The Supreme Court ruled that judicial admissions must be made in the same case to be considered as such. It found that statements made by Qua in a separate collection case did not constitute judicial admissions in the present case involving foreclosure of shares. The trial court erred in considering the statements as judicial admissions and in denying Qua's application to suspend foreclosure. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court ruled that judicial admissions must be made in the same case to be considered as such. It found that statements made by Qua in a separate collection case did not constitute judicial admissions in the present case involving foreclosure of shares. The trial court erred in considering the statements as judicial admissions and in denying Qua's application to suspend foreclosure. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court ruled that judicial admissions must be made in the same case to be considered as such. It found that statements made by Qua in a separate collection case did not constitute judicial admissions in the present case involving foreclosure of shares. The trial court erred in considering the statements as judicial admissions and in denying Qua's application to suspend foreclosure. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
SPOUSES VICENTE and LEONIDAS BANAL, Respondents.
Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal are the registered owners of
19.34 hectares of agricultural land situated in Camarines Norte covered by TCT No. T-6296.
A portion of the land consisting of 6.23 hectares (5.47 of which
is planted with coconut and 0.76 planted with palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Adm. Order No.
6, (s. 1992) as amended by A.O. No. 11, (s. 1994), Landbank valued the property at P173,918.55.
Spouses Banal rejected the above valuation. A summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land; it affirmed the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied, spouses Banal, filed with RTC (Br. 40) of Daet,
Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation against DAR and Landbank. They prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
The trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00 and awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash.
It based the same on the facts established in another case
pending before it: Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.
Forthwith, Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review. The Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Can a court summarily take judicial notice of records of other
cases pending in or which have been tried by the same court?
HOLDING:
NO. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR
adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. In the
Page 1 of 69 proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court.
In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
several factors enumerated in R.A. 6657:
1) cost of acquisition of the land
2) current value of like properties 3) nature, actual use and incomet 4) sworn valuation by the owner 5) tax declarations 6) assessment made by government assessors 7) social and economic benefits 8) non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution
These factors have been translated into a basic formula:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1).
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in determining just compensation for the property.
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here. The RTC applied the Rodriguez case to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.
While the determination of just compensation involves the
exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law.
Page 2 of 69 CASE NO. 2:
GARCIA vs. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001 PANGANIBAN, J.
GRACE J. GARCIA, Petitioner,
REDERICK A. RECIO, Respondent.
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
FACTS:
In 1987, Rederick Recio married Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen. In 1989, a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree of divorce was issued by an Australian family court.
In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. In 1994, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina. Since 1995, Recio and Garcia separated de facto. In 1996, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the RTC of Cabanatuan City (Br. 28) on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of Recios prior marriage to Samson only in 1997. Recio averred that in 1993, he had revealed to Garcia his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.
In 1998, Recio was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down. Thus, he prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. To which the OSG agreed.
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Can Philippine courts take judicial notice of a foreign divorce
decree?
HOLDING:
NO. The Supreme Court states that: It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
Page 3 of 69 the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. WHEREFORE we REMAND the case to the court a quo.
Page 4 of 69 CASE NO. 3:
REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION and GERVEL, INC. vs. QUA
G.R. No. 144413, July 30, 2004 CARPIO, J.
REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION (RGC) and GERVEL, INC., Petitioners,
LAWRENCE C. QUA, Respondent.
To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in
the same case in which it is offered.
FACTS:
Petitioners and Respondent were stockholders of Ladtek, Inc.
Ladtek obtained loans from Metrobank and Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) with its stockholders as sureties.
Among themselves, the stockholders executed Agreements for
Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks. The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladteks loans, the parties would reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to the creditors.
Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of stock of General Milling
Corporation (GMC) in favor of RGC and Gervel. It served as security for the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel may be held liable under the Agreements.
Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP.
Hence, Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua.
RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million, hence, Metrobank
executed a waiver and quitclaim in favor of RGC and Gervel. Thereafter, a joint motion to dismiss the Collection Case against RGC and Gervel was filed.
RGC and Gervel demanded payment from Qua of P3,860,646 or 42.22%
of the total as reimbursement, which the latter refused; hence, they sent notices of foreclosure of Quas pledged shares.
Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application
for a TRO. RTC of Makati (Br. 63) issued a TRO, but denied the Urgent Petition to Suspend Foreclosure Sale. RGC and Gervel eventually foreclosed all the pledged shares of stock at public auction. Thus, Quas application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction became moot.
After trial on the Foreclosure Case, the trial court ordered RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua. On motion for reconsideration, RGC and Gervel, RTC reversed and set aside its earlier decision.
Quas MR was denied, hence, he appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed the 2nd ruling of the RTC and reinstated its 1 st ruling. Hence, the present petition.
Page 5 of 69 ISSUE:
Is Qua estopped from claiming that the other solidary debtors,
RGC and Gervel, did not pay the entire loan obligation; as he is bound by his judicial admission in the Collection Case?
HOLDING:
NO. RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making conflicting statements in two different and separate cases. Qua cannot now claim that the payment made to Metrobank was not for the entire obligation because of his Motion to Dismiss Collection Case where he stated that RGC and Gervels payment was for the entire obligation.
The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in
relation to the party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the estoppel in his favor.
On the party to be estopped, such party:
1) commits conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are inconsistent with those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 2) has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at least influence the other party; and 3) has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.
On the party claiming the estoppel, such party:
1) has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth on the facts in question; 2) has relied, in good faith, on the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; 3) has acted or refrained from acting based on such conduct or statements as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.
In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are inexistent.
While Quas statements in the Collection Case conflict with his
statements in the Foreclosure Case, RGC and Gervel miserably failed to show that Qua, in making those statements, intended to falsely represent or conceal the material facts. Both parties undeniably know the real facts. Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied on Quas statements in the Collection Case such that they changed their position or status, to their injury, detriment or prejudice.
RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on Judicial Admissions to support their stance:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings
filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.
Page 6 of 69 The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements in the Collection Case and in the Foreclosure Case, and not in the same case as required in Section 4 of Rule 129.
To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in
the same case in which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.
Page 7 of 69 CASE NO. 4:
PEOPLE vs. YATAR
G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004 PER CURIAM
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", Appellant.
Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. The DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
FACTS:
The 17-year old victim, Kathylyn Uba, lives with her grandmother, Isabel Dawang in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn was left alone in the house because her grandmother left for their farm in Nagbitayan (2 km away).
Anita Wania (Kathylyns aunt) and Beverly Deneng stopped by the
house of Isabel and they saw appellant Joel Yatar (the husband of Kathylyns aunt Luz) at the back of the house, allegedly getting lumber.
Around noon, on her way home from Nagbitayan, Judilyn Pas-a
(first cousin of Kathylyn) saw appellant (wearing white shirt with collar and black pants) descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel and run towards the back of the house, where he paced back and forth.
She again saw him in the afternoon when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." When Judilyns husband approached them, appellant immediately left.
In the evening, Isabel arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
Kathylyn was found sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Isabel cried for help. Relatives and neighbors came to offer assistance and the police were called to the crime scene.
The police discovered the victims clothes beside her naked
cadaver and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any
knowledge of Kathylynss death; however, he was placed under police custody. Appellant tried running away, but he was recaptured.
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, and was sentenced to Death; hence, this automatic review.
Page 8 of 69 ISSUE:
Is DNA evidence admissible in evidence and sufficient to warrant
the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
HOLDING:
YES. DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as
a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. In human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
Subsequent DNA Testing showed that the semen found in the vagina of the victim matches the gene type of the appellant when he submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of his counsel.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, the following factors: 1) how the samples were collected, 2) how they were handled, 3) the possibility of contamination of the samples, 4) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, 5) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and 6) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on her testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends
that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination. This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
Moreover, independently of the physical evidence, there were
several circumstances in this case, which were properly appreciated by the court a quo to warrant the appellants conviction.
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in
light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence, if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 9 of 69 CASE NO. 5:
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
REYNALDO DE VILLA, Petitioner,
JUNE DE VILLA, Petitioner-relator, THE DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISONS, Respondent.
DNA evidence of non-paternity by the accused of a child born to the
victim of the crime of rape does not affect his conviction, but it may nonetheless affect the award of child support imposed against him
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1994, the 12-year old victim Aileen Mendoza
woke up in her familys rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner Reynaldo de Villa (her uncle by affinity)on top of her.
She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. He succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated.
This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileens pregnancy, which
was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza. It was then revealed that she was raped, prompting her parents to bring her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant. On December 19, 1994, Aileen prematurely gave birth to an 8-month old baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.
Petitioners defenses: (1) Old age (67 years old) and sickness rendered him incapable of having an erection (2) Aileens family had a grudge against him, (3) Alibi, he was in San Luis, Batangas.
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. Hence, the automatic review to the SC.
In petitioners brief, he sought the conduct of a blood type test
and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001 affirming petitioners conviction for rape.
Reynaldo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, wherein he
once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. This was denied with finality; hence, the Decision became final and executory.
Three years after the promulgation of the 2001 decision, June de
Villa, the son of Reynaldo alleged that he was unaware of the availability of DNA testing during the trial of the case and was only informed about it during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case.
Page 10 of 69 Undaunted, June, asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to June, who immediately labeled the cup as Container A.
June then gathered samples from four (4) grandchildren of
Reynaldo, placed them in separate containers with distinguishing labels, and temporarily stored them in a refrigerator. During transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory, the containers were kept on ice.
June requested the National Science Research Institute (NSRI) to
conduct DNA testing on the samples, including that of Reynaldo. The preliminary report dated March 21, 2003, showed that Reynaldo could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's.
Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus with a prayer for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
ISSUE:
Does DNA evidence entitle the accused to outright acquittal, or
if already convicted and incarcerated, to avail of the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy?
