs for reduction during Stage I and abandoned the requirement to balance US and Soviet levels at 2.5 million personnel before proceeding
to the 2.1 million ceiling. Second, the Outline of April 1962 limited Stage I participation to the United States and the USSR, thereby allowing China to abstain,
and introduced the untested system of zonal inspection. Third, in May 1962, the US
delegation to Geneva suggested: specifying quantities of SNDVs for Stage I reductions; initiating foreign base reductions during Stage I; delaying zonal inspections
until the beginning of Stage II; and reducing Stage I ceilings to 1.9 million. ACDA,
they argued, showed a propensity for presenting negotiating positions before they
had been properly evaluatedzonal inspection being an outstanding example. This
recess should become the occasion for strengthening US positions, not for causing
further concessions that would only whet the Soviets appetite.19
Responding on 1 October, Secretary McNamara called JCS criticisms an
oversimplification. The administration had made such massive analyses that it
would indeed have been remarkable had no changes occurred. The key question,
he said, was whether such changes had enhanced the opportunity to reach reasonable agreements: I believe that they have. McNamara agreed, though, that evaluation procedures could improve. When substantive differences developed, JCS
views would be aired at the Principal and White House level.20
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Soon afterward, ISA sent General Taylor (who was now Chairman) a stinging
attack on previous JCS papers. The memorandum was kept informal, to avoid requiring a reply which might have been equally stinging. According to ISA, the majority
of JCS studies are so loaded with caveats as to constitute unreasonable measures
which the USSR, even should she become desirous of reaching agreements, could
not accept. Such studies usually showed how reductions would affect the United
States but not the Soviet Union. They projected current relationships into the future,
without reasonable consideration of the military implications of political, economic,
and sociological trends. As a result, JCS advice was overruled on occasions when
better studies might have won support. OSD, by default, had to provide military projections.21 Evidently, ISA hoped that Taylor would correct these faults. On the issue
of a limited test ban treaty, that hope was realized. Otherwise, though, Taylors accession to the Chairmanship brought little change.
Some Small Steps
n 23 October 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis, Assistant Secretary
Nitze asked the JCS to assess the desirability and feasibility of a purple telephone allowing instantaneous US-USSR contact. Replying on 10 November, they
suggested that a teletype circuit would be quicker, more accurate, and more secure
than a telephone. They recommended discussions with allies before going ahead,
because the missile crisis had made them particularly sensitive about advance
consultations. That hurdle was quickly cleared. At Geneva, on 12 December, the
US delegation tabled a generally worded proposal to create emergency communications links. Four months later, the Soviets endorsed the idea of a WashingtonMoscow hot line. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 20 June 1963.
The Pentagons National Military Command Center became the hot lines major terminal in Washington; it was also connected to State Department and White House
communications centers.22
The administration sought some way to avoid militarizing outer space. In
May 1962, President Kennedy charged an interagency committee with formulating a negotiating position. It opposed a declaratory ban on orbiting weapons
of mass destruction and noted a need for adequate verification. Questioning
the need for verification, Kennedy asked for a study of reliance upon unilateral means to do so. ACDA supported a declaratory ban, if it allowed (1) use of
intelligence-gathering satellites and (2) withholding of pre-launch notification
and inspection. The JCS, however, opposed initiating such a proposal. A declaratory ban, they advised Secretary McNamara on 14 September, would inhibit the
US space program while allowing the Soviets to go forward clandestinely. ACDAs
proposal also would strike other nations as being inconsistent with the longstanding US position that disarmament measures must be substantive, balanced,
87

and subject to some means of verification. Assistant Secretary Nitze sent these
comments to ACDA, adding that he too opposed a separate measures approach.
When the Committee of Principals met on 15 September, General Decker
acknowledged that orbiting weapons was a more difficult way to deliver warheads than launching ballistic missiles. Then the Committee, Decker included,
accepted and President Kennedy approved seeking a declaratory ban monitored
by technical means.23 One must conclude that JCS and ISA objections had been
pro forma and not deeply felt.
In the spring of 1963, chiefly as a matter of negotiating tactics, Secretary Rusk
put off any approach to the Soviets. On 2 October, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko gave Rusk a draft declaration whereby the two nations would agree not to
orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons. The JCS opposed either a formal
treaty or a joint executive agreement because verification would be inadequate.
They wanted the Soviet draft amended to cover weapons of mass destruction as
well as objects carrying nuclear weapons. The Committee of Principals agreed to
insist upon weapons of mass destruction, which would have to be interpreted as
embracing all nuclear weapons. President Kennedy decided that a United Nations
General Assembly resolution would avoid the problem of Senate ratification.
ACDA circulated a draft with which General Taylor concurred. On 17 October, a
unanimous General Assembly summoned all nations to refrain from placing in
orbit around the earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.24
In mid-November 1962, Director Foster suggested transferring 50,000 kilograms of uranium to peaceful purposes if the Soviets would do likewise with half
that amount. Later, he added, a US upper limit of 100,000 could be considered.
General Taylor commented that we might be giving away important resources,
but Secretary McNamara said he was willing to consider trading 100,000 for 50,000
if that also brought about a stoppage of production. When Foster put this in a draft
memorandum for the President, though, Taylor protested that he could not recall
agreement on 100,000 having been reached. Foster then proposed an initial private
approach to trade 60,000 for 40,000. The JCS stressed, and Nitze agreed, that the
US public position should call for equal transfers.25
In April 1963, US negotiators did make a private approach to the Soviets. Four
months later, at Geneva, they presented the trade proposal. President Kennedy
established, for exploratory purposes, an upper limit of 100,000 and a maximum
US-Soviet ratio of two for one. Ultimately, with JCS concurrence, Washington
and Moscow reached a much less ambitious understanding. In January 1964,
President Johnson publicly declared that the US was willing to shut down more
plants if and when the Soviet Union does the same, plant by plant, with inspection
on both sides. On 20 April, after correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev, he
announced that US uranium production would be cut considerably over a fouryear period. Concurrently, Khrushchev announced that the USSR was suspending
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construction of two reactors and substantially reducing uranium production. There
was no mention of mutual inspection.26
Examining an SNDV Freeze
n May 1963, with the Geneva talks stalled and about to recess, President Kennedy ordered an examination of new approaches to significant measures short
of general and complete disarmament. The next several months were taken up
by negotiation of a limited test ban treaty. Late in August, General Taylor directed
the Joint Staff to delineate suitable terms for a comprehensive treaty and measure
them against the Outline of April 1962. The result, which the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara on 8 October after much reworking, repeated a familiar catalogue
of complaints. The Outline was deficient because it: failed to require Chinas
participation in Stage I; did not specify that an effective control organization must
start functioning before Stage I reductions began; described an untested verification system; categorized armaments in a way that highlighted SNDVs and ABMs;
introduced Stage I limitations in a way that precluded testing and modernization;
and contained no provision for rapid withdrawal. In its totality, therefore, the Outline posed unwarranted risks and, if implemented, would be detrimental to US
interests. Forwarding this appraisal to ACDA, McNamara supported most JCS
criticisms and proposed focusing on more modest goals.27
Gradually, despite JCS objections, interagency discussions focused upon
reducing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In December 1963, ACDA proposed
spreading over three years a 30 percent reduction of US and Soviet SNDVs. For
justification, ACDA observed that a strong and relatively invulnerable US strategic
force was nearing its projected peak. The Soviets were just beginning their expansion. This proposal, therefore, would probe Moscows intentions and, if accepted,
diminish the danger of a Soviet technological breakthrough. Unconvinced, the
JCS advised that ACDAs approach would disrupt NATO and endanger US security.
Without a satisfactory inspection system, it could shift the military balance in Moscows favor. The US arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons might not be sufficient to
offset Soviet conventional superiority. Then, in the eyes of our allies, the United
States would lose capability and credibility.28
Secretary McNamara admitted that ACDAs proposal posed serious problems.
But, he told General Taylor, we must in any event develop a firm US position in
this area. The State Department had suggested that a separable first stage consist
solely of ceasing to produce SNDVs, ABMs, and fissionable material. McNamara
asked the JCS whether freezing alone would eliminate many of the difficulties
raised by ACDAs reduction proposal.29
At that point, on 14 January 1964, the White House circulated a draft statement proposing that both nations freeze where they are the size and number of
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strategic nuclear weapons arrayed against each other. The JCS opposed it, on
grounds that neither side would accept the amount of inspection necessary. Also,
they called the categorization of weapons vague and objected to the apparent
exclusion of ABMs. The White House made changes, but the JCS wanted only to
explore a verified SNDV freeze. On 21 January, President Johnson called upon
the Geneva Conference to explore freezing the numbers and freezing the kinds
of strategic nuclear vehicles, whether planes or missiles, whether they are offensive weapons or defensive weapons.30
What, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the JCS, would be the impact of freezing ABMs along with SNDVs? On 15 February, following a tortuous inter-service
debate, they submitted a 68-page preliminary study. Broadly speaking, deterrence
might be maintained under a freeze allowing one-for-one replacement in kind. If
modernization was permitted, though, problems of the utmost complexity would
arise. Moreover, adequate inspection would require unprecedented intrusions into
national privacy. The JCS doubted whether ways could be found to fulfill the conditions that they deemed necessary.31
Indeed, when ACDA circulated a detailed freeze plan, the accompanying verification arrangements aroused strong JCS opposition. By relying largely upon US
intelligence, the Chiefs argued, ACDAs plan required neither aerial surveillance nor
unscheduled on-site inspections, except where production facilities were involved.
The JCS, conversely, insisted upon resident and random on-site inspection and
aerial surveillance. Reliance on other methods should be limited to validating
lists of installations, establishing inspection priorities, and double-checking the
data obtained from inspections. Indeed, they saw no point to performing a detailed
review of ACDAs proposal until these basic differences had been resolved. A
meeting of deputies to the Committee of Principals showed how deeply the divisions ran. ACDAs Deputy Director, Adrian Fisher, wondered whether it would
cause a riot if a freeze proposal was presented at Geneva. Yes, other deputies
replied, in the US Government!32
ACDA responded with a revised verification plan. Secretary Rusk suggested,
and the JCS supported, confining a freeze to areas where comparable Soviet
activities could be adequately verified. Thus the Joint Chiefs wanted ACDAs latest
effort changed to: strengthen the linkage between a freeze and a cutoff of fissionable materials production; freeze not only the numbers but also the hardening and
dispersal of missile sites; defer a decision on the degree of ABM inclusion; allow
unrestricted prototype testing, as the surest safeguard against a Soviet technological breakthrough; and include random overflights. Generally concurring, Secretary
McNamara informed Foster that he did not see overflights as essential but fully
agreed that prototype testing should continue unchecked.33
On 12 March 1964, ACDA circulated a freeze proposal to be cleared with NATO
and then presented at Geneva. Verification would be done by: carrying out continuing inspections of declared facilities; making a specified number of inspections of
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undeclared facilities; stationing observers to verify space launchings and missile
firings; and witnessing the destruction or replacement of vehicles and launchers.
The JCS did not favor exploratory East-West discussions at this time. If talks did
take place, they should skirt issues that had not been settled within the US government. McNamara agreed to presenting ACDAs proposal, noting that matters like
prototype testing and ABM systems remained unresolved. After gaining the allies
approval, US spokesmen offered the freeze plan at Geneva on 16 April. The Soviets
promptly dismissed it as legalized espionage that would not get rid of one missile
or bomber.34
In mid-May, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs to clarify their position on two points:
first, the number of long lead-time subassemblies to be controlled; second, a
basis from which to begin negotiations about model-by-model replacement. In
reply, they recommended putting production quotas on all major subassemblies,
not simply rocket engines and stages as ACDA proposed. The more complete the
surveillance, they reasoned, the higher the possibility of catching cheaters. As to
replacement, they defined their real objective as freedom to substitute improved
models of the same missile (e.g., Minuteman II for Minuteman I, Polaris A3 for
Polaris A1). ACDA, they worried, would foreclose this option by requiring rigid
dimension limitations. Secretary McNamara informed Director Foster that he also
would list engines, motors, tankage, and stages among the assemblies put under
control. He differed with the JCS, though, by excluding guidance packages and reentry vehicles because he did not believe that reliable inspection was possible. On
replacement, he rejected the JCS position in the absence of knowledge of specific
armaments which the Soviets may consider to be generally related.35
Meanwhile, an interagency task force analyzed the problem of prototype
testing and concluded that, after all, effective prohibitions could be imposed.
The JCS disagreed, but Secretary McNamara decided that four prohibitions were
possible: (1) test firings of multiple re-entry vehicles; (2) test firings of ABMs
against ballistic missiles; (3) test firings of new types of missiles from hardened
or mobile launchers; and (4) repeated launchings of new types of missiles on
sub-orbital trajectories exceeding 1,000 kilometers. The JCS repeated their position, but the Chairman (now General Wheeler) later agreed to exclude guidance
packages and re-entry vehicles from controls. Finally, McNamara told Foster that
among the four prohibitions he still supported (3) and (4), but he was deferring
judgment about (1) and (2).36
Late in July, the Committee of Principals approved a freeze plan. According to it, the subassemblies limited to one-for-one replacement would include
ballistic missiles, liquid rocket engines and fuel tanks, solid-fuel rocket motors,
stage assemblies, and mobile launchers. Inspectors would check those facilities and operating areas that had been declared closed, monitor plants still in
use, verify accidental losses and planned destruction, insure that limitations on
launchers were being honored, and carry out a specified number of inspections
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to check undeclared locations. On 27 August, US spokesman presented this
plan at Geneva. Once again, the Soviets disparaged a verified freeze as inspection without disarmament.37 ACDA set to work again but nothing substantive
resulted until early in 1965.
It is tempting, but misleading, to see the work of these years as laying foundations for the agreements consummated in 1972. Clearly, the Soviets were not willing to negotiate seriously about an SNDV freeze until they achieved equivalence
in strategic nuclear capabilities. The JCS raised objections that sometimes could
seem strained or contrived, but they were not the ones blocking movement.
Summation
ooking back from the 21st century, one must be surprised at how much time
senior officials devoted to arms control and disarmament during years of
almost continuous great-power confrontations. Civilian leaders kept seeking ways
to ease tensions, damp down the arms race, andnot leastsatisfy the public,
Congress, and allies that peace was their goal. The JCS, inevitably, approached
the problem from a very different perspective. Assuring the security of the United
States was their duty. The adversary was crafty, the means of verification by anything less than thorough on-site inspections inadequate. That situation, in their
judgment, left very little room for useful agreements.
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7
Nuclear Testing: Start and Stop
How Long to Abstain?
n January 1961, no arms control issue was more pressing than whether to
resume nuclear testing. Since 1958, Washington, Moscow, and London had
observed an informal moratorium on tests in every environment. By the latter part
of 1960, the Joint Chiefs came to favor renewed outer space, underground, and
underwaterbut not atmospherictesting. Without verification, they argued, the
moratorium amounted simply to a unilateral cessation in which time was working
to our disadvantage.1
The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests was
scheduled to reconvene in mid-March 1961. A position had to be formulated and
the Presidents adviser on disarmament, John J. McCloy, circulated one on 2 February. He proposed that a treaty banning atmospheric explosions be accompanied by
a three-year moratorium on underground tests that would be undetectable without
on-site monitoringfor example, those that produced seismic signals registering
less than 4.75 on the Richter scale. To verify the atmospheric treaty, seventeen control posts would be sited on US soil and seventeen on Soviet soil. There would be
twenty on-site inspections annually (or, as a fallback, ten) in each country.2
On 21 February, the JCS reaffirmed their recommendation to renew testing.
Their main worry was a major breakthrough by the Soviets. In their judgment,
US proposals made in 1958 for verifying a test ban had proven technically inadequateand a constant erosion of the [1958] US position has taken place. Unless
the Geneva conferees reached an agreement within 60 days after reconvening, the
United States should resume outer space, underground, and underwater testing.
The JCS did not ask for renewed atmospheric testing but argued that the health
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hazards from radioactive fallout had assumed importance far in excess of its significance in relation to the primary issue, the security of the United States. Secretary McNamara reserved judgment, pending completion of an interagency review.3
Meanwhile, McCloy had asked a panel chaired by Dr. James Fisk of Bell Laboratories to review technical issues. Reporting on 2 March, the Fisk panel concluded
that both countries could maintain very strong deterrent postures without further
testing. Under a ban observed by the United States but evaded by the USSR, both
sides pre-emptive capabilities would stay constant but the Soviets could develop
high-yield warheads, giving them a superior capability for counterforce strikes.
If both sides engaged in unlimited tests, increases in yields would lead to smaller
weapons, improving mobility and survivability that would make counterforce
attacks more difficult.4
At a meeting on 2 March, senior officials settled all questions save onethat
of how many on-site inspections should be allowed. Two days later, a White House
session resolved that as well. McCloy proposed a minimum of ten, adding more for
each unidentified seismic event beyond fifty, up to a limit of twenty. The JCS, General Lemnitzer said, would prefer that the number of inspections be strictly proportional to the number of detected events, with no ceiling. According to Assistant
Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, however, OSD did not see the number of annual
inspections as a matter of paramount importance. OSD was more concerned
about the composition of a control commission and the method of certifying an
event for inspection. President Kennedy decided to adopt McCloys proposal.5
The Fisk panels report, apparently, played little part in this decision. The
report itself was not distributed until 3 March. The Joint Staff, writing under a
24-hour deadline, criticized it for failing (1) to emphasize sufficiently that a major
breakthrough could drastically alter the military balance, (2) to stress that testing
and reliability were necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of stockpiled warheads, and (3) to accentuate the urgent need for obtaining data on weapons effects
in various environments. All this was done post-haste. As General Lemnitzer wrote
to Admiral Burke afterward, The traditional highest classification, DESTROY
BEFORE READING, has been topped with something newCONCUR WITHOUT
SEEING! . My first opportunity to see the Report and the JCS comment on it . . .
was thirty minutes before I was supposed to be at the White House and ready to
defend our position to the last ditch!6
At Geneva, on 18 April, the US and UK representatives tabled a draft treaty
banning all tests except those measuring less than 4.75 seismic magnitude. A
control commission, with equal US and Soviet representation and three neutral
members holding the balance, would supervise a worldwide inspection system. An
administrator would carry out the commissions decisions. The Soviets countered
with an offer of stations manned almost entirely by Soviet personnel, and three
on-site inspections. The United States and United Kingdom both wanted twenty
inspections. Moreover, the Soviets denounced the concept of a single impartial
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administrator, insisting that the control council consist of a three-member troika
(one pro-West, one pro-Soviet, and one neutral), each of whom would wield a veto.
Westerners took this insistence upon what amounted to self-inspection as evidence
that the Soviets were not interested in negotiating a treaty.7
McCloy concluded that the Soviets planned to let the talks limp along until
they could be merged with general disarmament negotiations. Then US freedom of
action would be severely inhibited, and the unenforceable moratorium could continue indefinitely. Clearly, he believed, it was time for deciding whether to resume
underground tests and/or seismic research programs. The JCS wholeheartedly
agreed. They recommended early and unannounced resumption, contending that, if
detected, these tests, regardless of the type, may be related directly to the seismic
research program. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric informed McCloy that he agreed, with
one exception. In our open society, he wrote, I doubt the wisdom and practicality
of attempting weapons tests under cover of the research program.8
Secretary McNamara asked Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research
and Engineering, to review the pros and cons of renewed testing. Under a voluntary moratorium, Brown contended, the Soviets almost certainly would cheat and
thereby pull ahead. If both sides resumed testing, by contrast, the United States
should make a number of advances that are more critical to us than to the USSR.
He favored early resumption and the JCS naturally agreed.9
Dr. Brown briefed the NSC on 19 May. Four days later, the Committee of
Principals convened. McNamara argued that the gross advantage to the US
from a resumption of testing was substantial. The cost of warheads and delivery
vehicles might be cut by tens of billions of dollars over a period of years. He saw
a potential for developing pure fusion and, possibly, effective ABM weapons. General LeMay, attending as Acting Chairman, noted how testing could improve our
trouble-plagued first generation of ICBMs. With smaller warheads and hence, missiles . . . we could afford to test more of them and thus increase their reliability. Dr.
Jerome Wiesner, the Presidents Special Assistant for Science and Technology, gave
his opinion that the military considerations involved were so long-range in nature
that the political considerations should be the determining factor in timing the
resumption of testing. Secretary McNamara agreed to the extent that, provided
there was a definite intention to resume testing, whether the tests were held in
July or December would make no difference.10
The Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, early in June, showed how far apart the
two sides were. Afterwards, President Kennedy told the American people that the
Soviet leader made it clear that there could not be a neutral administrator . . . ;
that a Soviet veto would have to apply to acts of enforcement; that inspection was
only a subterfuge for espionage, in the absence of total disarmament; and that the
present test ban negotiations appeared futile. In short, our hopes . . . for some slowing down of the arms race have been struck a serious blow. Secretary McNamara
reacted by pressing for action to end the moratorium. On 22 June, he circulated
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a draft letter asking the President to make a decision at an early date to initiate
preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing. He characterized as substantial the chances (1) that the Soviets were either secretly testing or preparing to do
so and (2) that such one-sided testing would lead to grave consequences for US
security. With a confrontation over Berlin looming, Secretary McNamara believed
this decision would display the depth of American resolution: The US has stated
that it could not continue indefinitely under an uncontrolled moratorium. This is an
appropriate time to demonstrate that the US means what it says. The JCS, going
further, wanted President Kennedy to make the decision to resume nuclear testing
at an early date and initiate preparations now to resume [them]. McNamara stayed
with his original wording, sending it to McCloy on 28 July.11
President Kennedy appointed a panel of scientists, chaired by Dr. Wolfgang
Panofsky, to appraise technical issues.12 Reporting on 21 July, the panel found that
none of the specific weapons tests now discussed appear to be of such urgency . . .
that a reasonable delay . . . would be critical. Thus, in the near term, decisions
could be based primarily upon non-technical considerations. If neither side tested,
the panel believed that US technological superiority would continue for some time.
If both resumed, their technologies probably would equalize in the relatively near
future. The likelihood of major surprises struck the panel as being small for strategic but great for tactical weapons. If Americans abstained while Soviets tested
secretly underground, the Soviets might gain selective technological superiority
within three to four years, but such advances would require extensive testing carrying a higher probability of detection.13
Not surprisingly, the JCS challenged these findings. In their judgment, conclusions about Soviet capabilities were based on unconfirmed estimates and thus
subject to gross error. The nature of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile was
essentially unknown both qualitatively and quantitatively. Did not the panels
admission that there could be important surprises in the tactical and weaponseffects fields tend to invalidate their claim that there was little urgency about
resumption? Dr. Brown sent their paper to the White House, along with a statement
that the Defense Department favored a resumption of underground testing as
soon as it is politically expedient.14
Some other agencies thought better of the Panofsky report. The Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission generally concurred with its findings and conclusions. Central Intelligence saw no convincing evidence of Soviet cheating. Mr.
McCloy and Acting Secretary of State George Ball favored preparations to test
early in 1962 but would delay announcement until a few days before the test. General Maxwell Taylor, who was working in the White House, argued for an immediate resumption of testing unless the most compelling of political arguments can
be adduced against it. He identified three areas in which testing mattered more to
the United States than to the USSR. First, ability to absorb a first strike depended
upon having a mobile force with lightweight warheads. Second, the possibility of
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the Soviets being first to deploy ABMs mandated developing decoys and multiple
warheads. Third, perfecting very small tactical weapons could allow their use with
greater safety for our own forces and populations.15
At the White House, on 8 August, General Lemnitzer said that the Joint Chiefs
main concerns were over lack of intelligence on what the Soviets were doing and
about the character and strength of their weapons and stockpile. The Director of
Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, countered that we knew much more than Lemnitzer supposed. President Kennedy ordered an effort to clarify disagreements and
narrow them if possible. The result did more to clarify than to narrow. Were the
Soviets testing secretly? The JCS saw a strong possibility that they were; Central
Intelligence found no evidence to support such a conclusion; the Panofsky panel
assumed an unqualified position of uncertainty. What was known about qualitative aspects of the Soviet stockpile? Central Intelligence and the Panofsky panel
believed that reasonable estimates could be reached; General Lemnitzer did not.
Lemnitzer, Dulles and Wiesner (representing Panofsky) did agree upon the need
for the United States to resume testing within a reasonable time.16
Testing Resumed: Who Benefited More?
bruptly, the argument over possible Soviet cheating became academic. On 30

August, Moscow announced that it would resume atmospheric testing, and
forecast explosions running from twenty to 100 megatons. On 5 September, after
the Soviets third atmospheric explosion, President Kennedy announced a resumption of testing in the laboratory and underground and with no fallout. That left
the JCS unsatisfied because underground tests were tailored primarily to slow,
expensive development of small tactical weapons. They wanted to measure (1) the
disrupting effects upon radar and communications and (2) the high-altitude kill
radius of an ABM warhead. Here, they believed, the potential impact of surprise
breakthroughs was profound. On 29 September, they recommended a resumption
of atmospheric testing, initiating preparations immediately. Secretary McNamara
also urged that preparations be made, and the President approved doing so.17
There were some difficulties about the preparations. In 1958, when the moratorium began, the JCS had urged that the testing task force be kept intact. They were
overruled and the organization was dissolved. Now, reconstitution was complicated. The firm that manufactured cables for use at test sites had ceased production;
months passed before output began again.18
Soviet atmospheric testing came to a climax on 30 October, detonating a superbomb of colossal yield. In Congress, the JCS faced criticism because the American
arsenal contained nothing comparable. General Lemnitzer explained to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy that the United States did not need larger warheads.
Existing weapons, he testified, were accurate enough to destroy any target and
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powerful enough to obliterate any civilian target. Therefore, he concluded, the
Soviet superbomb could only be a terror weapon for blackmailing the West.19
In mid-November, President Kennedy established an NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy chaired by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission; other members included William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Harold Brown, Director, Defense Research and
Engineering; Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President on Science and
Technology; and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security. Kennedy gave them stringent guidelines. He would personally review every
proposal. Atmospheric tests could take place only when (1) important information
was unobtainable any other way, (2) military needs outweighed the desirability of
avoiding radioactive fallout, and (3) the resulting fallout was minimized in every
possible way. The Committee recommended 27 shots over a three-month period
starting in the spring of 1962. The President approved but decided to delay a public
announcement until about 1 April, just before the tests would begin.20
The Soviet series ended with at least 45 explosions detected. Preliminary
evaluations indicated a highly successful effort to achieve greater thermonuclear
efficiencies, improve warhead yield-to-weight ratios, and reduce requirements for
fissionable materials. Indeed, in some cases, the Soviet results appear to go beyond
present US technology. Assistant Secretary Nitze asked for a JCS appraisal. Their
reply, dated 22 December, stated that Soviet progress potentially changed the positions of the two countries. Without full-scale US testing, the Soviets probably would
move well ahead in ABM development and yield-to-weight ratios. An early renewal
of atmospheric testing thus was imperative. They added that, at this point, a test
ban treaty would be most emphatically contrary to US interests. No amount of
inspection could stop the Soviets from capitalizing upon their recent tests and readying a new round. A second series could make their advantage overwhelming.21
On 29 January 1962, with the Soviets refusing to soften their position, US and
UK delegates at Geneva forced an indefinite suspension of talks about a test ban.
Since the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference was going to reconvene in
mid-March, President Kennedy did not want to give the impression that US policy
was still unsettled. When the NSC discussed testing issues on 27 February, General
Lemnitzer reported that the Joint Chiefs strongly favored resumption and particularly emphasized the importance of proof-testing complete weapon systems. He
also said that the JCS could not approve a test ban treaty like that presented at
Geneva on 18 April 1961. Although Secretary McNamara agreed about the tests,
he was willing to sign on to such a treaty. The President saw some advantages
in updating the treaty but was ready to start testing. In a televised address on 2
March, Kennedy announced that atmospheric tests would start during the latter
part of April and run for two or three months.22
The initial series, conducted at Christmas and Johnston Islands in the Pacific,
lasted from 25 April until 12 July with 26 detonations. A second set, from 2 October
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to 4 November, involved ten explosions. One Polaris missile with a nuclear warhead
was launched at sea over the water. (Concurrently, the USSR conducted about thirty
more atmospheric tests.) President Kennedy authorized preparations for firing an
Atlas ICBM with its warhead, but then vetoed the test. Despite a JCS protest that
military confidence was in direct proportion to . . . proven capabilityhe did not
relent. The Atlas would have been fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,
where a malfunction and abort could release radioactive material. Kennedy also may
have seen little value in testing an ICBM that was nearing obsolescence.23
A committee of weapons experts, drawn from the Los Alamos and Livermore
Laboratories, concluded that an earlier review of the Soviets 1961 tests had significantly overestimated their capabilities. The group also believed that the Soviets 1962 tests did not involve any substantial advances over their 1961 series. As
for American tests, Dr. Brown informed Secretary McNamara that an amazingly
high percentage of the experiments obtained useful data. The JCS view was much
more guarded. In December, General Taylor (now the Chairman) advised McNamara that more testing was essential. The Soviets, he wrote, have conducted about
five sophisticated high-altitude tests that should make them much better informed
than we . . . . Superior knowledge here could be vital to winning a nuclear war.24
More Drafts, More Disagreements
eantime, ACDA drafted a total or comprehensive test ban that took two
developments into account. First, neutrals at the Disarmament Conference
had tabled a draft that placed major reliance upon national detection systems.
Second, findings from Project Vela indicated that US ability to distinguish earthquakes from underground explosions was better than had been supposed. But
the JCS found this draft, too, full of faults. First, the ban should apply to detectable tests alone. Second, detection should be based upon the concept of international administration; ACDAs solution struck them as being too vague even for
comment. Third, on-site inspection ought to be absolutely mandatory; ACDAs
permissive phraseology left this open to doubt. Fourth, negotiating obstacles
should not be left for later resolution by a commission; ACDA proposed passing
so much to the commission that the implementation of verification procedures
might be delayed indefinitely. Fifth, the mechanism for withdrawing from the
treaty should not be so highly involved and inhibiting. Finally, as to requirements for inspection and verification, the JCS denied that the overall technical
situation justifies any significant change in the US position. In forwarding these
comments to Director Foster, the ISA agreed that the verification system was
too vague and that on-site inspection must clearly be obligatory. What the JCS
were willing to accept was a comprehensive ban, excluding tests below a detectable threshold, with reliable detection and inspection systems. Quickly, ACDA
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produced limited and comprehensive treaties with which OSD generally agreed.
Draft treaty articles sought by the JCS that authorized underground explosions
and preparations for testing were deleted with an understanding that the propriety of doing these things would be made perfectly clear during negotiations.25
At Geneva, on 27 August 1962, US and UK spokesmen tabled two draft treaties.
A comprehensive ban required on-site inspections by international teams; an atmospheric-outer space-underwater ban omitted these measures by allowing small
underground tests. A futile gesture! The Soviets still insisted upon what amounted
to a total but unverifiable ban. Early in September, the conference recessed without recording any progress.26
Perhaps the near-catastrophe of the Cuban missile crisis helped ease this
impasse. American and Soviet scientists raised the possibility of using tamperproof automatic seismic detectors with built-in recorders, dubbed black boxes,
that would be supplied by the international control commission and put in place
by the host country. In December, Chairman Khrushchev wrote President Kennedy that he would accept three black boxes and two or three annual inspections.
Unsatisfied, Kennedy replied that black box locationsall outside the areas of
highest seismicitywere wrong, and that eight to ten inspections were necessary.
Khrushchev agreed to change the sites but not the numbers.27
In New York and Washington, American, British, and Soviet diplomats opened
talks about a comprehensive ban. Late in January 1963, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Nitze asked the JCS to assess where matters stood. Their reply focused on
what they called the quite radical changes that ACDA had in mind for the comprehensive draft treaty of 27 August 1962. Shortcomings like too few inspections,
too much reliance on black boxes, and allowing the accused state to declare that a
suspected explosion lay within a sensitive security area would virtually invite Soviet evasion. At a White House meeting on 8 February, President Kennedy ruled that
six annual inspections would be our rock-bottom number, a figure with which the
Secretary of Defense agreed. By this time, in fact, Secretary McNamara had broken
with the Joint Chiefs on key aspects. In his judgment, the United States currently
possessed clear strategic superiority and more advanced nuclear technology. A
total ban would lock in that technological lead, and evasions would not critically
harm US security. Besides limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the superpowers agreement to stop testing could set an example that would restrain others.
Hence, McNamara was willing to accept a less than perfect treaty.28
ACDA circulated a revised draft in which the JCS again found flaws (e.g.,
exclusion from inspection of sensitive defense installations, acceptance of a 4.0
detection threshold for underground testing, no abrogation of the treaty for three
years). Nitze decided that, although most of the Joint Chiefs suggestions were
desirable, a proposal containing all of them would be non-negotiable. ACDAs draft
generally conformed to the treaty of 27 August 1962, and its new features had presidential approval. Accordingly, Nitze asked ACDA for only modest revisions such
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as cutting the withdrawal period, to which ACDA agreed. On 23 March 1963, ACDA
circulated the final version of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Under its terms,
each country would allow seven black box sites and seven annual inspections.
McNamara declared this draft acceptable.29
Meanwhile, ACDAs habit of rushing drafts through the reviewing process had
brought JCS dissatisfaction to a boil. In mid-1962, Director Foster promised that
DOD would be allowed seven days to review normal and three to review emergency
ACDA papers. However, in the exercises described above, three-day deadlines had
become the rule and seven-day reviews the exception. Accordingly, on 4 March, the
JCS protested to Secretary McNamara that military views were being slighted. They
claimed, also, that the Committee of Principals was being crippled by the press of
time and the lack of formal procedures. Improvements should include: making the
JCS Chairman a Principal rather than just a member; circulating an advance
agenda; preparing a record of decisions and a recapitulation of unresolved issues;
and permitting individual members to comment upon papers sent to the President.30
Secretary McNamara agreed that ACDAs deadlines would be honored only when
seven days were allowed. Otherwise, there would be no DOD response and Defense
personnel would boycott the next meeting at which that paper was discussed. He
communicated these views to Foster, who accepted virtually all the suggestions pertaining to members and procedures for the Committee of Principals. Foster denied,
though, that deadlines were too short. Substantive issues, he reminded the Secretary,
were discussed at the staff level well before drafts actually circulated.31
Since the shape of a comprehensive treaty now seemed to have crystallized, the
JCS decided to summarize the situation as they saw it. So, on 20 April 1963, they told
Secretary McNamara once again why a total ban that prohibited testing below the
detection threshold would not serve American interests. The United States stood on
the verge of developing a spectrum of clean warheads. The Soviets could develop these
devices by undetectable underground tests, thereby making major strides in their tactical and ABM capability. They already possessed a substantial lead in very high-yield
weapons and more advanced knowledge of high-altitude effects. In these circumstances, they deemed an energetic test program in all environments to be essential.32
No one was more determined to press for a treaty than John F. Kennedy. The
President professed himself to be haunted by a feeling that, without a ban, there
could be ten or fifteen nuclear powers by 1975. At a press conference, he spoke of
1963 as the critical year: If we dont get it now . . . perhaps the genie is out of the
bottle and well never get him back in again. He had backing in Congress. On 27
May 1963, Senators Hubert Humphrey (D, Minn.) and Thomas Dodd (D, Conn.)
introduced a resolution co-signed by 32 of their colleagues asking the administration to try again for a treaty banning atmospheric and underwater tests. They urged
the administration to abstain from atmospheric and underground testing as long as
the USSR did so. But, bearing the Soviet record of deceit and bad faith in mind,
US testing facilities should remain in a state of constant readiness.33
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General Taylor anticipated that the Senate Armed Services Committee would
ask the JCS to describe an acceptable treaty. That worried him because we have
been against many things but have made no affirmative proposals. At his request,
the Joint Staff appraised the Dodd-Humphrey resolution and tried to produce a
positive positionand failed. Their finding, which the JCS approved on 12 June,
was that either a fully effective test ban containing vital and responsible safeguards or continued testing in all environments could be compatible with national
security. Every limited test ban proposal they had reviewed, including Dodd-Humphrey, contained shortcomings of major military significance. ISA also drafted a
statement for the Senate Committee. When the JCS reviewed it, they found differences ran so deep that even an amended statement could not adequately convey
their views. ISA argued that Soviet cheating could lead to progress only at the
lower end of the weapons spectrum and that, with or without a test ban, the United
States could maintain a second-strike capability but its strategic superiority would
erode. The JCS believed that cheating could create advances in all categories, that
a ban would make preserving a second-strike capability more difficult, and that
ISA was implying abandonment of the counterforce strategy and denigrating what
research and development might accomplish.34
About Face
culmination came much sooner than anyone in Washington expected. Khrushchev had agreed that American and British representativesUnder Secretary
of State Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham, Minister of Science and Technology,
were appointedcome to Moscow for talks about a comprehensive ban. Speaking
at American University on 10 June, President Kennedy smoothed their path, asking
Americans to re-examine their long-held attitudes toward peace, toward the Soviet
Union, and toward the Cold War. Moscow negotiations, he announced, looked
toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. To demonstrate its
good faith and solemn convictions, the United States would refrain from atmospheric testing as long as other nations did likewise.35
However the American people may have felt about a test ban, the administration remained divided. When the Committee of Principals met on 14 June, Secretary McNamara urged that a head-on collision be avoided if possible. It was not.
On 26 June, Admiral Anderson read to the Senate Armed Services Committee the
JCS statement opposing a comprehensive test ban treaty. Next day, General LeMay
testified that testing was necessary in order to keep making technological advances and maintain military superiority. McNamara had suggested rewording the JCS
statement, but LeMay rejected any changes apart from grammar and style.36
Secretary McNamara helped organize a series of interagency consultations,
from which several White Papers emerged. He believed that they represented a
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broad consensus but, in order to achieve a full measure of certainty, circulated them for comment. The broad consensus balloon burst. As an example, Dr.
Brown, Dr. Wiesner, and Central Intelligence stated that Soviet cheating could not
change the basic US-USSR balance. The JCS, the Defense Atomic Support Agency,
and Livermore Laboratory claimed that the contrary was true.37
Speaking in East Berlin on 2 July, Chairman Khrushchev said that he was
willing to sign a treaty banning atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing. There could be no on-site inspection, though, and a nonaggression pact must
accompany the treaty.38 Allowing underground testing to continue would finesse
the vexed issue of cheating below the detection threshold.
On 9 July, the NSC reviewed Harrimans instructions for his mission to Moscow. General Taylor noted that the Chiefs, individually, had taken the position
that a limited test ban treaty was not in the national interest. He wanted the Committee of Principals to review the entire proposal again in light of developments
during the past year. Secretary McNamara opposed doing so, on the grounds
that there was wider diversity on the advisability of a treaty this year than there
was last year. Secretary Rusk said that the time for review was past, and that
we must now take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national
interest. Later that day, in the Oval Office, Kennedy promised Taylor that the
JCS would have their full day in court before the Senate if and when a formal
treaty proposal came up for ratification.39
On 10 July, the Joint Staff drafted a memorandum calling a limited test ban
militarily disadvantageous, and stating that there must be overriding nonmilitary considerations for such a treaty to be in the national interest. General
Taylor suggested a milder statement that there must be compensating non-military
considerations. But Wheeler and LeMay wanted to say overriding, and at a JCS
meeting on 16 July they won their way. This draft, which they approved but did not
forward to Secretary McNamara, stated that
there are significant military disadvantages to the proposed treaty. To a
degree difficult to establish, it could continue the USSR lead in very high yield
technology. In addition, there are significant opportunities for cheating which,
if exploited, could provide military gains to the Soviets that would be denied to
the United States. The test ban treaty would deny the United States the opportunity to conduct important atmospheric effects tests and to eliminate some
uncertainties in the survivability of our hardened, fixed base, second strike
force and to conduct training exercises with tactical nuclear weapons. . . .
In view of the foregoing, there must be overriding nonmilitary considerations favoring the treaty for it to be in the national interest.40
Meantime, in Moscow on 15 July, Harriman and Hailsham opened negotiations

with Chairman Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The Soviets
quickly ruled out a comprehensive ban. Several issues about an atmospheric-outer
space-underwater treaty had to be resolved. Americans dropped on-site inspection.
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The Soviets agreed to forego a nonaggression pact and accepted an article allowing parties to withdraw upon 90 days notice if they decided that extraordinary
events had jeopardized their supreme interests. Withdrawal on short notice was
a point for which the JCS had pressed strongly. Negotiators completed their work
on 25 July; President Kennedy told the American people that a shaft of light cut
into the darkness.41
On the morning of 24 July, the JCS met with the Chief Executive, who assured
them that we cannot reduce our military readiness if an accord is reached, for the
whole situation could turn around in six months. But he emphasized that, in giving
advice about the treaty, all Chiefs should base their position on the broadest considerations, not just military factors.42 Here he was invoking NSAM No. 55, issued
in June 1961, which instructed the JCS to be more than military men and fit military requirements into the overall context of any situation.
The JCS decided to poll knowledgeable officials about the treatys technical
and political aspects. Those polled included John McCone, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the AEC; Drs. Wiesner and Brown;
Dr. John Foster of the Livermore Laboratory and Dr. Norris Bradbury of the Los
Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. Their answers were generally, although not completely, reassuring and plainly eased JCS concerns. On the issue of clandestine testing
by the Soviets, for example, Bradbury, Brown, and Wiesner believed that no major
advances could be made without a substantial risk of detection. But Foster and
Seaborg felt that small atmospheric effects tests might verify US weaknesses and
so be worth chancing.43
General Taylor sent the Service Chiefs a draft endorsing the limited test ban
treaty, subject to certain safeguards, and recommending its ratification. They spent
the day of 12 August discussing, occasionally amending, and then approving the
Chairmans draft.44 In this remarkable paper, the JCS abandoned a position they
had consistently advocated over the past two years and restated as recently as 16
July. It would be very difficult to find another situation in which the Joint Chiefs
did such an abrupt about-face.
The JCS began by saying that the USSR must be unable to gain or retain any
significant advantage in military technology that the United States would be unable
to overcome. Successful Soviet cheating must make no serious difference to the
military balance. Failure to fulfill these criteria would require that adequate compensating advantages be found elsewhere.
The JCS then compared capabilities in nuclear technology. The Soviets led
in high-yield categories (10100 megatons), were about even in the intermediate
range (310 megatons), and lagged somewhat in yields below two megatons. The
USSR appeared to be further ahead in ABM design, but developing a US system did
not depend upon atmospheric testing. Probably, the United States was superior in
tactical weapons. Overall, the US at present is clearly ahead of the USSR in the
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ability to wage strategic nuclear war, and is probably ahead in the ability to wage
tactical nuclear war.
If both sides observed the treaty, the Soviets could maintain their high-yield
lead and eventually erase the US advantage in low-yield weapons. But the Soviet
lead was somewhat spuriousthe JCS saw no need to develop 100-megaton weaponsand the American advantage could only be overcome at great cost. What
about Soviet cheating? The dangers of detection and the difficulties of outer space
testing led the JCS, this time, to dismiss cheating as a relatively minor factor. The
more probable peril, in their estimation, was abrupt Soviet abrogation followed by
a new round of atmospheric testing. Four safeguards could reduce that risk: (1)
conducting comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground tests; (2)
maintaining modern laboratory facilities; (3) keeping atmospheric testing sites in
readiness; and (4) improving detection capabilities.
In conclusion, the JCS termed the treaty compatible with the security interests of the US and supported its ratification. If the treaty restrained proliferation
and drove a wedge between Moscow and militant Beijing, that advantage will
compensate for fluctuations in nuclear technology. Their most serious reservations stemmed from fear that euphoria might erode the Wests vigilance and
willingness to continue with collective security. Ratification, therefore, must be
buttressed by the four safeguards specified above. Then, the risks inherent in the
treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved
through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful
environment in which to seek resolution of our differences. General Taylor carried
copies of this statement to Secretary McNamara on 12 August, and to Secretary
Rusk and President Kennedy on the following day. The Chairman later described
this JCS endorsement as the greatest diplomatic triumph of his career.45
Secretary McNamara, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 August, awarded the treaty his unequivocal support. Next day, General
Taylor gave the JCS position described above. The Service Chiefs testified on 19
August. General LeMay, known to be a hard-liner, came under the closest questioning. Helike his colleaguesfirmly denied having been put under presidential
rack and screw. LeMay claimed that we examined the military and technical
aspects and came up with a net disadvantagea conclusion, the historian must
add, that could not clearly be deduced from the JCS position above. He insisted
that the JCS had a broad duty to weigh political factors as well, and these nonmilitary factors accounted for his approval.46
The Joint Chiefs testimony was instrumental in dispelling any remaining
doubts. President Kennedy assured Congressional leaders that he would continue
underground testing, improve detection capabilities, press vigorous research programs, and maintain readiness to resume atmospheric testing. On 24 September, by
a vote of 80 to 19, the Senate gave its advice and consent.
105

In hindsight, the limited test ban treaty looks less significant now than it did
in 1963. Certainly, achieving a test-free atmosphere helped to make it worthwhile.
Yet the limited treaty did not pave the way for a comprehensive one, any political
advantages proved rather ephemeral, and the proliferation of nuclear powers did
not stop. But it must also be said that none of the dire consequences about which
the JCS warned so forcefully and so frequently ever materialized.
106
8
The Cuban Debacle
Overview
hat happened at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961the defeat and capture of
anti-communist exiles trying to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castrohad
far-reaching consequences. First, failure there blighted relations between President Kennedy and the JCS. Kennedy believed that the Chiefs had given him bad
advice on crucial points, and the JCS evidently harbored some doubts about the
Presidents strength of purpose. This mutual lack of confidence affected how the
administration managed challenges during the next eighteen months. Second, a
communist victory virtually at Americas doorstep emboldened the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev pressed a confrontation over Berlin and then risked putting missiles into Cuba, triggering the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War.
Conception
ulgencio Batista, Cubas long-time strongman, fled from Havana on New Years
Day in 1959. Fidel Castro emerged from the Sierra Maestra Mountains to take
control of Cuba. He carried out sweeping changes that won support from the lower
classes. Soon, he channeled the Cuban revolution into a pro-communist and stridently anti-American course. During 1960, Castro welcomed Soviet Deputy Premier
Anastas Mikoyan to Havana, concluded extensive trade agreements with the USSR,
expropriated $700 million worth of US assets, and boasted that his communistinspired Fidelismo would sweep Latin America.
107

By early 1960, the administration had come to see Castro as an enemy. On 17
March, President Eisenhower approved a CIA paramilitary plan patterned after
the effort which in 1954 had driven the Arbenz regime from Guatemala. Briefly,
anti-communist exiles would infiltrate back into Cuba, and arms would be airdropped to them. Guerrilla bands would grow in strength until they could challenge and ultimately overthrow Castro. Secretly, the president of Guatemala agreed
that these exiles could train at remote camps in his country.
In September, the 5412 Committee1 approved supply flights from Guatemala by exiles that dropped arms and munitions into the Escambray Mountains,
where guerrillas supposedly were operating. But the drops proved ineffective,
and Castros military strength and political control appeared to be improving. On
4 November, the CIA radically changed the exiles mission. Only sixty men continued guerrilla training. Thirty-eight US instructors began preparing the remaining
Cubans, who christened themselves Brigade 2506, to act as airborne and amphibious assault troops.
By December, CIA planners had selected March 1961 as the time to attack
the town of Trinidad, on Cubas south central coast, as the landing site. Here,
after infiltration by guerrillas and strikes by bombers flying from Nicaragua, 600
to 700 lightly-armed exiles could come ashore unopposed. Ultimately, if all went
well, disaffected Cubans would rally to the Brigade and a general uprising would
ensue. President Eisenhower ordered that everything feasible be done to help the
paramilitary project and with all possible urgency. On 3 January 1961, the day on
which he severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, Eisenhower agreed that the exile
force should be increased as much as possible. Nine days later, the 5412 Committee reviewed the bidding and arranged for a State-Defense-CIA working group
to assess what additional measures might be required. Eisenhower left the White
House without having seen or approved the Trinidad plan, because whatever was
done would be executed under a new president.2
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while not yet involved in the paramilitary plan,
were deeply worried about Castro. On 10 January 1961, General White advised
his JCS colleagues that he saw scant hope of a successful popular uprising. Castro controlled a 32,000-man army, a police force of 9,000, and a peoples militia
estimated at 200,000. According to US Air Force Intelligence, Cuba had received
from 20 to 25,000 tons of Soviet military equipment, along with many communist
bloc technicians and military advisors. Consequently, General White concluded,
decisive interference with the Castro regime must come from outside Cuba.
Without immediate and forceful action by the United States, he foresaw a great
and present danger of Cuba becoming a permanent part of the communist bloc,
with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere. White
outlined a spectrum of actions to oust Castro, running from propaganda through
economic strangulation to a total blockade and culminating with direct US mili-
108
The Cuban Debacle

tary intervention. The JCS referred Whites paper to J5, where it would be incorporated into a report on the Cuban situation.3
Meanwhile, Joint Staff officers were being read into the paramilitary plan.
On 11 January, CIA representatives gave a full briefing to Major General Charles
Bonesteel, USA, Special Assistant to the Chairman, and to Brigadier General David
Gray, Chief of J5s Subsidiary Activities Division. General Gray became the JCS
representative on a State-Defense-CIA working group. Gray evaluated three military methods for ousting Castro, in the event that political and paramilitary operations appeared inadequate. On 19 January, he gave the group an answer that had
been approved informally by General Lemnitzer and by Lieutenant General Earle
Wheeler, who was Director of the Joint Staff. The only course certain to succeed
would involve overt US military intervention, either unilaterally or in conjunction
with volunteers.4
On 27 January, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a memorandum that repeated General Whites appeal for immediate and forceful action to prevent the permanent communization of Cuba. The primary objective, they said, should be Castros
speedy overthrow. The paramilitary plan failed to assure the accomplishment
of that objective; it provided neither for the direct action that might be needed
to avert failure nor for follow-up efforts to exploit success. They recommended,
therefore, that an interdepartmental group develop an overall plan of action.5
Next day, in the Cabinet Room of the White House, President Kennedy discussed the Cuban situation with senior officials who included Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lemnitzer.
The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, said that the basic elements
influencing events were (1) a rapid and continuing growth in Castros military
power and (2) a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime.6 McNamara and Lemnitzer advised that none of the actions currently authorized would
oust Castro. Kennedy ordered the DOD and the CIA to review the Trinidad plan
and report their conclusions. Afterward, at the Pentagon, Secretary McNamara
questioned whether such a small force could achieve a worthwhile objective. The
CIA, he said, should be told that its plan was not good and an alternate one should
be developed. Lemnitzer agreed.7
On 1 February, the JCS created a working group drawn from J2, J3, J4,
J5, and all the Services. Apart from General Gray, the only officers with complete
knowledge of the paramilitary plan were Lemnitzer, the Service Chiefs and their
Vice Chiefs, the Operations Deputies, the Director and Assistant Director of the
Joint Staff, and the Directors of J2, J3, J4, and J5.8
On 31 January, CIA officers briefed General Gray and members of the working
group about their Trinidad plan. Operations would commence on D-1 with aerial
attacks aimed at neutralizing Castros air force, patrol ships, communications centers, and tank and artillery parks. At dawn on D-Day, Brigade 2506 would carry out
an air-sea assault and secure a beachhead near Trinidad.9 Avoiding the city itself,
109

the Brigade would hold a nearby beachhead and attract volunteers. If the beachhead became untenable, it would retire to the mountains for guerrilla warfare.
The working group concluded that, given complete surprise and total air
supremacy, Brigade 2506 could hold its ground for four days. Gray presented
this assessment to General Wheeler, who insisted upon an overall evaluation of
the prospects for success. Wheeler suggested saying fair and Gray agreed. But
Wheeler wanted something more, so Gray calculated the chances for ultimate success to be thirty in favor and seventy against.10
On 1 February, Wheeler gave General Lemnitzer a preliminary evaluation that
the overall plan was basically sound. He did not, however, cite the 30/70 calculation. Two days later, the JCS gave Secretary McNamara their evaluation that the
Trinidad plan would not necessarily require overt US intervention. The working
group, they reported, considered Trinidad to be the best area in Cuba for carrying
out this operation. But logistical support for the landing force was marginal at best
and probably would prove inadequate against moderate, determined resistance.
Trinidad had been chosen because it was isolated, separated by the Escambray
Mountains from Havana where the bulk of Castros forces were concentrated. The
Cuban army probably could not launch a coordinated counterattack until D+4,
which the Brigade should be able to resist. Yet, unless there were substantial uprisings or large follow-on forces, the Cuban army eventually could reduce the beachhead. In summary, the JCS rendered a favorable assessment . . . of the likelihood
of achieving initial military success. Since assessments of the Brigades combat
worth derived from second- and third-hand reports and because certain logistic
aspects were highly complex and critical to initial success, they recommended
evaluation by a team of US officers. Still, despite shortcomings, the JCS believed
that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even
if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the
eventual overthrow of the Castro regime. McNamara endorsed these conclusions.11 In retrospect, this evaluation was worded in such a way that Secretary
McNamara would have focused on a favorable assessment of initial success and
very likely did not realize that a fair chance of ultimate success equated with
odds of 30/70 against such success.
During 2526 February, three Joint Staff officers visited two training areas
in Guatemala and the air base in Nicaragua. The ground force evaluator, Colonel
John R. Wright, USA, was quite favorably impressed by Brigade 2506. The logistics
evaluator, Colonel R. B. Wall, USMC, judged the logistics organization to be neither
well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. He considered it imperative that an experienced US instructor arrive as soon as possible. The air evaluator,
Lieutenant Colonel B. W. Tarwater, USAF, concluded the odds were about 85 to 15
against being able to carry out a surprise air strike. Castros agents would see when
the invasion force moved from Guatemala to Nicaragua. Once this was known,
Castro would disperse his planes and alert his antiaircraft batteries. One plane
110
The Cuban Debacle

alone could sink part or even all of the invasion fleet. Therefore, Tarwater urged
that serious consideration be given to abandoning the amphibious operation and
executing an airborne assault instead.
The JCS, on 10 March, informed Secretary McNamara that they found these
evaluations generally valid. However, they disapproved Colonel Tarwaters argument for an airborne assault. Since only a single airfield was available, any damage
to that strip would impede operations for a considerable time. Equally, one hostile
plane could interdict the airfield. The JCS repeated their judgment that the initial
assault should succeed, but ultimate success would depend on the extent to which
it catalyzed action by anti-Castro elements within Cuba. They urged that Secretary
McNamara support their views, that a logistics instructor go immediately to the
training camp, and that a decision about employing the Cuban Volunteer Force be
rendered promptly, so that final preparations could commence. Lieutenant Colonel
Wall did return to help correct logistics deficiencies.12
On 11 March, President Kennedy reviewed preparations for Trinidad with people who included Brigadier General Gray and Lieutenant Colonel Tarwater; none of
the JCS were present. Richard Bissell, the CIAs Deputy Director for Plans, outlined
the operation. Kennedy said that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead
but could not endorse a plan that would put us in so openly, in view of the world
situation. He directed the development of a plan where US assistance would be
less obvious. There should be a quiet landing, preferably at night.13
On the morning of 14 March, CIA planners presented five alternatives to the
JCS working group. By evening, the group had pared the alternatives to three and
completed an evaluation of each. The next morning, at 1000, the group presented
its evaluations to the JCS in a twenty-minute briefing. The Chiefs immediately
approved those evaluations and sent them to Secretary McNamara.14 Their appraisals read as follows:
Alternative IThis was the Trinidad plan, changed to a night landing
and stripped of airborne assaults and air strikes. The JCS saw a fair chance
of seizing initial objectives. However, lack of air support, difficulties of resupplying during darkness, and the danger of daylight air attack indicated that
there would be small chance of ultimate success.
Alternative IIThis targeted the northern coast of Oriente Province at
Cubas eastern end. An airborne landing in early evening would be followed by
night-time debarkation of the Brigades main body. Ships would depart before
daylight; planes would begin flying from a captured airstrip on the following
day. There were numerous shortcomings in this plan. Castros troops were too
near the landing site; the airstrip appeared inadequate; proper logistical support
seemed difficult; and the invasions distance from Havana would diminish its
psychological impact. All in all, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages.
Alternative IIIThis was a landing at the Bay of Pigs in the swampy
Zapata peninsula, eighty miles west of Trinidad. Two companies would come
ashore at night, followed by four more at dawn. Ships would leave the area
before daylight. At daybreak, B-26s would land on captured airstrips and
111

commence operations immediately. The advantages were: two probably
usable airfields; a remote and inaccessible area, making reaction slow and
difficult; absence of Castros forces in the area; feasibility of surprise; and
proximity to Havana. There were a number of disadvantages: resupply would
have to come from outside Cuba and be brought across the beach; exits from
the beachhead could be sealed; and no sizeable, immediate help from the
local population was possible. Nonetheless, the invasion force could be landed successfully and sustain itself for several weeks, provided that replenishment of essential items could be accomplished.
Among these alternatives, the JCS rated Zapata as the most feasible and the
most likely to accomplish the objective. But they did not judge any of these three
to be as feasible and as likely to accomplish the objective as the original Trinidad
planor, as it was worded in this memorandum, the basic para-military plan.15
Secretary McNamara misread the Joint Chiefs evaluation, believing that they
favored Zapata over Trinidad.16 Like the JCS memorandum of 1 February, this had
been phrased and presented in a way that might lead an inexperienced person, which
McNamara then was, into making such a mistake. What would later draw the Presidents ire was something not mentioned in the memorandumthe fact that the JCS
had approved these evaluations promptly after a twenty-minute briefing.
When Bissell briefed Kennedy about the Zapata plan, later on 15 March, the
President disliked a dawn landing and wanted ships to clear the area before then,
so that the appearance of an inside guerrilla-type operation could be preserved.
Since the JCS evaluation specified that ships would depart before daylight, the CIA
must have given him a slightly different concept of operations. Next day, the CIA
presented a revised plan featuring night landings, dawn air drops, and ship departures before dawn. This meeting was attended by Secretary McNamara, Admiral
Burke, and Brigadier General Gray. The President asked Admiral Burke how he
viewed the operations chance of success. Burke gave a probability figure of about
50 percent. Kennedy asked what would happen if the invaders were pinned down
and being slaughtered on the beach. By Burkes account, It was decided that they
would not be re-embarked because there was no place to go.17 Discussion emphasized that the plan depended upon a general uprising, without which the entire
operation would fail. President Kennedy approved continued preparation and final
planning for a landing at the Bay of Pigs, but he reserved his right to cancel the
operation in as little as 24 hours before a landing.18
Since the CIAs support capabilities appeared to be inadequate, McNamara
tasked the JCS with preparing a logistical plan for supplying about 30,000 men.
Their reply outlined the following concept of operations: a landing phase from
D-Day to D+3 to secure the beachhead; a build-up phase from D+3 to D+30; and an
offensive phase from D+30 onward. They recommended, and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric agreed, that this effort receive a higher priority than the one for supporting
friendly forces in Laos, where communist advances were making US intervention a
distinct possibility.19
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The Cuban Debacle

On 29 March, President Kennedy directed that Brigade leaders be informed
that US forces would not be allowed to participate in or support the invasion in
any way. Did they, he wanted to know, wish to proceed under this restriction and
believe their operation would succeed? They answered yes.20
At the State Department, on the evening of 4 April, President Kennedy convened another meeting. General Lemnitzer later recalled that, before it began, he
argued vigorously with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann against Zapata.
The Bay of Pigs, he said, was a poor site compared to Trinidad; the JCS did not
want the Brigade landing any closer to Havana. Mann replied that the President
already had decided for Zapata. Why, Lemnitzer countered, were these things done
without JCS consultation and concurrence? Mann answered that political considerations were overriding. In any case, he added, the President had rendered his decision. Lemnitzer, therefore, refrained from raising this issue with the Chief Executive. During the meeting, Secretary Rusk spoke against the plan but McNamara
expressed approval of the general concept.21
Soon afterward, an air plan was decided upon. The JCS opposed any preinvasion attacks on the grounds that they would be indecisive and might alert
Castros forces. CIA also favored a single all-out effort on the morning of D-Day.
Nonetheless, presumed political advantages put a D-2 strike in the plan. This would
coincide with a diversionary landing by 160 men in eastern Cuba and be attributed
to defectors. Still, D-Day sorties were to be the main means of destroying Castros
air force.22
On 24 March, General Lemnitzer informed Admiral Robert Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), what would be the rules of
engagement for his forces. CINCLANT was to protect the six ships carrying the
1,500 men of the Cuban Volunteer Force. One destroyer would rendezvous with
the ships on D2 and escort them to a point 40 miles from the Cuban coast. One
LSD [dock landing ship] would convoy landing craft with CIA crews to the rendezvous point. A combat air patrol would shield the convoy from dawn to sunset
on D-1. These rules underwent several revisions. First, after the 4 April meeting,
McNamara asked the JCS to ensure against overt engagement between US and
Castro forces. Accordingly, on 7 April, Lemnitzer instructed CINCLANT that
the ships would sail independently to a rendezvous point and then proceed in
convoy for the last 40 miles. US destroyers would provide area coverage rather
than close escort; they were to open fire only if enemy ships actually attacked
the convoy. Similarly, the combat air patrol was to intervene only when a hostile
aircraft either commenced firing or opened its bomb bays and began a bombing
run. If US forces were compelled to intervene, such action would abort the entire
operation. Second, the Deputy Director of the CIA, Lieutenant General Charles
Cabell, USAF, worried that US escorts might intervene before they were needed.
He communicated this to General Lemnitzer and, on 13 April, CINCLANTs orders
were altered again. Hostile ships and aircraft might even be allowed to complete
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their initial attacks. Protection was to be withheld until the total destruction of
friendly ships appeared imminent.23
On 12 April, at the White House, Bissell laid out the final plan for Zapata. Hours
later, at a press conference, President Kennedy was asked how far this country
would be willing to go in supporting an anti-Castro invasion. He answered that
there will not be, under any circumstances, an intervention in Cuba by the United
States Armed Forces. This was not quite accurate. The next day, Kennedy ruled
that There will be no employment of US armed forces against Cuba unless quite
new circumstances develop.24
Death
n the morning of 15 April, which was D2, eight B26s flying from Nicaragua
bombed three Cuban airfields. A ninth B26 flew to Miami; the pilot claimed
to be a defector who, with several fellow-deserters, had stolen planes and bombed
airfields. Post-attack photos indicated that only five aircraft had definitely been
destroyed. But the cover story was not wearing well at the United Nations. On the
afternoon of 16 April, Secretary Rusk recommended suspending attacks until the
Brigade had captured airfields within Cuba. President Kennedy agreed to cancel
the strikes planned for dawn on D-Day. Bissell and General Cabell, of the CIA,
warned him that cancellation could endanger unloading and resupply operations.
Rusk said they could appeal to the President, but they declined. The JCS, at that
point, were neither informed nor consulted.25
Around midnight on 1617 April, General Cabell called General Gray to say
that, since dawn strikes had been disapproved, combat air patrol (CAP) and early
warning ships (EW) were urgently needed. At 0300, after consulting Generals Lemnitzer and Wheeler, Gray replied that CAP and EW could be made available. Secretary Rusk was then contacted; he approved EW but not CAP. This time, Cabell
appealed to the President, but Kennedy upheld Rusks decision. At 0550, orders
went to CINCLANT authorizing an EW mission. The destroyers reached their stations around noon.26
Brigade 2506 began landing in the early hours of 17 April. Almost immediately,
things went awry. The area proved fairly well inhabited and militia units were present; surprise was lost. Unforeseen coral reefs stopped the landing craft and critically delayed embarkation. By daybreak, though, the Brigade had seized Playa Larga
(Red Beach, at the Bays head) and Playa Giron (Blue Beach, on the Bays eastern
shore). About 1,400 men landed.
Learning of the invasion at 0315, Castro ordered prompt counterattacks and
left for the front to take personal command. Castros surviving aircraft struck
devastating blows that morning. Piston-driven Sea Furies and jet T33s sank Rio
Escondido, which was carrying the Brigades entire ammunition reserve, and hit
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The Cuban Debacle

Houston, forcing it to run aground. Washington received word of these setbacks
at 1017, along with a request for air support.27 At 1600, Admiral Dennison received
orders to establish a combat air patrol no closer than fifteen miles from Cuban territory. He was told to interpret these instructions as establishing a safe haven for
friendly ships. Dennison called Lemnitzer to say, This is the first order I ever got
from somebody who found it necessary to interpret his own orders. Lemnitzer
replied, That order was written at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.28
Early on 18 April, Red Beachs battered defenders began withdrawing towards
Blue Beach. By then, Castro had concentrated tanks, artillery, and about 20,000
troops against the Brigade, which found itself terribly outnumbered and outgunned. At the White House, Admiral Burke told President Kennedy that any
cover was completely gone and recommended that armed reconnaissance
aircraft overfly Red and Blue Beaches.29 Kennedy first refused, then authorized
unmarked aircraft to fly photo and eyeball reconnaissance, taking all possible
precautions to avoid being identified as US aircraft. The JCS so instructed CINCLANT, and two planes flew over; pilots reported Red Beach wiped out and Blue
Beach apparently under air attack only. By then, the JCS had passed further White
House instructions to CINCLANT: ready unmarked Navy planes for possible use;
move an amphibious group within four hours steaming of the landing area; and
prepare unmarked boats for possible evacuation of the Brigade. The Chiefs asked
Dennison how he viewed the situation; CINCLANT replied that he too was operating in the dark.30
Around midnight, in the Oval Office, the President convened an ad hoc meeting. Brigade Commander Jose Perez San Roman had just radioed, All we want
is low jet cover and jet close support. Enemy has this support. I need it badly or
cannot survive. Please dont desert us. . . . Tanks will hit me at dawn.31 Bissell and
Admiral Burke strongly advocated an air strike from the carrier Essex to destroy
Castros jets and thus allow B26s to hit Castros tanks. Secretary Rusk opposed
any use of US military power. Finally, Kennedy authorized jets from Essex to fly
escort for a B26 strike at dawn. So at 0337 on 19 April, the JCS ordered Admiral
Dennison to send six unmarked aircraft between 0630 and 0730: Pilots carry as little identification as possible. If necessary to ditch, ditch at sea. Further, PHIBRON
2 [amphibious squadron] should be put in position to assist an evacuation using
unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees so that they will not be easily
identified from the beach.32
The air strike totally miscarried. Flying by Nicaraguan rather than Cuban time,
four B26s passed over Essex before any of its planes were airborne and reached
the beachhead alone at about 0530. Castros jets downed two of the bombers, and
four Americans aboard were killed. When US aircraft arrived at 0550, aerial action
had ended.33
The situation at Red Beach grew rapidly worse. I will not be evacuated, Brigade Commander San Roman had radioed during the night. We will fight to the
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end here if we have to. Shortly before noon, San Roman sent a chilling report: We
are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help. We cannot hold.34
General Lemnitzer, who spent much of 18 and 19 April at the White House,
later recalled that many far-fetched ideas for saving the Brigade were floated
about. On the morning of the 19th, the Chairman commented to President Kennedy
that this was the time for this outfit to go guerrilla. To Lemnitzers surprise, Bissell replied that the fighters ashore were not prepared to do so.35 At 1157, the JCS
ordered CINCLANT to send two destroyers to Blue Beach and see whether there
was any chance of evacuation. President Kennedy now was prepared to risk direct
intervention, even combat. At 1312, the JCS sent an order to CINCLANT directing destroyers36 to take personnel off the beach and from the water to the limit
of their capability. . . . If destroyers [are] fired upon they are authorized to return
the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission. . . . God be with
you.37
Too late, too late! At 1417, a US destroyer passed a yacht carrying perhaps 200
people. They said there was nothing left to salvage and that Castro was waiting
on the beach. Two destroyers pressed within gun range of Blue Beach and found
it completely held by Castros forces. Their mission ended at 1520 when they were
straddled by shore batteries and withdrew at high speed.38 Warships cruised along
the coast until 26 April but rescued only a few people. Practically the entire Brigade was captured and imprisoned.39
Post-Mortems
he Cuban debacle stunned the administrationand the entire nation. Victory has a hundred fathers, President Kennedy ruefully remarked to reporters; defeat is an orphan. On 21 April he asked General Maxwell Taylor, who had
been Army Chief of Staff from 1955 until 1959, to come to the White House. Arriving next morning, Taylor found a familiar airthat of a command post that had
been overrun by the enemy. There were the same glazed eyes, subdued voices, and
slow speech. Kennedy persuaded Taylor to lead an investigation of what had gone
wrong and why. Accordingly, on 22 April, the Cuba Study Group came into being.
Its members were Taylor, Admiral Burke, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and
Allen Dulles.40
The Group heard some fifty witnesses. The Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Shoup, gave testimony that appeared inconsistent to some Group members. Shoup recalled saying that if this kind of an operation can be done with this
kind of a force with this much training and knowledge, then Marine divisions
ought to go on leave for three months out of four. He remembered spending a
lot of sleepless hours because there was no plan for helping these men if trouble
developed. But he believed that Zapata would have been successful if it had been
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The Cuban Debacle

executed as planned. The JCS, he argued, were responsible for the operation only
insofar as the Commander in Chief might want to know something about the adequacy of the plan, or the probability of success.41
General White said he felt all along that the success or failure of this operation depended almost entirely upon the reaction of the Cuban people. The problem with Zapata, he testified, was that there were last-minute changes of which
we did not know, cancellation of the air strike being a very key factor.42 While
White was not as blunt-spoken as Shoup, his view of JCS responsibility was about
the same.
In his testimony, General Lemnitzer described the JCS role as one of appraisal, evaluation, offering of constructive criticism, and assisting CIA in looking at
the training and detailed plans. The Chiefs regarded Zapata as feasible, but it was
not within our purview to approve the plan. Taylor asked whether it was fair to
say that the JCS had given Zapata de facto approval on a piecemeal basis? Lemnitzer replied, No other solution was feasible at that time; the rainy season was
approaching and 100 Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia. Admiral
Burke, appearing as a witness, assessed JCS responsibility somewhat differently:
According to what had happened before . . . and in view of the procedures which
had been set up, yes, they did discharge their responsibility; but morally, they did
not. . . . I regret personally that I did not insist upon things that I felt uneasy about.
I felt uneasy about being briefed instead of having something in writing so that I
could wrestle with it.43
Early in June, the Study Group circulated a draft report. General Lemnitzer
objected to several passages, particularly what struck him as a focus on the 20-minute briefing of 15 March. Since the time spent by other officials was not cited, he
wrote General Taylor, the implication is that the Chiefs did not give sufficient
consideration to the concept. Lemnitzer noted that the Chiefs were by this time
fully conversant with the overall aspects of the operation and had been pre-briefed
on it. He himself had spent actually hours studying proposed solutions. As you
know, he continued, under such circumstances a well-organized military briefing
can cover much detail in twenty minutes. In this particular instance the issues were
clear-cut and the time allotted was sufficient to determine that . . . Zapata was the
most feasible alternative. Lemnitzer also challenged a statement that there is no
question as to [the Chiefs] de facto approval. The JCS, he insisted, only appraised
the plan; approval had to come at the national level. He also objected to a connotation that approval meant they believed that Zapata had a strong chance of succeeding. Actually, the Chiefs never went beyond an appraisal that with control of
the air and . . . surprise . . . the force could establish itself ashore, but ultimate success would depend upon popular support.44
The Study Groups final report to President Kennedy, dated 13 June, omitted
mention of the 20-minute briefing and de facto approval. It stated the JCS indicated a preference for Zapata on 15 March and subsequently took active part in
117

considering changes to the plan as it developed into final form, did not oppose the
plan and by their acquiescing in it gave others the impression of approval. The JCS
reviewed the plan as a body four times after 15 March but did not assess the final
version because they received it only two days before the landing. While individual
Chiefs gave it considerably more personal attention than the above record suggests,
they did not and probably could not give the plan the same meticulous study which a
commander would give to a plan for which he was personally responsible.45
What mattered most, of course, was the Presidents own judgment. From
personal observation, Taylor concluded there was no doubt that John F. Kennedy felt that they had let him down.46 Meeting with the Chiefs on 27 May, the
President spoke with restraint, saying he viewed the failure as one involving all
of us and sought to improve our ways of doing business together.47 On 28 June
he issued NSAM No. 55, embodying what he saw as the lessons learned. First, he
regarded the JCS as his principal military advisers and expected to receive their
views direct and unfiltered. Earlier, Kennedy had promised that he would set
aside two hours every month to meet with them, alone and without an official
record. Second, he expected the JCS to take a role in Cold War operations similar
to that which they bore in conventional ones. Third, the Chiefs should present
the military viewpoint in governmental councils in such a way as to insure that
the military factors are clearly understood before decisions are reached. Fourth,
President Kennedy regarded the JCS as more than military men and expected
their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine
all assets into a unified, effective pattern. This was done against a somber
backdrop for, as the Study Group warned the President on 13 June, we feel that
we are losing today on many fronts and that the trend can be reversed only by a
whole-hearted union of effort.48
Simultaneously, Kennedy recalled General Taylor to active duty and appointed
him Military Representative of the President. This was an entirely new position,
quite unlike the office of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, filled by Admiral William Leahy between 1942 and 1949. Taylor would neither chair JCS meetings
nor place himself between the President and his statutory advisers. He was simply
a staff officer to advise and assist the President. But he would maintain close liaison with other agencies and watch the functioning of the intelligence apparatus
of the government. In the so-called Cold War planning and action, he would see
that all available assets were properly integrated and employed.49
Although the JCS Working Group prepared an after-action report, the JCS
never carried out a collective critique of what went wrong and why. In July, however, Admiral Burke sent General Lemnitzer some summary observations. First,
Zapata was a military operation and should have been planned and controlled by
the military. Second, cancellation of the D-Day air strikes should have caused cancellation of the entire operation. Third, the plan itself was not bad; it was failure to
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The Cuban Debacle

adhere to the plan that was bad.50 For the JCS, the last point emerged as the most
important. During the Berlin confrontation and again during the Cuban missile
crisis, there was an undercurrent of worry that civilian leaders might impose lastminute changes upon well-considered military plans.
When interviewed in 1975, Admiral Burke acknowledged that the Chiefs could
be faulted (1) for displaying a certain naivet and (2) for failing to voice their reservations more forcefully. He added, however, that there were important extenuating circumstances. As to the naivet, they did not appreciate how ignorant the new administration was and how drastically President Kennedys methods differed from those
of his predecessor. When President Eisenhower rendered a decision, all discussion
ended. Kennedy, however, conducted business somewhat in the manner of a college
seminar; decisions could be reviewed and changed up to the moment of execution.
Thus, the JCS thought that matters were settled when, in fact, they were still open
to debate and revision. Also, in Burkes opinion, the JCS were hobbled by peculiar
procedures for planning and execution. They wanted to undertake regular staffing of
CIA plans but were not permitted to do so. They were told many times that this was
not their plan; the administration wanted only the Chiefs personal opinions on various aspects of it. Looking back, Burke believed the JCS should have discerned from
such instructions that the White House did not understand how a military organization operated. As to why the JCS did not put forward their reservations more vigorously, Burke noted that the administration had installed below the Secretarial level a
group of men who were determined to reduce the militarys influence upon foreign
policy. In late January 1961, for example, the White House cancelled a speech by
Admiral Burke because it purportedly dealt with subjects outside the military sphere.
Consequently, in the NSC and other forums, the Chiefs were reluctant to volunteer
opinions about matters beyond their professional cognizance.51
General Lemnitzers afterthoughts were less charitable. In a 1976 interview, he
stated quite forcefully his conviction that the new civilian hierarchy was crippled
not only by inexperience but also by arrogance, arising from failure to recognize
their own limitations. He himself was well aware how little knowledge the newcomers possessed. The problem was simply that civilians frequently ignored the
military. Thus, without consulting the JCS, they changed the concept from a covert
landing to a conventional amphibious assault, switched the landing site from Trinidad to Zapata, cancelled the D-Day air strikeand then blamed the Chiefs because
matters went badly.52
Major General Chester Clifton, USA, who was Kennedys Military Aide, related
that the Presidents anger against his military advisers cooled after he had time for
reflection. He was particularly impressed when the Chiefs kept silent while antiJCS stories, possibly leaked by White House staffers, appeared in Newsweek magazine. During a summer sojourn in Hyannis Port, the President remarked to Clifton
that, when the critical meetings occurred, he had not been in office long enough
to establish a proper rapport with the JCS. So, he said, the Chiefs were not at fault
119

that much. He had not known enough to ask the right questions, and they had not
volunteered opinions as he thought they should have done.53
Back on 5 May the NSC had agreed that US policy should aim at Castros
downfall and that, since approved measures were unlikely to bring that about, the
matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action. On 3 November, President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, a CIA-directed effort to
stir things up . . . with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run and operated by
Cubans themselves. Mongooses purpose was to bring about a revolt by the Cuban
people that would overthrow Castros regime. The 5412 Committee expanded into
a Special Group (Augmented), chaired by General Taylor and with General Lemnitzer as a member, which oversaw covert operations like Mongoose.54 So the next
round began.
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9
The Laotian Precipice
A Nascent Crisis
and-locked Laos, with a population of perhaps 2,000,000, was bordered on the east
by the two Vietnams, to the south by Cambodia, to the west by Thailand, and to
the north by China. For US policymakers, geography plus a long-standing worry about
falling dominoes combined to make Laos appear as a critical pawn in the struggle
for Southeast Asia. The 1954 Geneva Conference established Laos as an independent,
neutral nation; an International Control Commission (ICC) drawn from Canada, India,
and Poland undertook to enforce the terms of settlement. Nonetheless, the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) and the communist Pathet Lao waged a sporadic civil war. The
United States bolstered the RLG with arms and money, establishing a small Program
Evaluation Office (PEO) in lieu of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
In November 1957, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma achieved an apparent reconciliation in which two communists gained RLG posts. Souvannas halfbrother, Prince Souphanouvong, was titular leader of the Pathet Lao. The ICC,
considering its mission accomplished, departed in July 1958. Soon, however, Souvanna was ousted by a pro-westerner and hostilities resumed. A complex situation
became chaotic when, on 9 August 1960, Captain Kong Le and his paratroop battalion seized the administrative capital of Vientiane. Kong Le declared his goal to
be a regime espousing a true neutral policy akin to that of Prince Souvanna, who
promptly formed a new government.
Although Prince Souvannas cabinet contained no communists, his new
government was perceived as a threat to US interests and objectives. General Phoumi Nosavan, Minister of Defense in the ousted government and a
professed anti-communist, talked with US officials about suppressing Kong Le.
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Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Mansfield Sprague asked for JCS advice.
General White proposed saying that further deterioration may well result in a
complete loss of Laos to communism and encourage tendencies toward accommodation by other nations in Southeast Asia. Unless Phoumis Force Arme
Lao (FAL) got adequate support, the US ultimately may be faced with a far
more difficult decision involving the intervention of US combat forces. The
other Chiefs softened Whites wording. On 19 August 1960, the JCS advised Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates that if the situation continued or deteriorated
further, the government of Laos will be Communist oriented if not Communist
dominated. Since matters might very soon turn for the worse, Phoumi should
be informed immediately that the United Sates would provide him with the support necessary to regain control of the Laos Government. Four days later, at a
State-Defense meeting, Secretary Gates and the JCS stressed that Phoumi was
our only hope in Laos.1
Phoumi joined with Prince Boun Oum and, on 10 September, announced a rival
government. The State Department tried to carve a middle ground, working with
Souvanna while supporting Phoumi. That effort floundered. Late in October, senior
State and Defense officials agreed that Souvannas usefulness to the United States
was over. On 11 November, by a bloodless coup, Phoumi seized the royal capital
of Luang Prabang. One month later, Phoumi attacked Vientiane and Souvanna fled
to Cambodia. Kong Le, bolstered by a Soviet airlift, fought back. On 16 December,
however, Phoumis troops secured Vientiane. The National Assembly dissolved
Souvannas government and installed a pro-western regime under Boun Oum, with
Phoumi as his deputy. Kong Le and his men retreated northward to the Plain of
Jars, where they joined with Pathet Lao forces. Soviet aircraft supplied them by
parachute drops.2
Boun Oum promptly appealed for US military and economic assistance. General White urged decisive and expeditious action, in a manner calculated to demonstrate clearly the will and determination of the United States to support friendly
governments in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. Beyond materiel and
airlift support, White was willing to introduce US ground combat forces to help
maintain internal security. Also, as a pre-condition for increased military assistance, the RLG should be required to recall all its representatives to Communist
Bloc countries and formally protest against further Soviet aid to enemy factions.
But Admiral Burke and General Decker opposed, at this point, any proposal for
unilateral US intervention. Whites preconditions, they also objected, would put
King Savang in the awkward position of protesting against some of the same Soviet
assistance which the RLG very recently had accepted. On 22 December, the JCS
approved a memorandum that deleted Whites proposal for committing US forces
and recommended furnishing military assistance without preconditions. T6 aircraftarmed trainerswere furnished to Phoumi from stocks in Thailand, where
Laotian pilots would be trained.3
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At an NSC meeting on 5 January, Secretary of State Christian Herter objected
to a JCS report criticizing indecision and lack of clear-cut policies and citing StateDefense conflict of judgment . . . concerning the proper implementation of US
policy in Laos. General Lemnitzer said that the JCS had experienced for some
time a feeling of frustration about Laos. Back in August, when Kong Le rebelled,
the Chiefs wanted to build up Phoumis FAL but State had followed a course of
strengthening Souvanna. This issue was not settled, Lemnitzer observed, and
as a result Kong Le had several months in which to build up his forces. Herter
responded that arming Phoumi would have meant arming rebels against the recognized government. President Eisenhower ruled that indecision had to be eliminated from the JCS report,4 but tension between the Chiefs and State would persist.
General Wheeler, who was Director of the Joint Staff, had asked J5 to review
courses of action. On 30 December, J5 recommended ensuring that the PhoumiBoun Oum regime would continue to control the main population and communications centers, as well as bolstering the FALs morale and efficiency by overtly
establishing a Military Assistance Advisory Group. As 1961 opened, Kong Le and the
Pathet Lao, supported by North Vietnamese troops and an on-going Soviet airlift, carried out an offensive that consolidated their control over the Plain of Jars. Admiral
Burke, evidently reacting to the latest news from Laos, proposed much stronger
language: The United States should under no circumstances permit Laos to come
under Communist domination. If Laos falls to the Communists it will be only a matter of time until South East Asia falls. The US should be prepared, with or without
allies, to take any action necessary to keep Laos from falling to the Communists.5
The other Chiefs wanted to soften Burkes words: change under no circumstances
to not; delete with or without allies; alter any action to those actions. General
Decker added an explanatory paragraph tied more closely to geographical factors
and stating the US stake in Laos: If Laos were to fall into Communist hands, a wedge
would be driven between Thailand and Vietnam; the Communists would be placed in
a position to dominate Cambodia and to outflank the defenses of South Vietnam and
Thailand. Therefore, the United States should be prepared to take those actions necessary to keep Laos from falling to the Communists.
In the final version, sent to Secretary Gates on 14 January, the JCS said it is
increasingly obvious that the United States must take immediate and decisive
actions to defeat the aggressors in Laos or face the possibility of a neutral or communist dominated Southeast Asia. At a minimum, the Phoumi-Boun Oum regime
had to maintain control of the principal population and communications centers.
The ultimate objective was emergence of a viable government, friendly to the
United States, and in complete control of Laos. They urged immediate replacement of the PEO with a legitimate MAAG, thereby showing that the United States
had openly assumed responsibility for supporting Phoumis FAL.6
Probably, the Chiefs continued, expanded overt and covert support would
achieve the minimum objectives described above. If not, the United States should
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muster support for the Phoumi-Boun Oum regime within the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) and, if necessary, seek SEATOs agreement to intervene.7
Should unanimity by SEATO prove unattainableGreat Britain and France would
be very reluctant to actWashington should press for action by as many nations as
possible. Intervention by a third power alone, such as Thailand, struck them as less
desirable than a multilateral response. In such an eventuality, North Vietnam probably would provide equivalent support to the Pathet Lao, and Thailand certainly
would demand explicit assurances of US support. The JCS described unilateral US
intervention as a last resort, to be done only if a multilateral approach collapsed
and minimum objectives could not be attained in any other way. North Vietnam
probably would react to US or SEATO intervention by full-scale mobilization but
would not enter the battle without believing that its troops could quickly overrun
US and/or SEATO forces in Laos, and that such action would not entail a serious
risk of involvement in general war. This being so, increased readiness measures
should coincide with any intervention.8
On 19 January, Senator Kennedy came to the White House for a meeting that
focused on Laos. President Eisenhower described Laos as the cork in the bottle; losing it would mark the beginning of losing much of the Far East. He greatly
preferred intervening under SEATO auspices but would consider acting unilaterally as a last desperate hope. Secretary Gates voiced confidence that military
intervention would succeed; 12,000 troops and their supplies could deploy in
twelve days.9
The Alternatives Narrow
he new administration immediately commissioned a State-Defense-CIA task

force to chart courses of action. On 23 January, senior officials presented their
findings to President Kennedy; their speed in doing so showed that Laos was the
top priority item. Immediate military actions should include using PEO personnel
as tactical advisers to FAL units, using silver bullets and bounties to eliminate
Pathet Lao leaders, and establishing a small logistic support group in Thailand
where more FAL personnel would be trained. Among possible additional actions
were sending Thai and South Vietnamese aircraft as well as unmarked B26s on
combat missions, removing restrictions on Laotians use of bombs and napalm,
preparing to commit US aircraft if Chinese fighters started escorting Soviet transports, and getting ready to employ two Thai regiments as volunteers in Laos. Diplomatically, there should be discussions with Soviets, preliminary moves toward
intervention by SEATO, and exploration of a possible Neutral Nations Commission comprised of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya. President Kennedy approved
the immediate military actions, although using PEO personnel as tactical advisers
would await advice from the embassy in Vientiane.10
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On 24 January, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a list of recommendations that
moved many of the possible additional actions up to the immediate category.
Actions they wanted taken as soon as reasonably possible included stepping up
overt and covert military assistance, establishing a logistic support group in Thailand, and staffing the Laos Country Team with people who merited the trust of the
Boun Oum-Phoumi regime and possessed the experience, resolution, and stature
needed to ensure maximum US influence over the government. The last point was
a thinly veiled slap at Ambassador Winthrop Brown, whom they felt was willing to
accept a neutralist regime that would quickly become communist-controlled.11
The next day, when the JCS met with the President as a body for the first time,
Admiral Burke said that he believed that a combination of military and political
actions could save the friendly government. The Chiefs, General Lemnitzer commented, have not been advocating the establishment of major US forces in Laos,
but rather the support of indigenous forces. Kennedy asked how many US troops
could be committed in thirty days and what the other side could do in response.12
The Joint Chiefs calculated that 69,000 men (mainly from one airborne division, one Marine division/wing team, and five Air Force squadrons) could deploy to
Southeast Asia within thirty days. The communists in that same time could commit
156,000 men, including fifteen North Vietnamese and eight Chinese divisions along
with 465 Chinese jet aircraft. Those figures, Lemnitzer advised the President, were
not as alarming as they might seem. Military objectives, geographical limitations,
and competing requirements affected the equation. The North Vietnamese, for
example, could not send their whole army into Laos while they had to reckon with
internal security problems and possible attack from South Vietnam.13
For the time being, the administration avoided major, overt military initiatives. On 1 February, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric told General Lemnitzer that
installing a Military Assistance Advisory Group was ruled out from fear of political repercussions. Likewise, a request by Admiral Harry Felt, who was the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to fly supplies directly into Vientiane was rejected.
Instead, the JCS designated Udorn in Thailand as the terminal point for US transports. However, the PEO was augmented by nine Special Forces teams; funds
and equipment were provided for four new FAL infantry battalions, supporting
artillery, and special forces detachments.14
American diplomacy drew poor results. King Savang (who would become the
last king of the Kingdom of Laos) invited Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya to form
a Neutral Nations Commission; the first two countries promptly declined. But the
Soviets call to convene an international conference and resurrect the ICC bore
fruit, as Great Britain and India proved receptive.
Meanwhile, the Pathet Lao and Kong Les forces were gathering strength in
the Plain of Jars. Without more assistance, Admiral Felt concluded, Phoumis FAL
could not contain the expected enemy thrusts. In fact, Felt thought it likely that
the Pathet Lao soon would try to seize Luang Prabang, the royal capital and seat of
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government for the kingdom of Laos. On 3 March, President Kennedy directed General Lemnitzer to (1) prepare a plan for capturing the Plain of Jars and (2) bring
Admiral Felt and the Chief of the PEO, Brigadier General Andrew Boyle, USA, to
Washington.15
At a White House meeting on 9 March, Secretary McNamara and General
Lemnitzer presented the Plain of Jars plan. Preliminary interdiction operations
by aircraft and indigenous Meo guerrillas would be followed by a two-pronged
attack from east and south, culminating in an FAL airborne assault. Success was
contingent upon additional psychological moves, fire support and logistic effort,
all of which could be accomplished with little fear of compensatory or retaliatory action by the Communist Bloc. Since the rainy season opened early in May,
speedy implementation was vital. Recalling an earlier plan that was never carried
out, President Kennedy asked why this one was better. The response was that the
Laotians probably could not bring off the earlier attack by themselves, but they
could bring this plan off if we all supported it. Claiming that Ambassador Brown
had fought the earlier plan, McNamara said it was essential that State, Defense,
Felt, and Brown all work on the same set of instructions. Points were made that
the Laos we are fighting for now should be anti-Communist but neutralin other
words, keep the Laotian government from strong Communist influence. Before, we
sought a pro-Western neutral Laos. McNamara and Lemnitzer said that, if preparations began at once, 1 April could be D-Day for the Plain of Jars operation.16
This plan, and most of the assumptions underlying it, quickly became obsolete. The Pathet Lao captured a critical juncture of Routes 7 and 13, only thirty
miles from Luang Prabang. On 18 March, General Boyle advised Admiral Felt that
Phoumi had grown rather desperate and could not be cajoled into assuming the
offensive on any front.17
To the Brinkand Back
n 23 March, President Kennedy went on national television to tell the American people about a difficult and potentially dangerous situation in Laos:
The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral
independence. He favored constructive negotiation and backed Londons call
for a cease-fire and convocation of an international conference: We will not be
provoked, trapped, or drawn into this or any other situation; but I know that every
American will want this country to honor its obligations to the point that freedom
and security of the free world and ourselves may be achieved.18
Concurrently, the SEATO Council of Ministers met in Bangkok. The United
States sought a declaration of firm resolve . . . not to acquiesce in the overthrow
of the Royal Lao Government and to undertake whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances. Other signatories, however, insisted upon adding
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paragraphs that stressed the peaceful hopes of SEATO and the allies desire for a
negotiated solution.19 Admiral Felt sent the JCS a plan for multilateral operations.
The RLG would appeal to SEATO, upon which the United States, the Philippines,
Pakistan, Thailand, and possibly Australia would move to intervene. The US contribution would be three Marine battalions and one air group, one Army airborne
battle group, and one USAF mobile strike force. Within four days, Felt calculated,
these troops could secure the principal cities and river crossings. Upon review, the
JCS shortened the time for execution to 48 hours and instructed that all feasible
emphasis be placed on using Thai, Pakistani, and Filipino units.20
Back on 10 March, Secretary McNamara had tasked Lieutenant General T. J.
H. Trapnell (Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps) with surveying firsthand (1) the adequacy of the Plain of Jars plan, (2) the extent to which Phoumi
had placed his best leaders in command of forward areas, and (3) the relationships
among Ambassador Brown, Admiral Felt, Brigadier General Boyle, and Phoumi,
determining the degree to which Brown was helping or hindering the approved
program. Reporting to General Lemnitzer on 28 March, Trapnell attributed communist successes entirely to the presence of North Vietnamese advisers who act
as stiffeners in Pathet Lao units down to company and lower levels. He laid out
nine steps to bolster Phoumis forces. Trapnell also urged that Ambassador Brown
be replaceda recommendation that General Lemnitzer deleted before he released
the report for staffing. On 31 March, the JCS asked the Secretary of Defense to
approve Trapnells proposals for using sixteen B26s to bomb the Plain of Jars and
converting the PEO to a MAAG. As for the others, they decided to wait for comments from Admiral Felt, who soon endorsed almost all of them. By 20 April, the
administration agreed to convert the PEO into a MAAG, increase the FAL by seven
battalions, and give Phoumi more T6 aircraft. For the time being, though, any use
of B-26s was disapproved.21
Resurrection of the International Control Commission had become a real possibility, so the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze
asked for JCS views on how the ICC should function. As the Chiefs saw matters,
the ICC consisted of one pro-western power, one pro-communist, and one reluctant to offend either side. They agreed that Canada, Poland, and India should
continue to be its members but wanted the administration to impress upon Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru the importance of Laos as a test case for resolving EastWest disputes. The Chiefs sought two changes in the ICCs terms of reference.
First, delete the proviso that field teams must procure the combatants permission
in order to conduct inspections. Second, substitute a majority vote for unanimity when making recommendations about violations or threats thereof. Even with
these improvements, they remarked, the ICC still could not compel even grudging
compliance with either its own recommendations or those of the international
conference. Consequently, the ICCs responsibilities should be limited initially
to confirming the existence of a cease-fire. Until the international conference
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improved its terms of reference, the United States should oppose expanding the
ICCs mission into inspection and supervision. On 24 April, Nitze asked Secretary
Rusk to accept this advice as the US position.22
Events were accelerating toward a disaster. On 5 April, in the Plain of Jars,
Phoumi opened what was described as an offensive; it collapsed within a week. At
strong British urging, the administration acceded to calling an international conference without getting prior guarantees of a cease-fire. Accordingly, on 24 April
London and Moscow appealed for an armistice, asked Prime Minister Nehru to
reconvene the ICC to certify a cease-fire, and issued invitations for a 14-nation conference opening in Geneva on 12 May. All this while, the Pathet Lao were counterpunching so successfully that it looked as though they might seize Vientiane and
Luang Prabang before an armistice could take effect. The RLG agreed to a ceasefire on 25 April. Ambassador Brown and General Boyle believed that the FAL was
approaching dissolution.23
Shaken only a few days earlier by the Cuban debacle, the administration now
confronted another crisis. On 26 April, President Kennedy conferred with senior
officials, among whom were McNamara, Nitze, and Admiral Burke as Acting Chairman.24 According to McGeorge Bundy, there was general agreement among Kennedys advisers that large-scale involvement in Laos would be unjustified. But since
the possibility of a strong US response was the only card left to be played in pressing for a cease-fire, . . . the President explicitly refused to decide against intervention at this time. Kennedy authorized deploying carrier and amphibious forces into
the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea as well as alerting units earmarked under
SEATO plans to move into Laos. The Joint Chiefs directed CINCPAC to prepare
for movement into locations in South Vietnam and Thailand from which air strikes
could be launched.25
On the morning of 27 April, Secretary McNamara consulted the Service
Chiefs. How quickly, he asked, could US troops arrive in Vientiane? About 1,000
men per day during the first three days, they answered, assuming the airfield
was not interdicted. McNamara then posed three questions. First, should the
United States intervene under SEATO auspices? Burke and White said yes;
Decker and Shoup gave vigorous nos. Second, should we try to hold southern
Laos? They split the same way, two yes and two no. Decker and Shoup argued
that North Vietnam and China would react just as strongly to this as they would
to a full-blown intervention. They also cautioned against the likelihood of largescale losses to tropical disease. Third, if the communists took control of Laos,
should we station troops in South Vietnam and Thailand? They all agreed that
this should be done.
Later that morning, the NSC reviewed matters without reaching any decisions.
The President and Admiral Burke then briefed Congressional leaders. Kennedy
told them that Vientiane might fall in 24 to 48 hours, at which time he would have
to decide whether US troops should move into Laos southern panhandle. The
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Chinese, Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles added, had stated flatly that
they would enter Laos if the Americans did. After a short silence, Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield said that intervention would be the worst possible mistake
we could make. Senators William Fulbright and Hubert Humphrey supported him.
Admiral Burke argued that the choice lay between what would likely be a long,
tough, hard warincluding use of nuclear weaponsand losing Southeast Asia
and retreating to the offshore island chain. Everett Dirksen, the Senate Minority
Leader, replied that when under pressure a sound military rule was to shorten the
line. Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee, called
our commitment in Laos an incredible fantasy from the beginning and wanted to
write the country off.26
Afterward, Admiral Burke spoke with senators whom he believed to be
hawkish. They told him that they had not spoken in his support because they felt
that they should not comment upon anything except the Presidents plan, which
Burkes presentation clearly was not. Admiral Burke again approached President
Kennedy, who told him bluntly that there was no point in further discussion. Burke
then gave the Chief Executive a one-page memorandum wherein he predicted that
losing Laos ultimately would mean losing all of Southeast Asia.27
At an NSC meeting on 29 April, the Service Chiefs emphasized escalation
through air power. Admiral Burke argued that each time you give ground it is
harder to stand the next time. If we give up Laos we would have to put US forces
into Viet-Nam and Thailand. We would have to throw in enough to winperhaps
the works. General Decker said that we cannot win a conventional war in
Southeast Asia; if we go in, we should go in to win, and that means bombing Hanoi,
China, and maybe even using nuclear weapons. The terrain in Laos, he pointed
out, would negate our advantage in heavy equipment and put us at the mercy of
guerrillas. Decker suggested first moving troops into Thailand and South Vietnam;
if there was still no cease-fire, then we should be ready to go ahead. General
LeMay, representing General White, reviewed possible ways of using air power,
which he believed could do the job alone. He did not think the Chinese would
intervene, but if they did we should go to work on China itself and let Generalissimo Chiang [Kai-Shek] take Hainan Island in the South China Sea. [Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was President of the Republic of China on Taiwan.] General
Shoup suggested employing B26s before troops were committed. Secretary Rusk
said that if a cease-fire was not achieved quickly, it would be necessary to get the
United Nations to endorse SEATO intervention. Secretary McNamara and Admiral
Burke replied that securing approval from the UN General Assembly would take
more than two weeks; Burkes view was that only the United States could pull its
own chestnuts out of the fire. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles said that
we were going to have to fight the Chinese anyway and it was just a question
of where, when, and how. In that case, LeMay responded, we should fight soon
since the Chinese would have nuclear weapons within one or two years.28
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On 1 May, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft memorandum for the President that recommended sending US troops into the Laotian panhandle. If North
Vietnam and China intervened, nuclear weapons should be used if necessary to
avoid defeat: In summary, we face the very real danger that a retreat in Laos will
trigger the eventual defeat of the West in Southeast Asia, whereas intervention now
may very well maintain essentially a continuation of the status quo in Soviet-US
relations. Convening later that day, the NSC tasked the Joint Chiefs with preparing an appreciation of the military implications of various measures that might be
taken in Southeast Asia.29
On 2 May, Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric circulated a
revised paper that, after listing pros and cons, advocated intervening if a cease-fire
was not achieved very quickly. We must be prepared for the worst and promptly
counter each added element brought against our forces with a more than compensating increment from our side. Uncontrolled escalation was very unlikely, since
the Soviets could hardly wish to see such an outcome. But achieving a settlement
at lower levels requires us to be willing to conduct ourselves without flinching
from such escalation. . . . A basic assumption in their paper, which hindsight
makes questionable, was that Moscow could exercise close control over what happened in the Far East.30
After a long discussion, Secretary McNamara asked the Service Chiefs and
Service Secretaries to submit written views that same afternoon. There were
those who thought that McNamara, perhaps subconsciously, was assuming the
role of JCS Chairman, leading discussions, soliciting individual opinions, and
providing off-the-cuff guidance. In any case, the Chiefs answers ran a wide
gamut. Admiral Burke wanted to put troops in Thailand and South Vietnam at
once and, within 48 hours, send SEATO troops to protect critical population
centers still held by the FAL. If no cease-fire followed, air strikes against targets
in Laos should begin and every enemy escalation should be matched forthwith.
General Decker also recommended sending SEATO troops into Thailand and
South Vietnam. He was circumspect about the next steps: If fighting continued,
then consideration should be given to direct intervention by SEATO ground
forces in Laos. Saying that intervention was a political decision, Decker neither
opposed nor endorsed it. General Shoup believed that massing forces in Thailand
and South Vietnam was the best way to obtain a cease-fire. Washington should
say that, unless a cease-fire began within 48 hours, stronger steps would follow.
Intervention should then involve ground occupation of given areas and air bombing within Laos. General White went much further than his colleagues. Calling
the Asian mainland a most unfavorable area in which to wage a land war, he
was reluctant to commit any more than token ground forces. If the communists
did not accept an armistice within 48 hours, aircraft should strike targets in
Laos. Then, if there was still no cease-fire, naval and air forces ought to threaten
Hanoi and south China. If the communists kept fighting, White proposed to strike
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Hanoi. That probably would ignite conflict with China, but I believe that war
with China is inevitable if we take decisive action in Southeast Asia and I would
seize the initiative.31
Admiral Burke had cabled General Lemnitzer, who was in Bangkok, asking
for his views. Replying on 2 May, Lemnitzer advised that only immediate military action could prevent losing most if not all the remaining key areas in Laos.
Thai and South Vietnamese leaders with whom he had spoken were deeply
frustrated and discouraged by developments in Laos and SEATOs failure to
act. The United States should not act unilaterally, he continued, but neither
should it delay because Britain and France were unwilling to join. He believed
that Pakistan, Thailand, and probably the Philippines would provide troops;
they awaited only a SEATO summons and a US airlift. Lemnitzer proposed that
the Royal Laotian Government ask for immediate SEATO intervention. SEATO
units then should proceed to secure as much FAL-held territory as possible. If
communists fought them and attempted further advances, SEATO forces should
counterattack strongly.32
At an NSC meeting during the late afternoon of 2 May, President Kennedy
ordered contingency planning to continue in the light of the rapidly developing
situation. Hours later, word came that the Soviets had told the Pathet Lao to
work out a cease-fire. Next day, the Pathet Lao did announce their agreement to
an armistice. On 4 May, State and Defense representatives circulated a draft plan
in which 12,000 to 13,000 SEATO troops would occupy crucial points along the
Mekong River that were still under RLG/FAL control. Should the Pathet Lao continue a broad offensive, they and their supply lines would be brought under air
attack. If a major North Vietnamese attack appeared imminent, Defense wanted
authority for immediate air strikes, but State would wait until an attack actually
occurred. State and Defense agreed, though, that in case of Chinese intervention
political authorization would be sought for prompt counter-action.33
Secretary Rusk asked whether we could conduct a conventional campaign
against North Vietnam and China. The Joint Staffs Operations Directorate concluded that the only way of countering Chinese intervention was to sever lines of
communication from China into North Vietnam and Laos. General White, dissatisfied, drafted a completely new paper stating that the United States was incapable
of waging non-nuclear war against China. The other Chiefs agreed. On 12 May,
they advised Secretary McNamara that we could conduct full-scale non-nuclear
war in Laos and North Vietnambut not against China. Also, conventional combat in Southeast Asia would degrade our capabilities elsewhere until mobilization and other emergency measures took effect. All the more reason, then, for
intervention to be preceded by a firm decision to achieve success. CINCPAC, they
noted, already possessed enough nuclear power to destroy or neutralize a Chinese
threat.34 By this time, however, diplomats were taking center stage.
131
Detours along the Geneva Road
n 9 May, President Kennedy approved guidance for US negotiators at the

