2016

Country Profile: Nigeria

Religious Literacy Project

Harvard Divinity School
February 26, 2016
"Atiku Campaign 2011," Atiku Abubakar
(2011), from Flickr Creative Commons.

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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Overview
Nigeria is a large country both in terms of size, population,
and importance on both a regional and global scale, and few
issues are as central to the national ethos as
religion. Religious practice in Nigeria is just as varied and
diverse as the population, creating a complex and
fascinating situation that arises from its “triple heritage,” of
indigenous religious traditions, Islam, and Christianity.
Nigeria has over 270 ethnic groups who speak over 370
languages. While it has been suggested that about half of
the population is Muslim, 40–45% is Christian, and 5–10%
practice indigenous religious traditions, none of these
figures can be accurately validated, and they are more
speculations than fact. This is particularly true given that
involvement to one degree or another in more than one
Contents religious tradition is common. Regionally, there is a
Overview 2 perceived cultural, economic, and political split between
Historical Legacies 5 Nigeria’s north and south, which is a direct legacy of British
The Colonial Era (1882–1960) 6 colonial policy and uneven regional development.
Independence & Modern Political Rule 8
(1960–present)
While the North is largely Muslim and the South is largely
Emerging Religious Movements 10
Economic Policies & Ideologies 13
Christian, the religious demographics of the country are far
Religion, Political & Legal Structures 14 more complex than the north/south binary implies. It is
Relations with Other Nation-States 15 true that Islam is deeply entrenched in the North, with
Case Study: Religion & Public Health 17 many different strands and beliefs represented from
Case Study: Interfaith Peacebuilding 20 widespread affiliation with Sufi brotherhoods, to Salafi
interpretations of Islam that reject Sufism, small Shi’a
Flickr Creative Commons. communities, and various interactions with indigenous
beliefs.
The Religious Literacy Project is
directed by Diane L. Moore and all There is a sizable Christian minority in several northern
content is constructed under her states (mostly migrants from the southern areas of the
editorial direction. country), though this population is shrinking as Christians
flee from violence. Christianity, predominantly comprising
"Notable of Sultan Alhaji Dr. Abubakar Isa Catholicism and Anglicanism, prevails in the Southeast but
Ahmadu, Emir of Mubi, Nigeria," by Alfred
Weidinger southwestern Nigeria is mixed, with substantial Muslim,
Christian, and traditional religious communities. The
“Middle Belt,” an area encompassing six states, is populated
largely by ethnic minorities and is also highly religiously
diverse.

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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Contemporary conflicts are frequently cast in narrowly-defined religious terms, but this
representation fails to include how great economic disparities give shape to tensions. It is more
accurate to say that those who have consolidated power and political influence—often by leveraging
their religious and ethnic affiliations—have benefited economically, while the vast majority of the
population is economically marginalized and competes for limited resources in a context of economic
injustice and widespread corruption. Though economic development, particularly that derived from
the 1970s oil boom, has enriched some communities in the North and the South, wealth tends to be
mainly controlled by a small, wealthy minority found in both the northern and southern parts of the
1
country, with very little trickling down to the vast majority of the population.

The disproportionate balance of political power and wealth in the country and the efforts of religious
exclusivists—those who maintain that their particular religious tradition is the right and only tradition—
have contributed to a rise in conflict. Between 2011–13, violence (predominantly against other Muslims,
but also Christians) initiated by Boko Haram against other Muslims as well as Christians, reached crisis
proportions in the Northeast. There has also been continued Muslim-Christian strife in the Middle Belt,
resulting in thousands of deaths and increasing numbers of refugees reported in both of these regions.
Anti-corporate protests in the South against multinational oil companies continues until the present day,
and is taking on religious overtones as one of the largest groups also threatened to attack Muslim targets
in retaliation for Boko Haram violence against Christians in the North. It is important to note, however,
that there are multiple anti-corporate resistance groups led by Christians, Muslims, and followers of
indigenous religions.

Most Nigerians celebrate the impressive diversity of their nation and many support integrative
policies to heal the deep divisions left in the wake of British colonialism. However, the increasing
polarization and stratification along religious, ethnic, and regional lines are a serious threat to stability.
While former president Goodluck Jonathan repeatedly expressed his commitment to religious
freedom, insiders and outsiders questioned his offensives in the North against Boko Haram by military
forces that led to the deaths of countless innocent civilians and caused many to flee as refugees.
Additionally, Jonathan’s economic policies failed to stimulate significant growth or opportunity for
everyday Nigerians, and thus conflict with religious overtones continued as resources dwindled under
his leadership.

In May of 2015, Jonathan lost the election to Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the All Progressives
Congress party who is a retired Army Major General, and who was head of state between 1983–1985
after taking power through a military coup d'etat.

1British Council, “Gender in Nigeria Report 2012,” British Council (2012); Sudharshan Canagarajah and Saji
Thomas, “Poverty in a Wealthy Economy: the Case of Nigeria,” Journal of African Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2001),
pp. 143–173.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
One of Jonathan’s last acts as President of Nigeria was to outlaw FGM (female genital mutilation), a
nonmedical practice that entails the removal of the external genitalia of girls and young women.
According to UNICEF, Nigeria accounts for almost a quarter of women affected by FGM globally. 2
FGM causes pain, possible infection, infertility, birth complications, and prevents sexual pleasure.
FGM is thus thought to protect young women from promiscuity, and preserve their virginities until
marriage. (The premarital virginity of women in Nigeria is of high cultural and social importance.)