HOLDING:
NO. In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ
of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity
is not central to the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child. (People vs. Alberio: Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape).
The grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our
Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victims claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic review.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court which, having duly acquired jurisdiction was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.
The writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a
post-conviction remedy. In the case of Feria vs. CA, we ruled that
Page 11 of 69 review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only if: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
In the case at bar, petitioner invokes the writ to assail a final
judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Even in the light of the sudden withdrawal of appearance of the
petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Alfonso Salvador (leaving for US for an indefinite period of time), there was no such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right.
On the other hand, a motion for new trial, under the Rules, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds, that is, it may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition has long
attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, the DNA evidence does not fall within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly-discovered evidence.
Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the
trial, it does not meet the criteria such that the evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Junes claim that he was unaware of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court.
Even with all the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence
presented by petitioner and his counsel, Reynaldo is not entitled to outright acquittal. His conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases.
Page 12 of 69 CASE NO. 6:
HERRERA vs. ALBA
G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005 CARPIO, J.
ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner,
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Respondents.
Where the evidence to aid investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
FACTS:
On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba (13 y/o) as represented by his
mother, Armi Alba filed before the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Compulsory Recognition, Support and Damages against Rosendo Herrera, the putative biological father of Rosendo Alba.
Herrera denied being the biological father of Rosendo Alba as he
also denied physical contact with Armi Alba.
Hence, Alba filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, she presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. to the effect that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.99% in establishing paternity.
Herrera opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has
not gained acceptability and it violates his right against self- incrimination.
On February 3, 2000, the trial court granted the Motion. Herrera
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 8, 2000. Herrera appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. Herreras motion for reconsideration was again denied, hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Is DNA test, a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to
determine filiation?
HOLDING:
YES. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as in this case. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
Page 13 of 69 In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects, namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
Under the Family Code, illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children, to wit:
1) record of birth; 2) admission of filiation in a public or private document; 3) open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child; and 4) any other means allowed by the Rules or and special laws.
Under the Rules on Evidence, an act or declaration about
pedigree, and family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are recognized.
Under jurisprudence, what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation includes:
1) A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father; 2) Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth; and
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.
Neither the Frye-Schwartz nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is
controlling in the Philippines. At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions.
Section 49 of Rule 130, on the opinion of a witness on matters
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training; does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
Page 14 of 69 CASE NO. 7:
AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005 CORONA, J.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, Minor MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE represented by his mother FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, Respondents.
DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering.
FACTS:
Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Arnel Agustin, the alleged biological father, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC of Quezon City.
Fe and Arnel shared an amorous relationship resulting in Fes
pregnancy in 1999. Arnel suggested an abortion which Fe refused and gave birth to their son Martin, out of wedlock in 2000. Martins birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel also shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses, but
later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his financial capacity. He even suggested having Martin be committed for adoption.
At one time in Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. In 2001, Fe was diagnosed for leukemia and since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Thus, the action for support.
In his Answer, Arnel admitted that he had a relationship with Fe
sometime in 1993, but it ended in 1998, long before Martins conception in 2000. He ended the same because Fe had one other secret lover by the name of Jun and she became obsessive.
Arnel also claimed that his signature and CTC in the
acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
Fe moved for a DNA paternity testing. Arnel opposed said motion
by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA affirmed.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
1) Can support be converted to a petition for recognition?
2) Can DNA paternity testing be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating the constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination?
HOLDING: Page 15 of 69 NO. On the first issue, the assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement.
NO. On the second issue, historically, it has mostly been in the
areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue.
Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his
argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated.
If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake
can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by
fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Page 16 of 69 CASE NO. 8: PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO G.R. No. 144656. May 9, 2002 PER CURIAM
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
GERRICO VALLEJO, Accused-Appellant.
An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available,
provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of July 10, 1999, 9-year old victim, DAISY
DIOLOLA, was last seen going to her tutor/neighbors house, AIMEE VALLEJO, the sister of accused-appellant GERRICO VALLEJO.
The victims mother, MA. NIDA DIOLOLA noticed that her daughter was not yet home at around 5:30 p.m., so she began looking for her until the early morning of the following day.
About 10:00 a.m. of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the compuerta of a certain Freddie Quinto.
Witnesses accounts placed the accused-appellant near the crime
scene coupled with his odd behavior during said encounters with them.
One Jessiemin Mataverde testified that she saw Daisy went away with the accused-appellant, and she saw him again at a store and noticed that both his shorts and shirt were wet.
Another witness, Charito Yepes, testified that she met accused-
appellant near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled, and that he did not even greet them, which was unusual. She also testified that accused-appellants shorts and shirt were wet, but his face and hair were not.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for
questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody. The bloodstained shirt and shorts were recovered from Vallejos house and were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.
Vallejo also confessed to Municipal Mayor Renato Abutan that he
killed the victim by strangling her, but claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. He even executed a handwritten confession inside his cell.
Blood samples (type O), buccal swabs and hair samples were taken from the accused-appellant and these were compared with the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy. The clothing of the victim and that of accused-appellant were also analyzed.
After trial, RTC-Branch 88 of Cavite City found accused-appellant
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced him to DEATH. Hence, this automatic review.
Page 17 of 69 ISSUES:
1) Is the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficient to secure the conviction of accused-appellant? 2) Are the confessions of the accused-appellant admissible in evidence?
HOLDING:
YES. On the first issue, an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more
often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator.
Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand
direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his
garments were not proven to have been that of the victim as the victims blood type was not determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by
Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellants and the victims clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type A.
He also questions the validity of the method by which his
bloodstained clothes were recovered. There is no showing, however, that he was coerced or forced into producing the garments; he voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police and becomes more convincing when considered together with his confessions.
The totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than
that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.
YES. On the second issue, accused-appellant challenges the
validity of the confessions he made. A careful perusal of the records of this case clearly shows that there was no violation of the accused- appellants constitutionally guaranteed rights. These confessions were made spontaneously and voluntarily. No one forced or coerced the accused-appellant into executing such confessions. CASE NO. 9:
Page 18 of 69 TORRALBA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 153699, August 22, 2005 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY TORRALBA, Petitioner,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Tape recording is admissible in evidence if a proper foundation has
been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording.
FACTS:
Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called Tug-
Ani ang Lungsod (Tell the People) which was aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. Four (4) criminal cases for libel were filed against him by Atty. Manuel Hontanosas, which were later consolidated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City.
Prosecution witness, Segundo Lim, one of the incorporators of the
Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc.(TMSI) testified that Torralba requested TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program, which was approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then its president. However, due to the incessant criticisms hurled by Torralba against former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector, TMSI ceased the sponsorship, which only lasted for a month.
Soon thereafter, Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the
minimum wage law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect. On December 17, 1993, Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in Torralbas radio program to explain their side, but the assault on TMSIs management persisted. This prompted Lim to ask his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim to record Torralbas radio program as contained in three (3) tape recordings.
Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear
petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim.
Despite Torralbas continuing objection to the admission of the
said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person who actually made the recordings, the trial court admitted the same. The tape recording dated April 11, 1994 marked as Exhibit D containing the statement, to wit:
These Hontanosas, Agapito Hontanosas and Castor
Hontanosas are collaborators during the war. In other words, they are traitors to the land of their birth. x x x The father of Manoling Hontanosas had treacherous blood.
was used to convict Torralba of one charge of libel for the
unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late CFI Judge Agapito Hontanosas, father of Atty. Hontanosas. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial courts decision with modification as to the penalty and award of damages. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Is a tape recording which was not authenticated by the person who actually recorded the same, be admissible in evidence?
Page 19 of 69 HOLDING:
NO. The Supreme Court held that:
In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that
before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:
1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking
testimony; 2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent; 3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording; 4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; 5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording; 6) identification of the speakers; and 7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.
These requisites were laid down precisely to address the
criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings.
In the case at bar, the proper foundation for the admissibility
of the tape recording was not adhered to because Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded Torralbas radio show on April 11, 1994 was not presented by the prosecution as a witness.
According to Justice Ricardo Francisco, Evidence of a message or
a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the identity of the speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his message or speech, or by the witness recognition of the voice of the speaker.
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on April 11, 1994. Lims bare assertion of being near the radio while his daughter was recording the radio broadcast is entirely different from actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the speaker. What further undermines his credibility is the fact that he had an ax to grind against Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was found guilty as charged by the court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the
testimony of Atty. Hontanosas in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence
against Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the CA due to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of libel.
Page 20 of 69 CASE NO. 10:
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994 PADILLA, J.
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ROMEO ZAMORA (RTC-Branch 94 of Quezon City) and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, Respondents.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to
challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, however, where it is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez was married to petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez.
On May 2, 1990, Rafael filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages on the grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of Teresita with Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
Among the exhibits offered by Rafael were three (3) cassette
tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons.
Teresita made her Objection thereto. But the trial court admitted all of Rafael's offered evidence. Teresitas motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA denied the petition, for two basic reasons: (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
From this adverse judgment, Teresita filed the present petition
for review before this Court.
ISSUE:
Is the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals?
HOLDING:
YES. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not
available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Page 21 of 69 In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
Clearly, respondents, RTC and CA failed to consider the
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. WHEREFORE, the subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
Page 22 of 69 CASE NO. 11:
RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 KAPUNAN, J.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA, Respondents.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms; and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
FACTS:
Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in
the amount of P610,000.00 against private respondent Ester S. Garcia before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
This case originated from a confrontation in Garcias office on
February 22, 1988, wherein the latter allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated Ramirez in a hostile and furious mood, and in a manner offensive to ones dignity and personality.
In support of her claim, Ramirez adduced in evidence a tape
recording of the private conversation.
As a result of Ramirez' recording of the event and alleging that
the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash (MTQ) the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, which was granted.