Geneva Conference. The goal should be a neutral, independent, peaceful,
sovereign, and socially and economically viable Laos. However, Our position on
the ground is weak. We cannot enforce what we would like. The Communists will
insist on getting a Communist-dominated coalition government. The United States
should be prepared to have the conference fail. If that happened and communists
renewed their offensive, we will face the ultimate decision: whether or not to
introduce US forces into this area through SEATO or with those SEATO members
prepared to participate. Kennedy told advisers that, while he had not ruled out
intervention, for the time being we didnt want to get large forces tied down in
such an out-of-the-way place, particularly with so many other things going on.35
On 11 May, a revived International Control Commission certified the existence of a cease-fire. The Geneva Conference opened five days later.36 Communist
attacks broke the cease-fire several times. On 12 July, the JCS protested to Secretary McNamara that US determination not to walk out of the Conference is dominating all other considerations. If current trends continued, Laos would emerge
more communist than neutral in which case US prestige will have suffered
another serious blow. They cited failure to exercise active leadership in SEATO,
particularly since August 1960. They saw a larger issue at stake: Credibility in the
US deterrent is waning. The challenge has been made in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev has indicated that Berlin may be next. Taking a firm stand over Laos, where
the risk of escalating into nuclear war was less than over Berlin, would enhance
credibility in US determination to use its military force wherever needed to protect
its interests. Such a course of action need not unhinge our general war posture to a
significant degree. The JCS recommended responding to the next cease-fire violation by (1) withdrawing from Geneva and (2) undertaking operations in Laos either
through SEATO, with willing SEATO members, or even unilaterally to achieve the
necessary military position to permit successful political negotiation for a unified
independent and neutral Laos.37
There was no change in administration policy. Late in August, the United
States, Britain, and France agreed to support Souvanna for the premiership of a
neutral coalition government. In return Souvanna would pledge to uphold the
monarchy and the constitution, deny communists access to critical cabinet posts,
and postpone elections until some tranquility was restored and non-communists could organize their political strength. Soon after, President Kennedy also
approved measures that included increasing US mobile training teams to 500 personnel and authorizing photo reconnaissance missions over all of Laos.38
The JCS remained deeply dissatisfied. On 7 September, they warned Secretary
McNamara that preoccupation with the confrontation over Berlin was obscuring important issues in Asia. They reasoned as follows: In 1948 the Communists
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concentrated our attention, resources, and effort in Europe by creating the Berlin
blockade. This action effectively diverted United States and world attention from
Communist action in Asia which had reached by late 1949 its interim goal of a
Communist-dominated mainland China. . . . This same pattern is evident again with
respect to Southeast Asia and Berlin. In their judgment, the Laotian situation had
deteriorated so drastically that the United States must take immediate and positive action to prevent a complete communist takeover of Laos and the ultimate loss
of all Southeast Asia to include Indonesia. Hence, unless an acceptable political
solution was achieved before the rainy season ended and fighting resumed, SEATO
forces should be sent into Laos.39
Judging by what we now know, the JCS were wrong in thinking that Moscow
and Beijing colluded to draw US attention away from communist designs in the
Far East. Stalin in 1948 and Khrushchev in 1961 tightened the screws on Berlin for
reasons that had nothing to do with events in Asia. But the Joint Chiefs belief in a
world-wide, coordinated communist strategy would continue to shape their views
about Southeast Asia.
In any case, President Kennedy kept following the diplomatic path. He
remarked to speech-writer Theodore Sorensen, Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise wed be in Laos by nowand that would be a hundred times worse.40
Contingency planning, of course, moved forward. A State-Defense proposal for
dealing with a major resumption of hostilities was completed late in September. Its
political objective was restoring RLG sovereignty over all Laos except the northeast area already under communist control. SEATO would send 24,500 troops into
Laos, with another 18,300 support personnel in Thailand. If strong North Vietnamese units entered Laos, friendly forces will take action without waiting for actual
engagement and will strike the enemy in Laos. Thus the earlier State-Defense dispute was resolved in Defenses favor. To meet a combined Chinese-North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, SEATO would need 278,000 men, including fifteen divisions
and eight regimental combat teams. The US contribution would be four divisions,
two of them drawn from the CONUS strategic reserve.41
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric advised the JCS that he was particularly concerned by the possibility of simultaneous crises in Laos and Berlin. Would assembling massive air power for Southeast Asia dilute other deployments, including
our basic posture for nuclear strikes? Gilpatric thought that the Presidents
decision on the proposed plan may well hinge on the risk of getting into a serious
two-front situation.42
In answering him, the JCS gave no ground. Necessary naval and air forces, they
said, could be concentrated in Southeast Asia without crippling capabilities elsewhere. More importantly, they contended that the time is now past when actions
short of intervention could reverse a rapidly worsening situation and prevent
losing Laos, South Vietnam, and ultimately Southeast Asia. Intervening in Laos
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might well spark escalation and thus compel mobilization beyond what was being
done over Berlin. But, they argued, it is not a question of the desirability of having
two limited war situations going at the same time. Rather, the fact of the matter
is that we may be faced with such a contingency.43 The exceptionally strong wording in this paper requires explanation. First, these were days in which tension over
Berlin was at a peak. Second, and probably more important, was the residue from
the Bay of Pigs. The JCS obviously worried about the administrations steadiness
and will to prevail.
In December 1961, Souvanna worked to assemble a government of national
union in which his neutralists would get the critical Defense and Interior ministries. The administration supported Souvannas effort and, when Phoumi would not
accede to it, suspended a $52 million monthly subsidy to the RLG. The JCS protested that, while our military programs were designed to bolster the RLGs bargaining
position, our political decisions were sapping the RLGs prestige and effectiveness
to the point where the legal government may soon have no tenable position from
which to negotiate. They believed the RLG had so improved its military posture
since May that it could and should negotiate from a position of strength.44 Phoumi
should not be pressured into yielding the Defense and Interior ministries to Souvannas faction. A neutralist Defense minister would bar pro-western officers
from high command positions, imperiling hard-won and very considerable American military assets. Occasional restraint of the RLG undoubtedly was required,
the Chiefs acknowledged, but encouragement and full assurance of continued US
support are equally necessary to the achievement of US objectives in Laos. Deputy
Secretary Gilpatric forwarded this memorandum to Secretary Rusk and President
Kennedy. While withholding endorsement of those parts that dealt primarily with
political matters, he noted that a Special National Intelligence Estimate recently
had confirmed the Joint Chiefs assessment of RLG military capabilities. Gilpatric
felt reasonably confident that, in the absence of reinforcements from North Vietnam, Phoumis troops could hold their ground.45
A Crisis Reprised
uring January 1962, Phoumis troops suffered a series of minor defeats. A

new Special National Intelligence Estimate attributed these reverses mainly
to an increase of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, from about 5,000 up to 9,000.
On 21 March, in Hawaii, Secretary McNamara, Lemnitzer and Decker conferred
with Admiral Felt and his staff. McNamara asked about enemy capabilities and
was told that the Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese help, could capture major
cities in about thirty days. General Lemnitzer said that a showdown was near
and doubted that the administration would authorize intervention by either US or
SEATO forces. Therefore, our only recourse is to support Phoumi and make him
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fight to keep the territory that he still controlled. Lemnitzer vigorously objected
to intimations that the MAAG should withdraw, denouncing that as a devastating
psychological blow that would hand the country over to the Communists. All the
conferees agreed that the MAAG should remain.46
On 19 April, President Kennedy decided that MAAG mobile training teams
should withdraw from forward positions sometime after 7 May. That was done to
pressure Phoumi into accepting Souvannas distribution of cabinet portfolios, and
Phoumi did become more flexible. Against US advice, though, Phoumi had concentrated 5,000 of his best troops at the town of Nam Tha near the Chinese border.
During 56 May, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces attacked Nam Tha and
sent Phoumis men streaming across the Mekong River into Thailand, about 75
miles away. Communists now controlled all northern Laos and were occupying
stretches of the Mekong River.47
This time, JCS suspicions about coordinated action by Moscow and Beijing
were justified. Khrushchev stopped trying to restrain the Pathet Lao, approving
what he was assured would be a reasonable campaign that did not widen the conflict. The Chinese deployed 2,149 of their soldiers along with 1,772 civilian workers,
203 vehicles, and 609 horses and mules to supply the Pathet Lao.48
Secretary McNamara and Lemnitzer were in Athens attending a NATO meeting.
President Kennedy ordered them to go at once to Southeast Asia and determine
(1) whether the Mekong would be an effective barrier and (2) whether Thai forces
could prevent the communists from entering northern Thailand. The two men
travelled non-stop to Bangkok. After transferring to a C47, they flew along the
Mekong at heights of 100 to 200 feet. They quickly perceived that the river posed
no obstacle at all. This was the dry season, and the water level had dropped so low
that they saw people wading across the Mekong. McNamara and Lemnitzer then
inspected some Thai military posts near the river and concluded that Thai troops,
as currently disposed, could not block a crossing.
Lemnitzer decided that the Thais needed to organize an airborne regiment to
constitute a rapidly deployable reserve. McNamara urged Prime Minister Thanarat
Sarit to create such a unit. Sarit agreed, if the United States would furnish equipment and financial support. McNamara replied that the Thais were perfectly capable of paying the costs themselves, and no agreement was reached.49
In Washington, meanwhile, the Service Chiefs described Nam Tha as conclusive
evidence of Souvannas inability to control the Pathet Lao. State proposed taking
steps to undermine Phoumis influence; they disagreed. The Chiefs recommended,
among other things, moving a US Army battle group then in Thailand up to the Laotian border and making it apparent that SEATO or US troops slated for intervention
had been alerted. Unless the pre-Nam Tha cease-fire line was restored, they saw no
alternative to intervening with as many SEATO members as proved willing.50
On 12 May, Secretary McNamara and Lemnitzer returned to Washington where
they briefed the NSC. President Kennedy authorized what he emphasized were
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strictly precautionary dispositions. These included: positioning two carriers in
the Gulf of Siam near Bangkok; augmenting and moving the battle group to the
border; alerting airborne units in Okinawa and the Philippines; and putting one
Marine battalion landing team, one Marine and one Air Force tactical squadron into
Thailand. The next day, Kennedy also directed steps to replace Phoumi as a political figure and restrict him to a military role. By 22 May, six of the nine thousand US
troops ordered to Thailand had arrived there.51
On 24 May, President Kennedy directed State and Defense to prepare plans for
two contingencies: using Thai forces to hold, with US support, Sayabouri province
in northwestern Laos; and retaking the southern panhandle by Thai, South Vietnamese, or US forces. The working groups first effort drew criticism from Secretary McNamara, the JCS, and from General Taylor who, as Military Representative
of the President, was monitoring the situation closely. On 2 June, senior officials
reviewed the groups revised plan. Initially, nine to ten thousand US troops would
occupy sites along the Mekong River valley. Taylor voiced doubts about occupying
an area so large that we might be drawn into a massive guerrilla pacification campaign. The primary purpose, he said, should be to protect South Vietnam and Thailand. Lemnitzer agreed that the issue was basically the security of Southeast Asia
and that the main threat to that security was North Vietnam. He outlined a plan for
landing at Vinh, just above the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams, in
order to seal off all the infiltration routes into Laos and South Vietnam. Conferees
reached a consensus that Laotian territory, while unimportant in itself, was important for the defense of Southeast Asia.52
On 4 June, the working group distributed another revision that again listed
occupying Mekong sites as the first step but described North Vietnamese aggression as the root cause of the problem in Southeast Asia. Senior officials still were
not satisfied. The Secretary of Defense believed that critical decisions would come
much more rapidly than the group presumed. He could not visualize remaining
long at the stage of merely occupying the Mekong valley; the communists almost
certainly would react in such a way as to make rapid escalation inevitable. The JCS
called for changes that included: shifting emphasis from a response against enemy
moves to initiating offensive actions; expanding consideration of the threshold
beyond which we would find communist activity intolerable; and removing limitations on air attacks in Laos and North Vietnam (e.g., heavy attacks against military
targets throughout North Vietnam rather than a massive strike on Hanoi). The significance of this exercise was that the focus of planning shifted from holding parts
of Laos to punishing North Vietnam. In fact, Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs
now opposed intervening in Laos simply for the purpose of achieving a unified,
neutral country under a coalition government. Planning, instead, would proceed to
support whatever expanded political objectives might be approved as the situation in Laos continues to develop.53
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On 11 June, Souvanna, Phoumi, and Prince Souphanouvong announced agreement on a Provisional Government of National Union. Cabinet posts were apportioned as follows: seven Souvanna neutralists with Souvanna himself as Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense; four Pathet Lao figures, with Souphanouvong as
Deputy Prime Minister; four RLG members, with Phoumi as another Deputy Prime
Minister; and four other right-wing neutralists not tied to Phoumi. Now satisfied with
Phoumis behavior, the United States resumed its financial support of the RLG.54
On 23 June, the Provisional Government was officially installed at Vientiane.
Exactly one month later, the fourteen powers at Geneva subscribed to a Declaration
on the Neutrality of Laos. They also agreed to a protocol requiring that all foreign
troops leave Laos within 75 days and prohibiting the importation of any armaments
save those needed for national defense. The ICC was empowered to supervise both
the cease-fire and the evacuation. The ICC could investigate alleged cease-fire violations either at the RLGs request or by a majority vote of its own members. Unanimity
was necessary, though, for all conclusions and recommendations.55
Soon, North Vietnam emerged as the real winner. The ICC, of course, proved
ineffective. With the Ho Chi Minh Trail down through eastern Laos now secure,
Hanoi infiltrated men and supplies into South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs were right
in claiming that nothing short of a powerful intervention, with air attacks extending beyond Laos, could have prevented that outcome. Yet time would show that
what was at stake was control of Indochina and not, as the Chiefs believed, of all
Southeast Asia.
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10
The Berlin Confrontation
Challenges Repulsed
hen World War II ended, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
the Soviet Union split the German capital as well as the German homeland
into occupation zones. Berlin, divided into four sectors, lay deep within the Soviet
zone about 110 miles from any of the western zones. Formal arrangements provided the western powers with access along air corridors, but arrangements for
rail and road passage derived from verbal understandings. In 1948, with Europe
itself divided by an iron curtain, the Soviets halted all ground access to what had
become West Berlin. A massive airlift kept West Berlin alive, and the Soviets eventually reopened the ground routes in May 1949.
Two separate German states came into existence1 but Berlin remained under
four-power occupation. Then, on 27 November 1958, the Soviets accused the western powers of using Berlin as a springboard for intensive espionage, sabotage, and
other subversive activities. Accordingly, Moscow proposed to end the four-power
occupation and convert Berlin into a demilitarized free city. Unless appropriate
arrangements were completed within six months, the USSR and East Germany
would conclude a separate peace treaty transferring occupation functions to the
East German government.2
President Eisenhowers response was firm yet low-key. He made no concessions but rejected JCS recommendations that would require a large-scale mobilization. What was the point of activating two or three divisions, he asked, when the
Soviets could deploy many more? He did not believe war would come but if it did
we must have the crust to follow through by using nuclear weapons.3 The Soviets six-month deadline passed quietly and tension eased.
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In the field, responsibility rested with General Lauris Norstad, USAF, who was
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as well as US Commander in Chief, Europe
(USCINCEUR). To prepare for Berlin contingencies, he was directed to create a tripartite planning staff called LIVE OAK. When supervising LIVE OAK, Norstad acted
only in his capacity as USCINCEUR. This bypassing of NATO channels was necessary because the North Atlantic Treaty, while it applied to American, British, and
French occupation troops, did not cover access and occupation rights in Berlin. In
May 1960, Norstad accepted LIVE OAKs plan for preserving air access. In June, he
approved LIVE OAKs proposal for testing a ground blockade with a battalion-size
probe. In January 1961, the three governments instructed Norstad to prepare plans
for a division-size thrust along the Helmstedt-to-Berlin autobahn.4
There was unilateral as well as tripartite planning. On 12 August 1960, the JCS
sent Secretary Gates a detailed checklist of possible countermeasures for meeting
a range of contingencies. If there was a Soviet turnover of control to East Germany,
for example, they listed fourteen options that included raising US forces in Europe to
full strength, increasing tripartite use of the Helmstedt-to-Berlin autobahn, and establishing an anti-submarine patrol along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom line.5
A Looming Showdown?
ate in February 1961, Moscow again warned that a peace treaty, liquidating the
four-power occupation and giving control over access routes to East Germany,
was forthcoming. President Kennedy commissioned former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson to study the Berlin problem. Replying on 3 April, Acheson argued that since
there could be no Berlin solution without German reunification, all courses of
action open to the United States were dangerous. So, if a crisis came, boldness might
be the best course. He concluded that the western powers could neither reopen a
ground corridor nor sustain an airlift against determined Soviet resistance. Therefore, the test would be one of will power rather than military power. The Soviets
could defeat or capture a battalion-size probe without revealing their depth of commitment. But using an armored division, with another division in reserve, would be
wholly different because such a force could deal with East German and token Soviet
opposition. He urged more professional study of such a move.6
Secretary McNamara, meantime, asked the JCS to review the adequacy of
contingency plans. They replied that their checklist of August 1960 remained
a satisfactory framework. As for LIVE OAK, though, they identified important
deficiencies including: training of the tripartite battalion force; completion of the
concept for a division-size probe; and arrangements for West German participation in LIVE OAK.7
The White House asked DOD to assess outcomes of a probe by one or two
divisions, a major effort to maintain air access, and to suggest actions outside
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Europe that might pressure the USSR into restoring access. On 28 April, the JCS
sent McNamara their views. Any substantial ground probe should be preceded by
the arrival in Europe of reinforcements, extensive deployments within the theater,
and partial mobilization. The East Germans alone, they said, could stop although
not destroy a two-division force. The Soviets could isolate and annihilate the two
divisions, but only by massing a large army. Thus the probe would serve political
rather than military purposes, setting up a test of wills that offered both sides a
wide range of alternatives. The Soviets might choose to restore access rather than
risk general war. An airlift, the Chiefs warned, could be broken by either harassment (e.g., jamming and electronic deception) or military measures. If either side
resorted to force, counterattacks on airfields and ground installations would be
imperative and the area of conflict must rapidly expand. As for countermeasures
outside Europe, they were satisfied with those in their August 1960 checklist (e.g.,
steps against Soviet Bloc shipping).8
Writing to President Kennedy on 5 May, Secretary McNamara recommended an
early re-examination of policy guidance. Plans from the Eisenhower era, in which
repulse of a small probe would be followed by rapid escalation, were inconsistent
with current thinking which proposes the use of substantial conventional force
before resorting to nuclear weapons. From the JCS paper, he concluded that plans
must be laid for a large-scale effort to reopen the autobahn, that efforts to restore
air access would be most hazardous, and that a wide range of worldwide pressures
could be applied against the USSR. Also, plans should be laid for exploiting West
Germanys military potential. McNamara seemed deeply disturbed by the Joint
Chiefs judgment that East German forces alone could stop a one or two-division
probe. A great power, he insisted, should not risk defeat by a puppet regime. Only
by overcoming purely East German resistance could a test of wills between the
United States and the Soviet Union take place.9
Concurrently, the JCS gave Secretary McNamara their appraisal of Achesons
report, calling it a realistic analysis of a complex politico-military problem. They
did take issue with it on some points. Launching a battalion probe probably should
precede a complete division, since the smaller force might reopen the autobahn.
Also, because a ground probe carried less risk of escalation than trying to break an
air blockade, vigorous efforts to reopen ground access should be exhausted before
an airlift began. Finally, the fact that West Berlin was militarily indefensible meant
that, at some point, resorting to general war might become preferable to committing more conventional forces.10
After reviewing McNamaras memorandum of 5 May, the JCS advised that his
phrase substantial conventional military force was, at this point, undefined and
hence unusable. When General Norstads appreciation arrived, a better definition
might be prepared for inclusion in a broader revision of policy.11 Before any policy
statement left the Pentagon, they wanted an opportunity to assess its implications.
The Chiefs also worried that linking nuclear weapons with general war measures
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would impair the latitude necessary in nuclear planning. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric agreed that planning must not be restricted in that way.12
General Norstads appreciation showed that he had no liking for flexible
response, as the administration conceived it. A small probe, he reasoned, would be
enough to show our seriousness of purpose and reveal Soviet intentions. Norstad
believed the communists could stop a large probe as easily as a small one, and
the greater the force used the greater the embarrassment which would result from
failure. Successive repulses might simply condition the western powers to defeat.
Nothing, he reminded McNamara, would impress the Soviets less than wasting in the corridor forces that are known to be essential to our overall defense.
Norstad also opposed the idea of using West German troops to reopen the autobahn. That would constitute an invasion of East Germany and cause the Soviets
to invoke their Warsaw Pact commitments. Under those circumstances, it is hard
to foresee any possibility of disengagement by either the East Germans or by the
Russians if West German forces become involved with them. Finally, Norstad
found it difficult to conceive a thrust that would confront East German troops
alone. A Soviet division stationed astride the autobahn at Magdeburg could avoid
action only by withdrawing. Once a battle began, he predicted, the Soviets could
not afford to allow the East Germans to be beaten. The Soviets need not intervene
openly; they could provide air, artillery, and logistic support in a covert manner
that never could be proven.13 This appreciation marked the opening of a major rift
between General Norstad and the civilian leadership.
The JCS, on 21 June, bluntly informed Secretary McNamara that the basic
hypothesis that the opposition will be purely [East German] is invalid. Although a
force of seven divisions and four tactical air wings could open and maintain access
against East German opposition, the concept of operations is so dependent upon
assumptions as to be an extreme gamble. Planning for this possibility formally
ended two months later.14
The Credibility Issue Takes Center Stage
n 12 May, Khrushchev proposed to President Kennedy that the two men meet
in Vienna during early June. This was agreeable to the President and arrangements were quickly consummated. On 26 May, one week before the meeting,
Premier Khrushchev told his Presidium colleagues that he believed the western
powers could be pried out of Berlin with hardly any risk of war. He intended to
conclude a peace treaty with the East German government and transfer to it control over air and ground access routes. Air traffic would be cut off, then allowed
to resume on condition that western planes land at East German airfields. Any
allied planes trying to land in West Berlin would be shot down. No other lifelines
would be severed, and there would be no interference in the affairs of West Berlin.
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Khrushchev assessed the conventional balance in Central Europe as highly unfavorable to NATO and presumed that American and European public opinion would
prevent the United States from resorting to force.15
On 27 May, the JCS provided President Kennedy with advice of a kind that
rarely appears in the written record:
In your conversations with Premier Khrushchev . . . be assured that you
speak from a position of decisive military superiority in any matter affecting
the vital interests of the United States and our Allies. . . .
It is the considered judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military
forces under your command . . . can achieve decisive military victory in any
all-out test of strength with the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent that the United
States will retain the dominant power position in the world. Thus, in your discussions, be assured that you may represent the national interest with confidence and without fear or reservation.
The military forces of the United States reaffirm their dedication to your
command and wish you Godspeed in your mission.
The phrases decisive military superiority and decisive military victory are
arresting. After the campaign oratory about a missile gap and the Bay of Pigs
fiasco, the JCS expected Khrushchev to act aggressively and wanted to be sure that
President Kennedy was fully aware of US strength.16
At Vienna, over 34 June, President Kennedy did face a forceful, confident
adversary. Khrushchev said that his decision to sign a separate treaty by December
was irrevocable. Kennedy, conceding nothing, replied that it would be a cold winter. The President then travelled to London, where Prime Minister Harold Macmillan found him somewhat stunned and baffled. Evidently, negotiating with Khrushchev had been rather like talking to Napoleon at the peak of his power. General
Lemnitzer, likewise, thought that Vienna had left Kennedy deeply disturbed.17
On 14 June, the JCS reviewed the situation with Dean Acheson, Admiral Dennison (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), and General Norstad. Acheson
feared that US nuclear power no longer restrained the Soviets from challenging us
directly. Agreeing, the JCS on 21 June advised Secretary McNamara that there was
an urgent need to re-establish the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Assuming a D-Day for Berlin of 31 December, they set out a sequence of actions. The
more significant ones follow: Between July and December, raise forces in Europe
to full strength, declare a national emergency and initiate appropriate mobilization,
resume U2 flights over the USSR, and intervene if necessary in Cuba, Laos, and
Vietnam. Between September and November, restart nuclear testing, and withdraw
non-essential military personnel from Europe. During November and December,
seek allied reinforcements, harass communist bloc shipping, and begin a SAC airborne alert. All these measures, the Chiefs stated, were predicated upon an early
political decision . . . that the United States will resort to general war, if necessary,
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in order to maintain its rights in Berlin. They asked McNamara to give their paper
to the President at the earliest opportunity.18
The United States, in the Joint Chiefs judgment, clearly could prevail if it
struck first. If the Soviets did so, the degree to which we are successful in prevailing is dependent upon the timeliness of our response. In summary, Our strengths
are adequate to deter enemy deliberate and rational resort to general war and, if
general war eventuates, to permit the United States to survive as a viable nation
despite serious losses, and ultimately to prevail and resume progress toward its
national objectives.19 Their point was that our military power looked more than
sufficient; it was our political will that remained in doubt.
The JCS also responded to a series of questions posed by Mr. Acheson. What
military preparations would influence Soviet decision-making? What conventional
forces would be required (1) to break an East German blockade, (2) to challenge
successively higher levels of East German and Soviet resistance, and (3) to continue fighting for five to fifteen days, providing the communists with time and
opportunity to restore Berlin access? The JCS replied that measures cited in their
memorandum of 21 June should sway Soviet decision-making in the direction
desired. Without a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, however, they feared
that full allied cooperation would not be forthcoming. A balanced force of seven
divisions and four tactical air wings could break through an East German blockade and defend itself against Soviet and East German attacks for five to fifteen
days. But they held out no hope of matching enemy escalations beyond that time.
After thirty days of fighting, the Soviets could concentrate 128 divisions in Central
Europe; the NATO powers could muster only 50 divisions in 120 days. As a viable
alternative to general war, the JCS raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons
against purely military targets in order to underline for the Soviets US determination and seriousness of purpose.20
On 27 June, General Norstad cabled the JCS his opinion that the new threat
was perhaps even more critical than the blockade in 1948. Since military measures had to be carefully attuned to political overtures and decisions, he argued
that we must maintain flexibility, freedom of action, whatever we do. If reserves
were mobilized, they should be activated for a stated time and then released or
retained as circumstances dictated. Troop movements might be conducted under
the guise of training exercises: bring three battle groups to Europe, return two,
and replace them with two or more. No actions should be announced on for the
duration basis, said Norstad, since this would quickly establish positions of
the utmost rigidity on both sides and would lead to escalation at an accelerating
rate.21 Norstads definition of flexibility was not the one conceived by Kennedy
and McNamara.
Replying that same evening, General Lemnitzer assured Norstad of his complete agreement about the seriousness of the threat. Secretary McNamara and the
Chiefs, Lemnitzer reported, had just agreed that the best recourse lay in substantially
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expanding conventional strength. The Chiefs were looking into an increase of perhaps 500,000 personnel.22
The next day, Mr. Acheson gave the President a report stating that the outcome
of a Berlin confrontation would go far to determine the confidence of Europe
indeed of the worldin the United States. Just like the JCS, he believed the best
way to restore the credibility of our deterrent was to consciously accept the hazard
of war and prepare for it. Acheson urged military preparations of three distinct
types: strengthening conventional forces in Europe; readying naval units for countermeasures on the high seas; and placing SAC in a suitable state of readiness.
Initially, a ground blockade should be answered by a civil airlift and an embargo
upon trade and travel. Once the airlift was impeded, however, we would have to
try to reopen the autobahn. A battalion probe should be followed by a one-division
thrust and then by a seven-division attack. The moment of decision would come
when, probably after one or two weeks of fighting, the seven-division force faced
defeat. Then the United States must employ nuclear weapons in order to preserve
its army, its allies and itself.23
On 29 June, Acheson made an oral presentation to the NSC. Admiral Burke
made plain his opposition to the scale of the proposed probe and to an airlift
unconnected with a probe. President Kennedy directed Secretary McNamara to
propose steps that would create capabilities for (1) a garrison and civilian airlift,
(2) naval harassment and blockade of communist bloc shipping, (3) large-scale
conventional ground action, and (4) keeping SAC at maximum readiness over
many months. Additionally, McNamara was to recommend the permanent increases in overall US strength that a prolonged period of greatly heightened tensions
would require.24
The JCS, on 6 July, replied that the requirements for airlift, naval harassment,
large-scale ground action, and SAC readiness would expand the armed forces by
867,872 personnel at a cost of $17.7 billion. Following up on their 27 June discussion with McNamara, the Chiefs specified, by separate memorandum, that an
increase of 559,000 military and 40,000 personnel would allow the services to
accomplish the following: Armyactivate four reserve divisions and bring three
training divisions to full strength; Navyadd one attack and one ASW carrier, 40
ships, 23 patrol squadrons, and amphibious lift for two divisions; Marinescreate
a fourth division/wing team; Air Forceretain one B47 and six interceptor wings
while adding 21 tactical, eight reconnaissance, and 56 troop carrier squadrons.25
President Kennedy instructed Secretary McNamara to produce a plan for supporting a ground probe, an airlift, and measures for improving our overall military
posture. Recommendations should be based upon an assumption that main reliance will not be placed on the use of atomic weapons at the outset of a military
engagement with the USSR in Europe.26
On 12 July, the JCS gave Secretary McNamara proposals that included: completing LIVE OAK planning for a division-size probe; planning unilaterally for
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a corps-size thrust; responding promptly to a ground blockade with a tripartite
battalion-size probe; and considering expanded air action as an alternative to larger
efforts on the ground. The JCS program was built around a 559,000-man expansion,
allocated as shown in their 6 July memorandum. Costs, confined to Berlin-related
actions, would come to $7.87 billion for FY 1962. Ten Army and three Marine divisions would be available for European service between Mobilization (M)-Day and
M+120 days. The allies would be expected to increase, by M+180, their ground
forces in Central Europe from 21 to 44 division-equivalents. Allied Command
Europe would acquire sufficient forces to wage non-nuclear war on a scale which
will indicate our determination and provide for some additional time to begin negotiations before resorting to nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, the Chiefs asserted,
NATOs main reliance must rest on nuclear weapons.27 Partial mobilization,
requiring a declaration of limited national emergency, would not generate enough
conventional forces to sustain non-nuclear combat on a broad scale. Consequently, the JCS called for collateral actions which would improve the nuclear deterrent
and demonstrate our determination to defend Berlin. These amounted, essentially,
to the actions listed in the JCS paper of 21 June.28
On 14 July, President Kennedy asked for an interagency evaluation of whether
to (1) ask Congress immediately for $1 to $1.5 billion, without any controls or
taxes, and (2) request in two or three weeks $4 to $5 billion along with controls,
taxes, and a declaration of national emergency. The JCS sent McNamara a quick
appraisal of the $1 to $1.5 billion proposal that highlighted its inadequacies. The
Secretary then told them to address the $4 to $5 billion proposal. Their answer,
dated 18 July, basically repeated what was in their memorandum of 12 July. Yet the
JCS worried that basic issues might be hidden in a thicket of studies. Stated in
their simplest form, they defined these issues as follows. First, a decision to stay
in Berlin at all costs and risks. Second, a willingness to accept general war and
a need to make that clear to the Soviets. Third, a requirement promptly to initiate
measures that would deter Soviet trouble-making. Fourth, an understanding that
partial mobilization would enhance our credibility and improve our capabilities for
conventional and nuclear conflict.29
Within the JCS organization, the question of how to restore US credibility
loomed largest of all. On orders from General Lemnitzer, the Joint Strategic Survey
Council compared the Berlin situation of 1958 with that of 1961. The military balance, it concluded, had not changed greatly over the past three years. Rather, the
difference derived from Soviet perceptions of US firmness in Lebanon and Taiwan
versus US vacillation in Laos and Cuba during 1961. Consequently, the Soviets
may now believe they can force the issue on Berlin without undue risk of general
war. Through another paper, the Council cautioned that increasing our conventional capability could damage the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Therefore,
military preparations should be such as to hold out no hope to the Soviets that
they can . . . wage a localized non-nuclear war with profit, or escape mortal damage
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themselves. The JCS agreed that General Lemnitzer should read this latter paper
to Secretary McNamara.30
President Kennedy conferred with the JCS on 18 July. He said, and they agreed,
that a declaration of national emergency could be postponed. Kennedy asked
whether NATOs air forces were strong enough to follow a ground probe with nonnuclear air action. Yes, General LeMay said, if NATO members acted together and
took the initiative. Kennedy also inquired whether additional US divisions could
be employed effectively if European allies failed to increase their own forces. No,
Lemnitzer acknowledged, but more US forces plus added allied strength would
expand the non-nuclear options.31
Next day, at an NSC meeting, Acheson called for a declaration of national
emergency and a reserve call-up not later than September. Secretary McNamara,
in rebuttal, laid out a flexible timetable. Measures already under way, he advised,
would create an active CONUS reserve of six Army and two Marine divisions. By 1
January 1962, without declaring a national emergency or mobilizing major ground
units, six divisions and supporting air units could deploy to Europe. On 24 July,
through NSAM No. 62, Kennedy adopted McNamaras approach. He also asked
Congress for $3.2 billion in new obligational authority and launched an effort to
improve the allies readiness. Kennedy outlined his decisions in a televised address
the next evening, saying that West Berlin has becomeas never beforethe great
testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments . . . and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation. On 1 August,
Congress authorized the Chief Executive to call up as many as 250,000 reservists
and to extend tours of duty for twelve months. Ten days later, the House and Senate completed passage of a $46.662 billion military appropriations bill, giving the
administration virtually everything it wanted.32
The Berlin Wall Is Built
mportant facets of contingency planning remained unsettled. A meeting of the

US, UK, French and West German foreign ministers lay just ahead. Assistant
Secretary Paul Nitze drafted a position paper about which McNamara solicited JCS
comments. The papers purpose was to provide American, British, and French military authorities with a wider range of alternatives. A main objective would be to
dispel any doubts . . . that increasingly large-scale violence could soon bring on the
use of nuclear weapons and then general war. According to Nitzes paper, a probe
force should be strong enough to avert defeat by the East Germans and maintain a
penetration for several weeks against Soviet counterattacks.33
The JCS, on 29 July, urged giving greater emphasis to (1) the interrelationship
of nuclear with non-nuclear forces and (2) how Berlin fit into the context of worldwide actions. They also asserted that, even by mid-1962, conventional forces could
147

not reopen ground access if they had to battle the Soviets on a large scale. The
Chiefs presented again the sequences outlined on 12 and 18 July. They also sent
Secretary McNamara a relatively brief document providing over-all planning guidance and presenting tasks to be accomplished.34 The rationale underlying Nitzes
paper, which McNamara endorsed, was that military planning in such a dangerous
situation must be kept under very close political control, so that a field commander
could not by himself precipitate general war. Military men, on the other hand, considered such detailed guidance to be improper and unrealistic.
Concurrently, in Paris, McNamara and Nitze conferred with SACEUR. General
Norstad, viewing Nitzes paper deficient as a directive and worried that it might
discourage an allied buildup, wrote a draft that put less emphasis on prolonged
conventional combat and more on preserving the general war posture. Ultimately,
though, Nitzes paper was the one used in presenting the US position.35 A basic difference persisted between the civilian leaders search for flexibility and SACEURs
main reliance on nuclear weapons.
Berlin itself now became the flash point. What was described as a gate-closing
panic swept East Germany; during July, more than 30,000 refugees entered West
Berlin. Back in May, Secretary McNamara had asked the JCS to assess our capability to support guerrilla operations, should uprisings occur incident to US military
actions in Berlin. They answered on 29 July that fourteen Special Forces detachments were stationed in West Germany, six in West Berlin, and 23 in the United
States; European Command could supply 82,500 rebels for thirty days. But, they
warned, a guerrilla campaign could escalate into general war. Since the Soviets
almost certainly would intervene, concurrent conventional operations probably
would prove necessary. Before attempting anything, therefore, the United States
should decide to do whatever was necessary to achieve success.36
During the first days of August, the exodus from East Germany neared a flood.
During one 24-hour period, 1,926 refugees registered in West Berlin. On 10 August,
Admiral Anderson speculated that spontaneous East German uprisings like those
in 1953 might take place. The Chiefs had not yet addressed the ramifications of
such an event. Now, Anderson cautioned his JCS colleagues, delay in deciding
upon a course of action could be disastrous.37
Already, however, Premier Khrushchev had decided upon a course of action.
Between 3 and 5 August, he secured agreement from satellite leaders for building a
wall around West Berlin.38 In the early hours of 13 August, East German troops and
police set up roadblocks and barbed wire. Two days later, they began building the
concrete wall.
The western powers, taken totally by surprise, did not challenge the wallbuilders. General Lemnitzers private judgment was that everyone appeared to be
hopeless, helpless, and harmless. On 16 August, Mayor Willy Brandt warned President Kennedy that continued passivity could provoke a crisis of confidence among
West Berliners. Brandt asked for a reinforcement of the US garrison. On their own
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initiative, the JCS recommended sending one battle group down the Helmstedtto-West Berlin autobahn. When General Lemnitzer presented this proposal, at a
White House meeting on 17 August, many of the Presidents advisers assailed it as
needlessly provocative. Lemnitzer, in fact, remembered this as one of the worst
confrontations of his Chairmanship. Nonetheless, much to Lemnitzers relief and
satisfaction, the President ruled that a battle group would go to Berlin.39
On 20 August, from dawn to dark, 350 vehicles and 1,600 men of the 1st Battle
Group, 18th Infantry Regiment, traversed the autobahn. At Babelsberg, just outside
West Berlin, the Soviets stopped the third of six serials. The US Provost Marshal
then relayed a warning that, unless the convoy was released within fifteen minutes,
the heaviest vehicle would crash through the barrier. The Soviet officer in charge
of the checkpoint quickly released the serial. Otherwise, the battle groups passage
was uneventful.40
The JCS, meanwhile, advised that stopping the refugee flow had increased
the possibility of an uprising and told McNamara that they were developing suitable contingency plans. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric replied that, absent a probe
or a limited war, US policy precluded overt backing of a rebellion. Planning could
continue, though, because that policy might change. The JCS responded by urging
McNamara to (1) oppose a policy of determining beforehand not to intervene and
(2) support planning and resource development that would provide a clear option
to intervene. Secretary McNamara agreed, telling Secretary Rusk that a prior decision against intervening would become known to the Soviets, who then could feel
free to suppress the insurgency. In December, when the chance of a revolt had
diminished considerably, the non-intervention policy was reaffirmed.41
Accelerating the Buildup
he Soviets seemed to be preparing for a confrontation in the air corridors.

On 23 August, the USSR accused the western powers of clearly abusing
air access arrangements by transporting all kinds of revanchists, extremists,
saboteurs, spies, and diversionists from West Germany into West Berlin. The 1945
accord, said the Soviets, only provided air corridors to the western powers temporarily for provision of their military garrisons.42
On 24 August, Assistant Secretary Nitze advised Secretary McNamara that
recent Soviet actions had so basically changed the situation as to require a fundamental reappraisal of the July decision for restrained, gradual military strengthening. Next day, in fact, the Defense Department issued orders mobilizing 76,600
men: 46,500 for the Army, to round out six divisions in CONUS and provide support
units for US Army, Europe; 6,400 for the Navy to help man 40 destroyers and 18
patrol squadrons; and 23,700 for the Air Force to activate 33 tactical, transport, and
reconnaissance squadrons.43
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On 31 August, without waiting for approval by any allies, the administration
told General Norstad how impediments to air access should be met. In case of an
administrative stoppage, substitute military for civil aircraft. If communist fighters forced civil aircraft to withdraw from the corridor, military transports would
fly with fighter escorts. If unescorted military transports were harassed by fighters, pilots would decide whether to proceed or withdraw. If planes came under air
attack, fighters sent to their rescue might take aggressive protective measures,
including immediate pursuit into hostile air space. Planes subjected to antiaircraft
artillery or missile fire would take evasive action and withdraw; counterattacks
could be carried out only with specific approval from Washington.44
On 1 September, President Kennedy ordered two changes. First, Washington
authorities rather than field commanders would decide whether fighter escorts
should accompany transports. Some in the White House doubted whether USCINCEUR had this authority. Moreover, General Taylor warned the President that,
if transports had been stopped by ground fire or missile salvos, fighter escorts
without self-defense capability would simply furnish enemy batteries with additional targets. Second, pilots of unescorted transports should make every effort to
continue on course to destination despite harassment. Since air crews always had
overcome such obstacles in the past, they should not now be encouraged to yield.
Taylor and McGeorge Bundy believed the original instructions had been too weak
on this point.45
General Lemnitzer told the Service Chiefs that these changes vitiated the
clean cut decisions of 31 August. State and Defense agreed that authority to
provide fighter protection ought to be vested with General Norstad rather than
retained in Washington. Accordingly, early in the evening of 2 September, the JCS
sent this recommendation to the White House. General Taylor agreed and appropriate orders were issued immediately.46
General Norstad wanted more latitude. I cannot believe, he cabled Lemnitzer,
that it is the intention of our Government to permit antiaircraft installations to fire
with impunity on allied aircraft in the corridor. He asked for authority to order, on
his own, retaliatory attacks against antiaircraft installations. The JCS urgently
requested the Secretary of Defense to seek such authority. McNamara contacted
the Secretary of State. Rusk replied that he also wanted USCINCEUR to have that
authority but would not consider issuing unilateral instructions unless agreement
with Great Britain, France, and West Germany proved unattainable.47
Meantime, on 30 August, Moscow announced the resumption of atmospheric
nuclear testing. Many in Washington saw this as an effort to intimidate the western powers. Two days later, President Kennedy authorized the movement of additional aircraft to Europe. General LeMay flew to Paris and reached agreement
with Norstad (1) to send twenty B-47s to Spanish bases, thereby releasing three
F-100 squadrons for non-nuclear missions, and (2) to deploy four F-100 squadrons to bases in France and West Germany. As Norstad wished, the latter step
150

was announced as part of a training exercise, to preserve flexibility and avoid the
appearance of either a Berlin-related buildup or a riposte to Soviet nuclear testing.
President Kennedy also asked Secretary McNamara to take another hard
look, particularly at the measures they had decided to defer in July. The Joint Staff
recommended replying that, since the Soviets were acting with increasing audacity and confidence, the United States should quicken by every possible means the
strengthening of military power. Four regular divisions should be sent to Europe
and four reserve divisions activated. Thirty-four air squadrons should be deployed
to Europe and thirty-four called up. On 6 September, the JCS agreed to use this as a
talking paper in discussions with the Secretary of Defense.48
Already, in fact, McNamara had prepared an analogous program. On 7 September, he proposed to the President a sequence of strong actions: about 15 Septemberorder members of four National Guard divisions to report for duty between
15 October and 15 November and augment European Command with 37,000 personnel; during Octobermove the 4th Infantry Division to Europe and send another
carrier plus supporting ships to the Sixth Fleet. Subsequently, if air access came
under challenge, declare a limited national emergency, impose sanctions against
the Soviet Bloc, deploy more Army divisions and USAF squadrons to Europe, mobilize the 4th Marine Division, concentrate part of the Second Fleet in the northeast
Atlantic, and begin a naval blockade. McNamara described efforts by the European
allies as encouraging though not as yet wholly satisfactory; he anticipated a definite improvement to their conventional capabilities over the next four months.49
Divided Counsels
resident Kennedy promptly approved sending 37,000 men to European Command; this was announced on 9 September. But he issued a probing series of
questions which General Taylor had composed:
1. What would sending six more divisions to Europe accomplish in terms
of meeting the Berlin challenge, galvanizing allied actions, and strengthening
the long-term defense of Western Europe?
2. Would increasing conventional capabilities convince the Soviets of our
readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin, or have the opposite effect?
3. Could thirty divisions defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack? Could a corps-size probe reopen access without stripping overall
defense? How long could combat by thirty divisions be supported logistically?
4. Why was mobilizing four divisions necessary?
5. How much of the four-division mobilization would be necessary if Berlin
did not appear to be near the flash point?
6. What tactical air support was needed?
7. Would an increase of combat forces lower logistic support capabilities?
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8. If we sent six divisions to Germany, might not the Soviets simply add
six or more of their own? Would logistical problems, fear of attack by nuclear
weapons, and preoccupations in the satellite nations set limits on what forces
could be immediately available?50
On 11 September, General Lemnitzer sent Secretary McNamara replies that he

emphasized were entirely his own:
1. Six divisions would provide proof of US leadership, strengthen allied
determination, and improve NATOs military and diplomatic posture. Adding
them, however, would not create a capability for restoring ground access or
for launching offensive operations across a broad front.
2. Such an increase would convey conviction about allied will power.
Other ways to show this determination included expanding production, raising
budgetary ceilings, mobilizing replacements for units deployed, and intervening in Laos if communists resumed offensive operations there.
3. Thirty divisions could defend for a significant time against a massive
attack. A US force of eleven divisions could mount a corps-size probe without impairing Allied Command Europes overall posture. In fact, probe forces
would necessarily be placed near the two most likely avenues of Soviet attack,
the Eisenach-Erfurt gap and the North German plain.
4. Both Berlin and Laos might soon boil over. National Guard units would
need four months to become combat-ready. Therefore, unless reserves were
mobilized before regular units began moving overseas, we could confront two
crises without a strategic reserve.
5. The Army needed at least two more active divisions, for a total of sixteen, in order to respond in more than one area and strengthen our initial posture for general war.
6. Tactical air requirements depended primarily upon how many divisions
were deployed. Current plans called for as many as 28 squadrons.
7. Existing stockpiles and production levels could sustain approximately
sixty days of intensive combat.
8. The Soviets could increase their forces in Eastern Europe rather quickly from 26 to 61 divisions. But they probably could not employ more than 55
divisions offensively because of logistical limitations, potentially hostile populations, vulnerable communications, the dispersal made necessary by nuclear
weapons, and the restrictive geography of the European peninsula. Consequently, any NATO buildup would reduce the margin of Soviet superiority and
make any Soviet offensive proportionally more risky.51
McNamara prepared tentative answers that followed those of Lemnitzer very

closely. The Secretary also solicited General Norstads views. Replying on 16
September, Norstad began by claiming that he and McNamara diverged in degree
rather than in principle. He then proceeded to chip away practically all the Secretarys assumptions. We must not, Norstad continued, confuse the wish with
the fact. It was wrong to believe that we could exercise independent, unilateral
control over the battle. The credibility of our deterrent could be destroyed by
accentuating a policy that the Soviets could construe as allowing them to fight
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and then, if the risk appeared excessive, to disengage. The enemy always must
feel that resorting to force risked general war. Surely, Norstad continued, our
allies would object to a policy that implied either trading large areas of Europe
for time in which to avoid the spread of war to the United States or denying the
use of capabilities and weapons which might divert or destroy the Soviet threat
to European lives and territory.
Comparing the two sides conventional capabilities, Norstad believed that a
ceiling of 55 divisions clearly underestimated the Pacts offensive strength. SHAPE
intelligence credited it with ability to employ upwards of 100 divisions in Central
Europe. Reinforcements could total forty divisions during the first ten days of
fighting and sixty more during the next twenty. Non-US reserves did not exceed ten
divisions. Additionally, the Soviets would enjoy conventional air superiority from
the outset. Consequently, Norstad dismissed as unduly optimistic the calculation
that a massive conventional attack could be withstood for thirty days. He anticipated, in fact, a quick deterioration in conventional defenses and ability to carry
out nuclear defense plans. Norstad concluded by recommending against reinforcing European Command until we have been able to absorb effectively the 40,000
augmentation now planned.52
On the morning of 18 September, Secretary McNamara put before the JCS
proposals to mobilize four National Guard divisions and send one regular division
to Europe. That afternoon, he and General LeMay as Acting Chairman attended
a White House meeting. At the Pentagon, meantime, the remaining JCS members
agreed that General Norstad should be supplied with two divisions if and when
he wants them and that in anticipation of such a request . . . two National Guard
divisions should be called up on 1 October 1961. General Wheeler, Director of the
Joint Staff, telephoned this recommendation to the White House. LeMay presented
their recommendation to the meeting and added that, while Lemnitzer and Decker
favored deploying as many as six divisions to Europe, the other Chiefs opposed
any overseas movement at this time. President Kennedy approved calling up two
National Guard divisions.53
At a press conference on 19 September, Secretary McNamara announced that
some 73,000 reservists were being summoned to the colors. Two National Guard
divisions, the 32nd Infantry of Wisconsin and the 49th Armored of Texas, would be
activated on 15 October along with 249 support units. To bring activated units to
full strength, 25,500 men from the Ready Reserve would be mobilized. If East-West
relations improved, reservists would be released before their twelve-month tours
ended. Should the world situation worsen, however, two more divisions might be
mobilized at a later time.54
Differences over policy and strategy did not diminish; if anything, they grew
wider. On 22 September, the JCS informed McNamara that while General Decker
concurred with Lemnitzers answers, Admiral Anderson, General LeMay, and
General Shoup disagreed fundamentally with them. These three officers reported
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having serious reservations over whether assembling a large ground force in Central Europe was the best way to demonstrate US determination to stand fast over
Berlin. Like Norstad, they noted that some allies saw this as evidence of our intent
to avoid the use of nuclear weapons until substantial areas of Europe are overrun.
They answered President Kennedys queries of 8 September as follows:
1. As a means of galvanizing NATO and improving its long-term defense
posture, deploying six divisions was unnecessary and too costly in terms of
available combat units. Once committed, they could not be withdrawn without adversely affecting the alliance. A better solution would be to send 40,000
fillers immediately, followed at an appropriate time by up to two divisions at a
maximum on an exercise basis.
2. Since the Soviets could counter any increases, the Soviets might see a
six-division augmentation as an indication of US reluctance to employ nuclear
weapons, thereby sapping rather than strengthening the credibility of our
deterrent.
3. A 30-division force was incapable of withstanding massive conventional
attack for any prolonged period of time.
4. More divisions, beyond the two being activated, should be called up on
a one-for-one basis to replace any that might be sent to Europe.
5. Since the Army was being expanded to sixteen active divisions, no additional action was necessary.
6. Available tactical air power was insufficient to support any large sale
conventional operations for any significant period of time against a determined
Soviet air effort. They termed Lemnitzers figure of 28 squadrons only a possibility and not now a firm commitment.
7. Adequacy of supplies depended upon the duration and intensity of combat.
8. Current intelligence credits the communists with the capability to
employ force substantially in excess of that indicated in the Chairmans
views.55 There might well be a limit on the number of Soviet divisions available for attack. Nonetheless, their vastly superior ability to replace combat
losses cannot be overlooked. Seen from this perspective, the ULTIMATE
margin of Soviet superiority in ground strength would appear to provide them
with an attractive option for large scale conventional operations.56
The same split viewpoints also permeated the process of contingency planning. At McNamaras request, the JCS tasked General Norstad with making plans
for restoring ground access. His responses left little doubt that he was quite skeptical about their practicality. A three-division probe could reach the Elbe River and
remain there for three days, but by doing so ran the risk of complete destruction.
A four-division corps could do that for five days, but at the same risk. A force of
six divisions could hold, for approximately seven days, a bridgehead 50 kilometers
wide and 40 deep; half the force might be lost. Tactical air forces could execute
assigned tasks for perhaps fifteen days, on a diminishing scale.57
After a discussion with Secretary McNamara, the JCS looked over actions that
might influence Soviet behavior over Berlin. On 2 October, Admiral Anderson set
out a sequence of graduated responses:
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Phase I: Undertake a coordinated buildup of all NATO forces.
Phase II: Respond to denial of access with economic sanctions and, if
necessary, an air or platoon-size ground probe. Position forces for general war,
and begin maritime reprisal measures.
Phase III: Launch limited ground and air actions, complemented by offensive measures at sea.
Phase IV: Resort to general war.
On 2 October, also, General Norstad spent the whole day conferring with Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs. During their discussion, Norstad referred repeatedly
to the high probability of explosive escalation. When Admiral Anderson showed
his paper, in which some responses to East German or Soviet interference would
be delayed as much as thirty or forty days, Norstad reacted violently. He asserted,
and everyone agreed, that an early probe was essential: If we had knocked down
the wall in Berlin when it was first put up there would have been strong protest, but
probably no other action and the wall would not be there today. It is too late now,
however. As for reinforcements, Norstad requested the 40,000 fillers already promised, heavy equipment, 500 aircraft, and some strengthening of the Sixth Fleet. But
the big problem, he insisted, was that the Soviets still doubted the US will to fight
and to use nuclear weapons: We have failed dismally to convince them.58
The next day, at the White House, General Norstad said bluntly that plans for
a graduated response, passing from A to Z without missing a step, were completely unrealistic. He recommended responding to a blockage by: starting with a
limited probe by one or more armored vehicles; next, conducting a battalion-size
probe; then launching some form of limited action, using nuclear weapons if necessary. Questioned by President Kennedy, he acknowledged that there were no
approved inter-allied contingency plans; even a ground probe was agreed only in
the sense that it was thought worth planning for. McNamara suggested that, after
Norstad had ascertained what alternatives were acceptable to the allies, the administration should indicate its preferences. Kennedy and Norstad disagreed; both men
wanted Washington to assume leadership. Norstad said again that he wanted no
more divisions now, since Soviet reaction might provoke a snowballing of forces
that would harm negotiations. But he did ask that three divisions be available in
ten days, and six to eight divisions within thirty days. McNamara dismissed the latter requirement as impossible.59
One week later, the administration authorized more augmentations for European Command. First, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment would go to Germany.
Second, eleven Air National Guard squadrons (275 aircraft) would arrive in Europe
by 1 November, while seven regular squadrons (126 aircraft) would redeploy
to CONUS. Unlike the Guard squadrons, regular squadrons were equipped for
aerial refueling and thus could return rapidly to Europe. Third, equipment for one
armored and one infantry division would be pre-positioned in Germany. Fourth,
battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division would substitute for those from the 101st
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Airborne Division in a training exercise, and at least two of those battle groups
would remain in Germany indefinitely. Thus the slower-moving infantry units
would be brought closer to the crisis area.60
For what proved the final round of contingency planning, ISA and State
Department officers drafted a sequence of actions. There were four phases, somewhat akin to those prescribed by Admiral Anderson. It was taken to the White
House, revised, and circulated for comment on 12 October.61 At General Lemnitzers direction, J5 drafted an alternate sequence. Approved by the JCS and forwarded to Secretary McNamara on 13 October, it took issue with the State-Defense
paper on two counts. First, maritime reprisals outside Europe should be complementary to, and not substitutes for, actions to restore access. Second, any interference ought to be opposed directly and immediately. The Chiefs objected to the
idea of increasing our reliance on air corridors when ground access was blocked,
and vice versa. The weaker the force posture and the more indecisive US actions
were, the swifter would be the progression from conventional to nuclear conflict.
The JCS contended, in fact, that positive action to oppose aggression in any geographical area would influence the Berlin situation. Intervention in Southeast Asia
would be one way of making US determination unmistakably clear to the Soviets.
The JCS recommended their own sequence of actions, which described dozens of
responses to more than thirty challenges. They wanted these brought before the
President when he reviewed the State-ISA paper.62
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric told the JCS that he believed the administration
needed a succinct paper, completed rapidly. In his judgment, it would be premature to fix too rigidly the details within each major class of action, which was what
the JCS paper did. Accordingly, Gilpatric and Rusk urged the President to establish
a national position at approximately the level of detail set out by the State-ISA
sequence of 12 October.63
On 20 October, President Kennedy approved a policy statement that deemphasized a delayed response and cited the Chiefs opinion that a naval blockade
should complement steps taken in Central Europe. According to it, interference
amounting to less than definitive blockage would be answered by a platoon-size
probe on the ground and fighter escorts in the air. Should significant blockage be
maintained, responses would include mobilization and rapid reinforcement along
with economic embargo and maritime harassment. But, if substantial reinforcements were already on hand, courses of action would include (1) expanding air
action to gain local air superiority and (2) ground operations in division and greater strength. If the Soviets threatened US vital interests, then stronger and steadily
escalating measures would be taken.64
The President also sent General Norstad an explanatory letter: I place as
much importance on developing our capacity and readiness to fight with significant non-nuclear forces as on measures designed to make our deterrent more credible. . . . It seems evident to me that our nuclear deterrent will not be credible to the
156

Soviets unless they are convinced of NATOs readiness to become engaged on a
lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation
to nuclear war.65
Kennedys line of argument, as he ought to have known, was not entirely evident to the JCS and not at all to General Norstad. At a White House meeting on 8
November, Norstad spoke with astonishing frankness, telling the President that his
letter was replete with clichs and jargon which were probably clear to people in
Washington but which were not clear to him. Norstad said the policy statement
was poorly drafted, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . . In its present form, he could
not use [it] as a basis for instruction to his planners.66
It was fortunate that, by this time, the crisis atmosphere had eased considerably. The President and General Norstad were completely at loggerheads. The
JCS, divided among themselves, proved unable to play a mediating role. In January 1962, Norstad complained to Lemnitzer that the JCS or higher authority were
communicating directly with the Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, and the
US Commander, Berlin. Lemnitzer replied: For many weeks I have been resisting
strongly the constant hounding and harassment to take these and other actions
which I regard as serious violations of the US traditional and tested system of military command relationships. . . . In some cases I have succeeded in resisting but. . .
the point was reached where further resistance was impossible without being in
direct violation of the specific instructions of the Commander-in-Chief.67
A Surprising Success
or all their supposed contradictions and shortcomings, the administrations

actions did revive US credibility. By September, apparently, Khrushchev had
decided to damp down the confrontation. On 17 October, he announced to the
Communist Party Congress that since the western powers were showing some
understanding of the situation . . . we shall not insist that the peace treaty be
signed . . . before December 31, 1961.68
Tranquility did not envelop Berlin immediately, by any means. Harassment
of western personnel entering East Berlin came to a dramatic culmination on 27
October 1961. Five jeeploads of US military police, five armored personnel carriers,
and five M48 tanks assembled at Checkpoint Charlie on the Friedrichstrasse.
The jeeps then escorted one US automobile as it made a four-minute excursion into
East Berlin. Moments after this foray ended, ten Soviet T54 tanks appeared. Ten
US tanks came to the western side of the barrier, and more T54s arrived. After
some tense hours, the Soviet armor withdrew.
Between 8 and 19 February 1962, the Soviets tried to reserve space in the air
corridors by peremptorily announcing flights at times and altitudes chosen unilaterally. US authorities responded by sending transports through the corridors at
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those same times and altitudes. Communist planes occasionally buzzed western
aircraft and frequently dropped radar-jamming chaff. Between 20 February and 29
March, the Soviets continued their transport runs but filed flight plans in advance
according to agreed procedures. The paths chosen, moreover, were too low to
endanger western aircraft and too infrequent to impede allied access. Still, the
western powers took care to fly an equal number of transports into West Berlin
every day. Then, on 30 March, the Soviets cancelled a scheduled eight-flight plan.
With that act, competition in the air corridors ended.69 Sporadic harassment on the
autobahn continued, and high-level officials devoted a good deal of time to Berlin
issues for months to come. In autumn 1962, Khrushchev hoped that installing missiles in Cuba would allow him to renew the Berlin confrontation under more favorable conditions.70 When that bid failed, the days of danger were past.
In June 1963, President Kennedy visited West Berlin. Speaking at the city hall,
he paid a memorable tribute: Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was
civis Romanus sum. Today, in the world of freedom the proudest boast is Ich bin
ein Berliner. . . . All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and
therefore as a free man, I take pride in the words Ich bin ein Berliner.71
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11
The Cuban Missile Crisis
More than Mongoose?
he Joint Chiefs of Staff saw Fidel Castros regime as a cancer that must be
removed, by whatever means proved necessary. They came to that conclusion
in March 1960 and conveyed it repeatedly thereafter to their civilian superiors.
Thus, in February 1962, they approved a Joint Staff paper describing communist
Cuba as incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western
Hemisphere. Castros ouster, ran the argument, could be accomplished without
precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world opinion, if it could
be justified as responding either to humanitarian needs or to an appeal by Cuban
insurgents, and if the United States announced that it would withdraw as soon as
a new government was installed by free elections. A military operation should be
conducted quickly and with sufficient force, so that the Communist Bloc would not
have time to take countermeasures. Invasion also would be politically acceptable
if Castro committed hostile acts against US forces or property, providing an incident upon which to base overt action.1
President Kennedy was not willing, at this point, to order an invasion. What
he had authorized in November 1961 was Operation Mongoose, a covert program
to help Cubans oust Castro. A Special Group (Augmented), of which General
Lemnitzer was a member, oversaw Mongoose activities. General Taylor chaired
the Group but Attorney General Robert Kennedy was its principal motive force.
Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, USAF, who was Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations, led an interagency working group that prepared
detailed plans for Mongoose and coordinated their execution. The JCS representative on Lansdales group, Brigadier General William Craig, USA, transmitted
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requests to the Joint Staff. Each directorate of the Joint Staff and each service
assigned an officer who worked full time on Mongoose. When more help was needed, Craig passed tasks, without stating their origin or purpose, to staff elements not
cleared for Mongoose.2
Mongoose planners soon recognized that an uprising could not succeed without prompt US intervention. Indeed, a firm promise of American assistance might
be necessary for persuading Cubans to begin a revolt. Accordingly, in mid-March
1962, General Taylor revised Mongoose guidelines to state that (1) final success
would require decisive US military intervention and (2) indigenous resources
would be used to prepare for, justify, and then facilitate this intervention.3
At the request of Lansdales group, the JCS prepared plans for rapidly inserting
forces into Cuba if a revolt occurred. On 5 March, Lansdale asked General Craig
to prepare a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes is
desirable for direct military intervention.4 The Joint Staff drew up a list of manufactured incidents: a menu of attacks, riots, and acts of sabotage at Guantanamo5;
blowing up an unmanned ship at Guantanamo or near Havana or Santiago de Cuba;
faked assassination attempts against Cuban exiles and terrorist bombings in Florida and Washington, DC; the sinking, real or simulated, of a boatload of Cuban
refugees; staging a filibustering expedition against an anti-communist Caribbean or
Central American nation that would appear Castro-sponsored; downing a civilian
airliner (actually a drone with no one on board) in Cuban air space; and the apparent shooting down of a USAF fighter over international waters. None of these incidents was supposed to involve actual killing, and in the fighter incident no aircraft
would really be destroyed. The staff did warn that these actions were feasible only
as long as there was reasonable certainty that US intervention would not directly
involve the Soviet Union. Any action, therefore, should take place within the next
few months. Subsequently, the JCS called attention to an obvious fact: Justification
for intervention would probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it
can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.6
On 13 March, General Lemnitzer forwarded the list of pretexts to Secretary
McNamara with the Joint Chiefs endorsement. He emphasized, though, that it was
only a preliminary submission, to be combined with those of other agencies and
then considered on a case-by-case basis. In fact, the provocation proposals never
moved beyond the discussion stage. On 16 March, President Kennedy informed
the Special Group that he foresaw no circumstances in the near future that would
justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action. He
told Lemnitzer that the United States might be so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere
that it could not spare four divisions that the JCS deemed necessary for a Cuban
invasion. A few days later, though, Robert Kennedy told Lansdales staff that this
summer, fall and next year may change all this. The President is prepared to do
whatever has to be done, we must use our imagination.7
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On 5 April, the Special Group concluded that the time had come to re-examine
Mongooses basic philosophy with particular reference to the possibility of finding
a pretext for early . . . intervention. General Taylor put two questions before the
Service Chiefs: (1) Should the United States invade Cuba?; and, (2) Did we have the
capacity to do so?8
Five days later, the JCS answered yes to both questions. They believed that
the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future and that a US invasion was
the only way to do so. A communist regime would foment subversion and instability throughout Latin America and possibly provide the Soviet Bloc with military
bases on our doorstep. Time favored Castro, who could use it to strengthen internal controls and external defenses while deepening the political indoctrination
of the next generation. Drawing upon a just-completed study by the Board of
National Estimates, they claimed that the United States could invade Cuba without
risking general war. Available forces could secure essential military control of
Cuba before the Soviets could react, although continued police action would be
necessary. An invasion should take place as soon as possible, preferably before
the release of Reserve and National Guard units mobilized during the Berlin confrontation. But, at a meeting of the Special Group on 11 April, Secretaries Rusk and
McNamara echoed the Presidents words that at this time there was no way to
justify an invasion. We could only play for the breaks while taking the necessary
steps to get into a position which would afford . . . a maximum number of choices
of action.9
Missed Opportunities
y then, the USSR was about to seize the initiative. Nikita Khrushchev conceived the idea of turning Cuba into a base for nuclear missiles. He wanted
to reduce the strategic imbalance, protect Castros regime, and create a more
favorable setting for another Berlin confrontation.10 Between 21 and 24 May 1962,
Khrushchev won unanimous agreement from his colleagues on the Presidium.
A Soviet delegation then went to Havana and won Castros consent. By 10 June,
a plan was ready. Secretly, in Operation Anadyr, the Soviets would deploy five
missile regiments. Three were equipped with R12 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), 24 launchers with 36 missiles able to reach Atlanta, Georgia, from
Cuba. The other two were equipped with R14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs), 16 launchers with 24 missiles able to reach the Midwest and Washington,
DC.11 Protecting the missile sites would be about 50,000 Soviet personnel manning
four motorized regiments, two tank battalions, one MiG21 regiment with 40 aircraft, and 12 SA2 surface-to-air missile batteries with 144 launchers. There also
would be 11 conventional and six nuclear-capable IL28 light bombers, plus two
short-range or cruise missile regiments with 80 nuclear-tipped weapons.12
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The Maria Ulyanova arrived in a Cuban port on 26 July, delivering Soviet soldiers who disembarked wearing civilian clothes. She was the first of many.13 By 21
August, when senior US officials who included McNamara and Lemnitzer reviewed
the Cuban situation, the influx of Soviet Bloc personnel and equipment had raised
alarms. Conferees agreed that the situation was critical and the most dynamic
action was needed. They reviewed options available in case the Soviets placed
MRBMs in Cuba but reached no conclusions. Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy
discerned a definite inter-relationship between Cuba and trouble spots like Berlin. A
blockade of Cuba, they believed, would automatically trigger a blockade of West Berlin; attacking a missile site in Cuba would bring similar action against Jupiter IRBMs
in Turkey and Italy.14 Two days later, President Kennedy asked the Defense Department, What action can be taken to get Jupiter missiles out of Turkey? This was a
query and not a directive, from which no action resulted. He also called for a study
of alternatives to eliminate installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attacks
against the United States (e.g., pinpoint or general counter-force attack, outright
invasion).15 Every one of these issues would re-emerge, unsolved, in mid-October.
On 29 August, a U2 flew over the entire island of Cuba. Even though much
of the eastern part was cloud-covered, photos revealed SA2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and guided-missile patrol boats. A flight over eastern Cuba on 5
September turned up MiG21s and more SA2 sites.16 At a news conference on 13
September, President Kennedy downplayed recent developments but stated that if
Cuba should ever . . . become an offensive military base of significant capacity for
the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done in order to protect its own security and that of its allies.17
On 14 September, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Claude Ricketts,
circulated for JCS consideration a memorandum in which he urged prompt military
action. Once a defense system had been completed, Ricketts argued, the Soviets
could simultaneously establish offensive bases, introduce nuclear weapons, and
declare Cuba to be a member of the Warsaw Pact. (Khrushchev did, in fact, plan
to visit Cuba in November after the missile sites had become operational and conclude a defensive agreement with Castro.) At that point, US counteraction might
well lead to general war. So Ricketts recommended early military intervention to
remove Castro.18
Five days later, the Joint Strategic Survey Council submitted a recommendation for blockading rather than invading, on grounds that a blockade would be
less dramatic, require smaller resources, cause fewer casualties, and be more
plausibly related to upholding the Monroe Doctrine. But the appearance of medium-range ballistic missiles, submarines, or other offensive capabilities would
change conditions completely. In that eventuality, the JSSC favored an immediate
invasion before the weapons became operational and the Soviets vital interests
were involved. What were the chances of counter-action against West Berlin? The
Council estimated that a Soviet response would be relatively temperate. Because
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both sides vital interests were engaged in Berlin, the range of actions that could
be taken without triggering war was extremely limited. After the JSSC paper was
tabled, Admiral Ricketts asked that his memorandum be withdrawn.19
A Special National Intelligence Estimate, issued on 19 September, concluded
that the buildup in Cuba was primarily defensive, although the Soviets might be
tempted to deploy weapons of an offensive character such as light bombers,
submarines, and short-range surface-to-surface missiles. However, placing medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba would be incompatible
with Soviet policy and practice.20 One week later, the Joint Chiefs decided simply
to acknowledge receipt of the JSSCs report. At the appropriate moment, they
would urge upon the President adoption of a basic policy decision to supplant
Castro-communism in Cuba as soon as possible. Meantime, they instructed the
Council to keep its paper current but delete the sections advocating a blockade.
The JSSC submitted a revised report on 1 October, stating that since the task
is that of supplanting Castro-communism with an acceptable successor government, blockade will not ensure these ends and an invasion is thus required.21
On 1 October, General Taylor became Chairman of the JCS and General Wheeler
took the post of Army Chief of Staff. The latter was sworn in at the Pentagon, the former in the White House Rose Garden. It was a bright fall day, Taylor remembered,
and the world seemed full of promise. . . . That afternoon, when Secretary McNamara met with new and old Chiefs, their discussion centered upon the circumstances
in which action against Cuba might become necessary. Next day, McNamara sent
Taylor a list of such contingencies: interference with access to West Berlin, leading
to a retaliatory blockade against Cuba; evidence that offensive weapons were being
emplaced in Cuba; an attack against Guantanamo or against US ships and aircraft
operating outside of Cuban territory; a substantial popular uprising, the leaders of
which asked for US aid; Cuban armed assistance to subversion elsewhere in the
hemisphere; and a presidential decision that conditions in Cuba endangered US security. Secretary McNamara asked what plans were appropriate to each eventuality,
what preparatory actions were needed for each, and how our capability to deal with
crises elsewhere would be affected. He assumed that the political objective of any
operation would be either to remove Soviet weapons or to oust Castro and install a
friendly regime. McNamara asked the Chiefs to focus on the latter objective, as being
more difficult and perhaps also necessary to accomplish the former.22
Meanwhile, the Soviet buildup had been moving ahead. In mid-September, Poltava and Omsk delivered 36 R12 missiles to Mariel harbor. Indigirka arrived on
4 October with nuclear warheads for the R12s; the ship also carried 80 warheads
for the cruise missiles, six nuclear bombs for IL28s, and 12 nuclear charges for
the short-range rockets. Aleksandrovsk was at sea with 24 warheads for the longerrange R14s as well as 40 warheads for the cruise missiles.23
While Soviet merchant ships were photographed en route, their cargoes
were down in the holds and unloaded in darkness. After 5 September, U2s and
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other reconnaissance planes flew only peripheral missions around Cuba, largely
because the State Department feared a shootdown over the mainland. However, between 20 September and 2 October, refugees and agents within Cuba sent
reports of missile sightings plus the creation of a large sealed-off area. Largehatch Kasimo was photographed in mid-Atlantic with sixty-foot crates amidships. On 9 October, US experts identified these as ten fuselage crates for IL28s
which were known to be nuclear-capable. Three days later, operational control of
U2 flights shifted from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Strategic Air Command. On 14 October, in clear weather, Major Richard Heyser flew a U2 over
suspected areas on the mainland.24
In Washington, on 14 October, the Joint Staffs Operations Directorate (J3)
gave the Chiefs a status report on contingency planning. Admiral Dennison, who
was the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, oversaw three operational plans (OPLAN):
CINCLANT OPLAN 31262: Approved in concept by the JCS and
being revised by Atlantic Command, OPLAN 312 would employ air power
alone to eliminate air and missile installations and to reduce Cubas warwaging capability. In six hours, 152 aircraft would be available; in twelve, 384;
in twenty-four, 470. Target priorities were: (1) aircraft, anti-aircraft and radar
installations, and airfields; (2) selective disruption of transportation and communications facilities; and (3) troop and armor concentrations, artillery, and
naval vessels.
CINCLANT OPLAN 31461: Approved by the JCS, it would bring about
Castros overthrow by a deliberate, large-scale attack. There would be simultaneous airborne and amphibious assaults around the Havana area. The invasion
force would include two airborne divisions, one infantry division, one armored
combat command, 1 Marine division/wing teams, and one Marine Expeditionary Brigade. An 18-day preparatory period would be needed to assemble
sufficient shipping for a force this size.
CINCLANT OPLAN 31661: Tentatively approved by the JCS for planning purposes, OPLAN 316 was essentially a quick-reaction version of OPLAN
314. An airborne landing in western Cuba would be carried out after five days
of preparation, and an amphibious assault around Havana after eight days.
Many supplies, J3 reported, had been pre-loaded or pre-positioned in southern states. If more funds were provided, reaction time could be reduced by: transferring an armored combat command from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort Stewart,
Georgia; repositioning four artillery battalions nearer to East Coast ports; reactivating 28 LSTs (tank landing ships) and building an LST ramp at Savannah; reopening
Opalacka Air Force Base, Florida; pre-positioning equipment in Key West, Florida;
and moving the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from Camp Pendleton,
California, to the Caribbean.
An invasion of Cuba, the J3 calculated, would make adequate airlift to Europe
or the Far East unavailable for eight days, severely restrict airlift within overseas
commands unless Reserve C119s were reactivated, require substantial requisitions
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of shipping for about thirty days, and delay full augmentation of the European and
Pacific Commands until combat operations ended. The J3 urged that activation of
C119 squadrons be incorporated into the OPLANs and that funds be provided for
training exercises. Already, in fact, the JCS had ordered Admiral Dennison to plan for
the prompt strengthening of Guantanamo, in anticipation of an attack. In his reply,
Admiral Dennison requested that the 5th MEB be transferred to the Caribbean.25
On 15 October, analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center in
downtown Washington studied film brought back by Major Heysers U2. Photos
taken over the Santa Clara and San Cristobal areas in western Cuba revealed long
canvas-covered objects and other equipment that the interpreters identified as
MRBM sites. By late afternoon, the Centers director, Arthur Lundahl, had reviewed
and confirmed that finding.26
Meantime, in the Pentagon at 1430, Secretary McNamara joined the JCS to
review contingency plans.27 He said that President Kennedy wanted, if possible,
to avoid taking military measures against Cuba during the next three months.
Then, turning to the OPLANs, he stressed that a decision to act should be followed
immediately by the initiation of air strikes. McNamara particularly emphasized the
importance of avoiding inactivity during the eighteen days preparing to execute
OPLAN 314. Here he recalled mistakes made by the British and French in 1956.
Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July; the Anglo-French attack
did not begin until late October.
But OPLAN 314, in fact, was not truly finalized. Conferees noted that an attack
against Havana would mean assaulting the enemys defenses at their strongest point;
invading elsewhere would delay capturing the capital city for three weeks. Should
the military danger be reduced and the political risk raised, or vice versa? They
agreed that this problem should be brought to the Presidents attention as soon as
possible. It is surprising that after months of planning, and on the literal eve of crisis,
such an important point was still being debated.28 Secretary McNamara decided that
C119 squadrons should be mobilized when air strikes beganbut not before
because this was the type of warning action that he and the President wanted to
avoid. The Secretary also allocated $300,000 per month for training exercises.29
Air Strike versus Blockade
n the evening of 15 October, General Taylor hosted a dinner party at Fort

McNair. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant
General Joseph Carroll, took Taylor aside and told him of the discovery.30 Around
0800 next morning, McNamara, Taylor, and the Service Chiefs were each shown the
photos. McGeorge Bundy briefed the President about an hour later; Kennedy called
for a conference at 1145.
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The JCS held their first missile crisis meeting at 1000 on Tuesday, 16 October.31
A DIA briefer described three sites for MRBMs, with ranges estimated at 700 to
1,000 miles, and said that an all-out effort could make these mobile installations
operational within 24 hours. General Taylor wanted to know what preliminary
advice he should take to the White House. The Chiefs quickly agreed that these
sites must be destroyed by air attacks. Anderson and Wheeler favored a surprise
air strike followed by invasion. General William McKee, representing General
LeMay who was in Europe, suggested that an efficient air attack and blockade
might obviate the need for invasion. Taylor added that invasion and occupation
might not be necessary. What threat was Cuba, he asked, once the island was
stripped of missiles and aircraft? The JCS agreed that no military action should
be taken until more intelligence was amassed about the number and location of
MRBMs. The Chiefs tentative proposal ran as follows: acquire more information;
then launch a surprise air attack against MRBM sites, airfields, SAM sites, torpedo
boats, tank parks, and all significant military targets; reinforce Guantanamo at the
same time; mobilize reserves and prepare for an invasion. Bearing this advice, General Taylor left for the White House.
At 1145 in the Cabinet Room, President Kennedy gathered advisers who
included Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Director
McCone, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, and McGeorge Bundy. After a briefing
by Arthur Lundahl, Rusk opened the debate by saying that they could either order a
surprise attack or employ graduated pressures. But, whatever was decided, several
days would be needed to alert US allies. McNamara argued strongly that air strikes
had to be carried out before the MRBMs became operational. Taylor laid out the
Joint Chiefs proposal, but he added that invasion was the hardest question militarily in the whole business, and one which we should look at very closely before
we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba. How effective, Kennedy asked, would
the surprise attack be? Never one hundred percent, Taylor replied, although the
first strike would take out a vast majority of Cubas military capability and continuous attacks would follow. The President authorized unlimited U2 overflights,
directed fuller development of military and political responses, and called another
meeting for that evening.32
The Joint Chiefs, together with all the commanders involved in Cuba planning,
gathered at 1630 in the Pentagon conference room known as the JCS tank. Taylor
summarized the White House meeting, at which he said the question was whether
to go for the missiles, or to go for the missiles plus a blockade and invasion possibly following. Secretary McNamara, joining them at 1740, authorized heavy reconnaissance and augmentation of air defenses in the southeastern states. The Secretary stated his preference for open surveillance and a blockade of weapons, saying
that going straight to military action might trigger a Soviet response. The military
men decided to readjust OPLAN 316, extending from five days to seven the interval
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between starting air attacks and launching an invasion. That way, paratroopers and
Marines could land simultaneously, reducing the risk of defeat in detail and allowing follow-on forces to arrive two days sooner. The JCS also decided to oppose (1)
low-level reconnaissance as tipping our hand and (2) striking only MRBMs, preferring inaction to a surgical strike.
In the next White House meeting at 1830, Secretary McNamara gave his personal view that MRBMs in Cuba did not change the strategic balance at all. Taylor
countered that the missiles could become a very important adjunct and reinforcement to Soviet strike capability because we have no idea how far they will go.
The main debate, though, was over whether to carry out an all-inclusive attack or
a surgical strike confined to MRBMs, nuclear storage sites, and MiGs. Kennedy and
McNamara thought that an all-inclusive attack seemed to lead inevitably to invasion. Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders feel
so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strike that they would prefer
taking no military action. . . . They feel its opening up the United States to attacks
which they cant prevent, if we dont take advantage of surprise. Taylor added that
his personal inclination was all against invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.33
After this meeting, McNamara directed the JCS to analyze five alternatives:
I: Attack the MRBMs and nuclear storage sites.
II: Attack above, plus MiG21s and IL28s
III: Attack above, plus all air capability, SAMs, short-range surface-tosurface missiles, coastal defense missile sites, and missile-firing torpedo boats.
IV: Attack all significant military targets, less those that would be struck as
a prelude to invasion.
V: Attack whatever targets should be struck to make possible an invasion
of Cuba.
On the Joint Staff, J3 officers worked through the night and produced the figures shown below:

Categories
I
II
III
IV
V
Targets
23
110
112
237
1,397
Sorties
52
104
194
474
2,002
These figures, however, excluded the sorties needed to provide combat air
patrol, suppress air defenses, and conduct post-strike reconnaissance. Several
days later, the numbers had to be recomputed and raised substantially. General
Taylor reacted sharply: What! These figures were reported to the White House.
You are defeating yourselves with your own cleverness, gentlemen. Perhaps the
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numbers for I and II had been kept low to make them appear more attractive to
the civilian leadership.
On Wednesday, 17 October, President Kennedy flew to Connecticut for campaign appearances that would preserve an appearance of normality. The Service
Chiefs met at 1000. General Taylor, returning at 1120 from a White House meeting, reported that some political action would precede a showdown. Blockade,
he added, entered only the minds of those who felt that hitting the missiles alone
would not suffice. The JCS decided to declare, for the record, their opposition
to attacking only MRBMs and advised Secretary McNamara that a surgical strike
would incur an unacceptable risk. Sparing enemy air power would expose the
continental United States and Puerto Rico to air attack and could cause unnecessary casualties among the garrison at Guantanamo and the forces assembling for
invasion. They recommended also hitting tactical missiles, aircraft, ships, tanks,
and other appropriate targets, as well as imposing a complete blockade.34
In an evening session at the White House, senior officials formulated five
possibilities:
Course 1: On Tuesday, 23 October, inform Western European and some
Latin American leaders of the situation. On Wednesday, attack the MRBM sites,
send a message to Khrushchev, and wait to see what would happen. Secretary
Rusk opposed this approach.
Course 2: Same as 1, but notify Khrushchev beforehand and wait about
three days for his reply. Defense spokesmen argued against doing this.
Course 3: Tell the Soviets that we were aware of the missiles and would
prevent any more from arriving in Cuba. Impose a blockade, declare war, and
make preparations for an invasion.
Course 4: After limited political preliminaries, attack the targets listed in
Categories III and IV above, and prepare for invasion.
Course 5: Same as 4, but omit the political preliminaries.
On Thursday, 18 October, the JCS met at 0930; General LeMay now joined
the discussions. The DIA briefer reported an important discovery. U-2 missions
covering 97 percent of Cuba had photographed sites for IRBMs. Unlike the
mobile MRBMs, these much heavier missiles with a range estimated at 2,200 miles
required fixed permanent sites.35 General Taylor saw their appearance as highly
significant. In these circumstances, he said, air strikes alone were inadequate; invasion and occupation of the sites would be necessary. After Taylor laid out the five
courses above, the Chiefs agreed that the minimum response should be Course 5,
coupled with a complete blockade and air strikes against the targets in Category IV.
A White House meeting started at 1110. Secretary Rusk recommended using
about five days of discussions with Khrushchev, at the UN, and with the Organization of American States (OAS) before taking military action. General Taylor said
that yesterday he had been far from convinced that the big showdown was necessary. However, air strikes could not remove the IRBM threatyou cant destroy
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a hole in the groundand so an invasion was required. But Robert Kennedy was
one of several who spoke about avoiding the stigma of a new Pearl Harbor. Virtually all the Presidents civilian advisers were convinced the Soviets would respond to
an attack by retaliating somewhere, most likely against West Berlin or the Jupiter
IRBMs in Turkey and Italy. There was tentative talk of removing IRBMs from Turkey in exchange for withdrawing the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secretary McNamara
now leaned toward beginning with a blockade because it reduces the very serious
risk of large-scale military action from which this country cannot benefit if we
launched a surprise attack.36
When the JCS reconvened at 1400, Taylor summarized the latest meeting, saying
the President seemed to feel we should hold back on military action until we got a
sense of the Soviet response. Were we really going to do anything except talk, LeMay
inquired? Certainly, the Chairman answered. Probably the order of events would be:
a political approach; a warning; air attack on the missile sites; blockade; and, if necessary, invasion. The Chiefs now directed that one battalion of the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade be airlifted from California to Guantanamo, that Opalacka airfield
in Florida be reopened, and that twenty interceptors deploy to Florida bases.37 The
JCS also decided that the earliest feasible date for an air strike would be Sunday, 21
October. The optimum date was 23 October; an invasion could begin on 28 October.
At 1700, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called at the White House.
Kennedy, revealing nothing of what he knew, said the situation was growing more
serious and read his statement of 4 September that the gravest issues would arise
should evidence of Soviet combat forces, military bases, or offensive weapons
appear. Gromyko replied that the Soviets were sending only defensive weapons,
none of which could constitute a threat to the United States.38
At 2115, nine men including General Taylor crowded into one automobile and
drove to the White House for another strategy session. A majority now favored
starting with political approaches plus some form of blockade.39 State was assigned
the duty of drafting political approaches to the USSR, Cuba, and NATO allies.
The JCS were told to draft plans for a blockade, either selective or total; Taylor
assigned that task to Admiral Anderson.
The JCS reconvened at 0900 on Friday, 19 October. A DIA briefer reported that
there were four MRBM and three IRBM sites, 21 IL28s (seventeen still in crates),
35 to 39 MiG21s, and 22 SAM sites, nine of which were believed to be operational.
In just a few weeks, said the DIA briefer, a couple of air defense nets would have
real capability. Lieutenant General David Burchinal, USAF, interjected: God! What
are we waiting for?40
Taylor told the Service Chiefs that the tendency was more and more toward
political actions plus a blockade. State, he continued, favored a selective blockade
for offensive weapons only. LeMay replied, It would be pure disaster to try that.
Saying that President Kennedy wished to speak with them that morning, Taylor
suggested that they speak in favor of a surprise attack on comprehensive targets,
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reconnaissance surveillance, and a complete blockade. Were they willing to advocate an American Pearl Harbor, he asked? LeMay was, but Anderson thought that
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer should be
allowed several hours warning. Taylor also worried that a surprise attack would
severely strain the Atlantic Alliance. Reluctantly, LeMay agreed that the British
should be informed a few hours beforehand. As for invasion, Taylor endorsed
preparations alone at this point. The Service Chiefs, however, saw little likelihood
of avoiding an actual occupation. At 0930, the JCS left for the White House.
After Taylor summarized the Chiefs view, the President replied that If we
attack Cuba . . . then it gives them a clear line to take Berlin, just as Kennedy
thought the Soviets in 1956 had been able to use the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt
as a cover while they crushed the Hungarian uprising. We would have no support
among our allies, who cared nothing about Cuba. Kennedy believed that taking
over Berlin was a basic goal of the Soviets, to which Khrushchev was personally
committed. Taylor responded that our strength in Berlin, our strength any place
in the world, is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. And if we
dont respond here in Cuba, we think the credibility of our response in Berlin is
endangered. LeMay argued that acting against Cuba actually would deter the Soviets from retaliating against Berlin; Admiral Anderson agreed. Wheeler observed that
Khrushchev had not declared Cuba to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Kennedy countered that [t]hey cant let us . . . kill a lot of Russians and not do anything. General
Shoup backed LeMay but added, contradictorily, that [w]eve had a hell of a lot
more than this aimed at us, and we didnt attack it. After Kennedy left, going on
another electioneering visit to avoid any air of crisis, Shoup reacted angrily to what
he called the Presidents preference for gradualism or escalation: If someone
could keep them from doing the goddamn thing piecemeal. Thats our problem.41
Virtually all the Presidents civilian advisers, including veteran Kremlinologists like Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen, were convinced that attacking Cuba would trigger retaliation against West Berlin and perhaps Turkey and
Italy. This was a crucial factor in drawing them towards a blockade. Yet, from
what we now know, the JCS were correct in downplaying this danger. When the
crisis broke, Soviet leaders thought strictly about counteractions in the Caribbean;
there is no evidence of preparing a reprisal against West Berlin. 42 Cuba was not
a vital interest of the USSR but Berlin was vital to the United States because its
loss could have drawn West Germany towards neutralism and so unraveled NATO.
Another confrontation over Berlin would draw the NATO allies together as a crisis
over Cuba might not. Presumably, the Soviets recognized this and were inhibited
accordingly. President Kennedy also was wrong in assuming that the invasion of
Egypt had given the Soviets a convenient cover for smashing the Hungarian revolt.
Actually, in 1956, Khrushchev had told his colleagues that [t]he English and the
French are stirring up trouble in Egypt. Lets not fall into their camp. The Presidium decided against military intervention in Hungary. The leadership reversed itself
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solely because a new government in Budapest announced that it was withdrawing
from the Warsaw Pact and turning Hungary into a neutral nation.43
Returning to the tank at 1050, the Service Chiefs approved directives that:
one battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles move from Maryland to Key West;
one Marine battalion shift from the West to the East Coast; and SAC disperse nonalert aircraft from Florida in an inconspicuous manner.44 General Taylor went to the
State Department for another session. There, McGeorge Bundy told conferees that
time was short and the President needed recommendations promptly. They split
into two teams. The Blues, who were to prepare the scenario for a surprise air
attack, included Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Director McCone, Dean Acheson,45 and McGeorge Bundy. The Reds, drafting a blockade
sequence, included Anderson, Shoup, Secretary Rusk, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric,
and Theodore Sorensen. The two teams constantly exchanged position papers and
critiqued each others work. Anderson protested to McNamara that a blockade would
lock the barn door after the horse had been stolen. It would bring on a confrontation
with the USSR rather than Cuba, risk attacks on Guantanamo and US shipping in the
Florida Strait, and leave the possibility of missiles being launched from Cuba.
Taylor came back to the Pentagon at 1400, leaving behind as JCS representative on the Blue team, Brigadier General Lucius Clay, Jr., who was the Deputy
Director for Operations, J3. Taylor told the Service Chiefs about Robert Kennedys
concern that the administration not be accused of carrying out another Pearl
Harbor. Would they, he asked, accept a 24-hour delay to inform allied leaders? All
approved a short interval to notify British, French, West German, and Canadian
leaders. Then they discussed reserve call-ups and determined that requirements
totaled 122,000: Army, 94,000 to fill out the Strategic Army Corps and perhaps two
reserve divisions; Navy, 10,500 to operate forty ships and eighteen air squadrons;
Air Force, 17,500 to man twenty-one C119 troop carrier squadrons. The JCS also
instructed CINCPAC to collect the shipping needed to transport the 5 th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade to the Caribbean. At 1600, General Clay brought back the
air strike scenario. Under it, on 22 October, the White House would announce that
missiles had been found, an accusatory message would go to Castro, and notices of
an impending attack would be given to the British, French, West German, Italian,
and Turkish governments.46 Early on 23 October, an air strike would be executed
against MRBMs, SAMs, high-performance aircraft, and nuclear storage sites. Simultaneously, the President would send Khrushchev a message that carefully defined
the extent of the operation, emphasized the intensity of the US commitment to
West Berlin, and indicate readiness for a high-level meeting.47
Saturday, 20 October, was the day of decision. When the JCS assembled at
1000, Taylor told them that the President might decide to bomb the missile sites
the next morning. Opposing a limited and hastily mounted strike, they authorized
Taylor to argue for an attack against all offensive weapon and supporting defenses
on Tuesday, 23 October, the last day before some missiles sites were expected to
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become operational. They also endorsed the air strike scenario above. At 1110,
General Clay returned from a meeting at the State Department attended by Cabinet
officers and some others. The consensus, Clay reported, was that the United States
would have to go through political shenanigans, followed by a limited blockade
and an air strike after three days. UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, he added, had
spoken strongly for a blockade less petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). Taylor
said he would tell the President that the proposed air strikes had every reasonable
chance of hitting all the missiles.
The climactic conference, formally christened the 505th Meeting of the National
Security Council, opened at 1430. Secretary McNamara argued for starting with a
blockade and opening negotiations, perhaps exchanging Jupiters in Italy and Turkey
for missiles in Cuba. Thus, the United States would remain true to its traditions,
cause the least trouble for its allies, act in a manner befitting its position as leader
of the Free World, and avoid a sudden move that might prompt Soviet escalation.
Taylor recommended an air strike on Tuesday, 23 October. That was the last chance
to destroy missiles before some of them became operational; soon the sites would
be camouflaged and impossible to find. Robert Kennedy, Treasury Secretary Dillon,
Director McCone, and Secretary Rusk all advocated beginning with a blockade and
then, after a short wait for Soviet compliance, executing an air strike. That way any
perception of a Pearl Harbor would be avoided. The President said he was willing to remove the Jupiters. If an air strike became necessary, he favored hitting the
missile sites alone. As for the IL28s, Kennedy said he could live with them. Ambassador Stevenson pressed for a settlement that involved evacuating Guantanamo.
The President sharply rejected surrendering Guantanamo, adding that the Jupiter
issue should be raised only at a later time. He then declared for a blockadequickly
refined to quarantineof offensive weapons and authorized preparations for (1) a
surgical strike on Monday or Tuesday and (2) an invasion of Cuba.48
Back at the Pentagon at 1815, Taylor told the Service Chiefs, This was not one
of our better days. The decisive votes, he said, had been cast by Rusk, McNamara,
and Adlai Stevenson.49 Pointedly, Taylor told the Chiefs that the President had said,
I know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust
that you will support me. Taylor continued, I assured him that we were against
the decision but would back him completely.
Late on Sunday morning, 21 October, McNamara and Taylor went to the White
House with General Walter Sweeney, who was the Commanding General, Tactical
Air Command. As Commander in Chief, Air Forces, Atlantic Command, Sweeney
would be directing the air operations against Cuba. The main issue before them
was not whether to attack but what to attack. Sweeney advised that a surgical
strike on the missile sites would require 250 sorties. According to the latest intelligence, forty-eight missiles were believed to be in Cuba and only thirty had been
located; Taylor said that the best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known
missiles. Sweeney strongly recommended hitting IL28s and MiGs, which would
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lift the sortie requirement to 500. The President agreed that any attack probably would include those aircraft and ordered that everything be ready by Monday
morning or any time thereafter.50
Simultaneously, the JCS directed Admiral Dennison to reinforce Guantanamo
with two Marine battalions and evacuate dependents.51 The Chiefs also gave Dennison temporary operational control over all Army and Air Force units allocated
for Cuban operations. Directly under him, Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze,
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, became the Commander, Joint Task
ForceCuba.
At their afternoon meeting, the JCS ordered a Marine air group and thirty
interceptors deployed to Florida. But the main issue was President Kennedys
concern, communicated through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, about Soviet counterstrikes against the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy. Was there not some danger of
Jupiters being fired without presidential authorization? The Chiefs thought that
this question bore little relation to reality. No matter what we might do in Cuba,
they advised Secretary McNamara, the Turkish and Italian governments would consider an attack on the Jupiter sites as an attack on them and on NATO, making the
United States bound by its treaty obligations.52
From 1430 to 1650, Taylor and Anderson attended an NSC meeting. President
Kennedy told Taylor that he wanted to shorten the seven-day interval between air
strikes and landings. Anderson described stop-and-search procedures and rules of
engagement. Later that day, the Joint Staff and the Services began studying how
to compress the seven days to five. Also, the JCS transmitted detailed instructions
to CINCLANT that read in part: Ships which are to be visited will be stopped. In
signifying his intent to stop a ship, a US commander will use all available communications. . . . Failing this, warning shots across the bow should be fired. Failing this,
make minimum use of force, taking care to damage non-vital parts of the ship, such
as the rudder, and to avoid injury or loss of life if possible.53
Monday, 22 October, was the day on which President Kennedy would tell the
American people about the discovery of missiles and what actions he would take.
When the JCS met at 0900, General LeMay asked that they:
1. Order SAC to put one-eighth of its aircraft on airborne alert, beginning
quietly at 1200 and taking full effect by Tuesday afternoon.
2. Direct SAC to move toward maximum readiness, DEFCON 2, commencing at 1200 and reaching completion twenty-four hours later.54
3. Instruct General Power to implement at his discretion plans for dispersing B47s to civilian airports.
4. Direct CINCONAD to disperse his interceptors on a very quiet, low-key
basis, beginning at noon.
5. Order that a world-wide Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3 take effect at noon.
Approving steps 1, 3, and 4,55 the Chiefs authorized General Taylor to seek
Secretary McNamaras approval for 2 and 5. Additionally, LeMay worried about
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overcrowding on Floridas airfields; nearly 500 tactical aircraft had been assembled at Homestead, MacDill, McCoy, and Key West. Air defenses in that area were
incomplete. Hence, LeMay suggested that CINCLANT be relieved of responsibility for remaining on six-hour alert, ordered to assume a twelve-hour posture, and
allowed to reduce forward congestion accordingly.
Midway through this meeting, General Carroll presented the latest intelligence.
Four MRBM sites were rated as operational and two would become so within
three to five days. One IRBM site would be available for emergency use by 15
November and completely operational by 1 December; the others should acquire
emergency capability by 1 December and full capability two weeks afterward. The
JCS adjourned at noon. During lunch, Secretary McNamara talked with Taylor and
decided that DEFCON 3 should be delayed until 1900, when President Kennedy
would be addressing the nation.56 Generating SAC toward maximum readiness
also would await a presidential decision. But McNamara did authorize loading the
5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade on transports57 and moving an armored combat
command from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort Stewart, Georgia, much nearer to the
port of Savannah.
The Secretary and the Chiefs reconvened at 1330. The Secretary said that
President Kennedy still worried about Jupiters being fired without authorizationeither by US personnel or by locals who had seized controlif the missile
bases came under attack. So a message went to General Norstad, telling him that
the missiles must be destroyed or rendered inoperable if the danger of unauthorized launches arose.58 Kennedy also wanted the Chiefs views on what to do if the
Cubans launched a missile against the United States. McNamara suggested warning the Soviets in advance that they would be held responsible, inducing them to
send a message to Cuba similar to the one just sent to General Norstad. Anderson
disagreed, fearing that a public warning to Moscow would stir strongly adverse
allied reactions. The JCS agreed that we should not say exactly what our retaliation
would be.
At 1500, all the Chiefs attended a meeting of the NSC. Here President Kennedy formalized the past weeks practice by establishing an Executive Committee
of the NSC, which would convene daily at 1000 for the duration of the crisis. The
ExComm consisted of the President and Vice President, Secretaries Rusk and
McNamara, Dillon, McCone, Robert Kennedy, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, and
Theodore Sorensen.59
The Chiefs reassembled in the tank at 1620. President Kennedy had asked
them to consider what to do (1) if a U2 was shot down and (2) if the Soviet buildup continued. For (1), they reviewed a range of responses (accept the loss; begin
low-level photography; send drones; strike selected SAM sites; attack all SAMs)
and decided that our response ought to depend upon the circumstances. On (2),
they favored tightening the blockade and then re-examining whether to launch an
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attack. The Chiefs learned that Kennedy had disapproved, for the time being, any
overt steps indicating an invasion. Thus they could neither call up reserves nor
requisition shipping. Taylor was not worried, remarking that if we cant lick the
Cubans with what we already have, we are in terrible shape. He did not know that
US intelligence had grossly underestimated the size of Soviet forces in Cuba.60
The JCS then addressed the dilemma of overcrowded Florida airfields. General Sweeney already had been authorized to assume a twelve-hour, instead of a
six-hour, alert posture. The Chiefs now advised Sweeney that he need not disperse
tactical aircraft, if he wished to continue taking the calculated risks involved in forward concentration. They ordered Lieutenant General William Blanchard, Inspector General of the Air Force, to fly to Florida and survey the situation.
Meantime, diplomatic and political preliminaries were being completed. British, French, West German, and Canadian governments were advised of the impending action. At 1700, the President briefed Congressional leaders, meeting a rough
reception as senators called for stronger action. One hour later, Secretary Rusk
gave Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin an advance copy of the Presidents speech and
a letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev.61
Speaking at 1900, President Kennedy declared that this urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base . . . constitutes an explicit threat to
the peace and security of all the Americas. It could not be accepted if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.
As initial steps, he ordered a quarantine on all offensive military equipment and
increased close surveillance of Cuba. Should offensive preparations continue,
further action will be justified. Kennedy stated that any nuclear missile launched
from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as
an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory
response upon the Soviet Union. He also asked for immediate meetings of the
Council of the Organization of American States and the UN Security Council. Finally, the President called upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace, abandon the quest for world domination, and join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the
history of man.62
This Is No Time to Run Scared
eeting at 0900 on Tuesday, 23 October, the Service Chiefs decided that

low-level reconnaissance was necessary. They also agreed that, if a U2
was downed, one or two flights daily should continue until another U2 loss
occurred. The next step would be to determine whether the projected rate of
attrition was acceptable. If so, flights should continue; if not, all the SAM sites
should be attacked.
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The ExComm convened at 1000. President Kennedy approved preparation
of a Proclamation of Interdiction and signed an executive order extending some
military tours of duty. He approved a contingency plan for dealing with opposition
to U2 overflights, unaware that the Service Chiefs were discussing the same problem. The ExComms plan stated that if there was a clear indication that an incident
had resulted from hostile action, the recommendation would be immediate retaliation against the most likely SAM site involved. It was expected, but not firmly
decided, that continued interference after a single incident and a single retaliation
would require elimination of the entire SAM network. Kennedy also authorized
low-level reconnaissance flights. McNamara called the Pentagon to ask how many
the Service Chiefs wanted; they said six, and that number was approved. Worried
whether all the aircraft assembled in Florida were properly protected against a surprise attack, Kennedy called for photographs of the four crowded airfields.63
When the JCS met at 1400, Admiral Anderson reported that the quarantine
would take effect at 1000 next day. The Chiefs directed CINCSAC to begin generating his forces toward DEFCON 2 at that same hour. Subsequently, SAC bombers
flew north to the radar line where they would be detected by the Soviets.64
Later that afternoon, by a vote of 19-0, the Council of the Organization of
American States recommended that members take all measures . . . including the
use of armed force . . . to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability
from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent.
The ExComm slightly revised the Proclamation of Interdiction, which Kennedy
signed at 1906. Delivery of these materials would be prohibited: surface-to-surface
missiles; bombers; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of
the above; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above
items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of
Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.65
The quarantine line, drawn 500 miles to the north and east of Cuba, was covered by Task Force 136. Commanded by Vice Admiral Alfred Ward, it had three
components. Commander Task Group (CTG) 136.1 with one heavy cruiser, one
guided missile cruiser, seven guided missile destroyers, and eleven destroyers
formed the quarantine line. Behind it was CTG 136.2 with the ASW carrier USS
Essex and four destroyers. CTG 136.3 had two oilers, one ammunition ship and
four destroyers. In support was Task Force 135, consisting of two carriersUSS
Independence and the nuclear-powered USS Enterpriseplus fifteen destroyers
and an underway replenishment group.66
Around 2200 on Tuesday evening, McNamara, Gilpatric, and two OSD civilians entered the Navy Flag Plot, the command center in the Pentagon. Apparently,
McNamara asked the duty officer detailed questions about procedures for stopping
and boarding. Unsatisfied by the replies, he called for Admiral Anderson. There are
drastically different versions about what happened next. By Andersons account,
Secretary McNamara looked at markers on a map showing where warships were
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stationed along the quarantine line and saw one destroyer isolated from the rest.
Why, he asked, had that ship left the line? The CNO tried to turn aside his question.
When Secretary McNamara became insistent, Anderson took him to a special secure
area and explained that the destroyer was shadowing a Soviet submarine, a feat
accomplished through highly classified intelligence for which the two OSD civilians
were not cleared. As Anderson and McNamara walked down a corridor, the CNO
said in what he thought was a joking tone, Why dont you go back to your quarters
and let us handle this? By Gilpatrics account, McNamaras questions about stopping and boarding irked Anderson to the point where he snapped, This is none of
your goddamn business. Weve been doing this since the days of John Paul Jones,
and if youll just go back to your quarters, Mr. Secretary, well take care of this.
McNamara reddened, rose, and left. As he walked to his office, he said to Gilpatric,
Thats the end of Anderson. As far as Im concerned, hes lost my confidence.67
Moscow, meantime, had sent coded messages ordering most of the Cuba-bound
ships (including two with R14 missiles aboard) to reverse course. Aleksandrovsk, carrying warheads for R14s as well as cruise missiles, and an escort ship were so close
to Cuba that they were instructed to sail on, reaching a port about 100 miles east of
Havana early on Wednesday. By late Tuesday, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
and the National Security Agency had picked up indications of the turn-around but,
fearing deception, waited to be sure and did not inform higher authority that night.68
When the JCS met at 0900 on Wednesday, 24 October, the Chairman said that
Secretary McNamara did not believe we knew enough about movements of the
Soviet ships and wanted a recommendation. Since the Secretary had been shown
photos of crowded Florida bases, Taylor raised the issue of whether aircraft should
disperse. Lets stay on concrete and not go to the dirt, LeMay replied. The Chiefs
agreed to send a memorandum stating that the advantages of forward positioning
far offset the risk of losses in a surprise attack.
The ExComm convened at 1000, all of its members believing that ships were
approaching the quarantine line. The Soviets only communication so far had been
a truculent letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy.69 Secretary McNamara showed
pictures of Florida airfields to the President. Taylor gave his opinion that the readiness level of aircraft there could be reduced; McNamara recommended scaling
back the notice needed for mounting a sizable strike back to twelve hours instead
of one or two. McNamara was describing intercept scenarios when Director McCone received word from ONI, now certain about its information that six ships bound
for Cuba had stopped or reversed course.70 This was evidently the time when Secretary Rusk whispered to a colleague, Were eyeball to eyeball, and I think the
other fellow just blinked. The story of how a potentially catastrophic confrontation was averted at the very last minute would endure for many years.
By dawn on Thursday, 25 October, fourteen ships were steaming away from
the quarantine line; five tankers, one cargo ship, and two passenger vessels were
continuing toward Cuba. In Moscow, Khrushchev decided to seek a way out. He
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would offer Washington a trade, withdrawing the missiles in return for a pledge not
to invade Cuba. By the missiles he meant R12 MRBMs, none of the R14 IRBMs
having arrived; presumably nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and battlefield Lunas
would remain in Cuba. That night, Khrushchevs colleagues on the Presidium unanimously approved his proposal.71
In the tank session at 0900 on Thursday, Secretary McNamara told the Chiefs
to work with ISA in studying what to do, at the lowest political and military cost, if
construction of the missile bases continued. After he left, General Wheeler reported that requirements for shipping and loading ruled out shortening to five days the
time between starting air strikes and launching an invasion. The ExComm focused
on which ships to pass, stop, or board and search. At noon, Taylor debriefed the
Service Chiefs: Last week they were talking like the blockade would bring down
Castro. Now Rusk was saying that if the blockade would keep out offensive weapons we would have accomplished the mission.72
Taylor lunched with McNamara and won the Secretarys approval to start
moving the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (11,000 men in twenty-one ships)
from California to the Caribbean. The next JCS meeting began at 1400. General
Blanchard, who had just returned from Florida, described aircraft dispersal as
good at Homestead and MacDill Air Force Bases, incomplete at McCoy, and crowded at Key West, where he said that aircraft were jammed together and would offer
very lucrative targets. Air defenses, however, were formidable. Blanchard said that,
if he were in Castros place, he would conclude that initiating an attack would be
suicidal. The JCS sent Secretary McNamara a summary of preparation times:
Two hours for low-level reconnaissance missions, reprisal against a single
SAM site, or strikes against all the SAM sites.
Twelve hours for a full air attack against all military targets.
Seven days for an invasion (OPLAN 316). Because the airborne elements
would be so vulnerable in flight, all or most of this time would be devoted to
suppressing air defenses.73
Early on Friday, 26 October, the freighter Marucla was boarded, searched, and
cleared. Carefully chosen by the ExComm, she was Lebanese-registered, chartered
by the Soviets, and manned by a Greek crew. An ominous development was that
overflights showed work on the missile sites continuingfour of the six were
thought to be operationaland assembly of the IL28s was accelerating. Exchanges in the ExComm focused on resolution by diplomacy, even discussing ways to
monitor dismantling of the missile sites.
In their morning meeting on 26 October, the Chiefs directed Admiral Dennison to stop work on OPLAN 314 and concentrate on 316. They also recommended pre-positioning ten transports and chartering 29 civilian cargo ships;
McNamara approved the first step but postponed action on the second.74 At the
afternoon session, Taylor reported that civilians on the ExComm felt things were
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off to a very good start. Taylor tabled a query from Secretary McNamara about
how many sorties were needed to: (1) render six MRBMs sites inoperable, which
he indicated was what McNamara and the White House favored; (2) destroy or
neutralize all MRBMs; (3) take out all the SAM sites; and (4) attack all offensive
weapons. General Sweeney supplied data which was refined by the Joint Staff,
approved by the JCS on the 27th, and provided to Secretary McNamara on the
28th. Sortie requirements rose from 168 for executing (1) to 508 for accomplishing
(4). The Chiefs advised that they were completely opposed to (1) and (2), labeled
(3) the least sound of all, and endorsed (4) because it moves to the heart of the
Cuban problem.75
At their meeting on the 26th, the Chiefs slightly amended and then approved
a paper from ISA and the Joint Staff outlining a sequence of steps to take if construction of the missile bases continued. It listed: pressure by the OAS; attempts
to goad Cuba into acts justifying reprisal (e.g., round-the-clock surveillance, naval
patrols within the three-mile limit, harassment of Cuban shipping); extending the
quarantine to include POL; and undertaking overt military action. The last course
was deemed best. According to the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate
(SNIE), the Soviet reaction would be approximately the same regardless of the
scale of attack.76 Therefore, all things considered, it appears at this time that the
only direct action which will eliminate the offensive weapons threat is an attack
followed by invasion.77
The JCS also submitted a pungent appraisal of diplomatic initiatives then under
consideration. U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, had proposed and
Khrushchev promptly endorsed a standstill period in which the United States would
not escalate and the USSR would not challenge the quarantine. Brazilian diplomats
floated the idea of denuclearizing all Latin America, which State and ISA were
studying.78 The JCS warned that if the Soviets could hide behind the endless arguments of often naive neutrals, then we have lost control and may well have lost our
objective. . . . The longer we talk, the more diffuse become the inevitable arguments,
the weaker becomes whatever may be the final agreement. And when this happens,
as it has in the past, we will have lent credence to the impression that we may be a
strong country but we are a country unwilling to use its strength. The Chiefs concluded with a statement that encapsulated their view of how to handle the crisis:
We have the strategic advantage in our general war capabilities; we have the tactical advantages of moral rightness, of boldness, of strength, of initiative, and of control of this situation. This is no time to run scared.79
On Friday evening, Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev offering to withdraw armaments in exchange for a no-invasion pledge.80 The day before, columnist
Walter Lippmann had written about resolving the crisis through a Cuba-Turkey trade.
Khrushchev took heart and proposed to the Presidium sending another letter, calling
for withdrawal of the Jupiters in addition to the no-invasion pledge. If we did this,
179

he told the Presidium, we could win. Moscow Radio broadcast this second letter on
Saturday at 1000 Washington time.81
The JCS spent Saturday, 27 October, in almost continuous session. 82 The
ExComm, convening at 1000, concentrated upon what to do about the Jupiters in
Turkey. General Taylor telephoned the Pentagon to report that eight reconnaissance flights had been authorized for the morning, eight more for the afternoon.
LeMay then suggested drafting a short paper taking account of the latest intelligencecontinuing construction at MRBM sites and evidence of Soviet ground forces as well as Luna missilesand recommending execution of a full-scale OPLAN
312, followed by 316. At 1330, McNamara joined the Chiefs in the tank. The
Director, Joint Staff, tabled a memorandum recommending early and timely execution of OPLAN 312, with readiness to execute OPLAN 316. Secretary McNamara
directed the Joint Staff to prepare two plans. First, move one Polaris submarine
off the Turkish coast before we hit Cuba, informing the Soviets before they could
strike Jupiters in Turkey. Second, assume we attacked sites in Cuba and the Soviets retaliated by knocking out the Jupiters. McNamara next asked what was meant
by early and timely execution of OPLAN 312. Attacking on Sunday or Monday,
LeMay answered. Taylor suggested changing the wording to read after a reasonable period of time, and the Secretary concurred.
At 1340, Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs were told that a U2 flying from
Alaska on an air-sampling mission had strayed over Soviet territory.83 At 1403, they
learned that a U2 overflying Cuba was thirty to forty minutes overdue. Taylor and
McNamara left at 1416 for an ExComm meeting. The Service Chiefs quickly agreed
to give the memorandum more precise wording. It read that delay in taking further
direct military action . . . is to the benefit of the Soviet Union. Cuba will be harder to
defeat. US casualties will be multiplied. The direct threat of attack on the Continental
United States . . . will be greatly increased. Therefore, they recommended executing
OPLAN 312 not later than Monday, 29 October, unless there is irrefutable evidence
in the meantime that the offensive weapons are being dismantled or rendered inoperable. Execution of OPLAN 316 should follow seven days later. This was sent to the
White House, where Taylor summarized it for the ExComm. Well, Im surprised,
Robert Kennedy remarked, evoking loud laughter from other members.84
When the ExComm reconvened at 1600, members discussed how to reply to
Khrushchevs letters, and what the modalities of a Cuba-Turkey trade should be.
Taylor relayed word that Navy F8s flying low-level reconnaissance had encountered ground fire.85 The errant U2 came safely back to Alaska. Around 1740, however, McNamara reported that Cubans had found, near a Soviet-manned SAM site,
wreckage of a U2 and the pilots body.86 McNamara argued that, to allow time for
discussion with NATO allies, an air attack should not take place until Wednesday,
31 October, or Thursday, 1 Novemberbut only if we continue our surveillance,
and fire against anything that fires against a surveillance aircraft. He reasoned
that an air strike would have to be all-out, almost certainly leading to an invasion
180

and probably to a Soviet attack against the Jupiters, to which we must respond.
Taylor said that deferring execution of OPLAN 312 beyond Monday will be very
dangerous . . . unless we can reconnoiter each day.87
Back at the Pentagon, Taylor told the Service Chiefs that President Kennedy
had been seized with the idea of a Cuba-Turkey trade, and that he seemed to
be the only one in favor of it. This was a bit misleading, in that Kennedy evidently wished to conclude a trade fairly quickly while others wanted to proceed
more slowly, probing for perhaps better terms.88 The Chairman then asked,
Should we take out a SAM site? No, LeMay replied, we would open ourselves
to retaliation; we have little to gain and a lot to lose. Wheeler agreed. Gentlemen, Taylor responded, you all recommended retaliation if a U2 was downed.
If this was wise on the 23rd, it should be just as wise on the 27th. (He was recalling what the ExComm had decided, not what the Service Chiefs had proposed.)
Wheeler observed that the latest intelligence showed concrete pads, on which
he feared there were nuclear-armed weapons. The JCS agreed that there should
be some reconnaissance tomorrow, but no U2 overflights. At 1945, a DIA briefer reported that photos from todays missions showed canvas had been taken
off the launchers. The missiles themselves were on the launchers, and a reload
capability was ready.89
Simultaneously, at the Presidents direction, Robert Kennedy went to the
Soviet Embassy. By the Attorney Generals account, he told Ambassador Dobrynin
that We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be
removed. . . . He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we
would remove them. When Dobrynin inquired about removing the Jupiters, Kennedy replied that, while there could be no deal or quid pro quo, If some time
elapsedand per [Secretary Rusks] instruction, I mentioned four or five months
I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily.90
It was long thought that this Kennedy-Dobrynin exchange, implicitly
accepting a Cuba-Turkey trade, was crucial in resolving the crisis. Actually,
by Saturday, Khrushchev was becoming sufficiently alarmed to accept a noinvasion pledge alone. When Dobrynin cabled that the Americans were willing
to withdraw the Jupiters as well, Khrushchev of course embraced that welcome
bonus.91
The ExComm began its third meeting of the day at 2100. Speaking for the
Chiefs, General Taylor proposed sending six low-level reconnaissance flights over
undefended sites, without fighter escorts. They could ascertain whether work was
continuing and prove were still on the job. Even if the planes were fired upon,
President Kennedy opposed retaliating immediately, not wanting to begin to sort
of half do it. McNamara proposed, and Kennedy approved, calling up 24 air transport squadrons and 14,000 USAF reservists. Requisition of the shipping needed for
invasion was to follow next day.92
181
Winding Down
hen the JCS gathered at 0900 on Sunday, 28 October, General LeMays thin
reserve of forbearance was exhausted. He wanted to see the President
later that day and hoped the other Chiefs would accompany him. Monday, LeMay
believed, would be the last day to strike the missiles before they became fully
operational. Taylor promised that, if they wanted a meeting, he would put in their
request. Wheeler added that, according to his information, all the MRBM sites had
become operational; if warheads were with the missiles, R4s could be ready to
fire in 2 to 5 hours.93 The JCS then turned to the days reconnaissance plan. At
that point, Moscow Radio began broadcasting Khrushchevs latest communication to President Kennedy. Taylor read a ticker tape summary to his colleagues:
I appreciate your assurance that the United States will not invade Cuba. Hence
we have ordered our officers to stop building bases, dismantle the equipment, and
send it back home. This can be done under UN supervision.94
McNamara, Gilpatric, and Nitze promptly joined the Chiefs. There was no talk
of triumph. Indeed, LeMay feared that the Soviets might carry out a charade of
withdrawal while keeping some weapons in Cuba. Anderson worried that a noinvasion pledge would leave Castro free to make mischief in Latin America. But
McNamara, Gilpatric, and Nitze were convinced that withdrawal of the missiles
would place the United States in a position vastly stronger than that of the USSR.
LeMay still wished to go to the White House, but the other Chiefs now wanted to
wait and see whether reconnaissance flights met opposition and what their cameras would reveal. Later that day, Taylor formally advised the Secretary that we
should maintain continuous readiness to execute CINCLANT OPLAN 312 on 12
hour notice . . . [and] CINCLANT OPLAN 316 within seven days after strike. I do not
recommend taking the decision to execute now.95
Assistant Secretary Nitze asked the JCS to prepare an outline inspection
plan. On 30 October, they submitted a 54-page study in which a 700-man team
would enjoy full freedom of access throughout Cuba. Missiles and bombers
would be displayed at airfields, then taken out under supervision through the
ports of Mariel, Matanzas, and Havana. General Taylor, who was not present
when the Service Chiefs approved this paper, advised Secretary McNamara that
he did not regard it as a feasible proposal but as a useful indication of the
magnitude of the requirements for a complete and thorough verification of fulfillment of Soviet undertakings.96
Overflights on 1 November brought back conclusive evidence that the missile sites were being dismantled. Starting on 7 November, merchantmen carried
what were counted as forty-two MRBMs out of Cuba. Castro adamantly rejected any on-site inspection, so US ships and aircraft performed visual and photographic inspections at sea, where the ships crews removed tarpaulins covering
the missiles.97
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Interestingly, during these days, President Kennedy raised more detailed questions about OPLAN 316 than he had during the week of crisis. At an ExComm meeting on 29 October, he asked how the advanced Soviet ground equipment spotted in
Cuba would affect an invasion. Answering four days later, Taylor assured him that
the plan was adequate and feasible. Should the enemy take the foolhardy step of
using nuclear weapons, we could respond at once in overwhelming . . . force.98
On 31 October, Kennedy told General Wheeler that, for reasons of national
prestige, an invasion must succeed swiftly. If more troops were needed, he was
willing to risk drawing down our capability to deal with a Berlin contingency. If
trouble did develop, he would authorize the use of tactical weapons in Europe
immediately. Wheeler reported this at the next days JCS meeting. Taylor commented, The President knows I disagree with him, but he seems very uneasy about it. I
will discuss this with him.
On 5 November, President Kennedy formally made his misgivings known to
Secretary McNamara, stating that OPLAN 316 seemed thin. There were three
uncommitted divisions in the Armys general reserve. Kennedy wanted to use
them in the invasion and, as compensation, activate National Guard divisions.99 At
a JCS meeting on 7 November, Wheeler reported on his visit to Army units in the
field. Saying he had never seen more imaginative and impressive training, Wheeler
concluded that we would never be more ready. Concurrently, in a conference
attended by all the commanders concerned with OPLAN 316, Admiral Dennison
suggested adding the 5th Infantry Division and a combat command from the 2 nd
Armored Division to the floating reserve and airlifting two Marine battalions into
Guantanamo. On 10 November, he put these recommendations before the JCS.
They approved adding the Army units but rejected augmenting Guantanamo as
well as CINCLANTs proposal that two National Guard divisions be mobilized on
D-Day. On 16 November, the JCS informed President Kennedy that the armed forces had assumed an optimum posture to execute OPLANs 312 and 316 and were in
an excellent condition world-wide to meet any Soviet countermoves.100
An atmosphere of crisis returned in mid-November, because President Kennedy
insisted upon prompt removal of the IL28s. Strictly speaking, bombers were not
covered by the 2728 October understanding, and Khrushchev tried to postpone their
withdrawal.101 On 9 November, General Taylor put a hypothetical question before the
Service Chiefs. Would they prefer that bombers be removed and a no-invasion pledge
issued, or that IL28s remain and a pledge withheld? They all favored the latter.
Taylor said he suspected that was what would come to pass (i.e., continuing surveillance, lifting the quarantine, and withholding a no-invasion guarantee).
A meeting between Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs was set for 16 November. On
the day before, the Chiefs reviewed a talking paper drafted by J5. The Chairman
criticized it as being condescending and full of platitudes: Were saying, Now see
here, young man, here is what we think you ought to do. Taylor tabled his own
paper, which in fact was toughly worded. Approved by the Chiefs as a framework
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for their presentation to the President, it read in part: Even if the IL28s are negotiated out of Cuba, there will remain systems of significant military importance
. . . . But more important than this equipment are the thousands of Soviet military
personnel who remain in Cuba to man it. . . . When the extent of this presence
is known . . . , it will be clear to the Western Hemisphere that it has indeed been
invaded and remains invaded by the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, we may
anticipate a loud popular demand . . . for the removal of the Soviet personnel and
neutralization of their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the United States
should generate now all the pressure possible to get the Soviet personnel out, feeling that their eviction is far more important than that of the equipment.102
The Chiefs talk with Kennedy may have bolstered the Presidents resolve.
Letters were drafted for Prime Minister Macmillan, President deGaulle, and
Chancellor Adenauer warning that another crisis could be coming: I am not yet
prepared to make the precise choices among the numerous courses of action
open to us, but I do expect to indicate very clearly tomorrow that renewed
action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL28s begin to leave, and (2)
our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro. 103 But no further
steps were necessary. On 20 November, Khrushchev informed the President
that IL28s would leave Cuba in thirty days, with Soviet combat units following
in due course. Kennedy promptly lifted the quarantine, ended SACs airborne
alert, reduced the alert status of other forces, and started redeploying tactical
aircraft from coastal bases.104 At an evening press conference, he stated that if
all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere
in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not
used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in
the Caribbean.105
Reflections
he military superiority of the United States determined the outcome of the missile crisis. Aware that the correlation of forces tilted heavily in our favor, the JCS
were confident of prevailing at any level of conflict.106 President Kennedy may not
have grasped just how strong a hand he held, but he felt constrained by the necessity
of preserving alliances and doing everything possible to avert nuclear war.
The performance of the individual Chiefs was not uniform in quality. Admiral
Andersons encounter with Secretary McNamara overshadowed the professionalism of the Navys work. General Wheelers lower profile owed a good deal to being
so new to his position. General Shoup was sometimes terse to the point of incoherence. General LeMay damaged himself with his outspokenness. Were spending
$50 billion, he remarked during a JCS meeting; if we cant take care of Cuba we
should go home.107 Kennedy may have been as much irritated as assured.
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The Service Chiefs looked a bit askance at General Taylor, fearing that he
might not be conveying their views to the ExComm.108 They were mistaken in that
Taylor always gave accurate reports. Judging by ExComm transcripts, though,
the Chairman did not establish a forceful presence there, deferring to Secretary
McNamaras natural tendency to dominate discussions. Back in the tank, Taylors debriefs of ExComm sessions rarely ran to more than a few sentences. It is
noteworthy that General Wheeler, as Chairman, made a habit of providing detailed
debriefings about White House meetings. In any case, Taylor did retain his Commander in Chiefs full confidence. Shortly after the crisis ended, newspaper editor
Benjamin Bradlee heard from the President an explosion . . . about his forceful,
positive lack of admiration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for Maxwell Taylor,
whom he calls absolutely first class.109
The Service Chiefs, although perhaps not General Taylor, kept harboring
doubts about the Presidents strength of purpose. General Shoups worry about
doing the goddamn thing piecemeal did have some foundation. On 27 October,
the peak day of the crisis, transcripts of the ExComms afternoon and evening sessions show that decisions about the type of Sundays reconnaissance and the scope
of retaliation were being kept open as long as possible.110 Afterwards, civilian leaders concluded that applying carefully chosen gradations of pressure, or squeezeand-talk, was the right way to achieve a limited objective without risking general
war. They did not perceive that the circumstances of October 1962 were, in many
ways, unique.
185
12
NATO: Advocating New
Approaches
Emphasizing Conventional Defense
he North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created in 1949, formed the centerpiece

of a policy that was designed to contain Soviet communism through collective
security. Article V of the treaty stated that an attack upon one member, whether in
Europe or North America, would be considered an attack against them all.1 In 1951,
the alliance organized an integrated command to defend Western Europe. The
United States stationed in West Germany a ground force equivalent to six divisions.
Americans held the most senior military positions. In 1961, General Lauris Norstad,
USAF, was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Admiral Robert L. Dennison
was the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Alliance strategy was
broadly outlined in the Report by the Military Committee on the Overall Strategic
Concept for the Defense of NATO (MC 14/2), approved by the North Atlantic Council in 1957. According to MC 14/2, NATO would respond with nuclear weapons,
regardless of whether the Soviets did so, in all situations except incursion, infiltration, or local hostile action. In no case was there a concept of limited war with the
Soviets.2
Early in 1961, the US Seventh Army in Germany contained two armored divisions, three infantry divisions, and three armored cavalry regiments. In the continental United States, earmarked for assignment to the SACEUR, were one infantry
and two airborne divisions. The US Air Forces in Europe comprised 21 strike,
four air defense, and six reconnaissance squadrons. Earmarked for assignment
in CONUS were another 14 fighter and four reconnaissance squadrons. While the
187

nuclear arsenal was NATOs sword, General Norstad described the non-nuclear
shield forces under his command as designed to bridge the gap between an all
or nothing response, to give validity to the principle of the deterrent. Allied Command Europes force goals for 1963, prescribed by the Military Committee through
MC-70, included 55 active divisions, 34 reserve divisions, and 4,802 aircraft.3
The new administration set about applying flexible response to NATO. Looking upon MC 14/2 as outdated, civilian leaders wanted to turn conventional forces
into Allied Command Europes sword. Early in February 1961, Secretary of State
Rusk informed Secretary of Defense McNamara that he assigned the greatest
importance to raising the threshold at which resorting to nuclear weapons would
become necessary. Allied Command Europe, in Rusks judgment, must be capable
of resisting a conventional attack long enough by conventional means to permit an
opportunity for negotiations and to allow the Soviets time to consider the wider
risks they faced. McNamara asked for JCS views. Creating that much conventional
capability, the Chiefs replied, would require modernizing US forces and considerably expanding allied efforts. NATO, they insisted, must not flinch from employing
nuclear weapons when necessary. The Joint Chiefs endorsed General Norstads
judgment that selective use of nuclear firepower need not result in total war.4
Rusk appointed Dean Acheson, who had been Secretary of State during
NATOs formative years, to chair a review group. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary
(ISA), represented the Defense Department. In mid-March, Achesons group circulated a draft report recommending that first priority go to preparing for contingencies short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack. The desirable objective would
be enough conventional strength to impose a pause of the length described above.
This time, the JCS critique was pungent. NATO intelligence, they noted, had judged
a conventional attack to be highly improbable during the next ten years. Hence
the cornerstone of NATO strategy was still a thoroughly credible deterrent against
massive aggression. Conventional capabilities certainly ought to be strengthened,
but priorities should provide for a proper balance between nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The decision to use nuclear weapons must not be delayed beyond the
danger point. While the JCS accepted the desirability of raising the threshold, they
could not envisage, now or in the future, a situation in which an attack by as much
as 60 divisions could be held by non-nuclear means for a period of possibly weeks.
An attack of such magnitude would be launched only to gain a major objective and
neither side would withhold the means for winning.5
Late in March, the JCS reviewed the Acheson groups final reportrecast now
as a policy directiveand said they were generally in accord with it. Still, the
group held that preparing for the more likely contingencies (i.e., those short of
nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack) deserved first priority. The Chiefs wanted
that changed to simply priority because they did not believe a limited war in
Europe to be any more likely than a general war. Norstad, likewise, objected to
assigning exclusive priorities among tasks that appeared equally necessary. And
188
NATO: Advocating New Approaches

he, too, challenged Achesons assumption that the more likely contingency was one
short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack.6
On 21 April, President Kennedy signed a policy directive giving first priority . . . to preparing for the more likely contingencies, i.e., those short of nuclear or
massive non-nuclear attack. The objective of improving non-nuclear capabilities
should be to create a capability for halting Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate
the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked. This program should
emphasize raising the manning levels, modernizing the equipment, and improving
the mobility of presently projected NATO non-nuclear forces. The US should then
press strongly for NATO execution of this program, as a matter of the highest priority.7 Thus the JCS reservations and recommendations were rejected.
Thomas K. Finletter, Permanent US Representative to the North Atlantic Council, presented these proposals to the Council on 26 April.8 General Taylor, watching from the vantage point of Military Representative of the President, wrote that
relatively junior officials of both State and Defense, fired with a missionary zeal
to reverse or at least reform the nuclear-oriented strategy of NATO, took off for
Europe on various pretexts. There . . . they undertook to explain the Kennedy strategy and in so doing succeeded in arousing to new levels the ever-latent suspicion
of American motives. Late in May, German officials made their misgivings known
to American officials. There could not be a pause, Germans argued, unless fighting came to a standstill. But the Soviets would not stop; instead, the allies should
so conduct their operations as to compel the Soviets to reveal their intentions
as quickly as possible. Also, the Germans argued, the minimum essential force
requirements, 19581963, (MC70) goals were insufficient to raise the nuclear
threshold significantly in the near future. Should a gap appear between NATO
strategy and military reality, the enemy might try to exploit the opportunities thus
offered. In June, NATOs Secretary General Dirk Stikker warned that the North
Atlantic Council could make no further progress until the United States amplified
and clarified Ambassador Finletters statement of 26 April.9
Secretary McNamara directed General Lemnitzer to organize a working group
that would propose such changes in NATO policy and force structure as were necessary to implement President Kennedys directive of 21 April. Chaired by Brigadier
General Edward L. Rowny, USA, the group had representatives from the Joint Staff,
the Services, ISA, SACEUR, and the OSD Comptroller.10
In mid-July, Rowny presented preliminary findings that lent considerable
support to advocates of the new strategy. Previous estimates, the Rowny group
argued, had exaggerated enemy strength. Soviet ground forces numbered 147 divisions, but only 90 of them were maintained at 70 to 85 percent strength; the other
57 were kept at 40 percent. Further, a Soviet division slice11 was about 26,000 men,
considerably less than the NATO standard of 35,000. Other factors favoring NATO
were the confining terrain of Central Europe, the austere levels of Soviet combat
189

support, and the vulnerability of enemy to air interdiction. Add to that the difficulty of achieving complete surprise, the necessity of staying dispersed because
of the nuclear threat, and the need to maintain troops on other fronts and in the
satellites. Under those conditions, the enemy no longer looks like an impossible
adversary. His employable strength against the Allies in Central Europe at any one
time is more like 55 divisions. It must be borne in mind, nevertheless, that once
he has built up to this level he can sustain it indefinitely. NATOs ground forces in
Central Europe consisted of 22 active and 18 reserve divisions.12 The Rowny group
calculated that 30 ready and 21 reserve divisions could conduct a conventional
defense for as long as thirty days.13
General Lemnitzer characterized the Rowny groups work as excellent, but
the Service Chiefs did not share his enthusiasm. In General Deckers judgment, the
force levels recommended were not enough to support the concepts expounded.
Admiral Burke noted that the group failed to stress how the defense of Central
Europe depended upon resupply by sea. General LeMay claimed that the 21 April
directive had reaffirmed the importance of a nuclear strategy, not rejected it as the
Rowny group seemed to believe. If the deterrents credibility was declining, he attributed that not to Soviet technological advances (as the group did) but to inadequate
manifestations of our willingness to use whatever forces are necessary to achieve
our objectives. Lastly, LeMay observed, the groups conclusions about a thirty-day
defense were considerably more optimistic than any approved JCS estimate.14
The Berlin crisis stimulated an improvement in conventional capabilities. The allies agreed that, by 1 January 1962, there would be 24 active,
full-strength divisions on the Central Front. This was the backdrop against
which planning NATOs force goals for 1966 went forward. The Major NATO
Commanders (MNCs), who were SACEUR, SACLANT, and the Commander in
Chief, Channel Command, set their requirements at 59 active divisions, 35
reserve divisions, and 4,095 strike, reconnaissance, air defense, and transport
aircraft. The JCS advised Secretary McNamara that these requirements ought
to be larger but were acceptable as a broad direction. McNamara and Rusk
wanted the Military Committee to prepare a priority list, assigning high priority to the enhancement of non-nuclear ground and air capabilities in forward
areas of Allied Command Europe. When the Chiefs protested that presenting
such a list would delay the Committees action, it became simply a set of suggested guidelines.15
NATOs semi-annual ministerial meeting took place in December 1961. A week
beforehand, the JCS were shown a speech to be delivered by Secretary McNamara.
They recommended dropping a statement that NATO forces could create conventional forces superior to what the Warsaw Pact could deploy in Central Europe.
McNamara agreed. They also asked him to reword a claim that NATO can probably
reduce or eliminate Soviet tactical air superiority to a more modest statement that
the West can reduce this advantage. McNamara rejected that recommendation.16
190

The meeting opened on 11 December, in Paris, at a time when the Berlin
confrontation was easing but a successful outcome was far from certain. General
Norstad informed the Military Committee that Allied Command Europe was nearly
ready to begin implementing a true forward strategy. Current war plans contemplated a voluntary withdrawal from half of West Germany to main battle positions
behind Hamburg in the north and Augsburg and Munich in the south. With small
additions to existing strength and redeployment of certain forces, Norstad believed
the defensive line could be moved forward to the border.17
Addressing the Council three days later, Secretary McNamara said that nuclear
superiority had to remain a fundamental strength of NATO, but massive retaliation was no longer credible against a range of lesser provocations. The Alliance,
he argued, could create conventional forces capable of holding an attack long
enough to make the Soviet Union aware how grave was the course on which it had
embarked. Afterwards, General Lemnitzer judged allied reactions to be extremely
favorable. Secretary General Stikker, in fact, said that he had never before
heard such a forceful or important statement in the Council.18 The Council then
approved MC96, its force requirements for 1966 being close to those listed above.
Lemnitzer advised President Kennedy that the session was more successful than
any of the seven I have previously attended.19
During 1962, the steady diminution of tension over Berlin relegated the debate
about strategy to a more detached, intellectual plane. General Taylor, acting as Military Representative of the President, toured European capitals in March. Norstad
told him that the surest way to bring about rejection of our reoriented thinking
would be to present it as something new and extraordinary. Subsequently, Taylor
proposed to President Kennedy that NATO undertake a comprehensive review
of the force requirements involved in a forward strategy. Thus any debate would
occur within the relatively cool atmosphere of military planning rather than amid
high temperature political discussions. Secretary McNamara concurred.20
Norstad directed the Commander in Chief, Army Group Center (CINCENT), to
prepare plans for implementing a forward defense. Concurrently, McNamara asked
the JCS what redeployments would be required. The Joint Staff, in turn, passed this
query to General Norstad and asked his opinion about the chances of defending,
with and without nuclear weapons, against a sixty-division attack. Norstad replied
that an assault on that scale could only aim at the conquest of Western Europe.
General war conditions would exist, with the Soviets making elimination of
SACEURs nuclear capability their first and highest priority task. If the main thrust
came across the North German plain, the allies would have to resort to nuclear
weapons almost immediately. If it came in the center, using nuclear weapons could
be delayed for several hours, possibly more. As for redeployments, Norstad supplied in July a calculation that ten divisions would have to be repositioned over 2
to five years at a cost of $2.787 billion. The JCS accepted his calculation, and so
advised Secretary McNamara.21
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Meantime, when the North Atlantic Council met in May, Secretary McNamara
argued again for a conventional buildup. He portrayed the Berlin confrontation as
an example of limited but decisive action. While nuclear weapons did not deter
the Soviets, expanding NATOs conventional capability demonstrated a determination that may have given [them] second thoughts. So he declared a truly forward
deployment, along the lines General Norstad has advocated, to be a truly urgent
need of the Alliance.22
The French and Germans, however, harbored serious doubts about the forward strategy. Even with thirty active divisions in Central Europe, they believed
Soviet superiority to be so great that a large-scale attack must be answered by
virtually instantaneous nuclear retaliation. They dismissed the idea of enforcing a
pause as clouding the American commitment to use nuclear weapons, which MC
14/2 required.23
At Secretary McNamaras suggestion, a US Defense Policy Conference convened in Washington on 11 October. He, Rusk, Ambassador Finletter, Lemnitzer,
and Taylor attended.24 They commissioned a number of studies, including one in
which the JCS would estimate how long available forces could resist various levels of enemy effort. All agreed that directly criticizing MC 14/2 could bring on a
divisive debate within NATO. The studies, instead, might supply a basis for more
fruitful negotiations with the allies. As Finletter reminded Rusk, we have made
very little progress toward implementing the directive of 21 April 1961: None of
the bilateral talks we have had on the subject with the Allies has changed the mind
of any allied government. The Political Directive, the Strategic Concept, and the
military policies of the SHAPE forces under SACEUR have remained as they were,
unaffected by the US New Conventional Policy.25
On 20 November, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that their studies
clearly demonstrated Allied Command Europes inability to cope with a massive conventional attack. According to the studies, enemy forces could mass
against any part of NATO Europe in overpowering ratios. (This, of course,
completely contradicted what the Rowny group had stated a year earlier.) The
western powers would need 34 active and 22 reserve divisions to defend the
Rhine River line and hold Schleswig-Holstein. They had only 23 ready and 12 in
reserve, many with shortfalls in manning, training, equipment, and logistical support. In a nuclear battle, where attrition would be extremely high, the Warsaw
Pact possessedand NATO lackedthe replacements and reserves essential for
exploitation. Comparing air capabilities only made things worse. The Warsaw
Pact possessed 6,515 aircraft, Allied Command Europe 3,816. This imbalance was
even worse than it appeared because SACEUR would have to reserve about half
his US aircraft for nuclear missions. The enemy enjoyed shorter lines of communication, greater dispersal potential, and a better position from which to initiate
attacks. A first strike by NATO could inflict serious damage, but the effort could
not be sustained over a long period.
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The Joint Chiefs conclusions offered scant comfort to those advocating a new
strategy. NATO forces could not defend Western Europe by conventional means.
Using battlefield nuclear weapons would improve NATO capabilities, although
not enough to make possible a successful defense. If all types of tactical nuclear
weapons were employed, the outcome would be an enemy superiority even more
pronounced than at the purely conventional level, due to the Warsaw Pacts large
reserves, rapid mobilization capacity, and greater mobility and dispersal. However,
in a general nuclear war, the external strategic forces available to NATO are clearly
superior, and this superiority would be maintained during and after the nuclear
exchange. With this residual power mustered for use in concert with residual NATO
tactical nuclear strength, the Sino-Soviet Bloc could be reduced to impotence.26
The Defense Policy Conference reconvened on 20 November. Secretary McNamara said that he wanted to make a strong move at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meeting but was uncertain whether we can be well enough prepared to
do so. Taylor observed, and McNamara agreed, that nuclear forces on both sides
gradually would become more invulnerable so that sword/shield metaphor should
be reversed, with nuclear strength becoming the shield and conventional forces the
sword.27 It is not readily apparent how Taylor reconciled that view with the Chiefs
conclusions described above.
Early in December, the JCS looked over a draft of what Secretary McNamara
proposed saying to the Councilessentially, that non-nuclear defense was attainable and affordable. General Taylor called it strong meat and offered only one
criticism. The value of tactical nuclear weapons should not be disparaged; they
ought to be portrayed as extending, not replacing, the effectiveness of conventional forces. The Army representative called the draft forthright and realistic. Admiral
Anderson made the usual argument for recognizing the importance of controlling
sea lanes. General LeMay, unsurprisingly, had deeper criticisms. He considered the
judgments about allies conventional capabilities to be overly optimistic while
those about the enemy were unduly circumscribed and substantially downgraded. He worried that a formal rejection of MC 14/2, such as the Secretary seemed to
be proposing, could prove dangerously counter-productive.28
Speaking to Defense Ministers on 14 December, McNamara claimed Soviet
and American nuclear forces had neutralized each other during the Cuban missile
crisis; US conventional superiority in the Caribbean then became decisive. So, for
defending Western Europe, he again stressed non-nuclear capabilities. Worldwide,
NATO nations nearly equaled the Pact in numbers of tactical aircraft and surpassed
it in quality. McNamara claimed that sixty divisions, active and ready reserve, could
conduct extensive forward operations along the Iron Curtain. Only American and
Canadian units, though, were completely combat ready. He estimated the cost of
correcting the allies deficiencies at $8.5 billion, spread over five years. We have
a superior nuclear shield, he concluded, and we must forge an effective nonnuclear sword. Other Ministers did not reply directly, Secretary Rusk reported,
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but their remarks indicated continuing basic divergences within the Alliance on
military questions.29 For Europeans, MC 14/2 still constituted a sound strategy.
A NATO Nuclear Force?
he elements that made up the Alliances nuclear arsenal lacked mechanisms for
comprehensive coordination and control. By far the greater portion consisted of
long-range bombers and missiles under exclusive US control. Europeans, naturally,
were unwilling to leave an essential element of deterrence in American hands. In
1957, the NATO Heads of Government authorized a nuclear stockpile regulated by
a two-key system. Tactical aircraft and missiles that would deliver nuclear weapons were owned and operated by each individual ally; the warheads were under
US custody. Thus, for example, West German F104s could not fly nuclear missions
until Americans released the warheads to NATO commanders. But Great Britain and
France controlled nuclear forces of their own. The French exploded a fission device
in February 1960; President Charles deGaulle made fielding a force de frappe
Mirage bombers carrying atomic bombshis top priority. The US government gave
no help to France, even though the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1958 permitted
assistance to nations that achieved substantial progress in this field. Britain, which
had been a nuclear power since 1952, did receive American help. A special relationship nurtured during World War II still endured. In March 1960, President Eisenhower promised to make available either air-to-surface Skybolt or submarine-launched
Polaris missiles (warheads excluded). The British thereupon halted development of a
Blue Streak missile intended to prolong the lives of their Vulcan bombers. In September 1960, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed to provide berthing facilities for
US Polaris submarines at Holy Loch, Scotland.30
General Norstad very much wanted to deploy a force of land-based, mobile
medium-range ballistic missiles operating under the two-key system. The State
Department persuaded the Eisenhower administration to promote a sea-based
approach. Addressing the North Atlantic Council in December 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter suggested creating an MRBM force that would
be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control, and
would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by
SACEUR. He said the United States would be willing to commit to NATO, before
the end of 1963, five fleet ballistic missile submarines carrying eighty Polaris
missiles. In taking this step, Herter continued, we would expect that other
members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles
to meet SACEURs MRBM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concepts which I have already indicated.31
Dean Achesons review group drafted a policy directive that, after minor revisions, President Kennedy issued on 21 April 1961. It was not a model of clarity,
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perhaps deliberately so. The directive stipulated that nuclear weapons would not
be withdrawn from Europe without adequate replacement.32 The United States
should suggest that the North Atlantic Council try to work out either general
guidelines regarding the use of nuclear weapons or a political method for determining their use. The US Government should announce its intention to commit,
say, five Polaris submarines to NATO, for use by the President in accordance
with the procedures outlined above. More seaborne missiles should be committed as they became available. Over the long run, it would be desirable if the
British phased out of the nuclear deterrent business. Therefore, if developing
Skybolt for US aircraft alone proved unwarranted, the United States should not
prolong the British V-bombers lives by that or other means. France should not be
given assistance in attaining a nuclear weapons capability. If Europeans wished
to expand the seaborne missile forces, following completion of the conventional
buildup slated for 19631966, the US should then be willing to discuss the possibility of some multilateral contribution by them.33
The directive raised the possibility of putting British-based B47s under NATO
command, so that the British might do likewise with their V-bombers. The JCS
saw little merit in this idea. The forty bombers to be stationed there constituted
an insufficient inducement, since the V-bomber force was considerably larger. If
the British did agree, though, they might demand a substantial voice in the use
of US forces. Also, once B47s were assigned to NATO, we might have to provide
replacements when they were retired.34 The idea was not pursued.
The Acheson group had suggested substituting one Polaris submarine for
the fifteen Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles slated for deployment to
Turkey. The JCS disagreed. Since $322 of the $388 million allocated for Jupiters
in Turkey already had been spent, they observed that cancellation would save
little. The Turks recently had rejected Soviet protests about the Jupiters. Stopping
their deployment would cause the Turkish government a great loss of face, more
so since the United States was about to station thirty Jupiters in Italy. Justifying
cancellation on grounds of obsolescence would hand ammunition not only to
those British and Italians who had opposed the original deployments but also to
those who wanted more modern missiles instead. Beyond these fiscal and political factors, the Chiefs argued that adding Jupiters would improve NATOs nuclear
capability and compound the Soviets targeting problems. General Norstad noted
that Polaris, while clearly superior to Jupiter, would be in short supply for several
years. The issue, he argued, was not whether one Polaris submarine was preferable
to fifteen Jupiters but whether Polaris plus Jupiters created greater strength than
Polaris alone. Norstad believed that they did. The Jupiters were installed between
August 1961 and March 1962.35
Meanwhile, on 26 April 1961, Ambassador Finletter informed the North Atlantic Council that the US reaffirms its intention to commit five Polaris submarines to
NATO, with more to follow. Their availability, he said, should postpone the time
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when it may become necessary to deal with the MRBM question. Speaking to the
Canadian Parliament on 17 May, President Kennedy made the Polaris offer public
and raised the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force, which
would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and
found feasible by our allies, once NATOs non-nuclear goals have been achieved.36
In mid-June and again late in August, the JCS backed General Norstads brief
for a NATO force consisting of 45 Jupiters and 450 mobile, land-based missiles.
McNamara wanted to delay offering an initiative. Rusk urged concrete action when
the Council met in December, immediately committing five Polaris submarines, but
he was persuaded to postpone any steps.37
In December, after the Council adjourned, Secretary McNamara called for
studies of MRBM requirements. The Joint Chiefs responded by characterizing
SACEURs position as reasonable. They refrained from endorsing a specific mix,
saying that would depend upon allied attitudes and intelligence estimates twelve to
eighteen months hence. The Chiefs did supply a detailed rebuttal of the frequently
mentioned alternative that CONUS-based aircraft and missiles could fill in for
MRBMs. Such forces were not under SACEURs control and thus not responsive to
his requirements. The allies might press for a strong voice in planning how to use
CONUS-based forces. The MRBM would have a shorter flight time than the ICBM,
be more accurate, and contain a smaller warhead thus lessening the possibility of
collateral damage. Moreover, failure to build MRBMs could (1) divide the Alliance
by ignoring Europeans aspirations for a larger role in NATO affairs and (2) induce
an attitude of allowing the United States to bear the whole burden.38
ISA denigrated the idea of a multilaterally-owned NATO missile force: It is by
no means clear that such a force would effectively stave off pressures for national
nuclear forces nor would it necessarily add to European feelings of security. The
Adenauer government had shown much interest in a multilateral force. But the
British opposed both a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and German operation of MRBMs, while the French seemed determined to press forward with their
force de frappe. A better answer, therefore, might be the earmarking of additional
US forces for assignment to NATOperhaps a combination of ICBMs, Polaris submarines, Thor IRBMs, and B47s based in Britain.39
The US Representative on the NATO Military Committee, General Clark Ruffner, warned the Joint Chiefs that the MLF proposal contained more dangers than
were readily apparent. The most exposed nationsWest Germany, Greece, and
Turkeywanted a control formula assuring them that nuclear weapons would be
used when any of them so wished. Other allies, particularly the British, insisted
upon a veto. Ruffner suspected that, after an agonizing analysis, all the allies
would agree that delegating decision-making powers to the American president
was still the best answer. Ruffner could not conceive of a collective control system
more credible to Europeans than the existing arrangement of relying upon Strategic Air Command. He added, however, that the requirement for MRBMs remained
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constant and should be divorced from the MLF. Absent any MRBMs, an American
guarantee of target coverage would be necessary, and that would imply a US desire
for monopoly.40
France, of course, opposed nuclear integration. President Kennedy solicited
suggestions for sweetening the sour state of Franco-American relations. General
Lemnitzer looked at an ISA proposal, found it in accord with previous JCS positions, and voiced confidence that the Service Chiefs share my unqualified approval of the prospective initiative. Secretary Rusk was equally emphatic, but in the
opposite direction. He thought deGaulle would accept no aid except on the same
terms that we had given the British, which ISA did not propose doing. Even limited
assistance struck Rusk as inconsistent with the MLF scheme, and liable to misinterpretation as signaling a shift in our attitude toward national nuclear programs.
Also, substantial help and not merely the limited aid proposed by ISA would be
needed to transform the present ineffective French program into an effort of significant proportions. In sum, the disadvantages of ISAs proposal outweighed the
advantages by a very wide margin.41
On 17 March, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that full French participation in NATO arrangements was essential to [the] over-all Free World military posture in Europe. Resources needed to fulfill NATOs conventional force goals were
being diverted to the force de frappe; other nations might follow Frances example.
Therefore, the Chiefs favored entering talks to determine how much US assistance
was needed to assure closer French cooperation with NATO. Concurrently, General Lemnitzer sent Assistant Secretary Nitze a rebuttal of Rusks argument. Basically,
the Chairman contended, State was treating France as an opponent rather than an
ally. One thing is certain, wrote Lemnitzer, NATO without France is essentially
no NATO. I appreciate the fact that the present may not be propitious for conciliatory negotiations with France. I do feel that we must have an accepted plan and be
prepared to initiate negotiations at the earliest possible time.42
ISA drafted a new plan which, after a few changes, won approval from Secretary McNamara and the JCS and went to the White House. During Step One, the
United States would provide assistance in missile technology and fill high-priority
French requests for conventional arms. France would equip four divisions and join
NATO discussions about command and control over the MLF. In Step Two, the
United States would supply additional aid in return for greater French participation
in NATO and the MLF.43
President Kennedy decided to deny any help. On 18 April, through a National
Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 148, he forbade members of the Executive Branch from speaking to French officials about nuclear assistance. Guidance
for press briefings made his meaning unmistakable.44 In Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy strongly opposed nuclear sharing with France, because of
communist infiltration into the French nuclear program. The Committees attitude
deeply influenced Kennedys decision; he did not want to spend political capital on
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this issue. Subsequently, General Taylor found from personal experience that this
refusal to extend any help created deep bitterness among the French.45
In mid-March 1962, following a discussion between Secretaries Rusk and
McNamara, the State Department circulated a Suggested NATO Nuclear Program.
The United States would express a willingness to join in creating a sea-based MLF
totaling about 200 missilesbut avoid indicating any urgent need to do so, in view
of the sizeable US strategic forces that already were available. The JCS registered
strong objections, insisting that the need for MRBMs was not purely political,
as the wording above seemed to imply. Exhaustive studies by SACEUR and by
themselves clearly showed that a military requirement did exist. MRBMs were
an essential element in force modernization, because fighter-bombers had become
highly vulnerable to missile attack. Moreover, NATO needed not only a limited
number of sea-based missiles but also mobile land and seaborne forces, with missiles bearing relatively small-yield warheads and high accuracy, responsive to current constraint policies, and which, under conditions of conventional war, would
stand as a viable nuclear deterrent. They also opposed making any commitment to
put Polaris submarines under multilateral controls; that should be discussed separately. They wanted to defer decisions about the MLFs size and character. However, national contributions should take the form of operational units. In their judgment, mixed crews would create more problems than they solved. The Joint Chiefs
felt so strongly about this issue that they asked Secretary McNamara for permission to present their opinion to the President, if State contested these conditions.46
On 16 April, nonetheless, President Kennedy approved States Program, adding only that the part about multilateral control of Polaris should not be volunteered.
General Lemnitzer sent Secretary McNamara a two-point protest. First, the types
and numbers of MRBMs should be specified. Second, operational units ought not be
manned by mixed nationalities. McNamara rejected both points. The Program, he
claimed, did not foreclose further measures to meet SACEURs MRBM requirement.
He viewed mixed manning as necessary to prevent crews of individual countries
from controlling ships and weapons.47 Concurrently, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked
the JCS to propose a schedule for committing Polaris submarines to NATO. They recommended five forthwith and twelve by December 1966. Instead, the administration
settled on twelveall that would then be availableby December 1963.48
NATO Ministers met at Athens early in May 1962. Secretary McNamara told
the allies that, in general nuclear war, our principal military objectives . . .
should be the destruction of the enemys military forces while attempting to
preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of allied society. He identified
three vital attributes for the Alliances deterrent: unity of planning; executive
authority; and central direction. Describing the strategic nuclear target system
as indivisible, McNamara warned that a failure in coordination might lead to
the destruction of Soviet cities just when our strategy of controlled response
was on the verge of success. He claimed that weak nuclear forces targeted
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against enemy citiesan obvious reference to British V-bombers and Frances
force de frappeactually invited a pre-emptive strike by the enemy. Effective
today, he announced, five Polaris submarines would be earmarked for assignment to SACLANT, with the number rising to twelve by December 1963. As for
mobile, land-based MRBMs, the United States was designing such a weapon
without committing itself to production or deployment.49
When Secretary McNamara presented this spare-the-cities approach publicly, in an address on 16 June, Europeans reacted angrily. An OSD official reported
that the French General Staff was in despair about the counterforce strategy,
seeing it as evidence of US weakness of will. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
wrote in his diary that McNamara had put forward with equal vigor and clumsiness a powerful condemnation of all national nuclear forces except, of course,
those of the United States. All the allies, Secretary Macmillan wrote, are angry
with the American proposal that we should buy rockets to the tune of umpteen
million dollars, the warheads to be under American control. This is not a European rocket. Its a racket of American industry.50
Macmillan assigned the US government too much credit for unity of purpose. President Kennedy discussed the issue with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and
McGeorge Bundy. On 13 June, he instructed Ambassador Finletter to inform
Europeans that MRBMs were not urgently needed for military reasons. If the allies
wished to add them, we were prepared to join in creating a seaborne MLF. The
force should be seaborne to avoid political problems associated with land-basing,
minimize vulnerability and collateral damage, and permit genuine multilateral control and manning (e.g., three nationalities aboard each ship).51
The issue of land-basing MRBMs would not go away. In September, Rusk
warned McNamara about the sentiment which my people have found among the
military for reopening the matter. Even as General Norstads tenure neared its
close, he kept pressing his case. On 17 October, Norstad told the North Atlantic
Council that 600 targets needed direct coverage and 1,000 more were of concern
to his Command. He doubted whether US-based forces could be employed in
timely fashion under all circumstances for direct defense of Western Europe.
Most probably, those vehicles would be launched only in conjunction with a general nuclear exchange. SACEUR estimated that his Commands nuclear capability
could be destroyed by fewer than 300 missiles. Therefore, introducing a land and
sea mix of MRBMs would vastly improve the situation. The German representative asked whether sea basing might move the enemy to spare much of Western
Europe. Norstads answer, contradicting McNamaras counterforce theory, was
that he could hardly see the Soviets absorbing nuclear strikes on their territory and
responding only against sea-based systems. He considered mobile weapons on land
more difficult to locate than those at sea, the difference being that between finding a needle in a haystack and finding one on a billiard table. Norstad closed by
repeating what he had told the Council in 1960: This is not a matter of choice. . . .
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You either have this or you have no defense . . . and that means you have no NATO
within a matter of a relatively few years.52 Only days later, President Kennedy
secretly approved withdrawing Jupiters from Turkey to help resolve the Cuban
missile crisis.
In mid-November, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a memorandum replete
with technical data designed to prove that a mix of land- and sea-based MRBMs
offered the most effective means of countering the Soviet IRBM threat. Hardening of
Soviet IRBM sites, they said, added a new urgency to the MRBM requirement. General Ruffner reported that European members of the NATO Military Committee were
dissatisfied. They wanted to deal with the IRBM issue but saw no chance of fashioning a consensus until the contradiction between Norstads position and that of the
US government was settled. Nitze put this problem before McNamara, who replied
that studies had not established, to his satisfaction, a military need for these missiles.
Consequently, General Taylor (now Chairman) could only inform Ruffner that the
administrations position, as outlined in April and June, remained unchanged.53
The Military Committee, meeting on 1011 December, heard opposing opinions
from Taylor and Norstad. After describing the threat list for 196769, by which
time the Soviets would have hardened their sites and perhaps deployed ballistic
missile defenses, Taylor denied that the United States was guilty of foot-dragging
or ill will. Rather, there was real doubt as to the best way to target this particular threat in this particular time frame. The Committee debated whether it had
endorsed Norstads requirement for MRBMs and decided, after a long discussion,
that it never had clearly done so. The Committee called upon its Standing Group
(US, UK, France) to submit firm recommendations.54
A number of strands now became entangled. Britain had applied to join the
European Economic Community, or Common Market. DeGaulle professed alarm
that the British, acting as US agents, could use this membership to clamp American control over Western Europe. Secretary Rusk warned Secretary McNamara
that it was of the utmost importance to avoid any actions that would expand the
Anglo-American special relationship. Specifically, any commitment to prolong their
nuclear delivery capability by acquiring Polaris submarines should be avoided at
this time.55 There was also reason to worry about Franco-German collaboration.
Like the French, the Germans had serious reservations about emphasizing conventional defense and sought a larger role in nuclear decision-making. Many thought
that Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss had the makings of future Chancellor
and German Gaullist.56
President Kennedy ordered another assessment of policy toward France. Previous discussions had broached the possibility of selling a nuclear submarine to
the French. In return, France would support the forward strategy, participate in an
MLF, commit another active division to NATO, and return its Mediterranean Fleet
to NATO command. ISA added another enticement: Establish tripartite machinery
for tripartite consultation on worldwide strategic and political questions. The JCS
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agreed, provided that France was pressed to provide four more divisions and that
sale of a Skipjack-class nuclear attack submarine undergo further examination.
Since Skipjack was our most advanced submarine in terms of speed and maneuverability, a compromise of information could prove quite damaging. The State
Department endorsed a Skipjack sale but doubted whether such an offer would
change deGaulles firmly held convictions.57
Abruptly, attention shifted to Anglo-American relations. On 7 November,
Secretary McNamara advised the President to cancel the Skybolt air-to-ground
missile. Next day, he informed the British ambassador, who replied that the
news would be political dynamite to the Macmillan government. The United
Kingdom had decided to base its entire 1960s deterrent force on the purchase of
Skybolt which would be dropped from the V-bomber. Cancellation of the Skybolt
program, after the British had cancelled all other projects, had severe political
ramifications in Britain. On 11 December, McNamara flew to London and offered
three alternatives: continue Skybolt on their own; adapt older Hound Dog missiles to the V-bombers; or participate in a seaborne MLF. Defense Minster Peter
Thorneycroft rejected all of them, implied a betrayal by the Americans, and
pressed for an assurance that Washington favored an independent British nuclear
deterrent. Secretary McNamara refused.58
On 16 December, one day after the formal announcement of Skybolts cancellation, President Kennedy conferred with senior civilians. After hearing a wide
range of views, Kennedy approved for planning purposes an offer of appropriate
Polaris missile components, on condition that the British eventually commit this
Polaris fleet to a NATO multilateral force and build their conventional strength up
to agreed NATO levels.59 Two days later, Kennedy flew to Nassau in the Bahamas
for a meeting with Secretary Macmillan. The President was accompanied by McNamara, Nitze, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and other civilians. None of
the JCS came with them. General Taylor had asked McNamara whether he should
accompany the presidential party. The Secretary said he saw no need for that,
since he did not anticipate any substantive discussions. This was supposed to be
an occasion of reconciliation, not decision.60 Instead, on 21 December, Kennedy
and Macmillan issued a Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems that moved the
MRBM/MLF debate in new directions. The Polaris issue, they declared, created an
opportunity for the development of new and closer arrangements for the organization and control of strategic Western defense. A start could be made by subscribing to NATO allocations from US strategic forces, UK Bomber Command, and tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe. They also agreed that the US will make
available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles (less warheads) for British submarines . . . . These forces, and at least equal US forces, would be made available
for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Except when Her Majestys
Government decided that supreme national interests were at stake, British forces
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would be used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in
all circumstances.61 There was no mention of a conventional buildup.
President Kennedy and Secretary Macmillan agreed that France should be
offered Polaris missiles, minus warheads, under similar but not identical terms.
Central Intelligence believed that the French could build a submarine by 1967
but would be unable to produce a nuclear warhead until well into the 1970s. Thus
the offer was considerably less useful than might appear. In any case, deGaulle
promptly rejected it, repeated his determination to create a force de frappe, and
vetoed Britains bid for membership in the Common Market.62
Just before Nassau, Secretary McNamara had argued that our current position with respect to a multilateral force simply will not work. . . . There is no way in
which we can persuade the Europeans to buy and pay for both a multilateral force
and a full compliance with NATO conventional force goals. Therefore, it was time
to move on to a more realistic arrangement.63 The Nassau Statement de-emphasized a conventional buildup in order to promote a seaborne NATO nuclear force.
Whether such an arrangement was more realistic remained to be seen.
Change of Command
eneral Norstad announced his retirement in July 1962. His disputes with
McNamara and Kennedy had deepened well beyond any chance of accommodation. The Secretary and the President informed the general that his health
problemsa heart attack in 1955 and another in 1960made it necessary for him
to retire. Norstad, who felt fine, told colleagues that he had been fired.64 His departure as Supreme Allied Commander, delayed by the Cuban missile crisis, took place
on 2 January 1963. General Lemnitzer, his successor, had differences with Kennedy
and McNamara but accommodated more to their thinking. Thus tension between
SACEUR and the administration eased considerably, but deep-rooted differences
between US and European viewpoints remained.
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13
NATO: Initiatives Falter
Rise and Demise of the Multilateral Force
n 10 January 1963, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara their initial recommendations for implementing the agreements reached at Nassau by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan. The best military solution, they said, would
assign any requirements that exceeded SACEURs capability to US-based forces.
The Chiefs were wholly satisfied with existing arrangements whereby portions
of Strategic Air Command, British Bomber Command, and the missiles in Europe
were assigned targets from SACEURs threat list. In assessing other options, they
cautioned, possible political gains should be carefully balanced against the likely
loss of operational effectiveness. If new arrangements were deemed necessary,
an MLF should be established in the simplest possible way. About twenty B47s,
an equivalent capability of Vulcan bombers, and Polaris submarines stationed in
the Mediterranean could constitute a separate MLF with a commander or director
reporting straight to SACEUR.1
Concurrently, an interdepartmental steering group was examining the same
issue. A sub-group proposed that initial assignments to the MLF consist of 20 B47s
based in Britain, 55 Vulcan bombers, three Polaris submarines, and all the tactical
nuclear forces that were included in SACEURs Strike Plan. The Joint Chiefs told
Secretary McNamara that they deemed this overly large for an initial commitment.
They strongly opposed assigning any tactical nuclear forces at all because doing
so would cut into SACEURs conventional capability (some aircraft being dualcapable), add nothing to his nuclear strength, and disrupt follow-on plans. The subgroups purpose, they presumed, was to dull the Germans craving for a national
nuclear force by offering them a greater role in planning and targeting, possible
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participation by German F84s and F104Gs, and eventual inclusion in mixedmanned Polaris submarines. But all that, the Chiefs concluded, really does not add
up to very much. Close examination would indicate to any serious European that
there has been only a regrouping of forces and no addition of strength or of European freedom of action. Only if the United States and other NATO governments
are ready to make serious concessions in the area of political control or to make
unqualified assignment of additional weapons . . . will it be possible to convince
the Germans and other Western Europeans that this proposal has real worth and
attraction for them.2
Chancellor Adenauer informed the President that Germany was prepared to
participate in creating an MLF. On 21 February, Kennedy appointed diplomat Livingston Merchant to head a State-Defense negotiating team that would pursue as
a matter of urgency the creation of an MLF. As to control of the force, Merchant
should propose that any decision about firing nuclear weapons be unanimous,
thereby preserving a US veto.3
OSD analysts favored using surface ships and Secretary McNamara agreed.
Submarines had greater survivability, but surface ships could spend more time at
sea, cost half as much to operate, deploy more rapidly, and lend themselves more
readily to mixed-manned crews. The JCS also advised that, if mixed manning was
deemed necessary, surface ships would ease personnel problems and reduce security risks. However, Admiral Anderson warned that internationalist feeling would
not easily displace national pride, which always had been a mainstay of military
motivation. Accordingly, he asked that Merchant solicit opinions from military as
well as political leaders. If mixed manning was to work, the understanding and
support of military men would be essential.4
Ambassador Merchant carried the MLF message to Bonn and London. He
found the Germans to be genuinely enthusiastic, the British more cautious. Kennedy authorized a formal invitation to Adenauer. He also directed the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Claude Ricketts, to lead a technical mission. On
30 April, Adenauer accepted Kennedys proposal, provided that control arrangements and exclusion of submarines could be re-examined later. McNamara decided
that before the President publicly committed himself, he ought to have a military
assessment of the MLF.5
On 1 May, the JCS (minus General Taylor, who was attending a meeting of
the Central Treaty Organization) tentatively approved a statement that neither
the advisability nor inadvisability of the MLF could be clearly substantiated at
the present time. Therefore, a more prudent initial course of action would be
to proceed with arrangements involving the in-being nuclear capability of NATOcommitted national forces. Next morning, McNamara and Gilpatric met with the
JCS. After some discussion, the Chiefs adopted what civilian leaders chose to construe as an endorsement of the MLF. Their memorandum began by stating that they
saw no military need for a seaborne force, since this requirement could be better
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met by national forces of appropriate mix committed to NATO. If the MLF helped
to prevent nuclear proliferation and strengthen NATOs cohesion, such a commitment of resources could be justified. Problems were so complex, however, that
inter-allied differences easily could appear. Consequently, proof of unity should be
clearly evident before US prestige became irrevocably committed. Nonetheless,
Given the adequate participation and accorded the full support of contributing
NATO partners, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the proposed . . . [MLF] is feasible and will contribute a militarily effective and useful augmentation of NATO
nuclear strength.6
With German cooperation apparently assured, Kennedy directed that discussions with the British begin immediately. Signs of trouble already abounded. Arthur
Schlesinger reported to the President that reactions ranged from tepid (government) to baffled (press) to hostile (Labour and Liberals). The British Chiefs of
Staff solidly opposed MLF.7
Secretary McNamara looked for ways to make the allies feel that they were
gaining a greater voice in nuclear planning. Could they, for example, be represented at Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha? The JCS opposed
doing so, largely on security grounds. But Generals Lemnitzer and Power,
SACEUR and CINCSAC, believed that political gains would outweigh military
risks, and McNamara overrode JCS objections. 8 On 24 May 1963, the North
Atlantic Council approved (1) assigning to SACEUR the British bomber force as
well as three Polaris submarines, (2) giving SACEUR a Nuclear Deputy, and (3)
arranging allied participation in operational planning at Omaha, Nebraska, the
headquarters of the Strategic Air Command.9
By mid-June, McGeorge Bundy had lost faith in the MLF. Creating such a force,
he advised President Kennedy, would make the French more antagonistic, expose
the British and German governments to charges of excessive subservience toward
Washington, and allow Moscow to portray the MLF as a militaristic maneuver
that prevented progress toward peace. At home, the President could gain congressional approval of the MLF only by expending much of his personal political
capital, since the State Department has no leverage and the Defense Department
will not be able to make the case on straight military grounds. Therefore, Bundy
suggested making clear to the Europeans our own conviction that this force will
work but taking away any sense of a deadline.10
President Kennedy did decide to take some action. In July, he asked the
Defense Department to appraise the possibility of operating one mixed-manned
ship. Admiral Anderson prepared, and the JCS approved, a study showing the
project to be feasible and best conducted aboard a destroyer equipped with Tartar anti-air missiles. Secretary McNamara agreed and, on 30 August, the President
authorized diplomatic approaches. By the years close, West Germany, Greece,
Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom had agreed to participate in the experiment. The guided-missile destroyer USS Biddle (later renamed USS Claude V.
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Ricketts) began operating as a mixed-manned ship in August 1964 and continued
so for eighteen months.11
Otherwise, the MLF project remained immobilized. Harold Macmillan fell
ill and resigned in October; his successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was widely
regarded as a caretaker. Concurrently, Konrad Adenauer finally retired. In Italian
elections, Socialists who were quite critical of the MLF gained much ground and
acquired several cabinet posts. And, in the United States, Lyndon Johnson assumed
the presidency in the aftermath of tragedy. In these circumstances, major decisions
necessarily were deferred.
In April 1964, President Johnson approved a tentative negotiating schedule to
bring the MLF into existence around July 1965. But everything now depended upon
the British, and parliamentary majorities in both the ruling Conservative and opposition Labor parties disapproved the project. Germanophobia, which was particularly
prevalent among Laborites, intensified this attitude. In September, the Director, Joint
Staff, told General Wheeler that I personally think the UK will fight the MLF down to
the wire.12 Next month, the Labor Party won a hairbreadth election victory. The new
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, already had made plain his distaste for the MLF.
The Wilson government proposed, in place of the MLF, an Atlantic Nuclear
Force (ANF) separate from and not subordinate to SACEUR. Its key element
would be, as a total substitution for the MLF, a multilateral Minuteman force of
ICBMs based in North America. Lemnitzer promptly warned McNamara and Wheeler that European allies would see this as an attempt to strengthen Britains position
in the NATO command structure and weaken that of the American SACEUR. Also,
according to top-level British officials, London looked upon the ANF as a device
by which to cut NATOs conventional requirements.13
During 56 December, President Johnson reviewed the MLFs prospects with
senior civilians. The fact that no JCS members attended showed that this had
become a political issue. Wilson was about to arrive in Washington, and Americans
needed to decide how hard to press him about the MLF. Johnsons advisers wanted
to force the issue, but the President was reluctant: Arent you telling me to kick
mother England out the door into the cold, while I bring the Kaiser into the sitting
room? How will that look to Americans? Dean Acheson, no mean hand with metaphors, replied that We arent kicking mother out. On the contrary, we have been
trying to get the old dame to come into the house with the rest of us for years but
she had insisted on swaying in the gutter, drinking her gin, and wouldnt answer
our call. The President, however, insisted that one cannot push a thing if everyones against it on Capitol Hill and in Europe. Remembering how President Franklin Roosevelt had squandered much political capital by persisting in his court-packing scheme, Johnson feared that the Administration wont have five cents worth of
money in the bank after this.14
Predictably, Wilsons visit produced nothing concrete. On 9 December, just
after the talks ended, Johnson sent word to Wilson that he had shown great
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restraint . . . because of his concern to avoid any appearance of running a power
play against a weak opponent. He appreciated Wilsons political problem but did
not want the prime minister misled into thinking that Washington had retreated
from its objective. Wilson replied that Her Majestys Government still reserved its
position on the surface fleet.15
During 1517 December, the North Atlantic Council discussed ANF and MLF.
Afterward, General Wheeler told the Service Chiefs that he had detected little
support for the MLF but did discern a widespread fear of West Germany getting
nuclear weapons. President Johnson decided against pressing matters any further.
NSAM No. 322, issued on 17 December, read as follows: I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time . . . I find
nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which
makes it necessary, from the point of view of the US alone, that there should be
final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months.16
That sounded the MLFs death knell. Washington had promoted the MLF as a
means of sublimating German nuclear ambitions, but Europeans fear of those
ambitions helped kill the idea.
Cutting Conventional Capability
he campaign to improve Allied Command Europes non-nuclear strength had

stalled, even threatening to go into reverse. Late in December 1962, President
Kennedy warned the JCS that US forces in Europe would have to be thinned
out unless the allies improved their readiness and gave substance to the forward
strategy. Two months later, he directed the Chiefs to examine how far US forces
could be cut over the next twelve months. Heavy reductions, General Wheeler
warned, might tempt the Soviets to seize Hamburg or Munich. Unimpressed, Kennedy replied that Europe was about eighth on our list of dangers. Communists
might capture all Asia, the President worried, while Washington poured money into
conventional defense of Europe. The balance-of-payments drain was much on his
mind. Like Eisenhower three years earlier, Kennedy stressed that it was absolutely
essential for us to protect our monetary position. Otherwise, we might be so poor
that we would have to withdraw everywhere.17
Anglo-American discussions, beginning in April 1963, did little to bridge their
differences in strategic conceptions. At this conference, US and UK spokesmen
discussed their divergent ideas. General Taylor argued that the British wanted
what amounted to a poor mans forward strategy, providing too few reserve divisions and tactical nuclear weapons, too little logistical support, and too short a
pause prior to nuclear escalation. His British opposite, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, recalled President Kennedys remark that NATO could cut ten divisions were it
not for the Berlin problem. Secretary McNamara challenged the British claim that
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improving conventional capability would make the nuclear deterrent less credible.
Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft countered that none of the European allies
believed that a conventional conflict could last more than a week. The USSR, he
added, had taken American doctrine to an extreme and equipped itself with all
the options. McNamara and Taylor disputed British claims that the enemy could
employ 91 divisions during the first ten days of combat and 50 more by D+30; their
estimate was 60 divisions over thirty days. Conferees agreed to develop assumptions and parameters for an examination of tactical nuclear weapons, try to reconcile assessments of enemy strength, and study (1) reducing standards for logistical support from 90 to 30 days and (2) eliminating requirements for MRBMS and
reserve divisions.18
Staff studies failed to narrow the US-UK gap. The British held that MRBMs
would be redundant, that 30-day levels were sufficient, and that reserves need only
bring M-Day forces to full strength and furnish a few extra units during periods of
tension. The JCS claimed that adding 600 MRBMs by 1968 would significantly
improve Allied Command Europes counterforce capability, that 90 days of supply
were the minimum needed for sustained operations, and that eliminating reserves
would cut from 45 to 31 the number of divisions available in Central Europe by
M+30. By their calculations, 56 divisions were required. With only 31 divisions,
Allied Command Europe would have to employ nuclear weapons immediately.19
Late in April 1963, President Kennedy asked the Defense Department to compare
the relative preparedness of American and allied forces and report what conclusions
ought to be drawn. OSD drafted a reply stating that US Seventh Army was the only
ground force with fully-equipped divisions and satisfactory non-divisional support.
Seventh Army had supplies for 90 to 120 days of combat, but allied forces were sustainable for only 15 to 30 days. None of the NATO air forces could fight beyond 20 to
30 days; poor basing and deployment rendered aircraft so vulnerable that logistical
improvements alone would do little good. Under these conditions, Seventh Army
would find itself engulfed and encircled due to the lack of sustained air support
and the inability of flank forces to hold their positions. Therefore, the administration
should either urge allies to improve their posture or reduce and redesign Seventh
Army so that it, too, need only fight 1530 days at the most.20
To General Taylor, cutting Seventh Armys support down to allied levels suggests that the United States should abandon virtue because it is forced to live among
sinners. In that eventuality, NATO would have to be ready rapidly to resort to
tactical nuclear weapons. Escalation would not be advantageous, however, unless
NATOs superiority at the tactical nuclear level was clearly evidentand Taylor did
not think that it was. Even if the phase of conventional combat was shortened, he
reasoned, stocks should not be decreased because the destruction of stores during
a tactical nuclear exchange would be very great. In fact, Taylor argued, the cost of
dispersing aircraft and depots would be considerably higher than the cost of enabling
forces to carry out existing plans. Taylor opposed any troop withdrawals, largely
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because of the political damage that would be done. NATO, after all, was not merely
a military alliance: It would be a serious mistake to sacrifice the political assets of
NATO in frustration over its slow military movement.21
Taylor prepared, and the JCS approved, a revised report to the President. Their
paper omitted OSDs stark alternatives, observing instead that there is little sign
that the Soviets consider the forces facing them weak or inadequate to the point of
inviting attempts at aggression. The security equilibrium that existed in Europe
should not be jeopardized. The best course, therefore, would keep US combat and
support forces at their current levels and urge the allies to act comparably.22
On 3 June, Secretary McNamara advised the President that continued allied
failure to increase conventional strength must result in a realignment of US forces.
But nothing should be done during the balance of 1963. Rather, the coming months
should be spent persuading allies to follow the American example. If they did not
do so, then we should promptly investigate alternative force structures and strategies. McNamara told Taylor that his advice to Kennedy was virtually the one you
transmitted to me and served to improve greatly the original draft.23
Concurrently, the North Atlantic Council inaugurated an exercise wherein the
major NATO commanders would formulate tentative force goals for 1970. Deputy
Secretary Gilpatric asked the JCS to propose adjustments in goals and standards.
Their reply, dated 3 September, cited two factors of particular importance. First,
the allies inability to fulfill force objectives had been the practice rather than the
exception. Experience indicated that any lowering of standards would induce the
allies to lower their own aims even more. Second was the conflict between NATO
and national interests. Each nation would welcome relief in one or more areas.
The United States might wish to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit by pulling
troops out of Europe. Such a step, however, would markedly degrade NATOs
military posture and establish a precedent which other nations could adopt on an
increased scale.24
Some allies did not wait for a precedent. London reduced the British Army of
the Rhine from seven brigades to six. The Belgians brought home four battalions
from West Germany, claiming that this step would renew public contact with and
support for the military. France announced that, effective 1 January 1964, one aircraft carrier and 18 destroyers would be removed from NATO command.25
The United States also altered its NATO assignments. The annual US military
expenditures abroad totaled $2.75 billion and contributed heavily to the aggravating balance-of-payments deficit. President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara
to propose ways of cutting $300 to $400 million from overseas expenditures by
December 1964. The Secretary proposed steps that included bringing back 23
B47s and 32 C130s, consolidating four air bases, and reducing Army stocks and
facilities. Reluctantly, the JCS concurred, reasoning that the impact could be offset
by using joint depots in France, preserving a capability for quick expansion, retaining appropriate base rights, and ensuring that adequate sea and airlift were readily
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available. Above all, the United States must perfect and demonstrate the capability to deploy forces rapidly throughout the world. McNamara sent his recommendations to the White House with JCS caveats attached; Kennedy approved them on
16 July.26
The Chief Executive wanted to cut overseas defense spending by another
$300 million in FY 1965 and an additional $450 million in FY 1966. So, in September 1963, McNamara proposed much larger redeployments. First, return 40 B47s
from the United Kingdom and 40 from Spain, leaving none in Europe. Second,
bring home one fighter squadron from France, four from West Germany, and seven
from the United Kingdom. Third, reduce Army logistical support forces by 30,000.
This time, the JCS strongly objected. Already, in their judgment, the Defense
Department had done as much as possible. B47s should remain because, in some
instances, they were the only quick-reaction weapon systems scheduled to strike
key nuclear targets. Secretary McNamara justified slashing tactical aircraft from
790 to 354 by claiming that modernization plus periodic movements from CONUS
back to European bases would minimize the effect of withdrawals. The JCS supported only redeployments from Britain, keeping 582 aircraft in Western Europe.
Otherwise, SACEUR would find himself in an untenable position if hostilities
began before squadrons could fly back from CONUS. Likewise, stripping 30,000
support personnel would leave Seventh Army with no sustained combat capability. Withdrawing one division, while not recommended, would be less unfavorable. The State Department was also alarmed and supported nothing more than
bringing back the B47s. A massive removal of air power, State warned, might be
misinterpreted as the beginning of a major disengagement. Withdrawing support
troops might be seen as a shift toward primary reliance upon nuclear weapons.
Instead of being completely combat-ready, US forces would need two weeks of
strategic warning to correct their deficiencies.27
At a Cabinet meeting on 24 October, President Kennedy ruled that: six US
division-equivalents would stay in Germany as long as they were needed; as previously decided, three C130 squadrons and 5,400 Army support personnel would
return from France; DOD should prepare a plan for withdrawing 30,000 more line-ofcommunication troops over the next two years. B47s based in Spain and the United
Kingdom would come home by spring 1965, a step opposed by the JCS but strongly
endorsed by McNamara and Gilpatric. Roundout units deployed during the Berlin
confrontationthree artillery battalions, two armor battalions, and one armored
cavalry regimentwould return to the United States. Finally, Kennedy approved in
principle the removal, by June 1966, of three squadrons from France and seven from
the United Kingdom; Defense and State were to prepare an implementation plan.28
A week later, the President reversed one of these rulings. On 31 October, Kennedy publicly stated that we intend to keep our combat forces in Germany as
they are today. Specifically, the roundout units would stay as long as there is a
need for them. Probably, the President was trying to calm the unease aroused by
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Exercise Big Lift, in which the 2nd Armored Division was airlifted from Fort Hood,
Texas, over to Germany and back again.29
In April 1964, President Johnson decided that those roundout units would come
home. Spokesmen stressed that US forces in Germany still would number several thousand more than the 231,000 who had been there in early 1961. Nonetheless,
hopes for creating a greater conventional capability in Central Europe had been seriously compromised. The Air Force presented a plan for dual-basing ten squadrons,
which meant shifting them permanently to CONUS but periodically flying them back
to Europe. The JCS warned that this would incur substantial risks. In August, Secretary Rusk advised that the political situation in Western Europe precluded any discussion of dual-basing. Accordingly, action was postponed.30 The impetus for expansion was spent; debate now focused on the scope of withdrawals.
Where to Build a Firebreak
he administration wanted to replace NATOs strategic concept, MC 14/2, but

