London School of Economics

Value Theory: Towards Conceptual Clarification

Author(s): Pat Duffy Hutcheon
Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1972), pp. 172-187
Published by: Wiley on behalf of London School of Economics and Political Science
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Pat Duffy Hutcheon*

Value theory: towards conceptual clarification

It is the contention of this paper that there has been a pronounced

tendency in sociology to under-emphasizethe study of values and moral
issues, and that the cause of this is twofold: the cultural and organ-
izational climate within which sociologists operate and the lack of
consensusamong them on a conceptual frameworkwithin which accu-
mulative research on values could occur. The broad outlines of such a
model will be offered in an effort to initiate a revival of constructive
debate on value theory, and a few possible implications for future
research on values will be suggested.
Why should sociology be concerned with the study of values? The
obvious reasonis that they may well provide the key to a more adequate
understanding of man in society. But accompanying this is a certain
moral imperative which impinges on the sociologist as a member of
humanity at this particular moment in time. A lack of progressin the
application of organized intelligence to the choice of goals for humanity
is everywhere apparent. It could be argued that the kind of disciplined
assault on the problem that the scientific approach to knowing can
provide is long overdue.
Furthermore, the possibility that sociology itself may bear some
responsibilityfor mankind's current moral crisis cannot be summarily
dismissed. The myth of the possibility of 'objectively' documenting
reality, so unquestioningly accepted by sociologists anxious to achieve
'scientific' status, seems now to have spread to a majority of those
involved in the humanities and the arts. The fetish of realism-too often
manifested as a detailed portrayal of pathology in the name of the
whole truth-is widely indulged in by the very 'creative' intellectuals
who scorn the social scientistsfor their conformistscientism. Ironically,
both groups may be operating from identical outmoded assumptions
about the possibility of a detached type of objectivity, and about the
individual's lack of responsibility for his personal contribution to the
shaping of the values which in turn shape humanity.1
The reaction of a large segment of the youth subculture to this
'disinterested' pursuit of truth-and its accompanying fascination with
* P. D. Hutcheon, B.ED. M.A. Assistant Professor,Faculty of Education, University of
Saskatchewan, Regina, Canada
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technique-is perhaps also a justifiable source of concern for the socio-

logist. For the young are equating this naive realism with rationality.
And if this be reason, they say, then we want none of it. So we are wit-
nessing a massive repudiation, not of the irrational assumptions about
the nature of knowing and valuing man which have brought about our
present obsession with documenting an objective 'truth' regardless of
consequences for humanity, but of that very difficult and challenging
application of reason to human affairswhich mankind may for the first
time be on the threshold of approaching. How tragic that at this parti-
cularmoment, our radicalyouth, who arerightlyprotestingthe prevailing
disregard for values in our society and among our intellectuals, have
become persuaded that the culprit is reason rather than the all-too-
obvious lack of it! That this situation represents a failure of the social
sciences in the past cannot be denied; that it could also imply a chal-
lenge for the future, which the sociologist is uniquely qualified to meet,
should not be overlooked.2