Hence, Garcia filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme
Court (SC), which referred the same to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA ruled that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the MTQ, which is correctible by certiorari. Ramirez filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), which was denied; hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Does Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation?
HOLDING:
YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 provides that: It shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
Page 23 of 69 private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
Moreover, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200.
Finally, the phrase "private communication" is broad enough to
include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally- charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Page 24 of 69 CASE NO. 12:
NAVARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999 MENDOZA, J.
FELIPE NAVARRO, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The Anti-Wiretapping Law does not prohibit the recording of a
communication which was not done privately.
FACTS:
On the night of February 4, 1990, prosecution witness Stanley
Jalbuena and the victim, Enrique Ike Lingan who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
Jalbuena took a picture of the scantily clad dancer as she
removed her brassieres. The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and threatened to kill him.
When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. They went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner Felipe Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and even asked them to join in, which they declined.
Meanwhile, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle; they were
met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.
Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena, pushed him to
the wall, and hurled angry remarks at him. At this point, Lingan intervened saying that they were only there to mediate. Navarro turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and instructed him to make an entry against Jalbuena and Lingan, which angered Lingan and challenged Navarro to a fist fight.
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena, telling him that he was a
living witness that it was Ike Lingan who challenged him first, then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature as his right hand was trembling so he simply wrote his name in print.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro
to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital where he died from his injuries.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on
tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City found petitioner Felipe Navarro
Page 25 of 69 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
ISSUE:
Is the tape admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping?
HOLDING:
YES. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the
conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. This is further corroborated by the tape recording.
The Anti-Wiretapping Law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting,
or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. In the
instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there
was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it. Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued a medical certificate, and her testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.
Page 26 of 69 CASE NO. 13:
PEOPLE vs. CALICA
G.R. No. 139178, April 14, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
FLORENCIO CALICA, Appellant.
The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused.
FACTS:
Spouses Igmedio and Dominga Pispis resided at Barangay Malabuan,
Makilala, Cotabato with their two daughters, one of whom was Dolores. The Pispis family lived in a hut that stood on a rubber plantation.
At around 1:00 a.m. of December 23, 1986, Dominga was awakened by
a call at the door. She peeped through the unfinished portion of the wall of their house and saw their neighbor, Rolando Gonzales, his hands tied at the back, and an armed man positioned in front of their door.
Two more men, similarly armed, stood beside the house, firearms pointed towards it, while still two others were sitting on a carabao sled nearby. The armed men wore bonnets over their heads.
The armed men took her husband away. Dominga recognized one of the men as the appellant, Florencio Calica, who also happened to be her husbands second cousin and a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) of Bato, because his bonnet was loosened and it was a moonlit night.
In the meantime, Lorena Valdez was with her family at their house in Barangay Villaflores, Makilala, Cotabato her husband Luis Valdez, Jr., her brother Joseph Montilla, and her young children. Suddenly, armed men wearing masks came and took her husband and her brother away.
The next day, the lifeless and hogtied bodies of Igmedio Pispis, Rolando Gonzales, Luis Valdez, Jr., Joseph Montilla, and Carlito Rolluda were found near a quarry in Malabuan.
In his defense, apellant Calica presented his neighbor Elpidio
Asidre and his brother-in-law Rudy Llanado as witnesses. They both testified that apellant Calica was with them from 8:00 a.m. of December 22, 1986 until 3:00 p.m. the following day, helping in the preparations for the death anniversary of Asidres mother, and in the drinking spree which followed suit. Asidre resided at Barangay Bato, Makilala, Cotabato, which was about ten (10) kilometers away, or a three-to-four hour hike to Barangay Malabuan, as the road was very difficult and one has to pass two (2) mountains to get there. Furthermore, he has no motive to kill the victim especially that the latter is his second degree cousin.
Agustin Alonzo and Elias Palog, both members of the CHDF
testified that they personally knew apellant. That in the morning of December 22, 1986, Commander Pedro Lopez arranged a meeting to pick up some people who are suspected members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), including Pispis who was a member of the Hukbalahap. They also testified that Calica was not among the group who was with Lopez. This
Page 27 of 69 was also the gist of the testimony of Alfredo Aca from whom the armed men asked for directions to the house of Pispis.
The trial court convicted Calica for the crime of murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to prove that the appellant was one of those who abducted Igmedio Pispis from his house on December 23, 1986, and killed him shortly thereafter?
HOLDING:
NO. In criminal prosecution, accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The probative weight of an in-court identification is largely
dependent upon an out-of-court identification. To resolve the admissibility and probative weight of an out-of-court identification of suspects, the totality of the following factors must be considered, viz.: 1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness degree of attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The totality of circumstances test has been designed precisely to
assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process in regard to out-of-court identification and to prevent the contamination of the integrity of an in-court identification. A suspect may be positively identified by his face, physical attributes, voice, mannerisms and body movements. In several cases, the Court has ruled that the suspect may be identified by the illumination by starlight and by the light of the moon.
Proof of the crime charged and the identity of the
suspect/suspects may consist of direct evidence and/or circumstantial evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that Igmedio was
abducted by five armed men wearing bonnets over their heads at about 1:00 a.m. in front of his house on December 23, 1986. Even the appellant presented evidence that the perpetrators were Pedro Lopez, the Commander of the CHDF, and his men who suspected that Igmedio was a member of the NPA.
However, we find the identification of the appellant as one of
the abductors and killers of the victim dubious and unconvincing. Consequently, we acquit the appellant of the crime charged.
It is inconceivable how Dominga could have seen the appellants
face when only his eyes and mouth were visible through the bonnet he wore over his head. Even if the bonnet of the appellant was "loose,"
Page 28 of 69 his face could not have been exposed, unless he was not wearing it, or it was rolled up and merely covered his head.
Moreover, if Dominga could not identify her husband in broad
daylight from the pictures shown to her because of her blurred vision, we find it hard to believe that she was able to recognize the appellant at night with his bonnet on, even if there was moonlight.
Equally unreliable is the testimony of Dolores that she saw the
face of the appellant because his bonnet was loosened as she watched from inside their hut, looking out from the unfinished portion of the wall. In contradiction, Dominga testified that her two children were asleep and they were not awakened by the commotion.
Page 29 of 69 CASE NO. 14:
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARCOS
G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004 CARPIO, J.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO MARCOS, Respondents.
The absence of the original copy of the documentary evidence casts
suspicion on the existence of said document considering the banks fiduciary duty to keep efficiently a record of its transactions with its depositors.
FACTS:
On two occasions in 1982, private respondent Leonilo Marcos made
two (2) time deposits with petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) in the amount of P664,897.67 and P764,897.67, respectively, earning interests at 17% per annum. PBC issued an official receipt for the first time deposit and a letter-certification by Branch Manager Florencio Pagsaligan for the second one.
In 1983, Marcos wanted to withdraw his time deposits and the
accumulated interests to buy materials for his construction business L.A. Marcos Construction Company. However, the bank through Pagsaligan persuaded him to keep his time deposits intact and instead to open several domestic letters of credit (LOC).
Marcos was then required to give a marginal deposit of 30% of the
total amount of the LOC and his time deposits would secure the remaining 70% by way of a Deed of Assignment in favor of the bank. Since Marcos trusted PBC and Pagsaligan, he signed blank printed forms of the application for the domestic LOC, trust receipt agreements (TRAs), and promissory notes (PNs).
Marcos executed three (3) TRAs totaling P851,250; therefore, his
obligation to PBC was only P595,875 representing 70% of the LOC. He argued that if only PBC applied his time deposits and the accumulated interests to his remaining obligation, he would have paid completely his debt.
Thereafter, PBC filed a complaint for violation of P.D. No. 115
or the Trust Receipts Law against him. PBC further alleged that Marcos obtained another loan from them in the amount of P500,000 with interest at 25% per annum covered by PN No. 20-979-83 dated October 24, 1983, which Marcos denied having contracted. Hence, in 1989, Marcos filed with the trial court a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against PBC.
During the trial, three hearing dates were postponed on account
of PBCs failure to produce its witness, Pagsaligan. On these scheduled hearings, PBC also failed to present other evidence such as when ordered by the trial court to produce the original copies of the loan application and PN No. 20-979-83, PBC instead presented only the machine copies of the duplicate of these documents.
The trial court also noted some discrepancies such as:
1) Marcos signature on the two documents are merely initials unlike
in the other documents submitted by PBC;
Page 30 of 69 2) It is highly unnatural for PBC to only have duplicate copies of the two documents in its custody; 3) The address of Marcos in the documents is different from the place of residence as stated by Marcos in the other documents annexed by PBC in its Answer; 4) Pagsaligan made it appear that a check for the loan proceeds of P470,588 less bank charges was issued to Marcos but the checks payee was one ATTY. LEONILO MARCOS and, as the trial court noted, Marcos is not a lawyer; and 5) Pagsaligan was not sure what branch of the bank issued the check for the loan proceeds.
Moreover, PBC did not have a ledger of the accounts of Marcos or
of his various transactions with the bank and it did not issue a certificate of time deposit to Marcos. Due to these considerations, the trial court found in favor of Marcos.
The Court of Appeals sustained the factual findings of the trial
court in ruling that PN No. 20-979-83 is void. There is no evidence of a bank ledger or computation of interest of the loan. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Can mere photocopies be given evidentiary value, when there is no
explanation as to why the original documents cannot be had?
HOLDING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled in this wise:
The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree
of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. As the banks depositor, Marcos had the right to expect that the bank was accurately recording his transactions with it. Upon the maturity of his time deposits, Marcos also had the right to withdraw the amount due him after the bank had correctly debited his outstanding obligations from his time deposits.
PBC failed to produce the best evidence which is the original
copies of the loan application and promissory note. The Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. Absent a clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.