In Nigeria FGM is slightly more common in the southern, predominantly Christian regions, but it is
practiced within both Christian and Muslim communities across the country. The ban of FGM in
Nigeria was reached by culmination of the efforts of organizations such as the Inter-African
Committee, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization (WHO), together with Muslim and Christian
groups. 3 Christians belonging to the Seventh Day Adventist tradition in Nigeria have been
particularly outspoken against FGM, and cite the Bible in their rejection of the practice.

The prohibition of FGM in Nigeria is a great success for anti-FGM campaigners, who seek to outlaw
the practice elsewhere in Africa, where it is common, as well as in parts of the Middle East and Asia.
These campaigns are often interfaith efforts, given that FGM is practiced in multiple religious
contexts.

2 “Nigeria: Female Genital Mutilation Fact Sheet,” UNICEF, n.d., http://www.unicef.org/nigeria/FGM_.pdf, accessed
February 19, 2016.
3 Thomas Banchoff and Robert Wuthnow, Religion and the Global Politics of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2011), p. 141.

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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Historical Legacies

No two historical factors have been more deeply implicated in contemporary struggles between
Nigeria’s diverse ethnic and religious groups than British colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade.
The slave trade triggered unprecedented internal competition as groups defined themselves in
contradistinction to others who could be enslaved. Additionally, slavery fostered greater contact with
European merchants and stimulated European mercantilism and economic interest along the southern
coast, thus laying the groundwork for colonialism and the economic changes it would bring.

Slavery, albeit in a much different form, was practiced in Africa independent of the transatlantic trade,
which lasted from the late 15th to the 19th century. Slavery was permissible under Islamic law, although
the enslavement of fellow Muslims was not and freeing slaves was considered a highly praiseworthy
act. 4 In the royal households of the Sokoto Caliphate, established in 1804, slaves were able to acquire
prestige and even positions of military and administrative power by virtue of their close relationships
and kinship ties with Sokoto leaders, similar to slaves in the Ottoman Empire, and in some cities in
Northern Nigeria more than half of the population could have been considered slaves.3 Domestic
slavery was prevalent in Yorubaland from at least the 15th century, one form of which was iwofa, where
an adult or child was pawned to settle a debt and then freed afterwards. 5 Thus, there were various
types of indenture and slavery that differed from the system of chattel slavery developed in North
America and the Caribbean.

Compared to the domestic forms of slavery outlined above, the magnitude of the transatlantic slave
trade was far more destructive because through that vehicle West Africa’s power structures, economic
relationships, and cultural patterns were radically reordered. European merchants hired local brokers,
particularly among the Ayo, Oyo, and Hausa, to provide captive Africans, which triggered predatory
internal struggles between groups and internecine warfare within groups to produce captives. The long-
standing trans‐Saharan trade route became a raiding station, thereby disrupting centuries-old trade
patterns. Also, slavery encouraged militarization and stratification, leading to the rise of warlords.

By the time the British outlawed slavery in 1807, northern Nigeria was deeply militarized and stratified.
Lagos and other coastal cities in the southern Delta region had risen as important economic hubs where
African merchants had longstanding European contact, setting the stage for polarization in the coming
years. Throughout Nigeria, traditional leadership structures had been shuffled and even dismantled,
leading to vulnerabilities and violence that left the country ripe for colonization. 6

4 Humphrey J. Fisher, Slavery in the History of Muslim Black Africa (New York: New York University Press, 2001).
Sean Stilwell, “The Development of ‘Mamluk’ Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate,” in Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam, ed. Paul E.
Lovejoy, (Princeton: Marcus Wiener Press, 2004), pp. 87–110.
5 Toyin Falola and Akanmu Adebayo, Culture, Politics, and Money Among the Yoruba (New Brunswick: Transaction

Publishers, 2000).
6 Toyin Falola and Saheed Aderinto, Nigeria, Nationalism, and Writing History (Rochester: University of Rochester Press,

2010).
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
The Colonial Era (1882–1960)

British colonialism began under the pretense of policing the slave trade. Britain outlawed slavery in
1807 and pushed for forms of “legitimate commerce” such as palm oil and cotton, and in so doing
developed an internal infrastructure to facilitate these markets. By the 1820s, the British had made
connections with the Sokoto Caliphate, whose highly structured society, aristocracy, and religion
struck colonial administrators as more “civilized” than the war‐torn groups they encountered in the
South. With the discovery of quinine in the 1850s, colonial explorers and missionaries who had been
unable to enter the southern interior due to risk of malaria began contacting a wider range of groups;
the British then had treaties and trade policies in place throughout the North and the South.

In the 1850s, the British used trade policies to influence African

politics, including deposing rulers who stood in the way of the
lucrative palm oil trade. In the 1880s, competition with French
colonial powers in Africa prompted a policy shift and in 1882 the
northern and southern “protectorates” were established. During the
Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, European leaders determined who
had rights to what “spheres of influence.” The two protectorates
were joined in 1914 under British governor‐general Frederick
Lugard, and the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria was established.
2014 marks Nigeria’s grand celebration of the 100th anniversary of
the union between the northern and southern regions.

