TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION (Witnesses to Wills, Allowance and Disallowance of Wills)

CASE NAME FACTS ISSUE RULING DOCTRINE INVOLVED

1 Gonzales vs CA (G.R.
No. L-37453, May 25, Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without 1. Can a witness be 1.Yes. The petitioner submits that the term
1979) issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece considered credible in Article 805 requires something
of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of competent under Art more than just being competent and,
Isabel’s will designating her as the principal 820-821 and still not therefore, a witness in addition to being
beneficiary and executrix. The will was be considered competent under Articles 820-821 must also
typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 credible as required be credible under Art. 805. The competency
months prior to death of Isabel. by Art. 805? of a person to be an instrumental witness to a
will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and
The petition was opposed by Rizalina 2. Is it required that 821), whereas his credibility depends on the
Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, there must be appreciation of his testimony and arises from
on the following grounds: 1. the will is not evidence on record the belief and conclusion of the Court that
genuine, 2. will was not executed and that the witness to a said witness is telling the truth. In the case of
attested as required by law, 3. the decedent will has good Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
at the time of the making of the will did not standing in his/her Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968,
have testamentary capacity due to her age community or that the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
and sickness, and 4. the will was procured he/she is honest or “Competency as a witness is one thing, and it
through undue influence. upright? is another to be a credible witness, so
credible that the Court must accept what he
1 SUX REVIEWERS
The trial court disallowed the probate of the says. Trial courts may allow a person to
will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the testify as a witness upon a given matter
said decision of the trial court. The petitioner because he is competent, but may thereafter
filed a petition for review with SC claiming decide whether to believe or not to believe
that the CA erred in holding that the will of his testimony.”
the decedent was executed and attested as
required by law when there was absolutely 2.No. There is no mandatory requirement
no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses that the witness testify initially or at any time
are credible. during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness
and for being reliable, his honesty and
uprightness (such attributes are presumed of
the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party) in order that
his testimony may be believed and accepted
by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of
the Civil Code are complied with, such that
the soundness of his mind can be shown by
or deduced from his answers to the questions
propounded to him, that his age (18 years or
more) is shown from his appearance,
testimony , or competently proved otherwise,
 as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
dumb and that he is able to read and write to
the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has
none of the disqualifications under Article 821
of the Civil Code.

