Frontispiece :t h demon ofDukkha

IDENTITY
AND EXPERIENCE
The Constitution ofthe Human Being
According to Early Buddhism

SUE HAMILTON

LUZAC
0RIENTAL
 LUZAC ORIENTAL
46 Great Russell Street, London WCI
1996

O Sue Hamilton 1996

ISBN I 898942 10 2

All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, or transmitted in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise without prior permission of the Publishers.

Printed and bound in Great Britain by

Bookcraft (Bath) Limited,
Midsomer Norton, Avon
For Ma, with love and thanks
 CONTENTS

Foreword
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations xiii
Introduction

I. T h e Riipakkhandha
Introduction
The RipaWrhandha
The Senses
Manas and Dhammi

11. T h e VidanZkhandha
Introduction to the AnipaWchandhas
The Vedanaandha
Phassa

SaEEi as Apperception
SaEEa' as Conception

Samkhira in the TilaWd2av Formula

Samkhira in the Paficcasamuppida Formula
SapkhGra as a Khandha
The Cyclic Causal Nexus
VIII Identity and Experience

v. The ViiZEiykkhandha
Vin"n"ipzas a K?zan&a
I . KfiKa'pz as impermanent
2. Kn"n"a'p.zas 'consciousness of
3. Kn"n"iij?aas a factor in cognition
4. Kfifi& as providing continuity
5. Efin"a'pas evolving
Summary
Vin"n"ip~and fiya
Manas and Citta

VIII. The Attitude towards the Body

Conclusion
Bibliography
Short Glossary
General Index
Index of Textual Sources
 Foreword

"WHATARE LITTLE BOYS MADE OFF?",asks the nursery rhyme, and reli-
gious traditions ask the same question. Though the Buddha apparently
denied that the human being contains something called a soul, what he
meant by the denial, or by the word in his language which we translate
"soul", has rarely been scrutinised.
In ancient India the Buddha's teaching was commonly summed up in a
verse which says that he taught "the cause of things which arise from a
cause, and their cessation too." He explained life as a causal process which
normally leads to suffering; salvation can only come from reversing that
process.
The Buddhist texts assert that a human being - indeed, any being living
in our world - has five constituents, one physical and four mental: feelings,
apperceptions, volitions, consciousness. The word for these constituents is
"bundles", to show that they are plural. So it looks at first glance as if the
Buddha was offering two analyses: the static, synchronic analysis of a
person into "bundles", and the dynamic, diachronic analysis into a causal
chain of events.
Sue Hamilton began by asking the nursery rhyme question and
analysed what the texts have to say about the "bundles". She has found an
exciting answer: they are bundles of experiences. On close scrutiny it turns
out that the Buddha did not ask "What is a man?" but "How is man?". For
objects he substituted processes. And his analysis of the human condition
was an integrated whole.
This book is a breakthrough in our understanding of the earliest
Buddhism and offers a firm foundation for future research.

Richard Gombrich
Oxford, March 1995
 Acknowledgements

THISBOOK IS A SLIGHTLY revised version of my Oxford D.Phil thesis.

Though I hope it will be of interest to as wide a readership as possible
given its specialised topic (a brief glossary is given for the assistance of the
more general reader), it is primarily intended to be a contribution to
Buddhist studies. To this end, I hope it will not only answer some
questions and clarify some areas of ambiguity but also stimulate further
questions and on-going research, for myself and for others. As my work on
this subject proceeded, I became only too aware of the size of the task I
had undertaken, and there is considerable scope for adding to the material
gathered together here. This reflects not just the extent of textual
references to this topic but also the centrality of it in the context of the
teachings of the Buddha.
I would add that this book was already tied into publishing schedules
by the time I recently became acquainted with certain relevant issues in
the Western philosophical tradition. An earlier acquaintance with these
might well have clarified my mind and/or prompted me to write (some-
times very) differently on certain points. But the fact that I was not familiar
with them does mean that what is contained herein has not had any
Western philosophical thought projected onto the Buddhist material: I
was not 'looking for parallels'. (That might happen later.) So while any
reader with knowledge of Western philosophy will therefore have to bear
with my ignorance, the parallels that there are can the more eloquently
speak for themselves.
It is a happy custom that writers of books have an opportunity to thank
those who have made a notable contribution, in one way or another, to its
production. In my case, thanks are owed to many. Alexis Sanderson was
an inspiring teacher in the early part of my graduate studies at Oxford.
Richard Gombrich, who supervised my D.Phi1, was an invaluable source
of advice, thought-provoking comments and constructive criticism. The
examiners of the thesis, Lance Cousins and Paul Williams, made useful
criticisms and suggestions, some of which have been incorporated in this
book: any omissions or errors that remain are entirely my own. During the
years of my graduate studies I was fortunate enough to be a member of
XII I d e n t i t y a n d Experience
\tblfson College, Oxford, which provided an incomparable environment
for such an intellectual undertaking, for which I am most grateful. Whilst
there I had the benefit of so many useful and stimulating discussions and
suggestions that the people concerned are too numerous to mention, but I
nevertheless acknowledge my indebtedness.
To two people I owe more than words can say. My daughter, Tanya,
learned a great deal about dukWla when she was uprooted in her early
teens to move to Oxford. She subsequently lived with me not only through
the demands and preoccupations af preparing the thesis in a limited
amount of time but also a further move to London. She has my deepest
love and thanks. My mother, Muriel Anderson, supported me financially,
emotionally and intellectually with generosity, understanding and
selflessness. For me, this has exemplified the beauty and profundity of the
Buddha's teachings and she has my gratitude and respect.

Sue Hamilton
London, 30 March 1995
 Abbreviations

Abh.K.B. Vasubandhu's AbhidhamakoSabh@ya

Ait. Up. Aitarga Upani~ad
AN Aiguttara Nikiya
As Atihasa'lini
Br. Up. Byhadfiranyaka Upanigd
Ch. Up. Chindogya Upani!ad
CPD Critical Pali Dictionary
DA Dzha Niyaghakathti (Surnarigalavil~'n(l
DhA Dhammapadanhakathi
Dhs Dhammasariga*
Dialogues Dialogues ofthe Buddha (translation of the Diiha Nkiya)
DN Diiha Nikiya
ERE Hastings (ed)En~clopediaofRel@on and Erhics
Further Dialogues Furthn Dialogues of the Buddha (SBB translation of the
Majhima Nika'ya)
GS Gradual Sayings (translation of the Ariguttara NiEyu)
J Jitaka
JpTs Journal of the Pali Text Society
KhA X l t u d d a k u ~ i i ~ h a ~(Purumatthajotikai
~W~-
KhP Khuddahpi~a
KS Kindred Sqings (translation of the Samyutta Nik@a)
K. Up. Kaugtah Upani~ad
MA M ~ h i m Nik%iya.tthakat.&
a (Papaiicasiidan~
Miln Milindapazha
MK NagaTiuna's Madhyamakukfiriki
MLS Middle L.agth Sayings (translation of the M e h i m a Nihiya)
MN Majhima Nika'ya
Mt. Up. Maitri UpaniSad
Mund. Up. M u d a k a Upani~ad
PaGs. Pa-hambhidimaga
PED Pali English Dictionary
PTS Pali Text Society
Pug Puggalapaiiiiatti
Pv Petauatthu
PvA Paramatthad@aniVol I V (commentary to Petavatthu)
RV Rg Veda
SA Samy utta Nkiiya#hakathi (Siratthapakririni)
 Identity and Experience
Sat. Br. sotapatha BrZhmayz
SBB Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series
SBE Sacred Books of the East Series
SN Samyutta N i h y a
Sn Sutta Nipita
SnA Sutta JVipCta!!hakathC (Paramatthajotih 11)
Svet. Up. SuettZhatara Upaninnad
Tait. Up. Taittimj,~Upaninnad
Vin Vinaya
Vism Vimda%imaga
YS Patafijali's Yoga SCtras
 Introduction

BUDDHISM HAS OFTEN BEEN SAID to complicate the attempts of scholars of

religious traditions to find common defining characteristics of 'religion'.
One of the difficulties is that unlike all the other major religious traditions
Buddhism does not accept the existence of a creator God. Nor, as is
frequently pointed out, does it accept the existence of an individual self or
soul. Because Buddhism is sometimes described more in terms of a way of
life, some have even asked whether it is simply a philosophy or an ideology.
It is, however, defined as a religion because its central concern is to offer to
human beings salvation from the cycle of earthly existences (samsira),which
is characterised by suffering (duMa).The non-acceptance of a creator God
in a system which offers salvation to human beings is not too problematic:
it can readily be accepted that salvation is achieved through one's own
efforts. The apparent denial of the existence of an individual self or soul
has, however, been found less easy to reconcile with such a notion of
salvation. If there is no self, what is it that is saved?
The apparent denial of the existence of an individual self or soul is con-
tained in what is known as the doctrine of anattii (Sanskrit: anitman), a
teaching which appears, if in somewhat different guises, in all forms of
Buddhism (save perhaps for a few modern hybrid forms). The focus of this
book is a collection of texts known as the Pali canon, the textual basis of
Theravada Buddhism, the only surviving school of the early forms of
Buddhism. The importance and traditional meaning of the doctrine of
anattz for this school is indicated by Malalasekera, a distinguished modern
Theravada Buddhist, as follows:
This is the one doctrine which separates Buddhism from all other religions,
creeds, and systems of philosophy and which makes it unique in the world's
history. All its other teachings .. . are found, more or less in similar forms, in
one or other of the schools of thought or religions which have attempted to
guide men through life and explain to them the unsatisfactoriness of the
world. But in its denial of any real permanent Soul or Self, Buddhism stands
alone. This teaching presents the utmost difficulty to many people and often
provokes even violent antagonism towards the whole religion. Yet this doc-
trine of No-soul or Anatta' is the bedrock of Buddhism and all the other
Teachings of the Buddha are intimately connected with it ... Now, what is
this 'Soul' the existence of which the Buddha denies? Briefly stated, the soul
XVI Identity and Experience
is the abiding, separate, constantly existing and indestructable entity which is
generally believed to be found in man ... it is the thinker of all his thoughts,
the doer of his deeds and the director of the organism generally. It is the lord
not only of the body but also of the mind; it gathers its knowledge through
the gateways of the senses ... Buddhism denies all this and asserts that this
belief in a permanent and a divine soul is the most dangerous and pernicious
of all errors, the most deceitful of illusions, that it will inevitably mislead its
victim into the deepest pit of sorrow and suffering.'

This description of the doctrine of anathi reflects the way it is consis-

tently propounded by Theravada Buddhists, and also the fact that it is tra-
ditionally considered to be the central doctrine taught by the Buddha.
Such a description, however, might prompt one to add two other ques-
tions to that posed above: if there is no thinker of thoughts or doer of
deeds, how does a human being experience suffering? What, indeed, is a
human being according to the Buddha's teaching? The latter of these is
the central question with which this book is concerned. And it is limited to
the human being because it is with the human being that the texts are
concerned: though other living beings such as animals and devas are some-
times mentioned, they are never discussed.
Perhaps because, as Malalasekera points out, it presents the utmost
difficulty to many people, other scholars writing about the human being
in early Buddhism have approached the texts with the aim of understand-
ing the doctrine of anatti. In his much-acclaimed book SeGflessPersons,
Collins, for example, writes that it is his aim:
... to elucidate how it [the anath7 doctrine] appears in the texts, what it
asserts, what it denies, and what it fails to assert or deny; and, perhaps most
importantly, I shall wish to study what role or roles it plays in the varieties
of Buddhist thought and practice, what function or functions it might have
for those who profess allegiance to it and whose religious activity is pat-
terned on it.2
In hisgThe Mind-body relationship in Pali Buddhism: a philosophical
investigationJJ,Harvey states that his intention is to attempt to "under-
stand the full meaning and actual implications of the teaching that 'all
dhammas are anattii"J.3 Harvey's thesis is that consciousness (vi66Zna) is in
effect a conventional self. Both these scholars write about the Theravada
Buddhist tradition as a whole, using as their primary sources not only the
early part of the Pali canon, the Sutta @aka, but also the later, scholastic
Abhidhamma maka, the commentarial tradition and the Ksuddhimagga of
Buddhaghosa, a highly influential Theravada Buddhist who lived in the
fifth century CE, and many other traditionally Theravada texts. Other
scholars have sought to establish that the early texts implicitly teach that
there is an absolutely transcendent non-empirical Self. A recent example
 Introduction XVII

of such work is Perez Rem6nYsbook Seyand ,Won-seyin Ear& Buddhism, in

which he seeks to make "a systematic and complete study of the an at^
doctrine in the five Nihyas".*
Another approach in modern scholarship is exemplified by those who
have concentrated on establishing that the early Pali texts teach an elabo-
rate psychology. For example, this is the aim ofJohansson, in his book The
Dynamic Psychology ofEarb He states his work is "a psychologist's
attempt to understand what the Buddha meant by 'dependent origina-
t i ~ n ' " .Similarly
~ Reat, in his The Orz@nsof Indian Psycholog;y, attempts to
understand the human being in terms of a "theoretical psychology".' For
such scholars, it is the content of the mind that as it were explains the indi-
vidual human being, and, incidentally, the external world. I will be return-
ing to the subject of the status of the external world shortly.
In attempting to answer the question "what is the human being accord-
ing to the Buddha's teachings?", I decided, unlike the authors referred to
above, to focus on the Sutta Pitaka of the Pali canon, principally the four
main Nik@as. These represent the key doctrinal treatises of the earliest
Buddhist material we have. A comprehensive comparison between the
earlier Sutta material and the elaborated and systematised material of the
Abhidhamma and commentaries would undoubtedly be most interesting and
would be a fruitful area for further research, but as a single work it would
necessitate an extremely lengthy book. Perhaps more importantly, I also
wanted to see what the earliest Pali material had to say on the subject
before it was significantly adapted or elaborated as the Theravada tradition
developed. This approach is not so much intended to suggest that there is a
pre-Theravada form of Buddhism as to look at the primary texts without
reference to how the tradition has interpreted them in later material.' In
some circumstances, particularly in chapter I? I have also drawn on the
later Abhidhamma and commentarial material, and on Buddhaghosa's
Ks~&imagga, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Such references
to the later texts are usually by way of confirmation or contrast in
interpreting an ambiguous point. In chapter I, however, it was the notable
shortage in the Sutta Pitaka of references to the subject matter of the
chapter, the khandha of the body, that prompted my consulting the later
material. Chapter VIII draws on later material, particularly that represented
by Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, specifically to illustrate a divergence of
interpretation as the tradition developed.
My approach to the subject was prompted by the Buddha's own con-
cern with the human condition or the human being itself, an orientation
which suggests that understanding the human constitution is important in
the context of following his teachings. Three of the key teachings contained
in the early Suttas illustrate this orientation. The first is perhaps the most
well-known of the Buddha's teachings, the Four Noble Truths. These are
given in terms of understanding the human condition in samsZra. In them
XVII I Identity and Experience
the human condition is diagnosed (the first Noble Truth states that saptZric
existence is unsatisfactory (or suffering) - dukkhag);the cause of the condi-
tion is identified (the second Noble Truth states that the arising of dukkha is
because of desire or craving - tanhi); a prognosis is given (the third Noble
Truth states that the condition is not terminal - the cessation of unsatisfac-
toriness (dukkhanirodha)is possible); and finally a prescription for achieving
dukkhanirodha is given (the fourth Noble Truth teaches the Eightfold Path
which leads to Nirvana,lo a synonym for dukkhanirodha).
The second key teaching is known as the formula of dependent origi-
nation, pa;iccasamuppida. This states that an individual is dependently origi-
nated, the most common version of the formula being given as follows:
Ignorance is the condition for [the arising of] the samkhiiras"
The samkhciras are the condition for [the arising of] co~~sciousness
Consciousness is the condition for [the arising of] ncimari@al2
~Vcimarzipais the condition for [the arising of] the six senses
The six senses are the cohdition for [the arising of] contact13
Contact is the condition for [the arising of] feeling
Feeling is the condition for [the arising of] craving
Craving is the condition for [the arising of] attachment
Attachment is the condition for [the arising of] becoming
Becoming is the condition for [the arising of] (re)birth
(Re)birth is the condition for [the arising of] old age and death.14
This formula gives us a synthetical explanation of how a human being
comes to be born in samsira. Describing how the human being is depen-
dently originated, one might call it a formula of existential mechanics.15
The third key teaching is given by the Buddha in contexts when he is
asked about individual identity: when people want to know 'what am I?',
'what is my real self?'. The Buddha says that individuality should be under-
stood in terms of a combination of phenomena which appear to form the
physical and mental continuum of an individual life. In such contexts, the
human being is analysed into five constituents - the paiicakkhandhi. The five
khandh are body (riipa), feelings (uedani), apperception and conception
(saiiiii), volitional activities (samkhei) and awareness (viiiiiiina).l6
The importance of the first two of these three key teachings is empha-
sised by their formulaic form: formulas were often used as a mnemonic
device in the oral tradition in which the Buddhist teachings took root. The
third teaching is the standard analysis of the human being in a large number
of Suttas. And though the khandha doctrine has usually been associated with
the doctrine of anattii in the specific sense that human beings haue no self but
only five constituent parts (an interpretation to which I will return in the
conclusion), its importance is more positively emphasised by the Buddha's
identification of the five khandhas together - in effect the earthly life of an
indi\.idual - with dukkha.17 Thus the fundamental characteristic of the
 Introduction XIX

human condition as stated in the first Noble Truth is given not just in
descriptive terms but is intrinsic to being human, indicating that the need
to understand the constitution of the human being is crucial to achieving
the goal of Nirvana, given as the cessation of dukkha. Above all, these
teachings indicate that however central the doctrine of anatti is, the
Buddha's concern is most undeniably with the human condition as a
whole, and though consciousness is mentioned in two of them it is given no
more elevated a place than the other parts of the respective teachings.
I therefore chose to approach a study of the human being by looking at the
way the texts describe the ldumdha analysis, with frequent cross-references to
the paticcasamuppida formula.
In all cultures there is some kind of common sense view of what a
human being consists of. In the West, for example, we tend to treat the
human being dualistically, as consisting of body and mind. There is no
consensus, however, about how these relate: major branches of philosophy,
psychology and medicine consist of discussing and investigating how body
and mind interact, and even physicists and mathematicians have joined the
general debate. The situation becomes more complex because Christianity
and other Western religions traditionally believe that in addition to body
and mind, individual human beings have souls, thus making the question of
how each part of the human being relates and interacts more problematic.
Furthermore, many cultures, including popular British culture, allow for
the existence of ghosts, which have human form but do not obey the laws
of matter as they are normally understood.
In view of such diversity just in the contemporary Western understand-
ing of the human being, one cannot assume a priori that any culture will
have a consistent or coherent view of what constitutes a human being. And
it would be particularly inadvisable to make such an a priori assumption of
the Pali canon since it is a body of oral literature which is generally thought
to have come together over time. Accurate oral preservation of literature
had been crucial in the pre-Buddhist Brahmanical tradition in India for
many centuries, and it is not uncommon the world over for the essential
parts of important teachings to have been incorporated into stories, songs,
chants, and so on, in order to preserve them accurately. There is clear
evidence in the Pali canon of such a process of preservation, and we can
thus be fairly sure that much of the Sutta Pitaka is of a very early origin.
Nevertheless, it would have been impossible for any one person, or even
one close-knit group of people, to have preserved all the extant material,
and there is textual evidence that different groups were given the task of
preserving certain sections of the teachings. The Theravada tradition
records that there were periodic councils at which the teachings as a whole
were recited. It was at these councils ( ~ a r i ~ t ithat
s ) the teachings were, over
time, codified. But it is also probable that the teachings were more widely
disseminated in this way: after hearing a complete recitation, a group of
xx Identity and Experience
bhikkhus might have spread topics which it was not strictly their duty to
preserve. So there was much opportunity for variations to be included in
the material. Though the Pali canon as compiled from all its different
sources was written down in approximately 25 BCE, scholars accept that
even after that date changes are likely to have taken place.'* This process of
preservation applies to the Vinaya, in which the bhiWd2u.s' code of discipline is
recorded, and the Sutta Pitaka, which contains the doctrinal teachings. The
Abhidhamma Pi!nka is a later scholastic compilation which deals systemati-
cally and minutely with a wide range of issues in the Buddha's teachings. It
aims to give definitive views on points which might not have been clear in
the earlier material. '"
My study of the Sutta PzPztakdwas undertaken with the initial view that
where various interpretations of apparently inconsistent passages are
equally possible, it would be faulty methodology not to attribute to the texts
the strongest interpretation, that is the most coherent and intellectually
powerful one, given their common doctrinal background. In view of the
way the canonical material was compiled, I nevertheless had little or no
expectation of finding a coherent understanding of the human being and
anticipated that a large part of this work would consist in relating its
inconsistencies. But I found that in the main the inconsistencies lie in
relatively minor matters such as the use of terms. In many instances a term
is used in different contexts with different meanings. Sometimes the
difference in meaning is only subtle and not easy to detect, and sometimes
there is a wide variation in meaning. In his History oflndian Philosophy,
Dasgupta makes the following comment on the fact that terms are used
with different meanings in different contexts:
The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper
philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method
and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some
of the philosophical terms at least are therefore somewhat elastic ...20
In discussing this point, I. B. Horner has suggested that this indicates a
certain insufficiency of terms rather than an unsettled state of philosophical
and psychoIogical terminology by the time the Nikoas came into being.21
But philosophy and psychology were in a far from settled state at the time
of the Buddha's teaching. The philosophical enquiry in the Brahmanical
religion, as recorded in the Brihmanas and the early Upanijads, was a
relatively recent phenomenon, seen as merely supplementary to the
ritualistic sacrificial system. The development took place gradually, and
this is reflected in the early Upani~adrwhich were perhaps extant at the time
of the Buddha. In them we find both the ritual of the Edas and the
speculative beginnings of a psychology based upon the new idea of
salvation as a special kind of knowledge. The systematic use of philosophi-
cal and psychological terminology is far from established, and terms are
 Introduction XXI

used to mean different things in different contexts in much the same way as
they are in the Pali canon.
Another reason for the different use of terms in different contexts is the
fact that the texts are a compilation, as mentioned above. And it is not
unlikely that as the years went by and the Buddha's teachings were given
to an ever wider range of people with different backgrounds, so they had
to be explained slightly differently in order for them to be understood by
those people.22We know, for example, that there were many different
speculative teachings being propounded in the milieu in which the
Buddha lived.13 In particular the Ajivikas and Jains are referred to in the
canonical texts, and others are mentioned in relevant Jain texts. When
teaching such people, the Buddha might well have adopted their terms in
order to communicate with them. And in so doing, it is possible that the
terminology was on some occasions used in what appear to be different
ways but in fact with the same meaning.
So the contexts in which terms are found have to be taken into consid-
eration when attempting to ascertain whether or not their meanings are
different. I have accordingly tried not to explain a term in one context by
taking out of context what is said about it elsewhere and thus arriving at an
inappropriate definition. In order to understand what a given term means
when it is being used in connection with one of the Wlnndhas it is sometimes
necessary also to understand what it means in other contexts. In these cases
I have not hesitated to discuss the other contexts in detail. In spite of this, I
found that in the majority of cases the contexts differ only superficially, and
terms are used with a considerable degree of coherence.
The Buddha's understanding of the constitution of the human being is
best introduced in the light of a brief description of the way the doctrines
and concepts he taught fit into the background in which he was teaching. I
have stated above that the religious milieu in which the Buddha was teach-
ing was a complex one and that the terminology he used was sometimes
varied to take this into account. But the dominant religion was that of the
Brahmans, including both the older Edic sacrificial religion and the rela-
tively new UpanGadic teachings, at least some of which were known to the
Buddha. Others have written about the emergence of Buddhism from its
Brahmanical background in considerable and in several places in
this book I too will discuss at some length the background to a particular
subject in order to gain a better perspective of the way it is understood in
Buddhism. Here, I will suggest in more general terms how those aspects of
the Buddha's teachings that are most crucial to the human condition in
sa?psira correspond to or are different from the Brahmanical religion.
In this respect, the most central doctrine of the Buddha's teaching is
based on his interpretation of the law of karma, a word which literally
means 'action'.25 The notion that karma, or action, brings results was
deeply embedded in Indian religion by the time of the Buddha. In the
XXII Identity and Experience
classical Vedic sacrificial religion, karma is the sine qua non for individual
well-being, for the well-being of society and for the maintenance of the
universe as a whole. The rationale of the entire sacrificial system is the
efficacy of (correctly performed) actions bringing about desired, and
desirable, results. Sacrifices are performed for specific personal benefit in
the short, medium or long term. Such sacrifices can have as their desired
results things such as good health, the birth of a son, good fortune both in
this world and in the next, or the benefit of one's ancestors already in the
next world. Personal ritual duties are also, and more commonly, performed
simply for general wellbeing, again both in this world and the next.
Sacrifices are also performed for the prosperity of the community as a
whole: the performing of the sacrifices serves to please the gods, who not
only grant individual desires but also maintain the universe.
According to the Vedic tradition, sacrificial, or enjoined, actions are
completely self-validating, whether or not a given action has any prima facie
purpose or expected result. Furthermore, the sacrificial rationale works
automatically: the correct performance of ritual actions is as it were a
mechanical device. Though it is said that if the gods are 'pleased' they will
maintain the universe and grant one's desires, in fact their reciprocal con-
tribution is as enjoined upon them by the performance of the sacrifice as
the performing of the sacrifice is enjoined upon the individuals in the
community. The ritual actions of the sacrifice can, therefore, be regarded
as a mechanical and automatic device for bringing about desired results.
In the early Upanijah karma is also of central relevance in the doctrine
of transmigration they espouse. I11 the earlier Vedic material, life after death
could be in one of several different lokas or worlds, the most important of
which are the pityloka, the 'world of the ancestors', and the devaloka, the
'world of the gods'.26Which of these is attained depends on whether or not
sacrifices have been correctly performed, though attainment of the pitrloku
also requires a man to have performed public services and alm~giving.~~
Gradually this belief developed into a system whereby individual existence
was seen in terms of a series of lives. And in the Byhadiiragaku arid Chindo~a
Upanijads we read that the kind of deeds performed in one earthly life will
determine the nature of the next earthly life: good deeds are rewarded with
rebirth in a high status and bad deeds result in a correspondingly
unattractive rebirth.28Though in these passages there is the suggestion of a
difference between the ritual and ethical dimensions of actions, this
differentiation was never developed in the Brahmanical religion; good and
bad deeds are ritual actions which are correctly or incorrectly performed.
The Buddha took for granted the concept of rebirth in a series of lives,
but revolutionised the concept of karma by teaching that karmic conse-
quences accruing to any particular individual are entirely dependent on his
or her mental v01ition.~'He defined karma as follows: "0 bhikkhus, I say
that volition (cetana) is kamma. Having willed, one acts through body, speech
 Introduction XXIII

and th~ught".~' The ethical implications of such a radical interpretation of

a well established principle condition the Buddha's teaching about how
salvation is attained: spiritual progress is frequently described in terms of
moral development, for example, and anything which helps or hinders
progress is described as wholesome and unwholesome (kusala/akusala)
respectively. The Buddha's reinterpretation of the law of karma was also
unlike the ideology of the sacrifice in that it involved the body, or corporeal
faculty of the human being, with the mind, or mental faculties, in an
unprecedented way: having willed, one acts through body, speech and
thought. Though the ritual actions of the Brahmanical religion are said to
bring about desired results, 'will' and 'mind' nevertheless have little or
nothing to do with the efficacy or quality of the action, which depend
entirely on the accuracy with which it is performed. The Buddha's version
of the law of karma also had the profound effect of making the individual
human being responsible for his or her own spiritual progress. Priests, gods
and scriptural injunctions were bypassed by the Buddha and his teaching
was centred on the moral condition (in its broadest sense) of individuals
themselves and how they could bring about their own liberation. Once
again this teaching suggests the importance of understanding how the
human being works.
The contemporary developments in the Brahmanical religion, as
recorded in the Brihmaes and early Upanisads, include the new teaching
that the soteriological path is epistemological. It arose from speculations
about the sacrifice which posited a correspondence between microcosm
(man) and macrocosm (the universe). According to the Upani~ads,the
culmination of the path, mok,ra, is achieved when one knows experientially
that the essence of one's self is identical with the essence of the universe:
itman is Brahman. In the Buddha's teaching, the goal of the path to
liberation, known either as Nirvana or as Enlightenment, is also an
epistemic condition. But in spite of certain similarities, the two traditions
are inherently and crucially different in a way which fundamentally affects
the way they respectively understand the human being.
In stating that liberating knowledge is the realisation that the
transcendent Reality, Brahman, is identical with the individual self, itman,
the Upanisads are ultimately concerned with being, sat. One can see,
therefore, that the question they are thus concerned with is "what is man?"
This would no doubt be the common sense approach to understandingthe
constitution of the human being; it was, indeed, the question I myself
formed when I started my research. But though the Buddha's teachings
also stress the need to 'know thyself ', in contrast to the transcendent self of
the Upanisads he taught liberating knowledge in terms of insight into 'things
as they are', yathibhiitdm. Most importantly, the macrocosmic/microcosmic
correspondence was expressed by the Buddha not in terms of an
ontological identity, but in the fact that all things are dependently
SSK Identity and Experience
originated. By extension, this is applied to his teaching on the law of
karma: one has to understand how one's existence is conditioned by
dependently originated in) one's volitions. For the Buddha, the important
thing is to understand the nature of the human condition and we see that he
emphasises not what things are but how they operate. Given that all things
are dependently originated, he states that it is not fitting to think in the
separative (independent) terms of "This is mine, this am I, this is my self".31
So he does not give us a different answer to the same question "what is
man?" but asks an altogether more sophisticated question: "how is man?"
, b d he sustains this approach systematically throughout his teachings. The
Buddha thus substitutes processes for objects. Primarily, he teaches the
process of attaining Enlightenment as a goal which is achievable if one
understands, and thus is able to overcome or reverse, the mechanics of that
\\.hich is preventing it. Descriptions in the Sutta @aka of the Buddha's own
Enlightenment describe it precisely in such terms: and there is no mention
of his experiencing what he is. And just as this ultimate experience involves
understanding the nature of the human being and how he or she exists in
samsiira, so, my research has found, the Buddha also teaches that the
analysis of the human being into five khandhas is not an analysis of what the
human being consists of, but of those processes or events with which one is
constituted that one needs to understand in order to achieve Enlightenment.
Knowing what the body is, for example, is of relevance only insofar as such
knowledge contributes to an understanding of how it operates in the overall
process of human existence. And we shall see in chapter I that contrary to
what one might expect given that we have 'sense organs', the senses are not
explicitly included in descriptions of the khandha of the body, an omission
which serves to highlight the importance of understanding them in terms of
the process in which they are involved rather than as organs of the body in
the physical sense. Perhaps because our everyday commonsense world
consists very much of what we think of as objects, and our tendency to
want to know what things are, this important point has frequently been
missed even within the Buddhist tradition itself.
One might suggest that the consistency of the Buddha's concern with
processes rather than substance is reinforced by his dismissal of questions
concerning ontological issues. He states that he is only concerned to give
whatever information will assist the individual in attaining liberating
insight, the process whereby one becomes free from the cycle of lives in
s a ~ i mand
, that ontological questions are irrelevant and/or mi~leading.~~
When asked questions which he did not think would be conducive to the
attaining of insight, he refused to answer them. Classically, there are four
'unanswered questions': whether or not the universe is eternal, whether or
not the universe is finite, whether or not that which is the vital principle
Ijiua) is different from the body, and whether after death a tathiigata (an
epithet of the Buddha and the implication is that it means any liberated
 Introduction xxv
being) exists or not, whether s/he exists and does not exist, or whether s/he
neither exists nor does not exist.33In similar vein, a long list of all sorts of
ontological views are refuted by the Buddha in the well-known Brahmajiila
Sutta. Here the implication is that all such views are not just erroneous in
the sense of holding to the wrong ontological view, but erroneous in the
sense that holding to an ontological view is simply the wrong approach to
the solution of the problem of bondage to samsiira. This point is further
supported by the fact that the having of 'views' (di!!hi) is sometimes stated
to be one of the Gavas, the most binding and deeply entrenched of all mis-
placed tendencies needing to be 'rooted out'.
All of this suggests that questions about what cannot be experienced as
part of the empirical human condition are considered to be speculative. In
refusing to answer such questions the Buddha has left the way open for
what one might call the nihilists and eternalists of all times and places,
Buddhists and scholars alike, to continue to speculate about whether or
not there really is a soul, and whether it is extinguished at death or persists
on some transcendent, non-empirical, level. But in the context of the early
Buddhist texts such speculations are pointless. First, they are destined to
remain speculative. In common with most religious texts, there is much in
the Sutta Pi!aka that is open to subjective interpretation. Thus both nihilists
and eternalists of every persuasion can find what they believe to be sup-
port for their theories. Second, and more importantly, in running directly
counter to the Buddha's teaching that it is not conducive to insight, onto-
logical speculation does not assist in one's attempt to understand the
teaching he gave, which was intended to be conducive to insight.
However, the question of ontology continues to arise in the scholarship
of early Buddhism. In particular, several ambiguous passages in the Pali
material have been interpreted as suggesting an idealistic ontology, like the
one formulated by the much later Buddhist school of Vijiianavada. This
development perhaps corresponds to the fact that there are passages which
suggest idealism in the Upani;ads and this ontology was later attributed to
them wholesale by Sankara and other Advaita Vedantins. The debate
about canonical passages which are ambiguous in this way recurs several
times in this book, and we shall see that in every case much depends on
how a passage is interpreted. An example of how differently a passage can
be interpreted can here be drawn from the Diiha NikcZya. In translating the
Pali ajhattam nipa-safifii eko bahiddha ri$~iiniparsati,~~
Johansson gives: "When
somebody experiences forms inside himself, he will see forms outside ..."
and writes of it: "The objective world, according to Buddhism, is no
different from the experienced world: it simply consists of the subjective
world projected by our mind ...".35But the passage can be translated and
interpreted differently, as follows: "One who apperceives a visible feature of
himself [likewise] sees visible features of others". This translation follows
the convention found in some contexts in the Sutta PiGaka, usually those
XXVI Identity and Experience
concerned with meditation, of using the terms ajhattam and bahiddhi,
'internal' and 'external', to refer to oneself in contrast to others. In the
Satipa!/za'na Sutta, for example, which contain descriptions of key medita-
tion exercises to be practised by bhikkhus, these terms are used to indicate
that the meditation exercises are to be practised both on one's own physical
and mental faculties and also on those of others.36The purpose is to realise
that one's nature is the same as the nature of anyone else. Even if in the
Diiha JVihya passage the term bahiddhi is interpreted simply as 'external', so
far as I am aware there is no convention in the Sutta @aka of qjhattam being
used as part of a psychological term to indicate an 'internal picture'. So in
my opinion it is unlikely that this passage was intended to have the
implications which Johansson reads into it. Rather, it suggests to me that
one sees that both one's own and external (be they of other individuals or
not) visible parts are of like nature. This is the more likely because the
context of the passage is one in which the various insights which come with
meditation are described. One of the most important insights for a bhikkhu
to achieve is that all things are of like nature, not whether or not the
external world is a projection of his mind.
Another frequently found term, loka, which literally means 'world', is
similarly ambiguous. This is a very important term and its use warrants
careful consideration. The nature of the human being is so fundamental
to the Buddha's teaching that a common metaphor for the life of an indi-
vidual is 'the world', loka. Failure to understand this metaphor has led
some to conclude that 'the world is not real', 'the world only exists in our
minds', and so on. But what appear to be ontological statements in fact
metaphorically relate to the subjective experience of the individual, and it
is invalid to extend the metaphor into a statement that the world is that
subjective experience.
The metaphorical use of the term loka pre-dates the Buddha's teaching.
Though in both Sanskrit and Pali the term loka does have the conventional
meaning 'world', even in the earlier sacrificial religion of the Brahmans its
meaning was not limited to the external world. According to Gonda, the
Sanskrit word loka has an "inherent vag~eness".~' It does not necessarily
indicate a spacial location but often means a state of happiness or stability.
Gonda traces the changing meaning of the term, and states that its earliest
meaning is a "free, open space" or a "safe, sacred space".38This concept
was of particular importance to the early Aryan settlers in India because of
the religious significance in early Indo-European culture of clearings, forest
glades and so on. Thus in the sacrifice a sacred space is constructed to rep-
resent the desired loka in this world and the next. In this way the term also
became associated with cosmological planes (desired lokas), which tend to
be interpreted s p a ~ i a l l yBut
. ~ ~the association of security and happiness
with the sacred space becomes extended metaphorically so that in fact the
desire to 'gain a loka' in this world (through sacrifice) and/or the next does
 Introduction XXVII

not just refer to the spacial location but to the individual's state of security
and happiness. So there are two principal meanings of lo&, the one spacial
and the other psychological.
The way the term loka is used in the Sutta Pi.taka is perhaps an extension
of this meaning of lo& in the Brahmanical religion. Here, too, it is used to
indicate cosmological levels. But metaphorically it is intended to indicate
the individual's subjective experience in samscira. This is most clearly
indicated in the K?zandha Samyutta, which is primarily concerned with the
analysis of the individual in terms of the five khandhas. Here we read that
the five khandhas together comprise a "phenomenon which is a world in the
The context is one in which the Buddha states that he has no
quarrel with the world (ngham l o h a vivadgmz) or with some of the teachings
of other teachers in the world (lokepagditi). But he wants to establish a
teaching which is not given by those other teachers, that of the five
khandhas, which he has thoroughly penetrated and realised (abhisambujhati
abhisametz). There is no suggestion in this passage that in associating the
term loka with the Wlandhas the Buddha wishes to deny the existence of the
external world. Rather, he is unconcerned with its status and concentrates
on passing on his understanding of the Wlandhas.
This metaphorical sense of loka is also suggested by the fact that it is used
in similar contexts to the term dukkha. As we have seen, the Buddha taught
that sapsciric existence is characterised by dukkha, unsatisfactoriness. And
that duWcha refers to the individual's sa?psiiric experience is confirmed by the
Buddha's definition of dukkha as being the five khandhas of which the
individual is comprised, as we have also seen. Frequently, teachings are
said to lead to the "ceasing of this entire mass of un~atisfactoriness''.~' This
means to the point where the individual, who persists with five khandhar
being reborn in samscira, achieves liberation. And that loka is being used in
the same way is illustrated in the Nidiina Samyutta of the Samyutta Nibya,
where two consecutive Suttas are the same save for the fact that in the
second Sutta loka is substituted for d~kkha.~* In the Suttas, the Buddha states:
I will teach you, bhikkhus, how dukkha/loka arises and how it ceases ... Visual
consciousness arises because of sight and (visible)objects (and so on through
all the senses); contact is the combination of the three; feeling is conditioned
by contact; craving is conditioned by feeling. This, bhikkhus, is the arising of
dukkha/loka,
The cessation of dukkha/loka comes about when the craving which is
normally conditioned by feeling no longer occurs: when craving utterly
fades away and ceases, then grasping, becoming, birth, and cyclic exis-
tence in samsgra cease.45
If one takes the first part of these passages out of context they can be
construed to be stating that both dukkha and the world arise as part of
one's psychological experience of perception. In other words, an idealist
XXVIII Identity and Experience
might conclude from this that the world has no external reality, that it
only exists in our perception. But if one considers the context in full, the
terms dukkha and loka are in fact associated with the life of an individual
and the Suttas are describing the process by which craving (ta*) brings
about continued becoming, rebirth, and so on, and it is through the cessa-
tion of craving that continued rebirth ceases. It is this individual 'world'
(loka) of the individual, sometimes called dukkha, that is the subject of these
passages, not the arising of the 'world' in general terms.
A similar passage in the Ariguttura Nikiiya states: "It is these five types of
sensual desire that are called the world in the discipline of the noble one".+'
The five types of sensual desire are identified with five corresponding
senses, and the passage continues by stating that a bhikWlu is to become
detached from sensual desire and practise appropriate meditation. When
he eventually sees that his Zsavas are completely destroyed, he "is said to
have come to the end of the world, he lives at the end of the world, he has
overcome attachment in the In stating that the five types of
sensual desire are called the 'world' of the noble one, this passage indicates
that loka is a verbal convention to indicate sarpsiiric existence which is fuelled
by desire. When the bhikkhu has achieved the destruction of the isavas, this,
for him, is the end of the cycle of rebirth, the end of 'his world'.
As a final example of this meaning of loka, I will draw on a passage in
the Safiyatuna Samyuttu, where we read:
BhzMhus, I declare that the end of the world is not to be learned, seen, or
attained by going to the end of the world. Nor do I declare, bhikkhus, that
the end of dukWla can be made without attaining the end of the world.&
Here one does not 'go to' the end of the world, but 'attains' the end of
the world. Loka has no spacial connotation, as it would if it referred to the
'external' world, but is a designation for the ending of the individual's
saciiric existence, duk-kha. Later in the same Sutta, the individual's 'world' is
again defined in terms of the senses. It is because of the craving that we
have for sensual experience that our 'world' has continued existence: this
is how the individual continues, not what the external world is.
Two points arise from the foregoing discussion. The first point is that
these passages and the possible interpretations I have shown illustrate the
need for ambiguous passages to be interpreted in the light of the material
as a whole. Those of us whose work lies primarily in attempting to under-
stand questions of a philosophical or doctrinal nature have to ask ourselves
which of the possible translations is the more likely given the doctrinal
background of the Buddhist teachings. With regard to ambiguous passages
which have potentially ontological implications, we have to ask ourselves
the prima facie question of whether it is likely that the Buddha would have
made such ontological statements. If we answer no to this question, then
we have to consider both whether a passage has an alternative meaning
 Introduction XXIX

and whether the ontological statements of others are incompatible with his
teachings. The second point is that I am in no way attempting to refute an
ontological position that other scholars have adopted because I wish to
adopt another one. I merely think that in view of the fact that the Buddha
clearly dissociates his teachings from anything to do with ontology, it is a
mistake to project any ontological significance onto the text.
I would like to make one further comment here about the fact that my
research has shown that the Buddha's teaching on what comprises the
human being is consistently focussed not on the substance of the
constituent parts but rather with what their function is and how they
contribute to the complex of human functions. In considering what are
usually called 'body' and 'mind', this important point has to be borne in
mind. The words body and mind have substantialistic connotations in
English. Though corresponding terms are used in the early Buddhist mate-
rial we will be considering, I shall suggest that such terms are a convenient
verbal convention and that they carry no substantialistic or ontological
implications. Returning to a brief example given above, this point is partic-
ularly important when considering the riipakkhandha, which refers to the
living body. It is analysed in terms of four 'elements', earth (patham), water
(Zpo), fire (40)
and air or wind (vgu). Though in the West one might tend to
think of the human body as what we would call 'matter', according to the
Buddha's teaching these elements are, rather, intended to signify that it is
analysed according to certain abstract qualities which characterise how the
body manifests. The characteristics of solidity and extension (the primary
characteristics of 'matter') are signified by the element earth. Fluidity is sig-
nified by water, heat by fire, and mobility by wind. We shall see more corn-
prehensive descriptions of the elements in chapter I, but my purpose in
commenting on this subject here is to alert the reader to the implications of
an analysis of the human being which is given not in terms of what he or
she consists of but in terms of how he or she operates.
A large part of the third volume of the Sarfl~utta Nikya, itself entitled the
mandha- Vaga, consists of the Khandha Samyutta, which exhaustively discuss-
es the five Wlandhas. Used in this way, the term Wlandha is distinctively
Buddhist, not being found in the earlier 'Vedic literature except in the sense
of 'trunk'. Most frequently, the h n d h are referred to by name without
giving any explanation as to what the name means or implies; where
descriptions are given, these are sometimes so brief that it is difficult defin-
itively to ascertain the precise characteristics and functions of each one.
Nevertheless it is possible to extract from the material as a whole a coher-
ent picture of each of the Wlandhas. No reason is given for the order of the
khandhas, which is virtually always in the order in which I will discuss them
below: &!pa, vedanii, saCfiZ, sarpkhiira and ~in"Cii;?a.~~
With regard to the first of
these, the rfipakhandha, this presents certain organisational complications
in that cross-references between material relevant to understanding it and
xxx Identity and Experience
material relating to the other four khandhas are not necessarily self-
explanatory until the later chapters have been read. For this reason, some
readers may find it helpful to delay reading the first chapter until they
have read chapters two to five.
Having discussed the five khandhas, I will then go on to discuss two
other key concepts with regard to the constitution of the human being,
niimanipa and manomaya. The former frequently occurs in association with
vin"n"iipzand is one of the links in the padccasamuppiida formula. The latter is
one of the most obscure terms found in the Sutta Pi!aka, but consideration
of what it means throws light on the manner in which the human being
exists as he or she progresses on the spiritual path to liberation. It also
illustrates the power of the mind according to Buddhist teachings. In the
light of this, in my final chapter I shall show that there is no justification
for holding the body to account for originating the volitions which bind
one to the cycle of rebirth.

Notes

Malalasekera, 1957, p.33f.

Collins, 1982, p.5.
Harvey, 1981, XI.
PCrez Remon, 1980, p.2.
Johansson, 1979.
Ibid., p.7.
Reat, 1990, p.8.
Though I am aware this approach is somewhat controversial (cf:, tbr example, Collins,
1990; and it is also an unwelcome approach in other religious traditions), it can neverthe-
less produce interesting, and in my opinion valuable, results.
Dukkha is notoriously difficult to translate literally into English. 'Suffering' is often used,
but can be misleading if understood in a narrow sense. 'Unsatisfactoriness' is more appro-
priate in that it conveys that all things are ultimately unsatisfactory because they are
impermanent - and therefore if one is seeking the permanence of ultimate bliss (or the
ultimate bliss of permanence) then the human condition is, by contrast, suffering. cf: the
Glossary entry and Rahula, 1985, chapter 2.
The Sanskrit word Nirvana has been integrated into the English language so I shall not
italicise it. When translating direct fiom Pali, I will use nibbiina.
T h e meaning of sa&-ra is discussed in chapter N.
T h e term niimanipa is discussed in detail in chapter VI.
This means contact between the sense organ and its corresponding external sense oh-ject,
together with consciousness. It is discussed further in chapter 11.
Amji-paccyii samkhiiri, saykhira-paccayi mn'iiiipam, ViirCipz-pmcayI ndmarzipam, niimunipa-pa-
cay6 sa.@yatanam, sahyatana-paccayii phmo, phhasra+accgii vedanii, vedanii-paccayi tap%, tafihi-
paccayi upidinam, upidiina-paccayi bhavo, bhava-paccayii jiti, jiiti-paccayi jariimarapzy. e.g.
SN.II.25 and throughout the 8idina Samyutta. All translations are my own unless otherwise
stated.
I will discuss this purpose, and the varieties, of the formula more fully in chapter N.
These translations are all discussed in fbllowing chapters.
Samkhittena pa6c' up~idinakkhandlzidukkhi: e.g. SN.v.421; MN.I.48; AN.1.177. cf'. also
SN.111.158: Katamaii ca bhikkhave dukkham? Paiic' upidc7nakkhandhii ti 'sra vacangam. This ques-
tion and answer in SN.111.158 is referred to again in chapter vnI below. cf. also Gethin,
1986, p.41.
 Introduction XXXI
O n the subject of the compilation of the Pali canon see Frauwallner, 1956; Lamotte, 1958;
Ziircher, 1962, and Cousins, 1983.
The precise chronology ofall parts of the three Pitakas is unknown, and there appear to be
small areas of possible correspondence of style in late sections ofthe Sutta P i g h and early
sections of the Abhidhamma Pibka. But in general terms the Abhidhamma is later.
Dasgupta, 1975, p.86, n.1.
Horner, MLS, Vol. I, p.xxv.
Mannt (1990) has analysed much of the material in the Jvihyus and shown that different
passages have a different, usually didactic, purpose.
See, for example, the Po~?hpGda Sutta, the Brahmajila Sutta (both DN, Vol I), etc.
For example, Gombrich, 1988, chapters 2 and 3; Collins, 1982, Part I; Reat, 1990,pmsim.
Again, the Sanskrit word karma has been integrated into the English language so I will not
italicise it. When translating fiom the Pali, I will use kamma.
cf: Collins, 1982, p.45ff on existence after death in the Kdas.
Ch. Up. V.10.3.
Br. Up. IV.4.5; Ch. Up. 5.10.7. This teaching is repeated in later U p a n i ~ a such
h as K. Up.
1.2; Katha 5.7; vet. Up. 5. 11-12.
Gombrich (1988, p.67flt) places the Buddha's ethicising ofthe law of karma in its historical
context.
AN.111.415: Cetani'ham bhikkhave kammam vadimi. Cetayitvi kammam karoti hyena vdti mana.si.
For example, MN.I.2321. Etam mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me atti ti.
cf:, fbr example, SN.II.223, V.437; MN.I.395; DN.111.134K
MN.1.157. cf: also the Cfib-Milu+asutta (MN.I.426@, the Ayiikutu Samyutla (SN.IV.37qff)
and the Am'-Vacchayottasuttu (MN.I.483fl) (much of the last two are phrased as a series of
questions and answers).
DN.111.260.
Johansson, 1979, p.83.
MN.I.5gff; DN.II.290 ff.
Gonda, 1966, p.110 and par.vim; cf: also Collins, 1982, p.45K
Gonda, 1966, pp.1-41.
Collins (1982, p.45 f?) discusses the three principal l o h : the piploka, the devaloka and the
s&Gm loka.
SN.111.139:Loke lokadhammo.
Evam ekrua h a h a dukkhakkhandhasra nirodho hotiti.
SN.11.71 ff.
DukkJtaua/loka.ua bhikkhaue .samudayaiica attharigamaficade~iwtimi... . Cakkhum ca p a k a ripe ca
uppajati cakkhuvifiiiii~mt i e m ~atigatiph,hasro pharrapaccayi vedani vedantipaccayi ta&-. Ayam kho
bItikkI2~vedukkhura/lokma .ramudayo. TadtCrya ascsaviriiganirodhi updinanirodho ... .
AN.IV.430: Pafica' ime ... kiirnaguni anyaua vinaye loko ti vuccati.
AN.IV.4311. BltWtu ...pafiii@a c' ara disvi iZraviiparikkJz@iihonti. Ayam uuccati ... bhikkhu lokwa
antam Egamma l o h r a ante uiharati tinm loke vtsattikan ti.
SN.IVg3: Niham bhikkhuvegamanena lokassa antum Eitayyam datfiayyam pattayyan ti vadimi. Nu ca
paniltam bltikkltave apatvi l o h a antam dukkhaua antukinyam vadcimi ti.
They are fbund with samkhlra and u i f i i l i ~having changed places at sN.1.112: Ripam
uedayitam saiitiam vin"fiipamyaficasamkhatam ... . This is, however, the first two lines o f a verse,
and the change in order (and the use of samkhata rather than samkhira) is in order to
conform to the .doh metre. The interchangeability of sqkhata and samh-ra is discussed in
chapter IV.
 CHAPTER I

T h e Riipakkhandha

Introduction

IN THIS CHAPTER, M Y CONCERN is with the body of the human being,

referred to as the ripakkhandha. Having selected the earliest part of the Pali
canon, the four main Nihyas of the Sutta Pitaka, as my source material for
this study of the khandhas, however, an immediate problem presents itself
which needs to be dealt with at the outset. In this early stratum of the texts
there is a notable lacuna in the information we are given about the human
being, a lacuna that at first sight appears to lie in the descriptions of the
riipakkhandha. From the two types of definitions of the riipakkhandha that we
are given one can draw out an overall view of how the Wlandha is meant to
be understood. Though relatively brief, this overall view is in some crucial
respects very informative, as we shall see. But as one proceeds to reading
canonical descriptions of the four ariipakkhandhas (ariipa refers to the four
that are not riipa) one sees with hindsight that an important and frequently
mentioned feature of the human being has not anywhere been explained.
This feature is the senses. All the ariipakkhandhas are subdivided according to
the senses, thus stressing their important role, but they are neither
considered actually to be part of the anipakkhandhas nor are they mentioned
at all in descriptions of the nipakkhandha. When later Theravada Buddhists
realised the importance of the senses, and attempted to redress the lacuna
in the descriptions of the khandhas, they included the senses in the
rzipakkhandha. In view of this, it seems appropriate to discuss the senses in
this chapter, and where necessary I have drawn quite extensively on com-
mentarial texts and parts of the Abhidhamma, notably the Dhammasanga@and
its commentary the Atthasalini, and the fibhanga. In so doing, I have been
guided (perhaps limited) by a desire not to arrive at a definitive view of the
rzipakkhandha as understood by the (later) Abhidhamma tradition, but to
suggest an overall picture of how the rzipakkhandha and the senses might be
understood that is compatible both with the brief definitions found in the
Sutta Pitaka and with other aspects of the human being described in later
chapters.
2 Identity and Experience
To this end, my discussion of this khandha will be structured as follows. In
the first part of the chapter, the definitions of rEpa as given in the Sutta Waka
will be discussed, including a consideration of the terms 'primary' (no-updq
and 'secondary' (upida')as used in this context. The discussion will also
cover the so-called 'elements', the mahiibhiiti, as briefly referred to in the
Sutta @aka and more elaborately in later material. The second part of the
chapter will concentrate on a specific discussion concerning the senses.
Recognising their importance, the Theravada tradition as a whole (that is
the Abhidhamma, commentaries, Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga and the
writing of modern Theravada Buddhists) singles out the senses and their
corresponding objects (collectively referred to as eatanas) in defining the
'secondary' level of the riipamandha (which itself is not defined in the Sutta
Pitaka). In spite of this, the attempt here to gain a meaningful under-
standing of the senses,has not been an easy one. As we shall see, even the
Abhidhamma is inconsistent in its descriptions. Though it defines them at
times as nipa, at other times it describes them in a way which suggests they
are not riipa. In the light of such ambiguity, I shall question just what it is
that is being referred to when the senses are mentioned in the Sutta Pitaka.
Not only do descriptions of each of the four ariipakkhandhas state that the
senses (or their objects) determine the different kinds of activity the Wlandha
represents, as I have said, but the senses are also one of the links in the
chain of the paticcmmupp2da formula which describes how the functioning
of a human being is dependently originated. I also referred in the
Introduction to passages which state that the ongoing existence of the indi-
vidual, his or her loka, is caused by desire based on the senses. The
Theravada Buddhist tradition, and many scholars of Buddhism, have
understood that where the senses are said to determine the different kinds
of activity of the ariipakkhandhas, they are the physical bases of the corre-
sponding mental activities. But I find this unsatisfactory: if the physical
sense organs are meant, one might expect them to be included in a descrip-
tion of the riipakkhandha in the Sutta Pi!aka, particularly in view of the fact
that they are subsequently mentioned, but not classified, in the descriptions
of each of the ariipakkhandhas. I shall suggest a way they might be
understood to be neither riipa nor arzipa, thus explaining why they are not
included in the khandha analysis in the Sutta Pitaka.
In Buddhism, and in other Indian religions also, it is common that the
senses include the five which are common to us in Western culture and also
a sixth sense, manas, the corresponding object of which is dhammi. The term
manas literally means 'mind', and as such appears qualitatively different
from the other senses. Perhaps because of this, it remains uniquely ambigu-
ous as a sense, throughout the Pali material. Nor is it immediately obvious
what dhammi refers to. Neither is explained in the Sutta maka, but in the
Abhidhamma and commentaries they are classified as eatanas, a term which
covers all the senses and their objects (thus giving a total of twelve gatanas).
 The Riipakkhandha 3
But in spite of the fact that the other (five) senses and their corresponding
objects (that is, those ten of the liyatanas) are clearly defined as 'secondary'
riipa, neither manas nor dharnrnii is defined as being riipa, or at least not
consistently so. The lack of clarity is compounded because the A~?hasiilin< the
commentary on the Dhamrnasariga@,contains what one might call a 'theory
of sense' (if an imperfect one) in the context of a description of riipa, but it
omits manas and dharnrnii from this theory. In fact both terms have a multi-
tude of meanings in the Pali material and, in my opinion, they have never
been adequately understood in the context of sense and corresponding
object, either by the Buddhist tradition or by modern expositors. In view of
the role of all six of the senses as determining the sixfold classification of
each of the ariipakkhandhas, it is important to establish how manas and
dharnrnii might best be understood and what the function of manas is before
we go on to consider those ariipakkhandhas. The concluding part of this
chapter will therefore be a discussion of these two terms.

The riipakkhandha

Apart from the specific context of the riipakkhandha, the term riipa is found
in two other contexts in the Pali canon which are relevant and need brief
mentioning here. First, it is the term which refers to the sense object
(riipQatana) which corresponds to the sense organ 'eye'. Here the criterion
of visibility dominates and it has the general meaning of 'visible object'. In
such contexts the literal meaning of the Pali word riipa, 'form', which in
common usage usually means shape or appearance, is most relevant.
Second, it is also frequently found in the compound niirnariipa. This literally
means 'name and form', but has also been interpreted as 'mind and body'.
The meaning of niirnariipa is discussed separately in chapter VI.When used
in the expression riipakkhandha, riipa is often understood through its literal
meaning (form) to refer to the shape or appearance of the human being,
that is the physical body. In this way the terms riipa and ariipa have usually
been understood to imply a distinction between 'body' and 'mind' respec-
tively. We shall see, however, that though riipa refers to the body, this is not
just in physical terms, and its shape or appearance, while clearly relevant as
visible object, riipQatana, is not an important factor in understanding the
riipakkhandha.
In the Sutta Pitaka there are two main kinds of description of the
riipakkhandha: the simple and general description, which gives us minimal
information, and the detailed and specific description, from which we get a
more comprehensive account of what the khandha comprises. The simple
descriptions are just two, both being found in the Khandha Samyutta of the
Samyutta Nikliya.' The first occurs, so far as I am aware, only once. But it is
picked up repeatedly by the later commentarial tradition. The second
4 Identity and Experience
constitutes a common formula used throughout the Pali material to define
riipa, and is of considerably more interest to us here. We shall see in the
comprehensive descriptions of it that the term epa also refers to a general
category, described as 'external', suggesting an overlap between the 'form'
characteristics of the body (@pakkhandha) and those of visible objects in
general (rii!p@atana).But both types of analysis of riipa indicate that the term
primarily refers to the body, in accord with the Buddha's central concern
with the human being.
The context in which the first simple analysis is given in the aandha
Samyutta is when the Buddha is teaching that none of the five khandhas con-
stitutes anything that should be thought of as a permanent, unchanging
'self', in this life or in any previous life. Each of the khandhas in turn is
briefly defined, and then each is discussed in a way which illustrates their
impermanence. The riipakkhandha is defined as follows:
And why, bhikkhus, is it called body? It suffers, bhikkhus. That is why the
word 'body' is used. Suffersfrom what? Suffersfrom cold and heat, from
hunger and thirst, from contact with gnats, mosquitoes, wind and sun and
snakes. It suffers, bhikkhus. That is why it is called body.2
The verb I have translated here as 'suffers', in order to draw out the
meaning of this passage, is ruppati. It is because of the use of this verb here
that this description is repeatedly referred to by the commentarial tradi-
tion, and by Buddhaghosa in his fiuddhimag;ga. Ruppati is taken by the tra-
dition as a pun on riipa, though etymologically ruppati has absolutely no
connection with riipa. And in spite of a similar lack of etymological link the
punning is also extended to ncma, which, as mentioned above, is frequently
found twinned with riipa in the compound niima~iipa.~ So in Pali the play on
words reads as follows: Namanalakkhayzm niimam ... ruppanalakkhpam
Discussing ruppati, Woodward, the translator of the Xhandha Samyutta for the
Pali Text Society, suggests that rutpati as a pun on riipa could be taken to
mean that body is embodied, form is in-formed, shape is ~ h a p e dLiterally,
.~
however, ruppati means 'to be destroyed', 'to be vexed' or 'to be oppressed'.
In Sanskrit, rupyate means 'to suffer violent pain', and by the r/l alternation
it is closely related to lupyate, 'to be broken' or 'to be de~troyed'.~ By exten-
sion one can understand ruppati simply as 'suffers', being analogous with
dukkha (so the definition might better read: "It is characterised by unsatis-
factoriness (dukkha)").This, surely, is the point that is being made by the use
of the verb: such etymologising was, typically, for didactic reasons. This
point has been completely missed by Mrs Rhys Davids, who suggests
translating ruppati as 'affected'. Woodward follows this, though he points
out in a footnote that he prefers 'afflicted'.' The latter is surely more
appropriate, being in accord with the fact that riipa is associated with
dukkha, which in turn is in accord with the Buddha's definition of duk-kha,
representing the individual's existence in sa~siira,as the khandhas. And
 The Rfipakkhandha 5
though it is the riipakkhandha which is defined in terms of affliction, the Sutta
goes on to state that one identifies mistakenly with each of the khandhas as
part of samstZric existence and that one is to become detached from each
and every one of them. The explicit association of nipa alone with affliction
is primarily because nipa lends itself to this pun. But an individual's life
in samsiro also tends to be predominantly associated with the body. Not
only is it the physical presence of an individual, but as such it is the vehicle,
so to speak, of his or her experience in a given life. It is therefore dispro-
portionately associated with samsiinc existence to the point where it is seen
to be 'responsible' for the affliction of dukkha. This point is more compre-
hensively discussed in chapter VIII.
The second and perhaps the simplest analysis of riipa is frequently found
in the Pali material and represents the standard simple analysis not only of
the riipakkhandha but also, as we shall see, of nipa in general (that is, whether
the body of the human being or of any other visible object). The context in
the Khandha Samyutta from which I am quoting is another in which the
Buddha is teaching that the human being should be understood in terms of
five khandhar, and that none of these constitutes a permanent, unchanging
self: one is to become detached from each of them. Here nipa is analysed
into the four great elements and whatever is derived from them: "And
what, bhikkhur, is the body (%pa)?It is the four great elements and whatever
physical thing is derived from the great elements: this, bhikWlus, is called the
b ~ d y " .The
~ four great elements (collectively known as the cattciro
mahiibhiitii(ni), or less specifically as dhztus) are: earth (pathavt-dhiitu),water
(5'0-dhiitu),fire (tgo-dhiitu) and wind (vtZyo-dhiitu). In some contexts a fifth
element, 'space' (iika), is mentioned: but in contexts where riipa is specifi-
cally being defined only the cattiiro mahabhgtii are mentioned. In the
cornrnentarial tradition, these are explicitly understood to have the abstract
meanings solidity, fluidity, heat and motion. In the Sutta maka, such
abstract meanings are only implicit, though in the more detailed descrip-
tions of each of the elements the implication is quite clear. It is the abstract
meanings of the elements which suggest how they are applicable both to
the riipakkhandha of the human being and also to anything else that has
form, explicitly described as the 'internal' and 'external' dimensions of $pa
in canonical passages which explain each of the four elements in turn.1°
The abstract meanings of the four elements also serve to indicate that the
notion of 'matter' is purely conventional here. Rather, rCpa refers to the
occurrence of various states or processes, collectively referred to as the
'body' (or visible object), which are characterised in a certain way." It is
only by virtue of a state or process having the characteristics of solidity or
extension that it can be described as 'matter', and the riipakkhandha is not
limited to this single characteristic.
In the Sutta Pitaka, the four elements are said to be 'primary'. The term
used for this is no-upiidii, which has two literal meanings: 'underived' and
6 Identity and Experience
'not clinging or grasping'. The former does not in any way compromise the
teaching that there is nothing in samsiira that is unconditioned. Indeed, we
read in a passage about Nirvana, which ir referred to as the unconditioned,
that it is without the four elements, a confirmation of the conditioned nature
of the four elements themselves: "Monks, there exists that condition
[Nirvana] wherein is not earth nor water nor fire nor air.. .".l 2 Anything to
which analysis in terms of the four elements is applicable, therefore, is part
of conditioned existence. The meaning 'underived' refers, rather, to the
fact that these four elements cannot be further broken down or analysed in
the way that, for example, a foot or a hand, both of which are complex
organs with more than one function, can be broken down or analysed to
the point where it is seen that they consist of an aggregate of elements. Put
abstractly, a complex organ is an aggregate which has characteristics that
are signified by more than one type of element. In this unaggregated sense
no-upidi means 'underived'. The latter meaning, 'not clinging or grasping',
suggests that rzipa has an underived state that is not the product of grasping.
In the context of the nipakkhandha, this is not explained any further, but the
similar term anupidi is regularly found in other contexts in the JVikZyas in
the sense of not having any more of the fuel (grasping) necessary for
rebirth, not clinging to the world. It is grasping, more usually called
volition, which leads to continued rebirth, continued human existence. In
the light of this, no-upid5 nipa means 'primary' in that it has not (yet) been
firthm conditioned by intention.13In the Atthasilinc the commentary on the
Dhammasanganf of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, this point is made explicitly:
"Upda means 'it grasps'; this means grasping the [four] great elements; not
letting (them) go, such (secondary/derived forms) exist depending on
them".14 This all suggests that the cattiro rnahzbhziti are as it were the
potential states from which the body, conditioned by one's karma
(intention), is derived; or, put differently, they represent the potential
characteristics of the body.
As well as no-upidi, rzipa is also described in the Sutta Pitaka as 'derived'
or 'secondary' (upczdq. In the simple analyses of the rzipakkhandhd there is no
mention of what upi& nipa comprises, and we shall see that the situation is
not clear in the comprehensive description of the rzipakkhandha either.
Though the commentary on the particular canonical passage we are
discussing makes no comment on what ~piidirzipa means,15the Theravada
Buddhist tradition has generally understood the term updi nipa specifically
to refer to the senses (usually taken to be the physical sense organs) and
their corresponding sense objects, collectively called gatanas. A typical
definition of upa'di rCpa is given in the Dhammasanganiof the Abhidhamma,
where it is stated to refer to ten of the gatanas (that is excluding the sixth
sense, manas, and its corresponding object, dhammZ).16In the Vibhanga the
same ten 6yatunas are in turn described as the four great elements which are
derived," which amounts to the same thing put differently. In the At.thasa'lin<
 The Riipakkhandha 7
upad5 nipa is discussed at length in terms of the qatanas, so much so that the
translator of the text for the Pali Text Society has entitled an entire chapter
"Derived Material Qualitie~".'~ In addition to such definitions, where the
Abhidhamma categorises upid6 nipa more extensively, so that it is said to com-
prise twenty-three different phenomena, the gatanas are included.lg
Likewise, in the section on the riipakkhandha in his fisuddhimagga, where
Buddhaghosa lists twenty-four kinds of upidi riipa, he includes the &atanus
in the same way as the Abhidhamma and the c ~ m m e n t a r i e sModern.~~
Theravada Buddhist writers also define upzdi Spa as the senses.21
That u.Jdi riipa, undefined in the Sutta Pitaka, eventually came to be
defined in this way might be because of the fact, mentioned above, that in
contexts in the Sutta Pitaka where the five khandhas in turn are being
defined, and where the nipakkhandha has been defined according to the
simple analysis of the four elements and their derivatives, the different
anipaWd2andha-s are each said to be of six types according to the six senses
or their objects. This repeated reference to the @atanas in such classifica~
tions might account for the fact that they became singled out for mention
as upEdi riipa.
Given such prominent mention of the senses in the Sutta Pitaka, and
given that it is obvious to us that there are physical organs corresponding to
at least five of the senses (so one might equally obviously assume that they
are part of the ru'pakkhandha),it is also conversely notable that nowhere in
the Sutta Pitaka are the senses, or their corresponding sense objects, explic-
itly stated to be part of the riipakkhandha, and none of the passages which is
specifically describing the riipakkhandha includes any of them as upEdd nipa.
It is this omission that prompts me to question whether the consistent
references in the Sutta Pitaka to the senses or their objects determining the
types of mental activity necessarily implies that it was intended that either
the senses or their objects, or all of them, should be classified as part of
upid5 nipa within the ru'pakkhandha, as later defined in the Abhidhamma and
understood within the Buddhist tradition.
The question is prompted not just by the omission but also by the fact
that compared with what is found in the Sutta P&ka, the later tradition's
understanding of the senses becomes, on the one hand, more complex,
and, on the other hand, more 'physical'. Dealing with the first of these first,
the Abhidhamma gives a more comprehensive classification of the twelve
Zyatanas collectively than is found in the four main NikZyas of the Sutta
&taka. In the Sutta Pi!aka, there is more of a distinction between the senses
and the sense objects, and the term Qatana is more frequently said to be
sixfold.**Where sabyatana appears in the pa$ccasamuppida formula given in
the Sutta Pitaka, for example, only the senses are included in the definition,
not the sense objects.13And though the senses and objects are at times
referred to as separate groups in the same classification, that is as dyatana.~,~~
the point is that the senses and objects are more clearly delineated from
8 Identity and Experience
each other, each as separate 'sixes', than in the Abhidhamma where the senses
and their objects are all referred to individually and equally as eatanas,
giving twelve in all, and are grouped together in definitions or descriptions
of upid5 r i i ~ aThis
. ~ ~ inclusion of the objects of sense in a definition of
something that is subject to 'grasping' is not, as might at first be thought, in
itself problematic. These objects are not necessarily external to the human
being: eyes and visibility, nose and smell, tongue and taste (and so on) are
all aspects of the human body. But this development represents a more
complex way of attempting to understand the senses than is found in the
Sutta P i ~ k aa, complexity that is compounded by lack of consistency.
By way of example, in the Dhammasangapiwe read that whatever riipa is
'internal' (that is personal to the individual) is upidi, but whatever riipa is
'external' is sometimes upidi and sometimes n o - ~ p i d iExternal
.~~ (bihiram)
riipa seems here to refer specifically to aspects of n2pa which are experienced
subjectively oneselE2' What is external in the sense of being part of other
beings is referred to in this text as bahiddhi, and is also referred to as
&ammi.28Though the gatanas, whether internal or external (bcihiram),are
usually collectively classified as upidi Gpa, ~otthabha,~~ manas and dhammi
are often excluded from the classification, though no reason is given for
this.,

With regard to the increasingly 'physical' understanding of the senses,

not only does the later tradition explicitly classify the senses as riipa, but the
later texts also give long and elaborate physical descriptions of the sense
organs. The Pali terms used to refer to the senses are cakWlu, sota, ghina,
jivh5, kiiya and manas, and following a physical interpretation of their
meaning, these are usually translated eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and
mind. But none of the meanings of the term ciyatana suggests that a physical
organ is meant.30In the Sutta maka, the senses are also sometimes referred
to as indnyas, 'powers' or 'fa~ulties'.~'Though in such contexts they are also
usually translated as sense organs, the term indriya does not suggest that
physical organs are implied any more than does Qatana. Similarly, they are
also called &itus, elements, which again need not imply phy~icality.~~ This
suggests that the later attempts to classify the senses as upid5 riipa might be
placing an inappropriate emphasis on their physical aspects. And as a
further complication, we shall see in the next part of this chapter that even
in this respect the later material appears inconsistent.
The nearest the Sutta Pi!aka comes to associating the senses with upi& is
in a passage in the Sutta N$ita where there is a reference to the fact that the
five sensual pleasures plus manas are the grasping (upidina)which afflicts the
This does not, however, refer specifically to n2pa, nor to the senses
themselves, but to the fact that sensual desire, the arising of which is based
on the senses, represents the fuel of continued sapiric existence: loka here
meaning the 'world' of the subjective individual rather than the external
world as a whole, as discussed above.
 T h e Riipakkhandha 9
In the Sutta @aka, all five khandhas are sometimes referred to as the
u~iidiinakkhandhii,~~and they too are upidina in both senses of the word:
they are both derivatives and conditioned by grasping. Another passage
in the Khandha Samyutta describes both the paiicakkhandhi and the
paiicupiidiinakhandhii. The term paiic&andhi, it explains, refers to the five
khandhas; p a E c p d n a a n means that each and every one of the five
khandhas is subject to i ~ a v a s .I~referred
~ to the term iisava in the
Introduction. It is a notoriously difficult word to translate into English, but
it refers to the strongest and most deep-seated of the factors ('graspings')
which cause bondage to sapsirit experience. There are said to be either
three or four &auar: the three are the &aua of sense desire (krZmGsava), the
iisava of desire for continued becoming (bhavwua), and the isava of
ignorance (amjiisaua), and the less common fourth is the isava of holding
views (di#h&ava). The &avm are to be eradicated; but so profoundly are
they rooted in the human psyche that such eradication represents the very
experience of Enlightenment, the goal of the path to liberation. Thus any
reference to the isavas being present indicates an association with the
samsiiric, pre-Enlightenment life of an individual, when he or she is
conditioned by grasping. R a n a ~ r aa, modern Theravada bhiMu, suggests
that this passage distinguishes between an arahant, in whom the &avm have
been eradicated, who comprises the paiicakkhandha', and an unenlightened
individual, who comprises the paEcupGdinakkhan&~i.~~ The point & n a i r a is
making is that an individual only arises as a result of continued grasping
(the mechanics of which will become clearer in chapter IV), and after
Enlightenment the individual will not arise (be reborn) again.
If the senses were to be classified as part of the GpakWlan&a, then of
course it follows from the foregoing that they would be upiida' riipa, requir-
ing further discussion here. But in view of the ambiguity about precisely
what the terms used for the senses (liyatana, indnya and &Ctu) are referring
to, and the fact that in the Sutta Pitaka the @atanasare neither defined as
upiidii @pa nor included in any of the definitions of the Gpakkhandha, it
seems more appropriate to defer such a discussion. Accordingly, I will
return to them in the second part of this chapter after discussing the
detailed analyses of the nipakkhandha found in the Sutta [email protected] that stage
more attention can be directed towards their important role.
The more detailed and specific analysis of the rzipaMandha is found in
three places in the Sutta Pitaka where the cattcro mahiibhiiti are being
e~plained.~' This analysis gives us much more information about nipa as the
body of the human being, though it is here that the term %pa is explicitly
stated also to refer to nipa that is 'external'. In each of the contexts in which
the comprehensive analysis is found, it is given for the purpose of teaching
that the individual's body is merely an aggregate of the elements and that it
should not be thought of in terms of selfhood or identity. In one place,
descriptions of the impermanent nature of the 'external' manifestation
10 Identity and Experience
of the elements are given in order to emphasise that the internal elements
are equally impermanent. For example, the external element of motion,
wind, is a t times too strong a n d can blow down whole villages a n d a t other
times there is n o wind at all a n d people have to fan a spark in order to
make a fire
T h e descriptions of the elements of pathavt a n d GPO, solidity a n d fluidity
respectively, with regard to their 'internal' manifestation as the body of a
h u m a n being, consist of various parts of the body. We read of the 'internal'
aspect of the element of solidity:
And what is the 'internal' element of solidity? Whatever is internal to the
individual and is hard and solid, and the product of grasping; that is to say
hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones,
bone-marrow, kidney, heart, liver, membranes, spleen, lungs, intestines,
mesentery, stomach, excrement, and whatever other thing is internal to the
individual and is hard and solid [and which is] the product of grasping: this
is called the 'internal' element of ~olidity.~'
Similarly, the 'internal' element of fluidity is described as follows:
And what is the 'internal' element of fluidity? Whatever is internal to the
individual, is liquid or fluid, and the product of grasping; that is to say bile,
phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, synovic fluid,
urine, and whatever other thing is internal to the individual, is liquid or fluid,
[and which is] the product of grasping: this is called the 'internal' element of
fluidity.40
T h o u g h both these passages include actual parts of the body, I suggest
t h a t the point they a r e intended t o make is to establish that the body
includes elements which are characterised either by hardness/solidity o r by
liquidity/fluidity. I n neither case are the literal meanings of the elements,
earth a n d water, directly applicable: it is their abstract meanings which are
of central relevance. Similarly, the fact that the list is manifestly n o t
comprehensive suggests that such descriptions a r e not intended t o b e
understood as definitive lists of what the body is m a d e of; rather they
indicate examples of the characteristics being described.
T h e passage continues with a description of the 'internal' element of
heat:
And what is the 'internal' heat element? Whatever is internal to the individ-
ual and is heat, heated, and the product of grasping; that is to say that by
which one is warmed, by which one ages, by which one is exhausted [lit:
burned], that by which one properly digests [lit: transforms] what one has
eaten, drunk, consumed or chewed, and whatever other thing internal to the
individual which is heated or warm [and which is] the product of grasping:
this is the 'internal' element of heat.41
 The Riipakkhandha II

I. B. Horner states that tejo includes cold as well as heat since both
vitalising energy and decay are due to this element.42Though it may be
appropriate to refer to it as the element of temperature rather than just of
being hot, it unclear whether this extends literally as far as being cold. In a
passage elsewhere in the canon, we read that it is heat, life and conscious-
ness that vitalise the human being (though the Pali word for heat in these
contexts is usmi) and without them there is only a dead body, thus dissoci-
ating heat and the processes associated with it from a dead body.43But the
concern of this passage is to establish the impermanence of the vitalising
factors, not the extent of the activity of heat: usmi and @u are said to be
mutually dependent,44and vifi6ina is associated with the senses.45The three
are also described as ~amkhiras,~~ which both indicates their constructed
nature and implies that they are the result of past karma.47I. B. Horner's
suggestion is supported by the description of the 'external' aspect of tejo,
which refers to fire:48it might be that it is in its external aspect that this
element is involved in the decay of a dead body. But this concern is an
unimportant one: as we shall see, the analysis of the body according to the
four elements is that of a live body rather than a dead one, which, though
leaving questions such as this unanswered, serves to emphasise the consis-
tency of the Buddha's concern with human experience.
For the 'internal' element of motion the Sutta states:
And what is the 'internal' element of motion? Whatever is internal to the
individual and is movement (Iliterally, 'wind'] or motion and the product of
grasping; that is to say upward movements, downward movements, move-
ment in the abdomen, movement in the belly, movements of any of the
limbs, in-breathing and out-breathing, and whatever other thing is internal
to the individual and is movement or motion [and which is] the product of
grasping: this is called the 'internal' element of motion.49
I have translated the Pali word vita as 'movements' in order to give this
passage some meaning in English. Its literal meaning is 'wind', and this
comprehensive description of wind passing all round the body, and along
every limb, recalls the Upani~adicfive inas: priina (the in-breath), apina (the
out-breath), yina (the circulatory or diffused breath), udina (the up-breath)
and samiina (the middle or equalising breath).50These were regarded as the
vital faculties responsible for respiration, digestion and the distribution of
food through the body.51 Breath (prina) was also considered to be the
vitalisingprinciple in the early Upani~ads,frequently used as a synonym for
Brahman.52T h e functions of the Upanisadic prinas do not correspond
directly to those of the v@odhitu according to the Majhima Nik@a, since
digestion, for example, is the province of the tejodhitu. Nor is there any
understanding of v@u as a vitalising principle in the Pali canon as there is
in the case of heat: breathing is merely a bodily function. The Pali expres-
sion arigamangiinusirino viti is not explained in the canon, but is understood
12 Identity and Experience
by Buddhaghosa to refer to the winds (or forces) that produce flexing and
extending and so on. This would be congruent with the abstract meaning
of vQu, motion.53There is evidence in the canon, however, (which is picked
up in the commentarial literature) that wind acts as a 'humour':54normal
wind conditions normal health, whereas winds which become strong (viiti
ba@antz), or deranged winds (umzda vat& cause pains and/or uncontrolled
movements of the body, eventually causing psychological derangement.55
The similarity between the Pali description of viyu and the U'ani~adic
description of the p r 6 is~enough for it to be possible that the former was
influenced by the latter.56
In two texts a description of the element 'space' (&%a)is also given:
And what is the internal element of space? Whatever is internal to the indi-
vidual, and is space or spacious, and the product of grasping; that is to say
the nose and ear orifices, the mouth opening, the passages by which one
swallows, retains and expels below what one has eaten, drunk, consumed or
chewed, and whatever other thing is internal to the individual and is space
or spacious [and which is] the product of grasping: this is called the 'internal'
element of space.57
Though ikisa is said to be both 'internal' and 'external', no description
of 'external' i&a is given in either of the texts in which this description is
found. Ak~sadoes have an 'external' dimension in descriptions of the
meditative states known as thejhznas. In such a context it is not, however,
the equivalent of external spaces between things paralleling the des-
cription of the 'internal' space element as internal orifices and openings. It
is, rather, a formless level where the apperception of visible shapes is
tran~cended.~~
Here we have a comprehensive analysis of the nipakWumdha according to
the cattzro mah~bhBtG.The term upadinnam ('the product of grasping')
indicates that all the factors included within the analysis of internal njpa are
upzdi. We shall see in chapter IV, and again in chapter VII, that this is com-
patible with the way volitions, which correspond to grasping, condition
every aspect of the arising of the individual in future lives.
The descriptions of each of the elements contain bodily parts or
functions which might logically be expected to be found there: solid things
are found in the analysis of the element of solidity, liquid things within the
element of fluidity, and so on. In other words, the analysis is common-
sensical. But the tgo and u@o dhGtus, and the ik6sadhitu when it appears,
comprise parts and functions which we might not immediately describe as
corporeal. Temperature, ageing and digestion, breathing and various
bodily movements, and orifices or internal spaces, are defined as being
part of the rzipakkhandha. Taken as a whole, this description of the cattiiro
mah6bhiitZ (plus a'&a) gives us the human body as a whole in full working
order. The analysis emphasises the characteristics and processes which
 The Riipakkhandha 13
enable the living body of a human being to function: this is not a
description of a dead human body. It follows, then, that the term rtipa is not
as strictly limited as one might in the first instance expect from the usual
association of body with matter or from the common understanding that
the word 'form' (the literal meaning of rips) means shape or appearance.
From the comprehensive description we have here, epa does not refer to
the physical body qua physical body; it is not concerned with what the body
is but with its living characteristics understood in terms of the four
elements.
We recall that the 'object' which corresponds to the sense (organ) eye
(cakkhu) is form (rtipa), and that its main criterion is visibility. Ru'pa as a
khandha does not so clearly imply visibility. One might say that processes
such as breathing, movement, and decay are visible, and if other processes
such as digestion and temperature control were not operating one would
be able to see that. This would correspond to the fact that in the 'external'
dimension fire and wind are also visible (at least through their effects). But
such suggestions do not seem to me to be in accord with the overall
impression one gets from the description of the riipakkhandha, and the
internal organs are normally visible only potentially. Certainly visibility
does not seem to be a primary characteristic of the riipaWduzn&a.
The parts of the body referred to in the descriptions of the pa{hautdha'tu
and the cpodhatu above are also found in the canonical material as a
standard list of bodily parts to be used in a meditation exercise.59The
standard list incorporates exactly the same parts as do the descriptions of
the dhiitus and is as follows: hair of the head, body hair, nails, teeth, skin,
flesh, sinews, bones, bone-marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, membranes, spleen,
lungs, intestines, mesentery, stomach, excrement, bile, phlegm, pus, blood,
sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, synovic fluid and urine.60During
meditation, a bhikkhu should realise that his body includes a collection of
these physical items, none of which is to be identified as or with any sort of
abiding self. Other bodily processes are referred to in these meditation
exercises, such as breathing and movement, posture and decay.61None of
these passages states that it is offering a description either of the
riipakkhandha as such or of the cattcrro mahibhu'tcr. The meditation on the body
in the Satipat&Zna Suttm, however, is clearly intended to be comprehensive,
including as it does a wide range of bodily activities, processes, postures and
states of decay, in the sense that such meditations should bring the bhiWrhu
to realise that all such aspects of the body are similarly conditioned. It also
includes a meditation on the fact that the body is composed of the four
dha'tus as follows:
And again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu contemplates this body as it is placed or
disposed in respect of the elements, thinking 'There are in this body the
elements of extension, fluidity, heat and rn~tion'.~'
I4 Identity and Experience
No further analysis of the body according to dhitu is given, which again
emphasises the lack of concern in the texts to understand the human body
in terms of what its substance is.
The riipakkhandha, then, is the living body of a human being. This is
analysed according to the four (occasionally five) dhlitus. 'Body' is an
appropriate translation of nipa when it refers to the nipamandha, since
even those phenomena included in this Wlandha which are not corporeal
are nevertheless parts of or associated with the body. And rii-a which is
external to the human body is not part of the Wlandha analysis as such.
One might conclude this part of this chapter by suggesting that the
emphasis on the characteristics of the human body which relate to how it
functions, rather than what it is in terms of substance, is highlighted both
by what is omitted from the descriptions discussed and by the style of the
descriptions of what is included. It is in this respect that what appears to
be merely an overview of this Wlandha is in fact singularly informative.