What PBC presented were merely the machine copies of the
duplicate of the loan application and promissory note. No explanation was ever offered by the bank for its inability to produce the original copies of the documentary evidence. The bank also did not comply with the orders of the trial court to submit the originals.
The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best
evidence is the prevention of fraud. The absence of the original of the documentary evidence casts suspicion on the existence of PN No. 20-979-83 considering the banks fiduciary duty to keep efficiently a record of its transactions with its depositors. Moreover, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court bolster the conclusion that PN No. 20-979-83 is bogus.
Page 31 of 69 CASE NO. 15:
SPOUSES DIOSO vs. SPOUSES CARDEO
G.R. No. 150155, September 1, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.
SPOUSES RAMON and FELICISIMA DIOSO, Petitioners,
SPOUSES TOMAS and LEONORA CARDEO, Respondents.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.
FACTS:
The subject property, Lot 248-A with a total area of 222 square meters, is located along F. Gomez St., Sta. Rosa, Laguna. It was originally owned by Magno Eraa, the father of petitioner Felicisima Dioso, respondent Leonora Cardeo, Natividad, Julieta, and Encarnacion Javel.
It was later on partitioned into two, whereby the outer portion
became the property of respondent spouses Tomas and Leonora Cardeo where they built their house in 1972. Whie, the interior portion became the property of Encarnacion (deceased) who sold it to Felicidad Legaspi who, in turn, sold the same to petitioner spouses Ramon and Felicisima Dioso.
Petitioners wanted to build their new house on their interior
portion and demanded from respondents, a right of way under the Pinanumpaang Salaysay ng Paghahati executed between Leonora and Encarnacion on May 29, 1977.
Respondents refused, hence, petitioners filed with the RTC of San
Pedro, Laguna, a complaint for specific performance and/or easement of right of way with damages.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the genuineness
and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, alleging that it was falsified.
According to them, Leonora and Encarnacion could not have claimed
co-ownership over Lot 248-A as early as 1977, because it was only on August 27, 1992 that the other siblings waived or renounced their shares over the said property.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, noting that
the petitioners presented only a photocopy or machine copy of the purported document and they were not willing to pay the indemnity for the easement to which the respondents are entitled to.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial courts decision.
The petitioners witness, Veneranda Legaspi, merely testified that she did not know why only a photocopy of the said document was given to her by her mother, Felicidad Legaspi, from whom the petitioners acquired the interior one-half portion of Lot 248-A.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the CA, a motion for
reconsideration/new trial based on newly discovered evidence thereby submitting:
Page 32 of 69 1) Tax Declaration No. 51637 for the year 1992 covering Lot 248-A in the name of respondent Leonora Cardeo where reference to the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was annotated at the dorsal portion thereof; 2) A photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, certified by the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna as having been verified with the original document kept by Encarnacion Javel; It likewise, certified that the Pinanumpaang Salaysay had been presented to the Office in connection with the issuance of respondent Leonora Cardeos Tax Declaration Nos. 51637 and 51638 covering Lot 248-A; and 3) Affidavit of Magtanggol Yldeso, one of the witnesses to the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, attesting to the circumstances surrounding its execution and identifying the signatures appearing thereon
However, this motion was denied. The CA reasoned that the
documents proffered by the petitioners, i.e., Tax Declaration No. 51637, Yldesos affidavit and the Municipal Assessors certification, could not be considered as newly discovered evidence. Had the petitioners exercised due diligence in securing these documents, they could have easily been made available at the time of the filing of the complaint or even before the case was elevated to it. Hence, the petitioners now seek relief from this Court.
ISSUE:
Were the petitioners able to establish the existence of
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay by secondary evidence, despite the non- admission of the copy certified by the municipal assessor?
HOLDING:
YES. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, indeed, provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as Section 5 thereof further states that [W]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or
unavailability of the original document is thus warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: 1) execution or existence of the original; 2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and 3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent
loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.
Admittedly, in this case, the original document of
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was not presented during trial. However, the petitioners presented a photocopy thereof, as well as testimonial evidence to prove its due execution and the loss or unavailability of
Page 33 of 69 the original document. Specifically, the existence and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was established by Yldeso, one of the petitioners witnesses, who testified that he was one of the witnesses to the execution thereof and that his signature appears thereon.
Moreover, the unavailability of the original document was
established by Veneranda, daughter of Felicidad Legaspi, who bought Encarnacion Eraas portion of Lot 248-A and eventually sold it to the petitioners. She testified that they exerted efforts to locate the original Pinanumpaang Salaysay, to no avail.
Further, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 13, 1984,
executed between Encarnacion Eraa Javel and Felicidad Eraa Legaspi, covering the formers portion of Lot 248-A, Annex B for the petitioners and admitted in evidence by the trial court, expressly mentioned the Pinanumpaang Salaysay.
Clearly then, since there was proof of the due execution of
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, and that, despite earnest efforts on their part, the petitioners could not produce the original thereof, the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said document was justified. Furthermore, contrary to the trial courts findings, the petitioners had sufficiently laid down the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.
The rule on the admission of secondary evidence provides that the
contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of the witnesses, in the order stated. The trial court and the CA, therefore, erred in denying the admission of a photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, when the same may be properly considered as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof. Interestingly, except for the perfunctory denial of the due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay contained in their answer, the respondents never categorically denied the existence or the presence of their signatures thereon when they took the witness stand. In fact, when the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration/new trial with the CA, submitting therewith a copy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, certified by the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Rosa as a faithful reproduction of the original document kept by Encarnacion Javel, the respondents did not refute the same. Even in their comment and memorandum filed with this Court, the respondents did not categorically deny the existence and execution of the said document. To the Courts mind, this is an indication of the genuineness of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay.
Page 34 of 69 CASE NO. 16:
REPUBLIC vs. MASONGSONG
G.R. No. 162846, September 22, 2005 CALLEJO, SR., J.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
JOSE AND JUANITO MASONGSONG y LUBIS, Respondents.
The offeror is not obliged to prove the loss or destruction of the
original document beyond all possibility, as it is enough to prove a reasonable probability of such loss.
FACTS:
The late Serapio Lubis is allegedly the owner of a parcel of land
(6,146.85 sq. m.) denominated as Lot No. 8500 located in Batangas. Cadastral Decre No. 639024 was purportedly issued in his name on June 21, 1937.
Serapio died on December 12, 1940, he was succeeded by his
daughters, Angela and Gregoria. Gregoria died on April 26, 1977, leaving behind two (2) daughters, namely, Corazon and Milagros. Subsequently, on October 29, 1989, Angela died; and she was succeeded by her six (6) children: Alberto, Nicanor, Jose, Juanito, Arsenia, and Lourdes.
The heirs of Serapio and their successors-in-interest decided to
adjudicate among themselves said property. They caused the re-survey of the said property and a survey plan was prepared by geodetic engineer, Gregorio Pesigan. A deed of extrajudicial settlement of intestate estate was made on December 31, 1999.
At this juncture they found out that then Bureau of Lands (now LRA) has no existing or salvaged records of the above-mentioned Cadastral Decree in the name of Serapio Lubis and they were issued a Certificate to this effect.
On December 28, 2001, brothers Jose and Juanito Masongsong,
children of the late Angela Lubis filed a petition before the RTC of Lipa City to nullify Cadastral Decree No. 639024 in the name of their grandfather and to issue a new Decree in their name.
The trial court gave due course to said petition and set it for hearing on February 4, 2002. All interested persons may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted. A copy of the petition and the Order dated January 4, 2002 were served upon the Register of Deeds, the City Prosecutor, and posted in three (3) conspicuous places, namely, at the Lipa public market, Lipa City Hall and at Brgy. Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas.
The OSG did not file its opposition. During the hearing, the petitioners submitted the following evidence in support of their claim:
1) Technical description of the land as certified by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands (August 13, 1998); 2) Tax declarations covering the property in the name of Serapio Lubis, from 1968 to 1994; 3) Certification from the LRA dated May 29, 1998, stating that after due verification of the record book of cadastral lots in its custody, it was found that Decree No. 639024 was issued on June
Page 35 of 69 21, 1937 covering Lot No. 8500 of the Cadastral Survey of Lipa and Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, based on a decision in Cad. Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296; 4) Certification by the Register of Deeds of Batangas stating that there was no existing or salvaged record of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 8500; 5) Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that per its records, Lot No. 8500 located in Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, is not covered by any kind of public land application or patent; and 6) Certified true copy of page 88, Cadastral Decree Book, Cadastral Decree Section, LRC, showing that Decree No. 639024 covering Lot No. 8500 based on the decision, Cadastral Case No. 79-1 was issued on June 21, 1937.
On May 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision granting the petition. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA, arguing that the petitioners failed to adduce evidence of the purported cadastral decree issued in favour of their predecessor-in-interest and that no notice was served upon the adjoining lot owners. On March 15, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC and dismissing the appeal of the OSG. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Is the failure of the petitioners in this case to present in
evidence the assailed cadastral decree or at least a copy of the decision granting said decree be excused on the mere presumption that the same has been lost or destroyed during World War II?
HOLDING:
NO. The respondents, as the petitioners in the RTC, were burdened
to prove the following: that the court had rendered the decision in LRC Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296 covering Lot 8500 in favor of Serapio Lubis, and that as such, Decree No. 639024 was issued on June 21, 1937 in favor of Serapio Lubis.
The respondents were burdened to adduce in evidence the original,
or even a certified copy directing the issuance of a decree to prove its contents. As provided for in Section 3 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, secondary evidence may be adduced in such a case when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror.
Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Rule states that: When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The offeror is not obliged to prove the loss or destruction of
the original document beyond all possibility, as it is enough to prove a reasonable probability of such loss. This may be done by a bona fide and diligent search, fruitlessly made in places where it is likely to be found.