Lugard instituted a policy of indirect rule through native

authorities, who collected taxes and performed other local
administrative tasks. In the North, Lugard worked through
the Fulani ruling classes, who used the British in order to retain
their power and to acquire wealth. Because rulers were no longer
accountable to their people, corruption and poverty spread.
Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, Vanity
Many Muslims began to see the Fulani leadership as pawns—a Fair, 1895," Vanity Fair, from Wikimedia
sentiment echoed today by members of Islamist movements Commons.
towards northern leadership. British favoritism towards Muslims,
combined with Hausa‐Fulani advances into the Middle Belt, led to widespread conversion to Islam.

At the same time, a rising African intelligentsia—graduates of Christian missionary schools—

began to challenge British rule in the South. Christianity spread rapidly at the grassroots level
from the 1860s onwards, in large part due to the mission education system. Colonial
administrators encouraged conversion to Christianity in the South, especially Anglicanism, as part
of their mandate to “civilize” Africa. Mission schools became training grounds for the intellectual,
commercial, civic, and military elites, who tended to be promoted by the British colonial
government and who would be at the forefront of the nationalist movement. However, at the
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
insistence of Hausa‐Fulani leaders in the North, the British barred Christian missionaries from
proselytizing there, which meant that Western education was limited to Nigeria’s South. It also
resulted in a preponderance of Christians among Nigeria’s nationalists.

After WWII the British began to see that colonialism was no longer pragmatic in Nigeria, and
responded to the protests from returned ex‐servicemen who had fought alongside the British in the
war by instituting a series of changes meant to develop a federal government. In 1954, the Lyttleton
Constitution cemented a federal system with three self-governing states under weak central control.
This included a large northern state and smaller eastern and western states, which reflected the three
regional units managed separately and differently by the colonial administration. While they loosely
corresponded with major ethnic groups, the borders were not intended to demarcate ethnicity and
they arbitrarily cut across ethnic and linguistic communities. As the British never prioritized fostering
unity among Nigeria’s disparate peoples, colonialism left Nigeria deeply divided. 7

For Nigerians, access to colonial resources was determined by the relative strength of their identity
groups in relation to British power, and this fostered competition. In the South, Nigerians had benefited
from missionary education and saw economic growth, urbanization, and the rise of a skilled middle
class. Christianity dominated, though there were significant Muslim and indigenous religious
communities as well. The larger but more insular North had extensive agricultural production, little
access to Western education and rampant poverty. Mutual distrust was pervasive on the eve of
independence.

7Adiele E. Afigbo, “Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State,” Publius, Vol. 21, No. 4
(1991), pp. 13–29.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Independence & Modern Political Rule (1960–present)

At independence in 1960, appeals to regional identity, ethnicity, and

religion became the most salient means of mobilizing political support.
Early nationalists shared a vision of a unified Nigeria, but competition for
political power and access to economic resources in an immensely divided
state made this impossible. Indeed, not all politicians sought
independence—many were afraid of losing power granted to them by the
British and therefore resisted a central government. This was especially
true of the North, which feared ascendency by the much more
economically developed South. In response, northern politicians promoted
a shared Islamic identity, while some Middle Belt groups converted to
Christianity to resist Islamization and to join a rising Christian political
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,"
elite. The First Republic was composed of multiple regionally-based parties
Nigerian Government image led by a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Sir Abubakar
(1962), from Wikimedia Commons. Tafawa Balewa, a passionate advocate for northern interests. He was
joined by Ahmadu Bello, who pursued a “One North, One Islam” Islamization policy that endeavored to
unify northern Muslims behind an umbrella organization, the Jama’tu Nasril Islam (JNI). 8 The heavy
representation of the North in the post-independence government was a result of its massive size, and
therefore the greater number of northern politicians in the House of Representatives (174 out of 312),
which led to resentment in the south and east. Some Christians felt betrayed that Britain didn’t ensure
the ascendency of Christian groups, assuming that as a “Christian” country it would put more weight
behind coreligionists’ interests. 9

This first government was ousted in a bloody military coup in 1966, which members of the JNI
perceived as being led by the Christian Igbo, prompting widespread fear in the North that Muslims were
being politically disempowered. Violent retaliation against the Igbo ensued, which was a major factor
leading to the secession of the largely Igbo Republic of Biafra (it also contained several non‐Igbo ethnic
groups in the Southeast), and subsequent civil war that nearly tore the nation apart and killed over a
million Nigerians. 10 The civil war was framed by its leader, Lieutenant Colonel—later General—O. C.
Ojukwu, as a religious conflict (Christians against hegemonic northern Muslim power). The war
devastated the East, with echoes to this day. Following the civil war, Yakubu Gowon, the Chief of Staff of
the Army and a Middle Belt Christian, took over Nigeria’s leadership. Over the next thirty years, the
Nigerian government passed between various military dictatorships, though some were more inclined
towards democracy than others.

8 Don Ohadike, “Muslim-Christian Conflict and Political Instability in Nigeria,” in Religion and National Integration in
Nigeria: Islam, Christianity, and Politics in the Sudan and Nigeria, ed. John O. Hunwick (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1992), pp. 101–124.
9 Ogbu Kalu, African Pentecostalism: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 90.
10 Barnaby Philips, “Biafra: Thirty Years On,” BBC, January 13, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/596712.stm,

accessed November 22, 2013; Trevor Rubenzer, “Nigeria: 1967–1970,” in Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since
World War II, eds. Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), pp. 567–584.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Following a decision by the military to annul elections in 1993 General Sani Abacha, a northern
Muslim), seized power. General Abacha’s time in office is remembered as one of the worst periods in
contemporary Nigerian history; his government was accused of corruption and various human rights
violations, perhaps the most notable being the hanging of Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, an important
figure in the protest movement against multinational oil companies (in particular the Royal Dutch Shell
Group) for their exploitation of the Niger Delta. Following Abacha’s death in 1998, Nigeria’s Defense
Chief of Staff Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar stepped in and announced a transition to
democracy. In 1999 former military leader and People’s Democratic Party member Olusegun Obasanjo
(a Baptist Christian and Yoruba from the Southwest) won the presidency.