The Senses

According to the evidence in the Sutta @aka the senses are central to the
psychological/cognitive functioning of the human being. We shall see
below that even consciousness, the sine qua non of human life, is classified
according to the senses. And we shall also see in more detail in following
chapters that all discursive thoughts, ideas and knowledge arise because of
the simultaneous presence of a sense, its corresponding sense object and
consciousness: from this threefold event, known as 'contact' (phassa), all
cognitive activity, of whatever nature, arises; and, conversely, without such
an event no cognitive activity takes place.63From this we see that the senses
are not only the means by which the individual interacts with the 'external'
world in which he or she exists, but are also the means by which cognitive
experience subsequently leads either to progressing along the path to
liberation or to remaining in bondage within samslra. And yet in spite of
their importance in the individual's psychological functioning, in the Sutta
Pitaka they are neither included in the analysis of the riipakkhandha, as we
have already seen, nor are they included in the analysis of any of the
ariipakkhandhas. I have suggested above that though the Abhidhamma
discusses the @atanasat length, its understanding of them appears to be
inconsistent. I have also explained that the terms commonly associated
with the senses, qatana, indnya and dhitu, need not immediately suggest that
it is the physical sense organs that are being referred to in the terms cakrdzu,
sota, ghiina and so on. In looking at these points in more detail here, we
shall, I think, indeed see that what is meant by the senses is not their physical
organs but that they have a unique role which is as it were neither riipa nor
ariipa, and that this is why they are not included in the Wlandha analysis.
 The Rtipakkhandha I5
I have stated in the first part of this chapter that in common with other
Indian religions, Buddhism recognises six senses. Be that as it may, casual
reference to different passages in the Pali material can cause confusion
concerning the number of senses there are. The standard canonical list of
sense pleasures (kiimagunii) includes only five senses: eye (cakkhu), ear (sota),
nose ('ghina), tongue iivhq and body ( f i y ~ )We . ~ saw
~ the same five, together
with their corresponding objects (ten @atanas in all), referred to in the
Dharnmasanga~definitionof upddi rzipa mentioned above.'-j5But this and sim-
ilar passages in the Abhidhamma are not suggesting that there are only five
senses: the reason the Dhammasaigaqi definition in question only includes
five senses is because the author of this passage is defining upiidii riipa, in
which he does not include manas and dhammii. Generally in Pali texts
(including the Abhidhamma) the senses are sixfold. In the paticcasamupp6da
formula, for example, when nimarzipa is said to be the condition for the
arising of the senses, the senses are stated to be The six senses are
the five mentioned above as the kimapnd plus mannr. Their corresponding
objects are (in Pali) riipa, sadda, gandha, rasa, photGhabba and dhammii, usually
translated (visible)form, sound, odour, taste, tangible things and mental
objects. They are discussed repeatedly, though not in detail, both in the
Chachakkasutta'-j7and in the Mahii~a&yatanikasutta,~*and an entire volume of
the Samyutta Nikiija is entitled the Sa@yatana Vagga.'-j9The sensory events
@hassa),which are discussed in chapter 11, are sixfold according to the six
senses.'O We also read that in order to establish the moral basis from which
a bhikkhu can proceed as an arzyasivaka, all six senses have to be brought
under contro1,'l (a discipline which perhaps reflects one of the meanings of
Qatana, which is 'exertion', 'effort', 'practice').
Where each of the anipakkhandhas is described according to a sixfold
sub-classification, the terms mentioned above which are often associated
with the senses, @atana, zndriya and dhdtu, are not used, just the names of
the senses or sense objects them~elves.~~ We read of vedani, for example,
that it is of six types. These arise from contact, and are classified according
to the six senses.73Similarly the vifiiiiinakkhandha is of six types according to
each of the six senses.74Both the safiiidkhandhaand the samkhirakkhandha are
again of six types, but these are classified not according to the six senses but
to their The texts do not explain why two of the anipakkhandhar
are classified according to the senses and the other two according to the
sense objects. The Pali word I have translated as 'types' is k&G (literally
'bodies'). Though this is sometimes translated in this context as 'bases' or
seat^','^ such translations act as red herrings, making it more difficult to
understand why the classification differs. If one assumes, as has been
done, that the senses refer to the physical sense organs, one might accept
that an internal sense might be a 'seat' of a mental activity; but it is hard
to see that an external object could be such a seat. If fiyi is translated as
'types', however, then neither the senses nor the objects need be considered
16 Identity and Experience
as the actual 'bases' of the mental activities. Rather, the difference
between vedanii and vin"n"iinaon the one hand and saXii and samkhiira on the
other hand might be explained as follows: san"n"iand samkhiira are more
developed and discursive levels of the cognitive process than are either
vedanii or uin"n"iipand as such they are externally focussed. So with regard
to san"n"iione would apperceive a smell or a sound rather than the nose or
ear. Likewise with samhiira, one's volitions would be directed towards the
smell or the sound and not the sense itself. Moreover, both are able to
focus on a specific smell or sound rather than being limited to the general
olfactory and auditory senses. Thus the six types of safiiiiiand samh-ra are
classified according to the external objects. Neither uedanii nor vin"n"ii~is so
clearly defined, both functioning more generally in the cognitive process
when the activity of the senses is more relevant. So with regard to uedanii,
one has visual or auditory feeling rather than visible object or sound
feeling. Vin"n"iinatoo is visual or auditory. Both of them function at the
general level of the visual or auditory sense, for the focussing on a specific
external object is the function of the san"n"iior samkhiira handhas.
The English words usually used in translations of the senses (eye, ear,
nose, tongue, body and mind) suggest that in each case (with the exception
of mind) it is the physical sense organ that is being referred to, which
probably accounts for the tendency to describe them as 'seats' or 'bases',
as mentioned above. And there is no doubt that (again with the exception
of manas, which is discussed in the third part of this chapter), these are
physical organs which are part of the human body. The terms most
commonly associated with them, iyatana, indriya and dhiitu, suggest,
however, that they might also refer to something other than the physical
organs themselves. Though all three of these terms have been translated as
if they do refer to the physical organs, a consideration of their other
meanings, together with some contexts in which the senses are referred to
in the Sutta Rtaka, suggests an interesting alternative.
In the Sahyatana Vaga of the Samyutta Nikqa, the six senses are defined
as being ajhattam, personal or internal, and the six corresponding objects
are defined as being bdziram, external, thus giving two 'sets' of six gatanas.
In the Nidina Samyutta, however, which is concerned with explaining
paiiccasamuppiida, only the personal iyatanas are referred to by the term
~ a b y a t a n aThis
. ~ ~ difference in usage in itself makes the term Qatana an
ambiguous one, and it is unsurprising that the Pali English Dictionav does
little to clarify the term when it states that iyatana means "sphere of
perception or sense in general, object of thought, sense-organ and object".78
The dictionary goes on to state "Qatana cannot be rendered by a single
English word to cover both sense-organs ... and sense objects".79Other
meanings of cZyatana given in the Pali-English Dictionary are: "stretch, extent,
reach, compass, region; sphere,80locus, place, spot; position, occasion ...
relation, order."81 It also means "exertion, doing, working, practice,
 The Riipakkhandha I7

performance", as mentioned above. If one considers qatana in perhaps its

most crucial context, that of the paticcquppda formula, it is unlikely that
it refers to the sense organs themselves. Though the definition of sakyatana
in the Ndiina Samyutta is given in terms of cakkhu, sota, ghiina, jiu&, kya and
manas, it seems improbable that the physical sense organs would warrant
their own stage in the description of the arising of an individual human
being when no other physical organs are mentioned in the formula.
Niimarzipa, which precedes sakyatana in the common twelvefold version of
the formula, is discussed in chapter vr. I suggest there that it does not mean
'mind and body' as commonly supposed, but that it means the 'name and
form' of the individual in an abstract sense, according to which the psycho-
logical and eventually (at birth) the physical faculties of the individual
develop. The sabyatana precede birth by several stages in the formula and
thus represent part of the development of the psychological faculties
of the individual: in this context it is virtually inconceivable that it is the
physical sense organs in a literal sense that are being referred to. Rather,
the context suggests that what is meant is the sphere or extent of vision,
hearing, taste, and so on, the locus (in a non-physical sense) of the senses,
which establishes the foundation (again in a non-physical sense) of the
psychological life of the individual. Sphere, extent and locus are all
meanings of Zyatana. The 'external' Zyatanas correspond to the 'internal'
@atanasbecause the interaction between the individual and the objective
world is the 'occasion' when the spheres of vision, hearing, etc., are associ-
ated with their corresponding objects; it is the relation between, or the
relating of, the internal and external aspects of the sensory event. Thus in
the commentary to the Digha Nibya, Buddhaghosa (to whom the commen-
tary is attributed) defines iijatana as samosarana, coming together or
meeting.82The Pali English Dictiona~definition of gatana, when it refers to
the senses and their objects, would do better to confine itself to "sphere of
perception or sense in general" and omit "sense-organ and object", and
there need be no concern with the lack of a single English word for both
sense organs and sense objects.
The terms indriya and dhiitu support such an interpretation of gatana.
lndriya means 'power' or 'faculty' in the sense of controlling principle or
directive force.83In connection with the senses, it thus means the power or
potential of the individual to have sensory experience: cakkhindnya, for
example, means the personal potentiality for seeing.a4Other indnjas men-
tioned in the Sutta Pi!aka, which in the Abhidhamma came to be systematised
with many others,85include, for example, pleasure and pain, joy and grief,
and e q ~ a n i m i t ynone
, ~ ~ of which is physical but which refer respectively to
the personal potentiality for pleasure and pain, joy, grief and equanimity.
Dhiitu literally means 'element', and is often associated with the four
elements which define rips, the mahzbhziti. Another of its meanings is
'phenomenon' similar to the meaning of dhamma in some context^.^' We
I8 Identity and Experience
have seen above, however, that the four mahibhuti can also have the
abstract meanings of extension, fluidity, heat and motion. In the same way,
the meaning of dhitu can be abstract. In the Dhitu Samyutta, where it is
associated with the senses, we also find it used in connection with abstract
characteristics such as radiance and beauty,88and ignorance.89
From all these meanings of iiyatana, indriya and dhitu, as well as from the
position of qatana in the pa$ccasamuppiida formula, one might suggest that
what is referred to by the terms cakkhu, soh, ghina and so on is not primarily
the sense organs eye, ear, nose, etc., but that the terms are to be interpreted
figuratively as the faculties of vision, hearing, smell and so on. In English
the word 'vision' has a quite different meaning from that of the word 'eye'.
The latter only means the physical organ (unless it is being used as a verb,
which would have a different context). The former involves the physical
organ, but means more than that: it means the ability to see, or sight itself.
Each sense faculty is a sphere or locus (in an abstract sense) for a potential-
ity: the potential to see or hear. What is particularly interesting about this
interpretation of the senses is how it relates to their objects. Though the
sense objects are not necessarily part of the human being, they too can be
thought of as representing the potentiality for a sensory event. A sound is a
sound whether anyone hears it or not, but it is also potentially part of an
auditory experience for a human being. Thus the sense objects can also be
referred to as iiyatana, indriya and dhitu.
A figurative interpretation of the senses is also suggested by a metaphor
associated with them in the Sutta Fitaka, which is later picked up and used
more frequently (and again systematically) by the Abhidhamma and com-
mentarial traditions. In the Sutta Pitaka we find several references to the
senses as 'doors' or 'gates' (dvira) which need to be guarded.g0 Such a
metaphor suggests that they are both physical organs and openings at the
same time. The description of the senses as 'guarded' or 'unguarded' gives
the same metaphor a qualitative colouring, even where the word dvira is
not m e n t i ~ n e d . This
~ ' metaphor is doubly appropriate to what we have
been discussing here. O n the one hand, it implies that there is an abstract
meaning to the senses which goes beyond the physical sense organs. O n the
other hand, it indicates that the senses are a 'way in' or 'entrance', and
in this sense they are of fundamental importance in the psychological
processes of the human being. That they have to be guarded suggests that
what one experiences through the senses can be interpreted or reacted to in
a way which can be detrimental to one's progress on the path to liberation.
This is explained in the Simalitiaphala Sutta, where the Buddha tells King
Ajatasattu how a bhikkhu guards the doors which correspond to his senses.
When the bhikkhu sees a visible object with his visual faculty, the Buddha
states, he is not entranced with views about its various characteristics. He is
intent on restraining those things which give rise to unwholesomeness, evil,
covetousness or dejection which flow over him for as long as he lives with
 The Riipakkhandha I9

his sense of sight unrestrained; he guards the visual sense, and attains
restraint over it.92
The notion that the senses are doors which need guarding has to be
understood in the context of the whole of the cognitive process or psycho-
logical life of the individual. It is significant that in the passage quoted in
the last paragraph the bhikkhu is said not to be entranced with views about
what he sees. It is not that the visual faculty itself has to see differently. As
we shall see below in chapters 11 and IV, it is the involvement of the
sa*iirakkhandha in the cognitive process that gives rise to unwholesomeness,
evil, covetousness or dejection. Though it is from the senses that feelings
arise, and such feelings can in themselves be agreeable, disagreeable or
neutral, the arising of any unwholesomeness (in its broadest sense, which
means anything that is binding) is associated with volitions directed towards
the feelings by the samhirakkhandha. What has to be guarded is in fact one's
reaction to what one experiences by means of the senses. It is precisely this
that constitutes the struggle on the path to liberation: and just as it is not
the fault of a door or an opening that an enemy enters and has to be fought
inside the building, so it is not the fault of the senses themselves that one
reacts unwholesomely to one's sensory experience. Both an arahant and a
puthujana might see exactly the same potentially desirable object; it is their
reaction to that sight that is different. Illustrating its connection with the
samkhh, in theJitaka the door imagery is associated with the ethical triad
of thought, word, and deed (in the Pali this is kiiya, vacc m a n a ~ )Body,
.~~
speech and mind are said to be the three doors which are to be guarded so
that no evil is done in act, word or thought.g4
Another metaphor associated with the senses in the Sutta Pitaka confirms
that it is not the senses themselves that give rise to binding volitions which
have to be guarded against. This metaphor is of an empty village. We read
in the Sahyatana Samyutta that 'empty village' is a name for the six personal,
or internal, senses.95The emptiness of the village, that it is unoccupied,
implies that it is not to be thought of in terms of an abiding self. It also
implies that it is the locus of activity which is generated by something other
than the physical infrastructure of the village itself. In the same passage we
read that the corresponding external objects are referred to as 'village
plunderer^'.^^ This is because shapes, sounds, odours, tastes etc. are what
we find entrancing. When the sphere of such an object comes into the
sphere of the corresponding sense, our reaction might be to become
entranced by it: to have 'views about its various characteristics' (to refer
back to the SGmaEEaphala Sutta).
It is obvious that the physical sense organs themselves, being part of the
body of the human being, are part of the riipakkhandha whether they are
singled out for mention in a classification or not. Indeed the major part of
what is contained in the later texts about the senses concentrates on
describing the physical sense organs in minute and extensive detail and
20 Identity and Experience
classifies them clearly as ?%pa.'' But from the foregoing it also seems likely
that in contexts where the senses are referred to in the Sutta Pitaka, the
terms cakkhu, sota, ghcna and so on are to be understood figuratively as the
potential for vision, hearing, smelling and so on, rather than being mereZy
the physical sense organs. This accords with contrasting references in later
texts to the @atanasbeing invisible, as mentioned above, thus implying the
importance of their function and not their (visible)phy~icality.~~ So the
question remains whether the senses as @atanasshould also be considered
part of the riipakkhandha. We have seen above that comprehensive
descriptions of the rcpakkhandha are not restricted to physical organs.
Indeed, we saw that the khandha includes processes such as breathing and
movement.
In the Aghasalini, however, one passage suggests why classifying the
senses as rzipa may not be as straightforward as with some other processes.
We read:
T h e physical eye does not see because it is not conscious. Nor does con-
sciousness see, because it is not an eye. But, when an object comes together
with a sense door, one sees with one's consciousness together with the sense
organ as the physical base."
Though the descriptions of the riipakkhandha refer to a live body, the
relevant non-corporeal processes which life involves (such as breathing and
temperature) do not specifically involve consciousness in the same way as a
sensory experience does, according to the Atthasiilinz':one does not have to
be conscious of breathing or temperature regulation in order for them to
function. Nor can consciousness be said to be part of the nipakkhandha.
What is suggested by the fact that in order to function there has to be the
coming together of sense organ and consciousness, is that vision, hearing
and so on are potential processes, bringing us back to the meaning we
arrived at above in discussing the terms @atand,indnya and dhitu. As such it
would be inappropriate to attempt to classify them in terms of n2pa or anipa:
just as phma (which is discussed in chapter 11) is not classified in such terms,
so the senses should remain unclassified, as they do in the Sutta Pitaka.
Supporting this conclusion, and in striking contrast with the quantity
of material on the physical characteristics of the sense organs, in the
A~hastZlinithere is also to be found one short paragraph which gives what
I have referred to above as a 'theory of sense'. The theory is incomplete
in that it does not make any mention of manas and dhamma. But this is
probably because the theory is (oddly) included in the passage which
discusses upa'dti riipa, and manas and dhammi are not so defined. Maung
Tin's translation of the passage states:
For the eye has the characteristic of sentience for phenomena worthy of
directly impinging on the object, or of sentience sprung from action caused
 The Riipakkhandha
by a desire to see the object. It has the function of drawing consciousness
towards the objects; it has the localizing of visual cognition as its manifesta-
tion; it has the being produced by action caused by a desire to see as
proximate cause. The ear has the characteristic of sentience for phenomena
worthy of directly impinging on sounds, or of sentience sprung from action
caused by a desire to hear sounds; it has the function of drawing
consciousness towards sounds; it has the localizing of auditory cognition as
its manifestation; and it has a proximate cause as above. The nose and the
tongue (or smell and taste), and lastly the body or tactile sense may be
analogously defined.lW
There is a clear indication in this paragraph of cakkhu and sota (and so
on) as potentialities. First is the use of the term pmida, which Maung Tin
translates as 'sentience'. Earlier in the same chapter, the Aflhmiilini states
that though the sense organs are corporeal (mamsa), they comprise two
aspects, pasiida and sasambhiira.lo1Sasambhiira means merely that it is a
compound of physical parts. Pmiida literally means clearness or brightness,
but in this context means something like 'sensitive surface'.lo2 The
introduction of the concept of paszda clearly indicates that the eye is
psychophysical. And we have an indication of how the physical sense organs
(eyes)contribute to vision: they provide the physical sensitive surface on
which objects might impinge. Second, desire to see is instrumental in as it
were activating the sentience. Again the potentiality of vision is indicated:
mere possession of a physical eye does not constitute seeing. Third, this
passage confirms that vision is a conscious process.
An analogy to bring these things together and illustrate that sense is an
epiphenomenon of all of them can be suggested in terms of music. The
musical instrument represents the physical sense organ. On the one hand
the instrument is comprised of minute physical parts, smambhiira, and on
the other hand it is also a sensitive surface, pasiida. The hands of a player
represent the sense object. Neither of these (the instrument and the hands)
constitutes music. Just as sense objects are @atanas by virtue of
representing the potential for an individual's seeing or hearing (and so on)
but they are not limited to being part of such sensory processes, so the
player's hands are not limited to being part of the creating of music. For
there to be music, the musical instrument and the hands of a player have
to be combined with conscious intention, or 'action caused by a desire to
create music', to echo Maung Tin's translation above. On the one hand
the musical instrument and the hands of the player are musical instrument
qua musical instrument and hands qua hands respectively. On the other
hand, they are potentialities for music. In the same way the physical sense
organs and their corresponding objects are literally those things and also
potentialities for the relevant senses, the @atanas. Neither the musical
instrument nor the hands of the player would be classified as music; and
22 Identity and Experience
music would not be defined as physical merely because the instrument
and the hands are physical. In the same way, neither the physical sense
organs nor their corresponding objects are the senses, and the senses are
not definable as physical.
In the text, cakkhu, the eye, is also referred to figuratively in that there is
said to be an 'eye of wisdom' @an"n"iicakkhu) which is of five kinds: the eye of
awakening, the all-seeing eye, the eye of knowledge, the divine eye and the
eye of dhamma.lo3This treatment of cakWlu is no doubt because of the role
of insight in the path of liberation in Buddhism: such insight can be
described in terms of seeing. But pa55iicakkhu refers to a qualitatively
different kind of seeing which is more akin to cognition than to the level of
the senses. Pan"n"Zis discussed in chapter V.
In sum, then, there is nothing in the Sutta &aka to suggest that the
@atanasare classified as part of the rzipaWchandha, and no direct evidence of a
theory of sense. Though the Abhidhamma and other later Pali material
define upiidii nipa in terms of the @atanas,it seems clear that if one considers
the evidence as a whole, one can come to an understanding of the senses as
neither riipa nor anipa. They are, rather, potentialities which determine the
nature of each of the types of an individual's psychological processes. In
order to be effected, the potentialities make use of a physical sense organ
and also involve consciousness. So, one can metaphorically understand
them as doors through which the individual subjectively interacts with the
objective world.

Manas and dhammz: the sixth sense and its object

I have been arguing that the senses are not limited to the physical sense
organs, and that even the external sense objects have a potentiality for
sensory experience by a human being as well as their objectivity. In five
cases out of six the corresponding physical location of the senses is
nevertheless obvious to us, and such physical sense organs are part of the
body of the human being, part of the rzipakkhandha. In five cases out of six
it is also obvious to us what is meant by their corresponding external sense
object. But the physical location of manas, the sixth sense, is never
mentioned in the Sutta Fiiaka and neither the function of manas nor the
identity of dhammZ is clearly defined. I will first discuss the question of the
physical location of manas in the light of the later Pali material. I will then
go on to suggest that from references to manas in the Sutta Pitaka, one can
extract an understanding of its function, and the identity of dhammi.
Again, reference to the way it is understood in the later material helps to
clarify such an understanding.
According to Buddhist tradition, the physical basis of the mental faculties
is the heart (hadayavatthu), and in Indian religion as a whole the Sanskrit
 The Riipakkhandha 23
word for 'heart' (hydaya)is often used to refer to cognitive acts, rather than
just to an affective centre.lo4But in spite of the fact that its literal meaning is
'mind', nowhere in the Pali canon, not even in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, do we
read that the heart is the physical base of manas.lo5There is one oblique
reference in the Abhidhamma to hadaya being synonymous with manas in a
passage which is defining citta, but in the context it does not have the specific
meaning of haddyauatthu.la One might in any case expect the AbMamma not
to state that the heart (or anything else) is the physical location of manas since
we have seen that manas is specifically defined in the Abhidhamma as ariipa.
There is, however, an apparent inconsistency on this point, and in one
passage there is the suggestion that manas does have a physical base.lo7The
somewhat obscure Pali is translated by Aung as follows:
That material thing on the basis of which apprehension and comprehen-
sion take place - that thing is related to both of them, as well as to their
concomitants by way of the relation of Base.''
The grammatical structure yam riipam .. . tam riipam could not be less
informative about the location of the physical base for manas. Not until the
commentaries do we find the term hadayauatthu being used,logand it is
identified as the location of manas by Buddhaghosa in his Visuddhimqga.l lo
And Buddhaghosa accordingly includes hadayauatthu (amongst the other
gatanas) in his analysis of upa'dii riipa. '
Aung suggests1'*that the omission of the term hadayauatthu from the
canonical material is not accidental, proving simply that the compilers of
the early material and founders of the Abhidhamma doctrine did not believe
the heart to be the location of manas.'13 Manas is a sense, and as such it
might not have been considered by the Abhidhamma tradition to have had
sufficient cognitive function to be identified with the common pan-Indian
understanding that hadayauatthu is the seat of the cognitive faculties. It is
significant in this respect that in the Sutta Pi!aka it is citta and not manus that
is associated with the heart, both explicitly and implicitly.l14
Two writers within the (modern)Theravada tradition assume the brain
to be the physical location of manas. Ranavira Thera refers to a passage in
the Sabyatana Samyutta which states that the senses are that by which, in the
world, one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world.l15 Ranavira takes this
passage as substantialistic (though it need not be taken in such a way) and
states that just as the eye is a physical thing, so manas is the "mass of grey
matter contained in my head".l16Jayasuriya, writing about the psychology
of the Abhidhamma, states that the "Heart or Mind-base element... [is] in
the brain".l17 It is notable that in passages in the Sutta Pitaka which refer to
the sense organs in general, and manas in particular, the brain is never
mentioned. And in only two occurrences of the standard list of parts of the
body (discussed above) is the brain (matthalunga) mentioned. Both are
in books in the Khuddaka Nikiya: the Patisambhidiimagga,l18 and the
24 Identity and Experience
[email protected] The list is identical to the standard list of thirty-one parts
found elsewhere in the Sutta Pitaka save for the fact that it includes the brain
(matthaluriga)as the thirty-second part. The commentary does not acknowl-
edge how unusual it is in including the brain, and no explanation for its
inclusion here, or its exclusion elsewhere, is given.Iz0The Khuddaka JVihya is
comprised of a variety of books, some of which are considered to be
considerably later than other parts of the Sutta Pi!aka.l2l It is possible,
therefore, that these two passages are late, and that matthalunga might have
been added to the extant standard list as a part of the body which had
become more widely known about. Alternatively, this list might have been
one which circulated among different people from those who recorded the
list which survives in other places in the Sutta &aka.
The brain is also mentioned both in the Enaya122and in the Sutta
N$~iita.l~~The context in which it is found in the Enaya is a discussion of a
brain-destroying disease from which a householder is suffering. No other
parts of the body are mentioned, and the passage does not offer an analysis
of the body. The Sutta Nipiita passage, on the other hand, is more
comprehensive:
Joined together with bones and sinews, having a plastering of skin and flesh,
covered with hide, the body is not seen as it really is - full of intestines, full of
stomach, (full) of the lump of the liver, of bladder, of heart, of lungs, of kid-
neys and of spleen, of mucus, of saliva, of sweat, and of lymph, of blood, of
synovial fluid, of bile, and of fat.. . and its hollow head is filled with brain.lZ4
Many of the parts mentioned are also included in the standard list.
Probably because the Sutta NipGta is in verse rather than prose, the order
of those parts that are common to both is different; and several of the stan-
dard parts are omitted in the Sutta NipGta passage.125 It is acknowledged by
scholars that much but not all of the Sutta JVipiita is very early. The inclusion
of matthaluriga here may be an indication that this particular passage is late.
But it may only be that the brain was not an organ which was known to
those early Buddhists who were concerned to give an analysis of the body,
whether for classification or for meditational purposes. Certainly, there is
no suggestion in the canonical material, early or late, that it is manas or the
physical base of manas.
There are three possibilities concerning the location of manas. First, we
have seen above that in the Sutta fi!aka the senses are not explicitly stated
to be upiidi rzipa. I have suggested that this might be because they princi-
pally represent the potential processes of seeing, hearing and so on. Their
corresponding physical organs might have been excluded from the classi-
fication partly because they are readily identified (in all but one case) and
partly because the physical organs as such, though necessary, are of minor
significance in the psychological implications of seeing. If the terms used to
list the first five senses (cakkhu, sota, ghdna,jivhii and kqa) are actually
 The Riipakkhandha 25
intended to mean the psychological elements of vision, hearing, smell,
taste and touch rather than the physical organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue
and body, then in the Sutta P i t h those senses are not explicitly located: we
know their locations because they are familiar to us. One is at a loss to
locate manas only because its location is not obvious to us any more than it
was obvious to the writers of the Abhidhamma.
Second, it is possible that though manas is part of the riipakkhandha, it
has no gross physical organ. We find in the DhZtukathii, another book in
the Abhidhamma f i . h , a classification of 6pa which includes an analysis of
it according to whether it is subtle or gross.126This would account for the
non-corporeal aspects of the nipakkhandha we have already discussed, and
might explain the elusiveness of manas in being physically located. Third,
from the evidence (or lack of it) in the Sutta Pitaka, it remains a possibility
that manm has no corresponding physical organ, whether gross or subtle.
This might be another reason why the six senses as a whole are not classi-
fied within the nipakkhandha in the Sutta &ah.And it is clearly the implicit
understanding in sections of the Abhidhamma where manas is omitted from
descriptions of upzdii nipa.
There is insufficient evidence in the Sutta &aka, or in the Abhidhamma,
for us to know which of these three is correct. Nor do our general knowl-
edge and observation help. We may know from observation, for example,
that even if references to the senses in the texts are to be understood figura-
tively as referring to psychological processes rather than physical organs, a
corpse will nevertheless still have the physical organs eye, ear, nose, tongue
and body. But we do not know whether it also has a mannr.
I turn now to the function of manas and the identity of its object, dhammtf.
Manas is one of the most ambiguous and confusing terms in Pali material.
Western scholars and those working within the Theravada Buddhist
tradition usually translate it literally, as 'mind'. Given that manas is an
gatana, however, such a translation is perhaps questionable, since the word
'mind' tends to suggest that it undertakes processes that would be classified
in one of the ariipakkhandhas. Though there have been some twentieth
century Western philosophers (notably Wittgenstein and Ryle) for whom
'mental' processes such as thinking are not incorporeal processes, most
Westerners are still very much influenced by the Cartesian dualism
between mind and body, whereby thinking is a non-corporeal process. And
in the Buddhist analysis of the person into Ahandhas, thinking is definitely
not a process which is associated with any of the elements by which the
body is characterised. The extent to which the Buddhist tradition's
understanding of the sense manas attributes cognitive processes to it is no
clearer than whether or not it has a physical location. The lack of clarity in
this respect may well be because cognitive, thinking processes are clearly
stated to be the function of certain mental faculties, as we shall see.12' The
ambiguity of the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the term manus is
26 Identity and Experience
also frequently used in the Nifiyas in a generic sense (as opposed to the
specific sense of manas as sense organ) in contexts where it does have a
mental, cognitive meaning. And etymologically the word comes from the
same root as the verb man"n"ati,to think. Ascertaining in what sense manas is
being used requires consideration of the contexts in which it is found, some
of which are more ambiguous than others. In many passages it is
contextually clear that it is as a generic term for the mind in its cognitive
capacity that manas is being used. In a well-known passage, for example, it
is used in sequence with citta and vin"n"a'p,which are definitely associated
with cognitive activities.lZ8 Here the term manas clearly does not refer to the
sense. Elsewhere, in contexts which one might loosely call 'formulaic', the
formula appears sometimes with manas and sometimes with citta or cetas,
which again are definitely mental or cognitive terms. Such contexts are
discussed further in chapter v.
Ambiguity about the meaning of manas is compounded because the
Abhidhamma tradition systematised the term, using various suffixes to give
it different technical meanings in different contexts. Though these later
technical usages of manas are occasionally mentioned in this chapter, their
later technical meanings are far from obvious in the Sutta Pitaka, the
material with which I am primarily concerned. And the ambiguity is yet
further exacerbated by the fact that dharnma', the object corresponding to
manas, also has a multiplicity of meanings. When manas is translated as
'mind', dhamma' tends to be translated accordingly as 'thoughts', 'ideas',
'mental images'.lZ9Yet the term can refer to phenomena of any kind as
well as to teachings and doctrines.130
In order to distinguish manas as sense from manas as 'mind' in general
I will henceforth call the sense manodha'tu. In the Abhidhamma, manodha'tu has
a technical meaning which distinguishes it from rnanayatana and
manovin"n"a'nadha'tu.There, rnantiyatana is a collective term referring to the
whole of consciousness, but it is not clear to me whether either manodhltu
or manovin"n"a'pdha'tumeans manas as sense as discussed here.13' My use of
the term manodha'tu in a completely non-technical way just to refer to the
sense is similar to its use in the Sutta &aka in contexts where all the senses
are referred to as dha'tu~.l~~
As I have stated above, nowhere in the Pali material is the precise
meaning or function of the sense manodha'tu explicitly made clear. But from
a consideration of the contexts in which it is found in the Sutta Waka one
can suggest that it is understood in two different ways, both of which have
been adopted by the later Abhidhamma and commentarial traditions: as a
unique quasi sense, and as an 'ordinary' sense.
The first meaning of manodha'tu is suggested from passages in which it is
referred to differently, as a unique sense rather than as the sixth in a
series of senses each having a similar level of functioning. A passage in
the Khandha Samyutta refers first to the first five senses and then to
 The Rtipakkhandha *7
manodhitu separately. The passage does not explicitly offer an explanation
of the meaning or function of manodhiitu, and from the context one can
only make a suggestion as to why it has been singled out, which I will do
below.
The passage states that the first five senses (that is, not including
manodhitu) manifest because of an erroneous belief in ~e1fhood.l~~The next
sentence makes most sense if translated: "there are [also], bhikkhus, manas
and dhammi, which are the basis for kno~ledge/ignorance".'~~ The Sutta
goes on to state that it is through contact with ignorance that various
(false) views regarding selfhood arise in ordinary people,13' and a para-
phrase of its conclusion, in order to draw out its meaning, might be:
It is in the holding of such views that one persists as an individual in
samsara, that is, one who has the five senses. In the well-taught advanced
disciple ignorance comes to an end and insight arises, there are no more
(false) views concerning selfh00d.l~~
A consideration of the main implication of this passage, though it is not
precisely present in the Pali, serves to highlight the meaning of the passage
itself. The implication is that for the advanced disciple who gains insight
there will be no more persistence as an individual in samsiira; he or she will
therefore no longer be reborn as someone with five senses, the manifesta-
tion of which is accompanied by the manifestation of a further so-called
sense which is associated with the cognitive process. So the significance of
the passage is that the arising of senses indicates that one is still ignorant
and bound in the cycle of samsara.
T h e use of aviji (ignorance) in one reading of this passage can be
explained because the cognitive process is that which takes place prior to
liberating insight: it is samsiric cognition, which from the point of view of
liberating insight is not v i j i but au;jii. Thus where v;jii means liberating
insight, manodhitu is associated with ignorance rather than knowledge.
Liberating insight is of a different nature, and according to this interpreta-
tion it does not involve manodhitu, even though the individual with the five
senses is still manifest during the lifetime in which he or she achieves
Enlightenment. On the other hand, the use of v i j i in connection with
manodhitu can be explained because given that the eventual liberating
insight is to a certain extent dependent on the gradual elimination of
ignorance as the bhikkhu proceeds along the path, manodhiitu might be
associated with eventual knowledge: the samsiiric perspective from which
virtually everyone operates is that from which ignorance is gradually
diminished and liberating knowledge is correspondingly built up, culminat-
ing in insight itself. And according to this interpretation, manodhitu may
even be involved in such insight.
What this passage establishes, whichever variant one reads, is that
manodhitu is different from the other senses. Since the context is concerned
28 Identity and Experience
with ignorance or knowledge, this difference might be because according
to Buddhist teachings liberation comes about by means of the cognitive
faculties of which manodliitu is in some way the sense. As such it is directly
involved in the process of liberation in a way the other senses are not.
The way in which manodhiitu functions as the sense which is associated
with the cognitive faculties is suggested elsewhere. We read that manodhiitu
functions as a 'collator' (patisarana) for the five mutually distinct senses
(pafic' indrzyiinz) and experiences or realises the scope of their activity.ls7
Patisarana, the word I have translated as 'collator', more literally means
'refuge', 'shelter' or 'help'.138I. B. Horner translates it as 'repository'.13gIn
my opinion the context demands something more like 'collator', and, as
we shall see when its function is explained in more detail, this is not
incompatible with the more literal meanings: the other five senses are
directed through it, as it were, and in acting as the collator of the data fed
in by them it is both a repository for those data and also assists them in
rendering those data comprehensible.
Mrs C. A. E Rhys Davids discusses this passage in her Buddhist P~chology.
She assigns to manodhiitu the role of co-ordinator, and refers to it as the
sensus communis, a description which has also been used by subsequent
scholars.lq Mrs Rhys Davids was no doubt drawing on the meaning given
to the 'internal sense' referred to as sensus communis by Thomas Aquinas.I4l
Accordingly, she suggests that manodhztu as sensus communis is the subjective
correlative of dhammii, which it recognises as the objective mundus sensibilis.
What this seems to me to mean is that manodhiitu serves as a special
filtering and collating 'sense' which is the subjective side in our relation to
the objective world, all of which is referred to collectively as dhammii.
Dhamma as counterpart to manodhiitu is a pluralistic representation of the
world, which has a certain inherent rationality, and manodhztu is the
receiver of these phenomena in general (without any initial specification as
to sound, visible objects, odour, and so on): and it is able to act as their
collator, rendering them cognisable for the cognitive faculties.14= This is a
necessary process since we receive data from different sensory objects
simultaneously. The perception of a person, for example, might involve
sight, hearing, smell and touch. The sense of sight, however, cannot itself
distinguish colour from sound, odour and touch: we need something to
synthesise all the sense impressions.143 So, Mrs Rhys Davids writes, through
manodhiitu as sensus communis, "we get a simulated unity and simultaneity of
impressions, which are really single and successive, if exceedingly and most
delicately swift".144Manodhiitu can also be considered a sense in that it
'senses' the 'sensibility' of phenomena (dhammq.14= Rather than 'ideas',
'mental objects' and so on, dhammi according to this explanation of its
meaning might therefore be translated as 'sensory phenomena', which
covers the sa?psiin'cworld in its entirety as experienced by us through our
senses.146
 The Riipakkhandha 29

In accord with understanding dhammi as all sensory phenomena,

Geiger, in his Pali Dhamma, interprets dhammi as the "empirical world".'47
In the light of this, a point needs to be clarified about the mandha Samyutta
passage first cited above in which the existence of manas and dhammi were
referred to after the arising of the five senses. Woodward's translation of
this passage is that manas and dhammi are the result of the manifestation of
the five senses.'48In my opinion this is not. what the passage means. It
refers to manas and dhammii separately because they have a unique role in
the cognitive process as data collator and raw data respectively. The raw
data, dhamma, may be the empirical world as experienced through our
senses, but that is not to say that the empirical world itself arises because of
sensory activity.
It is not uncommon in the Sutta Pitaka for the word dhammii to mean
more than just sensory phenomena. In the tilakkha?~formula, for example
(which is discussed in chapter IV), &ammi has the universal meaning of all
phenomena of whatever nature. Such a meaning would obviously include
more than Geiger's 'empirical world'. Another understanding of dhammii is
that it refers to phenomena which are 'knowable', though as such one
cannot either claim or deny their universality. Carter, for example, states
that dhammi are phenomena that "can be grasped, known by the 'mind-
organ' (manas).. . are themselves without substance but cooperate in a
changing but orderly co-production in such a manner that they can be
noted, thought out, and mastered, so to speak - internal psychic and
external physical patterned processes, as knowa able^'."'^^
I agree with Carter's suggestion that dhammii as the object of manodhitu
are knowable phenomena. But his statement needs, in my opinion, two
qualifications. First, there is no evidence that the manodhiitu has what we
would call the mental faculties of grasping and knowing. In its capacity as
sensus communis, it receives dhammi as incoming raw data at the preliminary
stage of the cognitive process. Grasping and knowing both take place at
subsequent stages of the cognitive process as functions of the various
mental faculties. We saw above that in guarding the senses as doors, the
bhikkhu must not be entranced. Though the Pali for this is na nimittagczhi,150
which more literally means that he must not seize upon (any sensory
experience), I mentioned there that such entrancement or seizing comes
not from the sense but from the ~amkhirakkhandha.'~' Even if one interprets
Carter's use of the word 'grasps' metaphorically, as indicating something
like 'pays attention to' or 'is conscious of', by stating that it 'knows' he
would still be attributing more to manodhitu than we are able to confirm
from the texts.
Second, Carter's description of dhammi as "internal psychic and
external physical" phenomena is potentially ambiguous. The analysis of
the @atanasis into the subjective senses and the objective sense objects: the
@atanas as a whole represent the means whereby the individual as subject
30 Identity and Experience
interacts with the objective world. As such the former are internal or
subjective to the individual and the latter, including dhammi, are external
or objective to the individual. I have deliberately stated 'external or
objective' and not 'external' alone because knowables may not strictly be
external, even if they are objective. Dhammi as knowables would include
phenomena such as teachings, doctrines, concepts, and so on. It also
includes thoughts and ideas insofar as these are objectified: someone else's
thoughts and ideas, for example, or one's own previous thoughts and ideas
which have become objectified through the lapse of time. The subjective
mental processes which arise immediately subsequent to one's subjective
interaction with the objective world, such as thinking and knowing, are
not (yet) objectified and are thus not included in the term dhammi as the
stream of incoming raw data: they are not the object but the content of the
mind. So dhammi in the context of being the object of the manodhitu refers
to all objective phenomena, and the sentence referred to above might
have been clearer as 'objective psychic and physical' phenomena.
Whether they are sensory or abstract, all such phenomena are filtered
through or collated by the manodhitu, subsequent to which the cognitive
processes function.
The fact that manodhitu also processes abstract or conceptual dhammi,
as well as all other sensory dhammi, suggests its second role as that of an
'ordinary' sense: processing data which are specific to its nature, as it were.
The abstract or conceptual dhammi are phenomena which are as specific
to manodhitu as, say, sound is to the ear. So though all dhammi are
processed by mano&itu, it also has this aspect to its function which one
might consider to be a more 'normal' sensory function. I will return to
this second understanding of manodhitu in the Sutta Pi@ka shortly.
The understanding of dhammi as objective phenomena in general rather
than being limited to mere sensory phenomena is compatible with the use
of dhammi in the Satipatthina Suttas. In these Suttas the fourth satipathina is
the contemplation of dhammi.'" This exercise is to be undertaken
considering in turn the nfvaranas, the khandhas, the gatanas, the seven
bojhangas and the four Noble Truths. The context suggests that it is the
teachings on each of these things which are to be meditated upon;
presumably why they were given, their significance, meaning, and so on.
Here dhammi represents all phenomena which arise in the course of each
meditation exercise, and the doctrinal concepts which form the objects of
the meditation are as objective to the individual as are strictly external
sensory phenomena.
Writing from within the Theravada tradition, Nyanatiloka explains that
the term dhamma refers to nimariipa dhammi "as presented to the
investigating mind by mindf~lness".'~~ Though Nyanatiloka, following
Buddhist tradition, interprets na'mariipa dhammi as "bodily and mental
phenomena", we shall see in chapter VI that this is not necessarily an
 The Ripakkhandha 3I
appropriate interpretation of it: nima is not the equivalent of arqa, and
therefore mental, dhammi. Rather, it is the equivalent of conceptual or
abstract dhammi, which precisely fits with the conceptual or abstract (and
objective) dhammi referred to in the last paragraph. Riipadhammi refers to
sensory phenomena. The nature and status of all dhammii later became the
subject of extensive philosophical speculation within the Buddhist tradition
as a whole, much of which is recorded in Vasubandhu's Abhidhamzakoia and
its bhiga. But there is no such speculation in the Sutta Pitaka: there, even the
term nimarzipa dhammi is not used, let alone defined.
We find manas in one other context which appears to confirm its unique
role as what one might call a quasi sense and that it functions as collator
of a wide range of incoming data. This is in a reference to the level of
awareness achieved in the fourthjhina. "What can be understood through
mano~in"n"inal~~ when it is 'purified', that is when it is isolated from the five
[other] senses?"155The reply is that one can know that space is unending
(ananto ikso), that consciousness is unending (anantam viiiiiigam) and one
can know the sphere of no-thing (ikn"can"n"123)atana). These three represent
consecutivejhina levels of meditation, none of which is knowable through
the senses.
Here the role of manodhitu appears to be similar to that meant by sensus
communi.r as described above, in that it collates the incoming data as the
first stage of the cognitive process, but those data are what one might call
supra-sensory rather than simply abstract or non-sensory. In another
description of the jhinas, what one knows at the fourth level is described
differently:
...through completely transcending all apperceptions based on appearance,
through the cessation of apperceptions which are sensory in origin, through
not paying attention to apperceptions of rn~1tiforrnity.l~~
Though in this passage the involvement of manodhitu is not explicitly
stated, what one knows is clearly not from sensory data. Perhaps in line
with this, the Vibhariga suggests that manas might function at even higher
non-sensory levels when it states that both manm and dhammi are some-
times lokya (worldly) and sometimes lokuttara (supramundane).15'
I stated above that where dhammi refers to all phenomena whatsoever
the term clearly referred to more than Geiger's 'empirical world'. We have
now arrived at an understanding of dhammi when it is the object of
manodhitu which includes sensory, non-sensory and supra-sensory phenom-
ena. Whether or not this meaning of dhammi also represents more than
Geiger's 'empirical world', on the grounds that it includes phenomena
which are not actually empirical, is open to debate. The non-sensory and
supra-sensory phenomena may not be empirical in the Western
materialistic meaning of the word, but it may be a valid word to use in
Buddhism. Even at supra-sensory jhiina levels phenomena are part of
3* Identity and Experience
samsrZric experience: in spite of terms such as 'the sphere of no-thing', such
levels do not constitute liberating insight and are part of the samsiin'c
cognitive process. They would not be psycho-cosmological 'spheres' if they
were not.15*On the other hand, if dhammii applies at lokuttara levels it might
include within it the unconditioned as well as conditioned phenomena, as
it does in the tilakkhana formula (discussed in chapter IV). In view of the
diversity of phenomena included within the term dhammii, it is perhaps
unnecessarily ambiguous to define it as the empirical world when 'know-
able~'is more clearly an inclusive term.
An important implication of understanding manodhiitu as smus communis
is that any and all sensory activity involves the activity of the manodhGtu. If it
is the coordinator and collator of all sensory input, then it is activated
whenever any of the other five senses functions. In this respect it is unique
among the senses; it functions, as already suggested, as a quasi sense.
References in the canonical material to only five kiimapnii might be based
on this assumption: though manodhztu would be involved in the process of
the arising of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile pleasure it
would not in itself be the basis for a specific type of pleasure in its own
right.
But this assumption overlooks the 'normal sense' aspect of manodhiitu,
and it is this aspect alone which features in the second understanding of
manodhiitu that one can extract from the Sutta FiFitaku, to which I now return.
Even if manodhiitu functions as a quasi sense which processes all incoming
raw data, another part of its function is as the sense which processes
abstract phenomena, as we have seen above. As such, one might think that
pleasure could be associated with these abstract thoughts or ideas. This
possibility is referred to in some passages which are otherwise problematic
in the light of the analysis of manodhiitu as s m communir. Such passages only
treat manodhitu as an ordinary sense, that is the sixth in the series of senses,
and assume that it functions in the same way as the other senses in relating
to its corresponding object. Though such passages confirm one role of
manodhiitu, however, they indicate that for the authors of such passages it is
not understood as comprehensively as has been described above.
An example of this is in the description of the arising of feelings in the
Madhupindikasutta, which was quoted from above.159It gives exactly the
same description for all six senses: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tac-
tile and 'mental'. Thus the sentence construction for the description of
'mental feeling' is the same as it is for visual feeling. 160 No mention is made
of the manodhiitu being activated as collator for the other senses. Nor does
the commentary on this passage suggest that manodbiitu functions differently
from the other senses: having described the arising of visual feeling, it states
that the same process applies to auditory feeling and all the others.161
Similar passages about the arising of feelings are found elsewhere in the
canon.162Likewise, in many of the Suttas whose content is primarily
 T h e Riipakkhandha 33
concerned with the senses, the description given of manodhitu is in precisely
the same formula as that given for the other five senses.163
Rahula, writing from within the Theravada Buddhist tradition, also
understands manodhitu in this way,16' as does fianavira Thera.165In such
contexts manodhctu is translated as 'mind'. And as object corresponding to
'mind', dhammi is translated by words such as 'thoughts', 'ideas', 'mental
images', 'mind states' or 'mental states'.166Such translations are justified
because in these contexts there is no indication that the object correspond-
ing to manodhctu is any less specific than are the objects corresponding to the
other five senses. And if manas literally means 'mind' then it is understand-
able that a translator, and indeed the Theravada tradition, might assume its
object to be something like thoughts, ideas, mental images and so on. Such
translations confirm that here the function of manodhctu is not considered to
be that of receiving all incoming data whether sensory or abstract. Rather,
in these contexts the understanding of manodhitu seems to be limited to its
being the sense which processes the abstract phenomena discussed above,
while sensory data (riipadhammi are the province of the other five senses.
In this understanding of manodhitu, then, only one aspect of it is
recognised: that it is the sense which corresponds to abstract 'mental'
objects. It is not seen as the collator of all the incoming data from the other
senses. As such it functions in the same way as the other senses in that
contact with abstract objects - the thoughts of another, a teaching, one's
own previous thoughts - can give rise to 'mental' feelings and so on. This
less comprehensive understanding of mnodh-tu might have a prosaic origin.
It is possible that the mnemonic style of many of the passages found in the
JVikQas resulted in a sixfold analysis being included in a manner which
made it impossible to convey the unique function of manodhitu in handling
both the abstract phenomena which are said to be the object of it as a
sense, and the other sensory data which it collates as pa{isarana. It could
simply have been that because of an oversight the passages in question
were arranged mnemonically at the expense of comprehensiveness.
It might also simply be that we do not understand the meaning of manm
as a sense and thus are unable to interpret the relevant passages correctly.
And the Theravada tradition perpetuates but does not co-ordinate the two
meanings, showing that it is itself unclear as to the meaning of manodzitu. We
have seen above that in the commentaries no distinction between manoa3itu
and the other five senses is introduced when commenting on canonical
passages which refer to manodhitu as the sixth in a series of senses, and that
writers within the Theravada tradition accept manodhitu as a sixth sense in
this way. But elsewhere in the commentaries and the Theravada tradition,
manodhitu is interpreted as a collator for all sensory data (that is as sensus
communis as already defined). We read in the Abhidhamma commentarial
literature, for example, that the apperception of a visible object arises at the
door which is the visual sense and also at the door which is manodhitu. The
34 Identity and Experience
same is the case with all the other senses.'" Similarly, Karunadasa, writing
about the Buddhist analysis of matter according to the Abhidhamma and Pali
commentarial material, states: ". ..all the nipadhammas become the objects
of man~viiiiiina".~~~ This does not mean that the objects of manodhitu are
limited to nipadhammi, but is confirming that the objects of the other five
senses, collectively the nipadhammi, are collated by manodhitu.
In spite of the unclear and/or conflicting evidence, one might suggest
that the most satisfactory way of understanding manodhitu in the Sutta Pibku
is that it has both a unique function as a collator of incoming data and also
can be described in terms of the sixth in a series of senses in that it is the
sense corresponding to 'mental' objects. The translation of manas and
dhammi as 'mind' and 'mental objects', however, is potentially misleading,
not least because of the ambiguity and insufficiency of such English words
in this context: they are neither precise nor indicative of the complexities of
the Pali terms. These translations might also imply too developed a
cognitive role for these two 9atana.s. Though we have seen the crucial role
of manodhitu as collator of all incoming data (dhammi), which is the raw
material for the cognitive process, the fact remains that they are included in
classifications of the senses, and not in the analysis of the individual in
terms of the paiicakkhandhi which gives such comprehensive attention to
mental activities. And though it is this unique combination of being a sense
and also functioning so crucially in all cognition that justifies calling it a
quasi sense, this nevertheless does not make it (according to the analysis as
given) part of the mental processes as such. What one can say is that just as
the other five senses each act as the door between their particular kind of
object and the subjective experience of the individual, so manodhitu
(whether or not it has a corresponding physical organ, gross or subtle), as
collator, acts as the door between the objective world in its entirety
(whether it be riipa or anipa) and the cognitive experience of the individual.
Sensus communis is a suitable name for it only insofar as such a name is not
understood as limiting it to incoming sensory data. The English word
'sensitivity' has connotations which go beyond the mere senses: it implies an
intuitive dimension which perhaps corresponds to the role of the manodhitu
at trans-sensory levels of experience. Overall, however, manodhitu can
perhaps not be translated by any current English term.
The figurative understanding of the senses as doors suggests not just that
they link the individual and the objective world but that they are also the
link between the rzipakkhandha and the four anipakkhandhas: not strictly the
former nor the latter themselves, they nevertheless have their riipa aspect
(with the possible exception of manodhitu) and yet function as that by which
all the activities of the anipakkhandhas are sub-divided. That they are explic-
itly classified (if confusingly) in the Abhidhamma is perhaps unsurprising
since the Abhidhamma is primarily concerned with classifying. The analysis
of the human being into khandhas in the Sutta Pi!aka, on the other hand, is
 T h e Rtipakkhandha
not intended to be a comprehensive classification. It describes the riipa and
arzipa aspects of the way an individual manifests which, when understood,
illustrates the inappropriateness of thinking in terms of separate selfhood:
not only is this clearly the didactic context in which they are frequently
referred to in the texts, but we have seen from our examination ofjust one
of the khandhas a manifest absence of any attempt to be descriptively
comprehensive. The senses themselves are not included in this analysis
because what is relevant about them is neither rzipa nor ariipa. But their
necessary role in the functioning of the human being is perhaps why they
are included in the paficcasarnuppida formula.

Notes

SN, Vol 111.

SN.III.86: K&a bhikkhave nipam vadetha? Ruizpatiti kho bhikkhave tasmii riipan ti vuccati. Kina
mjpati, sftcna pi ruppati u$ma pi mf@atijghatchqa pi nrpiati piprSga pi W a t i dawa-makasa-
viitiitapa-sin'wapa-~amphascnza pi ruppati. Ruppatiti kho bhikWlave tasmii nipan ti vucciiti.
Wayman (1984, p.619) discusses the use of the pun on niima by Vasubandhu,
S a g h a b h a d r a and Asaliga. Namana literally means 'bending', and the point is that the
four ariipakkhandhas (collectivelytaken to mean niima, though this assumption is discussed in
chapter vr) "go towards objects (artha) as though naming them, thus 'bending' toward them
... [and] because when the body disintegrates, these aggregates, so to say, bend toward
another existence".
For example, MA.1.221; Vism p.528.
KS.III.73, n.1.
cf Monier Williams' Sanskrit Englkh Dictiona~,p.884 and p.904.
KS.III.73, n.1. Karunadasa (1967, p.gf) discusses the use ofruppati.
For example, SN.III.59: Katamafica bhikkhave rCpar.n? Cattiiro ca mahiibhitii catunnam ca
mahiibhltiinam upidiija nipam idam vuccati bhikkhave nipam.
For example, MN.I.423, 111.241. In the Abhidhamma, CrkiisadhZtu is considered to be part of
the category ofupiidi ('secondary ' or 'derived') nipa (for example, Dhs 638). As we shall see,
upiidii nips is systematised and classified in the Abhid/zamma in a way which is completely
absent fi-om the fbur main flikiijas of'the Sutta Pitaka.
MN.I.185ff, 42rff, III.2qoff: Pa{havidIzZtu [ipo-, tejo-, vlT;yu-] s+ii ajhattikii s+ii biihirii. I
mentioned in the Introduction the convention where ajhattam and bahiddhii are used to
make a distinction between oneself' and others. Here, this convention is not being used
(save in the sense that what is external to oneself' includes other people). In the
Patisambhidiimagga of' the Khuddaka Nikqa, there is a classification of what is 'internal'
(ajhatta) and 'external' (bahiddhi). Among other characteristics, they are defined as being
'produced by craving' (taghZsambhiita),suggesting they are upiidii (see the discussion below).
T h e senses and sense objects are the factors classified, but they are not specifically stated to
he nipa (Patis 1.76-78).
cf. Harvey, 1991,p.3.
Udiina VII1.i: Atthi bhikWlaue tad ciyatanam,yattha n'eva pafivi na iipo na tejo nu viiyo ... . Pande
(1983, p. 711) discusses the lateness of the prose sections of' the Udiina as, in effect,
commenting on the earlier verses it contains. Our quotation is part of a prose section,
maybe indicating that the question of the conditioned nature of'the cattiro rnahiibhritii needed
to be clarified. The passage need not (and, in my opinion, should not) be interpreted
ontologically: the fbur elements are a feature ofsapsiitic perception, not of 'seeing things as
they really are' (Nirvana). Nor does the term qatuna, often translated as 'sphere', necessarily
have spacial implications: we shall see in the next section ofthis chapter that when used in
connection with the senses it has no spacial meaning: In the context quoted here, 'condition'
is meant in the sense of 'state', with no causative connotations.
 I d e n t i t y a n d Experience
cf. Dhs 877-80, where it states that some no-upaii Spa does not result from karma. In
chapter IV, we shall see that it is intention that conditions all five of the khandhas in future
lives, including the body.
As1 p.305: Tattha upiibyati ti upiidii. Mahiibhltiingahe amuiicitvii tiini nbsqa pavattanti ti attho.
SA.III.276.
Dhs 594: Cakkh~atanam,sotrSyatanam, ghiinrlyatanam, jivh*atanam, kqqatanam; nipiiyatanam,
saddeatanam, gandhrlyatanam, ras@atunam, photthabb@atanam.
Vibhatiga p.7ofE Catunnam mahiibhltiinam upiid@a.
Expositor, Vol.11, chapter 111, a translation of As1 p.305ff.
Dhs 596. cf: also Nynnatiloka, 1957, p.23. Karunadasa (1967, p.31) states that derived @a is
not defined until the commentaries, overlooking the extensive Abhidhamma explanations.
Vism p.444. Buddhaghosa makes one exception from the rlyatanas, tangible data
PhotthabbrSyatana). Nanamoli, in his translation of the i&uddhimagga (1964, p.489, n.13),
points out that in the Paramattha-maiiJiiJ&ii, the Vi~uddhimaggaCommentary, it is explained
that the exception is because tangibles arejncluded in primary Spa.
cf., for example, Rahula, 1985,p.2of, and Nanavrra Thera, 1987, p.g8ff.
For example in the paticcasamuppiida formula, the Cltachakkasutta, MN.III.28oq the
Mahiisa@yatanikasutta(MN.III.287ff) and the Sagyatana Vagga (SN, Vol. IV).
SN.II.3, etjeq.
For example, the Chachakkasutta and the Sabyatana Vaga.
For example, Vibhariga 70K
Dhs 586: Yan tam riipam ajhattikam, tam upiidd, yan tam nip- biihiray, tam atthi upiidii, atthi
nop17dii.
Dhs 743 (I take it that this is referring back to Dhs 596).
Dhs 1045. cf'. also Dhs 1208, 1418.
Dhs 744.
The use of the term anidasra with regard to the iiyatanas at Kbhatiga 7off does not mean that
the physical sense organs are not indicated, but that one cannot, in seeing the sense organs,
actually see any more than their material constituents: it is their function as senses that is
not visible. ct: Dhs 1087-90.
For example, SN.111.46, V205; MN.1.180. Sometimes (for example at SN.III.46, V.205)
these are fivefold, excluding manm, but at MN.1.180 manas is referred to as manindnyam.
For example, in the Dhiitu Samyutta, SN.11.14oK The Abhidhamma systematises the gatanas,
indnyas and dhiitus, and the senses are included in all three classifications. cf: Nyanatiloka,
1957, pp.27ff. These terms are discussed further in part 2 of this chapter.
Sn I 70: khtmn- tam upEdinamyattha loko uihaiEiati ...paiica Emagunii loke manoch.t.%i paved&.
For example, at SN.III.58f.
SN.III.47.
~ a n a v i r a1987,
, p.26. cf also Gethin's discussion ofthe term updii&andha (1986, p.3fl.
MN.I.x85f, 42x1; III.2qof.
MN.1.189.
MN.1.185: Katumii c'iivluo ajhattikii pafiavidhiitu? Yam ajhattam p a c c a t t ~kakkhabm khanyatam
updipzm; swathidam kesii lomd nakhii dantii taco maway nahiiru atfii athimiiijii vakkam hdayam
yakanam kilomakam pihakam papphZsam antam a n k g u w udanyam karisam, yam vii panYar?iiampi
kiiici ajhattam paccattam kakkhabm khangatam upiidinpzm, yam vuccat'iiuuso ajhatlikiipafiavidh(7tu.
kirtamii c'iivuso ajhattikti Zpodhiitu? Yam ajhattam paccattam 90iipogatam upiidigam; styyathidam
pittam semlzam pubbo lohitam sedo medo m u vmii khek sitighiinika' hikii muttam,yam vii pan' aEam
pi kiiici ajhattam paccattam iipo iipogatam uplidinam, ayam vuccat' Zvuso ajhattikii iipodhiitu.
khtamii ca ajjhattikii tgodhiitu? Yam ajhattam paccattam tgo ,%jogatam upiidinpzm ~eyyathidam yena ca
.~antaJpatiyena cajinyati yena ca par;hayhatiyena ca masltapitakh~itas@itam sammii pan$iimawt
gacclzati, yam vii pan' aiiriam pi kiiici ajlzattam paccattam tgo ttjogatam upiidinym, ayam vuccati
ajhattikii tgodhiitu.
I. B. Horner (trans.), MLS.I.4, n.9.
MN.I.296: Yadii kho iivm imam Eyam kayo dhammiijahanti: @u wnii ca vin'iim, athqam &yo
ujjhito avakkizitto setiyathii &!!ham acetanan ti, cf also SN.111.143;DN.II.335.
MN.I.295.
MN.I.296.
Ayxramk/ziirii: the context implies that all three factors are included in the plural (MN.I.295).
 T h e Riipakkhandha 37
See chapter IV. cf also Reat, 1991,p.2ggE
MN.1.188.
Katamii ca ajhattikii vqodhiitu? Tam ajhattam paccattam v q o viiyogatam upiidinqam; sgyathidam
uddhangamd vdtd adhogamii viiE kucchhayd viitii kotflasayii vitii aligamangiinusdrino viihi w & o
pmibo, yam vii pan' aiirsam pi kiiin' ajhattam paccattam vtiyo viiyogatam upiidiwm: ayam uuccati
ajhattikii viyodhiitu.
Br. Up. 1.5.3, 3.9.26; Ch. Up. 3.13,5.19-23. Ten breaths are mentioned but not listed at Br.
Up. 3.9.4. cf. also Reat, 1991,p.213fF.
The later Mt. Up. 2.6 describes the respective function of each breath in detail.
cf, for example, By. Up. 3.9.9, 4.1.3, 5.13.2, 6.1.1; Ch. Up. 3.15.4, 5.1.1.
Vism 350.
SN.IV.230; AN.II.87, III.131, V.110.
Pv. 11.6 and PvA. 94. cf. also Kbhanga 84.
Reat (1991, p.214fl) traces and discusses the fifteen vital, perceptual and volitional faculties
(each ofthe three consists of five faculties) in the Upancacis.
MN.I.423; 111.241: Katamii ca ajhattiEii cihsadhiitu? Yam ajhattam paccattam &am &agatap
upcidipqzm, seyyathidarl,: kappaccbddam misacchiddam muWviiram, yena ca adap~>itcrrcSyitam
ajhoharati, yattha ca a s i t a p i ~ ? i t a s d y Y 2 t asantitflati,
m yena ca anantapttuk!@itasqitam adhobhrSgH
nikkhamati;yq vii pan' airiram pi kiiici ajhattam paccattam iikcam L7ka-sagatam upiidinqam: T a m
vuccati bhikkhu ajhattikii Zfiadhiitu.
For example, MN.I.352: riipasafiiiiinam samaa'kkama.
MN.I.57; AN.III.323, V.109; DN.II.293; SN.Xq8.
For example at MN.I.57: Atthi imasmim k q e kesii lomii nakhii danti taco mapsum n a h h a#hi
atfiimiiijd vakkam hadayam yakanam kilomakam pihakam papphibum antam antagupam udanyam
karbam pittam smJunn pubbo l o h i m sedo medo m u vast? khcb sitighii@& Wa'muttan ti.
The processes included vary, the Satipatwna Suttm (MN.I.57; DN.II.293) being the most
comprehensive.
Puna ca param bhikkhaue bhkkhu imam ma k q a m yatha-bitam yathdpayihitam dhdtuso paccavekkhati:
atthi imasmim k q e pa fiauidhiitu iipodhiitu tejiodhcitu viyodhiitfiti.
We shall see in chapter IV that there are exceptions to this. But such exceptions take place
at such an advanced stage on the meditative/soteriological path that they do not
compromise the importance of the senses in the cognitive process.
e.g. DN.I.245; MN.I.266; AN.111.411; SN.IV.225: at these references the kimagunii are listed.
There are other references to the term patlta kiimagund which do not explicitly state what
they are, Ibr example AN.111.411; D N . I I . ~ ~ I , I I I .234. I ~ ~cf.
, Reat, 1990, p.22flon the five
classical sense faculties in the UpanGads.
Dhs 594K
NTmanipa-paccayii safiyatanam.
MN.III.28oK
MN.III.287fE
SN, Vol. IV.
MN.III.239.
MN.1.18oc 266,346.
SN.III.5gfE
Chayime vedaturkyii: cakkhmmphacrajii vedanii, sotasamphassajii vedanc?,ghiinasamphassajii uedand,
jwhrZsamphwqh- vedanii, k+asamphacrajii vedam?, manosamphussajiivedanii.
Chqime viiMii&qii: cakkhuvinviniiiiqam,sotavin'tiiiqqn, ghC&-iiiiqam, juEviiiZ@am, fiyavinvin%yam
manovijiiiiqam.
So fbr the saiirTiikhandha we read: chayime saiifikiiyii: rtipasaififd, saddasaiftld, gandhasaiiiid,
rasasaiiiiii, pho@habbasaiiitii, dhammasaifiid, and the sapkhiirakkhandha is described in the same
way except that cetanii is substituted tbr saifiiii in the Pali.
For example, KS.III.52E
For example, SN.II.3: Katamaiica bhikkhave sa&yatanam? Cakkhiyatanam sot9atanam
ghiiniyatanam jivhc7yatanam kiiyqatanam manqatanam.
PED, p.105.
Ibid., quoting from Aung, 1963.
When it is found in contexts where the jhiinar are being described it is usually translated
'sphere'.
 Identity and Experience
PED, p.105.
DA.1.124f.
PED, p.121.
PED makes this suggestion.
Gethin (1992, chapter 4) discusses in detail the complete list of twenty-two indriyas, first
explicitly mentioned together in the Vibhariga but also found unsystematically scattered
throughout the Indriya Samyutta ([email protected] h e Sarigiti Suttanta (DN.I11.207@ refers to
eighteen ind@as at DN.III.219, 239.
SN.V.207: Sukhindriyam dukkhindriyam somanmindnyam domanmindt.iyam upekhindnyam.
Dhammii as the ob.ject(s) corresponding to manas is discussed below.
sN.11.150: abhiidhat~,subhadhiitu. Though such terms may have meditative levels as their
primary reference, this does not invalidate the point I am making.
SN.11.153: avijiidhiitu.
For example, DN.I.63, 70, 250; SN.11.218, 1V.103, 117, 194. In the Chiindo~aUpani~ad
(III.13), the heart is said to have five 'openings of the gods' (deva-suga), corresponding to
the five senses. They are the 'doorkeepers' of the 'world of heaven' (svap+ya lokaya dviira-
p 4 . cf: Radhakrishnan, 1953, p.390. cf: also Cousins, 1981, which discusses the way a
'sense-door process' is developed in the Abhidhamma.
MN.1.180, 221; AN.11.16.
DN.I.70: Katham bhikkhu indriyesu guttadviiro hoti ... idha bhikkhu cakkhunii rtSpam disvii nu
nimittggiihi hoti niinuvya6jan~i.Yatviidhikaravm enam cakkhundnyam asamvutam uiharantam
abhijii-domanassiipiipakii akusalii dhammii anviissaveyyum tassa samvariiya pat$ajati, rakkhati
cakkhundriyam, cakkhundnyesamvaram iipajati.
Again, this triad is discussed in chapter IV.
5.1.276: Khyadviiram vacidviiram manodviiran ti tini dviiriini rakkha, mii kiiyena piipakammam kari mi
viiciiya mii manarii.
SN.IV.174: Sufifio giimo ti kt10 bhiWchave channam ajhattikinam adhivacanam. The term iiyatana is
not mentioned here, though from its presence in the next sentence quoted above one can
infer it. In her translation of the Dhammasatigam(inwhich this metaphor is referred to) Mrs
Rhys Davids suggests that ijyataninam be included in this sentence (A Buddhist Manual of
P~ychologicalEthics, p.160, n.2).
SN.IV.I 75: Corii giimaghiitakii ti kho bhikWlave channam biihirnam iiyataninam adhivacanam.
As1 p.305ff.
Vibhanga, p.7oE with the exception of nipa as visible object.
As1 p.399f: CaMu nipam nu passati, acittakattii; cittam nu pmati, acakkhukattii. Dviiriiramma;?a-
samg.hattanena pasidavatthukena cittena passati. Citta seems to be used in a general sense of
'mind' or 'consciousness' here. This term is discussed in chapter v. In the Abhidhamma
tradition the eye is sometimes referred to as fiasiida. This is discussed below.
The Expositor, Vol 11, p.408f; translating As1 p.312: E h u hi nipiibh&h~rahbhttappasaalakkhapm
d a t t h u k i i m a - t i i n i d i i n a k a m m a s a m u t $ u i n a b h ~ vii cakkhu riipesu iivit?janara.ram
cakkhuviiifiiiwsa iidhiirabhiivapaccupatthiinam dat{hukiimatii-nidiinakammajabhiitapada{ghiinam.
Saddiibh&hii~rahabhttappasdaUagms o t u k i i m a t i i n i d i i n a k a m m a s a m u { ! h i i n a b h i i t a ~
vii sotam saddesu iiviij'janarasam sotaviiifiiinassa iidhiirabhiivapaccupatthiinam sotukiimatiinidiina-
kammajabhltapadat{hiinam (and the fbrm is the same fbr the other three senses). Maung Tin's
translation of bhttappasiida as "sentience fbr phenomena" is questionable. It has been
suggested to me by Mr. Lance Cousins that bhtta here is likely to mean mahiibhtta and that
pasiida has the technical meaning of a sensitive point of subtle @a within the eye itself: So
this might read: "the eye has the characteristic of (having) a sensitive point and of (being
comprised of) the four elements" (my translation).
As1 p.306. So of cakkhu it states: Mam.racaMupi sasambhiiracakkhupasiidacaWchiiti duvidham hoti.
In some contexts in the Sutta Pt{aka, pasiida also means mental composure or serenity.
Gethin (1992, p.112fl) discusses the close relationship, in such contexts, between pasiida and
saddhii, faith, in a psychology of 'confidence'.
As1 p.306: Tesu buddhacakkhu samantacaMu fiiipcakkhu dibbacakkhu dhammacakkht tipaficavidham
paEfiiicakWzu.
cf: Collins, 1987a, p.357.
This fact was first pointed out by Shwe Zan Aung in his Compendium of Philo.rophy (Aung,
1963, p.277ff.); cf: Nyanatiloka, 1980, p.73, and C. A. E Rhys Davids, 1974, p . ~ x x x v ~and ff
 T h e Riipakkhandha 39
1914,p.71, n. 1. Karunadasa, 1967, p.62-3 also discusses the fact that the identification of
hadayavatthu with manas is a post-canonical development.
106. Dhs 6.
107. Tikapaghina, Part I, p.4: Tam e p a m n k q a manodhitu ca manovin'tii&hiitu ca vattanti, tam nipam
manodhdtuyii ca manovin'n'iiydhiituyi ca tam sampayuttakiinati ca dhammZnam nisrayapaccayena
paccayo.
108. Aung, 1963, p.278.
109. Atthasilini, p.264: LukWlancTdito pan' esii duvidh pi manoviCtiZ&hZtu ... hadayavattllupadat111Eniiti
veditabbii.
110. Vism 447: Manodhiitu-manovin'iiiydhiitiinam nixsayalakkhanam hadayavatthu. An important
proviso has to be added here. Because of the addition of the suffixes dhGtu and vin'n'Zpuihhatu
in the commentarial tradition as a whole, precise comparisons between such terms and the
manas ofthe Sutta Pitaka are necessarily handicapped. Others have made detailed studies of
the development ofthe terminologies (cf: fbr example, Cousins, 1981).My aim here is to
draw out an overview in order to suggest a coherent general picture.
I I I. Vism 444.
112. Aung, 1963, p.278.
"3. cf Karunadasa, 1967,p.621. possible reasons fbr the failure to identify the physical location
of the manodhcTtu are discussed.
114. PED gives extensive examples of hoth explicit and implicit associations of citta with the
heart: pp.266ff. c i t h is discussed further in chapter v.
1x5. SN.IVg5: Tena lokarmim lokascm'n'ihoti lokamiini.
116. Nanavira, 1987, p.96.
I 17. Jayasuriya,1963, p.51.
118. Patis. 1.6.
119. KhP p.2.
120. <aramatthajotikG I, p.60.
121. Nanamoli (trans.), Minor Readings, introduction.
122. Vin.I.274.
123. Sn 199.
124. Atfiinahiirusatifitto tacamaviivalepano cltaviyii k q o paficchanno yathiibhltam nu d k a t i , antapziro
udarapziro yakape.ha uatthino hadayassa papphassa vakkaua pihakmsa ca si;mghip&ya f i e h a
sedasa m e d w a ca lohitwa lasik*a pittwa ca vasqa ca ... ath' m a susiram siiam matthalu@au'a
piiritam ... I have used Norman's translation (1992, p.21f).
125. Z?k (1991, p.143, n.54) is mistaken in giving this Sutta JViprik! reference for the standard list
of parts of the body.
126. Narada, in his translation of the Dhiitukathii fbr the Pali Text Society (the Dbcourse on
Elements), helpfully clarifies this in his tabulations of the complex contents of the DhZtukath?.
Existence at levels of subtle riipa is discussed below in the chapter on manomaya.
127. One passage suggests that manar as a sense and the mental processes as a whole were
considered to be linked through the fact that the power ofthe mind at every level conditions
our Suture lives. This is discussed in chapter VII,when the subject will be clearer to us.
128. SN.II.95: Cittum itipi mano i t i p i ai6filvm itipi. This passage has been taken to mean that
citta, mano and vifitiiig are being used synonymously. This need not be the case, and these
terms will he discussed in further detail below.
129. cf'., for example, Rahula, 1985, p.21; KS.III.52.
130. Carter discusses the term dlzamma as religious teaching in his book Dhamma: A Study o f a
Relieous Concept (1978).
131. ct: Nyanatiloka, 1980, p.115, and 1957, p.28.
132. SN.11.140ff.
133. SN.III.46: A.smtti kfzo pana bhikkhave udhigate atha paficannam indriycinam avakkanti Aoti:
cakkhundriyaua .rotindriyassa g/zZnindri;yassajivhindriyassa kiyindnyasra. Avakkanti literally means
that the five senses 'descend', but the meaning here is figurative, and best conveyed by
'manifest'. Elsewhere avakkanti is used in the sense of'descending into the mother's womb'.
This is discussed in chapter v.
134. Atdzi bhikkfzavemano atthi d/mmmii avijiidhtu. The editor of this passage notes that amjZdh5tu is
only found in one manuscript, and that others read: at#zi bhikwurve mano atthi dhammii atthi
vijZdhiitu (hence my inclusion of 110th ignorance and knowledge in the translation). The
40 Identity and Experience
translator fbr the PTS, EL. Woodward, considers the reading avijadhiitu more appropriate
to the context and translates accordingly (KS.111.41, n.2).
I 35. Avijiramphasajena bhiWrhave vedayitmq phuttha.csa a.wutavato ~uthujanairaasmiti pi'm hoti, ayam
aham asmiti pi'ua hoti, bhavkanti pikra hoti, nu bhavGsanti p i k a hoti, nipi bhavkranti piJ.w hoti,
anipi bhavissantipika hoti, satifit bhavissantipi'.s.sahoti, asan"fiibhavissantipi'ssa hoti, nevaraiifiinisafiiii
bhauirsantipi'.l;sa hoti.
I 36. Tdthanti Uzo pana bhikkhave tatth 'eva paiicindnyiini. Atlz 'ettha .rutavato ariyasiivakassa avijii pahgati
vcii uppujati. Ta.ssa uv~liviriigiivijuppiidii umiti pi'ssa na hoti, ayam aham armiti pi)J.ra na hoti,
bhavkranti, na bhavzkanti, nipi, ariipi, saiiiii, a.safiiii, neva saiin"in&aiifii bhavkanti piba na lzotiti.
137. MN.I.295; SN.V.218: Paiic' imiini indnyiini niiniizisayiini niinGgocariini . .. kim pagraragam, ko ca
ne.ramgocaravisayam paccanubhoti?... Mano patisaragam, mano ca nesam gocaravisayampaccanubhoti.
138. It is used in this more literal sense at, fbr example, MN.III.9 and MN.1.310.
139. MLS.I.355. Mrs Rhys Davids discusses the translation in the introduction to her translation
of the Dlzammasaqgam(1974, ~.LXXXVII).
140. C.A.E Rhys Davids, 1914, p.68ff. cf also Reat, 1990, p.2251'and p.243ff.
141. cf: Copleston, 1955, p.173t:
142. cf: also PED, p.520.
143. Aquinas gives the 'internal sense' the further firnction of being that by which we know that
we see a visible object rather than hear it; that we hear a sound rather than feel it, and so on.
Reat (1990, p.225fand p.243ff) discusses the meaning of'manas in the Upancad, where it has
many meanings ranging from sensus communir right up to "the supreme faculty ofthe soul,
capable of apprehending ultimate truth". Reat also discusses the role of manas in the pre-
Upani~adicVedas (p.107ff), where it is most commonly stated to he the locus of emotions or
the repository of the individual's character traits. O n e such epithet is nymanas:
'herominded'. Zaehner (1969, p.156) compares the Buddhist understanding of manas as
.rensus communis with manur in the Blzagavad Gitii, where it sometimes is the controller of the
senses (3.7; 6.24) and sometimes has to he controlled (2.60, 67). In the well-known parable
of the chariot in the KathopaniSad, buddhi is the charioteer, manar is the reins and the senses
are the horses: so there manu.\ is perhaps neither controller nor controlled hut an
implement of control.
144. C. A. E Khys Davids, 1914, p.70.
145. PED, p.520.
146. In the chapter which describes the evolutes of prakyti, the Siimkhya SUtras state that manas is
the principal PradhZna) evolute "because it is the receptacle of all sam.rkiirasW:Tathii
(Siimkllya SCtras, 11.42).
's'e~usam.rkiirZdhZratviit
147. Geiger, 1920, p. 80-2.
148. KS.III.41.
149. Carter, 1978, p.2. cfalso p.611'.
150. DN.I.70.
151. In the Clziindo~aUpanipd (111.2) nose, speech, tongue, eye, ear, mind, hands, and skin are
said to be the eight 'graspers' (grahah: lit. 'graspings') (Radhakrishnan translates this as
'perceivers' - 1953, p.215). But it is their ob.jects (atgralG) which do the grasping: jihvii (fbr
example) vaigraha?z, sa raseniitgriiheyghita'. . . The notion of grasper and grasped might he
a figurative indication that the functioning ofthe senses requires the coming together of
sense and ot!ject; or it might more generally be a metaphor fbr the relationship between
sub-jectiveexperience and the objective world. This notion was developed in later Buddhist
systematic philosophy.
152. MN.I.60; DN.11.301: Puna ca param bhikkhave bhikklzu dhamme.ru dhammiinupmf vihamti.
153, Ny%natiloka,rg80, p.42.
154. In common with the other senses, in order to function manodhiitu is 'activated' by vifin'iiga,
hence manovifiiiiiga.
155. MN.1.293: Niaghena h'Zvuso paiicahi indnyehiparisuddhena manovin"fiiiyenakim nqyan ti?
156. MN.I.352: . .. .sabbaso riipasaEiiiinam samatikkamii pafighasaiiiiinam atthagamii niinattasafiiiiinam
amanasikijrii. (In translating, I have paraphrased slightly in order to draw out the meaning.)
157. Vibhatiga p.76: Dasclyatanii lokiyii; dvrIyatanii siyii lokiyii s ~ lokuttarii.
Z This comes in a chapter
where manas and dhammii are always referred to as the eleventh and twelfth of the qatanar.
158. T h e psycho-cosmological spheres are discussed in chapter vrr.
159. MN.1.11rf'.
 T h e Rtipakkhandha
160. Manafi c'iivuso paticca dhamme ca uppajati manovififiiiqam, t i n y m sangati phasso, phassapaccayii
vedanr7,yam vedeti tam saiijaniiti.. . Cukkhufi c'iivuso paticca r%pe ca uppajati cakkhuvin'fiiiqam,tinqam
sangati phasro, phmapaccuyr7 vedanii, yam vedeti tam saiijiiniiti.. .
I 61. MA.II.77: Sotafic'iivuso ti iidbu pi es' eva nuyo.
162. For example at MN.III.28off, 287K
163. The Mahiisu~yatanzkasutta (MN.III.287q; the Clzachakkasutta (MN.III.28off); and much of
the Sabyatana Samyutta (SN, Vol. IV).
164. Rahula, 1985, p.23.
165 ~ a n a v i r aThera, 1987,p.94K
166. cf; for example, Rahula, 1985,p.23; KS.IV.56 and passim; Further Dialogues, Vol 11, p.315K
167. As1 74: Ripr7rammaqam hi javanam cakkhudviire pi uppajati manodviire pi; saddiidiiirammapsu Pi
es'eva nuyo. Elsewhere in the same hook (As1 264) we read the following: Lukkhaniidito ...
manoviiifiiiqadhiitu .. . habramma~v~iinana-lakkhw-santira+. .. From the context and
meaning of this passage it appears possible that manovifin'iinadhiitu is the equivalent of
manodlziitu in the Sutta W k u . Here the characteristics of manoviii&iqadhiitu are said to be
knowing the six sense ob-jects and having the property of investigating them. cf. Cousins,
1981,where the development and meaning of the technical Abhidhamma and commentarial
terminologies are discussed.
168. Karunadasa, 1967, p.63 Similarly, Karunadasa's use of the term manovin'n'iiqa appears to
refer to the same thing.
 CHAPTER I1