2 Molo-Pekson vs
Tanchuco (G.R. No. L- Mariano Molo died and by will bequeathed all Whether or not the Yes. Section 620 of the same Code of Civil
8774. November 26, his estate to his wife. Later, his widow, died employees of one of Procedure provides that any person of sound
1956) leaving no forced heirs but only collateral, — the beneficiaries of mind, and of the age of eighteen years or
children and grandchildren of her sisters. She the will may testify. more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able
was supposed to have executed about two to read and write, may be a witness to the
In the matter of the years before her death, a document execution of a will.
testate estate of the purporting to be her last will and testament,
deceased JUANA wherein she bequeathed the bulk of her
JUAN VDA. DE property to her two foster children, Emiliana This same provision is reproduced in our
MOLO. EMILIANA and Pilar (appellees/petitioners). These two New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The
MOLO-PECKSON foster daughters presented the document for relation of employer and employee, or
and PILAR PEREZ- probate in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. being a relative to the beneficiary in a will,
NABLE, Petitioners- does not disqualify one to be a witness to
2 Appellees, vs. The other relatives, such as Enrique a will. The main qualification of a witness SUX REVIEWERS
ENRIQUE Tanchuco, only son of Juana’s deceased in the attestation of wills, if other
TANCHUCO, sister Modesta, and his two children, Ester, qualifications as to age, mental capacity and
FAUSTINO and Gloria, both surnamed Tanchuco, and literacy are present, is that said witness
GOMEZ, ET AL., Faustino Gomez and Fortunata Gomez, the must be credible, that is to say, his
Oppositors- only surviving grandchildren of another testimony may be entitled to credence.
Appellants. deceased sister, named Francisca, filed
opposition to the probate of the will. There is a long line of authorities on this
MONTEMAYOR, J.: point, a few of which the Court may cite:
After hearing, the trial court, in a well
“A ‘credible witness’ is one who is
considered decision declared the document
not disqualified to testify by
Exhibit Ato be the last will and testament of
mental incapacity, crime, or other
Juana Juan, and admitted the same for
cause. Historical Soc. of Dauphin
probate. Failing to obtain a reconsideration of
County vs. Kelker, 74 A. 619, 226
this decision, the Oppositors appealed.
Pa. 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010.”
(Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p.
Contention of Oppositors: 340).
Under Section 618 of Act 190, the “As construed by the common law, a
Old Code of Civil Procedure, which requires ‘credible witness’ to a will means a
that a will should be attested or subscribed ‘competent witness’. Appeal of
by three or more credible witnesses, two of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann.
the attesting witnesses to the will in Cas. 1917A, 837.” (Ibid. p. 341).
 “Expression ‘credible witness’ in
question, namely, Miss Navarro and Miss
relation to attestation of wills means
Canicosa, who were employed as
‘competent witness’; that is, one
pharmacist and salesgirl, respectively, in
competent under the law to testify to
the drugstore of Pilar Perez-Nable, one of
fact of execution of will. Vernon’s
beneficiaries in the will, may not be
Ann. Civ. St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First
considered credible witnesses for the
State Bank of Uvalde, Tex. Civ. App.
reason that as such employees, they would
60 S. W. 2d 888, 889.” (Ibid. p. 842)
naturally testify in favor of their employer.
“The term ‘credible’, used in the
statute of wills requiring that a will
shall be attested by two credible
witnesses, means competent;
witnesses who, at the time of
attesting the will, are legally
competent to testify, in a court of
justice, to the facts attested by
subscribing the will, the competency
being determined as of the date of
the execution of the will and not of
the time it is offered for probate.
Smith vs. Goodell, 101 N.E. 255,
3 256, 258 Ill. 145. (Ibid.) SUX REVIEWERS
“‘Credible witnesses’, as used in
the statute relating to wills, means
competent witnesses — that is,
such persons as are not legally
disqualified from testifying in
courts of justice, by reason of
mental incapacity, interest, or the
commission of crimes, or other cause
excluding them from testifying
generally, or rendering them
incompetent in respect of the
particular subject matter or in the
particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 152 N. E. 545, 546, 322
III. 42.” (Ibid. p. 343)
The Court itself held in the case of Vda. de
Roxas vs. Roxas, that the law does not bar
relatives, either of the testator or of the heirs
or legatees, from acting as attesting
witnesses to a will.
 3 Pascual vs De la Cruz The basic principles on undue pressure and
(G.R. No. L-24819, May Catalina died, left a will naming Pascual heir. W/N the influence as laid down by the jurisprudence REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL
30, 1969) Nephews and Nieces opposed, alleging inconsistencies and of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE OF
contradictions in the will, the influence exerted must be of a kind WILL; SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES
inconsistencies in the testimonies. TC testimonies would that so overpowers and subjugates the mind BEST QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY ON
admitted probate. SC affirmed, taking into prohibit the will from of the testator as to destroy his free agency DUE EXECUTION OF WILL. —
account the 8-year difference between time being probated. and make him express the will of another Where a will is contested, the
of signing and time of testimony. rather than his own (Coso v. Fernandez subscribing witnesses are generally
Deza, 42 Phil. 596; Ino v. Ino, L-18979, 30 regarded as the best qualified to
1. 2 Jan 1960: Catalina Dela Cruz, 89, died, June 1964; Teotico v. Del Val, L-18753, 26 testify on its due execution. However,
single and without any surviving ascendants March 1965); that the contention that a will it is similarly recognized that for the
or descendants. was obtained by undue influence or improper testimony of such witnesses to be
pressure cannot be sustained on mere entitled to full credit, it must be
2. Andres Pascual filed a petition for the conjecture or suspicion, as it is not enough reasonable and unbiased, and not
probate of her will. Pascual was named that there was opportunity to exercise undue overcome by competent evidence,
executor and heir therein. influence, or a possibility that it may have direct or circumstantial. For it must
been exercised (Ozaeta v. Cuartero, L-5597, be remembered that the law does not
3. Respondents, nieces and nephews of 31 May 1956); that the exercise of improper simply require the presence of three
Catalina, opposed, alleging that Catalina was pressure and undue influence must be instrumental witnesses; it demands
mentally incapable of disposing her supported by substantial evidence that it was that the witnesses be credible.
properties by will at time of execution; that actually exercised (Ozaeta v. Cuartero, ante;
such was procured through undue influence, Teotico v. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965);
4 etc; and that her signature was procured that the burden is on the person challenging SUX REVIEWERS
through fraud. the will to show that such influence was 2. CONTRADICTIONS AND
exerted at the time of its execution (Teotico v. INCONSISTENCIES IN
4. Probate court admitted the will. Del Val, ante); that mere general or WITNESSES’ TESTIMONIES DO
Respondents appealed directly to SC reasonable influence is not sufficient to NOT ALTER PROBATIVE VALUE
(properties involved were valued at over invalidate a will (Coso v. Fernandez Deza, OF TESTIMONIES ON DUE
300k) ante); nor is moderate and reasonable EXECUTION IN INSTANT CASE. —
solicitation and entreaty addressed to the The contradictions and
5. Respondents: the testimonies of the testator (Barretto v. Reyes, L-5830-31, 31 inconsistencies appearing in the
witnesses and the Notary Public were January 1956), or omission of relatives, not testimonies of the witnesses and the
inconsistent and contradictory; that the will forced heirs, evidence of undue influence notary, pointed out by the oppositors-
was not signed by all the witnesses in the (Bugnao v. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson v. appellants (such as the weather
presence of one another. (TC: the instrument Coronel, 45 Phil. 416). condition at the time the will was
was signed in 1954, while the testimony was executed; the sequence of the
given in 1962 – 8 years difference; not Tested against these rulings, the signing by the witnesses; and the
unreasonable for witness to forget some circumstances marshalled by the contestants length of time it took to complete the
details. What is important is that there be certainly fail to establish actual undue act), relate to unimportant details or
unanimity and certainty in their testimony re: influence or improper pressure exercised on to impressions of the witnesses
the signatures of the testatrix, the witnesses, the testatrix by the proponent. Their main about certain details which could
and the notary public, and the fact that they reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the have been affected by the lapse of
were all present at time of signing). course of his testimony, that the deceased time and the treachery of human
"did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" memory, and which inconsistencies,
(t.s.n., page 7, 27 January 1962), which does by themselves would not alter the
 not amount to proof that she would sign
anything that proponent desired. On the probative value of their testimonies
contrary, the evidence of contestants- on the due execution of the will.
appellants, that proponent purchased a
building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the
title in his name, but caused the name
"Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted thereon in 3. FRIENDLY RELATIONS
bold letters to mislead the deceased even if BETWEEN WITNESSES AND
true, demonstrates that proponent’s influence TESTATOR DO NOT AFFECT
was not such as to overpower and destroy WITNESSES’ CREDIBILITY. — The
the free will of the testatrix. Because if the authorities are to the effect that
mind of the latter were really subjugated by friendly relations of the witnesses
him to the extent pictured by the contestants, with the testator or the benificiaries
then proponent had no need to recourse to do not affect the credibility of the
the deception averred. former, so that the proven friendship
between the proponent and the
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not instrumental witnesses would have
the testatrix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to be no bearing on the latter’s qualification
one of the instrumental witnesses evidence to testify on the circumstances
of such undue influence, for the reason that surrounding the signing of the will.
the rheumatism of the testatrix made it
difficult for her to look for all the witnesses.
5 That she did not resort to relatives or friends SUX REVIEWERS
is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant 4. APPELLANTS’ EVIDENCE
the disclosure of the terms of her will to those WEAK. — Two circumstances that
interested in her succession but who were militate against giving credence to
not favored by her, thereby exposing her to appellants’ evidence of a tape
unpleasant importunity and recriminations recording of a conversation between
that an aged person would naturally seek to instrumental witness Manuel Joingco
avoid. The natural desire to keep the making and oppositor Pedro B. Cruz at the
of a will secret can, likewise, account for the latter’s house in 1960 (which
failure to probate the testament during her recording was admittedly taken
lifetime. without Joingco’s knowledge)
wherein said witness is supposed to
We conclude that the trial court committed no have stated that when he signed the
error in finding that appellants’ evidence will the other witnesses’ signatures
established at most grounds for suspicion but were already affixed, and were not
fell far short of establishing actual exercise of then present, and that he signed the
improper pressure or influence. Considering document in 1958 or 1959, are: 1)
that the testatrix considered proponent as her absence of adequate proof that the
own son, to the extent that she expressed no declarations tape recorded were in
objection to his being made the sole heir of fact made by Joingco, the latter even
her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of denying the voice was his; and 2) the
her own rights, we find nothing abnormal in ratification of the testament appears
her instituting proponent also as her own among the entries for 1954 in the
 beneficiary. As stated by the Court in the
Knutson case— notarial register involved.

"The truth of the matter is that bequests and

devices to those in whom the testator has
confidence and who have won his affection 5. BASIC PRINCIPLES ON UNDUE
are more likely to be free from undue INFLUENCE UPON TESTATRIX. —
influence than bequests or devises to The following are the basic principles
others." (In re Knutson’s Will, 41 Pac. 2d. on undue influence as laid down by
793). the jurisprudence of the Court: To be
sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
Appellants invoke a presumption of undue exerted must be of a kind that so
influence held to exist by American overpowers and subjugates the mind
authorities where the beneficiary participates of the testator as to destroy his free
in the drafting or execution of the will favoring agency and make him express the
him; but since the will was prepared by Atty. will of another rather than his own;
Pascual, although a nephew of the that the contention that a will was
proponent, we do not think the presumption obtained by undue influence or
applies; for in the normal course of events, improper pressure cannot be
said attorney would follow the instructions of sustained on mere conjectures or
the testatrix; and a member of the bar in suspicion, as it is not enough that
good standing may not be convicted of there was opportunity to exercise
6 unprofessional conduct, or of having undue influence SUX REVIEWERS
or a possibility that it
conspired to falsify a testament, except upon may have been exercised; that the
clear proof. exercise of improper pressure and
undue influence must be supported
The charge of fraud, being premised on the by substantial evidence that it was
existence of undue influence, needs no actually exercised; that the burden is
separate discussion. on the person challenging the will to
show that such influence was
WHEREFORE, the decree of probate exerted at the time of its execution;
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against that mere general or reasonable
contestants-appellants. influence is not sufficient to invalidate
a will; nor is moderate and
reasonable solicitation and entreaty
addressed in the testator or omission
of relatives, not forced heirs,
evidence of undue influence.