THE WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT VALUE THEORY

There are a number of sociologists, of course, who have always be-

lieved that the study of values is essential to progressin the behavioural
sciences. However, this interest has not yet resulted in any notable
degree of consensus in theory, nor demonstrable improvement in the
usefulness of empirical research findings. Furthermore, a survey of
accomplishments in value study thus far reveals at least four rather
disturbing tendencies.
I. Failureto dealwith thesourceand validationof values
William Kolb,3 in a review of the changing prominence of values from
Durkheim until 1959, refers to this omission in Parsons' work. Kolb
claims that Parsons is probably with him in assuming a non-empirical
source, but whether this is a spiritual entity or a reified and mystical
'society' is not clear. Parsons' 1958 paper on 'Religious Organization in
the United States'4 implies an acceptance of the 'fundamental reli-
gious roots' of values. Indicative of his philosophical assumptionsalso,
is the fact that in his 'paradigm of evolutionary change'5 he divides the
environment within which action systems function into two realms:
ultimate reality (at the top of the diagram) and the physical-organic
environment (at the bottom).
A unique attempt to delineate a non-empirical but societal source
of even the most deeply rooted religious values is Guy Swanson's The
Birth of the Gods.6The value theory is pure Durkheim and seems strange-
ly anachronistic, but at least the problem of value origin and validation
is faced squarely. Robin Williams, in his attempt to clarify the concept
of values for the 1968 edition of the InternationalEncyclopediaof the Social
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also states his position clearly as follows: 'Values as empirical
Sciences7
elements in human behaviourcertainly ariseout of human experience.'8
However, Williams fails to identify the correspondingassumptionsof
the other value theorists whose work he surveys, thereby overlooking a
major cause of the conceptual confusion which he documents.
2. Tendency to assumethatsocietyis antecedent to theindividual
The disturbing aspect of this is that it is seldom spelled out even by
those who acknowledge Durkheim's influence. It can only be inferred
from a consistent over-emphasis in theory on values conceived solely
as norms and from research designs which identify values always as
independent variables. Williams9tries to correct this imbalance, as does
Kecskemeti in his booklO and Inkeles in his 1965 article entitled
'Personalityand Social Structure'."1The inadequacy of such a paradigm
for the explanation of social change has been amply assessedelsewhere.12
3. Stresson conformity andminimization of theroleof reason
A logical consequence of the second characteristic is a stress in value
theory on the idea of conformity to social norms and a corresponding
minimization of the roles of selective perception and of reasonin human
action. This emphasis has been noted by Kolb13 in his discussion of
Parsons' model. It is criticized by Alvin Gouldner14and by Dennis
Wrong15in his warning about 'the oversocializedview of man and the
overintegrated view of society' in modern sociology. Reinhard Bendix
claimed in I95116 that the image of man dominating social science
researchwas that of an essentiallyirrational being whose behaviour was
determined by group interest and organic drives.
surrounding
4. Confusion theconceptof value
(a) Valuesas norms.The prevailing identification of values with norma-
tive rules has already been discussed. In fact Kolb claims that (until
the I96os at least) the most significant accomplishment of value study
was the firm anchoring of the concept in the realm of objective group
norms. True, subjective aspects of values (defined as attitudes) had
been elaborated by Ellsworth Faris and George Herbert Mead in the
1920s, but these had come to be considered the subject matter of
psychology alone. Interestingly, almost a half-century later, we find
social scientists still trying to bridge this compartmentalization in an
effort to clarify the relationship between attitudes and values, as a
prerequisiteto value theory development.
(b) Valuesas culturalideals.Milton Rokeach,17in a recent attempt at
clarification, suggests that values differ from attitudes in that they
transcend specific situations and have to do with generalized modes of
conduct (instrumental values) and end states of existence (terminal
values). This conceptualization seems to be building on Merton's
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familiar means-end model. Further examination of Rokeach's research,

however, reveals that what he is actually measuring is the relative
commitment claimed by the respondentto whatever ideal or principle is
symbolized for him by each of the terms which he is asked to rank.
These terms (equality, freedom, independent, loving, etc.) could per-
haps better be considered as symbolizing cultural ideals.
Similarly, William Eckhardt,18who employs content analysis in an
effort to assessthe values of Fascism, is assuredlyobtaining measureson
evaluative verbal referencesof some sort. But they seem to be references
to a symbolic system of cultural ideals which may or may not have
operated as actual motivating factors in Fascist countries. Eckhardt
defines a value as any goal or standard of judgment which in a given
culture is ordinarilyreferredto as if it were self-evidentlydesirable.This
seems a good definition of the ideals which Gunnar Myrdal discussesin
An -AmericanDilemma. And if we assume a one-to-one relationship
between these espoused goals and the values determining selective
behaviour, then we are defining Myrdal's tragic dilemma out of
existence. But perhaps Eckhardt makes no such assumptionand agrees
instead with Ethel Albert. In analysing values and value systemsfor the
Encyclopedia of SocialSciences,19Albert states that 'values are by defini-
tion distinct from conduct . . . a system of criteria by which conduct is
judged and sanctions applied'.20Ideals again ?
(c) Valuesas assessments of action.Landes,21in a 1967 study, measures
what he considers to be values by having respondents rank fifty be-
havioural items on a ten-point scale from 'least to most worst'. He is
either defining values simply as moral judgments or employing moral
judgments as indicators of values, without clarifying his procedures.
Similarly, E. H. Epstein,22 in discussing changing values in Puerto
Rico, seems to be defining values solely in terms of the occupational
reward structure.
(d) Valuesas beliefs. Milton Albrecht, in his article entitled 'Does
Literature Reflect Common Values?'23 constructs (for the purpose of
content analysis) a list of supposed American family-life values.
However, as this list appears to be a mixture of statements describing
behaviouralprescriptions(normativebeliefs?), descriptionsof the 'good'
or desirable (affective beliefs?), and descriptionsof the 'real' (cognitive
beliefs?) it is difficult to infer the exact meaning which Albrecht
attributes to the concept of value. Richard Morris,24 however, in
developing a typology of norms, is very clear about what he means by
the term. He defines values as either individual or commonly held
conceptions of the desirable. (In other words, values are normative and
affective beliefs, according to Morris.)
(e) Valuesas objects.Ralph Turner,25 on the other hand, first defines
values as objects which are regarded favourably or unfavourably, and
then, while explaining value conflict, seems to imply that these values
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impinge upon the individual in the form of norms removed to a higher