T h e Vedaniikhandha

Introduction to the ariipakkhandhas

THEFOUR KHANDHASOTHER THAN the riipakkhandha are collectively called

arzipa in the Pali texts. They are sometimes referred to in scholarly works
and translations as the 'mental' khandhas, in the sense of being opposed to
the corporeal (riipa) khandha. We have seen in the discussion of the
rzipakkhandha, however, that the term rzipa is not limited to corporeality.
Defining the ariipakkhandhas as 'mental' in this polar sense should therefore
be done with caution. And just as the composition of the rzipakkhandha was
not described in terms of substance, so one should not anticipate that the
anipakkhandhas comprise some sort of mental entity. In describing the four
elements which comprise riipa, I stated that they represented the occur-
rence of certain states or processes which are characterised by solidity (or
extension),fluidity, heat and motion. The ariipakkhandha-smight be similarly
interpreted as the occurrence of certain states or processes that are not
characterised according to the four elements. In Buddhism this distinction
does not imply the ontological dualism posited by Descartes' well-known
polarisation of consciousness (which is unextended) and matter (whose
primary property is extension). Rather, one might suggest that it implies
that the states or processes occur at different levels on a spectrum of density.
Those which are designated by the term riipa occur at levels on the spec-
trum which are characterised by the four great elements. Though the most
dense of these is solid, that they include heat and motion illustrates that
their range is considerable. Those states or processes which are designated
by the term aripa occur at levels on the spectrum which do not have any of
the characteristics associated with riipa. The signdicance of this spectrum is
discussed in chapter VII. The four ariipakkhadas are vedanii, san"n"6, samklzira
and Viiiiiiipz.
 The Vedanikhandha 43
The Vedaniikhandha
Vedani is usually translated as feeling or sensation. We read in the Xilandha
Samyutta that there are six kinds of feeling.' Literally, the Pali states that they
are feeling which arises through contact of eye, feeling which arises through
contact of ear, through contact of nose, through contact of tong-le, through
contact of body, through contact of mind (manas). I have already suggested
in chapter I that in such contexts the terms used to refer to the senses,
cakkhu, sota, ghiina and so on, mean the faculties of vision, hearing, taste, etc.
rather than the physical organs of eye, ear and tongue. This passage,
therefore, is better translated as stating that the different types of feeling
arise from visual contact, auditory contact, gustatory contact, olfactory
contact, tactile contact and 'mental' contact.
In the Madhupi~ikasuttaof the Majhima NikQa, the arising of feeling is
stated to be dependent on the presence of several factors: consciousness, at
least one of the organs of sense, and contact between the organ and its
corresponding external object of sense. The feeling is subsequently
apperceived (or identified).2 The Sutta describes the arising of feelings
according to each of the senses, the process being the same in each case. SO
of visual feeling, for example, we read as follows:
Visual awareness arises because of eye and [visible] forms; contact [is the]
combination of the three; feelings are caused by the contact; that which one
feels, one apperceives (or identifies)...
This passage makes more sense of the sixfold definition of feeling
referred to above as we now see that (visual) contact is defined as the
combination of consciousness, eye and visible form. Thus contact is more
than the mere contact of eye and visible form: it is the conscious coming
together of sense organ and corresponding object. In other words, it is a
conscious sensory event. This passage also makes clear that visual
awareness (also often called 'eye consciousness') (cakkhuvin"n"i~) is a pre-
requisite for the whole process of the arising of the feeling: if there can be
no visual contact without the presence, or activation, of cakkhuwin"n"Zpz,then
without it there can be no feeling.
There are many different descriptions of the types of vedani. By far the
most commonly referred to are the three types covered by the term tiao
vedani: agreeable, disagreeable and n e ~ t r a lIt. ~is this analysis which stands
first in the Vedani Samy~tta.~It is also stated that vedani which is agreeable,
disagreeable and neutral is experienced (vedayitam) either bodily or
men tall^,^ making six types of feeling in all.' And in the Satipatthina Sutta it
states that agreeable, disagreeable and neutral feelings can be experienced
with regard to material (simisa) or non-material (nirimisa) thing^.^ These
last two sentences have been interpreted as meaning that feelings have
both a physical and a mental a ~ p e c tIn . ~my view, however, it seems more
44 Identity and Experience
likely that the first refers to the fact that feelings that have a tactile origin
are experienced bodily (k@a is the object corresponding to the sense of
touch) and feelings that have a non-tactile origin are experienced mentally:
so, for example, the agreeable feelings we experience as a result 9f hearing
or seeing something nice are not in this sense 'bodily' feelings. In the Digha
Nikya it states that bodily pain is produced through bodily contact; grief is
an example of mental pain, which arises through mental contact
(manosamphas~ajam).~~ As manas appears to be understood in this context as
meaning the 'mental' sense, and grief does not obviously arise from eye, ear,
nose or tongue, this passage does not explicitly support my suggestion that
the bodily/mental analysis differentiates between &ya as the tactile sense
object and all other sense objects. But it does support the point I am
making, which is that this analysis refers to different types of feeling and
does not mean that all feelings have both physical and mental aspects. With
regard to the second sentence, simisa and nirdmisa are used to make a
distinction between the experience of feelings which arise from the
riipakkhandha, which means from sensory contact, and the experience of
feelings which arise from levels of meditation. This is explained in the
Vedand Samyutta, where feelings are stated to be of three kinds, delightful
(pitz] agreeable (sukha) and neutral (upekhi). Simisa refers to the five
kimaguni. l JVirimisi(am) piti/sukham/upekhi, however, is experienced in
levels of meditation (ihina).12Elsewhere imisa is put in opposition to dhamma,
with a similar contrast in meaning.13We are told that a feeling is pleasant
or unpleasant depending on whether pleasure or pain is the dominant
feature of the feeling.l 4
Many different classifications of feelings are given in the Vedani Samyutta.
It starts by stating that feelings are of two kinds (bodily and mental), or
three kinds (agreeable, disagreeable and neutral). It continues with five, six,
eighteen, thirty-six and one hundred and eight kinds. The five kinds are the
moods (indriya)of pleasure, pain, joy, grief and indifference.l 5 The six kinds
are those which arise from contact with each of the six senses. The eighteen
kinds are the six ways (presumably according to the senses) of paying
attention to (upauicira)joy, grief and indifference respectively.l6 The thirty-
six feelings comprise a more complex analysis of feeling in that it relates the
six forms of joy, grief and indifference (that is, each of them experienced
according to the six senses) with the worldly life and with the renunciatory
life in turn." According to the analysis into one hundred and eight feelings,
the thirty-six feelings can be classified as past, present or future.18
The analysis that pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feelings can be
experienced as worldly (gehasita) or as renunciatory (nekkhammasita)is also
given in the Majhima Ni&ya.lgThe distinctions 'worldly' and 'renunciatory'
apply to the manner in which the feelings arise: whether they arise from the
perception of material things, or whether they arise from the discernment
of the transitory nature of things seen. This reflects the distinction made
 The Vedanikhandha 45
throughout the Pali canon between the ordinary (ignorant) man, the
puthujiana, and the advanced disciple of the Buddha's teaching, the
anyasiivaku. The well-taught ariyasivaka knows, for example, that there is a
refuge from disagreeable feeling other than happiness through sense
pleasures.20 He or she would, presumably, experience feelings as
renunciatory. This is also described as having feelings but being detached
from them.21
In one text a lay person, PaficakAga, expresses his doubts about neutral
feeling and insists that there are only two kinds of feeling, agreeable and
disagreeable. He repeatedly refuses to accept the venerable Udayi's
teaching that there are three kinds of feeling, including neutral. Eventually
the Buddha pronounces that different people explain vedani in different
ways, and that they are all correct. According to some explanations there
are only two, but it is also correct to say that there are three, five, six,
eighteen, thirty-six and one hundred and eight kinds of feeling.22The
Buddha goes on to make the point that inevitably some people will quarrel
about how many kinds of feelings there are, but that such quarrelsomeness
is futile and harmful. It is far better to accept that people can understand
the matter differently and to dwell in harmony with the different opinion.
fidanii is sometimes translated as 'sensation' rather than 'feeling', and it
could be argued that 'sensation' is a word which is more readily associated
with neutrality than is 'feeling', which is more often associated in our minds
with pleasure or pain. The word 'sensation' also implies a connection with
the senses, which might be said to be more appropriate to vedand', which
requires the coming together of a sense organ and its corresponding sense
object in order to arise. But 'feeling' can be used neutrally: it is not uncom-
mon to say 'I feel indifferent about that'. And not only is it commonly
accepted that feelings require sensory activity, even if this is not obviously
implicit in the word itself, but in the Buddha's analysis of the handbas this
does not only apply to the vedanikhandha but to all four of the anipakkhandhcrr.
The main reason I prefer the use of the word 'feeling' rather than
'sensation' in translating uedanii is, however, because I suggest that uedani has
a cognitive dimension which is conveyed by the word 'feeling' but not by
'sensation'. The word vedanii comes from dvid, which has a twofold meaning
involving both knowledge and (mere) feelings: intellectually it means to
know and experientially it means to feel. In uedani both of these meanings
are relevant. Though itself referring only to potential cognitive processes,
the wording of the twelvefold pa!iccasarnuppiida formula suggests that the
purely sensory event takes place when 'contact' occurs. The Pali word for
this contact is phassa, and it is from phassa that vedani then arises, which in
turn subsequently gives rise to craving (tal?h4.From this we see that vedani
is more than the (mere) sensory event: it is one stage further on in the
process. We have also seen above that feelings are intrinsically pleasant,
unpleasant or neutral. This also implies that at the level of the feeling itself
46 Identity and Experience
there is a degree of discrimination or cognition sufficient for its classifica-
tion in one of these three ways. A further point arises from the description
given above of the arising of feeling, which is that it illustrates that it is part
of a process involving both safiti and viiiiiiina. We shall see below in the
chapters on these two khandhas that both of these are part of the cognitive
process. But the samkhiirakkhandha is not involved. Again as we shall see
below (in chapter IV),this is where the emotions Westerners associate with
feelings come from.23
The cognitive role of vedanii is unsubtle: one might say that it is affective
rather than intellectual cognition. It is nevertheless significant enough to be
an important factor in understanding the role of the vedanikhandha
correctly. From a psychological point of view, it is not too difficult for us to
understand that vedana' is part of the cognitive process. We know, for
example, that feelings can be expressed cognitively: if we say we are feeling
sad, we also mean that we know that we are experiencing sadness. We also
commonly refer to feelings as a vague level of knowledge in expressions
such as 'I have the feeling that this is correct', or 'I feel there is something
wrong here'. Thus vedanZ plays a part, however nebulous, in the cognitive
process of an individual. It is perhaps significant that vedayita, the (irregular)
past passive participle of the verb vedeti, from which vedanii comes, is often
interpreted as meaning 'experienced' rather than 'felt'. And 'experience'
might be a better translation of vedanii when it is found in the context of the
cognitive process as a whole: in English to state that cognition necessarily
involves experience is more readily acceptable than stating that it
necessarily involves feelings. I will return to the question of the cognitive
role of vedanii in the chapter on the viiiKii@andha, when we will have more
information available to us.
What the discussion here has shown is that though different types of
feelings are referred to, descriptions of what feelings are emphasise the
way they arise. The concern is not with understanding what a feeling is per
se, but in seeing that feelings arise as part of a process.
I have pointed out above that according to the twelvefold version of the
pakcasamuppa'da formula, feeling (uedan4 has contact &ham) as its condi-
tion and that feeling itself is therefore more than mere sensory event. And
in the description of the arising of feeling to which I have referred it is also
from phma that feeling is stated to arise. Indeed, in the Phmmzihka Sutta
in the VedanZ Samyutta the dependence of vedani on phma is stressed: the
three feelings (agreeable, disagreeable and neutral) are born of contact,
rooted in contact, caused by contact, conditioned by contact.24Before
going on to discuss the safiiiikhandha, therefore, it would seem appropriate
to investigate the role of phma in more detail.
 The Vedanzkhandha
Phassa

In the Majhima NikrZya passage which describes the arising of, say, visual
feeling (and the form of the Pali is the same for all six senses),phma is said
to be the combination of three things: eye, (visible) object and conscious-
. ~ ~is what I have suggested should be understood as the conscious
n e s ~This
(visual) sensory event. And it is from this conscious sensory event that
feeling arises.26Elsewhere the way in which phassa gives rise to agreeable,
disagreeable or neutral feeling is described by means of analogy. So of
agreeable feeling we read that just as when two sticks come into contact
together (i.e. when there is friction between them), warmth and heat are
produced, but when the two sticks are separated and kept apart, the
warmth and heat dissipate and are no longer produced, in just this way
agreeable feelings arise because of the appropriate phassa and do not arise
when the appropriatephma ceases.27There is no suggestion in the text that
this description refers exclusively to bodily (tactile) feelings, and the
reference to contact as tactile has to be understood as meaning the coming
together of any of the senses and a corresponding object. This point is
stressed by the commentator on the Brahmaja'la Sutta who states that sense
and object are not to be thought of as literally touching one another:
rather, phma is what occurs when there is the appropriate coming together
of the two (and uin"n"iyz).**A further point about the analogy of the sticks is
that it raises the possibility that phassa itself is agreeable, disagreeable or
indifferent. That appropriate feelings arise from appropriate contact
suggests that, say, the agreeableness of the feeling is determined at the
phassa stage of the process of the arising of the feeling.
As we shall see in chapter 111, the passage from which I have quoted a
description of the arising of feeling states that as the process continues
apperception and identification of the experience in question take place. I
have also suggested, partly in the light of this passage but also in the light of
others (which are discussed fully in chapter v) that vedanz is not to be
understood as mere feeling but that it is part of the cognitive process as a
whole. It follows from this suggestion that phma is also a sine qua non of the
cognitive process as a whole. That this is the case is explicitly supported by
some canonical passages in whichphma is found. In the Brahmqjiila Sutta, in
which the Buddha systematically refutes a wide variety of views held by
Brahmans and ascetics, phma is stated to be involved in each and every one
of the views referred Without phassa, the Sutta states, none of those
views would be held.30All of the views arise because of continual contact in
~ ' in the Samyutta N i y a we read that (visual)
the six spheres of c ~ n t a c t .And
contact is defined as the meeting, coincidence, coming together of eye,
visible object and consciousness.32Later the passage states: "Contacted one
feels, contacted one thinks, and contacted one apperceive^".^^ In a descrip-
tion of the five khandhas in the Khandha Samyutta of the Samyutta JVikrZya we
48 Identity and Experience
read that it is from the arising ofphassa that vedanii, saiiiiii and samkhiira arise,
and from its cessation that they cease.34In the same passage, riipa is said to
arise and cease according to the arising and cessation of food (iihiira), and
viiiiiii~arises and ceases according to the arising and cessation of niimariipa.
These differences are unsurprising if one remembers that the classification
into handhas is an analysis rather than a prescription for the arising of the
human being. What is meant, therefore, is that the body is dependent for its
functioning on food; and uedanii, saiiiiii and samkhiirii are dependent for their
functioning on phassa (which the passage has defined as the conscious sen-
sory event). Viiifiiipa is not dependent on phasrn since phassa involves viiiiiiipz.
It is, rather, dependent on niimarzipa. Niimariipa is discussed in chapter VI,
when it will become clearer in what sense vifiiiiina might be said to be
dependent on it.
It appears from what we have seen thus far that it is reasonable
to describe phassa, which is defined as the contact which takes place
when viiiiiiina, sense organ and sense object come together, as a conscious
sensory event, as I have suggested. But in the Cii&vedalla Sutta, we find
phassa used in a context where this definition and understanding ofphassa
do not seem quite a p p r ~ p r i a t e The
. ~ ~ nun Dhammadinna is asked by
Visakha how many contacts impinge (phusanti:literally 'contact' or 'touch')
on a bhikkhu when he has emerged from the meditation which involves the
stopping of apperception and feeling.36Dhammadinna replies that when a
bhikkhu emerges from the attainment of the cessation of apperception and
feeling three contacts impinge on him: the contact as void, the contact
that is signless (i.e. without any object), and the contact that is undirected
(i.e. free from all longing^).^' Here phassa seems to mean something like
'impression': when a bhikkhu emerges from the (highest) meditative level,
saiiiiiivedayitanirodhasamiipatti,he is conscious of the impression of voidness,
signlessness and freedom from longing. These have not arisen as a result of
the coming together of viiiiiZna, sense organ and sense object because the
bhzkkhu's meditative state was one which transcended such activity.38But
~ r h e nhe emerges from this state and sensory experience returns, he has an
impression of his non-sensory experience. One might say that the
impression occurs when his non-sensory experience comes in contact with
sensory experience. Such impressions are distinct from, perhaps less
'defined' than, the conceptions which are associated with the saiiiiiihandha,
&cussed in chapter 111.The contrast appears to be between conscious dis-
cursive thought, from which conceptions arise, and meditative experience
\\-hlch is non-discursive), from which impressions arise.
In an unusual passage in the Mahiiniddesa, a book of the Muddaka Nikqa,
the significance of the impressions of voidness, signlessness and freedom
from longing (suiiiiatophasso, animittophasso, and appanihito phasso) becomes
clear. The passage gives a commentary on the term 'a seer of discrimina-
tion in respect of contacts' (uivekadauiphauesu). First, a comprehensive list of
 T h e Vedaniikhandha
different types of phwa is given which is not found elsewhere. This first of
all includes contact relating to the six senses, then goes on to include verbal
and sensory contact, contact from agreeable, disagreeable and indifferent
feeling; good, bad and indifferent contact; contact of the sensory, form and
formless realms; void, signless and desireless contact; mundane and supra-
mundane contact; past, future and present contact.39The passage goes on
to state that the vi~ekdd~regards all such contacts except for suiiiiatophmo,
animitto phwo, and appanihitophasso as free from self, from what belongs to a
self, from what is permanent, stable, unchanging.40Sun"n"atophmo, appanihito
phasso and lokuttarophwo are not explicitly referred to, but the passage then
states that whatever contacts are noble, rid of the iisavas, supramundane,
connected with the void, are seen as free from passion, ill-will, ignorance
and so Because suEGato, appanihito and lokuttarophasso are not stated to
be free from a self, PCrez-Remon draws on this passage to support his thesis
that early Buddhism posits a non-empirical Self.42In fact all this passage
seems to be stating is that there are some kinds ofphwa which are associat-
ed with those things which are commonly mistaken for a permanent self,
but which the uivekada.cCcomes to realise are not associated with such a self,
and other kinds ofphassa which are conducive to liberating insight, where
such a sense of self is not relevant.
Elsewhere, two of the types of contact listed in the Mdhiiniddesa referred
to in the last paragraph, are referred to in a way which suggests that they
represent an understanding that phma is of two distinct kinds,not including
the meditative impressions mentioned above. These are adhivacanasamphma
and patighasamphassa. In the Mahiinidiina Suttanta of the Dgha Nihya, for
example, these terms are used to describe the way in which nimariipa gives
rise to phassa in a ninefold version of the pa~ccasamuppiidaformula which
excludes the safiyatanii link.43NiimariZpa is discussed more fully in chapter w.
In the Vibhanga (of the Abhidhamma Pitaka), patighasamphassa and
adhiuacanasamphassa refer to ~an"n"ii,~~
and this context will also be referred to
below in chapter 111. In both of these two contexts, however, pagghasamphma
refers to Phma in the sense of sensory contact, and adhivacanammpharca refers
to phassa which is verbal or conceptual, that is abstract. Neither of these two
contexts refers to the non-sensoryjhiinas:it follows from what we have seen
in the Mahiiniddesa passage that the lokuttara types of phassa transcend
conceptualisation. They indicate that the range of 'ordinary' (i.e. non-
lokuttara)phassa includes two kinds: sensory contact in the literal sense (pa.@ha
means 'striking against' and refers to the 'meeting' of sense organ and sense
object) or sensory contact in the abstract sense (a good translation of
adhiuacanasamphassa would be 'metaphorical contact'). This distinction
probably corresponds in the first instance to the contrast between the first
five senses and the manodhitu as the 'standard' sixth sense: the latter
functioning abstractly by comparison with the others; and also to the two
aspects of the san"n"Gkhandhadiscussed fully in chapter III. There, on the one
50 Identity and Experience
hand, the literal sense of sensory contact corresponds to apperception, and,
on the other hand, its abstract sense to conception.
It also seems clear that phassa is a conscious event, whether sensory or
metaphorical contact, or meditative impression. It is defined as the
coincidence of viii-a, sense and sense object. And as abstract impression
on emerging fromjhina, it is experienced when consciousness is once again
'normal7. It is thus clear that the English word 'contact', which tends to
have a tactile or spacial connotation, is insufficient on its own to convey the
full meaning of phassa. Rather, the meanings of phassa which we have
discussed suggest that it refers to the moment of contact between the
subjective world of the individual and the objective world with which he or
she interacts. This explains why consciousness is included in the definition
ofphassa, for the individual is not interacting with the world if he or she is
not conscious, and why the consciousness of the event is of more
significance than the (mere) contact. In the Buddha's teaching it is what
happens subjectively that matters.
Writing as a modern Theravada bhikkhu, manavira suggests that if one
understands that phassa is primarily contact between subject and object,
rather than contact between eye, forms and eye consciousness, then it is
possible to see that such contact implies the presence of the illusion of 'I'
and 'mine'. Thus for an arahant, when there is cessation of such illusion,
there is also phasr~nirodha.~~ He refers to a verse in the Udina, which states:
"Contacts impinge dependent on ground; how should contacts impinge on
a groundless one?".% His point is that eye as sense organ is a sense organ in
Puthujiana and arahant alike, and is a mere physiological aspect of the human
being. Eye consciousness as a subjective aspect of the human being, on the
other hand, is part of that human being's psychological constitution and is
affected by his or her degree of insight on the path to liberation. Phasra as a
practical function continues for an arahant, when cognitive faculties still
function on the basis of eye, visible forms and eye consciousness. But it
must no longer be regarded as contact with me, or with him, or with
somebody, ~ a n a v i r astates. He refers to the Sa@yatanaSutta, where it states
that the Blessed One possesses an eye (and all the other sense organs), he
sees visible forms with the eye; but he has no desire and lust, and his citta is
wholly freed.47Having no desire and lust is a concomitant of no longer
having false notions of 'I' and 'mine' according to Buddhist teachings.
According to Ranavira, then, the subjective aspect ofphassa implies the
involvement of some illusory sense of 'I' in relation to the objective world.
This is borne out by the role ofphassa in the continued sapiric existence of
an individual, the continuity of which will cease after arahantship is
attained.
A final point is that the verb from which phassa comes, phusati, is also
used in contexts where its meaning is perhaps an extension of the meanings
contact and impinge. The expression ceto-samzdhim phusati, for example,
 T h e Vedana'khandha
means "[the bhikkhu] attains a state of concentration of the mind".48
Nirodham phusati means "he attains ces~ation".~~
P h a , then, is of two kinds and is found in two corresponding contexts.
Most commonly it refers to the conscious sensory or metaphorical contact
which is a sine qua non for the arising of feelings and for the cognitive
process as a whole. It also refers to an abstract impression which is~also
conscious but which does not originate from the coming together of a
sense and its corresponding sense object.

Notes

SN.111.591' iiatami ca bhikkhave vedand? Chayime bhikkhave vedanikiiyi .. . cakkhusamphassaji

vedani, sotasamfihmrajti vedani, ghinmamphmajti, jivhii.samphmsaj5, kiyasamphau'aji, manosamphas-
sujh- vedani.
MN.1.111. Apperception is the function ofthe saiiiiaandha, the sub-ject of chapter 111.
Cakkhuii-cJivusopa+cca riipe ca uppajati cakkhuviiiiiiyzm, tinnam sarigati phauoJ phassapaccayi
vedani, yam vedeti tam saiijdniti.. . .
e.g, DN.III.275; SN.II.53, 82, IV.204, 207, etc; AN.111.400: Suklti vedani dukkhi vedani
adukkhamasukhi vedand.
SN.IV.204.
k2yikap v i cetarikam vi.
MN.1.302; SN.IV.208, etc. However, the Abhidhamma classifications note only five types of
feeling: bodily agreeable and disagreeable, mentally agreeable and disagreeable and neu-
tral. cf:, fbr example, Ebhariga 72 and Dhs 133.
MN.I.59.
This is suggested by Reat, 1987,p.23.
DN.11.306: Kiiyikam dukkham ... kiiymamphassajam ... domanmsam ... cetasikam dukkham ...
manosamphajam.
SN.IV.236: Katamaiica bhikkhave sdmisi(am) piti/sukham/upekhakha?Paiic'ime bhiWchave kiimagu@.
T h e Sutta states: Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu ... pathamam jhiinum ... duriyam jhinam ... taCiyam
j k n a m upmampaja viharati; idam vuccati bhikWlave nirimisam sukham.
cf., for example, MN.I.12.
MN.1.303: Sukhi kho dvuso vedani thitisukhi viparindmadukkhii, dukkhii vedani fhitidukkha
uz)ariniimasukhd.
SN.IV.232: Katamd ca bhikkhave paiica vedani? Sukhindriyam dukkhindnyam somanassindnyam
domanasrindnyam uflekkhindriyam imd vuccanti bhikkhave paiica vedani.
Cha .romanmupavicdri cha domanarsu~avuirdcha upekkhupaviciri; i m i vuccanti bhikkhave atthrura
vedani.
Cha gehasitini somanacrdni/domana,~'dni/u~ekkhi cha nekkhammasitini somanm.riini/domanmsini/
upekkhi.
A t i t i chattimsa vedani, andgatd chattim.ra vedand, paccuppanni chattimsa vedani; i m i vuccanti
bhikkhave atthasata vedand.
MN.111.216E
SN.IV.209: Pajdndti bhikkhave sutavi ariyasivako aiiffatra kimasuklzi d u k k h q a vedaniya
nkara~m.
SN.IV,2 I 3: So sukham /duWcham /adukkhammukham ce vedanam vedeati ui~afiffutto nam vedeati.
SN.IV.223f:
In a description of the vedanikhandha, Pio (1988, p.gf) gives a long account of different
emotions. In my opinion, she has fallen into the trap of' projecting a Western interpreta-
tion of feelings onto the vedamikhandha.
SN. IV.215: Tixro i m i bhikkhave vedani /hux~ajifihmamzilakii fihmanidini Pkuapaccayi.
M N . I. I I I: Cakkhuii c'ivwo pakca nipe ca uppajati caMuviiiiiipam, t i ~ sarigati
m pho.
Phmapaccqi vedand.
 Identity a n d Experience
MN.III.2421; SN.Ill215: Sqyathiipi, bhzkkhu, dvinnam katthiinam sampham.s4mod&nii usmiij q a t i
tgo abhinibbattati, te.samyeva dvinnam katYtiinam niiniibhiivii vinikkhepiiyii tuja usmii sii nirujhati sii
vCpmmmati; euam eva kho, bhikkhu, sukhavedangam phmam pa$cca uppajati sukhii vedanii .. . tau' eva
.sukhavedan@assaphusma nirodhiiyam tajam vedayitam sukhavedangam phassam pa%ca uppannii suWla
vedanii sii nimjhati .sii oCpasammatzti.
DA.1.125: Ettlia ca kiiiciipi iiyataniinamphusana-kiccam vlya vuttum, tathi pi nu &.sum phusana-kiccaki
veditubbii. .Nu hi qataruini phusanti, phauo va tam tam iiramma@m phusati. Ayataniini pana phrso
upanikkhipitvii dmikini.
D N . 1.42: Tatra, bhikkhave,ye te samaw-briihmanii smatuviidii sasatum atkinaii ca lokaii ca paiiiiiipenti
catuhi vattlziihi [and so o n with all the different views], tad apiphmsa-paccayii.
DN.I.43: Tatra, bhikkhave,ye te soma@-bramapi .smatavdii smatum atkinaii ca lokari ca paiiGpenti
catuhi vattlziihi [etc], te vatu aiiiiatra phriipa$amvedksantiti n'etum thiinam vgati.
DN.I.45: Sabbe te chahi phusciyatanehiphus)'a phma pa$amvedenti.
S N . I Y 6 8 : Cakkhuiica pa~ccanipe ca uppajati cakkhuviiiiiiinam ... Yii kho bhWiaue imesam t i q z m
dhammiinam .sanyati sann$iito .samavgo, y a m vuccati bhikkhave cakkhusamphmo.
SN.IV.69: Phu~hobliikkhave vedeti, p/zutqio ceteti, phu~!Jzo.sa@niiti.
SN.III.60: Phauasamudayii vedanisamudayo, phawnirodhi vedaniinirodho .. . phassasamudayii .saiiiii-
samudayo phas.sanirodhii saiiiiiinirodho .. . phassa.samudayii samkhiirasamudayo, phas.ranirodhii
.samkJiiiranirodho.
MN.1.302.
Saii%vedayitanirodhcuamiipatt;rii vutthitam pan' ayye bhikkhum kati p h m a phusantiti?
Saiiiiiivedayitanirodhuamiipatt~iivut!Jiitum kho iivuso VisiikIia bhikkhum tuyo phaslii phusanti: suiiiiato
phuro, animitto phaso, appanihitophasso ti. T h e predicative fbrm suiiiiato does not seem t o affect
t h e meaning or parallelism between the three types ofplzma.
T h i s state is referred t o again i n chapter v.
Mahiinidde.sa, V o l I, p.222. cf: also pp.52-3: P1iau.o ti cakkhusamphasso .sotusam)lhmoghiinuamfiluwo
jivliisampha~so kiiyasamphmo manosamphasso adhivacanasampha~sopattghasampharso sukhauedan&o
sumphaso dukkhauedango samphmso adukkhammkI~uedan@osamplmsso kusalo phauo akwalo phmo
aycskato phrso kiimiivacaro pharso nipiivacaro phano anipiivacaro phauo .suiiiiato phasso animitto pharso
o phasso lokutturo ~ h atitoo phmo aniigato phmo paccuppanno phmo . .. ayam
appanihito ~ h s loklyo
vuccati pharso.
fivekadassfphue.su ti cakkhuamplzasam [and so on] uivittum pmati a t h a vii attunjena vii niccena vii
dhuvena vii .saxsatma vii av$a+iimadhammena vii.
Athavii ye te phmii anyii aniisavii lokutturii suiiiiatupa@iamyutki, te phme uivitte flu~tiriigena dosena
mohena, etc.
Ptrez-Rembn, 1980, p.176
DN.II.62.
Fbhariga 6 .
Nanavira, 1987, p.91.
Udiina 2.4: Phusanti phmii upadhim pagcca, ninipadhim kena phus yyum phmii?
SN.IV.164. Samuijati kho iivuso Bhagavato cakkhu [and so o n ] , pmati Bhagavii cakkhunii nipam,
clundariigo BIugavato n'attlii, .suvimuttacitto Bhagavii. T h e meaning o f cittu is discussed further in
chapter v.
DN.I.13, III.30,108, etc.
DN.1.184; Abhidhammatthasanyaha IV. 11.
 CHAPTER I11

The SaZZCkhandha

THEREARE SIX TYPES OF san"n"iiand, like feelings, they arise through contact
of the six subjective senses with their corresponding 'external' objects. The
precise function of the san"n"&handha has been considered difficult to assess
since the term san"n"a'is used in different ways in the canonical material. Mrs
Rhys Davids, for example, wrote of it: "The apparently capricious way in
which the intension of the term san"n"i is varied in the F'itakar makes it
difficult to assign any one adequate English rendering".2 It is true that most
canonical references to it do not give an explanation of what it means or
what it does. There are, however, exceptions, and from a consideration of
such explanations, together with careful analysis of the context in which the
term is found, one can ascertain that there appear to be two different ways
in which san"n"ii is understood. On the one hand, it is found in contexts
where it is said to have a discriminatory or identificatory role. Though
sometimes such a role is indicated in what appears to be a merely token
definition of san"n"ii, there being no clear understanding on the part of the
author as to its precise role, elsewhere the discriminatory role is more clearly
defined. On the other hand, it is also clear that conceptual processes of
various kinds (ideas, imagination, abstract conceptions, and so on) are part
of its role.3

Safifia' as Apperception

An example of what appears to be a token definition of san"n"5is found in the

B a n d h a S a y y ~ t t a The
. ~ context is one of many where the Buddha is
recorded as explaining that one should understand oneself in terms of the
five khandhas. In this particular passage he is explaining why each of the
khandhar is referred to as it is.
The precise meaning of the description of san"n"ii is unclear. The Pali
could be translated as follows:
What, 0 monks, do you call san"iia? One perceives, 0 monks; that is why the
word saiiiii is used. Perceives what? Perceives blue, yellow, red and white.
One perceives, 0 monks; that is why the word sun"% is used.'
54 Identity and Experience
The rendering of sa@GnZti simply as 'one perceives' here, is, perhaps,
somewhat unsatisfactory, because perception as such might be considered
to be a sensory function - of the eye. Even allowing for the fact that the
word 'perception' has an elasticity of meaning which can extend it beyond
a simple sensory function, it is nevertheless inadequate, and certainly too
ambiguous, to express accurately the meaning of saiijiniiti (or san"n"6).An
alternative translation would be 'one identifies', giving saEjZniiti a more
discriminatory meaning, and the san"n"iikhandhaa discriminatory function:
"Identifies what? Identifies [that a colour is] blue, yellow, red or white
[rather than green, orange, or brown, etc.]". In the passage describing the
arising of feeling, to which I have already referred: it is clear from the Pali
that sa@ZnZti does not mean 'one perceives', since it is directed towards
something that has not only already been seen, but about which a feeling
has also already arisen. Perception is neither required nor meaningful at
this stage. The context demands that it be translated in a way which
conveys that it is discriminatory, and/or that it acts in some way as a
comprehender or processor of what has already taken place.
So, on the face of it, 'one recognises' is a preferable translation to 'one
perceives' in the Khandha Samyutta passage. But the situation is complicated
by the fact that in the same K7tandha Samyutta passage recognition or
identification seems to be the function of the vin"Eiinakkhandha. The Pali
description of vin"n"iy corresponds structurally to the description of san"n"i&
~ a ~ i i n i ibeing
ti replaced by ~1jiinZtiand various gustatory qualities, such
sourness, sweetness, saltiness, replacing the c o l ~ u r sIn . ~ the context of this
passage it is difficult to translate viincti in a way which does not
incorporate discriminatory knowledge: zriiin";?adistinguishes that something
is sour, sweet, salty, and so The solution may be that even if san"n"5 and
vin"n"Eyare both to be understood as discriminatory faculties, they differ in
the degree, or level, of discrimination for which they are responsible. So, for
example, it may be that vin"n"iiy identifies that something has colour and
saEn"ii identifies that it is yellow; or that vin"n"iinaidentifies that something is
sour and saEZii identifies it as lemon.gUnfortunately, the Khandha Samyutta
passages on san"n"a' and vin"n"Cyrespectively are not directly comparable in
this respect, so we cannot from this material alone ascertain the precise
function of san"n"Z (or of vin"n"iy). The colours and flavours referred to in the
passage are standard lists, so it may be the case that the author of this
passage did not know the difference between saiin"5 and viiin"ii~and merely
gave two different standard lists as a way of avoiding giving a proper
definition of each of them. If the author understood uin"n"5pzas the faculty of
discrimination, it may even be that as far as he was concerned san"Eci had no
readily identifiable function, but he felt obliged to offer some token
description of it as one of the khandhas (or i c e vmsa).
The Mahavedallarutta also gives what appear to be token definitions of
both san"n"8 and vin"n"iina.1° Here too the definitions imply that both are
 The San"n"ikhandha 55
discriminatory: vin"n"inais said to discriminate (veinitz) pleasure, pain and
the absence of pleasure or pain and the standard list of colours is again the
example given for what san"n"idiscriminates. The discrimination between
feelings according to pleasure, pain and their absence is also mentioned in
the Satipafihina Suttas,ll but there it is mentioned as part of the process of
attaining insight rather than as a brief definition of the function of uin"n"i?:
the cognitive verb used is pajlniti rather than @iniiti. The Mahivedallasutta,
which is discussed in chapter v, gives a comprehensive description of the
cognitive process. As we shall see, the function of vin"n"inais to provide
'consciousness of' all cognition rather than to discriminate. But the brief
definitions given in this Sutta for these two terms do little to clarify their
roles. What we seem to have here is another example of the author of the
passage having difficulty in defining the terms he is using: he is able to
describe the cognitive process using the relevant terminology, but when it
comes to defining the Wlandhas involved in the cognitive process he resorts
to standard formulas in place of adequate definitions. Alternatively, both of
these passages may reflect the practical difficulties associated with an oral
tradition: the ease with which teachings that are standardised for mnemonic
purposes can end up in contexts that are not quite suitable.
Centuries later, Buddhaghosa gives more comprehensive definitions of
both san"n"6and vin"ii@aas cognitive faculties (jlZnanabhiva)(along with pan"ii9,
and he uses colours as examples for both of them, thus making a proper
comparison possible. The difference between san"n"iand vin"n"Zna,he explains
in his Visuddhimagga, is that the former identifies an object as blue or yellow
but cannot bring about the penetration of its characteristics as imperma-
nent, unsatisfactory and impersonal.12The latter identifies an object as blue
or yellow, penetrates its characteristics, but cannot bring about, even
through endeavour, the manifestation of the supramundane path.13 It is
pan"n"ithat does all these things.14Thus Buddhaghosa understands all three
as discriminatory faculties. He goes on to give the analogy of the
understanding of a child, an adult and an expert respectively. While there
may be the germ of such a threefold division of cognitive functions in the
Sutta Pitaka, it is far from being as tidy and consistent as Buddhaghosa
presents it. And we shall see in chapter v that though it is integral to the
cognitive process, vin"n"inais not specifically discriminative.
If we return to the passage in the Sutta Piiaka describing the arising of
feeling, we have a context which gives us a much clearer description of
saEEi as a faculty which discriminates or identifies. It is significant that
vin"n"ipzin this context has no discriminatory function, but is stated to arise
when eye (for example) and visible object are mutually present.'= Here
uin"n"ipzhas the meaning of the 'awareness' which underlies or 'attends' all
human (i.e. conscious) experience.16 We then saw that the feeling
subsequently gives rise to sarln"i.17The Pali continues: yam sa@initi tam
vitaliketi,yam uitakketi tampapaEceti. To make sense of this, it is relevant that in
56 Identity and Experience
classical Sanskrit one of the meanings of samjzii (Pali san"n"9is 'name'.'* In
Buddhism, the sapiiric cognitive process is based on not seeing things as
they really are: and this rnisperception is what constitutes the ignorance
which generates continued samsiiric existence. Misperception involves
'naming': the process by which what we see or experience is identified by us
according to our understanding of it. It is also relevant that though the Pali
papazceti is usually understood to mean 'to be obsessed' (so the phrase above
is translated "what one reasons about obsesses onenL9), in Sanskrit prapaiica
means manifoldness. It is the term used by the great Mahayana Buddhist
N ~ e j u n ina his Madhyamakukiih- to indicate that which needs to cease in
order for liberation to take place:20manifoldness implies our mistaken
imposition of separateness upon things that are in reality dependently
originated. The Pali English Dictionary states that it is unclear whether
papaiica means the same in Pali as it does in Sanskrit. In my opinion, the
context in which we find it here demands a similar interpretation of it.
While such manifoldness could be understood in terms of obsession, in the
sense that it is our misperception of the way things are that brings about
the various desires which represent bondage (or 'obsess' us), the meaning of
the passage is more readily understood if we translate papaiiceti as 'one causes
to become manifold'. Papafca is associated with saiiiiii throughout this Sutta
in a manner which suggests that manifoldness is a concomitant of
identification. And the significance of such manifoldness here, as for
Nagarjuna, is that it implies that in perceiving manifoldly one is attributing
separate independent existence to everything one perceives. That this is
the meaning ofpapaiica is confirmed by other passages in the Sutta Maka in
which it is found. In the Safiyatana Samyutta, for example, we read:
Men who have conceptions of manifoldness of some kind go on separating
things when apperceiving; but [eventually] he [a bhikkhu] drives out
everything that is [thus] constructed by the mind and to do with the
mundane life and proceeds to a life of r e n ~ n c i a t i o n . ~ ~
In this passage there is a clear indication that the attribution of
manifoldness, in the sense of separateness, where there is (according to the
Buddha's teaching) no such separateness, is part of samsiiric perception: the
term rnanomaya, constructed by the mind (literally, 'mind-madeyz2) indicates
that papalica is not perception of 'things as they are' lyathibhitam)but that
the bhikkhu has to proceed from such mundane ('constructed') samsiiric
perception. Similarly, in the Aettara Nikiiia we read that whoever is given
to manifoldness will not reach Nirvana.23In two other passages in the
Ariguttara Nikiya, we read that the classical 'unanswered questions' (referred
to in the Introduction) are papaii~itam,~~ and that other such views are the
result of "making manifold what is not (really)manifold".25
Johansson points out that such examples "bind the concept ofpapaiica to
the psychological area of associative and analytical t h o ~ g h t " ,and ~~
 The Saiiiiiikhandha
Ranananda has suggested the translation 'conceptual proliferati~n'.~~ Both
Johansson and Ranananda discuss papaiica in considerably more detail than
is necessary to understand it in the context we are discussing in this
chapter. Neither of them, however, appears to have understood the
profound implication of papaiiceti as making manifold. Johansson, for
example, sums up his chapter as follows: "Papan"ca is, then, a word for a
vaguely defined prolific tendency, in the fields of imagination, thought and
action. It is the tendency to produce associations, wishful dreams and
analytic But this surely misses the much more profound point
that in seeing things as manifold one is attributing independent existence to
them, and to oneself as perceiver. Nagarjuna's Madhyamakaka-h- are above
all concerned to refute independent existence and to teach dependent
origination, and in singling out the term papaiica he is giving us an
indication of the underlying meaning of it. This meaning is also indicated
in the Suttu Nipita where it states: "The wise man should put a stop to the
thought 'I am', which is the root of all naming in terms of manifoldne~s",~~
Of this passage, Johansson states: "It @apaiica]is an ego-related activity,
which gives satisfaction to human vanity and pride ... To get rid ofpapaiica
is therefore one of the problems of the Buddhist disciple".30In Buddhism,
ego-related activity is more than just satisfying to human vanity and pride:
it is h fundamental ignorance which has to be eradicated. And the use of
asmi in the above sentence is surely both literal and figurative; that is, it
means both the erroneous sense of 'I am' on the part of the individual
bhikkhu, and the erroneous attribution of independent existence to that
which he sees as manifold. Furthermore, as the fundamental ignorance
which has to be eradicated, it is the problem for the Buddhist disciple, as
Nag-juna states, not merely one of them.
To return to our discussion of saEiii, from the Majhima .iVihya passage we
are discussing here, we see that saEEi has a discriminatory or identificatory
function which is in effect one of 'naming'. This in turn leads on to the
various thought processes (VitaWca)of sa;?zsiiricexistence, and a separated or
manifold way of interpreting our experiences. This sequence is confirmed
in the Sutta NiZta, where we read:
One who is conscious of neither a conception nor a false conception, and
who is neither unconscious nor conscious of a conception that has
disappeared: for one who has attained such a state, form disappears, for
naming in terms of manifoldness arises subsequent to conception^.^'
As Johansson points out, the first part of this probably refers to the
higherjhina levels in which there are no conceptions of form.32The second
part clearly confirms that papafica follows safin"Z.
From this perhaps the most satisfactory translation of saEiii would be
'apperception', which implies both that its function is discriminatory, and
also that it incorporates a function of assimilation or comprehension of
58 Identity and Experience
what has been perceived so that identification can take place. Such
apperception (which one might also call the way we name things) and the
resulting thoughts and application of manifoldness, would be 'accurate' in
ultimate terms according to one's degree of insight as to the way things
really are. This differs from the assimilatory function of manodhiitu in that
manodhiitu collates sense impressions in order to impose some sort of pattern
or order, whereas the sa6n"a'khandhaassimilates data at a more (refined' or
'classified' level. ManoAiitu renders sensory data comprehensible, whereas
the saEn"cikhandhadoes the comprehending: the former is a preparatory stage
for the latter, cognitive process. This is perhaps to be expected from the
etymology of the word sat2n"Zthe prefix sam functions similarly to the Greek
syn (synthesis)and the Latin con or co (comprehension, cognition): san"n"ii
synthesises the raw data presented to it by the man~dhiitu.~~
This distinction
is formally recognised in the Abhidharnma, where it is explicitly stated that
safiiiiioperates on information from the manodhiitu:
What, then, is sa5iEi? Sa5iia'is the apperception, the apperceiving, the state
of having apperceived which arises because of contact with m~nod~tu; this,
then, is ~ a n " E . ~ ~
One might think from the foregoing that the san"iiZW2andzais associated,
at least to some extent, with discursive thought. The discrimination,
assimilation and/or comprehension, and 'naming' of what might loosely
be called incoming data all involve at least some degree of thinking about
the data. And in the Jiitaka, the expression saEEii karosi is clearly used in the
sense of 'you think'.35 But though both uitakka and papaiica, which are
described as taking place subsequent to the activity of saEn", are more
obviously discursive processes, whether or not saiiiiii itself is discursive
remains unclear.36
The use of the standard list of colours in definitions of san"n"ii,and the
fact that the example given of the arising of feeling is referring to visual
feeling, does not mean that san"n"a'functions only in connection with visual
perception. Feelings based on the other senses arise in the same way and
subsequently go through the same identificatory and interpretative
process:37the Khandha Samyutta states that saiiiiii is sixfold according to the
six senses,38and in the Mahkatipatjhiina Suttanta san"Eii is explicitly linked
with all the senses.39

San"n"a'as Conception

The fact that san"n"Zfunctions as the 'naming' faculty means that it can also
be thought of as the faculty of conception, or what Johansson calls
' i d e a t i ~ n ' Johansson
.~~ makes his suggestion not because san"n"iiis the
'naming' faculty but on the grounds that the colours referred to in the
 The Saiiiiiikhandha 59
definitions of saatiratirii can be both visually apperceived and also imagined. In
the context of saiiiiii as naming faculty, this might be further explained as
follows: saiiiiii identifies our experience, and for as long as one is unenlight-
ened it as it were superimposes samsiiric criteria onto reality 'as it really is',
or apperceives reality through samsiiric spectacles. In so doing, concepts
(Johansson would call them 'ideas') are generated as well as 'things' being
named; and such concepts or ideas may be of a much less specific nature
than, say, the interpretation of a single visual perception. In this respect
saiiiiii functions in the sense of 'conception' (which I prefer to 'ideation')
rather than 'apperception'. Put differently, the functioning of safiii is not
dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data. When such sensory
data is co-temporal, saiiiiii apperceives (identifies)them; when they are not
co-temporal, saiifii functions conceptually. The latter might either be in the
sense specifically suggested by Johansson, of imagining a (previous) apper-
ception (one might describe this as the bringing to mind of an image of an
earlier identification). Or it might be in the less specific and more asbtract
sense of imagining or conceiving of something that has not actually been
apperceived as it is (presently) being imagined or conceived of. As
mentioned in the discussion ofphassa, in the Abhidhamma the twofold role of
saiiiiii as apperception and conception is referred to as pa.@hasamphmaji and
adhivacanasamphassaja re~pectively:~' apperceptions arise from sensory
experience and are described as 'gross' (okriki), conceptions are abstract
and are described as 'subtle' (sukhumi).
We read elsewhere that at the meditative levels known as the ariipajhiinas,
which are beyond sensory experience and (therefore) a p p e r ~ e p t i o n a, ~ ~
meditator can have abstract conceptions even though he or she does not
'sense' that sphere.43The abstract conceptions are that 'space is infinite'
(ananto iikiiso tz), 'consciousness is infinite' (anantam viiiiiiinam tz), 'there is
no-thing' (natthi kiiicf tz), which correspond to the first three ariipajhiinas. The
fourth ariipajhiina is non-conceptual as well as being beyond apperception:
nevasaiiiiiinZsaatiratir@atana.
The distinction between apperception and conception is illustrated in a
passsage in the Majhima Nik@a where we read that gods with riipa are the
product of manas4*and ariipa gods are the product of ~aiiiiii.*~ From the
context, it is not clear whether there are such gods or whether they are
being referred to hyp~thetically.~~ What is obviously being referred to is
the difference between gods which have form, which can be apperceived,
and gods without form, which can only be conceived oK4'
Thevroleof saiiiiii as the faculty of conception is referred to in the
Ariguttara Nikiiya where the Buddha mentions four types of distorted
conception (visaiiiiii) as having ideas of permanence in what is imper-
manent, of satisfactoriness in unsatisfactoriness, of the concept of self in
impersonality, and the idea of beauty in what is not b e a u t i f ~ l The .~~
Buddha's use of the term uisafiiiii to refer to these four types of erroneous
 Identity and Experience
conception has the concomitant implication that san"n"ican be correct: if the
term san"Eion its own meant erroneous conception, there would be no need
of the prefix vi. So though certain conceptions may be incompatible with
'seeing things as they are', other conceptions may also be correct: the term
saiiiii does not in itself mean false conceptions. This is illustrated in a
description of deep meditation given by Sariputta. On the one hand, he
states that deep meditation is a state "in the world but without any concept
of the world".4gThis suggests that ideas or concepts are of an ongoing
nature, part of our general samsin'c experiential baggage, and that in our
normal waking state what we experience as the 'world' involves 'naming'
by us according to our level of insight. On the other hand, in such medita-
tion Sariputta is nevertheless able to have a specific idea,50in this instance
that Nirvana is the end of rebirth,51which is clearly not false according to
Buddhist teaching.
There is no suggestion that the world is mereb conceptual, only that it is
san"n"5that interprets it according to our level of insight. We find san"ii
described as 'like a but the passage is one in which each of the
khandhas is being described in a manner which conveys its impermanence:
the context does not imply that san"n"6is being singled out as unreal. In this
context, it is relevant that the meditative levels of the nipajhGnu.s and the first
three arzipajhinas (or spheres - Qatana) are all referred to as These
three ariipajhinas have already been referred to above. The fourth anipajh&a
is called the realm of neither-conception-nor-non-conception54 (which is
why it did not feature in the Anguttara Nikiiya passage which gave the
abstract conceptions of the meditator in the ariipajhinas). The fourth
arzipajhzna does not, however, represent the attaining of insight any more
than the precedingjhinas do: it is a state free from conceptions of whatever
nature, and is conducive to the attainment of Nirvana since it is thus free
from any notion of but liberating insight has still to be achieved. There
is controversy about whether the subsequent and highest meditative level of
the cessation of conception and feeling (safiivedayitanirodha) represents
liberation or If it does, then it cannot be just because of the cessation
of conceptions. Not only does the fourth aspajhina, which, as I have said,
does not represent liberation, also appear free from conceptions, but it is
also stated elsewhere that the destruction of the isavas (which does
represent liberation) can take place in one who has conceptions. Indeed,
the experience is described as being the highest activity of ~an"n"5.~~ It would
appear from this that san"n"inot only apperceives and conceives all our
samsiric experiences, sensory and abstract, but is also instrumental in
identifjnng the liberating experience. And though it precedes p a p a h when
papaka occurs, it would appear that papan"cais not automatically a result of
saiifik, as might be inferred from the description of the arising of feelingm5*
Supporting the points made in this and the last paragraphs, it is stated in
the Abhidhamrna that saiii can be bad, good and neither-good-n~r-bad.~~
 The San"n"ikhandha 6I
We also read of the conceptual activity of san"n"ias conception being
deliberately used, in the sense of a visualisation process or mindfulness
exercise, to give names to things or concepts in a way which conduces to
subsequent 'right thinking', rather than o ~ l to y a continuation of sums&
perception, so aiding the bhikkhu's progress towards liberation. This
function of san"n"a'might be called the 'constructive imagination', since it
represents a process of good/positive (constructive)conditioning of one's
faculty of apperception by means of deliberate conceptualising
(constructing).The most simple example of this is the three 'conceptions of
a bhikkhu', found in the SamapzsaEEZ V a a in the Ariguttara Nzkaya. The three
conceptions are: "I have come to a state of being without caste; my
livelihood is dependent on others; I must dress [or behave] myself
differentlyn.=OA sick bhikkhu, Girimananda, is also taught ten conceptions
(dasa san"ii6)in order to allay his illness.61The ten are: impermanence,
selflessness, unpleasantness, wretchedness, abandoning, dispassion,
cessation, discontentedness with all the world, the impermanence of all
samsciric phenomena, and mindfulness of inbreathing and ~utbreathing.~~
Each of these is subsequently elaborated in an explanation of what it
represents. Elsewhere in the Anguttara NkQa there is another list of ten
conceptions given for the purpose of attaining the deathless, Nirvana
(amatogadhamatapanyosZnZ): conceptions of what is unpleasant, of death, of
the repulsiveness of food, of distaste for all the world, of impermanence, of
unsatisfactoriness in impermanence, of selflessness in unsatisfactoriness, of
abandoning, of dispassion, of cessation;'j3and another for the purpose of
preventing any evil unprofitable states overpowering one's state of mind.M
In the Samyutta JVzka3a we find similar conceptions, but with the addition of
the four brahma ~dzZras.~~ The 'conception of impermanence' (aniccasan"n"4,if
practised and developed, is specifically stated to cause all sensual lust, all
desire for form, all desire for continued existence, all ignorance and all
notion of 'I' to come to an end." Conversely from certain appropriate
insights the corresponding conceptions of impermanence (aniccasan"n"i),
unsatisfactoriness (dukkhasan"n"ii)and selflessness (anattasain"Z)arise.'j7
The foregoing suggests that this deliberate use of san"fiZin the sense of
constructively imagining certain conceptions acts psychosomatically: the
imagining of a mental state that is being aspired to contributing in some
way to the achieving of the aspiration. This role of san"n"Zisfurther supported
in the Digha JViEya where we read that if a b h M u turns his attention to the
idea of light, and sustains the idea of day [i.e. light] both during the day and
the night, both during night and day, then with his thoughts open (or
unveiled) and uncovered he develops a luminous This is one of the
four developments of concentration, samcidhi bhriuani. Similarly, we read that
if a bhWu enters and abides in the idea of happiness and lightness, then his
body is lighter, softer, more plastic and more luminous, and he is able to
levitate easily.69This is part of how psychic power (id&) is established.'O
62 Identity and Experience
From all of the foregoing, it seems likely that the san"n"5khandharepresents
the processes of apperceiving and conceptualising, where apperceiving
refers to the identificatory process that takes place on receiving incoming
sensory data and conceptualising refers to the process of bringing to mind
any abstract images, conceptions, ideas and so on which are not co-
temporal with incoming sensory data. Those passages where this is only
referred to by means of the standard list of colours are those where vin"n"5~
seems to be understood as the faculty of discrimination and the difference
between the two faculties is not clearly defined. There is clear evidence
elsewhere, however, that san"n"5has an identificatory function. As conception
(in the sense of constructive imagination) it can also be used as a
meditational tool wjth which to develop insight.
Another passage which refers to san"n"5is particularly interesting,
although it is not a passage in which the physical and mental faculties are
being analysed or explained. In the Po#.hap&ia Sutta71 the Blessed One is
asked by Potthapada how the mental state of abhisan"n"5nirodha(?the cessation
of consciousness - discussed below) comes about. During the conversation
between Po~hapadaand the Blessed One, we come across safiiif hoti (he
becomes conscious)in apposition with asan"6ihoti(he becomes unconscious).
Throughout the Sutta the word saiiiiii is used in the sense of 'consciousness'
as a blanket term for mental awareness in general, or the sum of the mental
faculties. But it is also used in the sense of the arising or cessation of
particular 'conceptions', or states of consciousness (such as joy or desire),
which is achieved through training the mind,72and san"n"aggam(highest
consciousness) is referred to as something which is to be achieved, a
meditational goal, as it were.73At a point where the Blessed One is
describing various meditational states,74we also read: "there arises in him a
consciousness, subtle but yet actual, of everything being within the sphere
of the infinity of cogniti~n".~~ So in this Sutta as a whole, san"n"5appears to
cover an extraordinarily wide range of meanings and functions. An
explanation for this might be that the Buddha's interlocutor, Potfhap~da,is
not a Buddhist (in the Sutta, he is described simply as a paribbiijako, a
wandering mendicant). It is possible that the Buddha conducted the
conversation using terms in a way which was meaningful to Potthapada
even if this was not how he would have used them himself in a different
circumstance. The Sutta is unusual in being the only one in which the term
abhisan"ii5nirodha is found. Rhys Davids, in his translation of this Sutta,
remarks that it is the earliest reference to the term in Indian l i t e r a t ~ r eIt
.~~
has usually been interpreted to mean the cessation of consciousness in the
sense of 'trance', the Pali English Dictionary, for example, stating that the
prefix abhi qualifies the whole compound, giving it the meaning 'trance'.77
Its actual meaning, however, remains unclear, and though this passage is an
interesting one, its uniqueness does not in any way detract from the
consensus derivable from other passages about the meaning of saiifii.
 T h e SaEEiikhandha
Notes
SN.111.60.
C.A.E Rhys Davids (trans.) Buddhist P~hologicalEthics, p.6, n.4.
In using words such as 'ideas', 'imagination', 'conceptions', and so on, I assume their
everyday common sense meaning and intend no association with technical usages by
psychologists or philosophers.
SN.III.87.
Kiiica bhikkhaue saiiiiam vadetha? Saiijniihti kho bhiWdtave tusmd saiiiii ti vuccati. Kiiica satljiiniiti?
Mlam pi .saEjiiniitipitakam pi .raiijiiniiti lohitakam pi saiijiiniiti odiitam pi satTjiinciti. Saiijiiniititi kho
bhikkhaue tasmii saiiiiii ti vuccati.
MN.1.111.
KiiiGa bhikkhave viiiiiiiyam vadetlla? Viiiniititi kho bhikkhaue tasmii VifiEpn ti vuccati. Kiiica viciniiti?
Ambilam pi Uijiiniiti titittakam pi vijiiniiti kahkam pi yiiniiti madhukam pi vijiiniiti kharikam fi VijEniiti.
Akhiirikam pi viiiniiti lopkam pi viiiniiti alowkam pi viiimiti. Viiiniititi kho bhtWchave tasmii viiiiiii~m
ti vuccati.
An alternative interpretation of'viiniiti is given in chapter v.
cf. Williams (1992): in (Tibetan) Mahayiyana Buddhism, the precise classificatory role of
saq'iiii (the Sanskrit fbrm of safiAZ), as suggested here, has become clarified.
MN.I.292fX
MN.I.59; DN.II.298.
Vism 437: Saiiiiii nilam pitukan ti iirammapsaiijinanamattam eva hoti; aniccam dukklzam anattii ti
lakkhappativedlzam pcipetum nu sakkoti.
ViiiiiEnam nilam pitakan ti iirammanaiica jiiniiti lakkhanapa~ivedlzan'ca piipeti. Ussakkitvii puna
magapiitubhiivam piipetum na sakkoti.
Paiiiiii vuttanayavusena iirummanaii cajiiGti, lakkfzapzpativedl~aiica piipeti, u.u'akkitvE ma,ga~r?tublziva%
ca piipeti. PaAiiii is discussed in chapter v.
MN. I. I I I: Cakkhufi-c'iivuso pa%ca rtipe ca uMajati cakkhuvinviniiipzm.
I will return to this function ofviiifiiipz below under point (2) in chapter v.
Yam vedeti, tum saiijcinlih'.
Monier-Williams' Sanrkrit-EnglulzDictionary, p.1133.
I. B. Horner (trans.) MLS.I.145.
MK 1.1, in Williams, 1977, p.72.
SN.IV.71: Paparicasaiiiiz itaritarii narc pafiaiicayantii upayanti saiiiiino; manomayam gehasitatica
sabbam panuja nekkhammasitam ieati. I have translated safiiiii as 'conceptions' in this and
some of the fbllowing sentences. The notion that conceptual processes are part of its role is
discussed below.
Manomaya is considered in greater detail in chapter VII.
AN.III.294: Yo papaiicam anuyutto ... vircidhayi so nibbinam.
AN.IV.68f.
AN.11. 16 I :Appapaiicam papaticeti.
Johansson, 1978, p.191.
fianananda, 1986, p.4.
Johansson, 1978, p.195.
Sn 916. cf: also, AN.IV.229: Mdam papaticarumklt@ci . . . mantii 'asmi ti'sabbam uparundhe.
Johansson, 1878, p.195.
Sn 874: Na safiiiasatiiiina vi~aiin'maiiiiino pi asaiiiii na vibhltasarZii2; evam sametuua uibhoti rtipam,
satiiiiinidiinii hi papaiicasamkhi.
Johansson, 1978,p.193.
cf: Verdu, 1979, p.41.
Dhs 4: Katamii tasmim samayc saiifi hoti? Yii tmmim samayc tujii manov~iEpzdhiiusqphm.jii
saiifiii saiijiinanii saiijiinitattam; ayam iasmim samaye saiifiii hoti. And in the Abhidlzarmakoiabhipa,
Vasubandhu states that saiiiiii means "identifying what is indicated by sense objects", an
interpretation very similar to that which we have arrived at here: Abh K B 11.24:
v~ayanimittodgrahap.(Verdu (1979, p.411) mistakenly attributes this to the Koia itself.) The
technical translation of vi:ayanimittodgrahapz, given to me by Paul Williams in a personal
communication, is "apprehending of the nimittas - the signs of class-inclusion - with
 Identity and Experience
reference to an object". This specifically refers to the discriminatory (i.e. classificatory)
aspect ofsaiiiiii as more formally understood in later Buddhist schools of thought. cf. also
Williams 1992.
J.II.~I.
T h e Abhidhamma defines vitakka as 'thinking of' something and viciira as 'thinking about' the
same thing. Both are terms used in a technical sense in meditation. This is explained in
Cousins 1992.
MN.1.112.
SN.111.60.
DN.II.309.
Johansson, 1979, p.92.
Vibhatiya 6.
AN.IV.427: Rtipasaiiiicinam samatikkamiipa.Qha-saiifinam attharigamii.
Euam saiiiit ... tad @atanam no pa&ramvedeti.
MN.1.410: Devii riipino manomayi.
Devii anipino .saiiiirmayi.
T h e commentary states (MA.III.122) that both are the product of meditative states, in the
nipa and anipajhiinas respectively: jhiinacittamayii ... anipajhiinasaiiiiiiya saiiiiiimayii.
In a personal communication, Lance Cousins infbrms me that the Theravada tradition
would probably understand this passage to mean that the minds of'the tbrmless gods can
be known. I will discuss the term manomaya, which has arisen twice in this chapter, more
lully in chapter VII.
AN.II.52: Anicce niccasar5iino dukkhe ca suklurvaMino anattani ca attii ti asubhe subhasailt?ino ...
AN.ff.9: Na idhaloke idhalokasan'iiiahosim.
Saiiiif ca pana ahosin ti.
Bhavanirodho nibbiinam ... safiiiii uppajjati.
SN.111.142: MaridEpamii .raiin'ii.
For example, SN.IV.217: RCpasan'iiii, iikZ~iinaiic@atanasaiiiiii, vin'fiiinaiicciyatanasan'iiii and
iikiiicaffi@atanaran'iii.
Nevasan'iiinZ.saiiii@atanam.
SN.IV.zg4f.
San'n'iivedayitanirodhamsamiipannm.sa saiifiii ca vedanii ca nimddhii honti: "both conception and
feeling have ceased when one has attained the cessation of conception and feeling".
AN.111.202: 1Tathii .rafiiiiua anantarci iisaviinam k h y o hoti, idam san'iiiinam %am.
MN.1. I I I : Yam saiijiiniiti tam vitakketi,yam vitakketi tam papaiiceti.
Vibhariga 6: kusalii, akusah, ayiikata.
AN.\! 21o: Vevannlyamhiajhtipagato, parapagbaddhii mejtvikii, an'n'o me cikappo karaHyo ti.
AN.\! 108t. Yam bhikkhuno Girimiinandmsa dasa saiiiiii sutvii so ibiidho thiina.ra pa&hz.uambh~ya.
Aniccasan'iiii, anattaaiiiiii, asubhasatin'ii, iidinavasan'iiii, pahiina.raiiiiii, virigasan'iiii, nirodharaiifii,
sabbaloke aanabhiratasaiiiiii,sabbasamkhiiresu aniccasaiiiiii, iiniipiinasati.
AN.\! 105: A.subkasaiifii, marapuan'riii, &iirepatiWcu-lasaiiiiii, sabbaloke anabhiratasaffiiii,aniccaraiiiiii,
anicce dukkhmaiin'ii, dukkhe anattaran'fii,pahdnasan'n'ii, virGgasan'iiri, nirodhasan'n'i.
AN.V. 107: No cittam bhavtj,ati na c ' u p p a n ~piipaki akusalii dhammci cittam pariyiidiiya @thrunti. cf:
also DN.III.289.
SN.\! 13oK
SN.111.155: Aniccasaiiriii bhikkhave bhiivitii bahutikatii sabbam kcimarigam pariyiidiyati sabbam
rtipariigam pariyidiyati sabbam bhavariigam pariyiidiyati sabbam avijatp parzyiidiyati sabbam
a.mimtSnampanyiidiyati samtihanti.
AN.III.443f.
DN.III.223: Idh' iivuso bhikkhu iilokascliiiiam manasikaroti, diva saiiiam adhithitiyathii divi tathii
rattim,yathii rattim tathZ divii, iti uiuatena cetasii apariyonaddhenasappabhti~amcittam bhiiveti.
SN.V.283: Sukhasaiitiaiica lahusaiiiiaiica kiiye okkamitvii viharati, tarmim samaye tathigatma kiiyo
lahutaro ceva hoti mudutaro ca kammaniyataro ca pabhmarataro ca ... appakasiren'eva pathaviyii
veh&am abbhqgacchati.
This ability to use meditative states to effect a change in the state of one's body is discussed
further in chapter WI.
DN.I.178ff.
DN.1.182: Evam pi sikkhii ekii .ran'n'ii uppqjanti, sikklzii ekii saiin'ii nirutjihanti.
 The SaZEikhandha 65
73. DN.1.184.
74. The jl~nasand v i m o h .
75. DN.1.184: Vin"iii~iic~atanasukhumnracc~aAn"H tasmim samaye hoti. I have used T. W.Rhys
Davids' translation (Dialogues,p.250).
76. Dialogues, p.251,
77. PED, p.70. cf. also CPD s.v. abhtsaiI&inirodha, which gives the same rendering,
 CHAPTER IV

The Sa~khiirakkhandha

SAMKHARA HAS BEEN VARIOUSLY AND often confusingly translated by terms

such as mental formations, habitual tendencies or dispositions, conditional
aggregates, and former impressions, terms which have little precise
meaning for us in English. The term samkhcii-aoccurs in many different con-
texts in the Nikiiyas, and has been notoriously difficult to explain and
understand. We can, however, substantially clarify its meaning by looking
at it in three distinct contexts: in the tilakkhaqa formula, as the second link
in the paficcasamuppida formula, and the samkhirakkhandha.We shall see that
the second and third of these contexts are closely linked through the cyclic
nature of karma and through the Buddha's ethicising of the law of karma,
and how this largely functions through the ethical life of the individual.
Though in both the second and third of these contexts one can initially
come to a relatively clear understanding of the meaning of samkhira, we
shall see that in fact the boundaries between the two contexts are blurred
and extended through their mutual involvement in the overall causal nexus
which provides the 'fuel' by which the individual persists in sapsira.

Samkhzra in the Tilakkhaca Formula

First, and fundamentally, the term appears in the tilakW2a~formula. I put

this first, and say that it is fundamental, because the tilakkhana formula
describes the nature of s a ~ i r i existence
c as a whole, insight into which is
liberating knowledge according to the Buddha's teachings. Claritjrlng what
it means in this formula also shows how different the meanings of samh-ra
can be, since in this context its meaning is significantly different from the
two which follow. In the passage in the Artguttara JVikya where this formula
is found,' it is stated that the formula refers to 'the fact that things are a
certain way' (dhammaa#ita@, and 'the fact that there is a regularity of things'
(dhammaniyimatii)which applies whether or not a tathigata (an epithet of the
Buddha) appears in the world.* The formula is: "all conditioned
 The Samkhirakkhandha 67
phenomena (samkhir4 are unsatisfactory, all conditioned phenomena
(samkhirii)are impermanent, all phenomena (dhammq are selfIe~s".~ In fact
all the phenomena of sapiric experience, of whatever kind, are condi-
tioned: this is precisely why they are impermanent and unsatisfactory. So
all samszric phenomena are sarjt?khcZras(or samkhata - conditioned; the two
words are virtually interchangeable).The construction of the word satpkhira
itself gives us insight as to its precise meaning: the verb kar (Sanskrit: ky)
basically means 'make' or 'doY;but the addition of the prefix sams gives
'make' the more specific meaning of 'put together', 'compose', 'form' or
'condition'. As nothing to do with sarpiric experience is asamkhata, what this
clearly means is that nothing exists as an ultimate element or simple: all
s a ~ i r i phenomena
c are 'formed' or 'conditioned'. This is re-stating that all
samsiric phenomena are dependently originated.
The characteristic referred to in the third line of the formula, selflessness
(anatt4, is implicit in the meaning of sarflkhira:being conditioned does not
allow for the independence that selfhood presupposes. But in this third line,
samkhiini is juxtaposed with the word dhammi. Dhammi refers here to all
phenomena, whether conditioned (samkhata)or otherwise: in other words
the last line of the formula, all things are selfless (sabbe dhammi anatti),
includes the samkhata phenomena of sa?psiric experience referred to in the
first two parts of the formula, but it goes further than they do in that it
includes the unconditioned (asamkhata),which in the Buddha's teachings
refers specifically to the experience of Nirvana. Impermanence and
unsatisfactoriness are not attributed to the unconditioned, but it is
important to establish that for it too, along with conditioned phenomena,
any attribution of independent selfhood is erroneous.
First, then, the term samkhiira refers to all the phenomena of samsiric
existence: there exists nothing in s a ~ i r which
a is not sawata. Everything
being discussed here in connection with the five hndhas, for example, is, as
well as any other meaning or significance it may have, a samkhira. This is
what is meant when the nun Vajira describes a 'being' (satta) as a "mere
heap of say&ziras".*In this context, the term means, therefore, conditioned,
dependent, formed (rather than spontaneous or independent)phenomena:
it means saviric phenomena.

Samkhiira in the Paticcasamuppiida For mula

Second, samkhira is the second link in the formula of paticcamm~PPida.~ In

order to ascertain the meaning of sapW2cZra in this context, it is important to
understand the purpose of the formula. It has usually been understood to
have been intended as a metaphysical formula explaining the nature of
sayira as such. Indeed the doctrine o f ~ a . ~ c a m u above
d a all states that
all samsiric phenomena are causally originated, conditioned. At the
68 Identity and Experience
beginning of a canonical passage in which the formula is given, the Buddha
states that he is teaching dependent origination and about things which
have arisen d e ~ e n d e n t l yHe
. ~ also states that he is referring to the way
things are (dhamma{thitat@,the fact that there is a regularity of things
(dhamman+imatG), and that things are causally related (idappaccayat4.' We
saw the first two of these phrases used in introducing the tilaWchapu formula
above. The third, idappaccayati, is used elsewhere in the canon in a context
which indicates clearly that it is a term which refers to the metaphysical
nature of ~ a m s i r a .Such
~ phrases support the usual understanding of
pa$ccasamuppida, that it describes the conditioned nature of samsira.
I suggest, however, that the term pa{iccasamupPida - dependent
origination - applies to a general doctrine, and that the actualformula given
by the Buddha is intended to have a more specific purpose. This is to
explain the 'how' of human existence in samsira, to give a synthetical
formula which explains the mechanics of how a human being is a human
being. The dilemma in response to which it might have been given could
have gone something like this: 'If the whole of samsiric experience is
pa$ccasamuppanna (i.e. it consists only of conditioned, dependently originated,
phenomena), if all that can be said about conditioned phenomena is that
they are impermanent and unsatisfactory, and if absolutely all phenomena
are selfless, how does what we experience as an individual life actually func-
tion? How does it hang together as a seemingly coherent whole? One might
be able to accept that inanimate things are unsatisfactory, impermanent
and selfless, but the case of human beings is more complex and requires
further elucidation.'
My suggestion that the formula has this purpose is well supported in the
texts. Most significantly, this purpose is implied by the fact that the formula
itself refers specifically to a human being. Terms such as ignorance,
consciousness, senses, feelings, birth, old age and death, are clearly
referring to a human being.g In the Mahinidina Suttanta in the &ha JVifiya,
which is one of the most important passages dealing with pa$ccasamuppida,
each stage of the formula is further elaborated in terms of human charac-
teristics such as holding opinions, quarrelling, slander and lies, and so on.1°
Elsewhere, the formula is given in order to explain dukkha, the term the
Buddha used to describe the samsiric experience of human beings, as stated
in the first Noble Truth." It is precisely because samsiric experience is
d&a that the Buddha gave his teaching to lead people away from it: it was
the human condition he was concerned about. The formula is used in
other contexts to describe the Middle Way: the lack of independent
existence of anything at all is conceived of as the 'middle way' between
existence and non-existence.l 2 But the fact that it is so obviously associated
with the human being surely reflects both the Buddha's express statement
that he was solely concerned with helping people to gain Enlightenment
and so escape from the cycle of sapsira, and also that he was not concerned
 T h e Samkhirakkhandha 69
to give ontological explanations. The achieving of Nirvana involves 'seeing
things as they really are' (yah-bhz&zy),but exactly what things really are is
never described by the Buddha: only the way to achieve such insight
oneself is described. This suggestion is also supported in the texts by the
fact that understanding the teaching is stated to mean that one will no
longer ask questions about individual existence in saeiira, past, future, or
present, such as "Am I, or am I not? What am I? How am I? This 'being'
that is 'I9,where has it come from, where will it go?".13
Paticcasamuppiida as a generally applicable doctrine which demonstrates
that all things are causally originated is unquestionably fundamental to the
Buddha's teaching. In some contexts where the formula is also given, and
in one context where the formula is not given, the general doctrine is stated
as follows: "When this is, that is; when this arises, that arises; if this is not,
that is not; when this ceases, that ceases".14 The modern way of putting this
is "When A is, B is; A arising, B arises; when A is not, B is not; A ceasing,
B ceases".15 In my opinion, however, it is only through understanding that
the purpose of the twelvefold formula itself is specifically to explain how
human beings exist in samsira that one understands it accurately.16This is
certainly the case when it comes to understanding what samkhzra means in
this context: the term applies to the way in which a human being arises, not
to the way in which samsira in the wider sense of the objective world in
general arises, and confusing the two can be very misleading. My point is
that the formula is not explaining that the 'stuff of samsiira (the objective
world) is the sa*iiras, and so on, conditioned by ignorance. I will
vir?ia"liy
return to this point below.
The formula varies as to the number of 'links' it contains. The common
twelvefold version (given in the Introduction) starts with ignorance, and
states that ignorance is the condition for the arising of the sa+-ras, which
in turn are the condition for the arising of viZZ@a,nimarCpa, the safiyatanas,
and so on. It explains the whole cycle of human existence, how individuals
are reborn again and again. As existence is thought to be cyclical in
Buddhism, it seems most likely that the formula is intended to be under-
stood as circular rather than linear; but given that liberation from the
samsa'ric cycle is brought about by insight, it is perhaps not surprising that
the formula as given should begin with ignorance. 'Ignorance' simply
means 'lack of insight'. This can vary in degree, but always means that
liberating insight has not taken place. This, indeed, is why there is
continued samsGric existence as an individual. Ignorance represents the
prime condition for the human condition as a whole. And because of such
ignorance or lack of insight, certain volitional and formative activities,
called samkhliras, take place, which in turn are the specific conditions of a
particular human being. I say 'specific' and 'particular' because in this case
samkhGra is not merely a generic term covering all conditioned phenomena.
Here, samkhiras arise according to the nature of the ignorance of each
70 Identity and Experience
individual: no two people's ignorance is precisely the same (it is dependent
on where someone is on the path to liberation) and so no two people's
sa+-ras are the same. To understand in what way they are volitional, it
helps if one bears in mind that according to the Buddha's teaching, karma
(action) is cetanti (volition), and that the words karma and samkhara come
from the same verbal root, kar (Sanskrit: ky). How one acts or intends,
therefore, is conditioned by one's level of ignorance (or knowledge), and so
long as they are conditioned by ignorance, such actions or intentions
continue to have their place as a condition for the arising of a particular
individual. We read in the canon that only an ignorant person (purisapuggalo)
will have good or bad intentions; when ignorance has ceased, he or she will
have neither good nor bad intentions.'' The term sapkhira has sometimes
been translated or interpreted as 'formati~n'.'~ When it refers to saykhtira
as the second link in the paficcasamuppiida formula, this is a particularly apt
translation because it has more of an activelyformative meaning than mere
'volition' has. That the samkhiras are formative is also implied from their
position as the condition for the subsequent arising of an individual. In an
abstract sense they are the creative principle in a human being.
The second meaning of the word samkhira, then, is the' active and
formative principle which, conditioned by ignorance, in turn conditions (or
forms) the arising of a particular individual. One might say that it is the
individualising faculty, in the sense of being the formative principle which
distinguishes individual A from individual B. We shall see in chapter v how,
by way of association with the faculty of consciousness (viKGna), this
subsequently gives rise to the 'name and form' of the individual concerned.
'Formative activities' would perhaps be an appropriate translation of the
term samkhira in this context.