Nigerians have held democratic elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015, though each election has
been followed by a stormy aftermath. Some of the anger in recent elections comes from the fact that
they have seemed to upend the unwritten rule of Nigerian politics; the People’s Democratic Party—
which has since 1999 consistently fielded the winning candidate—would alternate candidacy between
southerners and northerners. Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian from the Ijaw people of the southern delta
region) had been elected vice president in the 2007 election, and assumed power in 2010 after the
sudden death of late President Umaru Yar’Adua. In 2011, Jonathan went on to win the election outright
and ran for re-election in 2015 where he was defeated by Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the All
Progressives Congress party.

Muhammadu Buhari won the presidential election in March 2015, after the election had been delayed
because of Boko Haram insurgency. Aged seventy-two, the former military ruler is the first opposition
candidate to win an election in Nigeria, and he won by a margin of 2.5 million votes over his opponent
Goodluck Jonathan. 11 Buhari is a Muslim with strong support in the North of Nigeria. He appointed Yemi
Osinbajo, a Christian, as his Vice-President in a show of interfaith collaboration. It is a common, though
unfixed, trend for the President to appoint a Vice President belonging to the alternate religious
tradition. Jonathan, a Christian, had a Muslim Vice-President when he was in power.

His military background seems to have appealed to voters in the midst of the ongoing conflict with Boko
Haram. Buhari’s current role as President is preceded by three election losses (2003, 2007, and 2011),
in addition to a short-lived military coup in 1983–1985. As leader of Nigeria in the ‘80s, Buhari
implemented an austere economic policy, and was known for his hardline disciplinarian tactics. (Civil
servants who arrived late for work were reportedly forced to do frog jumps in the office.) 12 His rule was
ended by Ibrahim Babangida, and was largely motivated by a widespread dissatisfaction with the
economy. 13

11 “Muhammadu Buhari,” Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammadu-Buhari, accessed 12

February, 2016.
12 “Nigeria's Muhammadu Buhari in profile, BBC, March 30, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12890807,

accessed 12 February, 2016.

13 “Muhammadu Buhari,” Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammadu-Buhari, accessed 12

February, 2016.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Emerging Religious Movements

Due to an economic downturn spurred by falling oil prices the 1980s, the state failed to provide basic
services to most Nigerians, and this led many to question the state’s secular foundations. This period
saw the emergence of Islamist movements, most notably the Izala, which was made up largely by the
urban poor, and which received financial support from Islamists in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. 14
Leaders of the Izala accused the government of using secularism to promote Christian agendas,
channeling economic resources to Christians, and stifling Muslims’ ambitions to live a godly life.
Corruption and poverty were the signs that secularism had failed, and many Muslims felt that only an
Islamic government could restore justice. They asserted that since Nigeria is majority Muslim, the
government should reflect certain Islamic ideals that they claimed the sole authority to determine.
Their interpretations excluded various other interpretations of Islam, most notably Sufism. They
pointed to the national celebration of Christian
holidays and the weekend’s inclusion of Sunday, among other things, as evidence that the “secular”
government was in fact based on a European Christian and colonial model, and was therefore
inherently discriminatory towards Muslims. 15
However, Nigeria equally observes and celebrates
Muslim holidays and festivals. For example, the
federal government subsidizes and organizes both
Muslims pilgrimages to Mecca during the Hajj and
Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem. Some do not
approve of a secular government at all with or
without the socio‐economic “proof” of its failure, A UNAMID peacekeeper from Nigeria prays and sings at the
and prefer religion-based forms of governance. Christian Protestant church at the UNAMID base in El Daein,
East Darfur. From UNAMID, Flickr Creative Commons.

New exclusivist Christian movements also took shape in the 1970s and 1980s, partly influenced by
the rise of Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism in the United States and Britain in the 1960s (and their
missionary efforts in Nigeria). These movements increased rural-to-urban migration, the economic
changes and growing conspicuous consumption that accompanied the oil boom, the political culture
of military dictatorship and widespread corruption, and by fears of the occult that were culturally
associated with some of these other factors.16 These transnational movements provided “born-again”
converts with this-worldly salvation, emphasizing “health and wealth,” modernity, and individualism
while condemning perceived demonic forces, including Muslims, and those who pursue ill-gotten
financial and political gains.17

14 Olufemi Vaughan, “Ethno-Regionalism and the Origins of Federalism in Nigeria,” in Democracy and Prebendalism in
Nigeria: Critical Interpretations, ed. Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).
15 April A. Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook (Santa Barbara: ABC-­‐CLIO, 2003).
16 Kalu, African Pentecostalism: An Introduction, p. 240–241; Matthews A. Ojo, “The Contextual Significance of the

Charismatic Movements in Independent Nigeria,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute,” Vol. 58, No. 2
(1988), pp. 175–192.
17 Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 2009), p. 100–103.