level of generality and inclusiveness. (Ideals?)
In defining values as objects Turner is in the company of such
respected theorists as R. B. Perry,26 Stephen Pepper,27 Florian
Znaniecki,28and even John Dewey, who saw values as inherent aspects
of objects. Perry'sclaim that a theory of value must refer to the emer-
gence of interests having objects29 is fairly representativeof this point
of view. However, Becker,while elaborating on the reciprocityof needs
and values,30concludes that if knowing and valuing are inseparably
united then all objects experienced by an individual become values
for him. This definition of values as objects therefore would seem to
render the term completely powerless as an ordering concept.
(f) Valuesas valueorientations.
This term, as used by Clyde Kluckhohn
in 1951,31 and by Florence Kluckhohn in 1961,32 seems to symbolize a
deeply rooted set of culturally patterned and regulatoryresponsesto the
major environmental challenges facing man in every time and place,
capable of being identified at the level of the cultural system. Rainer
C. Baum explains recent attempts to measure this concept both by
direct respondent-ranking procedures and by content analysis of
the literature of various historical periods.33On the whole, however,
the term 'value orientation' seems to have gained more rapidly in
popularity than has the concept, and is now often confusingly inter-
changed with 'attitude'.
(g) Valuesas behaviour probabilities.Franz Adler34claims that in order
for values to qualify as concepts of social science they must be defined
in terms of behaviour. He sees them as learned components of per-
sonalities identifiable only as probabilities that particular behaviour
will occur in a variety of circumstances.He says that besides personali-
ties, groups, society and culture are all value systemsof varying degrees
of complexity. Milton Yinger,35in a somewhat similar vein, cites what
he calls the 'inner-tendency'system as the source of predisposingfactors
for behaviour, with the 'socio-cultural'system providing the precipitat-
ing factors. Like Adler, he claims that only from individual behaviour
can we infer either the inner structure of the person or the patterns of
the socio-cultural system.
(h) Valuesas generalizedattitudes.Consideringthe progressin attitude
measurementduring the last four decades, it is rathersurprisingthat the
relationship between values and attitudes has not claimed more atten-
tion in the behavioural sciences. Rokeach36 moves in this direction,
claiming that although values (like attitudes) are predispositionsto act,
they differ from attitudes in their transcendence of specific objects and
situations. In a recently published major study edited by Kurt Baier
and Nicholas Rescher, it is stated that 'choices manifest preferences
which in turn mirror values'.37 If these 'preferences' could be concep-
tualized as attitudes, this simple description might be combined with
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Adler's definition to suggest a model capable of relating and inter-
preting by means of individual behavioural choices the phenomena of
attitudes and values, as well as those represented by concepts such as
cultural ideals, norms, moral judgments, reward structures, espoused
beliefs and value orientations.

OBSTACLES TO VALUE STUDY

I. Philosophicalcompartmentalization
Why this apparent lack of progressin value theory? Could it be that the
prevailing cultural climate has not been conducive to the introduction
of radically new approachesin this area? Certainlythe world view based
on the premisesof Christianity,in particular, insists that the sources of
values are spiritual: beyond the possibilityof critical analysis by man in
his material world. Christianity, along with the majority of world
religions, assumes an interfering God: one whose actual intercessionin
the course of history provides the basis for official dogma. Further-
more, the philosophical perspective stemming from and providing the
intellectual justification for present-day transcendentalist views per-
ceives reality as divided into two parts. These are the realm of 'fact',
where sensory experience and reason have finally been acknowledged
as supreme, and that of 'value', where the individual's natural knowing
and valuing equipment must be suspended in favour of what tradition
has transmitted in the name of unchallengeable spiritual authority.
2. Institutional
compartmentalization
It seems that this convenient partitioning of reality by philosophers
occurred only after Copernicus' discoveries in physics, and received
added impetus following the Darwinian explosion in biology. We often
forget that prior to these intellectual revolutions, 'truth' or factual
knowledge as well as value was primarily the domain of theology and
myth. In fact, it can be argued that the history of ideas from Aquinas
through Descartes and Kant to Max Weber is largely the story of the
agonizing struggle by sincere and intelligent men, trapped in the
other-worldly premises of their culture, to reconcile the evidence of
their senses and the logic of their reasoning with a transmitted faith in
spiritualism. By the end of the nineteenth century the concept of a
reality neatly segmented into a scientific world of fact and a theo-
logical world of value had become the conventional wisdom of the
age-as exemplified by the popularity of the 'separationof church and
state' idea in politics. Sociology, the one discipline which might have
been expected to challenge this partitioning because of the obstacle
that it presented to a comprehensive study of man in interaction, instead
accepted Max Weber's position on objectivity, supporting the separa-
tion principle.
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3. Organizational compartmentalization
American sociology has tended to develop in isolation from the humani-
ties, and in the form of a highly specialized technique rather than as a
broad, philosophically and historically sophisticatedperspective for the
study of man. This may have been due as much to the trend toward
professionalization and kingdom building in academic life as to the
widespread acceptance of the philosophical assumptions of Weberian
neopositivism. The establishment of separate departments in universi-
ties no doubt encouraged competition among the social sciences for
funds, students, and better means of sharpening data-manipulating
techniques. It is easy to see how values, with their notorious resistance
to precise measurement,might be assignedlow priorityin this situation.
4. Theoretical compartmentalization
A not-unrelated reason for the neglect of values has been the lack of
consensus on a satisfactory conceptual frameworkfrom which fruitful
research could be launched. Those working in this area have been
severely handicapped by the lack of any consistent body of theory on
the nature of man as a valuing organism and even by an obvious lack
of agreement as to the meaning of the concept of value itself. Theorists
have sought to explain values as identifiable components of either
cultural, social or personality systems, but seldom have these perspec-
tives been adequately related to action within one comprehensive
model. The urgent need at the present time, therefore,would seem to be
for a concerted effortto constructand test a body of systematictheory on
the building of values and on valuing as a combination of social,
psychological and biological processes.
A MODEL PROPOSED