The third relevant context in which the term samkhira is found is the
samkhtirakkhandha. I have put this third because understanding what it
means here is facilitated by having already looked at the preceding two
contexts. As we shall see, the meaning of sapk%irahere is closely related to
that in the pa&mzsamupptiah formula, with one distinction. Once again, we
need to bear in mind the reason for the analysis of the person into khandhar
in order to grasp its proper meaning. We have already seen that the
tihWdtapz formula explains the fundamental nature of saviric existence in
general, and that the pa.hcasamuppiida formula is a synthetical explanation
of the 'how' of individual human existence. As we know, the Wzandhas also
apply to human existence, but analytically rather than synthetically: they
.show that while it is possible to show how an individual human being arises,
as the pakcasamuppCda formula does, that individual should be understood
 T h e Samkhirakkhandha
not in terms of separate selfhood but in terms of how each khandha can be
seen to 'contribute' certain key characteristics of the human being as a
whole. The analysis is entirely impersonal (in the psychological rather than
the metaphysical sense of impersonal), and is not at all intended to explain
a particular or specific human being in the way the pa~iccasamupp~da
formula can.
In the KlzanMa Samyutta, the samkhlirakkhandha is defined as the six groups
of volitional activity.lg Once again the sixfold classification is according to the
connection of the six senses with their corresponding six objects. Signifi-
cantly, this definition of the samkhirakkhandha clearly separates what in the
West would probably be called 'will' from other mental states.20In Buddhism,
the teaching that karma is intention makes it particularly important that this
be clearly defined: the nature, presence or absence of volitional states deter-
mines the way in which, and extent to which, one is 'bound'.
This is established in another definition of sa*iira given in the Khandha
Samyutta. From the Pali one can see that there is a complex play on verbal
and nominal forms of words associated with sam Jkar: Samkhatam
abhisamkharontiti bhzkkhaue tasmi sar(lkhiri ti uuccanti.*l What it means is: "The
khandha of volitional activities is so called because they volitionally construct
(abhisamkharonti)conditioned phenomena (samkhatam)".The passage goes on:
What conditioned phenomena do they volitionally construct? They
volitionally construct the conditioned phenomenon that is the body as body;
they volitionally construct the conditioned phenomenon which is [the
khandha of] feeling as feeling; they volitionally construct the conditioned
phenomenon which is [the Wulndha of] apperception as apperception; they
volitionally construct the conditioned pherlomenon which is [the khandha of]
the volitional activities as volitional activities; and they volitionally construct
the conditioned phenomenon which is [the khandha of] consciousness as
cons~iousness.~~
What this passage clearly indicates is the way in which the individual's
will determines his or her future saysim'c existence: one's volitions are the
instrumental factor in the coming-to-be of the entire human being.23The
key role played by volitional activities in the cyclic s a ~ a r i cexistence of an
individual human being is further discussed below.
The.samkhirakkhandha is unique among the khandhas in that it need not,
and indeed ultimately should not, be 'activated' in the functioning of a
human being. We have already seen above, in our discussion of the
pa&casamuppida formula, that ignorance is the condition for the arising of
the formative activities (samkhirm). Ultimately, a bhikkhu is aiming to substi-
tute knowledge for ignorance, in which case the condition for the arising of
these formative activities will cease. Indeed the pa$ccasamuppiida formula is
given in reverse in the Nikiijas to illustrate how it is possible for human
existence in the cycle of samsira to cease. Similarly, the analysis into
72 Identity and Experience
Wtandhas shows that a human being can function without the involvement
of the samkhirakkhandha,without volitions in the sense that is intended here.
The description of the arising of visual feeling, for example, to which we
have already referred, shows clearly that it is quite possible for the feeling to
arise without any involvement at all of the sapkhiirakkhandha:
Visual awareness arises because of eye and [visible] forms; contact [occurs]
when there is a combination of the three; feelings are caused by contact;
that which one feels, one apperceives...24
From this we can see that the sensory activity, including both the organ
and object of sense, involves the rzipakWurndha; awareness is the function of
the vififiiinakkhandh~;~~ apperception takes place in the saiifiikhandha: and
these three khandhas are involved in the activating and recognising of what
is experienced in a fourth - the vedizniikhandha. The feeling can be agreeable,
disagreeable or neutral, but the samkhiirakkhandha is only involved if there is
a concomitant volition concerning the feeling: if it is an agreeable feeling, a
concomitant volition might be to desire it; if it is a disagreeable feeling, one
might be revolted by it. In practice, the feelings of an unenlightened
individual usually are accompanied by volitions, and this is illustrated by
the fact that in the paticcasamuppiida formula feelings are said to be the con-
dition for the arising of craving (tayhi).But one can, and ultimately should,
experience feelings without any concomitant volitions: an arahant is able to
experience pleasant and unpleasant feelings while remaining entirely
detached from them. This is stated in the Vedanii Samyutta, where we read
that the well-taught Ariyan disciple has no repugnance for painful feeling,
or delight in sensual pleasure.26The process of analysing the person into
khandhas shows how this is a constitutional possibility. An interesting pas-
sage in the Majjhima Nhya, which is discussed in detail in chapter v, states
that it is impossible to separate vedani, saiifii and uifi'iiiina, but does not say
that sa*iira is similarly in~eparable.~~
The samkhiirakkhandha, then, is the khandha of the will, and it might be
translated as the 'volitional constituent' of the human being.

The Cyclic Causal Nexus

As we have seen, both the samkhiirakkhandha and the paticcmamuppiida for-

mula are specifically connected with the sa~ii?icexperience of the human
being. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the meaning of samkhiira in
each of these two contexts should be closely linked, as we shall now see.
First, however, I return to the point made above that there is one
difference between the meaning of samkhiira as a khandha, that is as the
volitional constituent of a human being, and its meaning as the second link
in the chain of the pagccasamuppida formula, the formative activities. This is
 The Samkhirakkhandha 73
that the volitional constituent does not function as that which conditions or
forms the constitution of the individual for this life (as can be inferred from
the fact that its inactivity does not affect the composition of an individual).
Rather, the volitions of the samkhiirakkhandha are concerned with how the
individual operates: his or her day to day volitions during this life. This
difference is compatible with the fact that the paticcasamuppida formula is a
synthetical explanation of how a human being functions, while the Wlandha
formula is analytical: the former is creative and the latter is not. It is also
compatible with the fact that there are two distinct aspects to the way
karma works. In the first instance, samkhira as formative activities, the
second link in the pa/iccasamuppiida formula, forms the human beingfor this
life: it is the creative aspect of karma. In the second instance, the
samkhiirakkhandha,which is the volitional constituent of that human being in
this life, functions according to the way he or she has been formed: it is
what we might call the operative aspect of karma. Being cyclical, of course,
the operative karma of this life will (unless it is neutral) become the creative
karma of a future life: one's present volitions eventually condition the
ignorance on which future formative activities are based. This is explicitly
evidenced in the passage above which defines the samkhirakkhandha as
volitionally constructing the human being.
The difference between the meanings of samkhira in these two contexts
is by way of their representing two aspects of karma, which is itself the
linking factor between them. It is in this sense of the cyclical nature of
karma that Frauwallner, who translates samkhiira as Gestaltung, 'formation',
states that it "signifies that something is put in a condition of readiness
which further influences and operates", and compares this with its meaning
in the classical Samkhya system, where the term samkhard denotes "the
condition of the wheel which is moving in rotation and continues to move
of itself".28Interestingly, the word (abhz)samkhirais used in the Ariguttara
Nikciya in a passage in which a wheelright is discussing how long a wheel
will continue to roll: a wheel will keep rolling for as long as 'the impulse
that set it rolling' lasts.2gThis is clearly an apt analogy for the 'wheel of
samsiira', which is a popular way of expressing the cyclical nature of the two
different aspects of sapkhira being discussed here, and which together
might be said to be the 'fuel' of the individual in samsira. Frauwallner is
attempting to give a single translation for these two meanings of samWliira,
which I have called 'formative activities' and 'volitional constituent'
respectively. While this is a perfectly legitimate aim, there is nevertheless an
ambiguity which results from using one translation rather than analysing
the differences between the contexts in which the term is found. In fact,
from the discussion above of the two aspects of karma represented by the
two meanings of samkhiira which I have suggested, we are in a better
position to see that where such a single translation is required,
Frauwallner's 'formation' can have the connotation of both the creative and
74 Identity and Experience
the operative aspects of the term in these two contexts. But it does not
immediately convey the cyclic nature of the two kinds of volition, and
without first offering an analysis of the two meanings this twin connotation
might easily be missed. Confusion may also arise because 'formations' has
been used extensively by I. B. Horner in her numerous translations to refer
solely to samkhzra when it is part of the paticcasamupp5da formula: its creative
aspect.=OShe uses 'habitual tendencies' when translating samkhiira as the
fourth of the five khandhas. The best single translation is 'inherited forces',
since here there is a much clearer implication in the word 'inherited' of an
operative aspect and in the word 'forces' of a creative aspect.31That
volitions are 'inherited' does not necessarily mean that they are entirely
pre-determined (without at least a degree of free will the Buddha's
ethicising of the law of karma would be pointless), but they are nevertheless
as conditioned as any other aspect of the individual by one's overall moral
state in one's previous life or lives.
A frequently used formula brings together the two meanings of samkhiira
as aspects of the ethical life of the individual which functions cyclically in his
or her continuing rebirth process through the law of karma. This is the tri-
ad 'thought, word and deed' by which all the actions of an individual are
carried out. Highlighting both the ethical nature of this triad, and the way
the samkhiiras condition the individual's life in every way, we read in
Kukkuravatikasutta: "One volitionally acts through body, speech and
It is according to whether such actions are harmful (sabyzbqj'ham)
or harmless (abiibajham)that one is subsequently reborn, the Sutta states.
Elsewhere this triad is described in terms of karma, with karma being used
as a synonym for ~ a p k h i r aTaking
. ~ ~ the two passages together, we see the
Buddha's ethicising of karma clearly tied in with the function of the
samkhiirakkhandha as the khandha of volitions. E. J. Thomas, in his History of
Buddhist Tho~ght,~' suggests that the division of samkhiira into hya, vaci and
citta (or manas) is the earliest classification of the samkhiirakkhandha. He is
referring to the fact that the later Abhidhamma classifiesthe samkhiirakkhandha
according to fifty different mental activities, only one of which is volition.35
There is another early classification in the Saripi Suttanta, not mentioned
by Thomas, which ties in the ethical teaching by using a different triad.
This is into good (puiifia),bad (apun"n"a),and (literally) imperturbable or
stationary (IZn~?ja).~~ The literal translation of iindja might suggest that this
classification includes karmically neutral volitions. According to the
commentary, however, iim?iibhisamkhiirohere refers to the will for rebirth in
the ariipa loka, and this meaning of the term is also found in the
Abhidhamma.37The context of the Bigha NikrZya passage does not help us in
determining the way in which it is being used, because the Sari8-ti Suttanta
gives lists for recitation purposes without any explanations: it is generally
agreed to be a kind of proto-Abhidhamma, an early work of scholastic
classification, no doubt for mnemonic purposes. But the view of the
 The Samkhiirakkhandha 75
commentator that iiner7jiibhisamkhirois not referring to neutral volition is
supported by the other context in which the same triad is found.38Here the
three types of samkhiira of the triad are stated to be the volitions of an
ordinary ignorant man (aviiiigatopurisapugalo), and the passage goes on to
state that when ignorance has been replaced by wisdom the bhiMu will not
have volitions of these three types.39Rebirth in the ariipa loka (or the result
of any other volition which is not neutral) is ultimately undesirable since it
does not represent liberation. So a bhikkhu in whom ignorance had been
replaced by wisdom would not have such volitions. We have here, then, two
early triadic classifications which might be applied to the activity of the
sapkhiirakkhandha, both of which are ethical in nature.
We also find the former of these triads, that into kiya, urn-and citta, in a
passage where it is clear from the context that the classification is referring
to samkhiira as the second link in the paiiccasamuppiida formula rather than to
the samkhiirakkhandha. This is located in the Nidiina Samyutta, the section of
the Sutta Pitaka which discusses the doctrine of pa!iccasamuppiida, and the
passage is describing the links of the paticcasamuppiida formula in turn.
Samkhdrd is defined in terms of body, speech and mind.40In a passage in the
Abhidhamma, we find the two triads linked in a description of samkhiira as the
second link in the pa!iccasamuppida formula. So formative activities
(sapkhiiras) which are good, bad or desirous of the ariipaloka, are bodily,
verbal and mental.41The application of these triadic ethical classifications
of satpkhiira to both of these two contexts, the samkhiirakkhandha and saWra
as the second link in the pa~iccasamuppiidaformula, clearly emphasises the
interconnectednessof these two kinds of samfira in the cyclic continuum of
the individual in s a ~ i i r as
a well as their significance in the ethical process.
A word needs to be said at this point about the role of samkhiira in
conditioning future rebirth. I have said that the samkhiirakkhandha as the
operative aspect of karma becomes the creative aspect of karma in
determining a subsequent individual life, and this was evidenced in the
&$andhaSamyutta passage where the constituents of the human being were
all said to have been volitionally constructed. In the Samkhiiruppattisutta in
the Majhima Nikiiya the Buddha explains the arising of samkhiras in a
different context.42The Sutta states that a bhikkhu who possesses faith
(saddhi), moral standing (sfla),learning (suta),detachment (tea) and wisdom
(pan"n"i)can set his mind to being reborn in a particular favourable circum-
stance, such as a wealthy noble (khattiyamahiisiila),brahmin or householder,
a god, or in one of the many brahma realms. Together with the five qualities,
a bhikkhu's mind must have 'constant inclinations' (bhlZviti bahulihti) towards
the rebirth he desires. The Sutta is somewhat simplistic in style, and it is
therefore tempting to interpret it equally simplistically, and assume that it
is intending to explain how a bhikkhu is able to will himself into a nice
rebirth if he so wishes. This indeed it does, and illustrates the way in which
his inclinations or intentions in one life condition his subsequent life. One
76 Identity and Experience
might in any case expect to find a passage on this subject included in the
canonical material since it is a pan-Indian belief that one can to a greater
or lesser extent choose or influence one's next life by one's particular
aspirations at the time of death.43And the Buddha's teaching that karma is
volition gives considerably more credence to this notion. But the message
the Sutta contains is far more powerful if considered in the light of its final
paragraph. This states that a bhzkkhu who has reached the advanced stage
implied by possession of the five qualities of faith, moral standing, learning,
detachment and wisdom, need not have inclinations towards a specific
favourable rebirth such as those already mentioned. He also has the choice
of liberation, which is achieved through the extinction of the iisavas. Since
one of the Esavas is the desire for continued becoming, we can see that it is
the extinction of this altogether, rather than desiring to continue to become
in a favourable circumstance, that is necessary in order to bring about the
liberating factor of no subsequent arising (rebirth) at all.44So while this
Sutta does serve to illustrate that specific mental inclinations can produce
specific results, the message of the Sutta is, rather, a warning of the binding
power of volitions.
Having discussed sapkhira in the contexts of the pa.hcmuppiida formula
and the sapk+zErWndhaand established a relatively clear understanding of
how each contributes in its own way to the cyclic ethical activities of the
individual, I turn now to illustrating that, in practice, the complex of
volitional factors of which an individual is comprised is far from being so
clearly defined. Volitions do not come to fruition according to a set
temporal pattern. They can therefore lie dormant, as it were, and for long
periods of time condition the constitution of the individual through the
cyclic way the formative activities and the volitions condition each other.
The term used in Pali to indicate this is anusya, which means: "bent, bias,
proclivity, the persistence of a dormant or latent disposition, predisposition,
tendency. Always in a bad sense".45'Bad' of course means binding, not bad
in the legal sense of criminal or even in the simple sense of unpleasant. The
English term 'bias' is perhaps a good word to convey the connotations
associated with anuraya. That anusaya implies 'bad' tendencies is suggested
in passages which equate their absence with the absence of other
fundamentally binding factors. In the Sutta N;Pcita we read of "the bhiMu in
whom there are no latent tendencies, in whom the unwholesome roots are
d e ~ t r o y e d "The
. ~ ~ venerable Khemaka, who has managed to eradicate
overt identification with each of the five khandhas, still has not "eradicated
the tendency to think 'I am"'.47 The subtle nature of this tendency is
likened in the text to a soiled cloth which has been washed clean but which
still has about it the vague smell of salt or cow-dung. It has to be returned
to the washerman to leave it for some time in a sweet-scented coffer
(analogous to further meditation on selflessness). The vague smell will then
be completely removed.
 The Samkhiirakkhandha 77
Though this passage illustrates that Khemaka's persisting notion of
'I am' is subtle, it also suggests that the anuqas function at a very deep level.
They are almost what one would describe as 'part of human nature'. In the
Mahiimiilunkyasutta, the Buddha states that even in a baby there are the
latent tendencies to the view of (identifymg with) its own body, to doubt, to
clinging to customs and rituals, to sense pleasure, and to ill-will towards
other beings.48 The Sangitti Suttanta lists seven anusayas: sense pleasures,
anger, views, doubt, conceit, the desire for continued existence and
ignorance,4gand each of these is found in many places throughout the Sutta
Pitaka. Elsewhere a triplet is given: obstinacy, prejudice and bias.50The
profundity of the anusayas is perhaps most strongly suggested by the fact
that four of them mentioned here, sensual desire, the desire for continued
existence, views and ignorance, are together referred to as the iisavas. These
are the last binding factors to be eradicated by the disciple on the path, and
their eradication is accompanied by Enlightenment.
The association of the anusayas with the &mas reinforces the suggestion
made above that they are almost what one would describe as 'part of
human nature'. Cyclically reinforced over many lives, they have become
deeply embedded in an individual's psychological make-up. They are the
origin of unwitting, mampaja, action^.^' We also see the threefold classifica-
tion of volitions according to bodily actions, speech and thoughts identified
with breathing, discursive thought, and apperception and feeling respec-
tively, all of which are normal processes in every human being.52This is
perhaps why the term 'roots', milii, is so often associated with binding
defilements in Pali material: they have to be rooted out. Paradoxically,
however, it is volition which is applied in the rooting out process. In the
light of the deeply embedded nature of the anusayas (or iisauas), which fuel
one's continued samsiiric existence, this process is so difficult that it is
referred to as going 'against the current', patisotagiimi.
We have seen that samkhiira and karma are classified according to good
and bad. Though in popular teaching good volitions or actions are usually
said to lead to a favourable rebirth, they can also be used intentionally to
direct one's will towards the following of the Eightfold Path and eradicating
the roots of defilement. In the Sabbiisavasutta, for example, it states that the
iisauas can be eradicated by wisely paying attention lyoniso manasikiira) to
their control (samvara), to endurance (adhivisanii)and so on.53All of these are
deliberately or volitionally applied. We also find the terms patthanii and
panidhi, respectively meaning aspiration and mental resolve, in association
with cetanz, volition, in contexts where all three can be used towards the
continuing of dukkha or can be directed towards activities which conduce to
sukha, its direct opposite (and as such sometimes used as a synonym for
N i r v a ~ ~ aA) bhikWlu
. ~ ~ has to keep his thoughts under control by a deliberate
act of will (samkhiira)involving habitual restraint.55
78 Identity and Experience
The way the samW1ciras act as a 'fuel' for the individual's continuing
samstiric existence is not difficult to understand from all of the foregoing.
We can see the way volitions in one life condition a subsequent life and
how this process is reinforced through its cyclic nature. We have also seen
how fundamentally this is embedded in the psychological nature of the
human being, in the desire for continued existence, for example. This
probably explains why the term samkhiira is also used together with @u or
jcvita to mean the 'life-force'. In the Mahiiparinibbiina Sutta, we read that
the Buddha can either deliberately hold on to this life force56or give it up
and die.57Elsewhere it is used as one of the defining characteristics of a
live person: without it there is only a dead body.58
In view of the complexity of the causal process, it seems reasonable to
suggest that the goal of volitional inactivity mentioned above applies only
to those volitions that are potentially karmically binding:59volitions such as
hate, desire, anger have to be distinguished from those karmically neutral
volitions which are continually involved in the practical functioning of an
individual, such as deciding to sleep, eat, sit down, and so on. The former
are to be eradicated, the latter continue and are insignificant to one's
progress on the Path. What this means is that karmically neutral actions
are not technicalb volitions. This is relevant to understanding the meaning of
sapkhcira both in the pa.ticcasamuppcida formula and in the samkhirak-khandha.
In the case of the paticcasamuppiida formula, in spite of the fact that
saMciras, the volitional formative activities which condition an individual,
are dependent on ignorance, it is possible for a human being to continue to
function even after all ignorance has been eradicated. One only has to
recall that the Buddha continued to live for forty-five years after his
Enlightenment to realise that this is the case. This need not be problematic
if one considers the formula in the spirit in which it was intended rather
than pedantically applying logic to it. As already stated, the formula is
intended to show how a human being's continued rebirth is primarily
dependent on ignorance, and once ignorance is eradicated there will be no
more rebirth; the life of an Enlightened individual may continue until
death takes place in due course but that death will not be the condition for
rebirth. It is at the death of an Enlightened individual that the entire causal
nexus, including karmically neutral activites, ceases. In the case of the
samkhtirakkhandha, it would seem that this khandha is only activated when
volitions in the technical sense take place: karmically neutral, or non-
technical, activities do not involve the samkhtiraMandha. Once again, no
problems arise if one bears in mind the purpose of giving the analysis: the
Buddha's overriding concern was to offer a path to liberation rather than a
complete classification of every process that occurs, and, since karmically
neutral activities are not a soteriologically significant factor within human
existence, they do not have to be part of an analysis of the human being
which is given for the sole purpose of leading to liberating insight. The
 The Samkhirakkhandha 79
technical status of samkhZras is suggested in passages which state that
Nirvana, the cessation of ignorance, is the stilling (or cessation) of
samkhira~.~O At this point one's state of mind is without volitional a~tivity.~'
But at this point that part of the causal nexus which fuels one's basic
functioning as a human being nevertheless continues.
A final point concerning samkhira brings me back to the suggestion that
it is important to understand that the paJiccasamuppida formula applies to
the way a human being arises and not to the way saysira in the general
sense of the objective world arises. We can see that the meaning of samkhiira
in the tilakkhapu formula differs from its meaning as the second link in the
paticcasamuppida formula and in the samkhirakkhandha in that the first has a
passive meaning, 'conditioned phenomena', and the last two have an active
meaning, 'formative activities' and 'volitional constituent'. We saw above
that all the phenomena of samsiric experience are samkhiras, and in this
sense all the khandhar and parts thereof are samkhiras regardless of any other
more specific function they may have. Given also that the pa~iccasamuppida
formula describes a process wherein the samkhiras are the active and
formative principle of individual samsiric continuity, one might say, as
Franke does, that the term samkhzra refers both to process and product. In
making this point, however, it is crucial to understand (as Franke does not)
both that this can be said only with reference to human samsinc continuity,
and also that both process and product are concerned with method and not
with substance (that is, with how it works rather than with what it is).
Franke claimP2 that samkhira is both process and product of an entirely
mental creative activity; that the process, being based on ignorance, is
psychological, and the product imaginary. He makes this claim for the
world as a whole. Franke has failed to understand that the paticcasamuppiida
formula is intended to explain the 'how' of human samsinc existence, not the
'what' of the world as a whole. He erroneously states on the one hand that
because the samkhiras are conditioned by ignorance and give rise to the
subsequent parts of the chain, the entire process is mental, and mistakenly
claims on the other hand an idealistic ontological status for the
In my opinion, it cannot be claimed that the samkhiras are both process and
product of the objective world (samsara) as a whole, because we have no
evidence to support the supposition that the world is volitionally formed,
only that it is conditioned (samkhata).

Notes

I. AN.I.286. The fbrmula itself is also found at Dhammapada 5-7; 277-279.cf. also MN.I.336;
.,,
DN.11.157.
2. EL. Woodward translates dhammat[lzitatii as 'causal law of nature' and dhamman&iimatii as
'orderly fixing of things' (GS.I.2641). His translation of the fbrmula itself is misleadingly
incorrect because he gives 'phenomena' for both samHziirii and for dlzammii.
3. Sabbe samkhiirii dukkhii, sabbe samkharii aniccii, sabbe dhammii anattii.
80 Identity and Experience
SN.1.135: Satto ... suddhasamkhirapuiijo.
For example, at SN.II.25 and throughout the Nidiina Samyutta.
SN.II.25: PaticcasamuppiidaEcavo bhikkhave deskiimipa.&casamuppanne ca dhamme.
Ibid.
For example, SN.1.136: ... duddasam idam &inam: yad idam idappaccayatii paticcasamuppiido:
''This is something hard to perceive: that this is conditioned by that, it is dependently
originated."
T h e formula may also refer to other beings on the saysiirk cycle of rebirth: animals, deuu
and so on. But the path to liberating insight is primarily given in terms of the human
condition and it is this with which this book is concerned.
DN.II.55fE Ditgtipiidiina ... tuvamtuva-pesuAfa-musiiviidii.
For example, AN.1.177; SN.II.2 etc.; MN.1.190.
Anupagamma mujhena tuthiigato dlmmmam deseti. There are many examples of such contexts in
the Nidiina Samyuttu; for example, SN.11.17. cf. Mrs C. A. E Rhys Davids' comment in
Dialogues Vol 11, p.42f.
SN.II.27: ... almp nu kho smi, nu nu kho smi; & nu kho smi; katham nu kho smi; aham nu kho sattu
kuto iigato so kuhimgcimi bhaviuafi ti.
MN.II.32 (without the fbrmula); SN.II.28,95; MN.III.63. Not at DN.II.55f or AN.1.176f.
Imasmim sati, idam hoti; imass' uppiidii idam uppajati; imasmim arati, idam na hoti; imasra nirodhii
idam nimjlzati.
cf: Rahula, 1978, p.53.
I will henceforth make this distinction: the term pakcasamuppiida means the doctrine of
dependent origination, whereas the paticcasamuppiida 'formula' refers to the chain itself:
SN.II.82.
For example, I. B .Homer in her translations for the Pali Text Society. See her note at
MLS, Vol.1, p.xx~v.
SN.111.60: Katamii ca bhikWlave samkhiirii? Chayime bhikkhave cetanlkrijrii.
I am using 'will' in a general commonsense way and do not imply any technical meaning
which may be associated with specific philosophies.
SN.III.87.
h X c a samkhatam abhkamkharonti? Riipam rripattlrya samkhatam abhlsaykharonti, vedanam vedanafiya
.sa;?zWtatam abhiramkltaronti, saiitZam saiiiiattliya samkhatum abhiramkharonti, samkhiire samkhdrattriya
sumWzatam abhhapkharonti, viiiiiiipzm viAAiiytthliya samkhatam abhiramkharonti.
Collins (1982,p.202) translates .samkhatam abhziamkharonfiti tasmii samkhiira as "(people) fbrm a
construction, thus they are 'tbrmations"'. Though this translation may be philosophically
correct, it makes no mention either of the Wzandlta the passage is defining or of the role of
volitions in the constructing of an individual.
MN.1. I I I: CakkhuA c'ivuso paticca ripe ca uppafluti cakkhuvin'iiiinam, tinpzm sarigati p h m o ,
phapaccayii vedami,yam vedeti tam safijiinciti.. . .
The vififiiipzkkhandlta is discussed in chapter v.
MN. IV 209: Ta.niiyeva kho pana dukkhrijra vedanlfya pat2ltavii na hoti ... kiimasukham niibhinandato.
MN.I.293: YZ c'iivuso vedangyii ca san"AiiyaA ca vin"n"aymime dlzammii sapsatthii no vkamsa~&ii,na
ca labbhii imesam dlzammiinam vinibbhujitvii vinibbhujitvz niiniikaranampan"n"iipetum
Frauwallner, 1973, p.159.
AN.1. I 12: Ydvatikii abhiramkhiras.ra gati.
cf. Horner's note, MLS, Vol.1, p.xxrv.
Gombrich, 1971,p.346.
MN.I.389: k Z y a ~ q k h Z r a mabhtsamkhuroti .. . vacfiamkhiram abhisamkharoti ... manosamklziiram
abhziamklwroti.
MN.I.41gE Kqakammam ... viic~akammamand manokammam. The interchangeability of cittu
and manas in this context is discussed in chapter v.
Thomas, 1933, p.61, n.2.
For example, Dhs 62.
DN.III.2 17: Tayo samklziirii:pun"n'iibhiramW~iiro,apun'iiiibhisqkltilro, dne8jiiblz~at;nkztriro.
DA.III.gg8 and Vibhariga 135: .. .atumo iinen"jiibhi.ramkhiiro?Kusalii cetunii ariipiivacarii, y a m vuccati
iine@ibhziamkhiiro ti.
SN.II.82.
Ato kho bhikkhave bhikkltuno avijii pahind hoti vijZ uppannii, so av@iiviriigii vijuppiidii n'eva
pui7Eiibhkamkhdram abhiramkharoti, na apuZEiibhiramkhiiramabltkamkharoti, na iineiiJZbltkamkha-ram
abhkamWmroti.
 T h e Samkha'rakkhandha
SN.II.4: &tame ca bhikkhuve samkhiiri? Tayo 'me bhikkhave samh-ri hya.sam&-ro vmtsaykhiiso
cittasamkhiiro: ime vuccanti bhikkhave saykhdri.
Vibhanga I 35: Ta ttha [in the paticcasamuppida formula] katame avijjiipaccayl samkhira?
Pun'iiiibhiramkhZro apufiiTiibhbam&-ro inAj6bhisamkhiiro hyasamkhiiro vacisamWraWrarocittasa*iiro.
Vibhatiga 340 only mentions the first triad.
MN.II1.99: Sapkhimppattim vo, bhikkhave, desiuimi.
Gombrich (1971, chapter 5) discusses how this is understood by Buddhists in a village
setting in Sri Lanka.
MN. 111.103: Ayam, bhikkllave, bhikkhu na katthmi upMati nu kuhit7n'uppajatfti.
PED, P.44.
Sn 14: YassZnusayi na santi keci mtilii akusali samtihatZse. cf: also Sn 369.
SN.111.130: A~rnitianmayo asamtihato.
MN.I.433: Sak;ka>adi&hinuayo, vicikicchinuayo, stlabbatopariirn&inu.sayo, LiirnarCSginusayo, sattesu
by@idiinusayo.
DN.III.254: KZrnarZgZnusayo, patighinusyo, dighinuyo, vicikicchinurayo, miniinusayo (this is
usually associated with 'I am'), b&var@inusayo, avijiinusqo.
Adhit#Znibhinivesinusayi. For example at MN.1.136, 111.31, 240; SN.11.17, 111.10, 135, 161;
AN.V.111.
AN.11.158, SN.II.40. cf. also AN.1.171.
MN.1.301.
MN.I.~.
For example, AN.I.32, V.212.

DN.II.;G.
MN.I.296. This passage, where cSymamkhZra is combined with heat, usmii, and consciousness,
vififiiipz, was referred to in chapter I and is also discussed in chapter v. cf. also DN.II.335.
I use the word 'karmically' here in the (possibly Westernised) general meaning of that
which hinds an individual to the cycle of rebirth.
SN.1.136; AN.1.133: Sabbasamhraamatho .. nibbinam.
Dhammapada 154: Viamkfiragatam cittam.
Franke, 1913,pp.307-18. I am indebted to Birte Plutat for assistance in translating from the
German.
Reat (1987passim, and 1990, chapter VI, especially pp. 317fl) makes the same mistake. Reat
bases his idealistic interpretation of the pac;tcaamu@ida formula on his understanding of
niimanipa, which will be discussed in chapter VI.
 CHAPTER V

The Viiiiianakkhandha

THEFOURTH AND LAST OF the ariipakkhandzas is the uin"n"ipkkhandha.Unlike

the terms used to denote the other three ariipakkhandhas (vedani, san"n"iand
samkhzra), uin"n"avis often used in the Pali texts as a generic term to denote
'mind' in general. This generic use means that it is found in many different
contexts in which there is no clear indication of its precise meaning or
function as a khandha. The lack of clarity is compounded by the fact that
other terms are also used in a generic sense to denote 'mind' in general;
and they too have their own specific meanings in other contexts. By the
time the Abhidhamma was compiled, numerous different terms had been
introduced to denote general mental activity,' the meanings of which were
elaborated in the commentarie~.~ In the Sutta Pitaka, however, the most
common terms used, often seemingly interchangeably with vin"n"Gna,are
n'tta and mana,~.~All three are used far from systematically: on the one hand,
the same term means different things in different places; on the other hand,
the meanings of the terms overlap and they sometimes appear to be being
used synonymously.
The term vin"n"iyzis usually translated as 'consciousness' or 'awareness'.
Because one of the most fundamental characteristics of human beings is
that they are conscious, this makes it a particularly important term in the
analysis of the human being. But because there is such a widely diverse use
of the term in the Sutta Pitaka, it is not immediately obvious that the authors
or compilers of the material had a clear understanding of what the
viczinakkhandha is or does. We have already had some indication that
defining vifin"ip is not likely to be a simple matter. In the discussion on the
safin"&andha we saw that in a brief description of each of the five khandhas in
the Khandha Samyutta, both san"n"iand vin"n"iv were defined as discriminative
faculties, with standard formulas being used in each case. The difficulty in
understanding the term is not helped by the fact that to this day
philosophers, psychologists, doctors and theologians, not to mention physi-
cists, of both East and West continue to speculate about what consciousness
is: there is no consensus as to its meaning or function.
 The Viiiiiinakkhandha 83
In attempting to define vin"n"inahere, many of the numerous contexts in
which it occurs are necessarily omitted: a thorough analysis of them all
would constitute a book in itself. My concern has been to draw on those
contexts which I consider both to be important and to offer some clarifica-
tion of the term. I will first attempt to establish how one might understand
the meaning and function of vin"n"ipzas a Wlandha. An overview of the mass of
unsystematic contexts in which it is found has suggested five headings under
which it is most helpful to do this, though some of the points made under
each heading will overlap: (I) Vin"n"iinaas impermanent, (2) Vin"n"ina as
'consciousness of', (3) fin"n"5naas a factor in cognition, (4) Vin"n"inaas
providing continuity, and (5) Viiin"ipzas evolving. In imposing such headings
on unsystematic material there is of course the danger that one is projecting
onto it a greater degree of coherence than exists in the texts. Indeed, such is
the lack of any systematic approach in the texts that to a certain extent this
is unavoidable if one is to attempt to come to any meaningful understanding
of the function of uifiiiina. But so far as I am aware none of what I will
discuss under these headings is significantly compromised by anything I
have omitted. Similarly, though some of the contexts on which I have drawn
do not explicitly identify viiiiiina as a Wlandha, in my opinion these contexts
are nevertheless relevant in an attempt to understand how the khandha func-
tions. In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the common associa-
tion of vin"n"ipzwith kya, body, and will suggest that even if this is understood
as an alternative analysis of the human being it is nevertheless compatible
with the Wlandha analysis. And in the third part I shall also briefly discuss the
terms citta and manas in both their generic and their more specific meanings.

a a Khandha
En"n"ii?zas

I. Vififiiina as impermanent
In the introduction to the ariipakkhandhas at the beginning of chapter 11,
I suggested that they might be described as the occurrence of certain states
or processes which do not involve the four mahibhiiti. In considering uedani,
san"n"iand samkhira, this suggestion does not present any conceptual
problems. We do not tend to think of feelings, apperceptions or
conceptions, and volitions or will, as permanent; our experience of them is
that they constantly change, and they can all readily be understood as
processes which operate given the appropriate conditions. fiiin"ipz,however,
has connotations which are both substantive and permanent. Such conno-
tations derive partly from the association in the UpaniJads of the Sanskrit
term uijn"ina with Brahman. In the Byhadiranyaka Upani~ad,for example,
Brahman is defined as consciousness and bliss.* It is cardinal to Upani;adic
teaching both that Brahman is permanent and also that it is 'being', sat.
84 Identity and Experience
Because it is also cardinal to Upanjadic teaching that there is a macrocos-
mic/microcosrnic correspondence between Brahman and itman, it follows
that the consciousness, u$Ena, of the individual is also permanent and is
'being': it is the essential stu& both of the individual and the co~mos.~ The
connotations associated with vin"n"ii?aalso derive from the common transla-
tion of uin"n"Zvas 'consciousness'. In English, this nominal form is open to
interpretation as a substantive noun, suggesting that consciousness is some
sort of permanent entity. Such a translation allows ontological significance
to be projected onto the term vin"n"iinaand tends to suggest that it is not
ordinarily conditioned. Finally, our subjective experience is that our
consciousness is in some sense the common denominator of all our experi-
ences. It seems to us to have some degree of constancy.
I shall discuss further the way in which vin"n"iinafunctions as a process
under point (2). And I shall discuss its apparent constancy under point (4).
Here our concern is to establish that any interpretation of vin"n"iinaas
permanent is erroneous. The most fundamental point to make here is that
any suggestion of permanence does not accord with the key doctrinal
teachings of the Buddha. The doctrine ofpa~ccasamuppiidaand the tiWapz
formula, for example, underline that everything that is connected with
samsiiric experience is conditioned, dependently originated, and therefore
impermanent. With regard to the constitution of the individual, we also see
in the standard twelvefold version of the pa~iccasamuppiidaformula that
vin"n"iinaarises conditioned by ignorance and the formative activities. In an
alternative version which appears in the MahZnidZna Suttanta, the formula
begins with vin"n"iyz, but it is stated that vin"fiiiy and niimariipa, given as the
second link in the chain, are mutually conditioningS6Similarly, the khandha
analysis with which we are concerned was given by the Buddha in order to
illustrate his teaching that no part of the individual should be thought of as
having independent existence (self-hood). So of vin"n"iiy, for example (and
the form of the Pali is the same for each of the khandhas), we read that the
well-taught ariyariiuaka "does not view vin"n"@aas self, nor self as possessing
vin"n"Zna,nor vifin"Znain self, nor self in ~in"n"iina".~None of these doctrinal
teachings is compatible with attributing permanence to vin"n"2na.
One passage on the pa&asamuppiidz formula which might be considered
to indicate that vin"n"a'nais some sort of enduring transmigrating entity is in
the Mahiinidiina Suttanta, where the ninefold version of the ~a~hcasarnuppida
formula is given. Though I cited this Sutta above as stating that vin"n"iipand
niimarizpa are mutually conditioning, we read further on in the Sutta that
uin"n"a'na'descends' or 'enters' into a mother's womb.* Literally the Pali
means: "If vin"n"iy did not descend into a mother's womb, would niimariipa
take shape therein?" The context of the passage is an explanation of what
is meant by the various stages of the chain in the pa.hcasamu.piida formula,
where uin"n"ii?ais followed by niimariipa. The meaning of niimariipa will be
discussed in chapter VI and need not concern us here. This passage has
 The ViCiiinakkhandha
been construed to mean that &Gina is the reincarnating factor which
'descends' into a woman's womb when conception takes place, and without
which the embryonic individual would not take shape.g But an alternative
interpretation of this passage is as follows: a human being will not develop
if all the relevant constituents are not present; and the development of the
individual, indicated by the term nimanipa, requires the faculty of vir?&ipz.
These two interpretations imply very different roles for vin"Zyz.
The key word in this passage is okkamisatha, from a verb which literally
means 'descend' or 'enter'. But it also has a figurative meaning, perhaps
indicated in English by 'arise' or 'manifest'. In glossing okkamissatha, the
commentary on this passage states that it means 'entering', but, important-
ly, it adds 'as it were'.1° We also find the same verb used figuratively else-
where in the Pali material. The expression sukhasan"n"am~kkamitvii,~~ for
example, does not imply that the sense of happiness literally 'descends'; and
likewise o h n b middhel2does not mean that sluggishness literally 'descends'.
I mentioned in chapter I that where we find avakkanti associated with the
senses, the meaning is best conveyed by 'manifest'.13Two consecutive Suttas
in the Nidina Samyutta, which form part of a series of Suttas illustrating the
dependently arising links of the paticcasamuppida formula, use the verb
avakkanti, also literally 'descending' or 'entering', in connection with
niimariipa and vin"n"iyzrespectively.14In both contexts the meaning is clearly
intended to be figurative: that nimaepa and vin"n"inaarise dependently. In
view of this figurative use of the verb avakkanti elsewhere, together with the
fact that the Mahinidina Suttanta also states that vin"n"iiyand niimanipa are
mutually conditioning, it seems unlikely that this passage should be inter-
preted to mean that vin"n"iiyzis an enduring transmigrating entity. Moreover,
the Mahinidina Suttanta passage on the paficcasamuppida formula ends by
reiterating the interdependency of vin"n"iyzand nimariipa and by stating that
the cycle of rebirth, ageing, death and rebirth is experienced by nimanipa
together with vin"n"iy (nzmanipapsaha vin"n"ipna):at no stage in the process is
vifiiiiina independent.15 Nor can one deduce that nlimariipa and vin"n"iina
together form some sort of enduring reincarnating entity: we are told else-
where16 that there is no coming or going, decease or rebirth, persistence,
growth or increase of vin"n"inawithout all the other Wlandhas, and the
rzipakkhandha manifestly is not permanent. The point of these passages is to
establish that uin"n"iyzis conditioned.
Though we shall see under point (4) that vin"n"iinafunctions as the
provider of a sense of continuity, the evidence does not suggest that it
should be understood to be an enduring reincarnating entity. The use of
verbs which mean 'descend' or 'enter' are a linguistic convention which
indicate that vin"n"iinais a vital factor in the arising of an individual and in
the sapsiric experience.
The fact that vin"iiiyzis not permanent or unconditioned is more specifi-
cally confirmed, explicitly and implicitly, in many passages in the Sutta
86 Identity and Experience
Pi@h. It is recorded in the canon that adherents to an abiding soul theory,
also referred to as 'eternalists', tended to assume that this was the role of
viiriia'na. This view is emphatically and comprehensively refuted by the
Buddha when, for example, it is propounded by a bhikkhu named Sati. Sati
repeatedly states: "Insofar as I understand the dhamma taught by the Lord,
not another, transmigrates and continues from life to
it is that this vin"n"a'p,
life". l7 The Buddha replies:
Foolish man, have I not said in many ways that vin"n"Q'guis dependently
originated; that without conditions there is no arising of vir?n"pz? Foolish
man, you slander me through your misunderstanding, and you also destroy
yourself and produce much demerit. Foolish man, this will be harmful and
painful for you for a long time."
A passage in the Nida'na Samyutta emphasises even more the transient
nature of Ui7?iiEp.Though here uiiin"a'yu is being used generically, together
with manas and citta, the analogy given in the passage would by extension
apply to vin"n"ipas a khandha: if the 'mind' as a whole is impermanent,
then any constituent of it could not be permanent. The Buddha states that
what we call vin"n"a'p(and citta and manas):
... arises as one thing and ceases as another, by day and by night. Just as a
monkey moving through the forest or the woods holds on to a branch, lets
it go and holds on to another; in the same way what we call vin"n"Q'~ (and
cith and manas) arises as one thing and ceases as another, by day and by
night.lg
This idea was developed by the Abhidhamma and commentarial tradi-
tions, and by many later Buddhist sects, into a theory of 'momentariness'
(khanikavida, Sanskrit: kyanika~a'da).~~But in the Sutta Pi~Qka,the purpose of
this passage is simply to illustrate that one's mental processes are imperma-
nent. And its concern is not to establish that the object(s) of one's mental
processes are constantly changing (though of course they are) but that this
is how one's mind operates subj.ectively: the context of the Sutta indicates
that it is to one's subjective experience that the Buddha is referring.
The impermanence of zriiin"iyzis implicit in passages which state that it is
dependent on the other four khandhas. In the Khandha Samyutta, for example,
we read: "By means of body (the form of the Pali is the same for the other
khandhas), bhikkhus, uiiririna, having a foothold, will persist".*' In the
SGrnan"Capha1aSutta, one of the fruits of the life of a religieux who has attained
the meditative state of the fourthjhana is said to be that he has so purified
himself that he is able to turn his thoughts (cittaZ2) to gaining insight into the
relationship between his body and vifiira'g: he realises that his body has
form, is made up of the four elements, it arises from father and mother and
is nourished by boiled rice, and is subject to impermanence, decay,
abrasion, dissolution and disintegrati~n.~~ He also understands that his
 T h e ViiiiTinakkhandha 87
uiEn"6na is bound up with his body and tied to it.24The passage goes on to
give an analogy to explain that the relationship between viiiEiv and Eya is
like that between gem and thread in a necklace. This analogy suggests that
just as both gem and thread have to be present in order for there to be a
necklace at all, so it is with the human being: body and Tn'n"n" iv interre-
are
lated and interdependent. Indeed, the passage implies that far from being
an independent entity, uin"n"inais bound up with and dependent on the body:
uin"n"inayettha sitam ettha patibaddham means 'here [to this body] is vin"n"ina
bound and tied'. The analogy of the gem on a thread further suggests that
occurrences of consciousness are held together, as it were, by their common
physical locus, a particular body. The way in which uin"Eina represents
continuity of experience is discussed further under point (4). Of importance
to the point we are discussing here is that in the meditative state of the
fourthjhina, a bhikkhu gains the insight that as an 'individual' he comprises
both body and vin"Eiy, integrally bound up with and dependent on each
other: without either of them there is no 'individual' at all.
One further example will suffice to illustrate that Tn'n"n"6pais conditioned
and impermanent. A passage in the NidZna Samyutta states:
If we neither will, nor determine, nor are occupied with anything, there is
no arising of an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being no
object, there is no foothold for consciousness.25
This indicates that vinfiipa only functions when there are other concomi-
tant mental states which are primarily of a volitional nature. We saw in
chapter IV that volitions form the causal nexus which ties us to the wheel of
rebirth. Thus our s a ~ i r i existence
c is both kept going and characterised by
volitions of various different sorts. In order to function, uiEEiy is dependent
on this 'fuel' of saviric existence; it does not function independently. This
point is also made in the twelvefold version of the pa~iccasamuppidaformula,
where uin"n"5naarises conditioned by ~amkhiri.*~ And conversely, it is when
volitions cease that viEZGp ceases.27
From all of these references, both to general doctrinal teachings and to
contexts in which uin"n"ip is specifically discussed, it is clear that vin"n"iy is
impermanent. Doctrinally, it is, as part of the samsiric existence of a human
being, subject to dependent origination. More specifically, we have seen
that it does not function independently of a body, and it is dependent for its
occurrence and persistence on there being other concomitant mental

2. Vin"n"6na as 'consciousness of'

I mentioned above that one of the reasons why vin"Eiy tends to have
connotations which are substantive and permanent is because it is usually
translated as 'consciousness'. Here, I will draw on canonical references
88 Identity and Experience
which indicate that viiiiiina functions as a process which is better conveyed
by the translation 'consciousness of'.29
One of the M2ancUaa Samyutta passages to which I have already referred
in introducing each of the preceding khandhas puts the question 'And
what, bhikkhus, is ~in"n"ipz?".~~ The reply is: "There are these six types of
uin"n"ipz:visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental. When
name and form arise, vin"n"a'yarises; when name and form cease, vin"n"iv
ceases''.31
Of this reply, I will discuss here only the six types of vin"n"a'pz.In order to
interpret the second part of this statement we need to consider the
meaning of the term nimariipa. This is a substantial subject and will be
discussed at length in chapter VI. The usual translation of the Pali terms
referring to the six types of uin"n"a'~, cakkhuvin"n"i@,sotavin"n"ii~,
etc., is 'eye
consciousnessy,'ear consciousness', and so on, which has little or no precise
meaning for us in English. By using a little licence, however, in interpreting
the terms in the light of what we now know about the senses, much more
sense can be made of the Pali terms. If we translate the words cakkhu, sota,
ghina, jivhi, Eya and mano not as the organs of sense themselves but as
representing the functions of those organs of sense, that is sight or seeing,
hearing, smelling, and so on, and if we specifically word the translation of
each term as a genitive tuppurira compound, then we have the following:
cakkhuvin"n"ina,for example, would mean awareness of sight or seeing;
sotavin"n"a'pzwould be awareness of sound or hearing; gha'nauin"fiipzawareness
of taste, and so on. The same meaning is perhaps achieved more elegantly
by translating as 'visual awareness', 'auditory awareness', and so on, but by
using the overtly genitive wording in the first instance we gain a clearer
understanding of the viilEZnakkhandha as providing 'consciousness (or
awareness) of'.
We can gain some idea of how this occurs from the passage we have
already discussed in previous chapters which shows that vin"n"inais a key
factor in the arising of feelings and apperception. This passage, in the
Madhupipdikasutta, states: "Visual consciousness arises because of eye and
visible form ... auditory consciousness arises because of ear and sound (and
so on through all six senses)".32The presence of the three, the Sutta states, is
called 'contact', phasa. If we consider this together with the analogy which
states that the activity of uin"n"ipzcan be likened to the way a monkey travels
through a forest grasping and letting go of branches, we see both how
vin"n"a'9works as a process and also that it provides awareness of each stage
of the process. In arising as it were sequentially from one or other of the
senses coming into contact with its corresponding 'external' stimuli (and we
have seen that manodhitu collates this mass of incoming data), vin"n"igais a
process which provides seemingly continuous awareness. And in arising
dependent on specific senses, it provides us with awareness ofsight, hearing,
taste, and so on. In our subjective experience of awareness, we know that at
 T h e Vififiinakkhandha
certain times we see, hear, taste, and so on. This point is highlighted when
we consider that if we have not been aware of a sound then we have not
heard it: awareness of the sound is hearing it, and visual awareness is sight.
Of course that does not necessarily mean that if we have not been aware of
a sound then it has not happened, but for an individual to be able to say 'I
heard a sound' he or she has to have been aware, or conscious, ofit.
A passage about the arising of consciousness elsewhere in the Majhima
Nikiya emphasises that one has to be conscious of by stating that
samanndzira, 'attention', is a part of the process. It states:
If the individual's eye33is intact and external (visible) forms come within its
range, but there is no appropriate attention, then there is no arising of the
appropriate type of consciousness. But when the individual's eye is intact,
external (visible) forms come within its range, and there is appropriate
attention, then there is the arising of the appropriate type of consci~usness.~~
Reat suggests that from these two passages about the arising of
consciousness:
... two equations emerge: (1) faculty + object + viiiiiina =
phassa/samanni/uira, and (2) faculty + object + phassa/samannihiira =
viiiiiina. Sensory contact, accompanied by appropriate attention, is as
necessary for consciousness as consciousness is for sensory contact and
appropriate attention.35
The term samanndzZra also means 'corning together', so it is possible that
the terms phassa and sarnannihira are broadly interchangeable in these
contexts as Reat suggests. The 'attention' referred to here does not appear
to refer to deliberately paying attention, but, rather, to the fact that a
conscious event provides one with awareness of its object; without
awareness of its object it is not a conscious event.
Elsewhere we read that vin"fiina is categorised according to sense only
because a particular sense is the origin of its arising, not because there are
different kinds of consciousness. The passage states:
Consciousness is known by this or that name [i.e. visual, auditory, olfactory
(and so on)] because an appropriate condition arises. If consciousness arises
because of eye and visual form, it is known as visual consciousness (and so
on).36
In the same way, the Sutta goes on by way of analogy, a fire is defined
according to what is burning. If it is burning sticks, twigs, and so on, it is
known as a stick or twig fire.37The analogy implies that just as fire is fire
whatever is burning and whatever name is given to it, so vin"n"iip is vin"fiip
whatever sense originated the cognition and whatever name is given to it as
a result: it is not fire or vin"fiipz itself that is of different types. This analogy
accords well with understanding uififiipz as 'consciousness of'. As fire can
90 Identity and Experience
be described as the process of burning which only occurs given appropriate
conditions, so consciousness can be described as a process of being aware
which occurs given appropriate conditions. Though those conditions are
infinitely variable, in the case of the former the relevant characteristic of
fire is burning, and in the case of the latter the relevant characteristic of the
vin"n"i&Ahandha is providing consciousness ofthem.
The association of consciousness of with attention referred to above,
however minimal that attention might be, raises the question of how
'involuntary' reactions are accounted for. I have suggested that if one is not
conscious of a sound then.one has not heard it. We can, however,
sometimes react 'involuntarily' to a sound without being conscious of it: in
sleep, for example, a loud sound can cause one to make a movement even if
there is absolutely no consciousness of the sound at all. We also experience
peripheral awareness which we do not seem to be conscious oJ: We
regularly avoid obstacles in our path while our attention is wholly
elsewhere, for example. Though such experiences of peripheral awareness
might indicate the minimal level to which consciousness of, or awareness,
operates, this question is not explicitly dealt with in the Sutta &aka. Nor is
the experience of involuntary reactions explained. This is a significant
omission because involuntary reactions such as wet dreams became the
subject of controversy in the early Buddhist sangha: if they are unconscious,
do they constitute a volition with moral implication^?^^
One passage in the Sutta &ka is problematic when it comes to translat-
ing viiiiiiga as 'consciousness of'. This is in the Mahivedallasutta, where
vifiiiina appears to be identified as a 'life principle' (ciyusamfiira). The
context (referred to in earlier chapters) is one in which Sariputta states that
the five senses (paEc'indriyinz) are dependent on vitality (Qu), vitality is
dependent on heat (usma?,and likewise heat is dependent on vitality.39
Sariputta then introduces the term @usa?nkhE,and goes on to state:
"When three things leave this body, life, heat and vin"n"ina,then this body
lies down abandoned, cast off, like a senseless log of The
suggestion is that life, heat and vin"n"a'nacollectively represent some sort of
basic life principle, and there is little room here for viKn"5na to mean
'consciousness of'. But there are only two contexts in which vin"n"iv is used
in this way.41In other contexts where the term IZyusamkhiira is used it either
appears in the singular,42or is not explicitly associated with vin"n"iip~.~~ It is
possible that the notion of vin"n"@za as a life principle contributed to the
development in later Buddhist traditions of more elaborate theories of
consciousness. In the Sutta Pi~aka,however, it does not significantly
compromise the many other contexts in which uiiin"ina seems to mean
'consciousness of ' . M
Several times in this chapter I mention that being conscious is a
fundamental characteristic of a human being and this might be why it is
associated with the life-principle in the MahZvedallasutta. But in Buddhism
 The Vicfiinakkhandha 91
there is a further reason for suggesting that it is consciousness of that is of
greater importance. This is the Buddha's teaching that karma is volition.
The purpose of this teaching is precisely that one should be conscious of
the process of cyclic rebirth that is fuelled by one's volitions: the qualitative
causal dimension implicit in the Buddha's definition of karma requires
consciousness ofwhat one is willing. This association between consciousness
of and spiritual progress might also explain why there is no discussion of
peripheral awareness or involuntary reactions: they are not spiritually
relevant.
So having established that vin"fiinais impermanent, we see here that
descriptions of vin"n"inain the Sutta Waka also suggest that it functions as a
process of being aware, and that a good translation of it is 'consciousness
of'. Another way of putting this point would be to say that while in the
Upani!ads consciousness is the very stuff of existence, in Buddhism
consciousness is not explained in terms of a metaphysical entity. The
Buddha's teaching is more concerned with how the human being operates
than with what he or she consists of, and vin"fiiyz refers to the process which
provides consciousness 645

3. VififiZna as a factor in cognition

As one might expect, vin"n"Zp42,awareness, is a key factor in the cognitive
process. This is indicated in the passage in the Majjhima JVZkya, to which I
have referred several times, which begins "Visual consciousness arises
because of eye and visible form".46We discussed the passage in full in the
chapter on the san"n"&hndha. I need not repeat the Pali here, but in English
it continues:
Contact [occurs] when there is a combination of the three; feelings are
caused by contact; that which one feels, one apperceives; that which one
apperceives, one reasons about; that which one reasons about, one causes
to become manifold.
This passage represents our normal savnslZric experience and the way in
which we interpret it; it describes the s a ~ i r i ccognitive process, in which
vififiipz is here seen to be a key factor. It appears at the beginning of the
sentence because it is a prerequisite to every stage in the cognitive process.
The sensory event, phassa, which gives rise to feeling, does not occur
simply because of the proximity, or, to give phassa its literal meaning,
because of the contact of eye and visible form: vin"n"a'yzhas to be present at
the preliminary stage of the process. When phassa, the sensory event,
subsequently gives rise to feeling, this is then identified by safin"i. This is
then followed by discursive thought (reasoning, vitakka) and the process of
seeing things as manifold, as discussed above. It is the function of vin"n"iv
to enable us to be aware of each of these aspects of the cognitive process.
92 Identity and Experience
In chapter 111, I referred to a passage in the Samyutta NiklZya which
appeared to suggest that there is a discriminative function to vifiiitipz, and
that this can be applied to each of its six types. The passage was translated
there as follows: "And what bh.ikkhus, do you call vin"n"tiy? It is called vin"n"tiy
because it discriminate^".^' Vin"n"tina appears to discriminate whether
something is sour or bitter, acid or sweet, alkaline or non-alkaline, saline or
non-saline. The tentative suggestion was made in chapter 111 that the
difference between the discriminatory functions of saii7ii and vin"n"tipzmight
be one of degree: vin"n"iv discerns that a taste is sweet or sour, but it is san"n"ti
that discriminates or identifies it more precisely as, for example, sugar or
lemon. But we also noted that the author(s) both of this passage and the
similar passage in the Mh-r)edallmtta seem to have difficulty describing the
difference between san"Cti and vifiiitina, using standard formulas about
colours and tastes. The verbs used in both these passages to define vin"n"tipz
and sarZti are z+'tintiti and saEj'a'ntitirespecti~ely.~~ These verbs are associated
with cognition, but neither of them has a precise meaning and their use
further indicates that the author(s) had difficulty in attempting to define
vin"n"tinaand san"n"a'.The description of the cognitive process can assist us
here, in that it contains no suggestion that vin"n"tiyaacts in a discriminatory
capacity. If one bears this in mind, together with the understanding of
viKEtina as consciousness of, one can make more sense of the apparent
confusion created by the author(s) of the Samyutta Nika'ya passage and the
Mahiivedalhsutta. Kalupahana makes the helpful suggestion that the phrase
vij6niti ... t m t i vin"n"iyn ti vuccati might be interpreted "vin"ii6;?astands for the
function of 'being conscious"'.49This accords with vin"n"@zaas consciousness
of, and as such it functions in providing awareness when something is
discriminated, regardless of whether the discrimination is general or
precise. Perhaps this is the point that the author of these passages has failed
to understand. I have stated that we have to know that we hear something.
We also have to know when we discriminate something. ViECa'na does not
specifically do the discriminating, but, rather, is the awareness by which we
experience every stage of the cognitive process, including the process of
discriminating.
In this sense, vin"n"tiyz is comparable to p7ajn"ti as described in the KaMtaki
Upani~ad(which is almost certainly later than the time when the Buddha
was teaching). There we read:
Verily, without pr.jn"a, speech does not make known any name at all. One
thinks 'My mind was elsewhere; I was not aware of this name'. Without
prajr?, breath does not make known any smell at all. One thinks 'My mind
was elsewhere; I was not aware of any smell' (and so on through all the

The passage concludes:

 T h e Viiiiia'nakkhandha 93

Without prujiiti? no thought whatever would happen. One would not be

aware of what one should be aware oE5'
The Mahiivedallasutta gives us an account of the way in which the three
ariipawduzndhas of vedanii, saiiiiii and ViiiEiipz function together in the cognitive
process, and the centrality of the cognitive process to making progress on
the path to liberating insight is also illustrated, using the cognitive term
paiiiii. The different cognitive terms are not clearly explained and their
different meanings have to be drawn out. It appears from the Sutta that
paiiiia' refers to a specific type, or attainment, of cognition. Sariputta is being
questioned by one Kotthita the Great. Kotthita wants to know in what
respect one is described as either duppaiiiia or paiiiia.52Sariputta explains:
One is said to be duppaiiiizz if one does not comprehend 'this is dukkha', 'this
is the arising of dukkha', 'this is the cessation of dukkha'and 'this is the course
leading to the cessation of dukWza'.53
Conversely, one is said to bepaiiiia if one does comprehend these things.
The verb I have translated as 'comprehend' is padiii which is within the
range of cognitive verbs such as samdiiiiand zdiZ to which I have already
referred, none of which has a precise meaning. The prefix pa, however,
suggests an intensification of Ea', to know, giving us a meaning such as 'to
know completely', or 'to know qualitatively better'. This meaning is also
suggested by the context in which we find it used in the Mahiivedallasutta.
Completely knowing or comprehending the Four Noble Truths is
indispensable for liberating insight, and thus it is qualitatively different
from other kinds of knowledge. This qualitatively different knowledge can
perhaps be translated as 'wisdom'. Paiiiii, therefore, seems to refer not just
to the cognitive process that all human beings experience but to the
cognition of someone who has advanced in understanding the teachings of
the Buddha; one who is well on the way to 'seeing things as they really are'.
In chapter 111 I mentioned that Buddhaghosa understood paEiiii to
contribute to insight in a way which neither saiiiii nor viiiiitina does, and
suggested there that Buddhaghosa's interpretation is more systematic than
that found in the Sutta W k a . Many contexts in the Sutta Rpka nevertheless
indicate that paiiiiii is of a qualitatively different nature from other
knowledge. It is implicit in the fact that the term is used in the traditional
threefold division of the Eightfold Path into paiiiiti, cia, and samiidhi. Here a
distinction is made between cognitive wisdom (paiiiii) and the meditative
experience (samtZdhi). Though both are to be practised or cultivated, in the
Buddhist teaching it is the penetrating insight which is achieved through
wisdom, rather than meditative levels per se, which constitute liberation. As
a division of the Eightfold Path, paiiiia' covers 'right view' (samma' ditfii) and
'right thought' (sammi sarikappa). We read in the Majihima Nbya that 'right
view' is of two kinds, mundane and ~upramundane.~~ It is supramundane
94 Identity and Experience
'right view', which is of the Path (leading to liberation), that is associated
with p~iin"ti.~~ The importance of developing pan"n"a'is highlighted in other
canonical passages. We read, for example, that it is through wisdom that
the advanced bhikkhu comes to see dependent origination and conditioned
phenomena as they really are.56The development ofpaiia' results in the
eradication of igr~orance.~' Even the destruction of the iisavas can be
realised through the development of pan"n"a'.58Elsewhere the Buddha
describes Sariputta as havingpaZtia' that is great (mahq, broad (puthu),joyful
(ha'sa),alert (javana), clever (tiWd2a)and penetrating (nibbedhika).Here pan"n"a'
clearly means Sariputta's wisdom, since the Buddha goes on to state that
he, Sariputta, is able to teach dhamma even as well as the Buddha.59Finally,
it is only through wisdom (paiin"4that things are properly understood, intel-
lectual and discursive knowledge is ins~fficient.~~
The Mahd'vedallasutta continues with definitions of the terms vedana', san"n"i
and vin"n"a'y.a(and the absence of clear definitions has been discussed above).
Kotthita goes on to ask S ~ i p u t t awhether vedan4 san"n"Eand vin"n"a'naare
associated or whether they are dissociated; is it possible, he wants to know,
that they will be seen to be separate from each other after repeatedly
analysing them." S~ariputtareplies as follows:
fidanii, saiin" and vin"n"iipzare associated, not dissociated, and even after
repeatedly analysing them one does not see them as separate from each
other: that which one feels, one apperceives; that which one apperceives,
one is aware of. Therefore they are associated, not dissociated, and even
after repeatedly analysing them one does not see them as separate from
each other6*
Kotthita also asks whether vin"n"a'na and pan"n"a' are associated or
dissociated, and whether one can see them as separate from each other
after repeatedly analysing them. The reply to this too is that they are
associated, and that whatever one comprehends, that one is aware oc and
whatever one is aware of, that one comprehend^.^^ Then Kotthita asks: if
they are so associated, what is the difference between paiiiii and viEa'na?
S-iputta tells him that pan"n"a'is to be developed (bha'vetabbh4 and vin"n"a'pzis
for everything that is to be known @am'n"n"eyyam).64 My translation of
parin"@yam as 'for everything that is to be known' is dumsy, but what I want
to convey is that the difference between pan"n"a' and vin"n"a'nais that vin"n"a'na
functions as the faculty which provides awareness of everything (indicated
by the prefix pan) that is to be known (jikyyyarfi), and this contributes to the
development of wisdom, which is developed (bhduita) and eventually
culminates in liberating insight. In this passage vin"n"a'pzis singled out from
the cognitive faculties to be discussed alongside pan"n"a'because it is, as we
have seen, the fundamental factor without which no process takes place: it
as it were 'activates' the cognitive process because without awareness there
is no cognition or experience of any kind. Its inextricable association with
 The Viiiiiinakkhandha 95
uedani and saiiiii in the cognitive process is unequivocally stated by
Sariputta, and we have already seen an example of how all three work
together in the arising of a feeling. Its inseparability from pan"n"iimplies that
wisdom has to be conscious: you have to know what you know. This is
compatible with the fact that the term san"iiiwas used to refer to liberating
insight: we saw above that insight has to be identified. Here we see that it
has to be known.
I suggest that this passage is giving us a picture of the way the cognitive
process works and the contribution it makes to, and its involvement with,
the development of the wisdom that is an indispensable prerequisite for
proceeding to liberating insight. We have the three mental khandhas of
vedani, saiin"iand uin"n"i~
working together, each contributing to the process:
uedani as affective cognition, sa4iii as discriminatory or identificatory
cognition, and viiiiiiina as consciousness of each and every part of the
process as a whole. The absence of the samkhirakkhandha here will not sur-
prise us since we have seen that it is the source of volitions, which are to be
neutralised completely if wisdom is to be attained. EZZina, the khandha
which provides awareness, represents the very basis of all knowledge, and
while the highest levels that constitute liberating insight may be
qualitatively and inconceivably different knowledge from mundane cogni-.
tions, one is nevertheless conscious of it in some way: this much is evident
from the Buddha's accounts of his own experience of Enlightenment.65

4. I'in"n"@a as providing continuity

I have suggested that one of the reasons why vin"iiiiptends to have connota-
tions of permanence is because our subjective experience of being
conscious is that it is constant. When awake we do not experience disconti-
nuity between different moments of awareness: the process appears to us to
be a continuous one. I referred to the analogy of the monkey moving
through the forest, constantly changing his grasp from branch to branch.
Though this illustrates the impermanence of viiin"iy, it also suggests how it
represents continuity. For the monkey, the experience is of travelling. In the
same way, our experience is that our consciousness has continuity. Even
when we wake after being asleep, our consciousness seems to us to continue
as it did before we slept. The same is true after other periods of being
'unconscious', such as having an operation or even being in a coma. It even
appears to function at times when one is not 'normally' conscious. People
relate that while asleep they are aware of dreams, or that they have had
awareness while in a coma, and even severely mentally ill people have some
sort of awareness of their surroundings. With respect to continued sapiric
existence as a whole, I have already stated that it is volition of various
different kinds which provide the 'fuel' for this, as also discussed fully in
chapter IV.This 'fuel' is a complex of factors which causes our continued
96 Identi0 and Experience
existence even in states of total unconsciousness. With respect to the
continuity of consciousness while in deep (i.e. dreamless) sleep, the
Abhidhamma and commentarial tradition developed the theory of bha~ariga.~~
This theory is not present in the Sutta Pitaka, but it is interesting that the
term bhauariga appears in the Ariguttara Nibya as follows: "There are, monks,
four constituents (arigini).What four? Riipa, vedani, saiin"and b h a ~ a " Here
.~~
the close association between samhira and uin"n"ipzis indicated by the fact
that they are both represented by the term bhava, becoming. It is the opera-
tion of consciousness, propelled by volitions, that quintessentially consti-
tutes continued samriiic existence.
But the continuity I am referring to here is that which we associate
specifically with being conscious. Because we are conscious of all our
experiences, ui,n"fia~ as the process of being conscious in this way provides
us with a sense of ~ontinuity.~' It is a sense of continuity of a subjective
nature: we are each conscious of our own experiences. This does not imply
a spacial limitation to what we are conscious of. We shall see below under
point (5) that in Buddhist meditation the individual's awareness (vififiina)
of experiences is said to be 'unlimited'. But it is the individual meditator
who is conscious of his or her own experiences, whatever they may be. We
discussed above a passage in the Siman"n"aPha1aSutta which stated that the
relationship between vin"n"inaand the body was analogous to a gem on a
thread.69I suggested there that this analogy not only confirms the imper-
manence of uin"n"inabecause it is dependent on a body, but also that it
further suggests that occurrences of consciousness are held together, as it
were, by their common physical locus, a particular body. Similarly just as
the paticcasamuppida formula can explain the arising of a particular individ-
ual, so this synthetical formula also suggests that each individual's uinn"ipzis
subjective to themselves: it functions conditioned by the individual's
ignorance and samhzri.
The subjective sense of continuity is not merely historical. It also gives us
an expectation of continuity in the future. It is perhaps because of this that
vin"n"inais classified as one of the four 'foods' (ihirii) which contribute to
continued existence." In the Ahiravagga in the Nidina Samyutta, uin"n"ipais
singled out. To the question "Of what is consciousness the food?", the reply
is: "The food which is consciousness is the cause of renewed becoming, of
rebirth in the future".71 From this, it seems that the sense of continuity
provided by being aware of our existence becomes in itself a factor which
contributes to our continued becoming. One might infer from this that it is
consciousness that acquires some sort of 'momentum'. But it is more likely
that the expectation of continuity of awareness functions as some sort of
volition.'* In one passage on the four foods, we read that they themselves
are dependent on volitions such as passion, delight and craving, and
without such volitions uin"fiigawill not be '~tationed'.~~ As samsaric existence
continues, however, so one subjectively continues to associate it with
 The ViEEiinakkhandha 97
continuity of awareness, and that sense of continuity becomes inseparable
from a desire for continued existence: consciousness becomes propelled by
volitions. And, as already mentioned, desire for continued existence is so
fundamental a part of our experience that it is one of the three isavas that
is rooted out only immediately prior to liberation.
This sense of continuity provided by viEn"iipis also emphasised when it
is described as a '~tream'.'~In the SampasGdanijJaSuttanta in the Diiha Nzkaia,
for example, one "insight meditation" (dassana samiipattz) is described as
follows: "He understands a man's stream of consciousness, unbroken in
both cases, which is stationed both in this world and in the next
Two points arise from this passage. The first is the notion that uiEn"a'nais
'stationed'. This is a common metaphor which is discussed further under
point (5).Of relevance to us here is that the term translated as 'station' is
always thiti, or some variation of it (herepatitthitam). This term itself implies
continuity: being 'stationed' implies that it 'persists'. As the Pali English
Dzctionary points out, were the term intended to have spacial significance, it
is more likely thiina would have been used.76The second point that arises
from this passage is that the process of being aware is to be discerned in
meditation, and it is likened to a stream. The implication is that just as the
flow of a stream appears to be continuous, so zrin"Eiipzcontinues to function
from life to life. This does not imply that viiin"iinais a permanent entity
which transmigrates: there is no part of a stream which can be said to be
permanent; it is changing all the time. It means that the individual's
viiiiiiinakkhandha functions as the process of being aware as seemingly
continuously as a stream flows. And as the flowing of a stream depends on
a supply of water, so the continuity of uin"n"ii~ is dependent on the volitions
which fuel the cycle of lives in sapiira. Conversely, as we saw under point
(I), when that volitional fuel comes to an end, there will no longer be any
need for uin"n"ipto f~nction.'~ Similarly, in the Miira Samyutta we read that
the bhikkhu Godhika's vi6n"iinais not 'stationed' (appati$iitena)again (does not
persist) at his death because he has destroyed craving and the root of
craving (samdam ta@am).78The 'unbroken stream' is compatible with the
general Indian belief that rebirth follows immediately after death.

5 . Vin"n"iinaas evolving
The cycle of samsiiric existence which consists of a series of rebirths is
occasionally referred to in the Sutta Pitaka as the 'evolving' of beings.79By
good deeds one 'evolves' to heaven,*O and by bad deeds one 'evolves' to
rebirth as a hungry ghost." Given the fundamental role of consciousness in
the life of the human being that we have seen, it is unsurprising that in one
place it is uiEEiina that is said to 'evolve'.82This expression is not used
systematically and does not always appear to suggest that beings evolve in
the sense of making progress along the path to liberation; it is used, as we
98 Identity and Experience
have just seen, to indicate a bad rebirth, for example, more in the sense of a
metaphor for rebirth. But the point of the Buddhist teachings is that
individuals should make progress along the spiritual path, and that progress
can be understood in terms of the evolving of vin"n"iiya.
I have discussed under point (4) the way in which vin"n"iipz is the provider
of a sense of continuity because it functions throughout the cycle of lives in
samsira. And I have also referred to a passage which stated that uin"n"a'p2is
'stationed' in successive lives,83to Godhika's uin"n"inano longer being
' s t a t i ~ n e d ' and
, ~ ~ also to the fact that the body provides a 'platform' for
uin"n"iinawhere it is '~tationed'.'~It is this expression (usually thiti or some
variation of it), which can be translated as 'station' or 'platform' and which
has the connotation of persistence, which is more frequently used in
association with uin"n"iiyato indicate the different types of samsiric existence
experienced by individuals. Each 'station' (or life) is sometimes simply
referred to as 'a consciousness', and "every consciousness whatever" is
described as: "past, future or present, one's own or someone else's, gross or
subtle, low or high, far or near".86 A tathigata is said to know "all the
stations of consciousness".87As the disciple makes progress on the path to
liberation, so vin"n"iip is 'stationed' in more favourable rebirths, culminating
in rebirth in one or more of the rzipa or ariipa 10kas.~~ These lokas are also
attained at certain levels of meditation, and so in meditation too zin"n"iinacan
be 'stationed' at different levels.
We have seen that in the process of rebirth vin"n"iinaprovides a sense of
continuity without being a perm.anent transmigrating entity. Likewise, we
can interpret the 'stationing' of vir2n"iiv metaphorically, so it refers simply to
the existence of an individual in a particular life or at a particular level
during which the vin"n"a'mandhafulfils the function of providing awareness:
the centrality of consciousness to the human condition allows uin"n"iina to
function as a metaphor for the entire life of the individual.
But this metaphor notwithstanding, during each life uiiiiiina functions as
the provider of awareness and the sense of continuity, and we also read that
when stationed, it "seeks enjoyment, persists, grows and increase^".^^ This
can be interpreted as the enjoyment (in the sense of experience) of a
particular life, the persistence of the functioning of vin"n"a'yathroughout the
life, and its participation in the growth and development of the human
being as he or she matures. One might think this sense is more likely
because this expression also occurs in association with nimanipa: we read
that if zrin"n"iiyais cut off in a young person there would be no "persistence,
growth or increase" of n&i+~ani.pa.~~ But I suggest that the expression 'growth
and increase' might also relate to the way vin"n"a'p can be understood to
evolve, and that this can be explained as follows.
The Buddhist path to liberation is a progression from ignorance to
insight. 'Normal' sapiric cognition represents ign~rance,~' and the path
leads the disciple through progressively subtle, and eventually formless,
 The Viiiiiiinakkhandha 99
levels of meditation, culminating in the attainment of insight. Both normal
samsiiric existence and the various meditative levels correspond to
cosmological levels, in which one can be reborn as well as experiencing
them in meditation. This can be summed up by saying that the metaphor of
the spiritual path underlies Buddhist cosmology.92At every stage of one's
progress along the path to liberation one's experience, which is one's
'consciousness of' one's life, is conditioned by one's level of ignorance. That
ignorance is characterised by volitions of various kinds and degrees, which
are summarised in Buddhist teachings by the expression 'greed, hatred
and delusion', and it is a pan-Indian phenomenon to state that the
consciousness of an ignorant person is 'defiled', 'veiled', 'tainted3, and so
on. As progress along the path is made, ignorance is reduced and one's
experience is characterised by increasing insight. Decreasing ignorance is
therefore accompanied by (or leads to) the experience of subtle and
formless levels of meditation and/or rebirth. At every one of these levels
viZEiina provides awareness and a sense of continuity. As the individual
progresses, the consciousness provided by viiifiina becomes qualitatively
different: it is increasingly less conditioned (or 'restricted') by 'normal'
samsiiric ignorance. The four formless levels (the ariipajhiinas), for example,
are described as 'the plane of infinite space' (&iinar"icqatana), 'the plane of
infinite consciousness' (vin"n"iinaiic@atana),'the plane of nothingness'
(iiIn'Ecafn"@atana)and 'the plane of neither apperception (or conception) nor
non-apperception' (ne~asaiiiiiincZran"n"123)atana).~~
Though from a perspective of
'normal' awareness we cannot know precisely what is meant by these
descriptions of the arzipajhiinas, it is clear that they represent experience
which is quite different from that of samsiiric existence which is in the
cosmological level known as the kimadhiitu.'Infinite space' and 'infinite
consciousness' might mean the intensification of awareness as one
withdraws from the limiting objectivity of samsaric perception, or one might
describe it as the 'expansion3of awareness which accompanies the breaking
of the boundaries of sa~iiric cognition; 'the plane of nothingness (no-thing-
ness)' and 'the plane of neither apperception nor non-apperception' are
likely to refer to levels at which one ceases to 'make manifold3.Whatever
their meaning, at all of these levels vin"iiii~continues to provide
consciousness of: the individual continues to be aware. Even the practice of
saiiiiiivedayitanirodha, which one can attain subsequent to experiencing the
fourth ariipajhgna, and which involves the suspension of all conceptual
activity as we know it does not mean a cessation of consciousness as such.'* In
describing the goal of the path as insight into how things really are
lyathibhiltam), the Buddha indicated that consciousness functions at the final
level: we have already seen above that one has to know what one knows
(paEn"iiis accompanied by vififiina). This is the case even though the final
insight transcends any familiar cognitive experience. Because vin"iiZna
provides awareness at all these levels, it is viiiiiiy that can be described as
100 Identity and Experience
becoming less 'defiled' by ignorance. And as the awareness it provides is
progressively less limited according to one's degree of ignorance, so it can
be said to 'grow and increase'.
According to the Buddha's teaching, insight is also called purity: the
path to insight is a path of purification, the removing of the 'defilements'
referred to above. This correspondence between insight and purity
explains why vin"n"Zpzcan also be described as 'purified' in the sentence
"that by which one knows, when it is purified and cleansed".95 The
Abhidhamma and commentarial traditions, and many later Buddhist
schools, developed the idea that vin"n"Zpz in its 'natural' state is pure. In the
Theravada tradition, this idea is contained in its theory of the bhauanga
mind.96But in the Sutta Pitaka the implication is not that vin"n"Znareturns to
its natural state, but that as the individual progresses on the spiritual path,
so vifiiiipa gradually functions in a way that can be described in terms of
purity. Once again, this accords with the Buddha's concern only to
explain how insight can be achieved. And just as he remains silent on the
subject of possible existence after liberation, so he also comments on the
"inconceivability of the beginning".97
The vin"n"Zyof an arahant is also said to be 'radiant'. If it is not restricted
by the objectivity of ignorance, an analogy for the 'unlimited' or
'unbounded' (by ignorance) awareness it provides is that it radiate^'.^^ And
when ignorance is eradicated entirely, vin"n"6nacan be said to be 'free' or
'liberated'. Radiance is most often attributed to citta, and this will be
discussed later in this chapter. But in the Kkuadlha Sutta in the Diiha Nihya
we find the following sentence describing the vin"n"Zpzof an arahant: l4n"n"Zpzm
anidassanam anantam sabbato pahapg9A variant reading for paham here is
pabham, and from the context it seems most likely to me that this variant
makes most sense.loOWith pubham, the sentence reads: "[His] vin"n"a'nais
formless [literally, 'invisible'], unlimited, and radiates all round". This
reading is compatible with the statement that of all things that radiate, a
Buddha is said to be the best, his radiance is beyond compare.lo1The
correspondence between insight and purity referred to above also explains
why beings are said to 'evolve to the radiant levels'.102The subtle or
formless (again 'unbounded') levels which are attained on the path to purity
are described in terms which correspond to the state of the individual.
Another way of understanding the association of zrin"n"iivwith terms such
as 'purity' and 'radiance' is to interpret its role as the provider of awareness
on the path to insight as being analogous to the providing of light for one
who needs to see. As one cannot see without light, so one cannot be aware
without vin"n"Zpz.According to this metaphor, then, as one progresses along
the path to insight, so the 'light' that is shed by the vin"n"iiyzMandha(in the
sense of the awareness it provides) becomes purer and more radiant. The
metaphor is one of progressing from darkness to light, or of becoming
en-light-ened.lo3Again, it is not that viEGna is an entity which either
 The Viiiiia'nakkhandha 101

becomes or is revealed to be purer or more radiant, but that the key role
played by viiiiiipz in the path to insight lends itself to its being identified
metaphorically in this way.
So vin"iia'g.zcan be said to evolve because it operates as the provider of
awareness as the individual progresses along the path to liberating insight.
As insight replaces ignorance, so viiiiiigz provides awareness of the individ-
ual's changing experience. And as that changing experience involves the
breaking of the boundaries (separateness) which arise because of igno-
rance, so viiizap 'expands' or 'evolves' and is eventually 'free'.lo4

Summary
To sum up the way uiiiiiigz operates as a bandha, we have seen first that it
has no more permanence than anything else in saviira. The tendency to
attribute permanence to it is emphatically refuted in the Sutta Pitaka and is
incompatible with the fundamental doctrinal teachings of the Buddha.
KEiiigz is, rather, the process of being conscious. As such, it is integral to
the cognitive process, providing subjective awareness at all stages.
Similarly, because the vin"n"5nakkhandhafunctions throughout the series of
lives of an individual in the samst2m'c cycle, it provides a sense of continuity
both within a single life and also from life to life, such continuity being
likened to a stream. Being conscious is so fundamental to human
experience, that an individual life is sometimes described as a 'station' of
vin"n"5na.And it is because the functioning of vin"n"5nais fundamental to
human experience that as the individual progresses from ignorance to
insight, viiin"ipzcan be said to 'evolve': viiin"@aprovides awareness of the
changing experiences and insights which accompany spiritual progress.