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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), an umbrella group of various Christian denominations,
opposed efforts to institutionalize and expand Islamic law and fiercely protested Nigeria’s membership
in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986. Both Christian and Muslim exclusivists taught
that members of the other faith received preferential treatment and economic resources from the
government, a message that further undermined the legitimacy of the secular state. The
Pentecostal/Evangelical movement is perhaps even more outspoken in its renunciation of indigenous
religions as demonic. Some find this stance ironic because it relies to a certain extent on these traditions
to define itself in contradistinction to them. Some also find similarities in the worldview and worship of
this movement and indigenous traditions although the movement stresses a complete break from any
and all traditional practices, concepts, and ideas. 18

In 2002 an indigenous northern Islamist group referred to as Boko Haram was formed and in 2009
began attacking police and army targets. 19 They have directly compared the Nigerian government to
the colonial government, and have expanded targets to include other Muslims, Christians, media
outlets, government offices, and a United Nations office. In 2004, a state of emergency was declared in
the central Plateau state after more than 200 Muslims were killed in Yelwa in attacks by Christian
militias; revenge attacks were launched by Muslim youths in Kano. 20 These cycles of retributive
violence marked the beginnings of deepening conflict among Christians and Muslims in the northern
and Middle Belt regions, which threaten to spill over into the South.

In April of 2014 Boko Haram kidnapped over 200 young girls who were attending boarding school in
Chibok. This mass kidnapping prompted global media coverage, and social media campaigns were
launched with the hashtag “#bringbackourgirls.” High-profile figures such as Michelle Obama became
involved, and eventually Britain and the United States sent planes to search for the kidnapped girls of
Chibok. 21 The girls have still not been returned to their families, though a few managed to escape. Boko
Haram claims that they have forced the girls into marriages and cannot locate them.

In early 2015 the group killed approximately 2,000 people in a small town called Bagu, near the
northern city of Maiduguri. Due to the continued threat of Boko Haram to Nigeria, especially in the
Northeast, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger formed a military coalition in 2015. The coalition
achieved substantial success, and the Nigerian army went on to seize Boko Haram's alleged stronghold,
Gwoza.

18 Jacob K. Olupona, “Bonds, Boundaries, and Bondage of Faith: Religion at the Crossroads in Nigeria,” Harvard Divinity
Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 2 & 3 (2013), pp. 20–30.
19 “Boko haram timeline: From preachers to slave raiders,” BBC News, May 15, 2013,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22538888, accessed November 22, 2013.

20 Said Adejumobi, State, Economy, and Society in Post-­‐Military Nigeria (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
21 “Nigeria profile – Timeline,” BBC, 12 June, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13951696, accessed 12

February, 2016.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
UNICEF has reported that approximately 800,000 children have been displaced as a result of the
conflict with Boko Haram. 22 The militant group itself has also started enlisting children as cooks,
combatants, and sex slaves. The group’s use of young girls became particularly evident in 2016, when
three girls wearing suicide vests were sent to a refugee camp and killed thirty-eight people. 23 One of
the three girls managed to escape Boko Haram without activating her suicide vest, and explained how
she was held captive. The Guardian reports that, over a six-year period, Boko Haram has killed 20,000
people and displaced 2.5 million others. 24

The Boko Haram conflict has fostered animosity among some persecuted Christian groups in the North,
who suspect their Muslim neighbors of supporting Boko Haram. 25 Tensions have also arisen between
peaceful minority Shi’ite Muslims and the Nigerian military. The Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic
Affairs (NSCIA) has reported concerns that the military could trigger a revolt, after it killed hundreds of
Shi’ites in Zaria.

In the midst of this antipathy and fear, Muslims and Christians—both of whom have been targeted by
Boko Haram—have united in opposition to the group. Sheikh Adam Albani, a prominent Muslim cleric
who spoke out against the group’s actions, was subsequently assassinated in 2014. Consequences such
as these have likely discouraged others from denouncing Boko Haram’s actions, although activists do
continue to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. Hafsat Mohammed, for example, has set up an NGO
called Choice for Peace, Gender and Development, in spite of repeated threats to her safety. 26 The aim
of Mohammed’s organization is to help young people and women whose family members have been
taken by Boko Haram. Mohammed has also worked closely with the much-celebrated Interfaith
Meditation Center, which promotes Muslim-Christian dialogue in Nigeria, and about which the film The
Imam and the Pastor was made. Since 2012, the IMC has been implementing a project entitled:
“Training of Leaders on Religious & National Coexistence (TOLERANCE).”

Nearby Cameroon has set up an admirable example of interfaith peacebuilding on its border with
Nigeria, where it is vulnerable to attack by Boko Haram; Muslims and Christians take turns to guard
one another’s place of worship at prayer times. 27

22 UNICEF, “800,000 children forced to flee violence in Nigeria and region,” April 13, 2015,

http://www.unicef.org/media/media_81518.html, accessed 12 February, 2016.