6. UNDUE INFLUENCE UPON

TESTATRIX HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED IN INSTANT CASE.
— The trial court committed no error
 in finding that appellants’ evidence
established at most grounds for
suspicion but fell far short of
establishing actual exercise of
improper pressure or influence.
Considering that the testatrix
considered proponent as her own
son, to the extent that she expressed
no objection to his being made the
sole heir of her sister, Florentina
Cruz, in derogation of her own lights,
we find nothing abnormal in her
instituting proponent also as her own
beneficiary.

7. PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE
INFLUENCE WHERE
BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATES IN
DRAFTING OF THE WILL DOES
7 NOT APPLY IN SUX REVIEWERS
INSTANT CASE. —
Appellants invoke a presumption of
undue influence held to exist by
American authorities where the
beneficiary participates in the drafting
or execution of the will favoring him;
but since the will was prepared by
Atty. Pascual, although a nephew of
the proponent, we do not think the
presumption applies; for in the
normal course of events, said
attorney would follow the instructions
of the testatrix; and a member of the
bar in good standing may not be
convicted of unprofessional conduct,
or of having conspired to falsify a
testament, except upon clear proof.

4 Suntay vs Suntay
(G.R. Nos. L-3087 and In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen Whether or not the The fact that the municipal district court of
L-3088, July 31, 1954) and a resident of the Philippines, died in will executed in Amoy, China is a probate court must be
Amoy, China. He left real and personal Amoy, China can still proved. The law of China on procedure in the
properties in the Philippines and a house in be validly probated in probate or allowance of wills must also be
 Amoy. the Philippines. proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of the will in China in 1931 should
He married twice, the first marriage was with also be established by competent evidence.
Manuela Cruz with whom he had several There is no proof on these points.
children. While the second marriage was with
Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings
had a son, petitioner Silvino Suntay. in the municipal district court of Amoy were
for the purpose of taking the testimony of two
Intestate proceedings were instituted by the attesting witnesses to the will and that the
heirs of the first marriage. While the second order of the municipal district court of Amoy
wife, the surviving widow who remained in does not purport to probate the will.
Amoy China, filed a petition for the probate of
the last will and testament of the deceased The order of the municipal district court of
which was claimed to have been executed Amoy, China does not purport to probate or
and signed in the Philippines in November allow the will which was the subject of the
1929. The petition was denied due to the loss proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the
of the will before the hearing thereof. alleged probate cannot be said to have been
done in accordance with the accepted basic
After the pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have and fundamental concepts and principles
found among the records of his father, a last followed in the probate and allowance of
will and testament in Chinese characters wills. Consequently, the authenticated
8 executed and signed by the deceased on transcript of proceedings held in the SUX REVIEWERS
January 1931 and probated in the Amoy municipal district court of Amoy, China,
District Court. He filed a petition in the cannot be deemed and accepted as
intestate proceedings for the probate of the proceedings leading to the probate of
will executed in the Philippines on November allowance of a will and therefore, the will
1929 or the will executed in Amoy China in referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed
November 1931. and recorded by a competent court of this
country.

5 Singson vs Florentino
(G.R. No. L-4603, Leona Singson died leaving a will. In said The oppositors RULING ON THE FIRST ISSUE:
October 25, 1952) will the deceased instituted as heirs her raised the following
brothers Evaristo, Dionisio and Manuel, her errors: (THREE We opine that, while the taking of the
IN RE: PETITION FOR nieces Rosario F. de Donato, Emilia ISSUES) deposition was not made in strict
THE PROBATE OF Florentino and Trinidad Florentino de Paz, compliance with the rule (section 11, Rule
THE WILL OF THE
her grandniece Consolacion Florentino, and FIRST ISSUE: 77), the deficiency, if any, has been cured
DECEASED LEONA
SINGSON. some servants. by the waiver evinced by counsel for the
WON the trial court oppositors which prevented the court
MANUEL SINGSON, erred in admitting
She named her brothers Evaristo and from constituting itself in the residence of
PETITIONER AND
 APPELLEE, Manuel as executors of the will. the deposition of the witness.
Fidel Reyes, an
VS. Manuel Singson filed a petition for the Section 11, Rule 77 of the Rules, if the will
instrumental witness,
EMILIA FLORENTINO, probate of said will. which was taken is contested, all the subscribing witnesses
TRINIDAD because he was then present in the Philippines must be produced
FLORENTINO DE PAZ, Emilia Florentino, Trinidad Florentino de Paz and examined, and if they are dead, absent
AND JOSEFINA suffering from
and Josefina Florentino Vda. de Lim, or insane, this fact must be satisfactorily
FLORENTINO VDA. DE paralysis and was
LIM, OPPOSITORS daughters of a sister of the deceased, shown to the court. If a subscribing witness
thus physically
AND APPELLANTS. opposed the petition alleging among other is present in the Philippines but outside
incapacitated to
grounds that the signatures appearing in the the province where the will has been filed,
appear and testify in
will are not the genuine signatures of the his deposition must be taken.
court.
deceased, and that the will has not been
executed in accordance with the formalities We believe, however, that the deposition
of the law. may also be justified by interpreting
section 11, Rule 77, in connection with
The trial court found that the will has been Rule 18, section 4 (c), of the Rules, relative
9 executed in accordance with law and to the taking of the deposition of a witness in SUX REVIEWERS
admitted the same to probate. ordinary cases when he is unable to testify
because of sickness. Interpreting and
The oppositors appealed to the Court of
harmonizing together these two
Appeals, but the case was later certified to
provisions we may draw the conclusion
this court for the reason that it involves purely
that even if an instrumental witness is
questions of law.
within the seat of the court but is unable
to appear because of sickness, as in this
case, his deposition may still be taken, for
a different interpretation would be
senseless and impractical and would
defeat the very purpose which said Rule
77 intends to serve.

SECOND ISSUE RULING ON THE SECOND ISSUE

 WON the The law referred to is article 618 of the
attestation clause, Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
which allegedly Act No. 2645, which requires that the
failed to state the attestation clause shall state the number of
number of sheets pages or sheets upon which the will is
or pages in which written, which requirement has been held to
the will is written, be mandatory as an effective safeguard
substantially against the possibility of interpolation or
complied with the omission of some of the pages of the will to
law. the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
property is intended to be bequeathed

(In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy

Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil, 405;
Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs.
Morata, 54 Phil., 481; Echavarria vs.
10 Sarmiento, 66 Phil., 611). The ratio
SUX REVIEWERS
decidendi of these cases seems to be that
the attestation clause must contain a
statement of the number of sheets or pages
composing the will and that if this is missing
or is omitted, it will have the effect of
invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be
supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself.

But here the situation is different. While

the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages upon which the
will is written, however, the last part of the
body of the will contains a statement that it is
composed of eight pages, which
circumstance in our opinion takes this case
 out of the rigid rule of construction and places
it within the realm of similar cases where a
broad and more liberal view has been
adopted to prevent the will of the testator
from being defeated by purely technical
considerations.

One of such cases is De Gala vs. Gonzales

and Ona, 53 Phil., 104. Here one of the
objections raised was that, the attestation
clause does not state that the will had been
signed in the presence of the witnesses
although this fact appears in the last
paragraph of the body of the will, and the
Court, in overruling the objection, said that "it
may be conceded that the attestation clause
11 is not artistically drawn and that, standing
SUX REVIEWERS
alone, it does not quite meet the
requirements of the statute, but taken in
connection with the last clause of the body of
the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries
out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible
doubt as to the authenticity of the document".