ViKEiina with @a

In the discussion of vin"n"ipzas a bandha, I have several times mentioned that

it is fundamental or integral to life as a human being. Indeed, this is our
subjective experience of consciousness, and the reason why the term has
attracted so much interest and speculation in all ages and cultures. It is
perhaps for this reason that the term vin"5ig.zis used in so many contexts in
the Sutta Pitaka with so many different meanings: it is used to signify
virtually any and every mental state, sometimes being used in the same
Sutta with more than one meaning. Here, I will discuss the common associ-
ation of vin"ii5~with Eya, body. I have mentioned that the individual life is
sometimes expressed by stating that vin"n"ipzis 'stationed': the centrality of
consciousness allows it to be used as a general metaphor for an entire life.
In association with hya, viiiiia'~is often used as a metaphor for 'mind' in
general: all the individual's mental faculties without further analysis. Thus
102 Identity and Experience
vi55iy and kya, mind and body, together represent the individual human
being as a whole.
We have seen that each of the Wlandhas is more properly understood as a
process rather than as offering an analysis which polarises physical and
mental entities. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, to find the human being
so often described in the Sutta @aka in terms of mind and body. But though
the analysis of the human being into khan&as might give a greater degree
of insight into the fact that we consist of various processes, our normal
subjective experience nevertheless i~ one of being conscious and having a
physical body. At a practical level, this is a simple and acceptable way of
understanding ourselves, and the terms vi33ina and kga are used to
designate the former and the latter respectively.
Though the following of the Buddhist path, in particular the meditation
exercises, gives understanding that the individual is more complex than at
first appears, the simpler analysis is a useful convention for others who do
not have that insight. This is illustrated in the Mahivaggo Sattarno, which is
one context in which vin"n"i~ is used both generically, in the general sense of
'mind', and in the more specific sense of a Wlandha. In the section where it
is used generically it appears in opposition to 'body' (kga), and this is
clearly stated to be the way 'ordinary people' (puthujana) understand
t h e m s e l ~ e s . In
' ~ ~the section of the Sutta where it is used to refer to the
khandha, it is stated that the anyasivaka understands that the individual he
appears to be is made up of five khandhas.lo6In other words, while the
ordinary person thinks about the human being conventionally, it is part of
the anymivaka's agenda to make a more refined analysis than simply 'mind
and body'. Here the generic meaning appears to be a popular convention
and the specific meaning is used for a more sophisticated group. But the
convention is also used by the Buddha and his close associates, as we shall
see below, illustrating its usefulness at all levels.
In contexts in which vin"n"inais used generically in opposition to 'body',
the expression most frequently used is saviKinaka kiija, 'the body with
mind'.lo7 In the Ariguttara Nikga, for example, Ananda questions the
Buddha as follows:
Is it possible that a bhikkhu can attain such formless meditation that in this
body and mind, or in anything external to it, he has no notion of 'I' or
'rnine'?'m

The Buddha replies that it is indeed possible, and briefly tells Ananda
how to bring this about. In the following Sutta, Sariputta exclaims to the
Buddha that he is ready to teach the dhamma. The Buddha replies: "Then,
Sariputta, you must train yourself as follows. In this mind and body, or in
anything external to it, there is no notion of 'I' or 'mine"'.10gIn a third
similar e~arnple,''~the Buddha tells some bhikkhus that it is advantageous
not to think in terms of self, to have no idea of 'I' and 'mine', in the body
 The ViEZinakkhandha 103
with mind, or in anything outside it."' In none of these examples is any
other analysis of the individual given, only sauin"n"6nahya. So sauiCn"ip2hya
is a general expression which serves well in a situation where one wants to
convey the meaning of the whole human being's bodily and mental
faculties. In contexts where it appears together with bahiddhz sabbanimittesu,
the implication is that one should not think in terms of 'I' or 'mine' (that is,
separate individuality) in anything at all, whether it be subjectively or
objectively. So in such contexts sauin"n"Gnahya bahida%Gca also serves well to
convey everything within sa?pim'c existence as a whole.
Two further points need to be considered concerning passages in which
those with considerably advanced insight are stated to understand the
human being in terms of body and consciousness. We have discussed some
such passages here when the Buddha is talking with his close disciples
Sariputta and Ananda, and under point (I) I referred to a passage where
the relationship between the body and uiCn"@a(which was described in
terms of a gem on a thread) was discerned at the meditative state of the
fourthjhina. I suggested that these passages show that such an analysis was
a useful convention at all levels. But they can also be construed to mean
that uin"n"inawas considered so central to the life of a human being that it is
singled out as the faculty whose relationship with the body needs to be fully
understood. The complexity of uinn"ipz, which is apparent from the variety
of headings under which it has been discussed in this chapter, and its
association with permanence, might mean that insight into its relationship
with the body comes at an advanced stage of meditation.
It might also be the case that the analysis of the human being in terms
of kiiya and vin"6ina is earlier than that into khandhas. The Pali English
Dictionary, for example, suggests that the generic meaning of viiin"inais its
"simpler unecclesiastical, unscholastic popular meaning" and that its
classification as a khandha is part of "ecclesiastical scholastic dogrnatic".ll*
This implies that the latter is considerably later than the former. While in
my opinion this division is too formal, and there are many contexts in
which both analyses appear together, it may nevertheless be the case that
some passages which only mention the simple analysis are early. The Biha
Nikjya passage containing the analogy of the gem and the thread might be
a case in point. The passage also refers to the fact that liberating insight is
attained from the fourth rzipajhina. Elsewhere, insight follows from the
arzipajilznas, which are attained subsequent to all the riipajihinm, and it might
be that the fourfold analysis is earlier than the eightfold one.'13
The possible lateness of the khandha analysis has also been brought up by
(among others) Mrs C. A. F'. Rhys Davids in a paper entitled %wards a
History of the Skandha-Doct~ine.~'~ In this paper Mrs Rhys Davids contends
that the analysis of the human being into khandhas was a late "editorial
increment", interpolated into texts which originally stated that man was
simply body (&ya) and consciousness (Vin"n"ina).ll5 Though she states that her
104 Identity and Experience
research is not comprehensive, she contends that the interpolations are
suggested by the presence of material about the khandhas in some contexts
where they appear to be an ill-fitting gloss or insertion, and also by the
absence of any mention of them in some contexts where one might expect
them to be included, notably the section on 'fives' in the Ariguttara N i ~ y a .
Mrs Rhys Davids' main concern is that the khandha analysis is
reductionist, and the implication of institutional systematisation in PED's
description of it as "ecclesiastical scholastic dogmatic" also perhaps has
reductionist connotations. The earlier analysis into kciya and vin"n"inais
understood by Mrs Rhys Davids to have meant that the intelligent,
persistent, 'indwelling' man (vi66Zp.z)enjoyed and used his group (k@a)of
faculties. In the khandha analysis kiiya is replaced by riipa and vin"n"ina
becomes a mere aspect of mind.'16
Though textual analysis of this kind is not the specific concern of this
book, I would make two brief comments on the matter of a possible
interpolation. The first is to express my surprise that such a comprehen-
sive exercise, if such it was, neither more efficiently excised the earlier view
if it was incompatible with it, nor was included in obvious contexts such as
the 'fives' section of the Ariguttara Nikiya. Second, MannC and others
whose work is specificaly in the area of textual analysis have shown that
different kinds of Suttas were written and compiled for a different (usually
didactic) purpose.''' This might explain why certain teachings are more
prominent in some texts than in others. And it also might explain why in
some places teachings are put differently and over time come to be mixed
together. Aside from these two points, my concern here, rather, is to
suggest that the khandha analysis is not incompatible with the simple
analysis of the human being as savin"n"Znak@a,and, more importantly, that
if it was late then it was not reductionist in the manner Mrs Rhys Davids
suggests.
First, the use of the term nipa in the khandha analysis rather than the
more specific term bya seems to me merely to indicate that the body is
comprised of elements that are similar in structure or characteristics to
those of nipa when it occurs anywhere else. This is not incompatible with
understanding the human body as a 'group' (&ya). On the contrary, it
stresses that the body is comprised of a group of processes which are
classified according to four kinds of characteristics, and I have suggested
that these characteristics are best understood in terms of solidity, fluidity,
heat and motion. The more complex term ?Spa allows the reader to gain
more understanding of how the body is constituted in a way the
designation k@a does not.
Second, if the use of vin"n"6naas a generic term in association with kga
(notably in the expression savin"n"6nakga) was early as well as being a simple
and/or popular convention, it emphatically does not follow that the earlier
meaning of the term was the 'intelligent, persisting, indwelling man'. We
 T h e ViGZinakkhandha
have seen, for example, that when Sariputta states that he is ready to teach
the dhamma, the Buddha replies:
Then, Sariputta, you must train yourself as follows: in this mind and body,
or in anything external to it, there is no notion of 'I' or
Likewise, in our discussion of the passage in the SZmaZZa'phala Sutta which
stated that the relationship between vin"n"apand the body was analogous to
a gem on a thread,"g we saw that there was no suggestion that vin"n"5pis a
persisting 'essence' of man. Rather, in emphasising its dependence on a
body the passage illustrates the impermanence of viiiZZna. And its
impermanence has been discussed and illustrated in many other ways.
There remains an important point, however. Though in my opinion
there is no suggestion in the Sutta &aka that vin"n"apwas ever as exalted as
Mrs Rhys Davids would like, there is no suggestion either that it was ever
as reduced to nothing as Mrs Rhys Davids fears. This point has two
aspects. First, we have established at some length the complexity of its
functions. We have seen that it is the sine qua non of all awareness and
cognition, that it is the provider of continuity and can be said to evolve. It
is so central to human existence that it is used as a metaphor for an
individual life. By including it in an analysis of the human being into
khandhas, none of these functions is diminished. What the Wlandha analysis
does do is to give more detailed information about how the human being is
constituted in a way which is intended to assist in attaining liberation by
preventing identification with any component of the empirical individual.
Second, and more important, is that to identify vin"n"inain.any context
with an abiding essence of man is to fall into the trap of projecting onto
material which is concerned with how things operate an interpretation in
terms of what they are. So if comprehensive textual analysis were to
support the suggestion that the khandha analysis was interpolated into the
texts, it cannot in my opinion be considered fundamentally to alter or com-
promise any earlier teaching. Though the analysis of the human being
which it gives may be more comprehensive than others, it is nevertheless
compatible with the central doctrinal tenets of the Buddha's teachings.
The term vifin"i~, then, is used specifically to indicate that constituent of
the human being which provides certain functions as we have discussed
above. It is also used generically to indicate both an individual life and,
more commonly, the dental processes as a whole. When used in the latter
sense, it is frequently fouad in conjunction with the term fiya.

Manas and Citta

The two terms most closely associated with zrin"Zi;?ain the Sutta Pi@hare, as
I have already indicated, mands and citta, and the three terms are sometimes
106 Identity and Experience
used in sequence to refer to one's mental activities as a whole.120 Like
uin"n"ijgz, manas and citta are sometimes used in the generic and non-technical
sense of 'mind' in general.121And like vifiEijna, they are used in many
contexts, often with different meanings even in one sentence.12*Sometimes
a passage contains both manas and citta in the sense of 'mind', each associ-
ated with a different adjective,lZ3and sometimes citta is used in association
with k@a to indicate 'body and mind'.124Of the numerous contexts in
which both manm and citta are found, I can only select here what I consider
to be the most important for an understanding of their main meanings. I
will first discuss manas in contexts where it is used to mean 'thinking', and
will suggest that in such contexts manas is in effect being used in the non-
technical sense of 'mind', and that by extension this is regarded in general
terms as that with which one thinks. We shall also see that sometimes
thinking is not so much the general activity of the mind but is a deliberate
activity which might also be described as volitions. We shall see that citta is
also used to mean thoughts, and that several of its cognate forms are used
actively in the sense of thinking or willing. I will go on to suggest, however,
that the primary meaning of citta itself is not active, but that it represents
one's 'state of mind'.
Because several terms which are grammatically closely associated with
citta will be mentioned in the following discussion, we need first to consider
the relationship between them before looking at manas and citta separately.
The cognate forms are cintii, cetas, cinteti, cekti and cetanii. We know that all
these terms come from the same two closely associated verbal roots, cit and
cint.lZ5In Sanskrit, the two verbs have slightly different meanings: cint
means to think, whereas cit has a more abstract or cognitive meaning of to
perceive, know or appear. The two roots are conflated in Pali and are
generally understood to mean to think. In Sanskrit, citta is the past partici-
ple of the root cit, but the Pali English htionary less specifically states it is the
past participle of ~inteti.'~~ SOin Pali citta literally means 'thought' and by
extension also has the non-technical meaning of 'mind'. We shall see that it
has a further specific meaning (which I suggest is its primary meaning)
which reflects its passive form. Cintii, which in Pali means 'the act of
thinking', is an abstract noun from the root cint according to Whitney,12' or
from the root cit according to PED12' (in which case it has been nasalised).
Cetas is a noun from the root cit which in Pali is onli found in the instru-
mental, cetasii, or in a compound ceto-. When the term cetasi is used, cetas
has almost exactly the same meaning as does citta when citta is used in the
general sense of 'mind'. Thus cetasii is what one does 'with the mind':
thinking. A frequent use of cetas in a compound is cetovimutta, 'liberated
through cetas'. In Pali this is a technical term used to describe a certain sort
of liberation with which we are not concerned here.lZ9In the Abhidhamma
tradition cetas was developed into another technical term, cetasika, and
applied to an analysis of all possible mental states, but this is not found in
 The Viiiiia'nakkhandha 107

the Sutta Pitaka. Finally, cetanii is an action noun formed from the root cit. In
Pali this term means more than just 'thinking'. Emphasising its active form,
it has the technical meaning of volition, and actively separates deliberate
willing from the general activity of thinking. Where the verb cinteti is not
used, we shall see that one thinks 'with the mind': manosamkhiira/kamrna or
cittmamkhiira/kamma, rnanasii or cetasi. Willing, however, is more specifically
indicated by cetank it is the term the Buddha uses to define karma.130
With regard to the term manas, this has already been discussed when it
has the specific meaning of a sense, which I have called the manodha'tu, and
another specific use is discussed below in the chapter on manomaya. I will
discuss here the way it is used as 'thoughts' (or thinking), and occasionally
as 'volitions'. That the term manas is used in the sense of 'thoughts' is
unsurprising since it comes from the same verbal root as maEEati, to think,
and is etymologically connected to the English words 'mind' and 'mental'.
We have seen above the problems this presents for understanding the
meaning of manas as a sense. There its role could be associated with mental
processes through its function as the collator of incoming data which it then
presents, as it were, to the saiiiiiikhandha for further processing: The manodhitu
itself, however, does not function as a mental faculty. The use of the term
manas in the sense of thinking appears to be an extension of its use in a
generic and non-technical sense as 'mind' in general. In a non-technical
sense one might simply define thinking as mental activity and so state that
one thinks 'with the mind', manmi. And the fact that in some passages the
emphasis is more overtly on what appears to be volitional activity might
also be because volitions are in effect deliberate thoughts: the distinction
between thinking and willing becomes blurred. Technically, however, we
are reminded in some contexts that in defining karma as volition the
Buddha separates the will from thinking. And one can see how this can be
so: one can, for example, make a conscious act of will not to think negative
thoughts.
Manas appears as the general thinking faculty in numerous contexts. For
example, in the Sutta JV$iita we read: "thinking over views with the
mind" ,131 which implies that manas is that which thinks. And elsewhere in
the same text we read: "If he is a buddha, one who sees without obstruc-
tions, he will verbally answer the questions asked in [your] mind".132This
is a reference to the ability of one who has gained insight to 'read' other
people's minds. But it also implies that manas is the faculty which thinks, or
'asks questions'. A similar passage is found in the DQha Nikga: 'Ask me
whatever question you wish that is in your mind".lS3Elsewhere we read
that manas as a thinking faculty has to be purified: "Our mental activity (i.e.
thoughts) will be completely purified".134In this, the Buddha states, the
bhikkhus are to train them~e1ves.l~~ Finally, manas is often used together with
the verbal root kar in the sense of 'paying attention'. The term manaxihra is
often used to express this,'36and we also frequently find the following
108 Identity and Experience
passage: "Listen and pay attention well and I will speak".137One has to
direct one's attention to the right things: liberation, for example, is
described in terms of not paying attention to any outward sign, and paying
attention to the signless realm. 13' The commentary glosses sabbanimittcZna6ca
amanasikiro as Nirvana.lS9Though to 'pay attention' is the appropriate
English idiom, manasiEra in fact simply means 'applying the mind', and this
term suggests how the distinction between willing and thinking becomes
blurred in practice: deliberate thinking is in effect indistinguishable from
willing. This is apparent in a passage that might be translated either as:
''Just as this man's volitions are directed, so after this state of mind he will
reflect that reflection", or as: ''Just as this man's thinking is directed ...".140
The point is that the thinking is intentional.
Some contexts attribute a volitional aspect to manm in a different way. For
example, the eighteen 'investigations of the mind' (atjhidasa manopavicirii)
consist in investigating whether something has given rise to joy, grief or
equanimity (somanassa, domanassa or upekhi).141Manas is also said to be
'pleased', to be 'delighted', to be 'angry', and to be 'irritated'.14*
A frequent synonymous use of the terms manas and citta is found in the
common ethical triad of kpa, v i c i and manas/citta which was mentioned in
chapter IV.In simple terms, this means 'body, speech and mind', and it
refers to the categories more usually expressed in English as 'thought, word
and deed'. The English expression better conveys the meaning of the Pali
formula than does the simple translation. This triad represents three ways
of practising sila, the morality which bhikkhus have to develop alongside
their training in meditation and insight. That manas and citta in such
contexts mean thoughts in the general sense that thinking is the function of
the 'mind' is more readily apparent in contexts where the three terms of
the formula appear as compounds with samkhira and with kamma.lq3Their
association with the terms samkhira and kamma, both of which have the
general meaning of activity, makes the compound mean 'activity of the
mind', or 'thinking'. This is clear from one context which states:
A bodily action is to be done [only] after much attention, a verbal deed is to
be done [only] after much attention, a mental action is to be done [only]
after much attention.144
This context clearly implies that manasi kamma~is the thinking which
mentally (as opposed to bodily or verbally) puts into action previous
deliberations (more usually specifically called volitions). The same is the
meaning of the expression manosamkhiram abhisatnkharoti. Such usages
were discussed in chapter IV.
This point is also more readily apparent in contexts where the triad is
found in the instrumental, kcZyena, uiicga, manadcetasii. I have mentioned
that when used in the instrumental case the noun cetas has the same mean-
ing as does citta when it is used to represent the mind in a non-technical
 The ViZn"ii?zakkhandha 109
sense. The most well-known context in which this formula is found is in the
definition of karma: "I say, bhikkhus, that karma is volition. Having willed,
one acts through body, speech and mind".146At first sight the second
sentence here appears to have the rather odd meaning of 'having willed
(mental activity), one acts through the mind (more undifferentiated mental
activity)'. But this is a context in which the will is clearly distinguished from
thoughts, and so the definition of karma means: "BhiWchus, I say that action
is the will. It is according to one's will that what are referred to as bodily
actions, speech and thoughts take place". So while the term cetant-imeans
'will', these passages suggest that the use of manas and cittu in these contexts,
whether alone or together with sa?nkht-iraor kamma, are intended to indicate
thinking as mental activity. And the instrumental terms manasii and cetasi
have the same meaning.14'
If we recall the discussion in chapter IV on anusaya, latent tendencies, we
see that the process of thinking following volition can happen unwittingly.
The latent tendencies themselves are expressed in thought (and word and
deed).148Here again the close association between volitions and thoughts is
illustrated. Even those thoughts which arise unwittingly have the causal
nexus of volitions as their origin. And once again we can see the cyclic
nature of how this operates if we consider two other contexts in which the
threefold formula of thought, word and deed is found. The first is in the
Samyutta NikQa, where it is suggested that one owns one's actions of
thought, word and deed, and carries them forward to the next life as a
threefold 'karmic baggage', as it were.14gMore explicitly, we read in the
next Sutta that bad bodily actions, speech and thoughts lead to an
unfavourable rebirth and good bodily actions, speech and thoughts lead to
a favourable rebirth.150Not only do volitions condition our thoughts, but
by putting those volitions into action thoughts contribute to the cyclic
volitional process in a way which in practice blurs the distinction between
volitions and thoughts even if doctrinally the will is distinguished from
other mental activity.
To sum up, we have seen that the term manas is frequently used in
contexts which suggest that it means thinking, and that this is often
expressed in the general sense that manas is 'that which thinks' or in the
sense that thinking is what one does 'with the mind'. Thinking is closely
associated with volitions, because mental activity is one of the three ways
that volitions are stated to manifest themselves: having willed, one acts
through body, speech and thoughts. And volitions are also described in
terms of deliberate thinking. The close association between thinking and
willing might account for some contexts in which manas is described in
terms which suggest that it actually has volitions. One further point arises in
connection with the close association between volitions and thinking as a
general activity of manas. It is significant because in the description of the
cognitive process in the Sutta e k a , the term manas is not used (except for
I 10 Identity and Experience
the preliminary role of manodhritu as discussed). The discursive activities in
cognition itself are the function of san"n"ii,together with reasoning (or reflec-
tion) (vitakketz) and making manifold @apaficetz).151This suggests that the
'thinking' that manas does is more closely linked to volition than to the
discursive processes which are associated with apperception: it is the
mental activity which follows from having willed, whenever that willing
took place.
Thinking as the general activity of the mind also applies to contexts
where citta means thoughts. We have seen in these examples the use of cetas
as a synonym for cittasamkhira or cittakamma, meaning general activity of the
mind, or thoughts, and that in such contexts these terms are synonymous
with manas/manasii. I also mentioned above that citta is etymologically
cognate with the verb cinteti, to think. This verb appears so many times in
the Sutta P$aka that it is unnecessary for me to cite examples here. Citta is
also, though not often, used in nominal form to mean thought, and, as I
have stated above, in Pali this is its literal meaning. In a short section of the
Samyutta JVikqa entitled Cintii, 'the act of thinking', we read "Bhikkhus, do
not think an evil and unwholesome t h o ~ g h t " . 'The
~ ~ Sutta goes on to state
that one should think the four Noble Truths. The importance of thoughts
is summed up in the following passage: "The world, bhikkhu, is led by
thoughts, it is carried along by thoughts, it proceeds under the control of
thoughts which have arisen".153In the Introduction I discussed the use of
the term loka to mean the life or experience of the individual human being.
Here we see that it is thoughts which dominate and shape that life. As one's
willing conditions one's thoughts (cetayitn?... kammam karoti manasq, so it is
those thoughts which condition one's future. We saw in chapter IV the way
different types of sapkAiira in fact act cyclically. What we have here is the
same process expressed in different terms. And those terms also suggest
why thoughts are sometimes described in terms that one might more
readily associate with willing. In a non-technical sense the mental activity
we have been discussing here includes both willing and thinking, not just
the general cognitive process.
In these two passages in which citta means 'thought' we can see two
factors which are significant to what in my opinion is its alternative, central
meaning. The first is that as 'thought' it always appears in the singular.
Though this might indicate that it functions as a collective noun, in my
opinion it is because its central meaning is expressed in the singular case,
and 'thought' is in fact a secondary meaning extended from this. The
second point is that the nominal term citta has a passive meaning, corre-
sponding to its grammatical form as a passive past participle: 'a thought',
not 'thinking'; the activities associated with citta as 'mind' in general are
expressed by the active terms cinteti or cetasri. The central meaning of citta I
would like to suggest is also passive in meaning. This is that it represents
one's 'state of mind'. By this I mean that citta is the term used to refer to the
 The ViEEinakkhandha III

qualitative picture, as it were, of the way all one's mental processes are
functioning at any given moment. This is very different from any of the
different mental processes of which the whole 'mind' is comprised: citta is
neither an entity nor a process (which probably accounts for its not being
classified as a hiandha, nor mentioned in the pagccasamuppida formula), but
is a term which abstractly indicates one's progress on the path, or, even
more generally, one's mental condition.15*One might suggest that it
corresponds to one of the possible meanings of the term citta as the past
participle of the root cit in Sanskrit: the 'appearance' of the mind at any
given time. I noted that in the passage cited above which states that the
world is led by thoughts, the term citta is in the singular and suggested that
the singular form reflects the more central meaning of citta. The passage
could in fact also be interpreted according to this meaning, so that what it
is stating is that as citta is a qualitative indication of the state of one's mind,
so it also qualitatively indicates the way in which one conditions one's exis-
tence in sayscira.
Understanding citta to mean 'state of mind' clarifies otherwise confusing
passages, such as the following examples: "Without understanding the
thoughts of his mind, one is reborn in life after life (literally, 'runs from
existence to existence') with a restless state of mind".155Likewise: "My state
of mind is not of such nature that it will return to kimabhaua levels of
e x i ~ t e n c e ;knowing
'~~ this, one's state of mind is well acquainted with
wisdom".157Johansson suggests these (and other similar) passages imply
that citta "seems to signify a surviving entity".'58 But what they are indicat-
ing is that one's state of mind reflects one's progress, or lack of it, on the
path to insight.
In the Satipatthina Suttas we read that citta is to be 'meditated upon':
"How does a bhikkhu proceed to meditate on [his] state of mind qua [his]
state of mind?".lS9By doing this he will see whether he is passionate or
detached (sarigam cittam vitarigam vi; literally, 'a state of mind with passion
or without passion'), whether or not he has hatred (sadosam cittam uitadosam
vi), whether or not he is deluded (sarnoham cittam vitamoham UZ), and so on.
This meditation on the state of his mind also tells the bhikkhu what types of
meditation he has practised: if it has 'become great' (mahagatam cittam) this
indicates that he has attained certain meditative levels (jhzna). This was
referred to under point (5)above, where I suggested that as one progresses
on the path to insight so one's awareness is progressively less restricted and
can be said to 'grow' or 'increase'. Here we see that that attainment alters
one's state of mind, and, further, that an examination of one's state of mind
correspondingly indicates the meditative attainment. This is implicit in a
simile we are given elsewhere where the state of mind of one who is
ignorant is likened to a "dirty, stirred up and muddied pool of water", and
that of one who is enlightened is "transparent, clear and not stirred up".160
The meditation exercises described in the Satipatthina Suttas are for the
I 12 Identity and Experience
purpose of detached observation, as we shall discuss in chapter VIII. But we
read in the Cetokhilasutta that the purpose of knowing that one's states of
mind are unwholesome is so that one can direct one's attention towards
getting rid of such unwholesomeness and thus make progress in the
dhamma.161Thus a passage in the Majhima Nikqa states: "A bhikkhu has
power over his state of mind; he is not the slave of his state of mind".16*
We also read in the Majjizima Nikiiya that it is in citta that one's
"wholesome moral habits" (kusalasilii)and "unwholesome moral habits"
I stated earlier in this chapter that
(akusalas2'lZ)originate (citta~arnu?thiinZ).'~~
the association in the Upani:ads and the Vedanta traditions of cit with
Brahman might be one reason why citta is sometimes understood in terms
of an entity. Passages such as this in the Majhima Nikea which state that it is
the source of volitions, also probably account both for substantialistic inter-
pretations of ~ i t t aand
l ~ ~for definitions of it solely in terms of thinking,165in
both cases overlooking the central meaning I have suggested here of 'state
of mind'. But such passages do not refer to an entity nor to citta as that
which wills. If they did, one might ask why it is not included either in the
analysis of the human being into khandhas, or in the pa6casamuppZda
formula. What is meant here is that as it is the complex causal nexus of
volitions which one experiences (discussed in chapter rv) that continuously
conditions one's actions, thoughts and so on, and as one's state of mind at
any given moment as it were reflects that complex causal nexus, so the
causal origin of one's actions, thoughts and so on can become associated
with one's state of mind. But this is a manner of speaking. Though citta
from moment to moment as it were reflects one's causal nexus, this does
not mean that it actually is that causal nexus: it is perhaps better under-
stood as an abstract reflection. We see here an important similarity
between vifiiiiina and citta: they are both associated with the qualitative
condition of a human being. Viiifiap functions as the provider of awareness
and continuity by which one knows one's moral condition (in its broadest
sense), and citta is an abstract representation of that moral condition. This
reflects the fact that ethical concerns (also in their broadest sense) are
paramount in Buddhism. In attempting to understand the close association
of citta and volitions indicated by the manner of speaking referred to in this
paragraph, one can perhaps understand better the fact that citta comes
from the same verbal root as the active terms cetanZ, cetas and cinteti.
It is important to remember here that an indication of meditative
attainment also represents progress on the path to insight in a cognitive
sense. The removal of unwholesome states does not correspond to
becoming 'nicer' in some sentimental sense. Though the defilements which
represent ignorance are described in moral terms, and though the
development of morality (sila) is fundamental to the Buddhist teachings, the
removal of defilements implies the development of wisdom, which is part of
the cognitive process. In giving us an abstract picture of our state of mind,
 The Viiiiiiinakkhandha 113

citta reflects one's cognitive as well as one's more strictly moral progress. In
this sense it has a broader meaning than when the term citta is used in the
sense of mind in general or thinking.
The bhikkhu having power over his citta, we also frequently read that it is
to be 'tamed' (dantam),controlled (guttam) and 'guarded' (raWchitam).'66The
guarding and taming of citta is the subject of the Cittavaggo chapter in the
Dhamma~ada.'~~ Such injunctions are meant metaphorically: because the
state of one's mind is an indicator of one's spiritual progress, one should
ensure that it does not indicate unwholesome states. In effect, the
'guarding' is done by the process referred to above: one consciously wills to
concentrate on the dhamma.
In similar vein, we read that a bhikkhu 'purifies' his citta (cittam
pani0dhet2),'~~ and that it becomes 'radiant' (sappabhfiamcittam bhavetz).169 The
radiance (pabhmsara)of citta is likened to the radiance of pure gold, and, like
gold, it can be defiled.170We saw the term pabhassara used to describe
uifiiiana, and I there suggested that it meant that as one progresses from
ignorance to insight, so one's awareness is progressively less restricted by
the objectivity of samsaric perception and can be said to 'radiate'. It
functions as it were as the 'light' of knowing. As those stages are reached, so
one's state of mind will reflect the fact that one's volitional activity is ceasing.
Eventually, this is a state of visankhZragatam cittam,171and corresponds to the
transparent and radiant state of the unmuddied pool of water. 17* In the
Anguttara Nihya we read: "This state of mind is luminous, but it is defiled by
defilements from outside".173Though this passage might be construed as
suggesting that citta has 'original' purity, in the context of the Buddha's
teachings as a whole it is no more likely that this passage about citta is
intended to suggest original purity than that vifiiiina should be thought of in
such a way, as discussed earlier in this chapter. But because one's state of
mind is in fact an abstraction, there is an abstract sense in which citta might
in principle be thought of as pure: just as a pool of water might be thought
in principle to have a calm surface which reflects all ripples and muddiness,
so one's state of mind might be thought in principle to be luminous but to
reflect all mental activity.
The attaining of a 'purified' citta corresponds to the attaining of liberat-
ing insight. And just as viiiiiina is described as being 'free', so citta is also
described as being 'completely liberated'. 174 At liberation, it is citta which is
stated to be 'free' of all the a~auas."~ By extension from this, one who has
attained liberating insight is frequently referred to as cetovimutta. This has a
technical meaning with which we need not be concerned here.176What it
indicates in general terms, however, is that at liberation one's state of mind
reflects no defilements, no ignorance. And as defilements and ignorance
represent bondage, so their absence is described in terms of being free.
It is perhaps because citta is a general qualitative indicator that the
Abhidhamma and commentarial traditions developed its association with the
"4 Identity and Experience
heart as a psycho-affective centre. A reference to this in the Pali English
Dictionary, for example, describes citta as:
The heart (psychologically). i.e. the centre and focus of man's emotional
nature [more properly, volitions] as well as that intellectual element which
inheres in and accompanies its manifestations, i.e. t h 0 ~ g h t . l ~ ~
The association with the heart does not imply, as it might in the West,
that citta is thought of in the sentimental terms referred to above. In pan-
Indian thought the heart is associated with one's mental faculties.
To sum up, then, our discussion here of the terms citta and manas has
shown that both are frequently used in a generic non-technical sense of
'mind' in general. Both are also associated in general terms with the activity
of the mind, and this is primarily the thinking which originates in volitions.
Manas is particularly used to refer to such mental activity. We have seen
that though the verbal root cit, from which we get the term citta, also gives
us the active terms cetan6, cetas and cinteti, all of which are specifically
associated with volitions or thinking, the nominal term citta itself primarily
has the passive meaning of one's 'state of mind'. This is neither an entity
nor a process, but, rather, is an abstract qualitative indication of the moral
and cognitive condition of a human being at any given time.

Notes

cf. Dhs p.10 and Vibhutiga p.144, where the following list is given: Cittam ... mano mitzaram
hadayam pandaram mano [sic] maniiyatanam manindryam viiiiidnam viiin'iinakkhandho tajii
rnanovin'ifiydhlitu.
e.g. As1 p.274fE
Pieris (1980) discusses the different terms found in the Abhidhamma and commentaries. Not
even then, he states (p. 213), are the three terms vin'fliina, citta and manas formally
differentiated.
Br. Up. III.g.28: Vijn'inam %andam brahma. The more frequent use of cit in similar contexts
in the UpanGads and the Vedanta traditions has corresponding consequences for scholarly
understanding of citta in Buddhism.
cf Reat, 1990, p.295. Reat refers to By. Up. 2.1.17, and discusses the U'anipdic suggestion
that consciousness in some way emanates less essential levels of consciousness.
DN. 11-56:Iti W o Ananda nimanipa-paccayi m'fifiipzm,viAAip-paccayi nimanipam.
For example, at MN.111.18. cf also SN.III.56f, 68, 86ff, 103: Sutavii anyasiivako . .. nu vifiEnam
attato samanupassati, na viiiifiipzvantam v i attinam, nittani vd vifiiiipzy, na vififlfipumim vii attiinam.
A similar passage is found at Vin.I.12-3.
DN.II.63: Viififiipzm va hi Ananda mitu kucchim na okkamisatha, api nu kho niimanipam miitu
kucchirmim samucchirratha?PED (p.687) states that the derivation and meaning of samucchati is
uncertain. The context suggests that it is highly likely to be from sam dmurch, to become
solid, and should thus read sammucchirratha.
For example, Johansson, 1979,p.57.
DA.11.502: .Nu okkamkathi ti paviritvi pavattaminam v g a pa@3andhwasma nu Pfavathsatha.
SN.V.283.
Miln. p.299: the lateness of this text does not matter here; what it illustrates is an example
of a linguistic convention.
SN.III.46.
 The ViCCinakkhandha 115

SN.II.goE Niimariiparra avakkanti hoti and viiiiicipzssa auaWcanti hoti. JCzmanipassa avakkanti hoti is
also found at SN.II.66.
DN.II.63ff. The same ninefbld paticcasamuppcida formula is given at DN.I1.31ff, with explicit -
statements that viiiiiZp and nlmartipa are mutually dependent (pp.32,34 a d 35).
SN.III..inK
MN.I.~;%~:Tathci 'ham bhagavahi dhammap desitap Zjiimimiyathii tad ev' idam viiiikpzm sandhlvati
sa;?rrati, anaiiGn ti.
MN.I.258: Nanu mayi moghapurira anekapany(7umapat;ccasamulgannam viiiiiciem vuttam; atitiatra
pmcayi natthi vin"iZiipmasambhavo ti. Atha ca pana tvam moghapurisa attan2 duggahtha amhe c' ma
abbhiicikkhasi attiinaii-ca khagzsi bahuii-ca apufiiicim pasavasi. Tam hi te moghapurisa bhavissati
dgharattam ahitiiya dukWtcSyciti. How a bhikkhu should acquire such a fundamentally erroneous
view of the Buddha's teaching is explained in the commentary on this passage (MA.11.305).
Here it states that SZti was not learned, but was a repeater ofJZtukas (in other words, he
was essentially a story teller) who mistakenly thought that, alone of all the khandhas, vifiiiiip
was unconditioned.
SN.II.95: Yam ca kho etam bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viiifiiipzm iti pi tam ratteii ca
divasassa ca aiitZad eva uppajati aiifiam nimjhati. Seyyathiipi bhikkhaue makkato ariiiirk pavane
caramiino .siikham gunhati, tam muficitvci aiifiamga@ati; evam eva kho bhikkhaveyad idam vuccati cittam
iti pi mano iti pi viiiiicipm iti pi tam rattiyii ca divmassa ca afiilad eva uppajiati afifiam nimjhati. cf:
also MN.I.60.
The development of the theory of momentariness, and its imagery in Theravada Buddhist
sources, is discussed in detail by Collins (1982,p.237fl).
SN.III.53: Rtipupiiyam bhikkhaue viiiiicipum titthamiinam titthgya. The C P D (s.v, upqa) reads
upqa fbr up3a in the title of this Sutta, which is given in the PTS edition as upiiyavago
pathamo. T h e C P D reading suggests the above quotation would be amended so that a
translation would read: "by attaching to body ...". This does not seem significantly to alter
the point being illustrated here.
Citta is discussed separately in the third part of this chapter.
DN.I.76: So evam pajiinciti: Ayam kho me k@o riipt ccitum-mahci-bhitiko mcihipettikasambhavo odana-
kummEsupacayo anicc-ucchiidana-pan'maddana-bhedana-~&hyam&amrno. cf: also MN.111.17.
Idan' ca pana me viiZiilqam ettha sitam ettha patibaddhan ti.
SN.II.65f: Yato ca kho bhikkhave no ceva ceteti no ca pakalgeti no ca anuseti irammapzm etam na hoti
viiiiicipzssa thitiyi. Arammap asatipatit#ci vifiikymsa na hoti.
cf. also SN.11.101: the four 'foods' (ihiri), which include viiiiiip, are themselves each
dependent on passion (rZga),delight (nanda)and craving (ta@ci).
For example, MN.I.53: samkhciranirodhii viiifiiipnirodho. cf. also SN.II.82: viiiiicinam ...
anabhiramkhiiraiica vimuttam. In what sense viiiiiap is 'released' is discussed under point (5).
None of the discussion under this point precludes the possibility that vin'iiZna might be
associated with a 'subtle body', a possibility which is illustrated in chapter vn.
I intend no connection with any technical philosophical usage of 'consciousness of'. I am
using this expression simply to note the difference between a substantive entity (suggested
by the single word 'consciousness') and the process of being conscious ('consciousness of').
SN.111.61.
Chayime bhikkhave viiiiicinakciju7: cakkhuviiiiicinam sotaviiiiicinam ghiinaviiifiinam jivhiivifiiiiinam
byaviiificipm manoviiiiicipm. idam uuccati bhikkhave viiiiiiiym. MmarEpasamudayii vififiiiysamudayo;
ncimartifianirodhii vifiiiciwnirodho.
MN.1. I I 11':Cakkhuii-c'iivuso paticca ripe ca uppajati cakkhuviiifiiivm ... sotafi-c'iivusopaticca .sadde
ca uppajati sotaviiiiiiipm .. . .
Ajhattikam cakkhum: I have translated this as 'the individual's eye' because 'personal eye' is
not an English expression, and the context suggests it is referring to the physical eye and
not some abstract 'internal' faculty.
MN.1.190: AjhattikaE-ce civuso cakkhum aparibhinnam hoti 6rShirii ca nip6 c7pcitham Zgacchanti no ca
tajo samanniihiiro hoti, n' eva tciva taja.rsa viEficipbhcigassapiitubhiivo hoti. Yato ca kho iiuuso
ajhattikaii-c'eva cakkhum apan'bhinnam hoti bEhirZ ca riipii ipitham iigacchanti tajo ca sarnanntihiro
hoti, evam tajasa vifiiZ~bhZg(1u'a pdtubhiivo hoti.
Reat, 1987, p.19.
MN.I.259: Yaii - $ad - eva bhikkhaue paccayam pat;cca uppajiati viiifilpzm tena h' eva satikham
gacchati: cakkhuii-capat;cca nipe ca ulgajjati viiiiicipzm, cakkhuviiiikpn t' eva sarikham gmchati ... .
 Identity a n d Experience
Syyathii pi bhikkhave yaii - yad - eva paccyam pa&ca aggi jalati 2ena ten' eva .wrikham gacchati.
Ka/i/zan' (sakalikaii and so on) - ca pa/icca aggt.jalati, katthagi t'eva ~arikhamgacchati.
The controversy is discussed in Cousins (1991).
MN.I.295.
MN.I.296: Yadi kho ivmo imam Eyam tuyo dhammd jahanti, r7yu urmii ca viiifidpzm, athgam k ~ y o
ujhito avakkhitto setiyathii kagham acetunan-ti.
MN.I.296; DN.II.335.
For example, DN.11.106; A N . I V ~ I IUdiina ; 64.
At SN.II.266 the plural is used but not defined.
Reat (1990, p.301) cross-references the Mahivedalhutta use of dfi@a with contexts in which
it is used with kiiya to mean the individual as a whole, which I discuss in the second part of
this chapter. In my opinion the two contexts are not comparable: in the fbrmer, viiin'iiy is
explicitly associated with the life principle; in latter contexts, it has a generic meaning of
'mind' in a general and non-technical sense.
Reat (1990, p.296) also makes this distinction.
MN.I.IIIK
SN.III.87: Kiiica bhikkhave vin'fiiinam vadetha? Vi~iinititikho bhikkhave t u m h viiiiiiipzn ti vuccati.
Kiiica vijiiniiti? Ambilam pi Uijiinati tittakam pi vijiiniiti, kahkam pi vijiindti madhukam pi vijiniti,
klzirikam pi vijiiniiti akhiinkam pi vijiiniti, lowkam pi vijiindti alopkam pi vijiiniti, vijiiniititi kho
6lzikWlaue b m a viiiiiiipan ti vuccati.
And we shall see below that pajiniiti is used in defining paEiii.
Kalupahana, 1979, p.234.
K. Up.III.7: Na hi prajn'ipetii viiri niima kiiicana pr.jfiiipayet, anyatra me mano'bhzid ity &.a ndham
etan ndma prcijiiiiscam iti, nu hi prajiidpetd p r i i ~gandham kaiicana prajiipayet, anyatra me mano 'bhzid
ity &.a niiham etam gandham pr@n'iisijarn iti ... . The term prajii is not systematically used in
the Upanhds, and it does not directly correspond to v i f i i i i ~in all contexts in which it is
found. And the senses in the Upan&ds do not exactly correspond to the six senses in the
Pali canon. But the function ofprajn'h in the cognitive process as described in this passage in
the Kau%ki Upanijad is nevertheless very similar to that of viiiiiiiy.
Na hi prajn'iipetii dh3 kiicana sidlyen nu prajiiiitavyam pra~ii@eta.
MN.I.292: kittiivatii nu kho iivuso duppafftlb/paiiiio ti vuccatfti?
Nu-flq2niiti nu-ppajdndti kho ivuso, ta~miiduppatiiio ti vuccati. Kim nu-flajiindti? Idam dukkhan ti
nu-ppajiniiti, ayam dukkhasamudayo ti nu-ppajdndti, ayam dukkhanirodho ti nu-pp~jiindti, y a m
dukkhanirodhagiirninfpatipadii ti nu-ppajiniiti.
MN.III.72: Lokuttarii sammii di&hi.
Katamd ca, bhikkhave, sammiidit@zia@ aniisavii lokutturii rnagga@ii? Yii kho, bhikkhave ... pan'fiii
pafiindriyam pan'iiiibalam dharnmavicayasamb0jiharigo sammiiditthi maggarigii. Masefield (1986)
discusses the lokuttara meaning of 'right view'.
SN.II.27: Tathii hi bhikkhave ariyudvakma ayaiica fia.$caramuppido ime ca samuppanni dhammii
yathibhiitam sammiipaiiitqa sudiplzciti.
AN.I.61: Pan'n'ii bhiivitii kam attham anubhoti? 2% avgii sipahpati.
DN.III.230: Asaviinam khayo pan'iiiiya sacchikaranpo. In this passage paiiiiii is one of four
sacchikaramyi dhammii.
SN.1.191: Eva? eva kho tvam Siin'putta may2 anuttaram dhammacakkam pavattitam sammadeva
anupavattesi ti.
MN.1.I 33: ...ekacce moghapurisii dhammam pariyiipupanti ...; te tam dhammam pariyipunitvd tesam
dhammiinam pafiii@a attham nu upaparikkhanti, tesam te dhammiipan'n'@a attham anuparikkhatam nu
nijihiinam khamanti. T h e Pali contrasts wisdom with learning by rote, which I have
interpreted as figuratively representing intellectual activity. cf. alsoJohansson, 1979, p.1g7ff
for a discussion ofpaiiiii, which he translates as 'understanding'.
Yii c'iivuso vedaniiyii ca saiiiiiyaii ca viiiiiiipzm ime dhammii sapatlzii udiihu vbamsatthii; labbhii ca
pan' imesam dhammiinam vinibbhujitvii vinibbhujitvii niiniikaranampan'n'iipetun ti.
Yii c'iivuso uedaniyii ca safiiiiyan' ca vififiiiyzm irne dhammd samsatQhii no visa;msa&hii, na ca labbhii
imesam dhammdnam vinibbhujilvi vinibbhujitvii tu7nEkaranam pan'Zpetum. Yam h'iiuuso vedeti tam
saiijiiniiti,yam saiijiniiti tam vijiiniiti, tarn6 ime dhammi samsatfii no visa;msat@-, nu ca labbhii imesam
dhamminam vinibbhujitvii vinibbhujitvii niiniikarapm paiiiiiipetun ti.
Yam h' iivuso pqzniiti tam vgiiniiti, yam vijiiniiti tam pajiniiti.
Paiin'i bhiivetabbii vin'iiiipm pariiiiqyam, idam nesam niinEkarapn ti.
 The Viiiii@zakkhandha 117

cf. Williams (1992, p.1g4f) for a discussion of the conceptual and linguistic problems
associated with describing a trans-conceptual insight.
Its role in deep sleep is discussed by Collins (1982, p.2qof-f). cf. also Aung, 1963, p.1off.
AN.II.79: Cattiir' imiini bhikkhave atigiini. Katamiini cattiiri? Rtiparigam vedanangam saiiiiarigam
bhavangam. As far as I am aware this is the only time bhavatiga appears in the Sutta Pitaka. cf
also Jayatilleke, 1949, p.216. The reading of bhavatiga here is, however, disputed. Cousins
(1981, p.2 and n.4) suggests that it first appears in the Path-nu, and that the term in the
Atiguttara Nikciya should read bhavaggam.
Though what I am discussing here only relates to well people, the importance of a sense of
continuity to the human condition is indicated by the modern tendency to refer to those
who are irreversibly comatose, or otherwise permanently unconscious, as 'vegetables'.
DN.I.76.
For example, MN.1.261; DN.III.228, 276; SN.11.11ff, 101. The others are solid food
(kaba:nkiirii&ra), contact Phassa), and volitions (manosaketan6).
SN.II.13: K k a nu Wlo bhante viiifiiiniihiiroti? Viiiiiiniihiiro ciyatim punabbhaviibhinibbaftyiipaccayo.
The commentarial tradition introduced the expression abhtsamkhiira-vin'fiiipa(SA.II.259;
SnA.1.39)' but this is not fbund in the Sutta m a k a . cf. also Collins, 1982, p.205ff. We also
saw above that in one context vin'n'& is associated with the term ciyura&-ra.
SN.11.101: Vin'Eiip ce bhikWrave &ire atthi riigo atthi nandi aUhi tanhiipati!!hitam tattha vifiiiii@m.
The common translation ofpatiMitam as 'stationed' is discussed below, and under point b).
The metaphor of the stream is a common one in the canon, perhaps because the term
s a ~ i i r ais derived from dsT, which means, amongst other things, to flow. At SN.I.15 we find
the expression bhavasota, 'stream of becoming', used to refer to the series of lives in s a ~ i i r a .
It is also used to denote the Noble Eightfold Path at SN.V.347: anyo atfhangzko maggo soh.
Those who gain the necessary spiritual status to follow the path and not fall away (this is
described in several different ways) are called 'stream-winners', sotripanmi (cf.,for example,
SN.II.68f, V.3466 357, 376; etjeq: cf. PED, p.725). Collins (1982,p.24giT) usefully divides the
stream metaphor into negative and positive contexts: the stream of saysiira, which one
wants to reverse or 'go against', and the stream to liberation, which one wants to follow or
'go with' (to oversimplify).
DN.111.105: Purisassa ca viiiiiiipa-sotam pajcSniiti ubhayato abbocchinnam idhaloke patiflhitaii ca
parulokepatit#itaii ca; cf also DN.111.134.
PED, p.619.
For example, MN.1.53: SamWldranirodhii viiiiiiiynirodho.
SN.1.121f:
DN.I.17: Samvattanikii sat,!& cf. also SN.X4g.
For example, AN.II.54, 111.46; DN.1.51,111.66: Sagga-samvattanika.
AN.IV.247: Pittivisaya-samvattanika. cf. also Collins, 1982,p.297, n.8.
MN.II.262: Samvattunikam viiiiiiipam.
DN.111.105.
SN.I.rz1f. cf. also SN.II.65, 111.124.
SN.III.53: Vifiiiiigzm ti&thamiinam titthyya. cf: also DN.III.228.
SN.111.68: r a m kifici vifiiiiiwm atitiiniigatapaccuppannam ajhattam vii bahiddhii vii ofirikam vii
.ruklzumam vii hinam vii punitam viiyam dtire santlkG vii, sabbam viiiiiiiym.
Sn I I I 4: Viifi@atthitiyo sabbii.
T h e possible different 'stations' for vin'tiiip are summed up in nine categories at DN.II.68:
Satta Wlo imii vin'n'iiy.@itiyo due ca ciyataniini.
SN.III.53: Rti~apatit~tham nandupmevanam vinilhim vuddh* ve@llam iipajdyya. cf. also MN.1. 101;
SN.V.47: by fbllowing the Noble Eightfold Path one attains growth, increase and maturity
in the dhamma.
DN.II.63: Vin'fiiiym daharw'eva sato vocch@batha ... api nu kho mimariipam vuddhim v i e h i m
vepullam c?pajissathiiti? No h' etam. In chapter VI, I suggest that the term refers to the
conceptual and formational 'blueprint' of the individual for any given life. As the
individual progresses on the spiritual path, it is possible that as that blueprint changes for
each life it can also he thought to 'evolve'. But it does not appear to have that meaning in
the Digha Nikiya passage cited here.
The 'lesser' beings which inhabit various hells are also part of the cycle of samsiira, and
their level of cognition might be lower than that of humans. But it is the human condition
I 18 Identity and Experience
with which I am concerned here, and I cannot go into other possibilities. In any event, they
do not affect the point I am making.
92. The psycho-cosmological levels are tabulated by Collins (1982,p.217). This correspondence
is also discussed in chapter VII.
93. DN. 1-35,e t f i q (cf. PED, p.286).
94. This term was discussed briefly in chapter 111. Griffiths discusses in detail the state of
safifiivedqitanirodhain his paper "Pure Consciousness and Indian Buddhism" (1990).cf. also
Griffiths, 1986 and Williams, 1992.
95. MN.III.242: VSfiipzm ... pakuddham pariyoditam, tena vififiiiqena kificijiniti. There is some
ambiguity in this passage about how uifiE&za comes to be purified and cleansed, but the
implication is that it comes through the following of the Buddhist teachings.
96. In section (4) I referred to a different interpretation of the term bhavatiga in the Ariguttura
JVikaya. But in view of the fact that this reading is disputed, one cannot suggest that there is
a later divergence from an original meaning. The bhavanga mind as naturally pure is
discussed by Collins (1982, p.246).
97. SN.11.178f; 187,III.149, 151,V.226, 441: anamatugLiyam. cf: also Kalupahana, 1979, p.235.
98. In the Brahmanical tradition insight (which is the realisation that itman is Brahman) is also
associated with light, and this theme is also developed in later schools of Buddhism.
99. DN.I.ZZ~.
loo. There is considerable scholarly discussion on this word. cf, for example, Lamotte, 1980,
p.2079, n.2; Norman, 1987, pp.23-31; Ruegg, 1969, p.412, n.2; and there is a discussion of
the different ways scholars have interpreted this word in Dialogues I, p.283, n.2.
I or. sN.1.15: Tattha tuttha pabhisati sambuddho tapatam settho, esi i b h i anuttari ti.
102. DN.I.17: Abhara-samvattaniki sattii; cE also SN.I.95.
103. In a personal communication, Lance Cousins has suggested to me that radiance here has
an experiential content rather than being a metaphor. And (though Mr. Cousins did not
suggest this) this might correspond to the subjective experience of illumination that
accompanies insight: from the subjective point of view the progress from darkness to light
might well seem more literal than metaphorical.
104. In my paper "Anatti: A Different Approach" (1gg5), I have included the metaphorical
interpretations described here to illustrate a particular hermeneutic approach to the
Buddha's teachings.
105. SN.II.94.
106. SN.II.95.
107. In a mnemonic passage, the S a w ' Suttanta (DN.111.216)~we find the term s a h y a used to
refer to the human being as a whole. It is also used in this sense at MN.III.284.
I 08. AN.1.132: S+i nu kho bhank bhikkhuno tathiripo samiidhipatiliibhoyathii imasmifi ca savififiiivke k 9 e
ahamkira-mamamkiira-miininusayi nissu, bahiddhii ca sabbanimittesu ahamkira-mamamkiira-
mcininusayi n s u ?
109. AN.1.133: Tasmiit iha Siriputta evam sikkhitabbam: imasmifi ca savififiipzke kiiye ahamkira-
mamamkira-miniinusayii na bhavissanti, bahiddhii ca sabbanimittesu ahamkira-mamamkara-
mininusayti na bhavtsfanti.
110. AN.IV.53. cf. also SN.II.252, 253; SN.III.7gC 8of, 169, 170.
1x1. In the PTS translation of this passage, E. M. Hare translates savififiinakiiya as
'discriminative body' (GS.IV3o). This is, as Mrs Rhys Davids points out in her introduction
(p.v~),misleading: the body is not itself discriminative. Harvey.(1g81)also states that fiya (in
the sense of corporeal body) can "be seen to have a mental component". Harvey states
(p.92) that the presence of the terms niImaka3a and ripakrSya in the canon (for example, at
DN.II.62) implies that both nima (the mental faculties) and nSpa (the physical body) are
faculties or characteristics of kiya (the physical body). I disagree with this interpretation,
and take kLiya here to have its abstract meaning as 'aggregate', not 'physical body'. And in
concluding that such passages show that the term savifiEE&*a represents all five khandhus
(p.gof), Harvey goes on to argue that k q a refers to the first four, giving vififiipz a uniquely
significant role. Again, I do not agree with this analysis.
112. PED, p.618.
1x3. This is suggested in PED, p.286.
1x4. C. A. E Rhys Davids, 1937.
1x5. Ibid., p.405.
 The Vin"n"5nakkhandha
116. Ibid., p.4ogf.
117. Mannt, 1990.
118. AN.1.133: Tasmiit iha Siiriputta evam sikkhitabbam: imasmiii ca saviiirliinake kiiye ahamkira-
mamamkiira-miiniinusayii na bhavissanti, bahiddhii ca sabbanimittesu ahamkiira-mamamkcira-
mantinurayii nu bhavirranti.
"9. DN.I.76; cf also MN.III.17.
120. For example, SN.II.94.
121. For example, manas: Sn 1144;D N . I . z I ~ , I I I . I oAN.1.170;
~; SN.III.93, V74; Dhammapada 390;
Sn 967. Citta: SN.1.1g4, 207, 1263; DN.III.223; AN.1.170, IV86.
122. DN.I.ZO,III.QZ.
123. For example, SN.III.93, V.74.
124. For example, DN.I.ZO,III.Q~; SN.III.zff, V.66; AN.11.137. The term sacittakaia is not fbund.
125. PED's mention of the two stems, cit and cet, is unhelpfully confusing (p.266).
126. PED, p.266.
127. Whitney, 1885,p.47.
128. PED, p.268.
129. cf'. Gombrich, 1994,seminar 3.
130. Cetanii'ham kammam vadiimi. cf: also Biihtlingk and Roth, 1858,s.v. 4.cit) cint, cintZ, cetas.
I 31. Sn 834: Manasd dit%igatiini cintayanto.
I 32. Sn 1005: Aniivara~dasriiviyadibuddho bhavkati, manas6 pucchite pa& vLCrya viwajesati.
133. DN.II.275: Puccha ... mum pailhamyam kifici manas' icchaFi
134. MN.I.272: Parkuddho no manosamLiiro bhaviwati. cf. also Dhammapada 96 and 233.
I 35. Euam hi uo bhikWlave sikkhitabbam.
136. DN.111.104, 108f; 112,227, 273; MN.I.296, etJieq.
137. For example, SN.II.24: Suniitha siidhukam manasi karotha bhiisiuimi. Mannt (1990, p.341) cites
fbrmulas used to open discourses of various types which include this sentence.
138. MN.I.296: Sabbanimitkinafi ca aman(u.ikIro, animitkiya ca dhEuyii manasikiiro.
139. M A . I I . ~ ~ ~ .
140. DN.III.104: rathii i m m a bhoto mano.rapkhiir6 pandzitii, tathi imasra cittasra anantarci amum nima
vitakkam vitakkessattti.
141. MN.111.216f;
142. Respectively: SN.I.133: Me nirato mano; Sn 424: Me raiijati mano (cf: also Dhammapada 116);
MN.I.377, Sn 659: manopadosa; Dhammapada 233: manopakopa.Johansson (1965, p.1861) states
that such contexts suggest manas functions as an affective centre. But the feelings and
emotions here referred to are more properly understood as volitions, as I have discussed in
chapter 11.
143. MN.I.389, 373,415e SN.II.4; DN.111.191: k+asamkhEra, viifiamkhiira) mano (or citta) samkhiira
(and similarly with kamma). The generality of the meaning of'the term citta in such contexts
is indicated at MN.1.301 where cittasamkhiira is stated to comprise both sarlfii and vedan2.
Though some scholars (fbr example Reat, 1990, p.313) have attempted to give a complex
analysis of this passage, in my opinion it suggests that citta comprises general mental
activity, or 'mind' in a non-technical sense.
144- MN.1.415: PaccavekkhitvZ paccavekkhitvii hyena kammam kattabbam, paccavekkhitvii paccavekkhhii
viicqa kammam kattabbam, paccavekkhitviipaccaveMitvZ manmii kammam kattabbam.
145. MN.I.389.
146. AN.III.415: Cetanii 'ham bhikkhave kammam vadiimi. Cetayitvii kammam karoti k@ma viic@a manasii.
cf'. also DN.111.104.
147. The term manosarlcetanii, which is stated to be one of the four cihiircu. (DN.II1.228),probably
has a similar meaning that volitions become mental activity.
148. AN.II.158; SN.II.40: Asampajiino.. . manosa+-ram abhtsamkharoti.
149. SN.I.93: ran' ca karoti kcryena viic@a uda cehii, tam hi t m a sakam hoti, taiiGa d q a gacchati.
150. SN.I.94: So k@ena duccaritam carati vcic+a duccaritam carati manmii duccaritam carati; so kgena
duccaritam caritvi viic@a duccaritam caritvi manasii duccaritam caritvii, k @ m a bhedii param maranii
apqam duggatim vin$Ztam uppajati . .. So kiiyena sucaritam carati viiciiya sucaritam carati manas2
sucaritam carati; so kiiyena sucaritam caritvii viicga sucaritam caritvii manasii sucaritam caritvii k @ w a
bhedii param maranii sugatim sagam lokam uppajati. cE also SN.1.102; AN.I.63; Sn 232;
DN.III.96.
151. MN.1.111.
120 Identity and Experience
152. SN.yq18: Mii bhikkhavepipakam akusalam cittam cinteyyitha.
153. AN.11.177: Cittena kho bhikkhu loko niyyati, cittenapan'kisraticittasra u@annasra vasam gacchatfti.
154. Johansson (1965, p.166fQ states that it is "conceived predominantly as an entity ... on the
other hand [it] may be used for the produced processes themselves [i.e. thoughts]". In his
lengthy paper he nowhere suggests that citta means 'state of mind', and assumes that its
passive fbrm implies the existence of an entity.
155. Udiina p.37: Avidvi manaso vitakke hurihuram dhvati bhantucitto.
156. The different levels ofexistence are discussed further in chapter VII.
157. AN.IV.402: Amivattidhammam me cittam kiimabhavciyii tipafifiaya cittay .r@arin'tum hoti.
158. Johansson, 1979, p.157.
159. MN.I.59; DN.II.299: Kathafi-ca bhikkhave bhikkhu citte cittinupassf viharatz?
160. AN.1.g: Udakarahado ivilo lulito kalalTbhtito ... udakarahado accho vippasanno aniivilo.
161. MN.1.1orfT
162. MN.1.214: Bhikkhu cittum vasam vatteti, no ca bhMu cittaua vasena vattati.
163. MN.II.27. cf. also MN.I.36; DN.1.71,11.81, 111.270.
164. For example, Johansson, 1965, p.168 and 1990, p.157. Though elsewhere Johansson places
the emphasis on cittu as the thinking faculty (1990, p.161).
165. For example, Kalupahana, 1979, p.235; Reat, 1990, p.296.
166. AN.I.7, 261, 111.435; SN.1.48.
167. Dhammapada 33ff.
168. DN.I.71, 77. cf: also SN.V;6g.
169, DN.III.223; SN.V.278; AN.I.8 (pasannacittam), 10.
170. SN.V.92.
171. Dhammapada 154.
172. T h e term atittaka, which Paul Griffiths translates as 'mindless' (1986 and ~ggopassim)when
it relates to the condition of safiEivedayitanirodha, suggests either that at that point one's
state of' mind cannot be discerned: it is 'blanked out', as it were; or in this context the term
citta means 'thought' or mental activity, and this state is one in which such activity is
absent.
173. AN.I.10: Pabharraram idam bhikkhave cittum tafi ca kho Ggantukehi upakkihehi upddcili{,tham.
174. For example, SN.I11.13,45: Cittam suvimuttam.
175. DN.11.81: Cittam sammad eva Gavehi vimuccati.
176. cf, Gombrich, 1994, op.cit.
177. PED, p.266.
 CHAPTER VI