23 “Teenager seized for Boko Haram attack tells how she tore off suicide vest and fled,” The Guardian, February 11, 2016,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/teenager-seized-for-boko-haram-attack-tells-how-she-tore-off-
suicide-vest-and-fled, accessed 12 February, 2016.
24 Ibid.
25 Cristina Silva, “Boko Haram Violence: Christians Take Revenge Against Muslims In Nigeria,” International Business

Times, 4 April, 2015,

http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-violence-christians-take-revenge-against-muslims-nigeria-1874995, accessed 19
February, 2016.
26 Cailann Morgan, “Meet the Nigerian woman taking on Boko Haram,” Aljazeera, 4 November, 2015,

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/women-make-change/2015/11/151104160651727.html, accessed 20
February, 2016.
27 Joe Mellor, “Christians And Muslims Protect Each Other Against Boko Haram,“ The London Economic 16 January, 2016

,http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/christians-and-muslims-protect-each-other-against-boko-haram/26/01/,
accessed February 20, 2016.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Economic Policies & Ideologies

Oil was discovered in the Niger Delta in the late 1950s, and by the 1970s a massive transformation of
Nigeria’s economy was underway. Oil wealth is channeled to only about 1% of the population, typically
Nigerians with entrepreneurial acumen, political influence, and powerful connections, predominantly
(though not exclusively) in the South. This sudden influx of incredible wealth has, in part, led Nigerians
to use ethnic and religious identity as an assertion of patriotism in their effort to access that wealth.
Not surprisingly, the high economic stakes have fostered broad corruption. 28 Increasing violence,
tension, and hostility between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria is caused or exacerbated by these
gaping economic disparities.

Most of Nigeria’s development and job creation has been concentrated in the South, whereas Nigerians
in the North have long perceived government neglect, even though it is acknowledged most of the
political rulers (particularly heads of state) have come from the North. Some 75% of northerners live in
poverty, compared with less than half in the South, though these economic disparities do not fall only
along a north‐south divide. Indigenous communities who live in oil-producing regions have also been
denied access to wealth and power generated by the oil industry. Militant protest movements,
particularly among the Ogoni and Ijaw who inhabit the Niger Delta, have brought attention to the gross
inequalities and ecological devastation that have accompanied the oil boom. The rebel Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has staged periodic, targeted attacks on pipelines and oil
facilities and kidnapped foreign oil workers. In 2013 MEND threatened to attack Muslim targets in
retaliation for Boko Haram violence against Christians in the North. However, while predominantly
Christian, anti-corporate activists and rebels include members of various religious faiths.

There has been a collapse of basic infrastructure and social services since the early 1980s, initially as a
result of falling oil prices, which has deepened due to neglect of Nigeria’s agricultural sector, to political
mismanagement, and to massive national debt. 29 Consequently, many Nigerians feel that they are worse
off now than they were at independence. The pressures of rapid urbanization and a climate of political
corruption and favoritism has resulted in increasing disenfranchisement and a distrust of the central
government. In the impoverished North, this phenomenon has led many to question the moral validity
of secularism, which is reflected in Islamist calls for Islamic leadership and provides fertile ground for
Islamist recruitment efforts.

At the same time, critics suggest that Jonathan is hostage to the powerful interests that helped put him
into office (especially the oil industry). While many in the South also struggle, a small elite concentrated
around Lagos has grown increasingly wealthy, and is marked by conspicuous consumption of luxury
goods. 30 Notably, among the elite are pastors of some of Nigeria’s large “prosperity gospel” Pentecostal

28 Kalu, African Pentecostalism: An Introduction, p. 229.

29 Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook, p. 165.
30 Mfonobong Nsehe, “Wealthy Nigerians, Pastors Spend $225 Million On Private Jets,” Forbes, May 17, 2011,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2011/05/17/wealthy-nigerians-pastors-spend-225-million-on-
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
churches. 31 These wealth disparities fuel resentment against the elite, suspicion against some religious
leaders, but also incentivize membership in “health and wealth” churches. At the same time, many of
these emerging churches have filled in the gaps left by the failures of the state to provide much needed
services and support to its citizens.

Ultimately, while progress is visible in some parts of the country, particularly in the richer, well-
governed states such as Lagos and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, poorer states experience
rising unemployment and poverty rates, which stokes inter- and intra‐religious violence and tension. In
spite of promises to end government corruption, many ordinary Nigerians express anger and distrust
toward their state and national governments, believing that officials continue to pocket riches rather
than allocating them toward development projects that will ensure long‐term economic prosperity for
all.

Since taking office in 2015, Buhari has continued to uphold the anti-corruption stance he proffered
during the election. Corruption is particularly endemic in Nigeria, and is one of the reasons for its stark
wealth inequality. One of his ministers, Lai Mohammed, announced that $6.8 billion in public funds has
been stolen from the government. He claimed that of the $6.8 billion, a sum of $2.1 billion intended for
weaponry to fight Boko Haram was instead used to fund the election campaign of Goodluck Jonathan. 32
In a report entitled “Leaking Revenue,” a charity called ActionAid also revealed that economic
corruption and frailty in a different area; Nigeria lost $3.3 billion through a ten-year tax break granted
to three oil and gas companies: Shell, Total and Eni. 33 As a result Buhari has appointed himself the oil
minister of his own cabinet, in order to stem further corruption and the loss of even more money.
Because Africa’s economy is so reliant on revenue from oil exports, the loss of this money, together
with the fall in oil prices in 2015, have posed a substantial threat to economic stability.

Religion, Political & Legal Structures

Nigeria has had multiple constitutions since the colonial era, which were modeled on the British
constitution and, more recently, on the American constitution. The current Nigerian constitution
(1999), explicitly states that there will be no state religion, supports the free expression of religion,
and prohibits discrimination on the basis of religious belief. In reality, political life reflects a more
complicated engagement with religious identity that varies by religion, ethnicity, and region.

private-jets/#41781716a2a3, accessed October 3, 2013.