Another case that may be cited is Mendoza

vs. Pilapil (72 Phil., 546). In this case, the
objection was that the attestation clause does
not state the number of pages upon which
the will was written, and yet the court held
that the law has been substantially complied
with inasmuch as in the body of the will and
on the same page wherein the attestation
clause appears written it is expressly stated
 that that will contains three pages each of
which was numbered in letters and in figures.

The conclusion is inescapable that the

will has been drafted in substantial
compliance with the law. This opinion is
bolstered up when we examine the will itself
which shows on its face that it is really
and actually composed of eight pages
duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses.

RULING ON THE THIRD ISSUE

A perusal of the above attestation clause

THIRD ISSUE would at first glance give the impression that
12 the testatrix merely signed or stamped her SUX REVIEWERS
WON the
thumbmark on the will in the presence of the
attestation clause
witnesses, without stating the place where
state that the
her signature or thumbmark had been
testatrix signed
affixed, which impression is caused by the
each and every
fact that right after the sentence firmo e
page of the will in
imprimho su marca digital en presencia de
the presence of the
todos nosotros, there appears a semicolon;
three instrumental
but if this semicolon is disregarded, we would
witnesses as
at once see that the testatrix signed or affixed
required by law.
her thumbmark not only at the bottom of the
will but also on the left margin of each and
every page thereon, considering the
concluding part of the sentence concerning
the signing of the will. That semicolon
undoubtedly has been placed there by
mistake or through inadvertence, as may be
deduced from the use of the word tambien
 made by the witnesses in the sentence
immediately following, which conveys the
idea of oneness in action both on the part of
the testatrix and the witnesses. Thus
considered and interpreted, the attestation
clause complies substantially with the law.

"The appellants earnestly contend that

the attestation clause fails to show that
the witnesses signed the will and each
and every page thereof because it simply
says (that we the witnesses also signed in
the presence of the testatrix and of each
other).

"In answer to this contention it may be said

13 that this portion of the attestation clause must SUX REVIEWERS
be read in connection with the portion
preceding it, which states that the testatrix
signed the will and on all the margins thereof
in the presence of the witnesses; especially,
because the word also used therein
establishes a very close connection between
said two portions of the attestation clause.
This word also should, therefore, be given
in its full meaning which, in the instant
case, is that the witnesses signed the will
in the same manner as the testatrix did.
The language of the whole attestation clause,
taken together, clearly shows that the
witnesses signed the will and on all the
margins thereof in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other."
 6 Caluya vs Domingo
(G.R. No. 7647, March This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the The Supreme Court does not believe that
27, 1914) Province of Ilocos Norte denying the probate of a will. any of the objections are well founded and
the judgment refusing its probate must,
The CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte denied the probate on the therefore, be reversed.
DOMINGO CALUYA, following grounds:
petitioner-appellant, I. The evidence shows that the name
I. Although the testator had signed by mark, it nowhere of the testator was signed by another person
vs. appeared in the will who had written the signature or that it had been at the testator’s request and under his
written at his request. direction and in his presence and in the
LUCINA DOMINGO, presence of the witnesses to the will.
respondent-appellee. II. The witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really have
signed the attestation clause because, at the time it was executed, he Section 618 of the Code of Civil
was attending a session of the municipal council of Piddig as a Procedure provides in part:
member thereof.
No will, except as provided in
III. As to the other witness, Segundino Asis, the will mentioned the preceding section, shall
and confirmed a sale of land to him by the testator, and he being be valid to pass any estate,
thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed. real or personal, nor charge
14 or affect the same, unless it
SUX REVIEWERS
be in writing and signed by
the testator, or by the
testator's name written by
some other person in his
presence, and by his
express direction, and
attested and subscribed by
three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each
other. . . .

In the case of Barut vs.

Cabacungan , it is nowhere required that,
where the testator is unable to write, the fact
that his signature was written by some other
person, at his request and express direction,
should appear in the body of the will itself.

The name of a person who is unable

to write may be signed by another, by
express direction, to any instrument known to
 the law. There is no necessity whatever, as
far as the validity of the instrument is
concerned, for the person who writes the
name of the principal in the document to sign
his pen name also. As a matter of policy, it
may be wise that he did so inasmuch as it
would give such intimation as would enable a
person proving the document to demonstrate
more readily the execution by the principal.
Nevertheless, as a matter of essential validity
of the document, it is unnecessary.

II. As to the second objection, it does

not appear in the evidence of the opposition
that the witness Pandaraoan was attending a
meeting of the municipal council of Piddig
from something like 10 o'clock until 12.30
o'clock of the day on which the will was
executed and that the will was executed
sometime between 10 and 12 o'clock. The
barrio of Piddig is only a short distance from
15 the house in which the will was executed and SUX REVIEWERS
it would have taken but a short time to cover
the distance. The witness Pandaraoan
himself testified directly and positively that,
after having left the meeting of the municipal
council, he went to the house of the testator
by appointment and there signed the will as
stated in the attestation clause. The other
witnesses to the will as well as the notary
public support this declaration.

All of the witnesses to the will unite in

declaring that they were there present at the
time the will was executed and that they
signed as witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. Antonino
Pandaraoan testified that the municipal
council began its session about 10 o'clock;
that in order to attend the execution of the
will, as he had agreed with the notary public
he would do, he was obliged to leave the
session before it terminated. He left the
session, mounted a horse and arrived at the
 house of the testator at about 12 o'clock, in
time to take part in the execution of the ill as
stated in the attestation clause.

III. As to the third ground upon which the

CFI based its decision; namely, that the will
having mentioned and confirmed a sale of
land to Segundino Asis, one of the witnesses
to the will, while not rendering the will entirely
invalid, throws great doubt upon the legality
of its execution and especially the testimony
of said witness relating thereto.

Section 622 provides:

If a person attests the

execution of a will, to whom
or to whose wife or husband,
or parent, or child, a
beneficial devise, legacy, or
interest, of or affecting real
16 or personal estate, is given SUX REVIEWERS
by such will, such devise,
legacy, or interest shall, so
far only as concerns such
person, or the wife or
husband, or parent or child
of such person, or anyone
claiming under such person
or such wife or husband, or
parent or child, be void,
unless there are three other
competent witnesses to such
will, and such person so
attesting shall be admitted as
a witness as if such devise,
legacy, or interest had not
been made or given. But a
mere charge on the real or
personal estate of the
testator, for the payment of
debts, shall not prevent his
creditors from being
competent witnesses to his
 will.

As observed to the will, no interest of

any kind was created by the will in favor of
Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or transfer
any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact
already consummated, a sale already made.
Even if, however, the will had conveyed an
interest to Segundino Asis, it would not make
the whole will void. Only that clause of the
will conveying an interest to him would have
been void; the remainder could have stood
and would have stood as a valid testament.