Niirnariipa

THEEXPRESSION N&UXZDPA IS AN important one in ancient Indian psychol-

ogy. The term nima (name) on its own is first found in the Rg fida where
the pis gave names to things.' The expression used for this is nimadhya -
'conferring a name'. Later, in the Byhadiranyaka Upani?ad, when
Yajfiavalkya is asked what it is that does not forsake a man when he dies,
his answer is 'name'.* Name-conferring must, then, have been an impor-
tant enough process for Yajfiavalkya on this occasion to state that the name
is eternal, a characteristic one might expect to be attributed to itman rather
than nii~na.~ Yet in the giving of a name, some sort of abstract or notional
identity is established which is independent of the empirical thing or indi-
vidual. We need only consider that when someone we know dies, their
name and all that is associated with it does not die, but conceptually repre-
sents that person to us in our memories. Likewise with, say, a book: its
name persists even if the book itself is destroyed.
The earliest instance of the pairing of nirna with riipa is probably in the
Satapatha Briihmap, and it continues to be found in Aranyaka literature and is
not uncommon in the Upani~ads.Scholars of Buddhism have commonly
interpreted nZmanipa as a metaphor for 'mind (naina) and body (riipa)', but
the original meaning in the Briihmaps and UpanSads is nearer to its literal
meaning: 'name (nima) and (visible) form (riipa)'. The two examples given
above clearly indicate that this is how nima on its own is understood. And
we shall see from the following examples that this is also the case with the
compound niimariipa.
In the earliest reference in the Satapatha Brtilmap we read that when the
universe consisted just of undifferentiated Brahman (neuter), it differen-
tiated itself by means of nZmarfipa: whatever has a name, that is nima;
whatever one knows by its form (even if it has no name), that is riipa.*NZma
and riipa are Brahman's two means of manifestation or representation,
described as the two great forces (or monsters) of Brahman, and the two
great tempting appearances of Brahman.= Similarly, we read in the
&rhad6ranyaaka Upani!ad (which is the last part of the Satqpatha Bramapa) that
the unmanifest or undifferentiated (auyiibta) world became differentiated
(zy&tu) by means of nrima and riipa (n&wmipZbhjva'm);even today, it states, the
122 Identity and Experience
world is differentiated in the same way, by saying of someone (or
something) 'he [or it] is called so-and-so; he looks like such-and-such'.6
Also in the Byhadiranyaka Upanisad, the universe is said to be triadic in
nature: name and form together with action (karma).' This is also the
triadic nature of itman, though karma in this instance is said to arise from
iitman.8This part of the triad need not concern us further here. NGma and
n?pa together are said to be the real.g Everything that is nima arises from
speech (vic); and everything that is n?pa arises from the eye.lo Viic was an
important term in the Brahmanical religion prior to the time of the
Buddha as it was one of the subjects of speculation about the nature of the
self and the universe in the late Vedic and early Upani~adicperiod. Here,
however, apart from connotations associated with such speculation, the
association of nima with v i c suggests the conceptual nature of nima: that it
is the conferral of differentiation by verbal means, i.e. the practice of
naming referred to above.
There is no cosmic significance associated with eye (caksus), but the
association of riipa with eye is interesting for different reasons. On the one
hand, in Pali canonical descriptions of the patunas, riipa appears as 'visible
object', corresponding to the sense 'eye'. In the Pali context, rzipa does not
have eye as its source, as in the UpanGad, but it is nevertheless defined as that
which is visible. The other point of interest is the etymological link between
riipa, varpas and vaw, through the root v~." According to Louis Renou vaqas
signifies change or metamorphosis of form, including deceptive
a pearances, practically equivalent in usage to uivartu (though uivarta is from
&t, not .\lvr).12 This suggests that though nips is what the eye sees, such
visual perception is not necessarily what really is, a teaching which was to
become s~stematisedby the proponents of Vedanta. Renou suggests that the
term vaw, the classical word for 'colour', seems to intend a 'category of
recognition' in terms such as disa- or &ya-va~a,rather than difference
merely of co10ur.~~ Such a meaning is considerably more conceptual than
visible, and moves a long way from the meaning of nipa as the sense object
corresponding to the eye, and also from any suggestion that the main
criterion of 5pa is visibility. The etymological link between riiipa and vaw is
interesting partly because sometimes such links can throw a different light
on a word and help in understanding its meaning, and partly because in Pali
Abhidhamma literature, riipa is again associated with 'colour' (as well as
shape).14 The term used for 'colour' is vacnibhii, 'coloured appearance',
which suggests that r6pa is form which is apparent by means of colour. Shwe
Zan Aung, the translator of a late Pali text, the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, states
in his notes to that translation that the most appropriate understanding of
riipa is as colour plus extension (vanna and pa!haui).l5 Likewise, in his
Abhidhamzakoiabhiipa, Vasubandhu indicates that varp alone is too narrow a
definition of nipa when he explains that riipa is of two kinds, shape (sapsthiina)
and colour (~arpz).'~ Wayrnan has suggested that in the Abhidhamma context
rcpa can best be understood as the verbal noun 'colouring', meaning
'touching up', 'filling out', 'giving body to'." And it may be that
Vasubandhu's inclusion of samsthiina in his definition of riipa results in a
similar meaning to that proposed by Wayrnan. Wayman's suggestion brings
the meaning of riipa/varpz nearer to the more general criterion of visibility,
which is the main characteristic of riipa where it is the object of the sense
'eye', and also of riipa as part of the cosmic triad in the Brhadiirayaka
Upani;ad passage we have been discussing here. While niima, the conferral
of a name, is a conceptual differentiation by verbal means, riipa is differen-
tiation by means of (visible) appearance or form: as the earlier passage of
the Upani!ad puts it, 'he [or it] is called so-and-so, and looks like such-and-
such'. The Upani~adicunderstanding of niimariipa, then, is, as stated above,
close to the literal meaning of the term. One might put this differently and
suggest that name and form together confer individuality, and that in this
figurative sense, therefore, nimarfipa does have a psychophysiological
meaning. Reat suggests that in the Upani;ads nimariipa is used to denote the
"conceptual and apparitional aspects of a given object".18 This fits well
with the notion of individuality, since both concept (which represents
name) and appearance are peculiar to the individual. And in spite of
Yajfiavalkya's statement about niima being eternal, which is perhaps
characteristically profound, nimarzipa, as both conceptual and apparitional
aspects, is associated with the temporal existence of a thing as much as
with the duration of an individual's lifetime. Thus the Munp'akopani~adstates
that just as flowing rivers cast off name and form when they flow into the
ocean, so one who knows is freed from name and form and attains the
divine person, higher than the high. lg
Just as scholars of Buddhism have often understood the term niimariipa to
refer to 'mind and body' rather than its more literal meaning of 'name and
form',20so the later Theravada tradition has understood niimariipa. Such an
understanding, however, is scarcely compatible with the main context in
which niimariipa is found in the Pali canon, which is as the fourth link in the
usual twelvefold version of the chain of dependent origination, the
paticcasamuppiida formula. In another version of the formula, nimariipa
appears as the second link in the chain, but is still preceded by uiiiiiiina. If
mind and body arise at this stage, how can one make sense of the subse-
quent arising of what seem to be mental faculties, and why do we findjiti,
birth, so much further along the chain? Several suggestions have been
made to explain this, both within the Theravada tradition and outside it,21
most of which have been in terms of spreading the chain over the previous,
present and next lives of the individual. In the following discussion of
nirnariipa we will see that some of the contexts in which the term is found in
the Sutta fitaka do suggest that it means 'mind and body'. I will also suggest
that in contexts where such an interpretation is problematic, primarily the
pa~iccasamuppidaformula, an alternative interpretation makes considerably
124 Identity and Experience
more sense of nimariipa. And the alternative interpretation of nimanjpa also
makes more sense of the formula itself.
Nimarzipa is a relatively common term in the Sutta P$aka, and nima and
riipa are formally paired together in the canonical 'lists of twos'.22In a post-
canonical text, the Milindapagha, the two are said to be in~eparable.~~ The
term has been interpreted by scholars as meaning 'mind and body' for two
reasons. First, there are a few passages in the Pali material where such a
meaning might be implied. For example, there are passages in the Sutta
Pitaka where it is used to indicate the individual as a whole, in much the
same way savi'n"fii&~a is. We find such a usage in the Samyutta Nzkaia, where
one of the metaphors describing an arahant's freedom from rebirth is the
total cessation of mind and body.24A similar use of nimariipa occurs in the
Sutta jV$~iita.~=The second reason is because later Theravada Buddhist
exegetes have also understood ncmariipa to mean 'mind and body' and have
said so in some influential and widely read texts. In some passages, nimariipa
is defined as representing the individual as a whole. In his Visuddhimaga, for
example, Buddhaghosa states that in meditation a bhikWlu defines nimanipa
in terms of the five khandhas, with nima representing the four ariipakkhandhas
and rzipa the rzi~akkhandha.~~ In the chapter in the Visuddhimagga entitled
'Description of the Purification of View' (Dit/zihuddhiniddeso),Buddhaghosa
discusses definitions of nimariipa at some length. Quoting several canonical
passages which illustrate the selflessness of the human being in terms of the
handhas, the body, and d&a, he goes on to state that all such passages are
in fact saying that the human being is only niimariipa, and that no self is
found therein because in the ultimate sense there is only ~ziimarzipa.~~ This
clearly equates niimanipa with the five hndhas as representing the individual
as a whole, analysed according to body and mind. In two other non-
canonical Pali texts, the Netti Pakarap and the Abhidhammattha Sangaha,28and
in the commentary on the Dhammapada, we find the same d e f i n i t i ~ n . ~ ~
Nimarzipa is most frequently found in the Sutta Pitaka associated with
vin"n"ina,usually as consecutive links in the pagccasamuppida formula, and
the two together have been understood by later exegetes to represent the
individual. In the version of the paficcasamuppida formula found in the
Diiha Nihya, for example, we read that ViEfiina and nimarzipa are mutually
dependent,30and that the experience of the cycle of samsira is by means of
nimanipa together with ~in"n"iiy.~l Neither nimarzipa nor UijiEipi on its own is
sufficient cause for the subsequent development of an i n d i v i d ~ a l . ~ ~
Elsewhere vififiina is said to be dependent on nimariipa, the other way
round from the pa~iccasamuppidaformula.33Though, as we have seen,
Buddhaghosa defined nZma as representing all four of the ariipakkhandhas, he
also discusses nimarCpa together with vififiina in the chapter of his
Visuddhimagga where he deals with each part of the paficcasamuppida formula
in turn. He interprets the two of them according to the analysis of the
person into Wlandhas. Thus riipa and vin"n"ip correspond to their respective
Wmndhas, leaving niima to represent the remaining three mental khan&a.s of
vedanii, saiirii and samh-ra. As well as stating that nima is three artipfindhas,
he defines rUpa in terms of the four elements.34The w h a Nikga passage
where nimariipa and vin"n"iinaare said to be mutually conditioning, which has
also been referred to in chapter v, is one in which the paticcasamuppida
formula begins with vin"n"iia as the condition for the arising of ncimariipa,
omitting arnjii and sa?nkhiira." It may well be that vin"n"@aand niimariipa are
stated to be mutually conditioning so that independent existence cannot be
projected onto zritn"iguas the first link in the chain. But to a reader of this
text, or of any other which states their mutual dependency, who is aware
that elsewhere nZmariipa is explained as the four khandhas other than vin'iiciy,
the passage suggests that the mutually conditioned pair represent the
individual as a whole, particularly since it also states that together they
experience samscira.
The only definition given of nimariipa in the Sutta does not explicitly
refer to the Wlandhas, but it is given in a way which has been interpreted as
implying that translating nrima as 'mind' is 'appropriate. Rzipa is again defined
as the four elements (and their derivitives) and niima is said to consist of
feeling, apperception, volition, sensory contact and a t t e n t i ~ n VedanG? .~~
sattii, cetanii, fh.ssa and manasikira might all be said to be 'mental' rather
than 'physical'. In the Papatcaszidani, the commentary on the Majhima
N.iknra, an analysis according to the khandh is projected onto this definition,
so san"n"iis said to stand for the san"n"&andha, vedanii for the uedandhanndha, and
cetanii, pahassa and manasiEra collectively represent the ~amkhiirakW1andha.~' The
canonical passages where this definition of nima is found are dealing with
the paaticcasdmuppzdaformula. As zrin"n"iipzis the condition for the arising of
niimariipa, the definition of niima given in the commentary ensures that all
five khandhas are explicitly included in this passage, thus encompassing the
mental and bodily faculties of the individual as a whole.
From all of the foregoing it is perhaps unsurprising that scholars have
translated niimarzipa as 'mind and body'. It is significant, however, that
nowhere in the Sutta P$aka is nima explicitly defined in terms of the
ariipakkhandhas, or in terms of khandhas at all. Only one definition of nima is
given, that it is vedami, satiiii, cetdnii, phasa and manaxikEra, as mentioned in the
last paragraph. Rzipa is consistently defined in terms of the four mahcibhiiti
and their derivatives, but only in those contexts which are explaining the
human being in terms of the five khandhas is it specifically referred to as the
nipakkhandha. In the discussion above on the nipamandha we saw that parts
of the khandha are either not visible or their visibility is unknown, unlike riipa
as visible object of the sense 'eye'. And because as a khandha it is associated
specifically with the human body, we concluded 'khanttha of the body' to be
an appropriate definition. With regard to the term riipa as part of the com-
pound ncimariipa, there is no suggestion in canonical material that it is limited
by a criterion of visibility. But the compound is almost exclusively found
I 26 Identity and Experience
either in the context of representing a human being as a whole, or in the
context of the paticcasamuppida formula. In chapter IV I suggested that the
pa.Eiccasamup~iidaformula should be understood as referring specifically to the
'how' of human existence within sams5ra. It follows, therefore, that the term
riipa in the compound niimariipa also refers to the human being. In this
respect I disagree with Reat, who suggests that nimariipa has a wider appli-
cation because the human body is more usually referred to as b ~ a . ~The *
human body is indeed often referred to as Eya. It is also referred to as sagra.
But in every analysis of the human being according to the five Ahandhas the
term used to refer to the body is Spa. We have already seen that the same
term also refers to that which is external to the human body; but we have
also seen descriptions of the nipafiandha in which riipa unequivocally refers
to the human body. Perhaps Reat overlooks the fact that in connection with
the human body rips has a wider meaning than that which is visible; it
includes processes and functions which are definitely not physical, for exam-
ple. It may well be the case, as I will suggest below, that in principle niimarzipa
might apply to that which is external to the human being. But when it is
found in the context of the paficcasamuppiida formula it applies to the human
being; and thus riipa refers to the human body in the same way riipakWlandha
does. In making this statement I am not, however, suggesting that niima
corresponds to the four ariipakkhandha-s. On the contrary.
I mentioned above that in the MilindapaKha, a post-canonical text, nima
and riipa are stated to be inseparable. In the Mahiinidina Suttanta of the
Nikga,39 which is the Sutta in which nZmariipa and vifiEZna are stated to be
mutually conditioning, we find another passage referring to the insepara-
bility of niima and rzipa. The passage also gives us insight into a meaning of
niimargpa which does not present logical problems when attempting to
understand the paficcasamuppida formula. Here the Buddha is explaining
the paficcasamuppiida formula to Ananda. He points out that he has stated
that niimariipa is the condition for the arising of sensory contact (phassa). He
explains by asking Ananda whether, if those various characteristics by
which n5ma is conceived of were absent, there would be any corresponding
discernment of verbal impression with regard to rcpa. Ananda correctly
replies that there would Similarly, he asks if those various character-
istics by which riipa is conceived of were absent, would there be any corre-
sponding discernment of sensory impression with regard to niima, and
again Ananda replies that there would not." Next the Buddha establishes
the inseparability of nima and riipa by asking if the various characteristics of
both kinds were absent, would there be any discernment of either verbal or
sensory impression, and the answer is that there would And finally,
he establishes that without the various characteristics by which niimariipa is
identified there would be no discernment of sensory contact.43
This passage tells us two things about nimaepa. First, it confirms the
mutual dependency of nrZnaa and riipa: without one, there would not be the
other. Second, and more significantly for our attempt to suggest an
alternative meaning for niimarzipa, we learn that niima is described as giving
rise to a verbal or conceptual, that is abstract, impression on nipa, and riipa
is described as giving rise to a sensory impression on niima, and that there
are thus these two aspects to the compound as a whole. The Pali words
which are used for what I have called verbal or conceptual and sensory
impression are adhiuacanasamphassa and pa.tzghasamphassa respectively. And the
significance of this is more readily apparent if we remember that we met
with both these terms in the discussions on phassa and the safifiikhandha.
The two types ofphma were abstract impression and sensory contact; and
the two terms represented safifiii as conception and apperception
respectively. I suggest that this is relevant to understanding the role of
nimarzipa and that niimaru'pa represents a stage which one might call the
'blueprint' of the individual in terms of concept and conceived. It should
go without saying that in Buddhism this 'blueprint' has no independent
identity as early Greek notions of 'form' have. It is, rather, dependent on
the samkhiiras, which, as we have seen, are the creative aspect of the
individual, in themselves conditioned by ignorance. Rather than
representing 'mind', niima provides an abstract identity for the individual.
And we arrive at a meaning which is also the literal meaning of the word
niima: the individual's 'name'. This is not mere name, but, rather, 'name' as
the entire conceptual identity of the individual. Riipa provides 'form' or
recognisability to the individual in the sense of giving shape to that abstract
identity which, eventually, is apperceivable by means of sensory impression.
At that stage, the form, riipa, acquires solidity or extension, patha* and the
characteristics of the other mahiibhiitii. Nimariipa is thus name and named,
and neither has any meaning or significance without the other: they are
mutually necessary. And what this passage in the MahZnidcSna Sutta is stating
is how they relate, how they are said to give rise to 'contact'. It states that
according to the various characteristics of each, they impinge on or have
contact with each other abstractly, or conceptually, in the case of niima on
?-@a; and by means of being that which is conceived, that which will be
apperceivable, in the case of riipa on nima. The meaning of ncmarzipa in the
paticcasamuppida formula is, then, name and form, in a way which is
remarkably close to the Upani~adicunderstanding of niimariipa discussed at
the beginning of this chapter.44
That niima means conceptual identity is illustrated in a slightly different
way in a passage in the Anguttara NikQa which discusses the perception of
an arahant. I have already referred to this passage in chapter 111 in order to
illustrate the abstract conceptual function of safifiii. The passage states that
the perception of an arahant is similar to that attained in the anipajhtinas,
which is beyond form perception and where apperception has ceased:45
there is just that which is called 'vision', but no sensing of objects or the
sense of sight; that which is called 'hearing', but no sensing of sound or the
I 28 Identity and Experience
sense of hearing; that which is called 'smelling', but no sensing of odour or
the sense of smell; and so on through all the senses.46Here the senses only
have abstract identity.
Nima is also defined, in the Mahiniddesa, as distinguishing mark or
identity; it is the giving of names to things in our everyday experience in
order to distinguish one thing from another.47
Neither of these passages is suggesting that nima and riipa as they appear
as a link in the paticcasamuppida formula are separable because neither of
them is directly discussing nimarzipa in that context. I quote them merely to
illustrate that conceptual identity is a recognised definition of the term nima
in the Sutta Pitaka.
I have already mentioned that many explanations of the paticcasamuppida
formula have been in terms of spreading the twelvefold sequence over
more than one life, and this is how several Buddhist schools, including the
Theravada tradition, have attempted to make sense of it.48The most
common division is that the first two links in the chain, amji and samkhira,
represent the past life; the next eight links, uiEEina to bhaua inclusive,
represent the present life; and the last two links,jiti andjarimarana represent
the future life. While such a division avoids the anomaly of appearing to
have two births for one life, it nevertheless leaves the present life somewhat
incomplete: that this life might end with 'becoming' (bhaua) is somewhat
unconvincing.
Another of the explanations offered for the position of nimarzipa near the
beginning of the paticcasamuppida formula, with the subsequent develop-
ment of mental faculties andjiti further along the chain, is that nimariipa
represents physiological c o n ~ e p t i o nCollins
. ~ ~ associates this suggestion
with contexts in which both nimarzipa and viEKip are referred to in terms of
'descent' (into the womb).50He states that the 'descent' of viEKiina is the first
'moment' of consciousness when viEEigz is about to join with the material
causes of an embryo. In the Theravada tradition (as well as in other schools
of Buddhism), this 'moment' of consciousness is also referred to as the
gandhabba. The 'descent' of nimarzipa is the moment when the gandhabba and
the material, or psycho-physical, causes of an embryo are conjoined.
Though such an explanation also avoids the problem of two 'births' in the
pa!iccasamuppida formula, it seems unlikely that the Buddha intended the
formula to be understood physiologically: there is no mention in it of the
development of the body, and the tone of the formula is much more
psychological than physiological.
In my opinion, a better explanation is provided by the suggestion that
niimariipa is the conceptual and formational blueprint of the individual. In
the terms of the formula, on-going ignorance is the condition for the
arising of the individual's samkhiiras. These condition consciousness, which
is a prerequisite for human life since human life is conscious. This
consciousness in turn is the condition for the arising of nimariipa, and on
the basis of this conceptual and formational blueprint the individual has
psychological faculties peculiar to him or her, is born (giving 'substance' to
the form), ages, and dies, and the process may continue in a similar way in
future lives. I have suggested above that the mutual dependence of niimaripa
and uiiiiiiina, which is stated in versions of the paticcasamuppiida formula
which begin with uiiiiiiipa, is established in order to prevent independent
existence being ascribed to ViiiEiipz. But given the alternative interpretation
of niimanipa which I have suggested, it is not difficult to see that their mutual
dependence could also be because these two represent the most funda-
mental aspects of the human being in his or her present life. Av;jiii and
samWlZrii are 'inherited' from the previous life or lives. Vin"n"a'yaand niimariipa
are what actualise the individual in this life: and they are mutually necessary
to the subsequent development of the individual. This would explain the
Samyutta N&@apassage referred to in chapter v where vin"n"Zy is said to be
dependent on niirnani~a.~~ It may be convenient to regard the 'conception'
(in the physiological sense) model and the 'blueprint' model as literal and
metaphorical aspects of the same process. But since there is no mention in
the formula of the physical development of the embryo it does not bear too
literal a biological interpretation.
Elsewhere the relationship between niimariipa and conception is explicitly
referred to, but unfortunately it is not clear whether the passage is intended
to equate or to separate the two. The passage is found in the Anguttara
Nih~iya,~* and is concerned to refute the erroneous views of other teachers,
such as that there is a creator God (issaranimmiina), that all things are
uncaused and unconditioned (sabbam tam ahetu-appaccayi). In it we find a
version of the pagcccasamupptida formula which is not found anywhere else in
the Sutta Fibku, or, to my knowledge, in the Pali material as a whole. This
gives an account of conception. The formula states that the six dhiitm are
the condition for the descent of the embryo, there being such descent there
is nZmariipa, niimarripa is the condition for the arising of the six senses, which
subsequently give rise in turn to contact and feeling. This, the Buddha
states, is duWcha.5sFrom this we see that the description of the relationship
between the descent and niimariipa does not use the usual terms of
causation, upZdga or paccayii, as does the rest of the formula. It states, rather,
that 'there being descent, there is n6manipa'. It is thus not clear whether the
descent is the condition for the arising of niimanipa, or whether the two are
coincidental: the same thing. This structure is not normally found in the
various paticcasamuppiida formulas, so it may be that the passage is stating
that they are coincidental, especially since upiid@a and paccayii are used for
the rest of the formula. But the structure is found in the general causal
formula of the pa.$ccasamuppiida doctrine: this being, that arises ... (immim
sati, dam hoti ...).=* This doctrinal statement is not intended to indicate
coincidence, but, rather, the law of dependent origination. What makes
this 'conception' version of the formula particularly unusual and difficult to
130 Identity and Experience
interpret is that it is not given as an alternative to the usual version of the
paticcasamuppiida formula: the common twelvefold version immediately
follows it in the text. It is also not clear how the six dhiitus are the condition
for conception. The dhiitus are defined earlier in the passage as the four
mahdbhita', viiiiidna and a'kdsa. The relationship between these and
conception is nowhere explained. Even if one were to understand the
mahdbhitd' and viiiiiiipa to represent the bodily and mental aspects of the
individual, this would not explain why &a is separate; and it is difficult to
see how these could gbe rise to conception. In view of its uniqueness and
since it is immediately followed by the twelvefold version of the
paticcasamuppdda formula, it may be that the 'conception' formula was
interpolated into the text here. Or alternatively it may be that the
'conception' formula was considered incomprehensible and the twelvefold
formula was interpolated. In any event, the formula does not help us in
ascertaining the relationship, if any, between conception and ndmariipa.55
I have suggested that niimanipa is not being defined in terms of the five
khandhas; but there are metaphorical parallels between the two: they both
represent the identity of the individual. We have seen that it is only in later
Pali material that ndmanipa is defined as representing the khandhas. Maybe
this definition was the only way the exegetes of the formula knew how to
convey individuality. The definition of na'ma given in the Sutta @aka, that it
is vedanci, saiiiiii, cetand, phassa and manasikiira, is an odd one for several
reasons. First and most obviously, uedanii and phassa are both subsequent
links in the paticcasamuppiida formula, and cetanci is represented by samkhiira
(and ta*4. Second, it is surprising that manasihra, which is usually inter-
preted as meaning mental attention or concentration, finds a place at a
time when the individual is as yet undeveloped. Even if one understands it
more generally, as 'activity of the mind', it seems premature to put this
before other more basic psychological faculties. Third, and similarly, it is
unlikely that san"n"aas we have defined it could have a place prior to the
senses, sensory contact and vedana': apperception is directly involved with
sensory input, and conception (the cognitive, not the physiological, kind) is
a relatively sophisticated psychological process. Perhaps this is another
occasion when the author(s) of these passages did not really know how
adequately to define the term, a suggestion which is borne out by the fact
that the commentary on such passages does not explain why this sequence
of five terms is used in the definition of niima but merely transposes them
into a classification in terms of the khandhas.
That ndmariipa represents individuality is interestingly suggested in a
passage in the Sutta JViPdtawhich relates it to papaiica. The passage states:
Having understood ntirnarzipa as manifoldness, which is the root of both
subjective and objective disease, he is completely released from bondage to
the root of all disease.56
 I suggest roga, disease, is being used in this passage as a synonym for
dukkha. The root of dukkha is thoughts of 'I' and 'mine', from which root
grows papaiica, the process of making manifold, or attributing independent
existence to, what is not manifold or independently existing. Attributing
independent existence to oneself and attributing independent existence to
what is external to oneself are equally relevant, hence the two terms
ajhattay and bahiddhii. That niimariipa can refer to external objects will be
discussed below, but the point here is that an individual's samszic existence,
the identity of which is represented by niimariipa, is caused by failure to see
that one does not exist independently. As such, niimariipa is papaiica: one's
(false)manifoldness.
In his paper "Some Fundamental Concepts of Buddhist Psychology",
and in Chapter VI of his T h 0riS;ns oflndian Pgchology, Reat discusses at
some length the term niimarii'a in the Pali canon.57He suggests that it
should be understood as "a comprehensive designation of the individuality
of a perceived thing". 58 while "designation of individuality" appears
similar to the way I have suggested niimanipa should be understood, Reat's
suggestion is different in one very significant respect which in my opinion is
not supported by the canonical material. This difference is represented by
the fact that he refers to the designation of the individuality "of a perceived
thing". He states that:
There is no indication in the suttas that the first four links of the standard
enumeration of pa.hcasamuppida, culminating in the phrase 'viiitzana condi-
tions niimariipa', are to be construed as confined to an explanation of
rebirth. Instead, the conditioning of mimariipa by vin"n"a';?arefers to the arising
of any instance of consci~usness.~~
In the case of the individual, the analysis into khandhas is actually an
analysis of consciousness as experienced, Reat states: given sufficient
conditions for the arising of consciousness, "the five aggregates are brought
into the picture as an analysis of that consciousness".60He goes on to
suggest that ''just as consciousness does not arise without an object, so does
an object not arise without consciousness", and states that while "there is
little evidence of an abstract interpretation of the elements [the standard
definition of riipa - 'object'] in the suttas themselves ... there is also little to
suggest that they posit an independently existing material world".61
Elsewhere he puts this point more emphatically: "... according to early
Buddhist psychology, there are no 'external' objects as such, but only
apparent objects based on the objectivization of certain aspects of
C O ~ S C ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ S S . " ~ ~
Reat bases this conclusion that early Buddhism is idealistic on two ca-
nonical passages. First, he refers to a passage in the Mahsatthipadopamasutta
in the Majhirna [email protected], Reat states, supports his claim that the
analysis of the human being into five khandhas is actually an analysis of
132 Identity and Experience
consciousness as experienced. In fact the Sutta is ambiguous, and Reat's
conclusion is not the only one that can be drawn from it. The Sutta starts by
defining dukkha as the five upidinakkhandhi. It goes on to give the detailed
description of each of the catttSm fnahiibhiitd' as they relate to the human body
that has been referred to above in chapter I. Then comes the passage in the
Sutta which is relevant to us here. It begins by giving an analogy:just as
space that is enclosed by stakes, creepers, grass and clay is known as a
dwelling, so a space that is enclosed by bones, sinews, flesh and skin is
known as a body.64The Sutta goes on to state that for there to be an
appearance of a corresponding kind of consciousness,65there has to be one
of the internal senses 'intact' (or functional), its corresponding external
object within range, and appropriate attention or c ~ n c e n t r a t i o nThe .~~
form of the Pali is the same for all the senses. The Sutta then states that
whatever is rips, vedanii, safifii, sapkh&a and uifiiiiy that comes to be in this
way is included in the khandha corresponding to each of those five
analy~es.~'
The precise meaning of this passage is not immediately clear. First, the
analogy of the dwelling place and the body does not seem to have any
connection either with what precedes it or with what follows and may be,
as Reat suggests, a corruption in the text.68In any event, it may be ignored
in this discussion. According to Reat, the rest of the passage states that
"rripa, as a khandha .. . come[s] into existence on the basis of the functioning
of consciousness".69In my opinion, however, it does no more than state in
the first instance that consciousness is consciousness oJ; as already discussed
in chapter v: for consciousness to arise there has to be internal sense organ,
corresponding external object within range, and the appropriate attention
(samannihiro - literally the coming together of the two). And second, in
what follows the Sutta is stating that it is by means of this process of the
arising of 'consciousness of' that one analyses one's experience according
to khandhas: as human beings, our experience is conscious, and all our
analyses are therefore by means of the subjective cognitive process. Reat's
claim that the analysis into khandhas is actually an analysis of consciousness
as experienced suggests that all the khandhnr are (merely) different types of
consciousness. This suggestion is not supported elsewhere in the Sutta
R@ka, and in my opinion one should interpret this passage as stating that
the analysis into khandhm is an analysis of experience as we are conscious of
it. Such an interpretation does not have the implication that consciousness
is the stufof the khandzm, and it is in accord with the context of the Sutta as
a whole: the detailed description of the cattiZro rnahiibhzitz is classified as the
riipakkhandha by means of being conscious of it: without being conscious of
it there could be no analysis of it. Though Reat is correct in stating that
"consciousness does not arise without an object", there is no evidence that
he is also correct in stating that "an object does not arise without
consciousness".
 The second passage on which Reat bases his idealistic interpretation is
in the Digha NikQa, where the consciousness of an arahant is being
discussed and it is stated that the four elements cease when vin"n"ipzceases.
Long and short, fine and coarse, pure and impure also cease, and name
and form cease without trace.70
In my opinion, Reat is mistaken in interpreting this passage as evidence
that an idealistic ontology is posited in the Suttu Pistaka.I referred above to a
passage in the Udiina which states that 'that condition wherein is not earth
nor water nor fire nor air' is N i r ~ a n a . I~ also
' pointed out that this need
not, and indeed should not, be interpreted ontologically: the four elements
are relevant to samsciric perception, not to Nirvana. Similarly, arahantship is
stated to be the cessation of ninaepa in the sense that it represents freedom
from rebirth: Enlightenment means that there is no further coming to be as
an individual.72At the death of an aruhunt, uin"n"iipz,along with all the other
constituents of the human being, also ceases. And since human life is
primarily characterised by consciousness (human beings are conscious
beings), the cessation of an individual's consciousness for the final time
represents the cessation for that individual of all the other things which
characterise samriiric existence. In the Sutta Mpita this is expressed by stating
that the cessation of consciousness is the cessation of the arising of dukl~a.'~
None of this implies, however, that human existence is a product of that
individual's consciousness (in the idealistic sense). Indeed the same Sutta
JVipita passage states that the cessation of each and every link in the
paticcasamuppida formula represents the cessation of the arising of duma,
using the same form of Pali words as that quoted for uin"n"i~, but with the
relevant link of the formula in its place. What this is stating is that bondage
to sqiiric existence (duWcha)ceases for an individual when Enlightenment is
attained. Subsequent death is the cessation of all the links of the
paficcasamuppiida formula, so the cessation of any of them also represents the
cessation of the arising of dukkha, not just the cessation of uin"n"ipz.But since
human life is conscious, vin"n"@tanirodha is an appropriate term to use to
signify an arahant's ending of s q i i i c existence.
Reat does not account for the first two links in the twelvefold version of
the pa.ticcasarnuppiida formula: avijii and sarpldiri. Indeed, though he suggests
that the first four parts of the formula are applicable to any instance of
consciousness, he does not again mention them. Nor does he mention the
subsequent links in the formula. As I argued above in chapter IV,there is
no evidence to suggest that anything other than individual sentient beings
is volitionally formed. And the pa.ticcasamuppiida formula is given in terms
which clearly apply specifically to the individual. I do not, therefore, think
that there is sufficient reason to conclude, as Reat does, that the term
niimariipa in the pa[iccasamuppiida formula refers to the 'comprehensive
designation of the individuality of a perceived thing'. Rather, it refers to the
comprehensive designation of the individuality of a human being according
I34 Identity and Experience
to his or her ignorance and formative activities (avijG and samkharii). I stated
above in chapter IV that samhira as the second link in the paticcasamuppida
formula is the individualising faculty in the sense of being the formative
principle which distinguishes individual A from individual B. j\rimariipa
represents the point at which that individual, having become associated
with the potential for being conscious, acquires identity in terms of name
and form.
I have referred several times to the formula which is given in the Sutta
&aka to illustrate the cognitive process, particularly in the sections on the
saiiiii and uin"n"ip2handhas. It states that (visual)consciousness arises because
of eye and visible object; contact occurs when there is a combination of the
three; feelings are caused by contact; that which one feels one apperceives;
that which one apperceives one reasons about and causes to become
manifold.'* This is of interest to Reat since it begins with viEiiina, and he
discusses it at some length.75 He treats both this formula and the
pa.ciCcasamuppGda formula as descriptions of processes of consciousness. They
are each, therefore, in his view, open to interpretation in the light of the
other. Thus because the formula describing the cognitive process states that
saiiiii arises from feelings, one can assume that "the arising of saiiiii is
implied in the standard formula ofpaticca-samuppida by the arising of vedani
conditioned by phassa" .76 Similarly, he argues, because nimanipa and vifiiiiy
are mutually conditioning in the ninefold version of the paficcasamuppida
formula in the Mahiinid-ina Suttanta of the Digha Nhya, one can assume that
nimariipa is represented in the formula of cognition by the presence of a
sense (he does not explicitly account for the corresponding sense objects
but he may have intended to include them), with nima referring to manas
(and possibly dhammq, and riipa referring to the other senses (and possibly
their objects). It is in this way, Reat states, that nima and nips give rise to
adhivacana and patighasamphassa re~pectively.'~
In my opinion the two formulas have different purposes and describe
different processes. On the one hand, the pa!iccasamuppada formula is not
describing the arising of consciousness and it is therefore inappropriate to
attempt to establish a mini version of the cognitive process in the middle of
it. It is possible to see that the persistent arising of the individual's cognitive
process, which is based on a false notion of self (i.e. ignorance) and its
consequent craving, signifies the continuation of the individual's samsiric
existence as described in the pahccasamuppida formula. This is explicitly stat-
ed in the Brahmaja'la Sutta, where the (erroneous)views being refuted are
stated to originate with sensations (that is, phma), which give rise to feelings,
craving, and so on, which represent bondage.78But this is an explanation
that such cognitive activity is samsinc activity which leads to further samsiric
existence, not a description of the ontological status of the cognitive activity
itself. And on the other hand, it is not appropriate to prefix the cognitive
formula with nimariipa in the sense in which it is used in the paticcasamuppGda
formula (as Reat understands such use). Even if the objects involved in the
cognitive process have their own name-and-form, a point which is
discussed in the next paragraph, those objects are not themselves condi-
tioned by av$ii, samkhiirii and/or vin"n"ipz.Thus these two formulas are not
open to the kind of manipulation suggested by Reat.
As already mentioned, it might be the case that the term nimarzipa could
mean the name and form of things other than the human being. In the
Samyutta Nikga we read of 'external' (bahiddhq ntZrna6pa,79and in the Sutta
Nipiita it states that a seeing man will see niimariipa.80It might therefore be
appropriate for the term to be understood to have two applications: in its
most common context, the paiiccasarnuppiida formula, it refers to the name
and form of the individual human being; in other contexts it refers to the
name and form of any objects. The texts do not suggest that in the latter
case such an object is dependent on viiin"iwfor its existence. From descrip-
tions of the cognitive process, however, we know that our perception and
apperception of any such object are so dependent.
To sum up, we have seen that the term nimariipa is commonly
understood by scholars of Buddhism to mean 'mind and body', and that
the later Theravada tradition has also understood it in such a way. I have
suggested, however, that such an interpretation is incompatible with the
main context in which nimariipa is found in the canonical material. A more
meaningfbl understanding of the term is that it refers to the individualising,
or abstract identity, of the human being (or other sentient being) in terms
of name and form: dependent on the ignorance, formative activities and
subsequent consciousness of a given life, that life has conceptual and
formational individuality.

Notes
RV. X.71.1.
By. Up. 3.2.12f:YZjfiavalba, yatrqam puruso mnyate, kim enam najahiititi? Ntlma iti, anantam vai
ntlma.
In Sanskrit, niiman would be the correct form here. But because in the following discussion
both Pali and Sanskrit are referred to, I will use the form ntlma in the interest of clarity.
Sat. Br. ~1.2.3.3.
: b r a h m a ~mahatiabhve ... te haik brahmap mahatiyak;e.
Sat. Br. ~ 1 . 2 . 3 . 4Te~ huite
Br. Up. 1.4.7;cf'also Ch. Up. 6.3, 8.14.
Br. Up. 1.6.1-3.
Atha karmantlm iitmeg etad e;Zm uktham.
fliimarUpe satyam.
Tesiim niimntlm viig ig etud e~iirnu k h m , ato hi samtlni niimiiny utti$hanti ... atha nipiiniim cak;ur iti
etad e~iimuktham, ato hi saruiini nipEny utt+/hanti.
This is discussed by Wayman (1984, p.620), who refers to Louis Renou's ~ t u d e ssur le
ficabulaire du Rgveda, Premitre Skrie, p.12.
Renou, 1958,pp.13f:
Ibid., pp.14f:
Dhs 617.
Aung (trans.) Compendium ofPhilosophy, 1963,p.272.
136 I d e n t i t y a n d Experience
Abh.K.B. 1.Ioa.
Wayman, 1984, p.620.
Reat, 1987,p.15.
Mund. Up. 111.2.8: Yathi nadyar syandamink samudre 'stam gacchanti nimanipe vihiya, tab-
viduiin nimariifiid vimukt4 parit param purusam upaiti divyam.
For example, Radhakrishnan, 1988, p.172; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, 1914, p.rgf; Johansson,
1969, p.78; E.,J. Thomas, 1951,pp.63fK
cf: Collins, 1982, p.203fand p.212; Thomas, 1951,p.79.
DN.I.223, 111.211; AN.I.83.
Miln p.49: Ailfiamaiiiiti'anksiti... ekato va uppajanti.
SN.1. I 3, 35: Tattha niimafica riipafica asesam uparujha@cf: also DN.I.223.
Sn 1100; cC also Sn 1037. PED suggests that mimaiiiiya is used as a synonym for mimartipa at Sn
1074. I do not agree. Nor does the translator for the PTS, K.R.Norman (The Group of
Discourses, 1992, ~.120),who translates niimak@a as "mental body", in the sense of 'body/
group of mental faculties'.
Vism p.438f ... catunnam ariipakkhandhinam vavatthiipanepaffd ayam nima vavatthipanapafifiii;yi
nipakkhandhasfa vavatthiipanepafifii, ayam riipavavatthaTanapaiirEti.
Vism p.gg31': Evam anekasatehi suttantehi nimariipam eva dijjitam, nu satto, na pugalo ...
paramatthato pana niimariiparnattameva atthi.
Of these two texts, the Ibrmer is considerably earlier (c. second century CE) than the latter
(c. eleventh century CE).
Rcpakiiyo rripakkhandho, nimakiyo cattcrro anipino khandhi. Netti Pakarap 41; Abhidhammatha
Satigalta VI11.14; DhA 1V1oo. The Pali in the latter puts the same thing differently: Tattha
sabbaso ti sabba.rmimPi vedanridznam catunnam nipakkhandharsa cii ti pdcannam khandknam vmena
pavatte niimanipe.
DN.II.56: Niimanipa-paccayiivififiii~m,viEiiii~-paccayimimanipam; their mutual dependency is
also stated at SN.11.104, 113.
DN.II.64: &marzipam saha vin'n'Ipna.
DN.II.63. Uniquely, the paticcasamuppida fbrmula given at fibhatiga p.138 states that vififiiv
is the condition for the arising of turma alone, which in turn is the condition fbr the arising
of the senses, contact and so on. The commentary on this passage states that this is
intended to cover the cases of beings without bodies (Sammohavinodanip.174).
SN.111.61: Xmanipasamudgyivifiiri~amud~o, nimanipanirodhiviiriiipnirodho.
Vism p.558: Niman ti . .. vedaniidayo tayo khandhii; rtipan ti cattiiri mahibhtitini catunnafca
maltiiblriitcsnam upiidiiya nipam.
This version ofthe fbrmula is also fbund at DN.II.32; SN.11.104f, 113.
MN. 1.53; SN.II.3f; Pagr p. 183: Vedani saffiii cetaniiphasro manasikiro, iday vuccat ' iivuso nimam;
catkin' ca mahiibhzitcsnicatunnafi ca mahibhiitinay ufiiidiiya nipam, idam uuccat' ivuo riipam; iti idair
ca niimam idaii ca nipam idam vuccati' iivuso niimartipam.
MA.I.2 2 I : Vedanii ti vedanfikhandho; sat?n"ii ti safiiiiikhandho; cetani phasso manasikiro ti
samkhirakk-handha.
Reat, 1987, p.17.
DN.II.62K
Yehi Ananda &irehiyehi lirigehiyehinimittehiyehi uddesehi nimakiiyassa pailfiatti hoti, tesu iikiresu tesu
litigesu te.ru nimittesu tesu uddesesu mati, api nu kho nipakiiye adhivacanasampharropafin'@ethrTti? No h'
etam bhante.
Yehi Ananda iikirehiyehi lirigehiyehi nimittehiyehi uddesehi nipakiiyasra pafifiatti hoti, tesu iihresu te.su
lirigesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho nimahye patzghasamphuno paEfiCyehiti.? .No h'
etam bhante.
Tehi Ananda ikiirehiyehi finyehiyehi nimittehiyehi udde.sehi niimaktiyaua ca nipaktiyarra ca pafiatti
hoti, tesu iikiiresu tesu litigesu tesu nimittGsu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho adhivacanasamphauo v i
fia.&ha.sam~tzas.sovii paiifi*ethiiti? No h' etum bhante.
Tehi Ananda iikirehiyehi lirigehiyehi nimittehiyehi uddesehi nimanipasa pailfiatti hoti, tnsu r?kire~utau
litigGsu tesu nimiltesu tesu uddernu arati, api nu kho phmo pan'fiiiyeethiti?No h'etam bhante.
Reynolds suggests (1976, p.378) that the term niimakiiya in the passage being discussed here
is a synonym tbr the manomaya body. In my opinion, he is mistaken. I do not think the term
kiiya in the compound nimakiiya in this context is intended to be taken literally as 'body' but
in its more generic sense of 'aggregate'. Manomaya is discussed in chapter WI.
Rlpasaiiriiinam samatikkamii pa.tighasaAn'iinam attharigamii.
AN.IV.426E Tad eva niima cakkhum bhavisati, te nipii taii c@atanam no pa{kamvedissati; tad eva
niima sotam bhavkati, te saddi taii cqatunam no patisamvedksati; tad eva niima ghinam bhavirsati, tc
gandhii taii c3atanam no fia&amvedisati; and so on.
Mahiinidde.~~p.127: Niiman ti samkhd samaiifiii pafiatti lokavohZro niimam nr7makammam
nimadhyam nimtti byaiijnum abhilipo.
Thomas (1951, p.65) mentions different Buddhist schools which divided the formula into
three existences; Collins (1982, p.203f) gives different divisions of the formula. cf: also
Nyanatiloka, 1980, p.159, who gives the standard Theravada division.
cC, for example, Collins, 1982, p.212; Thomas, 1951,p.79.
This 'descent' has been discussed in chapter v.
SN.111.61.
AN.1.176.
Channam bhikkhave dhiitiinap upzdiija gabbhassiivakkanti hoti okkant@ii sati niimaripam,
niima6papaccayii sabyatanam, sabyatanapaccayii phasso, passapaccayii vedanii ... idam dukkhan ti
pun'n'iipemi.
SN.II.28, 95; MN.III.63.
A different sequence giving the events ofconception and birth is given at MN.I.265E The
context in which is is given does not affect my discussion here.
Sn 530: Anuvicca Papaka mimanipam gjjhattam bahiddhii ca rogamflam sabbarogamflabandhanii
pamutto.
Reat 1987 and 1990.
Reat, 1987,p.18.
Ihid., p.17.
Ibid., ,p.20.
Ihid.
Ibid., p.317,
MN.1.185fE
MN.1. rgof S~yathZpi i i w o katlzafl ca pa$ca vaUiii ca pa&a tiyan' ca pa.hta mattikafi ca pa@a
iikciro pariviirito agiiran t' eva salikham gacchati, euam ma kho iivuso atthim ca paticca nh-run' ca pa ficca
muysaii ca Paticca cammaii ca paticca iikiiso pariviirito nipan t' eva sankham gacchati.
Though bhiga literally means 'portion' or 'section', it makes more sense to translate it here
as 'kind' because viiiiiiiy is defined as being of' six kinds according to the six senses.
Yato ta Wlo iivuso a j h a t h - - c' ma cakkhum aparibhinnam hoti bairii ca @ii Ipiithay CTgucchanti
tajo ca samanniih6ro hoti, mum tajasra vin'n'iipabh@asraPiitubhvo hoti.
Yam tathiibhii~anipam tam riipupc3diinakkhandhesatigaham gucchati, y6 tathiibhftussa vedanii sii
vedanupiidinakkhandhe sarigaham gacchati,yii tathibhltassa san'n'd sii saiifiupiidiinaWchandhcsarigaham
gacchati,ye tathiibhitwa saykhiirii te samkhiirupiidiinakkhandhesarigahap gacchanti, yam tuthiibhiitaua
viiiiiii@m tam vitIn'iiqpiidiinakkhandhesarigaham gacchati.
Reat, 1987, p.20.
Ihid.
DN.I.223: Vin'n'ii@m anidasranam anantam sabbato pabham Wabham as a variant reading fbr
paham here is referred to in chapter v). Ettha iipo ca pathavt tejo v 3 0 na glidhati, ettha bighaif ca
ras~'aiica anum thiilam subh&ubham, ettha niimafica nipan' ca aresap u@rujhati, v i n ' n ' w a nirodhma
etth' etam uparujhatiti.
Udiina V111.1.
SN.I.13, 35.
Sn 734: Vi'n"Einmanirodhena n' atthi dukkhma sambhavo.
MN.1.111.
Reat, 1991,314K
Ibid., p.314.
Ibid., p.316. This seems not dissimilar to the mind-body understanding of nimatipa Reat is
attempting to get away from.
DN.I.44.
SN.II.~~.
Sn 909: Pasram naro dakkhiti mimanipam.
 CHAPTER VII

Manomaya

Introduction

INTHE INTRODUCTION I MADE the point that many of the key terms which
we have to consider in order to understand the early Buddhist analysis of
the person, and to gain some insight into the psychological processes of the
human being, are used in different contexts in the Sutta Pitaka with quite
different meanings. We have seen evidence of this problem in almost every
chapter. Of the terms with which we are concerned, one of the most
difficult to understand precisely is manas. I have already discussed this term
in two very different contexts in which it is found. The first was as a sense,
when I referred to it as manodha'tu, discussed in chapter I. We saw there that
in that context its precise meaning and function were not clearly defined
and that many passages had to be considered together in order to extract
some degree of clarity. The second context was manas in the sense both of
mind in general and of thinking, which I discussed in relation to the terms
citta and vin"n"a'pz.We now come to a third use of manas, manomaya.
Manomaya is one of the most obscure terms found in the Pali canon. Not
only can the term can be understood in grammatically different ways but it
is also found in many different contexts, some of which suggest it has a
metaphorical as well as a more literal meaning. I shall discuss the two
implications separately, but we shall see that the metaphorical meaning is
in fact suggested by the more literal use of the term. Leaving aside for the
present the metaphorical meaning, in all but one of the contexts which will
be discussed here, the term manas refers to mind in general rather than
manas as a sense (manodha'tu).But the grammatical ambiguity arises because
not only does maya have different meanings, but as a tappuka compound it
can be taken as a genitive, locative or instrumental. Maya can mean
'consisting of', 'made' or 'originating'. So, if taken as a genitive tappurisa,
the compound can mean 'consisting of/made of the mind'; 'originating in
the mind' if taken as a locative tappurisa; or 'made by the mind' if taken as
an instrumental. In effect the locative and instrumental have the same
 Manomaya I39
meaning: that the mind is the cause of something else coming to be. The
genitive meaning, on the other hand, indicates that the stuff of something
is the mind, and its concern with what something is means that it is an
ontological interpretation of the compound. Both of these meanings of
manomaya are given in the Pali English Dictionar~y,' and both are used by
tran~lators.~ In understanding the term manomaJvaone needs to consider the
implication of these two possible meanings.
The point has already been made, especially in the Introduction and in
chapter v, that it is important to distinguish between what something is
made 05and how it is made: whether a passage is concerned with the
former or the latter. In the Sutta Pi.taka, I have suggested, the prime concern
is with understanding how samsiric existence operates so that one can
understand how to achieve liberation from the cycle of rebirth. Even those
analyses which appear to offer an explanation of what there is, and the
analysis of the person into khandhas is a good example, are intended to assist
in understanding how the human being should be understood to function,
rather than simply as a separate 'self'. There is no suggestion that the
analysis has any ultimate ontological significance: rather, it is notable that
insofar as the analysis of the human being into Wlandas is concerned with
the 'what' of the human being, it is 'what' in the sense of structure rather
than substance that matters; and we have seen that all the khandhas are to
be understood as processes. To achieve liberation it is more important to
understand, for example, that the processes which we think of as the
substance of the body are subject to decay and dissolution, thus emphasis-
ing the body's lack of permanence, than what that substance is. This point
is the subject of one of the stock expressions in Pali: "This is my physical
body, made up of the four great elements.. . and the very nature of it is
impermanence, it is subject to erosion, abrasion, decay and breaking up".3
And it is also notable that in the analysis of the nipakbiandha non-corporeal
bodily processes are given equal emphasis to the more concrete aspects of
the body, as we have seen.
I will discuss the term manomaya in four different contexts. First, I will
consider the first line of the first and second verses of the Dhammapada. In
this context the main question which arises is whether or not manomaya is
being used to indicate a particular ontology. The context also shows the
extent to which Buddhist teachings are concerned with the power of the
mind. Second, I shall briefly refer to rnanomya in an unusual context
where it refers specifically to manas as a sense and not to 'mind' in general.
We shall nevertheless see that here too it is the power of the mind that is
being referred to, if in a different way. Third, I will discuss its use as a
metaphorical synonym for the riipadhitu level in Buddhist cosmology and
how this corresponds to a samsiric mode of existence. In order to under-
stand its use in this context, I will also discuss the fact that in the Sutta
Pibka there is no explicit or implicit ontological discontinuity between what
140 Identity and Experience
one conventionally thinks of as body and mind, riipa and ariipa. On the
contrary, we shall see that the absence of discontinuity directly corresponds
to the way in which cosmological levels metaphorically represent an
individual's spiritual progress. Lastly, I will discuss manomaya in its most
well-known context, that of the ability of those who have attained a certain
level of meditation to create a manomaya body. By extension from its
meaning 'mind-made', manomaya in this context is sometimes interpreted
as 'formed by the magic power of the mind, magically formed'.l And
again one of the main points which arises from this context is the power of
the mind in Buddhist teachings. We shall see that in the concept of
manomaya these two points, the absence of ontological discontinuity
between body and mind, and the power of the mind, are linked. We saw
in the section on manas in chapter v how closely thinking is associated with
volitions and we saw the role they both play in the cyclic causal nexus. In
much of this chapter that association becomes merged and I have not
distinguished between volitions and thinking: to do so would be too
tediously pedantic and difficult to read. What is meant here is the
collective power of the causal nexus as a whole.
In the discussion of the third and fourth contexts in which manomaya is
found, I shall refer repeatedly to the fact that the concepts with which we
are dealing are not exclusively Buddhist. I shall also preface my remarks by
a brief discussion of the terms manomaya and v;jn"a'namaya (literally
'consciousness-made') in the [email protected] more comprehensive comparison
between these concepts as they are understood in Buddhism and as they
occur elsewhere would no doubt be a fruitful area for more extensive
research: many of the concepts are found in other Indian traditions, and
the concept of the mind-made body is also a phenomenon found outside
India. What distinguishes the Buddhist context from the others, however, is
the combination of the Buddha's teaching that karma is volition with his
teaching that the path to liberation consists in the purification of the mind.
It is clear in the Buddhist material that the acquisition and use of a
manomaya body is associated with attaining a certain level on the spiritual
path. In the Upani:adr, by contrast, this point is far from clear.
First, then, I will consider manomaya as it is found in the first line of each
of the first two verses of the Dhammapada. Here manas in the term manomaya
is used in association with dhammii, which is potentially confusing in view of
the association elsewhere in Pali material of the terms manas and dhammi as
sense and sense object. As sense and sense object, these two terms were
discussed in chapter I. In the Dhammapada however, both terms are being
used in their generic sense: manas is being used as 'mind' in general, and
dhmnmi is being used as it is in the tihkkha~formula, discussed in chapter rv.
When these terms are used generically, the precise meaning of the passage
has to be determined from the context. The line in question literally means
something like: "Phenomena are the result of mind (or are preceded by
mind), have mind as their best, are mind-made".= In isolation, this
sentence might be construed as positing an idealistic ontology, that the
phenomena which comprise the world as we know it, dhammi, are nothing
but the mind: the external world is magically created by the mind and
consists of mind. There is an alternative way of interpreting this line,
however, which is, in my opinion, the accurate one. To understand this, we
must look at the rest of the two verses in question. In full, the Pali is:

Manopubbarigama- dhummii manosethi manomayi,

manasi ce padut.hna b h a t i vii karoti v i
tato nam duwdulm anveti cakkarp va vahato padam.

Manopubbarigami dhummii rnanoset.h- manomayii,

manasi ce pasannena bhiisati vii karoti vZ
tato nam s u h m anveti c&yi va anap@inE

Excluding the first lines of these verses, a translation of the rest of them

If a man speaks or acts with a wicked mind, sorrow follows him as a wheel
follows the foot of a draught [animal]. .. if a man speaks or acts with a pure
mind, happiness follows him as a shadow always follows Fim].
The point of these sentences is that one reaps the consequences of one's
actions: just as a wheel which is set in motion by a footed beast follows the
actions of the foot, and just as a shadow always follows the actions of a
man, in just such a way one's future experience is determined by one's
speech and actions now. And one's speech and actions are qualitatively
conditioned by whether one's mind is wicked or good. This corresponds to
the Buddha's definition of karma to which I have already referred: "Karma
is volition: having willed, one acts by means of body, speech and thought".
The whole of the first chapter of the Dhammapada is concerned with this
teaching: that one reaps as one sows, and that sowing is qualitatively
determined by intention.
I mentioned in chapter IV that when used in a non-technical sense
'mind' (whatever term is being used) indicates general mental activity. So
the first lines of the first two verses in fact have the following meaning:
dhamma' are an individual's experiences - everything, in fact, that is a part of
the individual's life. And qualitatively those experiences follow from one's
mental activity: rnanopubbarigami; it is mental activity which principally
governs the nature of the life: manosetfiii; and it is in mental activity that
what follows originates: manomaya. To interpret this sentence ontologically
is co'mpletely to ignore the context in which it is found and to divorce it
from the subject matter of the entire chapter. To convey the meaning of
manas in this context accurately, it is better to translate it as a verbal noun,
denoting the activity or process of the mind: 'thinking'.6 In English this
142 Identity and Experience
gives us a less ambiguous sentence: "The individual's experiences are
preceded by thinking, have thinking as their best, originate in thinking". It
is the reification of manas as 'mind' which tends to mislead here.
There is a similar passage in the Aliguttara JV&>a which states:
Whatever states (dhammi) are unwholesome, participate in unwholesomeness,
are associated with unwholesomeness, all such things are preceded by
thinking. One's thinking arises as the first of those states: the unwholesome
states follow. Whatever states are wholesome, participate in wholesomeness,
are associated with wholesomeness, all such things are preceded by thinking.
One's thinking arises as the first of those states: the wholesome states f01low.~
Once again, this illustrates the role thinking plays in the karmic process.
We saw some similar contexts above in the section on manas in chapter v
where manas was associated with the activity of the mind.
In chapter IV, I referred to a passage which stated that one's future
rebirth can be influenced by one's volition^.^ I suggested there that it was
illustrating the binding power of volitions. The first two verses of the
Dhammapada, and the Ariguttara Nika'ya passage which we are discussing here,
also serve to illustrate the same power. But here it is referred to in more
general terms as originating in the mind, or being the magical power of the
mind, manomaya, rather than as cetana' or samkha'ra'. And here the power is
discussed with direct reference to its ethical dimension and can be summed
up by stating that good experiences originate in a wholesome mind and,
conversely, bad experiences originate in an unwholesome mind.
The second context in which manomaya occurs is when it is used to imply
samszric perception, or the mundane life of samsira, in contrast to the
lokuttara nature of liberation. Such a context is found in the SaEyatana
Samyutta of the Samyutta NikQa, and here samsiric perception is linked to
mands as the sixth sense (i.e. manodha'tu). The context is a teaching on the six
senses (referred to as phmQatanii). Untamed, unguarded, unwatched and
unrestrained, they are the bearers of ill. Conversely, when they are well
tamed, well guarded, well watched and well restrained, they are the bearers
of happines~.~ The text proceeds to give examples of the dangers to which
a bhikkhu is subjected by each of the senses and in what sense they should be
guarded. Through the eye, for example, there is the danger of finding the
appearance of things delightful or disgusting, and one therefore has to
restrain one's desire for sights which are delightful. Similarly, one has to
restrain one's tendency to be led astray by sweet sounds. When it comes to
rnanodhitu, the Pali states:
Papaiicmaiiiiii itaritarii narii,
papaiicayantii upvanti saiiiiim
manomayap gehusitaiica subbum
panda neWchamma~2~tam injrati.lo
 Manomaya I43
This verse was discussed in chapter 111 with reference to the term
PaparZca. It means:
Men who have conceptions of manifoldness of some kind go on separating
things when apperceiving; but [eventually] he [a bhikkhu] drives out every-
thing that is mind-made and to do with the mundane life and proceeds to a
life of renunciation.
The term manomaya here clearly refers to the fact that all samsiric
phenomena are processed by the manodhitu. In other words, the subjective
experience of the mundane life is conditioned by (maya) the mind (manas).
And the bhikkhu is to detach himself from such mundane life and turn
himself instead to the lokzlttara life which will lead to liberation.
This context in which manomaya is found appears different from the one
discussed above because here the term manomaya has been attached to the
incoming raw data of samsiric experience and not the thinking process as
such: the former data precede discursive thought, and the latter might be
described as the mind's processing of that data. But this passage gives us a
clear indication of the link between manodhitu and the mental processes in
general; and it suggests that the power of the mind in fact operates through
every level of the mental processes as a whole, from manodhh to thinking or
volitions. We have seen in chapter I that the need for the senses to be
guarded does not mean that it is in the senses themselves that unwanted
volitions originate. But manodhitu is the door through which samstira is
subjectively experienced. It is for this reason that experience acquires the
epithet manomaya, and also for this reason manodhitu can be understood as
the source, as it were, of the volitional process which determines one's
future lives.
There is, nevertheless, one further point which needs to be made
concerning this context in which the term manomaya is found. We have
seen that even liberating insight involves the use of the mind and we have
also seen that liberating insight has to be known: in one context identifying
such insight was referred to as the highest function of the safiiiikhandha.
This would seem to suggest that the turning of the mind towards lokuttara
rather than mundane things does not mean that the activity of manodhitu
ceases completely but that it would have some supra-sensory activity such
as was suggested in chapter I. So the reference in this SaFyatana Samyutta
context to the driving out of that which is mind-made is intended to be
figurative rather than literal. As with the teaching about the other senses,
the point is that one should be on one's guard not to be entranced by
samsiric experiences, but should instead be concerned with that which is
conducive to liberation. One might put this point differently and say that
the power of the mind is to be reorientated." This process was implied in
chapter IV where we saw that volitions can be used to eradicate other
volitions.
I44 Identity and Experience
The third context in which I will discuss manomaya is when it is used as
an abstract synonym for the cosmological level of the nipadhtu. I will also
consider the relationship between riipa and ariipa and the sigrdicance of this
relationship for the subject of this chapter. This is closely linked with the
fourth of the contexts in which I will discuss manomaya, which is when it
refers to the ability of those who have mastered a certain level of
meditation to create what is called a manomaya body deliberately. First,
though, a brief outline of the way in which relevant subjects are understood
in Vedic material, mainly the early Upani~ads,is helpful by way of
background.
I have already referred in this chapter to the place in Buddhist teachings
of the power of the mind, and I shall return to this point in the discussion
below on the remaining two contexts in which manomaya is found in canon-
ical material. The concept of the power of the mind was not new in the
Buddha's teachings, however. It is alluded to in the Hymn of Creation in
the Rg Veda, for example, where desire (or volition) is stated to be the first
seed of the mind.'* The power of the mind is the motivating factor in the
ParipimavcZda of chapter VI of the ChcZndogya Upanipd, where Being creates
the universe by thinking "Would that I were many, let me procreate
myself".13 And in many other Upani~adiccosmogonies the mind plays an
instrumental role.l4
The way these Upani;adic references to the power of the mind are
expressed serves to emphasise the point made above that the reification of
the term 'mind' can be misleading. In the UpaniSads as in the Buddhist
material the power of the mind originates in the process of thinking, or
willing. This important point underlies my use of the expression 'the power
of the mind' throughout this chapter.
In spite of the fact that the mind plays such an important cosmogonic
role in Edic material, the Brahmanical religion recorded in those Vedic texts
is usually understood to be based on ritual actions. Indeed, the rationale of
the Vedic sacrificial religion was that the universe and all individuals
depended for continued existence, and the way in which they continued to
exist, on the correct performance of ritual actions. To this day, the
orthodox Brahmanical tradition teaches that such ritual actions are crucial
to the nature of one's future existence. In this causal process there is little or
no ethical dimension as we know it. When Yajfiavalkya states "One
becomes good by good action, bad by bad acti~n",'~ this refers to the fact
that the details of the physical (and verbal) actions must be performed
correctly. If they are not, bad (i.e. wrong) results will follow. In another
passage where Yajiiavalkya gives the same teaching, however, we also see
the suggestion that it is the power of the mind which determines one's
future rebirth. He states first: 'As one acts and behaves, so one becomes.
The doer of good becomes good, the doer of bad becomes bad".16 He goes
on to state:
 Manomaya I45

Some say that a person is made by desire. As is one's desire, so is one's

intention (kratu);as is one's intention, so one performs actions; as is the action
he performs, so he becomes."
In spite of the introduction of the term 'desire', there is still no
implication of any moral teaching here, As Collins puts it:
'Desire' here should not be taken in the general moral sense with which we
are familiar...; rather it is that concentrated attention within the sacrificial
ritual, focussed on the desired object of sacrifice, which was held to be a
necessary condition of attaining it.''
What Yajfiavalkya does in using the term 'desire' is explicitly to suggest
that the power of the mind is instrumental in obtaining the object of the
sacrifice.lg
More usually in Vedic material, and in classical Indian religions which
are based on the Upani;ads, this power of the mind is associated with
knowledge rather than intention in the sense of volitions. Knowledge of a
thing gives power over it, and the importance of knowledge underlies the
sacrificial rationale: it is knowledge which gives the ritual actions their
power. The way this was thought to work in the early sacrificial religion is
discussed in some detail by Collins, and I need not go into it here.20What
is of interest to us here is the early suggestion that knowledge of something
through meditation can have a transformative effect on the individual
meditator. The principle is found as early as the Satapatha Briihmapz, which
states: "One becomes whatever one meditates on".21And it is referred to in
an early Upani;adic passage on meditation, where Gargya instructs
AjataSatru as follows:
Verily, I meditate on him [Brahman] as a likeness. He who meditates on
him in this way, to him comes what is like, not what is unlike; from him
arises what is like him.22
The suggestion that one becomes what one meditates on is also of
cosmological significance. The UpanGalis teach that Brahman is everything.
So it follows that if one meditates on Brahman one becomes identified with
everything. This is generally expressed in the microcosmic/rnacrocosrnic
formula that &an is Brahman, and knowledge (in the sense of experience)
of this constitutes liberation. One passage in the Byhadtiragaka Upani~ad
identifies Ztman/Brahman with all things. It states: "The self (5tman)is
indeed Brahman; it is consciousness-made, mind-made and breath-
made".23The passage continues: "[The self] is sight-made, hearing-made,
earth-made, water-made, air-made, space-made, light- and no-light-made
... made of all".24This passage clearly indicates an absence of ontological
discontinuity between the different things of ( or by) which one is made and
implies that in identifjring with Brahman one identifies with everything.
146 Identity and Experience
The first three of the things of/by which one is made according to this
Brhadiiranyaka Upani~ad passage, that one is consciousness-made
(uifiiinamaya), mind-made (manomaya) and breath-made (priinamaya), are
referred to elsewhere in the UpaniSads in a way which suggests that they
constitute a threefold analysis of the levels of human existence. The
Taittiqa UpaniSad states that one has as it were three layers of bodily
existence. First, it states: "Breath is the life of all beings", and this life is
referred to as the "bodily self".25This is not so far-fetched if one recalls that
breathing is part of the rzipakkhandha, and that u@u is one of the primary
characteristics of riipa. One might suggest that (together with heat) it is the
least dense mode of nipa itself. The similarity between Upani~adicdescrip-
tions of the pr&as and the canonical description of the element u@u was
discussed in chapter I. The Taittinia Upani~adgoes on:
Verily, different from and within that which is breath-made is a self which is
mind-made. By that [mind-made self] this [bodily self] is filled. This, verily,
has the form of a person; according to that [bodily] personal form is this
[mind-made self] with the form of a person.26
Of the third level, the text states:
Verily, different from and within that [self) which is mind-made is a self
which is consciousness-made. By that [consciousness-made self) is this
[mind-made self] filled. This, verily, has the form of a person; according to
that [mind-made self's] personal form is this [consciousness-madeself) with
the form of a p e r ~ o n . ~ '
This is a clear reference to one's existence at different levels of density
and subtlety, ranging from bodily or solid existence through other exis-
tences which have form but are without solidity. This is supported by a
more general passage in the ChGndo~aUpaniSad, which states that food
(anna), water (GPO) and heat (tejo) exist in three modes: coarse (sthauistha),
medium (madhyama) and subtlest (aniStha).28It is from this passage that
~ a l i k a r aconcludes that everything is threefold in this way.2gWe shall see
below that in Buddhism the teaching that the path to liberation is a
progressive purification of the mind corresponds clearly to cosmological
levels which can be defined according to degrees of density or subtlety. In
corresponding to an intermediate subtle level of cosmological existence,
manornaya therefore also corresponds to an intermediate stage on the path
to liberation. Though we have seen in the &hadiiranyaka UpaniSad passage
above that there is no ontological discontinuity between these and other
levels or aspects of existence, the teaching in the Upani~adsis completely
unsystematic, and it is unclear whether any comparable correspondence in
terms of 'levels' in both microcosm and macrocosm can be made. From the
little evidence there is, it seems more likely that the three UpaniSadic bodies
co-exist at all times and the range between dense and subtle represents the
 Manomaya I47
range between the outer, empirical, self and the inner, 'real', self. In prin-
ciple, this is suggested by the emphasis in the UpaniJads on the 'inner
controller' and the 'self within the heart'. It is also more specifically
suggested in another passage in the Brhadiranyaka UpaniJad. In answer to
the question "Which is the self?", it states:
The person [selfl is the consciousness-made [selfl which is among the
breaths [that is, the bodily self, according to the Taittiqa Upani~adpassage
quoted above]; it is the light within the heart.30
The UpaniJad goes on to state: "There is an intermediate third state, that
of being in sleep [or dream]".31 In this context, the term manomaya is not
used to describe the intermediate level of sleep/dream, but three levels are
nevertheless indicated. There is a lengthy description of the freedom in the
sleep/dream state to do whatever one wishes.32This is remarkably similar
to descriptions of the abilities acquired by the Buddhist who creates a
manomaya body, as we shall see. Though in classical Indian thought dreams
are not considered to be delusions or unreal (except insofar as any or all of
samsiiric perception is), they are not an ability or mode of existence which is
acquired with spiritual progress. It might, however, be that the dream state
is used to exemplify the creative power of the mind, in which case it could
correspond to the existence in a manomaya body of a Buddhist bhikWlu who
has achieved a certain level of meditation.
That the dream state is being used as an analogy for a level at which one
exists seems more likely in view of the fact that the UpaniJads give an alter-
native threefold analysis of the individual. This is the bodily self (Sacra), the
dream self (svapna itma) and the self in (dreamless)sleep (supta$ ... svapnam na
v i i n i t ~ )These
. ~ ~ are three levels of the empirical self, and they act as the
bearer of the deathless, bodiless (real) self.34Here the dream state might
suggest a level at which the power of the mind is able to act creatively. This
state is not unreal, but nor does it constitute absolute reality: it is an inter-
mediate state, between the physical body and the cessation of (samsiric)
mental activity, symbolised by dreamless sleep.
Explicit reference to the fact that there is a subtle self or body is rare in
the early UpaniJadr. So far as I am aware, the term liriga Sacra, for example,
occurs only once in the early Upani~ads.~~ It occurs more (though it is still
not common) in later U p a n i p ~ hand
, ~ ~it is frequently used by Sankara in his
commentaries on the Upani~ads.In the early UpaniJads, it is the terms
manomaya and viiiinamaya (and possibly dreams) which suggest the subtle
self. But the theory of the subtle self and its constitution is not well devel-
oped in the early UpaniSads, and where these terms occur they often do not
fit the threefold model suggested above in the passages cited from the
Taittimja and Brhadiiranyaka Upan4adr. Two passages seem to invert the levels
of manomaya and viiiinamaya suggested above. For example, manomaya (not
vciiinamaya) is used elsewhere in the Brhadirayaka Upani~adin a passage
148 Identity and Experience
which states: "This person who is mind-made is of the nature of light, is
real, is within the heart ...".37And in another passage in the same Upani;ad,
u;jn"iinamaya (not manomaya) is used of the mode of a person when he falls
asleep. Then, the passage states, he functions as a "consciousness-made
person".38 Here it is the consciousness-made person who can do whatever
he pleases in dreams:
When he moves about in dreams, these are his worlds: then he becomes as it
were a great king, as it were a great brahman. He as it were enters high and
low. As a great king can move around in his country as he pleases taking
[with him] his people, so also here this [consciousness-made person], taking
with him his breaths, moves about in his own body as he pleases.39
Elsewhere, it is the priinas which appear to be the subtle selKqO
In his translation of the principal Upan+ads, Radhakrishnan states: "In
the dream state the self is identified with the subtle body",41but he does not
give any textual references to support this statement. And we do not know
whether he assumes that the concept of the subtle body incorporates both
manomaya and uijn"iinamaya bodies. Another passage in the Brhadiiranyaka
Upani;ad adds to the confusion when it states that the subtle self has manas
"attached to it" (nis~ktam).~~ In his commentary on this passage, Saxikara
ignores the implication of nisaktam and states: "the subtle body is called
mind because mind is the principal factor of the subtle body".'l ~alikara
clearly identifies the manomaya body with the subtle body. But the context of
this passage does not indicate that this is the dream-body. The passage
discusses what happens to someone when they die and are reborn. It states
that the subtle self "comes again from that world to this world for [fresh]
This is another passage where manomaya is used where one might
expect to find v;;in"iinamaya.The situation is further complicated by the fact
that in his bh&a on the Chindogyo Upani;ad, ~ a n k a r aidentifies the priina
Sa6ra with the subtle body.45
From all these references, we can conclude that though there is some
evidence in the Upani;ads that the individual exists on three levels of density,
this evidence is far from clear, and there are many confusing or contradic-
tory references. The three levels seem to co-exist for all people and do not
appear to be acquired through the power of the mind, or meditation.
Through meditation one can, however, become identified with whatever
one meditates on, and it appears that there is no ontological discontinuity
between levels of existence.
I turn now to a consideration of manomaya in the third and fourth
contexts in which it is found in the Sutta Pi!aka. The main concern of this
book has been an investigation of the fivefold analysis of the human being
into khandhas. We have seen that these are divided into one rzipakkhandha,
which is the living body of the individual, and four ariipakkhandhas, which
collectively represent the mental faculties of the individual. Though when
 Manomaya I49
considered together this analysis appears to conform to the convention
that the individual comprises body and mind, in Buddhism, this apparent
dualism does not have the ontological significance it usually carries in
dualistic religions or philosophies. As I have already mentioned, the
distinction between the bodily and the mental khandhas in Buddhism is not
intended to suggest that human beings consist of two ontologically distinct
substances, one physical and the other mental. A later Buddhist school, the
Yoggcara, interpreted this absence of distinction in an ontological sense: to
mean that 'all is mind'. In my opinion this conclusion cannot be drawn
from the material in the Sutta Pi@&. It has been a constant theme of this
book that the teaching of early Buddhism is not concerned with offering an
ontological analysis as such: it is concerned with offering whatever infor-
mation and guidance are necessary to enable people to achieve liberating
insight and so escape the cycle of saysiifricexistence. Such teaching does not
include an analysis of whether the actual stuff of anything is mind (whatever
that might be) or anything else. It does, however, include information
concerning the nature of things, or the mode in which things exist. This
teaching is contained in the metaphysics implicit in the tilakkhapz formula
and the doctrine ofpaticcasarnuppiida. From these, we know that all things
are dependently originated and as such are impermanent, unsatisfactory
and do not occur as (separate/independent) 'selves'.46
This means that what it is important to understand for the purposes of
liberating insight is that whether something is physical or mental it is of
precisely the same nature. Whether it be solid or liquid, apperceived or
conceived, it is equally dependently originated. This is why Buddhist
meditation exercises, such as those described in the Satipatthina Suttas,
include as objects for meditation the body itself, thoughts, feelings, and
abstract conceptual factors such as doctrinal teachings." The exercises are
to be similarly practised in each case and the point of each of them is the
same: the realisation that none of these things should be thought of in
terms of their separateness or selfhood, subjectively or objectively. We have
also discussed what appear to be widely differing constituents of the human
being: the physical body as described in passages about the riipakkhandha,
ideas as described in passages about the saiiikhandha, and volitions as a
product of the samkhiirakkhandha, for example. In spite of the apparent
differences between them, all of these are samkhiras in the metaphysical
sense: they are all conditioned. One might suggest, therefore, that insofar
as our experience leads us to think in terms of the substance of things, all
we can know about them from Buddhist teachings is that we experience a
variation in the degree of density and/or in the behaviour of similarly
conditioned phenomena. What the phenomena are, in the ultimate sense, is
irrelevant to attaining liberating insight. Even the four mahzbhiiti can be
understood in such a way: it is hardly credible, for example, that the solid
parts of the body literally consist of earth, pa$aut: The point is their solidity
150 Identity and Experience
or extension. And the same is true for fluidity (ipo), heat (40) and motion
(vriy): these abstract meanings are more relevant than the literal meanings
of these terms (water, fire and wind). These primary constituents of riipa are
not types of substance, but constitute different modes or states which come
together as derived riipa. And all of these primary constituents of the
rzipakkhandha are samkhiras: the more detailed information refers to their
position on what Johansson calls the "spectrum of density or solidity".48All
phenomena on the spectrum could also be called different modes of reality.
In Buddhism, all sarpkhira-s, whether solid or abstract, are different modes of
reality: none is more real than any of the others.49This is perhaps easier for
us to grasp in view of the discovery in modern physics that matter is a gross
form of energy. And the analogy of ice, water and steam also illustrates the
absence of ontological discontinuity between different modes of existing on
the spectrum of density.
This spectrum is reflected in Buddhist cosmology which, though it is
only fully evolved in the commentarial tradition and in the Visuddhimagga
of Buddhaghosa, is unsystematically present in the canon. Briefly, this is
divided into three spheres: the sphere of desire (klimadhatu),the sphere of
form (riipadhitu) and the sphere of formlessness (ariipadhitu).The first and
third of these spheres have various complex levels.50The first, the
klimadhitu, is comprised of the various heavens and hells in which beings
are reborn in what in Buddhist terms are gross riipa bodies. The middle
sphere, the riipadhitu, is the level at which live certain beings (often called
devas) which have subtle rzipa bodies. The third sphere, the ariipadhitu, is
stratified according to the more rarified levels of meditation which are
attained by advanced disciples. It is inhabited by those who died just
before gaining liberating insight; they dwell at an appropriate level of pure
meditation and at this stage they are formless.
Gombrich calls the arqadhitu "an elaborate spacial metaphor for
spiritual pr~gress".~' In fact one might say that all three of the dhitus are
spacial metaphors for spiritual progress. The kimadhitu is inhabited by
those whose actions are still impure or 'gross' enough to keep them in the
cyclic world of sensual desire: it correlates with the gross physical body.
Though the riipadhitu is inhabited by the devas mentioned above, who
derive from Maha B r a h m i ~ it, ~is~ also inhabited by those who have
performed an important service or who have achieved a certain level of
meditation. And though such individuals possess a riipa body, there is
canonical evidence that it is subtle Spa: as it were mid-way between gross
riipa and the formlessness of the acpa level. In the fourth point raised in
this chapter we shall also see that this subtle body, which is called
manomaya, can also be acquired or created by some individuals who still
inhabit the kiimadhitu, and that the ability to create such a body is acquired
on the spiritual path.53The metaphor of the spiritual path underlines the
continuity between the spheres. And just as for Buddhists the path
 Manomaya 151