Europeans saw no reason why the threat of rapid nuclear escalation would
not continue to be an effective deterrent. General Taylor sought common ground
with the Germans. When he and Secretary McNamara spoke with their German
opposites, on 31 July 1963, Taylor claimed that the only difference might concern the amount of conventional combat considered necessary before an attack
was identified as serious. Three days later, at Stuttgart, Taylor and McNamara
conferred with US commanders. They all agreed that, without tactical nuclear
weapons, available conventional forces could not enforce a pause long enough to
allow meaningful negotiations.31
Upon returning to Washington, General Taylor tried his hand at prescribing a
concept of defense which will enlist the support of the principal Allies and offer a
reasonable chance of success. Clearly, Europeans would not create enough conventional forces to permit a prolonged non-nuclear defense. The French would
remain obstructionist and the British probably would reduce their forces further.
Therefore, he concluded, the defense of Western Europe would depend primarily upon American and German efforts. To assure German support, we must stop
talking pause and casting doubt [on] our willingness to use nuclear weapons as
needed to prevent loss of territory. . . . If the presently planned NATO forces were
highly trained, properly deployed, and plentifully equipped with tactical nuclear
weapons, they would have the capability of offsetting the superior numbers of the
Communist Bloc by forcing the Soviets to approach in widely separated formations, unable to mass their forces.32
A visit by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard was approaching. The State Department
saw merit in President Kennedys directive of April 1961, but Rusk expected Erhard
to advocate a strategy requiring the early use of nuclear weapons. Obviously,
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Rusk informed McNamara, such a strategy would not accord with the US view.
Rusks letter caused concern at State-Defense working levels, and General Taylor
so informed the White House. On 21 November, the day that Kennedy departed for
Dallas, McGeorge Bundy issued an interim correcting document. The President
wanted to avoid debating strategic concepts with Erhard, because he would review
the issue prior to the North Atlantic Council meeting in December. Bundy implied,
though, that changes were in the offing: I think it would be a mistake for officers of
the United States Government to assume that a paper of April 1961 is Holy Writ.33
President Johnson, of course, had no time for a review. Consequently, US
representatives at the Paris meeting offered no initiatives. What the Council confronted was MC 100/1, a draft entitled Appreciation of the Military Situation As It
Affects NATO Up To 1970. Perhaps trying to satisfy all parties, MC 100/1 spoke of
maintaining credible capabilities at the conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic
nuclear levels. Meantime, the JCS had written and McNamara endorsed a parallel
paper, Military Strategy for NATO, which is summarized below:
General: NATOs deterrent should comprise the following elements: superior tactical and strategic nuclear capability; ready conventional forces able
to defend near the border, identify the nature of any aggression, and oppose
penetrations into Western Europe before and after a nuclear exchange; and a
manifest determination to defend Western Europe for as long a time and with
whatever weapons proved necessary.
Limited Aggression: NATO should respond immediately and aggressively with conventional forces, augmented if necessary by tactical nuclear weapons, to compel the abandonment of aggression without escalation into all-out
war. Allied Command Europe must be able to conduct precise, controlled,
discriminatory nuclear operations against military targets.
Major Aggression: The alliances objectives should be: to conduct a
nuclear offensive necessary to destroy the enemys will power and ability to
wage war; to stop enemy ground forces as near the border as possible; to minimize the effects of a nuclear attack; and to maintain the residual power relationship necessary to survive and pursue postwar objectives.
Believing that this paper possessed greater utility than MC 100/1, McNamara solicited Rusks comments or concurrence so that we may seek Presidential
approval at an early date.34
Secretary Rusk lodged several objections. First, it focused on deliberate aggression, which he considered the least likely case. More probable in his opinion were
unintended conflicts arising from trouble over Berlin, disorders in East Germany,
problems along NATOs southern flank, or sheer miscalculation. Second, it treated
the employment of tactical nuclear weapons too ambiguously. These weapons, he
wrote, should be used only if substantial nuclear forces faced destruction, access to
West Berlin could not be restored, or lost territory could not be recovered promptly.
Third, it neglected the necessity for exercising political direction before hostilities
opened, so that military and political efforts could be properly coordinated, and after
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the battle began so that the application of force can be efficiently controlled and
directed toward accomplishment of political objectives. In February 1964, Rusk sent
McNamara a counter-draft articulating States views.35
McNamara asked for a JCS assessment. The Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General David Burchinal, USAF, advised General Taylor that State Department officers were entrenched in strategic doctrine which they developed in
1961, particularly where it supports the development and employment of a large
conventional force. Rusk seemed unaware that the use of tactical nuclear weapons had been examined extensively during the past year and unwilling to admit
that conventional force increases by the allies were unobtainable. In the Directors
judgment, interdepartmental differences went too deep to allow a meaningful compromise. Perhaps, instead, State should redirect its energies toward drafting a new
political directive for NATO.
On 28 April, the Joint Chiefs told Secretary McNamara that States draft
addressed overall policies rather than military strategy alone, and might more
appropriately be considered in connection with a new political directive. They then
rebutted specific points. State had engaged in an unjustified disparagement of
tactical nuclear weapons. Their categories of limited and major did not cover
the entire range of contingencies. While detailed political control was desirable, it
could be carried to excess; control of individual weapons, for example, could be
impractical and dangerous. The Chiefs suggested that State and Defense review
the 1961 directive, as a prelude to developing new guidance.36
In June McNamara advised Rusk that, since State and Defense agreed on major
aspects of NATO strategy, trying to reconcile residual differences could well prove
counter-productive. The fact that US representatives were using MC 100/1 for guidance struck him as sufficient. Rusk agreed to defer a debate but remarked that MC
100/1 was so broad in language as to lend itself to widely divergent interpretations.
Why not, then, consult over specific issues when required? McNamara agreed.37
The next dispute, though, took place within the Pentagon. On 1 October,
Secretary McNamara asked the Chiefs to appraise a paper on the relationship
between NATO strategy and tactical nuclear weapons. In it, he rejected the idea
that a firebreak against escalation could be built at the tactical nuclear level.
Since both sides possessed soft and concentrated tactical nuclear forces, the one
that struck first would win an enormous advantage. Like the gambler, the losing
side in a nuclear war may find irresistible the temptation to recoup the losses by
firing a few more or larger weapons. McNamara did not see how such a process
could stop short of theater-wide and possibly general nuclear war nor did he see
how US strategic nuclear superiority could be exerted to any meaningful political
end. Similarly, he professed difficulty in understanding what constituted tactical
nuclear superiority and how such an advantage could be used to control escalation. Moreover, he was persuaded thatwhatever their declaratory policies
our European allies would not agree to having even a very constrained nuclear
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war fought over their territory. McNamara believed a major non-nuclear option
to be not only feasible but also eminently desirable, because it would present a
substantially smaller risk of escalation. A well-defined firebreak exists between
non-nuclear and nuclear war. It is widely recognized, and it has been observed
for nearly twenty years. He concluded, in fact, that having a major non-nuclear
capability, free for use as such, is the only satisfactory basis on which to rest the
defense of Western Europe.38 Thus McNamara sided with Rusk in wanting to
build a firebreak at the conventional level of conflict. The split over strategy was
civilian versus military, not State versus Defense.
The Joint Chiefs readily agreed that SACEURs conventional posture should be
improved. They objected, though, to Secretary McNamaras thesis that strictly separating conventional from tactical nuclear forces would preserve the firebreak and
thus inhibit escalation. Instead, such a separation might delay the employment of
tactical nuclear weapons until either the enemy had occupied considerable allied
territory or opposing forces had become so intermingled that no discriminate
targets could be found. Moreover, most tactical nuclear delivery systems were
dual-capable, being equally usable in conventional conflict. A decision to commit
or withhold them properly should be determined by the mission of the command,
the commanders estimate at the time, and the technical and tactical characteristics
of the delivery systems rather than by the existence of the dual capability. Finally,
the Chiefs observed that our ability to employ any option, whether conventional or
nuclear, would in itself constitute a strong incentive for the enemy to avoid initiating or escalating a conflict.39
In preparation for the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, OSD
drafted an address that stressed two intermediate options. First, a powerful conventional capability; second, enough tactical nuclear weapons to conduct a demonstration or block an enemy advance. But the Joint Staff wanted to avoid a Council
debate over strategy because (1) the French had warned that they would feel compelled to challenge American arguments and (2) the US government did not have
an agreed position. The Joint Staff also criticized OSDs draft because it cited the
JCS endorsement of a major non-nuclear option but omitted the JCS argument that
tactical nuclear strength would endow the conventional deterrent with added flexibility and credibility.40 OSD did not accept any of these criticisms.
Addressing the NATO Ministers on 16 December, McNamara echoed Rusk
in saying that the most probable causes of conflict were unpremeditated military collisions arising from political confrontations. He advocated study of, and
not actual preparation for, conflict at the tactical nuclear level because I must
state my lack of confidence that [employment of these weapons] will necessarily
make the enemy back down or that a general nuclear war could be avoided. He
repeated all the caveats in his October paper: In sum . . . I believe the battlefield
nuclear option...should not be regarded as a substitute for the major non-nuclear
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option. Rather, it should be regarded as an insurance policy against the failure of
that option.41
There was no allied consensus about a strategy. The British held that, since
war in Europe was extremely improbable, existing defenses would continue to
deter the Soviets. The Germans favored building a firebreak between battlefield
and tactical/strategic weapons, not between conventional and tactical nuclear
weapons as Secretary McNamara wished. The complication was that Germans
wanted battlefield nuclear weapons put into the hands of front-line troops, their
own included. Afterward, General Wheeler cautioned Service Chiefs that optimistic
press reports did not reflect realities.42
A Flawed Strategy?
he administrations effort to create a credible conventional defense was

based upon an assumption that NATO would take the initiative in deciding when and whether to use nuclear weapons. From what we now know, that
assumption almost certainly was wrong. Around 1960, the Soviets adopted a
doctrine of all-out nuclear war, restructuring the Warsaw Pact and its plans
accordingly. The Soviet General Staff concluded that the first strikes and the first
operations would be decisive. Command post exercise Buria, conducted in the
fall of 1961, contemplated nuclear strikes and deep armored penetrations. With
an attack speed averaging 100 kilometers per day, tanks would cross the Rhine
by the fifth day of fighting.43 Exercises carried out in the following years made
it clear that use of nuclear weapons was expected no later than the third day of
combat. The Czechoslovak war plan of 1964 specified using 131 nuclear missiles
and bombs in the first strike. By the seventh or eighth day of operations, attacking troops were supposed to take control of the areas of Langres, Besancon, and
Epinal, well inside France.44 While senior US civilians contemplated enforcing a
pause and thereby creating favorable conditions for negotiations, Soviet planners
evidently saw their objective as smashing the enemy. It would seem, therefore,
that JCS views about the utility of tactical nuclear weapons were better attuned
to operational realities than those of Secretaries McNamara and Rusk.
215
14
Paring the Military
Assistance Program
FY 1962: An Uncertain Start
he Kennedy administration inherited a military assistance program that, during the

later 1950s, had started shrinking in size because the nations of Western Europe
no longer needed very much grant aid.1 For FY 1961, Congress appropriated $1.8 billion
worldwide. For FY 1962, the Defense Department wanted $2.4 billion in new obligational authority; President Eisenhower reduced that request to $1.8 billion.
Since 1955, the Secretary of Defense had delegated broad powers for
executing the military assistance program (MAP) to his Assistant Secretary
(International Security Affairs). The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services provided advice and recommendations. 2 On 25 February 1961, Deputy Assistant
Secretary William Bundy urged Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to support the
original $2.4 billion program. In justification, he cited preliminary conclusions
from ongoing strategic studies. First, limited war and counter-insurgency activities ought to be awarded higher priorities. Second, prosperous allies should be
pressed to assume a greater share of the mutual security burden. Third, and
most important, underdeveloped countries probably would stay out of the communist orbit only if they achieved self-sustaining growth. Under these conditions, the military role of richer nations might expand and that of poorer allies
contract. Countries with sizeable military establishments (e.g., Greece, Turkey,
South Korea, and Taiwan) should turn toward compact force structures, so
that their economic development would not suffer. After all, the top priority
objective for underdeveloped countries was creating societies strong enough
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to resist communist subversion. Bundy envisaged the United States acting as
the free worlds arsenal by substantially expanding its export of military equipment and services. Speaking for the JCS, General Lemnitzer endorsed a $2.4 billion program but reserved judgment on Bundys supporting rationale, pending
further JCS review. McNamara and Rusk agreed that their departments would
review the underlying premises for MAP.3
On 22 March 1961, President Kennedy asked Congress for only $1.6 billion in
FY 1962, stating that military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize
the internal security, civil works and economic growth of the nations thus aided.
The President acknowledged, however, that this amount might not meet minimum
needs and that new crises and conflicts could compel a more costly effort. The program would provide $428 million for selected force improvements, $1.072 billion
for maintenance, training, construction, and overhead, and $100 million for contingencies. The JCS informed Secretary McNamara that, even though it left many
voids and allowed only minor modernization, this amount was defensible before
Congress. Since MAP objectives were being reappraised, they recommended a
review before the appropriations bill was passed. Conditions might require supplemental funding and/or changes to country programs.4
OSD conducted its own reassessment without consulting the Joint Staff, the
Services, or the unified commands. McNamara proposed adding $532.2 million.
After exchanges between Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary of State
Chester Bowles, that figure was cut to $392 million and sent to the White House.
Kennedy chose to add only $285 million, entirely for force improvement items. The
President informed Congress that a crisis on Southeast Asia, a communist threat in
Latin American, and increased arms trafficking across Africa justified the increase
to $1.885 billion. His message fell on some deaf ears. Representative Otto Passman
(D, LA), chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, was a powerful and vehement critic of MAP. Ultimately, the
House and Senate appropriated only $1.6 billion.5
The FY 1963 Program: Changes in Concept
he reappraisal of MAPs underlying premises, agreed upon by McNamara and

Rusk, began during the summer of 1961. An interdepartmental steering group
studied programs in six forward countries around the Sino-soviet periphery. These
were Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. ISA asked the Joint
Chiefs whether smaller indigenous forces, and by implication smaller military assistance programs, could achieve the same objectives. The JCS replied that, in any of
the six, the absence of forces strong enough to oppose external attack could lead to
either a fait accompli or an extremely difficult tactical situation. However, if indigenous forces could contain or at least delay local aggression, the United States would
218
Paring the Military Assistance Program

have enough time to employ her forces to best advantage. So they recommended
against MAP reductions either at present or in the foreseeable future.6
Most of the steering groups members saw matters differently. In December 1961,
a majority reported that the military danger facing the six forward nations was a less
serious long-term threat to those underdeveloped countries than the failure of their
governments to meet . . . the expectations of their citizens for improved standards of
living, education opportunities, and national development. Consequently, the main
thrust of US aid in the next decade should be directed toward repelling the more likely
Soviet threat of indirect aggression by furthering economic development and nationbuilding. This meant slowly shifting aid from military to economic programs, stretching out force modernization, and withholding sophisticated materiel from backward
nations. The groups chairman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military
Affairs Jeffrey Kitchen, endorsed these conclusions completely. So did representatives
from the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Agency for International
Development. The OSD representative, William Bundy, expressed reservations about
reducing aid to South Korea while the JCS representative, Rear Admiral Harry Smith,
opposed any cuts at present or in the foreseeable future.7
In fact, the groups recommendations won no support in the Pentagon. Secretary McNamara disagreed with many points; Assistant Secretary Nitze called the
conclusions arrant nonsense. The JCS challenged the groups assumption that a
diminished threat of overt aggression justified a reduction in military aid. Rather,
improvements in internal security, political stability, and economic development
could occur only under the umbrella of military security. It was the existence of
strong indigenous forces, they maintained, that had diverted communist efforts
from overt to indirect attack. Reducing that array will serve merely to cause a
commensurate rise in Bloc aggressiveness on the military front. Also, cutting MAP
would run counter to the new emphasis on conventional capabilities. Finally, they
warned that reductions could upset a recipients economy. In South Korea, where
unemployment already was a problem, reducing the armed forces from 600,000 to
350,000, as the group proposed, could have drastic consequences.8
On 18 January 1962, after an NSC discussion, President Kennedy called for
another review, bearing in mind that while we would like to have enough aid to
accomplish all of our military and economic aid objectives, we are likely . . . only
to get enough to accomplish a portion of them. He told the JCS to reconsider
their position, recognizing that decreases in military aid would be compensated
by increases in economic aid. But the JCS did not come to the conclusion that
Kennedy obviously desired. Experiences with Congressional budget-cutting led
them to dismiss as tenuous any premise that MAP reductions would be offset
by AID additions. A genuine tradeoff would occur only when the increased economic aid is applied in direct support of Armed Forces Programs. The Steering
Group proposals, however, do not indicate that any portion of the increased economic aid would be applied in this manner. Usually, economic aid was planned
219

for individual countries and could be altered without affecting neighboring
nations. Military Assistance Programs, on the other hand, were prepared from a
wider perspective; changes would have far-reaching ramifications. For these reasons, the JCS reaffirmed their position.9
Nonetheless, the administration did shift emphasis to economic aid at MAPs
expense.10 Late in 1961, Secretary McNamara tentatively set the FY 1962 MAP
request at $1.7 billion. The JCS cautioned that even the $1.885 billion originally
sought for FY 1962 contained substantial shortfalls. If deliveries were to continue
at an annual rate of $2.4 billion, new obligational authority of $2.2 billion would
be necessary.11 When the President held his budget wrap-up with the Chiefs on 3
January 1962, General Lemnitzer noted that the FY 1963 program had been shaved
again, down to $1.5 billion. At Kennedys suggestion, General Taylor telephoned
Budget Director David Bell, who said he had personally reviewed MAP funding
and concluded that the latest cuts would not compel any reductions in planned
programs. That satisfied the President, who determined to ask Congress for $1.5
billion. Recoupments and reappropriations would raise the total to $1.7 billion,
with the lions share going to the Far East ($831 million), the Near East and South
Asia ($423 million), and Europe ($321 million). Congress, however, reduced MAP
to $1.325 billion.12
The travail of MAP did not end there. Mounting troubles in Southeast Asia drove
expenditures above programmed levels. Late in August 1962, OSD proposed to offset
these by major reductions for Greece, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan as well as
smaller ones for Pakistan and the Philippines. The JCS protested that unified commanders had requested $381.3 million for force improvements in those six countries;
OSD would allow only $187.5 million. That level of assistance, if maintained over an
extended time period, would leave those countries unable to meet the anticipated
threat. The Chiefs complained, also, that a major reason for MAP shortfalls was the
continuing trend to fund the Agency for International Developments programs with
MAP dollars. Additionally, recurring year-end transfers to AID$15 million in FY
1961, $23 million in FY 1962subjected MAP to a double cutting edge.13
In mid-September 1962, OSD proposed still more cutbacks. After reviewing them, the Joint Chiefs advised McNamara that the present reality and future
probability of insufficient MAP appropriations created a vital need to reassess
and restate the programs objectives. Specifically, reductions should be borne by
more than the seven countries identified by OSD: Greece; Turkey; Iran; Pakistan;
the Philippines; Taiwan; and South Korea. Perhaps programs for some neutral
countries like Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia could be cut, and NATO nations
(Greece, Turkey, and Portugal excepted) also could absorb reductions.14
OSD circulated its final adjustments on 20 October. The major trims were imposed
upon Taiwan, down from $169.8 to $94.5 million, and South Korea, down from $254.2
to $201.3 million. Aid for embattled South Vietnam rose from $158.4 to $176.7 million.
Three days later, Congress completed an FY 1963 appropriation of $1.325 billion.15
220
The FY 1964 Program: Cut More, and Sooner
n revising the FY 1962 program and preparing the one for FY 1963, the administration had taken shortcuts around established procedures. But FY 1964 proposals
were put together by regular methods. First, State and Defense drafted a Basic Planning Document (BPD) outlining general objectives and dollar guidelines. Within the
Defense Department, this task fell to the Director of Military Assistance, General
Williston Palmer, USA, who worked in ISA. Next, the JCS circulated Annex J of their
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, listing missions and force objectives for actual or
potential allies. The BPD and Annex J were sent to unified commanders, who used
them in preparing country plans. After reviewing commanders recommendations,
the JCS would advise whether the BPD conformed to their strategic guidance.
In December 1961, General Palmer circulated the BPD for FYs 19641968. He
assumed that the administration would seek $1.7 billion annually in new obligational
authority and that program and delivery requirements averaging $1.9 billion could be
adequately funded. The Joint Chiefs judged that, with relatively minor exceptions,
the BPD adhered to their recommendations. Secretary McNamara, however, found
that greater efficiency could make MAP more effective in almost every case he investigated. He was particularly concerned about the fact that MAPs undelivered balances approximated almost two years of normal deliveries. Accordingly, he ordered that
the current balance of $2.9 billion be cut at least to $1.9 billion by mid-1963. This was
easier said than done; the unexpended balance in mid-1963 stood at $2.421 billion.16
General Robert J. Wood, USA, who succeeded Palmer as Director of Military
Assistance, recommended $1.7 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1964.
The JCS supported him, being particularly pleased to see compensating additions
planned for the seven countries that had borne the brunt of FY 1963 reductions.
Expecting that even more money would be needed for South Vietnam, Thailand,
India, and Latin America, they again suggested taking funds from neutral Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia.17
A presidential advisory committee headed by General Lucius Clay, USA (Ret.),
handed ammunition to Congressional budget-trimmers. In March 1963, Clays committee recommended that MAP be reduced to $1 billion in a few years. General
Wood devised a plan for paring the program back to $1.16 billion by FY 1969. Recognizing what they called fiscal realities of the present day, the JCS endorsed Woods
guidelines. They attached several caveats, the main one being that South Vietnam
would require considerably more money in FY 1964, perhaps less in later years if
things went well.18
Secretary McNamara asked Congress for $1.405 billion during FY 1964. By September 1963, however, the fiscal realities on Capitol Hill were such that General
Wood prepared and the Secretary approved a revised program of $1.05 billion. In
December, Congress appropriated only $1.0 billion; a $50 million transfer to MAP
from the Agency for International Development offset that last reduction. The final
221

allocations, endorsed by the JCS, followed a familiar pattern. The original request
for Greece was cut by $34 million, down to $69.5 million; for Turkey by $41 million,
down to $142 million; for Taiwan by $52 million, down to $82 million; and for South
Korea by $58 million, down to $147 million. So Greece was denied 54 self-propelled
howitzers, Turkey an initial increment of medium tanks, South Korea the delivery of
1,300 jeeps and trucks as well as ten F5 jet aircraft. Again, South Vietnam was given
a $60 million increase, providing more aircraft, helicopters, carbines, and rifles.19
MAP was another area in which OSD had made planning and programming
much more centralized, imposing tight deadlines for preparation and review. Consequently, a good many matters no longer were being reviewed by the Joint Chiefs.
In March 1963, following a discussion between Generals Taylor and Wood, an ad
hoc group drawn from ISA and the Joint Staff studied how the JCS organization
might play a larger role. It made four recommendations. First, OSD should coordinate with the JCS all policy, planning, and programming matters having either
strategic or operational implications. Second, OSD should put into each Program
Change Proposal the detailed information needed to facilitate a JCS review. Third,
regular and frequent ISA-Joint Staff-Service meetings should be held. Fourth, the
Joint Chiefs should improve Annex J of their Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. This
Annex supplied the Services and field commanders with basic guidelines about the
reasonably attainable forces deemed necessary to support JSOP strategy. In ISAs
judgment, past statements about missions and tasks lacked enough detail to establish the parameters for equipping and operating allied forces. Also, some objectives
far exceeded those that seemed reasonably attainable, JSOP goals for Greek and
Turkish forces being prime examples. Accordingly, the group proposed (1) requiring
field commanders to submit more detailed mission statements about local forces,
(2) providing in Annex J more definitive guidance as regards the reasonably attainable feature of recommended forces, and (3) advancing Annex Js circulation date
to synchronize it with the MAP cycle. By September, the JCS had approved and ISA
endorsed all these changes.20 Yet MAP had contracted so far, and become so much a
hostage to Congressional attitudes, that they had little practical significance.
The FY 19651966 Programs: Leveling Off
n mid-November 1963, State, Defense, and AID prepared a preliminary estimate

of $1.2 billion for FY 1965. William Bundy urged Secretary McNamara, instead,
to support $1.389 billion in new obligational authority. The FY 1964 cut could be
cushioned by increasing deliveries of items due from past years programs, reducing unexpended balances from $2.4 billion in mid-1963 to $1.7 billion by mid-1964.
But since this delivery cushion would be considerably smaller in FY 1965, Bundy
foresaw a danger of severe psychological reactions among key recipients. He also
222

urged that the FY 1965 proposal contain some cut insurance, since Congress
would eliminate $100 million and perhaps more.21
Early in December President Johnson consulted Senator Richard Russell (D,
GA), the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who said that $1.2
billion was the most Congress would approve. In fact, there was no assurance the
administration could obtain anything close to that amount. Accordingly, the President requested $1 billion (with recoupments and reappropriations, $1.160 billion).
To strengthen the rationale, ISA replaced strictly regional groupings with fresh
categories. These were: forward defense, covering eleven countries along the
periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, $745 million; Alliance for Progress countries in
Latin America, $66.2 million; military base rights applicable to Spain, Libya, and
Portugal, $24.4 million; grant aid phase out in Denmark, Norway, and Japan, $54
million; free world orientation for seven countries, $15.2 million; and US force
support and MAP administration, $256.2 million.22
Testifying before Congress in April 1964, Secretary McNamara pleaded his
case in the strongest terms: Anything less than $1 billion a year . . . will inevitably
require a reassessment of our entire policy of depending on indigenous forces in
preparing our own contingency war plans and, accordingly, of the size and character of our own military forces. General Taylor followed with similar language.
Representative Passmans influence was diminished by the death of his ally Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.
The new Chairman, Representative George Mahon of Texas, aligned with the new
President. Congress appropriated $1.055 billion for FY 1965, giving the administration an extra $55 million it sought for South Vietnam.23
But even as the threat from Capitol Hill eased, others appeared. In October
1964, William Bundy warned McNamara that there would be a $123 million shortfall, largely due to increases for Southeast Asia and fall-offs in recoupments and
reappropriations. Bundy proposed, and McNamara agreed, that offsetting reductions should fall principally upon the forward defense countries. The JCS protested that such cuts could have serious political repercussions. If some program
had to be reduced, why not the one for neutral India? They observed, too, that MAP
could not respond to a major crisis in one part of the world without badly hurting
programs in other parts. The Chiefs recommended seeking a supplemental appropriation, perhaps in the form of funding for open hostilities as in South Vietnam
and Laos.24
Meanwhile, in February 1964, General Wood suggested that MAP stay at $1
billion annually through FY 1970, since that was as much as Congress would
approve.25 The Joint Chiefs, in April, highlighted two aspects for special consideration. First, the forward defense countries should receive priority for improvement and modernization programs. The US Commander in Chief, Europe, had
reported that, under projected funding levels, it was extremely doubtful whether
Greek and Turkish forces could maintain even their currently limited capability to
223

perform their missions. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, advised that, while countries in his area of responsibility were reasonably well equipped at the moment,
projected budget cuts would lead to slow but sure declines in their effectiveness.
The US commander in Korea stated that prospective MAP funding would produce
a substantial change for the worse in the overall effectiveness of South Korean
forces. Five months later, he reported that a process of slow starvation had
begun. The Chairman, General Wheeler, replied that no relief was in prospect. 26
The Joint Chiefs asked yet again that allies like Greece, Turkey, and South Korea
get more money and neutrals like India less. Their second point was that more
MAP resources might have to be devoted to internal security. Latin America, for
example, should be given enough for governments to modernize internal security
forces and to obviate any need to buy arms from other nations.27 Secretary McNamara agreed that force improvement and modernization should receive the maximum share of MAP resources. He promised, also, to reassess the guidelines for
Greece, Turkey, and India. As 1964 ended, however, ballooning demands in Southeast Asia were taking funds from practically every other program.28
MAP kept shriveling because the administration emphasized economic development as a better guarantor of security and many in Congress viewed MAP as a
relic from the 1950s. Thus the Joint Chiefs warnings had practically no effect. As
the war in Southeast Asia escalated, MAP funding for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand
as well as some costs for South Korea and the Philippines were transferred to the
regular Defense budget. By FY 1969, the MAP appropriation fell to $375 million.
Often, sales and credits came to supplant grant aid.
224
15
Latin America: Containment
and Counter-Insurgency
Focusing on Internal Security and Civic Action
uring 196061, the concept of hemispheric security underwent a wrenching

change. The Rio Treaty of 1947 addressed external threats, stating that an
armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered as an
attack against all the American states.1 The Eisenhower administrations concept,
expounded in 1959, was that each Latin American state would contribute to hemispheric defense by insuring its own internal security and by defending its coastal
waters, ports, bases, strategic areas, and associated lines of communication.2 Then
Fidel Castro turned Cuba into a communist beachhead in the western hemisphere;
his ambitions clearly stretched beyond one island. It was common wisdom in
Washington that Latin American governments were fragile, being mostly dictatorships, and that grinding poverty spawned widespread discontent. Thus communistinspired insurgency loomed as an imminent danger.
In February 1961, the State Department proposed a new concept in which the
United States would bear primary (though not exclusive) responsibility for external defense, while Latin forces handled intra-hemispheric tasks. An Inter-American
Police Force with a US contingent should be organized, with grant aid confined
largely to those countries that contributed to it. Countries should be encouraged
to undertake partial disarmament and apply the savings to economic development. Also, the United States ought to start the process of convincing the Latin
military . . . that their most patriotic role, their true defense role, lies in executing a
concept of defense through development, with all that this entails.3
225

The JCS agreed about the importance of internal security and urged efforts
to have Congress remove restrictions against using grant aid for this purpose. But
they detected serious flaws in several of States ideas. The Chiefs believed that
existing rivalry and wide disparity in forms of government made it unlikely that
members could agree upon actual use of an Inter-American Police Force. They
saw little likelihood that Latin countries would reduce their armed forces. Military
establishments were matters of prestige; they also were essential in protecting
internal security and important in preserving political stability. And was it realistic
to assume that Latin America would embrace disarmament before the rest of the
world did so? Even if States proposals were adopted, savings would be relatively
insignificant. If Washington tried to coerce the Latins by curtailing military assistance, some countries simply would buy arms elsewhere. The JCS judged hemispheric defense contributions planned by the Latin governments to be desirable
and reasonably attainable.4
The administration touted its Alliance for Progress as an important agent
of social improvement. In March, President Kennedy informed Congress that
military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize the internal security, civil works and economic growth of the nations thus aided. In May, with the
assistance of Joint Staff and Service officers, ISA circulated a draft policy paper on
hemispheric security that incorporated Kennedys statement and softened some of
States more controversial proposals. According to this draft, the Western Hemisphere possessed the greatest capability to deal with the least likely threat, which
was external attack, and the least capacity to cope with the most probable danger,
which was insurgency. Priorities and programs should be readjusted accordingly.
Specific steps should include: making Latin nations aware of the dangers posed
by Castro and communism, and of the need for taking prompt multilateral action,
when necessary, to eliminate those threats; considering bilateral agreements that
would allow the United States to assist countries that asked for help in defeating
subversion and indirect aggression; strengthening the Inter-American Defense
Board and establishing an Inter-American Security Force; creating an Inter-American Defense College; seeking a modest increase in military assistance, giving first
priority to internal security measures and placing new emphasis on programs that
contributed to civic improvement and economic development; and encouraging
regional arms control agreements.5
The JCS assessed these proposals as adequate, subject to several changes.
First, include a strategic appraisal of Latin Americas military importance. Second,
prepare guidance for possible actions to prevent communist takeovers. Third,
defer establishment of an Inter-American Security Force until the concept could be
tested in the Caribbean. Fourth, speak of arms limitation rather than arms control; US influence could be exerted far more effectively through the Military Assistance Program than through any regional or bilateral agreements. Fifth, note that
bilateral agreements permitting US assistance against indirect aggression appeared
226
Latin America
to be militarily undesirable. Why so? Because the United States would be obliged
to keep regimes in power; there would be difficulties in determining whether opposition movements actually were communist; and the Latin countries involved in
such agreements would be surrendering some of their sovereignty. In any case, the
Chiefs observed, one state always had the right to assist another when so requested. Most of these recommendations were incorporated, but the paper was not forwarded to the NSC.6
In October 1961, the State Department circulated a draft of Guidelines for
Policy and Operations in Latin America. State assigned first priority in US aid to
internal security programs. In dealing with external attack, the antisubmarine warfare forces of Latin nations would be assisted only if they could effectively engage
high-speed submerged submarines. Latin militaries should be encouraged, among
other things, (1) to accept internal security as their major mission, (2) participate
in inter-American police or patrol forces, and (3) form dual-purpose units with
civic action as well as military capabilities. The JCS asked for several changes: add
a strategic appraisal of Latin Americas military importance; drop the idea of an
inter-American security force; and make the definition of Latin ASW capabilities
less demanding. ISA agreed and added several other criticisms. When the Guidelines were issued as administration policy, in May 1962, Defense got everything it
wanted except a strategic appraisal.7
Concentrating on Civic Action
resident Kennedy constantly prodded the Defense Department to do more about

internal security. In May 1961, he asked how effective civilian police forces were,
and what might be done to bolster them. The JCS assured him that programs for
strengthening internal security were adequate. Indeed, most Latin nations could not
absorb all the out-of-country training that had been offered to them. The Chiefs proposed providing more in-country training along with more materiel.8
In October 1961, the President inspected Army Special Forces at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. He asked General Decker what more the US military, in conjunction
with Latin counterparts, could do. The JCS response, forwarded to the President on 30
November, listed many possibilities. Steps to increase internal security included: easing
Congressional restrictions upon using MAP for internal security; persuading the Latin
military to accept an apolitical role; expanding technical military assistance; broadening and expanding indigenous capabilities for counter-insurgency, anti-subversion, and
psychological warfare; and ensuring that means existed for the rapid provision of training, equipment, and materiel. Among other things, the Chiefs set out ways of establishing a broad base of information and education for the Latin American military man.
Departing from purely military roles, they cautioned, would result in some resentment
and criticism from certain power groups in Latin America. However, integrated policy
227

direction at the national level combined with close coordination of country programs
would minimize that risk.9
Through NSAM No. 118, issued on 5 December 1961, the President ordered
State to draft policy guidance and Defense to develop specific programs for
US-Latin military collaboration. In January, the JCS sent McNamara a list of 46
projects. Two months later, Kennedy approved a brief paper from State and circulated it as NSAM No. 140. Also, at the Presidents urging, Congress changed the
primary purpose of MAP in Latin America from hemispheric to internal defense.10
Kennedy wanted to include civic action programs within military assistance. In
February 1962, the State Department distributed a draft message stating that MAP
would fund measures aimed at increasing the Latin militarys ability to undertake
civic action efforts. Among these measures were: equipping and maintaining new
units whose primary mission would be civic action; supporting existing units when
they were performing civic action projects; and providing specialized equipment to
enhance civic action capability.11
The JCS lodged reservations that showed their distaste for mingling civic and
military missions. Civic action, they argued, should be undertaken not only with
MAP-supported units but with a countrys own resources. Such an approach would
be consistent with the principles of self-help and with the ceiling on MAP funding
for Latin America, about $55 million. New units with the primary mission of civic
action should be neither created nor funded under MAP. Rather, MAP-supported
units should perform only such civic action tasks as were ancillary to their military
mission and lay within their organic capabilities.12
Late in 1961, and again at President Kennedys urging, a team drawn from
Defense, Caribbean Command, State, AID, FBI, and Central Intelligence travelled
through South America. Its task was to appraise the communist threat, the capacity of each country to maintain internal security and effect reforms, the capabilities of US agencies to assist local governments, and the requirements for advice,
assistance, and training.
The team concluded that there was still time to take corrective action, even in
countries where the problems were most urgent (Colombia and Bolivia, followed
by Peru and Ecuador). As a rule, indigenous forces could maintain order and suppress outbreaks of urban violence. The team wanted Latin militaries to shift away
from major cities and out of their traditional political roles, but internal security
should come first, civic action second. Latins could not convert their conventional
units into internal security forces and, simultaneously, divert substantial resources
into civic action. The team also recommended revising the entire US military
programforce structures, bilateral treaties, intelligence efforts, missions, and
Military Assistance Advisory Groupsin order to emphasize internal security and
consolidate supervisory authority.13
The Joint Chiefs readily supported increased internal security assistance and
more coordinated guidance, but they opposed revising MAP wholesale. A recent
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Latin America
consolidation of Service missions with MAAGs, they believed, would alleviate some
of the difficulties. As to bilateral agreements, they feared that the United States
might lose more in renegotiation than it would gain. Lastly, and a bit curiously, they
criticized the team for failing to stress sufficiently the importance of civic action
programs and military participation therein. While agreeing with these criticisms,
ISA endorsed all the teams other proposals, including the one that internal security
deserved a higher priority than military participation in civic action programs.14
In February 1962, President Kennedy voiced concern about the relatively
modest MAP for Latin America and asked a familiar question: Why not more?
The Chairmans Assistant, Major General Theodore Parker, USA, suggested that
since Congress seemed unlikely to increase MAP appropriations, Latins should be
encouraged to employ their armed forces in civic action projects. On 14 March,
a message along these lines was sent to the Commanders in Chief, Atlantic and
Caribbean. It cited military information and education programs as a field for
increased activity. In reply, the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB),
noted one possibly insuperable obstacle: the recipients were illiterate conscripts to
whom written materials would be incomprehensible.15
By this time, concrete projects were taking shape. In April 1962, General Lemnitzer sent OSD a Civic Action Plan for Ecuador costing about $1.5 million. Phase I
involved building roads and supplying water; Phase II emphasized school construction, water supply, and public health; Phase III stressed colonization, advanced
agriculture, and education. Phase I would require 41 US and 250 Ecuadoran military
personnel along with 4,950 civilian volunteers. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric approved
the plan, agreeing that funding would come from the MAP for FY 1962. Significantly,
he assigned it a worldwide priority over all MAP and Army claimants.16
Concurrently, the Country Team in Bolivia urged US support for a pilot Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC), similar to the New Deal program of the 1930s. Secretary Rusk endorsed the idea and recommended drawing funds from MAP. The Joint
Chiefs backed the idea but asked that funding come from other sources or through
an increase in MAP. Ultimately, without an increase, the Defense Department funded CCC projects in Bolivia and El Salvador.17
In September 1962, McNamara and Lemnitzer flew to the Panama Canal Zone for
a conference with the CINCARIB, who was Lieutenant General Andrew P. OMeara,
USA. Also attending were Major General Victor Krulak, USMC, Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, and General Robert Wood, USA, Director
of Military Assistance. In his briefing, OMeara identified the chief problem as Congress $57.5 million ceiling on MAP for Latin America. Also, he said, there were limits
upon how far the Latin military could be prodded into civic action.18 The officer
corps would dissipate neither its capacity for maintaining law and order nor its ability to exert pressure upon rulers whom it considered dangerous. Only by allocating
the whole $57.5 million to internal security could all requirements be met by FY 1966.
But the United States was heavily involved in Latin ASW programs; these would
229

have to be augmented ($12.5 million was currently planned) to receive a return on
earlier investments. Suspending ASW would be risky, OMeara argued, because the
Latin navies wielded considerable political power. At the conclusion of the conference, Secretary McNamara agreed to consider about $3 million worth of civic action
projects for the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Bolivia, and
Chile. Lemnitzer subsequently recommended, and the Secretary approved, projects
requiring $3.417 million in DOD and $1.2 million in AID funds.19
By the autumn of 1962, action had begun on 39 of the 46 projects recommended by the JCS in January. Four hundred men from the 7th Special Forces
Group were sent to Caribbean Command, where they split into thirty mobile training teams. The Air Force dispatched 1st Air Commando Group (eight planes, eighty
personnel) to the Canal Zone, where it was training Honduran pilots. US Army
intelligence and security advisers were serving in twelve countries. In the area
of hemispheric defense, US-Latin commanders conferences had become annual
events; the Inter-American Defense College was about to open. As for economic
development, the military services in all Latin American countries were participating in civic action projects.20
Late in 1964, McGeorge Bundy tasked the Defense Department with drafting a new strategy for dealing with the Latin military. ISA proposed phasing out
all grant aid, which Congress was cutting in any case. In its place would come
sales and cost-sharing arrangements, supplemented when necessary by project
aid designed to equip a specific force for a fixed period or to implement a specific program for a fixed sum. In the internal security area, ISA saw no need for
a major restructuring of Latin military establishments. ISA also implied that the
concept of hemispheric defense had lost validity, because assistance for ASW
programs flowed primarily from the need to maintain friendly relations with the
Latin nations.21
The JCS claimed that ISAs study needed modification. While acknowledging
the danger from internal disorder and political instability arising out of the social
upheaval now under way, they argued that it is communist inspiration, sponsorship, and direction of this upheaval that poses the greatest threat. Latin military
establishments were not strong enough to control any widespread insurgencies.
So, contrary to what ISA hoped, regular units could not withdraw from their internal security duties until police forces became more effective. Therefore, the shaky
economies of these countries and the continuing insurgent threat will not permit
any sizeable shift from grant aid to military sales in the near future. They insisted,
too, that Latin ASW forces served a real need, since no US units could be spared to
protect convoys during wartime. That being so, hemispheric defense did remain a
valid concept.22
In June 1965, McNamara sent Bundy a revised study that went some way
toward meeting JCS objections. McNamara wanted to end grant aid by FY 1971,
except for $15 to $20 million annually in training support. The State Department
230
Latin America
agreed in principle but urged indefinite delay from fear of disrupting US influence
and possibly alienating those Latin military forces upon whom the Alliance for Progress had to rely as preservers of stability. Accordingly, Secretary McNamara decided
to proceed without a rigid time frame, concentrating upon prudent management . . . under existing guidance rather than on the initiation of a new strategy.23
Case Studies
n January 1961, no country seemed riper for revolution than the Dominican
Republic. Rafael Trujillo, a long-entrenched dictator, faced a failing economy
and growing discontent. The JCS were willing to do anythingquite literally, anythingthat would avert another Cuba in the Caribbean. On 26 January 1961, they
advised Secretary McNamara that the time is now at hand for the United States to
initiate political, economic and, as the ultimate, direct military measures to replace
Trujillo and his government with a democratic regime friendly to the United
States. Dominicans who were capable of taking over the government and furthering US interests in the area should be actively sought out by the United States and
actively assisted in their endeavor to overthrow the Trujillo Government. If chaos
threatened after Trujillo fell, the Joint Chiefs favored providing whatever military
support is required, ranging from naval patrols that would prevent communist
interference up to military occupation of the entire country.24
On 5 May, President Kennedy told the NSC (1) that the United States should
not initiate Trujillos ouster without knowing what would replace him and (2) that
any military action against Trujillo should be multilateral in character. The US Consul General in the capital, which was then called Ciudad Trujillo, kept in contact
with pro-American dissidents. On 30 May, some of these men waylaid and killed
Trujillo. The next day, the Defense Department ordered seven warships and transports carrying 1,000 Marines to assemble off Ciudad Trujillo. There was worry that
Trujillos son Ramfis, considered a playboy with a vicious streak, might take power.
On 1 June, McNamara issued orders sending two carriers plus escorts and the 4th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Caribbean. Three days later, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral James Russell, recommended sending the cruiser
Northampton into the harbor of Ciudad Trujillo and moving the rest of the task
force close enough to be within plain view. Russell also recommended telling President Joaquin Balaguer, a figurehead until now, that Washington wanted to help him
move away from dictatorship and would intervene with overwhelming forces . . .
at the first sign of any Pro-Castro, Pro-Communist influences. Shortly afterward,
however, Vice President Johnson,25 Secretary McNamara, and Under Secretary of
State Alexis Johnson decided against taking such steps.26
Balaguer stayed in control and slowly began making liberal reforms. In
mid-November 1961, Ramfis and his family tried to regain power. The United
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States moved warships within sight of the capital and stood ready to intervene
on Balaguers behalf. Ramfis fled the country, and the difficult transition toward
democracy continued.27
Brazil presented another kind of danger when, in 1961, Joao Goulart assumed
the presidency. A Special National Intelligence Estimate described Goulart as a
leftist with a long record of collaboration with the Communists. Early in 1962,
CINCARIB warned McNamara that communists occupied key positions in the
Brazilian army and government, and that the country might go communist in three
years. The culmination came in March 1964 when, according to the US ambassador, Goulart embarked upon a campaign to seize dictatorial power and accepted
the Communist Partys active collaboration. The administration initiated steps to
ensure that Brazilian troops in Sao Paulo would have enough fuel to move to Rio
de Janeiro. Tankers as well as a naval task force began steaming on 31 March, but
events outpaced them. General Humberto Castello Branco directed a military coup
and, on 2 April, Goulart fled to Uruguay. Castello Branco, who was conservative
and pro-US, assumed the presidency.28
The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), the State Department, and ISA
favored an expression of support for the new anti-communist regime. ISA recommended raising MAP from $9.8 to $12.5 million; the US ambassador proposed $20
million. The Joint Chiefs, on 22 October, criticized ISAs figure as too small to demonstrate support and likely to offend Brazilian sensibilities. Since Congress had set
a ceiling on material aid for Latin America, there would have to be compensating
cuts in other country programsa process that would disrupt orderly planning,
deprive countries of critical assets, and shake confidence in US reliability. Therefore, they urged an early and strong effort to either remove the ceiling or raise
it to $75 million. Once that was done, a $20 million Brazilian program could be
approved for planning purposes. Credit assistance and cost-sharing proposals
also should be prepared. Since Congress was unwilling to raise the ceiling, the
administration approved $11.8 million in grant aid and considered credit sales of $8
to $10 million.29
Cuba: Threat and Target
he end of the missile crisis did not mean that Cuba no longer ranked among
the administrations top concerns. On 8 January 1963, President Kennedy
created an Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba, chaired by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sterling Cottrell. General Wheeler acted as
JCS representative on the Committee; Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance became
McNamaras agent on all Cuban matters. Cottrell circulated a draft that described
Castros overthrow as the ultimate objective but sketched less ambitious immediate objectives that included isolating Cuba, promoting internal dissension, and
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Latin America
frustrating Castros subversive activities. The JCS found this acceptable as broad
guidance. Appraising specifics, however, Vance argued that Cottrells draft did not
make clear whether the administration intended actively and boldly to pursue the
ultimate objective or whether it would adopt a substantially less active policy.
If the former, the draft should say that the United States would apply increasing
degrees of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. If the latter, it should speak simply of being
prepared, as appropriate opportunities present themselves, to do these things.
Not surprisingly, the JCS favored the ultimate objective of overthrowing Castro
and recommended including repeated low-level reconnaissance flights among the
courses of action.30
On 20 January, Cottrell circulated a revised paper that proposed first to create
propitious conditions in Cuba for advancing to the objective of removing Castro.
However, we should not set ourselves on a single track which propels us into
an invasion regardless of unforeseen international consequences. Upon review,
the JCS reaffirmed their preference for stronger actions. On 24 January, Cottrell
sent the NSCs Executive Committee a list of objectives that included: preventing
aggressive military action by Cuba against other Caribbean states; reducing Castros capabilities for supporting subversion and insurrection; supporting developments within Cuba that offered the possibility of replacing the regime with a noncommunist government; and preparing for a wide variety of military contingencies.
Vance judged these inadequate because they did not make Castros overthrow an
objective and did not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to
bring about Castros downfall. Pursuing the ultimate objective, according to Vance,
would involve a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological, and military actions that might include: large-scale training of Cuban exiles
who would be used inside Cuba; extensive air activity, including both high- and
low-level reconnaissance; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba
and on key installations in Cuba; and, ultimately, the use of US military forces.31
On 25 January, Cottrell presented the ExComm with a paper that melded Vances
objectives and some of his actions with those on Cottrells list above. After an
ExComm discussion, President Kennedy deemed it unnecessary to endorse the
general parts of the paper and summarized the specific actions that he already had
approved (e.g., covert collection of intelligence and backing of suitable exile groups).32
A month later, Kennedy conferred with the JCS about OPLANs 312 and 316.
He directed them to develop plans for inserting troops rapidly in case a general
uprising should occur. Late in April, reacting to reports that Castro was receiving
more materiel, the President urged that additional forces be allocated to 312 and
316. McNamara replied that reactivating eleven LSTs and planning to acquire extra
C130s would allow the early introduction of more troops and heavy equipment.33
On 8 June 1963, Central Intelligence proposed a more forceful program of
actions, general sabotage and harassment among them. The types of sabotage
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would include externally mounted hit-and-run operations and providing men and
materiel to internal resistance elements. On 19 June, at a White House meeting
attended by the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, the President approved this program. By the years end, Central Intelligence had directed four externally-mounted
operations that were rated successful. The JCS recommended two other sabotage
actions, but the DOD representative (evidently Secretary Vance) did not bring them
to the Special Groups attention.34
President Johnson suspended what was termed the paramilitary program. During a White House meeting on 18 January 1964, he questioned seriously whether
these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the US to be doing. General Taylor argued that they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily
occupied running hither and yon. On 4 March, the President directed the JCS to
give him a list . . . of everything they think we can do that we are not now doing to
put further pressure on Castro. General Taylor circulated a draft that, with minor
additions, won the Service Chiefs approval. On 21 April, the JCS recommended a
resumption of the program (which is presently approved but on which no actions
are currently being taken) involving the employment of covert assets to conduct
interdependent operations, including the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuba. As this program unfolds, they would favor intensifying and
expanding it. . . . The Chiefs still believed that our ultimate objective should be
Castros overthrow. However, . . . [i]t is a hard fact that little remains which offers
promise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to or including invasion. They will keep this problem
under continuing review and advise you should any new and promising courses of
action be uncovered.35
It must not be supposed that Castro remained a passive target. In northwestern
Venezuela, on 3 November 1963, a large arms cache was found buried on a beach.
Examination of the weapons showed them to be of Cuban origin. Secretary Vance
asked the JCS to propose plans for air and sea surveillance. Answering in mid-January, they advocated a flexible combination of barrier at destination, with emphasis on Colombia and Venezuela, plus air reconnaissance in waters south of Cuba to
identify vessels exiting from Cuba. They calculated US force requirements as: one
carrier, fourteen destroyers, one oiler, and 23 patrol planes for sea surveillance;
one fighter squadron and one airborne early warning squadron for air surveillance.
On 20 January they directed CINCLANT to monitor all ship movements into Venezuela, in order to obtain a sampling of shipping density. This was done over 2431
January, using two destroyer escorts and 55 flights.36
CINCLANT reported that, although surveillance could be accomplished, boarding and searching all ships would be such a daunting task that firm intelligence
about subversive traffic was absolutely vital. On 17 February, he presented a scheme
for interdicting the flow of arms; Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs promptly
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Latin America
approved it as the basis for a detailed plan. In Washington, there was debate over
whether the stopping and searching of selected vessels should take place on the high
seas or only in territorial waters. General Taylor favored the high seas as deterring
the Cubans and giving us a reprisal capability, but he was overruled. On 26 July 1964,
the Organization of American States by vote of 153 condemned Cuba for its acts of
aggression and intervention against Venezuela. Subsequently, all members except
Mexico severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.37
Castro made Bolivia another target. His lieutenant, Ernesto Che Guevara,
entered the country late in 1966. Leading a small guerrilla band, Guevara tried to
ignite a revolution that would spread across the continent. The Defense Department
provided Bolivia with a 16-man training team to help organize a new Ranger battalion.
It also supplied ammunition, rations, and communications equipment on an emergency basis under MAP and expedited the delivery of four helicopters. Guevaras campaign failed. He was captured by Bolivian Rangers on 8 October 1967 and executed
the next day.38 This was the signal success of counter-insurgency in Latin America.
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16
Middle East Kaleidoscope
The Middle East was beset by feuds that made it virtually impossible for the
United States to pursue a coherent regional policy. Tension between Arabs and
Israelis never abated. Arabs threatened and sometimes fought each other, authoritarian populist regimes often pitted against conservative monarchies. The kings
of Saudi Arabia and Jordan were pro-western, as was the non-Arab Shah of Iran.
Egypts President Gamal Abdul Nasser, a charismatic leader with pan-Arab aspirations, cultivated relations with the Soviet Union, which became his principal arms
supplier. President Kennedy tried to promote a personal tie with Nasser, but their
policy differences proved too great.
A summary of US-Iraqi relations during 1963 illustrates the complications
and swift reversals that Washington faced in trying to foster stable, pro-Western
regimes. In 1958, General Abdul Karim Qassim had destroyed Iraqs pro-western
monarchy and seized power. In February 1963, Qassim was himself deposed and
executed. The new regime promptly sought to purchase helicopters, light tanks,
and tank transporters from the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed
sales on a case-by-case basis, consistent with existing US regional commitments
and objectives in the area. The administration adopted this approach but without
becoming a major supplier of offensive weapons.1
By July, Iraqi requests had lengthened to include supersonic fighters, transport aircraft, eight-inch howitzers, and hundreds of trucks. The JCS recommended responding favorably to requests that fell within the administrations
approach. In justification, they observed that the Baath Party members who now
ruled Iraq were anti-Nasser and anti-Soviet. Iraq had just confederated with Nassers United Arab Republic (UAR), comprised of Egypt and Syria. Since Baathists
controlled Damascus and Baghdad, continued disunity between Nasser on the
one hand and Iraq and Syria on the other could ease pressures upon Saudi Arabia
and other monarchies as well as Israel. The Chiefs even foresaw a good possibility that Iraq and Syria would align openly with the West. Moreover, Moscow
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was extending political support to Kurdish rebels in northeast Iraq. The Chiefs
believed that a firm Iraqi military position, coupled with a willingness to accommodate legitimate Kurdish grievances, offered the most promising avenue for
advancing Iraqs internal stability.2
Unfortunately, that avenue soon closed. In November 1963, pro-Nasserite officers ousted the civilian Baathist leadership. Washington and Baghdad did conclude
a modest military sales agreement, but, thereafter, the two governments drew apart.
Supplying Arms to Israel
nitially, the Kennedy administration intended to continue an even-handed

approach toward Arabs and Israelis, assuring Israels survival but avoiding a
major role as arms supplier. Thus, in February 1962, the State Department proposed maintaining a watch on the Arab-Israeli military balance, declining to supply
Israel with major categories of arms but being prepared to consider occasional
sales of weapons and equipment of an essentially defensive nature. Although the
Joint Chiefs endorsed these guidelines, ISA proposed a slightly more stringent definition: Be prepared to consider occasional sale of light weapons and equipment
particularly suitable for defensive purposes. State accepted ISAs words for its
guidelines published in June 1962.3
Already, the limits of this policy were being tested. In 1960, the Eisenhower
administration had rejected an Israeli bid to purchase a Hawk surface-to-air missile
system, largely on grounds that the Soviets might then equip Arab states with surface-to-surface rockets, rendering the Hawks an expensive waste. When Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion met President Kennedy in May 1961, he renewed the
bid for Hawks. Kennedy was non-committal.4
Visiting Washington in May 1962, Israels Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres
claimed that Soviet deliveries to Egypt of MiG21 fighters and Tu-16 medium bombers were creating a military imbalance. He therefore repeated the request for Hawks.
State and ISA asked for a JCS assessment of Israels vulnerability to air attack.5
Answering on 12 July, the JCS calculated that Israels air force could defeat
Egypts, if the Israelis were able to protect their air facilities. Israeli radar provided
complete high-altitude coverage, but a low-level surprise attack might damage
as many as 40 percent of their aircraft. The arrival of more Tu-16s would further
increase Israels vulnerability. In the Chiefs judgment, Hawks would fill an important air defense gap without shifting the regional balance. ISA agreed. Secretary
Rusk also concurred, if a regional arms limitation proved unattainable within two
or three months.6
In mid-August, the administration made a contingent offer to sell Israel the
equipment for one Hawk battalion with 24 launchers.7 Production could be completed within 24 months of the order date, but US schools had no training vacancies for
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Israeli crews before January 1965. The JCS recommended delaying training for other
countries so Israelis could finish the course by November 1964. They cautioned,
though, that the Hawk sale could have unpleasant repercussions. First, the trend
toward improving relations with Arab states might be reversed, with consequent
material and psychological benefits to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Second, Egypt probably
would try to acquire similar equipment from the Soviets, fuelling an arms race. Third,
President Nasser could raise anew the standard of Arab nationalism and boost his
flagging prestige, to the detriment of pro-western Arab leaders.8 Under an agreement signed in June 1963, Israel purchased a Hawk battalion for $23.5 million, creditfinanced over a ten-year period.9
Egypt entered into production of surface-to-surface rockets and intervened
massively in Yemens civil war. Israel began pressing Washington for (1) a formal,
public security assurance, (2) some sort of military collaboration and contingency
planning, and (3) freer access to US weaponry. State Department officials wondered whether joint contingency planning alone would satisfy Israel. ISA asked for
a JCS judgment.10
Answering early in August 1963, the Joint Chiefs opposed either a security
assurance, joint planning, or changing the existing policy about supplying arms.
Major US objectives in the Middle East, they noted, were to promote stability,
maintain access, and ensure the availability of oil to Western Europe. Communist
penetration, in their judgment, posed the main threat to these goals. If the United
States yielded to Israeli pressure, Arabs would lean more heavily upon Soviet support. Therefore, the Chiefs saw no sense in going beyond President Kennedys
recent public statement that in the event of aggression or preparation for aggression . . . we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other
courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression.11
While the Chiefs acknowledged that joint planning would facilitate the entry
of US forces, they believed that Israels ability to defeat any combination of Arab
states made such efforts unnecessary. If Arab aggression did occur, the most effective US support would be to attack the facilities from which air and missile strikes
were being launched. The Israelis were aware of our capabilities and could fill
most of their arms requirements from Western Europe. Therefore, Israeli pressures
upon the United States were most probably politically motivated. Their true aim
might be leakage to the Arabs of the nature and extent of joint planning.
Should overriding political reasons require a US-Israel dialogue, the Chiefs recommended that it take the form of political discussions in order to avoid any connotation of joint military planning against the Arabs. The United States could provide
an estimate of Arab strength and generalized information about US capabilities. In
return, Israelis would provide more information about their plans for force development as well as assurances that, in the event of political turmoil in neighboring
Arab states, Israel would not seize the West Bank of the Jordan or undertake other
pre-emptive action without prior consultation with the United States. The course
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recommended by the JCS was to promote negotiated settlement of lesser issues on
a piecemeal basis. Again, ISA agreed.12 The administration avoided either offering a
security guarantee or engaging in contingency planning.
In mid-November 1963, an Israeli delegation arrived in Washington to make a
case for buying weapons that were not strictly defensive. Citing the program for
producing ground-to-ground missiles, they claimed that Egypt was expanding her
armed forces with all possible speed. In armored strength, the Israelis could accept
an Arab advantage between two and three to one, provided that Israeli tanks were
qualitatively equal. In 1965, by their calculation, the Arab inventory would reach
3,000. Israel, therefore, needed 1,000 modern tanks. That would mean replacing 300
Shermans of World War II vintage and increasing Israels inventory by 100 to 200
new tanks.13
The State Department recommended continuing to restrain US arms sales.
ISA, however, argued that continuing Soviet aid to the Arabs, growing Egyptian air and missile capability, and the increasing tempo of Western European
arms sales to the whole area required a change of policy. First, stop letting the
Europeans have the first chance at arms sales. Second, permit selective sales
of so-called offensive weapons on a case-by-case basis. The JCS agreed that
the arms race was accelerating but cited an intelligence estimate that the substantial military equilibrium between Israel and the Arabs had not been upset.
Therefore, they saw no immediate need to supply major quantities of arms.
Rather, highest priority should go to achieving agreement about restricting the
flow of arms.14
Early in January 1964, Israel urgently sought permission to buy tanks: 200
M-48A3s and 100 M60s to replace an equal number of Shermans, and 100 M60s
to modernize its inventory. The JCS advised that Arab states, individually and
collectively, remained qualitatively inferior to Israel. In fact, Israel could either
defeat attacks on all four fronts (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon) or hold on
three fronts and mount a successful offensive on the fourth. Moreover, serious
differences among Arab governments made combined action against Israel highly
unlikely. Tank inventories totaled 1,932 for the Arabs versus 734 for Israel, but the
Arab advantage was less impressive than it looked. Lebanese and Saudi Arabian
forces would exercise minimal effect on the fighting; Anglo-American influence
probably would keep Jordan neutral; Iraqi and Syrian capabilities had been extensively degraded by internal upheavals. In these circumstances, the JCS found no
justification for increasing Israels armored strength. They agreed, however, that
replacing 300 Shermans was militarily sound on the basis of modernization. If
the Israelis insisted on M48A3s (a diesel-powered model with greater range and
a 90-mm gun that could be replaced with a 105-mm), these should be provided by
converting M48s, which then would be replaced in the US inventory by the latest
105-mm M60A1s. If the Israelis were offered M60A1s, though, they would have to
be provided by expanding production.15
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In February, Secretary McNamara approved in principle a credit sale of (1)
200 M48s over the next one to two years and (2) 100 M60s over the next two to
three years.16 Instead, the administration arranged for West Germany to supply 150
M48s and for the British to sell 150 Centurions, both outfitted with 105-mm guns.
However, when word leaked to Cairo early in 1965 Bonn was pressured into cancelling the contract. Ultimately, the United States sold Israel 210 M48A3s.
Meantime, nuclear non-proliferation emerged an irritant between Washington and
Tel Aviv. With French help, Israel was building a heavy-water reactor with supporting
facilities at Dimona in the Negev. In April 1961, two US scientists toured Dimona and
found no present evidence that the Israelis have weapons production in mind. Soon
afterward, a JCS study cautioned that Israels acquisition of a nuclear capability would
have a definite and serious impact on US policies toward the Middle East and possibly
toward France. Therefore, the United States should [a]ttempt by all feasible means,
official, quasi-official and private to convince Israel and France that such acquisition
would be against the best interests of the Free World, the Middle East and of Israel.
In 1963, Israel appeared to back away from a promise to permit more inspections of
Dimona. President Kennedy ratcheted up the pressure, warning Ben-Gurion that this
Governments commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if
it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject
as vital to peace as the question of the character of Israels effort in the nuclear field.
After Levi Eshkol succeeded Ben-Gurion as prime minister, Kennedy repeated his
warning. A US inspection team visited Dimona in January 1964, almost a month after
the reactor went critical, and found no immediate weapons making capability.17
These were not watershed years in US-Israeli relations. Washington sold
Hawks because they were defensive, rejected requests for surface-to-surface missiles and naval weapons,18 and tried to have Europeans supply tanks. The JCS
clearly were wary of anything resembling close military collaboration, but they did
endorse Hawk and tank sales as special cases.19
Supporting the Saudi Regime
ilitary relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia dated from
World War II, when the Dhahran air base was built and leased. In 1957, the
Saudis agreed to a five-year extension of the lease; the United States promised to
expand its training program. By 1960, however, the situation had become mutually
unsatisfying. Although Dhahran was no longer a primary base for the Strategic Air
Command, a Middle East air base was still considered essential for logistic support activities. Yet, as the JCS observed in September 1960, Dhahrans value was
severely limited by restrictive provisions. Emergency use, for example, was contingent upon Saudi assent. Unless a more flexible agreement could be obtained, the
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Chiefs urged that facilities be sought elsewhere. As alternatives, they listed Iran,
Kuwait, and Muharraq islet off British-controlled Bahrain.20
In March 1961, King Saud announced that the Dhahran lease would not be
renewed. The JCS recommended endeavoring to retain residual rights (a Military
Training Mission and landing privileges for in-transit aircraft) as well as base rights
in Pakistan and, at Muharraq Airfield, Bahrain, rights for transport aircraft stops and
stationing of a small support unit. ISA agreed about residual rights and Muharraq but
not Pakistan.21 The State Department proposed that the Military Training Mission
continue only if the Saudis granted residual rights. The JCS responded by urging that
residual rights be defined more broadly, to include wartime availability as well as
peacetime landing privileges for Military Air Transport Service (MATS) aircraft. ISA
supported them and State amended its policy guideline accordingly.22
Soon, however, Saudi-American ties were to strengthen dramatically. The cause
was civil war in Yemen, a small and backward country in the southwest corner of the
Arabian peninsula. When Imam Ahmad died on 17 September 1962, many educated
Yemenis had been swayed by liberalizing ideas and Nasserite propaganda. So, on
2627 September, army officers overthrew the Imamate and proclaimed a republic.
The Soviet bloc and many Arab states recognized the new regime; Nasser sent 20,000
of his soldiers to support the republicans. The royalists rallied behind Ahmads
son, Imam Badr; Saudi Arabia and Jordan provided material aid. Thus a Yemeni civil
war escalated into a confrontation involving much of the Arab world.23
To Saudi Arabias rulers, the threat was clear. King Saud was ill, and at his death
the Yemeni experience might be repeated. In mid-October, Crown Prince Faisal
became prime minister and de facto ruler. Faisal immediately communicated his
concern to Washington, even suggesting that the Eisenhower Doctrine (by which
the United States pledged to assist victims of communist aggression) be invoked
on behalf of Yemeni royalists. The State Department asked Defense to survey what
steps might be taken to support the Saudis in defending their own territory.24
The JCS assessment, sent to Secretary McNamara on 9 November, stressed
that Saudi Arabias real problems were internal. The Chiefs specific recommendations were modest in tone. As an example, the Chief of the Military Training Mission should impress upon Saudi military leaders the necessity for ensuring the loyalty of all personnel. More broadly, the JCS urged extracting, as a quid pro quo for
US support, an acceptable agreement on the Military Training Mission, continued
use of Dhahran, and at least a promise to inaugurate internal reforms.25
Working through diplomatic channels, Washington secured public pledges by
Yemeni republicans to respect Saudi Arabias territorial integrity and by Egypt to
undertake a reciprocal expeditious . . . removal of its troops from Yemen. Then,
on 30 December, reports came that Egyptian aircraft had bombed the Saudi village of Nejran, through which arms shipments were passing to the royalists. The
Saudis urgently requested a US show of force; the State Department asked for
military advice.26
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The JCS, answering on 2 January 1963, advised caution. Circumstances surrounding the Egyptian attack, they said, were clouded considerably by Saudi support for the royalists and by Faisals emotional reaction. The Chiefs favored active
employment of US forces only after political efforts had failed, and then only to the
minimum extent necessary. If military measures were decided upon, they proposed
the following progression of events, each preceded by a major diplomatic effort.
First, dispatch a Composite Air Strike Unit (CASU) consisting of eight fighter and
two to four reconnaissance aircraft. One destroyer also could visit Jidda. Second,
send a carrier task force into the eastern Mediterranean. Third, execute contingency plans that included interdicting shipping and bombing targets in the United Arab
Republic and Yemen.27
The administration was prepared to deploy fighters periodically, under orders
to fight only in self-defense and on condition that Faisal stopped sending aid to the
royalists. But ISA worried that, if this show of support proved ineffective, State
would propose stronger measures. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary Nitze asked
the Joint Chiefs to assess a compromise solution by which American destroyers
in the Red Sea would direct US interceptors flying from Saudi airfields.28
The JCS found several reasons why this compromise solution was militarily
infeasible and therefore undesirable. First, US aircraft would need authority to
engage over Yemeni territory and international waters. Second, Nejrans distance
from the Red Sea (120 miles) and its closeness to the Yemeni border meant that
destroyer control of interceptors probably would prove ineffective. Third, Egyptian
aircraft could approach coastal towns undetected either by flying low or by staging
through Yemen. Fourth, available interceptors lacked all-weather capability. In any
case, they repeated, the administration ought to apply the full spectrum of economic and political measures before resorting to direct military action.29
A White House meeting on 25 February debated whether to offer a plate glass
fighter squadron if Faisal would suspend aid to the royalists. Assistant Secretary
Nitze summed up the DOD position: Lets not start down the toboggan until we
know where we might land. The only militarily effective course would be to attack
UAR airfields, which might lose the whole Middle East. As for defending Saudi Arabia, General Wheeler observed that it would be almost impossible to locate intruding aircraft without some kind of radar net. President Kennedy decided to send a
special emissary to Riyadh, offering to deploy a squadron in exchange for suspending aid to the royalists.30
Nitze next requested JCS views on the size and location of a US air unit.
The JCS suggested that it be stationed at Jidda and consist of eight F100s, one
transport, and one control and reporting post. When Nitze asked what military
measures lay within US capabilities, the Chiefs stressed difficulties and dangers:
length of supply lines; lack of clear national boundaries; how to distinguish friend
from foe and soldier from civilian. Again, they urged that all possible non-military
measures be employed, and that every effort be made to exploit the potential of
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British forces in Aden, Bahrain, and Cyprus. If US military intervention proved
necessary, they listed steps roughly similar to those in their memorandum of 2
January. When Nitze forwarded these views to State, he expressed doubt about
the wisdom of close Anglo-American collaboration.31
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, acting as the Presidents special emissary,
worked with UN diplomats to negotiate disengagement. Secretary General U
Thant announced an agreement on 29 April. The United States then extended overt
military support to Saudi Arabia. An air survey team visited the country between 19
and 24 April, but actual deployment of aircraft awaited proof that the Saudis had
stopped supporting the royalists. In fact, President Kennedy vetoed a plan to send
Major General Perry Griffith, USAF, to Saudi Arabia. Wanting the mission to be in
a very low key, Kennedy ruled that whoever went must be below general officer
rank. An advance party from the Composite Air Strike Unit arrived on 3 May. At
States suggestion, Kennedy modified the CASUs rules of engagement to ensure
that, before US interceptors attacked intruding aircraft, every effort would be
made to induce the interlopers withdrawal.32
In mid-June, President Kennedy approved deploying a CASU consisting of
eight F100Ds, one support plane, and necessary refueling aircraft. Code-named
Hard Surface, its arrival was delayed until 5 July, by which time UN observers
were on hand and Saudi adherence to the disengagement agreement appeared certain. Hard Surface was supposed to leave by 15 September, but the State Department wanted it to remain until substantial numbers of UAR troops also left Yemen
and Saudi-Egyptian tensions subsided. So the CASU stayed through autumn.33
On 7 October, the JCS agreed to extend Hard Surface. The next day, President
Kennedy decided to adopt an aggressive policy to localize and terminate the situation . . . at the earliest possible time. In the region, Defense counted 201 USAF aircraft against 339 Egyptian ones. Accordingly, Kennedy directed the pre-positioning
in Spain of those B-47s earmarked by SAC to support wartime operations in the
Middle East. He also shifted two tactical fighter squadrons from Europe and a carrier strike force from the Sixth Fleet. Kennedy indicated that he was willing to
accept the risks inherent in such a policy.34
Apparently, the aerial buildup made no impact. After promising sizable withdrawals, Nasser kept 30,000 troops in Yemen and resumed bombing Saudi territory.35 Consequently, State wanted the CASU extended through January 1964. This
time, General LeMay asked the other Chiefs to join him in filing a formal protest.
On 21 December, while a paper was being drafted, President Johnson decided in
States favor. Nevertheless, three days later, General Taylor sent the completed
memorandum to Secretary McNamara, saying that he did so because their reasoning remained valid. The Joint Chiefs rated the CASU as being too small for effective
self-defense against UAR forces. When UN observers withdrew, perhaps as early as
4 January, Faisal might resume aid to the royalists and provoke Egyptian reprisals.
If Hard Surface was still in Saudi Arabia, the United States would have to respond
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militarily or risk losing credibility. But if Hard Surface withdrew after Faisal had
resumed aid, its departure would signal a cessation of US support and an invitation to UAR aggression. In either case, the United States might well face black and
white choices of either fighting the Egyptians or abandoning the Saudis. These
being the options, the JCS wanted Hard Surface to leave forthwith. If a military
presence still appeared necessary, they suggested either periodically dispatching a
CASU or moving Sixth Fleet units into the immediate area.36
Hard Surface finally was withdrawn in February 1964; the UN mission departed in September. Nasser brazenly ignored the disengagement agreement, sending
more troops to Yemen. The Saudis kept funneling aid to the royalists and Egyptian
aircraft once again bombed Nejran.37 In 1967, after losing the Six Day War, Nasser
finally began withdrawing from Yemen. Two years later, the civil war ended with
royalists being integrated into the republican regime. From the US standpoint that
was a decent outcome, more the result of good fortune than good decisions.
Supporting the Shah of Iran
eography made Iran a critical front-line state in the global strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, whose rule rested primarily on the loyalty of military and security forces, faced growing hostility from
conservative clerics and the liberalizing urban middle class. The JCS, in January
1961, advised that any regime replacing the Shah would be less Western-oriented
and would therefore represent a net loss to US interests in the Middle East. They
wanted planning to take account of the numerous and varied possibilities of political crisis in Iran which may call for US military action of some kind. While the
Shah should be supported by all appropriate means, plans were needed for backing a pro-Western successor.38
On 15 May, a presidential task force reported that the continuing trend toward
revolution and chaos in Iran has reached the point where the US must take vigorous action. Four days later, the NSC decided upon a major effort to back reformminded Prime Minister Ali Amini and more actively encourage the Shah to move
toward a more constitutional role. While making no decision about whether or
how to react militarily to a Soviet attack, plans would be developed for promptly
introducing (1) conventional forces as large as two divisions and (2) nuclear striking power so that it could be brought to bear in the Soviet border areas of Iran.39
Assistant Secretary Nitze asked for a JCS assessment. They replied that,
although Irans strategic importance cannot be overemphasized, the United
States did not have enough strength to station permanently significant additional forces there. Although a temporary show of force was feasible, as was
pre-positioning of materiel, delays in obtaining transit clearances and base availability could restrict immediate actions to the dispatch of naval forces. They
245

rejected a detailed earmarking of units in contingency plans as impractical. In
fact, existing plans provided for using more than two divisions, with or without
nuclear weapons. But such a commitment would raise the possibility of escalation and general war, in which the Middle East area would have to be defended
primarily by indigenous forces.40
During the autumn of 1961, as the Berlin confrontation grew tenser, President
Kennedy became concerned about the likelihood of Soviet diversionary pressures
upon Iran. He learned that there was no plan for waging a limited war, confined
to Iran, which would involve US and Soviet forces. This was so because the old
assumption that a Soviet attack would signify general war still applied. Accordingly, on 7 October, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked the JCS to assess US capacity
for fighting a limited war there. Their reply held out hope of resisting limited Soviet
intervention and probing aggression, but not of stopping a substantial and determined incursion. In northeast Iran, scanty road and rail facilities would limit US
forces to two divisions plus two battle groups. Such a force, together with Iranian
units, was simply too small to stop a sizable Soviet attack. Once again, they stated
that any commitment of US forces must be preceded by a decision to do whatever
was necessary to achieve national objectives. To assure any chance of success,
there would have to be immediate attacks against air bases in the Soviet Union,
using conventional or nuclear weapons as appropriate.41 Fortunately, no such contingency occurred.
In preparation for the Shahs visit to Washington in April 1962, the administration prepared a five-year military assistance program with a ceiling of $330 million. Major items included 10,250 jeeps and trucks, 100 M113 armored personnel
carriers, two minesweepers, 16 transports, between 26 and 52 supersonic aircraft,
airfield construction, and an early warning radar system. Fulfillment would be conditional upon overall strength of the Iranian armed forces falling from 200,000 to
150,000. The JCS described the capabilities of Iranian armed forces as generally
low, although a slow, steady improvement has been made. But they believed this
program would enable Iran to stay ahead of Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which
were armed by the Soviets.42
In Washington talks, the Shah insisted on getting the latest and best equipment,
which McNamara and Lemnitzer assured him was the case, and seemed to balk at
manpower cuts. Secretary McNamara gave a firm undertaking about equipment
deliveries. A US planning team went to Iran and recommended supporting a level
of about 160,000; the JCS endorsed its finding. On 19 September, the Shah accepted
a five-year program that added two patrol frigates to the items listed above. Providing equipment was to be dependent upon Iranians reducing their manpower to
160,000 over two or three years.43
During 1963, the Shah carried out a White Revolution in which he broke the
power of large landowners and, for the time being, of the fundamentalist clergy as
well.44 In January 1964, the Shah opened negotiations for more military hardware.
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His most pressing demand was for M60 tanks and M551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles to replace 414 obsolescent M47 tanks. The Joint Chiefs advised
Secretary McNamara that they found military justification for armor modernization
and wanted the United States to remain Irans principal source of arms. They were
willing to supply M60s, provided production expanded so that the Shahs order would
not impinge upon other US needs. The Sheridan, however, should not be considered
because it was still under development and had not been operationally tested.45
Through a July 1964 Memorandum of Understanding, Iran agreed to purchase
$250 million worth of equipment ($50 million in cash, $200 million through credit)
during FYs 19651969. The items included 26 F-5 interceptors, 460 M60s, and one
battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. By mid-1970, also, certain categories of
deliveries through the Military Assistance Program would increase (e.g., 39 more
F5s, another 1,000 vehicles).46 Thus the United States maintained a close military
tie to Iran.
CENTO Staggers On
he Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) lacked the ingredient most essential

to a healthy alliance: a common purpose. CENTOs aim, ostensibly, was to
bolster the ability of northern tier nations to resist Soviet pressure. Iran, Pakistan,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom were signatories.47 But the Britons and the Turks
considered their NATO commitments more important; Pakistanis worried almost
to obsession about attacks from India or Afghanistan; Iranians were attentive to
Nasserite subversion as well as Soviet pressures. The United States concluded
bilateral executive agreements with regional members but refrained from becoming a CENTO signatory, although participating in its committees and attending its
conferences. The JCS Chairman usually acted as US representative at semiannual
meetings of CENTOs Military Committee.
In mid-March 1961, the Director, Joint Staff, recommended that the JCS resubmit their previous recommendations that the United States formally join CENTO,
support creation of a command structure and appointment of a Supreme Commander, develop unilateral plans for tactical nuclear support of all CENTO forces,
and improve solidarity among CENTO, NATO, and SEATO. The State Department
had suggested focusing upon how CENTOs goals could relate to popular aspirations for economic and social improvement. If the administration decided to deemphasize CENTOs military side, the Director suggested that there be: a small
permanent staff to develop standardization, training, and communications; semiannual meetings of senior commanders; and annual Chiefs of Staff conferences.48
Late in March 1961, CENTOs Council of Ministers approved Basic Assumptions for Global War. Their action meant that CENTOs Combined Military Planning Staff could prepare its plans only within the context of a general nuclear war.
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The United States, insisting that planning be tied to the communist threat, had
objected to inferences that CENTO might engage in a limited war against neighboring states. Washington accepted a Pakistani proposal that the Council, after
approving Basic Assumptions for Global War, consider limited war assumptions
as well.49 But planning for lesser contingencies could not begin until Ministers had
issued political guidance, and US-Pakistani differences prevented approval of any
Basic Assumptions for War in the CENTO Region.
When the Military Committee convened late in April, General Lemnitzer stated
that for political reasons the US government deemed appointment of a Supreme
Commander undesirable. Pakistanis and Iranians replied that planning without a
complete command structure was not worthwhile. The Committee referred this
issue to CENTOs Council of Foreign Ministers which did agree, several days later,
that an American or British officer should be appointed Supreme CommanderCENTO Military Planning Staff. But when the British nominated General Sir Charles
Jones, early in 1962, the Pakistanis indicated that only an American would be acceptable. Since Washington was unwilling to supply a candidate, nothing was done.
A Permanent Military Deputies Group was drafting requirements plans and
capabilities plans. The former, roughly equivalent to the Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan, was far from completion. The latter, akin to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan, drew sharp criticism from Iranians and Pakistanis on grounds that available forces were hopelessly inadequate for the missions assigned, tactical nuclear
weapons were not available, communications were vulnerable, and an effective
command headquarters could not be created after hostilities had begun. General
Lemnitzer and Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the British representative, responded
by emphasizing the allies world-wide nuclear power.
Early in June 1961, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that regional members
appeared more concerned about limited war than global conflict. From those members perspective, major threats to their security came from uncommitted countries
that were being supported overtly or covertly by the Soviet bloc. That being so, the
degree of US participation hinges on the extent to which there is a politico-military
requirement to retain Iran as a strong pro-Western ally. In their judgment, Iran did
constitute a vital part of the Free World collective security system.50
Meetings of the Military Committee in November 1961 and April 1962 accomplished nothing. American, British, and Turkish representatives endorsed a draft
capabilities plan but Iranians and Pakistanis rejected it. Why, the Pakistani member
asked, should his country belong to CENTO if all she could expect was to save her
own skin with her own forces? In November 1962, after the United States agreed
to discuss intelligence assessments of the Afghan threat, a capabilities plan finally
was approved, although Iran and Pakistan attached the criticisms outlined above.51
But the requirements plan fared less well. Pakistanis insisted that it ignored basic
issues like protection of West Pakistan and the availability of tactical nuclear weapons. The American representative proposed either approving the plan as guidance
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for further efforts or returning it for revision along more specific and realistic (i.e.,
less ambitious) lines. The Committee authorized a revision, after the United States
had made available its own appraisal of CENTO force requirements.52
In April 1963, all members of the Military Committee except Pakistan approved
the requirements plan. Pakistans representative accused the Americans and British of pursuing a policy of indifference toward CENTO and said that his country
was completely disillusioned. American military assistance to India, begun in the
wake of the Sino-Indian border war, was undoubtedly the root cause of Pakistani
disillusionment. General Taylor, who was now the US representative, replied that
strategic nuclear attack would be the main US contribution in case of general war.
Clearly, CENTOs members were following diverging paths. Iran stressed the danger from a confederation of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Pakistan was preoccupied by
threats from India and Afghanistan.53
This session precipitated a change in JCS attitudes about CENTO. Afterward,
General Taylor composed an incisive critique: A coalition makes military sense
only if its combined strength is greater than the sum of its national parts. It is questionable if CENTO passes this test. . . . The coalition has no strategic reserves . . .
beyond those which the US (and possibly the UK) might make available in a
crisis . . . . Hence, I conclude that CENTO is not a military necessity and the justification for its continued existence must be found in other fields. I am inclined
to believe that this justification does exist in political and psychological considerations. A break-up of CENTO would inevitably appear as a serious Cold War defeat
for the US. However, the price of continuing CENTO should not be too high. It is
not worth paying blackmail to any memberfor the moment it appears that the . . .
[Pakistanis] are in a blackmailing mood but it has been the Iranians in the past. In
any case, we should keep the need for CENTO under continuing review.54
Concurrently, ISA suggested moving toward a more active US role. First, consider
maintaining a floating depot in the area, explore the establishment of an island base in
the Indian Ocean, pre-position equipment in exposed countries, and consider bilateral
or multilateral plans for US intervention. Second, formally join CENTO, adopting one
or more of the measures just listed, and conduct more frequent military exercises.
Third, concentrate on alleviating the internal instability of regional members.55
The JCS, however, had undergone a change of heart. The views they submitted
on 12 June 1963 ran heavily on the side of restraint. At some point, they acknowledged, the United States might have to contribute forces and designate an American
as Commander-Military Planning Staff. But the regional members desire for plans
addressing their individual antagonisms (Pakistan versus India, Iran versus Egypt)
could lead to greater demands for specific US commitments. Moreover, the military
capabilities of those countries were quite limited. In a major confrontation, the United States and the United Kingdom would have to bear the brunt of any fighting.
Moving to specifics, the JCS endorsed exploring a base in the Indian Ocean
but urged that the idea of a floating depot await evaluation of an experimental
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ship in Subic Bay, the Philippines. The Chiefs opposed multilateral planning
because CENTO planners already could take cognizance of possible aggression
from non-Soviet sources, and they cautioned that bilateral planning might create
as many problems as it would solve. They did favor frequent military exercises
and more assistance for counterinsurgency. As to becoming a CENTO signatory,
though, the Chiefs said no. To make that step meaningful, there would have to be
a commitment of US forces. Therefore, they recommended continuing the current level of participation for the next several months and conduct frequent reevaluations thereafter.56
Surprisingly, CENTOs health improved. The Military Committees meeting in
November 1963 witnessed little more than familiar warnings from Pakistan about
the Indian threat and from Iran about the Nasserite danger. But in April 1964 the
Pakistanis displayed a marked change of attitude. They accepted the requirements
plan, although adding that Pakistani forces would not be available to CENTO as
long as a threat from India existed. Previously the Pakistanis had insisted that,
before a CENTO team could survey their air defense requirements, the United
States would have to provide a five-year assistance program for the Pakistani air
force. They now withdrew that stipulation. All in all, CENTO veterans considered
this meeting to be the most productive ever.57 So while CENTO was not flourishing,
it was at least surviving.
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17
New Africa and the Congo
Entanglement
What Arms for Africa?
he Kennedy administration confronted a continent that was rushing from colonial tutelage into tumultuous freedom. Between 1953 and 1963, the number
of independent African states rose from five to thirty-four. During September and
October 1960 alone, sixteen African states became members of the United Nations.
Would these fledgling nations become pawns in the Cold War? The JCS
perceived a real danger. In October 1960, they made known their concern over
accelerating communist penetration of Guinea and Ghana. Guinea, in particular,
appeared well on the way to becoming a Bloc satellite since it received arms and
assistance solely from communist countries. Sited on the western bulge of Africa,
those countries possessed air-sea facilities which in unfriendly hands would constitute a serious threat to US interests in the South Atlantic and South America. The
State Department agreed those countries were drifting in a pro-communist direction but did not consider them hopelessly unredeemable because neither one
wished to become a Soviet satellite.1
President Eisenhower, in September 1960, proposed that the United Nations
explore ways of averting an arms race in Africa. Soon afterward, a group of African states drafted a resolution asking all powers to regard their continent as an
atom-free zone. The State Department solicited military advice and, one week
after President Kennedy took office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul
Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess proposals for (1) an atom-free zone
and (2) regional arms control arrangements. Three months later, they replied that
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the acceleration in arms procurement was mostly attributable to Sino-Soviet
subversive activity and was thus a symptom of Cold War tensions rather than of
aggressive African ambitions. Therefore, arms control arrangements would cause
the communist bloc to intensify its efforts and to seize upon any defects in such
arrangements . . . to debilitate the power of African national governments and to
lessen the external protection now afforded them by the West. The Cold War, the
JCS continued, was tending to enlarge US military interests in Africa. A loss of
Western base rights, resulting from arms control arrangements, could have a most
serious impact on the Free Worlds defense posture. The JCS hoped to keep available three bomber bases in Morocco, from which the United States had agreed to
withdraw in 1963. Consequently, they recommended (1) opposing an atom-free
zone and (2) supporting regional arms control in the lowest possible key, if such
action became politically necessary and could be separated from the atom-free
proposal. ISA forwarded this paper to Secretary Rusk. On 24 November 1961, the
UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting members to consider Africa a
nuclear-free zone. The United States abstained because the resolution called for an
unverified and uninspected moratorium.2
Meanwhile, in May 1961, the State Department circulated draft guidance about
supplying arms to sub-Sahara Africa. Basically, the United States should stand
ready to meet legitimate requests, at least in part, to avoid swift communist infiltration. Such programs, however, should be premised and justified upon political
rather than military grounds. Certainly, we should studiously refrain from any
automatic matching of Soviet offers. Military assistance should be closely correlated with nation-building activities and awarded regardless of political behavior.3
ISA agreed that policy should contribute to limiting African armed forces to
internal security needs, but sought clarification of several points. The occasional
necessity of taking the initiative in eliciting arms requests should be acknowledged,
and the implication that recipients political behavior was irrelevant ought to be
expunged. A State Department directive issued in March 1962 incorporated this
advice. Between FYs 1961 and 1964, the United States dispensed $89.6 million in
MAP funds to African nations. The main recipients were Morocco, while it still had
three SAC bases, and Ethiopia, where a communications relay station operated.4
Legacies of Colonialism
resident Kennedy was determined to align the United States with black Africans aspiration for independence. In the State Department, a New Africa
group aggressively pursued this approach. Its most forceful expression came
through guidelines proposed in November 1961. State depicted Africa as probably
the greatest open field of maneuver in the Cold War. The largest US asset in this
contest was its reputation for generosity, love of freedom and fair dealings. Our
252
New Africa and the Congo Entanglement