31 Tomas Sundes Dronen, Pentecostalism, Globalisation, and Islam in Northern Cameroon: Megachurches in the

Making? (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 46; Norimitsu Onishi, “Africans Fill Churches That Celebrate Wealth,” The New York
Times, March 13, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/13/world/africans-fill-churches-that-celebrate-
wealth.html?pagewanted=all, accessed October 3, 2013.
32 “Nigerian minister claims $6.8bn of public funds stolen in seven years,” The Guardian, January 18, 2016,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/nigerian-minister-claims-68bn-of-public-funds-stolen-in-seven-
years, accessed 12 February 2016.
33 “Leaking Revenue: How a Big Tax Break to European Gas Companies has Cost Nigeria Billions,” Action Aid, January 20,

2016, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/leakingrevenue.pdf, accessed 12 February 2016.

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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
For example, there are complaints on the part of Muslims and Christians alike that political leaders
show favoritism toward citizens and groups that share their religion, and stoke sectarian violence
when it suits their purposes. On one hand, many Nigerians sense that their religious group is
underrepresented or unfairly excluded from the political realm on the local, state, or national level,
though the election of Buhari may have altered this feeling. On the other hand, Christians in the South
express fears that the army and defense positions are dominated by northern Muslims.

There are also concerns over the relationship between politicians and the religious experts they often
patronize in order to gain access to political power. It is widely known that some politicians across
political parties enlist the services of religious experts (sometimes from two or three traditions at the
same time) to ensure victory in elections, or to consolidate power. Apart from some of the ethical
issues raised by some of these activities and the way they are reported and/or perceived, there is
concern over the potential subservience of political leaders to these religious experts.

Finally, the constitution also permits individual states and regions to utilize common law (including
religious law) in local courts, and thus legislative processes differ across Nigeria’s thirty-six states and
Federal Capital Territory. State governors and state legislatures enjoy significant autonomy in decision-
making, and the 1999 constitution allows permits to establish courts based on common or customary
law systems.

Consequently, Nigeria’s constituent states have been allowed to institute Islamic law (shari’a) as the
basis of local civil and court procedures. In 1999–2000, with Muslim politicians leading the effort and
garnering support from a populace disappointed with corruption in the national legal system, all twelve
northern states elected to do so. Some Islamist groups, including Boko Haram, view Islamic law as the
sole legitimate source of political authority. 34 However, the adoption and practice of Islamic law has
received a mixed response among Muslims, with some preferring the status quo before its adoption.

Relations with Other Nation-States

Northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon share a border that in the past two decades has been a
site of increasing conflict, particularly due to militant Islamism among members of Boko Haram
and disputes over the oil rich area known as the Bakassi Peninsula. These issues are tied to the
drying of Lake Chad due to climate change; locals who once relied on Lake Chad’s ecosystem now
compete over limited resources in the context of widespread poverty and political
instability. 35 The border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon was decided by the International
Court of Justice in 2002, referred to as the Greentree Agreement, at which point Nigeria agreed to

34 John Campbell, “Religion and Security in Nigeria,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security, eds. Chris Seiple
et al. (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 215–225.
35 Abiodun Alao, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment (Rochester: University of Rochester

Press, 2007).
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
transfer land to Cameroon and Nigerian troops were withdrawn from the Peninsula. The
agreement was reaffirmed in 2013. 36

Diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria became closer in the 1990s during the Sani
Abacha regime, when the United States imposed certain economic and diplomatic sanctions on
Nigeria. Currently, Nigeria is China’s third largest African trading partner behind Egypt and South
Africa. 37 China is also a large and important market for Nigerian oil and is heavily invested in
Nigerian oil production, which has included supplying military assistance to combat anti-
corporate militant activism in Nigeria’s Delta region. 38 While some perceive Chinese interest in
Africa as a new type of “scramble for Africa,” as it often has a negative impact on local
communities and businesses through environmental degradation and economic exploitation, for
some China presents an alternative to what is perceived as Western exploitation, neglect, and neo-
colonialism.

The United States relies heavily on Nigerian oil, though the recent North American shale oil boom
is decreasing demand, much to the chagrin of Nigerian business and political leaders. The United
States has been involved with anti-terrorism efforts in Nigeria since the 9/11 attacks by Islamist
militant group al-Qaeda. 39

During the Abacha regime in the 1990s, American President Bill Clinton imposed various
sanctions on Nigeria in protest of human rights violations against government opposition,
particularly the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. However, Clinton did not introduce oil sanctions,
which was suggestive of the importance of Nigerian oil imports during that period. Human rights
groups criticized Clinton’s decision, stating that oil sanctions would have swiftly ended the Abacha
regime.

Lastly, Nigerian immigration to America is currently altering America’s religious landscape as

Nigerian Catholic priests become more prominent in American church leadership, and Nigerian
Pentecostal movements flourish. The United States has a large Nigerian population with roots in
transatlantic slavery as well as in more recent immigration waves. In particular, the rise of military
dictatorships triggered a massive immigration, especially among educated Nigerians, doubling the
Nigerian American population between 1989 and 1990. 40 At the same time the difficult economic

36 Piet Konings, “Settling Border Conflicts in Africa Peacefully: Lessons Learned from the Bakassi Dispute between
Cameroon and Nigeria,” in Land, Law and Politics in Africa: Mediating Conflict and Reshaping the State, ed. Jan Abbink, Jon
Abbink, and Mirjam de Bruiin (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 191–211.
37 John E. Anegbode and Cletus E. Onakalu, “How Ready is Nigeria for Chinese Investments?” in The Political Economy of

Development and Underdevelopment in Africa, eds. Toyin Falola and Jessica Achberger (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.
267–278.
38 Dino Mahtani, “Nigeria turns to China for defence aid,” Financial Times, February 28, 2006,

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef8dbc30-a7c6-11da-85bc-0000779e2340.html, accessed October 25, 2013.