The respondents failed to adduce evidence that the decision of
the court and the decree were in favor of Serapio Lubis, and failed to
Page 36 of 69 present a certified copy of the LRA decision in LRC Case No. 24. They even failed to adduce in evidence the original or certified true copy of the courts decision in favor of Serapio Lubis. They could have secured a copy of the decision from the court or from the LRA, but failed to do so. There is even no showing that the court records in LRC Case No. 24 and the copy of the decision transmitted to the Land Registration Commission (now the LRA) were missing, lost or destroyed.
Additionally, the Court notes that the respondents failed to
adduce proof that from 1937 until 1968, Serapio Lubis, or after his death, his heirs, ever declared the property for taxation purposes under his/their names and paid the realty taxes therefor. There is even no evidence that Serapio, or his heirs after his death, ever took possession of the property from 1937. Inexplicably, it was only in 1968, long after Serapios death, that the property was declared for taxation purposes under his name. Moreover, Jose Masongsong took possession and cultivated the property only in 1970.
Page 37 of 69 CASE NO. 17:
NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 146267, February 17, 2003 QUISUMBING, J.
NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES
and/or CATHY NG, Petitioners,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)
and VIRGINIA M. PUBLICO, Respondents.
FACTS:
On February 8, 1995, petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia
Publico as a sewer. Under the terms and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but required to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the average, she earned P185.00 daily.
At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be
allowed to leave the work place early, as she was not feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was refused but nonetheless, Publico went home. The following day, Publico called up her employer and notified management that she was still recovering from her ailment.
On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. However, the security
guard prevented her from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on managements order. It was only when Publico declared that she would just complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7 that the guard let her in.
Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner,
Stephen Ng. She was instead asked to come back the following day. It was when she found out that she was dismissed due to her refusal to render overtime service. Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Petitioner Corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng.
Before the Labor Arbiter (LA), petitioners alleged that Publico
did not report for work on May 7, 1997 because her husband did not allow her to work at night. As night work is a must in their line of business, particularly when there are rush orders, petitioners claimed that given Publicos failure to render overtime work, they were left with no other recourse but to fire her.
The LA held Publicos dismissal to be illegal and ordered
respondents to reinstate her to her former position with full backwages from the date her salary was withheld until she is actually reinstated. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA in toto.
Petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil
action of certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals (CA). The appellate court dismissed the petition outright. because there was non-compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition was merely accompanied by a certified xerox copy of the assailed NLRC decision, instead of a certified true copy thereof as required by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioners failed to attach the other pleadings and documents pertinent and material to their petition, such as the parties position papers,
Page 38 of 69 their evidence and the motion for reconsideration in contravention of the said rule.
The petitioners motion for reconsideration has been denied,
hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Can a special civil action for certiorari before the CA be
dismissed based on purely technical grounds, i.e., that the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a mere photocopy of the original decision?
HOLDING:
NO. Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires that the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 3-96, a certified true
copy is such other copy furnished to a party at his instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified. It must further comply with all the regulations therefor of the issuing entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and not a mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an annex to the petition or other initiatory pleading.
Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the
disputed document although stamped as certified true copy is not an authenticated original of such certified true copy, but only a xerox copy thereof. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright pursuant to paragraph 5 of the same Administrative Circular, which provides: That it shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the documents to verify and ensure compliance with all the requirements therefor. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such annexes and the dismissal of the case. Subsequent compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless the court is fully satisfied that the non-compliance was not in any way attributable to the party, despite due diligence on his part, and that there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make such other disposition as it may deem just and equitable.
This Court is not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for
compelling reasons, we have disregarded similar procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice made. However, petitioners here have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule. Petitioners are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Page 39 of 69 CASE NO. 18:
DE VERA, ET AL. vs. SPOUSES AGUILAR
G.R. No. 83377, February 9, 1993 CAMPOS, JR., J.
BASILIO, LUIS and FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA
represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., Petitioners,
SPOUSES MARIANO and LEONA AGUILAR, Respondents.
Secondary evidence is admissible if there is proof of its former
existence, its due execution, its actual loss or destruction, and the contents thereof.
FACTS:
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all
surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960.
In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of
land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621.
This disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and
Felipe to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Bordador and in turn Marcosa sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free
patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.
On September 1, 1980, petitioners claimed that as children of
Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof since the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959, which respondents denied.
Hence, petitioners falsification case against the respondents,
which was dismissed. Again in 1981, they filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by OCT No. P-1356(M).
The trial court ruled in petitioners favor. It admitted, over
the objection of the respondents, Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial courts decision,
hence, this petition.
Page 40 of 69 ISSUE:
Had the petitioners satisfactorily proven the loss of the
original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same?
HOLDING:
NO. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents
were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.
A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely
ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel
of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document the same may be
established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.
We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have
sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public.
After the due execution of the document has been established, it
must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for
before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non- production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This
Page 41 of 69 petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question, a purported xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B, has not been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original of the document in question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible.
Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the
effect that he did not have a copy of the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street, Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 establish the loss or destruction of the original document in question. What was lost or destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the duplicate original copies on file with him.
Nor did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the
Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax declaration No. 15412 and of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the effect that his office had no copy of the document in question because the notary public might not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites, prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original copies of the document in question.
Page 42 of 69 CASE NO. 19:
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. & TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126006, January 29, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC., and ELIAS Q. TAN, Petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORP., Respondents.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the
co-petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each.
As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted
to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. Hence, respondent Bank was constrained to file a complaint seeking payment of the specified sum of money with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.
In its answer, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring
indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity and for his own use and benefit; thus, it interposed a cross-claim against petitioner Tan.
For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the
loans from the respondent Bank in his personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-over) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same.
According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee
required him to affix two signatures on every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such that the petitioner Foundation was included as party thereto.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, and ordered defendants Tan and Lapulapu Foundation to pay jointly and solidarily the principal obligation inclusive of interests, charges, and penalties as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses plus costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment
of the court a quo by deleting the award of attorneys fees. The appellate court applied the parol evidence rule in rejecting petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank. It likewise applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity in holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable. Hence, this petition.
Page 43 of 69 ISSUE:
Are the petitioners Tan and Lapulapu Foundation jointly and
solidarily liable for the obligation to respondent Bank?
HOLDING:
YES. This Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner
Tans allegation that he was made to sign blank loan documents and that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was superimposed by the respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. It is hard to believe that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature could have been so careless as to sign blank loan documents.
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly
showed upon their faces that they are the obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal capacity. Moreover, the application for credit accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner Foundation. These documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this
Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in- interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.
Page 44 of 69 CASE NO. 20:
MADRIGAL & MALLARI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142944, April 15, 2005 GARCIA, J.
EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI, Petitioners,
COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSE MALLARI, Respondents.
Even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be
resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the parties.
FACTS:
Private respondent Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina are the owners of a 340-square meter residential lot with a 2-storey residential house erected thereon, situated at Olongapo City.
They have ten (10) children, five (5) of whom are staying with them in the same house, while the other five (5) are either residing abroad or elsewhere in the Philippines. One of said children is petitioner Virgilio Mallari who is residing with his own family in San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
In need of money for his wifes planned travel to the United
States, Jose thought of mortgaging the above property with a bank. However, his son Virgilio convinced him to instead assign to him a portion of the same property, with the following assurances:
1) that his father could continue in occupancy of the property;
2) that he will allow his sister Elizabeth who operates a store thereat to continue with the same; 3) that he will occupy one of the rooms in the house in case he goes to Olongapo City on vacation; 4) that he will renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she comes back from the States; 5) that he will not dispose of the property without his fathers consent; and 6) that his father could redeem the said property any time he acquires money.
On October 22, 1987, Jose and Fermina executed a document
denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby the spouses appeared to have conveyed to their son Virgilio, a one-storey residential house standing on a 135-square meter lot for a consideration of P50,000.00 although the property easily commands much more at that time.
However, Virgilio sold the same property for the same amount to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallaris in the area through a document entitled Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan dated June 25, 1988.
On September 7, 1988, Madrigal demanded for Jose to vacate the
subject property. It was then that Jose came to know for the first time of the sale of his property by his son Virgilio in favor of Madrigal. Hence, Jose filed a complaint for annulment, redemption and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against his son and Madrigal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City.
Page 45 of 69 The RTC rendered judgment for plaintiff Jose Mallari by ordering defendant Edenbert Madrigal to allow the former to redeem the subject property based on the same amount it was sold to him by his co- defendant Virgilio Mallari, and for the two (2) defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Jose Mallari moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and the cost of suit. This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied; hence, petitioners present recourse.
ISSUE:
Can the questioned deed of sale be properly construed as an
equitable mortgage?
HOLDING:
YES. Evidence clearly shows that there was indeed no intent to
sell the subject property. Rather, what transpired between the parties, who were father and son, was only a mortgage involving P50,000.00 over a portion of a lot with a house in Olongapo City. Circumstances surrounding the transaction between respondent Jose Mallari and petitioner Virgilio Mallari pointed only to one thing, that respondent was in need of money to finance the US trip of his wife and he planned to mortgage the subject property with a bank but he was prevailed by his son, herein petitioner, not to proceed with his plan and he gave a tempting offer to his father which the latter cannot refuse. Moreover, the consideration appearing in the Deed of Sale is grossly inadequate considering the location of the property, the area and the fact that it was a two-storey building or house.
We cannot view the Deed of Absolute Sale in question in isolation
of the circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilios parents, more so in the light of his fathers disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state.
In Lustan vs. CA, this Court ruled that [E]ven when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.
In Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, we wrote: [I]t is
a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
Page 46 of 69 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and 11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, we have made a close hard look
into this case and found none of the foregoing exceptions as obtaining herein to warrant our departure from the established norm. Nor are we inclined to disturb the findings of the courts a quo that petitioner Edenbert Madrigal is not buyer in good faith.
Page 47 of 69 CASE NO 21:
INCIONG, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996 ROMERO, J.