7 Merza vs Porras (G.R.

No. L-4888, May 25, This is an appeal from the Court Whether or not the document The premise of the conclusion is, in our
1953) of Appeals which affirmed an partakes the nature of a will, and opinion, incorrect.
order of the Court of First not of a codicil.
Instance of Zambales denying It must be admitted that the attestation clause
17 the probate of the last will and was very poorly drawn, its language
SUX REVIEWERS
testament and so-called codicil, exceedingly ungrammatical to the point of
identified as Exhibits A and B, of being difficult to understand; but from a close
Pilar Montealegre, deceased. examination of the whole context in relation
to its purpose the implication seems clear
The testatrix was survived by the that the testatrix signed in the presence of
husband and collateral relatives, the witnesses. Considering that the
some of whom, along with the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign
husband, were disinherited in and attest to the testatrix's signing of the
Exhibit B for the reasons set forth document, and that the only actors of the
therein. proceeding were the maker and the
witnesses acting and speaking collectively
The opposition to Exhibit A was and in the first person, the phrase "in our
predicated on alleged defects of presence," used as it was in connection with
the attestation clause. Written in the process of signing, cannot imply anything
the local dialect known to the but the testatrix signed before them. No other
testatrix, the attestation clause, inference is possible. The prepositional
as translated into English in the phrase "in our presence" denotes an active
record on appeal, reads: verb and the verb a subject. The verb could
not be other than signed and the subject no
The foregoing instrument other than the testatrix.
consisting of three pages, on the
date above-mentioned, was The use of the word "also" is no less
 executed, signed and published enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the
by testatrix Pilar Montealegre witnesses sign in the presence of the testatrix
and she declared that the said and of one another, so the testatrix sign in
instrument is her last will and similar or like manner — in their presence.
testament; that in our presence
and also in the very presence of In consonance with the principle of the liberal
the said testatrix as likewise in interpretation, adhered to in numerous later
the presence of two witnesses decision of this Court and affirmed and
and the testatrix each of us three translated into inactment in the new Civil
witnesses signed this a Code (Article 827), we are constrained to
testament. hold the attestation clause under
consideration sufficient and valid.
The opponent objected that this
clause did not estate that the "Precision of language in the drafting of the
tetratrix and the witnesses had attestation clause is desirable. However, it is
signed each and every page of not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the
the will or that she had signed word of the statue be made. It is sufficient if
the instrument in the presence of from the language employed it can
the witnesses. The Appellate reasonably be deduced that the attestation
Court dismissed the first clause fulfills what the law expects of it."
objection, finding that "failure to (Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)
18 estate in the attestation clause in SUX REVIEWERS
question that the testatrix and/or "It could have been the intention of the
the witnesses had signed each legislature in providing for the essential
and every page of Exhibit A were safeguards in the execution of a will to
cured by the fact that each one of shackle the very right of the testamentary
the page of the instrument disposition which the law recognizes and
appears to be signed by the holds sacred." (Leynes vs. Leynes, supra.)
testatrix and the three attesting
witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 With reference of Exhibit B the Court of
Phil., 152, (1924); Ticson vs. Appeal agreed with the trial court that the
Gorostiza, 57 Phil., (1932); document having been executed one day
Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., before Exhibit A could not be considered as a
3rd Suppl. (October 18, 1939), codicil "because a codicil, as the word
510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 implies, is only an addition to, or modification
Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940)." of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that
"the content of Exhibit B are couched in the
But granting the correctness of language of ordinarily used in a simple
the premise, the court held the affidavit and as such, may not have the legal
second objection well taken and effect and force to a testamentary
thus concluded: "The question disposition." Furthermore, the Court of
whether the testatrix had signed Appeals observed, disinheritance "may not
in the presence of said witnesses be made in any instrument other than the will
can not be verified upon physical of Exhibit A, as expressly provided for in
 examination of the instrument. article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there
Hence, the absence of the being no disposition as to the disinheritance
require statement in said clause of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the
may not, pursuant to the surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it is
decisions of the Supreme Court, quite clear that he can not be disinherited in
be offset by proof aliunde even if any other instrument including Exhibit B,
admitted without any objection." which is, as above stated, a simple affidavit."

Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will.

A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil
code of Spain as "the act by which a persons
dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as
"an act whereby a person is permitted, with
the formalities prescribed by law, to control to
a certain degree the disposition of his estate,
to take effect after his death. Exhibit B comes
within this definition.

Being of testamentary character and having

been made with all the formalities of law,
19 Exhibit B is entitled to probate as an SUX REVIEWERS
independent testementary desposition. In the
absence of any legal provision to the contrary
— and there is none in this jurisdiction — it is
the general, well-established rule that two
separate and distinct wills may be probated if
one does not revoke the other (68 C.J., 885)
and provided that the statutory requirements
relative to the execution of wills have been
complied with (Id. 881). As seen, Exhibit B
embodied all the requisites of a will, even
free of such formal of literary imperfections
as are found in Exhibit A.

It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and

effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs
from testate or intestate succession. Article
849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not, as
the appealed decision seems to insinuate,
require that the disinheritance should be
accomplished in the same instrument by
which the maker provides the disposition of
his or her property after his or death. This
 article merely provides that "disinheritance
can be affected only by a will (any will) in
which the legal cause upon which it is based
is expressly stated."

It is our judgment therefore that the

instruments Exhibit A and B admitted to
probate, subject of courts to the right of the
disinherited person under particle 850 to
contest the disinheritance, and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellee.

8
G.R. No. L-12207 Juan Palacios executed his last Whether or not the opposition is It should be noted that petition instituted the
December 24, 1959 will and testament on June 25, proper. present proceeding in order to secure the
1946 and availing himself of the probate of his will availing himself of the
JUAN PALACIOS, provisions of the new Civil Code, No. The only purpose here is provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the
petitioner-appellant, he filed a petition for its approval. merely to determine if the will new Civil Code, which permit a testator to
In said will, he instituted as his has been executed in petition the proper court during his lifetime for
20 sole heirs his natural children accordance with the the allowance of his will, but to such petition SUX REVIEWERS
vs.
Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea requirements of the law. on Maria Catimbang filed an opposition
MARIA CATIMBANG C. Palacios. alleging that she is the acknowledged natural
PALACIOS, oppositor- daughter of petitioner but that she was
appellee. On June 21, 1956, Maria completely ignored in the will thus impairing
Catimbang filed a opposition to her object to the probate of the will insofar as
BAUTISTA ANGELO, the probate of the will alleging it due execution is concerned or on the
J.: that: ground that it has not complied with the
formalities prescribed by law; rather she
she is the objects to its intrinsic validity or to the legality
acknowledged natural of the provisions of the will.
daughter of petitioner
but that she was We hold that such opposition cannot be
completely ignored in entertained in this proceeding because its
said will thus impairing only purpose is merely to determine if the
here legitime. will has been executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law, much less if
The court on July 6, 1956 issued the purpose of the opposition is to show
an order admitting the will to that the oppositor is an acknowledged
probate. The court, however, set natural child who allegedly has been
a date for the hearing of the ignored in the will for issue cannot be
opposition relative to the raised here but in a separate action. This
intrinsic validity of the will and, is especially so when the testator, as in
 after proper hearing concerning the present case, is still alive and has
this incident, the court issued merely filed a petition for the allowance of
another order declaring oppositor his will leaving the effects thereof after his
to be the natural child of death.lawphi1.net
petitioner and annulling the will
insofar as it impairs her legitime,. After a will has been probated during the
lifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily
The appeal was immediately mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same
appealed to the SC by the before he has had a chance to present such
petitioner. petition, the ordinary probate proceedings
after the testator's death would be in order"
(Report of the Code Commission, pp. 53-
54).The reason for this comment is that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent
(Article 777, new Civil Code.).