greatest liability is our failure to live up to some of our ideals. The most promising
courses involved (1) clarifying the US commitment to freedom in Portuguese-ruled
Angola, French-ruled Algeria, and white-ruled South Africa and (2) achieving more
racial progress at home. Selected Africans might even be encouraged to study
Americas racial problems and suggest ways of solving them.5
Upon review, the JCS characterized this draft as being infused with an humility not in consonance with the dignity and stature that the United States must
establish in our relationships with countries of the area. Their critique, in fact,
amounted to a broadside blast against the New Africa approach: To place all
blame upon our NATO allies and upon ourselves overlooks the basic element of the
native share in responsibility for the current status of these nations. To engage in
excessive self-criticism of ourselves and of the West will stimulate an irresponsible
attitude on the part of the Africans, inhibiting their real progress and prejudicing
our influence on the continent. They also wanted greater attention given to the
problem of countering communist influence. ISA supported nearly all their suggestions, but States final guidelines retained the self-critical tone and contained no
significant alterations.6
Trying to formulate policies for Angola and South Africa created conflicts
between military requirements and political objectives. On 15 March 1961, in the
UN Security Council, the United States supported an Afro-Asian resolution condemning Portugals repressive rule in Angola.7 The Joint Chiefs warned Secretary
McNamara that they appreciated the reasons for doing so but were deeply concerned about the possible impact upon US base rights in the Azores, sited in the
mid-Atlantic, and in Spain because Morocco coveted the Spanish Sahara. Noting
that the lease on Lajes airfield in the Azores would expire on 31 December 1962,
the Chiefs described Lajes as essential for executing general war plans and contingency operations. Similarly, Spanish air bases would become more important
after use of Moroccan facilities ended in mid-1963. Losing Morocco and the Azores
would remove the last vestiges of flexibility in planning for base utilization in
the North Atlantic area. Winter weather rendered the route through Iceland and
Greenland unsatisfactory; long distances and lack of bases in Africa made the
South Atlantic route impractical. Accordingly, they asked McNamara to emphasize
the essentiality of the Azores and Spanish bases in conversations with Secretary
Rusk. Subsequently, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric did advise Rusk against pressing
anti-colonial efforts to the point of alienating Spain and Portugal. Continued access
to the Azores, Gilpatric argued, was important in peacetime and essential during limited or general war.8
An interdepartmental task force addressed the Portuguese problem. Assistant
Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams irritated Defense representatives by insisting
that the United States press Portugal to institute immediate reforms leading to independence. In mid-July 1961, the task force presented, and President Kennedy accepted, proposals that included sending a special envoy to Prime Minister Salazar with
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instructions to plead the case for rapid and far-reaching changes in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. This would be initiated quietly, in order to minimize
the risk of losing the Azores. Defense representatives included in the task forces
report a statement that the military air base at Lajes in the Azores is the single most
valuable facility which the United States is authorized by a foreign power to use.9
In August 1961, the administration determined that Portugal was diverting
some US-supplied equipment to its colonies and imposed major restrictions, holding all Portuguese requests in suspense. Lisbon reacted bitterly. The JCS professed
great concern that this action had seriously endangered extension of the Azores
lease. They wanted the State Department promptly to begin preparing for renewal
negotiations. If Portuguese demands proved high, the Chiefs favored a somewhat
more liberal military assistance program.10
Not until June 1962 did the United States ask for a five-year extension of the
Azores lease. Negotiations began in November but went nowhere. On 31 July 1963,
with the US abstaining, the UN Security Council approved a resolution calling upon
Portugal to recognize the right of independence and requesting all States to refrain
from supplying arms to Portugal. President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara
how the loss of Lajes might be offset. The Secretarys answer implied that the consequences would not be severe. Tactical aircraft crossing the Atlantic could be
refueled in mid-air. Transports could either fly directly to Europe or proceed to
Britain via Newfoundland. Shortages in cargo-carrying capacity could be overcome
by pre-positioning equipment and later by using C141 jet transports. Anti-submarine warfare activities could be shifted to Rota, Spain, without any critical loss of
capabilities. Major ASW operations undoubtedly would involve NATO, in which
case the Azores would become available. The Director, Joint Staff, advised General
Taylor that McNamaras appraisal reflected overly optimistic assumptions: that
the Azores would be opened to NATO use; that facilities in other countries would
be available; and that no concurrent crises would drain transport capabilities.11
Under Secretary of State George Ball conferred with Prime Minister Salazar and
reported that he was unyielding about the African colonies. Rusk suggested that
the Portuguese actually wanted continued use of the Azores base as leverage on
us.12 Ultimately, Portugal allowed US access without renewing the agreement.
In South Africa, a white minority ruled a huge black majority through the
rigid segregation of apartheid. During the winter of 196162, the State Department circulated draft policy guidelines with which the JCS took issue. Some sections, they informed McNamara, suggested that pressure to change racial policies
be applied regardless of their impact upon US and Free World security interests.
There should be a caveat against carrying such efforts to the point of precipitating internal disintegration and anarchy. ISA agreed, but State did not make the
desired changes.13
In August 1963, the UN Security Council condemned apartheid and called upon
member states voluntarily to stop selling armaments and strategic materials to Africa.
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American diplomats had succeeded in removing a call for boycotting all South African
goods. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson stated that the United States would complete
deliveries of equipment already sold and feel free to sell equipment required for the
common defense effort. One year later, Lockheed sought permission to sell sixteen
ASW aircraft. The JCS strongly supported approval; the Deputy Secretary of Defense
concurred. Subsequently, though, Secretary McNamara advised President Johnson that
this was a political decision because South Africas ASW capabilities were not essential to our national defense. The aircraft sale was disapproved.14
In March 1964, the State Department circulated a draft National Policy Paper
suggesting that South Africa be offered an improved international position in
return for an internal policy that was acceptable to all races. Rejection of this
offer would set in motion selective and graduated pressures, such as preventing
petroleum and wool purchases and severing military and scientific ties. The JCS
endorsed the offer but objected to the apparent intention of replacing, after a few
months, persuasion with pressure. The dialogue, they believed, should be conducted in a patient and friendly manner: As long as racial disorders and Communist penetration in Africa remain active threats to Free World interests, stability in
South Africa is desirable under all circumstances, and the United States should do
everything that its political and moral position permits to contribute to this. ISA
agreed that pressure should be applied only after persuasion clearly had failed and
a new analysis of the alternatives had been completed.15
Concurrently, a draft National Security Action Memorandum was circulated.
Among other things, it called for urgent diplomatic efforts to delay the creation
of separate homelands for blacks in South West Africa, which South Africa
held as a UN mandate, and directed State to analyze what sanctions could be
considered if South Africa went ahead with the homelands. Four tracking stations in South Africa were supporting almost all the major US space programs;
Defense and NASA should seek alternative sites if evacuation became necessary.
Once again, the JCS pleaded for patient multilateral persuasion to avoid the
loss of significant military capabilities and a key geographic area. But Deputy
Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance disagreed, and NSAM No. 295 was issued
without modification.16
On 22 May, the Joint Chiefs made still another plea for restraint. The provisions
of NSAM No. 295, they warned Secretary McNamara, were reminiscent of attempts
made by the United States, with tragic consequences, to influence the domestic
policies of the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1946 and the Batista government in
1958. In both of these cases, the political, military, and economic support necessary to maintain in power anti-communist governments was withheld. This should
not be permitted to happen in South Africa. Likewise, ISA informed State that it
favored delaying a decision about sanctions until friendly persuasion clearly had
failed. A National Policy Paper, issued in January 1965, did focus on diplomatic
efforts.17 But the issue of sanctions would soon resurface.
255
The Congo: Coping with Chaos
owhere were the consequences of independence more disruptive and communist involvement deeper than in the Congo. The Belgian Congo gained its
freedom on 30 June 1960, becoming the Republic of the Congo with its capital at
Leopoldville. One week later, the native National Army mutinied and went on a
plundering rampage; Belgian paratroopers promptly intervened to protect their
fellow-citizens. On 10 July, evidently with Belgian encouragement, Moise Tshombe
declared copper-rich Katanga province in the southeast to be independent. The next
day, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed for a
United Nations military force. On 14 July, the UN Security Council approved a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing the creation of a
UN Expeditionary Force (UNEF). American aircraft promptly started flying United
Nation contingents into Leopoldville. By the end of August, Belgian tactical units had
departed and the UNEFs strength reached almost 20,000.18
Prime Minister Lumumba, a fiery nationalist possessed of considerable charisma, sought help from the communist bloc to crush secessionists. The Soviets supplied trucks and technicians. In mid-September, however, Colonel Joseph Mobutu
took power in the armys name, put Lumumba under arrest, and ejected the Soviet
and Czech missions. Lumumba later was flown to Elizabethville, Katanga. In Oriental province to the northeast, Antoine Gizenga assumed Lumumbas mantle and
won Soviet backing. Thus three power centers competed: Mobutus and Kasavubus
in Leopoldville; Gizengas at Stanleyville in Oriental; and Tshombes separatist
movement in Katanga.
A few days after President Kennedy took office, the J5 assessed the situation, predicted alarming developments, and proposed preventive steps. When the
JCS reviewed the J-5s proposals, Admiral Burke suggested adding two tougher
measures. First, US fighters might be stationed in the Sudan to prevent overflights
by Soviet aircraft delivering arms to Gizenga. Second, if all else failed, the United
States should unilaterally offer money, arms, and transportation to Mobutu and
Tshombe. General Decker proposed adding a statement that the overall US posture
should be improved forthwith, since concurrent interventions in Laos and Cuba
might also prove necessary.19 Those were either rejected or watered down. Even
so, what the JCS sent to Secretary McNamara on 30 January was a grim evaluation. The UNEF was failing to arrest erosion of the Mobutu-Kasavubu government,
and UN authority soon would be weakened by withdrawals of Egyptian, Guinean,
Moroccan, and Indonesian contingents. Soviet aid, meantime, was expanding
Gizengas military strength. Consequently, unless immediate and strong action is
taken now there is the definite possibility that the entire Republic of the Congo will
soon be under the control of a Communist-dominated regime. If that occurred,
neighboring states, being too weak to resist subversive pressures, ultimately
would come under communist rule.
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What could be done? The JCS sought approval of measures that included:
pressing Secretary General Dag Hammarksjold (1) to instruct the UNEF to restore
law and order throughout the Congo and (2) to replace his personal representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal of India, who patently favored the LumumbaGizenga faction; persuading the Sudanese to seek US assistance in stopping the
flow of Soviet supplies to Gizenga; and undertaking, unilaterally and immediately,
extensive covert operations to weaken and contain Gizengas Stanleyville regime.
President Kennedy ordered an interdepartmental task force to prepare a detailed
program of action.20
State, OSD, and CIA spokesmen recommended replacing what they termed
largely discredited Eisenhower policies with new ones: strengthen the UNs
mandate; create a broadly-based Congolese government; and establish UN administration for the Congo. The JCS identified what they believed were important
weaknesses. First, a firmer UN mandate would be meaningless without the military
strength to enforce it. In any case, removing Dayal was a pre-requisite to success.
Second, a broadly-based coalition would not serve US interests. The demonstrated
demagoguery of Lumumba, coupled with his current appeal resulting from his prison martyrdom, would surely push him to the forefront in any form of government.
While the best solution would be a strong centralized government led by Kasavubu
and backed vigorously by the United Nations, a federated government excluding
Lumumbas faction also was acceptable. Finally, as a fallback, the Chiefs noted that
the United States could carry out a successful intervention without unduly degrading its general war posture. ISA generally agreed with their appraisals. On 1 February, Secretary Rusk forwarded to President Kennedy a paper outlining the new
policies, with one change: press for a middle-of-the-road cabinet government that
would include Lumumba elements but not Lumumba himself as Prime Minister.21
Assistant Secretary Nitze solicited practical advice from the JCS about
strengthening UN and Congolese forces; he also asked them to assess US capability for military intervention. In reply, the Chiefs recommended reorganizing UN
forces on a regional basis, deploying them to ensure adequate shows of strength,
and giving them a capability for mobile and independent operations. Instruction of
Congolese soldiers should stress, first, basic training of ground forces and, second,
gendarmerie activities. As for US intervention, two Army divisions and one Marine
division/wing team could be committed; a two-division force could conduct timely, decisive action. CINCLANTs plan called for occupying Leopoldville and a line
of communications to the seacoast.22
Matters took a dramatic turn when, on 13 February, Katangese authorities
announced that Patrice Lumumba was dead, allegedly shot while attempting
to escape. A UN investigation concluded that he had been murdered almost a
month earlier.23 Third World leaders were outraged, and the Soviets made much
propaganda mileage. Several communist and Afro-Asian countries extended diplomatic recognition to Antoine Gizengas Stanleyville regime. On 21 February, after
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a vituperative debate, the UN Security Council approved a resolution whose main
pointsstrengthening the UNs mandate, urging withdrawal of all other foreign
military and political advisers, calling upon states to prevent such persons from
travelling to the Congo, and urging a convening of the parliamentparalleled the
Kennedy administrations new policies.24
Nonetheless, on 21 February, the JCS warned that the one factor which is
most seriously aggravating the situation is the existence of the Gizenga regime and
its actions, made possible by Soviet-backed support from the United Arab Republic25 and other neutrals. The Sudanese, displaying commendable constancy to the
UN, were permitting only UN-approved materiel to pass through its territory. Now,
however, Sudanese were coming under extreme pressure from Nasser to grant
transit rights to the UAR, a step that would be disastrous to US-UN interests.
The Chiefs deemed it essential from a military standpoint that the United States
(1) provide Sudan with the strongest possible encouragement and support and (2)
try to elicit a joint declaration from Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, the Central African
Republic, Chad, and Congo-Brazzaville of their determination to prevent the passage of any military equipment, except under UN auspices. OSD agreed and so
advised the interdepartmental task force.26
Lumumbas death worked very much to the advantage of the United States.
The Soviets, having placed all their hopes upon Lumumba, were left without a rallying figure. Under strong US pressure, Secretary General Hammarksjold removed
Rajeshwar Dayal. Kasavubu, Gizenga, and Tshombe engaged in labyrinthine negotiations. For the post of prime minister, Washington supported the moderate Cyrille
Adoula. On 1 August, parliament approved a Government of National Unity. While
President Kasavubu nominally led this coalition, Adoula as Prime Minister wielded
the executive power; Gizenga became a Deputy Prime Minister and formally dissolved the Stanleyville regime.27
The United Nations Battles Moise Tshombe
he Congo remained divided because Tshombe continued running a separatist regime in Katanga. This was intolerable to the Leopoldville government,
since Katangas copper mines generated more than half the whole countrys
tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings. Allying himself with the Belgian
Union Miniere, Tshombe used these funds to hire white mercenaries and mount
a propaganda campaign picturing himself as a stalwart anti-communist. He
won sympathy in Western Europe and among conservative circles in the United
States. To most black Africans, though, Tshombe seemed nothing more than a
tool of colonialism.
Pursuant to the 21 February resolution, the UN command tried to compel
Tshombe to rid himself of 500 soldiers of fortune. Fighting between UN and
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Katangan forces broke out on 13 September in Elizabethville, and UN forces
fared badly. One lone Katangan airplane, an obsolescent Fouga Magister fighter,
a two-seat French jet trainer, dominated the skies. Secretary General Hammarksjold agreed to meet Tshombe at nearby Ndola, in northern Rhodesia, on 17 September. Flying at night to avoid the Fouga, Hammarksjolds aircraft crashed and
all aboard were killed.
On 18 September, for the first time, Washington authorized using US transports
for airlift within the Congo. Three C130s and one C124 flew to Leopoldville for
this purpose. The next day, President Kennedy authorized the deployment of US
fighters, if no other nation would supply such aircraft, to protect US transports and
UN ground forces from air attack. A cease-fire was arranged on that same day, so
the fighters never deployed. American transports did, however, deliver food and
medical supplies to UN outposts.28
On 21 November, the Security Council authorized Acting Secretary General U
Thant of Burma to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure
of force, for the immediate [removal] . . . of all foreign military and para-military
personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations Command. By this
time, other countries had provided enough fighters for the UNEF to control the
skies over Katanga. When fighting resumed on 5 December, the United States committed twenty-one more transport aircraft.29
The Kennedy administration knew that US prestige would suffer if the UN
Command met with a military reverse. From the White House, on 11 December,
General Taylor put several questions to General Lemnitzer. What was known
about UN military plans? Had any US officer appraised their prospect of success?
If not, how could the United States acquire more influence over the situation?
President Kennedy ordered the JCS to send an officer to the Congo. They selected Major General Mercer Walter, USA, who was Deputy Chief of Intelligence for
US Army, Europe. General Walters announced mission was to supervise US airlift operations and advise the US ambassador; his real task was to evaluate the
UN military plans.30
The JCS advised General Taylor that there always had been extreme difficulty in obtaining information from the UN Command. Nonetheless, they were
reluctant to recommend drastic remedies. If it became known that US officers
were reviewing UN plans, the Secretary Generals position could be seriously
undermined and Washington would bear the blame for failures. Absent a US
political decision to become more actively engaged and to acquire the authority
and resources to influence UN activities significantly, our present practice of
furnishing some counsel to UN officials and practical logistic support to the UN
operation should not be altered.31
Reinforced UN troops rapidly occupied Elizabethville; Tshombe agreed
to a cease-fire and recognized the Congos indissoluble unity. 32 General Walter, who reported that the UN Command really possessed no long-range plans,
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was released from his Congo assignment late in December. General Lemnitzer
advised the State Department that we already have considerable military intelligence strength in the Congo, from the attachs, and that the UN Command was
unwilling to divulge its plans, very likely because little if any military planning is
being done.33
On 4 January 1962, with matters evidently much improved, the JCS advised
Secretary McNamara that, unless the US intends to become identified as an active
participant in the UN Congo force, intra-Congo airlift should be restricted to bona
fide emergency conditions. The existence of such emergencies, moreover, ought
to be evaluated at the national level so that all the implications should be fully considered. OSD and State agreed.34
Months passed without progress toward Congolese unity. Late in August
1962, UN officials promoted a Plan for National Reconciliation that Prime Minister Adoula accepted while Tshombe remained recalcitrant. Then, when Tshombe
became more accommodating, Adoula (under parliamentary pressure) refused to
make further concessions. One State Department official likened these negotiations to the game of croquet in Alice In Wonderland, where the balls were live
hedgehogs that took every opportunity to unroll and creep away and the mallets
were flamingos that interrupted every stroke by turning back their heads to argue
with the players.35
Meantime, in December 1961, American diplomats urged that a small US
advisory team go to the Congo; some UN members objected successfully to
such unilateral action. Two months later, the offer was repeated to Adoula and
U Thantand again rejected. Finally, in May 1962, Adoula accepted the services
of US advisers. A six-man team led by Colonel M. J. L. Greene, USA, visited the
Congo during 612 July. Upon its return, the team recommended: a training and
modernization program under UN auspices; reducing the military establishment
to a 14,000-man internal security force plus a small air force for training and
liaison missions and a modest navy for river patrol; providing a $2 million grant
of vehicles, radios, repair parts, and rations; and maintaining a small US military
mission to monitor progress. The JCS judged these steps generally sound, noting that immediate shipment of materiel would provide a political earnest of
US intentions but do little to improve military effectiveness. But the scope, content, and timing of US assistance should be attuned to the possibility that such
aid might encourage and precipitate a Central Government attack on Katanga,
regardless of US policy at the time. Also, the aid program should proceed on a
bilateral basis rather than within a UN framework.36
State wanted a swift token shipment. On 14 September, the President authorized
deliveries costing $150,000. Shipped on a bilateral basis, these supplies reached the
Congo on 8 October. Two weeks later, Kennedy endorsed the Greene teams recommendations. Contrary to JCS advice, however, he accepted States argument that the
aid program should be international rather than bilateral in character.37
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On 7 November, President Kennedy approved a State Department plan aimed
at buttressing Adoula, expanding UN military strength, and pressuring Tshombe.
Earlier, the US ambassador in Leopoldville had warned Washington that UN inability to achieve reconciliation posed two military problems for the US: one, how
would the UN force be extricated, and two, what would replace it? The Joint Staff
reported that requirements for intervention under the most unfavorable circumstances included a carrier task force, two airborne battle groups (reinforced), one
Army Special Forces group, 1/9th Marine division/wing team, four USAF tactical
squadrons, and troop carrier aircraft.38
Some UN officials were beginning to insist upon a showdown with Tshombe.
The UN Secretariat sought aircraft from Greece, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines
with scant success. UN headquarters also requested and received US help in airlifting vehicles to Elizabethville. On 29 November, the JCS directed execution of an
administration decision to deploy three C124 transports to the Congo. This step
was not lightly taken, since standing US policy limited participation in intra-Congo
airlift to bona fide emergencies.39
The outlook kept worsening. The UNs mandate would have to be renewed in
January 1963, and a large Indian contingent was due to depart in February. Conceivably, the UN effort would collapse and the Congo descend again into chaos.
The Soviets, relatively passive spectators since Lumumbas death, indicated a
willingness to supply the Central Government with aircraft and equipment. Prime
Minister Adoula, who barely had survived a no-confidence vote, claimed that parliament and the army would accept Moscows offer.
Assistant Secretary Nitze asked for JCS advice about whether to offer the UN
and the Central Government enough military support to forestall the possibility of
Soviet intervention. Answering on 11 December, they defined the central issue
as whether to keep a pro-western regime in power. They recommended (1) trying
to revitalize UN political and military efforts and (2) implementing the approved
military assistance program as soon as possible. Direct American intervention,
under UN aegis, should be undertaken only when collapse of the central government appeared imminent. In that eventuality, the US commitment should consist
of one Composite Air Strike Unit (eight F100s and two reconnaissance aircraft)
accompanied by support elements and two reinforced rifle companies for base
security. However, this commitment should carry with it the recognition that, if
necessary, the United States will also furnish under UN auspices any additional
forces required to tip the balance of power decisively in favor of the UN forces in
the Congo. ISA concurred that same day and urged State to begin implementing
actions as soon as possible.40
In New York, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, spoke
with U Thant and found him strongly opposed to introducing US combat forces. U
Thant asked, instead, for US equipment (ten F86s with ground crews, six armored
cars, and thirty-two light trucks) along with one engineer battalion. On 16 December,
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the Joint Staff advised ISA that this was not enough. American air and sealift already
had moved 88,000 personnel and 38,000 tons of equipment. U Thant was suggesting
merely an extension of the considerable support already provided. The UN Command had enough planes to neutralize Tshombes air power, yet these aircraft were
not being used to stop sorties against the Central Governments forces. Consequently,
the armys morale had fallen, Adoulas effectiveness was being undermined, and
Katangas spirit of resistance had risen. The Joint Staff favored committing the Composite Air Strike Unit but withholding engineers and ground maintenance personnel,
because those men might become involved in combat and in any case could not
impart the dynamic effect which an entry of US combat forces would provide.41
The ExComm met on the morning of 17 December, followed by the full NSC
that afternoon. The State Department presented a plan involving commitment of
one fighter squadron. The President, however, approved only the ground equipment U Thant had requested plus some aircraft suitable for UN use along with
ground crews, a small engineering unit, and transportation of six Philippine aircraft. If Tshombe initiated fighting or failed to cooperate promptly on reintegration,
then the Composite Air Strike Force would deploy.42
On 22 December, the UN Secretariat decided to accept US materiel assistancenamely, F-84 fighters, transport and tanker aircraft, bridging equipment,
trucks, and armored personnel carriers. At President Kennedys direction, the
JCS had ordered Lieutenant General Louis Truman, USA, to lead a military mission that would examine UN and Congolese Army operational plans and determine whether more personnel, aircraft, and equipment were needed. The Chiefs
themselves counseled caution, attributing the lack of forceful action by UN units
not to insufficient strength but to the mandate itself, or to the manner of executing it, or to poor leadership and management. Consequently, they recommended
deferring a decision about introducing US forces until General Trumans findings
could be fully considered.43
As it turned out, the dangers and difficulties had been exaggerated. In Elizabethville, on the night of 2728 December, Katangan gendarmes began shooting
at UN soldiers. UN troops quickly responded by securing roadblocks surrounding
the city. Then they seized a military base at Kamina and advanced toward the last
centers of resistance, which were Jadotville and Kolwezi at the far southern end of
Katanga. U Thant agreed to a standstill on 2 January, but an Indian column occupied Jadotville the next day.
Under these circumstances, General Trumans report became superfluous. Submitted on 31 December and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs and ISA, Trumans major recommendations included ferrying ten F84s to Kamina, loaning three C124s and enough
tankers to support fifty fighter sorties daily, delivering six helicopters, and providing a
small number of technicians but no combat units.44 The UN Command asked for Bailey
bridges, parachutes, and helicopters to assist its advance on Kolwezi. These proved
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unnecessary because Tshombe agreed to end his secession on 17 January 1963 and UN
troops entered Kolwezi unopposed.45
At this moment, US policy seemed fully successful. The Congo was unified and
communist influence excluded; the UN Command had served Washingtons purposes. The Joint Chiefs viewed the problem in terms of Cold War competition, willing
to bolster the UN Command insofar as doing so would prevent Moscow from gaining a foothold. Yet much of the US and UN achievement rested on quicksand. There
was more instability, civil unrest, war, famine and bloodshed in the Congos future.
263
18
South Asia: Contradictions of
Containment
As matters stood in 1961, Indians and Pakistanis disliked and distrusted each
other more than they worried about threats from the Soviet Union or Communist China. In 1947, independence from Great Britain resulted in the creation of
a Moslem Pakistan apart from a mainly Hindu and far more populous India. This
partitioning was accompanied by scenes of expulsion and massacre, leaving lasting
scars on both sides of the border. The fate of Kashmir aroused the deepest passions. Indian troops occupied this predominantly Moslem land; Pakistanis insisted
that nothing except a complete Indian withdrawal would satisfy them.
During the 1950s, India and Pakistan pursued diametrically different domestic
and foreign policies. India under Jawaharlal Nehru remained the worlds largest
democracy. Pakistan allied itself with the United States, joining the Central and
Southeast Asia Treaty Organizations, but it fell into such internal disarray that the
army took power in 1958. Pakistan also provided intelligence and communications
facilities as well as bases from which U2s overflew the USSR. India opted for nonalignment and bid for leadership of the Third World; relations between Washington
and New Delhi were sometimes prickly.
In mid-1961, President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan came to the United
States with a list of arms requests that included: accelerating the modernization
of 5 divisions; acquiring one submarine and shipboard anti-air missiles; supplying C130 transports; and replacing aging F86 interceptors with F104s. Twelve
F104s were slated to arrive in July; Ayub wanted 32 more. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff advised that, from a purely military standpoint, most requests were justifiable.
However, budgetary limitations made a larger military assistance program inappropriate. While deliveries of 58 M47 tanks could be advanced into FY 1961, other
ground force items sought by Ayub were either unavailable or unjustifiable. No
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submarine should be supplied, and shipboard anti-air missiles ought to be placed
on a very low priority. Four C130s would be delivered during FY 1964, but the
Pakistanis appeared incapable of handling more F104s. On 15 July, while flying to
the LBJ Ranch in Texas, Ayub spoke with General Lemnitzer and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense William Bundy, who said that deliveries under the Military
Assistance Program would continue at about the previous level. Some M47s
would be sent during FY 1962 and four C130s would arrive early in 1963, but neither a submarine nor additional F104s would be forthcoming.1
Ayub returned to Washington in September 1962 and revisited this issue. To justify increased US aid, he complained to Secretary McNamara that India was consummating a deal whereby the Soviets would sell MiG21s and help manufacture Soviet
engines for Indian planes. McNamara pledged that FY 1963 deliveries would at least
double those in FY 1962, attributing the past years problems to crises over Berlin and
Laos and the need to strengthen CONUS reserves. He promised that 130 tanks (mostly
M48s, which were basically improved M47s) would be delivered during FY 1963,
that enough F86s and F104s would be furnished to replace normal attrition, and
that one submarine would be supplied in FY 1964. Ayub appeared highly pleased.2
The Sino-Indian Border War
everal years of rising Sino-Indian tension reached a culmination during October and November 1962. Ambiguities in the McMahon Line, drawn in 1914
by the British through the Himalayan Mountains, generated conflicting border
claims along Indias Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and in the Ladakh area of
Kashmir. Minor incidents accumulated and diplomatic warnings escalated.3
On 20 October 1962, Chinese troops launched attacks in both the NEFA and
Ladakh, driving back an Indian brigade in the former and overrunning isolated
garrisons in the latter. The Kennedy administration, focused on the Cuban missile crisis, decided not to offer assistance but was willing to respond to Indian
requests. On the evening of 25 October, Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith
cabled that an Indian request was imminent, probably asking for infantry weapons to equip two divisions.4
The Joint Chiefs, meeting on the morning of 26 October, were preoccupied
with Cuba and recommended caution. First, let Indias fellow-members of the
British Commonwealth survey requirements and furnish the first measures of
assistance. Second, extend sympathetic consideration to Indian requests, while
General Wheeler surveyed available US Army assets. Third, before completing
any commitments, estimate how deliveries to India would affect US air and sealift
capability elsewhere.5
As more border posts fell to the Chinese, Nehru declared a state of emergency
and publicly admitted that we were getting out of touch with reality . . . and living
266
South Asia
in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation. The Indians initial shopping list,
which reached Washington on 29 October, included 10,000 rifles, more than 1,000
mortars, 800 machine guns, and 1,000,000 anti-personnel mines. With the Cuban
crisis easing, the administration reacted rapidly. On 31 October, Nehru dismissed his
discredited Defense Minister, the outspokenly anti-American V. K. Krishna Menon.
That same day, President Kennedy authorized military aid to India. The first transports landed in Calcutta on 3 November; Indian troops in the NEFA began receiving
British and American arms twelve days later.6
On 11 November, American, British, Canadian, and Australian representatives
gathered in London. Three days later, they proposed outfitting five Indian divisions during the next three to five months. Equipment should be strictly limited to
reasonable quantities of items now either lacking or inferiorfor example, there
would be no major additions of combat aircraft. There should be an understanding with India, as formal and explicit as possible, that any equipment was intended
solely for use against Chinese aggression.7
Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy asked for a JCS assessment of these proposals. On 19 November, the J5 defined US objectives over the longer term as: Indias
firm alignment with the West; peaceful resolution of Indian/Pakistani disputes; and
unequivocal recognition of the Sino-Soviet blocs inherent hostility and aggressive
intent toward the free nations of the West. Meantime, the J-5 argued, judgment
on the five-division plan should be deferred until Indian requirements had been
adequately assessed. Nations of the British Commonwealth should make maximum contributions which the United States would only supplement. Later that day,
McNamara and the JCS agreed that a high-level military fact-finding mission should
go to India immediately.8
Just then, the border war escalated dramatically. On 16 November, the Chinese broke a battlefield lull and sent Indian troops reeling back on both fronts. The
situation was most serious in the NEFA where the 4th Division, supposedly one of
the stoutest in the Indian Army, practically disintegrated. Chinese troops advanced
into what indisputably was Indian territory and, by 19 November, stood within thirty
miles of the Assam plains.
Nehru sent two letters to President Kennedy, describing the situation as
really desperate and requesting immediate dispatch of twelve US fighter
squadrons to protect Indian cities and assist in any battles over Indian air
space. Nehru also asked for two squadrons of B47 bombers, sending Indian
pilots and technicians at once for training in the United States. The administration shied away from what Rusk called a request for an active and practically
speaking unlimited military partnership against Chinese invasion. However, on
20 November, Kennedy did announce that a mission headed by Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman, whose stature well exceeded his rank, would
visit Pakistan and India. The President also authorized prompt deployment to
India of twelve C130s.9
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Before Harrimans mission left Washington, the border war ended. At midnight
on 20/21 November, the Chinese announced that they would cease firing 24 hours
hence and, beginning on 1 December, withdraw 12 miles behind pre-hostilities
positions, provided India did likewise. The Indians pulled back without admitting
that they had done so. Ultimately, the Chinese withdrew completely from the NEFA
but retained some contested areas of Ladakh.
India then asked for reconnaissance aircraft. Secretary McNamara was pretty
enthusiastic about providing them and called for JCS views. The Director, Joint
Staff, reported that four to six planes could deploy within six days. However, the
Joint Chiefs opposed any action at this time. Instead, the Harriman mission
should assess what India could do with aircraft already on hand or with planes supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom. The State Department feared
that India might interpret the arrival of American reconnaissance aircraft as evidence of unconditional support. Accordingly, the JCS advice was adopted.10
The Harriman mission reached New Delhi on 22 November. Its members included Assistant Secretary Nitze and General Paul Adams, USA, who headed the newlyformed Strike Command. Simultaneously, a British mission arrived; it was led by
Duncan Sandys, Chief of the Commonwealth Relations Office. The next day, Ambassador Galbraith urged Washington to provide extensive aid at once, without waiting
for the missions findings. The JCS successfully opposed taking such a step.11
The Harriman mission detected a fundamental change in Indian attitudes
toward China and a widespread desire to create a new relationship with Pakistan.
Nehru, under strong pressure from Harriman and Sandys, agreed to open negotiations about Kashmirs future. The Indian armys chief of staff, Lieutenant General Jayanto Chaudhuri, presented a plan to re-equip three divisions and organize three new
ones by the end of 1963. Proceeding to Pakistan, Harriman and Sandys persuaded
Ayub to join with Nehru in announcing that Kashmir talks would start at an early
date with the object of reaching an honorable and equitable settlement. But the mission also found that US military aid to India had caused a great emotional shock
in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, with the notable exception of President Ayub and his
immediate entourage, still saw India as their primary enemy. Nothing less than a
Kashmir settlement acceptable to Pakistan could alter this attitude.
In a report dated 3 December, the Harriman mission discerned a major national interest in providing India with appropriate aid. But Pakistani sensibilities
had to be taken into account and a turn toward China averted. The report recommended providing, as an emergency phase over the next two months, $90 million
worth of ammunition and replacement equipment to forward units. Erecting a
radar net would cost $40 million more. As an intermediate phase, in 1963, three
divisions should be re-equipped and three new ones outfitted for mountain warfareessentially the Chaudhuri plan. On 10 December 1962, President Kennedy
authorized a $60 million program of emergency aid, on the assumption that Great
Britain and the Commonwealth countries would provide a like amount.12
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South Asia
On 2 December, Ambassador Galbraith had proposed bolstering Indias air
defenses by making US aircraft and crews available, with India supplying ground
personnel and equipment. Three days later, President Kennedy suggested to Prime
Minister Macmillan that Britain and the Commonwealth commit to sending fighter
squadrons, with the United States providing radar and ground equipment.13
During the morning of 14 December, the JCS conferred with Harriman, Galbraith (who was in Washington for consultations), and senior State Department
officials. Galbraith claimed that India was now the most militantly anti-Communist, pro-US country in the world. Harriman also saw a real opportunity for moving India to the side of the Free World, but urged that any long-range aid program
be attuned to Indias willingness to make concessions over Kashmir.14
Formally, that same day, the Joint Chiefs advised against stationing US aircraft,
crews, and supporting personnel in India. There was an obvious danger of combat
losses, and US participation would prompt adverse reactions from Pakistan. The
JCS wanted Britain to take over-all responsibility for implementing an air defense
program, with the United States and Commonwealth countries furnishing materiel
and training assistance. The United States role during 1963 should be limited to
supplying three fixed radars and, over a longer term, three mobile radars along
with enough Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for three fighter squadrons. Britain, Canada, and Australia ought to provide command and control communications as well
as modernization for three fighter squadrons, together with training support and
operational assistance. A US-UK team should go to India and refine requirements
within this commitment. Recognizing the inadequacies of these measures, the
Chiefs wanted the administration to urge Britain and Commonwealth countries to
assure India that they would provide interim air defense forces against renewed
Chinese aggression. But, in their opinion, the US Government should reserve its
own decision about providing air defense.15
Since President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan planned to meet at
Nassau during 1821 December, a precise position had to be prepared. Deputy
Secretary Gilpatric noted that the Joint Chiefs appraisal of air defense focused
on deploying radars during 1963. Might any radars be installed in the next one or
two months? The Joint Staff reported that this could not be done without seriously
degrading US capabilities. There were only five mobile radar posts in the United
States, and three of them were committed to Cuban coverage. Secretary McNamara
told the Chiefs that action should be initiated immediately to expend as much as
$100 million in obtaining more mobile radars.16
On 18 December, at a meeting attended by Taylor, Rusk, and Galbraith, three
proposals were discussed: (1) an Indian plan to deploy eleven radars along the
entire Himalayan front; (2) a plan by General Adams to limit radar coverage to
Ladakh and the NEFA; and (3) a JCS plan to emplace radars in the NEFA alone.
A general feeling emerged that the British should be asked to agree in principle
upon a USUK survey of air defense requirements. Such a survey would consider:
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relocating Pakistan-oriented radars to face China; modernizing the Indian air
forces command and control; rotating US and UK fighter squadrons to Indian airfields; and visibly pre-stocking some US Air Force equipment at Indian air bases.17
At Nassau, Macmillan remarked that unless we are careful the Indians will
slide back into their same old arrogance and beautifully detached view toward . . .
the West. The prime minister believed that we have to get them to face up to
the fact of Kashmir. Agreeing, Kennedy called it obvious that Nehru sought to
persuade them not to couple Western aid with compromises over Kashmir. He
and Macmillan decided to commit $60 million each during the next two months.
Since air defense was the most important leverage for a Kashmir settlement, they
agreed that a decision about it would await the findings of a USUK team. At a session attended by Americans alone, the President stated firmly that if four fighter
squadrons went to India, the mix should be two US and two British/Commonwealth. Deputy Assistant Secretary William Bundy argued for a 1-3 ratio, but Kennedy apparently was persuaded by the argument that this would be the most visible element in whatever was done and that we should not be outnumbered in it.18
India Courted, Pakistan Offended
USUK survey team, led by Air Commodore C. J. Mount, RAF, and Brigadier
General James Tipton, USAF, spent most of February 1963 in India. Reporting
to the JCS in mid-March, Tipton characterized Indian fighters as ineffective and
Indian night/all-weather capability as negligible. Until these weaknesses were corrected, there appeared to be no alternative to providing outside forces. He recommended that the United States furnish, as first priority, radars for New Delhi and
Calcutta. The British should provide replacement aircraft, air-to-air missiles, and
three squadrons of night/all-weather fighters.19
The JCS still wanted the British to assume overall responsibility for implementing an air defense program. In justification, they cited the Commonwealths
relationship with India, the fact that most Indian equipment was of British origin,
and the circumstance that Indians had patterned their force development and
operational procedures according to British advice. Should overriding political
reasons make a US commitment necessary, the Chiefs wanted it to be couched
in general terms, specify the conditions for termination as Indian capability improved, and reserve to the United States a determination about whether
and how much to deploy. If Sino-Indian hostilities resumed and city bombing
appeared imminent, the United States should be prepared to dispatch one fighter
squadron and ground control intercept (GCI) radar. As to long-term aid, the
Chiefs endorsed Tiptons proposals. For security reasons, they added, India must
ensure that any assistance from the communist bloc excluded Soviet advisory
and inspection personnel.20
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South Asia
President Kennedy asked State, Defense, and Central Intelligence whether they
saw any prospect that China would attack when spring arrived. If so, was the United States doing enoughquickly enoughto help India? Answering on 9 March
1963, the JCS rated the danger of another border war as relatively low. China
would not wish to make India even more pro-Western or to antagonize the USSR,
which also was assisting India. In any case, no crash program could enable India
to overcome years of neglect. For example, improvements in road, rail, and airlift
capability could not be effected until late 1963. In these circumstances, the current scale and pace of US aid struck them as appropriate. The Chiefs also believed
that full employment of Indian air power would greatly enhance defensive
capabilities. There was some chance of Chinese counteraction, but city bombing
would risk UN or USUK intervention. Additionally, Chinese air forces would face
formidable logistical problems in operating over the Himalayas. Consequently, the
Chiefs concluded that the Indians with outside assistance could hold their own for
a much longer time than a comparison of the overall IndiaChinese Communist air
strength would indicate. OSD generally agreed but advised the State Department
that it favored expediting action on items costing $20.5 million.21
Concurrently, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy told the Chiefs that there was an
urgent requirement for a fundamental determination of the US political and military
policy toward the subcontinent. Bundy asked for a strategic appraisal of the area and
a determination of its military importance to the United States in the context of our
worldwide aims and commitments. On 29 March, the JCS replied that the countries of
South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, possessed significant strategic importance
to the Free World. If India were to be effectively neutralized by communism, or defeated in armed conflict, the whole strategic balance of Asia would be upset. It is, therefore, in the US interest to buttress India against communism in the same way that it has
been in our interest to do so in Thailand and South Vietnam. Should India and Burma
join the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the flanks of CENTO and SEATO would be turned and communists would gain easier access to Africa. But the Chiefs noted the Indian subcontinent was shielded by formidable natural barriersthe Himalayas, the Bay of Bengal,
and the Arabian Seawhich would obstruct any large-scale aggression. Also, South
Asia possessed scant economic wealth; the Middle Easts oil and Southeast Asias food
surpluses made those areas more tempting targets for overt attack.22
Obviously, the Chiefs words about South Asias significant strategic importance did not square with their reluctance to support more than minor military
commitments there. Whenever generalities gave way to specifics, this sort of contradiction was not rare. The Joint Chiefs looked upon Pakistan as an ally but were
never sure about India. By 1964, while reviewing military assistance programs, they
would classify India as a neutral. Their words not withstanding, the Joint Chiefs
never contemplated buttressing India in the same way as South Vietnam.
Again, Ambassador Galbraith urged that India be offered substantial military
aid in exchange for concessions on Kashmir. Convinced that the opportunity
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was fleeting, he was not reticent: May I have, for Gods sake, reasonably prompt
reply? The JCS saw no merit in his proposition. In their judgment, an aid package
large enough to constitute a reasonable lever would have to include: defense production support of $34 million annually for the next four years and raw materials
costing $20 million per year; ground equipment, air-to-air missiles, and three night/
all-weather squadrons for air defense; and underwriting the creation of nine new
divisions during 196467. Militarily, Galbraiths proposal ignored the important part
that the UKCommonwealth should play. Politically, it failed to address the issue
of whether Pakistan would accept an Indian concession involving only part of the
Vale of Kashmir. There was nothing to indicate that India was willing to yield a
substantial portion of Kashmir, and no evidence that Pakistan would settle for anything less than complete possession. Thus the United States might commit itself to
aiding India yet fail to advance Kashmir negotiations. Pakistan might demand similar aid, placing the United States in a position of paying both sides to achieve an
agreement which they ought to conclude in their own national interests. At a White
House meeting on 1 April, President Kennedy rendered decisions that amounted to
a rejection of Galbraiths proposal.23
By late April, Nehru was taking a hard line on Kashmir and the British
appeared reluctant to commit themselves to anything beyond the emergency $60
million. Secretary Rusk was preparing to visit India and Pakistan; the question was
how far to condition US aid upon progress over Kashmir. At a White House meeting on 25 April, Secretary McNamara downplayed the military danger to India. He
thought American and British aid should not exceed $300 million over three years,
and perhaps only half that. President Kennedy, however, decided against being
penny wise because he failed to see how we could stop China without India.
He did not want to be limited by what the British would do and was ready to move
ahead without requiring concessions over Kashmir.24
Upon returning, Secretary Rusk outlined what he called a holding operation to
strengthen ties with the Indian military without antagonizing Pakistan or reducing
our leverage on Kashmir. He recommended concluding an executive agreement to
consult with India about using US air power in case of a Chinese attack and, in collaboration with the United KingdomCommonwealth, being prepared to deploy three
interceptor squadrons to defend New Delhi and Calcutta, to station mobile radars as
well as communications and navigation aids there, and to participate in intermittent
peacetime air defense exercises. Although the Director, Joint Staff, strongly urged
non-concurrence, the JCS gave a highly qualified endorsement. Again, they cautioned
that a commitment involving US combat units should be made only for overriding
political reasons. Periodic rotation of fighters to India constituted a de facto commitment of US forces . . . and could involve the United States in combat action at a
time, place, and under circumstances not of our choosing.25
At an NSC meeting on 9 May, General Taylor emphasized that defending
India involved a very heavy commitment for which no additional forces had
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South Asia
been provided. The basic issue, he argued, was not air defense of India but
how to defend all Asia against Chinese aggression. He and Secretary McNamara
believed that nuclear weapons would be required. President Kennedy wanted
to consider a flat guarantee of the territorial integrity of India. If we were prepared to defend Korea and Thailand, why not India? Remembering our failure in
1950 to include South Korea in the US defense perimeter, Kennedy hoped that
a guarantee to India would deter Chinese attack. Accordingly, the President
approved Rusks recommendations described above.26
The JCS prepared and the State Department approved a plan for air defense exercises involving one US fighter squadron and one mobile radar. At Kennedys urging,
Macmillan contributed one British squadron. Air defense exercise Shiksha took place
between 1 and 30 November. Afterward, the Joint Chiefs reported that Shiksha had
served to unveil dramatically many inadequacies of the Indian Air Defense System.
Airfields were operational only in good weather; ground equipment was deficient;
radars needed to be re-sited; major improvements in organizational structure, communications, and the systems for filtering information and identifying aircraft were
imperative. They recommended against any repeat of Shiksha until Indian air defenses
improved to a point where such exercises would prove remunerative. OSD agreed.27
Meantime, in August, the JCS reviewed the military assistance program for
India and recommended an FY 1964 ceiling of approximately $50 million. The
proper objective, they told McNamara, was not expansion of Indian forces but
qualitative improvement of them. Areas best suited for US assistance were roads,
airfields, logistics, communications, training, radar, and force improvement. Yet
again, they asked that the British Commonwealth be encouraged to make the greatest possible contribution. Also, India should not be awarded priority over those
countries now firmly committed to the United States. Hence, aid to Pakistan ought
to remain roughly in balance with assistance to India. McNamara approved everything except the argument that Indias priority should be no higher than that of
countries firmly committed to the United States.28
Also in August, ISA completed an analysis of aid requirements for Pakistan,
aiming at a three-year funding commitment. The Pakistanis apparently hoped to
acquire more supersonic aircraft in return for allowing expansion of the US intelligence facility at Peshawar. Pakistan had received one F104 squadron of twelve
aircraft. ISA proposed providing 24 more F104s, instead of 24 F5s that lacked air
defense capabilities. The JCS concurred but voiced concern that an attempt to placate Pakistan would stimulate Indian demands for equal treatment. They foresaw a
vicious cycle, in which acceding to Indian requests would generate fresh unhappiness in Pakistan. Therefore, the manner of presenting a three-year aid program to
the Pakistani government was most important. Pakistanis should be assured that
military aid to India had been inspired entirely by the communist threat. The JCS
believed that, once Pakistanis learned that aid to India was not the massive assistance alleged by the news media, much of their apprehension would be allayed.29
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Under Secretary of State George Ball was the next high-ranking official scheduled to visit Pakistan. In preparation, State and ISA proposed that he indicate US
willingness to (1) discuss a multi-year MAP commitment, (2) undertake a joint
large-scale exercise, (3) study the threat to Pakistan, without mentioning India by
name, and (4) consider pre-stocking supplies. The JCS objected to (3). Excluding
India from the study would hurt USPakistani relations, particularly at the military
level. But if the threat from India was discussed, US planners would have to admit
Indias overall superiority. Talks then would revolve around Indias intent, over
which Americans and Pakistanis differed, and upon the chance of India attacking
Pakistan while the threat from China persisted, which would tend to confirm Pakistanis view of China as their primary protector.30
The Under Secretarys trip, from 3 to 6 September 1963, was not a success.
Ball reported that officials from Ayub down are filled with deep fear of potential
Indian military action to destroy Pakistan. . . . Against this background the Paks are
unwilling to accept, as meeting their security requirements, any military guarantee
that the US is presently willing to propose. . . . Accompanying this fear bordering
on despair is a growing doubt in Pak[istani] minds whether their policy of alliance
with the US is viable for the future. Ball urged that, while Pakistanis were going
through their agonizing reappraisal, the administration consider giving Pakistan
more MAP and accelerating the phase out of MAP for India.31
Courtships Cool
hester Bowles, who replaced Galbraith as ambassador to India,32 proposed

trading a five-year MAP commitment, about $6575 million annually, for
an understanding that India would not exceed reasonable force goals, limit its
purchases from the Soviets, and take a more active role in containing China.
Significantly, there was no longer any mention of Kashmir concessions. Early in
December, Rusk, McNamara, and AID Administrator David Bell advised President
Johnson that such an arrangement would be well worthwhile. Instead of putting their cards on the table at the outset, though, they recommended proceeding cautiously to gauge Indian and Pakistani reactions. The JCS had set Indias
requirements at twelve divisions and 35 squadrons. Rusk, McNamara, and Bell
recommended preparing a five-year plan calling for $50 to $60 million annually in
MAP funds. Willingness to proceed would depend on achieving the understanding
outlined by Bowles. For Pakistan, there should be a three- to five-year plan running
around $40 million annually.33
Just before Christmas, General Taylor visited New Delhi and Karachi. The Indians had more ambitious force goals: 16 divisions and 45 squadrons, perhaps rising
to 64. The Chairman concluded, however, that the Indians were prepared to view
themselves, implicitly at least, as part of a regional security community with the
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South Asia
common objective of containing China. Taylor discerned a justifiable requirement
for continuing US aid, held within bounds proportioned to the limited nature of
the military threat. Going on to Karachi, Taylor listened to Ayub orate about how
America was arming India against its supposed ally, Pakistan. Taylor did allow that a
certain type of operational planning could be engaged in, but without concentrating
attention exclusively on anyone. Ayub responded that, while planning need not be
oriented to one direction, all contingencies should be considered. As the meeting
ended, Ayub remarked that the United States seemed to be applying a reverse order
of priority, with communist countries getting the most attention, then neutrals, and
finally friends and alliesif anything was left. Taylor replied that we could do little
if we confined ourselves to helping those who did not criticize us or follow policies
divergent from ours. He then questioned Ayub about Chinese foreign Minister Chou
En-lais forthcoming visit to Pakistan. Ayub answered heatedly that he would be
performing a service to the West by ascertaining Chinas intentions and discerning
any move by New Delhi toward an accommodation with Peking.34
Upon returning to Washington, Taylor recommended offering India a one-year
interim program of about $50 million and indicating willingness to embark upon
parallel military planning, once India produced a satisfactory five-year plan that
met Bowles conditions. Pakistan should be given a similar five-year proposal. Taylor was willing to include two squadrons of supersonic aircraft and a joint mobility exercise involving a proposed Indian Ocean Task Force. Subsequently, the JCS
specified three conditions. First, India and Pakistan should understand that there
were no firm fiscal commitments. Second, in light of declining MAP appropriations,
a planning ceiling of $50 million per year was preferable. Third, any F104s for
Pakistan should not be taken from the US Air Forces inventory.35
Early in February 1964, President Johnson approved exploratory approaches
to both countries. India presented its five-year plan in March. The JCS advised Secretary McNamara that it struck them as having been developed to meet unstated
objectives in response to unevaluated threats. Apparently, India wanted the capability to cope with simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan. The plan called for
23 division-equivalents with 564,000 combat troops. Yet, since China could commit no more than 270,000 men and Pakistan another 128,000, these goals seemed
clearly excessive. Also, fulfilling the plan would require rupee and foreign
exchange expenditures far in excess of what India could afford. Therefore, any US
response should await a thorough understanding with Indian officials regarding
the political and economic basis of Indian military planning.36
Ambassador Bowles urged that India be provided with F104Gs to enhance
US influence and preclude Indian production of MiG21s. The JCS disagreed that
a rise in US influence would pre-empt that of the Soviets, establish a meaningful
constraint on Indias behavior, or compensate for a further exacerbation of USPakistani relations. If political considerations became overriding, they proposed
offering F5s or F6As, the latter planned as a high-subsonic fighter costing only
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one-fifth as much as the F104G. Secretary McNamara, however, decided to be
forthcoming in providing aircraft that could be funded after FY 1965.37
American and Indian officials opened discussions in mid-May 1964. The Indians indicated no intention of reducing their force goals and made known that
Soviet aid programsnamely, the furnishing of 80 to 90 MiG21s to be assembled
in Indiaconstituted firm agreements. After a hiatus caused by the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, modern Indias founding father, a Memorandum of Agreement was
completed on 3 June. Basically, there would be $10 million in credits for FY 1964
and $50 million in FY 1965 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and
defense production, mainly ammunition. Secretary McNamara withheld any fiveyear promises pending further work on planning, particularly about air defense.
The JCS believed that, while 12 divisions and 29 squadrons still constituted desirable levels, Indian plans probably would run above them. They saw no point,
though, in trying to establish the limits of acceptability. Without the authority to
inspect all units and items, India will be able to use credit sales equipment to support forces in excess of those stated.38
Dealings with the Pakistanis went even less well. In February 1964, the Commander in Chief of Pakistans army, General Mohammed Musa, sent General Taylor
a catalogue of the numerous vital and wide gaps that still existed in his forces.
After reviewing Musas lengthy list of requests, the Joint Staff advised Taylor that
some of Musas complaints were well founded. Most, however, flowed from a lack
of familiarity with MAP procedures, an inflated idea of available resources, and
insufficient information about specific items. McNamara told the Pakistani ambassador that Musas letter contained a number of misrepresentations and was one of
the most upsetting he had ever read. When I make a commitment, he insisted, I
keep it.39
When Musa visited Washington in April, the Director of Military Assistance,
General Robert Wood, told him that the current MAP ceiling would not be raised.
Wood cautioned, moreover, that delivery of two F104 squadrons during 196566
would be contingent upon a resolution of political differences with India. Subsequently, Musa told General Taylor that such conditions stripped the charm and
grace from their relationship. Taylor replied that, since Congressional approval for
MAP was necessary, they were simply an acknowledgement of the facts of American political life.40
Pakistanis efforts to promote joint planning fared no better. General Musa
wanted extensive joint planning for the defense of all Pakistans frontiers to precede a joint mobility exercise. He spent two days with General Paul Adams and
finally took home a scenario for President Ayub. Early in July, Adams asked the
JCS whether they still wanted the exercise to proceed. The Chiefs responded that,
since Pakistanis evidently aimed at achieving a commitment of US forces, our
best course was to let the Pakistanis make the next move. On 1 August, General
Wheeler (who had just become Chairman) wrote Musa that too little time remained
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South Asia
to arrange an orderly and successful exercise during 1964. On 5 August, General
Adams received a letter from Musa dated 31 July (antedated, one may surmise)
suggesting that some US officers proceed to Pakistan and participate in detailed
planning for the exercise. As instructed by the JCS, Adams answered that all action
must be deferred.41
In September, India accepted substantial Soviet military assistance that included MiGs, two surface-to-air missile complexes, and 90 amphibious tanks. President
Ayub talked about leaving SEATO. Late in 1964, the White House received information that the Pakistani government had a secret commitment from China establishing a significantly closer relationship than was publicly acknowledged.42
From the US standpoint, two years of effort ended in disappointment. Neither
India nor Pakistan had enlisted in a strategy for containing China. Pakistan continued to fear India more than China. India was not willing to align itself with the
West or to compromise about Kashmir. Consequently, US military assistance could
not be turned to political advantagean outcome that the JCS predicted. Five-year
plans for India and Pakistan, rather nebulous in any case, were undone by the old
bugbear of Kashmir. Sporadic fighting began along the border in April 1965 and
escalated into full-scale war by August. The United States suspended aid to both
belligerents, irritating both countries.
Entering the Indian Ocean
n 1961, the British began talking about withdrawing from Hong Kong, Singapore,
and all points east of Aden. Foreseeing a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean area,
the JCS in January 1962 suggested negotiating long-term agreements for emergency
use of strategically located islands. First priority should go to Diego Garcia in the
Indian Ocean and Socotra in the Gulf of Aden. The State Department believed
Socotra would be a political liability but was willing to talk with the British about
detaching Diego Garcia before the latter became independent. Approached in April
1963, the British agreed three months later to preliminary discussions.43
In July 1963, President Kennedy raised the possibility of sending a small carrier
task force into the Indian Ocean. Secretary Rusk reacted favorably but the JCS did
not. Already, the Chiefs believed, there were enough activities in the Indian Ocean
area to supply substantial evidence of US interest and intent. While opposing any
deployments as militarily undesirable, they were prepared to commit a carrier task
temporarily if political needs so dictated.44
Secretary Rusk insisted that more must be done. Accordingly, in mid-November 1963, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to prepare for deploying an Indian
Ocean Task Force (IOTF) during two months out of every six. But, before they
could do so, a news leak triggered adverse reactions abroad. China charged that
the IOTF was merely an extension of the Seventh Fleet, well known as an agent
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of containment in the Far East. President Ayub told General Taylor that the IOTF
seemed like a modern version of teaching the natives and the heathen how to
behave.45
In February 1964, the State Department acknowledged that the IOTFs itinerary
had to change. Visits to India and Pakistan could prove counter-productive; port
calls to Indonesia and Malaysia might disturb delicate negotiations between those
feuding countries. Conversely, stops in East Africa would be highly desirable,
especially in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) which, after a pro-communist
coup in Zanzibar, might assume an important place in the satellite tracking program. The JCS believed that these changes robbed the cruise of any real value.
Nonetheless, they submitted an itinerary without formally registering their misgivings. On 19 March, President Johnson approved the concept of periodic cruises in
the Indian Ocean. He considered this a most appropriate use of air-sea power in
an area of considerable strategic importance to the United States.46
The voyage of the Concord Squadron, consisting of the carrier Bon Homme
Richard, three destroyers, and one oiler, lasted from 31 March until 13 May. Its
ports of call included Diego Suarez in the Malagasy Republic, Mombasa in Kenya,
Aden, and the Gulf of Oman, where a weapons demonstration was conducted for
the Shah of Iran. Afterwards, Rusk characterized the cruise as an outstanding
success that more than lived up to expectations.47 Another voyage occurred during JulyOctober, but events in South Vietnam led to cancellation of a third cruise
scheduled for the spring of 1965. Nonetheless, the Indian Ocean remained embedded in US planning.
278
19
The Far East: Seeking a Strategy
Regional Strategy: A Changing Context
hen the Truman and Eisenhower administrations set global priorities, the Far
East always ranked below Europe. For Asia, the key concept was holding
and defending without committing large US ground forces. Thus JSCP-62, the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan approved in December 1960, emphasized protecting the
offshore island chain during general war: In the Western Pacific, the United States
and its Allies will hold in Southeast Asia as far forward as possible and along the
general line Philippines-Taiwan-Okinawa-South Korea and Japan while maintaining
control of the contiguous waters. South Korea would be defended to the extent
such action will not prejudice the task of securing Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the
Philippines. Defense of Southeast Asia would have to be accomplished primarily
by Allied and indigenous forces unless US forces have been previously deployed.1
In February 1961, Secretary Rusk suggested creating a more visible, forward
US presence around the Asian periphery. Threatened nations, he said, could combat insurgencies better if they shed some of the burden of defending against external attack. The JCS saw serious flaws in this approach. Shifting this responsibility
to the United States would sap Asians will to resist and provide excellent themes
for communist propaganda. Since Asian countries that reduced their conventional
capabilities would become extremely vulnerable to Sino-Soviet blackmail, the United States would have to increase demonstrably its power in the Western Pacific.2
In May, the Laotian crisis raised the possibility of a direct confrontation
between US and Chinese forces. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked the JCS to
appraise several scenarios. His questions and their answers ran as follows:
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Q. What would be the outcome of air battles?
A. With or without sanctuaries and with or without nuclear weapons,
American air power probably would prevail.
Q. Could US and allied forces hold a line in Southeast Asia?
A. Without nuclear weapons, nothing more than Saigon and the Mekong
River line could be held. With them, a line that ran from Hue and Da Nang
down to Kontum and Pleiku in South Vietnam, Pakse and the Bolovens Plateau
in Laos, and then along the Mekong River could be defended. Even if the Chinese used Soviet-supplied nuclear weapons, that line could hold as long as the
allies maintained air superiority.
Q. Could the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu be held?
A. With nuclear weapons, yes. Without them, no.
Q. Could North Vietnam be defeated and Hainan Island captured?
A. Winning by conventional means would require extended operations
accompanied by a major mobilization. Using tactical nuclear weapons, US and
allied forces could defeat North Vietnam supported by China. If nuclear weapons were not employed against China itself, the effort involved would be much
greater. Unrestricted nuclear attacks, however, could defeat North Vietnam
and destroy or neutralize the Chinese threat. If China retaliated with Sovietsupplied nuclear weapons, timely and effective attacks could destroy major
portions of the Soviet-supplied arsenal, but surviving forces could inflict considerable damage upon US bases.3
General Taylor toured the Far East in September 1962, just before assuming the Chairmanship. He reported that, for the first time, we sense the need
to deter China in a way similar to the deterrence of the USSR. In appraising air
defenses, for example, the entire western Pacific ought to be treated as one entity. He described Chiang Kai-sheks most pressing problem as acquiring modernized air defenses for the Republic of China on Taiwan. He remarked that one US
objective for Chiangs troops was extensively assisting American forces in the
event of general war. That concept, however, could justify a force of almost any
size. He suggested a three-division expeditionary force, reducing Chiangs army
requirements accordingly.4
Secretary McNamara responded to Taylors report by assigning the Joint
Chiefs two tasks. First, study how early use of nuclear weapons against largescale Chinese aggression would affect US and allied force requirements. Second,
prepare a plan for coping with the growing threat of Chinese air power. In April
1963, the JCS submitted their air defense study. The USSR impressed them as a
decisive factor. In July 1960 the Soviets had withdrawn their advisors from China,
opening a momentous split between the two powers. Without Soviet assistance,
the Joint Chiefs believed, China might be unable to wage sustained air warfare
against first-class opposition or even to maintain the current peacetime effectiveness of its air force. The JCS recommended steps that included: continuing
to put primary reliance on nuclear deterrence, avoiding any attempt to deter
solely with conventional strength; modernizing and increasing deployments of
US fighter and attack aircraft; and stationing Polaris submarines in the Pacific.
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The Far East

McNamara agreed that sole reliance on conventional capabilities would be
unwise but opposed putting primary dependence on nuclear deterrence because
that would be ineffective against insurgency, subversion, and the like. He agreed
about Polaris but questioned whether increased air deployments were necessary,
considering the US advantages in quality and mobility.5
In May 1963, the JCS advised McNamara that a strategy of early nuclear
response would not affect current US and allied force levels. Chiangs Nationalists
on Taiwan could not cut their requirements because they needed forces sizeable
enough to compel the communists to launch a large-scale attack and thus present
suitable nuclear targets. Nationalist troops also constituted a continuing deterrent threat, tying down large forces opposite Taiwan, and provided one of the few
strategic reserves in the Far East. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, a reduction of indigenous forces most likely would lead to increased requirements for US support.6
McNamara found the idea of using Nationalists as a strategic reserve plausible
but wondered whether their appearance on the mainland might create major political problems. Secretary Rusk was sure that it would. The Nationalists, he argued,
could be employed only against large-scale Chinese Communist aggression. Otherwise, their appearance in Southeast Asia almost certainly would provoke Chinese
Communist intervention. The Nationalists, Rusk reasoned, would commit their
troops only for a major conflict that might lead to their regaining control of the
mainland. So, if the Chinese Communists made a limited probe in Southeast Asia
and the Nationalists intervened, Peking might see that as presaging an invasion of
China and react violently, thereby turning a limited probe into a major conflict.7
Accepting Rusks arguments, Secretary McNamara tasked the JCS with determining whether, under this more restricted mission, Nationalist forces should
remain at their current levels. Their reply, dated 22 October 1963, reminded the
Secretary that Nationalist force objectives were tailored to defending Taiwan, the
Penghus, and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu; possible deployments
elsewhere did not enter the calculation. The Chiefs did recommend minor adjustments: withdraw MAP support for six light infantry divisions; reduce objectives
for destroyers, destroyer escorts, and LSTs but raise them for minesweepers. They
opposed cuts in Chiangs air force, because air superiority over the Taiwan Strait
was essential in countering a communist attack.8
The availability of a strategic reserve seemed less pressing because, during
1963, the Chairmans Special Studies Group reached, and Secretary McNamara
accepted, more optimistic conclusions about what was needed for a successful
conventional defense in Southeast Asia. China and North Vietnam could commit 21
divisions but, facing US air superiority and limited by an austere rail and road net,
the Group believed they could support only about seven to twelve in combat. The
thirteen Thai and South Vietnamese divisions in the area, reinforced by one Commonwealth and five US divisions, could halt the enemy along the general line of the
15th parallel and thence north along the Mekong River. For Korea, an Army study
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indicated that current forces standing along a well-fortified zone could defeat a
Chinese/North Korean attack on the scale of 1951.9
The specter haunting strategic planners, civilian ones especially, was that of a
nuclear-armed China. In December 1960, General Lemnitzer reminded the Service
Chiefs that China might explode a nuclear device in the not too distant future.
The impact upon Asian and African nations might well be profound. He proposed, and they agreed, to assess how Chinese nuclear capability would affect the
Free Worlds security posture and deployments, and recommend steps to counteract the Chinese achievement.10
The JCS sent their analysis to Secretary McNamara on 26 June 1961. They
believed that China might test a nuclear device sometime during 196264 and
amass a small stockpile of nuclear weapons within two years. China could develop a missile reaching 200 to 500 nautical miles by 196870, but no ICBM able to
reach the United States until well after 1970. Although US power would remain
superior as long as China possessed only a small stockpile of bombs, the price
of preserving pro-western orientations among non-communist nations would
rise. When Chinas arsenal became sizeable, however, the military balance in the
Far East would start swinging toward the communists unless US forces there
increased. Additionally, Chinas acquisition of medium-range missiles would compound the problem.
What might be done? For the short-range period, 196164, the Chiefs suggested steps that included: postponing Chinas attainment of nuclear capability
for as long as possible by all feasible overt and covert actions; lessening the
psychological impact of the first Chinese detonation by telling all concerned
countries that neither the balance of power nor US policy in Asia would
change; and exploiting Sino-Soviet differences as well as Chinese weaknesses.
For the mid-range period, 196470, the Chiefs recommended strengthening US
conventional, air defense, and nuclear capabilities. Additionally, selected allies
should be supplied with nuclear weapons carriers. For the long-range period,
they favored completing a cohesive regional alliance and strengthening the US
base complex.11
In November 1962, Secretary Rusk authorized preparation of a program to
influence world opinion in the aftermath of a Chinese explosion. The JCS produced a draft minimizing the changes that would occur in Chinas behavior and
capabilities after the first nuclear test. In June 1963, the US Intelligence Board
cleared a sanitized version for dissemination among friendly nations.12 Over the
next fifteen months, a fair amount of effort was spent trying to define how much
the threat would increase and how Asian nations might be reassured. The JCS
argued that for the indefinite future, . . . the real relations of power among the
major states would not alter. Nor did they see any reason why US responses
to aggression should be restricted. In their judgment, Chinas willingness to use
nuclear weapons would be inhibited not only by fear of US retaliation and doubt
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The Far East

as to Soviet support13 but also by worry about coalescing Asian nations against
them, spurring Japanese rearmament, and forfeiting leadership of the worldwide
revolutionary movement. Therefore, our posture before and after a Chinese detonation ought to be one of calm and assurance, making clear that US nuclear
power far exceeded Chinas, demonstrating US will and ability to respond appropriately against any aggression, capitalizing upon a Chinese explosion to stimulate allied defense efforts, and launching a psychological warfare campaign to
denigrate Chinas international stature.14
Apparently, the Chiefs approach of calm and assurance was not widely
shared within the administration. In July 1963, Acting Assistant Secretary Bundy
asked the JCS to prepare a contingency plan for attacking Chinas nuclear
weapons production facilities, using conventional munitions. In December,
the Chiefs replied that such an operation was feasible but recommended using
nuclear weapons. On 15 September 1964, President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara,
McGeorge Bundy, and Director McCone discussed what actions to take and
decided they were not in favor of unprovoked unilateral US military action
against Chinese military installations at this time. However, they saw many
possibilities for joint action with the Soviet Government if that Government
is interested . . . even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military
action. They agreed that Rusk would explore the matter very privately with
the Soviet ambassador.15
Time had run out. At Lop Nor, on 16 October 1964, China exploded an 18-kiloton enriched uranium device. Asked to analyze this event, the JCS described
the US military posture planned for the Pacific area through 1970 as generally
adequate. Certainly, China would try to use its nuclear capability as a weapon
for spreading influence and promoting insurgencies. But the likelihood of either
a direct confrontation with the United States or a pre-emptive attack against
US forces and bases would not increase significantlyat least, not until China
acquired an intercontinental delivery system. Obviously, the United States would
have to stand firmly behind its Asian allies. The Chiefs suggested: increasing
MAP support to South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand 16; pass a
Congressional resolution authorizing the President to retaliate in kind if China
used nuclear weapons against a US ally; explore possibilities for strengthening regional alliances; and persuading Japan to increase her defense efforts and
permit nuclear weapons to be positioned at US bases there. Although the US
military posture needed no adjustment at present, certain areas like air defense
did require reassessment. If a missile was launched near the Sino-Soviet border,
for instance, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was not accurate enough
to tell whether it was Soviet or Chinese. Overall, however, the Chiefs reaffirmed
their judgment that Chinas possession of nuclear weapons will not, for the
indefinite future, alter the real relations of power among the major states, or the
balance of military power in Asia.17
283
Withdrawals from South Korea?
lthough the Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice, tensions on the peninsula remained high. In South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK) armed
forces numbered about 600,000, including 29 divisions (19 active, 10 reserve) and
195 jet aircraft. The US Eighth Army comprised two divisions and a missile command. The American general who commanded US forces in Korea also acted as
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), thereby controlling
South Korean and tiny allied contingents as well. North Korea had around 355,000
men under arms.18 China kept no combat units in North Korea but maintained formidable forces in adjacent Manchuria.
In January 1961, South Korea was burdened by a sputtering economy and ineffective political leadership. On 5 May, the NSC ordered a task force under State
Department leadership to review US policy. In Seoul, eleven days later, a group
of officers overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Myon Chang. The
new regime, led by Major General Park Chung Hee, was fiercely puritanical and
unmistakably authoritarian. General Carter Magruder, acting in his capacity as
CINCUNC, called upon all military personnel in his command to support the Chang
government. After a White House meeting, General Lemnitzer cabled Magruder
that the consensus . . . was that your statement went just about as far as you can
possibly go and suggested that Magruder avoid issuing anything further. Park and
his colleagues, who soon consolidated their power, very briefly withdrew ROK
forces from Magruders command.19
General Lemnitzer was embarrassed because he had visited Seoul early in May
and spoken with some of the officers who were then plotting Changs overthrow.
None of them had hinted at what was coming. Subsequently, during a congressional hearing, Senator Albert Gore (D, Tenn.) asked Lemnitzer whether he had
known about or played any part in the coup. Lemnitzer answered emphatically that
he had notand added that he resented the question.20
On 13 June the NSC discussed a task force report that, among other things,
called for reviewing the ROK militarys missions and force levels. In General
Lemnitzers recollection, a State Department representative argued that US
troops should be withdrawn, largely for political and economic reasons. Lemnitzer, amazed that such an important subject would be broached without
informing or consulting the Chiefs beforehand, argued strongly against any
reductions at that time. First, he said, the war and its 33,000 American dead had
given the United States a great stake in South Koreas future. Second, South
Koreas reconstruction testified to the effectiveness of US economic aid. Third,
a non-communist South Korea was vital to Japans security. Fourth, the American who acted as CINCUNC was clothed with the symbolic authority of the
United Nations, by virtue of which he commanded all forces in South Korea.
That arrangement impressed Lemnitzer as the most effective deterrent possible
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The Far East

under the existing situation. Finally, he forcefully protested against this bypassing of the Chiefs. President Kennedy rejected a withdrawal; the NSC approved
further study of alternatives.21
On 2 August, the JCS advised Secretary McNamara that they had reviewed and
rejected every possible change. The impact of a US withdrawal would be immediate and dangerous, possibly inviting renewed aggression and prompting Japan to
reappraise her position. Cutting the Military Assistance Program in order to reduce
the ROK armed forces might eliminate inefficiency, but it could also tempt the
communists to try another invasion. Reducing both US and ROK strength would
worsen a conventional balance that already favored North Korea and China. Augmenting US forces, however, would mean abandoning the policy of supplementing rather than supplanting indigenous ones. If the MAP was increased in order to
accelerate ROK modernization, funds would have to be diverted from other critical
areas. Expanding both the Eighth Army and the ROK military would strain both
countries economies and drain US strength that was needed elsewhere.22 Consequently, no changes should be made to US and ROK force structures at this time
and the MAP should continue at planned levels.23
The US balance of payments deficit worsened, leading the State Department to
raise the possibility of shifting one division from Korea to some place in the Pacific
where only US dollars were used. On 1 August 1962, State, ISA, and Joint Staff
representatives reviewed matters. Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson
said that, despite General Lemnitzers oft-repeated opposition to any reductions,
the issue would have to be reopened. Conferees agreed that State, Defense, and
AID should study the implications of a partial withdrawal.24
ISA asked the Joint Chiefs to assess the implications of transferring one division from Korea to Okinawa. Doing so, they replied, could dilute the deterrent to
an unacceptable degree and lead to undesirable changes in command relationships. With only one US division in Korea, it would be hard to justify preserving US
army and corps headquarters. Koreans might be unwilling to remain under CINCUNCs operational control. Two ROK divisions would have to replace the US one
withdrawn, virtually eliminating the ROK reserve. On Okinawa, moreover, housing,
training, port, and airfield facilities already were inadequate. Theater-wide mobility
would suffer, because the division on Okinawa would have to be ready for a rapid
return to Korea. After assessing this submission, State and OSD agreed that a onedivision withdrawal would be inadvisable at this time.25
General Taylors accession to the Chairmanship precipitated a major change.
In NATO, he wrote afterwards, we had undertaken an unqualified commitment
to use [nuclear] weapons if essential to the security of the alliance, and the NATO
force structure was based upon that undertaking. If we would agree to treat a
major Chinese attack in the same way. . . . We would greatly reduce military force
requirements and add importantly to the deterrent effect of the forces we had.
After hearing his argument, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to study how early
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use of nuclear weapons would affect force requirements, and whether any changes
in the MAP were indicated.26
The Joint Staffs answer did not satisfy General Taylor, apparently because it
concluded that conventional force levels could not be reduced. Accordingly, on 6
March 1963, he ordered the Joint Staff to prepare a study based upon the following
assumptions:
1. Nuclear capabilities would be increased by deploying PERSHING and
SERGEANT missiles to Korea and by stationing one or more Polaris submarines in the western Pacific.
2. The ROK would be supplied with surface-to-air missiles to protect Seoul
as well as the ports of Inchon and Pusan.
3. The US Air Force would keep available, for reinforcing South Korea, up
to five interceptor and twelve tactical squadrons.
4. After the above measures had been carried out, the US ground presence
would be reduced to CINCUNC headquarters and a nuclear missile command,
plus the necessary support and logistical units.
5. Subsequently, the ROK army would be reduced to rough parity with the
North Korean army.
6. A political study would seek ways to normalize conditions along the
Demilitarized Zone, thus ending the need to man a continuous fortified front.27
Remarkably, Taylor brought the Service Chiefs over to his side. On 20 April, the
JCS advised Secretary McNamara that a nuclear strategy did appear feasible. To
make it credible, however, the United States must clearly establish and exhibit the
intent to be willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons without hesitation in the
event of a major attack from the north. Implementing this strategy would involve
sending nuclear-capable missile units to Korea, withdrawing the two US divisions,
cutting the US presence from 52,400 to 17,250, and reducing the ROK army to
about 450,000. The US cutbacks could be completed by December 1965, the ROK
reductions by December 1967. Admittedly, there were risks. Unless the new strategy was clearly understood, major US withdrawals could result in ROK reluctance
to continue under US operational control, and provoke a withdrawal of other allied
contingents. Asian allies, misconstruing the intent of these reductions, might turn
towards neutralism or pro-communism. Japan might refuse the base and port
rights necessary to support a nuclear strategy. Finally, large-scale cuts in the ROK
army might worsen that countrys chronic unemployment problem. Nonetheless,
the Chiefs acknowledged that indefinite maintenance of the present military
confrontation in Korea is not desirable, and that there are political and economic
considerations which might warrant the assumption of certain politico-military
risks.28 This marked a decisive change from the position stated consistently during
Lemnitzers tenure.
Assistant Secretary Nitze found serious faults in a nuclear strategy. If a policy of giving the President maximum options in Europe makes sense, he wrote
to Secretary McNamara, it would seem also to make sense in the Pacific. . . . If
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The Far East

a policy of getting our allies to reduce . . . the conventional imbalance in Europe
makes sense, I dont see why a similar policy doesnt make sense in the Pacific.
Nitze saw good reasons to keep American troops in Korea. First, a withdrawal
would produce no significant balance-of-payments saving because South Korea
would have to reduce US imports by roughly the amount of the cutback. Second,
resort to nuclear weapons would not necessarily be one-sided. Nitze saw little
likelihood that Moscow would passively accept Maos overthrowand exactly
this is implied by large-scale nuclear attacks on China. In any case, China probably would explode its own nuclear device within the next few years, right in
the middle of the proposed phase-down. Finally, Nitze postulated, shifting to a
nuclear strategy would strike communists as a substantial reduction of the US
commitment, shake allied confidence, and possibly renew Sino-Soviet solidarity. He urged that there be no major US withdrawals, and that the ROK army
be reduced to about 500,000 but modernized by keeping the MAP near current
levels. Whatever cuts were made, the public rationale should cite increased US
mobility and Chinas military weakness rather than a strategy of early nuclear
response. Reluctantly, the State Department also concluded that withdrawing
two US divisions was politically infeasible. In a letter to General Taylor the State
Department cited many of the same reasons as Nitze. State claimed, also, that a
US withdrawal would remove an important check on civil strifean important
point, since a presidential election was scheduled for that autumn.29
Naturally, Taylor took strong exception to many of these arguments, writing a
memo for his own use at interagency debates. Politically, he noted, there was no
evidence that a US presence in South Korea had affected the course of domestic
events. As for UN partners, he could see no particular reason to anticipate either
objections against, or withdrawals over, a nuclear strategy. Strong conventional
capability would not be discarded, but nuclear weapons should be used to defeat
a major Chinese attack just as they would be used against a massive Soviet assault
in Europe. Lastly, Taylor claimed to see in what Nitze and State were saying a lack
of belief that deterrence of an enemy is ever possible. If the vast US preponderance
of nuclear power over Red Chinaeven if assisted by the USSRis not sufficient
to deter that country from major aggression, then our military strategy world-wide
needs to be re-examined.30
Secretary McNamara sided with Taylor, against Nitze and State. On 1 June,
OSD circulated a draft memorandum for the President advocating a nuclear strategy. Backed by nuclear firepower, it said, South Koreans could handle a Chinese/
North Korean attack with the same conventional forces needed for non-nuclear
defense against North Korea alone. Consequently, US troop levels could be cut
to 17,000 by December 1965 and ROK forces to 450,000 by December 1967. Upon
review, the JCS recommended adding that conventional cutbacks must be based
upon an assumption that the United States would display clear intent promptly to
retaliate with nuclear weapons against any large-scale attack.31
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On 4 June, Rusk, McNamara, and Taylor discussed the situation along with
Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson and Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense William Bundy. They decided that a working group, under Johnsons
leadership, would prepare a force reduction plan. In July, ISA and the Joint Staff
proposed shifting one division to California by late 1965, pre-positioning equipment
for one division in Korea, and reducing the ROK army to 465,000 by December
1965. But the United States would neither announce nor imply that it was adopting
a strategy of immediate nuclear response.32
Unsatisfied, Secretary McNamara ordered the plan rewritten to state that withdrawal would be conditional upon an announced intention to use nuclear weapons.
He wanted both US divisions withdrawn, starting much earlier than October 1964,
and pre-positioning to be severely limited. A revised plan was prepared, under which
the first US division would leave by April 1964 and the second by April 1965. The
JCS asked that the first division not begin leaving until the outcome of South Koreas
presidential election, scheduled for mid-October, could be assessed. Departure of the
second division should be dependent on an assessment of the situation at the time.33
In the October 1963 election, Park won the presidency by a narrow plurality.
McNamara told Taylor that he favored carrying out ROK force reductions during
196465 and preparing for withdrawal of one US division in 1965: Apart from the
political and budgetary factors pointing in the direction of these reductions, the
Chiefs papers indicate to me that they believe the moves can be justified. . . . In
view of the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting picture of somewhat deteriorating
Chinese Communist capabilities. The rest of the year was devoted to drafting and
revising withdrawal plans.34
In January 1964, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk discussed what to do. McNamara argued that troops in Korea did not contribute substantially to the US military
posture in the Far East. Rusk, however, opposed withdrawals on political grounds
and McNamara conceded that force reductions had become a political rather than
a military problem. The JCS looked into the best time spans for accomplishing a
withdrawal. They reported that a 24-month span would allow the most orderly US
and ROK reductions. If a faster rate was wanted, cutbacks could be completed
within 18 months, despite attendant difficulties involving reorganization, equipment shortages, and storage. One US division could depart within twelve months, if
no significant amount of its equipment had to be stored in South Korea.35
On 5 May 1964, President Johnson directed a State-Defense-AID study about
possibly redeploying one division. While advising against any withdrawals at this
time, the JCS urged that a redeployed division remain as far forward as possible
on US territory in the Pacific. Dividing it between Guam and Hawaii would be one
answer; the least expensive and most readily available solution would be to split
it between Alaska and Fort Lewis, Washington.36
According to a draft memorandum for the President, dated 8 June, McNamara
believed that a decision to redeploy should be made now and implemented over
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The Far East

the next 18 months, while Rusk held that the risks in withdrawing were disproportionate to the relatively small balance of payments and military gains (if any).
When McNamara read the draft, however, he concluded that action should be postponed because of the rapidly worsening situation in Southeast Asia. And there, in
fact, the debate about reductions ended. The South Korean government was ready
and willing to send its troops to fight in South Vietnam.37 As things turned out, part
of the price for dispatching ROK units to Vietnam was keeping two US divisions in
Korea. Also, of course, the nuclear strategy was aborted. Not until the Vietnam War
began winding down would the issue of withdrawing a division be reopened.
Japan and Okinawa: A Sluggish Evolution
n October 1961 the State Department circulated draft guidelines describing

Japan as our principal ally in the Far East, our second world trading partner,
the host for vital US forward facilities, and a source of technical skill and capital
contributing to the economic development of South and Southeast Asia. As to the
security-military field, State suggested, among other things: de-emphasizing this
aspect to US-Japanese relations to ease fears that the presence of US bases might
involve Japan in a nuclear war; maintaining necessary US forces and facilities in
Japan; avoiding direct pressure upon Japan to increase her military establishment;
and retaining over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands only that degree of control necessary to protect vital US security interests. The JCS proposed, and ISA supported,
three changes. First, recognize that continued US control over the Ryukyus was
indispensable for the foreseeable future. Second, encourage Japan to strengthen
her military capabilities and assume a greater share of responsibility for defending
the western Pacific. Third, try to obtain Japanese agreement to store nuclear weapons at US bases. States final guidelines, issued in March 1962, added the first and
second points but not the third.38
Into this relatively stable relationship, General Taylor injected some controversy. During his Far East tour of September 1962, Taylor noted how Japanese sensitivity about nuclear weapons limited the wartime value of US bases there. That,
plus Japanese apathy about their self-defense requirements, led him to rate Japan
a poor bet as a military ally and to conclude that military considerations should
not shape US-Japanese relations.39
After reading Taylors report, President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara whether dollar spending in Japanabout $350 million annuallycould
be reduced. McNamara decided that his query raised a more basic issue: How
valuable, actually, were these Japanese bases? He asked for JCS views. The J5
drafted a reply citing only the advantages derived from maintaining US bases.
The Joint Chiefs rejected it, calling for a fuller report that listed both debits and
credits. On 7 December 1962, they sent McNamara a statement that bases in
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Japan contribute significantly to the overall strategic US posture in the Pacific
and should be retained in essentially their present form. Disadvantages included: the infeasibility of bringing nuclear weapons into Japan during peacetime; the
treaty requirement for prior consultation before deploying US forces to combat
areas; vulnerability to strikes by communist-controlled laborers; the on-going
dollar drain; and continued Japanese apathy toward shouldering obligations for
their own defense. But the penalties of withdrawing would include: impairing
a forward strategy, thereby reducing confidence among allies and non-aligned
nations; strengthening neutralism within Japan as well as the communist drive
against US bases worldwide; and lessening US capabilities for dispersal, flexibility, and logistic support. Bases in Japan were essential to maintaining the
US deterrent posture in the Far East and were required to support US forces in
Korea. They made possible rapid tactical deployments to the western Pacific,
furnished essential repair, communications, and intelligence-gathering facilities,
provided facilities supporting the Single Integrated Operations Plan for nuclear
war, allowed dispersal of stocks and bases, complicated Soviet nuclear targeting,
and constituted an important link in preserving and improving a range of USJapanese ties.40
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric informed the President that he agreed with the
Chiefs assessment. Kennedy worried about the dollar drain; Gilpatric assured him
that the Defense Department would try to reduce it, mainly by persuading Japan to
purchase sophisticated US equipment. Kennedy replied that, unless the Japanese
started offsetting US defense expenditures within the next year or so, changes
must be made: relocating Air Force squadrons; reducing Army logistical bases; and
ending the home-porting of warships in Japan.41
Gilpatric visited Japan in February 1963 and found little reason to think that
the dollar drain would stop soon. Even if the Japanese spent more for defense,
he concluded, they could produce most of what they needed and did not require
sophisticated US weapon systems. Consequently, Gilpatric asked the JCS to submit
plans for reducing the dollar drain, short of a major redeployment, and to analyze
Japans missions and modernization requirements for 196470. After reviewing
potential cost-cutting possibilities, the Chiefs opposed all of them. Nothing except
returning US dependents home would produce major savings, and that seemed
unfair as long as tourism and other government travel remained unrestricted.
Instead, the JCS urged vigorous prosecution of a military sales program. By their
calculation, Japan would need $1.7 billion in new equipment.42
Civilian leaders were determined to ease the dollar drain. In June 1963, Secretary
McNamara told the JCS that he would propose to the President moving the 1st Marine
Air Wing (MAW) from Japan to Okinawa and making some smaller changes. The
Chiefs, General Shoup excepted, opposed shifting the MAW on grounds that Okinawa
would become overcrowded, the alert posture lessened, and SIOP target coverage
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The Far East

reduced. McNamara dropped that idea. On 16 July, President Kennedy approved the
smaller steps.43
Early in 1964, the Navy recommended relocating a 58-plane Marine Air Group
(MAG) from Japan to Okinawa.44 General Wheeler and Admiral McDonald joined
General Greene in supporting this move because: coordination and training with
the 3rd Marine Division, stationed on Okinawa, would improve; operating and maintenance costs would be cut; a small balance of payments saving would accrue; and
the extremely sensitive Landing Ship Tank with nuclear weapons aboard could
move from Iwakuni to an area where US dollars were used. Generals LeMay and
Johnson objected on grounds that: the MAG would have to drop one-third of its
nuclear target assignments; concentrating nearly one-half of Pacific Commands
land-based strike force on Okinawa would create unacceptable vulnerability;
Kadena Air Base, the principal marshalling point for air movements, would become
overcrowded; and reaction time for emergencies in Korea would lengthen. In June,
McNamara authorized relocating the MAG to Okinawa and moving the LST to a
dollar area.45 But, when US involvement in Vietnam escalated, execution was postponed indefinitely.
There was one important area where the Japanese sought change while the
JCS were quite content with the status quo. The 1951 peace treaty made the
United States the administering authority over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands,
with Japan retaining residual sovereignty. Ten years later, both the Japanese and
the Ryukyuans were becoming restive. In August 1961, after a discussion with
Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, President Kennedy ordered an interdepartmental
task force to examine economic and social improvements for Ryukyuans, bearing
in mind both Okinawas importance to the United States and the need to continue
friendly relations with Japan.46
The task force recommended negotiating an agreement by which Japan
would cooperate with the United States in supplying Okinawa with increased
economic aid. The Joint Chiefs protested that the Japanese might view such
negotiations as a tacit admission of their right to participate in Ryukyus administration, and demand a far greater role than the task force was proposing. The
Chiefs were convinced that complete US jurisdiction over the Ryukyus would
remain essential for the foreseeable future. If Okinawas internal security was
jeopardized by excessive relaxing of political controls over the citizenry, there
might be a major disruption of our strategic posture in the Western Pacific. The
task force claimed that US ability to use Okinawa freely depended upon tacit
cooperation by Japan. That struck the Chiefs as an overstatement. If it was true,
the administration would have to carry out a re-evaluation of the means to
implement our basic strategic concepts.47
McNamara, taking a slightly softer line, advised President Kennedy that he
favored a negotiated agreement. The Secretary did follow JCS advice by urging
that Okinawas internal security not be jeopardized through excessive relaxing of
291

political controls over the citizenry. On 5 March, the President approved negotiations aimed at minimizing interference with US political control and recognizing,
at least tacitly, our intention to administer the Ryukyus for the foreseeable future.
A Japanese-American Consultative Committee came into being two years later.48
The JCS kept worrying about the strength of reversionist tendencies, and
received assurances that US negotiators intended to limit talks to economic matters only. As you know, the Director of the Joint Staff wrote to the J5, the Japanese have tried every dodge known to man to get a toehold on Okinawa. In February 1963, General Wheeler brought to his colleagues attention the eroding efforts
which have been made by various agencies over the years which run counter to US
military interests. The Chiefs raised this issue in meetings with Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy, reminding them that the Ryukyus chain had been
developed into the most important military base complex in the Western Pacific.
Okinawa contained sixteen major installations; forces stationed there included
most of the 3rd Marine Division, an Army airborne battle group, an Air Force tactical fighter wing, and three troop carrier squadrons.49
In May 1963, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer foresaw a trend toward de facto
integration between Japan and the Ryukyus. Accommodating to it impressed him
as the prudent course; opposing it could forfeit Japans cooperation and encourage pressure for reversion. He mentioned, as a possible fallback position, returning administrative authority to Japan while retaining unhindered utilization of US
bases. The JCS responded that granting greater concessions would in fact fuel
reversionist sentiment and risk undermining the US military position in the Ryukyus. They opposed, even as a fallback, returning administrative control.50
Just as with Korea, the looming crisis over Vietnam put any further movement on
hold. By December 1964, the State Department agreed that fundamental policies for
the Ryukyus appeared sound and US administration effective. Substantial progress
in problem areas had lessened popular pressures for change.51 Here, too, basic decisions would be postponed until the war in Southeast Asia began winding down.
Indonesia: A Falling Domino
nder the guided democracy practiced by President Sukarno, Indonesia was

pursuing adventurous and increasingly anti-western policies. Sukarnos claim
to Netherlands New Guinea, or West Irian, was an immediate cause of friction.
Although the Papuans who lived there had neither racial nor cultural ties with
Indonesia, West Irian had been part of the Dutch East Indies and Sukarno was
determined to acquire it. Moscow and Peking supported Sukarnos claim; the Soviet Union supplied him with considerable military equipment. The United States, on
the other hand, backed the Netherlands position that West Irians future should be
decided by self-determination.
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The Far East

In October 1961, General LeMay let his JCS colleagues know that he was
deeply concerned about the steady deterioration of US influence in Indonesia.
At his urging, the Chiefs made their collective concern known to Secretary McNamara. The USSR, they said, was making a determined effort to win Indonesia.
Soviet military shipments to date totaled $840 million, making Indonesia second
only to Egypt among non-communist recipients. American military assistance, by
contrast, came to only $61.6 million. The Chiefs strongly believed that a communist or even pro-communist Indonesia would be a tremendous asset to the
Sino-Soviet Bloc. SEATO would be outflanked, Australia and New Zealand isolated. Communists could launch overt and covert operations against the Philippines
and South Pacific islands as well as deny tremendous oil, tin, and rubber resources. Moreover, losing Indonesia to the communists might well begin a chain reaction that could lead to forfeiture of the main US bases in the Far East. Conversely, a pro-western or genuinely neutral Indonesia would significantly enhance the
US position in Asia. The Chiefs recommended that these views form the basis of
the Defense Department position, and that the NSC consider this issue on a priority basis. They also recommended, as a matter of utmost national urgency,
that the administration exert a major effort to salvage Indonesia from communist
control, enumerate objectives and determine specific methods for doing so, and
develop a detailed and dynamic national plan for taking the offensive. Finally,
the Chiefs argued that one fundamental cause of the erosion in Indonesia
stemmed from our partial failure to gain and maintain a pro-Western orientation of the other countries of Southeast Asia. Events in Indonesia and the rest of
Southeast Asia struck them as being intimately inter-related. The Secretary forwarded their memorandum to the State Department, for use in drafting a policy
paper. Since Defense would be afforded an opportunity to comment upon States
draft, he deemed an NSC discussion unnecessary.52
Already, however, the administration was working toward a diplomatic
resolution for West Irian that essentially would give Sukarno what he wanted. In
February 1962, the State Department circulated guidelines that clearly aimed at
currying Sukarnos favor. First, remove the West Irian dispute from communist
exploitation by forestalling hostilities, obtaining the voluntary departure of
the Dutch, and finding a status for the area that was acceptable to the disputants
and consonant with the UN Charter. Second, divest the United States of its image
as a protector of colonial interests. Third, develop close personal ties between
Presidents Kennedy and Sukarno. Fourth, strengthen the willingness and ability of
Indonesians to oppose communist inroads in their country. The army, under General Abdul Haris Nasution, constituted the countrys most effective anti-communist
force. The JCS proposed changing the passage about voluntary departure of the
Dutch to read consult as frequently and as closely as possible with the Indonesians and the Netherlands. ISA rejected this recommendation but proposed two
others. First, make no mention of a close Kennedy-Sukarno relationship; doing so
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could enhance Sukarnos stature and lessen the likelihood of transferring power to
moderate elements. Second, acknowledge US support of the Indonesian Mobile
Brigade, a strongly anti-communist paramilitary unit. The Brigade was supported
by AID money and might receive MAP funds in future years. Ultimately, however,
no Defense suggestions were adopted.53
During the summer of 1962, a solution for West Irian emerged. The mediating
skills of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker played a part, but so did Sukarnos threat
of imminent invasion. The final settlement, signed on 15 August, stipulated that
administration of West Irian would pass immediately from the Netherlands to the
UN and then to Indonesia on 1 May 1963.54
Hoping to get a reasonable return on this investment, President Kennedy
asked all agencies to identify measures that might be useful in improving USIndonesian relations. The JCS sent Secretary McNamara a list that included
reorienting MAP toward civic action programs.55 Unhappily, the administrations
investment yielded no dividend. Sukarnos appetite was whetted, not sated.
Prince Abdul Rahman, prime minister of Malaya and a staunch anti-communist,
was organizing a Federation of Malaysia that would include Malaya, Singapore,
Sarawak, and Sabah (North Borneo). Denouncing this as a survival of colonialism, Sukarno proclaimed in January 1963 a policy of confrontation aimed at
stopping the formation of Malaysia.
Admiral Anderson urged that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan levy additional tasks upon CINCPAC, based on the assumption that Indonesia might well
pursue an expansionist course. Such plans could cover: interference with Malaysia;
further expansionist attempts on New Guinea; military action against Portuguese
Timor; closure of the Strait of Malacca; expansion toward the southeast or toward
the Philippines; and Indonesias alliance with or bestowal of base rights upon members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The JCS agreed, and CINCPAC received appropriate
orders on 9 February 1963.56
Malaysia was formally established on 16 September 1963. Immediately, Sukarno severed commercial ties with the new federation and vowed to crush Malaysia. The United States suspended all MAP shipments to Indonesia of aircraft,
ships, weapons, and ammunition. Soon afterward, an act of Congress stipulated
that no further aid be furnished to Indonesia, unless the President determined that
doing so was essential to the national interest.
On 7 January 1964, the NSC discussed whether President Johnson should sign
such a determination; General LeMay represented the JCS. All agreed that there
should be limited but tightly controlled economic aid; Indonesia ought to be given
nothing that would improve her military capabilities. Subsequently, President Johnson decided against signing a determination until the outcome of meetings among
Asian leaders was known. Meantime, existing MAP would continue.57
In March, the United States broadened its list of prohibited military items.
General Nasution wrote to General Taylor, expressing hope that limited assistance
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The Far East

would continue in two areas: civic action and officer training. Taylor replied that
this would depend primarily upon how Indonesia handled its confrontation with
Malaysia. Without real progress toward a peaceful settlement, he warned, the
immediate future may well be fraught with difficulties. For the present, Taylor
promised that a civic action food production program would continue.58
Meanwhile, several hundred Indonesian guerrillas infiltrated into Borneo; efforts
to arrange a cease-fire (by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, among others) ended
in failure. In April, at States request, OSD considered whether to start a small training mission in Malaysia. The JCS, while acknowledging that a mission could enhance
US influence and indicate political support, asked that alternatives like visits by
senior officers or military units also be considered. Since Britain and Commonwealth
countries had extensive training commitments there, those governments should be
asked how the United States could supplement their efforts. After doing that, the
administration could decide how to proceed. In July, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman came to Washington asking for arms and advisors. President Johnson agreed
that Malaysians would be admitted to US training schools, and he told the Defense
Department to give other requests swift and sympathetic study.59
On 17 August 1964, Sukarno seemed to pass the point of no return. During a
three-hour speech, he denounced the United States as Indonesias main enemy and
dedicated his nation to a year of living dangerously. Simultaneously, three groups
of Indonesian guerrillas made seaborne landings near Singapore. The State Department now concluded that Sukarno opposes everything we are trying to do and
everything we stand for in Asia. Thus far, US aid had made no discernible impact
on Indonesian policy; continued assistance might lead Sukarno to think that Washington was prepared to tolerate actions it actually opposed. As a first step, State
urged termination through mutual agreement of military assistance and of AID support for Indonesian police.60
The JCS, unwilling to endorse a complete break, advised Secretary McNamara
on 26 August that a closely monitored Indonesian MAPlimited to civic action
and CONUS school trainingshould be continued for intelligence purposes and
for possible future influence upon key Indonesian leaders. On 3 September, President Johnson approved several recommendations from Rusk and McNamara. First,
defer delivery of major military communications equipment and suspend shipment
of all military-type equipment to Indonesian police and internal security forces.
Second, work quietly toward mutual agreement to reduce or eliminate military
training programs. Third, continue economic and technical assistance, civic action
programs, and provision of non-military training and equipment for police and
internal security forces.61
Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs began sounding alarms about an apparent Indonesian threat to freedom of the seas. The British sent four warships and an antiaircraft regiment to Singapore. After these ships had passed through the Sunda Strait,
between Java and Sumatra, Indonesia announced that all ships transiting the Strait
295

or entering waters claimed as territorial would have to secure permission from the
Indonesian Foreign Office. On 8 September 1964, the JCS recommended that Washington clearly and unequivocally reaffirm that the United States would not tolerate any interference with its freedom of access to international seas, straits, and air
space. As proof, they wanted US ships and aircraft to pass through the waters and
air space in question whenever possible. The Chiefs repeated this recommendation
three times during the next five months, but the State Department vetoed unannounced transits as politically inflammatory.62
As 1964 ended, Indonesia seemed firmly aligned in the communist orbit. But
the autumn of 1965 witnessed a dramatic reversal. An attempted communist coup
triggered a massive and bloody reaction, in which the army crushed the communists and took control of the government. Preserving even limited ties with the
Indonesian military proved to have been a sound investment.
Summation
lthough the administration viewed developments in the Pacific basin as closely

inter-related, it failed to formulate a single, coherent military strategy for the
area. The escalating war in Southeast Asia undid General Taylors effort to impose
a nuclear strategy. Instead, for Vietnam, civilian leaders followed a formula that
worked so well in the Cuban missile crisis: apply graduated pressure, on a scale
sufficient to achieve a limited objective without risking general war.63 This time,
however, piecemeal escalation would lead to a huge commitment without breaking
the enemys will to resist.
296
20
Conclusion: Appraising
Performances
or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the early 1960s was a time of almost unremitting
crises. The Cold War reached onto practically every part of the globe, as Cuba,
Berlin, the Congo, India, Laos, and South Vietnam turned into major flash points.
What was far worse, the JCS became convinced that communist powers were prevailing. As the Cuba Study Group advised President Kennedy in June 1961, We feel
that we are losing today on many fronts.1
The Bay of Pigs, the Joint Chiefs were convinced, went well beyond being a local
defeat. It was a fiasco that greatly damaged American credibility worldwide. Repeatedly, as tension mounted over Laos and Berlin, the Chiefs warned civilian leaders
that forceful measures were required to restore that credibility. President Kennedys
doubts about the Chiefs competence were matched by their doubts about his determination to do whatever might prove necessary to prevail. In a setting where war in
some place and at some level seemed more likely than not, the Chiefs could perceive
little scope for nuance and compromise. That was why they could see only one
solution for Cuba: invade the island and oust Castro. Arms control, in this climate,
seemed to them pointless and even dangerous; superior military strength was what
communist leaders understood. The limited test ban treaty of 1963 was an anomaly,
which they endorsed only with important qualifications. In 1964, the JCS reacted to
a looming crisis in South Vietnam by arguing that strong action against Hanoi was
imperative because failure there would have far-reaching consequences.
Looking back, the administrations record after the Bay of Pigs was better than
the JCS realized. Europe, and not the Third World, was the crucial arena. Khrushchev perceived that, potentially, West Berlin was the Achilles heel of NATO. After
failing to dislodge the Western Powers from there in 1961, Khrushchev hoped that
turning Cuba into an offensive missile base would severely shake US credibility in
297

West European and particularly West German eyes. Then he could reopen the Berlin confrontation under much more favorable conditions.2 Instead, Khrushchevs
forced retreat over Cuba also marked the end of danger to Berlin. The Berlin blockade of 194849 had been the first direct confrontation of the Cold War; demolition
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 would mark the Cold Wars end.
Usually, in times of war and crisis, military influence is enhanced at the civilians expense. Such was not the case here. What has been called the McNamara
revolution institutionalized a contraction of JCS influence. Economic analysis,
applied to the planning-programming-budgeting system, substantially changed JCSOSD relationships. Procedurally, the system assured that JCS advice on all major
force-planning issues would be heard. Substantively, however, the new approach
led OSD analysts to explore virtually every facet of the force structure. When civilians ratified military recommendations, they often did so not out of deference to
military wisdom but as the result of their own investigations that coincided with
JCS judgments.
The more expertise civilians acquired, the less attention they paid to military
advice. This situation became most pronounced in the field of strategic retaliatory
forces. Here there was no fund of practical experience; civilians could speak about
nuclear warfare with as much authority as senior officers. The OSD analysts prepared draft presidential memorandums buttressed by elaborate and well-expressed
rationales. The JCS had no equivalent think tank in the beginning, and they were
further hobbled by inter-service splits. The Service staffs overshadowed the Joint
staffs in the 1960s. This resulted in inter-service competition and infighting among
the Chiefs. Services were unwilling to support the needs of other Services. This
parochialism and inter-service rivalry affected national security. In 1961 each JCS
member submitted a separate set of recommendations instead of a single coherent recommendation, a result that virtually invited OSD intervention. That set a
precedent for later years, when the major decisionsadopting assured destruction and leveling off the Minuteman force at 1,000 launcherswere OSD and not
JCS products. Similarly, in shaping a continental defense posture, Secretary McNamara relied upon his own analysts. Admiral McDonald would later recall that he
learned pretty soon not to raise the issue of experience before certain individuals
because . . . that just made you parochial.3
In fashioning general purpose forces, many of Secretary McNamaras decisions ran close to the median JCS recommendations. Again, though, this was more
the result of coincidence than of the Chiefs persuasiveness. Take, for example,
the time that Secretary McNamara relied on the Index of Combat Effectiveness to
claim that NATO could create a capability to defend Central Europe by conventional means. General Taylor argued that conclusions drawn from the ICE lacked
practical validity because no soldier seriously believes that the outcome of a
battle is calculable in mathematical terms.4 McNamara changed some wording but
not his basic argument. He was not willing to develop a force structure for a single
298
Conclusion: Appraising Performances

service that was separate from a national force structure. Basically, by 1964, most
major features of the force structure were decided by OSD.
Inevitably, this resulted in personal and institutional friction. The Navy, never
in the forefront of unification, did not warm to his leadership. Very quickly, Admiral
Burke began worrying about the Secretarys predilection for delving into matters
of detail. Burke repeated to McNamara a Navy adage that a captain was best measured by how well the ship ran during his absence. If, he advised the Secretary,
you get so immersed in details, operational details particularly, that you have
to make these daily decisions, then your policies are wrong or not understood.
McNamara seemed receptive, but Burke soon concluded that he had no intention
of altering his approach. I was completely and absolutely frustrated, Burke said
years later. I didnt feel very proud of myself for being in that sort of an organization. Burke had submitted a request for retirement prior to the 1960 election. During FebruaryApril 1961, Attorney General Robert Kennedy pressed him to reconsider. When Burke formally presented his retirement request to President Kennedy
in May, the Chief Executive asked him to remain in office. After Burke again
declined, the President offered him the ambassadorship to Australia. Burke turned
down this and similar posts, primarily because he thought that an ambassador had
become a social functionary lacking any real influence and importance.5
Admiral Anderson had a rougher passage. He asked for, and General Lemnitzer
arranged, a special meeting late in 1961 between Secretary McNamara and the JCS.
At this meeting, Anderson made three points. First, OSD systems analysts were
encroaching upon his statutory responsibilities. Anderson particularly resented
efforts by budget analysts to usurp his authority by determining how many attack
carriers the Navy needed. Second, public affairs officials in OSD were questioning
the Navys civilian orientation cruise program. Third, Special Assistant Adam Yarmolinsky had been quoted as saying at a dinner party that he made or broke general and flag officers. But then the discussion strayed from Andersons purpose as
General LeMay talked about the future inadequacy of strategic retaliatory forces.
Afterwards, as the story filtered back to Anderson, McNamara told several of his
people that the Chief of Naval Operations had put them on report.6
Although Admiral Anderson had hoped for reappointment, he left his post on
1 August 1963 under particularly unpleasant circumstances. Anderson felt sure
that the real reason for his relief was his criticism of the F111. McNamara was
promoting the aircraft as a model of bi-service economy and efficiency. In Congressional testimony, the CNO made clear his belief that the Secretary had selected a
design that did not met the Navys needs. After his retirement had been announced,
however, Anderson heard that OSD officials were spreading what he considered a
wholly inaccurate version of his contretemps with McNamara and himself in Flag
Plot during the Cuban missile crisis. So Anderson saw fit to give the Secretary a
lecture on integrityand then returned to his office to find more press releases
that, he believed, cast aspersions upon his competence. In September, after retiring
299

from the Navy, Anderson publicly criticized tendencies to downgrade the role of
the men who may have to fight our countrys battles and discredit the voices of
dissent within the military.7
General LeMay knew that his views carried little weight with Secretary McNamara and the President, and that he was being tolerated for political reasons. General White, his predecessor, put into print what LeMay felt privately: In common
with many other military men, both active and retired, I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called defense intellectuals
who have been brought into this nations capital. I dont believe a lot of these often
over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians, and other
theorists have sufficient worldliness or motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy
we face.8 In 1968, after he retired, LeMay published America Is In Dangerwhich
he attributed in no small part to McNamaras approach to defense issues.
Army members of the JCS, General Decker excepted, had the best relations
with civilian leaders. This may have been because the Army benefitted the most
from the flexible response strategy. Kennedy and McNamara thought well enough
of General Lemnitzer to arrange his appointment as SACEUR. The President singled out General Wheeler to be Chief of Staff, and Secretary McNamara in 1964 was
sufficiently satisfied to recommend him for the Chairmanship. General Taylor was
the officer who most impressed Kennedy and McNamaraand he fully reciprocated their respect. It is illuminating, therefore, to conclude by looking at the letter
that Taylor gave to McNamara on 1 July 1964, the day he left the Chairmanship to
become ambassador to South Vietnam.9
Taylor began by assessing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff. He judged it to be
only marginally adequate, hampered by an uneven and sometimes excessively
heavy workload, by cramped working conditions, and by inadequate recognition of
its members by their Service of origin. Taylor discerned some progress in preserving the integrity of the Joint Staff input from distortion by Service views, but there
remained an inherent slowness in the process by which JCS memorandums were
drafted. Tactfully, Taylor observed that the Services are still not putting their best
people on the Joint Staffnot always. Instead of distributing important jobs proportionately by Service, he favored calling for nominations from all the Services and
choosing the best candidate regardless of Service affiliation. However, strong action
to correct these weaknesses would not occur until the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act.
Addressing Army-Air Force relations, which Taylor believed were worse than
when he assumed the Chairmanship, he argued that Army commanders responsible for conducting sustained land combat must always have available under
their operational control that indispensable element of air power necessary for the
success of the land battle. If necessary, the attachment of Air Force units should
be made without hesitation. Otherwise, an overhaul of roles and missions statements would become indispensable. Yet the way in which Taylor defined issues
300
Conclusion: Appraising Performances

and adversaries may show that he could not entirely transcend his own services
attitude. In Vietnam in 1968, General William Westmoreland put Marine aviation
under the mission direction of his Deputy, an Air Force officer. The Army Chief of
Staff joined the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations in registering strong opposition to a single manager.10 This was evidence that,
at the JCS level, each service kept interpreting jointness to its own advantage.
It is worth noting that when General Lemnitzer left the Chairmanship, he publicly
described the JCS as needing no statutory change and as being useful precisely
because it brought alternatives to the civilians attention.
Turning to contingency planning, Taylor remarked upon the incompleteness of past efforts. Except for Cuba and Southeast Asia, the top priorities of the
moment, he rated current plans as little more than outlines which could not be
expanded for implementation other than on a crash basis without months of additional staff work both in the field and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Assuming Taylor
was correct, the worries of people like Representative Carl Vinson that the JCS
might come to resemble the German General Staff had no foundation. If there was
a danger, it lay more in the diffusion and fragmentation of responsibility among the
JCS, the Services, the unified and specified commands, and OSD.
Finally, Taylor recalled his former unhappy days as Army Chief of Staff when
he had cried out for a decisive Secretary of Defense to end the unending conflicts.
I got one and am now content. However, he spotted potential difficulties arising
from the fatal attraction which some of our civilians find in military planning . . . . I
feel it is very important for ISA and the Systems Analysis area of the Comptrollers
office to understand that they are not in the business of military planning and are
not a rival source of military advice in competition with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
301
Acronyms
ABM
ACDA
AID
AMSA
ANF
ASW
AWACS
anti-ballistic missile
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Agency for International Development
Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft
Atlantic Nuclear Force
anti-submarine warfare
airborne warning and control system
BMEWS
BNSP
BOB
BPD
BUIC
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems

Basic National Security Plan
Bureau of the Budget
Basic Planning Document
Backup Interceptor Controls
CAP
CASU
CCC
CENTO
CI
CIA
CINCENT
CINCLANT
CINCUNC
CNO
CONAD
CONUS
CTG
combat air patrol

Composite Air Strike Unit
Civilian Conservation Corps
Central Treaty Organization
Counter Insurgency (Special Group)
Central Intelligence Agency
Commander in Chief, Army Group Center
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
Chief of Naval Operations
Continental Air Defense Command
continental United States
Commander Task Group
DEFCON
DEW
DIA
DPM
Defense Condition
distant early warning
Defense Intelligence Agency
Draft Presidential Memorandum
303
EW
ExComm
early warning
Executive Committee
FAL
FBI
FYDP
Force Arme Lao

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Five-Year Defense Program
GCI
GCA
ground control intercept

ground control approach
ICBM
ICC
ICE
IMI
IOTF
IRBMs
ISA
intercontinental ballistic missile

International Control Commission
Index of Combat Effectiveness
improved manned Interceptor
Indian Ocean Task Force
intermediate-range ballistic missiles
International Security Affairs
JCS
JSCP
JLRSS
JSOP
JSSC
JSTPS
JWGA
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
Joint Long-Range Strategic Study
Joint Strategic Objective Plan
Joint Strategic Survey Council
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
Joint War Games Agency
LCP
LCU
LSD
LST
landing craft, personnel

landing craft, utility
dock landing ship
tank landing ship
MAAG
MAG
MAP
Military Assistance Advisory Group

Marine Air Group
military assistance program
304
Abbreviations and Acronyms

MATS
MAW
MEB
MLF
MNCs
MRBMs
Military Air Transport Service

Marine Air Wing
Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Multilateral Nuclear Force
Major NATO Commanders
medium-range ballistic missiles
NATO
NEFA
nm
NSAM
NSC
NSTL
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Northeast Frontier Agency
nautical miles
National Security Action Memorandum
National Security Council
National Strategic Target List
OAS
ONI
OPLAN
OSD
Organization of American States

Office of Naval Intelligence
operational plan
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PCP
PEO
PHIBRON
POL
PPBS
Program Change Proposal

Program Evaluation Office
amphibious squadron
petroleum, oil, and lubricants
planning-programming-budgeting system
R&D
RLG
ROAD
ROE
ROK
Research and Development

Royal Laotian Government
Reorganization Objective, Army Division
rules of engagement
Republic of Korea
SAC
SACEUR
SACLANT
SAGE
SAM
SEATO
Strategic Air Command

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
Semi-Automatic Ground Environment
surface-to-air missile
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
305

SHAPE
SIOP
SLBN
SNDVs
SNIE
SRAM
STRICOM
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Single Integrated Operational Plan
submarine-launched ballistic missile
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
Special National Intelligence Estimate
short-range attack missile
Strike Command
TRACE
Transportable Control Environment
UAR
UNEF
USCINCEUR
USDIS
USSR
United Arab Republic

UN Expeditionary Force
US Commander in Chief, Europe
US Disarmament Agency
United Soviet Socialist Republic
WSEG
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
306
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief
John F. Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
20 Jan 61 22 Nov 63
22 Nov 63 20 Jan 69
Special Assistant to the President

(National Security Affairs)
McGeorge Bundy
20 Jan 61 27 Feb 66
Secretary of State
Dean Rusk
20 Jan 61 20 Jan 69
Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara
20 Jan 61 29 Feb 68
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Cyrus R. Vance
24 Jan 61 20 Jan 64
28 Jan 64 30 Jun 67
Assistant Secretary of Defense

(International Security Affairs)
Paul H. Nitze
William P. Bundy
John T. McNaughton
29 Jan 61 29 Nov 63
29 Nov 63 14 Mar 64
01 Jul 64 19 Jul 67
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA
01 Oct 60 30 Sep 62
01 Oct 62 01 Jul 64
03 Jul 64 02 Jul 70
Chief of Staff, US Army

General George H. Decker
General Earle G. Wheeler
General Harold K. Johnson
01 Oct 60 30 Sep 62
01 Oct 62 02 Jul 64
03 Jul 64 02 Jul 68
Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke
17 Aug 55 01 Aug 61
307

Admiral George W. Anderson
Admiral David L. McDonald
01 Aug 61 01 Aug 63
01 Aug 63 01 Aug 67
Chief of Staff, US Air Force

General Thomas D. White
General Curtis E. LeMay
01 Jul 57 30 Jun 61
30 Jun 61 31 Jun 65
Commandant, US Marine Corps

General David M. Shoup
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.
01 Jan 60 31 Dec 63
01 Jan 64 31 Dec 67
Director, Joint Staff

Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, USA
Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, USN
Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, USAF
01 Apr 60 24 Feb 62
25 Feb 62 23 Feb 64
24 Feb 64 31 Jul 66
Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Admiral Robert L. Dennison
Admiral Harold P. Smith
29 Feb 60 30 Apr 63
30 Apr 63 30 Apr 65
Commander in Chief, US European Command

General Lauris Norstad, USAF
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA
20 Nov 56 01 Nov 62
01 Nov 62 05 May 69
Commander in Chief, Pacific

Admiral Harry D. Felt
Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp
31 Jul 58 30 Jun 64
30 Jun 64 01 Aug 68
Commander in Chief, Caribbean

(After 06 June 1963, Commander in
Chief, US Southern Command)
General Andrew P. OMeara, USA
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA
01 Feb 61 22 Feb 65
22 Feb 65 18 Feb 69
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

General Thomas S. Power
General John D. Ryan
01 Jul 57 01 Dec 64
01 Dec 64 01 Feb 67
Commander in Chief, Strike Command

General Paul D. Adams, USA
09 Oct 61 01 Nov 66
308
Notes to Pages 19
Notes
Chapter 1. Entering the New Frontier: Men and Methods
1. Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC; GPO, 1962),
pp. 103. (Hereafter referred to as Public Papers: Kennedy.)
2. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 206.
3. Major General C. V. Clifton, USA (Ret.) interviewed by W. S. Poole on 14 Aug 79, JHO.
4. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 302
303. Msg, JCS 3675 to USCINCEUR et al., 22 Nov 63.
5. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, November 29, 196310:00 A.M.,
Att to CM-1050 to JCS, 30 Nov 63, Chairmans File (hereafter CJCS) 031.1 (Meetings with the
President).
6. Michael Beschloss, Taking Charge (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 408411,
415416.
7. Stanley L. Falk, The National Security Structure (Washington, DC: ICAF, 1967), pp. 4445.
8. NY Times, 20 Dec 60, p. 1. Hearings, Organizing for National Security, Senate Cmte.
on Government Operations, 86th Congress, 2nd session, passim.
9. Memo, L. J. Legere to Maxwell Taylor, The Middle of 1961, 20 Jun 69, Box 34, Maxwell
Taylor Papers, National Defense University.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19611963, National Security Policy, vol.
VIII (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1996), pp. 478480. (Hereafter
Foreign Relations of the United States will be referred to as FRUS.)
11. Henry E. Glass interviewed by W. S. Poole on 17 July 1979. Since McNamara was not
yet in office, Colonel E. F. Black (Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense) carried his request to them and brought their answers back.
12. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 229240. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 8 Mar 61,
JCS 2101/413, Joint Master File 5000 (8 Mar 61) sec. 1. Even more questions were added later.
Joint Staff officers joked that the exercise should bear the same title as a current television
show: Youth Wants To Know. Annually, during 196264, McNamara issued similar but somewhat smaller lists.
13. Lawrence S. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy: 19611965 (Washington, DC:
Historical Office, OSD, 2006), p. 73. Hearings, DoD Appropriations for 1962, H. Com on
Appropriations, 87th Cong, 1st sess, pt. 1, pp. 12, 1011. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 10 Feb
61, JCS 1800/401, JMF 7000 (10 Feb 61).
14. Memo, ASD (Comptroller) to AsstSecys of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 3 Apr 61,
JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 1. Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (1961), pp. 2139.
15. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 7778. Memo, ASD (Compt.) to AsstSvcSecys, 13 May 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 1. Hitch listed I and II as Central War Offensive
and Defensive Forces, but for the sake of uniformity, the terms later adopted are used here.
16. Memo, DJS to JCS, The FY 1963 Military Budget, 19 Apr 61, same file.
17. CSAFM-130-61 to JCS, 24 Apr 61, same file.
18. SM-508-61 to Service Chiefs & JCSM-308-61 to SecDef, 10 May 61, JCS 1800/414; JMF
7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 2.
19. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 8095. FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 158177.
20. Memo, SecDef to Dir, BoB, 7 Dec 61; Memo, ASD (Compt.) to CJCS et al., 4 Jan 62;
JMF 7000 (21 May 62). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Dec 61 & JCSM-848 to SecDef, 5 Dec 61, JCS
1800/483; JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61).
21. Memo for Record by DepSecDef, Presidents Meeting with the JCS on January 3,
1962, Chairmans File (hereafter CJCS) 031.1. Also in FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 232234.
309
Notes to Pages 914
22. The Joint Program for Planning was outlined in JCS 2089/13, JMF 3100 (13 Apr 59) and
JCS 2143/102, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60). The JSCPs are in the following files: SM-67-62 to CINCAL
et al., 16 Jan 62, JCS 2143/141, JMF 3130 (9 Jan 62). SM-1402-62 to CINCAL et al., 15 Dec 62,
JCS 2143/179, JMF 3130 (5 Dec 62). SM-1082-63 to CINCAL et al., 5 Sep 63, JCS 2143/205-1,
JMF 3130 (15 Aug 63) sec. 2A.
23. Memo, A. D. Suttle to BG Evans, Comments on First Draft of JLRSS-73, 20 Apr 64; Memo
for Record by CAPT Henderson, J5, Discussions Between the ODDR&E and the R&D Division,
J5, Personnel Concerning the JLRSS and the JSOP, 9 May 64; JCSM-613-64 to SecDef, 18 Jul 64,
JCS 1920/15; JMF 3110 (24 Oct 63). The body of JLRSS-73 is in the same file, sec. 1A.
24. DJSM-950-61 to Operations Deputies, 11 Aug 61, JCS 2143/123; JCS 2143/124, 14 Sep 61,
and Decision On, 20 Sep 61; SM-992-61 to Director, J5, 21 Sep 61; JMF 3130 (10 Sep 61). JCS
2143/148, 15 Feb 62; Note to Control Div., JCS 2143/148, 21 Feb 62; JMF 3130 (23 Oct 61) sec. 2.
25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 May 62, and CM-735-62 to SecDef, 14 Jun 62, JCS 1977/162;
JMF 5010 (23 May 62) sec. 1.
26. The term originally employed was Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
The usage later adopted, Five-Year Defense Program, is used here for convenience.
27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 Apr 62, JCS 1800/506; Memo SecDef to CJCS et al.,
18 May 62, JCS 1800/515; JCS Memo of Policy No. 136, 11 May 62, JCS 1800/590; JMF 7000
16 Apr 62) sec. 2. New procedures were summarized in JCS 1800/509, 11 May 62, same file.
Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 118119.
28. CSAFM-139-62 to JCS, 27 Apr 62, JCS 2143/152; CM-734-62 to JCS, 13 Jun 62; CM-85962 to JCS, 2 Aug 62, JCS 2143/164; Decision On JCS 2143/164, 6 Aug 62; JCSM-654-62 to
SecDef, 27 Aug 62, JCS 2143/170; JMF 3130 (24 Oct 61) sec. 3. Henry Glass interviewed by W.
S. Poole on 17 Jul 79. At McNamaras request, the JCS submitted a comparison of the FYDP
with JSOP-67. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Jul 62, JCS 1800/555, JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 8,
pt. 1. JCSM-672-62 to SecDef, 31 Aug 62, JCS 1800/593, same file, sec. 18.
29. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 253254. General Taylor interviewed by W. S.
Poole on 29 Oct 79.
30. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 121125; flooded comes from p. 122.
31. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Nov 62, JCS 1800/560; Note to Control Div., JCS 1800/560,
30 Nov 62; JCSM-964-62 to SecDef, 3 Dec 62; JMF 7000 (28 Nov 62).
32. Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 27, 196210:45 A.M.
Palm Beach, by MG C. V. Clifton, CJCS 031.1 (Conference with the President, Palm Beach,
Florida). Also in FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 446453.
33. CM-109-62 to Director, Joint Staff, 14 Nov 62, JCS 2143/177, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1.
34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 15 Nov 62, JCS 188/651; CM-141-62 to SecDef, 27 Nov
62, JCS 188/651; JMF 7000 (23 Nov 62). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Dec 62, JCS 1800/656
(reissued as JCS 2143/194, 21 Feb 63); CM-289-63 to SecDef, 19 Feb 63, Encl to 1st N/H of JCS
2143/194, 26 Feb 63; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Mar 63, Encl to 2nd N/H of JCS 2143/194, 4 Mar
63; JMF 7000 (4 Dec 62) sec. 1.
35. CM-109-62 to DJS, 14 Nov 62, JCS 2143/177; Msg, JCS 7744 to CINCAL et al., 7 Dec 62,
JCS 2143/178; JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1. Memo, Mid-Range Branch, J5, to Admiral Kauffman and Colonel Gildart, Conference with General Taylor, 29 Jan 63, JMF 3130 (23 Jan 63).
36. JSOP Presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 March 1963, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62)
sec. 2. CM-524-63 to SecDef, 17 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, same file, sec. 2B.
37. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 30 Nov 63, JCS 1800/795; JCSM-952-63 to SecDef, 6 Dec 63,
JCS 1800/795-1; JMF 7000 (30 Nov 63). Memorandum of Conference with the President at
the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Monday, 30 December 1963, at 11:45 EST, by Secretary, JCS, CJCS
031.1 (Meeting with the President). Also in FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 587596.
38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Dec 63, JCS 1800/799; JCSM-997-63 to SecDef, 20 Dec
63, JCS 1800/799-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Dec 63, JCS 1800/806; JMF 7000 (13 Dec
63) sec. 1. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 489490.
310
Notes to Pages 1421
39. SM-1176-63 to CINCAL et al., 23 Sep 63, JCS 2143/205-2, JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 2.
CM-1164 to JCS, 9 Jan 64, JCS 32143/205-13; Note to Control, JCS 2143/205-13, 10 Jan 64;
CM-1122-64 to SecDef, 11 Jan 64, JCS 2143/205-14; JMF 3130 (5 Jul 63). CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20
Mar 64, JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A. DJSM-587-64 to JCS, 4 Apr 64, JCS 2143/225, JMF 3130 (4
Apr 64). Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 306308.
40. JCSM-1000-64 to SecDef, 30 Nov 64, JCS 1800/868-2, JMF 7000.1 (17 Aug 64) sec. 2.
Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Dec 64, JCS 1800/920, JMF 7000.1 (23 Dec 64).
41. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Dec 64; CM-288-64 to JCS, 1 Dec 64, JCS 1800/913; JCSM1022-64 to SecDef, 5 Dec 64, JCS 1800/913-1; JMF 7000 (2 Dec 64). Memorandum of Conference between the President, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Tuesday, 22 December 1964, at 1010 CST, 15 Feb 65;
Lyndon B. Johnson Library. A shorter version is in Foreign Relations of the United States:
19641968, vol. X, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept.
of State, 2002), pp. 199201.
42. FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, p. 197.
Chapter 2. Strategic Priorities Undergo Major Change

1. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 4 Feb 61, JCS 2101/407, JMF 3001 (4 Feb 61) sec. 1. Also in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, pp. 2427.
2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 Feb 61, JCS 2101/409; JCS 2101/412, 8 Mar 61; CSAM111-61 to JCS, 10 Mar 61; JCSM-153-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61, JCS 2101/412; JMF 3001 (4 Feb
61) sec. 1.
3. FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, p. 42. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 232. JCSM-190-61 to
SecDef, 28 Mar 61, JCS 2305/424, JMF 9050/3070 (16 Mar 61) sec. 2. Memo, ActgExecSecy,
NSC, to NSC, 24 Apr 61, JCS 2305/466, same file, sec. 3.
4. Project Solarium was a comprehensive strategy and policy review conducted during the
first year of the Eisenhower administration.
5. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 19 May 61, JCS 2101/429, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61)
sec. 2.
6. JCS 2101/436, 5 Jul 61; Note by Secy, JCS, Decision on SM-744-61, 5 Jul 61; JMF 3001
(14 Apr 61) sec. 3.
7. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Jul 61, JCS 2101/440; JCS 2101/441, 29 Jul 61; Note
to Control, JCS 2101/441, 2 Aug 61; JCS 2101/442, 3 Aug 61; DM-915-61 to JSSC, 4 Aug 61;
JCS 2101/443, 5 Aug 61; JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) sec. 3. The JSSC paper is summarized in FRUS:
196163, vol. VIII, pp. 121122.
8. Note to Control, BNSP, 7 Aug 61, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) sec. 3.
9. State Dept. Draft, BNSP, 26 Mar 62, JMF 3001 (26 Mar 62) sec. 1. Summarized in
FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 243247.
10. State Dept. Draft, BNSP, 7 May 62, JMF 3001 (26 May 62) sec. 1. Summarized in
FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 281282.
11. JCSM-308-62 to SecDef, 16 May 62, JCS 2101/472; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 13 Jun 62,
Att to 1st N/H of JCS 2101/472, 18 Jun 62; JMF 3001 (26 May 62) sec. 3. FRUS: 196163, vol.
VIII, pp. 580584. General Lyman Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 22 Apr 77.
12. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 27 Jul 62, JCS 2101/482; Talking Paper, National
Security Policy Planning Tasks, tabled by CSAF at JCS mtg on 13 Aug 62; Notes to Control,
BNSP Planning Tasks, 13 & 20 Aug 62; JMF 3001 (26 Mar 62).
13. FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, p. 330. Memo, DepUSecState to SecDef, 15 Oct 62, JCS
2101/491, JMF 3001 (26 Mar 62) sec. 4. JCSM-952-62 to SecDef, 7 Dec 62, JCS 2101/493;
CM-165-62 to SecDef, 7 Dec 62, JCS 2101/493; same file, sec. 5. In The Uncertain Trumpet,
pp. 8283, Taylor wrote that Eisenhower BNSPs were so broad in nature and so general in
311
Notes to Pages 2126
language as to provide limited guidance in practical application. . . . The Basic National

Security Policy means all things to all people and settles nothing.
14. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to Holders of NSC 5906/1, Rescission of NSC 5906/1 Basic
National Security Policy, 17 Jan 63; CJCS NSC Files, 5906 BNSP #3. Practically, of course,
NSC 5906/1 had been a dead letter since Kennedy took office. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS,
National Security Planning, 4 Apr 63, CJCS 381 Plans. OASD(ISA), Draft: National Security Planning, 25 Jun 63, CJCS NSC Files, 5906 BNSP #3.
15. CM-414-63 to JSSC, 18 Mar 63, JCS 2101/501; Note to Control, BNSP, 15 Apr 63; JCS
2101/507, 7 Jun 63; Notes to Control, JCS 2101/507, 2, 5 & 17 Jul 63; Policy Considerations
Affecting Planning, tabled by CJCS on 17 Jul 63; JMF 3001 (23 Jan 63).
16. FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, pp. 489490. Memo, Col. E. C. Hardin to CJCS et al., BNSP,
17 Jul 63; Note to Control, BNSP, 22 Jul 63; J5 P 1335-63, 25 Jul 63; CSAFM-407-63 to JCS,
26 Jul 63; Note to Control, Follow-on Questions . . . , 29 Jul 63; JCS 2101/507-1, 24 Aug 63,
and Decision On, 28 Aug 63; JMF 3001 (23 Jan 63).
17. SM-54-62 to CINCAL et al., 11 Jan 62, JCS 1844/350, JMF 3120 (11 Jan 62). SM-1402-62
to CINCAL et al., 15 Dec 62, JCS 2143/179, JMF 3130 (5 Dec 62). SM-1082-63 to CINCAL et
al., 5 Sep 63, JCS 2143/205-1, JMF 3130 (15 Aug 63) sec. 2A.
18. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. X, National Security Policy
(Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2002), pp. 206209.
19. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 May 61, JCS 2285/47, JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 3. Memo,
Carl Kaysen to ASD(ISA), 16 Jun 61, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) sec. 3, Part I. Also in FRUS:
19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 7779, 102105.
20. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 302303.
21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 10 Feb 61, JCS 1800/401, JMF 7000 (10 Feb 61). FRUS:
19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 2730 (quote on p. 29), 4853. JCSM-126-61 to SecDef, 3 Mar 61, JCS
1969/188; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Apr 61, JCS 1969/198; DJSM-417-61 to CSA et al., 11 Apr 61;
JMF 360 (19 Feb 61) sec. 2, pt. 1. The first such report is in JCS 1969/238, 21 Aug 61, and Dec
On, 28 Aug 61, same file, sec. 2, pt. 2.
22. Memo, SecNav to CJCS, 25 Apr 61, JCS 2285/44; JCSM-302-61 to SecDef, 5 May 61, JCS
2285/46, JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61). NSAM 55 to CJCS, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1977/140, JMF 3310 (28 Jun
61). Also in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, p. 111.
23. During a 1977 conversation with W. S. Poole, General Lemnitzer recalled President Kennedy saying that he wanted principals to do some of their own research.
24. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 229230. Memos, Gen. Taylor to DepSecDef et al., 14
Dec 61, and to Members of the Special Group, 2 Jan 62; CM-501-62 to Gen. Taylor, 10 Jan 62;
Memo, BG Craig to CJCS, 11 Jan 62; NSAM 124 to CJCS et al., 18 Jan 62, JCS 1969/288; NSAM
165 to CJCS et al., 16 Jun 62, JCS 1969/369; NSAM 184 to CJCS et al., 4 Sep 62, JCS 1969/414;
NSAM 186 to CJCS et al., 17 Sep 62, JCS 1969/420; JMF 3360 (18 Jan 62) sec. 1. After Gen. Taylor left his White House job, Alexis Johnson became chairman of the Special Group (CI).
25. Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine:
19421976 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), pp. 225227. Kennedy
wanted to transform the entire US Army, both mentally and structurally, into the type of politically astute, socially conscious, and guerrilla-savvy force that he believed was necessary to
combat Maoist-style revolutionsand General Decker did not. Decker assured the President
that, with proper preparation, any good soldier can handle guerrillas. Ibid, p. 226.
26. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 1969/287, same file. Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 24 Jan
62, JCS 1969/293, same file, sec. 2. SACSA-M 18-62 to DJS, 6 Mar 62, CJCS 334 Special Group
(Counterinsurgency).
27. JCSM-252-62 to SecDef, 5 Apr 62, pp. 1926 & 3435, JCS 1969/326, JMF 360 (26 Mar
62) sec. 2.
28. NSAM 56 to SecDef, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1969/215; Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 8 Jun 62, Att
to 2nd N/H of JCS 1969/215, 13 Jun 62; JMF 3330 (28 Jun 61) sec. 1.
312
Notes to Pages 2631
29. US Overseas Internal Defense Policy Guidelines, n.d.; JCSM-552-62 to SecDef, 24 Jul
62, both in JCS 1969/386; JMF 3360 (18 Jul 62) sec. 1. NSAM 182 to CJCS et al., 24 Aug 62,
JCS 1969/410, same file, sec. 2. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 381383. In November, the
JCS revised their paper to conform with US Overseas Internal Defense Policy. JCSM-91862 to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS 1969/439, same file, sec. 3.
30. Memo, Michael Forrestal to Special Group (CI), 11 Dec 62, JCS 1969/449; JCSM-102062 to SecDef, 27 Dec 62, JCS 1969/451; Memo, G. A. Carroll to Michael Forrestal, 10 Jan 63,
JCS 1969/455; JMF 3360 (11 Dec 62).
31. In December 1963, Strike Command was assigned planning responsibilities for the
Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.
32. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 27 Aug 62, JCS 1969/409; JCSM-757-62 to SecDef, 29
Sep 62, JCS 1969/421; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 6 Dec 62, JCS 1969/448; JMF 3360 (22
Aug 62) sec. 1. JCSM-104-63 to SecDef, 4 Feb 63, JCS 1969/475; CM-285-63 to SecDef, 13
Feb 63, Encl to N/H of JCS 1969/460; CM-286-63 to DJS, 14 Feb 63, JCS 1969/464; JCSM258-63 to SecDef, 30 Mar 63, JCS 1969/475; same file, sec. 2.
33. Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 3 June 1977.
34. CM-727-63 to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, 12 Jun 62; CM-728-62 to SecDef, 12 Jun 62;
JMF 3360 (10 Feb 61) sec. 12.
35. Information provided by Mr. Dale Andrade of the US Army Center of Military History.
36. Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 22 April 1977.
37. Extract from a Memo for the President from the Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology, 25 Nov 60, JCS 2056/208; Memo, SecDef to JCS, 20 Jan 61, JCS
2956/208; JMF 3205 (17 Aug 59) sec. 9.
38. JCSM-252-61 to SecDef, 18 Apr 61, JCS 1899/640; CM-190-61 to SecDef, 18 Apr 61, JCS
1899/640; Decision On JCS 1899/651, 2 Jun 61; JMF 3020 (3 Apr 61) sec. 2.
39. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 5 May 61, JCS 2101/427, JMF 3001 (5 May 61) sec. 1.
JCSM-406-61 to SecDef, 15 Jun 61, JCS 2101/433, same file, sec. 2.
40. SM-393-61 to CINCAL et al., 13 Apr 61, JCS 2056/236; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) sec. 1.
41. JCS 2056/236, 4 Apr 61, and Dec On, 13 Apr 61; SM-389-61 to JCS, 13 Apr 61,
JCS 2056/236; SM-390-61 to DSTP, 13 Apr 61, JCS 2056/236; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) sec.
1. Memo, DSTP to JCS, 3 May 61, JCS 2056/251; SM-1266-61 to DSTP, 27 Nov 61, JCS
2056/287; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (4). Memo, DSTP to JCS, 23 Jun 61, JCS 2056/260, same
file, sec. 2. Memo, DSTP to JCS, 23 Jun 61, JCS 2056/264, same file, sec. 2. The words
quoted above are those of the Atlantic Command representative but they apply equally
well to the Pacific Command representative.
42. JCSM-547-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 2056/274; CM-32-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS
2056/274; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (3). JCS 2056/285, 26 Oct 61; Note to Control, Guidance for
Preparation of SIOP-63, 23 Oct 61, and JCSM-756-61 to SecDef, 26 Oct 61, JCS 2056/285;
same file (3) sec. 2. A heavily redacted version of the Guidance is printed in FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. VIII, pp. 181187.
43. A Study of Requirements for US Strategic Systems: Final Report, 1 Dec 61, JMF 4700
(1 Jun 61) sec. 1A. FRUS: 196163, vol. VIII, p. 196, fn. 5.
44. JCSM-23-62 to SecDef, 10 Jan 62, JCS 2101/452, JMF 4700 (1 Jun 61) sec. 1.
45. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to SecDef, Review of the Hickey Study, 22 Dec 61, 381 Strategic Systems, A 3463, RG 330.
46. JCSM-467-62 to SecDef, 20 Jun 62, JCS 2056/230; Msg, JCS 5083 to DSTP et al., 20 Jun
62; CM-986-62 to DSTP, 28 Sep 62; JMF 3105 (8 Mar 61) (3) sec. 4. President Kennedy was
briefed on 14 September. CM-975-62 to Pres, SIOP-63 Briefing, 22 Sep 62, same file. Secretary Gates had given responsibility for war-gaming the SIOP to the JSTPS in Omaha. Gen.
Decker and Adm. Anderson wanted the Joint War Games Control Group in Washington to
conduct comprehensive war games; Gen. LeMay proposed restricting the Group to explor313
Notes to Pages 3138
atory analyses and gaming examination. Gen. Lemnitzer agreed with Decker and Anderson,
advising Secretary McNamara that war-gaming by the JSTPS alone would be a violation of
the time-proven principle that for objective results you never depend solely on self-examination. McNamara authorized comprehensive war-gaming in both Omaha and Washington.
CM-892-62 to SecDef, 18 Aug 62, JCS 1948/72; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Aug 72, Att to 1st
N/H of JCS 1948/72, 5 Sep 62; JMF 3511 (2 Jul 62) sec. 2.
47. JCSM-868-62 to SecDef, 14 Nov 62, JCS 2056/360, JMF 3105 (22 Jun 62) sec. 1. JCSM826-63 to SecDef, 23 Oct 63, JCS 2056/400, same file, sec. 2. The characterization of SIOP-64
draws upon JCS 2056/400, 16 Oct 63, pp. 27, 36, 3839, 4344, and 51. Also, FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. VIII, p. 309.
48. Public Statements of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1962, vol. III, pp.
15051506, OSD Historical Office.
49. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2006), p. 442.
50. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 31 Aug 63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, JCS 1800/753;
JMF 7000 (31 Aug 63) sec. 1. The percentages for assured destruction are printed in FRUS:
19611963, vol. VIII, p. 549.
51. JCSM-867-63 to SecDef, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1800/753-3, same file, sec. 2.
52. Hearings on Military Posture, Senate Com on Armed Services, 88 th Cong, 2 nd
sess, p. 6920.
53. CSAFM-148-64 to JCS, 17 Feb 64; Chairmans Flimsy 117-64 to JCS, 18 Feb 64; Note to
Control, JCS 1844/419, 18 Feb 64; JCS 1844/419, 10 Feb 64; SM-264-64 to CINCAL et al., 2
Mar 64; JMF 3120 (10 Feb 64). That summer, the drafting of JSOP-70 produced the same service splits and a very similar compromise solution. JCS 2143/233, 15 Jul 64, JMF 3130 (15 Jul
64) sec. 1. CSAM-383-64 to JCS, 24 Jul 64; CM-55-64 to JCS, 28 Jul 64; CF-16-64 to JCS, 30 Jul
64; Note to Control, JCS 2143/233 (JSOP-70, Parts IV), same file, sec. 2.
Chapter 3. Strategic Nuclear Forces

1. Donald P. Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic
Forces: 19501983 (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1996), p. 82, 85, 109112.
2. Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 19601961 (Washington,
DC: 1962), p. 919. (Hereafter referred to as Public Papers: Eisenhower.)
3. Figures from the latest NIE are cited in JCS 1924/119, 27 Mar 61, JMF 9177/4700 (23
Mar 61). General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.), interviewed by W. S. Poole on 13 Apr 77.
4. Hearings, Military Posture Briefings, H. Com on Armed Services, 87th Cong, 1st sess,
pp. 646-647. JCSM-430-61 to SecDef, 24 Jun 61, JCS 1907/313, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (12 Jun
61) sec. 1.
5. This was one of the four task forces described in chap. 1.
6. Rpt, Strategic Offense, Continental Air Defense and Related Development Programs,
15 Feb 61, 020 OSD Files, RG 330.
7. Research and Development Task Force Report, 14 Feb 61, 020 OSD Files, RG 330.
8. Hearings, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1962, S. Com on Armed
Services, 87th Cong, 1st sess, pp. 229, 316411.
9. JCSM-521-61 to SecDef, 3 Aug 61, JCS 1800/445; CM-308-61 to SecDef, 7 Aug 61; JMF 7000
(6 Mar 61) sec. 3. JCSM-550-61 to SecDef, 15 Aug 61, JCS 1800/445, same file, sec. 4, pt. 1.
10. JCS 1800/455, 31 Aug 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 4. The OSD paper of 29 August, on
which J5 was commenting, apparently has been destroyed.
11. JCSM-620-61 to SecDef, 11 Sep 61, JCS 1800/451, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 5, pt. 1.
12. JCSM-657-61 to SecDef, 21 Sep 61, JCS 1800/469, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6.
314
Notes to Pages 3948
13. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces
19631967, 23 Sep 61, App I, 23 Sep 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 7. Printed in FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. VIII, pp. 139152.
14. DJSM-1095-61 to General Taylor, 12 Sep 61, JCS 1800/467, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 5.
15. JCSM-697-61 to Pres, 5 Oct 61, JCS 1924/127, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61). FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. VIII, p. 156.
16. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Oct 61, JCS 1800/474, JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61). NY Times, 27
Oct 61, p. 1.
17. Note to Control, DoD Budget for FY 1963, 30 Oct 61; JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61).
18. Memo, SJCS to CJCS, 1 Nov 61; 1st N/H of JCS 1800/476, 3 Nov 61; 2nd N/H of JCS
1800/476, 15 Nov 61; JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61). JCSM-802-61 to SecDef, 17 Nov 61, JCS 2056/286,
JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 7.
19. Memo for Record by DepSecDef, Presidents Meeting with JCS on January 3, 1962, 6
Jan 62, CJCS 031.1. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 232244.
20. CM-592-62 to SecDef, 18 Apr 62, JCS 1924/135, JMF 2210 (27 Sep 61).
21. JCS 2143/148, 13 Feb 62; Note to Control, JCS 2143/148, 21 Feb 62; JMF 3130 (24
Oct 61) sec. 2. CM-734-62 to JCS, 13 Jun 62; CSAFM-186-62 to JCS, 28 Jun 62, JCS 2143/158;
CM-859-62 to JCS, 2 Aug 62, JCS 2143/164; same file, sec. 3.
22. JCSM-654-62 to SecDef, 27 Aug 62, JCS 2143/170, same file, sec. 3. Memo,
DASD(Compt.) to SpecAsst for P&B, JCS et al., 27 Jul 62, JCS 1800/564, JMF 7000 (16 Apr
62) sec. 10. JCSM-630-62 to SecDef, 18 Aug 62, JCS 1800/571, same file, sec. 13. Memo, DASD
(Compt.) to AsstSecAF, 11 Sep 62, N/H of JCS 1800/564, 19 Sep 62, same file, sec. 10.
23. CJCS Special Studies Group, Strategic Nuclear Study, Att to CM-961-62 to SecDef, 15
Sep 62, JMF 4611 (6 Jun 62) sec. 1A. Strategic Nuclear Study: Supplement 1, Att to CM-98862 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, same file, sec. 1.
24. JCSM-836-62 to SecDef, 5 Nov 62, JCS 1823/716; CM-84-62 to SecDef, 5 Nov 62, JCS
1823/717; same file, sec. 2.
25. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 100107.
26. Memo, DASD (Compt.) to SpecAsst for P&B, JCS et al., 10 Sep 62, JCS 1800/614;
JCSM-750-62 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, JCS 1800/616; JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 21B.
27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 62, JCS 1800/619, JMF 7000 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.
28. JCSM-864-62 to SecDef, 6 Nov 62, JCS 1800/639, same file.
29. CM-94-62 to SecDef, 6 Nov 62, JCS 1800/639, same file.
30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Nov 62, JCS 1800/636, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 62).
31. JCSM-907-62 to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS 1800/644; CM-128-62 to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS
1800/649; JMF 7000 (5 Nov 62).
32. Memo for Record by DepSecDef, Second Meeting with the President on FY 1964
Budget Issues, 23 Nov 62, CJCS 111 Budget. Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 27, 196210:45 AMPalm Beach, CJCS 031.1 (Conference with President). Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 415416, 451. Department of Defense FiveYear Force Structure and Financial Program, 7 Jan 63, JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 25B.
33. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201; CM-524-63 to SecDef, 17 Apr 63, JCS
2143/201; JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B. CSAFM-175-63 to JCS, 2 Apr 63, same file, sec. 2A.
34. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 19651969 Strategic Retaliatory
forces, 31 Aug 63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Sep 63, JCS 1800/753, JMF 7000 (31 Aug
63) sec. 1.
35. JCSM-867-63 to SecDef, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1800/753-3, JMF 7000 (31 Aug 63) sec. 2. Draft
Memo, SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 19651969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces, 6 Dec
63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A. Memorandum of Conference with the President at the LBJ
Ranch, Texas, on Monday, 30 December 1963, at 1145 EST, CJCS 031.1 (Meetings with the
315
Notes to Pages 4855
President). Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 590594. DoD Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, 10 Jan 64, JMF 7000 (30 Jan 64) sec. 1A.
36. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/204-15; CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20 Mar 64;
JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A, Vols. I, II, III.
37. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 May 64, JCS 1800/753-4; Amended by Memo,
ASD(Compt.) to CJCS et al., 20 May 64, N/H of JCS 1800/753-4, 25 May 64; JMF 7000 (16
May 64) (1). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Nov 64, JCS 1800/907, same file, sec. 1.
38. JCSM-973-64 to SecDef, 20 Nov 64, JCS 1800/907-1; CM-267-64 to SecDef, 23 Nov 64,
Att to 1st N/H of JCS 1800/907-1, 25 Nov 64; JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to
CJCS et al., 7 Dec 64, JCS 1800/907-2, same file, sec. 3.
39. Enclosure C to JCS 1800/879-1, 9 Sep 64; JCSM-791-64 to SecDef, 12 Sep 64, JCS
1800/879-1, JMF 7000.1 (2 Sep 64) sec. 2.
40. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Oct 64, JCS 1800/900, JMF 7000 (19 Oct 64).
41. JCSM-925-64 to SecDef, 31 Oct 64, JCS 1800/900-1, JMF 7000 (19 Oct 64). CM-267-64
to SecDef, 20 Nov 64, Att to 1st N/H of JCS 1800/907-1, 25 Nov 64, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 2.
42. Conference between the President, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Tuesday, 22 December 1964, at 1020
CST, 25 Jan 65, printed in FRUS: 19641968, vol. X, pp. 199201.
43. J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A. Goldberg, The Development of Strategic Air Command:
19461986, (Offutt AFB, Nebraska; Office of the Historian, HQ, SAC, 1986), p. 113. CINCLANT
Historical Report of Headquarters Operations: 1964, p. 22.
Chapter 4. Continental Defense

1. Watson, Into the Missile Age, pp. 405, 432433. Figures for B47s and B52s come from
Hopkins and Goldberg, The Development of Strategic Air Command: 19461986.
2. Watson, Into the Missile Age, pp. 381383.
3. JCSM-64-61 and CM-83-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 1620/336, JMF 4714 (4 Jan 61).
4. Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) was an automated control system that
could track and intercept enemy bombers. This system was used by the North American
Aerospace Defense Command from 1959 to the 1980s.
5. Strategic Offense, Continental Defense and Related Programs, 15 Feb 61, 020 OSD
Files, RG 330.
6. Memo, DDR&E to CJCS, Project 24, 20 Apr 61, JCS 1620/341, JMF 4730 (20 Apr 61).
7. JCSM-267-61 to SecDef, 24 Apr 61, JCS 1620/343, JMF 4730 (20 Apr 61).
8. General LeMay had replaced General White, which may explain the Air Forces change
of position.
9. JCSM-639-61 to SecDef, 15 Sep 61, JCS1800/462, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 5.
10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Sep 61, JCS 1800/471, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6.
Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Oct 61, JCS 1800/474 (9 Oct 61).
11. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to CJCS, 21 May 62, JMF 7000 (21 May 62). DM-403-62 to JCS, 21
Mar 62, JCS 1800/503, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 8.
12. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Nov 62, JCS 1899/747, JMF 3210 (13 Nov 62).
13. JCSM-933-62 to SecDef, 21 Nov 62, JCS 1899/748, JMF 3210 (13 Nov 62). JCSM-979-62
to SecDef, 12 Dec 62, JCS 1899/753, JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 24A.
14. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Continental Air Defense, 3 Dec 62, JMF 7000 (16 Apr
62) sec. 24A.
15. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Oct 62, JCS 2012/216, JMF 4740 (6 Oct 62).
16. JCSM-884-62 and CM-103-62 to SecDef, 10 Nov 62, JCS 2012/219, JMF 4740 (6 Oct 62).
17. FRUS 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 397, 448.
316
Notes to Pages 5663
18. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B.
CSAFM175-63 to JCS, 2 Apr 63, same file, sec. 2A. Memo, Jerome Wiesner to Pres, 23 Aug
63, JCS 1731/740, JMF 4740 (23 Aug 63).
19. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, A Program for Strategic Defense, 9 Oct 63, Att to
Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Oct 63, JCS 1800/774, JMF 7000 (1 Oct 63).
20. JCSM-852-63 to SecDef, 6 Nov 63, JCS 1800/774-2, JMF 7000 (1 Oct 63). Draft Memo,
SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, 14 Nov 63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.
21. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 587596.
JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A.
23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 May 64, JCS 1800/829, JMF 7000 (21 May 64) sec. 1.
24. JCSM-662-64 to SecDef, 5 Aug 64, JCS 1800/829-5, JMF 7000 (21 May 64) sec. 2.
25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Sep 64, JCS 1800/829-6, JMF 7000 (21 May 64) sec. 2. JCSM
878-64 to SecDef, 16 Oct 64, JCS 1800/829-8, same file, sec. 3.
26. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Nov 64, JCS 1800/907, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 1.
27. JCSM-973-64 to SecDef, 20 Nov 64, JCS 1800/907-1, JMF 7000 (15 Nov 64) sec. 2.
28. See FRUS: 19641968, vol. X, pp. 164165.
29. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to SecAF, Att to N/H of JCS 1800/829-8, 7 Dec 64, JMF 7000 (21
May 64) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Dec 64, JCS 1800/907-2, JMF 7000 (5 Nov 64) sec. 3.
Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 31 Jul 64, JCS 1800/864; Memo, DASD (Compt.) to AsstSecArmy,
21 Nov 64, Att to N/H of JCS 1800/864, 16 Nov 64; JMF 7000.1 (12 Aug 64).
30. Memorandum of Conference between the President, the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Tuesday, 22
December 1964, 1020 CST by Dep SJCS, 25 Jan 65, Box 29, National Security File, Lyndon
B. Johnson Library.
Chapter 5. Conventional Capabilities Expand

1. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. VII, 19571960 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), p. 29. United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited
Military Operations to 1 July 1962, 28 Sep 60, JCS 2285/22, JMF 3072 (7 Jul 60) sec. 3.
2. CM-65-61 to Mr. McNamara, 17 Jan 61, JMF 7000 (16 Jan 61). The Marine Corps was
required by statute to have at least three divisions.
3. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 31 Jan 61, and Memo, DepSecDef to SecAF, 3 Feb 61, JCS
2016/114, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). The C130E is an all-weather, four-engine transport aircraft. It is basically a C130B with two underwing fuel tanks added to increase its range.
4. President Eisenhower had presented an FY 1962 budget calling for $41.8 billion in new
obligational authority.
5. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Feb 61, JCS 2285/35, JMF 3072 (1 Feb 61). JCS 2285/37,
5 Feb 61, JMF 4031 (31 Jan 61). JCSM-75-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 2285/39, JMF 4031 (31
Jan 61). General Lemnitzer was away from Washington and did not file an opinion.
6. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Feb 61, JCS 2285/36, JMF 3072 (3 Feb 61) sec. 1. JCSM-7161 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 2285/38, same file, sec. 2. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Feb 61,
JCS 1924/117; JCSM-68-71 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 1924/118; JMF 2230 (3 Feb 61). Aircraft
deployments are not included because they were listed in numbers of squadrons for the US
and in numbers of aircraft for the communist powers. The two sentences quoted come from
JCSM-71-61.
7. Limited War Proposals, 17 Feb 61, 020 OSD Files, RG 330. Public Papers: Kennedy,
1961, pp. 229240.
317
Notes to Pages 6368
8. JCS 1259/533, 21 Apr 61; JCSM-292-61 to SecDef, JCS1 259/535; CM-222-61 to CSA et al.,
20 May 61; JMF 3140 (11 Apr 61) sec. 1. JCS 1259/547, 30 Jul 61, same file, sec. 3. JCSM-54961 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 1259/547; CM-335-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61; same file, sec. 4.
9. Note to Control, 21 Aug 61; CM-348-61 to SecDef, 29 Aug 61; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19
Sep 61; JMF 3140 (11 Apr 61) sec. 4. JCSM-686-61 to SecDef, 29 Sep 61, JCS 1259/554, same
file, sec. 5. Msg, JCS 1927 to CINCAL et al., 19 Oct 61, JMF 5170 (17 Oct 61). US Strike Command History: 19611962, p. 24. In November 1963, STRICOM was assigned responsibility
for the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and South Asia.
10. JCS 2250/29, 12 Apr 61, JMF 3350 (11 Apr 61) sec. 2.
11. JCS 2250/30 & 31, 26 Apr 61; Note to Control, JCS 2250/29, 30, and 31, 3 May 61; JMF
3350 (11 Apr 61) sec. 2.
12. Rpt, SecNav to SecDef, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 27 May 61; Rpt by DoD Working Group,
A Report on Anti-submarine Warfare 19611967, 15 May 61; JMF 3350 (11 Apr 61) sec. 1.
13. JCSM-429-61 to SecDef, 23 Jun 61, JCS 2250/35, JMF 3350 (11 Apr 61) sec. 2.
14. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Apr 61, JCS 2285/43; Memo, SecNav to JCS, 25 Apr 61, JCS
2285/44; JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 1. Encl B to JCS 2285/46, 5 May 61, same file, sec. 2.
15. JCSM-320-61 to SecDef, 5 May 61, JCS 2285/46, JMF 3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 2.
16. A battle group on Okinawa was expanded into the 173rd Airborne Brigade.
17. Note to Control, Appraisal of Capabilities of Conventional Forces, 8 May 61, JMF
3410 (20 Apr 61) sec. 2. Memo, SecDef, 10 May 61, JCS 2285/47, same file, sec. 3. Published
in part in FRUS: 1961-1963, vol. VIII, pp. 7981. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 May 61,
JCS 2337, JMF 5120 (20 May 61) sec. 1. ROAD stood for Reorganization Objective, Army
Division. The pentomic-to-ROAD switch is described in John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 293298, 303308.
18. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 396406. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy,
pp. 6466.
19. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 535536. NASM 62 to SecDef et al., 24 Jul 61, JCS
1907/335, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (14 Jul 61) sec. 2. Printed in Foreign Relations of the United
States: Berlin Crisis 19611962, vol. XIV (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of
State, 1993), pp. 225226. Kaplan, McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 153154.
20. JCS 1800/437, 7 Jul 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 2. Summary of General Purpose Forces,
4 Sep 61, same file, sec. 4A. JCSM-637-61 to SecDef, 15 Sep 61, JCS 1800/465, same file, sec. 5.
21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Oct 61, JCS 1800/474, JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61). Printed in FRUS:
19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 164169. Civilians in OSD believed that Air Force leaders were
slighting TAC so as to continue concentrating resources in Strategic Air Command. Alain C.
Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 9.
22. JCSM-544-61 to SecDef, 12 Aug 61, JCS 1800/448; Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 22 Sep
61, JCS 1800/471; JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Oct 61, JCS 1800/474,
JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61). FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 170173. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al.,
10 Nov 61, JCS Att to 2nd N/H of JCS 1800/471, 15 Nov 61, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6.
23. Kaplan, McNamara Ascendancy, p. 88. CM-456-61 to SecDef, 1 Dec 61, CJCS 020 (Army).
24. Memo for Record, Meeting on Army Reorganization, 2 Jan 62, CJCS 020 (Army).
1962, 6 Jan 62, CJCS 031.1. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 232234.
26. DJSM-403-62 to JCS, 21 Mar 62, JCS 1800/503, JMF 7000 (6 Mar 61) sec. 6. Between 30
June and 31 December 1961, active duty strength of the armed forces grew from 2.483 to 2.799
million. By activating two National Guard divisions and bringing three regular divisions in
CONUS to full strength, the Army increased its combat-ready divisions from 11 to 16. The Navy
activated 18 ASW squadrons and 40 ASW ships; amphibious lift capability grew from 1 to 2 divisions. The Air Force activated 21 tactical fighter, 4 reconnaissance, and 11 transport and troop
carrier squadrons.
318
Notes to Pages 6874
27. JCS 2143/148, 13 Feb 62; Note to Control, JCS 2143/148, 21 Feb 62; CM-734-62 to
JCS, 13 Jun 62; CM-859-62 to JCS, 2 Aug 62; JCSM-654-62 to SecDef, 27 Aug 62, JCS 2143/170;
JMF 3130 (24 Oct 61) sec. 2.
28. Memo, DASD(Compt.) to SpecAsst for P&B, JCS, 15 Aug 62, JCS 1800/591, JMF 7000
(16 Apr 62) sec. 16.
29. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, pp. 101-104. Final Rpt, US Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, 20 Aug 62, JMF 3230 (24 Jan 62) sec. 1. John J. Tolson,
Airmobility (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1973) provides an overview.
30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Oct 62, JCS 2285/85, JMF 7000 (17 Feb 62) sec. 3.
31. JCSM-922-62 to SecDef, 21 Nov 62, JCS 2285/89, JMF 7000 (17 Feb 62) sec. 3.
32. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 423425.
33. During the Cuban missile crisis, 24 C119 and C123 squadrons were mobilized in
anticipation of a large-scale airborne assault. Those aircraft could not operate over extended
distances. C130Es, by contrast, could serve in either an assault or a strategic airlift role.
34. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 446453. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Oct 62, JCS
2285/85, JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 3. JCSM-922-62 to SecDef, 21 Nov 62, JCS 2285/89, JMF
7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 5.
35. Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, 7 Jan 63,
JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 25B.
36. These were: Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces; Air Force Tactical
Aircraft; Airlift and Sealift Forces; Attack Carrier Forces; Antisubmarine Warfare Forces;
Amphibious Assault Forces; Naval Mine Warfare Forces; Fleet Air Defense Systems; Navy
Shipbuilding and Conversion; and Underway Replenishment Forces.
37. CM-109-62 to DJS, 14 Nov 62, JCS 2143/177, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1. JCSM-30063 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, same file, sec. 2B. During the summer, the Army
submitted Program Change Proposals asking for 18 divisions or at least more units to beef
up existing ones. The JCS repeated their JSOP-68 recommendations, and McNamara disapproved the Armys PCPs. JCS 1800/744-1, 8 Aug 63; JCSM-616-63 to SecDef, 10 Aug 63, JCS
1800/744-1; JMF 7000 (16 Apr 62) sec. 43. Memo, DASD(Compt.) to AsstSecArmy, 10 Sep 63,
JCS 188/744-2, same file, sec. 45.
38. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Oct 63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Oct 63, JCS
1800/775, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 1.
39. JCSM-873-63 to SecDef, 12 Nov 63, JCS 1800/775-1, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 3.
40. CM-1009-63 to SecDef, 12 Nov 63, JCS 1800/775-2, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 3.
41. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 1965-1969 Army and Marine Corps
General Purpose Forces, 19 Dec 62, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A. Relevant parts are printed
in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 565575.
42. See table in Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. X (Washington,
DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2002), p. 192.
43. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 9 Nov 62, JCS 2427; JCSM-924-62 to SecDef, 27 Nov 62, JCS
2427/2; JMF 3230 (24 Sep 62).
44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Dec 62, JCS 2427/5; JCSM-1024-62 to SecDef, 26 Dec 62,
JCS 2427/5; JMF 3230 (24 Sep 62).
45. JCSM-314-63 to SecDef, 19 Apr 63, JCS 2427/10; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 27 May 63, JCS
2427/11; JMF 3230 (24 Sep 62) sec. 4.
46. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 1.
47. JCSM-782-63 to SecDef, 15 Oct 63, JCS 1800/759-1, JMF 7000 (13 Sep 63). Draft Memo,
SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Air Force Tactical Air Program, 12 Dec 63,
JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.
48. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B.
319
Notes to Pages 7479
49. The CX4 later became the C5A.

50. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 14 Sep 63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Sep 63, JCS
1800/760, JMF 7000 (14 Sep 63). Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 1965FY
1969 Airlift and Sealift Forces, 6 Dec 63; DoD Force Structure and Financial Program, 10
Jan 64; JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A. C124s, numbering 272 in mid-1965, would be phased
out by mid-1969. Sealift in mid-1969 would include 53 cargo ships, six Roll-on/Roll-offs, 25
tankers, three forward floating base ships, and two project ships.
51. JCSM-757-63 to SecDef, 12 Oct 63, JCS 1800/760-1, JMF 7000 (14 Sep 63).
52. JCSM-300-63 to SecDef, 13 Apr 63, JCS 2143/201, JMF 3130 (14 Nov 62) sec. 2B, vol.
I. The ASW carriers were Essex-class, dating from World War II, with decks too short to
handle jets.
53. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Sep 63, Encl to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Sep 63, JCS
1800/765, JMF 7000 (6 Sep 63) sec. 1.
54. JCSM-786-63 to SecDef, 10 Oct 63, JCS 1800/765-3; Memo, SecDef to ASD(Compt.), 14
Oct 63, JCS 1800/765-4; JMF 7000 (6 Sep 63) sec. 1. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Attack Carrier (CVA) Forces, 18 Dec 63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.
55. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces FY 1965-1969, 18 Oct
63, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Oct 63, JCS 1800/781; JCSM-862-63 to SecDef, 8 Nov
63, JCS 1800/781-2; JMF 7000 (22 Oct 63). Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Anti-Submarine
Warfare Forces FY 19651969, 11 Dec 63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A. Draft Memo, SecDef
to Pres, 25 Sep 63, Encl to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 27 Sep 63, JCS 1800/766; JCSM-778-63
to SecDef, 5 Oct 63, JCS 1800/766-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 25 Oct 63, JCS 1800/766-3; JMF
7000 (25 Sep 63). Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, Recommended FY 1956-1969 Amphibious
Assault Forces, 10 Dec 63, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) sec. 1A.
56. Memorandum of Conference with the President at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Monday,
30 December 1963, at 11:45 EST, CJCS 031.1 (Meetings with the President).
57. DoD Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, 10 Jan 64, JMF 7000 (3 Jan
64) sec. 1A.
JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A, vol. I.
59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 7 Oct 64, JCS 1800/893, JMF 7000 (7 Oct 64).
60. The Armys justification was that nine divisions were needed to meet fixed requirements in Europe, Korea, Hawaii, and the Western Hemisphere, six to reinforce NATO, and
three to defend South Korea.
61. JCSM-913-64 to SecDef, 30 Oct 64, JCS 18000/893-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Dec 64,
JCS 1800/893-2; JMF 7000 (7 Oct 64).
JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A.
63. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Oct 64, JCS 1800/898, JMF 7000 (15 Oct 64).
64. JCSM-924-64 to SecDef, 31 Oct 64, JCS 1800/889-1, JMF 7000 (15 Oct 64).
65. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/205-15, JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A.
Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 May 64, JCS1800/760-2, JMF 7000 (16 May 64)(2). JCSM-85264 to SecDef, 8 Oct 64, JCS 1800/888-1, JMF 7000.1 (24 Sep 64) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to JCS,
9 Nov 64, JCS 1800/908, JMF 7000.1 (9 Nov 64).
66. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 May 64, JCS 1672/298, JMF 4114 (11 May 64) sec. 1.
JCSM-709-64 to SecDef, 17 Aug 64, JCS 1672/298-2, same file, sec. 2. Memo, SecDef to JCS,
9 Nov 64, JCS 1800/908; JCSM-964-64 to SecDef, 17 Nov 64, JCS 1800/908-1; 1st N/H of JCS
1800/908-1, 15 Dec 64; JMF 7000.1 (9 Nov 64).
67. JCSM-219-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 64, JCS 2143/205-15; CM-1272-64 to SecDef, 20 Mar
64; JMF 3130 (16 Sep 63) sec. 4A, vol. I. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Oct 64, JCS 1800/895;
320
Notes to Pages 7985
JCSM-901-64 to SecDef, 23 Oct 64, JCS 1800/895-1; CM-215-64 to SecDef, 30 Oct 64, JCS
1800/895-2; JMF 7000 (10 Oct 64).
68. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Sep 64, JCS 2250/62, JMF 3350 (17 Sep 64).
69. JCSM-837-64 to SecDef, 1 Oct 64, JCS 2250/62-1, JMF 3350 (17 Sep 64).
70. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 64, JCS 2250/62-2, JMF 3350 (17 Sep 64).
71. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 May 64, JCS 1800/827, JMF 7000 (16 May 64). Memo,
SecDef to CJCS, 17 Oct 64, JCDS 1800/899, JMF 7000 (17 Oct 64).
72. JCSM-923-64 to SecDef, 3 Nov 64, JCS 1800/899-1; CM-234-64 to SecDef, 3 Nov 64, JCS
1800/899-2; JMF 7000 (17 Oct 64). Hrgs, Senate Cmte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations, 1966, 89th Congress, 1st session, pp. 101102.
73. FRUS: 19641968, vol. X, pp. 192193, 199201. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Dec 64,
JMF 7000 (2 Dec 64).
Chapter 6. Disarmament Gives Way to Arms Control

1. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 2, 23, 403. Ltrs, John J. McCloy to Pres, 9 & 24 May
61, JCS 1731/456, JMF 3050 (9 May 61).
2. Memo, McCloy to Pres, 23 May 61, JCS 1731/456; Ltr, DepSecDef to McCloy, 2 Jun 61, JCS
1731/459; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 Jun 61, JCS 1731/456; CNOM-77-61 to JCS, 5 Jun 61;
JCSM-386-61 to SecDef, 6 Jun 61, JCS 1731/458; JMF 3050 (9 May 61).
3. Dept. of State Bulletin, 17 Jul 61, pp. 99106, and 6 Nov 61, pp. 762765. Public Papers:
Kennedy: 1961, pp. 626627.
4. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. VII (Washington, DC: Office of
the Historian, Dept. of State, 1995), pp. 1314.
5. That was about the US total; Soviet personnel numbered perhaps one million more.
6. While there would be debate over exactly what qualified as an SNDV, the broad categories were intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and
bombers. Cruise missiles, because their ranges varied so widely, later became a particular
subject of controversy.
7. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 6 Jun 61, JCS 1731/461; JCS 1731/462, 7 Jun 61; JCSM395-61 to SecDef, 10 Jun 61, JCS 1731/463; JMF 3050 (6 Jun 61) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to
McCloy, 14 Jun 61, JCS 1731/468, same file, sec. 3.
8. JCSM-440-61 to SecDef, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1731/469, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 61) sec. 2. JCSM-53161 to SecDef, 9 Aug 61, JCS 1731/477; Memo, DepSecDef to McCloy, 10 Aug 61, N/H of JCS
1731/477, 18 Aug 61, same file, sec. 3. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 144148.
9. Encl B to JCS 1731/485, 19 Sep 61; JCSM-654-61 to SecDef, 20 Sep 61, JCS 1731/485;
JMF 3050 (18 Sep 61). Public Papers: Kennedy: 1961, pp. 618626. Dept. of State Bulletin,
16 Oct 61, pp. 650654.
10. CM-376-61 to SecDef, 4 Oct 61, JCS 1731/487; Ltr, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 14 Oct 61, JCS
1731/491; JMF 3050 (4 Oct 61) sec. 1.
11. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Oct 61, JCS 1731/491; JCSM-850-61 to SecDef, 6 Dec 61,
JCS 1731/500; Memo, DepSecDef to Dir, ACDA, 28 Dec 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/500, 4 Jan 62,
JMF 3050 (4 Oct 61) sec. 1.
12. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Jan 62, JCS 1731/508, JMF 3050 (4 Oct 61) sec. 1. JCSM101-62 to SecDef, 8 Feb 62, JCS 1731/511, same file, sec. 2. JCSM-139-62 to SecDef, 21 Feb
62, JCS 1731/518, same file, sec. 3. Memo, DepSecDef to Dir, ACDA, 27 Feb 62, Att to N/H of
JCS 1731/511, 5 Mar 62; same file, sec. 2. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 24 Feb 62,
JCS 1731/523; JCSM-137-62 to SecDef, 24 Feb 62, JCS 1731/516; JCSM-155-62 to SecDef, 28
Feb 62, JCS 1731/524; JMF 3050 (18 Jan 62) sec. 2.
13. JCS 1731/530, 13 Mar 62, JMF 3050 (28 Feb 62). Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII,
pp. 345351, 376378.
321
Notes to Pages 8588
14. Ltr, ActgDir, ACDA, to SecDef, 22 Mar 62, JCS 1731/536; JCSM-230-62 to SecDef, 28
Mar 62, JCS 1731/536; CM-629-62 to SecDef, 29 Mar 62, Att to N/H of JCS 1731/536, 3 Apr 62;
JMF 3050 (24 Mar 62).
15. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 406413, 417425, 426437.
16. Dept. of State Bulletin, 7 May 1962, pp. 747760. ACDA later raised the possibility of
discussing foreign base reductions. The JCS and OSD opposed doing so. President Kennedy
approved discussing the possibility, although only after there had been substantial progress toward verifiable arms reductions. ACDA reopened the issue in late 1962 and again in
December 1963. The JCS again objected, McNamara supported them, and the issue faded
away. JCSM-485-62 to SecDef, 27 Jun 62, JCS 1731/590, JMF 3050 (12 Jun 62) sec. 1. Memo,
ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Aug 62, JCS 1731/613, same file, sec. 2. FRUS: 19611963, vol.
VII, pp. 607608. Memo, DSAD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Dec 62, JCS 1731/765-1; JCSM-1011-63 to
SecDef, 30 Dec 63, JCS 1731-765-3, JMF 3050 (19 Dec 63) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to Dir, ACDA,
9 Jan 64, JCS 1731/765-5, same file, sec. 2.
17. One reason was that the Soviets apparently had backed away from their position that
there must first be agreements concerning West and East Germany. NATO then was considering creation of a multilateral nuclear force, West Germany included. FRUS: 19611963,
vol. VII, p. 570.
18. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Sep 62, JCS 1731/624; JCS 1731/626, 19 Sep 62;
JCSM-727-62 to SecDef, 18 Sep 62, JCS 1731/625; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 26 Sep
62, JCS 1731/630; CM-1-62 to SecDef, 3 Oct 62, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/630, 4 Oct 62; Memo,
ASD(ISA) to McGeorge Bundy, 5 Oct 62, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/630, 9 Oct 62; JMF 3050 (23
Aug 62).
19. JCSM-732-62 to SecDef, 19 Sep 62, JCS 1731/621, JMF 3050 (20 Aug 62). In 1977, Gen.
Lemnitzer remembered zonal inspection as having emerged from discussions between
Soviet and American scientists. Lemnitzer recalled saying at an NSC meeting that the JCS
believed zonal inspection could be evaded by assembling equipment at the edge of a zone,
then moving it into the next zone before inspection began. General Lemnitzer interviewed
by W. S. Poole on 31 March 1977.
20. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Oct 62, JCS 1731/632, JMF 3050 (20 Aug 62).
21. Memo, OASD(ISA) to CJCS, Improved JCS Studies on Arms Control Issues, n.d.
[early Nov 1962], CJCS 388.3 Disarmament.
22. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Oct 62, JCS 1731/637; JCSM-876-62 to SecDef, 10 Nov 62,
JCS 1731/639; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepDir, ACDA, 23 Nov 62, N/H of JCS 1731/639, 27 Nov 62; JMF
3050 (23 Oct 62) sec. 1. N/H of JCS 1731/641, 27 Dec 62, same file, sec. 2. Memo, ASD(ISA) to
CJCS, 23 Apr 63, JCS 1731/698; JCSM-341-63 to SecDef, 26 Apr 63, JCS 1731/698-1; JMF 3050 (23
Apr 61) sec. 1. NSAM No. 255 to SecState and SecDef, 30 Jul 63, JCS 222/714; same file, sec. 2.
Dept. of State Bulletin, 8 Jul 63, pp. 5051.
23. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 563564. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 Sep 62, JCS
1731/622; JCSM-719-62 to SecDef, 14 Sep 62, JCS 173/623; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepDir, ACDA, 14
Sep 62, N/H of JCS 1731/623, 24 Sep 62.
24. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Oct 63, JCS 1731/746-1, JMF 3050 (1 Oct 63) sec. 1. JCSM785-63 to SecDef, 7 Oct 63, JCS 1731/746-3; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 10 Oct
63; Note to Control, ACDA Memorandum dtd 10 Oct 63, 11 Oct 63; same file, sec. 2.
FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 892893.
25. MemCon, Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 10 Nov 62, JCS 1731/642; Draft
Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Pres, 12 Nov 62, JCS 1731/643; CM-110-62 to SecDef, 13 Nov 62, JCS
1731/643; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Pres, 20 Nov 62, N/H of JCS 1731/643, 27 Nov 62; JMF 3050
(23 Nov 62). Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Dec 62, JCS 1731/651; JCSM-9-63 to SecDef,
5 Jan 63, JCS 1731/654; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepDir, ACDA, 23 Jan 63, N/H of JCS 1731/654, 28
Jan 63; JMF 3050 (15 Dec 62).
322
Notes to Pages 8994
26. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XI (Washington, DC: Office
of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1997), 78, 2123, 3134, 3840, 46-54. JCSM-41-64 to Theodore Sorensen, 17 Jan 64, JCS 1731/785, JMF 3050 (17 Jan 64).
27. NSAM No. 239 to Cmte of Principals, 6 May 63, JCS 1731/701, JMF 3050 (6 May
63). CM-836-63 to DJS, 28 Aug 63, JCS 1731/718-3; JCSM-776-63 to SecDef, 8 Oct 63, JCS
1731/718-4; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1731/718-5; JMF 3050 (9 Jul 63) (B).
Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, p. 692, 889-892.
28. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Dec 63, JCS 1731/763-1, JMF 3050 (12 Dec 63) sec.
1. JCSM-16-64 to SecDef, 13 Jan 64, JCS 1731/763-2, same file, sec. 2.
29. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jan 64, N/H of JCS 1731/763-5, JMF 3050 (12 Dec 63) sec. 2.
30. Memo, Theodore Sorensen to Dir, ACDA, 17 Jan 64; JCSM-41-64 to Sorensen, 17 Jan
64, JCS 1731/785; JCSM-42-64 to SecDef, 18 Jan 64, JCS 1731/785-1; JMF 3050 (17 Jan 64).
Public Papers: Johnson, 19631964, pp. 171175.
31. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Jan 64, JCS 1731/794, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) sec. 1. JCSM128-64 to SecDef, 15 Feb 64, same file, sec. 3.
32. Memo, ActgDir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 6 Feb 64, JCS 1731/790-1; Memo,
ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Feb 64, JCS 1731/790-2; JCSM-148-64 to SecDef, 22 Feb 64, JCS
1731/790-4; JMF 3050 (23 Jan 64). JCS 1731/800, 24 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (6 Jan 64).
33. JCS 1731/790-9, 2 Mar 64, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec. 2. JCSM-187-64 to SecDef, JCS
1731/790-11; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 5 Mar 64, JCS 1731/790-15; same file, sec. 3.
34. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 12 Mar 64, JCS 1731/790-19; SecDef to Dir,
ACDA, 16 Mar 64, JCS 1731/790-19; JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec. 3. JCS 1731/790-23, 9 Apr
64; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Apr 64, JCS 1731/790-22; JCSM-317-64 to SecDef, 11 Apr
64, JCS 1731/790-24; same file, sec. 4. Encl B to JCS 1731/790-26, 20 May 64, same file, sec. 5.
Facts on File, Disarmament and Nuclear Tests: 19641969, pp. 1617.
35. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 May 64, JCS 1731/790-25, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec.
4. JCSM-443-64 to SecDef, 26 May 64, JCS 1731/790-26, same file, sec. 5A. Ltr, SecDef to Dir,
ACDA, 3 Jun 64, N/H of JCS 1731/790-26, 4 Jun 64, same file, sec. 5.
36. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 15 May 64, JCS 1731/818; Memo, DASD(ISA)
to CJCS, 20 May 64, JCS 1731/818-1; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 4 Jun 64, N/H of JCS 1731/8182, 8 Jun 64; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Jun 64, JCS 1731/818-3; JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) (A) sec.
5. JCSM-530-64 to SecDef, 19 Jun 64, JCS 1731/818-5; CM-20-64 to SecDef, 17 Jul 64, N/H of
JCS 1731/790-35, 17 Jul 64; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 5 Aug 64, N/H of JCS 1731/810-5, 7 Aug
64; same file, sec. 6.
37. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XI, pp. 87-91. Memos, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 6 Jun,
17 Jul, and 24 Jul 64, JCS 1731/790-32, -35, and -37, JMF 3050 (22 Jan 64) sec. 5. Dept. of State
Bulletin, 21 Sep 64, pp. 413417.
Chapter 7. Nuclear TestingStart and Stop

1. JCSM-347-60 to SecDef, 26 Aug 60, JCS 2179/221; JCSM-528-60 to SecDef, 21 Nov 60,
JCS 2179/228; JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60).
2. Outline of Recommended US Positions, 30 Jan 61, Encl 3 to Ltr, McCloy to SecDef, 2
Feb 61, JCS 1731/426, JMF 3050 (2 Feb 61). In March 1960, the United States and the United
Kingdom had proposed a somewhat similar underground moratorium. Geneva Conference
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (1961), pp. 9091.
3. JCSM-99-61 to SecDef, 21 Feb 61, JCS 2179/230; N/H of JCS 2179/230, 28 Feb 61; JMF
4613 (3 Feb 61).
4. Memo, J. B. Fisk et al.to McCloy, 2 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (2 Mar 61).
5. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Mar 61, JCS 1731/430; JCSM-133-61 to SecDef, 4 Mar 61,
JCS 1731/431; JMF 3050 (2 Mar 61). Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test
323
Notes to Pages 94100
Ban (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 3844. FRUS: 19611963,
vol. VII, pp. 1014.
6. Memo, CJCS to CNO, 8 Mar 61, Chairmans File 471.94. This may explain why Dr.
Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, wrote that Lemnitzer presented the
JCS view not very forcefully, I thought. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, p. 11.
7. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, p. 327. Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (1961), pp. 125129. Simultaneously, at the United Nations,
the Soviets insisted that Secretary General Dag Hammarksjold resign and be replaced by a
similar troika.
8. Memo by McCloy, Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations, 22 Apr 61, JCS 1731/442; JCSM-275-61 to
SecDef, 26 Apr 61, JCS 1731/442; N/H of JCS 1731/442, 30 Apr 61; JMF 3050 (22 Apr 61).
9. Memo, MG Bonesteel to DJS, 15 May 61, JCS 1731/450; JCSM-334-671 to SecDef, 17
May 61, JCS 1731/451; JMF 3050 (29 Mar 61).
10. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 6978.
11. Public Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 1961, p. 444. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22
Jun 61, JCS 1731/465; JCSM-445-61 to SecDef, JCS 1731/466; JMF 4613 (22 Jun 61). FRUS:
19611963, vol. VII, pp. 116124.
12. Dr. James Fisk, who chaired the panel described above, was a member.
13. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 106109. Memo. Dr. Jerome Wiesner to SecDef, 28 Jul
61, JCS 1731/434, JMF 4613 (28 Jul 61) sec. 1.
14. JCSM-517-61 to SecDef, 2 Aug 61, JCS 1731/475; Memo, Dr. Brown to Dr. Wiesner, 3
Aug 61, N/H of JCS 1731/475, 9 Aug 61, JMF 4613 (28 Jul 61) sec. 1. Printed in FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. VII, pp. 124129.
15. Memos, DCI, Chmn, AEC, and ActgSecState to Dr. Wiesner, 3 & 4 Aug 61, JCS
1731/476, JMF 4613 (28 Jul 61) sec. 1. Memo, General Taylor to Pres, 7 Aug 61, Box 32, Maxwell Taylor Papers, National Defense University. The State and Taylor memos are printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 131134.
16. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 134137. NSAM No. 69 to Gen. Taylor, 15 Aug 61, JCS
1731/479; Memo, Gen. Taylor to Pres, 8 Sep 61, JCS 1731/482; JMF 3050 (18 Aug 61).
17. FRUS: 19611963, p. 162. JCSM-680-61 to SecDef, 29 Sep 61, JCS 2179/238, JMF 4613
(20 Sep 61). Ltr, DepSecDef to Pres, 9 Oct 61, JCS 2179/242; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Oct
61, JCS 2179/242; JMF 4613 (12 Oct 61) sec. 1.
18. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 31 March 1977.
19. Ibid.
20. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 226227, 241248, 250251.
21. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 30 Nov 61, JCS 2101/448; JCSM-880-61 to SecDef, 22 Dec
61, JCS 2101/451; JMF 2210 (30 Nov 61) sec. 1.
22. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 331-337. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 186192.
23. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 27 Feb 62, JCS 2179/280, JMF 4613 (12 Oct 61) sec. 4.
Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 9 May 62, JCS 2179/313; JCSM-375-62 to SecDef, 11 May 62,
JCS 2179/314; Note to Control, Additional Nuclear Tests During DOMINIC, 14 May 62;
Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 May 62; same file, sec. 7. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 21 Jun
62, JCS 2179/332, same file, sec. 8. JCSM-509-62 to SecDef, 12 Jul 62, JCS 2179/339, same
file, sec. 11. Msg, JCS 5518 to CJTF-8, 1 Aug 62, same file, sec. 12. Kaplan, The McNamara
Ascendancy, p. 335.
24. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, p. 584. Memo, DDR&E to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS
2179/376, JMF 4613 (20 Nov 62). CM-181-62 to SecDef, 21 Dec 62, JCS 2179/383, JMF 4613
(21 Dec 62).
25. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Aug 62, JCS 1731/606; JCSM-614-62 to SecDef, 9 Aug 62,
JCS 1731/607; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to Dir, ACDA, 10 Aug 62, N/H of JCS 1731/607, 17 Aug 62; JMF
324
3050 (6 Jul 62) sec. 2. JCSM-514-62 to SecDef, 14 Jul 62, JCS 1731/597, same file, sec. 1. Memo,
ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Aug 62, JCS 1731/614; JCSM-645-62 to SecDef, 22 Aug 62, JCS 1731/615;
Ltr, ASD(ISA) to Dir, ACDA, 24 Aug 62, N/H of JCS 1731/615, 30 Aug 62; same file, sec. 3.
27. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Feb 63, pp. 198202.
28. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 341-344. JCSM-97-63 to SecDef, 2 Feb 63,
JCS 1731/661, JMF 3050 (29 Jan 63). FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 580, 644645.
29. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 20 Feb 63, JCS 1731/670, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec. 3. JCSM160-63 to SecDef, 22 Feb 63, JCS 1731/672; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepDir, ACDA, 23 Feb 63, N/H of
JCS 1731/672, 5 Mar 63, same file, sec. 4. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Mar 63, JCS 1731/683;
JCSM-234-63 to SecDef, 19 Mar 63, JCS 1731/684; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 22 Mar 63, N/H of JCS
1731/684, 25 Mar 63; same file, sec. 5. Memo, Dir, ACDA to Cmte of Principals, 23 Mar 63, JCS
1731/688; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 5 Apr 63, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/684; same file, sec. 6.
30. SAACM-57-62 to ASD(ISA), 26 Feb 63; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to ActgDir, ACDA, 27 Feb 63, JCS
1731/679; JCSM-172-63 to SecDef, 4 Mar 63, JCS 1731/662; JMF 3050 (7 Apr 62).
31. Note to Control, Formulation of US Position Regarding Arms Control and Disarmament Matters, 4 Mar 63; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 15 Mar 63, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/662, 16 Apr
63; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 10 Apr 63, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/662; Ltr, Dir, ACDAA, to SecDef,
30 Apr 63, 2nd N/H of JCS 1731/662, 14 May 63; JMF 3050 (7 Apr 62).
32. JCSM-327-63 to SecDef, JCS 1731/696, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec. 7.
33. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 280, 378. S. Res. 148, 27 May 63, Att to JCS
1731/707-1, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec. 7.
34. CM-643-63 to DJS, 4 Jun 63, JCS 1731/707; JCS 1731/707-3, 11 Jun 63, and Decision On,
12 Jun 63; JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec. 8. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Jun 63, JCS 1731/709,
JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec. 1. JCSM-462-63 to SecDef (Appendix, pp. 1819, 2325), 17 Jun 63,
JCS 1731/709-1, same file, sec. 2.
35. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 714718. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 759764.
36. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 719726; the McNamara quotation is on p. 721. Hearings, Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, S. Com on Armed Services, 88th Cong. 1st sess, pp. 302305, 352366. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, p. 345.
37. Drafting of the White Papers was prompted by the Committee of Principals meeting on
14 June. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 26 Jun 63, JCS 1731/714, JMF 3050 (26 Jun 63) sec. 1. JCSM514-63 to SecDef, 5 Jul 63, JCS 1731/714; DJSM-146-63 to CJCS, 9 Jul 63; same file, sec. 2.
38. NY Times, 3 Jul 63, p. 4.
39. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII, pp. 779785. Harrimans instructions are printed on pp.
785788.
40. JCS 1731/711-2, 10 Jul 63; CM-732-63 to JCS, 12 Jul 63, JCS 1731/711-3; CSAM-423-63 to JCS,
15 Jul 63; CSAFM-375-63 to JCS, 16 Jul 63; Decision On: JCS 1731/711-3, 16 Jul 63; JMF 3050 (5 Jul
63) sec. 1. Draft JCSM-543-63 to SecDef, n.d., with notation not used; same file, sec. 2.
41. The Defense Department was represented at the Moscow talks by General Counsel
John McNaughton. All Moscow-Washington cables are in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VII and CJCS
388.3 (Test Ban Treaty). Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 599606 (treaty text and address).
42. Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 24, 196310:00 AM, CJCS
031.1 Meetings with the President.
43. Note to Control, Limited Test Ban Treaty, 24 Jul 63; CM-760-63 to DJS, 25 Jul 63, JCS
1731/711-4; JMF 3050 (5 Jul 63) sec. 2. Ltr, CJCS to SecState, 27 Jul 63, JCS 1731/711-7; Ltrs,
CJCS to Dr. Brown, Dr. Wiesner, and Chmn Seaborg, 30 Jul 63, JCS 1731/711-8, -9, & -10; JMF
3050 (26 Jul 63) sec. 1. JCS 1731/711-27, 8 Aug 63, same file, sec. 2.
44. CM-802-63 to JCS, 10 Aug 63; Notes to Control, CM-802-63, 12 Aug 63; JMF 3050 (26
Jul 63) sec. 3. General Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole on 16 Oct 78.
325
45. Statement of Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Three-Environment Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, 12 Aug 63, Encl A to JCS 1731/711-30, JMF 3050 (26 Jul 63) sec. 3. Encl B
contains an unclassified version given to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations
Committees. Taylor Interview, 16 Oct 78.
46. Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, S. Com on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st sess,
pp. 109, 272277, 354359. In subsequent testimony, Dr. Brown, Dr. Bradbury, and Chairman
Seaborg endorsed the treaty while Dr. Foster criticized it. Among former Service Chiefs,
Admiral Anderson spoke for and Admiral Burke spoke against the treaty.
Chapter 8. The Cuban Debacle

1. The Committee drew its name from a presidential directive, NSC 5412, that dealt with
covert activities. The Committee consisted of a Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs. It convened regularly to review covert operations
being conducted by the CIA.
2. CIA Chronology, 23 Apr 61, Chairmans Special File. General Lemnitzer interviewed
by W. S. Poole on 12 Feb 76. Encl C to JCS 2304/19, 24 Jan 61, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Jan 61).
Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 196.
3. Although his phrasing is unclear, General White apparently was offering options for consideration and not actually recommending their execution. JCS 2304/16, 10 Jan 61, and Dec On, 13
Jan 61; SM-41-61 to Dir, J-5, 13 Jan 61; JMF 9123/9105 (10 Jan 61).
4. Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, CJCS Special File.
5. JCSM-44-61 to SecDef, 27 Jan 61, JCS 2304/19, JMF 9123/9105 (10 Jan 61). Printed
in Foreign Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. X, Cuba: 19611962 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1997), pp. 5759. (Hereafter, FRUS:
19611963, vol. X.)
6. In the Discussion accompanying the draft of what became JCSM-44-61, J5 assessed
the internal situation quite differently: In view of the rapid buildup of the Castro governments
military and militia capability and the lack of predictable future mass discontent [emphasis
added], the possible success of the Para-Military Plan appears very doubtful. Encl C to JCS
2304/19, 24 Jan 61, JMF 9123/9105 (10 Jan 61).
7. Memo of Discussion on Cuba, 28 Jan 61, CJCS 091 Cuba. Accounts also are in FRUS:
19611963, vol. X, pp. 6164; the subsequent Pentagon meeting is described on p. 65.
8. CM-261-61 to JCS, 6 Jul 61, CJCS Special File.
9. The Cuban Volunteer Force consisted of (1) an infantry battalion of 826 personnel
armed with mortars, recoilless rifles, and 5 light tanks, (2) an air force of 17 B26 light
bombers and 15 transports, and (3) a navy with 2 LSTs, 3 LCUs, 4 LCPs, and 1 LSD.
10. Peter Wyden, The Bay of Pigs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 89.
11. CM-261-62 to JCS, 6 Jul 61, CJCS Special File. DM-120-61 to CJCS, 1 Feb 61, CJCS 091
Cuba. JCSM-57-61 to SecDef, 3 Feb 61, is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 6778.
12. JCSM-146-61 to SecDef, 10 Mar 61, JCS 2304/21, JMF 925/310 (3 Feb 61). Printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 119134. Ibid, p. 581.
13. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 143, 583.
14. DJSM-549-61 to JCS, 8 May 61, p. 2, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61). The twenty-minute briefing
is mentioned in CM-235-61 to General Taylor, 7 Jun 61, p. 2, CJCS 091 Cuba.
15. JCSM-166-61 to SecDef, 15 Mar 61, JCS 2304/23, JMF 925/310 (3 Feb 61). Printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 149156.
16. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 440.
17. At a meeting on 29 March, however, Bissell indicated that if the operation failed, the
force would probably have to be withdrawn. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 177.
326
18. Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Memo for Record by MG Gray,
Summary of White House Meetings, 9 May 61; CJCS Special File. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X,
pp. 159160.
19. JCS 2304/24, 24 Mar 61; JCSM-210-61 to SecDef, 4 Apr 61, JCS 2304/25; 1st N/H of JCS
2304/25, 12 Apr 61; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61).
20. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 177.
21. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 12 Feb 76. Memo for Record by
General Gray, Summary of White House Meetings, 9 May 61, CJCS Special File. FRUS:
19611963, vol. X, p. 185.
22. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 585.
23. CM-152-61 to CINCLANT, 24 Mar 61, CJCS 091 Cuba. Narrative of Events, p. 1, Encl
to Memo, CINCLANT to JCS, 5 May 61; Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 28 Mar 61, Encl B to JCS
2304/26; SM-363-61 to CINCLANT, 1 Apr 61, Encl A to JCS 2304/26; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec.
1. Memos for Record by General Gray, Summary of White House Meetings, 9 May 61, and
Rules of Engagement for Naval Air and Surface Craft, 2 May 61; CJCS Special File. CM-17961 to CINCLANT, 7 Apr 61; Analysis of...Rules of Engagement, pp. 45, Encl 2 to Memo,
CINCLANT to JCS, 5 May 61; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 1. ROEs of 7 & 13 April are printed
in FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 192195, 218219. The covering Task Group 81.8, commanded by Rear Adm. John E. Clark, consisted of the carrier Essex and seven destroyers, two
destroyers for a convoy escort unit, one LSD as an amphibious support unit, and one tanker
as a replenishment unit.
24. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 213216, 218. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 258259.
25. Except where otherwise cited, this section is based upon Haynes Johnson, The Bay of
Pigs (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), pp. 103172, and Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 173288.
26. Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, CJCS Special File. Msg, JCS
994222 to CINCLANT, 171050Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2. Lemnitzer Interview, 12
Feb 76. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 589.
27. A CIA Command Post had been set up in Washington. Information was passed by
messenger and telephone from the CIA to the Pentagons War Room; Service liaison officers
then briefed their respective Chiefs. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 599, 542.
28. Msg, JCS 994227 to CINCLANT, 171622Z Apr 61; Msg, JCS 994248 to CINCLANT,
172035Z Apr 61; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2. Narrative of Events, p. 8, Encl 3 to Memo,
CINCLANT to JCS, 5 May 61, same file, sec. 1. Adm. Dennisons recollection is in Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Oct 79, p. 112.
29. The transcript of Adm. Burkes telephone call to his aideNobody knew what to do
nor did the CIA who were running the operationis in FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 274275.
30. Adm. Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 26 Oct 75. Msg, JCS 994309 to CINCLANT,
181337Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2. Msgs, CTG 81.8 to CINCLANTFLT, 182212Z &
182142Z Apr 61, same file, sec. 3; the JCS were information addressees. Msg, JCS 994317Z to
CINCLANT, 181949Z Apr 61, same file, sec. 2. Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 182306Z Apr 61, same
file, sec. 2. Practically all the message traffic for 18 and 19 April is printed in the FRUS volume.
31. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 287.
32. Msg, JCS 994379 to CINCLANT, 190837Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2.
33. Narrative of Events, p. 14, Encl 3 to Memo, CINCLANT to JCS, 5 May 61, JMF 9123
(24 Mar 61) sec. 1.
34. Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 190701Z Apr 61; Msgs, CTG 81.8 to CINCLANT, 191340Z &
191618Z Apr 61; JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 3. The ammunition-carrying freighters Atlantico
and Caribe had headed south on 17 April. They were brought back by the US Navy but held
sixty miles offshore, because CIA Headquarters decided that they would certainly be lost in
a daylight run. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 592594.
327
35. Afterwards, Lemnitzer testified: It was our understanding. . . without any doubt
that moving into the guerrilla phase was one of the important elements of the plan,
and any idea that the Chiefs considered that they were making an indefinite lodgment
on the beachhead is not right. . . . This Zapata area is not much different from that in
Vietnam, where theyre having the devils own time chasing the guerrillas through the
swamps. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 534, 535. However, moving into the guerrilla phase was quite different from the build-up and offensive phases outlined in the
Chiefs logistical support plan above.
36. Destroyers were dispatched because amphibious craft had not yet arrived in the area.
FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 543.
37. Msg, JCS 994392 to CINCLANT, 191812Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61) sec. 2.
The heading read from General Gray but other hands presumably did a good deal of
the drafting. Lemnitzer remembered what a British officer had said during a crisis in
the Salerno landing of 1943no operation was more difficult than withdrawal from a
beleaguered beachhead. Lemnitzer Interview, 12 Feb 76.
38. Msgs, CTG 81.2 to CINCLANTFLT, 191917Z & 192020Z Apr 61, JMF 9123 (24 Mar 61)
sec. 3.
39. The survivors were ransomed and brought to Florida in December 1962.
40. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 179184.
41. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 496497.
42. Ibid, pp. 502, 505.
43. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 531, 532, 536. Burkes testimony is printed in Operation
Zapata (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981), pp. 350351.
44. CM-235-61 to General Taylor, 7 Jun 61, CJCS 091 Cuba.
45. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 584.
46. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 188.
47. Untitled draft with Notation by General Taylor, This was read by President Kennedy to the JCS about 27 May, 1961, Box 12, Taylor Papers, National Defense University. This draft also contained a biting critique of the JCS: I must say frankly that I do
not think the JCS gave me the support to which the President is entitled. My impression
is that as a body you did not study the plan with the thoroughness which so important a
matter deserved. But, when interviewed separately by W. S. Poole in 1980, General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke firmly denied that the President used those words in speaking
to them.
48. NSAM No. 55, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1977/140, JMF 3310 (28 Jun 61). FRUS: 19611963, vol.
X, p. 575.
49. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to CJCS, 28 Jun 61, JCS 1977/141, JMF 5201 (28 Jun 61).
50. Memo, CNO to CJCS, 17 Jul 61, CJCS Special File.
51. Admiral Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 28 Oct 75.
52. Lemnitzer Interview, 12 Feb 76.
53. Major General Chester V. Clifton, USA (Ret.), interviewed by W. S. Poole on 14 Aug 79.
54. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 482, 666667, 710.
Chapter 9. The Laotian Precipice