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
The rule on parol evidence does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.
FACTS:
On February 3, 1983, petitioner Baldomero Inciong, Jr., Rene
Naybe, and Gregorio Pantanosas signed a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch.
The promissory note became due on May 5, 1983 and despite
demands, the obigors have not paid their obligation. Consequently, on January 24, 1986, private respondent filed a complaint for collection against the three of them.
The complaint was initially dismissed for failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute the case. However, it was reconsidered and the sheriff was able to served summons upon petitioner. Pantanosas was dropped as a defendant, while Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia.
In his answer, petitioner alleged that his friend, Rudy Campos, a
partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of private respondent convinced him to sign as co-maker in the loan of Naybe to the extent of P5,000.00, in order to purchase a chainsaw as contribution in the venture. That he signed five (5) copies of blank promissory note and he indicated on one (1) copy that he bounds himself only for the amount of P5,000.00.
In the assailed decision of the lower court, it noted that the
typewritten figure "P50,000-" clearly appears directly below the admitted signature of the petitioner in the promissory note. Hence, the latter's uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability cannot prevail over the presumed regularity and fairness of the transaction. It also noted that petitioner was a holder of a Bachelor of Laws degree and a labor consultant who was supposed to take due care of his concerns, and that, on the witness stand, Pio Tio denied having participated in the alleged business venture. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision and it likewise denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review for failure of petitioner to comply with the Rules. Both his first and second motion for reconsideration was denied. Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a motion for clarification. Hence, the present petition was given due course.
ISSUE:
Is the affidavit of Pontanosas executed after the rendition of
judgment of the lower court, which supports petitioners allegation of fraud and misrepresentation tenable?
Page 48 of 69 HOLDING:
NO. The petitioner's contentions in the instant petition are
clearly factual. Petitioner is to be reminded of the basic rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. Having lost the chance to fully ventilate his factual claims below, petitioner may no longer be accorded the same opportunity in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court below. Had he presented Judge Pantanosas' affidavit before the lower court, it would have strengthened his claim that the promissory note did not reflect the correct amount of the loan.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the
promissory note is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law, but a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of attesting witnesses, parol evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory note.
What is required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is
in fact founded on long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them. Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the
right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Page 49 of 69 CASE NO. 22:
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121506, October 30, 1996
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, RTC-BRANCH 9 OF CEBU CITY,
MELBA LIMBACO, LINDA and RAMON LOGARTA, Respondents.
Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the
written contract, such evidence is admissible, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement.
FACTS:
In 1949, officers of the National Airport Corporation (NAC)
offered to purchase the various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport for purposes of its expansion; otherwise, they will be expropriated by the government.
Among such landowners is Inez Ouano, the grandmother of private
respondent Melba Limbaco. Inez signed a Deed of Sale conveying her property, because of the promise that the land will be returned to her when it is no longer in use.
Said deed, however, does not contain any provision regarding Inez right to repurchase the properties. Nor does she have any rider such as the one given to Eufemio Vercide.
Nonetheless, during her lifetime, Inez used to remind Melba, who
was living with her, about the assurance by the NAC officials that the properties will be returned and that the latter can recover the land herself should Inez die before the proper time arises.
Then President Aquino ordered that the airport be transferred to
Mactan such that the other landowners were able to recover their properties. The appellees tried to repurchase the properties, but it was denied by Capt. Antonio Oppus, the manager of appellant Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) because the deed of sale covering Inez properties does not contain any condition relating to the right to repurchase, thus, they had become the absolute properties of the NAC.
Private respondents thereafter filed a case for reconveyance with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, which ruled in their favor. On appeal to the CA, the same was affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the verbal agreement allowing Inez Ouano and her successors-
in-interest to repurchase the lots in question absent any rider in the deed of sale admissible in evidence?
HOLDING:
YES. The CAs finding that there was an agreement allowing the right of repurchase was established after admitting the parol evidence presented by private respondents. We reject petitioners argument that
Page 50 of 69 in the absence of any rider providing for such right of repurchase, no evidence, whatsoever can be received to establish that such a right indeed exists. Both the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano can be sufficiently established by parol evidence.
We see no reason, however, why Inez should be considered as not
similarly situated as the owners of these other lots. All these lots surround the Lahug Airport and were acquired by the government for the proposed expansion of the airport. The appellee has not presented any evidence to show that Inez lots were acquired for a different purpose or under different conditions. Why then should the sale of such lots be singled out as not subject to the right to repurchase when a good number of the lots around them were already repurchased by their original owners?
In the case at bench, the fact which private respondents seek to
establish by parol evidence consist of the agreement or representation made by NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute the deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase should the government no longer need the property. Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract though it may relate to the same subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of existing evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity.
More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when
private respondents introduced evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA, SALVADOR, ISIDRO, CARMELITA, DAVID, AMPARO, ERLINDA and ALEJANDRA LOZA, Respondents.
The parol evidence rule is not applicable where the controversy is
between one of the parties to the document and third persons.
FACTS:
Petitioner Victoria Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry
with damages against the private respondents, pertaining to lots A and B on the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. This complaint was dismissed. Pending appeal before then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, petitioner instituted another action for recovery and possession; thus, these two (2) cases were tried jointly.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, dismissing the two
cases and declaring defendants except Salvador Anona and Jose Lozada as owners and lawful possessors of the land in question together with all the improvements thereon. The Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of the cases. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting and giving credence to the testimony of the vendor, Leoncia Lasangue regarding the sale of the disputed lot where such testimony is contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner.
Petitioner testified that she bought the land now subject of this litigation from Leoncia as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "A") and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7912. She took possession of the same in 1951 through her tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta Losarita and Simeon Guinta, who shared one-half of the produce of the riceland with her.
Simeon Guinta corroborated petitioners testimony by stating that
he worked on the subject lot since 1954 when its former tenant, Roberto Lazarita (now deceased) left the land. On June 14, 1958, while Simeon was plowing Lot A preparatory to rice planting, private respondents entered the land and forced him to stop his work. They were carrying unsheathed bolos, which made him afraid so he left and reported the matter to petitioner. Again, on June 24, 1958, private respondents entered Lot B, and cut the 620 bamboo poles growing thereof. By June 1959, private respondents grabbed the whole parcel of containing six (6) hectares to the damage and prejudice of petitioner.
Private respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the land
which petitioner bought from Leoncia in 1950 as evidenced by Exhibit A, is different from the land now subject of this action.
On April 6, 1931, their predecessor-in-interest, Hugo Loza
purchased a 53,327-square meter parcel of land from Victorina Limor as evidenced by a Venta Definitiva (Exhibit 3). On March 17, 1941, Hugo again bought from Emeterio Lasangue a 4-hectare parcel of land
Page 52 of 69 adjoining the land he had earlier bought from Victoria, and which sale was duly evidenced by a public instrument (Exhibit 2).
These two (2) parcels of land were consolidated and designated,
during the cadastral survey of Lambunao, Iloilo in 1959 as Lot No. 5456; while the remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza.
Private respondents claimed that the lot bought by plaintiff from
Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by Exhibit A, is situated south of the land now subject of this action and designated as Lot No. 5522, in the name of Victoria Lechugas. This fact was testified to by Leoncia Lasangue herself.
ISSUE:
Is the testimony of the vendor Leoncia Lasangue that what she
sold to petitioner Victoria Lechugas is Lot No. 5522 containing six (6) hectares and not Lot 5456 which is subject of this litigation, admissible?
HOLDING:
YES. As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court,
the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is
misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.
From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that
Lasangue did not intend to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The undisputed fact is that the respondents have timely questioned the validity of the instrument and have proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does not reflect the true intention of the vendor.
Page 53 of 69 CASE NO. 24:
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 135481, October 23, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.
LIGAYA S. SANTOS, Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE GERIATRICS FOUNDATION, INC., Respondents.
The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses.
FACTS:
In 1969, private respondent Philippine Geriatrics Foundation,
Inc. (PGFI) occupied the ground floor of the Geriatrics Center on Lions Road, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas Street, Ermita, Manila, upon the invitation of the president of the Philippine Federation of Medical Practitioners.
In 1971, PGFI built a gymnasium adjacent to said building, which
was later on converted into a canteen and leased to one Victor Jimenez. Jimenez later on vacated the space after he failed to pay rentals therefor.
In 1989, petitioner Ligaya Santos occupied the canteen by virtue
of a letter-contract executed between her and Vicente Pulido, president of PGFI.
Meanwhile, the City Mayor of Manila requested PGFI to vacate its
office at the Geriatrics Center. It agreed and planned to transfer to the canteen.
On December 27, 1993, PGFI asked petitioner to vacate said space
in a letter advising the latter of the termination of the lease contract, however, petitioner refused.
In the meantime, the city government of Manila forcibly ejected
PGFI from the Geriatrics Center on January 7, 1995. On October 11, 1995, PGFI through counsel, sent another demand letter to petitioner asking her to pay rentals in arrears and to vacate the canteen space within ten days of receipt of the letter. Still, petitioner refused.
Thereafter, PGFI filed an ejectment case against petitioner with
a prayer for the payment of rentals in arrears for the period September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 totaling P36,750.00.
The parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the premises on the ground of non-payment of rentals.
The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint on
the ground that PGFI failed to establish the existence of a lease contract. PGFI claimed that the contract had been lost when it was forcibly ejected from the Geriatrics Center.
To prove the existence of the contract, PGFI presented affidavits
of its trustees and officers and presented to the trial court an unsigned photocopy of the same. However, the trial court refused to admit the photocopy as secondary evidence. Consequently, the MeTC
Page 54 of 69 ruled that there is no evidence that would warrant ejectment of petitioner from the subject premises.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision.
PGFI filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), and a subsequent motion to treat said MR as a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Since, PGFI found its copy of the lease contract signed by petitioner and Pulido, as well as by its other trustees. PGFI presented said contract to the RTC, which rejected it as forgotten evidence.