It is clear that the trial court erred in

entertaining the opposition and in
annulling the portion of the will which
allegedly impairs the legitime of the
21 oppositor on the ground that, as it has SUX REVIEWERS
found, she is an extraneous matter which
should be treshed out in a separate
action.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set

aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

9
Macam vs Gatmaitan This is an action brought by the Issues: It is inferred from the foregoing document
(G.R. No. L-42619, plaintiff as executrix of the testate that the deceased Leonarda Macam and the
March 11, 1937) estate of the deceased Leonarda 1. Whether or not the order defendant Juana Gatmaitan lived together as
Macam, for the recovery from the allowing the will, which order has friends, Leonarda having contributed the
defendant Juana Gatmaitan and become final and executory, bars house and Juana the Buick automobile and
Magno S. Gatmaitan of the the presentation and probate of most of the furniture to such companionship,
ownership of the house the codicil. [NO] both having thereby established between
described in paragraph 2 of the themselves a de facto joint ownership of the
complaint. The plaintiff appealed 2. Whether or not the failure to properties respectively contributed by them
from the decision of the court file an opposition to the probate which, judging from their nature and
absolving the defendants. of the will prevents the filing of an description, are more or less of the same
opposition to the probate of the value. Such must be the case, judging from
 On September 24, 1929, the codicil thereof. [NO] the fact that, although the house was
deceased Leonardo Macam and purchased with money exclusively belonging
the defendant Juana Gatmaitan to Leonarda, it was made to appear that both
purchased the house in question were the purchasers.
for P3,000 from the spouses
Generosa Inducil and Flora The plaintiff contends that with respect to the
Ramos (Exhibit B). It is stated in house, Exhibit C, on the part of Leonarda,
the deed of sale that the vendors constitutes a donation mortis causa in favor
received the purchase price of of Juana, and that as it had not been
the house from the vendees, executed with all the formalities required by
both single. However, on June law for a will, it is entirely invalid and did
12, 1932, the deceased produce the effect of conveying the
Leonarda Macam and the ownership of the house to Juana.
defendant Juana Gatmaitan
subscribed a document (Exhibit The lower court, in absolving the defendants
C) which reads as follows: from the complaint, considered the act of the
deceased Leonarda as a transfer of the
Know all men by these presents: ownership of the house in favor of Juana, but
not in the concept of a donation. This
That we, Leonarda Macam and conclusion of the court below is supported by
Juana Gatmaitan, both single of the literal interpretation of Exhibit C, wherein
22 age and residents of the the parties describe the act performed by SUX REVIEWERS
municipality of Calumpit, them as an agreement and a transfer.
Province of Bulacan, Philippine
Islands, by means of this This court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is
document, freely and voluntarily an aleatory contract whereby, according to
state as follows: article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the
parties or both reciprocally bind themselves
1. That during the time we lived to give or do something as an equivalent for
together as friends, we have that which the other party is to give or do in
purchased a house of strong case of the occurrence of an event which is
materials built on a lot belonging uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate
to the Diocese, situated in the time. As already stated Leonarda was the
municipality of Calumpit, owner of the house and Juana of the Buick
Province of Bulacan, and automobile and most of the furniture. By
declared for taxation purposes virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the
under Tax No. 6977, one Buick owner of the house in case Leonarda died
automobile, and furniture first, and Leonarda would become the owner
necessary for the house. of the automobile and the furniture if Juana
were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and
2. That I, Juana Gatmaitan, Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
hereby declare that the house property to one another conditioned upon
purchased by us was paid with who might die first, the time of death
my friend Leonarda Macam's determining the event upon which the
 own money in the sum of three acquisition of such right by the one or the
thousand pesos (P3,000) and other depended. This contract, as any other
therefore, said house truly contract, is binding upon the parties thereto.
belongs to my said friend. The Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before
following furniture likewise truly Juana the latter thereupon acquired the
belong to her: ownership of the house, in the same manner
as Leonarda would have acquired the
One (1) wardrobe with mirror and ownership of the automobile and of the
carved top. furniture if Juana had died first.

One (1) narra bed. In view of the foregoing considerations, the

judgment appealed from is affirmed with
One (1) small wooden wardrobe. costs to the appellant. So ordered.

One (1) small wooden table.

One (1) narra chair.

One (1) rattan sofa.

One (1) dining room table.

23 SUX REVIEWERS
One (1) kitchen table.

One (1) dining room benches.

One (1) kitchen benches.

One (1) ice box.

3. I, Leonarda Macam also

hereby declared that the Buick
automobile and most of the
furniture in the house where we
live, as the narra chairs,
wardrobe and bed, truly belong
to my friend Juana Gatmaitan,
said automobile and most of said
furniture having been bought with
money exclusively belonging to
her; and she was also the one
who had my house painted.

4. That in consideration of the

 friendship we mutually profess,
considering ourselves almost as
sisters, we have voluntarily
agreed that whoever of us will die
first shall leave to the survivor, as
the latter's property, the houses
and all the furniture therein
together with the Buick
automobile above-stated,
excluding the furniture belonging
to Leonarda Macam stated in
paragraph 2 of this document,
which may be taken by the heirs
of said Leonarda Macam if she
will be the first to give up her soul
to God, as remembrance to her
surviving friend, and this
agreement shall be equivalent to
a transfer of the right of the one
who dies first and shall be kept
by the survivor; and none of our
24 heirs shall claim the property SUX REVIEWERS
mentioned in this document left
by any us who dies first.

In witness whereof, we affix our

signature at the foot of this
document as a proof of the
acceptance by each of us of this
agreement, this 12th day of July,
1932, in the municipality of
Calumpit Province of Bulacan, P.
I.

10 Adriana Maloto died leaving as WON the will was validly For a valid revocation to occur, the 'corpus'
Testate Estate of heirs her niece and nephews, the revoked? and 'animus' must concur, one without the
Maloto vs CA (G.R. petitioners Aldina Maloto- other will not produce a valid revocation. The
No. 76464 February Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, physical act of destruction of a will must
29, 1988) and the private respondents come with an intention to revoke (animus
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. revocandi).

Believing that the deceased did Under Art. 830, the physical act of
not leave behind a last will and destruction, in this case the burning of the
testament, these four heirs will, does not constitute an effective
 commenced an intestate revocation, unless it is coupled with animus
proceeding for the settlement of revocandi on the part of the testator. Since
their aunt’s estate. While the animus is a state of mind, it has to be
case was still in progress, they accompanied by an overt physical act of
executed an extrajudicial burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling
settlement of Adriana’s estate done by the testator himself or by another
dividing it into four equal parts under his express direction and presence.
among themselves. They
presented the same and In this case, the document or papers burned
successfully gained court by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not
approval. satisfactorily established–that such was the
will of Adriana Maloto. And that the burning
Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex- was not proven to have been done under the
associate of the deceased's express direction of Adriana. Also the burning
counsel allegedly discovered her was not in her presence. Both witnesses
last will which was purportedly stated that they were the only one present at
dated 1940, inside a cabinet. the place where papers were burned. The act
Hence the annulment of the done by the witnesses could not have
proceedings and a probate constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s
petition was filed by the devisees Will.
and legatees. The said will was
allegedly burned by the
25 househelp under the instruction SUX REVIEWERS
of the deceased

Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio

Palma, ex-associate of the
deceased's counsel allegedly
discovered her last will entitled
“KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento),” which was
purportedly to be the last will and
testament of Adriana dated 1940,
inside a cabinet. Hence the
annulment of the proceedings
and a probate petition was filed
by the devisees and legatees.
The said will was allegedly
burned by the househelp under
the instruction of the deceased

Malotos oppposed the probate of

the Will stating among others that
the said will was revoked. Two
 witnesses were presented to
prove that the will was burned by
Adriana herself.