I. On thenatureof theory
A theory is considered to be an abstract model that pictures a relevent
and relatively identifiable segment of the real world as a set of working
relationships.Reality is here hypothesized as a systematicand emerging
pattern of relations in the material universe. Social reality (human
behaviour) is therefore assumed to be determined by what has come
before, but because of the complexity of the interaction it is to a large
degree undeterminable and unpredictable. Theories about reality
are believed to be derived at least partially by an intuitive 'discerning
of Gestalten'.38 Whenever the individual attaches meaning to sense
impressions he is formulating or adopting a theoretical model of the
way the particular segment of reality fits together. Formal or scientific
theories differ from 'unscientific' ones only in the method of formulat-
ing, stating, and testing. This view implies that 'fact and theory are not
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categorically and permanently distinct',39as was formerlypostulated. It

also rendershighly questionable the older view which holds that theory
inevitably evolves slowly in relation to the gradual accumulation of a
proven factual base.
Kuhn states that it is always possible for more than one theoretical
construction to be placed on a given collection of data.40 We know, in
fact, that it is common during the pre-scientific stage of a discipline's
growth for many theories to contend for acceptance in one area of study
-each as plausible as the others, but all of them imparting vastly
different meaning to the data in question, and thereby producing
widely varying 'facts'. (This is well illustrated by the many theories of
value change competing for consensus in sociology today, and the
inconsistent research findings which they have provided.) It is only
when a theory is accepted by the majority of researchersin a given
problem area that we can say that it has achieved the status of a
paradigm.
The major paradigms in a science determine not only the process by
which empiricalrelationsare interpretedas facts, but the very means by
which they are selected for observation and the tools by which they are
measured. These paradigms both shape and are shaped by the world
views or ideologies of their inventors, or by what Polanyi refersto as the
premisesof science in various historicaltimes and places.41For example,
the paradigms of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton were
determined by their images of the universe, and then in turn provided
later scientists with a 'nest of metaphysical and methodological com-
mitments'42 founded on the assumption that all phenomena could
be reduced to the mechanics of some kind of ultimate constituent
particles.43
All 'normal', accumulative, evolutionary progress in science occurs
within the framework of paradigms. However, revolutionary changes
happen periodically as a result of old paradigms having exhibited
prolonged and pronouncedfailure in directing problem-solvingactivity.
Such a change usually follows a gradual and simultaneous emergence
among scientists of 'observational and conceptual recognition' of a
disturbing anomaly between experience and theory.44
In this context the study of values is apparently still in the pre-
scientific stage of development. Franz Adler's pleas45for a single defi-
nition system by means of which various generalizations could be
translated into the same terms is in reality a recognition of the need for
a dominant orderingparadigm.
2. On the natureof man
A useful paradigm of man should provide the broad outlines of that
complex set of responses which intercedes between the environmental
stimuli and the observable behaviour of the individual. This is that
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nine-tenths of the iceberg hidden below water level, but conceivably of
far greater significance to the understandingof human action than are
those inputs and outputs immediately accessible to observation and
measurement. That thrust of ice above the water provides us not with
the dimensionsof the whole iceberg, but with the empirical clues which
help us to construct a picture of what the whole probably is, and to
hypothesize relationships between the iceberg and its surroundings
which logically would hold, assuming that our model of the unmeasur-
able whole is accurate.
It should be unnecessaryto emphasize that any comprehensive and
useful model for sociology must be in accord with current research
findings in the biological sciences on the nature of organic processes.
The twin unresolved problems of 'specificity' and 'organization'which
haunt the biologist probing at the threshold of knowledge in his field46
are surely representative of the key processes to be understood at the
socio-psychological level as well. The young human organism, like
other living material entities, differs from non-living matter solely
in the degree of complexity of organization and specificity attained.