represents the progressive purification of the mind, so the spheres repre-

sent corresponding degrees of density or subtlety.54It is notable that just as
liberation means the cessation of sap.siric existence, so the achievement of
insight itself does not have a corresponding cosmological stratum.
Collins discusses the relation between Buddhist cosmology and psycholo-
gy, calling it psychological cosmology.55He tabulates the cosmological
spheres of early Buddhism and correlates them with meditative levels.56This
has been mentioned in chapter v. The correspondence between cosmology
and psychology, and the lack of ontological discontinuity, is again evidenced
by the fact that experience of a certain meditative level identifies the subject
with that level of reality, enabling the meditator to manipulate it. We have
also seen a somewhat different, and spiritually humble, example of this
principle in chapter 111. There, we referred to canonical passages in which
bhikkhus were encouraged to develop spiritually advantageous 'concepts',
such as impermanence and selflessness. This practice would contribute to
the bhikkhu's realisation of these insights: in experiencing the psychological
ideas he eventually identfies with them cosmologically.
The psychological/cosmological transmutation which comes about
through meditation is the same as the rationale behind the practice of
classical yoga," and we saw examples of this process above in the Satapatha
Brihmana and the Byhadiranyaka Upani~ad.In these three examples, the
transmutation of the meditator is different from that in Buddhism. In
them, the point is to become the same as the stuff on which one is medi-
tating (usually Brahman); in Buddhism, the point is to experience what is
meant by selflessness. The former imply an ontological transmutation, of
what one is. The latter is an epistemic transmutation, to know how one
operates. In stating only that one realises how one is, Buddhist teachings
leave unanswered the question of whether one thereby becomes identified
with everything.
The term dhatu, which we have just seen used to refer to cosmological
levels, is used elsewhere in the Sutta maka to refer to a classification of the
four mahibhiiti, (earth (pa~haui), water (ipo), wind (ugu) and fire (tejo)),plus
space (ihsa) and consciousness (vin"n"ip~).~~ One can see that here, too, there
is a progression from the grossest or densest element to the subtlest. And
their classification together as elements indicates their congruity in all other
respects: consciousnessness is not categorically distinct from earth. The fact
that there are no category distinctions is further emphasised in this Sutta,
which is called the Bahudhituka Sutta, when the term dhitu is applied in like
manner to processes such as the senses, to abstract notions such as comfort
and discomfort, happiness and unhappiness, harmfulness and harmless-
ness, and to the three cosmological realms, as well as to the six elements
just mentioned.59
There is in the Sutta PiGaka an alternative threefold division of the
degrees of density of phenomena to that of the cosmological dhitus, and it
152 Identity and Experience
is here that we find the term manomaya introduced in this context. In the
Poghapida Suttu of the Diiha JVikd'ya, the Buddha explains to Potthapada that
there are three modes in which an individual (atta-patilibha)can exist in
~amsZra.~O The term I have translated 'an individual', atta-patilibha, is
uncommon and its meaning is not generally established. It literally means
'the taking on of a self'. The commentary glosses it as attabhii~a.~'
The term
attabhiua, which literally means 'becoming a self', has several meanings,
given by the Critical Pali Dictionary as follows:
I. (abstract) existence of a soul ... 2. The existence as an individual, proper
nature; but most frequently concrete: a living being, or its bodily form, per-
son, personality, i.e. the various appearance of the att;, opp. the continual
existence of the attii.. . (among words denoting 'body').62
In the context found here, it must surely have the meaning of existence
as an individual in samsira, which is, in effect, existence as a conventional
self, because the three terms o&rika, manomgya and aepa undoubtedly refer
respectively to gross and subtle form, and to absence of form. The com-
mentary glosses the three as corresponding to khmabhava, rcpabhava and
arripabhava respectively." This would preclude the possibility of attabhiva
having the more concrete meaning of 'body'. So here manomaya has a
metaphorical meaning which corresponds to the cosmological level of the
riipadh&: it is existence at a level which is between that of gross riipa, which
corresponds to the kiimadhiitu, and that of formlessness, which corresponds
to the arripadhiitu. It is existence as it were at the intermediate level of subtle
riipa, the riipadhZtu. In the Sutta, the Buddha explains that the first has form,
is characterised by the four great elements, and is nourished by solid food.
The second also has form, but it originates in the mind; here, one has all
the limbs of a (gross) physical body and has supernormal senses. The third
is without form and originates at conceptual levels.64
We see from the Pali that in this passage the three modes of existence
all relate to the atta-patilibha. Indeed, the Buddha explicitly states that he
teaches a doctrine which leads to the abandoning of the conventional
notion of selfhood in each of these existence^.^^ They therefore might be
said to represent the degrees of density in which one can have samsiric
existence. And once again the absence of discontinuity between gross,
subtle and formless is emphasised.
We noted above that in Buddhism the anipadhiittu is a spacial metaphor
for spiritual progress, and I suggested that all the cosmological levels could
be considered in the same way. This is supported in the commentary on
the Poflzapida Sutta passage, where spiritual progress, by way of the attain-
ment of certain levels of meditation, is clearly linked with the three spheres.
Significantly, we also see from the Pali that the cosmological term
brahmaloka is explicitly identified with meditational levels. The commentary
states that kimabhava refers to those who live at any of the levels between
 Manomaya I53
hell and a certain type of god (the deuas) by taking on a gross (o@rika)riipa
body.66 Riipabhaua refers to those who live with a subtle riipa (manomaya)
body, and this level corresponds to a range of spiritual attainments from the
first jhiina level right up to the highest brahmaloka level of meditation.
Ariipabhava refers to those who live with an ariipa body, and this level
corresponds to meditational attainments ranging from the brahmaloka
known as the sphere of infinite space up to the brahmaloka known as the
sphere which is neither conceptual nor non-c~nceptual.~~
The BrahmajrZla Sutta suggests that the intermediate level is also called the
'sphere of radiance'.68 It states that beings here are "mind-made and
radiating light from themsel~es".~~ I referred to this passage in chapter v
and suggested there that as individuals progress on the spiritual path, so
they are increasingly described in terms of light and radiance. It would
appear that this radiance is apparent at the intermediate level of manomaya:
the lightness which results from spiritual progress corresponds to the
subtlety (or lightness) of the level at which one exists.
The clearest canonical reference to the distinction between riipa and
ariipa devm and their association with psycho-cosmological levels is found in
the Majhima NikQa. Those devas which are riipa are described as manomaya
and those which are ariipa are described as ~an"n"irnaya.'~ In discussing this
passage in chapter 111,it was suggested that though the passage itself is not
concerned to make clear whether or not such gods actually exist, the
description indicates the difference between gods which have form, which
can be apperceived, and gods without form, which can only be conceived
of Elsewhere in the Sutta Pitaka, however, the existence of all such devas is
taken for granted, and this passage serves to confirm the point that bodies
which are manomaya do not consist ofthe mind, but have form, riipa, which
is created by the mind. Ariipa gods, on the other hand, exist at a level which
can only be referred to as abstract, and correspond to ariipa levels of medi-
tation. Like the commentary on the Potthapida Sutta, the commentary on
this passage also confirms that the subtle manomaya body of the riipa deua
requires a certain meditative state to have been achieved in the same way
that existence at the level of the ariipa deva does. Riipa and arzipa deuas, it
states, are the product of the nips and ariipajhinas respectively.'' Here the
attainment of a certain (unspecified in the commentary) riipajhina is the
prerequisite for the creation of a mind-made riipa deva; and the attainment
of a certain (again unspecified) ariipajjhina is the prerequisite for the
existence of an abstract or conceptual ariipa deva.
In the Anguttara NikQa there is another passage which connects deva
levels with meditational attainment and spiritual progress. Here, Sariputta
is relating to the bhikkhu Udayin that if a bhikkhu who has achieved the
meditative level of saiin"iivedayitanirodha does not subsequently achieve
liberation (no an"iiamiiriidheyya: literally, 'does not accomplish wisdom') while
in this life (ditthe va dhamme: literally, 'in a visible condition'), he will be
154- Identity and Experience
reborn higher than (atikamma: literally, 'go beyond') the deua community
which feed on solid food and live (upapanno: literally, 'arise') in a mind-made
body.'* The prerequisites are that the b h M u shall have completely achieved
morality, concentration and wisdom, and shall have entered and emerged
from the state of safifii~edayitanirodha.~~ Three times Sariputta relates to
Udayin that this is so.74When Udayin repeatedly refuses to believe him,
Sariputta appeals to the Buddha, who asks Udayin who he thinks has a
mind-made body.75Udayin replies that it is those devas who are formless
and conceptual, which, the Buddha states, is the word of an ignorant
Sariputta was right: if a bhiWchu has achieved morality, concentration and
wisdom and has entered and emerged from safiiiivedayitanirodha, but
nevertheless does not achieve liberating insight, he will be reborn with a
mind-made body at a level higher than the community of nips devas who
feed on solid food.
This passage seems to suggest that the manomaya, or rfipadhitu, level is
complex (in the same way the kiimadhah and anipadhiitu levels are): there are
both those devas who feed on solid food, and a higher, or perhaps more
subtle, level beyond that. In stating that those who have experienced
saiiffivedayitanirodha go to the riipadhZtu, it is possible that Sariputta is
referring to those who have experienced saiiEiivedayitanirodha without first
experiencing the arfipajinas, since those who are proficient in the
arzipajhinas would be reborn in the arzipadhitu. Udayin perhaps does
presume that one who has experienced safifiivedayitanirodha has also first
experienced the ariipajhinas, but misuses the term manomaya. In any event,
Udayin is told he is an ignorant fool to confuse the two levels of manomaya
and ariipadhitu.
The implication of this passage is that even if a bhikkhu has attained the
highest meditational level of saiifiivedayitanirodha,the next rebirth will be in
the rzipadhitu unless he has experienced the ariipajhinas. And we also see
from the passage that there is the added proviso that the meditational
achievement is accompanied by the proper following of the Eightfold Path
(summed up in the three terms sila, samiidhi and pafifiq. This is a further
indication of the link between rebirth and spiritual progress: the bhikkhu
must be spiritually accomplished in all respects. Only if he is accomplished
in this way does meditational attainment achieve a corresponding future
level of existence if he falls short of liberating insight.
Elsewhere we read that the process can be reversed: those with a subtle
body can revert to having a solid body if they feast on the taste of the earth
and feed on it and are nourished by it for a long time; to the extent that they
thus feed, their bodies become solid.77This passage is part of the Aggafifia
Suttanta, and describes how the world begins to r e - e v o l ~ e .From ~ ~ its
unevolved state the process is one of gradual solidification. The final stage
is when, tasting the earth with their fingers, the subtle beings are overcome
by the taste and this brings about desire.79Here we have a figurative account
 Manomaya I55
of the way in which false notions of separate selfhood, which are the
corner-stone of the ignorance upon which desire is based according to
Buddhist teachings, bring about solidification: and it is precisely the
opposite of the process of liberation. Though the Sutta is concerned with
the genesis of the social order and not with a regression in the progress of
an individual, it supports the point being made in this chapter that
ignorance corresponds to solidity and insight corresponds, according its
degree, to subtlety or formlessness.
We read in the Satipattziina Sutta that in the practice of sati on one's state
of mind (citta), one of the states of mind that one might have achieved is
that of having "become great" ( m a h ~ a t a )The. ~ ~commentary on this states
that this means that one has experienced thejhiinm, either riipa or ariipa. At
the level of the kiimadhiitu, one's mental state is one of not having become
great.81 This suggests that the experience of meditation makes the
individual subtler in a way which is described as the mind expanding. This
clearly fits with the suggestion that the process is one of liberation: the
metaphor is that at its most dense or ignorant level, existence is contracted
or restricted; at its most subtle level, it expands to the point where it is free
from restriction. This point was suggested in chapter v.
In the Ariguttara Nihiya there is a passage which clearly indicates that the
term riipa used in connection with the term manomaya refers to subtle (not
gross) riipa. The passage states that Kakudha, a personal attendant of
Mahamoggallana, has just died and been reborn with a mind-made body.
The form of the mind-made body is such that it fills two or three villages in
Magadha.82 In this instance, one can clearly infer that the riipa of
Kakudha's body is subtle because the text goes on to state that in spite of its
size it does not cause harm either to himself or to others.83In this rebirth,
Kakudha is a deua, the text states.84There is no explicit mention in this
passage that Kakudha has achieved an appropriate level of meditation. We
cannot, therefore, tell whether this achievement has been taken for
granted, or whether his service as Mahamogallana's personal attendant is
sufficient for the attainment of a spiritually advanced rebirth.
To sum up the third point in this chapter, manomaya is found in the Sutta
Pi!aka in contexts which show that it represents the cosmological level of the
riipadha'tu, which is the intermediate level between gross rzipa and
formlessness, characterised by subtle riipa. The stratification of the
cosmological levels in turn corresponds to spiritual progress: the
spectrum ranging from the most dense form level to the level of
formlessness parallels the disciple's progress from ignorance to insight.
Being at an intermediate level on the spectrum of density, the attainment of
a manomaya existence represents an intermediate level of spiritual progress.
The fourth of my contexts for discussing manomaya is when it refers to the
ability of those who have mastered a certain level of meditation to create a
mind-made body. As the attainment of a certain meditational level in one
 156 Identity and Experience
life results in rebirth at the nipadha'tu, or rnanmayn, level in a subsequent life,
a bhiMu may come to understand this link and use it to affect the mode in
which he exists in his present birth. He learns the principle of this at an
early stage in his meditative practice. We read, for example, that in the first
jhina, which arises from detachment (vivekaja),a bhiWchu "drenches, saturates,
permeates and suffuses this same body with the happiness8=and joy which
arise from detachment; there is no part of this whole body which is not
filled with the happiness and joy which arise from deta~hment".~~ From this
passage, we see that in meditation the bhiWGhu is able to affect his body. At
more advanced levels of meditation, he is able deliberately to create a
subtle body while he is living in a gross nipa body. This ability is described
in the Simaiiiiaphala Suttu of the @ha JVi&ya. The b M u must have attained
what is referred to as the meditative level of the fourthjhina (elsewhere
called the fourth rzipajjhina), which is characterised by equanimity and
purity of mindfulness, and is without pleasure or pain.87In some contexts in
the Pali canon, the four nipdjjh6na.s precede four aru'pajhiinas,and one has to
be proficient in all eightjha'nas before liberating insight can be achieved.88
But in this DQha JVikiiya passage, it is clear that the fourth ripajhtina
represents the culmination of meditative practice, and insight is attained
from this level. Prior to liberating insight, however, the bhikkhu progressively
acquires various other insights and powers. Each of these is enumerated in
the text and will be discussed shortly.
According to this Sutta, the first result of attaining the fourthjhina is that
the bhikkhu is able to purify his mind sufficiently to see clearly the relation-
ship between his body and his consciousness: this passage was referred to in
chapter v. With his mind so purified, the text states, he is then able to
"apply and bend down his thoughts to the magic creation of a mind-made
body" and "from this body, he magically creates another mind-made body,
having form and all the [corresponding] limbs and parts and with
supernormal senses (~hinindnyam)".~~ According to the Critical Pali Dictionaly,
ahinindnjam means 'without defect of any (sense)-fac~lty'.~~ Buddhaghosa
suggests that it has this meaning when he glosses the term in two places as
paripunnindriyagland avikal-indr~ya.~* I have used the term 'supernormal'
because if the context is concerned with a magically created mind-made
body then it would seem likely that such perfected senses would also in
some sense be 'supernormal'. We shall see below that the use of supernor-
mal (dibba - 'divine') senses is referred to in this passage, and if the ability to
behave in such a way is acquired at a relatively advanced stage of the
spiritual path then perhaps what is to us supernormal is in fact an
indication that the senses are perfected. In support of this interpretation,
we read elsewhere that a bhikkhu who attains the meditative state of
saKEiuedayitanirodha has senses which are "quite purified".93
There follow three analogies which imply that the mind-made body
looks identical to the bhikkhu's existing body. The first is the pulling of a
 Manomay a I57
reed from its sheath: one knows that the two are separate from each other
but they precisely fit together or correspond to each other. The point of the
second and third analogies is the same as the first: a sword and its scabbard
and a snake and its The form of the Pali is the same for the sword
( a 4 and scabbard (kosl),and the slough (karada) and the snake (ahz).
A possibility which arises from these analogies is that they might also be
an indication that the creating of a mind-made body is of spiritual signifi-
cance: that it is an ability which is acquired when a certain advanced stage
on the path to liberation is attained. Eliade points out that the image of the
snake and its cast skin, for example, is one of the oldest symbols indicating
initiation, or mystical death and resurrection, and is found in Brahmanical
literatureeg5In the SiirnaiiEa'phala Sutta, the acquisition of various magical or
supernormal powers (iddhis) and insights, which culminate in liberating
insight, follows the stage at which the bhiMu is able to create the rnanomaya
body. As such, the process might have metaphorical symbolism as a rite of
passage or initiation to the level at which the soteriologically advanced
stages of the bhikkhu's progress along the path take place. This might be
more plausible if one understands the creating of a manomaya body as a
'subtlising' process, not as another body, as I suggest below Alternatively, the
analogies might just indicate the close relationship between the bodies,
such as we saw described in the Taittinia UpanGad,where the three levels of
bodies were said to 'fill' each other, indicating that they normally occupy
the same space.
As well as the fact that the mind-made body looks identical to the
bhikkhu's existing physical body, this passage tells us that it also has form, it
is rzipa. The variety in the modes of reality to which we have already
referred gives us some indication that this mind-made body, though it has
form, might differ in nature from our physical bodies. We have also seen
that the Brahmanical religion recorded in the Upani~adsaccepted the
existence of an individual's 'subtle body' (manomaya, vijn"l2namaya or linga
SarEra). And we have concluded above that rebirth at the psycho-cosmolo-
gical level of manomaya means having a subtle rzipa body. It is likely,
therefore, that in this context also the created body is a subtle body.
Because the mind-made body referred to in the Siimaiiiiaphala Sutta has
form, however, we know that it is not merely a concept that the bhikkhu
creates: its level of reality is ?%parather than a?%pa,even if it is subtle ~ i i p a . ~ ~
Its existence, therefore, is not in the mind or ofthe mind, but it is a body
created by the power of the mind. In some way the bhikkhu's mind is able to
manipulate riipa to create a subtle body in exactly the same form as the
gross body.
The phenomenon of deliberately creating a body is not unique to
Buddhism, or even to the Indian tradition as a whole. In his book, 25ga:
Immortali~and Freedom, Eliade discusses the phenomenon of the transmuta-
tion of substance in tantric yoga and in Western alchemy.97Both practices
 158 Identity and Experience
involve the manipulation of matter by the power of the mind. And both
involve the transmutation of the flesh into a subtle body. For alchemists it is
a 'body of glory'; for yogins it is a divine body (diva-deha), called a
'diamond body' by Vajrayanists and a 'perfect body' (siddha-&ha)by Hatha
yo gin^.^* In the light of our discussion above, we can see the likely signifi-
cance of the fact that in the Simaiiiiaphala Sutta passage the meditative level
attained by the bhikkhu who creates the manomaya body is stated to be the
most rarified of the ru'pajhinas and not an ariipajhlina. In attaining the level
of subtle rzipa, he is able to identify with and manipulate it: his mind has the
power to create a subtle body. If we relate this to our discussion above of
manomaya as it corresponds to the cosmological level of nlpadhiitu, then were
this bhiMu to die having attained this meditative level, he would be reborn
as a deva in the n?padhZtu. The difference here is that in remaining alive, he
is able to create the same mode of existence deliberately.
This relationship between the mind and the body is referred to in the
Iddhipiida Samyutta, where Ananda asks the Buddha if he knows he will
reach the brahmaloka in his mind-made body by means of his psychic power
(iddhz), and the Buddha replies that he does.99Ananda then questions the
Buddha in exactly the same way if he knows he will reach the brahmaloka in
his body made of the four great elements by means of his psychic power,
and the Buddha again answers in the affirmative. This ability to do the
same thing with both bodies, the Buddha goes on to state, is because the
tathiigata concentrates the body in the mind and concentrates the mind in
the body: in his body he enters and abides in the conception (saiiii'ii:that is,
he visualises) of bliss and lightness so that his body is lighter, softer, more
plastic and more radiant.loOWhat this passage means is that in meditation
the tathiigata identifies body and mind. This does not mean that he identifies
with body and mind, but that he identifies them as of like nature. And being
of like nature, only differing in degree of density, both can be manipulated
in the same way.Io1
Johansson states of this passage that it illustrates the way "a material
body may become less heavy and solid through meditation and by not
identifying oneself with it".lo2He goes on to state that "the idea is probably
that the mind (citta) is thin and light; by mixing it well with the body the
combination will become less heavy. Concentration in itself is a force, and
concentration on lightness is apt to reduce the weight of the body".lo3The
Iddhipida Samyutta itself does not state that the lighter body comes about
because one does not identify oneself with it, but this is implicit in the fact
that the subtle body is acquired at a certain level of spiritual insight: one
can assume that it follows from this that progress has been made in the
liberating task of ceasing falsely to identify with one's empirical body.
Johansson's second and third sentences miss this point, however. It is not a
question of rmxing light mind with heavy body and producing something
in between. The point is that greater degrees of insight correspond to less
 Manomaya I59
dense levels of reality, so one no longer exists at the more dense levels. At
the more dense levels of Gpa, the mind is correspondingly dense or
ignorant; as one progresses, both one's mind and one's body become less
dense. Concentration is indeed a force, but its task is to clarify (lighten) the
mind and the state in which one has bodily existence follows from this.
When one has consciously understood this fact through spiritual progress,
and crucially through the attainment of advanced stages of meditation, one
is able to direct the mind to manipulating the more dense levels of reality.
The tathiigata is Enlightened, and his complete understanding of the process
enables him to identify body and mind in meditation and have mastery
over both.
That one comes to understand the link between spiritual progress and
the density of the body is dramatically exemplified in a passage in the
Sagyatana Samyutta.lo4This passage relates the death of Upasena. Instead of
his body being subject to the normal process of decay after death, it is
spontaneously scattered like a handful of chaff.lo5The reason for this, the
text states, is that Upasena had for a long time removed any concept of 'I'
or 'rnine'.lo6This clearly indicates the link between conscious identification
with one's empirical existence, which in Buddhist terms is tantamount to
the most basic (or dense) ignorance, and the continuing of one's gross
material body. Conversely, no longer having any false notions of 'I'
represents insight, or en-light-enment, which means that one's body is
correspondingly light. And in this passage Upasena knows in advance that
when he dies his body will spontaneously dissipate in this way: it is he who
announces that this will happen. He instructs other bhikAhus to lift this body
onto a couch and take it outside before it is spontaneously scattered like a
handful of chaff.lo'
In this use of the term manomaya, then, yet again the power of the mind
is being referred to. This time there is no explicit link with an ethical
dimension, as we saw in the Dhammapada: the link is, rather, with the
achievement of an advanced stage on the spiritual path. But it is neverthe-
less cardinal to Buddhist teaching that in order to achieve spiritual progress
ethical issues must first be dealt with. So what we see here is the way the
power of the mind continues to determine one's samsciric existence at
advanced stages on the path. And at a certain advanced stage, the mind
can be deliberately used in a creative manner to manipulate riipa. We saw
above that the samkhcirakkhandha volitionally constructs every khandha in
which one experiences a future life. What we are considering here is the
implication of that. If liberation has been achieved through the mind (and
the terms pa6n"ci-and ceto-zimutta clearly refer to the centrality of the role of
the mind in liberating insight), those future lives are not experienced and
the bodies are not formed. And if the presence or absence of major
congenital abnormalities of the body is karmically determined, as
suggested in chapter I, and if karma is volition, then one can see an even
I 60 Identity and Experience
more direct link between the mind and the physical body. Though one is
unaware of it, it is the mind that is the power or creative force behind not
only the condition of one's body but also its very existence. Furthermore,
we have seen above in a reference to the AggafiEa Sutta that desire (or
volition, the power of the mind) is instrumental in the solidification of
re-evolving beings. In Buddhism such solidification might symbolically
indicate ignorance, but it nevertheless also indicates the creative power of
the mind in a manner which echoes the way human beings originate
according to the Vedic cosmogonies I have mentioned. This point is
implicit in the second Noble Truth. It states that the arising of dukkha is
dependent on desire (tanhq. Elsewhere, dukkha is defined as the five
khandhas, or savim'c existence. So it follows that the meaning of the second
Noble Truth is precisely the point made in this paragraph: that volitions
are the instrumental factor in bringing about future bodily rebirths in
sapsira.
In considering the creative power of the mind in Buddhism in this way,
we illustrate even more strongly the absence of discontinuity between
gross and subtle form, and formlessness, riipa and ariipa. And according to
the SimaiiiTaphala Sutta, a bhikkhu is able, when he has attained the highest
level of meditation and purified his mind appropriately, deliberately to
create another body with his mind. It could be that having achieved a
stage where karma is no longer the medium through which the power of
the mind works, he is able to utilise that power inhntion-ally: he 'applies
and bends down the mind' (cittam abhiniharati abhininnimetz) to creating a
mind-made body (manomayam kijyam abhinimminijya).
The SimaEEaphala Sutta continues with a description of other things the
bhiMu is able to do at this stage, and from this description we can see other
ways in which it is claimed that the power of the mind is able to manipulate
riipa. First, he is able to practise the various iddhis, or supernorma1 powers:
the bhikkhu has the ability to become many when he is one, and then to
become one again; he can be be either clearly visible or indiscernible; he
goes unobstructedlo8to the other side of a wall, a fence or a mountain as if
through air; he enters and emerges from the ground as if it were water; he
walks on water without sinkinglogas if it were the ground; he travels cross-
legged in the air like a bird on the wing; even the moon and the sun, with
such potency and majesty, he touches and grasps with his hand; with his
body he reaches even to the brahmaloka.ll*In effect, he can make himself
into anything he wishes. The Sutta gives the analogy of a skilled potter or
his apprentice being able to make or create out of well prepared clay any
shape of bowl he likes, or an ivory carver out of ivory, or a goldsmith out of
gold. l
The iddhis, also called magic or psychic powers, are a pan-Indian
phenomenon and pre-date Buddhism. The Buddha seems not only to have
taken it for granted that such powers exist, but, as we see here from the
 Manomaya 161
Siima33aphala Sutta, he teaches that they are acquired as part of the
meditative process.l12 The Suttas also refer to the development of the
iddhipiidas, the 'bases of supernormal power'. l 3 There are four bases:
resolution (chanda), energy (uiriya),thought (or ?concentration) (citta) and
investigation (utmamsG). One might suggest from these four that the
collective purpose of developing the iddhipiidas is the focussing of the power
of the mind. In the Aligwttara Nika'ya, the Buddha is stated to have identified
disciples according to their specific mastery of such powers: Maha
Moggallana is most skilled in the psychic powers, and Culla-panthaka is
most skilled at the creating of a mind-made body, for example.l14
It is stated elsewhere that the iddhis are either worldly (zmisa) or in accord
with dhamma (sometimes called 'spiritual').l15 In the finaya the iddhis
described here are called puthujanika iddhi and these are contrasted with the
three knowledges (Eirso uzz9 and the divine sight (dibba cakkhum), which are
considered desirable for a disciple to acquire.l16 In the Keuaddha Sutta the
Buddha explicitly states that he is concerned about, ashamed of and detests
the special psychic powers because he sees danger in the practice of
them."' For the Buddha, the real wonder or miracle is education.l18 He
explains that this begins with exercises in reasoning (VitaWEa and manasikiira)
and proceeds through the entire range of teachings he has given, culminat-
ing in the realisation of the Four Truths and the destruction of the i i a ~ a s . ~ l ~
There are also strict rules in the Enqa about inappropriate practice of the
iddhis: the display of iddhis beyond the capacity of ordinary men is
prohibited,lZ0and a bhikkhu who falsely claims possession of such powers
expels himself from the Sangha.121There are, however, several references in
canonical material to the use of iddhis in contexts where they are considered
acceptable. The several references to the practice of disappearing from one
place and reappearing in another is a good example, and one which the
Buddha himself practises.122In the Keua&ha Sutta, this 'magical' form of
transport is explicitly associated with the power of the mind: "Then,
Kevaddha, the bhikkhu attained such a level (riipa) of concentration that,
when his mind was completely concentrated, the way leading to the d m
appeared [to him]".123Later in the same Sutta, the bhikkhu uses the same
technique when moving to the next de~aloka.~*~ The Mahzparinibbiina Sutta
also relates that the Buddha magically transports both himself and his
following of disciples across a river. lZ5
The concern of the Buddha about the practice of the iddhis and the pres-
ence of the rules in the Vinaya together suggest that the distinction between
these two types of iddhi, worldly or in accord with dhamma, is considered of
great importance. Concern about abuse of the iddhis probably reflects the
fact that such powers were abused by some who perhaps were believed to
practise certain meditations specifically in order to acquire the more sensa-
tional powers. In India such people became known as siddhas, the same
term used for the powers themselves in the Yoga tradition. In Pataiijali's
I 62 Identity and Experience
Yoga Siitras, the whole of chapter I11 is concerned with the supernormal
powers.126Patafijali's teaching is complex, but indicates that though the
yogin acquires such powers the real power is achieved through samidhi, not
through the siddhis, and the practice of the siddhis can hinder liberating
insight, defined as right samidhi.12' So though such people could perform
things which lay people could not, such practices alone neither indicate
their spiritual accomplishments nor contribute to their eventual liberation.
The teaching of the Buddha is thought by scholars to pre-date that of
classical yoga, but the Buddha's opinion that the abuse of the powers is
dangerous as well as not being in accord with dhamma is highly likely to
have been for the reason given by Pataiijali: his concern was always with
whatever is conducive to liberation.
From the level of the fourthjhina, there are several other things the
bhikWlu is also able to do. These are all conducive to insight and constitute
what are called the superknowledges (abhin"n"4which are in accord with
dhamma. In summary, he is able to use his divine hearing (dibba sotadhitu) (no
doubt one of the supernormal senses) to hear both celestial and human
sounds whether far or near. In similar manner, he is able to grasp fully with
his own mind the minds of other beings and men and to know accurately
the state of those other minds; whether they are angry, steadfast or
attentive, for example. He is able to recall accurately any number of his
own former places of existence (or former lives) and he can use his divine
sight, dibba cakkhu (another of the supernormal senses), to see beings passing
from one life to another. He sees the way in which the qualitative nature of
their activities has given rise to the condition in which they were reborn.
Finally, the bhikWlu is able to understand and root out the iisavas. He under-
stands as it really is the fact of unsatisfactoriness, the origin and cessation of
unsatisfactoriness, and the path leading to the cessation of unsatisfactori-
ness (the four Noble Truths). Likewise, he understands the isauas of sensual
desire (kima), the desire for continued existence (bhavfiava)and ignorance
(auiji) as they really are, and is able to eradicate them. Knowing he is
liberated, he realises the cycle of rebirth has been destroyed, the holy life
has been fulfilled, he has done what had to be done: after this life there will
be no further life.128
Of all of these supernormal abilities, only one, the creation of the body,
is specifically stated to be manomaya. But just as the mind-made body
required that the bhikkhu, having achieved the stated meditative level, 'apply
and bend-down his mind' in order to create such a body, so in the descrip-
tion of every single one of the other abilities, it clearly states that first the
bhikkhu has to apply and bend-down his mind.129The difference seems to
be that the body is created by the mind whereas the other supernormal abil-
ities are activities of the mind: in the former case, the mind produces some-
thing; in the latter case the mind does something. And though it is not
explicitly stated in the text, it would appear that it is the mind-made body
 Manomaya 163
which is subsequently directed by the mind to perform the iddis, use its
divine hearing and seeing, have insight into the minds of others, and recall
former existences, and ultimately eradicate the cfsavas. This is perhaps more
likely in view of the fact that the iddhis are the only one of the supernormal
abilities referred to in this and other similar passages which are stated to be
'worldly' powers; all of the others are in accord with dhamma and conducive
to insight. The former, as we have noted, are not specifically Buddhist; the
latter are. As such, the supernormal abilities might be said to be supra-
mundane (lokuttara)activities, possibly requiring a more subtle, or rarified,
bodily vehicle. The iddhis are the only supernormal abilities which involve
any external movement of the mind-made body. All the others are internal
or subjective supernormal activities. So it might be that in the latter cases
the mind-made body is not separate from the normal body, but is consti-
tuted as if the reed were still in its sheath, the sword in its scabbard, and so
on. Thus in such circumstances the mind-made body could be thought of
as some sort of 'subtlising', or 'sensitising' of the body and its faculties. This
suggestion would fit well with the correspondence between developing the
clarity of the mind and the density of the body, discussed earlier.
The term manomya, then, in the context of the ability to direct the kind
to the creating of a 'mind-made' body is another illustration of the central-
ity of the power of the mind in Buddhist teachings. Just as from the
Buddha's teaching that karma is intention it follows that the power of the
mind creates and shapes our very existences, so at certain meditative levels
that intention can be consciously directed to the creating of a body with
certain faculties conducive to insight, such as supernormal senses. The key
difference is that the former seems to us to happen 'automatically': we are
not conscious that our existence originates in the mind. The latter is the
deliberate creation of a body. There is also a difference in the quality of the
rzipa with which the bodies are constituted when the mind itself has
advanced to a certain stage on the spiritual path. Our 'normal' bodies are
gross rzipa, whereas the mind-made body is subtle riipa. This is true whether
the manomaya body is one in which one is reborn as a result of having
attained a certain level of meditation in a previous life, or whether the
manomaya body is deliberately created in this life. The implication of both is
that the clarifying of the mind which is achieved on the path to liberation
results in a corresponding subtlising of the body. It is in this sense that the
metaphorical meaning of manomaya is suggested by its literal meaning: the
metaphorical meaning represents an intermediate psycho-cosmological
level which corresponds to the fact that a certain degree of spiritual
advancement has to have been achieved for the deliberate creation of
something 'originating in the mind', the literal meaning of manomaya.
If we compare the concepts discussed in the last two points in this
chapter as they are found in the Sutta Pitaka with similar concepts in
Upani;adic material, we see that there are some close similarities between
164 Identity and Experience
them. In both traditions, the power of the mind plays a central role.
According to both traditions, the practice of meditation harnesses that
power in a way which transforms the meditating subject. Both traditions
state that the individual exists at different levels of density or subtlety, and
that there is no ontological discontinuity between the levels. We have seen
that in the Buddhist material the metaphor of the spiritual path clearly
underlies the continuity between the levels of existence. And as the
Buddha's teaching states that the path represents the progressive purifica-
tion of the mind, so the levels of existence represent corresponding degrees
of density or subtlety. In the Upani~ads,this correspondence cannot be
made in the same way. Though the material is far from clear, one can,
however, suggest that there is a correspondence which differs only because
liberation in the two traditions is understood differently. The material in
the Upancads suggests that the different dense and subtle bodies, or modes
of existence, co-exist. It suggests that they represent the range between the
outer, empirical, self and the inner, 'real', self.These are all simultaneously
present in the life of the individual, whose task it is to identify with the real
self rather than the empirical self. In Buddhism, the liberating process con-
sists, rather, of progressing from ignorance to insight, which corresponds to
the 'subtlising' of one's body. In the UpaniSads one has to realise what is
already the case; in Buddhism, to make a process happen. In both tradi-
tions, the goal is achieved by progressively identifying with less dense levels
of existence.
The contexts in which the power of the mind has been discussed in this
chapter have dwelt in particular on its power in relation to the body. We
have seen that the very existence of the body in samsara originates in the
volitional activity of the mind. And the mode of existence of the body
corresponds directly to the spiritual progress of the individual, which in
Buddhism is the progress from ignorance to insight: from density to light.
This leads me to my final chapter, in which I will discuss the attitude
towards the body in early Buddhism. We shall see that it is unjustifiably
held responsible for many of the activities of the mind.

Notes

I. PED, p.521.
2. Dialogues, I , p.30, 47f, etc. uses 'made of mind'; mal?amoli, in his translation of the
Vsuddhimagga, translates it as 'mind-made', which corresponds to an instrumental
interpretation of the term (77ze Path ofPunzation, 1964,p.443f).
3. For example at DN.I.76: A y a p kho me kiiyo r6pi citum-mahG6hltiko ... anicc' ucchidana-
parimaddana-bhedana-viddhapana-dhammo.
4. PED, p.521.
5. Dhammapada I and 2 : ManopubbatigamZ dhamma manosethi manomayi.
6. 'Thinking' is meant here in a non-technical sense (i.e. not equating mamu with uitakka or
any other more overtly discursive term), merely to convey the point being made.
 Manomaya 165
AN.I.11: 2'e keci bhikkhave dhammi akusalii akusalabhigzyii akusalapakkhikii sabbe te
manopubbarigamii.Mano h a m dhammiinamp a h m a m uppajati anuad ma akrrsah dhammii ti. Ye keci
bhikkhave dhammii kusali kwalabh@iyi kusalapakkhikii sabbe te manopubbarigami. Mano tesam
dhammiinam pathamam uppajati anvad ma kusalii dhammi ti.
MN.III.99.
SN.IV.70:Adanti agutti arakkhi&?mamvuti dukkhidhivihz ... Sudan&?sugutti surakkhitii swamvuti
sukhiidhivcsha-.
SN.IV.71.
We are reminded of the passage referred to above in the discussion on manas in chapter v
which describes liberation in terms of not paying attention to any outward sign but paying
attention to the signless realm: Sabbanimithinafi ca aman&-ro, animittiiya ca dhiituyii manash-ro
(MN.I.296).
Rg Veda X. 129.4: k2Zma.s tad agre sam avartatiidhi, manio rek? prathamamyad &-t.
Ch. Up. VI.2.3: Tad adyata bahu y i m prajiiy~eti.
For example, Br.Up. 1.2.I , 1.4.1f, 1.4.17; Ait. Up. 1.1.I.
Br. Up. 111.2.I 3: Punyo vaipunyena karmanii bhavati, pZp4 pipeneti.
Br. Up. IV.4.5: YathZkZriyathGciiri,tathi bhavati. Siidhuktirisidhur bhavati,piip~k~ripiipo bhavati.
Ibid.: Athau khalu i i h 4 kiimamaya eviiyam burtqa iti. Sa yatha-kimo bhavati, tat kratur bhavati; yat
kratur bhavati, tat kunna kumte;yat karma kumte, tat abhirampadyate. cF. Ch. Up. 111.14.1: rathi-
kratur asminl lokepum~obhavati tathetahprepa bhavati, sa kratum kurvita. cf. also Ch. Up. VIII.2.2.
Collins, 1982,p.58. Collins discusses the development of the doctrine of rebirth in the bdic
material in considerable detail. cf. also Jayatilleke, 1949,p.220.
Reat (1990, p.1110 also discusses the power of the mind in the sacrificial ritual described in
the Rg Veda.
Collins (1982, p.58fl) discusses the earlier background to this central teaching of' the
Upanipdr.
Sat. Br. X.V.2.20: Tamyathiiyathopiisate tad eva bhavati.
Br. Up. 11.1.8: Pratiepa iti vii aharn etam upika iti, sa y a etum evam upiiste, pratiriipam haivainam
upagacchati, niip'atiniparn, atho pratinipo 'm-jj6jat.e. The whole of this chapter teaches that one
becomes what one meditates on.
By. Up. IV.4.5: Sa vii ayam iitmi brahma; VijGnamayo m a n o q a h priiymwya.
Ibid.: Cakprrnayah Sroturnayah prthivimaya iibomayo vqumaya ikiiamayas tcjomayo 'tg'omaya ...
sawamayah. cf. also By. Up. 111.7.3-23.
Tait. Up. 11.3.1: P r i p hi bhCtiinirn 6ju ... taryaija eva Sarira itmii.
Ibid.: T i - d v i etusmit PrZpzmayiid anyo 'ntara iihni manomaya. T e a PQr&. Sa v i e ~ punqa- a
d h a ma; tasya puqa-vidha&?m anu ayam putqa-vidha.
Tait. Up. 11.4.1: Timiid vii etasmiin manomayd anyo 'ntara iihnahna m~-namaya.T e n a ~ a p i iSa
~ .v i
eja pum~a-vidhaeva, tasya purusa vidhatiim anv ayam purqa-vidha.
~ hup. . v1.5.1-4.
Ch. Up. Bhisya p.421: Samasya triyt-kfta-tva.
By. Up. IV.3.7: Kbtama itmeti? Yo'yam VijtTiinamayah p r d ~ s uhr-dy a n t a ~ o t i hpunqa!t. The
expression prqfiitmii is substituted for v&finamayapurtqa at Br. Up. Iv3.35, but the context
indicates the same phenomenon is being referred to.
By. Up. IV3.g: Sandhyam &*am svabna-sh-nam.
Br. Up. IV.3.g-IV.3.34.
For example, at Ch. Up. V1II.g-11.
C h. Up. VIII. I 2. I : Tad a s y i m m r t a r y ~ m ~ r ~ i t m'dh+&Znam.
ano
Br. Up. IV4.6.
For example, at vet. Up. 1.18;Maitri Up. 6.10; 6.19.
Br. Up. V.6.1: Manomayo 3am puru~ahbhi$ sapah tasminn antar-hydaye ... .
Br. Up. 11.1.17: Ej8iina-mayd puwa.
By. Up. 11.I. 18: Sa yatraitya sva@ykarati, te k y a lokih: tad uteva mahiircsjo bhaaati, uteva mahi-
brilhma&. UtGua u c c i v a c ~nkacchati. Sayadii maht(7jojinapadk g hftvii suejanapadeyathaatha-Mmay
parivarteta, mam evai~aetut pii@n ghitvi sue Sarireyah--kiimam parivartate.
For example, Br. Up. IV.4.2.
Radhakrishnan, 1953,p.253.
By. Up. IV4.6: m u m manoyatra tn)akrom q a .
By. Up. B h y a , p. 855: M a n 4 p'adhiimtvii1 litigarya mano litigam i& ucyate.
I 66 Identity a n d Experience
Br. Up. IV.4.6: Tamil loMt punar aiti asmai lokciya kannap.
Ch. Up. BhlISya p.204 (Commentary on Ch. Up. 111.14.2):RZpa-Sarirahprip lirigiitma.
Nirvana is stated to be unconditioned (asamkhatam) (Udiina VIII.3). Though we know from
the third line of the tilakkhayz formula that this does not mean it is or has an independently
existing self (sabbe dhammii anatti), the fact that it is unconditioned suggests that it is not
subject to dependent origination. The paticcasamuppiida doctrine explains samsZric
experience, however, so this question does not affect the points I am making in this chapter,
which are also concerned with experience in sapsiira. The way selflessness is attributed to
Nirvana is discussed in the Conclusion.
MN.I.55e DN.II.2goK
Johansson, 1979, p.37.
Johansson discusses the absence of discontinuity between the gmss and the subtle, nipa
and anipa, in his book The Qnamu Psychology ofEarb Buddhism (1979, pmim).
Gombrich, 1975, p.133ff explains these in much more detail than it is necessary for me to
go into here. cf. also Thomas, 1951,p.111f.
Ibid., p.134.
Ibid., p.135, presumably written with the &a& Suttanta in mind.
Reynolds (1976,p.3819 shows how the nipadhiitu corresponds to the Buddha's dhammakaya in
the late Theravada and Mahayana traditions, and states that the notion of a dhammakciya
evolved from references to the manomaya body.
We see a parallel in the colloquial English usage of terms such as 'dense' and 'thick' to
refer to one end of the spectrum of intelligence and 'bright' and 'clear' to refer to the
other end.
Collins, 1982, p.215ff.
Ibid., p.217. cf. also Narada, 1979, p.4oE
Eliade, 1973, p.88.
MN.III.62.
MN.III.62f.
DN.1.195: Tayo h%o 'me Po#hapZda am-patihibk, o@rikoatta-pa.@iibho, manomayo atta-patihibho,
anipo atta-patiEbho.
DA.II.380: Tattha attu-patikbho ti attubhiiva-patiliibho,
CPD S.V.attubhCva.
DA.11.380.
Katamo ca Po&hapda ogriko atta-patihibho?Rtipi ciitummahamahabhiitiko
kabalitikir&-ra-bhakkho, ayam
opriko atta-patiliibho. Katamo manomayo atta-patiliibho? R q f manomayo sabbanga-paccangf
ahinindnyo, yam manomayo atta-patiliibho. Katamo ca anipo atta-patiliibho?Anipf safifiiimayo, ayam
anipo atta-patiliibho. The term ahinindriyo, which I have paraphrased as supernormal senses,
is discussed below.
DN.1.1gsf: O@ikassa (manomayassa/anipassa) kho aham Pot?hapZda atta-patiliibhassa pahiir@ya
dhammam desemi.
Surprisingly (in view of the widely accepted Ascension of Jesus Christ), Westerners often
find it odd that gods can have gross riipa bodies. But this is a common pan-Indian
phenomenon and is explicitly referred to in the Sutta pitaka at, for example, DN.I.34. It is,
perhaps, made easier to understand from the context we are discussing here: during the
gradual progression through the stages on the spiritual path, there comes a point when an
individual has advanced sufficiently to be known as a 'god': This point comes when he or
she still has a gross nipa body.
DA.11.380: Oprik' attabhiiva-j~atihbhenaavtcito pat?hi>a paranimmita-vasavatti-panyosinamkiima-
bhavam dassesi; manomaya-attabhiiva-patiliibhena pathama-jhiina-bhtimito patthciya akanitfha-
brahmaloka-pariyos6nam rtipa-bhavam darsesi; arq'attabhiiva-patihibhena akCs' iinafic' ciyatana-
brahmalokato pa+*ya neva safiG-n' &a%' ciyatana-brahmaloka-panyos(7namanipa-bhavam dmesi.
DN.I.17: Loko iibharo.
Manomyii ... sayam-pabhi.
MN.1.410: Devii riipino manomayii ... devi anipino safifhimayii.
MA.III.122: JhZnacittumayii ... ani~ajhiinasafin'+asafin'iimqii.
AN.111.192: Kabalitikiiriihiirabhakkhiinam deviinam sahayatam an'fiataram manomayam kciyam
upapanno.
Slarampanno samZdhisampannopafifiampanno saiiii&edayitunirodhamsamiip.jigya pi vvut&ahyya pi.
 Manomaya 167
Atth' etam thiinan ti.
AN.111.194: Kam pana ham U d 9 i manomayakaiampaccest Q In the PTS edition of the Ariguttara
JKika>a, this sentence reads as follows: Kam pana tvam UdcTyi manomayam &yam paccesi ti? This
would have to be translated "What, Udayin, do you think a mind-made body is?". Though
it is a small point, I have chosen to emend the Pali to give a bahuvrihi compound,
manomayakiiyam, which both accords with the use of kam and makes more sense in the
context.
Ye te bhante deuli anipino saiiiilimayi ... blilarra ay a t t m a bhunitam.
DN.III.86: Atha kho k ... sattZ rasa-pathavim paribhuiijanti tam-bhakkird tad-iihiirii cirap &%ham
addhinam atthapsu. Tathiyah- kho te satti rtrra-pafi2avimparibhufijantii tam-bhakkhii tad-Ehiirh ciram
dgham addhiinam atthapu, tathii tathii tesam sattiinam kharattafi c'eva kiiyasmim okkami.
DN.III.84: Ayam loko vivat@ti.
DN.III.85: T m a rasa-pathavim ariguliyii siiyab acchidesi, ta&- c' m a okkami.
MN.I.59.
MA.1.280: Mahaggatam ti 6piiriipiivacaram;amahaggatan ti kiimiivmaram.
AN.111.121: Tena kho pana samayena Kakudho niima Koliyaputto iiyasmato Mahiimoggallinassa
ufia#hiko adhunii kiilakato aiifiatarammanomayam kiiyam upupanno, t m a evanipo attabhiivapatilibho
hoti, s~yathlipi nima due v i tini vii mZgadhikinigiimakkhettiini.
So tma attabhiivapatiliibhena n'eva attiinam no param yiibidheti.
Kakudho devaputto.
Sukha, the opposite of dukkha. As a synonym for Nirvana, its meaning is not happiness in
the affective sense, but refers to the absence of the dis-ease that is dukkha.
MN. 1.276: So imam eva k q a m uiuekajena pitkukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripiireti parippharati;
n&a kiiici sabbivato k g m a vivekajena pitirukhena apphutam hoti.
DN.I.75: Adukkham asukham upehati-pirisuddhim catutthqjhiinam.
T h e eight jhiinas correspond to the eight vimokkhii, and can be followed by a ninth
attainment, saiiiiiivedayitanirodha,what PED calls "trance" (PED, p.286). This was referred to
in chapter rv. Whether thejhlinas are thought to be fourfold or eightfold, insight is separate
from them: they are the means to the end and not the end in itselE It was because they
made t h e j h i n a s themselves the aim of their teaching that the Buddha rejected the
doctrines of two of his teachers, Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta (cf. MN.1.1640.
DN.I.77: Manomayam kiiyam abhinimmin@a cittam abhiniharati abhininniimeti ... So imamhii kiiyii
aiiiiam kiyam abhinimminiiti riipim manomayam sabbariga-paccatigim ahinindriyam. cf.. also
MN.11.17f;
CPD, s.v. ahinindt-iya. PED (p.65) suggests that ahinindnya is probably an inferior reading for
abhinindnya, which it suggests comes near in meaning to *abhit?tZnd';Ua. CPD rejects this as a
misreading.
DA.1.120.
DA.I.222.
MN. 1.296: Indnylini vippasanniini.
DN.I.77: Sgyathli pi puriio muiijamhi kikam pavlihqya. T m a euam m a : 'Ayam muiijo ayam k i . )
a K o muiZjo aiiiiii-isijGii)muiijamhii tv ma kikiipavii.& ti'.
Eliade, 1973, p.165, referring toJaimin9a Brdzmana 11, 134, etc.
Again terminology makes the situation confusing: we have seen in chapter I that nipa is
defined as consisting of the four elements, of which pafi2avi is one. It would have made it
easier for us to grasp the notion of subtle body had a term other than rtjpa been used. The
point really is that the subtle body is not just conceptual. We have also seen the use of the
term nipa in another context in which it is without solidity in chapter VI.
Eliade, 1973, p.274fX
Eliade, 1973, p.274. Siddha is the term used for the various powers acquired by the yogin,
but it literally means 'perfection'.
SN.V.282: AbhiinZti nu kho bhunte bhagavi iddhiyi manomayena kqena brahmalokam upasamkamitii
ti?... Abhiiiniimi khviiham Ananda iddhiyii manomayena Eyena brahmalokam u@samkamit?i ti.
SN.V.283: Yasmim Ananda samaye tathiigato kiiyam pi citte samiidahati cittam pi ca kiiye samiidahati;
~ukhasafiiiaiicalahurailiiaiicakiiye okkamitui viharati, tasmim Ananda samaye tathigatasra kiiyo Iahutaro
ceua hoti mudutaro ca kammaniyataro ca pabhwarataro ca.
cf. Br. Up. VI.2.15.
Johansson, 1979, p.38.
I 68 Identity and Experience
Ibid.
SN.IV4of.
SN.IV.41: Atha kho iyasmato Upasenma b y o tatth'eua vikiri swathtipi bhusamu,ght ti.
Ibid. : Tathd hi paniiyasmato Upasenma dgharattam aha@ira-mamapbra-miindnusayii susamiihaki.
SN.IV.40: Etha me iivuso imam kiiyam maiicakam iiropetvd bahiddhii niharatha puriiyam kiiyo idheva
vikirati syyathiip. bhuarnut#~ti.
Asajjamdno: literally, this means unattached, or not clinging, so it might be that the b h M u is
able to do the things described because he has achieved a state where he is detached.
Abhijiamdno: literally, without breaking through.
DN.I.78: So aneka-vihitam i d d h i - d a m paccanubhoti: eko pi hutvd bahudhii hoti, bahudhiipi hutvd eko
koti, dvibhdvam tiro-bhdvam tiro-kuddam tiro-pikiiram tiro-pabbatam asajamdno gacchati sgryathii Pi
iihiise, pafhavgii pi ummuja nimmujam karoti syyathii Pi pathamjam, udake Pi abhijamiino gacchati
sgyathi pi pathamyap, ZkcIre pi p a l l a h a kamati syyatha- pi p a m i sakup, ime Pi candima-sutiye
m a p mahiddhike evam mafinubhiive piinifiii parimmati parimajjati, yiiva brahma-lob pi kiiyena va
samvatteti.
Syyathd pi dakkho kumbha-kiiro vii kumbhakiirantevEsi vii suparikammakat~amattikC7yayam yad ma
bhjana-vikatim Zkadihyya tam tad eva karyya abhinippfidcyya (and the form is the same for
ivory (danta)and gold (suva*)).
T.W. Rhys Davids comments on this in his introduction to the Kevaddha Sutta in his
translation of -ha JV%ya, Vol. I (Dialogues,I, p.272).
DN.11.103, "5; MN,I.IO~,II.II. They are also discussed at length in pa^ II.205K
AN.I.24: Etad a g a m bhikkhave mama sdvakiinam bhikkiinam iddhimantdnam yadidam Mahd
Mogalkno ... manomayam k@am abhinimminantrinamyadidam CuUa-panthnko.
AN.1.93: Due ' m i bhikWlave iddhjo. Katamii due? Amira-iddhi ca dhamma-iddhi ca. DN.111. I 12
contrasts anya and no-ariya iddhi.
Vin.II.183.
DN.1.213: Imam kho aham Kevaddha iddhi-piiMiiriye iidinavam sampassamdno iddhi-piitihdriyena
attiydmi hariiyiimijigucchdmz.
Anusirani$ii&-@am.
DN.I.214E
Vin.11.112.
Vin.II1.91.
I am indebted to Mark Allon for the following references (as well as several others used in
this chapter): DN.11.50 (the Buddha); DN.I.222, DN.II.37, 40, 46f, 181, 2396 253-4 (other
buddhas, bhikkhus or d m - including Brahma, who travels between lokm in this way).
DN.1.215: Atha kho so Kevaddha bhikkhu tathii-?%Pam samddhim samripji yathii samiihite citte
devaydn~omaggo piitur ahosi.
DN.1.220.
DN.II.89. In a personal communication, Mark Allon informs me that similar examples of'
the Buddha making use of various iddhir are found more frequently in the Buddhist
Sanskrit version of the Maha?atinimiy Siitra.
Woods, 1914, p.203fE
Ibid., p.265.
DN.I.84: Kmuttasmim vimuttam iti iidym hoti, khiniijdti vusitam brahmacariyam katam karaNya~
miparam itthawiiti pgiifiiiti.
Cittam abhiniharati abhininfiiimeti.
 CHAPTER VIII

T h e Attitude towards the Body

OURSUBJECT IN THIS CHAPTER is the attitude towards the human body in

Pali Buddhism. We shall see that in the canonical material this attitude is
primarily analytical, but that it changes to being openly negative by the
time of Buddhaghosa. This change in attitude is important for two main
reasons. First, it diverges from the doctrinal teaching on the relationship
between body and mind; and second, it is likely to distort meditation
exercises which use the body as the meditational subject. Theravada
Buddhism is spreading in Western countries at the same time as the
attitude towards the body is enjoying what one might call a high profile in
Western culture. If a view about the body which is fundamentally different
from the canonical position is disseminated in the West as representing 'the
Theravada Buddhist view', then this misleads body-conscious Western
Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike.
A further word needs to be said here about the expressions 'body and
mind' and 'the attitude towards the body'. In the foregoing discussion of the
analysis of the human being into Wlanh, and particularly in chapter WI,we
have seen that though the Wlandha of the body is largely dense or solid and
the mental khandhas are formless, there is nevertheless no ontological distinc-
tion between them: whether or not they involve the constituents of Tu'pa, they
all represent the occurrence of different processes or events on a spectrum of
possible modes of existence. It follows that the terms 'body' and 'mind'
might misleadingly suggest some sort of Cartesian dualism, especially to a
Western reader. They might also mistakenly be interpreted as denoting two
opposing objects rather than a combination of processes or events. But the
fact is that as ordinary people we do tend to substantialise body and mind,
and our samstikc experience of spa and artZpa is that they are qualitatively
different. As Griffiths puts it: "The mental and the physical are categories of
event which are phenomenologically irreducibly different".' Ice and steam
give us a good analogy to illustrate the situation. There is no ontological
discontinuity between these different states in which the same chemical
combination of hydrogen and oxygen occurs. Phenomenologically,
170 Identity and Experience
however, this is far from obvious: each is qualitatively distinct from the
other and our experience of each of them is irreducibly different. We have
to have some knowledge of chemistry to know the true relationship
between them. Similarly, the absence of ontological discontinuity between,
and the real nature of, the human processes are insights which are only
realised as one progresses on the path to liberation. Conventionally, we
continue to think of the body and mind as two distinct aspects of ourselves.
It is with this conventional dualism that we are concerned in this chapter.
This book has been primarily concerned with the constitution of the
human being as it appears to have been understood by the compilers of the
Sutta Pitaka of the Pali canon. I have also in some places drawn on the Pali
Abhidhamma, the commentarial material, most of which is believed to have
been compiled by Buddhaghosa in the fifth century CE, and Buddhaghosa's
own work, the Vkuddhimqga. The Abhidhamma, the commentaries and the
Vii~ddhimaga together form a highly influential corpus of written material
which has become the foundation of Theravada Buddhism. Buddhaghosa's
writings in particular have been so influential as to have become the deter-
minant of the orthodox Theravada position on virtually every point of
religious concern. Buddhaghosa himself, however, claims merely to have
been an exegete of the canonical material upon which the commentaries
are based and to which there are numerous references in his Viuddhimagga.
This claim is extremely important for Theravada Buddhists: the Pali canon
has always been, and remains to this day, the canonical heart of Theravada
Buddhism. Those who accept the teachings of Buddhaghosa believe they
are adhering to the teachings contained in canonical materialV2
Theravada Buddhism is often, one might say commonly, understood to
have a negative attitude towards the human body. Though there are what
appear to be negative statements about the body in the canonical material,
we shall see in this chapter that this negative attitude has largely been
promulgated by Buddhaghosa, both in his Visuddhimaga and in the
commentaries on the Pali canon: in spite of his exegetical claims,
Buddhaghosa's writing is in fact significantly different in this respect from
canonical material. The statements in the canonical material and the
increasingly negative attitude towards the body will be discussed in the light
of the canonical analysis of the human being which has been the main
subject of this book. I shall consider whether there is any constitutional or
doctrinal basis for a negative attitude towards the body, and discuss
possible reasons for the presence of negative statements in the canon. We
shall also see that some translations of the Pali canon have been responsible
for introducing negativity towards the body where none exists in the Pali.
Other translators of what appear to be negative statements in the canon
have failed sufficiently to consider the context in which certain Pali words
have been used. The result of this is that the English versions sound more
negative than the contexts warrant.
 The attitude towards the body 171

In discussing first the attitude towards the human body in the canonical
material, we have to consider an apparent paradox. On the one hand, we
can see in the Pali Canon statements about the body which appear to be
distinctly negative. We read, for example, that the body is a 'heap of
corruption' kiiti~anda),~ that bodily functions are 'impure' (asuci)? and that
only a completely deluded (or ignorant) fool would think of the body as
beautiful. A passage in the Anguttara JVikQa describes the body as a boil
@ando),which has nine open wounds (naua uanamukhinz), nine natural
openings (nava abhedanamukhinz). Whatever oozes out from them is impure
(asucz), bad-smelling (dugandham)and loathsome (jeg~cchiyam).~
In the Khandha Samyutta we read that it is one's body that leads one
astray, at least as much as the other parts of our fivefold psychophysical
make-up (that is, the four khandhas other than the body). We are told, for
example, that "[Our] teacher, sir, is one who speaks of the control of desire
and passion ... in the body, in feelings, in apperception, in the volitional
constituent, in consciousness".7 Another passage states that we are to
". .. get rid of that desire and passion which are in the body, feelings,
apperception, the volitional constituent, consci~usness".~ Such statements
are particularly relevant since passion and desire are the very source of
karmic bondage in Buddhism, as we are told in the second Noble Truth
and as has been further demonstrated in previous chapters.
Apart from canonical statements which attribute passion and desire in
like measure to all the khandhas, from some translations of Pali texts it seems
that it is the body alone which leads us astray. For example, in a Pali Text
Society translation of the Sutta Nizta, we read that it is from the body that
"passion and hatred have their origin", and thoughts which "toss up the
mind" arise from the body.gAnd in Miiller 's translation of Dhammapada 202
and 203 he states: "there is no pain like the body" and "the body is the
greatest of pains".1° The importance of such translations should not be
underestimated as they are widely disseminated as representing the canon
of Theravada Buddhism and as such are source books for students and
believers alike.
On the other hand, the other side of the paradox is that it is cardinal to
Buddhism that karmic consequences accruing to any particular individual
are entirely dependent on his or her mental volitions. I have already
referred above to the definition of karma in the Pali canon as volition, and
that it is having willed that one acts through body, speech and mind." This
is central to the Buddha's message, and indeed is precisely what distin-
guished his teaching from that of other Indian religions of his time: in
interpreting action (karma) as volition, he uniquely ethicised the law of
karma. From this it is clear that the Buddha qualitatively distinguished
volitions from the body so far as the function of the law of karma is con-
cerned, in spite of the fact that volitions and body are equally impermanent
and conditioned in their constitution and are not ontologically distinct, as
we have seen in chapter VII.
172 Identity and Experience
In that chapter, I also referred to the power of the mind in a more
general sense, and two points emerged there which are relevant here. First,
not only is it volitions (tanhi, according to the second Noble Truth1*)which
condition our future existences (d&a), but it is also volitions which keep us
on the cycle of rebirth in samsira at all: because of, and conditioned by,
one's ignorance, such volitions bind us to the cycle of becoming. And
second, we saw that the spiritual path according to Buddhist teachings is a
gradual clarifying of the mind, and that progress along this path
corresponds to the level of density at which one exists in any given life.
In view of the centrality of the role of ignorance and volitions in
influencing one's mode of existence, it seems primafacie unlikely that it is
from the body that passion, desire and hatred, all of which are in
themselves volitions which arise because of ignorance, originate. Indeed,
we have discussed in some detail already that such volitions are directed
towards something by the sapkhZrakkhndha. But we have not yet specifically
considered the attitude towards the body according to the Sutta Pi!aka. And
in view of the presence of what appear to be distinctly negative statements
about the body in this material, we shall now turn to a consideration of the
early attitude towards the human body.
The analysis of the human being into five constituent parts, the khandhas,
was given by the Buddha in order to illustrate how one should understand
the experience of individuality in terms of selflessness. Our study of this
analysis has perhaps led us to a position where we can see that one can look
at it in two ways: first, one can see that the different khandhas are each
responsible for specific and different aspects of the human being, and sec-
ond, one can see that they are all nevertheless interdependent and mutual-
ly conditioning: it is together that they produce the psychophysical continu-
um of an 'individual'. I shall treat these two aspects, the distinctiveness and
the interrelatedness of the khandhas, separately.
In considering first their distinctiveness, I shall draw on canonical
descriptions of the practice of sati, mindfulness. This practice is particularly
relevant here because, first, the subjects on which the mindfulness medita-
tion is to be practised include the body and volitions, and each subject is
distinguished from the other in the meditation exercises, emphasising their
distinctiveness, and, second, because mindfulness is a meditational practice
which is so important in Pali Buddhism that it has two Suttdc and a Samyutta
entirely devoted to describing its techniques: the SatipaMGna Sutta and the
Mahcisatipaghiina Suttanta, in the Majhima JVikiiya and Deha Nik@yarespec-
tively, and the Satipaghcina Samyutta in the Samyutta [email protected] the
beginning and end of the Suttas, the practice of sati is described as follows:
There is a way, bhWm, leading to [only] one destination, for the purification
of beings, for the transcending of grief and lamentation, for the cessation of
unsatisfactoriness and misery, for the attaining of the [right] path, for the
realising of nibbznu; this [way] is the four foundations of mindfulness. l4
 The attitude towards the body I73
Likewise, in the Satipa!/ziina Samyutta, we read: "The four foundations of
mindfulness, if cultivated and developed, are conducive to complete
indifference, passionlessness, cessation, tranquility, highest knowledge,
complete enlightenment, to nibbiina".15 The text goes on to state: "Whoever
neglects the four foundations of mindfulness also neglects the noble path
which is the way to the complete destruction of unsati~factoriness".~~
The four bases, or meditational objects, for the mindfulness exercises are
the body (kiiya), feelings (uedani), states of mind or thoughts (citta) and
abstract mental objects (dhammq. We shall see that in this context volitions
are included in the general term citta. According to the sources which
describe the practice of sati in detail, all four of these are to be practised in
precisely the same way. But we nevertheless read in the Awttara Nika'ya that
mindfulness concerning the body (fiyagati satz) is sufficient in itself for the
attaining of Nirvana." We shall see from the more detailed descriptions of
sati that the point is to achieve liberating insight into selflessness. The
practice of all four of the exercises is advocated, but insight can be gained
simply by meditating on the body. It is interesting to recall here that
according to Buddhist tradition, it was observing the impermanent nature
of the human body, through seeing in turn an ill person, an old person and
a corpse, that prompted the bodhisatta Gotama to go forth from home on
the journey that was to lead to his Enlightenment.
The Sah)atJhZna Suttas contain detailed descriptions of the method to be
followed in the mindfulness exercises. All procedures are first of all to be
followed using the bhiMu's own (ajhattam)body, feelings, states of mind and
abstract mental objects as the object of meditation. Then, the same
procedures are to be followed on external (bahiddhii)body, feelings, states of
mind and abstract mental objects. In this context, the term bahiddhii refers
not just to what is 'external' to oneself in general, as it did in descriptions of
the riipakkhandha (and the use here of @a, not riipa, for 'body' probably
reflects this), but to the body, feelings, states of mind and abstract mental
objects of someone else.18With regard to the body, the bhikWlu is first of all
to centre his attention on the body qua body, and not on the feelings or
anything else he might associate with the body but which are the subject of
another specific mindfulness exercise. The techniques are essentially
identical for the other three meditational subjects mentioned above, and in
this way each of the subjects of meditation is considered to be distinct from
the others. With regard to the body, we read (and the form is the same for
the other subjects of meditation):
In this [exercise], bhikhus, a bhikkhu proceeds contemplating the body qua
body, ardent (i.e. conscientious),attentive and mindful, in order to remove
[himself]from the covetousness and misery (abh~~omanasram) in the world.lg
I have translated abhijjhZdomanassam as 'covetousness and misery', but
the term clearly refers to desire, which binds one to samszra (sa~sirais
I74 Identity and Experience
indicated by 'in the world' - loka), and to dukkha, the unsatisfactoriness
with which s a ~ i r is
a associated. So one might paraphrase the last part of
the sentence as: "in order to remove [himself] from desire and unsatisfac-
toriness, which are associated with saysira". Precisely this is the purpose of
the meditation.
In the meditation exercise on the body, the bhikkhu then concentrates in
turn on different aspects of the body, such as breathing, posture, the
standard list of bodily parts, and functions (walking, sitting down) and so
on. He also meditates on a corpse in progressive states of decomposition,
which the texts describe in considerable detail. The bhikkhu trains himself
(sikkhati)to 'experience' (pa6arndvid)each object of meditation very precisely,
excluding every thought other than that it is a part of the body. In this way
the bhikkhu establishes that while the body, or part thereof, exists, he also
becomes aware of and observes its impersonal nature: there is nothing
about it which constitutes separate selfhood. The Suttas state:
... his mindfulness is present precisely to the extent necessary for knowledge,
sufficient for mindfulness, and he proceeds unattached, not grasping [i.e.
identifying with] anything in the world.20
The attitude of detached observation required for this exercise is
suggested by Nyanaponika when he states that a bhiWGhu meditates on each
object "without reacting to them by deed, speech or mental comment".21
The commentary confirms that the purpose of the meditation exercise is to
gain insight into selflessness when it glosses 'not grasping anything in the
world' as: "he does not grasp at [false notions] such as having a soul, or
thinking 'this is my self' of anything in the world, whether it be the body or
any of the other Wlandhas" .22
The Suttas also strongly imply in these exercises that there is nothing
about any particular part, or condition, of the body that is intrinsically
desirable or repugnant: be it breathing or posture, hair or pus, a young
body or a rotting corpse, a bhikkhu is merely to obserue it quite free from any
connotation. The purpose of such mindfulness exercises is so to
concentrate on each specific subject of meditation that there follows clear
comprehension of its precise nature, which is that it is impersonal and
conditioned. The exercise is purely analytical, and in experiencing each of
the objects of meditation in this way as distinct from each other, a bhikkhu
understands that there is nothing inherently disgusting, or hateful, or
desirable, or anything else about the body; nor is there anything inherently
desirable or repugnant about pleasurable or painful feelings.
Desire (sariga citta; lit: 'a state of mind with desire') and hatred (dosa),
along with other volitions, are meditated on as part of the mindfulness
exercise on citta, the third of the four objects described in the Satz$a#hina
S ~ t t a sIn
. ~this
~ exercise the bhikkhu observes and understands (pnjrntlh)every
state of mind he experiences. Included here are volitions, such as those just
 The attitude towards the body I75
mentioned, and whether or not he has experienced certain levels of
meditation (jhina). This is expressed by his meditating on whether he has
experienced a state of mind that "has become great" or "has not become
great", (mahaggatam, amahaggatam). I referred to these terms in chapter VII.
They are glossed in the commentary as indicating that he has been
associated through meditation with the subtle and formless cosmological
levels and the gross material level re~pectively.~~ In understanding other
states of mind, the bhikkhu is also able to see to what extent he has gained
insight. He sees, for example, whether or not his state of mind has other
states of mind "superior to it", whether or not it is "composed" (in the
sense of having equilibrium), and whether or not it is "liberated".25
Again, as with the other exercises which comprise the four foundations
of the practice of mindfulness, the bhikWzu does this "precisely to the extent
necessary for knowledge, sufficient for mindfulness" so that "he proceeds
unattached, not grasping anything in the Understanding his state
of mind not only enables him to understand his progress on the path to
liberation, but also allows him to see that any volitional activity is directed
towards the body or feelings or abstract mental objects by certain mental
states. By separately meditating on the body qua body, on feelings qua
feelings, and so on, the bhikkhu sees that volitional activity need not accom-
pany those constituents of the human being: they originate in mental states
because of lack of insight.
So our consideration of the key meditation exercise, sati, which concen-
trates on the distinctiveness of the five khandhas, clearly indicates that in the
Pali ~VikcZya~the attitude towards the body that the bhikWlu is to adopt is one
of analytical observation. Such analytical observation is conducive to
gaining insight into impermanence and selflessness. It also suggests that
there is no foundation for stating that the body is the origin of passion,
hatred and thoughts which toss up the mind.
I turn now to discussing the question of the attitude towards the body
and the origin of passion, hatred and thoughts which toss up the mind in
the light of the interrelatedness of the khandhas. In view of the many
references I have made to the way in which the khandhas work together, this
discussion need only be brief. As already stated, it is together that one is to
understand the khandhas as aspects of the psychophysical continuum called
an 'individual'. Each of the khandhas, and part thereof, has precisely the
same conditioned (samkhata) status, and as such is characterised by
impermanence (aniccati), unsatisfactoriness (dukkhati) and impersonality
(anattati), the 'three characteristics' of the tilakkhana formula. They are
unsatisfactory precisely because they are impermanent, or transitory, and
impermanent in that they do not exist independently. Their very lack of
independently existing identity is the most fundamental aspect of their
interrelatedness. This interrelatedness is emphasised by the fact that the
khandhas are collectively defined by the Buddha as what constitutes dukkf~a.~~
176 Identity and Experience
Given that it is as individual human beings, or, one might say, as individual
bundles of khandhas, that we experience conditioned, savim'c, existence, this
is essentially the meaning of the first Noble Truth.
It has already become clear to us in earlier chapters on each of the
khandhas in turn that they are mutually dependent in their functioning. One
of the passages which describes the cognitive process, to which I have
referred several times, is probably the best example of such mutual
dependency:
Visual consciousness arises because of eye and visible form; contact
[occurs] when there is a combination of the three; feelings are caused by
contact; that which one feels, one apperceives.. , .28
Here we can clearly see that the operation of the sense involves the
rtipakkhandha, awareness is the function of the vin"n"i&khandha,feelings are
classified as the uedanikhandha, and apperception is an aspect of the
saECikhandha.
A particularly notable point which arises from this passage, apart from
the fact that it obviously confirms that the khandhas are interrelated, is that
both feelings and apperception can arise without any involvement of the
sapkhirakkhandha. We saw from the description of the analytical meditation
exercise above that volitions are separate from the body and feelings. Here,
likewise, in a passage which serves to illustrate the interconnectedness of
the khandhas rather than that they are separate, we have a canonical passage
which indicates that the presence of a feeling, be it physical or mental,
agreeable or disagreeable, is not dependent on there being a concomitant
volition concerning it.29I will return to this point.
We can now see more clearly that it is misleading to say that volitions
such as passion, hatred and thoughts which toss up the mind arise from the
body. T h e body is indeed present in the arising of feelings, but it is
completely unactivated, as it were, unless the cognitive ('mental') faculties
of awareness, apperception and feeling are simultaneously present: and it is
towards this combination of functioning khandhas that volitions are
subsequently directed. The fact that the khandhas function together, how-
ever, does serve to explain the presence in the canon of those statements
cited above which advocate the driving out of desire and passion from all
five of the khandhas. Furthermore, desire and passion arise because of
ignorance regarding the selflessness of all things, and the reference to the
driving out of desire and passion in each of the khandhas can be understood
to mean that this selflessness has to be understood in every one of the
khandhas. But we nevertheless know from the analysis of the human being
given in the khandha formula that volitions actually originate in the
samkhimkkhandha: though we might apparently experience volitions within
the body itself, they have mentality rather than corporeality as their source.
So we can state quite specifically that all karmic effects, which in Buddhism
 T h e attitude towards the body I77
axiomatically ariie from passions and desires, are produced by the
saM5rahWzandha and do not originate from the body, the nipakkhandha. This
understanding of the body's role does not suggest that a negative attitude
towards it is appropriate. From the teaching given in the Sutta @aka, it
would seem that the attitude towards the body should be neither negative
nor positive: one is to have a purely analytical attitude towards one's body.
In view of this doctrinal position, why do we also find canonical
statements which appear to refer to the body negatively? Why is there the
apparent paradox mentioned above? Before addressing the specific
quotations to which I referred above, I will suggest a few possible general
reasons for the presence in the canon of what appear to be negative
references towards the body.
The first and most obvious reason is the Brahmanical and Sramana
milieu in which Buddhist teachings were first promulgated. Some of these
traditions taught that the body and its secretions were polluting, and many
advocated physical asceticism and the mortification of the body. The
practice of overtly subjugating the body to physical duress, combined with
the view that it is polluting, indicate that the body was considered to have a
negative effect on one's chances of salvation. In the Pali canon itself, apart
from a very few exceptions, the Buddha taught that extreme physical
asceticism and self-denial were unnecessary. Indeed, they were potentially
as misleading as indulgence: what is required is the Middle Way. The texts
tell us that the Buddha himself, while still the bodhkatta Gotama, spent six
years as a wandering ascetic, subjecting his body to extremes of heat, cold,
hunger, thirst, and so on. It was not until he realised the futility of such
behaviour from the soteriological point of view, and relinquished it, that he
was able to become Enlightened.30If, however, the negative view was
widespread, then it is likely that some of the people who were converted to
the teaching of the Buddha were influenced by this earlier attitude.
Second, Buddhist teachings allow room for what one might call a
'healthily negative' attitude towards the body. This is represented by the
Buddha's reaction to his observation of the human body as it is when old,
diseased and dead before he went forth from home, mentioqed above. And
its relevance is to the impersonality which lies at the heart of the Buddha's
teaching. Insight into this impersonality is liberating knowledge itself, and
ignorance of it is what binds us to sa?nscTric existence. If one has a slightly
sceptical, or detached, attitude towards one's body, one is less likely falsely
to identify with it.
That having been said, we do tend to identify with our bodies. And this
leads us to the third possible reason for negative statements about the body
in the Sutta R-taka.Faced with the Buddha's teaching that we are to realise
that all things are impermanent, unsatisfactory and impersonal, one might
instinctively apply this teaching to the body rather than to mental processes,
at least initially. Our experience is of a mind which is ever-changing,
178 Identity and Experience
flickering here and there constantly. But our bodies seem relatively
permanent to us, and we intuitively identify to some degree with them.
That we also identify other people to some degree with their bodies is
clearly illustrated in a well-known story in the Mahiparinibbina Sutta. We
read there that Ananda, the Buddha's closest friend and disciple,
remained, in spite of his advanced wisdom, so attached to the physical
presence of the Buddha that he did not achieve Enlightenment until after
the Buddha died and h a n d a was able to eliminate this attachment once
and for all.31It is precisely in order to avoid this kind of mistake that the
mindfulness exercises are to be practised both on one's own and on
someone else's body.
The Buddha himself acknowledged the apparently greater permanence
of the body. It is related in the Nidina Samyutta of the Samyutta N i k p a that
the Buddha stated that anyone looking for something permanent and
lasting would do better to try the body, which lasts up to a hundred years,
than the mind, which changes every moment.32For anyone struggling
against false notions of permanence, what more obvious object is there on
which they can both concentrate their efforts and also subsequently vent
their frustrations than the body?
My final suggestion draws on the link between the mind and the body
that we saw in the last chapter. There, it became clear that it is volitions
that in effect cause the body to arise in successive lives. At its simplest, this
is because the volitions which constitute karmic activity arise because of
ignorance: and karmic activity leads to rebirth in another body. We also
saw in that chapter the way in which the density of the body corresponds to
degrees of ignorance. It was suggested that the density of the body in which
a given existence takes place can reflect the spiritual progress of the
individual. It might be, therefore, that in the spiritual struggle from
ignorance to insight, the psychology of the situation tends to be inverted
and the physical body, which is the most dense form of rGpa with which one
can be reborn, is psychologically held responsible for ignorance rather than
recognising that in reality the causal process is the reverse: the body
represents the 'impurity' of the mind; it is not impure itself. This psycho-
logical reversal of the causal process might be even more likely because
(with very few exceptions) Enlightenment is achieved while in the physical
body. So what one might call the full extent of the spectrum of density can
be experienced by an individual in one lifetime: the dense level of the
physical body is present even when formless levels of meditation are
experienced. With such great contrast, the most dense levels might attract
negative associations even for a bhikkhu who is at a relatively advanced level
of insight.
For any or all of these reasons the b h i k k themselves might have been
predisposed, even unconsciously, towards making negative statements
about the body. In turning now to the quotations from the canon which I
 The attitude towards the body I79
cited above, however, we also see that in some cases a deeper consideration
of their context shows them to be less negative about the body than at first
appears.
The statement that "only an ignorant fool would regard it [the body] as
beautiful" can perhaps be explained as follows: anyone ignorant as to the
real nature of the body, who has not cultivated the foundations of mindful-
ness in order to see it as it really is, has not analysed it into its constituents.
Such a person has not perceived the body merely and precisely qua body,
but has a view of the body which is meta-physical, or what some modern
writers might call 'holistic'. In Buddhist doctrinal terms, what this means is
that such a person still erroneously identifies in some way with his or her
body. Because there is no room for such a view in the process of cultivating
the penetrating analysis of the bodily complex necessary for liberating
insight, and because anyone who has cultivated such insight is considered
wise, anyone holding such a viewsrnightbe deemed a fool, certainly from a
relative point of view; and the more so because it is only from the holistic
point of view that the body could possibly be considered beautiful: its
constituent parts, activities and functions are merely parts, activities and
functions.
In the reference to the body being a "heap of corruption", the Pali term
translated here is piitisanda. Piiti is also sometimes used with kiiya and
sometimes with ~ a n d e h aAll. ~ ~such expressions refer to the body. Other
meanings of the word piiti, apart from corruption, include 'putrid', 'rotten'
or 'decayed'. While the description 'heap of corruption, rottenness or
decay' appears prima facie to be unequivocally negative about the body, in
fact what such a term is doing is serving to emphasise the body's imperma-
nence, rather than that one should feel negative about it. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by the fact that piitisanda is found in contexts which
include other terms such as bhindana, which means 'breaking up, brittle,
falling into ruin', and pabharigu, which means 'brittle, easily destroyed,
peri~hable'.~~ And in one passage which uses the term piitihya, the context
is explicitly intended to illustrate impermanence: after describing the body
as Piiti, the Buddha asks Vakkali: "As to this, what do you think, Vakkali: is
the body permanent or i m ~ e r m a n e n t ? " ~ ~
I also referred above to the presence in the Pali canon of statements that
the body is 'impure'. There are many Pali words for impure, but the ones
most frequently found in connection with bodily functions are asuci and
asubha. Asuci is used in a passage in the Ariguttara Nikga to which I referred
above which describes the body as a boil from whose nine openings
impurity (usual, stench and loathsomeness ooze TOrefer to purity in
such a context clearly overlooks the meaning of purity in Buddhist
doctrinal terms. The Buddha teaches that salvation is obtained by
progressing from ignorance to insight. His prescription for how to achieve
insight is given in terms of following a path which can also be described as
I 80 Identity and Experience
a process of purification. This, indeed, is how Buddhaghosa understands it,
and he accordingly called his seminal work the ViiuddhiPnaga: 'The Path to
Purity'. The path to purity cannot, however, be understood to mean that a
disciple is to overcome or avoid the body or its functions and secretions
because they are impure in the way suggested in the passage quoted above
from the A@uttaraNibya. As we have seen, the psycho-cosmological status
of the body in relation to the spiritual path represents the state of the mind
purity is a metaphor for the degree to which one has achieved insight, and
is not associated with the body qua body. Doctrinally, in ethicising the law
of karma, the Buddha taught that defilement was moral or psychological.
Only indirectly is this connected with the physical body insofar as one's
body is one of the channels for one's intention, or will to act, as we have
seen in the definition of karma, and in the ethical triad of fiya, vacas and
citta or manas. According to the Buddha's teaching, impurity, or defilement,
comes from unwholesome (akumla) states of mind. In Buddhist teachings
the term for wholesome (kusala) implies karmic neutrality or spiritually
beneficial states of rninde3'
A passage in the Sutta JViPita illustrates the doctrinal understanding of
impurity. It states that some people think one can avoid all tainted fare
(imagandham) if one only eats certain foods which have been properly
prepared: "Eating what is well-made, well prepared, given by others, pure,
outstanding ... thinking 'Tainted fare is not appropriate for mey...".38 This
view was widely accepted in the Brahmanical and Sramayz milieu in which
the Buddha taught. The Sutta continues, however, with the Buddha's
teaching that what pollutes us are activities which are harmful to others,
such as killing (pinitipgta), stealing (theyya), telling lies (mw6vida), adultery
@aradi~asrnanq,~~ or volitions which are based on ignorance and which are
karmically binding, such as greed (yzddhi),anger (kodha),arrogance (mada),40
and so on. The Sutta summarises the uselessness of external or ritual prac-
tices (in particular Brahmanical and hamapa ones) in the cause of purity:
Not the flesh of fish, nor fasting, nor nakedness, nor shaven head, matted
hair, dirt, nor rough animal skins, nor observance of the fire ceremony, nor
even the many penances there are in the world for (gaining)immortality, nor
hymns nor oblations, nor the performance of sacrifices at the proper season,
purify a man.. . .4'
Though bodily functions are not explicitly referred to here, it is clear
from the context that it would be erroneous to think that they are polluting.
Rather, the Sutta goes on to state:
One should wander guarded in the appertures (of the sense organs), with
one's sense-faculties conquered, standing firm in the doctrine, delighting in
uprightness and mildness. Gone beyond attachment, with all miseries
eliminated, a wise man does not cling to things seen or heard.42
 The attitude towards the body 181
Here we have an unequivocal statement that what should concern a
disciple is following the doctrinal path. The purpose is to go beyond attach-
ment. And the implication of this passage is not only that it is not the body
or its functions that are polluting, but that even to dwell on the question of
whether bodily functions might be polluting constitutes clinging to things
seen. The Buddha teaches that the true struggle should be within oneself:
it is a moral and psychological struggle which should be directed towards
the overcoming of clinging, which is itself a particularly unwholesome state
of mind.
I have suggested above that the presence in the canonical material of
negative statements about the body might be because, however uncon-
sciously, the body was psychologically held responsible for ignorance. At
least in theory, this might account for references to the body being impure.
The metaphor associating density, ignorance and impurity is, however, a
sophisticated one, and in my opinion it is more likely that the term
'impure', when used in connection with the body and its functions, is
present in the canon as a result of the Brahmanical background in which
the teaching took root. This is clearly the case when there is an explicit
association of impurity with bodily secretions. The effect of the underlying
metaphor is more likely merely to have predisposed the collators of the
material to including such doctrinally inconsistent expressions.
I will return below to the reference to the body's nine oozing openings
when we consider Buddhaghosa's attitude towards the body. But if we look
now at the context of this passage, we see that the body is first described
according to the stock phrase that it is made up of the four elements and
begotten of mother and father. I have referred to this passage before, and
the point of it is contained in what follows: that the body is impermanent,
subject to erosion and decay, is perishable and subject to destr~ction.~~ In
Pali, it concludes: Tasmii ti ha bhikkhave imasmim k@e nibbindathi ti. E. M.
Hare, in his translation for the Pali Text Society, translates this sentence:
"Wherefore, monks, be ye disgusted with this body".44 It is equally
philologically correct, and in my opinion more appropriate both in this
specific context and in the wider context of Buddhist teachings as a whole,
to translate it: "So, monks, be indifferent towards (or dis-enchanted with)
your body".45The purpose of this passage is not to encourage bhikkhus to
feel disgust towards their impure bodies but to discourage them from
seeking anything permanent in, or identifjlng with, their bodies. The terms
in which the description of the body itself is couched are surely the result of
non-Buddhist, and certainly non-doctrinal, influence.
There is in the canonical material, both in the Samyutta JVik&iya4'and
j in
the Vina~a,~' an important story which illustrates the way in which certain
early bhikkhus disastrously failed to understand both the meaning of purity
and also the fact that meditating on the body is intended to give insight into
its impermanence. We read that the Buddha:
I 82 Identity and Experience

... talked to the bhiWdzus in many ways on the subject of impurity (asubha).He
spoke in praise of what is impure; he spoke in praise of the contemplation of
what is impure; he spoke again and again in praise of the stage of meditation
on what is impure.*
T h e bhikkhus go away to meditate on what is impure, and the text
implies that the principal subject they used was their bodies. It states:
They dwelt intent upon the practice of contemplating what is impure in
different ways. They were troubled by their own bodies, ashamed of them,
loathing them.49
The Vinaya version of the story gives an analogy to describe the depth of
their revulsion:
It is as if a woman or a man when young and delicate and fond of dressing
up, having washed their hair, would be troubled, ashamed and full of
loathing because they had the corpse of a snake or of a dog or of a man hung
around their neck.50
It continues: "So these bhikkhus, being troubled by their own bodies,
ashamed of them, and loathing them, by themselves deprived themselves of
life and deprived each other of life".5' Both the Enaya and the Samyutta
JVihya accounts record that a great many bhikkhus either killed themselves,
or were killed by another at their own request, for this reason.52
According to the Vinaya, when the Buddha learns of what has been
done, he is extremely angry with them. He states: "Bhikkhus, it is not
suitable for these bhikkhus, it is not fit, it is not proper, it is not worthy of a
disciple, it is not good, it should not be done".53He then gave the following
instruction: "Whatever bhikkhu intentionally deprives a human being of life,
or who seeks to be a knife-beare~-,~~ he is defeated, he is not one of the
~ o m m u n i t y " .This
~ ~ instruction is the third of the pirijika rules, the
breaking of which means that a bhikkhu has expelled himself from the
Sangha: his discipleship is 'defeated'.
Because of the disastrous nature of the episode which followed the
bhikkhus' misunderstanding of the teaching on impurity, it is unsurprising
that one should read at the end of the Samyutta account that Ananda said
to the Buddha: "It would be a good thing, Lord, if you would explain [the
teaching] in another way, so that the community of bhikkhus might be
established in k n ~ w l e d g e " This
. ~ ~ plea, and indeed the episode as a whole,
perhaps indicates the difficulty bhikkhus had in understanding that the
purpose of meditating on impurity (or unloveliness) is to realise its
impermanen~e.~'
I turn now to the translations I cited. In Norman's translation of Sutta
JVipZta 271, we read that passion, hatred and thoughts which toss up the
mind arise from the body. The word 'body' has been supplied by the
 T h e attitude towards the body 183
translator: it is not present in the Pali at all, which reads: Rago ca doso ca
itonidZnZ, arati rati lomahamso it@, ito samufih@amanovitah- kumiraka"dharikam
iuJossajanti. Norman translates the verse as follows: "'From this (body)
passion and hatred have their origin. From this (body)aversion and delight
and excitement are born. Arising from this (body) thoughts toss up the
mind, as young boys toss up a (captive)crow."58At the front of his transla-
tion, Norman states: "Words in round brackets are those which need to be
supplied in the English translation, although not found in the original Pali".
The key word in the Pali, to which Norman feels it necessary to add the
English word 'body', is ito, literally 'from this'.
The context is that theyakkha Saciloma has asked the Buddha, in order
to test whether he is a real ascetic or just looks like one, where passion and
hatred have their origin. Immediately following on from the verse quoted
above, we read: Snehajii attasambhctz nigrodhasseva khandhaji. Norman
translates this: "(They are) born from affection, arisen from oneself, like the
trunk-born (shoots) of the banyan tree."59 In an earlier edition of his
translation, Norman gives an alternative rendering at the end of the story,
translating ito as "from within".60In the context of Saciloma's question and
the subsequent verse, this would seem to me to be far preferable to, and
one might say more accurate than, "from this body". The commentary
glosses ito as attabhzvato. I cited the different meanings of the term attabhzva,
as given in the Critical Pali Dictiona~,in chapter VII. We saw that it has a
variety of meanings ranging from 'soul' in an abstract sense, the conven-
tional individuality experienced by an unenlightened person, represented
concretely by the five khandhas, and sometimes it can mean body. In later
material it is sometimes used when either the body or the five khandhas are
erroneously taken in the sense 'this is my self'.61In Buddhist Sanskrit,
itmabhiua is used for 'body'; but this is in conjunction with pratilambha,
again meaning bodily existence in its broad sense.62From the context in
which we find it here, the most likely of all these meanings is, in my
opinion, that of a conventional being, which is also its most frequent
meaning. Nor does the context support the translation of ito in the earlier
text as "from this body".
In Miiller's translation of Dhammapada 202 and 203, he states: "there is
no pain like the body" and "the body is the greatest of pains".63The Pali
sentences from which these translations have been made are, respectively,
as follows: n'atthi khandhadisi d&i and samkhamkharZ parami dukkfii. The first of
these is clearly repeating the Buddha's definition that the h n d h a s are what
constitute dukkha. With regard to the second, samkhzra does have a
multitude of meanings, and on occasion means bodily existence in its broad
sense. But it never means 'body' in the sense of 'corporeality'. So what this
sentence is saying is that the greatest dukkha is samstZric existence, which is
precisely the content of the first Noble Truth. Bateson makes the same
mistake in his article on "The body-Buddhism" in the Encychpedia 0fReliS;on
184 Identity and Experience
and Ethics when he states "the body is the sphere of suffering" and "... the
body is the origin of s~ffering".~~
The Pali word nibbdii is often found in contexts in the canon which refer
to the human body. We saw it above in the Ariguttara NiluZya passage about
the impermanence of the body. The way nibbidti is translated frequently
tends to further the view that the early Buddhist attitude towards the body
was negative. Nibbidii can mean 'disgust', 'revulsion', 'indifference' or
'di~enchantment'.~~ In contexts where it must mean 'indifference' or 'disen-
chantment', translating it as 'disgust' or 'revulsion' is highly misleading. In
the Pali Text Society translation of Volume V of the Samyutta Nikga, for
example, a translation by Woodward includes the following: "These seven
limbs of wisdom ... conduce to downright revulsion (ekantanibbidqa),to
dispassion, to cessation, to calm, to full comprehension, to the wisdom, to
JVibbZna"." Nibbida' frequently occurs in this phrase, and in my opinion it
cannot here mean anything other than 'indifference' or 'dis-enchantment':
'downright revulsion', directed towards the body or anything else, would be
a karrnically unwholesome, and therefore binding, volition quite inappro-
priate for a bhihkhu at this stage of the path. To use the words from another
of Woodward's translations, it would be one of the "evil, unprofitable
states which come to be because of wrong views".67Even if one were to
understand the qualities referred to in this sentence, disgust or indifference,
dispassion, cessation, calm, full comprehension, wisdom, Nirvana, as being
qualities which are acquired sequentially, it seems highly improbable to me
that disgust would immediately precede so many other qualities which are
more associated with detachment. Woodward repeats the translation of
nibbidii as "downright revulsion" throughout his translations for the Pali
Text S o ~ i e t y E.
.~~M. Hare translates nibbidti in the same context as
"complete or as "complete w e a r i n e ~ s " T
.~~
W. Rhys Davids,
however, translates it as "deta~hrnent".~'
There are a multitude of similar examples of translations which are
misleading about the attitude towards the body, but these will suffice to
make my point. Scholarly works other than translations can be just as
misleading in statements about the body, possibly because they have relied
on the translations.
We can now reconcile the apparent paradox referred to above in
summing up the attitude towards the human body found in the canonical
material. We have seen that the doctrinal position according to the
Buddha's teaching is that the attitude towards the body should be analytical.
This correlates with his teaching that karma is volition: it is one's state of
mind, not one's body, which is the source of desire, hatred and other
karmically binding states which determine the nature of one's future
rebirth(s). The presence in the canon of statements which appear to be
negative about the body is probably the result of outside influence or
doctrinal confusion which arises because of the demands of the spiritual
 T h e attitude towards the body 185
struggle. Many such statements are in any case not as negative as they at
first appear if read in their context or if translated more appropriately.
I turn now to consider Buddhaghosa's attitude towards the human
body. My examples are mainly drawn from Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga,
but I will also refer to the commentaries, which are believed to have been
compiled by him. Many people composed the material Buddhaghosa
included in the commentaries, however, and I have already acknowledged
that he can hardly have been the only one to write in such a way.
Nevertheless, the fisuddhimaga is consistently and exaggeratedly negative
about the body. I can only choose a few examples here.
I start with an example of the difference between the canonical material
and the commentaries. Though it is a relatively minor example, it never-
theless clearly illustrates the difference between simple analysis, which is
found in the former, and descriptive value which is added in the latter. I
referred in chapter I to the standard list of the constituents of the human
body which is found in several places in the Pali canon. The list of thirty-
one parts (or thirty-two when the brain is added), which is invariably given
without comment, is as follows:
There are in this body head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews,
bones, bone-marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, membranes, spleen, lungs,
intestines, mesentery, stomach, excrement, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat,
fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, synovic fluid, urine @rain).
It is this list which is used in the Satipa,@ina exercise on parts of the body,
which clearly illustrates the extent to which each and every part is to be
observed in the same objective light as part of the analytical meditational
exercise. This is regardless of whether it is, say, a tooth, or mucus or pus. In
itself, each part has nothing that is to be regarded with anything other than
complete neutrality. In the commentary on this list, however, qualitative
words are added, so the body and its constituent parts are described as
'vile' (kucchita),'impure' (asubha and asun), and 'loathsome' Ijeg~ccha).'~
In the section of the Ksuddhimagga which describes the practice of
mindfulness on the body, not only does Buddhaghosa give a substantial
description (as opposed to an analysis) of each of the parts of the body to be
meditated upon, but he also introduces many negative adjectives which are
not in the canonical material. Thus just of mere head hairs we read that
they are subject to a "fivefold repulsiveness" (ibazcadhipatikiilato), as to
colour (vanna),shape (sayihina),odour @andha),habitat (&ya) and location
(~krisa).~~ As a specimen from a lengthy passage, I quote:
Head hairs are repulsive in colour as well as in shape, odour, habitat and
location... Just as a baby's excrement, as to its colour, is the colour of
turmeric and, as to its shape, is the shape of a piece of turmeric root, and just
as the bloated carcase of a black dog thrown on a rubbish heap, as to its
I 86 Identity a n d Experience
colour, is the colour of a ripe palrnyra fruit and, as to its shape, is the shape of
a [mandoline-shaped] drum left face down, and its fangs are like jasmine
buds, and so even if both these are not directly repulsive in colour and shape,
still their odour is directly repulsive, so too, even if head hairs are not directly
repulsive in colour and shape, still their odour is directly repulsive.74
Other similes used in this passage are village sewage (giimanissanda), a
dunghill (@thar&) and a charnel ground ( s ~ s Z n a ) . ~ ~
Buddhaghosa uses the body in the chapter of the Tmddhimaga where
the meditation subject is loathsomeness or impurity, asubha. He sums up his
lengthy description of the body's nature by quoting some verses:
Fools cannot in their folly tell;
They take the body to be fair,
And soon get caught in Evil's snare
Nor can escape its painful spell.

But since the wise have thus laid bare

This filthy body's nature, so,
be it alive or dead, they know
There is no beauty lurking there.
For this is said:
This filthy body stinks outright
Like ordure, like a privy's site;
This body men that have insight
Condemn, is object of a fool's delight.

A tumour where nine holes abide

Wrapped in a coat of clammy hide
And trickling filth on every side
Polluting the air with stenches far and wide.