The lower court denied the

probate on the ground that the
animus revocandi in the burning
of the will was sufficiently proven.

11
Casiano vs Maloto One Adriana Maloto died on W/N the probate court had NO In this case, an intestate proceeding
(G.R. No. L-32328, October 20, 1963. jurisdiction to entertain the was filed. Subsequently, a petition for
September 30, 1977) petition for probate of the alleged It is not proper to make a finding in an allowance of the last will and
will of Adriana in the intestate intestate estate proceeding that the annulment of the proceeding was
proceeding. discovered will has been revoked. As a filed in the same
Aldina Maloto Casiano, matter of fact, the probate court in the proceeding(intestate proceeding).
Constancio Maloto, Panfilo intestate estate proceeding stated that
Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece "Movants should have filed a separate action Ultimately, ingon sa court dapat
and nephews, respectively, of for the probate of the will." And this court separate ang action for probate of
Adriana Maloto, in the belief that stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that the will sa action for intestate
26 "The more appropriate remedy of the proceeding.
SUX REVIEWERS
decedent died intestate,
commenced on November 4, petitioners in the premises stated in the
1963 in the Court of First petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate
Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will
proceeding. In the course of said in question."
intestate proceeding, Aldina
Maloto Casiano, Constancio In view of the foregoing, the order of
Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding
Maloto executed an extrajudicial No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition
Partition of the estate of Adriana for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana
Maloto whereby they adjudicated Maloto.
said estate unto themselves in
the proportion of one-fourth (1/4)
share for each. 2 The Court of
First Instance approved the
extrajudicial partition.

A document purporting to be the

last with and testament of
Adriana Maloto was delivered to
the Clerk of Court. It appears that
 Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent
Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and
Felino Maloto are named as heirs
but Maloto Casiano and
Constancio Maloto allegedly
have shares in said with which
are bigger, different and more
valuable than what they obtained
in the extrajudicial partition. The
said will also allegedly made
dispositions to certain devisees
and/or legatees, among whom
being the Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldina Maloto Casiano and

Constancio Maloto filed in the
intestate proceeding a motion (1)
27 for reconsideration; (2) SUX REVIEWERS
annulment of the proceedings;
and (3) for the allowance of the
last will and testament of Adriana
Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor also
filed in Special Proceeding No.
1736 petitions for the allowance
of the will of Adriana Maloto.

CFI – denied the motion on the

ground that the said motion had
been filed out of time.

The petitioners filed a petition for

certiorari and mandamus with the
Supreme Court and was denied.
The SC said that the more
 appropriate remedy of petitioners
in the premises stated in the
petition is for petitioners to initiate
a separate proceeding for the
probate of the alleged will in
question.

Petitioners commenced an action

to probate the alleged last will
and testament of of Adriana
Maloto.

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto

filed an opposition with a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the
alleged will sought to be
probated had been destroyed
28 SUX REVIEWERS
and revoked by the testatrix, the
instant petition for probate is now
barred by prior judgment or order
(or res judicata, the estate of the
late adriana maloto had already
passed out of existence and title
thereto had already arrested in
the distributees of their assigns,
petitioners aldina maloto casiano
and constancio maloto are now
estopped from seeking the
remedy tender this proceeding,
they having ceased to be
interested parties.

Probate Court – dismissed

petition for probate. the alleged
will sought to be Probated had
been destroyed and revoked by
the testatrix. the petition for
probate is now barred by the
 order in the intestate estate
proceeding.

12
MANUEL GONZALES 1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE
v. MANOLITA MADE BY TESTATOR AND
GONZALES DE SIGNED BY WITNESSES,
CARUNGCONG (G.R. SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH
Nos. L-3272-73, LAW. — An attestation clause made
November 29, 1951) by the testator himself more than by
the instrumental witnesses, but
signed by the latter right under the
signature of the testator, substantially
complies with the requirements of
law.

2. STATEMENT OF SHEETS OR
29 SUX REVIEWERS
PAGES IN BODY OF WILL HELD
SUFFICIENT WHEN CONSIDERED
IN CONNECTION WITH
ATTESTATION CLAUSE. — The
statement in the penultimate
paragraph of the will as to the
number of the sheets or pages used
is sufficient attestation which may be
considered in conjunction with the
last paragraph which was herein held
as the attestation clause. The law
does not require the attestation to be
contained in a single clause.

3. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY;
TESTIMONY OF ATTENDING
PHYSICIAN PREVAILS OVER THAT
OF TESTAMENTARY WITNESSES.
— Where the family physician
attended the testatrix during her last
illness and saw her on the day when
 the alleged document of revocation
was executed, the testimony of the
attesting witnesses tending to imply
that the testatrix was of sound mind
at the time said document was
executed, cannot prevail over the
contrary testimony of the attending
physician.
13
Samson vs Naval
(G.R. No. L-11823,
February 11, 1918)

14
De Molo vs Molo (G.R. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, Whether or not the 1918 will can Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down
No. L-2538, September one in August 1918 and another still be valid despite the in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,
21, 1951) in June 1939. The latter will revocation in the subsequent containing a clause revoking a previous will,
contained a revocation clause disallowed 1939 will having been disallowed for the reason that it
which expressly revoked the will was not executed in accordance with law
in 1918. He died without any cannot produce the effect of annulling the
forced heirs but he was survived previous will, inasmuch as the said
30 by his wife, herein petitioner revocatory clause is void. SUX REVIEWERS
Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and There was no valid revocation in this case.
nieces. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will
Only a carbon copy of the because of his knowledge of the revocatory
second will was found. The clause contained in the will executed in
widow filed a petition for the 1939.The earlier will can still be probated
probate of the 1939 will. It was under the principle of dependent relative
admitted to probate but revocation.The doctrine applies when a
subsequently set aside on testator cancels or destroys a will or executes
ground that the petitioner failed an instrument intended to revoke a will with
to prove its due execution. the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the
As a result, the petitioner filed new disposition fails of effect for some
another petition for the probate of reason.
the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will
had already been revoked under
the 1939 will. They contended
that despite the disallowance of
the 1939 will, the revocation
clause is valid and thus
 effectively nullified the 1918 will.