From conception on he selects inputs from the environment and as a
result of the accompanying experience of pleasant or unpleasant sensa-
tions and the relating of these to the correspondinginputs, he begins
to organize his associations into a system. This system, which in turn
provides a more and more refined sieve for the subsequent selection of
stimuli, could be conceptualized as that submerged part of the iceberg
which must be understood if we are ever to connect cause and effect
in human action in any meaningful way.
If values provide the key to that organization of stored experience
within the organism by means of which the 'self' evolves, and to that
selection and shaping of current experience that makes every individual
a unique bundle of potential responses,then it is folly to imagine that
such values can be identified in isolation from the concrete behavioural
choices in which they are manifested.
3. On thenatureof valuing
The young human organism rapidly progressesfrom random selections
to belief construction (learning to 'know' and to 'value') as he organizes
inputs from the raw data of experience: data which include, in addition
to momentary feeling-states, the ideals, norms, and established know-
ledge of his culture. According to this model, values are learned criteria
that predispose us to act as we do. They emerge from the inextricably
intertwined affective and cognitive belief systems. Attitudes are merely
the surface, or more specific manifestations of these underlying values.
Such values bear no necessary relationship to the statements of belief that
are cited in response to direct questions. Neither are they identical to
the ideals or norms propagated by one's culture, the goals one espouses,
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the moral judgments one makes of the behaviour of others, nor to the
objects of one's desire. All these are either the stuff of which values are
made, or the symbolic representationsof values. They are related to
actual, operating values as empirical data or theories are related to
scientifically confirmed knowledge.
What, then, do all of these phenomena have to do with the processof
valuing? At the moment of conscious choice it is that organization
of values which defines the 'self' that selects an appropriate action, just
as it is that same value system that provides for the smooth operation of
previouslypatterned or habitual behaviour. At the moment of conscious
choice it is not merely the ideals and norms as objectified in the cul-
ture, but the individual's entire value system which combines with the
immediate stimuli to determine his behaviour. Only to the extent that
he is a highly socialized product of a stable culture do his values and the
ideals and norms of his group closely coincide. To the extent that his
values have evolved systematically in a changing cultural milieu to
form an autonomous, valuing personality,he will be free from having to
accept the imposition of external authority or pressuresby his peers to
conform. He will be free also from the necessity of respondingpassively
to momentary stimuli.
At the moment of choice the individual is free to weigh alternatives
consciously, and on the basis of anticipated consequences (of both his
own and others' actions) to do what he decides is best. But what he
decides to do at that instant of action-or the way that he responds
subconsciouslyto the situation as his perceptual patterns define it-has
been determined by that totality of past experience which has provided
him with his knowledge and shaped his values.
If this were not so, and behaviour were produced either solely by
situational stimuli or by an interfering internal or external spirit, then
human beings and other animals would be totally unpredictable. But
we are quite aware that this is not the case. The more we come to 'know'
our friends the better we can predict their behaviour. But we sense, too,
that no friend could 'know' our values completely without having
experienced an identical genetic and experiential programming. This is
why human behaviour, although determined, is in practice to a con-
siderable extent undeterminable. Values can only be identified in so
far as regularities can be discerned-regularities which significantly
increase the probability of successfullypredicting future behaviour.
However, the apparently restricted role of regularities in human
behaviour does not mean that a search for more knowledge about them
must be fruitless. We know that that substantial portion of behaviour
which has assumed a habitual nature is fairly accurately predictable in
terms of observed causes, and we have learned to locate these causes in
ideals and norms as well as situational stimuli. In such conditioned
behaviour an entire pattern of responses has become established as a
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value, as a result of having been selected as appropriate for similar