If it perchance should come about

That what is inside it came out,
Surely a man would need a knout
With which to put the crows and dogs to
The passage concludes:
So a capable 6hikWlu should apprehend the sign wherever the aspect of foul-
ness is manifest, whether in a living body or in a dead one, and he should
make the meditation subject reach a b s ~ r p t i o n . ~ ~
Even allowing for poetic licence, this passage is in striking contrast to the
canonical analysis by which a bhikkhu also arrives at the conclusion that
there is nothing inherently desirable about the body.
 T h e attitude towards the body 187
Buddhaghosa is traditionally thought to have been born a brahmin. I
think this is almost certainly true, judging from the terminology he uses in
describing the body. So far as I am aware, his concern is not with the origin
of volitions such as passion and hatred but with the physical aspects of the
body. One further example will serve here: a section of Buddhaghosa's
description of the body's nature. The description begins relatively objec-
tively, but becomes wonderfully lurid as it goes on:
This is the body's nature: it is a collection of over three hundred bones,
jointed by one hundred and eighty joints, bound together by nine hundred
sinews, plastered over with nine hundred pieces of flesh, enveloped in the
moist inner skin, enclosed in the outer cuticle, with orifices here and there,
constantly dribbling and trickling like a grease pot, inhabited by a commu-
nity of worms, the home of disease, the basis of painful states, perpetually
oozing from the nine orifices like a chronic open carbuncle, from both of
whose eyes eye-filth trickles, from whose ears ear-filth, from whose nostrils
snot, from whose mouth food and bile and phlegm and blood, from whose'
lower outlets excrement and urine, and from whose ninety-nine thousand
pores the broth of stale sweat seeps, with bluebottles and their like buzzing
round it, which when untended with tooth sticks and mouth-washing and
head-anointing and bathing and underclothing and dressing would, judged
by the universal repulsiveness of the body, make even a king, if he wandered
from village to village with his hair in its natural wild disorder, no different
from a flower-scavenger or an outcaste or what you will. So there is no
distinction between a king's body and an outcaste's in so far as its impure
stinking nauseating repulsiveness is con~erned.'~
If this is Buddhaghosa's apology for Buddhism against the caste system
of the Brahmanical religion (which is based on a complex structure of
purity and pollution), in my opinion it fails dismally! What we read here is
riddled with concern about the polluting effects of bodily secretions, and, in
my view, it is nothing more than the Brahmanisation of Buddhist
hermeneutics.
Further on in the same passage, we read the following:
So men delight in women and women in men without perceiving the true
nature of [the body's] characteristic foulness, masked by adventitious adorn-
ment. But in the ultimate sense there is no place here even the size of an
atom fit to lust after."
Buddhism certainly teaches that lust, or desire in general, is misplaced.
But not because the body is foul. It is misplaced because insight into the
transient nature of all things brings the knowledge that what one is desiring
is momentary, impermanent, and therefore unsatisfactory. Like the bhWus
who committed suicide, Buddhaghosa appears to have missed this point
altogether, even though it is implicit in the teaching given consequent to the
I 88 Identity and Experience
earlier episode. What he appears to be doing once again is Brahmanising
Buddhist teachingmsO
I return to the point made twice above that one can be aware of one's
body and sensations without having any concomitant volition. It is funda-
mental to a bhikkhu's progress on the path to liberating insight that he
achieves indz$erence, or detachment. It is nonsensical in a Buddhist context to
cultivate antipathy, towards the body or anything else. Because of the
presence in the canon of descriptions of asubha bhivani, it is sometimes
argued that revulsion can be used as a meditational tool or catalyst for a
bhikkhu. But we have seen above that the term asubha is used in contexts
where the point is to understand impermanence, not that one should be
disgusted: what the bhikkhu is aiming for is indifference. And any meditation
on the bh.ikkhuYsown feeling or mental state of disgust would be for the same
purpose. Not only does this follow from the doctrinal teaching of freedom
from all volitions, but it is explicitly stated in several places in the Sutta
P i ~ k uWe
. read in the Bigha Nikiiya, for example, that a bhikkhu who "lives
detached from sensual pleasures, detached from unwholesome conditions"
experiences ease (sukha, the opposite of d~kkha).~' In the Brihmapa Samyutta
in the Samyutta Nik@a, which redefines what a brahmin is, it states that a
brahrnin is one who has "cast out both wickedness and merit.82
In the thirdjhc?na, a bhikWlu "pervades, drenches, permeates and sufises
his body with sukha without associating it with p l e a s ~ r e " Elsewhere
.~~ we
read that a bhikWlu is to reach a point where:
his mind is immovable, his body is immovable, b e is] inwardly well estab-
lished, well released. If he is aware with his mind of an attractive/a repulsive
state, he is not affected (mariku; literally, tr~ubled).'~
Finally, a later text, the Milindapan"ha, states that "arahants have neither
attraction nor anti path^".^^
Having an attitude of disgust or revulsion towards anything would
constitute a karrnically unwholesome, and therefore binding, 'view', just as
much as considering something to be beautiful and/or desirable; and the
bhikkhu has to see through and transcend all views and attain a karmically
neutral position. We have seen this point borne out in the canonical
descriptions of meditation: there is nothing in them which is designed to
induce any specific negative (or positive) attitude; merely a detached obser-
vation of what is. The question of gender is also relevant here. To have a
positive or negative attitude towards the male or female would be just as
much a karmically binding view; and the point is to be neutral. So one
might say that doctrinally or philosophically there is no room for sexism in
early Buddhism. The link between sexism and the attitude towards the
human body is the subject of Wilson's paper "The Female Body as a Source
of Horror and Insight in Post-Aiokan B~ddhism".~~ Wilson establishes and
extensively discusses the antipathy towards the body in commentarial
 The attitude towards the body 189
literature. She concentrates her study on the Dhammapadat.thakuthti, but also
draws widely on other commentaries and on Buddhist Sanskrit texts. She
seeks to illustrate that the negativity is largely directed towards women's
bodies, representing the ultimate dis-enchantment for male bhikkhus. The
examples she gives are certainly negative about the female body. But I am
not convinced, as Wilson is, that such passages necessarily reflect mysogyny
on the part of the authors. Though institutionalised Buddhism, as part of
Indian culture, was undoubtedly patriarchal, and though such patriarchy is
not doctrinally defensible, the use of women's bodies to illustrate imperma-
nence might merely reflect the fact that the texts were mostly composed by
and for men and that the sexual instinct is the most difficult desire to
eradicate. In my opinion the most important point of Wilson's paper is that
the degree of negativity towards the body in later, non-canonical, literature
has considerably increased. In concentrating on possible mysogyny in the
texts, however, Wilson misses the point that such negativity is non-doctrinal.
It indicates a lack of understanding on the part of the authors of the later
material that meditating on the body is for the purpose of understanding its
impermanence. Through such understanding, a bhikkhu is able to be
detached either from identifying with it or desiring it.
Because the cultivation of indifference, or detachment, is so central to
understanding Buddhist teaching, in my opinion Buddhaghosa (and others
writing in a similar tone) does a grave disservice to Buddhism in writing as
he does about the body. He goes far beyond merely commenting on the
canon, and his elaborate reinterpretations result in a teaching which bears
little relation to that contained in the original material.
We have seen clearly that it is not from the body itself that the
karmically binding passions and desires arise. We have seen too that the
point of meditation exercises is to see the human being as it really is, and so
to understand that there is nothing towards which any volition is justifiable:
so one might say that there is nothing either desirable or repulsive about
the body but thinking makes it so. All volition is due to ignorance
concerning the fundamental impersonality of all phenomena, physical or
mental. It is for this reason that the pa.ciccasamuppiida formula, which the
Buddha taught in order that others might understand how the human
being continues to be reborn, while ultimately circular rather than linear, is
described in canonical texts as beginning with ignorance.*' Put differently,
volitions have mentality rather than corporeality as their constitutional
source, and ignorance as their psychological source. According to the Pali
canon there is little or no room in Buddhism for a negative attitude towards
the body, and the negative terminology used by Buddhaghosa widely
diverges from the original material. The earliest Buddhist attitude towards
the body is neither positive nor negative: it is analytical.
 Identity and Experience
Notes

Griffiths, 1986, p.112.

I recognise that Buddhaghosa cannot single handedly have introduced the attitude
recorded here and that there will have been (possibly many) others prior to him with a
similar view. But it is he who has been of primary influence on the tradition as a whole,
and such important figures attract the brunt of any subsequent criticism or disagreement.
In spite of my criticism of and disagreement with him as stated in this chapter, I of course
do not presume to suggest that his eminence as a Buddhist leader and thinker is in any way
unjustified.
Dhammapada 148. This translation is used both by Miiller in SBE Vol X, and by
Radhakrishnan.
For example, Sn 197,205.
Sn 199: Subhato nam mar?iIatibilo avzlzyapurakkhato.
AN.IV.386: Tato yam kiitci pagharqya, asuci yeva paggharcyya, dugandham yeva paghargya,
jegucchyamyeva paggharwa.
SN.III.7: RCpe kho Zvuro chandar@avinayakkhdysattll vedantiya saitillzya samkhiresu vit?r?ipe.
SN.III.27: RCpasmiy (vedanlzya/sar?it~a/sam&Zresu/Vir?iii;?asmim)chandar@o tam pajahath.
Norman (trans.), 77u Goup OfDiscourses (1gg2),p.30.
SBE Vol. X.
AN.111.415.
For example, at DN.11.308.
MN.1, suttu 10; DN.11. sutta 22; SN.ll141ff.
MN.I.55K 63; DN.I1.290,315: Ekiano ayam bh*ve maggo sattiinam viruddh~isokapariddaviinam
samatikh-a dukkhadomanassi~athgam@ya tiiiyassa adhigamtSya nibbiinasa sacchikinyqa;yadidam
cattriro satifighini.
SN.V.179: Cattriro me bhikkhave sat$at&%ii bhimtii bahulfhtii ekantanibbidtSya uir@@a n i r o d e a
uparam3a abhGr?qa sambodhaia nibbiniiya sumvattanti.
SN.v.179: Y e a m kesaiiGi bhikkhave cattiiro satipatfiini viraddhi) viraddho h a m ariyo mago
sammidukkhaWihayagimT. cf. also SN.V.182, 294. Gethin (1992, p.30@ discusses the term
satipa.*ina, and how best to translate it, in great detail.
AN. 1-43: Ekadhammo bhikkhave bhavito bahulikato mahato . .. v~ivimuttiphalasacchikinyiiya...
kiiyagata- sati. cf. also M i l i n d w 248,336.
The commentaries state that ajihattam means attano and bahiddh6 means parma (MA.I.249;
DA.III.765).
MN.I.56; DN.II.290: Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu k@e klzyZnupmi viharati i t i p i sampajino satimi
vinpya loke abhijhrsdomana~~am.
MN.I.56; DN.II.292: ... assa satipaccupa.#hitZ hotiyivad ma fiipzmatt3a patisatimattriya, anirrito
ca v h r a t i na ca kiki loke upidpati.
Nyanaponika, 1986, p.3.
MA.1.250; DA.III.766: Lokasmim M c i nipam v i -pe - &Epzm v i ayam me atti v i attanfyam v i ti
na gaphiiti.
MN.I.59; DN.II.299.
MA.1.280; DA.III.776: Mahagatam ti nipit5pivacaram. Amahaggatun ti kirmivacaram.
MN.I.59; DN.II.299: Sa-uttaram . .. anuttaram pajZnati, samihitam ... asamlIhitam pajiniiti,
vimuttay ... auimuhm pojinZti.
MN.I.60; DN.11.300.
SN.y421: S+ittmapaiicY u p i d a n d h i d u r n 4 SN.111.158: Katamaii ca bhikkhave dukkham?
Pa&' upidinakkhandhd ti 'sra vacangam.
MN.I.III~:Cakkhur? c' Zvuso paticca ripe ca uppajati cakkhuviZitiym, t i n y m sarigati phasso,
phasrapaccayi vedani, yam vedeti tam sailjiniti ... .
As we have seen, there are what one might call the 'underlying' sa;mkhiras, which function
as the 'fuel' of continued existence in sapira. What need not function in the example
discussed here is the sa&hZrakk%andha in the sense of conscious volitions.
This is related in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta, MN.I.16off.
DN.11.142f-I
SN.II.94.f.
 The attitude towards the body
SN.1.131; MN.II.65; SN.1.131, 111.120.
SN.1.131: IminiipitikQena bhindanenapabhatigunii ... ;Dhammapada 148: bh&atipihandeh.
SN.III.120: ... imincipftika>ena ... Tam kim man"n"(7riVhkkali: nipam nucam vii aniccap vii ti?. The
use of nipa and not kqa in the second part of this passage is not, in my opinion, significant:
impermanence is, after all, an attribute of all aspects of nipa, not just the body. Nor do I
consider that the fact that the teaching given to Vakkali in this passage is usually
considered to be ad hominem affects the point I am making here.
AN.IV.386.
By extension, the term kusala has the sense of 'skilful', referring to spiritually beneficial
activites. This was extensively developed by Mahayana Buddhism where the frequently
used expression 'skill in means' (Sanskrit: upqa kauiaha) refers to activities which are
beneficial either to one's own spiritual progress or, in the case of a bodhisattva, in the
assisting of others to salvation. This led to the suggestion by some Mahayana Buddhists
that the Buddha's life as Gotama and his early teaching were but part of his upliya kadalya
to help all beings out of sapsira in a way they could understand at that time, the later form
of them being superior or more complete.
Sn 240-1: Yad admmcino sukatam sunittham parehi dinnam payatam pa@tam ... paribhufijamiino . ..
nu iimagandho mama ka@ati ti. Tainted fare' is Norman's translation ( T hGroup ofDircourses,
'992, p.27).
Sn 242.
Sn 243, 248, 245. A lengthy description in the Samyutta Aiikqa of what each stage of the
noble Eightfold Path means refers to qualities similar to those in the Sutta Mpita passage
discussed here (SN.V.8fl). cf also Dhammafiada, chapter XXVI (383fl).
Sn 249: Na macchamapsam nZn&akattam na -yam rnudeamj a @ j a b kharcsjkini tllig-gthuttm'
uparevanii vayiiye vii pi lob amari bahi tap5 mankihutiyaiiiia-m-uhi~arevaniisodhenti maccam ... .I
have followed Norman's translation. I shall refer to his use of round brackets below.
Sn 250: Sottsu gutto vijitindriyo care dhamme fiito ajavamaddave rato satigatgosabbadukkhaflahino nu
lij$ati dittharutesu dhiro. I have followed Norman's translation except for relocating 'One
should wander' at the beginning of the verse for easier reading.
AN.IV.386: Anitnrcchiidana-panmaddana-bhedana-v-mma.
GS.IV.258.
I will discuss the term nibbidE below.
SN.V.320.
Vin.III.68f:
Vin.III.68; SN.V.32of: Tm kho panu samayena bhagavii bhikkhham a&panyCrym arubhakatJzam
kahti. Asubhl?ya vagam bhisati; asubhabhiivan*a v a c m bhcisati; adirra iidirra asubhmamtSpatCiyii
vapnam bhisati. Asubha can also be translated as 'what is not beautiful' (Woodward's
translation of SN.V.32o uses 'unlovely': KS.V.284). This translation has the same
implication of impermanence as 'impure' does.
Te anekc7kiiravokiiram ancbhabhiivaniinuyogamanuyutki viharanti, te sakena kgena attiyantijarciyanti
j&ucchanti.
Vin.III.68: Sgyathiipi niima itthi v i puriro vii daharoyuvii madanakajitiko siiam nhrito ahikupzpena
vii kukkurakupzpena vii manussakupzfiena vii ka@e Zsattena a#jeyya har@eyyajigucchgya.
Evam eva te bhikkhg sakena kqena a@yantii harc?yantij@cchantii attaniipi atkinam jivitci voropenti
aiifiamairiram pijivitii voropenti.
Vin.III.6gc sN.V321.
Vin.111.71: Ygarahi buddho bhagavii. Ananucchauiyam bhikkhave tesam b h i k k h Q ananulomi(cam
~
uppatinipam asrcimayakam akapfiyam akara@yam.
Satthahiiraka: bringing a knife so that a bhiWchu can kill himself.
Ibid.: Yo pana bhikkhu saircicca manussav&jaham jivitii vorofigrya satthahiirakam v k a panyeseyya,
ayam pi pir@ikohoti aamviiSO 'ti.
sN.V.321: Siidhu bhnte bhagavi an"tZampany(7vam W a t u tathiiyathl7yam bhikkhuratigho aAR(7ra
s a ~ a h g y ati.
There are other accounts of bhikWlus committing suicide in the Sutta W k a (for example at
SN.I:12ofi S N . I I I . I ~ ~but
~ ) they
, are not attributable to misunderstanding the nature of the
body. The purpose of such passages, and the Vinaya passage discussed here, may have been
primarily to indicate that one should not commit suicide. This does not, however,
invalidate the point I have made.
Norman (trans.), 1992, p.30.
192 Identity and Experience
Ibid.
N o r m a n (trans.), 1984, p.47.
T h i s is discussed i n Collins, 1982, p.156E
PED, p.22.
SBE Vol. X , p.54.
E R E , Vol.11, p.759.
T h e Sanskrit equivalent o f nibbidii is nirveda, from nidvid. Monier Williams gives as
alternative meanings for nirveda: "complete indifference, disregard of'worldly objects ...
loathing, disgust for ..." (p.557). For nibbidii, PED gives: "disgust with worldly life, tedium,
aversion, indifference,disenchantment" (p.365).
SN.V.82: Satt'ime bhikkhave bojha@ii bhiivihi bahulikatii ekantanibbidZJa viriigiiya nirodhiiya
upasamriya abhin'n'riyasambodhriya nibbiinriya samvattanti.
Gs.V.153.
For example, at KS.V.158,227,316; Gs.V.152, 153.
GS.III.68.
GS.IV.97.
Dialogues, I. 255.
ParamatthajotikZ p.38f:
V i s m , p.249.
I have followed fial?amoli's translation, 7he Path ofPunication (henceforth referred t o as
Path), p.269 o f V i s m , p.24gf: Kesii niim' ete vanpto pipatiklhi, sa@hiinatopi gandhato pi Zsqato pi
okZsato pi patikchi ... YatM hi dahararsa kumiirarsa vaccam vangzto haliddivanpm, sa@hiinato [Pi]
haliddipindasa~hiinam, sankiirat~hiine chadditan' ca uddhumiitaka-ki/asunakhmariram uannato
tihpakkavanpm, sa@hiinato vatthetvii vksatthamudi@asa@hiinam, diifii pi Irra sumanamaku.hadirii ti
ubhayam pi v a m @ h i i n a t o seii appa#Clam, gandhena pana pat;kZlam eva, evam kesii pi s@ u p
vanpma&inato appa@iila, gandhena pana pautikutikuhi yeva ti.
V i s m , p.250.
I have followed l%namoli's rather quaint but effective translation (Path, p.202f.) o f V i s m ,
p.196:
Imam hi subhatu kiiyam gahetvii tattha mucchiti
biilii karonti piipiini; dukkhii nu parimuccare.
Tmmii p m q y a medhiivijTvito vii mattassa v i
sabhiivam pltikcl;varsa subhabhiiuena vqjitam
Vuttam h'etam:
Duggandho asucikaio kuyzpo ukkanipamo
nindito cakkhubhltehi kriyo biikibhinandito.
Allatammapat;channo navadviiro mahaahaum
samantuto paggharati, asuci pitigandhiyo.
Sace immsa kiyassa anto biihirako siyii
dadam nlna gahetviina kiike sop niviiraye ti.

fianamoli, Path, p.203, translating V i s m , p.196: Tasmii dabbajiitikcna bhikkhuniijtvamiinasariram

vii hotu matasariram vii, yattha yattha asubhiikriro pan'n'riyati, tattha tatth' eva nimittam gahetvii
kammatghiinam appanam pipetabban ti.
~ a n a r n o l i ,Path, p.201f, translating Vism, p.195: Paka@ii panu i d q sariram niima atirekatisatu-
atthikasamusrayam asitCata.sandhiratghatitam navanahirusata-nibaddhamnavamaysapesisaatrSnulittum,
allamanussacammapariyonaddham chaveii paticchannam, chiddiivachiddam medakathiilikii viya
niccuggharitu~qgghari~, kimirarighanirm'tamrogiinam riyatanam, dukkhadhammimm vatthuparibhinna-
~UY~-&O @a navahi va~mukhehisatuta&andm, y m a ubhohi akWlthi akkhi@thako jmgharati,
kanpabilehi kanpa@thako, niisaputehi sirighznikii, mukhato iihiirapittasemharudhiriini, adho-dviirehi
uccirapmiiui, navanavutiyii lomakuiasahauehi asucisedqiso paggharati, n Z l a r n ~ 7 d a y osampariuiirenri,
y a y dantaka~t/lamuWladhovana-s~am&na-&a-nw&anu-piimpa~J1i aparijq@vii, yathii-jiito va
fihawaut~fiaki@o hutvii giimena giimam vicaranto rrijZ pi puppha-chaddakacadiihidiru aiiiiataro Pi
sarnararirapa~iktilahiyanibbueso hoti, evam asucid~andhajeg~ccha~a~Eiku~latiiya nibbireso hoti, evam
asucidugandhajeguccI~apa~-la~ya raiiito ui c a d i h a vii sarire urnattam nima natthi.
 The attitude towards the body I93
~ a n a m o l iPath,
, p.202, translating Vism, p.195: Tato imind Zgantukena aludGrena paficchannatti
tad m a asubhalakWla~masaiijiinantiipuri.riiiUhEju, itthgo ca puriresu ratip karonti. Paramatthato pan'
ettha railjitabbakayuttu.t@iinam niima a ~ m a t t u mpi natthi.
Damien Keown, in his article "Morality in the Visuddhimagga" (1983), states that
Buddhaghosa's treatment of Buddhist ethics in the Vmddhimagga is far more concerned
with practices than with intentions. This would seem to support my point.
DN.11.214: Asapsa{@o viharati &mehi, asatpat#ho akusalehi dhammehi. T m a asatpa{.thassa kiimehi
asapsatghaua akusabhi &ammehi uppaJtati sukhap.
SN.1.182: Yo 'dha pun"Aiin ca pipan" ca bZhitvii.
DN.I.75: Euam eva kho mahiiriija bhiWchu imam eva @am n$pitikena sukhena abhisandetiparkandeti
pm&ireti pan'ppharati.
SN.V.74: T m a thito va &yo hoti gzitam cittam ajjhattam sura@hitum suvimuttum. Manas5 kfzopan'eua
dhammam vin"A3a manZpam/amanipam na mariku hoti.
Miln 44: JVatthi mahiiriija arahato a n u y o viipa.gho vi.
Wilson, 1995.
cf AN.1.177, where ddkhasamudaya is explained according to the pa~casamuppiidaformula,
beginning with anjii, rather than the more usual tu$ii.
 Conclusion

I STATED IN THE INTRODUCTION that three of the key doctrines taught by the
Buddha, the four Noble Truths, the paticcasamuppdda formula and the
khandha analysis, were all concerned with the human being and samsdric
existence. This, I stated, suggested to me the importance the Buddha
attaches to understanding the constitution of the human being and
prompted the orientation of my research. I also referred in the Introduction
to the fact that there is no suggestion in the Sutta Pitaka that the Buddha
had any concern with ontological matters; on the contrary, he dismisses all
ontological questions as irrelevant and/or misleading. When applied to the
human being, this means that in the early Pali material contained in the
Sutta Pi* we do not find information concerning what we are comprised
of, but only how we work. We have seen that the constitution of the human
being is understood and taught by the Buddha in terms of processes and
events. Here I wish to bring together these two points: the emphasis on the
human being and the absence,ofconcern with ontological matters.
First, I have considered in some detail several ambiguous passages
which some scholars have interpreted as positing an idealistic ontology, in
the perhaps somewhat limited sense that 'everything is (merely) made of
the mind' (whatever that is). In each case I have suggested that the passages
can be interpreted in another, non-idealistic (and, indeed, non-ontological)
way, and that in my opinion this alternative interpretation is more likely to
be correct. In introducing the Buddha's lack of interest in ontological
questions, I based my comments primarily on canonical passages which
state that he refused to answer such questions. And I also stated that I did
not want to counter one suggested ontology, usually the idealism as
described, with another. But the further point I would like to make here is
that any implicit ontology, if there is such a thing in the Sutta Pitaka, needs
to allow for the centrality of the human condition to the Buddha's
teachings. For the Buddha, the one basic truth is the reality of suffering.
This, indeed, is the first Noble Truth, and is the raison &&re of the Eightfold
Path to liberation. In idealistic systems suffering is sometimes said to be a
delusion. There is no possibility that the Buddha's teaching contained in
the Sutta R~akacan be interpreted as saying that suffering is just a delusion.
Though he never discusses whether the world is real, his concern to teach,
and his emphasis on alleviating the human condition by offering release
 Conclusion I95
from suffering, presuppose that there really are human beings who really
can learn how to bring an end to samsiiric existence. Though he is not
interested in ontological questions, he most emphatically is a humanist.
Second, the centrality of the human being in the Buddha's teachings
does not preclude the possibility that there are other sorts of beings existing
in different sorts of ways, ways which are what we might call 'subtle', and
certainly not obeying the laws of matter as they are conventionally under-
stood. Of relevance here is the suggestion by Buddhist modernists that the
Buddha anticipated modern physics, which explains that all matter is
energy. In its emphasis on how things are rather than what things are the
Buddha's teaching allows for beings to exist in an infinite number of ways
in a manner not incompatible with this modern law of physics. To mix the
terminologies of Buddhism and physics, such beings might be thought of as
'bundles of energies' (Bandhas), manifesting at different degrees of density,
brought together as conditioned by the power or fuel (energy) of volitions.
Third, and finally, I stated in the Introduction that one of the ways in
which the Buddha's teaching diverged from that contained in the Upan@&
is that he taught that the macrocosrnic/microcosmic correspondence was
not one of ontological identity but that all things are dependently origi-
nated. This book has perhaps shown how central this teaching is for an
understanding of the constitution of the human being. I also referred to the
fact that many scholars have approached the subject of the human being in
early Buddhism by discussing the doctrine of anatti. We saw that this is
often considered to be the central doctrine of early Buddhism and that it
tends to be understood as a denial of any kind of soul or self. I would like to
suggest here that the doctrine of anattii is not intended to be a denial of
being as is implied in the English 'there is no self'. Rather, it is no different
from the doctrine of paticcasamuppEda and is therefore simply intended to
indcate how things are.'
We have seen that everything within the cycle of samszra is conditioned
or constructed, samkhata. This is another way of expressing the doctrine of
dependent origination: all things are dependently originated. From these
two teachings, itfollows that there is nothing in samsiiric existence that is
permanent. And it follows further from this that there is no independently
existing or permanent entity which one might call a self or soul. Therefore,
though the prime concern of these two teachings focusses on the way
things exist rather than what exists, they might also be called a doctrine of
anattii. Nirvana is also (implicitly)included in the doctrine of anatts sabbe
dharnmz anattii is the last line in the tilakkhapz formula. But the inclusion of
Nirvana is also not intended literally as a denial of being. Rather, Nirvana
is selfless both because it is the experience of ceasing to project the sepa-
rateness of selfhood onto oneself and everything else and also in the sense
that it is an epistemic experience. This means that thinking in terms of self
or of there being no sevis making a category mistake. None of the Buddha's
196 Identity and Experience
teachings is actually concerned with what is, or what is not. The funda-
mental error is simply thinking in any such terms since they are all missing
the point that the way things (really)exist does not correspond to the notion
of separateness that is implicit in the confirmation and in the denial of
selfhood. As the Buddha puts it: understanding dependent origination
means one will no longer ask questions about individual (i.e. separate)
existence in samszra, past, future, or present, such as "Am I, or am I not?
What am I? How am I? This 'being' that is 'Iy,where has it come from,
where will it go?"* Though the doctrine of anattii appears to convey an
overriding concern to make ontological denials, I suggest that if one takes
this term at face value it can act as something of a red herring in one's
attempt to understand the constitution of the human being.

Notes

I. See my paper "Anatti: A Different Approach" for an extensive discussion of'this suggestion.
2. SN.II.27: ... aham nu kho smi, na nu kho smi; kim nu kho smi; katham nu kho smi; aham nu kho satto
kuto &at0 so kuhimgiimi bhavzc~afiti.
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 Short Glossary

anattii Selflessness. The Buddha taught that all things are dependently
originated (see pa~ccasamuppiida):nothing occurs independently or
separately, but, rather, all things occur because of/conditioned by
other things. It is erroneous, then, to attribute separate, independent
self-hood onto anything, either subjectively or objectively: this is not
'how things really are' (seeyathibhiitam). Seeing 'things as they really
are' (that is, that they are 'selfless' in this sense) constitutes the cessa-
tion of ignorance, or Enlightenment (9.v.).
arahant The term used to indicate an Enlightened person (literally:
'worthy one'). According to the early Buddhist texts, the experience
of attaining Enlightenment (9.u.) is the same for all people as it was
for the Buddha.
ariyasiivaka Literally 'disciple who is noble', this term refers to those who
have made considerable progress on the spiritual path, hence they
are also referred to as 'advanced disciples'.
&ava The Gavm are the fundamentally binding (to sapa'ra, 9.v.) aspects of
what it means to be a human being, needing to be eradicated if one is
to achieve Enlightenment (9.v.). Three or four &avm are referred to:
all/any sensual desire(s), the desire for continued existence, igno-
rance, and (when four are mentioned) 'views'. Underpinning all of
them is the basic error of separateness (see anattZ, 9.0.): all desires pre-
suppose a separate desirer; continued existence presupposes identity
in terms of separateness;ignorance is the (normal sarpsiric) state of not
seeing that things are really selfless, and therefore not separate; and
'views' are held by a 'separate' self about something perceived (erro-
neously) also to be separate (thus separateness is presupposed both
subjectively and objectively).The isavas are so deep seated in the
human psyche that they are described as needing to be 'rooted out',
which achievement is co-terminous with Enlightenment.
bhikWzu A (male) member of a Buddhist monastic community. By exten-
sion, a disciple following the path taught by the Buddha. Members
of female communities are called bhikkhunE Males and fernales can
experience Enlightenment (9.u.).
206 Identity and Experience
dhamma Most commonly, this term is used to refer to the teachings of
the Buddha as a whole: he taught 'the dhamma'. It also means the
Truth, in the sense that the Truth represents 'things as they really
are' (seeyathibhzitam), and what he taught was a means whereby one
might experience that. Dhamma is also used as a generic term to refer
to all knowable things, and is a way of saying 'everything'.
d u m a Often translated 'suffering', but 'unsatisfactoriness' less mislead-
ingly conveys its meaning. It is the term that was used by the Buddha
in the first Noble Truth (9.v.)to describe the principal characteristic of
human existence in saysara (q-v.).It relates to the impermanence (and
hence ultimate unsatisfactoriness) of all things in sarpira. It can most
accurately be understood if it is borne in mind that this is a truth
statement, not a value judgement.
Enlightenment On experiencing Nirvana (q.~.),one is Enlightened: one
'sees things as they really are' (seeyathabhzitam),thus experiencing the
cessation of ignorance. The word 'buddha' literally means awake,
the analogy being that ignorance corresponds to sleep and
Enlightenment/Nirvana corresponds to 'waking up' to 'how things
really are'. In Buddhism, the (gradual)eradication of ignorance (one
follows a progressive path over many lives) is referred to as acquiring
'insight'.
jkna Literally meditation. In Buddhism (and in other Indian religions),
a common kind of meditation is said to be stratified into 'levels',
meaning levels of experience and/or insight that are characterised
in certain ways, and it is to such levels that jhiina refers. In the Pali
texts, sometimes four and sometimes eight jhanas (levels of medita-
tion) are referred to. When eight are referred to, these are usually
sub-divided as to four riipajhinas and four arzipajhinas. Rzipa and
ariipa mean 'form' and 'formless' respectively. According to the
Buddha, even experiencing the highest of such meditational levels
does not in itself constitute insight into 'things as they really are' (see
yathibhzitam/Nirvana). It is this insight that distinguishes Buddhist
forms of meditation from others.
karma Literally 'action', karma more specifically means (in Indian
religions as a whole) that actions have consequences. The Buddha
taught that the consequential aspect of any action (put into effect
through thought, word or deed) lies in the intention behind it.
lokuttara Literally 'above the world', this term refers both to those who
have made spiritual progress beyond the merely mundane/ordinary
level of the putthujnna (g.v.),and to anything associated with advanced
(supramundane)stages of the path.
 Short Glossary 207
Nirvana The goal to which human beings can aspire, according to the
Buddha, is the cessation of the unsatisfactoriness (duWcha, 9.v.) which
characterises the human condition (samszra, 9.v.). The experience of
such cessation (dukWlanirodha) is known as Nirvana. Nirvana literally
means 'blowing out', and refers to the blowing out (cessation)of the
fuel which causes the continuity of unsatisfactoriness. According to
the second Noble Truth (q.v.), the fuel is craving or desire, often
further subdivided into the three 'fires' (fuel) of greed, hatred
(together the affective aspect of the fuel) and ignorance (the cogni-
tive aspect of the fuel). After experiencing Nirvana, one will no
longer be reborn in sapira.
Noble Truths In his 'first sermon', the Buddha taught four 'Noble
Truths': that the human condition is characterised by unsatisfactori-
ness (duWcha, 9.v.); that dUWGha is caused by cravings; that there can be
cessation of duMa (dukkhanirodha, a synonym for Nirvana, q.v.); and a
way to achieve such cessation (the Noble Eightfold Path).
pa!iccasamuppiida Dependent origination. The Buddha taught that all
things, of whatever nature (physical, mental, abstract, concrete, sub-
jective or objective - all things), that are or can be experienced in
samsira (9.v.) are dependently originated. As such, nothing occurs
independently or separately. It follows from this that the attribution
of separate, independent self-hood to oneself or anyone or anything
else is erroneous (see anatti).
puthujana By contrast with anyasivaka (q.v.),puthujana refers to 'ordinary'
or 'ignorant' (ordinarily ignorant) people who have not made
progress on the spiritual path to insight.
samsiira In Buddhism (and other Indian religions), all living beings are
thought to experience a series of lives (reincarnatiodrebirth).
Samsira, which literally means 'going round', is the term used to
indicate this cyclic experience, and by extension is often used to refer
to 'life on earth' or the human condition as a whole. (According to
Buddhist/Indian cosmology, it is not limited to life on earth as such,
and also applies to non-human living beings: rebirth can be at a
variety of cosmological levels and in a variety of forms.) The experi-
ence of Nirvana (9.v.) means one will no longer be reborn, and is
thus the 'opposite' of s a ~ i r a Neither
. term should be understood
spacially. They indicate different states of being: the former subject
to rebirths, the latter not.
sangha The Buddhist community. Sometimes the term refers to the com-
munity of all Buddhists, but more usually it refers specifically to the
monastic community, the members of which are called bhikkhus (9.v.).
208 Identity and Experience
sukha A synonym for Nirvana (q.v.), and the opposite of dukkha (9.v.).
Literally, suWla means 'bliss' (contrasted with 'suffering'/dW). It is
not, however, an affective state of bliss (i.e. pleasure/happiness) but
more profoundly refers to the cessation of the unsatisfactoriness
which characterises the human condition. In particular, this refers to
the 'ease' which corresponds to the absence of the 'dis-ease' of
ignorance.
tathiigata An epithet of the Buddha, and by extension a term for any
Enlightened (9.v.) person. The term, virtually untranslatable, means
something like 'thus-gone', referring to the absence/cessation of
separate individuality experienced when one sees that 'things as they
really are' (seeyathribhzitam) are selfless (see anatt@)in the sense of
being not separately identifiable.
yathiibhiitam Literally 'things as they are', this important term refers to
the Buddha's teaching that the cessation of ignorance (the cognitive
aspect of the 'fuel' which causes continued existence in samsiira (9.v.))
is 'seeing things as they really are'. Such experience is the equivalent
of Nirvana (9.v.). It follows that a key feature of human experience in
sapiira is that one does not 'see things as they really are'.
 General Index

abstract identity, 127-8, 135, 155. arubha see impure/impurity

abstract sense/meaning, x x ~ x5, , 10-11, 17-8, asuci see impure/impurity
30,32,49-51,59-60, 70, 106, 112-13, attabhciva, 152, 166n61-62&67,167n82&83,183
I I ~ ~ I 121,
I I ,127, 144, 149-51, 153, 183 attention, 29, 31,44,61,77, 89-90, 107-108,
abstract thought see conceptions 112,125,130, 132, 145, 162, 165n11, 173
adhivacanarampharsa, 49,52n39,58, 127, 134, attitude to body, 164, chapter v ~ ~ ~ p a r s i m
1361-1408~42 citman, XXIII,84, I 18ng8, 121-2, 135n8, 145,
Advaita Vedanta, I 12 165n34
advanced disciple, 27,45, 150 Aung, S. Z., 23,37n79,38n105,3gn108&112,
see also ariyascivaka 117n66, 122, 1351115
affective, aspect of causal nexus, 23,46, 95, avakkanti, 3gn133, 85, 115" 14
114,11gn142,167n85 amjci see ignorance
aggregate, 6,9,35n3,66, I I ~ ~ I 131, I I , 136n44 awareness, XVIII,31, 43, 55, 62, 72, chapter v
air see elements passim, 111-13, 125, 176
Ajivikas, XXI Qatana, 2-3, 6-9, 14, 16-24, 29-31, 34,351112,
ajhattam ('internal'), xxv-xxv~,5, 8, 10-2, 36n16-20-30"32, 37n77,38n95&96,40n157,
15-7, 19,28-30,35nro, 36n39-40&41, 52n28,60,122,166n67,192n78
37n49&57,40n143, "5"33&34, "7"86, see also senses
131-32, 137n56&66, 163, 173, 1gon18,
'93"84 b&iram/bahiddhci ('external'), xxv-xxvi, XXVIII,
cikcisa see elements 4-5,8-1o,12-14, 16-17,30, 351110, 36n26,
alchemy, 157 53, 88-9, 102-3, 1171186, 118n108&1og,
Allon, M., 168111228~125 11911118,126, 130-31, 135,137n56, 168n107,
analogy, 2I,47, 55, 73,763 86-9,95-6, 100, 173,190n18, 192n76
103, 105, 132, 147, 150, 156-57, 160, 169, 182 Bateson, J. H., 183
anattci, xv-XIX, 63n12,67,79n3, 11811104, bias see anusaya
166n46, 175, 195-96, 196n1,205 blueprint, 117ng0, 127-129
annihilationists see nihilists body, XVI-XIX,XXII-xx~v, xx~x-xxx, chapter I
anusaya, 76-7,81n47, 109 passim, 43,489 61,64n70, 7',74-78,839
cipo see elements 86-7, go, 96,98, 101-106,108-log,
appearance, 3,13,31, H I , 121-23,132,142,152 115n21&28,I I ~ ~ I 121,123-26,
II, 128, 132,
apperception, xvrn, xxv, 12, 31, 33,43, 47-50, 735,136n25&44, 137n77, 139-41, '44,
51"21 53-58, 59-62, 71-29 77, 83, 88, 91, 94, 147-168, chapter vnI parszm
99, 110, '25, '27, 730, 134-5, '43, 149, 153, see also nipakkhandha
171, 176 Brahman, XXI-xxw, 11,47,83-4, I 12, 118ng8,
see also saEEcih4andha 121, 135n5, 144-5,148,151,157, 180-81,188
Aquinas, Thomas, 28, 4on143 Brahmanical religion, xx-XXIII,xxvr~,122,
amhant, 9, 1g,50, 72, 100, 124, 127, 133, 188, '44, '87
204 see also Eda
anyascivaka, 15, 4011136, 45, 51n20, 84, 102, brain, 23-4, 185
I 14117, 116n56, 205, 207 Buddhaghosa, xv1-XVII, 2,4, 7, 12, 17, 23,
see also advanced disciple 36n20, 55, 93, '24, '50, '56,169-70,
ariipakkhandhas see khandhas 180-81, 185-87,18g,1gon2,1g3n80
cisavas, xxv, XXVIII,g, 49, 60, 64n57, 76-7, 94,
97, "3, '61-63,205 Carter, J. R., 29, 3gn130,40n14g
ascetic/asceticism, 47, 177, 184 Cartesian dualism, 25, 169
210 I d e n t i t y a n d Experience
cattiiro mahiibhftci see elements craving, XVIII,xxv, XXVII-XXVIII, xxxn14,
causal nexus/causal process, 66,72-9,87,91, xxx1n43, 35"'0,45, 72,96--7,'15"26,
109, "2, '40, 144, '78 "7"73, '34,. '72, '93"87
cetani, XXII, xxxmgo, 37n75,70,77,80n19&37, see also volit~on(s),sensory desire
106-107, log, 112, 114,117n70, 11gn13o- creative principle, see formations
146&147, '27, 130,136n36&37, 142 cyclic causal nexus see causal nexus
see also volition, karma
n'tta, 2376,39n114&128,52n47,80n33, Dasgupta, S., xx, xxxmno
114n3&4,11~nz2, 138 dead body see corpse
mind, 38n99, 82-3, 86, 105-114, 11gn143, defilement($ 77, loo, I 12-13, 180
138, 158, 160 density, 42,146, 148, 15052, 155,158-59,
thought, 74-5,86, I O ~ - I I ~ , I Z O ~ I ~ ~ &163-64,
I ~ ~ , '72,178, 181, '95
138,160-61,173 see also spectrum of
state of mind, 50,61, 100,105-106, 111-14, dependent origination, XVII-XVIII, XXIII-xx~v,
1zon154,155, 173-75,180, 185, 188 2,57,67-8,80n8,8on8&16,84,867,94,
cognition, 14,21-2,23,27,34,45-46,50,55, 123, '29, 149,166n46,195-96, 207
58,62,83,89,91-95,98-99, 105-106,11o, see also pa~cammuppcida
'14, "7"9', '34 Descartes, 42
cognitive process, 16, rg,25-32,34,37n63, see also Cartesian dualism
45-47,5',55-56,58,83,9I-95f '01, desire(s)see volition, craving, sensual desire
109-110, 112, 116n50,132, 134-35, 176 devar, XVI,8ong, 150, 153-54, 161, 1661170,
collator, 28-g,31-4, 107, 181 167n76&84,168n122
Collins, S., xw, xxnz&8, xxxrn~4-26-37&3g, dhamma, XVI, 17, 22,3gn130,44,86, 94, 102,
381-1104,80n23, 115n20, 117n66-72-748~81, 105, 112-13, 116n60, 117n89, 16163
I I 8ng2&96,128, 136n21,137n48&49,145, dhammii, 2-3,6,8, 15,21, 22-35,36n43,
151,165n18&20,166n55&56,192n61 38n87&92,39"734,40"'57,64"64,67,
commonsense, xxw, 12,8on20 7gn2&3, 80n6&27, I 16x140-56-58-616~62,
conceptions, 30-1,48-50,53,56-7,58-62, '34,I40-42,164"5,'65"7,166n46, '74,
63n3&21,64n56,83,85,99,122-23, '95, 205
127-30, 743, '49, '5254,158 &-tu, 5,8-g,12-18,20,36n32,3gn88-8g&r10,
conceptual/abstract identity, 127-29, 135, 153 99,129-30,150-58
conditioned phenomena, 32,67-g,71, 79,94, see also elements, cosmological levels
'49, 175, '95 discrimination, 46,48,53-5,57-8, 62, 63n34,
see also samkhEra 82, 92, ,95, 11811111
conscious, 20, 29,43,47-5',55,57,62,82, discursive thought, 14, 16,48,58,77,91,94,
89-91,95-6, 101-102,107, 1x3, 115n29, 128, 110, 143.
132-34,163,1gon29 see also thinking
consciousness, XVI,XVIII-XIX, XXVII, xxxn13, ditthi see views
11, I4,20-2,26,3',38"99,42-3,47,50,55, doors, senses as, 18-20, 22, 2g,33-4,
59,62,68,70-I, 811158, chapter v passim, 38n90-92&94
128,131-35,140,151,156,171,176 dukkha, xv, XVIII-XIX,XXVII-XXWII,
see also vviil@a~andh.a xxxng&r7, 4-53 63n11.3 68, 77, 79"3,93,
constancy, of awareness, 84f 116n53,124,129,131--33,137n53,141,160,
constitution, XVII,XIX,XXI,XXIII,xxx, 50, 167n85, 172, 174-75,183,188, 190n27,
72-3,76,84,104-1o5,170-71,189,194-96 193n87,205-206
contact see phma dviira see doors, senses as
continuity, sense of, 83,85,87,95-101,105,
112, 1171168 earth see elements
Copleston, E C., 4on141 elements, x x ~ x2,5-13,
, 17,25, 35n11,
corporeality, 42, 139,176,183,189 36n14&17,37n62,38n100,42,83, 86, 104,
corpse/dead body, 11, 13,25,78,17374,182, 125,127, '31, '33, '39, '45, 151-529 '58,
186 167n96,181
cosmology/cosmological levels, xxw-VKI,32, air/wind (v@u), xxnr, 5-6, 10-3, 35n10,
40"'58,99, "8n92,139-40, '44-55, 37n62,133,145-46,150-51,160,167n24
157-58,163, 173, '80 earth (pathavz?, xxrx, 5-6, 10, 35n10&12,
Cousins, L. S., xxx1n18,38ngo&100, 3gn110, 36n39,37n62,64n69,122, '27, '33,
41n167,64n36&.47, 116n38,117n67, '37"70, '45, '49, '51, 154,167n77-79&96
118n1og 168n11o
 General Index 21I

elements continued formlessness, 98-100, 150, 152, 154-56, 160,

fire (tejo), XXIX, 5-6, 11-2,35n10&12, 36n41 168, 175, 178,206
37n62, 52"37,89-90, '33,145-46, see also subtle self/subtle body
150-52,165n24 formulas, XWI', 4,33,54,6675,82, 92,
water (zpo), xxnr, 5-6,11-~,35nro&12, lo8-'09, I19"'37,130--32, '34-35, I45
36n40937n62, 133, I37n70, 145-6, analytical/synthetical, XVIII,68, 70, 73, 96
150-51,165n24 Four Noble Truths, XVII-xnr, 93,160,171,
space (Zk%a),5, 12, 31, 35"9,37"57, 59,99, 1.83, '94
'30, '45, '5' pa&casamuypida, XVIII-xnc,xxx, 2, 7, 15,
Eliade, M., 157-58,166n57,167ng5-97&98 17-8,35,36n22,45-6,49,66-76,78-9,
emotion, 4on143,46,51n23, 1x4, 11gn142 8on16,81n41&63,84-5,87,96,111-12,
see also volition(s), vedanii "5"15, '23-35, '36"32,137"48, '89,
energy, 11, 150, 161, 195 193n87, I94
Enlightenment, xxr~~-xxw, 9, 27,59, 68,72, t i m a n a , 29, 32, 667770, 79,84, '40, '49,
77-8, 95, '00, 111, '33, '59, '72-73, '76, 166n469175-76, '95
178,183 Four Noble Truths, xw-XIX, 30,68,93, 110,
epistemology, xxm, 151, 195 160, 162, 17172,176, 183,194,206-207
eternal, XXIV,121, 123 Franke, R. O., 79, 82n62
eternalists, xxv, 86 Frauwallner, E., xxxm18,73,8on~8
ethicdethical life, XXII-XXIII, xxx~nlg,19, ffee will, 74
66,74-6, 108, 112, 142, 144, 159, 171, 180, fuel, XXVIII, 6, 8, 66, 73, 77, 79, 87, 91, 95-73
193n80 1gon2g,1g5,205-207
see also qualitative causal nexus
evolving, of'consciousness, 83,g7-101, 105, Geiger, M., 29,31,4onr47
I I 7ngo Gestaltung, 73
exegete, 124, 130, 170 Gethin, R., xxxn17,36n36,38n85&102,
existence, xv, XVIII-XIX, XXII,xxw, XXVII-VIII, 1gon16
2,4-6,8,29,35"3,39"'26,50,567,61, Gombrich, R. F., xxxrn24&2g, 8on31,81n43,
66-7',77-9,84,86,90, 94,96-100, 103, 11gn12g,12on176,150,166n50-518~52
105, 1x1, 12on154&156,123, 125-26, 129, Gonda, J., xxv~,xxxrn37&38
'31-32, '34-35, '37"48, '39, '44, '46-56, Griffiths,I?, 118ng4,12on172,169,IgonI
158-60, 162-64, 169, 172,176-78,182-83,
'90n29,794-96 habitual tendencies, 66, 74
experience, x v ~~, ~ I I I - x x XXVIII,
v ~ , 5, g, I I, see also anusaya
14, 17-10, 22,28-9,32,34,40n151,44-8, Hare, E. M., I I ~ ~ I181,
I I ,184
55-60967-9,72,79,83-8990-99, 101-102, Harvey, I?, XVI,xxxng, 35n1I , I 18111 I I
110, 112,118n103,124-35,128, 132,141-43, heart, 10, 13, 22-4, 38ngo,39n114, "4,
'45, 149, 15'9 '54, '59, '66n4.6,169-70, 147-48
174-773 188, '95 heat, x x ~ x4-5,
, 10-13, 18,42, 47, 8x158, go,
extension see solidity 104, '46, I77
'external' see b&iram/bahiddh5 Horner, I. B., xx, xxxmn~,11, 28,36n42,
63n19,74,80n18&30
feelings, XVIII,x x w , 16, 1g,21, 32-3, chapter human nature, 77
r~pav~.irn,53-5,58,60,64n56,68,71-2,77, humanist, 196
83,88,9I, 95, "9nI42, '25, 129, '34, 149, humour, 12
'71,17376,188
see also vedami idea/ideation, 14,26,28,30, 32-3,53,58-62,
finite, xxi 63"3,15'
fire see elements see also conceptions
fluidity, x x ~ x5,
, 10, 12, 18,42, 104, 150 iddhi, 61, 157-63,167ng9, 168n11o-114-115-
form, xxv, 3-6, '3, 15,2643-4,49-50,57, 117&125
59,61,67-73,82-4,86,88-g,g1,121-22, idealism/idealistic, xxv, 79, 81n63, 131, 133,
127-29, 133-35,146, 150, 152-57,176,206 14:~194,
formative principle see formations identification,XVIII, 47,53-60, 62,76,92, 95,
formations/formative activities, 66, 69-76, '05
78-9,823 92, 734-35 identityhdentifying with, xv111, xxrrx, xxvxn,
see also samkhzrakkhandha g,I2I,127-28,I30-3I,I34-35,I45,148,
151, '58-59,164, '7779,781,189
212 Identity a nd Experience
ignorance/av@Z,xxxngq, g,18,26-8,38n8g, karma/kamma, XXII,xxxmg5,6,11,36n13,
39"134,40"'36,49, 56-7,58,61,68--71,73, 66,70-I, 73-7,91,107-1og, 110-11,
75,77-79,80n39,84,94,96, 98-101, 11gn1438~145, 122,135n8, 140-41, 159-60,
112-13, 116n57, 125, 127-29, 133-35, 155, 163,165n17,171, 180, 184,206
159-60, 162, 164,172,176-81, 189, 1931187 Karunadasa, Y., 34, 35n7, 361119, 38n105,
ignorant person, seeputhujjana 3gn113,4on168
imagination, 53,57,59,61-2,63n3,7g k@a, 8, 15, '7, '9,36"43,37"60&62, 44,
impermanence, xxxng, 4,g-11,55,50:61, 64n6gJ74-5, 83,87-8, 101-106,108-log,
67-8,83-7,9', 95-69 105, 139, '49, '51, '71, 1161144, I I ~ ~ I 11gn118,
II, 126, 136n44, 173,
173, 175, 177, 179, 181-82, 184, 186, 188-89, 179-81, IgonIg, 1g1n35&51
'97"35&48 Keown, D., 1931180
impression, 13, 28,48-51,58, 66, 126-27 khandha/paiicakkhandhci,XVII-XIX,XXI,XXN,
impure/impurity, 133, 150, 171, 178-182, XXVII-xxx,1-5, 7,9, 13-5, 20~25-6,29-30,
'85-87, 189,19'"48&49 34-5,36n13,42-3,45-6,48,53-5,58,60,
.seealso purity 67,70-6,78-9,80n23,82-6,88,93-5,
individual, xv, WII-XIX,XXII-xxrv,XXVI-VIII, 101-105, 111-12, 11gn18,I I ~ ~ I 124-26,
II,
2, 4-5, 8-12, 14, 17-9, 21-2, 27, 99-30, '30-32, 136n34, '37"67, '39, 148-9,
34-57 40"'43,46,50,57,66,68-79,80n23, 159-60,169, 171-72, '74-76,183,194-95
81n59,84-5,87-9,96-1o3, '05, '10, anipakkhandhas, I-3,7, 14-15,25, 34,35n3,
115n33, I 16n44, 117ng0, 121, 123-25, 42-3,459 82-3,93,124-26,136n26,148,
"27-31, 133-35, 14'3-42,144-45,147-50, '69
'52-53, '55, '57,764,166n66,17'-72, ripakkhandha, XIX,chapter r passim, 42,44,
175-76, '78, '83, '96 72,85,124-26,132,136n26&2g,139,146,
.feealso separateness '48-509'69, '73, '7677
indeya, 8-9, 14-18,20, 36n32, 38n85&86, samkhcirakkhandha, XIX,15-6, 19,29,37n75,
3gn133, 44, 9' 1 5 ~ 42,46, chapter rvpassim, 82,95, 125, 132,
inherited fbrces, 74 136n37, '49, '59, '72, '76-77, '90"29
insight, XXIII-VI,22, 27, 32, 49-50, 55, 58, safifiZkhandha,XIX,15, 37n75,42,48,51n2,
60-2,66-7,69,78, Bong, 93-5,97-'03, chapter 111 passim, 72,82,g1,93-4, 107,
107-8, 111-13, 117n65,118ng8&103,126, 125-27, 132, 134,136n37, 143, '49, '76
'43, '49-51, '54-59, 162-164,167n88,170, vedanZkhandha, xrx, 15, chapter II passim, 72,
173-75, 177-81, 186-88 82993-4, '25, 132, '36"37, '76
see alro Enlightenment, pan'E, wisdom v%iici&khandha,XIX, 15,42,46,48,54,72,
intention, 6,21,36n13,70-I, 75, 108, 141,145, 80n25, chapter vpassim, 132, 134, 176
160,163,180,182,193n80 knowables, 29-32
see also karma, volition knowledge, XVI,xx, xx~n-N,14, 22,27-8,
'internal' see ajhattum 39"'34,45-6,54,66,70-',93-5,'00, '06,
involuntary reactions, 90-1 112--13,129, 145, 160-61, 173-75, 177, 182,
187
Jains, XXI kurala/akusala see wholesome/unwholesome
Jayasuriya, W. E, 23,39n117
Jayatilleke, K. N., 1171167, 1651118 Lamotte, E., xx1n18, I 18n1oo
jltzna, 12,31,37n80,44,49-50,51n12,57, liberation, XXIII-XXN, xxvr, xxx, 9, 14, 1 8 9 ,
59--60,64n46,65n74,86-7,100, 103, I I I , 27-8, 32,49-50,56, 60-1,66, 69-70, 75-6,
127, 153,155-56, 158, 162, 166n67-718~88, 78,g2-4,g7-100,105-106, 108, 113,117n74,
175, 188,206 139-40, 142-43, '45-46, 149-57, '59,
.Johansson, R. E. A., WII, xxv-xxvr, xxxng, 162-64,165n11, 170, 175, 179,188, 194
xxx1n35,56-7,58-g, 63n26-28-30&32, life force/life principle, 78, go, 116n44
64n40, 111,114ng, 116n60,11gn142, light, 61, roo, 112, 118ng8&103,145. 147-48,
1non154-1588~164, 138n20,150, 158, '53,158-59,164,185,205-207
166n48&4g,167n102 liriga Sarira , 147, 157,166n45
loka, xx11, XXVI-XXVIII, 2, 8, 36n33,74-5,g8,
Kalupahana, D. J., 92, 116n49,r18ng7, 110,153,161,166n44&68,167n78, 16811122,
12on165 '74
kZmagunC, =~1n44,15,32,36n33,37n64,44, lokuttasa, 31-2,49,52n41&64,116n54&55,
5'"" 142-43,163,206
 Genera I Index
mahEbhftii see elements Miiller, M., 171, 183,190n3
Mah*6na, 56,63n9,166n53,191n37 mundus semibilk, 28
Malalasekera, G. P.,xv-XVI,xxxnr music, metaphor of', 21s
manas
as a generic term for mind, 23, 26, 29, Nagarjuna, 5 6 7
33-4,43,80n33,82-3,86, '06, 1'0, 114, niima, 4, 31,35n3, 116n50, 1181-1111, 1rgn140,
138-43 and passim chapter wpnrsirn, 167n82, Igrngo, 192n78,
as the sixth sense, 2-g,6, 8, 14-7,20, 22-35, 193:79
36n31,37n87,44,59, '07, "0,138-42, nZmampa, XVIII,xxx, 3-4, 15, 17,30-1, 37n66,
148 and passim 48-g,6g, 81n63,84-5,88,98,11qn6&8,
thought, thinking, 30,33-4,59,74, 115n14&15,chapter VI passim
106-110, 114, 138, 141 name, naming, 35n3,56-5g,60-I, 92,121-22,
manifoldness, 56-8,g1, 99, 110, 130-31, 134, 127-28
'43 name and form, 3,17,70,88, chapter w
Mannt, J., X X X I ~ ~ ~ , I O ~ , I I ~ ~ I I ~passim
&I~~
manodhcitu see manas as the sixth sense see also nimanipa
manomya, xxx, 39n126,56,63n22,64n44&47, Nanamo~i,Bhikkhu, 36n20,39n121,164n2,
107,136n44, chapter v~~passim '92"74-76-77&78,193n79
Masefield, I?, I 161155 eanananda, Bhikkhu, 57,63n27
matter, XIX,x x ~ x5, , 13,33-4,4~,150,195 Nanavira, Thera, g,23,33,36n21&36,
Maung Tin, 20-1,38nroo 38n116,41n165,50,52n45
meditation, xxw, xxwn, 12-3, 24, 30-1, Narada, 3gn126,166n56
37"63,38n88,44,48-50,59-60,62, negative attitude, to body, chapter ~ Ipassim
I
64n36-46&70,76,86-7,93,96-g,102-103, see also attitude to body
108, 111-12, 124, 140, 144-45, 147-168,169, neutral actions, karmically, 73,74,78, 180, 188f
172-78, 181-8~,185-89,~06 neutral feeling, 43-5,47
mental, =I, XXII-XXIII, XXVI,2,7, 15-8,22, nibbidi, 181,184,rg~nqg,1g2n65
25-69 28-34,42-4,61-2,66,71,74-7,79, nihilists, xxv
82,86-8, 101-103, 105-111, 113-14, Nirvana/nibbcina, XVIII-xrx, xxnr, xxxnIo, 6,
I I ~ ~ I11gn143&147,
II, 12on172, 123, 125, 35"'2,56,60-1,63"23,64n5', 67,69,
'28-30,136n25,14', 143,147-49, '55, '69, 77-9,81n60,108,133,166n46,167n85,
'71, '7377,188-89,196 172-73, 184,192n66, 195,206-208
metaphor, XXVI-VII, 18-g,22,zg, 38n95, Noble Truths see Four Noble Truths
40"'5', 49-51,97-101, '05, "3, "7"74, Norman, K. R., 3gn124, 118n100,136n25,
118nro3&104,120,124,129-30, 138-40, 182-83, rgong, 1g1n38-41-426~58, rgzn60
150, 152, 163-64, 180-81 no-upZdii riipa, 2,5-8,36n13
metaphysical, 66,68, 71,91, 149, 179 Nyanaponika, 174,190n21
microcosm/macrocosm, XXIII,84, 145-46, Nyanatiloka, 30,36n19-32,38n105,39n131,
'95 40n1539137n48
Middle Way, 68, 177
mind, xvr, XIX,xxru, xxv-xxvr, xxx,2,19, ontology, XXIII-xxvr,XXVIII,xxrx, 35nr2,42,
23,25-6,29-30,33-4,38n99,4on151,43, 69, 79,843 133-34, '39-41,145-46,148-51,
45,513 56,61--2,64"57, 75,823 8 6 9 % 1'34,169-71,194-96
roo-104,106-111, 112-13, 116n44,118ng6, okkamirsatha, 85, I 14n8
r1gn143, 121, 123, 127, 130 chapter VII
passim, 169,17172,174-78,180,182,184, Pali English Dictionary (PED), 1 6 7 , 37n78&79,
188, I94 38n81-83&84,39n114,40n142&145,56,62,
see also manas, citta 64n77,80n45,97, '03-104, 'o6,II4,114n8,
mind and body, xvr, XIX,XXVIII,3,8, 16-7, 117n74&76, 118ng2-II~&II~, 11gnlq&126,
25, '02, '05-106, 123-25, '35, '37"77, '40, 119n128,120n177,136n25, 13g,164n1&4,
148-4g,158-160,16g-70,172-73,178 167n88&go,1g2n62&65
mindSulness, 30, 61, 156, 172-79, 185 paifcakkhandhi see khandfi
mohility/motion/movements, x x ~ x5,1o-13,
, p~fi~~pcIdanaWchandhci see ~pzdiit&hdhii
18, 20,42, 90, 104,150,163 flaifG,22, 55,63n14,75,93-5,99,116n48,
mokja, XXIII 116n52-55-57-58-60&64,136n26,154,158
morality, XXIII,15,74-6, go, 108, 112-14, 154, papafica/prapaiica, 56-8, 60,63nz1-23-25-
I 80-8 I 29&3', 64n58,110, I30-37,'37"56,'42-43
see alro ethics
mPE see &avas
214 I d e n t i t y an d Experience
path, XXIII,xxx, g, 14, 18-9, 22, 27, 37n63, qualitative causal nexus, 91, 162
50,55,70,77-8,80"9,93-4,97-'02, I", qualitative state of mind, I I ~ f f
117"74-89&90, '40, '46, 150, '53-54, see a150 ktta
156-57,159,163-64,166n66, 170,172-73, see also ethics
175, 179-81, 184,188, 191n40,194,205-207 quasi sense, mancrr as, z6,31-z,34
p@k?hamphQfJa,49,59, '27, '34, '36"4'&42
patisar-, 28,33,40"'37 Radhakrishnan, S., 38ngo,4on151, 136n20,
pathaut see elements 148,165n41,1gon3
paticcmuppZda, doctrine of, 67-g,75,8on16, radiant, radiance, 8, roo-101, 1x3,118n103,
84, '29, 149,166n46, '95 153, '58
see also formulas - pa*caramuppida, Rahula, W., xxxng, 33,36n21, 3911129,
dependent origination 41n164&166,8on15
perception, XXVII,16-7, 28,35n12,44,53-4, reality, XXIII, 56,59, '47, 150-51, '57, '59, '78,
56358-9,61, 99, 113, '22, '27, '31, '33, '35, '94
142, '47 Reat, N. R., XVII,xxxn7, xxx1n24, 37n47-50-
PCrez Rembn, J., XVII,xxxnq, 49,52n42 56&64,4on140&143,5'n9,87"63,89,
phassa/contact, XVIII,XXVII,xxxn 13&14,14-5, 1I4"5,115"35,"6n44&45, "9"'43,
20,279 33, 37n73, 43-69 47-52953, 5937% r~on165,1~3,126,131-35,~36n18&38,
88-9, 90-1, II7n70, 125-27, 130, 134, 137n57-58-59-60-61-6~-68-69-75-76&77,
136n32,176 1651119
philosophy, xv,XIX-xx, m n , 25,31,40n151, Renou, L., 122, 135n11-12&13
63n3,80n20&23,83,115n29,149,188 responsibility, XXIII,5,54, 164, 178, 181
physical, XVIII-XIX, XXN,x m , 2-3,5-8, Reynolds, E, 136n44,166n53
13-21,22-5,29-30, 34,36n30,39n113, Rhys Davids, Mrs C. A. E, 4,28,38n95,
43-4,6z, 87,96, 102, 115n33, I I ~ ~ I I I , 40n139-140&144,53,63nz,80n12,103-105,
125-269128-29, 139,144,147, 14950, 152, I I ~ ~ I I I - I I ~136n20
&II~,
157, 160,16g,17678,180,187,18g,207 Rhys Davids, T. W., 62,65n75, 168n112,184
physics, 82, 150, 195 roots see isavar
Pieris, A., 116n3 Ruegg, D. S., 118n1oo
Pio, E., 5znz3 nipa, xwr, xxv, XXVIII, chapter I passim, 42,48,
poUuution/polluting, 177, 180-81, 187 59,64n46,96,98, 104, I 181111I, chapter VI
potential, 6, 13, 18-24, 134 pussim, 140, 144,146,150,152-61,163,
power, 8, 17, 61,76, 112-13,156-163, 195 166n49&66,167n96, 169,173,178,1g1n35,
of the mind, xxx, 3gn127, chapter VII 206
passim, I 72 see QlSO under khandha, mirnariipa
see also supramundane power Ryle, 25
pr4AZ, g2--3,116n50
process, XIX-XX, XXN,XXVIII, 5, 11-13, 18, sacrifice, xx-xm, 144-45,165n1g, 180
20-22,28-30, 32-34,37n61, 38n90,39n127, .ra,@atanasee Qatana, senses
42-3,46.-7,53,57-8,61-2,63"2', 74-5, salvation, xv, xx, XXII,177, 179, 1911137
78-383-6,88,go-I, 95-6,98,101-102, s a p d ~X~V,~XVII-XVIII,
, =I, XXN-XXV, XXVII,
104-105, 107-HI, "3-14, II5n29,126, 4-63 8-93 '4927-8,32,35"'2,50,567,
'29-37,134,738-39, 141-44,151, 155,157, 59-61966-73,75,77-9, Bong, 84-52 87,91,
'59, '61,164,169-70,177,'79-80, '94 95-9, TOT, 103, 111,113,117n74&g1,124-26,
see also causal nexus/causal process '31, 133-34, 1393142-43, '47, '49, '51-52,
see also cognitive process 159+0,'64,166n46,'69, '72, '73-74,
see also subtlising process '76-77,183, 190n29, '9'"37, '94-96,207
progress, XXIII,14, 18,61,g1,98-101, 111-13, samkhZra/samkhata, xv~n-XIX,xxxnI I, xxxm47,
II7"90,118n103,140, '47, '50-55,'57-59, 11,16,1g,42,48, chapter nrpasJr'm, 82-3, 87,
164, 170, 172, 175, 178, 188, I91n37,206 96, 108-1 10, I 16n27, 117n77,I rgn140&143,
psychology/psychological,XVII,XIX-xx, "5, 127-30, '32-35, 737n67, '41, 149-50,
xxv-XXVII,12, 14, 17-9,22-5,38n102,46, 175, '83, '90"7-8&29, I95
50,56,63"3, 71,77382, 114, 121,128, see also under khandha
129-31, 138, 151,178,180-81,189 ~arikara,xxv, 146-48
purity/purScation, 31, 86, roo, 107, 113, satigzti, XIX
118n95,124,140,146,151,156,164,172, saan'ii, XVIII, XXIX,16,37n75,42,46,48,
179-81, 187 chapter ~~~parsim, 72, 82-3,91,92-6, 110,
puthujana, 1g,45,50, 102, 161,207 "9"'43, '25, '27,130, '32, '34, '58,19'"7&8
see also under khandha
 Gener.al Index 2 15

san"Eivedayitanirodha,48,52n36&37, 60, 64n56, subtle self/subtle body, 11gnz8,146-68, 195

99,118n94,12on172,153-54,156,166n73, subtlising process, 155, 157, 163-64
167n88 suffering, XV-XVI,XVIII,xxxng, 4, 184,
sammbhira, 21, 38n101 194-95
sat, XXIII,83 suicide, 182, 187, 1911157
savifin"iy&ya, 101-105, 118nro8-IO~&III, sukha, 52n11-12-14&21,52n39,64n69,77, 85,
11gn118,124 141,165ng,167n85,188,207
seeing/sight/vision, XXVIII, 17--22,24-5, 28, supramundane, 49,55,93, '43, '57
43,88-9, '27, '63 powers (see also iddht), 61, 157, 160-63
things as they are, 35n12,56,60,69,93, senses, 31, 152,156, 162-63, 166n64
99,205,208 see also lokuttara
see alsoyathibhCtam
self/selfhood, XV-xvr, XVIII,xxrn-xxw, 4-5, tuth@ata, xxrv, 66, 80n1~,98,158-59
9, '3, 19,289 35,49,59,67, 7',84, '02, '22, 40 see elements
'24, 134, 739, '45-48, '49, 152, 155,164, tendency see anusaya
166n46, '74, '83,195-96 Theravada, xv-XIX, 1-2, 6-7,g, 23, 25,30,
see also separateness 33,50, 64n47, roo, 115nzo,123-24, 128,
sensation,-43,45, 134, 188 135, '37n48,'66n53,'69-71
see also feelings things as they are see under
senses, XVI,XVIII,xxrv, XXVII-XXVIII, 1-3, seeing/sight/vision and yathibhiitam
6-9, 11, 14-41,43-45,85,88, go, 92, thinking, 25,30,47,58,61,64n36, 106-114,
116n50,122, 125, 127-30,132, 134, 136n32, 140-44,164n6
137n65,142-43,151,156,162-63,166n64, see also manu, citta
176, 180 Thomas, E. J., 74, 136nzo&z1,137n48&4g,
see also ljyatana 166n50
sense organ(s), XXN,xxxnxg, 2-3, 6-8, 13, thought(s) see manas, citta
'4-35343, 45947-5',53, 71, 88, '32, '43, thought, word and deed, XXII-XXIII,19,74,
140, 180 108-109, 174,180
sense objects(s),xxxn13, 2-3, 6-8, 13, 14-41, Three Marks of Existence see formula -
43-4, 47-57,53,63n34,71, '22-23, '32, tilawchay
134,140 trance, 62,167n88
sensual desire/lust, XXVIII,2, 8,50, 61, 77, transcendent, XVI,XXIII-xxrv,48
142,150,162,174,176,187,205
sensus communis, 28-9, 31-4,4on143 unanswered questions, xxw, 56, 152
sentience, 20-1,38n100 unconscious, 62, go, 95-6, I 171168
separateness, XVI,35, 5 6 7 , 71, 101, 103, 139, unsatisfactoriness, XV,XVIII,XXVII,xxxng, 4,
'49, 155, '74, '96, 205,207 55,593 6',67-8,149,162,172-75, 177,187,
sika see morality 206-207
solidity/extension, x x ~ x5,
, 10-2, 18,42, 104, upidinakkhandhi, xxxn17, g, 36n36, 132,
'22, '27, 149-50, '55 IgOn27
soul, XV-XVI,XIX, xxv, 4on143, 86, 152, 174, upidi riipa, 2, 6-9, 15,20, 22-5,32, 35n8-9&10
'83, '95
space see elements Vbjrayina, 158
spectrum/degree of density, 42,146, 149-52, Vasubandhu, 31,35n3,63n34,122-23
'55,158,164,169,178, I95 vcTyu see elements
speculation, xxi Eda/ VGdc religion, xx-xxn, xxm, xxx1nz6,
spheres see cosmology/cosmological levels, 40n143,122, 144-45,160, 165n12-18&1g
dhitu see also Brahmanical religion
spiritual progress, XXIII,xxx, 91, 101, "3, vedani, XVIII,xxrx, xxxnrq, xxx1n43, 15-6,
140, 147, 150,152-156, 159, 164,166n66, 37n73, chapter 11passim, 72,80n24&27,
178, 191n37,206 82-3,g3-6, 116n61at62,11gn143,125,130.
Sramay, 177,180 132, 134, 136n36&37, 173, 176, 1gon7-8&28
state of mind see citta see also under khandha
station, of consciousness, 97-8, 101,117n73 verbal/linguistic convention, XXVIII-XXXX, 8j.
stream, 97, 101, 1171174 I 14n12
subjective, xxv-XXVII,8,22,~8-30,34, Verdu, A., 63n33&34
40n151,50,84, 86, 88,g5-6, 101-103, views, xxv, 9, 18-9, 27,47,52"29, 77, 93-4.
118n103, '43, '49, '63,205,207 1o7,116n54&55,124,134,184,188. 205
216 Identity and Experience
u ~ E E ~~ V, IXVIII,
, XXIX-xxx,xxxn14, wholesome/unwholesome, XXIII,18-9,
xxx1n47, 11,16,26,37n73&74,39n128, 64n59&64,80n37,81n46,110,112-13,142,
40"'54,42,46-48,50,54-5,62,63"'6, 165n7,180-I, 184,188, 1gon37
6970,72,81n58, chapter vpmsim, 123-26, will/willing, xxn-XXIII,70-2, 75, 77, 81n20,
128-1 30, 131-35, 1371164-65-66-67-708~73, 83,86, 91, 106-110. 113, 141, 144, 171, 180
138,151,190n7&8 khandha of, 72-3,75-6,79, 171
see also under khmdha Williams, l?, 63ng-20&34, I 171165, I 18ng4
vijfiana, 83-4, 114n4 Wilson, E., 188-89, 1g3n86
vijiianamaya, 140, 146-148, 157, 165n23-27- wind see elements
30&38 wisdom, 22,75-6,93-5, 111-12, 116n60,
Vijfianavada, x x v ~ 153-4,178,184
village, 19 see also pafiiiii
visible object/visibility, XXVII,3-5, 8, 13, 16, Wittgenstein, 25
18,28, 33,38n98,40n143, 43,472 50955, 72, Woodward, E L., 4,2g, 3gn134,7gn2,184,
88-9, 91, 121-23, 125, 134, 176 19x1148
vision see seeing/sight/vision world, xvn, xxn, xxv-XXVIII,6, 8,14, 17,22,
volition(s),XXII,XXIV, xxx, 6, 12, 16, 19, 29-34, 50,60-I, 69, 79, 110-11, 121-22, 131,
6978,80n23,83,87,90-', 95-7,99, '41, '48,161, '73-75
106-110, I 12, 1x4, 117n70,11gn142&147,125, see also loka
'33, 140-45, '49, '59-60,171-180,184,
187-89, 190n29, '95 YZijAavalkya, 121, 123, 135112, 144-5
volitional activities, ~VIII,69-71, 107, 1x3,164, yathiibhltum, XXIII,3gn125,56,6g, 99, I 16n56,
'75 208
see also saykhiirakkhandha yoga, 151,157,161-62,167ng8
volitional constituent see will, khandha of Yogacara, 149

water see elements Zaehner, R. C., 40n14.3

Wayman, A., 35n3,122-23,135n11,136n17 Ziircher, E., xxx1n18
wheel, 73, 87, 141 Zysk, K. G., 39n125
 Index of Textual Sources

Index of Textual Sources

Abhidhamma, xvr-xvr~,xx, x x x m I g, I-2,6-8,

14-89 22-6,33-4,35n9936n19&32,
38n90&99,41n167,49,51n7,58-60,64n36, Kafia Upan+ad, xxxm28,4on143
74-5, 82, 86,96, 100,106, "3, 114n3,122, Kau@takttakt
UpanGad,xxx1n28,92, 116n50
'70 Keuad& Suttu, 100,161,168n112
Abhidhammatha Sarigaha, 52n49,122,124,136n29 Xhandha Samyutta, xxvn, X X I X , 3-5,g, 26,29,
Abhidhannakoiabitiiga,31,63n34, 122, 1361116 43,47,52,54,58,70-1, 74-59 82,862 88,
AggafifiaSuttanta, 154,160,166n52 171
A@- Vacchagotta Sutta, xxxmgg Xhuddaka Nikiya, 23--4,35n10,48
Aitarva UpanGad, 1651114 Xhuddakap)c?tha,24, 39n119
Anyapariyesana Sutta, 1gon30 Kukkuravatika Sutta, 74
At.thasiilini, I , 3,6,2o-I, 3911109
A yikata Sutta, xxxrngg Madhupifidika Sutta, 32,43,88
Madhyarnakakirikii,5 6 3 6 3 n 2 0
Bahudhtuka Sutta, 151 Mahihatthipadopama Sutta, 13I
Brahmgiila Sutta, 47, 134,153 Mahiimiiluri@aSutta, 77
Brihmapu, xx, ~ I I 121 , Mahiinidiina Suttanta, 4g,68,84-5, 126-27, 134
Briihmapz Samyuttu, 188 Mahiinidde~a,48-g,52n32,128,137n47
Brhadiiranyaku UpanGad,X X I I , xxxm28, MahiiparinibbZna Sutta, 78, 161, 168n125,178
37n50&52,83, I 14n4&5,121--23,135n2- MahiZra@yatananikaSutta, 15,36n22,41n163,
68~7,145-48,151,164n15-16&17,165n22-23- 58
24-30-31-32-35-37-38-39-40-42439 Mah&atipa.#hina SuUmta, 58,172
166n43&44,167n101 Mahiivedalla Sutta, 54-5, go, 92-4, 116n44
Maitri Upan+, 37n51,165n36
Cetokhila Sutta, I 12 Miira Samyutta, 97
Chachakka Sutta, 15,36n22&24,41n163 Milindapaiiha, 114n12, I24,126,136n23,188,
Chiindogva UpanGad, X V I I I , xxx1n27&28, 190n17, '93"85
37n50&52,38n90,40nI5I,134n6, 144, '46, Mudaka Upanead, 123,1361119
148, 165n13-17-~8-29-33&34,166n45
CC.hmiilur@a Sutta, xxxmgg Netti Pakarana, 124, 1361329
CC/uvedalla Sutta, 48 NdZna Samyutta, x x v ~xxxnI4,
~, 16-7, 75,
80n5&12,84,86-7,96, 178
Dhammapada, 7gn1,81n61,"3, 11gn121-
134&142,12on167&171,124, 139-42,159, Pali canon, xv-WII, X I X , x x ~xxx1n18,1-2,
,
164n5, '71,183, 190n3, '9'"34&40 11-11, 23,32,45,70,86,116n50, "7"74,
Dhammapadaghakathi, 136n29,189 I I ~ ~ I I 122-23,
I , 131,138, 150, 153, 156,
Dhamma.sa%am, I-2,6, 8, 15,35ng,36n13-16- 170-72,176-79,181,184-85,188-89,194
19-26-27-28-29&30,37n65,38ng5,3gn106, Papaficartidani,35n4,41n161,64n46, I 1511x8,
40"'39,57"7,63"34,80n35, 114n1, '35"'4 11gn139,125,136n37,166n71,167n81,
Dhiitukathii, 25,3gn126 1gon18-22&24
Dhiitu Samyutta, 18,36n32 Paramatthad$- an< 37n55
Pararnatthq~tik~, 3gn120,192n72
Iddhipiida Samyuttu, 158 Pa#iambhidiimaga, 23,35n10,39n118,136n36,
Indtiya Samyutta, 38n85 168n113
218 I d e n t i t y a n d Experience
Petavatthu, 37n55 Sutta Pip.ka, xvrxwI1, xx, xxrv-XWII, xxx,
Pharramtilaka Sutta, 46 xxxxnxg, I-3,5-9, 14,16-20,22-6,28,
Poghapida Sutta, xxx~nng,62,152-53 30-2,34,35n9,38n702,39n~0,40n167,
55-6,753 77, 82, 85-63 90-1, 93,96-7,
Rg Veda, 121,135n1,144,165n12&1g 100-102,105,107,109-110, 117n67&72,
123-25,128-30,132-34,138-39,148-49,
Sabbkava Sutta, 77 151-53, 155, 163,166n66, 172, 177, 188,
Sa&yatana Samyutta, xxvIn, 1g,23,41n163,50, , '9'"57, '94
56, 142-43, '59 Svern'vatara Upani~d,xxx1nz8, 165n36
Sa&yatana Vagga, 15-6,36n22&24
SamawatiAi Vagga, 61
Szmafin'aphala Sutta,18-1g,86,g6, 105, 156-58,
I 60-61 UdCna, 35n12,50,52n46,116n42, 12on155,
SamWurWurmppatti Sutta, 75 133, 132n71,166n46
SimWlya Siitras, 4on146 UfianGads, xx-xxiii, xxv, xxx1n27&28, r I,
Sampasidanga Suttunta, 97 37"56&64, 40"'43,83, 91, "2, "4"4&5,
Sawti Suttanta, 38n85, 74, 77, 118n1o7 116n50,121-23, 140, 144-48, 157, 164,
Siiratthapakiisini, 36n15, r 17n72 165n20,195
Satupatha Briihma~,121,135n4&5,145, 151,
1651121 Vedani Samyutta, 43-4,46,5on12,72,8on26
SatipatfhcfnaSutta(s), xxw, 13,30,37n61,43, Vedas, xx, xxx1n26,4on143
55, 111-12, '49, '55, '7274,185, Kbhariga, 1,6,3',36n17-25&30,37"55,
1gon15&16 38n85&98,40"'53,48,5'"7,52"44,
Sumatigalavikisini, 38n82,52n28,80n37, 64n41&59,80n37,81n41,114n1,136n32
I 14n10,166n61-63&67,16gng1&92, Vinaya, xx, 24,3911122,114n7,161, 168n116-
1gon18-228~24 1208~2 12, 181-82,191n47-48-50-52-53&57
Sutta flidta, 8, 24, 36n33, 3gn1~3&125, 57, Visuddhimagga, xvi-xvii, 2, 4, 7, 23, 35n4,
63n29&31,76, 80n46, 106, 1171187, 119n121- 36n20, 37n53, ~ ~ ~ I I O & 55,63n12,
I I I , 124,
131-132-142&150,124, 130, 133, 135, 136n25, 136n26-27&34,150, fi4n2, 170, 180,
1371156-736~80,171, 180, 182, 1gon4&5, 185-89,192"73-74-75-76-77&78,
191n38-39-40-41&42 '93"79&80