15
Roxas vs Roxas (G.R. Petitioner Natividad Roxas filed a Whether or not the will was YES.
No. L-2396, December petition for the probate of will of attested by three credible
1, 1950) his deceased husband, Pablo witnesses?
Roxas. Under the will, Pablo
Roxas left all his property to his This case is one in which the will is couched
wife and his son, Reynaldo. The in a language known and spoken by the
will is typewritten and worded in testator and the signatures of the three
Tagalog and attested by Jacinto attesting witnesses are admittedly genuine.
Enriquez, Fortunato Gupit and Such being the situation, the question that
Martin Rodrido. arises, far from requiring the intervention of
experts, is one merely of credibility of
witnesses. In our opinion, the testimony of
the three attesting witnesses — confirmatory
Respondents filed an opposition of the due execution of the will — deserves
on the ground that the will was full credit, not only because of their
not executed and attested as qualifications (hereinbefore pointed out) but
required by law, that it was only because their reputation for probity has not
31 intended as a mere request and been impeached. The fact that they may SUX REVIEWERS
was subsequently revoked by the have some relationship with the petitioner is
deceased because it was not sufficient to warrant the belief that they
crumpled with an intention to did not tell the truth. The law, in the first
destroy. Respondents alleged place, does not bar relatives either of the
that the last will and testament testator of the heirs or legatees from acting
was not attested and subscribed as witnesses. In the second place, in the
by three or more credible normal course of things and to be sure that
witnesses in the presence of the the witnesses would not let the beneficiaries
testator. down, the testator may be inclined to employ,
as attesting witnesses, relatives of such
beneficiaries, if not wholly disinterested
persons. In the third place, under the will,
The Court of First Instance Reynaldo Roxas (adulterous son of Pablo
rendered a decision disallowing Roxas) is named a legatee on equal footing
the probate of the will on the with the petitioner, and the attesting
ground that body of the will was witnesses are not related whatsoever with
typewritten and signed by the him. In the fourth place, whereas the three
testator on a date or occasion attesting witnesses have no direct interest in
different from and anterior to the the subject matter of the will, oppositor Maria
date or occasion when the Roxas, like the other oppositor Pedro Roxas,
attestation clause was is an intestate heir of Pablo Roxas and,
typewritten and signed by the therefore, naturally interested in having the
 attesting witnesses, with the probate of said will disallowed.
result that the will was not signed
by the testator in the presence of
the witnesses.

Petitioner appealed the decision

of the CFI arguing that the
testimony of the witnesses
should be given more weight.
According to the witnesses,
Between two and three in the
afternoon Pablo Roxas showed
up and, approaching Gupit who
was then reading a book, asked
him to go to the sala with Roxas.
The latter got from his hip pocket
a folded sheet of paper (the will
here in question) and asked
Gupit to read it. In the meantime
32 Roxas proceeded to the dining SUX REVIEWERS
hall where a mahjong game was
being played and called Enriquez
and Rodrigo who thereupon went
to the sala and were asked to
read the will previously handed to
Gupit. Roxas then made the
request for the three to act as
witnesses. Roxas, using his
fountain pen, signed it in the
presence of Gupit, Enriquez and
Rodrigo. Gupit then signed with
his own pen and, noticing that
the ink in his signature was
spreading, asked for a blotter.
Roxas got a blotter from a nearby
writing desk and gave it to Gupit
who accordingly applied it.
Enriquez and Rodrigo, using the
pen of Gupit, took their turns in
signing the will, the blotter being
also applied. Thereafter, Roxas
refolded the document and
 inserted the same in his hip
pocket.

16
Trillana vs Crisostomo Damasa Crisostomo died and left WON the appellants are parties- NO. In civil actions and special proceedings,
(G.R. No. L-3378, two wills, one on October 19, in-interest and have the right to unless otherwise provided by law, the interest
August 22, 1951) 1946, and another on August 16, appeal the CFI decision in order that a person may be a party on
1948. In both wills, the testatrix appeal must be material and direct, so that
left all her properties as legacies he will be materially and directly benefited or
to other persons. The CFI injured by the court's order, decree or
allowed the October 19, 1946, judgment: and not indirect or contingent The
and declared invalid the interest claimed by the appellants is purely
subsequent will. contingent or dependent upon several
uncertain and future events: (1) The
Petitioner-appellants disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948
CONSORCIA P. CRISOSTOMO, (2)The allowance of the will of August 16,
ET.AL, who claim to be nephews 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies
and nieces and therefore legal left in said will of August 16, 1948. Therefore,
heirs of the deceased, applealed they are not real parties-in-interest, and have
33 the lower court’s decision saying no right to appeal. SUX REVIEWERS
that the October 19, 1949 will
should be disallowed, and in so
doing, they will they will inherit
the estate left by the testatrix.
They contend that said will
should be probated jointly or
together with the will of August
16, 1948, and the latter be
allowed instead of the former.

Appellants argue that they are

interested parties and therefore
may appeal in the present case,
because in the event the will of
October 19 is disallowed and in
its that of August 16 is allowed,
and the legacies in the latter are
declared invalid or the legatees
incapable to inherit, the legacies
will go to appellants.
 17
Austria vs Reyes (G.R. Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed Whether or not the lower court NO. Before the institution of heirs may be Before the institution of heirs may be
No. L-23079, February with the CFI of Rizal a petition for committed grave abuse of annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, annulled under article 850 of the Civil
27, 1970) probate, ante mortem, of her last discretion in barring the the following requisites must concur: First, Code, the following requisites must
will and testament. The probate petitioners’ nephews and niece the cause for the institution of heirs must be concur: First, the cause for the
was opposed by the present from registering their claim even stated in the will; second, the cause must be institution of heirs must be stated in
petitioners, who are nephews to properties adjudicated by the shown to be false; and third, it must appear the will; second, the cause must be
and nieces of Basilia. The will decedent in her will. from the face of the will that the testator shown to be false; and third, it must
was subsequently allowed with would not have made such institution if he appear from the face of the will that
the bulk of her estate designated had known the falsity of the cause. The the testator would not have made
for respondents, all of whom decedent's will does not state in a specific or such institution if he had known the
were Basilia’s legally adopted unequivocal manner the cause for such falsity of the cause.
children. The petitioners, institution of heirs. Absent such we look at
claiming to be the nearest of kin other considerations. The decedent’s
of Basilia, assert that the disposition of the free portion of her estate,
respondents had not in fact been which largely favored the respondents,
adopted by the decedent in compared with the relatively small devise of
accordance with law, thereby land which the decedent left for her blood
making them mere strangers to relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on
34 the decedent and without any her part to give the respondents more than SUX REVIEWERS
right to succeed as heirs. what she thought the law enjoined her to give
Petitioners argue that this to them. Excluding the respondents from the
circumstance should have left the inheritance, considering that petitioner
whole estate of Basilia open to nephews and nieces would succeed to the
intestacy with petitioners being bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy,
the compulsory heirs. would subvert the clear wishes of the
decedent.
It is alleged by petitioners that
the language used imply that Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved
Basilia was deceived into on its side, especially where the will evinces
believing that she was legally an intention on the part of the testator to
bound to bequeath one-half of dispose of practically his whole estate, as
her entire estate to the was done in this case. Intestacy should be
respondents as the latter's avoided and the wishes of the testator should
legitime, with the inference that be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate
respondents would not have court has found, by final judgment, that the
instituted the respondents as decedent possessed testamentary capacity
heirs had the fact of spurious and her last will was executed free from
adoption been known to her. The falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
petitioners inferred that from the influence, it follows that giving full expression
use of the terms, "sapilitang to her will must be in order.
tagapagmana" (compulsory
 heirs) and "sapilitang mana" ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is
(legitime), the impelling reason or denied, at petitioners cost
cause for the institution of the
respondents was the testatrix's
belief that under the law she
could not do otherwise. Thus
Article 850 of the Civil Code
applies whereby, “the statement
of a false cause for the institution
of an heir shall be considered as
not written, unless it appears
from the will that the testator
would not have made such
institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause.”

35 SUX REVIEWERS