PGFI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
reversed the ruling of the RTC, treating the unsigned copy of the lease contract that was presented before the trial court qualified as secondary evidence. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Is the unsigned copy of the alleged letter-contract of lease
executed between petitioner Santos and PGFI, admissible as secondary evidence?
HOLDING:
YES. Admittedly, the original copy of the contract was not
presented during trial, so PGFI as plaintiff therein resorted to presentation of secondary evidence. It presented the disputed unsigned copy of the contract as well as affidavits of persons who saw the contract and signed thereon representing PGFI.
Before the contents of an original document may be proved by
secondary evidence, there must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.
In the present case, the existence and due execution of the lease contract had been established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI who were signatories thereto. The loss of said contract was likewise established by the affidavit of Vicente Pulido, who attested to the fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copy of the contract at the PGFI office at the Geriatrics Center. These copies were lost in the chaos that ensued when PGFI was forcibly evicted from its office. Without a place to immediately move to, its files and records were left for sometime on the street where they were susceptible to theft. Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted to prove the contents of the contract.
The contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a
copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of witnesses, in the order stated.
There is testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of
the lost lease contract. The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital of the offer of petitioner to occupy the subject premises for a specified amount payable every month, and the conformity to these terms by the trustees of PGFI who signed thereon. Thus, even dispensing with the unsigned copy that was presented at the
Page 55 of 69 trial of this case, there is still evidence of the contents of the contract in the form of testimonial evidence.
Petitioners emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy
of the contract is misplaced. The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses. At best, the original copy of the contract that was later found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary evidence.
When the original copy of the contract was found, PGFI attempted to present it before the trial court by moving for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. On this point, we note that petitioner did not offer any objection as to the genuineness of the original contract or her signature thereon. She objected only insofar as claiming that PGFI could no longer present the document since it was not offered in evidence during the trial of this case. We take this as an indication that, indeed, there is nothing questionable about the original contract insofar as its genuineness is concerned.
Page 56 of 69 CASE NO. 25:
PEOPLE vs. GOCE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995 REGALADO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
NELLY D. AGUSTIN, Accused-appellant.
The absence of receipts or its disallowance as secondary evidence is
not fatal to a case for illegal recruitment, where the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are positive and affirmative as contrasted with the bare and self-serving denials of the accused.
FACTS:
This is a case for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate
and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on January 12, 1988.
Sometime between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, Agustin met private complainants, namely, Lorenzo Alvarez, spouses Ramona and Rogelio Salado, Dionisio Masaya, Ernesto Alvarez, Rolando Dalida, Dave Rivera, and Nelson Trinidad.
Accused-appellant Agustin represented herself as the manager of
Clover Placement Agency, which was owned by co-accused, spouses Goce. Private complainants were promised employment in Oman upon payment of placement fees and other processing fees such as for passports, in varying amounts exceeding P5,000.00 each.
Nonetheless, private complainants failed to leave for abroad.
This prompted them to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), and they discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Thus, they demanded refund, from Agustin who was able to return only a minimal portion of said sums of money, until such time the three (3) accused absconded.
This case was archived, but the RTC issued a standing warrant of arrest against the three (3) accused. Sometime in 1993, Agustin was apprehended by the Paraaque police, while spouses Goce remained at large. The counsel for Agustin filed a motion to revive the case, thus, the RTC reinstated the case and trial thereafter ensued.
For her part, Agustin denied any participation in the illegal
recruitment perpetrated by the Goce spouses; and that all she did was to introduce private complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's (Reynaldo Agustin) overseas job application was processed and facilitated by them. Although, she admitted having given P500.00 each to Rogelio Salado and Ernesto Alvarez, she explained that it was entirely for different reasons. Salado had supposedly asked for a loan, while Alvarez needed money because he was sick at that time.
The trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty
as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. Hence, the present appeal.
Page 57 of 69 ISSUE:
Is there proof that accused-appellant offered or promised
overseas employment to the private complainants, which constitutes illegal recruitment and placement?
HOLDING:
YES. At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused in this case were not authorized to engage in any recruitment activity, as evidenced by a certification issued by Cecilia Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Regulation Office of the POEA on November 10, 1987. Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit applicants for overseas employment.
The testimonial evidence hereon shows that Agustin indeed further
committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency. As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of
having the ability to send a worker abroad. It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of their applications. Her act of collecting from each of the complainant payment for their respective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law.
Appellant further argues that there is no evidence of receipts of
collections/payments from complainants to appellant. On the contrary, xerox copies of said receipts/vouchers were presented by the prosecution: 1) a cash voucher marked as Exhibit D, showing the receipt of P10,000.00 for placement fee and duly signed by appellant; 2) receipt, identified as Exhibit E, was issued and signed by appellant on February 5, 1987 to acknowledge receipt of P4,000.00 from Rogelio and Ramona Salado for processing of documents for Oman; and 3) receipt marked as Exhibit F, dated March 10, 1987, shows that appellant received from Ernesto Alvarez P2,000.00 for processing of documents for Oman.
Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were
lost, hence only xerox copies thereof were presented and which, under the circumstances, were admissible in evidence.
Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the
prosecution as secondary evidence are not allowable in court, still the absence thereof does not warrant the acquittal of appellant. In People vs. Comia, the Court held that the complainants' failure to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the accused
Page 58 of 69 therein, as well as their consequent failure to present receipts before the trial court as proof of the said payments, is not fatal to their case. The complainants duly proved by their respective testimonies that said accused was involved in the entire recruitment process. Their testimonies in this regard, being clear and positive, were declared sufficient to establish that factum probandum.
Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting
the version of the prosecution witnesses, their statements being positive and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit than the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of appellant. The lame defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case
essentially involves the credibility of witnesses which is best left to the judgment of the trial court, in the absence of abuse of discretion therein. Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.
Page 59 of 69 CASE NO. 26:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS vs. DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 146586, January 26, 2005 CARPIO, J.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS (DECS), Petitioner,
JULIA, MARIA, PACENCIA, and HEIRS OF SANTOS DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.
Proof of loss of the original document may be shown by anyone who had made a diligent search in the places where the said document may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful.
FACTS:
The heirs of Isaias Del Rosario filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner DECS. This case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters situated in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, registered in 1976 in the name of respondents under TCT No. T-222432. The Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) under DECS occupied a portion of said property by mere tolerance of the respondents and their predecessor- in-interest.
DECS countered that KPPS occupation of the 650 square meters of
the property since 1962 was with the express consent and approval of respondents father, the late Isaias Del Rosario who donated the same in 1959. In fact, DECS renamed the school as Isaias Del Rosario Primary School in honor of its benefactor.
The parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS presenting its
evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to the Municipality. DECS presented three witnesses: Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal De Jesus and Judge Eli Natividad, all residents of Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Nicolas testified that during a political meeting in his residence, he actually saw Isaias and Mayor Ramos sign a document which is a deed of donation in favor of the Municipality of Sta. Maria and the signing was made in the presence of Judge Natividad who was then a municipal councilor.
De Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to secure a
copy of the deed of donation from the Municipality of Sta. Maria, but according to the people at the municipal hall, when they transferred to the new municipal building, the deed got lost. They went to the DECS office in Malolos, but could not likewise find a copy of the deed.
Judge Natividad testified that he prepared the deed of donation
which was signed by Isaias in his residence which was accepted by the Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan through a resolution signed in the office of the secretary and the municipal mayor and a copy of said resolution could not be found due to the transfer of the municipal hall from the old to the new building.
Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R. Ignacio and Maria
Del Rosario-Esteban, daughters of the late Isaias.
Eugenia R. Ignacio testified that their father Isaias died on
April 18, 1966 long after the construction of the school and that she does not know everything about the donation because her father never informed them of his dealings and she did not inquire from him about the occupancy of the lot by the school. Maria del Rosario-Esteban, on
Page 60 of 69 the other hand, testified that her parents never donated any property because that is their only property. Also, she stated that their father told them that he just lent the property temporarily to the municipality and she never found any document conveying the lot in question to the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing respondents complaint for
recovery of possession. It explained that the defense was able to prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of the same; and taking into account the consistency, credibility and personality of the witnesses of the defense.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTCs decision and denied DECS motion for reconsideration. The CA was not fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the alleged lost deed of donation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the recantation or recollection of a witness, a sufficient
form of secondary evidence to prove the existence or the contents of a document, and its subsequent loss?
HOLDING:
NO. The donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is
void without the formalities stated in Article 749 of the Civil Code, that is, both the donation and its acceptance by the donee should be made in a public document. But if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an
authentic copy of the deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself.
A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a
written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non- production of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary.
The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some
extent the existence of the deed of donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and that he witnessed the signing of the document. However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.
In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus testimony does not help to
establish the deed of donations existence, execution and contents. On cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that
Page 61 of 69 Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself.
DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council
Resolution accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias lifetime without objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both instruments.
What mainly militates against DECS claim is, as the CA found,
inadequate proof that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful.
The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person
knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, on the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
In the present case, it is noted that Judge Natividad who claimed
to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated government offices. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The law requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary public.
DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register
where Judge Natividad as the notary public should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also explained why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.
Page 62 of 69 CASE NO. 27:
LEE vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.
JOHNSON LEE, Petitioner,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE MARKETING, INC., Respondents.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates
thereof.
FACTS:
Petitioner Johnson Lee is one of the original incorporators of
NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI). NMI was incorporated on January 27, 1978 and SEC approved its dissolution on March 1, 1988.
During NMIs existence, it transacted with Victorias Milling
Company, Inc. (VMCI) by providing them with empty white bags for the latters sugar products. The transactions are as follows:
DATE OF PURCHASE QUANTITY AND CHARGE INVOICE BPI CHECK
Around this time, Petitioner Johnson Lee was the President of
NMI, while co-accused Sonny Moreno was the General Manager.