circumstances many times. The valuing process is simply short circuited.
This conditioning is similar to the process by which instinctive beha-
viour is selected over many generations facing identical environmental
challenges, until the specific response pattern becomes reflected in the
genetic structure.47
4. On therelationship
betweenknowledge
andvalues
All organisms are subject to a degree of environmental change, and
their value systems must change as well, if only to release tensions
arising from failure to adjust to changes in knowledge. But sometimes,
when some disruption in empirical circumstances and in available
'facts' has rendered an individual's values obsolete, extreme tensions
may develop due to behavioural inconsistencies and value conflict.
Either 'knowing' (recognizing and reasoning) is applied to one's situa-
tion, forcing growth-enhancing reappraisals of one's entire value system
and role expectations, or symptoms of disorganization appear. In their
extreme forms these may be expressed either as a debilitating inability
to choose any course of action, or as a tendency to react inconsistently
to situational stimuli. This model conceptualizes the first of these 'ideal
type' reactions as characteristic of the individuals whose value system is
largely comprised of patterns of habitual or role-determined responses
internalized in toto from his culture, and who is thereby highly resistant
to change in that unfamiliar stimuli immobilize rather than arouse him.
The other 'ideal type' represents the extreme of openness to change: the
situation in which a coherent set of values has failed to evolve and
therefore there is little probability that any consistent behaviour
pattern will be discernible over time. At the one extreme the individual
lacks identity apart from a static cultural tradition; at the other he is
able to identify himself only fleetingly through membership in transient
groups.
This model assumes that such deficiencies in the development of self
autonomy occur where changes in the individual's cognitive and
affective beliefs fail to evolve in relation to one another and to changes
in the environment. Self growth is seen as a perpetual, interrelated
process of constructing beliefs and values. This process of value forma-
tion at the personality level is similar to that of ideology construction at
the group level. The individual's values shape the very perceptual
process by which he selects his sensory impressions,48 just as prevailing
ideologies affect the underlying premises of his knowledge paradigms.
The value system and the ideological system (the culture) are inter-
dependent sets of relationships. Both are determinative of behaviour,
just as both are simultaneously shaped by the actions of their individual
'carriers' and members. Chief among the environmental stimuli
initiating the individual's acts are the admonitory and modal behaviour
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 Pat DuffyHutcheon Valuetheory:towardsconceptual
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of other individuals. And each individual social act, in turn, affects the
culture of which it forms a part. Beliefs about the 'real' and about
the 'good' are twin aspects of the personality, or value system, while the
knowledge and normative systemsinteract at the cultural or ideological
level. Both the knowledge and normative systems of the group and the
cognitive and affective systems of the individual are inter-penetrating
and continuallyshapingone anotherin their parallelevolution.However,

Figure i
Individual Environmental
action Reflex stimuli
"a - -

Choice Habitual
S response

Stimulias
experienced
or interpreted

Value I
system
Rememberedor
(personalityI
or 'self') subconsciously Cognitive
I retained
Feeling states, or Beliefs
Affective beliefs N -
('the good') ('the real')

Factual "
Ideological Knowledge
System SNorms
(the group I Ideals - Paradigms
or society's I '-1
culture) Normative Knowledge
System I I System
-,1 i,, r8

'evolution' does not here imply progress toward an identifiable end-

state such as Maslow postulates.49No assumptionsabout human 'needs'
other than that of tension-releaseare necessaryto explain self growth in
this context. Every act evokes consequencesthat require further action,
and every conscious behavioural choice is an act of faith in the belief
systems upon which the individual-all too often unknowingly-'bets
his life'.
However, evolutionarychange is only one aspect of growth in person-
ality and social systems. Radical transformationsof belief systems-and
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Pat Dufy Hutcheon Valuetheory:towardsconceptual
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consequent fundamental changes in values--occur following periodic

dislocations in the knowledge system. The invention of new paradigms
and the discardingof old operates as a source of revolutionarychange in
the ideological as well as the individual value system.
Figure I shows the postulated relationshipsfor the total value system
of the individual and the ideological system of the group. When the
value system is divided into identifiable components for investigation,
while it is convenient to call the components 'values', each is seen as a
sub-system of the whole, with affective and cognitive aspects, rather
than as a separate homogeneous entity.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

For purposes of research it may be fruitful to establish categories of

openness to change in terms of individual value systems which would
correspond to Howard Becker's classification of societies on the basis
of readiness to accept or initiate change.50 It would appear useful to
relate Becker's'typical' societies, as defined by the content and rigidity
of their ideological systems, to the value systemsof their members, in
any case.
Such a classificationand measurementof ideologies should present no
insurmountable difficulties, given the present sophistication of scaling
and content analysis techniques. However, the private nature of values
raises problems. If we conclude that values are not the same as ideals,
norms, desired objects, or espoused beliefs about the 'good', but are,
instead, operating criteria for action, then we must agree that theore-
tically they are not themselves amenable to direct observation and
measurement. It follows that values can only be inferred from be-
havioural choices-not from what individuals say they believe or ought
to do or desire as end-states of existence.
The problem for the would-be value researcheris how to simulate
real life situations in which respondents are forced to choose among
alternative courses of action. A number of methods have been used
with some degree of success in attitude measurement. In our model,
however, it is only when we move from the identificationof an attitude
in a specific context to assessmentof the probability that a particular
pattern of action will be evoked in a number of situations, that we are
actually tapping the underlying values. One possible means of accom-
plishing this might be to involve the subject in a number of specific
problems which he recognizes as impinging upon him and to pose for
each a number of hypothetical solutions based on different beliefs about
what is good for men. These statements of belief--or reflections of
attitudes posing as alternative solutions for particular problems-would
have to be carefully constructed so that the values of the respondent
could be inferred from the pattern of attitudes revealed by his choices.
I84