1. Note to Control Div., Situation in Laos, 17 Aug 60; CSAFM-390-60 to JCS, JCS
1992/839; JCSM-373-60 to JCS, 19 Aug 60; JMF 9155.2/9105 (12 Aug 60). US Ambassador Winthrop Brown argued for a coalition government, headed by Souvanna but excluding communists and Pathet Lao. Adm. Burke promptly warned Secretary Gates that Souvanna was a
weak sister and not inclined to resist communists. Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age
328
(Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1997), p. 651. From here on, the JCS viewed Brown
as a purveyor of dangerous advice.
3. CSAFM-473-60 to JCS, 20 Dec 60; Briefing Sheet for CJCS, JCS 1992/882, 20 Dec
60; JCSM-580-60 to SecDef, 22 Dec 60, JCS 1992/882; N/H of JCS 1992/882, 6 Jan 61; JMF
9155.2/9105 (20 Dec 60). Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 654. By 31 December 1960, US
assistance to the RLG over the years totaled $214.1 million in economic and $63.4 million in
military aid. Memo, SecDef to BG Clifton, 30 Mar 61, CJCS 091 Laos.
4. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. XXIV (Washington, DC: Office
of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1994), pp. 78.
5. CNOM-7-61 to JCS, 10 Jan 61, JMF 9155.2/9105 (30 Dec 60).
6. At an interagency meeting on 17 January, Gen. Lemnitzer said that the principal concern of the JCS was that we were not winning on the ground because we were not able to
train and support the FAL fully. French responsibility for training was not good enough. We
had no indication of lack of equipment. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, p. 14.
7. SEATO signatories were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. A protocol designated Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam as additional areas where armed aggression would be recognized as a threat
calling for action under the treaty. In 1959, SEATOs Military Planning Office started work on
Plan 5 for intervention in Laos.
8. JCSM-13-61 to SecDef, 14 Jan 61, JCS 1992/894, JMF 9155.2/9105 (30 Dec 60).
9. Several accounts, contradicting each other on key points, are printed in FRUS:
19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 1925, 4142. The quotes come from p. 19 and fn. 5 on p. 25.
Eisenhowers exact words and their meaning have drawn a good deal of scholarly attention, none of it conclusive.
10. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 2642. Memos, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 23 Jan 61, Encl
B to JCS 1992/906, and McGeorge Bundy to SecState and SecDef, 23 Jan 61, Encl A to JCS
1992/906; JMF 9155.2/9105 (23 Jan 61). Secretary McNamara considered these decisions in
accord with the JCS goal of keeping the Boun Oum government in control of major cities.
N/H of JCS 1992/906, same file.
11. JCSM-34-61 to SecDef, 24 Jan 61, JCS 1992/903, JMF 9155.2/9105 (11 Jan 61). In
December, Gen. Decker had urged Amb. Browns removal. CSAM-430-60 to JCS, 8 Dec 60,
CJCS 091 Laos.
12. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 4244. On 26 January, Lemnitzer asked McNamara
to discuss with State ways of removing Kong Le from Laos and Souvanna from Cambodia,
creating a Laotian special forces unit, and arranging a bounty system for capturing or eliminating Pathet Lao leaders. CM-71-61 to SecDef, 26 Jan 61, JCS 1992/910, JMF 9155.2/9105
(26 Jan 61).
13. Memos, CJCS to Pres. Kennedy, 6 and 16 Feb 61, CJCS 091 Laos.
14. Msgs, JCS 990154 to CINCPAC, 3 Feb 61, and State 868 to Vientiane, 14 Feb 61, summarized in the Laotian Crisis Chronology, JHO.
15. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 012300Z Mar 61; CM-223-61 to JCS, 6 Mar 61; CJCS 091 Laos.
16. Concept for the Recapture of the Plaine des Jarres, 9 Mar 61, CJCS 091 Laos. FRUS:
19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 7279. Kennedy approved preparatory actions by DOD that included stationing a Marine Air Base Squadron in Thailand for helicopter maintenance support,
delivering four C130 transports, making eight B26 bombers available, and further augmenting the PEO. Msgs, JCS 991705 and 991727 to CINCPAC, 11 & 13 Mar 61, CJCS 091 Laos.
17. Msg, Chief, PEO, to CINCPAC, DA IN 94444, 18 Mar 61, JHO.
18. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 212220.
19. Msg, State Dept. Circular 1489, 29 Mar 61, summarized in Laotian Crisis, JHO.
329
20. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 240658Z Mar 61; Msg, JCS 992897 to CINCPAC, 29 Mar 61, JCS
1992/381; JMF 3146 (21 Mar 61). It is noteworthy that no one expected Britain or France to
participate in a SEATO intervention.
21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Mar 61; CM-153-61 to LTG Trapnell, 14 Mar 61; CJCS
091 Laos. Memo, LTG Trapnell to CJCS, 28 Mar 61, JCS 1992/936; JMF 9155.2/9105 (28
Mar 61). CM-159-61 to JCS, 28 Mar 61, CJCS 091 Laos. JCSM-206-61 to SecDef, 31 Mar 61,
JCS 1992/943; JCSM-233-61 to SecDef, 7 Apr 61, JCS 1992/954; JCSM-232-61 to SecDef,
11 Apr 61, JCS 1992/952; JCSM-244-61 to SecDef, 13 Apr 61, JCS 1992/955; JCSM-257-61
to SecDef, 20 Apr 61, JCS 1992/964; Ltr, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Apr 61, JCS 1992/966; JMF
9155.2/9105 (28 Mar 61).
22. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Mar 61, JCS 1992/947; JCSM-222-61 to SecDef, 11
Apr 61, JCS 1992/950; 1st N/H of JCS 1992/950, 27 Apr 61; JMF 9155.2/9105 (7 Jan 61).
23. Msgs, State Dept. Circulars 1614 and 1631, n.d.; Msg, State Dept. Circular 1665, 24 Apr
61; Msg, Chief, MAAG, Laos to CINCPAC, 26 Apr 61, DA IN 107585; Msg, Vientiane 1943 to
State, 26 Apr 61; summarized in Laos Chronology, JHO.
24. Gen. Lemnitzer was in Europe, finishing the first part of a round-the-world trip. After
talking long-distance with McNamara and Burke, he decided to continue the journey. Since
his travel plans were known, allies might interpret his return to Washington as a sign of
panic within the administration. Also, Lemnitzer wanted to visit US troops and missions in
the Far East at this time of rising tension. Gen. Lemnitzer made these comments to W. S.
Poole after reading an early draft of this chapter.
25. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 142144. It seems questionable whether the
general agreement described by Bundy included Adm. Burke. Msg, SecState 1172 to
Vientiane, 26 Apr 61; Msg, JCS 994935 to CINCPAC, 26 Apr 61; summarized in Laos
Chronology, JHO.
26. Memorandum on the Presidents Meeting with Congressional Leaders on April 27,
1961, Att to Memo, U. A. Johnson to BG Clifton, 4 May 61; Box 345, National Security Files,
John F. Kennedy Library.
27. Admiral Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 28 Oct 75.
28. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 150154.
29. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 May 61, Laos 381, RG 330. FRUS: 19611963, vol.
XXIV, fn. 1 on p. 164.
30. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 166169. Khrushchev did want to tone down risktaking in Laos by China and North Vietnam, but Beijing and Hanoi showed little inclination
to cooperate with him. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 394395.
31. Note to Control Div., Laos, 2 May 61, CJCS 091 Laos. Memos, CNO, CSA, CMC,
and CSAF to SecDef, 2 May 61, Laos 381, RG 330. These are summarized in FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 169170. Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr went beyond Decker
in recommending ground intervention. Conversely, Secretary of the Air Force Eugene
Zuckert appreciated that air attacks alone might prove ineffective but the difficulty
with ground intervention is that from the standpoint of the [Soviets] it may be exactly
what they wish. The result will be to tie us up, perhaps for years, in an occupation misty
as to its objective. By limiting itself to air action, the administration would preserve a
much better position to cut our prestige loss. Hindsight makes Zuckerts advice look
soundest of all. Proposal of Secretary of the Army and Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 2 May
61, Laos 381, RG 330.
32. Gen. Lemnitzers message is contained in his papers at the National Defense University.
33. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, p. 171. Draft Memo for the President, Plan for Possible
Intervention In Laos , 4 May 61, JCS 1992/985, JMF 9155.2/9105 (9 May 61) (2).
34. JCS 1992/976, 5 May 61; CSAFM-149-61 to JCS, 9 May 61; JCSM-319-61 to SecDef, 12
May 61, JCS 1992/976; 1st N/H of JCS 1992/976, 29 May 61; JMF 9150/3072 (5 Apr 61).
330
35. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 185187. Memo for Record by Chief, Pacific Division, J3, White House Conference, 9 May 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1992/988, 15 May 61, JMF
9155.2/9105 (9 May 61) sec. 1.
36. Secretary Rusk attended the opening sessions. Thereafter, Assistant Secretary of
State Averell Harriman usually headed the delegation. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul
Nitze represented DOD.
37. JCSM-460-61 to SecDef, 12 Jul 61, JCS 2344/1, JMF 9155.2/3100 (24 Jun 61). Printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 292294. Concurrently, Gen. Lemnitzer advised President
Kennedy that, although progress is being made, the FAL was not yet an effective fighting
force. Memo, CJCS to Pres, 7 Jul 61, CJCS 091 Laos. Printed in ibid, pp. 290292. In so saying, the Chairman relied upon Gen. Boyles assessment in Msg, Chief, MAAG, Laos, to JCS,
010515Z Jul 61, DA IN 127376, CJCS 091 Laos.
38. Msgs, Paris to State, SECTOs 30 & 31, 7 Aug 61, and SECTO 42, 8 Aug 61, summarized
in Laotian Crisis. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 399400.
39. JCSM-611-61 to SecDef, 7 Sep 61, JCS 2344/10, JMF 9155.2/3100 (9 May 61) (2).
40. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 644.
41. JCSM-688-61 to SecDef, 29 Sep 61, JCS 2344/14, JMF 9155.2/3100 (13 May 61).
42. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Oct 61, JCS 2344/17, JMF 9155.2/3100 (13 May 61).
43. JCSM-704-61 to SecDef, 5 Oct 61, JCS 2344/18, same file.
44. Gen. Boyle believed the FAL now could cope with the Pathet Lao but not the North
Vietnamese. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, p. 525.
45. JCSM-12-62 to SecDef, 5 Jan 62, JCS 2344/28; 1st N/H of JCS 2344/28, 16 Jan 62; JMF
9155.2/3100 (29 Dec 61). Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 578583.
46. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, p. 610. JCS 2343/99, 27 Mar 62, JMF 9155.3/9105 (16 Dec
61) sec. 4. A different account of the meeting, omitting most of Lemnitzers words, is in ibid,
pp. 658661.
47. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 695697, 711712, 717719.
48. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 425426.
49. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 16 Dec 76. Visit to SEA by the Secretary of Defense, 811 May 1962, JMF 9150/5420 (14 May 62) sec. 1.
50. JCSM-376-62 to SecDef, 11 May 62, JCS 2333/44, JMF 9155.2/3100 (10 May 62). Printed
in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 742744.
51. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 745746, 754756, 758-760. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS,
240026Z and 300232Z May 62, summarized in Laotian Crisis.
52. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, p. 789. JCS 2344/48, 31 May 62; Note to Control Div.
Laos (JCS 2344/48), 1 Jun 62; JCS 2344/49, 5 Jun 62; JMF 9150/3100 (30 May 62) sec. 1. Ibid,
pp. 801813; the McNamara and Lemnitzer quotations are on p. 811.
53. JCS 2344/50, 5 Jun 62; 1st N/H of JCS 2344/50, 7 Jun 62; JCSM-431-62 to SecDef, 6 Jun
62, JCS 2344/52; Note to Control Div., Laos, 6 Jun 62; JMF 9150/3100 (30 May 62) sec. 1.
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, pp. 815823, 829830.
54. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIV, fn. 1 on p. 837.
55. Dept. of State Bulletin, 13 Aug 62, pp. 259263.
Chapter 10. The Berlin Confrontation

1. The Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic while the western powers
zones became the Federal Republic of Germany. Here, for convenience, the two states are
labeled East and West Germany.
2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 19 Jan 59, pp. 8189.
331
3. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy:
19571960 (Washington, 0ffice of Joint History, 2000), pp. 126128.
4. Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 22 May 60, JCS 1907/270, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (26 Jun 59) sec.
2. Ltr, Dep USCINCEUR to CJCS, 20 Jun 60; Ltr, USCINCEUR to CINC, British Army of the
Rhine, 31 Jan 61, JCS 1907/290, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (20 Jun 60).
5. JCSM-349-60 to SecDef, 12 Aug 60, JCS 1907/274, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (28 Mar 600
sec. 2.
6. New York Times, 24 Feb 61, p. 1. Memo, Dean Acheson to Pres Kennedy, 3 Apr 61, JCS
1907/293, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec. 1.
7. JCSM-237-61 to SecDef, 13 Apr 61, JCS 1907/191, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (1 Apr 61) sec. 1.
8. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to SecDef, 17 Apr 61, JCS 1907/294; JCSM-287-61 to SecDef,
28 Apr 61, JCS 1907/295; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec.1.
9. Memo, SecDef to Pres Kennedy, 5 May 61, JCS 1907/298, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (3 Apr
61). Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, vol. XIV
(Washington, DC: State Dept. Historical Office, 1993), pp. 6163.
10. JCSM-196-61 to SecDef, 4 May 61, JCS 1907/296, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec. 2.
11. They were referring to a reworking of Basic National Security Policy described in chap. 1.
12. JCSM-353-61 to SecDef, 25 May 61, JCS 1907/302; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 25 May
61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (1 Apr 61) sec. 1.
13. Msg, USNMR to SecDef, 291747Z May 61, DA IN 117306; Msg, DEF 996578 to USNMR,
30 May 61; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 041730Z Jun 61, DA IN 118966-S; Msg, USCINCEUR to
JCS, 041800Z Jun 61, DA IN 119006Z Jun 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (19 May 61).
14. JCSM-419-61 to SecDef, 21 Jun 61, JCS 1907/308, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (3 Apr 61) sec.
3. J3M-732-61 to DJS, 1 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (19 May 61).
15. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 2006), pp. 355359.
16. JCSM-360-61 to Pres Kennedy, 27 May 61, JMF 5410 (25 May 61). Gen. White
wanted to say that it is the unequivocal opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At Gen.
Deckers urging this was softened to considered judgment. Memo, CASF to DJS, n.d.;
Memo by CSA, 26 May 61; same file. Interviews, Adm. Arleigh Burke, 28 Oct 75, and
Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, 25 Jan 77, with W. S. Poole.
17. Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 374377.
Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 3 Jun 77.
18. JCSM-423-61 to SecDef, 21 Jun 61, JCS 1907/309, JMF 9172 Berlin/3070 (15 Jun 61).
The Chiefs also passed their paper to Acheson.
19. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 12 Jun 61, JCS 1907/305; JCSM-430-61 to SecDef, 24 Jun
61, JCS 1907/313; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (12 Jun 61) sec. 1.
20. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to SecDef, 12 Jun 61, JCS 1907/306; JCSM-431-61 to SecDef,
26 Jun 61, JCS 1907/311; Memo, ASD(ISA) to Bundy, 26 Jun 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1907/311; JMF
9172 Berlin/3100 (12 Jun 61).
21. Msg, USNMR to JCS, 271335Z Jun 61, DA IN 125851, CJCS 091 Germany. Printed in
FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 136138.
22. Msg, JCS 998202 to USNMR, 27 Jun 61, CJCS 091 Germany. JCS 1725/391, JMF 3170
(1 Jul 61).
23. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 138159; the quotations are on pp. 138139 and p. 156.
24. Ibid, pp. 160163.
25. JCSM-464-61 to SecDef, 6 Jul 61, JCS 1907/316, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (30 Jun 61) sec.
2. JCSM-463-61 to SecDef, JCS 1725/391, JMF 3170 (1 Jul 61).
26. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, p. 186. This resulted from a meeting at the Kennedy
compound in Hyannis Port that Gen. Lemnitzer attended. Lemnitzer Interview, 25 Jan 77.
332
27. This statement was added at Gen. LeMays suggestion. CSAFM-228-61 to JCS 12 Jul
61, JMF 3170 (1 Jul 61) sec. 2.
28. JCSM-461-61 to SecDef, 12 Jul 61, JCS 1907/321, JMF 3170 (1 Jul 61) sec. 2.
29. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 197198. JCS 1907/328, 16 Jul 61, JMF 9172
Berlin/3100 (14 Jul 61) sec. 1. JCS 1907/329, 18 Jul 61; JCSM-486-61 to SecDef, 18 Jul 61, JCS
1907/329, same file, sec. 2.
30. JSSC Memo 45-61 to CJCS, 20 Jul 61, CJCS 091 Germany. JCS 1907/322, 13 Jul 61, and
Dec On, 20 Jul 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (13 Jul 61).
31. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 216-217.
32. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 219222, 225226. NY Times, 2 Aug 61, p.
1, and 11 Aug 61, p. 1. Public Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 533540.
Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc., 67th Congress, 1st session, pp. 4663, 175176.
33. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Jul 61, JCS 1907/337, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (27 Jul 61) sec.1.
34. JCSM-508-61 to SecDef, 29 Jul 61, JCS 1907/338, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (27 Jul 61)
sec. 1. JCS 1907/334, 26 Jul 61; JCSM-515-61 to SecDef, 3 Aug 61, JCS 1907/334, JMF 9172
Berlin 3100 (26 Jul 61). After long study, State and Defense disapproved, claiming mainly
that a short paper could not capture all the ramifications of a fast-moving crisis and that
some critical policies had not yet been adequately elaborated. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21
Oct 61, N/H of JCS 1907/334, 24 Oct 61, same file.
35. Msg, USNMR to JCS, ALO 659, 021555Z Aug 61; Msg, DEFREPNAMA to SecDef, REPNAMTO 9060, 031840Z Aug 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (27 Jul 61) sec. 2. Also, Paul H. Nitze,
From Hiroshima To Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 200201.
36. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 May 61, JCS 1907/299; JCSM-502-61 to SecDef, 29 Jul 61,
JCS 1907/331; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (1 Apr 61) sec. 1.
37. Memo, CNO to JCS, 10 Aug 61, JCS 1907/350, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (10 Aug 61).
38. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 375376, 381382.
39. JCS Historical Division, United States and West German Reaction to the Berlin Wall,
Section I, pp. 14, 8, JHO. Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 12 Feb 76. A much
less dramatic account of the meeting is in FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 347349.
Gen. Norstad, informed of the decision, recommended sending a much smaller force. Ibid,
pp. 350351.
40. JCS 1907/407, 20 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (21 Aug 61).
41. JCSM-570-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 1907/363; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 Sep
61, N/H of JCS 1907/363, 5 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (17 Aug 61) sec. 1. JCSM-651-61 to
SecDef, 20 Sep 61, JCS 1907/402; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1907/402,
4 Oct 61; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 8 Nov 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 1907/402, 13 Nov 61; same file, sec.
2. Msg, JCS 2442 to USCINCEUR, 2 Dec 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (29 Nov 61).
42. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Sep 61, pp. 431433.
43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 24 Aug 61, JCS 1907/375, JMF 9172 Berlin 3100 (24 Aug 61).
Monograph by Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army Expansion, 19611962, p. 53.
44. Msg, JCS 1329 to USCINCEUR, 31 Aug 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (31 Aug 61) sec. 1.
45. CJCS Debriefing of JCS, 1 Sep 61, summarized in Berlin Question, JHO. Memo,
Gen. Taylor to Pres, 1 Sep 61; Msg, JCS 1334 to USCINCEUR, 1 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100
(31 Aug 61) sec. 1.
46. CJCS Debriefing of JCS, 1 Sep 61, summarized in Berlin Question, JHO. Msg,
JCS 1362 to Pres, 2 Sep 61; Msg, JCS 1363 to USCINCEUR, 3 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/4031
(28 Jul 61).
47. Msg, USNMR ALO 809 to JCS, 18 Sep 61, DA IN 151916; JCSM-666-61 to SecDef, 22
Sep 61, JCS 1907/417; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1907/417; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Oct 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 1907/417; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (31 Aug 61) sec. 1.
333
48. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 31 Aug 61, Box 35, Maxwell Taylor Papers, National Defense
University. JCS 1907/386, 6 Sep 61, and Decision On, 6 Sep 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (5 Sep 61).
49. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 7 Sep 61, JCS 1907/390, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (7 Sep 61).
Gen. Norstad reported that, by 1 January 1962, combat-ready forces in Central Europe
would grow from 21 to 24 divisions. Additionally, the US, UK, France, and Canada had
agreed to assemble a strategic reserve of 12 5/3 divisions. But Norstad did not consider
these steps to be enough. Ltr, SACEUR to Pres, SHAPE 188/61, 15 Sep 61, summarized in
Berlin Question, JHO.
50. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 398399.
51. CM-358-61 to SecDef, 11 Sep 61, JCS 1907/395, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61). The
statements in paragraphs 3 and 8 were based upon conclusions by the Chairmans NATO
Working Group, described in chap. 13.
52. Msg, JCS 1495 to USCINCEUR, 12 Sep 61; Msg, SecDef to USCINCEUR, 13 Sep 61; Msg,
USCINCEUR PRS 232 to SecDef, 16 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61).
53. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 18 Sep 61; Note to Control Div., Presidents Questions
and Draft Answers Relating to Berlin, with Note to Implementation Div., 18 Sep 61; N/H of
JCS 1907/396, 19 Sep 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61). FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962,
p. 428429.
54. NY Times, 20 Sep 61, p. 1.
55. Current intelligence presumably referred to the SHAPE figure cited in Gen.
Norstads message above.
56. JCSM-641-61 to SecDef, 22 Sep 61, JCS 1907/396, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (8 Sep 61).
57. Msg, JCS 1227 to USCINCEUR, 24 Aug 61; Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, Ser 4414, 21 Sep
61, JCS 1907/412; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61) sec. 1.
58. JCS 1907/418, 26 Sep 61; CNOM-152-61 to JCS, 2 Oct 61, JCS 1907/420; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61)(1) sec. 2. Memo for Record, JCS Meeting with Gen. Norstad, 2 October
1961, 4 Oct 61.
59. Memo of Conv by Gen. Taylor, President Kennedys Meeting with Gen. Norstad, 3
October 1961, Box 35, Maxwell Taylor Papers, NDU. In fact, the allies did not reach formal
agreement upon operational plans.
60. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Oct 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61)(1) sec. 2. Msg,
JCS 1848 to USCINCEUR, 11 Oct 61, JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (9 Aug 61) sec. 3. The French
sent 10,000 men to augment their units in Germany and moved two divisions from Algeria to
northern France. West Germany lengthened its period of conscription from 12 to 18 months
and held 36,000 men in service for three additional months.
61. JCS 1907/426, 8 Oct 61; JCS 1907/432, 12 Oct 61; JMF 9172 Berlin/3100 (6 Oct 61) sec. 1.
62. JCS 1907/433, 12 Oct 61; JCSM-728-61 to SecDef, 13 Oct 61, JCS 1907/433; JMF 9172
Berlin/3100 (18 Aug 61) sec. 2.
63. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 Oct 61, Encl B to JCS 1907/435, JMF 91972 Berlin/3100
(18 Aug 61)(1) sec. 2.
64. FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 19611962, pp. 521523. This was issued on 23 October as
NSAM No. 109. Gen. Lemnitzer remembered going to the White House and telling the President about all the contingencies for which responses were prescribed. He thought that, after
the briefing, Kennedy was much relieved. Lemnitzer Interview, 25 Jan 77. This probably was
a meeting on 10 October described in ibid, pp. 487489.
65. Ibid, pp. 520521.
66. Ibid, p. 559.
67. Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 195. By communicating directly, Norstad meant that messages to him also
listed CINCUSAREUR and USCOB as information addressees, leaving him no opportunity
for exchanges with Washington before his subordinates were informed.
334
68. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 396401. NY Times, 18 Oct 61, p. 1
69. Daily events are summarized in Berlin Question, JHO.
70. See chap. 11.
71. Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 524525.
Chapter 11. The Cuban Missile Crisis

1. JCS 1969/303, 8 Feb 62, RG 218, File 202-10002-10104, Records of JFK Assassination
Project, NARA (hereafter cited as JFK Project).
2. BG Craig was a member of J5, the Plans and Policy Division. In July 1962, he was succeeded by BG Benjamin Harris, USA, who worked in the recently created office of Special
Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. Briefing for Robert Kennedy, 21
Mar 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-101183, JFK Project.
3. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 729, 747748, 771772.
4. Ibid, pp. 766767. Memo, BG Lansdale to BG Craig, Operation Mongoose, 5 Mar 62,
RG 218, File 202-10001-10216, JFK Project.
5. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, General Shoup had made a similar proposal.
6. JCS 1969/321, 14 Mar 62, JCS 1969/334, 10 Apr 62, RG218, File 202-10001-10104, JFK Project.
7. Memo, CJCS to SecDef, Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba, 13 Mar 62,
RG 218, File 202-10001-10104, JFK Project. Memo, DepSecDef to DOD/JCS Rep, Caribbean
Survey Group, same title and date; Memo, BG Craig to Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,
same title and date; RG 335, File 198-10004-10020, JFK Project. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X,
pp. 791792, 771. Memo by BG Lansdale, Meeting with the President, 16 March 1962, RG
335, File 198-10004-10020, JFK Project. Memo, Minutes of the Caribbean Survey Group, 21
March 1962, 21 Mar 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-10184, JFK Project.
8. Memo by Thomas A. Parrott, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation
Mongoose, Thursday, 5 April 1962, 5 Apr 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-10271, JFK Project.
9. JCSM-272-62, 10 Apr 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-10243, JFK Project. JCS 1969/334, 10 Apr
62; JCS 1969/335, 10 Apr 62; RG 218, File 202-10002-10104, JFK Project. FRUS: 19611962, vol.
X, pp. 783-785. Memo by Thomas A. Parrott, Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 11 April 1962, 11 Apr 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-10161; Memo by General
Taylor, Operation Mongoose, 13 Apr 62, RG 273, File 145-10001-10103, JFK Project.
10. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 414418, 429431, 434437.
11. According to US terminology, the R12s and R14s were SS4s and SS5s respectively.
12. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 439440. Anatoli Y. Gribkov and
William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr (Chicago: edition q, inc, 1994), pp. 2728. In September,
squadrons of surface ships and submarines with more than 5,000 men were dropped from
the deployment.
13. In the service of Anadyr, eighty-five merchant, freight, and cargo ships would make
some 150 round trips in the next three months. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 29.
14. In July 1961, when the Soviets were threatening West Berlin, Kennedy had told the
JCS that Berlin and Cuba were closely inter-related, giving the clear impression that moves
against West Berlin would trigger action against Cuba.
15. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, pp. 947949, 957958.
16. Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 104105,
116117.
17. Public Papers: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674675. Kennedy had met with the JCS that
morning, apparently to review plans for attacking SA2 sites. FRUS: 19611962, vol. X, p. 1081.
18. Memo, VCNO to JCS, 14 Sep 62, JCS 2304/57, JMF 9123/3020 (14 Sep 62). The memo
contains no evidence of participation by the CNO but, in a 1980 interview with W. S. Poole,
Adm. Anderson said that it would have been cleared with him beforehand.
335
19. JCS 2304/58, 19 Sep 62, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Sep 62). JSSC members were: MG J. S.
Holtoner, USAF; MG David W. Gray, USA; and RADM J. D. Wylie, USN. Note to Control Div.,
JCS 2304/57, 19 Sep 62, JMF 9123/3020 (14 Sep 62).
20. FRUS: 19611962, vol. X, pp. 10701072.
21. N/H of JCS 3204/58, 3 Oct 62, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Sep 62). Pages revised for the 1 October report are in JCS 2304/58, 19 Sep 62, same file.
22. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 261. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Oct 62, JCS 2304/64,
JMF 9123/3100 (2 Oct 62) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1961
1963, vol. XI (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1996), pp. 67.
23. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 4546. Michael Dobbs, One Minute To
Midnight (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), p. 58.
24. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 135139, 151, 164165, 172173, 181186.
25. JCS 2304/69, 14 Oct 62, JMF 9123/3100 (2 Oct 62) sec. 1. CINCLANT Historical Account
of Cuban Crisis1962, pp. 1721. JCS 2304/68, 12 Oct 62, JMF 9123/3100 (17 Sep 62).
26. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 190202.
27. Except where other sources are cited, the rest of this chapter draws upon Notes
Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October-November 1962,
Dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis; Secretarys Notes on Joint Chiefs of Staff Actions
During the Cuban Crisis, 1962; and Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban
Crisis, 4 Jan 63; all in JHO.
28. The solution, applied to OPLAN 316, is described in fn. 73.
29. Tentative Decision on JCS 2304/68, 15 Oct 62, JMF 9123/3100 (17 Sep 62). Tentative
Decision on JCS 2304/69, 15 Oct 62, JMF 9123/3100 (2 Oct 62) sec. 1. Congress had given the
President authority to call up as many as 150,000 reservists.
30. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 264.
31. Vice Chiefs and Operations Deputies often attended as well.
32. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.), The Kennedy Tapes (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2001), pp. 3353; the Taylor quotes are on p. 40 and p. 44.
33. The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 5372; the Taylor quotes come from p. 65.
34. JCSM-794-62 to SecDef, 17 Oct 62.
35. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 251, 276278, 281. U2 photos also showed evidence of
three Soviet armored combat groups; a fourth was found later. Ibid, p. 306.
36. The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 82105.
37. Msg, JCS 6833 to CINCONAD, 211920 Z Oct 62.
38. FRUS: 1961-1963, vol. XI, pp. 110114.
40. Burchinal was Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs. In 1976, W. S. Poole read
his remark but did not include it in the Notes Taken From Transcripts.
42. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 468474, 476486. Near the
height of the crisis, a Soviet deputy foreign minister did propose increasing the pressure on
West Berlin. Khrushchev responded, We are just beginning to extricate ourselves from one
adventure, and you are suggesting that we jump into another. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, p. 218.
44. Msg, JCS 6779 to CINCONAD, 191723Z Oct 62; Msg, JCS 6780 to CNO et al.,
191726Z Oct 62.
45. Just as he had during the Berlin confrontation, Acheson favored strong measuresin
this case, a surprise air strike.
336
46. The scenario was written this way because McNamara told the Blue team that the JCS
were willing to accept a delay of 12 to 24 hours. Actually, Taylor had said only that they were
willing to listen to arguments for that much advance notification. He and the Service Chiefs
had discussed a shorter period of two hours.
47. Air Strike Scenario, 19 Oct 62.
48. The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 125136. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 126136. Later, Kennedy cited his main reasons for vetoing a surprise air strike as: uncertainty that all the missiles
would be destroyed; avoiding action comparable to Pearl Harbor; and unwillingness to raise
the risk of a worldwide nuclear war. FRUS: 19611963, p. 156.
49. Presumably, Taylor named Stevenson because the Presidents decision coincided with
what General Clay had reported earlier in the day as being Stevensons position. In fact,
there is much evidence that the President and Robert Kennedy did not hold Stevenson in
high regard.
50. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 138140. Robert Kennedy also attended the meeting.
51. Msg, JCS 6827 to CINCLANT, 211639Z Oct 62. They also instructed unified and specified
commanders to prepare for all contingencies. Msg, JCS 6830 to CINCLANT, 211814Z Oct 62.
53. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 141149. Msg, JCS 6848 to CINCLANT, 221111Z Oct 62.
54. Defense Conditions ran from the lowest alert status, DEFCON 5, up to the highest,
DEFCON 1, when hostilities were under way. DEFCON 2 meant that hostilities were considered imminent.
55. Msg, JCS 6857 to CINCSAC, 221637Z Oct 62; Msg, JCS 6858 to CINCONAD, 221630Z
Oct 62; Msg, JCS 6851 to CINCLANT, 221341Z Oct 62.
56. Msg, JCS 6864 to CINCAL et al., 221809Z Oct 62. At General Norstads suggestion, European Command assumed a state of awareness rather than DEFCON 3.
57. Msg, JCS 6863 to CINCPAC, 221805Z Oct 62; Msg, JCS 6891 to CINCPAC and CINCLANT, 230311Z Oct 62.
58. Msg, JCS 6866 to CINCUSNAVEUR, 221821Z Oct 62.
59. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, p. 157.
60. Until 22 October, US intelligence estimated Soviet personnel at 8 to 10,000. By 24
October, that figure had been revised to 22,000. But the actual number was almost 42,000.
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 308. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 28.
61. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 158167.
63. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 168170. Adm. Dennison was informed of the U2 contingency plan via Msg, JCS 6958 to CINCLANT, 241922Z Oct 62.
64. Msg, JCS 6917 to CINCSAC, 232306Z Oct 62. General Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole
on 21 Nov 78. They also ordered that one Hawk battalion and one Nike-Hercules battalion be
positioned in the Miami-Homestead area. Msg, JCS 68913 to CINCONAD, 232121Z Oct 62.
66. CINCLANT Annual Report: 1962, pp. 1415.
67. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 7072; fn. 72 on p. 373 establishes that the incident
occurred on Tuesday, not on Wednesday as most accounts placed it. Admiral Anderson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 7 Nov 78. Roswell Gilpatric Oral History Interview, pp. 5962, John F.
Kennedy Library. In 1980, Adm. Anderson told Poole that Gilpatrics account was grossly erroneous and stressed that the words about John Paul Jones did not originate with him.
68. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 475478. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 4244, 8991, fn. 88 on p. 375. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 391392.
69. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. VI (Washington, DC: Office
337

71. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 483484.
72. Judging by the transcript of that meeting, in The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 246260, Taylor
was drawing inferences rather than reporting conversations.
73. JCSM-821-62 to SecDef, 25 Oct 62, JCS 2304/83, JMF 9123/3100 (25 Oct 62). The
assault elements in OPLAN 316 were the 2nd Marine Division(-) and the 5th MEB, the 82nd
and 101st Airborne Divisions, one combat command from the 1st Armored Division, and
one brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division. The floating reserve would consist of one combat
command of the 1st Armored Division and one brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division. On
call would be the rest of the 1st Armored and 2nd Infantry Divisions. Marines would land a
few miles east of Havana, Army units at Mariel about twenty miles west of the capital. Initially, they would skirt Havana and head for the missile sites. Apps A and B to Encl B to Rpt,
CINCLANT to JCS, 10 Nov 62, JCS 2018/508, JMF 9123/3105 (5 Nov 62) sec. 1. Dobbs, One
Minute to Midnight, pp. 104, 177. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Kitchen told
Rear Adm. D. L. Kauffman (Deputy Director, J5) that the OPLANs displayed a typical G. I.
approach. He wanted them revised to include (1) a response to genuine or simulated insurrection and (2) probable political restraints such as free cities and no deep interdiction.
Kauffman persuaded Kitchen that a new set of OPLANs was not needed. Memo, RADM
Kauffman to MG Reynolds, 29 Oct 62, Box 15, Maxwell Taylor Papers, NDU.
75. CM-55-62 to DJS, 26 Oct 62; DJSM-1348-62 to CJCS, 28 Oct 62; CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62).
76. This was a rather loose interpretation of the SNIE, which is printed in FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. XI, pp. 122125.
77. JCSM-831-62 to SecDef, 28 Oct 62, stated that the only direct action which will surely
eliminate the offensive weapons threat is air action followed by invasion and is, in the long
run, the best course of action.
78. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, p. 211.
79. JCSM-828-62 to SecDef, 26 Oct 62, JCS 2422/1, JMF 3050 (22 Oct 62).
80. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VI, pp. 172177.
81. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 487488. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VI, pp.
178181. Khrushchev also ordered that Aleksandrovsk with R14 warheads return to the USSR
and had the Defense Ministry cable the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, categorically forbidding any use of nuclear weapons without approval from Moscow. Until 22 October,
Pliyev had been granted authority to use battlefield nuclear weapons in extremis. Dobbs, One
Minute to Midnight, pp. 200201. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 4, 6263.
82. Adm. Anderson, however, spent most of the day in Norfolk attending the Navy-Pitt
football game. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 262263. The Vice CNO, Adm. Claude
Ricketts, represented him at the Pentagon.
83. The story of this flight is described in Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 222224,
254255, 258260, 263265, 268269, 271273.
84. The Kennedy Tapes, p. 351. Taylor added that his personal view is that we should
be ready to go in Monday [with OPLAN 312] and also ready to invade, but make no advance
decisions [to execute OPLAN 316]. Ibid, p. 353. The memo was formally submitted the next
day as JCSM-844-62 thru SecDef to Pres, 28 Oct 62, CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62).
85. President Kennedy had wanted to obtain some feeling for problems posed by
low-level attack. Accordingly, the day before, he had directed that pilots flying low-level
reconnaissance be encouraged to maneuver their planes as a fighter bomber pilot might be
expected to do in hitting a site. CM-85-62 to DJS, 26 Oct 62.
86. The shootdown, which had occurred at 1119, is described in Dobbs, One Minute to
Midnight, pp. 232233, 236237, 241242. The pilot was Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., USAF. He
and Major Heyser had been flying as many as two missions a day.
338
87. The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 356, 364, 358.

88. At McNamaras direction, ISA drafted a letter from Kennedy to the President of Turkey proposing that Jupiters be disarmed prior to an attack on Cuba, that the Soviets be so
notified, and that Polaris submarines carrying equivalent numbers of missiles be stationed
in the eastern Mediterranean. The ExComm was going to discuss this on Sunday morning.
Draft Ltr, Pres Kennedy to Pres Gursel, with attached note, CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62), filed
under date 28 Oct 62.
89. According to General Gribkov, who was on the scene, only about half the R12s were
ready to be fueledan eighteen-hour processand none had been programmed for flight.
Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 63.
90. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 270271. An ink line ran through the last sentence
quoted above. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 305307. A letter from Kennedy to
Khrushchev, released to the press at 2005, mentioned only the no-invasion pledge and
emphasized cessation of work on the missile sites as the first ingredient. FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. VI, pp. 181182.
91. Fursenko and Naftali, in Khrushchevs Cold War, p. 490, place Khrushchevs firm decision prior to the arrival of Dobrynins cable. Their chronology is challenged in Dobbs, One
Minute to Midnight, pp. 321324, 401402.
92. The Kennedy Tapes, p. 391396. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 271273.
93. Actually, the warheads were still in separate storage. Gribkov and Smith, Operation
Anadyr, p. 62.
94. The full text is in FRUS: 19611963, vol. VI, pp. 183187.
95. CM-61-62 to SecDef, 28 Oct 62, CJCS 091 Cuba (Oct 62).
96. CM-71-62 to SecDef, 30 Oct 62, JCS 2304/86, JMF 9123/3100 (28 Oct 62) sec. 2.
97. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 520-524.
98. CM-85-62 to Pres, 2 Nov 62, JCS 2304/93, JMF 9123/3100 (2 Nov 62).
99. Memos, Pres to SecDef and SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 62, JMF 9123/3100 (5 Nov 62) sec. 1.
100. JCSM-910-62 to Pres, 16 Nov 62, JCS 2304/110, JMF 9123/3100 (5 Nov 62) sec. 2.
JCSM-910 is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 472474. On 20 November, the Chiefs
advised McNamara that two National Guard divisions could be activated, but only one could
be equipped for combat. Both divisions, however, could be employed in less demanding
occupation duties. JCSM-913-62 to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS 2018/511, same file.
101. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VI, pp. 201215.
102. CM-116-62 to SecDef, 16 Nov 62, Encl B to JCS 2304/110; Chairmans Talking Paper
for Meeting with the President, 16 Nov 62, Encl C to JCS 2304/110; JMF 9123/3100 (5 Nov
62) sec. 2. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 474476.
103. Draft Ltrs to Macmillan, deGaulle, and Adenauer, n.d. [19 Nov 62], Box 16, Maxwell
Taylor Papers, National Defense University.
104. The recently mobilized Air Force reservists were released before Christmas.
105. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 487490, 492, 495503. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchevs Cold War, pp. 501504. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830831. This resolution of
the crisis had a ragged sequel. Castro kept trying to export his revolution and, as described
in chapter 16, Mongoose resumed along with exile raids into Cuba. In 1979, US intelligence
confirmed the presence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade.
106. By 27 October, there were 850 tactical aircraft and 183 interceptors concentrated in
southeastern states; 172 Atlas and Titan ICBMs and 1,200 bombers with 2,858 weapons were
on 15-minute alert. Cuba Fact Sheet, Att to Memo for Record by BG Clifton, 27 Oct 62, Box
36, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library.
107. In 1976, W. S. Poole read but did not record these remarks in the JCS Minutes.
108. Taylor sensed their misgivings about him. Swords and Plowshares, p. 269.
339
109. Benjamin F. Bradlee, Conversations With Kennedy (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 122.
110. The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 324400. As the last meeting ended, McNamara said that
We have two major decisions we have to make quickly at eleven [tomorrow]. We can wait
on both of those until eleven. Ibid, p. 398.
Chapter 12. NATO: Advocating New Approaches

1. For the full text, see Dept. of State Bulletin, 20 Mar 49, pp. 339342. Members were
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany (formally, the Federal Republic of Germany), Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. MC 14/2 is printed in Gregory Pedlow (ed.), NATO Strategy Documents: 19491969.
3. JCSM-439-61 to SecDef, 28 Jun 61, JCS 2305/519, JMF 9050/3410 (31 May 61) sec. 3.
Memo, BG Huglin to JCS 2 Feb 61, JCS 2305/362, JMF 9050/3410 (25 Mar 61) sec. 2. MC-70,
9 May 58.
4. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 4 Feb 61, JCS 2101/407; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 Feb
61, JCS 2101/409; JCSM-153-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61, JCS 2101/412; JMF 3001 (4 Feb 61) sec. 1.
5. A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future, Part Two: Defense, JCS
2305/413; Memo, Dean Acheson to BG A. W. Nielsen, 16 Mar 61; JCSM-175-61 to Acheson, 20
Mar 61, JCS 2305/414; JCSM-176-61 to SecDef, 20 Mar 61, JCS 2305/414; JMF 9050/3070 (16
Mar 61) sec. 2.
6. A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future, JCS 2305/423; JCSM-190-61 to
SecDef, 28 Mar 61, JCS 2305/424; JMF 9050/3070 (16 Mar 61) sec. 2. Msg, USNMR to JCS and
SecDef, ALO 327, 3 Apr 61, DA IN 99983, CJCS 092.2 (NATO).
7. Memo by ActgExecSecy, NSC, 24 Apr 61, JCS 2305/466, JMF 9050/3070 (16 Mar 61) sec.
3. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of
State, 1994), pp. 287288.
8. In preparing Finletters statement, the same issues had been reargued with the same
outcome. Msg, USNMR to CJCS and SecDef, ALO 390, 20 Apr 61; JCSM-271-61 to SecDef,
26 Apr 61, JCS 2305/461; Msg, State to Paris, TOPOL 1526, 26 Apr 61; Msg, Paris to State,
POLTO 1494, 26 Apr 61; JMF 9050/3070 (19 Apr 61) sec. 1.
9. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 209. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Jun 61, JCS
2305/508; Memo, General C. L. Ruffner to JCS, 12 Jul 61, JCS 2305/536; JMF 9050/3070 (19
Apr 61) sec. 1. But Finletter, reporting to President Kennedy, remained fairly optimistic.
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 304305.
10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Jun 61, JCS 2305/565, JMF 9050/9105 (2 Jun 61).
11. A division slice is the figure obtained by dividing the total number of army personnel
by the number of army divisions. Consequently it is considerably larger than the number of
personnel assigned to a division.
12. Since some allied units were undermanned, there were only 19 active division-equivalents.
13. Report of the Chairmans NATO Working Group, Att to CM-275-61 to SecDef, 14 Jul
61, JMF 9050/9105 (2 Jun 61) sec. 2.
14. CM-275-61 to SecDef, 14 Jul 61; JCSM-488-61 to SecDef, 20 Jul 61, JMF 9050/9105 (2
Jun 61) sec. 2. Later, in connection with the Berlin buildup described in chap. 10, Lemnitzer
and Decker supported the claim that thirty divisions could defend for thirty days. Anderson,
LeMay, and Shoup disagreed, as did General Norstad.
15. Ltr, SACEUR to Pres, SHAPE 188/61, 15 Sep 61, summarized in Germany and the Berlin Question, vol. III, p. 54, JHO. Memo, General C. L. Ruffner to JCS, 8 Aug 61, JCS 2305/561,
JMF 9050/9105 (2 Jun 61) sec. 3. TP for General Lemnitzers Use with Mr. McNamara on
NATO Force Requirements, n.d. [c. 1 Sep 61], CJCS 092.2 NATO. JCSM-594-61 to SecDef, 30
Aug 61, JCS 2305/578; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 61, JCS 2305/601; Msg, State to Paris,
340
TOPOL 365, 16 Sep 61; Msg, Paris to State, POLTO 348, 19 Sep 61; JCSM-667-61 to SecDef, 25
Sep 61, JCS 2305/602; Memo, General Ruffner to ASD(ISA), 2 Nov 61, JCS 2305/643; Memo,
SecDef to CJCS, NATO 1966 Force Requirements, 3 Nov 61; SM-1200-61 to General Ruffner, 3
Nov 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 2305/602, 8 Nov 61; JMF 9050/3410 (25 Aug 60) sec. 3.
16. JCS 2305/668, 4 Dec 61; JCSM-853-61 to SecDef, 14 Dec 61, JCS 2305/677; JMF
9050/5410 (3 Nov 61) sec. 1. McNamaras reactions can be ascertained by comparing the 4
Dec draft with his 14 Dec address.
17. Msg, Paris 3035 to State, 11 Dec 61, JMF 9050/5410 (27 Oct 61) sec. 2.
18. Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 14 December 1961,
Encl 1 to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 19 Dec 61, JCS 2305/698; CM-476-61 to CINCAL et
al., 22 Dec 61, N/H of JCS 2305/698, 2 Jan 62; JMF 9050/5410 (3 Nov 61) sec. 2.
19. CM-470-61 to Pres, 20 Dec 61, JCS 2305/697, JMF 9050/5410 (27 Oct 61) sec. 2. Printed
in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 347351.
20. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 368369, 372373. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 25 Apr 62,
CJCS 091 Europe.
21. Msg, USNMR to SecDef and JCS, ALO 388, 211145Z Apr 62; Memo, BG Brown
to CJCS, 30 Apr 62, JCS 2305/850; Msg, JCS 4332 to USCINCEUR, 2 May 62; Msg, JCS
4364 to USCINCEUR, 3 May 62; Msg, USNMR to JCS, ALO 434, 101805Z May 62; JMF
9050/3440 (30 Apr 62) sec. 1. CM-755-62 to USCINCEUR, 29 Jun 62, 3rd N/H of JCS
2305/896, 5 Jul 62; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 131628Z Jul 62, DA IN 247050; JCSM-566-62
to SecDef, 2 Aug 62, JCS 2305/944; same file, sec. 2.
22. Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, Encl 1 to
Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 May 62, N/H of JCS 2305/859, JMF 9050/5410 (23 Mar 62) sec.
2. The draft of his speech, with JCS concurrence, is in Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Apr 62,
JCS 2305/830; JCSM-322-62 to SecDef, 26 Apr 62, JCS 2305/833; same file, sec. 1.
23. JCS 2305/916, 9 Jul 62, JMF 9165/5420 (25 May 62). Rpt by Dr. Fritz Kraemer, OCSA, Trip
to France and Germany, 14 June1 July 1962, 26 Jul 62, CJCS 091 Germany.
24. By this time, Taylor was Chairman and Lemnitzer had been appointed to succeed
Norstad.
25. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 11 Aug 62, JCS 2305/976; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 29
Oct 62, JCS 2421/84; Ltr, Amb. Finletter to SecState, 24 Oct 62, JCS 2421/118; JMF 9050/9105
(11 Aug 62).
26. CM-29-62 to DJS, 12 Oct 62, JCS 2421/51, JMF 9050/3100 (12 Oct 62) sec. 1. JCSM-92362 to SecDef, 20 Nov 62, JCS 2421/94, same file, sec. 2. Similar conclusions were submitted
via JCSM-935-62 to SecDef, 26 Nov 62, JCS 2421/107, same file.
27. Memo for Record, Discussion of Defense Policy Conferences, 20 Nov 62, JMF
9050/9105 (11 Aug 62).
28. Mr. McNamaras Speech: Draft, n.d.; CM-159-62 to SecDef, 7 Dec 62; Memo, LTG T.
W. Parker to DJS, 6 Dec 62; Memo, CNO to DJS, 6 Dec 62; Encl II to CSAFM-418-62 to DJS, 6
Dec 62; JMF 9050/5410 (15 Oct 62).
29. Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 14,
1962, Att to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 18 Dec 62, JCS 2421/166, JMF 9050/5410 (15
Oct 62). FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, p. 466.
31. Norstads views are stated in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 254-255. JCS 2305/319,
20 Dec 60, JMF 9050/5410 (16 Dec 60). Watson, Into the Missile Age, pp. 560561.
32. The Acheson group recommended withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from
exposed forward positions. At the Joint Chiefs urging, this was deleted.
33. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 288290.
34. JCSM-288-61 to SecDef, 25 Apr 61, JCS 2305/460, JMF 9163/3410 (21 Apr 61).
341
35. NSAM No. 35, 6 Apr 61, JCS 2277/72; JCSM-263-61 to SecDef, 24 Apr 61, JCS 2277/73;
Msg, USNMR to SecDef and CJCS, ALO 403, 25 Apr 61; 1st N/H of JCS 2277/73, 30 Apr 61;
JMF 9187/4720 (6 Apr 61). Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the USAF: 19451960
(Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1990), pp. 226227.
36. Msg, Paris to State, POLTO 1494, 26 Apr 61, JMF 9050/3070 (16 Mar 61) sec. 3. Public
Papers: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 385.
37. JCSM-406-61 to SecDef, 15 Jun 61, JCS 2305/498, JMF 9050/4720 (4 May 61) sec. 2. TP
for General Lemnitzers Use with Mr. McNamara on NATO Force Requirements, n.d., CJCS
092.2 NATO. Memo, General Ruffner to JCS, 8 Aug 61, JCS 2305/561; JCSM-594-61 to SecDef,
30 Aug 61, JCS 2305/578; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 61, JCS 2305/601; JCSM-667-61 to
SecDef, 25 Sep 61, JCS 2305/602; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Nov 61; DJSM-1356-61 to CJCS,
6 Nov 61; JMF 9050/3410 (25 Mar 60) sec. 3. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 27 Nov 61, JCS
2305/660; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Nov 61, JCS 2305/660; JCSM-841-61 to SecDef, 1 Dec
61, JCS 2305/664; JMF 9050/4720 (4 May 61).
38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Dec 61, JCS 2305/700, JMF 9050/5410 (3 Nov 61) sec.
2. JCSM-822-61 to SecDef, 31 Jan 62, JCS 2305/722, JMF 9050/4720 (25 Jan 62) sec. 2.
39. OASD(ISA), Preliminary Report on MRBMs, Nuclear Sharing, and Related Issues, 1
Feb 62, same file, sec. 1.
40. Memo, General Ruffner to JCS, 23 Feb 62, JCS 2305/742, JMF 9050/4720 (25 Jan 62)
sec. 3.
41. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Mar 62, JCS 2278/43; CM-586-62 to ASD(ISA), 9 Mar 62, JCS
2278/43; Memo, SecState to SecDef, 10 Mar 62, JCS 2278/43; JMF 9164/9105 (2 Mar 62) sec. 1.
42. JCSM-199-62 to SecDef, 17 Mar 62, JCS 2278/44; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 62,
JCS 2278/46; CM-615-62 to ASD(ISA), 17 Mar 62, JCS 2278/46; JMF 9164/9105 (2 Mar 62) sec. 1.
43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Apr 62, JCS 2278/50; JCSM-270-62 to SecDef, 10 Apr 62,
JCS 2278/51; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Apr 62, N/H of JCS 2278/51, 18 Apr 62; JMF
9164/9105 (2 Mar 62) sec. 2.
44. NSAM No. 148 to SecDef et al., 18 Apr 62, JCS 2305/821, JMF 9164/4610 (18 Apr 62).
Soon afterward, speaking to his West German and Canadian counterparts, Rusk justified the
decision on grounds that the French had shown their contempt for NATO by withdrawing their Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command, denying the US nuclear storage rights
in France, making integrated air defense less effective, and making clear that the force de
frappes purpose was to ensure Frances independence from the US and NATO. FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. XIII, pp. 690691.
45. McGeorge Bundy made the statement about the JCAE during a colloquium at the
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, on 3 Mar 83. General Maxwell Taylor interviewed
by W. S. Poole on 29 Oct 79.
46. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Mar 62, JCS 2305/772, JMF 9050/4720 (25 Jan 62) sec. 3.
JCSM-250-62 to SecDef, 4 Apr 62, JCS 2305/780, same file, sec. 4.
47. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 384387. CM-653-62 to SecDef, 19 Apr 62, JCS
2305/817; Dec On JCS 2305/817, 24 Apr 62; N/H of JCS 2305/817, 24 Apr 62, JMF 9050/4720
(25 Jan 62) sec. 4.
48. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Apr 62, JCS 2305/820; JCSM-320-62 to SecDef, 25 Apr
62, JCS 2305/820; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Apr 62, JCS 2305/846; N/H of JCS 2305/846,
27 Apr 62; JMF 9050/4720 (18 Apr 62). Arrangements were made to create a replenishment
anchorage at Rota, Spain, for the Polaris squadron that would start deploying late in 1963.
49. Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, Att
to Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 10 May 62, N/H of JCS 2305/859, 16 May 62, JMF
9050/5410 (23 Mar 62) sec. 1. The Council did approve generally worded guidelines about the
use of nuclear weapons. That may be why Rusk chose to characterize the meeting as notably
successful. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 388389.
342
50. Rpt by Dr. Fritz Kraemer, Trip to France and Germany, 14 June1 July 1962, 26 Jul
62, CJCS 091 Germany. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day (London: Macmillan, 1973),
pp. 334335.
51. Memo, CAPT W. L. Nyburg to CJCS, MRBMs in NATO, 15 Jun 62, CJCS 092.2 NATO.
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 408411.
52. JCS 2421/76, 30 Oct 62, JMF 9050/4720 17 Oct 62). FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp.
447448.
53. Memo, General Ruffner to JCS, 31 Oct 62, JCS 2421/82; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS,
n.d.; CM-115-62 to General Ruffner, 16 Nov 62, N/H of JCS 2421/82, 23 Nov 62; JMF 9050/5410
(4 Apr 62) sec. 2.
54. Memo, General Dean Strother to DJS, 13 Dec 62, JCS 2412/162, JMF 9050/5410 (2 Oct
62). Strother had succeeded Ruffner as US Representative.
55. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 8 Sep 62, JCS 2294/19, JMF 9163/4610 (8 Oct 62). Printed
in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 10781080. Rusk sent a copy of this letter to the
White House.
57. CM-54-62 to JCS, 26 Oct 62, JCS 2278/60; JCSM-879-62 to SecDef, 12 Nov 62, JCS
2278/61; Memo, DepUSecState J. C. Kitchen to DepSecDef, 4 Dec 62, N/H of JCS 2278/61, 11
Dec 62; JMF 9164/9105 (26 Oct 62).
58. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 10851088. Kaplan, The McNamara Ascendancy, pp.
380383.
59. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 10881091.
60. General Taylor interviewed by W. S. Poole on 29 Oct 79.
62. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 743748. NY Times, 15 Jan 63, p. 1.
63. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 10891090.
64. Jordan, Norstad, pp. 89.
13. NATO: Initiatives Falter

1. JCSM-20-63 to SecDef, 10 Jan 63, JCS 2421/184, JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 2. Concurrently, fulfilling but never acknowledging the Cuba-Turkey trade, Washington conducted
delicate negotiations with Ankara to remove the Jupiter IRBMs by 1 April. As compensation,
three Polaris submarines were stationed in the Mediterranean. Foreign Relations of the
United States: 19641968, vol. XVI (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State,
1994), pp. 738756.
2. JCS 2421/202, 9 Jan 63; JCSM-45-63 to SecDef, 15 Jan 63, JCS 2421/222; JMF 9050/3410
(3 Jan 63) sec. 2. SACEUR, who was now Gen. Lemnitzer, made a similar assessment in Msg,
USNMR to JCS, ALO 108, 261230Z Jan 63, same file, sec. 4.
3. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 482, 507511.
4. Draft White Paper: Comparison of Submarine and Surface-Ship Platforms for SeaBased NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, 15 Feb 63, JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 7. JCSM157-63 to SecDef, 22 Feb 63, JCS 2412/302, same file, sec. 8. Memo, CNO to JCS, 20 Feb 63,
same file, sec. 7. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 27 Feb 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2421/305, 5 Mar 63, same
file, sec. 9.
5. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 529533. Ltr, Chancellor Adenauer to Pres Kennedy, 30
Apr 63, JCS 2421/426; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 May 63, JCS 2412/421; JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan
63) sec. 10. Later, the JCS suggested basing a control formula on a US veto plus a majority
vote of other major participants and a vote for any other smaller country that actually was
under attack. That would partially answer French demands for a triumvirate, ease German
worries about a British veto, and allay British fears of German domination. Memo, ASD(ISA)
343
to CJCS et al., 15 Apr 63, N/H of JCS 2421/396, same file, sec. 9. JCSM-384-63 to SecDef, 1
Jun 63, JCS 2412/435, same file, sec. 10.
6. Memo, Maj. W. Y. Smith to CJCS, 1 Jun 63, Box 39, Maxwell Taylor Papers, National
Defense University. JCSM-350-63 to SecDef, 2 May 63, JCS 2421/434, JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan
63) sec. 10. Later, in congressional testimony, McNamara quoted only the last sentence.
7. NSAM 240 to SecDef et al., 7 May 63, JCS 2421/440, JMF 9050/3410 (3 Jan 63) sec. 10.
Memo, Arthur Schlesinger to Pres, 25 Mar 63, CJCS 091 England. JCS 2412/479 and 485, 3
Jun 63, JMF 9050/5410 (29 Mar 63)(1).
8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Feb 63, JCS 2421/277; JCSM-221-63 to SecDef, 15 Mar 63,
JCS 2412/307; Msg, USNMR Paris to SecDef, ALO 334, 201410Z Mar 63; Msg, JSTPS to JCS,
282227Z Mar 63; JCSM-326-63 to SecDef, 20 Apr 63, JCS 2421/407; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3
May 63, JCS 2421/432; JMF 9050/3100 (9 Feb 63) sec. 1.
9. Dept. of State Bulletin, 10 Jun 63, pp. 895896. McNamara proposed reorganizing
the SHAPE staff into conventional and nuclear planning sections. Lemnitzer rejected the
idea, on grounds that dual-capable weapon systems made a separation impossible. In Paris
he and McNamara had a heated exchange, after which the Secretary settled for adding a
Nuclear Deputy. Subsequently, the office of Deputy for Nuclear Affairs had an unhappy history. According to Lemnitzer, the Council conceived this office as serving a window-dressing
function. The first appointee, Gen. F. V. P. van Rolleghem of Belgium, suffered considerable
frustration. The second, Gen. Nino Pasti of Italy, proved so inefficient that SACEUR asked
for his removal. In 1976, Pasti won election to the Italian Senate on the communist slate.
Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 18 Mar 77. The position was abolished in 1968.
10. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 592595.
11. NSAM 253 to SecDef et al., 13 Jul 63, JCS 2421/545; JCSM-569-63 to SecDef, 27 Jul 63,
JCS 2412/545-1; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 26 Aug 63, JCS 2421/545-2; Memo, McGeorge Bundy
to Holders of NSAM 253, 30 Aug 63, JCS 2421/545-2; JMF 9050/3100 (13 Jul 63).
12. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XIII (Washington, DC: Office
of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1995), pp. 3537. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to DDR&E et al., 9
Jun 64, JCS 2421/822, JMF 9050 (9 Jun 64). DM-1546-64 to CJCS, 14 Sep 64, JMF 9050/3410 (3
Jan 63) sec. 12.
13. Memo for Pres, The Wilson Visit, 4 Dec 64, Doc. 34a, United Kingdom, P. M. Wilson
Visit, 12/78/64, Box 214, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Msg, Gen. Lemnitzer to CJCS and SecDef, PRS 3151, 051319Z Dec 64, CJCS 323.3 SACEUR.
14. Memos of Conv, Wilson Visit and MLF, 6 Dec 64, Docs. 60 and 61, United Kingdom, P. M.
Wilson Visit, 12/7-8/64, Box 214, National Security Files, Johnson Library.
15. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XIII, pp. 156158. Msg, London 2821 to SecState, 14 Dec 64,
Doc. 179a, Memos, United Kingdom, vol. II, 10/64-2/65, Box 206, National Security Files,
Johnson Library.
16. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XIII, pp. 168-169. Note to Control, NATO Meetings in Paris,
21 Dec 64, JMF 9050 (19 Dec 64). Ibid., pp. 165167.
17. FRUS: 19611963, vol. III, pp. 449450; vol. XIII, pp. 516518. US gold reserves
amounted to $15.75 billion. The legal floor was $12 billion, and the $3.75 billion cushion was
being consumed at an annual rate of $2.75 billion.
18. Memo for Record by Col. B. W. Rogers, 17 Apr 63, JMF 5410 (17 Apr 63).
19. United Kingdom Study of Modifications to MC 26/4 NATO Force Requirements, 21
Aug 63, JMF 9050/3100 (16 May 63) sec. 5. JCSM-662-63 to SecDef, 27 Aug 63, JCS 2421/5016, same file, sec. 3. JCSM-675-63 to SecDef, 5 Sep 63, JCS 2421/501-5, same file, sec. 4. JCSM687-63 to SecDef, 3 Sep 63, JCS 2421/501-8, same file, sec. 3. The substance of these JCSMs
was transmitted to the British via SM-1183-63, 11 Sep 63, same file, sec. 4. At McNamaras
direction, the Chairmans Special Studies Group made an estimate of requirements for
196669. It concluded that, in Central Europe, 55 divisions would be needed by D+7. Memo,
SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jan 63, JCS 2412/217; CM-225-63 to DJS, 21 Jan 63, JCS 2421/233; JMF
344
9050/3410 (14 Jan 63) sec. 1. NATO Conventional Force Requirements, 1967: Projects I-L,
I-N, I-O. These were summarized in DJSM-1633-63 to CJCS, 27 Sep 63, same file, sec. 2. The
Groups findings were sent to the Secretary via CM-920-63 to SecDef, 1 Oct 63, JCS 2421/615,
same file, sec. 2.
20. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 29 Apr 63, JCS 2421/425; Memo, MilAsst, SecDef to CJCS et al.,
1 May 63, JCS 2421/425; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 May 63, JCS 2421/425-1; JMF 9160/3410 (1
May 63) sec. 1.
21. CM-659-63 to DJS, 10 Jun 63; CM-574-63 to DJS, 14 May 63; CM-578-63 to DJS, 15 May
63; CJCS 092.2 NATO.
22. CM-579-63 to JCS, 15 May 63, JCS 2421/425-3; JCSM-386-63 to SecDef, JCS 2421/421-4;
JMF 9160/3410 (1 May 63) sec. 1.
23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jun 63, JCS 2412/425-5, JMF 9160/3410 (1 May 63) sec. 2.
24. Dept. of State Bulletin, 10 Jun 63, pp. 895897. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 13 Jun
63, JCS 2421/508, JMF 9050/3100 (30 Nov 62) sec. 2. JCSM-678-63 to SecDef, 3 Sep 63, JCS
2421/508-2, same file, sec. 3. In August 1964, major NATO commanders submitted replies
to the 1970 force planning exercise. They presented two sets of goals: Alpha, calling for 90
active and reserve divisions, which they recommended; and Bravo, calling for 80, based
on a continuation of current spending rates and which they believed would incur unacceptable risks. 1966 NATO Defense Planning Survey and Country Defense Summaries, Jan 67,
p. 9, JMF 806 (2 May 67) sec. 1A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, p. 28, JMF
9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1. As things turned out, even Bravo levels proved unattainable.
25. Ltr, DefMin Thorneycroft to SecDef, 13 May 63, Encl to SM-836-63 to CJCS, 18 May 63,
CJCS 091 England. Memo, U. A. Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, Analysis of French and Belgian Force Changes in NATO, 28 Jul 63, CJCS 092.2 NATO.
26. JCSM-494-63 to SecDef, 3 Jul 63, JCS 1800/703-2; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 16 Jul 63, JCS
1800/734; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 16 Jul 63, JCS 1800/734; JMF 9700 (19 Jun 63) sec. 2.
27. JCSM-737-63 to SecDef, 23 Sep 63; JMF 9700 (19 Jun 63) sec. 3. Memo, U. A. Johnson
to SecState, 16 Sep 63, same file, sec. 1.
28. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 624626.
29. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 826827. USEUCOM Annual Historical Report:
1963, chap. 2, pp. 123.
30. NY Times, 11 Apr 64, p. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Apr 64, JCS 2147/317-9; JCSM456-64 to SecDef, 1 Jun 64, JCS 2147/317-10; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Aug 64, 2nd N/H of JCS
2147/317-10, 25 Jan 65; Memo, OASD(ISA) to SJS, 19 Jan 65, 2nd N/H of JCS 2147/317-10, 25
Jan 65; JMF 9700 (10 Sep 63)(E) sec.2.
31. JCS 2124/308-1, 15 Aug 63, JMF 9060/5420 (6 Aug 63) sec. 1.
32. CM-840-63 to DJS, 23 Aug 63, CJCS 092.2 NATO. The Chairmans Special Studies
Group had submitted a report, which the JCS endorsed, detailing the need for small-yield,
short-range nuclear weapons. Chairmans Special Studies Group, Further Study of Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Apr 63, JMF 4610 (20 Dec 62) sec. 2A. JCSM-374-63 to
SecDef, 15 May 63, JCS 1832/777, same file, sec. 2.
33. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 626627.
34. CM-1034-63 to JCS, 26 Nov 63; CM-1044-63 to SecDef, 29 Nov 63; Memo, SecDef to
SecState, 3 Dec 63, JCS 2421/659-1; JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1.
35. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 20 Feb 64, JCS 2421/659-3, JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1.
36. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Feb 64, JCS 2421/659-4; DJSM-474-64 to CJCS, 17 Mar 64;
DJSM-637-64 to CJCS, 11 Apr 64; CM-1324-64 to JCS, 16 Apr 64; JCSM-357-64 to SecDef , 28
Apr 64, JCS 2421/659-5; JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1.
37. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Jun 64, JCS 2421/445-6, JMF 9050/3100 (30 Nov 62) sec. 6.
Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 13 Aug 64, JCS 2421/659-6, JMF 9050/3100 (26 Nov 63) sec. 1. Ltr,
SecDef to SecState, 31 Aug 64, JCS 2421/659-7, same file, sec. 2.
345
38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS 26 Oct 64, JCS 2421/897, JMF 9050 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1.
39. JCSM-961-64 to SecDef, 17 Nov 64, JCS 2421/897-4, JMF 9050 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1.
40. DJSM-1948-64 to CJCS, 12 Dec 64, JMF 9050 (15 Oct 64).
41. NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 16, 1964, Comments by Secretary McNamara, Att to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 19 Dec 64, JCS 2421/925, JMF 9050 (19 Dec 64).
42. Encls 1 and 10 to Memo, Gen. Strother to JCS, 23 Dec 64, JCS 2421/927, JMF
9050 (23 Dec 64). Note to Control, NATO Meetings in Paris, 21 Dec 64, JMF 9050 (19
Dec 64). Wheeler was referring mainly to the MLF but his observation applied to this
area as well.
43. Matthias Uhl, Storming on to Paris, in Vojtech Mastny et al. (ed.), War Plans and
Alliances in the Cold War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 4658. US officials soon learned about the main features of Buria. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp.
299300.
44. Petr Lunak, Planning for Nuclear War: The Czechoslovak War Plan of 1964, in Cold
War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 12/13, pp. 289297.
Chapter 14. Paring the Military Assistance Program

1. As an example, France received $2.933 billion in grants during FYs 195357 but was allotted only $68.8 million in FY 1960. House Foreign Affairs Committee, US Overseas Loans and
Grants: July 1, 1945June 30, 1966, p. 125. Military Assistance Facts, 1 May 66, p. 7. Military
and other forms of assistance comprised the Mutual Security Program, which was supervised by
a semi-autonomous International Cooperation Administration in the State Department.
2. Watson, Into the Missile Age, p. 658.
3. Memo, ASD(ISA) to Dir of MilAsst, 23 Dec 60, JCS 2315/52, JMF 4060 (23 Dec 60).
MemCon, Meeting Between SecState, SecDef, and Dir BOB on MAP, 25 Feb 61, JMF 4060
(15 Mar 61).
4. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 211. ISA proposed that the major allocations be $739
million for the Far East, $357 million for the Near East and South Asia, and $353 million for
Europe. FY 1962 MAP Budget for FY 1962, 18 Apr 61, JMF 4060 (21 Apr 61) sec. 1. JCSM272-61 to SecDef, 26 Apr 61, JCS 2315/70, same file, sec. 2.
5. JCS 2315/74, 29 May 61; Briefing Sheet for CJCS, JCS 2315/74, 29 May 61; JMF 4060
(21 Apr 61) sec. 2. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 400. Passage through Congress is covered in Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 424425.
6. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Aug 61, JCS 2315/95, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 1.
JCSM-677-61 to SecDef, 29 Sep 61, JCS 2315/109, same file, sec. 3.
7. Memo, DepAsstSecState Kitchen to SecState and SecDef, Report of the Military Assistance Steering Group, 12 Dec 61, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 3A.
8. CM-485-61 to SecDef, 29 Dec 61, JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 3. Memo, RADM Smith to
CJCS, 9 Jan 62, CJCS 091.3 (MAP). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Jan 62, JCS 2315/130; Memo,
Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS et al., 11 Jan 62, JCS 2315/129; DJSM-43-62 to ASD(ISA), 11 Jan 62,
N/H of JCS 2315/129, 12 Jan 62; JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 3. JCSM-43-62 to SecDef, 17 Jan 62,
JCS 2315/133, same file, sec. 4.
9. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 26 Jan 62, JCS 2315/139; JCSM-122-62 to SecDef, 17
Feb 62, JCS 2315/145; JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 4.
10. Congress, in 1960, appropriated about $2 billion for economic aid; that figure rose to
$2.3 billion in 1961 and $2.6 billion in 1962.
11. JCSM-769-61 to SecDef, 7 Nov 61, JCS 1800/477, JMF 7000 (9 Oct 61).
1962, 6 Jan 62, CJCS 031.1 Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, House Cmte. on Foreign Affairs, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 71.
346
13. Memo, DepDirMilAsst to CJCS, 31 Aug 62, JCS 2315/212, JMF 4060 (22 May 62) sec. 6.
JCSM-714-62 to SecDef, 15 Sep 62, JCS 2315/215, same file, sec. 7.
14. JCSM-753-62 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, JCS 2315/219, JMF 4060 (22 May 62) sec. 7.
15. App to JCSM-753-62 to SecDef, 29 Sep 62, JCS 2315/219, JMF 4060 (22 May 62) sec. 7.
App A to SA/MAA-15-62 to DJS, 8 Nov 62, JMF 4060 (2 Nov 62).
16. Memo, DirMilAsst to CJCS, 11 Dec 61, JCS 2315/123; JCSM-894-61 to SecDef, 28 Dec
61, JCS 2315/125; JMF 4060 (11 Dec 61). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 May 62, JCS 2315/184,
JMF 4060 (31 May 62). Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, House Cmte. on Foreign
Relations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1090.
17. MJCS-1432-62 to DirMilAsst, 10 Nov 62, N/H of JCS 2315/228; DJSM-137-63 to CJCS, 30
Jan 63, JMF 4060 (2 Nov 62).
18. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 431433, 435. Memo, General Wood to
JCS, 3 Jan 63, JCS 2315/249; JCSM-173-63 to SecDef, 6 Mar 63, JCS 2315/257; Memo, General
Wood to DepAsstAdmin, AID, 30 Apr 63, N/H of JCS 2315/257, 3 May 63; JMF 4060 (3 Jan 63).
19. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 435438. Memo, General Wood to
SecDef, FY 1964 Revised Program, 20 Sep 63; Memo, General Wood to CJCS et al., 24 Sep
63, Att to Memo, General Wood to CJCS, 25 Sep 63, JCS 2315/297; Memo, DASD(ISA) to
SecDef, 21 Nov 63, Encl to Memo, General Wood to CJCS, 29 Nov 63, JCS 2315/297-3; JMF
4060 (20 Sep 63). Memo, Admin AID to SecDef, 24 Jan 64, JCS 2315/314; JCSM-271-64 to
SecDef, 31 Mar 64, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) sec.1.
20. CM-424-63 to DJS, 20 Mar 63, JCS 2315/262; JCSM-576-63 to SecDef, 30 Jul 63, JCS
2315/288; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Sep 63, JCS 2315/296; JMF 4060 (27 Dec 62).
21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Nov 63, JCS 2315/306, JMF 4060 (15 Nov 63) sec. 2. Memo,
ASD(ISA) to SecDef, MAP Appropriation Request for FY 1965, 5 Dec 63, same file, sec. 1.
22. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 439-440. Memo, SecDef to Admin AID,
24 Jan 64, Att to Memo, General Wood to CJCS, 24 Jan 64, JCS 2315/314; JCSM-271-64 to
SecDef, 31 Mar 64, JCS 2315/314-2, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) sec. 2. Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, House Cmte. on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 8587.
23. House Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, pp. 9699. Kaplan et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, p. 442.
24. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 2 Oct 64, JCS 2315/335-2; JCSM-877-64 to SecDef, 15 Oct
64, JCS 2315/335-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Nov 64, 1st N/H of JCS 2315/335, 19 Nov 64;
JMF 4060 (16 Sep 64).
25. Memo, General Wood to DJS, 4 Feb 64, JCS 2315/316, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A).
26. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 221350Z Feb 64; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 180208Z Feb 64;
JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A). Ltr, CINCUNC to JCS, 2 Apr 64, JCS 1776/691; Ltr, CJCS to CINCUNC, 27 Apr 64, N/H of JCS 1776/691, 29 Apr 64; Ltr, CINCUNC to JCS, 12 Sep 64, JCS
1776/691-1; Ltr, CJCS to CINCUNC, 13 Oct 64, JCS 1776/691-1; JMF 9144/9920 (2 Apr 64).
27. JCSM-324-64 to SecDef, 14 Apr 64, JCS 2315/316-3, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A).
28. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 May 64, JCS 2315/316-3, JMF 4060 (24 Jan 64) (A). Kaplan
et al., The McNamara Ascendancy, pp. 444445.
Chapter 15. Latin America: Containment and Counter-Insurgency

1. The text of the treaty is in Dept. of State Bulletin, 21 Sep 47, pp. 565572.
2. NSC 5902/1, 16 Feb 59, JCS 1976/266, JMF 9122/9105 (59). Printed in Foreign Relations
of the United States: 19581960, vol. V (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of
State, 1991), pp. 101102.
3. A New Concept for Hemispheric Defense and Development, n.d., JCS 1976/356;
Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Feb 61, JCS 1976/356; JMF 9120/3000 (27 Feb 61).
4. JCSM-110-61 to SecDef, 28 Feb 61, JCS 1976/357, JMF 9120/3000 (27 Feb 61).
347
5. US Policy for the Security of Latin America in the Sixties, n.d., JCS 1976/364, JMF
9122/9105 (8 May 61) (1) sec. 1.
6. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 May 61, JCS 1976/364; JCSM-323-61 to SecDef, 15 May
61, JCS 1976/365; JMF 9122/9105 (8 May 61) (1) sec. 1. A revised version is printed in FRUS:
19611963, vol. XII, pp. 173176.
7. Latin America: Dept. of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Oct 61, pp. 59-61,
JCS 1976/393; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Nov 61, JCS 1976/393; JCSM-828-61 to
SecDef, 30 Nov 61, JCS 1976/395; Ltr, ActgASD(ISA) to USecState for Political Affairs, 26
Dec 61, Att to N/H of JCS 197615 Feb 62, JMF 9122/9105 (18 Nov 61) sec. 2. Latin America:
Guidelines for Policy and Operations, May 62, pp. 5767, JCS 1976/488, same file, sec. 3.
8. Memo, CNO to JCS, 16 May 61, JCS 1976/376; JCSM-341-61 to Pres, 19 May 61, JCS
1976/369; JMF 9122/3360 (16 May 61).
9. JCSM-832-61 to Pres, 30 Nov 61, JCS 1976/394, JMF 9122/9105 (30 Oct 61) sec. 2. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XII, pp. 197202.
10. NSAM No. 118 to SecState and SecDef, 5 Dec 61, JCS 1976/396, JMF 9122/9105 (30 Oct
61) sec. 2. JCSM-30-62 to SecDef, 13 Jan 62, JCS 1976/401, same file, sec. 4. NSAM No. 140
to SecState and SecDef, 26 Mar 62, JCS 1976/433, same file, sec. 5. States paper is printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XII, pp. 221223.
11. NSAM No. 119 to SecState and SecDef, 18 Dec 61, JCS 1735/627; Memo, Dep DMA to
DJS, 2 Feb 62, JCS 1735/635; JMF 3310 (18 Dec 61).
12. JCSM-107-62 to SecDef, 10 Feb 62, JCS 1735/636, JMF 3310 (18 Dec 61).
13. Mission to South AmericaSouth American Assessment Team, 3 Jan 62, JCS 1976/405,
JMF 9130/3100 (3 Jan 62) sec. 2. Conclusions are summarized in Encl B to JCS 1976/419, same
file. Part I of the teams report is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XII, pp. 220209.
14. JCSM-187-62 to SecDef, 14 Mar 62, JCS 1976/419, JMF 9130/3100 (3 Jan 62) sec. 3.
Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState U. A. Johnson, 16 Mar 62, N/H of JCS 1976/419, 23 Mar
62, same file, sec. 2.
15. JCS 1976/420, 6 Mar 62; Msg, JCS 3623 to CINCLANT and CINCARIB, 14 Mar 62, JCS
1976/420; JMF 9122/9105 (30 Oct 61) sec. 5. Ltr, CINCARIB to JCS, 18 Mar 62, JCS 1976/421,
same file, sec. 6.
16. CM-671-62 to SecDef, 28 Apr 62, 1st N/H of JCS 1976/444, 8 May 62; Memo, DepSecDef
to CJCS, 8 May 62, JCS 1976/446; JMF 9138.2/3700 (26 Apr 62) sec. 1. CINCARIB sent the JCS
bi-monthly status reports on these projects.
17. JCSM-652-62 to SecDef, 24 Aug 62, JCS 1976/467, JMF 9122/9105 (30 Oct 61) sec. 7.
DOD approval is mentioned in comments on paragraphs 16 and 23 of Memo, DASD(ISA)
to McGeorge Bundy, 17 Dec 62, N/H of JCS 1976/472, 26 Dec 62, same file.
18. According to Gen. Lemnitzer, the Latins deeply resented, as gross interference in their
internal affairs, US efforts to tell them how large their military establishments ought to be.
Gen. Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 13 Jun 1977.
19. Ltr, CINCARIB to JCS, 26 Sep 62, JCS 1976/478; CM-12-62 to SecDef, 10 Oct 62, 1st N/H
of JCS 1976/478, 11 Oct 62; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Oct 62, JCS 1735/675; JMF 3700 (5 Oct
62) sec. 2.
20. JCSM-704-62 to SecDef, 13 Sep 62, JCS 1976/402, JMF 9122/9105 (30 Oct 61) sec. 8.
21. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to SecDef et al., 26 Oct 64, JCS 2315/339; Memo, ASD(ISA) to
CJCS et al., 13 Jan 65, JCS 2315/339-2; JMF 9105 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1. The first memo is printed
in Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXXI (Washington, DC: Office of
the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), pp. 7072.
22. JCSM-64-65 to SecDef, 27 Jan 65, JCS 2339/339-3, JMF 9105 (26 Oct 64) sec. 1.
23. Memo, SecDef to McGeorge Bundy, 11 Jun 65, JCS 2315/339-4, JMF 9105 (26 Oct 64)
sec. 2. Printed in FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXXI, pp. 7779.
348
24. JCSM-40-61 to SecDef, 26 Jan 61, JCS 1976/352, JMF 9128.4/9105 (23 Jan 61). The words
up to military occupation of the entire country were added at Adm. Burkes instigation. The
J5 and the Director, Joint Staff, had spoken only of establishing a naval patrol in the area.
Memo, CNO to JCS, JCS 1976/352The Dominican Republic, 24 Jan 61, same file.
25. President Kennedy was in Europe on a state visit.
26. TP for JCS Mtg, Dominican Republic, 15 May 61, JMF 9128.4/9105 (23 Jan 61).
Information given by Telephone to Dean Rusk by [DepSecDef] at 4:30 PM, 5/31/61, regarding developments in Dominican Republic; Msg, JCS to CINCLANT, 1 Jun 61, with note by
Adm. Wellings to JCS; Memo, VCNO to JCS, Means to Influence the Government of the
Dominican Republic, 4 Jun 61; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic.
27. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XII, pp. 676682.
28. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XII, p. 453. Memo for Record by CAPT Cunha, Report of
ConferenceCaribbean Command, 5 Feb 62, JMF 5410 (20 Jan 62). FRUS: 19641968, vol.
XXXI, pp. 412447.
29. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 12 Oct 64, JCS 2315/338; JCSM-896-64 to SecDef, 22 Oct
64, JCS 2315/338-1; Msg, DEF 1399 to USCINCSO, 28 Oct 64; JMF 4060 (12 Oct 64).
30. NSAM No. 213 to SecState, 8 Jan 63, JCS 2304/134 (printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI,
pp. 656657); Memo, SecArmy to Chairman, ICC, 11 Jan 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2304/134, 14 Jan 63;
2nd N/H of JCS 2304/134, 29 Jan 63; Memo, LTC Fairfield to SJS, 14 Jan 63, JCS 2304/135; JCSM54-63 to SecArmy, 16 Jan 63, JCS 2304/136; CSAM-19-63 to JCS 17 Jan 63, JCS 2304/138; JCSM67-63 to SecArmy, 19 Jan 63, JCS 2304/138; JMF 9123/3100 (8 Jan 63 sec. 1.
31. CSAM-23-63 to JCS, JCS 2304/140; JCSM-69-63 to SecArmy, 21 Jan 63, JCS 2304/143;
JMF 9123/3100 (8 Jan 63) sec. 2. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 670675.
32. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XI, pp. 676687.
33. Ibid, pp. 791, 802803. The ExComm frequently reviewed the schedule of U2 overflights. At an NSC meeting on 20 April, President Kennedy said that we could hardly continue to carry out a mild policy in Cuba at the time the Communists are carrying out an aggressive policy in Laos. He thus approved certain U2 flights over Cuba. Ibid, p. 773.
34. Ibid, pp. 828831, 906, 871. It was recognized that, to achieve the ultimate objective,
covert action depended heavily upon intensive efforts in other sectors, particularly economic denial to and political isolation of Cuba. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964
1968, vol. XXXII (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2005), pp. 554555.
35. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXXII, pp. 548549, 606607, 618619. Memo, ActgCJCS to
DJS, 6 Mar 64, JCS 2304/218; JCS 2304/218-2, 10 Mar 64; CSAM-159-64 to JCS, 11 Mar 64;
CSAFM-243-64 to JCS, 11 Mar 64; Chairmans Flimsy 128-64 to JCS, 18 Mar 64; JCSM-25364 to Pres, 21 Mar 64, JCS 2304/-218-3; JMF 9123 (6 Mar 64). At a White House meeting on
7 April, Gen. Taylor said the JCS favored the covert program in its entirety, believing that
it has never been given a fair test and that we should move forward with it in the interests
of making Castros life as hard as possible. Ibid, p. 629. In November, the JCS sent Secretary McNamara a plan for attacking Cubas sugar industry which, they thought, merited
serious consideration. JCSM-942-64 to SecDef, 9 Nov 64, JCS 2304/244-1, JMF 9123 (1
Sep 64).
36. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XII, p. 352. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 2 Dec 63, JCS 2304/2072; Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 13 Dec 63, JCS 2304/207-3; JMF 9123/3100 (22 Oct 63)(1) sec. 1.
JCSM-34-64 to SecDef, 16 Jan 64, JCS 2304/207-4, same file, sec. 3.
37. Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 5 Feb 64, JCS 1976/533; CM-1192-64 to SecDef, 15 Feb 64, JCS
2396/6; Msg, JCS 4914 to CINCLANT, 18 Feb 64; JMF 9123/3100 (22 Oct 63) sec. 3. Foreign
Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXXI (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), pp. 10, 12. Dept. of State Bulletin, 10 Aug 64, pp. 179184.
38. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXXI, pp. 372, 375376, 378, 381385.
349
Chapter 16. Middle East Kaleidoscope

1. Briefing Sheet for CJCS, JCS 2340/5, 7 Mar 63; JCSM-197-63 to SecDef, 9 Mar
63, JCS 2340/5; JMF 9182/9105 (21 Feb 63). Foreign Relations of the United States:
19611963, vol. XVIII (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1995), pp.
408409, 472.
2. JCSM-623-63 to SecDef, 15 Aug 63, JCS 2340/6-1, JMF 1982/9105 (21 Feb 63). Printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 673675.
3. Israel: State Dept. Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Feb 62; Memo, DASD(ISA)
to CJCS, 19 Mar 62, JCS 2369; JCSM-255-62 to SecDef, 5 Apr 62, JCS 2369/1; Memo,
DASD(ISA) to USecState for PolAff, 11 Apr 62, N/H of JCS 2369/1, 16 Apr 62; Guidelines for
Policy and Operations: Israel, Jun 62, JCS 2369/4; JMF 9183/9105 (19 Mar 62) sec. 2.
4. Warren Bass, Support Any Friend (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), pp. 152, 155156.
5. JCS 2369/3, 5 Sep 62; Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecArmy, 19 Jun 62; Ltr,
DepAsstSecState(NESA) to DASD(ISA), 25 Jun 62; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Jun 62, JCS
1887/657; JMF 9183/9105 (22 Aug 62).
6. JCSM-507-62 to SecDef, 12 Jul 62, JCS 1887/658; JMF 9183/9105 (22 Aug 62). Israel was
believed to have 139 fighters and 24 bombers, mostly French-supplied. Egypts inventory
was estimated at 169 fighters (mostly MiG-15s and MiG-17s, 3 MiG-21s), 46 IL28s, and 8 Tu16s. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 89, 2732.
7. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 5458, 6466. The offer was loosely linked to Israeli
cooperation on a UN-sponsored plan for resettling Palestinians who had become refugees during the 1948-49 war. Subsequently, the plan failed to win support from either Israelis or Arabs.
8. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 22 Aug 62, JCS 2369/2; JCS 2369/5, 5 Sep 62; JCSM-698-62
to SecDef, 11 Sep 62, JCS 2369/3; JMF 9183/9105 (22 Aug 62).
9. JCS 2369/5-1, 1 Aug 63, JMF 9183/9105 (15 Jul 63). Early in 1965, the first elements of
the Hawk battalion became operational in Israel.
10. Ltr, AsstSecState(NESA) to DASD(ISA), 15 Jul 63, JCS 2369/5; JMF 9183/9105 (15 Jul 63).
11. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 373.
12. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, p. 548, 666-67, 684-685. JCSM-611-63 to SecDef, 7 Aug
63, JCS 2369/5-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState(NESA), 22 Aug 63, JCS 2369/5-2; JMF
9183/9105 (15 Jul 63).
13. US-Israeli Talks Re UAR Missile Capability, 1213 Nov 63, JMF 9180/9105 (2 Dec 63) sec. 1.
14. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Dec 63, JCS 1887/677; JCSM-953-63 to SecDef, 7 Dec 63, JCS
1887/677-1; JMF 9183 (18 Mar 64) sec. 2. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 818819, 833
834. It is noteworthy that a situation of Israeli superiority was characterized as substantial military
equilibrium. Later administrations would continue this practice.
15. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964-1968: vol. XVIII (Washington, DC:
Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2000), pp. 1115. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Jan 64,
JCS 2369/6; JCSM-40-64 to SecDef, 18 Jan 64, JCS 2369/6-1; JMF 9183/9105 (8 Jan 64). Printed
without Appendices in ibid, pp. 2326.
16. Ltr, DepSecDef to DepUSecState, 8 Feb 64, JCS 2369/9, JMF 9183/9105 (8 Jan 64). The
JCS restated their position via JCSM-207-64 to SecDef, 12 Mar 64, JCS 23669/9-1, same file.
Printed in FRUS: 19641968, vol. XVIII, pp. 6668.
17. Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 198199, 202203, 213219, 233234. The quotation
from Kennedys letter appears on p. 219. The JCS study is printed in FRUS: 19611963,
vol. XVII, pp. 216221. The Dimona inspection report is printed in FRUS: 19641968, vol.
XVIII, pp. 2931.
18. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XVIII, pp. 1114.
350
19. Warren Bass concludes that the Hawk sale was a watershed, representing the birth
of the US-Israel alliance. Support Any Friend, pp. 185, 169. A better choice would be the
sale of high-performance F4s in 1968.
20. JCSM-398-60 to SecDef, 8 Sep 60, JCS 1881/67; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Oct 60,
JCS 1881/68; JCSM-60-61 to SecDef, 9 Feb 61, JCS 1881/69; JMF 9186/4960 (12 May 60) sec. 1.
21. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Mar 61, JCS 1881/71; JCSM-492-61 to SecDef, 21 Jul 61,
JCS 1881/76; JCSM-559-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61, JCS 1881/77; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 28 Sep 61, 1st N/H of JCS 1881/77-1, 3 Oct 61; JMF 9186/4960 (12 May 60) sec. 2.
22. Saudi Arabia: State Dept. Guideline for Policy and Operations, Mar 62, Att to Memo,
ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Mar 62, JCS 1881/79; JCSM-268-62 to SecDef, 10 Apr 62, JCS 1881/80;
Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 19 Apr 62, N/H of JCS 1881/80, 25 Apr 62; State Dept.
Guideline for Policy and Operations: Saudi Arabia, Jun 62, JCS 1881/83; JMF 9186/9105 (21
Mar 62) sec. 2.
23. The Yemeni civil war and its ramifications are described in Bass, Support Any
Friend, pp. 98143.
24. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, [17 Oct 62], JCS 1881/81, JMF 9180/3100 (19 Oct 62).
25. JCSM-875-62 to SecDef, 9 Nov 62, JCS 188/82, JMF 9180/310 (19 Oct 62). Printed, without Appendices, in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 205208.
26. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 265-267, 288-291. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 31
Dec 62, JCS 1881/84, JMF 9180/3100 (31 Dec 62).
27. JCSM-5-63 to SecDef, 2 Jan 63, JCS 1881/85, JMF 9180/3100 (31 Dec 62). Printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 295298.
28. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 303306. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Jan 63, JCS
1881/87, JMF 9180/3100 (31 Dec 62).
29. JCSM-55-63 to SecDef, 18 Jan 63, JCS 1881/88, JMF 9180/3100 (31 Dec 62).
30. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 363367.
31. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Feb 63, JCS 1881/90; JCSM-174-63 to SecDef, 2 Mar 63, JCS
1881/91; JMF 9180/3100 (27 Feb 63) sec. 1. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Mar 63, JCS 1881/93;
JCSM-188-63 to SecDef, 6 Mar 63, JCS 1881/94; 1st N/H of JCS 1881/94, 7 Mar 63; JMF 9180/3100
(2 Feb 63)(1). JCSM-188-63 is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 394396.
32. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 457459. DJSM-837-63 to ASD(ISA), 18 May 63;
TP-42-63 for State-JCS Mtg on 16 Aug 63, 15 Aug 63; Msg, Jidda 864 to SecState, 22 Apr 63;
Memo, BG Ewell to DJS, 22 Apr 63; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 May 63, JCS 1881/97; JMF
9180/4060 (16 Apr 63).
33. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 577581, 587588, 614615, 621622, 675680.
Concurrently, for Saudi Arabia, an air defense survey team outlined a system consisting
of three interceptor squadrons and three Hawk batteries, located around Jidda, Riyadh,
and Dhahran. The JCS and ISA concurred. In 1965, the Saudis purchased Hawks from the
United States and interceptors, radar, and communications equipment from the United
Kingdom. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecAF, 20 Jul 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2370/2, 24 Jul 63; JCSM-86363 to SecDef, 7 Nov 63, JCS 1887/676-3; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 18 Nov 63, JCS
1887/676-4; JMF 9180/3100 (25 Feb 63) sec. 1.
34. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 726730. Bass, Support Any Friend, p. 135.
35. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 759, 795796.
36. CSAFM-791-63 to JCS, 14 Dec 63, JCS 1881/101; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Dec
63, JCS 1881/102; JCSM-1003-63 to SecDef, 24 Dec 63, JCS 1881/101-1; CM-1094-63 to SecDef,
24 Dec 63, JCS 1881/101-2; JMF 9180/3100 (27 Feb 63) sec. 2. JCSM-1003-63 is printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 856858.
37. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXI (Washington, DC: Office
351
38. JCSM-27-61 to SecDef, 26 Jan 61, JCS 1714/123; 1 st N/H of JCS 1714/123, 1 Mar
61; JMF 9181/9105 (1 Dec 60). FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVII pp. 78, 3738.
39. A Review of Problems in Iran and Recommendations for the National Security Council, 15 May 61, JCS 1714/129, JMF 9181/9105 (9 May 61) sec. 1. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVII,
pp. 120122.
40. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Jun 61, JCS 1714/132; JCSM-443-61 to SecDef, 28 Jun 61,
JCS 1714/133; JMF 9181/9105 (9 May 61) sec. 2.
41. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Oct 61, JCS 1714/134, JMF 9181/9105 (9 May 61) sec. 2.
JCSM-741-61 to SecDef, 20 Oct 61, JCS 1714/135, same file, sec. 3.
42. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVII, pp. 548549, 556563, 582583; the quotation comes
from p. 558.
43. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVII, pp. 598604, 623625. JCSM-579-62 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62,
JCS 1714/156, JMF 9181/3100 (21 Apr 62) sec. 5. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 105109.
Memo of Conversation, Five-Year Military Program for Iran, 19 Sep 62, CJCS 091 Iran.
44. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVIII, pp. 831832.
45. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXII (Washington, DC:
Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1999), pp. 38.
46. JCSM-421-64 to SecDef, 16 May 64, JCS 1714/170-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecDef, 3
Jul 64, Att to Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Jul 64, JCS 1714/170-2; JMF 9181 (22 Apr 64). Ann
B to Report of the United States Military Survey Team to Iran, 16 Feb3 Mar 66, JMF 9181
(17 Jan 66) sec. 1A.
47. Iraq, an original member, withdrew after the 1958 coup overthrew the Hashemite
monarchy.
48. DJSM-283-61 to CJCS, 15 Mar 61; TP for State-JCS Mtg on 17 Mar 61, US Position on
CENTO, 16 Mar 61; JMF 9070/9105 (13 Mar 61). FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVII, pp. 4648.
49. JCS 2273/304, 28 Mar 61; Dec On JCS 2273/304, 29 Mar 61; JMF 9070/9105 (13 Mar 61).
50. JCSM-383-61 to SecDef, 8 Jun 61, JCS 2273/310, JMF 9070/5410 (7 Mar 61) sec. 2.
51. Its name was changed from the Joint Campaign Plan to the Emergency Defense Concept.
52. DJSM-955-62 to CJCS, 2 Aug 62; CM-864-62 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62, JCS 2273/363; Memo,
ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Aug 62, N/H of JCS 2273/363, 13 Aug 62; JMF 9070/3100 (2 Aug 62). JCSM124-63 to SecDef, 11 Feb 63, JCS 2273/376, JMF 9070/5410 (10 Oct 62).
53. JCSM-441-63 to SecDef, 10 Jun 63, JCS 2273/383, JMF 9070/5410 (5 Jan 63).
54. CM-549-63 for Record, 3 May 63, CJCS 333.1 (CENTO Mtg). The Shah, in the April 1962
meetings described above, had argued that US proposals to cut Iranian force levels ran dead
counter to CENTO studies. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XVII, p. 600.
55. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Apr 63, JCS 1887/669, JMF 9180/3100 (24 Apr 63).
56. JCSM-450-63 to SecDef, 12 Jun 63, JCS 1887/669-1, JMF 9180/3100 (24 Apr 63). Gen.
Lemnitzer, who was now SACEUR and USCINCEUR, still wanted the United States to join
CENTO. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 211740Z May 63, same file.
57. JCSM-138-64 to SecDef, 20 Feb 64, JCS 2273/389-4, JMF 9070/5410 (28 Jun 3) sec. 1.
JCSM-620-64 to SecDef, 21 Jul 64, JCS 2273/401-3, JMF 9070/5410 (14 Jan 64) sec. 2.
Chapter 17. New Africa and the Congo Entanglement