The trustee of NMI, Reyes, Treyes & Fudolin Law Office filed a verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa against petitioner and Moreno when they failed to turn over to the trustee the P1,500,150 they received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI.
The RTC of Negros Occidental admitted in evidence the photocopies
of Charge Invoice Nos. 0809, 0810, and 0811 issued by NMI to VMCI as well as that of BPI Check Nos. 068706 and 068993.
To prove the loss, destruction or non-availability of the
original copies of the charge invoices and checks, as well as the authenticity and due execution thereof, the prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores (employee of NMI). She testified that she saw the two checks in the office of the petitioner, the signatures at the dorsal portion of the checks were those of the petitioner, and he indorsed and deposited the same on September 4, 1987 with the Solidbank, instead of the BPI Plaza Cervantes branch in Manila, the official depository bank of NMI. She was able to secure microfilm copies of the checks from Solidbank. Sometime in 1987, she went to the office of the VMCI and inquired if it still had copies of the two checks and the clerk thereat informed her that it would be difficult to locate the checks as they were stored in the bodega.
Testifying for the prosecution in obedience to a subpoena issued
by the court, Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, declared that the records section of VMCI, which had custody of all
Page 63 of 69 checks and other corporate records, was near her office. She testified that the checks, including their other records, were lost during the flood in 1985. She also testified on the Certification issued by Carolina Diaz, the Comptroller of VMCI, confirming the loss of the two checks. She, however, admitted that she did not see the original copies of the checks and that she was not a signatory thereto.
The prosecution also offered the counter-affidavits of petitioner
during the preliminary investigation as part of their evidence.
The accused objected to the admission of the photocopies of the
checks and charge invoices on the ground that the best evidence was the original copies thereof.
Despite said objection, the RTC admitted the counter-affidavit of
the petitioner, as well as the photocopies of the checks and charge invoices, on the ground that the prosecution had adduced preponderant evidence that the original copies of the said charges and checks were lost, destroyed or non-available.
The RTC also denied both the motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence by the accused. Hence, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner sought relief from this Court.
ISSUES:
1) Was the petition at bar, the proper remedy of the petitioner?
2) Did the prosecution adduced evidence, testimonial and documentary, to prove the predication to the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and of the checks?
HOLDING:
A Petition for Certiorari is not a Proper Remedy against an
Interlocutory Order
NO. In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the
original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained.
The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the
photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.
Page 64 of 69 We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari. They are inappropriate for consideration in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court inasmuch as they do not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court hearing the said criminal cases but instead are defenses that might absolve them from criminal liability. Moreover, the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was premature for the reason that there were other plain and adequate remedies at law available to the petitioner.
Furthermore, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the Court unless the petitioner is able to establish that the findings of facts of the appellate court are not supported by or are contrary to the evidence; or if the appellate court ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted vital facts and circumstances, which, if considered, could change or even reverse the outcome of the case. In this, the petitioner failed.
Proof of existence, due execution, loss, and contents of an
original document must first be satisfied before resort to secondary evidence.
YES. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world
of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the
issues such as the nature, appearance or condition of physical objects or to evidence relating to a matter which does not come from the foundation of the cause of action or defense; or when a party uses a document to prove the existence of an independent fact, as to which the writing is merely collated or incidental.
It has been held that where the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved. If the document is one in which other persons are also interested, and which has been placed in the hands of a custodian for safekeeping, the custodian must be required to make a search and the fruitlessness of such search must be shown, before secondary evidence can be admitted. The certificate of the custody of the document is incompetent to prove the loss or destruction thereof. Such fact must be proved by some person who has knowledge of such loss. The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document must be positive.
In this case, there is no dispute that the original copies of the
checks were returned to VMCI after the same were negotiated and honored by the drawee bank. The originals of the charge invoices were kept by VMCI. We agree with the petitioner that the Certification signed by Carolina Diaz was inadmissible in evidence against him because of the failure of the prosecution to present her as witness and to testify on said certification. However, the records show that, in obedience to the subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum issued by the trial court directing the VMCI to produce the originals of the checks and the charge invoices, Bayaban, the Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, testified that all its records, including the charge invoices and checks, were destroyed seven years ago in a flash flood
Page 65 of 69 which occurred on November 28, 1995, and that such loss/destruction was known to all the employees of VMCI, including herself.
Moreover, with the admissions of the petitioner in his counter-
affidavit, the prosecution even no longer needed to adduce evidence aliunde to prove the existence, due execution and the authenticity of the charge invoices and the checks.
Page 66 of 69 CASE NO. 28:
REPUBLIC vs. SPOUSES MATEO
G.R. No. 148025, August 13, 2004 CARPIO MORALES, J.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
SPOUSES LORENZO and FELICIANA MATEO, Respondents.
The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission
of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.
FACTS:
On April 30, 1997, spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan a petition for Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-38769 issued on July 16, 1971 by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Bataan in the name of Jose Tan. It covers two (2) parcels of land forming part of Lot No. 979 of barrio Cabog- Cabog, Bagac, Bataan. Spouses Mateo allegedly acquired said property from Jose Tan for and in consideration of P50,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated September 3, 1978.
The original copy of TCT No. T-38769 on file at the ROD of Bataan is missing and could not be located despite efforts to do so, hence, deemed lost; while Lorenzo Mateo was in possession of the owners duplicate copy of the title, due to his frequent reassignment as a former military officer to different places from 1978 up to his retirement on September 3, 1990, he misplaced said title among his files, although he has a xerox copy thereof; and despite efforts to locate the owners duplicate copy of the title, the same proved futile and is now deemed lost.
Lorenzo Mateo presented the following documentary evidence:
1) Carbon copy of a September 3, 1978 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jose Tan in favor of the Mateos; 2) Photocopy of TCT No. T-38769 issued to Jose Tan on March 14, 1972; 3) Letter dated June 30, 1995 by B/Gen. Lorenzo Mateo informing the ROD of Balanga, Bataan that owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T- 38769 was missing and deemed lost following futile efforts to locate it; 4) Certified photocopy of a decision of March 17, 1969 in Cadastral Case No. 18, awarding several lots forming part of Lot No. 979 to six (6) persons including Donato Echivarria, from whom Jose Tan allegedly purchased the lands; 5) Photocopy of a June 5, 1969 Order issued by Judge Tito V. Tizon in Cadastral Case No. 18 for the Issuance of Decrees; and 6) Letter dated March 11, 1971 by the Acting Clerk of Court of the CFI of Bataan Antonio C. Quintos to Mr. Vicente A. Querol, Assistant Chief, Docket Section, Land Registration Commission that the original records of the petitions for cadastral reopenings of Jesus Gutierrez et al., Engracia Salaya et al., and Cecilia Briones et al., are presently with the Department of Justice being used in connection with the investigation of the administrative charge against Honorable Judge Tito V. Tizon; 7) Said petitions were taken by Senior Prosecutor Vidal M. Tombo on July 16, 1969 as per receipt of this office; Photocopy of a RECEIPT (Exhibit T) purporting to show that one, whose signature is illegible but who is alluded to as NBI agent Ramon Befetel,
Page 67 of 69 received on March 8, 1973 for VIDAL M. TOMBO, Special Assistant, Department of Justice, from the ROD of Balanga, Bataan the therein listed 93 documents including TCT No. T-386769 Jose Tan; 1997 Declaration of Real Property in the name of Jose Tan of 41-D Tangile St., Quezon City (Exhibit U); and 1997 Declaration of Real Property in the name of Jose Tan. (Exhibit U-1).
Aside from Lorenzo Mateo, Jose Y. de la Cruz, vaultkeeper since
1972 of the Bataan ROD, took the witness stand, the latter declaring that the original of the TCT was taken by a Fiscal Tombo. Also testifying was Mona Liza Esguerra, Chief of the Records Division of the DOJ since 1980, who declared that Atty. Tombo did not surrender the title to the Records Section.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that none of the sources for a petition for the reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title as enumerated in Sec. 3 of Republic No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732 has been presented by the spouses Mateo. The Mateos Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision having been denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in their favor applying the last item of Section 3, RA 26, to wit:
Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title., referring to the photocopy of the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-38769 (Exhibit I) as a secondary evidence.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Was there a validly existing title at the time of the loss, which may be the subject of reconstitution?
HOLDING:
NO. Reconstitution requires that the subject title was validly
existing at the time of the loss. An invalid title cannot be reconstituted.
The CAs reliance, as another basis of reconstitution, on the
March 17, 1969 certified photocopy of Judge Tizons decision awarding to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT, the TCT subject of reconstitution was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, as noted by the trial court, there is no showing how the parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan, the Mateos predecessor-in-interest.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, provides the sources-documents-bases in
the following order: 1) owners duplicate of the title 2) co-owners mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the title 3) certified copy of the title previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian 4) authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the OCT was issued 5) document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property is encumbered or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered;
Page 68 of 69 6) and any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed title.
Assuming that the existence and execution of the original of the
TCT has been satisfactorily shown, and that it was taken in 1973 by the DOJ and the NBI in connection with the investigation of the judge on whose order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred, which OCT was also taken by said government agencies, there is no satisfactory showing that the TCT has been lost.
By Lorenzo Mateos own information, a year before he
testified, he talked to the NBI agent, Ramon Befetel, who received the 93 documents for Vidal Tombo. Why said agent, who admittedly was still in the NBI main office, was not presented to shed light on the whereabouts of the TCT, no reason has been proffered.
In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the
original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos petition for reconstitution fails.
In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer available, not only is the photocopy of the alleged owners duplicate copy thereof (Exhibit 1) partly illegible.
When, where and under what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to spare it from being also lost were not even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the DOJ and NBI of an investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and lead this Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos evidence and propriety of a grant of their petition for reconstitution.