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Pat Dufy Hutcheon Valuetheory:towardsconceptual
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Admittedly this is a difficultprocessand one which, because it requires

a two-step chain of logical inference on the part of the researcher, is
highly subject to error. However, it is better to admit the obstacles to
valid value study and to proceed painstakingly, than, in the interest of
ease of measurement, to define values out of existence. This has been
done in the past by equating them with their antecedents such as
desired objects, ideals and norms; or with the beliefs upon which they
are based; or with societal assessmentsand rewards of action; or with
the specific attitudes which reflect them and which must be ascertained
as a preliminary step in their identification.
This is not to say that ideals and norms need not be studied, nor to
discount their contribution to the forming of value systems. But any
postulation of interdependence which might open avenues for future
research requires that the normative system of the group be visualized
as conceptually and existentially distinct from the values and attitudes
which it evokes in individuals and which in turn are the sourceof change
in the normative system. It is the confusion of these variables in the
concept of value orientation that renders the Parsonian model unsatis-
factory as a means of explaining value change.51
To summarize, this paper has attempted to assess the current level
of accomplishment in the field of value study and to suggest possible
reasons for the apparent lack of progress. The need for an increased
emphasis on this aspect of social relations is considered sufficiently
urgent to warrant a renewed effort toward the achievement of a
measure of consensusin theory. The premise that human social action is
an integral part of a totally interrelated, determined but largely un-
determinable universe of matter is offered as a possible starting point.
It is hoped that the model of value change proposed might eventually
prove capable of generating hypotheses concerning cultural and social
change and the relation of such change to value systems.
Notes

I. For an elaboration of this idea see SociologicalTheory,New York, Holt,

the author's article, 'Sociology and the Rinehart and Winston, 1957, p. Ii8.
Objectivity Problem', Sociologyand Social 4. TalcottParsons,'ReligiousOrgani-
Research, vol. 54 (January 1970), I53- zations in the United States', in Talcott
171. Parsons, Structureand Process in Modern
2. For an argument that it may well Societies, New York: The Free Press,
be a new type of sociologist who assumes 1961, p.
311.
the critical function previously performed 5. Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolu-
by scholars in the humanities, see J. P. tionaryand Comparative Perspectives,
Engle-
Nettle, 'Are Intellectuals Obsolete?', wood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp.
The Nation (4 March I968), 300-5. 28-9.
3. William Kolb, 'The Changing 6. Guy Swanson, The Birthof theGods,
Prominence of Values', in Howard Ann Arbor, University of Michigan
Becker and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), Modern Press, 1960.
185

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Pat DufjyHutcheon Valuetheory:towardsconceptual
clarification