1. JCSM-466-60 to SecDef, 17 Oct 60, JCS 2121/76; 2nd N/H of JCS 2121/76, 21 Nov 60; JMF
9110/9105 (23 Sep 60) sec. 1. At a State-JCS meeting in January 1962, Gen. Lemnitzer said
that the political situations in Guinea, Mali, and Ghana appeared to be improving. Foreign
Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. XXI (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1995), pp. 308310.
352
2. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Jan 61, JCS 2121/87; JCSM-280-61 to SecDef, 28 Apr 61,
JCS 2121/91; N/H of JCS 2121/91, 12 May 61; JMF 9110/3050 (27 Jan 61) sec. 1. The JCSM is
printed in FRUS: 19611963, Volume XXI, pp. 285287. JCSM-456-61 to SecDef, 6 Jul 61, JCS
2121/101; same file, sec. 2. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 580582, 647648.
3. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 3 May 61, JCS 2121/95, JMF 9110/9105 (3 May 61) sec. 1.
4. Ltr, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, 17 Aug 61, JCS
2121/106, JMF 9110/9105 (3 May 61) sec. 1. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXI, pp. 297
298. JCS 2121/128, 19 Mar 62, JMF 9110/9105 (5 Mar 62) sec. 1. House Foreign Affairs Cmte.,
US Overseas Loans and Grants (1967), p. 74.
5. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Nov 61, JCS 2121/113, JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61)
sec. 1.
6. JCSM-837-61 to SecDef, 1 Dec 61, JCS 2121/114; Ltr, ActgASD(ISA) to USecState, 19
Dec 61, N/H of JCS 2121/114, 15 Feb 62; JCS 2121/134, 9 Apr 62; JMF 9110/9105 (15 Nov 61)
sec. 1.
7. Dept. of State Bulletin, 3 Apr 61, pp. 497499. The resolution failed in the Security
Council but passed by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly.
8. JCSM-258-61 to SecDef, 22 Apr 61, JCS 570/529, JMF 4920 (4 Apr 61). 2nd N/H of JCS
2125/9, 25 May 61, JMF 9166.2/4920 (28 Feb 61) sec. 2.
9. DJSM-817-61 to CJCS, 11 Jul 61; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 27 Jul 61, JCS
2121/103; JMF 9115/9105 (12 Jul 61) sec. 2. Report: Presidential Task Force on Portuguese
Territories in Africa, 12 Jul 61, same file, sec. 1. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 901902.
10. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXI, pp. 548549. A 1951 letter of understanding committed
the United States, on Portugals request, to permit the use of US-supplied arms in Africa. A
later Mutual Defense Assistance agreement prohibited such diversions without US consent.
Ibid., pp. 573, 548. JCSM-648-61 to SecDef, 2 Sep 61, JCS 2125/11, JMF 9166.2/4920 (28 Feb
61) sec. 2. Transmitted to State via Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 27 Oct 61, N/H of JCS
2125/11, 3 Nov 61, same file, sec. 1.
11. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXI, fn. 1 on p. 578. Msg, Lisbon A-524 to SecState, 15 Apr
63; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 14 Aug 63, JCS 2125/27; DJSM-1420-63 to CJCS, 22 Aug 63; JMF
9166.2/4920 (28 Feb 61) sec. 4. The latter is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIII, pp. 965967.
12. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXI, pp. 578579.
13. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Dec 61, JCS 2121/115; JCSM-876-61 to SecDef, 21
Dec 61, JCS 2121/116; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to USecState, 5 Jan 62 N/H of JCS 2121/116, 15
Feb 62; JCS 2121/147, 8 Jun 62; JMF 9110/9105 (5 Dec 61) sec. 1.
14. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXI, p. 645. Dept. of State Bulletin, 26 Aug 63, pp. 333337. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Sep 64, JCS 2121/186; JCSM-794-64 to SecDef, 14
Sep 64, JCS 2121/186-1; Memo, DepSecDef to SecState, 15 Sep 64, JCS 2121/186-2; Memo
for Record by McGeorge Bundy, 30 Nov 64, JCS 2121/186-3; JMF 9110 (12 Sep 62). Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXIV (Washington, DC: Historical
Office, Dept. of State, 1999), p. 1005.
15. Dept. of State National Policy Paper: South Africa, 2 Mar 64, JMF 9110.1/9105 (16
Nov 63) sec. 1. JCSM-290-64 to SecDef, 8 Apr 64, JCS 2121/172-2; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to
Walt Rostow, 23 Apr 64, JCS 2121/172-3, same file, sec. 2.
16. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176; JCSM-292-64 to SecDef, 7 Apr 64,
JCS 2121/176-1; Memo, DepSecDef to McGeorge Bundy, 10 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176-2; NSAM
No. 295 to SecDef et al., 24 Apr 64, JCS 2121/176-3; JMF 9110.1/9105 (3 Apr 64). FRUS: 1964
1968, vol. XXIV, pp. 971, 979981, 984986.
17. JCSM-439-64 to SecDef, 22 May 64, JCS 2121/176-4; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS,
7 Jul 64, JCS 2121/176-5; JMF 9110.1/9105 (3 Apr 64). FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXIV, pp.
989991, 10071019.
18. During 196062, major contributors to the UNEF were India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia,
Ghana, Sweden, Malaya, Ireland, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Morocco. Force commanders were
353
Swedish (1960), Irish (196162), and Ethiopian (196263). ACDA, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 19601964 (Washington, DC: 1966), vol. III, Apps G and H.
19. JCS 2262/72, 26 Jan 61, and Dec On, 27 Jan 61; JCS 2262/70, 24 Jan 61, and Dec On, 27
Jan 61; CNOM-8-61 to JCS, 27 Jan 61; CSAM-36-61 to JCS, 26 Jan 61; JMF 9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).
20. JCSM-46-61 to SecDef, 30 Jan 61, JCS 2262/72; N/H of JCS 2262/72, 17 Feb 61; JMF
9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).
21. JCSM-52-61 to SecDef, 31 Jan 61, JCS 2262/73; JMF 9110/9105 (23 Jan 61). Foreign
Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. XX (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1994), pp. 3841.
22. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Feb 61, JCS 2262/76; JCSM-92-61 to SecDef, 17 Feb 61,
JCS 2261/77; JMF 9111/9105 (30 Jan 61). CINCLANT Contingency OPLAN 330-61, Africa
(South of the Sahara), JMF 3142 (13 Feb 61) sec. 1. After a JCS review, the plan was altered
to assign a high priority to seizing airfields. Subsequently, State turned down Defense
requests that it try to obtain advance approvals for basing and overflight rights. SM-432-61
to CINCLANT, 18 Apr 61, JCS 2018/243; same file, sec. 2. JCSM-712-61 to SecDef, 10 Oct 61,
JCS 2018/297; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 26 Oct 61, JCS 2018/298; same file, sec.
1. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Dec 61, JCS 2018/334; JCSM-92-62 to SecDef, 5 Feb 62, JCS
2018/332; same file, sec. 3.
23. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, pp. 1618.
24. Ibid., pp. 7475.
25. The UAR was comprised of Egypt and Syria, under the leadership of President Gamal
Abdul Nasser of Egypt.
26. JCSM-95-61 to SecDef, 21 Feb 61, JCS 2262/79; N/H of JCS 2262/79, 7 Mar 61; JMF
9111/9105 (23 Jan 61).
27. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, 139140, 184185. Adoula did not wait long before having
Gizenga jailed.
28. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, pp. 227, 231232.
29. Dept. of State Bulletin, 25 Dec 61, pp. 1068-1069. Information drawn from JCSM-4-62
to SecDef, 4 Jan 62, JCS 2262/104, JMF 9111/4031 (17 Sep 61).
30. Memo, Gen. Taylor to JCS, 11 Dec 61, JCS 2262/100; Msg, JCS 2587 to USCINCEUR,
13 Dec 61; JCSM-871-61 to SecDef, JCS 2262/102; Msg, JCS 2616 to USARMA Leopoldville,
160010Z Dec 61; JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).
31. JCSM-869-61 to Gen. Taylor, 15 Dec 61, and JCSM-870-61 to SecDef, 15 Dec 61, JCS
2262/101, JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).
32. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, p. 334.
33. Msg, Leopoldville 1635 to SecState, 23 Dec 61; Msg, JCS 2714 to CINCUSAREUR,
262257Z Dec 61; Msg, CINUSAREUR to JCS, SX 7791, 271322Z Dec 61, DA IN 187502; Memo,
CJCS to SecState, 29 Dec 61, 2nd N/H of JCS 2262/102; JMF 9111/2010 (11 Dec 61).
34. JCSM-4-62 to SecDef, 4 Jan 62, JCS 2262/104; Msg, SecState 1271 to Leopoldville, 16
Jan 62; JMF 9111/4031 (17 Sep 61).
35. FRUS 19611963, vol. XX, pp. 557, 625. Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation (New
York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 233.
36. Report of the Special Military Advisory Team: Republic of the Congo, 23 Jul 62, JMF
9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec. 1. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 31 Jul 62, JCS 2262/114; JCSM-60762 to SecDef, 8 Aug 62, JCS 262/115; same file, sec. 2.
37. Memo, ActgASD(SA) to DepUSecState, 15 Aug 62, JCS 2262/116; Ltr, DepUSecState to
ActgASD(ISA), 7 Sep 62, 1st N/H of JCS 2262/116; Memo, DepUSecState to ASD(ISA), 8 Oct
62, JCS 2262/118; JMF 9111/3100 (31 Jul 62) sec. 2. NY Times, 9 Oct 62, p. 5.
38. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, pp. 653656. Msg, Leopoldville 767 to State, 28 Sep 62;
Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Oct 62, and DJSM-1460 to ASD(ISA), 17 Nov 62, JCS 2262/117;
JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.
354
39. JCS 2262/119, 16 Nov 62, JMF 9111/3100 (6 Nov 62). Msgs, Elizabethville 733 to State,
9 Nov 62; SecState Circular 909, 14 Nov 62; USUN 1853 to State, 16 Nov 62; SecState 763 to
Leopoldville, 24 Nov 62; JCS 7623 to USCINCEUR, 29 Nov 62.
40. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Dec 62, JCS 2262/120; JCSM-983-62 to SecDef, 11 Dec
62, JCS 2262/121; Memo, ASD(ISA) to USecState, 11 Dec 62, 1st N/H of JCS 2262/121; JMF
9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.
41. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to DJS and SecDef, 15 Dec 62; VDJSM-1-62 to DASD(ISA), 16
Dec 62; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.
42. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, pp. 747, 750752.
43. Msg, SecState 1740 to USUN, 22 Dec 62; Msg, USUN 2476 to SecState, 22 Dec 62;
CM-173-62 to LTG Truman, 19 Dec 62, JCS 2262/127; Note to Control, Congo, 17 Dec
62; JCSM-1017-62 to SecDef, 21 Dec 62, JCS 2262/125; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 1.
The JCSM is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XX, pp. 780782.
44. Memo, LTG Truman to JCS, Final Report of the Congo Military Mission, 31 Dec 62,
JCS 2262/128; JCSM-11-63 to SecDef, 7 Jan 63, JCS 2262/169; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState, 15 Jan 63, 1st N/H of JCS 22262/129; JMF 91111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 2.
45. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Jan 63; JCSM-35-63 to SecDef, 11 Jan 63, JCS 2262/130;
DJSM-52-63 to JCS, 14 Jan 63; Note to Control, DJSM-52-63, 14 Jan 63; Memo, DASD(ISA)
to DJS, 15 Jan 63, 1st N/H of JCS 2262/130; JMF 9111/3100 (28 Sep 62) sec. 2. FRUS: 1961
1963, vol. XX, p. 832.
Chapter 18. South Asia

1. Memo, Col. W. F. Jackson to SecDef, 14 Jun 61, JCS 2315/80; JCSM-453-61 to SecDef, 1
Jul 61, JCS 2315/84; Memo of Conv, Discussion of Military Assistance with President Ayub of
Pakistan, 17 Jul 61, JCS 2347/1; Aide Memoire, DepUSecState to US Charg dAffaires, 4 Aug
61, JCS 2347/2; JMF 9157/4060 (14 Jun 61).
2. Memo of Conv by DASD(ISA), 25 Sep 62, JCS 2116/237; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS
et al., 16 Nov 62, JCS 2116/242; JMF 9157/5420 (29 Aug 62) sec. 1. Foreign Relations of the
United States: 19611963, vol. XIX (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State,
1996), pp. 325326.
3. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 340343.
4. Ibid, pp. 350351. Galbraiths friendship with the President gave him an unusual entre.
5. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 26 Oct 62, JCS 2271/25; Memo, DJS to CJCS, Military Assistance to India, 26 Oct 62, JCS 2271/26; JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1.
6. NY Times, 27 Oct 62, p. 1. The items sought are specified in Msg, DEF 920960 to
ALUSNA New Delhi, 30 Oct 62, JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1. NY Times, 1 & 2 Nov 62,
p. 1. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 31 Oct 62, JCS 2271/29; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 Nov
62, JCS 2271/30; same file. NY Times, 13 &16 Nov 62, p. 1. USEUCOM Annual Historical
Report, 1962, United States Military Aid to India, pp. 2, 5, 8, 10.
7. Msg, London 1865 to SecState, 14 Nov 62, JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1.
8. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Nov 62, Encl C to JCS 2271/31; JCS 2271/31, 19 Nov 62;
Note to Control, Aid for India, 19 Nov 62; JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1. By 14 November, equipment airlifted to India included 200 machine guns, 54 mortars, 750 radios, and
100,000 anti-personnel mines. DJSM-1467-62 to CJCS, 19 Nov 62, same file.
9. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 397, 400. Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, p. 832. J5
M67, 2 Dec 62, JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1. USEUCOM Annual Historical Report,
1962, United States Military Aid to India, p. 10.
10. Memo, DJS to JCS, RF 101 Reconnaissance Task Force for India, 21 Nov 62, JCS
2271/32; Note to control, Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff, . . . , 21 Nov 62; JMF
9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1. Memo, VDJS to CJCS, 21 Nov 62, w/att note by Col. Ewell, CJCS
091 India. CM-132-62 to SecDef, 21 Nov 62, 1st N/H of JCS 2271/33; Draft Joint State-Defense
355
Message to New Delhi, n.d.; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Nov 62, 2nd N/H of JCS 2271/33;
JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1.
11. Note to Control, Ambassador Galbraiths Request for Immediate Assistance to India,
23 Nov 62; J5 M67, 5 Dec 62; JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 1.
12. Report of the Harriman Mission, 3 Dec 62, JCS 2271/35, JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62)
sec. 2. Separately, Gen. Adams concurred with these recommendations and calculated their
cost at $114.6 million. Memo, Gen. Adams to ASD(ISA), 4 Dec 62, JCS 2271/38, same file.
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 429430.
13. Encl B to JCS 2271/39, 12 Dec 62; App to JCSM-996-62 to SecDef, 14 Dec 62, JCS
2271/39; JMF 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62). FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 419420.
14. Memo for Record by DJS, State/JCS Meeting of 14 December 1962, CJCS 091 India.
15. JCSM-999-62 to SecDef, 14 Dec 62, JCS 2271/41, JMF 9154/4060 (22 Oct 62) sec. 2.
JCSM-996-62 to SecDef, 14 Dec 62, JCS 2271/439, same file, sec. 1. JCSM-996 is printed in
FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 433434.
16. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 15 Dec 62, JCS 2271/42; TP for CJCS for Mtg with SecDef
on 16 Dec 62, Possibility of Introducing Radar Rapidly Into India, 15 Dec 62; Note to Control, Air Defense for India, 17 Dec 62; JMF 9154/4060 (12 Dec 62) sec. 1.
17. CM-172-62, Meeting at State Department on Subject of Indian Air Defense, 18 Dec
62, JMF 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 1.
18. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 453, 457. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Dec
62, Encl 3 to DJSM-3-63 to OpsDeps, 3 Jan 63; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Jan 63, JCS
2271/47; JMF 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 1.
19. Memo, BG Tipton to JCS, Report by the US Team on the Commonwealth/US Air
Defense Mission to India, 18 Mar 63, JCS 2271/55, JMF 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 3.
20. JCSM-256-63 to SecDef, 29 Mar 63, JCS 2271/57, JMF 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 3.
Since the United States had assumed general responsibility for providing airlift support, the
JCS agreed that 24 C119 transports should be withdrawn from USAF reserves and provided
to India. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Mar 63, JCS 2315/260; JCSM-225-63 to SecDef, 16 Mar
63, JCS 2316/261; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Mar 63, JCS 2315/263; JMF 9154/4060 (22
Oct 63) sec. 3.
21. NSAM No. 223 to SecDef et al., 26 Feb 63, JCS 2271/50; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2
Mar 63, JCS 2271/51; JCSM-185-63 to SecDef, 9 Mar 63, JCS 2271/52; Memo, DASD(ISA) to 23
Mar 63, JCS 2271/56; JMF 9154/3100 (26 Feb 63). States reply to the President is summarized
in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 524526.
22. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Feb 63, JCS 2339/104; JCSM-254-63 to SecDef, 29 Mar
63, JCS 2339/106; JMF 9150/9105 (6 Feb 63).
23. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 526529, 535537. Memo, Col. Ewell to CJCS and
DJS, 29 Mar 63; JCSM-259-63 to SecDef, 30 Mar 63, JCS 2271/58; JMF 9154/4060 (29 Mar 63).
24. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 543544, 552, 561563.
25. Draft Memo for Pres, Air Defense of India, n.d., JCS 2271/63, JMF 9154/3210 (1 Dec
62) sec. 4. A later version is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 579583. JCSM-357-63
to SecDef, 7 May 63, JCS 2271/63, same file.
26. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 583589.
27. JCSM-371-63 to SecDef, 11 May 63, JCS 2271/64, JMF 9154/3210 (12 Dec 62) sec. 4.
Memo, AsstSecState Talbot to ASD(ISA), 8 Aug 63, JCS 2271/64-3, same file, sec. 5. Note to
Control, Air Defense Ground Environment for India, 13 May 63, same file, sec. 4. FRUS:
19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 590591, 607608. Under an agreement concluded in July, the US
would station two mobile radars and periodically introduce one fighter squadron. Subsequently, India asked for a third Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radar and two Ground Control
Approach (GCA) radars. The JCS advised McNamara that, while no GCIs were currently available, the request should be reconsidered when the two GCIs already in India were replaced by
356
permanent radars. As for GCAs, four were scheduled for delivery under the FY 1964 MAP; the
delivery of two could be expedited. Ltr, New Delhi A106 to State, Transmittal of US-Indian
Air Defense Agreement, 30 Jul 63, same file, sec. 5. Msg, USMSMI to SecDef, 150802Z Aug 63;
JCSM-792-63 to SecDef, 11 Oct 63, JCS 2271/77-1; JMF 9154/4530 (20 Sep 63).
28. Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecArmy et al., 10 Jun 63; CM-691-63 to DJS, 27 Jun 63; JCSM545-63 to SecDef, 10 Aug 63, JCS 2271/71-2; JMF 9154/4060 (27 Jun 63).
29. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, p. 631. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Aug 63, JCS 2347/18;
JCSM-631-63 to SecDef, 14 Aug 63, JCS 2347/18-1; JMF 9157/4060 (2 Aug 3). MAP for India came
to $58.7 million in FY 1963, compared to $50.3 million for Pakistan. TP for CJCS for Mtg with
USecState, 11 Sep 63, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 2.
30. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Aug 63, JCS 2347/20, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 1.
JCSM-666-63 to SecDef, 27 Aug 63, JCS 2347/20-1, same file, sec. 2.
31. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 671675.
32. Bowles had been ambassador to India, governor of Connecticut, and Under Secretary
of State. So, like Galbraith, he had unusual influence with and access to top officials.
33. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 690691, 696701. JCSM-918-63 to SecDef, 23 Nov 63,
JCS 2271/79-1, JMF 9154/4060 (16 Nov 63).
34. Encls E, F, and G to CM-1089-63 to SecDef, 23 Dec 63, JCS 2271/80, JMF 5420 (23 Dec
63). Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 709722.
35. CM-1089-63 to SecDef, 23 Dec 63, JCS 2271/80; JCSM-15-64 to SecDef, 13 Jan 64, JCS
2271/80-1; JMF 5420 (23 Dec 63). CM-1089 is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp.
722726. The IOTF is described in the following section.
36. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXV (Washington, DC: Office of
the Historian, Dept. of State, 2000), pp. 45, 2627. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 30 Mar 64, JCS
2271/83; JCSM-361-64 to SecDef, 1 May 64, JCS 2271/83-1; JMF 9154/3100 (30 Mar 64) sec. 2.
37. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Apr 64, JCS 2271/86; JCSM-396-64 to SecDef, 1 May
64, JCS 2271/86-1; JMF 9154 (28 Apr 64). Memo, J. D. Stoddart to Gen. Wood, 9 May 64, JCS
2271/83-2, JMF 9154/3100 (30 Mar 64) sec. 2.
38. Memo for Record by Col. R. M. Tuttle, 16 May 64, Att to DJSM-834-64 to CJCS, 18 May
64, JMF 9154/3100 (30 Mar 64) sec. 2. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXV, pp. 104108, 115117.
JCSM-601-64 to SecDef, 15 Jul 64, JCS 2271/91-1, JMF 9154 (22 May 64).
39. Ltr, Gen. Musa to CJCS, 20 Feb 64, JCS 2347/29; DJSM-517-64 to CJCS, 21 Mar 64; JMF
9157/406 (20 Feb 64). FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXV, pp. 7779.
40. Memos of Convs, 22 and 29 Apr 64, Tabs to DJSM-160-64 to CJCS, 9 Jul 64, CJCS 091
Pakistan. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXV, pp. 9395.
41. Msg, CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA to JCS, 061700Z Jul 64; Msg, JCS 7335 to CINCSTRIKE, 10
Jul 64; Ltr, CJCS to Gen. Musa, 1 Aug 64; Msg, CINCSTRIKE to JCS, 061610Z Aug 64; Msg, JCS
7882 to CINCSTRIKE, 12 Aug 64; Ltr, Gen. Adams to Gen. Musa, 14 Aug 64; CJCS 091 Pakistan.
42. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXV, pp. 149, 159, 144, 167.
43. JCS 570/548, 28 Dec 61; JCSM-26-62 to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 570/548; Ltr, DASD(ISA)
to DepUSecState, 2 Mar 2, 1 st N/H of JCS 570/548, 6 Mar 62; Ltr, DepAsstSecState to
DASD(ISA), 28 Mar 62, JCS 570/556; JMF 4920 (19 Dec 61). When ISA asked the Chiefs to
specify types of facilities, they stressed the need for communications facilities at Diego Garcia. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 May 62, JCS 570/556; JCSM-592-62 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62,
JCS 570/560; same file. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, pp. 565, 623624.
44. JCS 2347/19-6, 31 Aug 63, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 2. Ltr, SecState to SecDef,
17 Aug 63, JCS 2347/19-3, same file, sec. 1. JCSM-735-63 to SecDef, 24 Sep 63, JCS 2347/19-6;
CM-918-63 to SecDef, 26 Sep 63, N/H of JCS 2347/19-8, 27 Aug 63; Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 2 Oct 63, JCS 2347/19-9; same file, sec. 3.
45. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 17 Oct 63, JCS 2347/19-10; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Nov 63,
JCS 2347/24; JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 3. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XIX, p. 714.
357
46. Ltr, DepAsstSecState to DASD(ISA), 14 Feb 64, JCS 2347/24-4; CSAFM-134-64 to JCS,
12 Feb 64, JCS 2347/28; Note to Control, JCS 2347/28, 26 Feb 64; JCSM-200-64 to SecDef, 16
Mar 64, JCS 2347/24-5; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState, 18 Mar 64, JCS 2347/24-6; NSAM
No. 289 to SecDef et al., 19 Mar 64, JCS 2347/30; JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 4.
47. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 4 Jun 64, JCS 2347/30-1, JMF 9157/9105 (13 Aug 63) sec. 4.
Chapter 19. The Far East: Seeking a Strategy

1. SM-1310-60 to CINCAL et al., 27 Dec 60, JCS 1844/324, JMF 3120 (24 Aug 60).
2. Memo, SecState to SecDef, 4 Feb 61, JCS 2101/407; JCSM-153-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar 61,
JCS 2101/412; JMF 3001 (4 Feb 61) sec. 1.
3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 8 May 61, JCS 2118/153; JCSM-405-61 to SecDef, 15 Jun 61,
JCS 2118/156; JMF 9141/3072 (8May 61).
4. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS et al., 200410Z Sep 62, JMF 9143/4920 (24 Sep 62) sec. 1.
5. Memo, BG Brown to CJCS, 28 Sep 62, JCS 2270/16; Memo, Col. J. J. Ewell to DJS, n.d.;
JMF 5000 (28 Sep 62). JCSM-276-63 to SecDef, 6 Apr 63, JCS 2118/201; JMF 9141/3210 (7 Jan
63) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 May 63, JCS 2118/206, same file, sec. 4.
6. JCSM-387-63 to SecDef, 23 May 63, JCS 2118/205, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5.
7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Jun 63, JCS 2118/205-1, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 1 Aug 63, JCS 2118/205-2, same file, sec. 6. Rusks letter is printed in Foreign
Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol. XXII (Washington, DC; Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1992), pp. 375378.
8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Sep 63, JCS 2118/205-3; JCSM-813-63 to SecDef, 22 Oct 63,
JCS 2118/205-4; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 6. JCSM-813 drew heavily upon Msg, CINCPAC to
JCS, 262231Z Sep 63, same file. In 1964, State proposed reducing MAP-supported personnel
from 561,000 to 500,000 by mid-1969. The JCS argued successfully for 531,000. State Dept.
National Policy Paper: The Republic of China, 18 Mar 64, JMF 9142/9105 (18 Mar 64) sec.
1A. JCSM-490-64 to SecDef, 6 Jun 64, JCS 1966/141-4, same file, sec. 1. State Dept. National
Policy Paper: The Republic of China, 11 Sep 64, same file, sec. 1B.
9. FRUS: 19611963, vol. VIII, pp. 578580.
10. CM-46-60 to JCS, 7 Dec 60, JCS 2320; Dec On JCS 2320, 7 Dec 60; JMF 9141/4610 (7
Dec 60).
11. JCSM-425-61 to SecDef, 26 Jun 61, JCS 2320/2, JMF 9141/4610 (7 Dec 60).
12. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Nov 62, JCS 2118/186; JCSM-216-63 to SecDef, 14 Mar
63, JCS 2118/187; JMF 3310 (28 Nov 62) sec. 1. Memo, DCI to DepSecDef, 17 Jun 63, JCS
2118/208, same file, sec. 2. JCS Orientation Program with Respect to a Chinese Communist
Nuclear Detonation, 15 Jul 63, Att to SM-909-63 to SpecAsst to DepUSecState, 18 Jul 63, JCS
2118/211, same file, sec. 3.
13. By this time, the Sino-Soviet split appeared to be irreparable.
14. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Jan 63, JCS 2118/190; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Nov
63, JCS 2118/217; JCSM-33-64 to SecDef, 17 Jan 64, JCS 2118/217-1; JMF 9141/3100 (9 Jan 63).
State, JCS, and ISA continued working on a Draft Program of Action. Later iterations and
critiques are in JMF 9141 (2 Jul 64).
15. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXX (Washington, DC:
Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1998), fn. 7 on p. 24 and pp. 9495.
16. Support for South Vietnam was being shifted to the regular DOD budget.
17. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Oct 64, JCS 2118/225; JCSM-1013-64 to SecDef, 3 Dec 64,
JCS 2118/225-2; JMF 9141 (17 Oct 64). JCSM-1013 was transmitted to the State Department
via Ltr, ASD(SA) to AsstSecState for Far East, 21 Dec 64, JCS 2118/225-3, same file.
18. Figures come from FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 477478.
358
19. FRUS: 196163, vol. XXII, pp. 448454. On 1 July, Magruder was succeeded by his
deputy, Gen. Guy Meloy.
20. General Lemnitzer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 29 Jun 77.
21. Lemnitzer interviews on 31 Mar and 29 Jun 77. The substance of the task forces
report is given in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 475479. Material on 479481 cites Lemnitzers notes of the NSC meeting, which mention a few of his arguments described above
but not the possibility of withdrawing US forces.
22. The Berlin confrontation was nearing its peak and intervention in Laos seemed possible.
23. JCSM-512-61 to SecDef, 2 Aug 61, JCS 1776/652, JMF 9144/9105 (5 Jun 61) sec. 2.
These findings were basically repeated in JCSM-265-62 to SecDef, 10 Apr 62, JCS 1776/656,
JMF 4060 (2 Aug 61) sec. 7; DASD(ISA), Korea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean
Forces, Apr 62, same file, sec. 7A; and JCSM-450-62 to SecDef, 15 Jun 62, JCS 1776/660,
same file, sec. 7.
24. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, p. 588-589. Memo, BG Turnage to CJCS, US Forces,
Korea, 2 Aug 62, CJCS 091 Korea.
25. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 2 Aug 62, JCS 1776/663; JCSM-622-63 to SecDef, 15 Aug 62,
JCS 1776/664; Memo, DepSecDef to SecState, N/H of JCS 1776/664, 31 Aug 62; JMF 9144/3410
(31 Jul 62) sec. 1. Ltr, SecState to DepSecDef, 19 Sep 62, JCS 1776/667, same file, sec. 2. The
arguments in JCSM-622 derived largely from Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 090203Z Aug 62, same
file, sec. 1.
26. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 256-257. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 601
605. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS et al., 200410Z Sep 62, JMF 9143/4920 (24 Sep 62) sec. 1. Memo,
BG Brown to CJCS, 28 Sep 62, JCS 2270/16; Memo, Col. J. J. Ewell to DJS, n.d.; JMF 5000 (28
Sep 62).
27. JCS 2118/195, 26 Feb 63; Note to Control, JCS 2118/195, 1 Mar 63; CM-367-63 to DJS,
6 Mar 63, JCS 2118/198; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 2.
28. JCSM-312-63 to SecDef, 20 Apr 63, JCS 2118/202, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 4.
29. Memos (2), ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 11 May 63, JCS 2118/207; Ltr, DepUSecState to CJCS,
28 May 63, JCS 1776/683; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5.
30. CM-634-63 to DJS, 3 Jun 63, CJCS 091 Korea. The same file has the original copy of
States 28 May letter, on which Taylor penciled comments that became the basis for CM-634.
31. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Jun 63; JCSM-425-63 to SecDef, 4 Jun 63, JCS 1776/684;
JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 5.
32. Memo for Record, Proposed Realignment of Ground Forces in the ROK, 5 Jun 63,
CJCS 091 Korea. DJSM-1240-63 to CJCS, 23 Jul 63, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 6.
33. DJSM-1403-63 to CJCS, 20 Aug 63; DJSM-1550-63 to CJCS, 14 Sep 63; JMF 3410 (2 Nov
62) sec. 6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Sep 63, JCS 1800/757, JMF 9700 (10 Sep 63) sec. 1.
JCSM-737-63 to SecDef, 23 Sep 63, JCS 1800/757-1, same file, sec. 3.
34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Nov 63, JCS 1776/687; JCS 1776/687-1, 13 Nov 63, and Dec
On, 16 Nov 63; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 6. J5 TP 129-63, 16 Nov 63; Note to Control, Force
Reductions in Korea, 18 Nov 63; JCS 1776/689, 13 Dec 63; JCSM-989-63 to SecDef, 16 Dec
63, JCS 1776/689; same file, sec. 7.
35. Note to Control, Reduction of Forces in Korea, 6 Jan 64, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 8.
Note to Control, Force Reductions in Korea, 22 Jan 64; JCSM-101-64 to SecDef, 6 Feb 64,
JCS 1776/690-1; same file, sec. 9.
36. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXIX (Washington, DC:
Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2000), pp. 21-22. JCSM-440-64 to SecDef, 22 May 64,
JCS 1776/692-4, JMF 3410 (2 Nov 62) sec. 10.
37. FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXIX, pp. 3536, 1517.
38. JapanState Dept. Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Oct 61, Att to Memo,
ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Nov 61, JCS 2180/159; JCSM-380-61 to SecDef, 30 Nov 61, JCS
359
2180/160; Ltr, ActgASD(ISA) to USecState for PolAff, 13 Dec 61, N/H of JCS 2180/160, 15 Feb
62; JapanGuidelines for Policy and Operations, Mar 62, JCS 2180/166; JMF 9143/9105 (17
Nov 61) sec. 1. The final version is printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 728738.
39. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS et al., 200410Z Sep 62, JMF 9143/4920 (24 Sep 62) sec. 1.
40. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, p. 742. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Oct 62, JCS 2180/170;
JCS 2180/171, 9 Nov 62; Note to Control, JCS 2180/171, 21 Nov 62; JCSM-967-62 to SecDef,
7 Dec 62, JCS 2180/172; JMF 9143/4920 (24 Sep 62) sec.1. JCSM-967 is printed in FRUS:
19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 761763. Major US facilities in Japan included: Army logistical and
support bases spread through all four home islands; naval bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo;
Navy and Marine Corps air stations at Atsugi and Iwakuni; and US Air Force bases at Itazuke, Misawa, Tachikawa, and Yokota.
41. Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 17 Dec 62, 1 st N/H of JCS 2180/172, 26 Dec 62; JMF
9143/4920 (24 Sep 62) sec. 1. Memo for Record, Trip Report, 8 Feb 63, JMF 9143/5420 (4
Jan 63).
42. Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 8 Feb 63, 2nd N/H of JCS 2180, 14 Feb 63, JMF 9143/4920
(24 Sep 62) sec. 1. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 766768. Memo, DepSecDef
to CJCS, 18 Feb 63, JCS 2180/178, same file, sec. 2. JCSM-242-63 to SecDef, 22 Mar 63, JCS
2180/182, same file, sec. 3.
43. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Jun 63, JCS 1800/703, JMF 9700 (19 Jun 63) sec. 1.
JCSM-494-63 to SecDef, 3 Jul 63, JCS 1800/703-2; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 16 Jul
63, JCS 1800/734, same file, sec. 2. The smaller steps were accelerating deactivation of a
B57 wing, sending back to the US 16 transports from Japan and 16 from Okinawa, and
also returning 46 instead of 26 F102 interceptors.
44. Several Groups comprised a Marine Air Wing.
45. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 Jan 64, JCS 2147/322, JMF 3440 (17 Jan 64) sec. 1.
JCSM-303-64 to SecDef, 9 Apr 64, JCS 2147/322-8; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 3 Jun 64, JCS
2147/322-10, same file, sec. 3.
46. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 702703.
47. Report and Recommendations of the Ryukyus Task Force, Dec 61; JCSM-145-62 to
SecDef, 24 Feb 62, JCS 1231/50; JMF 9147/9105 (11 Aug 61) sec. 1.
48. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 3 Mar 63, Att to N/H of JCS 1231/50, 9 Mar 62, JMF 9147/9105
(11 Aug 61) sec. 1. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXII, pp. 723724. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 May
64, p. 755.
49. DJSM-533-62 to OpsDeps, 20 Apr 62, JCS 1231/55; Dec On JCS 1231/55, 30 Apr 62; JMF
9147/9105 (11 Aug 61) sec. 2. DJSM-206-63 to Dir, J5, 4 Feb 63; TP for JCS/SecDef Mtg, US
Military Position in the Ryukyus, 26 Feb 63; Note to Control, same subject, 27 Feb 63; JMF
9147/3100 (4 Feb 63).
50. Airgram, Tokyo A-1677 to State, 24 May 63; JCSM-749-63 to SecDef, 27 Sep 63, JCS
1231/60-3; JMF 9198/9105 (24 May 63). These views were sent to the State Dept. via Ltr,
DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState Hilsman, 4 Oct 63, JCS 1231/60-4, same file.
51. Memo, Rear Adm. Blouin to DJS, 26 Dec 64, JCS 1231/62; JCSM-1091 to SecDef, 31
Dec 64, JCS 1231/62; JMF 9198 (26 Dec 64).
52. CSAFM-344-61 to JCS, 5 Oct 61, JCS 2357; JCSM-725-61 to SecDef, 13 Oct 61, JCS
2357; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Oct 61, Att to N/H of JCS 2357, 25 Oct 61; JMF 9156/9105
(5 Oct 61). JCSM-725 is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: 19611963, vol.
XXIII (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1994), pp. 443-445.
53. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIII, pp. 395398, 407409. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14
Apr 62, JCS 2357/2; JCSM-344-62 to SecDef, 4 May 62, JCS 2357/4; Memo, DASD(ISA) to USecState for PolAff, 24 May 62, N/H of JCS 2357/4, 28 May 62; JMF 9156/9105 (14 Apr 62) sec. 2.
Indonesia: State Dept. Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Mar 63, same file, sec. 1.
54. FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIII, p. 622.
360
55. NSAM No. 179 to SecDef et al., 16 Aug 62, JCS 2357/5; JCSM-692-62 to SecDef, JCS
2357/8; JMF 9156/9105 (16 Aug 62) sec. 1. Printed in FRUS: 19611963, vol. XXIII, pp. 627631.
56. Memo, CNO to JCS, 29 Jan 63, JCS 2357/10; Decision on JCS 2357/10, 8 Feb 63; Msg,
JCS 8565 to CINCPAC, 9 Feb 63; JMF 9156/3100 (28 Jan 63).
57. Memo for Record, Debrief of NSC Meeting on Aid to Indonesia, 8 Jan 64, CJCS 091
Indonesia. Foreign Relations of the United States: 19641968, vol. XXVI (Washington, DC:
Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2001), pp. 1620, 57. Johnson repeated this ruling in
July. Ibid, p. 119.
58. JCS 2357/22-1, 24 Aug 64, JMF 9156 (21 Aug 64). Msg, Djakarta 1989 to State, 26 Mar 64;
Ltr, CJCS to Gen. Nasution, 9 Apr 64, JCS 2357/19; JMF 9156/9105 (9 Apr 640.
59. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Apr 64, JCS 2365/11; JCSM-330-64 to SecDef, 15. Apr 64,
JCS 2365/11-1; JMF 9153.3/3500 (1 Apr 64). Memo for Record, Conversation Regarding Military Sales and Training for Malaysia, 28 Jul 64, Att to DJSM-1292-64 to CJCS, 30 Jul 64, JMF
9153.3/9105 (1 Apr 64).
60. State Dept. Memo, US Policy Towards Indonesia, n.d., App to Memo, ASD(ISA) to
CJCS, 21 Aug 64, JCS 2357/22, JMF 9156 (21 Aug 64).
61. JCSM-743-64 to SecDef, 26 Aug 64, JCS 2357/22-1; Memo, SecState to Pres, 30 Aug 64,
App to Memo, M. W. Roche to SJCS, 11 Sep 64, N/H of JCS 2357/22-1; JMF 9156 (21 Aug 64).
A sanitized version of JCSM-743 is printed in FRUS: 19641968, vol. XXVI, pp. 141142.
62. JCSM-779-64 to SecDef, 8 Sep 64, JCS 2357/23; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState for
Far East Aff, 10 Sep 64, JCS 2357/23-1; JCSM-951-64 to SecDef, 10 Nov 64, JCS 2357/23-2;
JMF 9156 (2 Sep 64). JCSM-1003-64 to SecDef, 1 Dec 64, JCS 2357/25; Memo, DepSecDef to
CJCS, 17 Dec 64, JCS 2357/25-1; DJSM-64-65 to ASD(ISA), 18 Jan 65, JCS 2357/25-2; Memo,
DASD(ISA) to DJS, 27 Jan 65, JCS 2357/25-3; JMF 9156 (17 Nov 64).
63. This is described in a separate series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam.
Chapter 20. Conclusion: Appraising Performances

1. FRUS: 19611963, vol. X, p. 575.
3. The Reminiscences of Admiral David Lamar McDonald, US Navy Retired, November
1976, p. 360, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
4. CM-1009-63 to SecDef, 12 Nov 63, JCS 1800/775-2, JMF 7000 (10 Oct 63) sec. 3.
5. Adm. Arleigh Burke Oral History Interview, pp. 45, 1213, John F. Kennedy Library.
Admiral Burke interviewed by W. S. Poole on 28 Oct 75, JHO.
6. Admiral George W. Anderson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 7 Nov 78, JHO.
7. NY Times, 7 May 63, p. 1, and 5 Sep 63, pp. 1, 19. Admiral Anderson Interview, 7 Nov 78.
8. Quoted in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 319.
9. Printed in FRUS: 19641968, vol. X, pp. 97101.
10. Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968
1973 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007), pp. 7684.
361
Index
5412 Committee: 108, 120
Acheson, Dean: 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 171,
18889, 19495, 206
Adams, Lieutenant General Paul D., USA: 63,
268, 26970, 27677
Adenauer, Konrad: 170, 184, 196, 204, 206
Adoula, Cyrille: 258, 260, 261, 262
Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft: 4950
Afghanistan: 246, 247, 248, 249
Africa: 2324, 25163
Agency for International Development: 2425,
219, 220, 22122, 228, 230, 285, 288, 294, 295
Ahmad, Imam: 242
Air Force, US
and AMSA: 49
and the B70: 37, 41, 43
and continental defense: 5354, 56
conventional forces: 61
counterinsurgency forces: 26
and Cuba: 234
and force planning: 38, 4142, 4344, 45, 4648,
68, 69, 7576, 77, 78
forces for Cuba: 171, 181
forces for Europe: 149, 15051, 18788
forces for Laos: 127, 136
intelligence on Cuba: 108
and Latin America: 230
and the Middle East: 24142, 24345
planning for nuclear war: 18, 27
Program Change Proposals: 42, 43, 44
reservists called up: 181
and the RS70: 4344
Special Warfare Center: 2627
and strategic retaliatory forces: 37, 38, 39, 41,
4748
strength: 6567
tactical air wings: 68, 69, 7273, 75, 77, 79, 80
Air National Guard: 54, 58, 155
Airborne warning and control system (AWACS):
5657
Aircraft
AWACS: 5657
and arms control: 83, 84, 85
B26: 114, 115, 127, 129
B47: 51, 83, 15051, 195, 203, 209, 210, 244, 267
B52: 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 4849, 50, 51
B58: 44
B70: 37, 3941, 43, 49

C5A: 78
C119: 16465, 171
C124: 67, 261
C130: 62, 67, 70, 7374, 78, 209, 210, 233,
26566, 267
C141: 67, 70, 7374, 78
CX4: 74
F4: 53, 70, 77
F12A: 5860
F84s: 20304
F100: 77, 15051
F101: 51
F102: 51, 53, 59
F104: 20304, 26566, 273, 27576
F105: 18, 77
F106: 51, 53
F111: 5859
numbers of tactical: 6667, 68, 7273, 75
Quick Reaction Alert: 77
RBX: 4344
RS70: 4344
Soviet: 51, 73, 79
T6: 122, 127
tactical: 6667, 68, 7273, 152, 194
U2: 162, 16364, 165, 166, 168, 175, 176, 180,
181, 265
Vulcan bombers: 195, 201, 203
Alaska: 51
Algeria: 23, 253
Alliance for Progress: 223, 226, 231
Allied Command Europe: 72, 146, 152, 18788,
190, 191, 192, 207, 208, 212
America Is In Danger, by Curtis E. LeMay: 300
Amini, Ali: 245
Amphibious assault forces: 75
Anderson, Admiral George W.: 3, 4, 294, 299300
and the B70: 39
and Berlin: 148, 15455, 156
and counterinsurgency planning: 26
and the Cuban missile crisis: 166, 16970, 171,
173, 174, 17677, 182, 184
and defense of Europe: 193
and force planning: 12, 6768, 70, 73, 74
and forces for Europe: 15354
and NATO: 193, 204, 20506
and nuclear testing: 102
and planning for the use of nuclear weapons: 30
363
Index
Angola: 25354
Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs)
and arms control: 83, 85, 8990, 95
funding for the production of: 53
Nike-Hercules: 54, 59
Nike-X: 55, 5657, 58, 5960
Nike-Zeus: 5152, 5355
production of: 5152, 55
psychological factors and: 53, 55
Soviet: 52, 55, 56, 9697, 101, 10405
testing of: 5455
warheads for: 95, 97, 98, 101
Anti-submarine warfare: 6364, 79, 22930
Apartheid: 25455
Arab nationalism: 237, 239
Armies, US
Seventh: 20809, 210
Eighth: 284, 285
Arms control
verification of: 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 8792, 9395,
99100, 102, 10304
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 8182,
8485, 86, 8788, 8992, 99101
Army, US
and ABMs: 5354
air assault division: 69, 71, 76
combat-effectiveness of: 76
and counterinsurgency planning: 25, 26
deployment of divisions: 7677
equipment for: 66, 75, 76
and force planning: 48, 68, 7577, 152
forces for Cuba: 171
forces for Europe: 187
mobilizations: 149, 151
number of divisions: 6568, 69, 71, 72, 7576,
77, 79
planning for nuclear war: 2728
procurement program: 66, 75, 76
restructuring of divisions: 65, 66, 76, 80
Special Warfare Center: 2627
Strategic Army Corps: 171
strength: 6566, 6768
Army Special Forces: 2324, 2627, 62, 125, 148,
227, 230
Atomic Energy Act: 194
Atomic Energy Commission: 82, 96
Australia: 127, 267, 269, 293
Ayub Khan, Mohammed: 26566, 268, 27476, 278
Azores: 25354
Badr, Imam: 242
Bahrain: 242, 244
Balaguer, Joaquin: 23132
Ball, George: 96, 174, 201, 254, 274
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System: 51, 52, 283
364
Basic National Security Policy statements: 6,

1415, 17, 1819, 2023, 2829
Basic Planning Document: 221
Batista, Fulgencio: 107
Bay of Pigs: 107120, 134
Belgian Congo: 256
Belgium: 209, 256
Bell, David: 7, 220, 274
Ben-Gurion, David: 238, 241
Berlin, Germany
air access to: 13940, 141, 14243, 145, 14951,
15758
and confidence in US will: 143, 14445, 14649,
15354, 155
confrontation over: 40, 6566, 86, 13234, 139
58, 191, 192, 246
170, 171
mobilization for the support of: 66, 7273, 147
planning for maintaining access to: 14042,
14347, 155, 156
refugees coming to West Berlin: 14849
and US relationships with allies: 14445, 150,
151, 154, 155
Berlin Wall: 14749, 298
Biddle, USS: 20506
Bissell, Richard: 111, 112, 114, 115, 116
Blanchard, Lieutenant General William, USAF:
175, 178
Blockade of Cuba: 162, 163, 16667, 168, 16975
Board of National Estimates: 161
Bohlen, Charles: 170
Bolivia: 228, 229, 230, 235
Bonesteel, Major General Charles, USA: 109
Bonin Islands: 289, 291
Borneo: 295
Boun Oum, Prince: 122, 12324, 125
Bowles, Chester: 12829, 218, 274, 27576
Boyle, Brigadier General Andrew, USA: 126,
127, 128
Bradbury, Norris: 104
Bradlee, Benjamin: 185
Brandt, Willy: 14849
Brazil: 232
Brigade 2506: 108, 10910, 111, 113, 11416
British Bomber Command: 201, 203, 205
Brown, Harold: 95, 96, 98, 99, 103, 104
Brown, Winthrop: 125, 126, 127, 128
Budgets
FY 1962: 7, 6263, 66
FY 1962 supplement: 7, 10, 64, 6566
FY 1963: 89, 10
FY 1964: 1112
FY 1965: 1213
FY 1966: 14
and the JCS: 69, 1113
and Kennedy: 7, 9, 63, 6566, 75
and McNamara: 69, 1013
planningprogrammingbudgeting system:
79, 11, 12, 15, 37, 298
Index
Bundy, McGeorge: 6, 98, 128, 150, 162, 165, 166,

171, 174, 199, 205, 212, 21718, 219, 22223,
23031, 266, 267, 270, 271, 283, 288
Bunker Ellsworth: 244, 294
Burchinal, Lieutenant General David, USAF:
169, 213
Burke, Admiral Arleigh: 23, 5152, 256, 299
and anti-submarine warfare: 64
and arms control: 8182
and the Bay of Pigs: 112, 115, 116, 117, 11819
and Berlin: 145
and Laos: 122, 123, 125, 12829, 130, 131
and planning for limited war: 62
relationship with Kennedy: 129
and US Strike Command: 63
Burma: 124, 125, 220, 221, 271
Cabell, Lieutenant General Charles, USAF:
11314
Cambodia: 123, 124, 125, 220, 221
Canada: 51, 121, 127, 171, 175, 193, 196, 267, 269
Caribbean Command: 228, 230
Carroll, Lieutenant General Joseph, USAF: 165,
174
Castello Branco, General Humberto: 232
Castro, Fidel: 64, 107, 10809, 11011, 112, 11415,
116, 120, 159, 161, 162, 163, 171, 178, 182, 184,
225, 226, 23233, 234, 235
Central African Republic: 258
Central Intelligence, Director of: 82
Central Intelligence Agency
and Africa: 257
and the Bay of Pigs: 108, 10910, 111, 112, 113,
114, 117, 119, 120
and Cuba: 27, 23334
and the Cuban missile crisis: 164
and India: 271
and NATO: 202
and nuclear testing: 96, 97, 103
Central Treaty Organization: 24750, 265, 271
Chad: 258
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 82. See also
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA; Taylor,
General Maxwell D., USA
Chang, Myon: 284
Chaudhuri, Lieutenant General Jayanto: 268
Chiang Kai-shek: 129, 280, 281
Chief of Naval Operations: 23, 301. See also
Anderson, Admiral George W.; Burke,
Admiral Arleigh; McDonald, Admiral
David L.
Chief of Staff, Air Force: 3. See also LeMay, General
Curtis E.; White, General Thomas D.
Chief of Staff, Army: 3, 163, 301. See also Decker,
General George H.; Johnson, General Harold
K.; Wheeler, General Earle G.
Chile: 230
China, Peoples Republic of: 52, 53, 59, 27778
border war with India: 26670, 274
containment of: 27178, 280
and Korea: 284, 28587
and Laos: 124, 125, 12829, 13031, 133, 135,
27980
nuclear capability: 28283
and Pakistan: 277
and planning for the use of nuclear weapons
against: 28586, 28788
relationship with the USSR: 280, 28283, 287, 288
and Southeast Asia: 27980, 281
and a test ban treaty: 89, 105
China, Republic of (Taiwan): 146, 21718, 220,
222, 279, 280, 281, 283
Chou En-lai: 275
Christmas Island: 9899
CINCLANT. See Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCPAC. See Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUNC. See Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command
Civil defense: 53, 56, 57, 5859
Claude V. Ricketts, USS: 20506
Clay, General Lucius, USA (Ret.): 221
Clay, Brigadier General Lucius, Jr.: 17172
Clifton, Major General Chester V., USA: 4, 11920
Cold War: 118, 29798
and Africa: 23, 25153, 263
and Asia: 23
and Cuba: 107, 10809
effect on policy development: 12
and the Middle East: 237, 245, 246, 249
and the Military Assistance Program: 21718,
21920
and planning for counterinsurgency
operations: 24
Colombia: 228, 230, 234
Commandant, US Marine Corps: 3, 301. See also
Greene, General Wallace M., Jr.; Shoup,
General David M.
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
(CINCLANT): 11314, 115, 116, 16465, 173
74, 183, 229, 23435, 257. See also Dennison,
Admiral Robert
Commander in Chief, Caribbean: 229, 232
Commander in Chief, North American Air
Defense Command: 5354
Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC): 125,
128, 131, 171, 224, 294
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
(CINCUNC): 28485, 286
Committee of Principals (arms control): 82, 83, 85,
88, 90, 9192, 95, 101, 10203
Communism
and Africa: 25152, 25557, 258, 263, 271
containment policy: 26578, 280, 29394
and Cuba: 225, 226, 23233
and the Far East: 279, 285, 28687, 29394, 296
365
Index
and India: 263, 269, 270, 271, 274

and Laos: 12123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130
31, 13234, 135, 136
and Latin America: 225, 226, 227, 228, 230,
231, 232
and the Middle East: 23738, 239, 242, 245, 248
and underdeveloped countries: 21718,
21920, 224
using the Military Assistance Program to fight:
21718, 219
Concord Squadron: 278
Congo: 62
Congo, Republic of the: 25663
Congo-Brazzaville: 258
Connally, John: 64, 65
Continental Air Defense Command: 58
Continental defense: 5160
Cottrell, Sterling: 232
Counterinsurgency: 2327
Craig, Brigadier General William, USA: 15960
Cuba: 23, 53, 64, 107120, 146, 15985, 225, 23235
Cuba Study Group: 11618, 297
Cuban missile crisis: 6, 32, 55, 73, 100, 15985,
200, 232, 26667
Cuban Volunteer Force: 111, 113
Czechoslovakia: 256
Dayal, Rajeshwar: 257, 258
Decker, General George H., USA: 3, 4, 300
and ABMs: 5152
and Africa: 256
and the B70: 39
and force planning: 6768
and Laos: 122, 123, 128, 129, 130, 134
and planning for the use of nuclear weapons:
29, 30, 33
and reliance on nuclear weapons: 18
and US forces for Europe: 153
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos: 137
Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of,
International Security Affairs (ISA): 1819,
2021, 62, 301
and Africa: 252, 253, 254, 25556, 257, 261,
26263
and arms control: 87, 88, 91, 99100, 102
and Berlin: 156
and Cuba: 178, 179
and Indonesia: 29394
and Japan: 289, 292
and Korea: 285, 288
and Latin America: 226, 227, 229, 230, 232
221, 222, 223, 232
366
and NATO: 196, 197, 200201

and South Asia: 273, 274
Defense, Office of the Secretary of
and Africa: 257, 258, 260
and continental defense: 52
and cost-effectiveness analysis: 79, 14, 45, 80
differences with JCS on force levels: 3738,
4041, 4546
differences with JCS on force planning: 6970,
7778, 79, 298
differences with JCS on missile defense: 55,
5657, 5960
Director of Defense Research and Engineering:
37, 52, 63
Five-Year Defense Program: 11, 12
and India: 271, 273
and Indonesia: 295
influence of the system analysts: 89, 11
and interservice feuding: 13, 15, 71, 74, 76, 77
and Korea: 285, 287
and the Military Assistance Program: 218, 219,
220, 222, 229
and NATO: 204, 209, 29899
and a nuclear test ban: 94, 99100
and operational employment of forces: 7677
procurement proposals: 3738, 4042
and Program Change Proposals: 1112,
1314, 42
relationship with ACDA: 101
relationship with the JCS: 2, 67, 3738, 4041,
4546, 55, 5657, 5960, 6970, 7778, 79, 298
Defense, US Department of
and the Bay of Pigs: 108, 109
and India: 271
and Indonesia: 29394, 295
and Laos: 123, 126, 131, 133, 135, 136
and Latin America: 227, 228, 22930, 235
and the Military Assistance Program: 217, 221, 222
mobilization to maintain access to Berlin: 149,
15051
and NATO: 205, 208
and nuclear weapons for NATO: 205
research and engineering program: 910
working group on anti-submarine warfare: 64
Defense Atomic Support Agency: 103
Defense Intelligence Agency: 73, 166, 168, 169, 181
Defense Research and Development, Office of the
Director of: 910
DeGaulle, Charles: 184, 194, 197, 200201, 202
Denmark: 223
Dennison, Admiral Robert L.: 11314, 115, 187
and Berlin: 143
and the Cuban missile crisis: 16465, 173,
17879, 183
Index
Deployment capabilities
airlift: 67, 69, 7374, 78
in Europe: 62, 66
sealift: 67, 7475
Soviet: 62
strategic mobility: 67, 69, 70, 7374, 78, 80
Dhahran air base, Saudi Arabia: 24142
Diego Garcia: 277
Dillon, Douglas: 171, 172, 174
Dirksen, Everett: 129
Disarmament
conferences: 82, 8485
proposals: 8287
Distant Early Warning Line: 51, 58, 59
Dobrynin, Anatoly: 175, 181
Dodd, Thomas: 10102
Dominican Republic: 230, 231
Douglas-Home, Alec: 206
Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs)
and budget planning: 89, 1415
on continental defense: 5455, 56, 5859
on force planning: 47, 4849, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73,
77, 78, 79
on strategic mobility: 67
Dulles, Allen W.: 97, 109, 116
East Germany: 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148
Economic development
and Latin America: 225, 226, 22730
21920, 224
Ecuador: 228, 229
Egypt: 170, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244
45, 249, 256, 293
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference:
8485, 86, 98
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 119
and Africa: 251, 257
and Berlin: 139
and budget restraints: 67, 207
and Cuba: 108
and Laos: 123, 124
and the Military Assistance Program: 217
and NATO: 194
and planning for nuclear war: 28, 3536, 61
and policy of nuclear retaliation: 17, 139
Eisenhower administration: 56
and the Far East: 279
and the Middle East: 238
and national security policy: 17, 18
reliance on nuclear weapons: 61, 141
underfunding of the military during: 66
and use of nuclear weapons: 28
Eisenhower Doctrine: 242
El Salvador: 229, 230
Election campaigns
US, 1960: 36
US, 1964: 5
Enterprise, USS: 79, 176

Enthoven, Alain: 2
Equipment, pre-positioning of: 76
Erhard, Ludwig: 21112
Eshkol, Levi: 241
Essex, USS: 175
Ethiopia: 252, 258
Faisal, Crown Prince: 242, 243, 24445
Fallout shelters: 53, 56, 58, 5960
Federal Bureau of Investigation: 228
Felt, Admiral Harry: 12526, 127, 128, 134
Finletter, Thomas K.: 189, 192, 19596, 199
Fisher, Adrian: 90
Fisk, James: 94
Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
Program: 69
Flexible response strategy: 61, 14142, 144, 145
46, 148, 155, 188
Florida: 169, 171, 17374, 175, 176, 177, 178
Force Arme Lao (FAL): 122, 123, 124, 12526,
127, 128, 130, 131
Force planning
and cost-effectiveness analysis: 79, 14
and defense of Europe: 68, 69, 76, 14446, 147,
15051, 15257, 190, 191, 20711
for the Far East: 28489
and the JCS: 1113, 15, 3746, 4748, 50, 6466,
6768, 7380, 14446, 147, 15051, 15257,
190, 191, 20711, 28488, 28992
for maintaining access to Berlin: 14446, 147,
15051
by McNamara: 69, 1112, 1314, 3639, 4345,
4750, 6465, 6670, 7180, 29899
strategic retaliatory forces: 89, 3741, 4647, 48
Foster, John: 104
Foster, William C.: 82, 84, 88, 90, 91, 98, 99, 101
France: 171, 175, 241
and Berlin: 139, 140, 147, 15051
and Laos: 124, 131, 132
and NATO: 192, 194, 195, 19699, 200, 205, 209,
210, 211, 214, 215
and nuclear weapons for NATO: 194, 195,
19699, 200201, 202, 205
Fulbright, William: 129
Galbraith, John Kenneth: 266, 268, 26970, 27172,
274
Gates, Thomas: 28, 122, 123, 124, 140
Geneva Conference, 1954: 121
Geneva Conference on Laos: 132, 137
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapon Tests: 93, 9495, 98, 99, 100
Ghana: 251
Gilpatric, Roswell: 19, 21, 23, 26, 246, 269
and Africa: 253
and the Bay of Pigs: 112
367
Index
and Berlin: 142, 149, 156

and the Cuban missile crisis: 166, 171, 173, 174,
17677, 182
and the Far East: 27980, 290
and force planning: 65, 6768
and Laos: 125, 130, 133, 134
and NATO: 20405, 209, 210
2829
Gizenga, Antoine: 25657, 258
Gore, Albert: 284
Goulart, Joao: 232
Gray, Brigadier General David: 10910, 111, 112,
114
Greece: 19697, 20506, 21718, 220, 222, 22324,
261
Greene, Colonel M. J. L., USA: 26061
Greene, General Wallace M., Jr., USMC: 5, 57, 76,
77, 78, 291
Greenland: 51
Griffith, Major General Perry, USAF: 244
Gromyko, Andrei: 88, 10304, 169
Guantanamo, Cuba: 165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 172,
173, 183
Guatemala: 108, 110, 230
Guerrilla warfare
in Cuba: 108, 10910, 112, 116
in Europe: 148, 149
in Laos: 126, 129, 136
Guevara, Ernesto Che: 235
Guidelines for Policy and Operations in Latin
America: 227
Guinea: 251, 256
Hailsham, Lord: 102, 10304
Hamilton, Fowler: 25
Hamlett, General Barksdale: 5
Hammarksjold, Dag: 257, 258, 259
Harkins, General Paul D.: 27
Harriman, Averell: 102, 10304, 26768, 269
Herter, Christian: 123, 194
Heyser, Major Richard: 164, 165
Hickey, Lieutenant General Thomas F., USA:
2728, 30
Hitch, Charles: 2, 79, 1112, 13, 31, 3637, 52
Honduras: 230
Howze, Lieutenant General Hamilton, USA: 173
Humphrey, Hubert: 10102, 129
Hungary: 17071
Ikeda, Hayato: 291
Improved Manned Interceptors: 5354, 5660
Independence, USS: 176
Index of Combat Effectiveness: 7172, 76, 80, 298
India: 121, 125, 127, 221, 223, 224, 247, 249, 250,
261, 262, 26573, 27476, 277, 278
368
Indian Ocean Task Force: 27778

Indonesia: 220, 221, 256, 29296
Infantry Regiment, 18th: 149
Intelligence operations, U2 flights over Cuba: 162,
16364, 165, 166, 168, 174, 175, 176, 180, 181
Inter-American Defense Board: 226
Inter-American Defense College: 226, 230
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs): 95
Atlas: 31, 35, 38, 45, 4647, 48, 50, 99
bomber defenses for: 54, 56
in Cuba: 161
Minutemen: 31, 32, 3537, 38, 39, 4142, 45,
4647, 48, 49, 50, 206
and NATO: 206
Soviet: 46, 47, 51, 161
Titan: 31, 35, 38, 39, 45, 4647, 48, 50
US protection against: 51
USSR testing of: 35
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on
Cuba: 23233
Intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs): 161,
162, 163, 16869, 174, 178, 195, 196, 200
International Control Commission for Laos: 121,
125, 12728, 132, 137
Iran: 61, 62, 68, 69, 218, 220, 237, 24547, 248, 249,
250, 261
Iraq: 23738, 240, 246, 249
Israel: 237, 23841
Italy: 162, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 195,
20506, 261
Jackson, Henry M.: 6
Japan: 223, 279, 283, 284, 285, 286, 28991
Johnson, Alexis: 21, 25, 231, 285, 288
Johnson, Lieutenant General Harold K.: 5, 58, 59,
77, 78, 291
Johnson, Lyndon B.: 5, 206
and Africa: 255
and arms control: 8889, 90
and budgets: 79
and Cuba: 234
and NATO: 20607, 211, 212
relationship with the JCS: 13
and reliance on nuclear missiles: 4748
and South Asia: 274, 275, 278
Johnston Island: 9899
Joint Chiefs of Staff
and ABMs: 5152, 53, 55, 5657, 5960
and Africa: 25152, 253, 25457, 258, 259,
26061, 26263
Index
and AMSA: 49
and arms control: 8183, 8485, 8688, 8992,
99100
and the Bay of Pigs: 107, 10809, 11012, 113
14, 115, 11617, 11820, 134, 297
and Berlin: 139, 14042, 14347, 15051, 15455
and capability for conventional warfare: 18, 19,
62, 65, 67
and CENTO: 247, 248, 24950
and Chinese nuclear capability: 28283
and the Cold War: 118, 297
and credibility of US will: 143, 14445, 14649,
154, 156, 170, 199, 211, 21415, 286, 297
and Cuba: 10720, 134, 15961, 23233, 23435
16668, 16985
and defense against nuclear attack: 79
and defense of Europe: 18889, 191, 19293,
21215
differences with McNamara on NATO strategy:
21315
differences with OSD on force levels: 3738,
4041, 4546
differences with OSD on force planning: 6970,
7778, 79, 29899
differences with OSD on missile defense: 55,
5657, 5960
differences with the State Department on Laos:
123, 135
differences with the State Department on
NATO strategy: 21315
draft of BNSP: 19
estimates of deployment capabilities: 62, 65, 67
and the Far East: 27980, 28183, 28488,
28992
and flexible response strategy: 61, 14142, 144,
14546, 148, 18889, 19093, 21215
and force planning: 1113, 15, 3746, 4748, 50,
6466, 6768, 7380, 29899
and forces for Europe: 14446, 147, 15051,
15257, 190, 191, 20711
and forces for the Far East: 28488, 28992
and India: 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 274, 27576
and the Indian Ocean area: 27778
interservice disagreements on forces for
Europe: 15354
interservice disagreements on Laos: 128, 129,
13031
interservice feuding: 10, 1112, 13, 15, 37, 41,
54, 59, 6364, 6768, 71, 74, 76, 7879, 80, 157,
298, 300301
J2: 109
J3: 109, 16465, 167
J4: 109
J5: 11, 18, 22, 3738, 41, 62, 63, 10809, 123,
156, 183, 256, 267, 28990
and Japan: 28992

and Korea: 28486, 28788
and Laos: 12224, 125, 127, 12831, 13234, 135,
136, 137
and Latin America: 22629, 23031, 232
membership: 23
and the Middle East: 23740, 24146, 24750
22122, 22324, 22829, 26566, 27172, 273,
274, 27576, 277
and military command relationships: 157
and mobilization of National Guard units: 153
and nuclear testing: 8992, 9394, 95, 9697, 98,
99101, 102
and nuclear weapons for NATO: 195, 196,
19798, 199202, 20307
and Pakistan: 26566, 27374, 27577
and planning for limited war: 19, 62
2831, 3233, 14142
and potential use of nuclear weapons in
Europe: 144, 14546, 14748
and potential use of nuclear weapons in Laos:
129, 130, 131, 132
and potential use of nuclear weapons in the Far
East: 28081, 28588
and production of nuclear weapons: 20
Program for Planning: 915
relationship between Taylor and the Service
Chiefs: 185
relationship with ISA: 19, 2021
relationship with Johnson: 13
relationship with Kennedy: 2, 3, 12, 19, 24, 103,
104, 107, 112, 114, 11617, 11820, 134, 143,
14849, 150, 157, 185, 297
relationship with McNamara: 67, 89, 1115,
19, 2122, 2627, 76, 11112, 148, 298
relationship with OSD: 2, 67, 3738, 4041,
4546, 55, 5657, 5960, 6970, 7778, 79, 298
relationship with the State Department: 21, 123,
135, 21315
role in national security planning: 1923, 6768
and the RS70: 43
and South Asia: 27172, 273, 274, 27577
Special Studies Group: 1011, 4243, 68, 69, 281
and the strategic nuclear balance: 36, 3739,
4041, 4243, 44, 4546, 48, 50
and tactical air power: 6667, 68, 7273
and a test ban treaty: 8992, 98, 99106
Joint Counterinsurgency Concept and Doctrinal
Guidance: 25
Joint Long-Range Strategic Study: 910
JLRSS71: 9
JLRSS72: 9
JLRSS73: 910
Joint Special Warfare Coordinating Group: 26
Joint Staff
and Berlin: 151
and budget planning: 8
369
Index
and CENTO: 247

and Cuba: 109, 15960
180
effectiveness of: 300
and force planning: 4647, 48, 71, 76
and Korea: 285, 286, 288
and the Military Assistance Program: 222, 276
and NATO: 191, 214
Operations Directorate: 131, 164
and the Program for Planning: 10, 13, 14
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP): 9, 279, 294
JSCP62: 279
JSCP63: 9, 22
JSCP65: 3233
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan: 9, 10, 12, 15, 21,
2223, 221, 222
JSOP66: 10
JSOP67: 10, 11, 4143, 46, 68, 71, 74
JSOP68: 10, 1213, 14, 22, 46, 5657, 71, 7374
JSOP69: 10, 1314, 2223, 48, 57, 7576, 78, 79
Joint Strategic Survey Council: 19, 2122, 33,
14647, 16263
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: 28, 2930, 31
Joint Task ForceCuba: 173
Joint War Games Agency: 58
Jones, General Charles: 248
Jordan: 237, 240, 242
Kasavubu, Joseph: 256, 257, 258
Kashmir: 265, 266, 268, 26970, 27172, 274, 277
Katanga province, the Congo: 256, 25763
Kaysen, Carl: 23
Kennedy, John F.
activation of National Guard units: 66
and Africa: 251, 25254, 256, 257, 259, 26061,
262
and arms control: 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 8889,
9596, 97, 9899, 100
and the B70: 43
and the Bay of Pigs: 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114,
115, 11618
and Berlin: 14041, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147,
14849, 15051, 154, 15658
and budget planning: 7, 9, 63, 6566, 75
and China: 283
and conventional warfare capability: 18
and counter-guerrilla capabilities: 2324, 2526
and credibility of US will: 175
and Cuba: 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 159, 160,
161, 162, 232, 233
168, 16973, 17475, 176, 180, 181, 18284
370
death of: 45
election campaign: 168, 170
155, 15657, 189
and force planning: 7, 9, 12, 46, 6768, 70, 73, 75
and forces for Europe: 14446, 147, 15051, 153,
154, 20708, 20911
and India: 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 27273
and Japan: 28992
and Korea: 285
and Laos: 124, 12526, 12829, 130, 131, 132,
133, 134, 13536
and Latin America: 226, 22728, 229, 231
meeting with Khrushchev: 95
messages to Congress: 18, 37, 63, 6566, 81, 218, 226
and the Middle East: 237, 238, 239, 241, 243,
244, 246
220, 228, 229
and national security policy: 18, 2022
and NATO: 191
and nuclear weapons for NATO: 19496, 197
98, 199202, 203, 204, 20506
and the NSC: 56
102, 105
33
relationship with Burke: 129
relationship with Khrushchev: 175, 177, 17980
relationship with Norstad: 155, 15657
relationship with Taylor: 34, 118, 185
relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2, 3,
12, 24, 103, 104, 107, 112, 11617, 11820, 134,
143, 14849, 150, 157, 185, 297, 299, 300
speeches by: 1, 81, 95, 98, 102, 104, 126, 147,
158, 162, 173, 174, 175
and the strategic nuclear balance: 37, 41
and a test ban treaty: 99, 100, 101, 102, 10304,
10506
Kennedy, Robert: 25, 116, 15960, 166, 169, 171,
172, 174, 180, 181, 295, 299
Kennedy administration
and Africa: 251, 258, 259
and China: 283
division over nuclear testing: 10203
and flexible response strategy: 61
and Israel: 23841
JCS members evaluation of: 119
220, 221
and South Asia: 26667
and the strategic nuclear balance: 3536
Khrushchev, Nikita: 29798
and the confrontation over West Berlin: 40, 132,
14243, 148, 15758, 170
Index
and Cuba: 107, 161, 162, 16869, 170, 171, 175,

17778, 17980, 181, 182, 183, 184
and Laos: 133, 135
and nuclear warfare: 3132, 35
and a test ban treaty: 10204
and wars of national liberation: 23
Kistiakowsky, George: 28, 29
Kitchen, Jeffrey: 219
Kong Le, Captain: 121, 122, 123, 12526
Korea, Republic of. See South Korea
Krulak, Major General Victor H., USMC: 25, 229
Kwajalein Island: 5455
Lansdale, Brigadier General Edward, USAF:
15960
Laos: 25, 62, 64, 12137, 146, 223, 224, 27980
Latin America: 2324, 221, 223, 224, 22535
Lebanon: 146, 240
LeMay, General Curtis E., USAF: 3, 4, 5, 299, 300
and ABMs: 55, 56
and the B70: 40, 4748
and Berlin: 147, 15051
and continental defense: 54, 55, 56, 57, 5960
17374, 177, 180, 181, 182, 184
and defense of Europe: 190, 193
and force planning: 11, 12, 41, 42, 4648, 50, 67,
70, 72, 73, 7475, 76, 77, 7879
and forces for the Far East: 291
and Laos: 129
30, 32, 33
relationship with McNamara: 12
and role of JCS in national security planning:
2021, 22
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA: 2, 19, 300, 301
and ABMs: 5152
and the Bay of Pigs: 109, 110, 11314, 115, 116,
117, 11819
and Berlin: 143, 14445, 14647, 14849, 150,
152, 156, 157
and Chinese nuclear capability: 282
and counterinsurgency planning: 24, 25, 26, 27
and Cuba: 109, 110, 11319, 15960
estimates of Soviet nuclear strength: 36

and forces for Europe: 152, 15354
and Korea: 284, 285, 286
and Laos: 123, 12526, 127, 131, 13435
266
and NATO: 189, 190, 191, 192, 197, 198, 202,
205, 206
and nuclear testing: 94, 9798
and Operation Mongoose: 120
20, 28, 30, 31, 33
relationship with Kennedy: 3
and South Asia: 266
and the strategic nuclear balance: 36, 41
and strategic retaliatory forces: 40
Leopoldville, The Congo: 256, 257
Libya: 223
Lippman, Walter: 17980
LIVE OAK (planning staff): 140, 14546
Livermore Laboratory: 103
Lodge, Henry Cabot: 27
Luang Prabang, Laos: 122, 12526, 128
Lumumba, Patrice: 256, 25758
Lundahl, Arthur: 165, 166
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: 63
Macmillan, Harold: 143, 170, 184, 194, 199, 201
02, 203, 206, 269, 270, 273
Magruder, General Carter: 284
Mahon, George: 36, 223
Malaya: 124, 125
Malaysia: 29495
Mann, Thomas: 113
Mansfield, Mike: 129
Marine Corps, US
conventional forces: 61, 62
and force planning: 7576
forces for Europe: 151
forces for the Far East: 29091
lift for: 75, 78
strength: 65, 66, 68, 79
Marine Expeditionary Brigades
4th: 231
5th: 16465, 169, 171, 174, 178
Matsu: 61, 280, 281
McCloy, John J.: 81, 8283, 93, 94, 95, 96
McCone, John: 25, 104, 166, 171, 172, 174, 177, 283
McDonald, Admiral David L.: 4, 57, 59, 72, 75, 76,
77, 78, 291, 298
McKee, General William: 166
McMahon Line: 266
McNamara, Robert S.: 2
and ABMs: 52, 53, 5455, 56, 5960
and Africa: 253, 25456, 260
371
Index
and AMSA: 4950

and anti-submarine warfare: 6364, 79
and arms control: 85, 86, 8788, 90, 91, 100
and assured destruction doctrine: 47, 48, 50
and the Bay of Pigs: 109, 110, 11112, 113
and Berlin: 14042, 14348, 149, 150, 151,
15455, 156
and Chinese nuclear capability: 282, 283
and cost-effectiveness analysis: 49, 5960, 7778
and counter-guerrilla planning: 2324, 25,
2627
and Cuba: 109, 110, 11112, 113, 160, 161, 232,
233, 23435
166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 17374, 17677,
17879, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185
and death of Kennedy: 4
and defense against nuclear attack: 79
and defense of Europe: 21112, 21315
and the Far East: 28081, 282, 28586, 28789
five-year program for general purpose forces:
66, 68, 70, 75
14546, 155, 188, 192, 193, 21315, 300
and force planning: 69, 1112, 1314, 3639,
4345, 4750, 6465, 6670, 7180, 29899
and force structure: 7071, 29899
and forces for Europe: 151, 15254, 155, 19192,
20710
and Indonesia: 293, 294, 295
and Japan: 28992
and Laos: 125, 126, 127, 128, 12930, 131,
13233, 13436
and Latin America: 228, 22932
219, 220, 22122, 223, 224, 266, 273, 27576
and mission of overseas forces: 18
and mobilization of National Guard units: 153
and national security planning: 2123
and NATO: 188, 189, 190, 191, 19293, 196, 197,
198, 20708, 21115
10203
and nuclear weapons for NATO: 196, 197, 198,
199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 20406
28, 30, 3132, 28586, 287
procurement proposals: 3738, 4042, 4344, 49
relationship with Taylor: 4, 11, 1213
relationship with the JCS: 67, 89, 1115, 19,
2122, 2627, 76, 11112, 148, 298300
and research and development projects: 37, 52,
56, 63
and role of the Secretary of Defense: 67
and the RS70: 4344
372
and South Asia: 266, 267, 268, 269, 27273, 274,

27576
and strategic mobility: 74, 75
191, 21314
and strategic retaliatory forces: 3639, 4041,
42, 45, 47
and tactical air power: 7273
and tactical nuclear warfare: 20, 21
and a test ban treaty: 89, 94, 100101, 10203,
105
testimony to Congress: 32, 37
Medium range ballistic missiles: 16162, 163, 165,
16667, 168, 169, 171, 174, 178, 179, 180, 182,
194, 19597, 198200, 20102, 208
Menon, V. K. Krishna: 267
Merchant, Livingston: 204
Mexico: 235
Middle East: 23750
Mikoyan, Anastas: 107
Military Air Transport Service: 242
Military Assistance Advisory Groups
for Laos: 121, 123, 125, 127, 135
in Latin America: 22829
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: 25
Military Assistance Program: 21724, 254
and Africa: 252
civic action program funding: 26
counterinsurgency funds: 26
and the Far East: 281, 283
funding for: 217, 218
and India: 26667, 268, 273, 274, 27576
22829, 232, 235
and Pakistan: 26566, 268, 27374, 275
and South Asia: 26568, 27172, 27374, 27576,
277
and South Korea: 28586, 287
Military Representative of the President: 34, 118.
See also Taylor, General Maxwell D.
Missiles. See also Anti-ballistic missiles
Jupiter: 162, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 17981,
195, 196, 200
Luna: 180
for NATO: 194, 195
R12: 178
R14: 177, 178
Skybolt: 37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 194, 195, 201
Soviet: 53, 200
Soviet, in Cuba: 16275, 176, 17885
surface-to-air: 51, 5859, 162, 169, 171, 175, 176,
179, 180, 181, 23839
Mobutu, Colonel Joseph: 256
Monroe Doctrine: 162
Morocco: 252, 253, 256
Mount, Air Commodore C. J., RAF: 270
Mountbatten, Admiral Louis: 207, 248
Index
Mozambique: 25354
Muharraq Airfield, Bahrain: 242
Musa, General Mohammed: 27677
Nam Tha, Laos: 135
Nasser, Gamal Abdul: 237, 239, 242, 24445, 250,
258
Nasution, General Abdul Haris: 293, 29495
National Counter-Insurgency Doctrine: 26
National Guard
activation of units: 66, 6768, 152, 153
mobilization of: 153, 155
strengthening of: 66, 67
National Intelligence Estimates: 35, 36, 59
National Photographic Interpretation Center: 165
National Policy Paper on South Africa: 25556
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)
on Africa: 255
National Security Council
and Africa: 262
Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy: 98
and conventional warfare: 61
and Cuba: 233
177
Executive Committee: 6, 262
Executive Committee for Cuba: 174, 176, 177,
17879, 180, 181, 183, 185, 233
JCS role in: 119
and Korea: 28485
and Laos: 123, 12829, 130, 131, 13536
Net Evaluation Subcommittee: 2728, 3031
organization of: 56
and South Asia: 27273
Special Group (Counter-Insurgency): 2425
Standing Committee: 6
National Strategic Target List: 28
Navy, US
and force planning: 38, 4647, 48, 68, 74, 7576,
77, 78, 79, 299300
forces for Cuba: 171
forces for Europe: 149, 151
forces for Laos: 136
nuclear power plant for: 7879
Seabee Technical Assistance Teams: 26
and strategic retaliatory forces: 38
strength: 6566, 68
Nehru, Jawaharlal: 127, 128, 265, 26667, 268, 270,
272, 276
Netherlands, The: 293, 294

Netherlands New Guinea: 292, 293, 294
Neutral Nations Commission proposed for Laos:
124, 125
New Zealand: 293
Newsweek magazine: 119
Nicaragua: 108, 110, 114, 115
Nigeria: 258
Nitze, Paul: 6263, 8788, 90, 94, 98, 100101, 127
28, 147, 148, 149, 166, 182, 219, 268, 28687
and Africa: 25152, 257, 261
and NATO: 188, 197, 198, 200, 201
Norstad, General Lauris, USAF: 187
and access to Berlin: 140, 14142, 143, 14445,
148, 15051, 15253, 15455, 15657
and NATO strategy: 18788, 191, 192, 202
199200
reliance on nuclear weapons: 188
North Atlantic Council: 187, 189, 192, 193, 19496,
199200, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214
North Atlantic Treaty: 140
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Anglo-American differences: 19697, 199, 200,
20102, 20508
attitudes of European allies: 18, 45, 89, 15152,
153, 189, 192, 19394, 196, 198, 199, 201, 202,
205, 208, 21112, 21314
and Berlin: 140, 143, 146, 147, 170
conventional forces: 153, 18788, 189, 190, 191,
192, 193, 197, 200202, 206, 20711, 212,
21315
cost-effectiveness analysis of forces: 76, 7778
and credibility of US will: 199, 211
18081
and the flexible response strategy: 188, 19094,
19899, 21115
force requirements: 71, 72, 73, 7677, 15152,
155, 189, 190, 191, 20809, 29899
force structure: 189
forward strategy: 190, 191, 192, 200201, 207
Military Committee: 187, 188, 19091, 200
multinational force: 19495, 196202, 20307
nuclear weapons for: 194202, 20307
reliance on nuclear weapons: 18, 4546, 70, 72,
15657, 18788, 189, 191, 19294, 195202,
20708, 210, 21115
tactical air forces for: 73, 77
US forces for: 152, 154, 15556, 20711
North Atlantic Treaty Organization documents
MC 14/2: 18, 187, 188, 192, 19394, 211
MC70: 188
MC96: 191
MC100/1: 212, 213
North Korea: 28182, 284, 285, 286, 287
373
Index
North Vietnam: 77, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 13031,

133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 280, 281
Northeast Frontier Agency, India: 266, 267, 268,
26970
Norway: 223
NSAM 55: 24, 104, 118
NSAM 62: 147
NSAM 118: 228
NSAM 140: 228
NSAM 148: 19798
NSAM 295: 25556
NSAM 322: 207
NSC 5906/1: 1718, 19, 21, 22
Nuclear weapons
and Africa: 25152
for allies: 20
and arms control: 8283, 84, 85, 8890
and assured destruction policy: 32, 33, 47,
48, 50
Chinese: 28283
and counterforce targeting: 4344, 46, 48
Cuba as base for Soviet weapons: 16164,
16575
as deterrent: 18, 20, 3132, 37, 41, 44, 4546, 50,
61, 132, 143, 145, 15253, 154, 155,
15657, 18788, 190, 192, 194, 19899, 201,
208, 21115, 28081, 28283, 28586, 287
funding for: 3738
guidelines for the use of: 20
and Laos: 129, 130, 131, 132, 133
limitation of damage from: 47, 4950
and a limited test ban treaty: 8992
in the Middle East: 241, 246, 24849
for NATO: 194202, 20307
NATO reliance on: 18, 4546, 70, 72, 15657,
18788, 189, 191, 19294, 195202, 20708,
210, 21115
nonproliferation of: 86, 205, 241
and planning for conflicts in the Far East:
28081, 28587
planning for the potential use of in Europe: 17,
144, 14546
planning for the use of in strategic nuclear war:
2733, 47, 298
production of: 20
proliferation of: 100, 101, 106
short-range attack missiles (SRAMs): 49, 50
Soviet testing of: 53, 15051
4143, 45, 4748, 84, 85, 89, 103, 10405, 161,
167
tactical: 17, 20, 89, 10405, 20304, 208, 21115
testing of: 93106, 15051
Office of Naval Intelligence: 177
Okinawa: 65, 136, 279, 285, 29092
OMeara, Lieutenant General Andrew P., USA:
22930
Operation Anadyr: 161
Operation Mongoose: 120, 15961
374
OPLAN 31262: 164, 18081, 182, 183, 233

OPLAN 31461: 164, 165, 178
OPLAN 31661: 164, 16667, 17879, 180, 182,
183, 233
Organization of American States: 16869, 175,
176, 179, 235
Outer space, militarization of: 8788
Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza: 245, 24647
Pakistan: 25, 127, 131, 218, 220, 242, 247, 248, 249,
250, 26566, 267, 268, 269, 27172, 27374,
27578
Palmer, General Williston, USA: 221
Panama Canal Zone: 229, 230
Panofsky, Wolfgang: 9697
Park Chung Hee, Major General: 284, 288
Parker, Major General Theodore, USA: 229
Passman, Otto: 218, 223
Pathet Lao: 121, 122, 123, 124, 12526, 127, 128,
131, 134, 135, 137
Peres, Shimon: 238
Peru: 228
Philippine Islands: 127, 131, 136, 220, 224, 261,
262, 279, 283, 293, 294
Phoumi Nosavan, General: 12122, 12324, 125
26, 127, 128, 13435, 136, 137
Plain of Jars, Laos: 122, 123, 12526, 127, 128
Planning-programming-budgeting system: 79,
11, 12, 15, 37, 298
Poland: 121, 127
Polaris submarines: 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 4142,
45, 46, 48, 50, 64, 99, 19496, 19899, 200,
20102, 20304, 205, 28081, 286
Portugal: 220, 223, 25354
Portuguese Guinea: 25354
Power, General Thomas S.: 28, 2930, 31, 173, 205
Program Evaluation Office (Laos): 121, 123, 124,
12526, 127
Project Vela: 99
Public opinion
and Berlin: 143
and China: 28283
confidence of allies in the United States: 145
confidence of the world in the United States:
14445
and a nuclear test ban: 102
Qassim, General Abdul Karim: 237
Quemoy: 61, 280, 281
Radar warning nets: 55, 5657, 5859
Radford, Admiral Arthur: 11
Rahman, Abdul: 294, 295
Ready Reserve: 153
Reischauer, Edwin: 292
Republic of Korea Army: 284, 28586, 28788
Ricketts, Admiral Claude: 162, 163, 204
Rio Treaty of 1947: 225
Index
Rosson, Major General William B., USA: 25

Rostow, Walt: 20
Rowen, Henry: 2021
Rowny, Brigadier General Edward L., USA:
18990, 192
Royal Laotian Government: 121, 122, 12627, 128,
131, 133, 134, 137
Ruffner, General Clark: 19697, 200
Rusk, Dean: 2
and Africa: 252, 253, 254, 257
and Berlin: 149, 150, 156
and China: 282, 283
and Cuba: 113, 114, 115, 161, 162
172, 174, 175, 177, 178, 181
and the Far East: 279, 281, 282, 28889, 295
and flexible response strategy: 188, 192
and Laos: 128, 129, 131, 134
229
and NATO: 188, 190, 19394, 196, 197, 198, 199,
200, 21113, 214
and a nuclear test ban treaty: 103
and policy on use of nuclear weapons: 1718
and South Asia: 267, 26970, 272, 273, 274
Russell, Admiral James: 231
Russell, Richard: 129, 223
Ryukyu Islands: 289, 29192
SACEUR. See Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe
SACLANT. See Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira: 25354
San Roman, Brigade Commander Jose Perez:
11516
Sandys, Duncan: 268
Sarit, General Thanarat: 135
Saud, King: 242
Saudi Arabia: 237, 240, 24145
Savang, King of Laos: 122, 125
Schlesinger, Arthur: 205
Seaborg, Glenn T.: 98, 104
Ships
destroyer escorts: 75, 79
numbers of ASW carriers: 66, 68, 74, 75, 79
numbers of attack carriers: 66, 68, 7475, 78, 79
overhauls of: 67, 75, 78
and strategic mobility: 74
troopships: 67, 74, 78
Shoup, General David M., USMC: 3, 185
and the B70: 3940
and the Cuban missile crisis: 170, 171, 184
and Laos: 128, 129, 130

29, 30
Singapore: 29596
Single Integrated Operational Plans: 28, 29, 75,
29091
SIOP62: 28, 29
SIOP63: 2930, 31
SIOP64: 31, 40
Smith, General Frederick H.: 41
Smith, Rear Admiral Harry: 219
Sorensen, Theodore: 133, 171, 174
Souphanouvong, Prince: 121, 137
South Africa: 253, 25455
South Korea: 61, 68, 7677, 21718, 219, 220, 222,
224, 273, 279, 28182, 283, 28489, 290, 291,
292
South Vietnam: 25, 27, 62, 68, 69, 123, 124, 128,
129, 130, 131, 133, 136, 137, 220, 221, 222, 223,
224, 280, 281, 289, 297
South West Africa: 255
Southeast Asia: 2324, 61, 68, 7677, 12137, 220,
223, 224, 27982, 29296
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO): 124,
12627, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 13435,
265, 271, 277, 293
Souvanna Phouma: 12122, 123, 132, 134, 135, 137
Spain: 210, 223, 244, 253, 254
Spanish Sahara: 253
Special Assistant for Science and Technology: 56,
82
Special Group (Counter-Insurgency): 232, 234
Special National Intelligence Estimates
on Brazil: 232
on Cuba: 163, 179
on Laos: 134
Sprague, Mansfield: 122
State, Secretary of. See Herter, Christian; Rusk,
Dean
State, US Department of: 1415
and Africa: 251, 25253, 25456, 257, 26061,
262
and Berlin: 156
and the BNSP: 20, 21
and Cuba: 108, 109, 113
and the Cuban missile crisis: 16364, 16970,
17172, 179
differences with JCS on Laos: 123, 135
and the Indian Ocean area: 277, 278
and Japan: 289
and Korea: 284, 285, 287, 288
and Laos: 122, 123, 126, 131, 133, 135, 136
Laos Country Team: 125
232
375
Index
and the Middle East: 238, 239, 240, 242,

24344, 247
and the Military Assistance Program: 221, 222
and NATO: 194, 197, 198, 200201, 204, 205,
210, 21112, 213
relationship with the JCS: 21
and South Asia: 268, 269, 271, 273, 274
and the use of nuclear weapons: 20
State-Defense-CIA working groups
on the Bay of Pigs: 108, 109
on Laos: 124
Stevenson, Adlai: 83, 166, 172, 255, 262
Stikker, Dirk: 189, 191
Strategic Air Command: 18, 51, 54, 57, 164, 171, 173,
174, 176, 184, 19697, 201, 203, 205, 241, 244
Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: 8384, 85, 86,
8992
Strategic reserve: 6869
Strauss, Franz Josef: 200
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs):
6364, 8586. See also Polaris submarines
Submarines: 66, 68, 75, 79. See also Polaris
submarines
Sudan: 256, 257, 258
Sukarno: 292, 29394, 295
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
(SACLANT): 187, 199. See also Dennison,
Admiral Robert L.
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR):
18, 140, 148, 15051, 187, 192, 194, 196, 198,
199, 202, 203, 205, 206, 210, 214. See also
Norstad, General Lauris
Sweeney, General Walter: 17273, 175, 179
Syria: 23738, 240, 249
Tactical Air Command: 18, 63, 6667
Tactical air power: 6667, 68, 7273, 152, 154
Taiwan: 146, 21718, 220, 222, 279, 280, 281, 283
Tarwater, Lieutenant Colonel B. W., USAF: 11011
Task Force 135: 176
Task Force 136: 176
Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA: 34, 5, 300301
and ABMs: 55
and Africa: 259
and the BNSP: 2122
and credibility of US will: 170, 211
and Cuba: 120, 15960, 161, 234, 235
and the Cuba Study Group: 11618
17175, 177, 17879, 18081, 182, 18384, 185
and defense of Europe: 189, 191, 192, 193, 198,
199, 20709, 21112, 213
and force planning: 44, 4647, 48, 6768, 71, 72,
73, 74
376

and Japan: 28990
and Korea: 28586, 28788
and Laos: 136
223
and the NSC: 6
and nuclear testing: 89, 9697, 99, 102, 104
201
and Operation Mongoose: 120
3233
relationship with Kennedy: 34, 118, 185
relationship with McNamara: 11, 1213
relationship with the JCS: 4, 11, 300301
relationship with the State Department: 21
and South Asia: 26970, 27273, 27475, 276, 278
and a test ban treaty: 89, 103, 104, 105
Ten Nation Disarmament Conference: 82
Test ban treaties
negotiation of: 8992, 93106
proposed verification: 93, 9496
Thailand: 25, 68, 69, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128,
129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 221, 224, 281, 283
Thant, U: 179, 244, 259, 260, 262
Thompson, Llewellyn: 170, 174
Thorneycroft, Peter: 201, 208
Tipton, Brigadier General James, USAF: 270
Trapnell, Lieutenant General T. J. H., USA: 127
Trinidad, Cuba: 108, 10910, 111, 112, 113
Trujillo, Rafael: 231
Trujillo, Ramfis: 23132
Truman, Lieutenant General Louis, USA: 26263
Tshombe, Moise: 256, 25863
Turkey: 162, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 17981,
195, 19697, 200, 20506, 21718, 220, 222,
22324, 247, 248
Uncertain Trumpet, The, by Maxwell D. Taylor: 21
Unified commanders
role in budget development: 12
Unified commands: 63
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Africa: 252, 25658, 261, 263
and arms control: 82, 83, 84, 8586, 8789,
9192, 95
and Berlin: 139, 14041, 142, 143, 144, 14648,
149, 150, 151, 15455, 15758, 161, 16263,
169, 170, 192, 29798
conventional forces: 76, 153, 154, 18990, 191, 192
and credibility of US will: 143, 14445, 14649,
154, 155, 15657
and Cuba: 107, 108, 29798
Index
and the Cuban missile crisis: 16164, 16585

deployment capabilities: 62
effects of US force planning on expenditures
by: 49
Eisenhower policy on conflict with: 17
estimates of bomber fleet: 51
estimates of damage from an attack by on the
United States: 53, 54, 57, 5859
forces in Eastern Europe: 152, 208
and India: 266, 270, 271, 274, 27576, 277
and Laos: 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131, 133,
135
and the Middle East: 23738, 239, 240, 242, 245,
246, 247, 248
and NATO strategy: 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193,
195, 198200, 208, 209, 211, 215
and nuclear testing: 53, 89, 9192, 93, 94, 9598,
99, 100, 101, 103, 15051
perceptions of US will: 14243, 145, 14647
policy on nuclear warfare: 3132
relationship with China: 280, 28283, 287, 288
and Sputnik: 64
40, 41, 4243, 44, 4546
submarines: 79
and a test ban: 93, 9496, 100, 101, 10206
United Arab Republic: 237, 243, 24445, 258
United Kingdom: 51
and Berlin: 139, 140, 147, 150
and Laos: 124, 125, 128, 131, 132
and NATO: 194, 195, 19697, 204, 205, 20708,
209, 210, 211, 215
and nuclear weapons: 194, 195, 19697, 19899,
200, 20102, 203, 204, 20506
and South Asia: 265, 266, 267, 268, 26970, 271,
272, 273, 277
and a test ban treaty: 9495, 98, 100, 102
United Nations
and Africa: 251, 252, 25663
and Cuba: 114
Expeditionary Force for the Congo: 25657,
259, 26063
General Assembly resolutions: 88
and India: 271
and Indonesia: 294
and Korea: 28485, 287
and Laos: 129
Security Council: 175, 253, 25455, 256, 258, 259
Uranium production: 8889
US Army, Europe: 149, 157
US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR):
140, 150, 22324
US Congress
appropriations for the military: 39, 40, 52

and the B70: 37
and funding to maintain access to Berlin: 146,
147
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: 9798,
19798
and Laos: 12829
and Latin America: 228, 232
21920, 22123, 224, 228, 232, 276, 294
and nuclear testing: 9798, 10102
US Defense Policy Conference: 192, 193
US Disarmament Agency: 8183
US European Command: 15051, 153, 15556, 157
US House of Representatives, Appropriations
Committee: 36
US Information Agency: 82
US Intelligence Board: 282
US New Conventional Policy: 192
US Overseas Internal Defense Policy
Guidelines: 26
US Senate
Armed Services Committee: 37, 102, 129
Foreign Relations Committee: 105
US Strike Command (STRICOM): 2627, 63
Vance, Cyrus R.: 25, 23233, 234, 255
Venezuela: 23435
Vientiane, Laos: 121, 122, 125, 128
Vietnam: 6, 14, 23, 123
Vietnam War: 289, 291, 292, 301
Vinson, Carl: 43, 301
Wall, Colonel R. B., USMC: 110, 111
Walter, Major General Mercer, USA: 25960
Ward, Vice Admiral Alfred: 176
Warsaw Pact
and Berlin: 142
conventional forces: 153, 154, 192
cost-effectiveness analysis of forces: 76, 7778
and Cuba: 162
forces available for conflict in Europe: 69, 71,
77, 192, 193
and NATO strategy: 19293, 215
Washington-Moscow hot line: 87
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group: 22, 36
West Germany: 140, 141, 142, 147, 148, 149, 150
51, 15556, 170, 171, 175
defense of: 191, 192, 199200, 209, 21015
and flexible response strategy: 189
and Israel: 241
and NATO: 191, 192, 194, 196, 199200,
20304, 205
nuclear weapons for: 194, 196, 200, 20304,
205, 207
pre-positioning of equipment in: 15556
US forces in: 18788
377
Index
West Irian: 292, 29394

Westmoreland, General William: 301
Wheeler, Lieutenant General Earle G., USA: 4, 5,
300
and ABMs: 57
and the Bay of Pigs: 109, 110, 114
and continental defense: 54, 55, 57, 58, 59
and Cuba: 232
181, 182, 183, 184, 185
and force planning: 12, 14, 49, 50, 70, 71, 72, 73,
74, 7576, 77, 78
and Japan: 292
and Laos: 123
and NATO: 206, 207, 215
relationship with the State Department: 21
White, General Thomas D., USAF: 3, 300
and ABMs: 52
and the Bay of Pigs: 10809, 117
and Laos: 122, 128, 129, 13031
White Paper on a nuclear test ban: 10203
Wiesner, Jerome: 56, 95, 97, 98, 103, 104
Williams, G. Mennen: 25354
Wilson, Harold: 20607
Wood, General Robert J., USA: 221, 222, 223,
229, 276
Wright, Colonel John R., USA: 110
Yarmolinsky, Adam: 299
Yemen: 239, 242, 24345
York, Herbert: 52
Zapata peninsula, Cuba: 11112, 11314, 11618
378

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Department of Defense Photo (MSgt Frank Hall, USA)

Department of Defense Photo (MSgt Frank Hall, USA)

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of Joint History

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

LAM SON 719: The "Moment of Truth"

2. Strategic Priorities Undergo Major Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

JCS and National Policy 19611964

8. The Cuban Debacle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9. The Laotian Precipice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10. The Berlin Confrontation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11. The Cuban Missile Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LAM SON 719: The "Moment of Truth"

13. NATO: Initiatives Falter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14. Paring the Military Assistance Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15. Latin America: Containment and Counter-Insurgency . . . . . .

16. Middle East Kaleidoscope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17. New Africa and the Congo Entanglement. . . . . . . . . . . . .

18. South Asia: Contradictions of Containment. . . . . . . . . . . . .

19. The Far East: Seeking a Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

JCS and National Policy 19611964

20. Conclusion: Appraising Performances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Young Men Meet the Old

n 20 January 1961, John F. Kennedy delivered an inaugural address that was as

JCS and National Policy 19611964

Entering the New Frontier

JCS and National Policy 19611964

Entering the New Frontier

New Methods: At the White House

resident Kennedy promptly dismantled much of the National Security Council

JCS and National Policy 19611964

New Methods: At the Pentagon

Entering the New Frontier

JCS and National Policy 19611964

Entering the New Frontier

Adjusting the JCS Program for Planning

JCS and National Policy 19611964

Entering the New Frontier

JCS and National Policy 19611964

Entering the New Frontier

JCS and National Policy 19611964

Entering the New Frontier

Conventional Capability Emphasized; Basic National

one of President Eisenhowers national security policies attracted more

JCS and National Policy 19611964

JCS and National Policy 19611964

JCS and National Policy 19611964

JCS and National Policy 19611964

JCS and National Policy 19611964

The SIOP: Striving for a Controlled Response

JCS and National Policy 19611964

JCS and National Policy 19611964