7. Robin M. Williams, 'The Concept 22. E. H. Epstein, 'Linguistic Orienta-

of Values', in David L. Sills (ed.), The tion and Changing Values in Puerto
International Encyclopediaof the Social Rico', Internat.J. Comparative
Sociol.,vol. 9
Sciences,vol. 16, New York, The Free (March 1968), 61-76.
Press, 1968, pp. 283-7. 23. Milton C. Albrecht, 'Does Litera-
8. Ibid., 286. ture Reflect Common Values?' Amer.
9. Robin M. Williams, AmericanSoc- Sociol. Rev., vol. 21 (December I956),
iety: a sociologicalInterpretation,2nd ed., 722-9.
New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., I960. 24. Richard T. Morris, 'A Typology
I0. Paul Kecskemeti, Meaning, Com- of Norms', Amer. Sociol. Rev., vol. 21
munication and Value,Chicago: University (October 1956), 610-I3.
of Chicago Press, 1952. 25. Ralph H. Turner, 'Value-Con-
I i. Alex Inkeles, 'Personality and flict in Social Disorganization', in
Social Structure', in Robert K. Merton, Seymour M. Lipset and Neil J. Smelser
Leonard Broom and L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), Sociology:the progressof a Decade,
(eds.), Sociology Today, New York, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Harper and Row, 1965, pp. 249-51I. 1961, pp. 522-7.
I2. For example, see Mohammed 26. R. B. Perry, Realmsof Value,Cam-
Guessous, 'A General Critique of Equili- bridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.
brium Theory', in Wilbert E. Moore and 27. Stephen C. Pepper, The Sourcesof
Robert M. Cook (eds.), Readings on Value,Berkeley, University of California
SocialChange,Englewood Cliffs, Prentice- Press, 1958.
Hall, 1967, pp. 23-5. Also, Wilbert E. 28. Florian Znaniecki, Cultural Sciences:
Moore, 'A Reconsideration of Theories of their Origin and Development,Urbana,
Social Change', Amer.Sociol.Rev., vol. 25 University of Illinois Press, I952.
(December I960), 813. 29. R. B. Perry, op. cit., 13.
13. William Kolb, op. cit., 116. 30. Howard Becker, 'Current Sacred-
14. Alvin Gouldner, 'Organizational Secular Theory and its Development',
Analysis', in Merton, Broom and Cottrell in Becker and Boskoff, op. cit., 139.
op. cit., 409. 31. Clyde Kluckhohn, 'Values and
15. Dennis H. Wrong, 'The Over- Value Orientations in the Theory of
socialized Conception of Man in Modern Action: An Exploration in Definition
Sociology', Amer. Sociol. Rev., vol. 26 and Classification', in Talcott Parsons
(April 196I), 183-193. and E. A. Shils (eds.), Towarda General
16. Reinhard Bendix, 'The Image of Theoryqf Action, Cambridge: Harvard
Man in the Social Sciences: The Basic University Press, 1951, pp. 383-433.
Assumptions of Present-Day Research', 32. Florence Kluckhohn and Fred
Commentary,vol. II (February 1951), 187- Strodbeck, Variationsin ValueOrientations,
192. Evanston, Row-Peterson, I96I.
I7. Milton Rokeach, 'Role of Values 33. Rainer C. Baum, 'Values and
in Public Opinion Research', Public Democracy in Imperial Germany', Sociol.
OpinionQuart.vol, 32 (Winter 1968-69), Inquiry,vol. 38 (Spring 1968), I79-96.
547-9. 34. Franz Adler, 'The Value Concept
I8. William Eckhardt, 'The Values of in Sociology', Amer. J. Sociol., vol. 62
Fascism', J. Sociol.Issues,vol. 24 (1968), (November I956), 272-9, and 'A Unit
89-I04. Concept for Sociology', Amer.J. Sociol.,
I9. Ethel M. Albert, 'Values and vol. 65 (January I96O), 356-64-
Value Systems', in David L. Sills, op. 35. Milton Yinger, 'Research Impli-
cit., 287-91. cations of a Field View of Personality',
20. Ibid., 288. Amer.J. Sociol., vol. 68 (March 1963),
21. J. R. Landes, 'Moral Value 580-92.
Structure of Laborers and Penitentiary 36. See Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Atti-
Inmates: A Research Note', Social tudes,and Values,San Francisco, Jossey-
Forces, vol. 46 (December I967), 269-74. Bass, I968, and, by the same author, 'A
186

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Pat Dufy Hutcheon Valuetheory:towardsconceptual
clarification
Theory of Organization and Change Weiss, 'Living Nature and the Know-
Within Value-Attitude Systems', J. ledge Gap', SaturdayRev. (29 November
Social Issues, vol. 24 (January 1968), I969), 19-22, 56.
13-33. 47. Anatol Rapaport, Fights, Games
37. Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, and Debates,Ann Arbor, The University
ValuesandtheFuture,New York, The Free of Michigan Press, I960, p. 252.
Press, A Division of the Macmillan Co., 48. Ibid., 254. Also, see Jerome S.
1969, Io8. Bruner and Leo Postman, 'On the
38. Michael Polanyi, Sciences,Faith and Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm',
Society, Chicago, The University of J. Personality,vol. 18 (December 1959),
Chicago Press, 1964, p. I1I. 206-23.
39. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structureof 49. A. H. Maslow, 'Psychological
Chicago, The Univer-
ScientificRevolutions, Data and Value Theory', in A. H.
sity of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 66. Maslow (ed.), New Knowledgein Human
40. Ibid., 76. Values, New York, Harper, I959, I19-
4I. Michael Polanyi, op. cit., 85-7. 136.
42. Thomas Kuhn, op. cit., 41I. 50. Howard Becker, Through Values
43. Polanyi, op. cit., 85. to Social Interpretation,Durham, Duke
44. Kuhn, op. cit., 62. University Press, 1950, 248-280.
45. Franz Adler, op. cit., (i960), 363- 5'1. For recent additions to this per-
364. spective, see Talcott Parsons, 'On the
46. For an elaboration of the chal- Concept of Value Commitments', Sociol.
lenges facing biology today, see Paul E. Inquiry,vol. 38 (Spring 1968), 135 -6o.

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