39 Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966–1999 (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 2003), p.

153.
40 Jeanne Armstrong, “Global Origins: Africa, Asia, and Europe,” in Immigration in America Today: An Encyclopedia, eds.

James Loucky, Jeanne Armstrong, and Lawrence J. Estrada (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), pp. 149.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
climate, particularly following the ballooning inflation after the controversial World Bank/IMF
Structural Adjustment Programs launched in the ‘80s, many highly (and often foreign) educated
Nigerians left the country in search of better employment, causing a type of brain-drain. In the
past decade, most African immigrants to the United States have been from Nigeria, which has had
a direct impact on America’s religious composition. Nigerian Pentecostal churches such as the
Redeemed Christian Church of God are growing in American cities, and Nigerian priests frequently
lead Catholic congregations as numbers of American priests dwindle and enrolment in Nigerian
seminaries grows. 41

President Buhari was invited to the White House in July 2015, shortly after his election. The invitation is
a show of interest and support for the country’s new leader by the United States. The United States has
also pledged $5 million toward the efforts of the multinational joint force combating Boko Haram, in
addition to the $34 million that has already been contributed to regional efforts in Nigeria. 42

Case Study: Religion & Public Health

Faiths United for Health is an interfaith initiative to combat malaria in Africa, which was launched by the
Center for Interfaith Action on Global Poverty (CIFA), in collaboration with the Nigerian Inter‐Faith Action
Association (NIFAA) and with the support of several international NGOs. Although the project has pan-
African goals, it initially focused on Nigeria, where malaria had been a particular problem, accounting for
one quarter of malaria deaths in Africa. 43

Faiths United for Health was publicly launched at a press conference in Abuja on December 10, 2009,
but represents the confluence of national and international initiatives dedicated to combating
pandemic diseases in Africa. 44 In 2008, the Secretary‐General of the United Nations, Ban Ki- Moon, set
an ambitious goal for the international community: to provide insecticide‐treated bed nets for every
bed in Africa by the end of 2010 and eliminate malaria‐related deaths by 2015.45 In an effort to achieve
this goal, CIFA and the UN Special Envoy on Malaria launched the One World Against Malaria

41 Andrew Rice, “Mission from Africa,” The New York Times, April 12, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/magazine/12churches-t.html, accessed February 26, 2016; John Soltes, “From
Nigeria to America, in Search of God,” The Brooklyn Rail, December 14, 2007,
http://www.brooklynrail.org/2007/12/local/from-nigeria-to-america-in-search-of-god, accessed October 25, 2013.
42 “Hope for a new chapter in U.S.- Nigeria relations,” The Washington Post, July 23, 2015,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hopeful-signs-from-nigeria/2015/07/23/07278892-3086-11e5-97ae-
30a30cca95d7_story.html, accessed 12 February, 2016.
43 "Stopping a Killer: Preventing Malaria in Our Communities (Christian)—CIFA," Religions for Peace International, n.d.,

http://religionsforpeaceinternational.org/publications/stopping-killer-preventing-malaria-our-communities-christian-
cifa, accessed 6 November 2013; "Malaria—Osotimehin, Religious Leaders Advocate Cooperation", This Day, 13 May
2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200905140079.html, accessed 6 November 2013.
44 "Stopping a Killer: Preventing Malaria in Our Communities (Christian)—CIFA."
45 Max Amuchie, "Global Action Against Malaria,” Business Day, May 10, 2009,

http://businessdayonline.com/2009/05/global-action-against-malaria-and-the-interfaith-perspective/, accessed 6
November 2013.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
Campaign at a May 2009 summit in Washington, DC. 46 The summit marked the launch of a unique
approach to malaria, which emphasized the role that faith communities and faith-based organizations
could play in battling the disease. At the summit, the Archbishop of Abuja, John Onaiyekan, and the
Sultan of Sokoto, Mohammed Sa’ad Abubakar III announced the formation of the Nigerian Inter-Faith
Action Association, which had already garnered local attention in Nigeria and a promise of $2 million
in funding from the Nigerian National Malaria Control Programme. 47 At the Summit, CIFA and the
Tony Blair Faith Foundation also announced a joint initiative to help other sub-Saharan countries
develop similar interfaith action associations. 48

Faiths United for Health is an outgrowth of the summit and the result of collaboration between faith-
based organizations, international NGOs, and the local government. The collaborative nature of Faiths
United for Health and the international interest in the project was apparent at the 2009 Abuja press
conference where the program was launched. In addition to the leaders of NIFAA, the Sultan of Sokoto
and the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria, the press conference was also hosted by the
Nigerian Minister of Health, the UN Secretary‐General’s Special Envoy for Malaria, the World Bank
Country Director, and the Methodist Prelate of Nigeria. 49

The number of participants in the press conference also hints at the ambitious nature of the project,
which requires support at many levels and $1 billion in funding. 50 At the initial launch of the program,
CIFA and NIFAA trained 100 Nigerian faith leaders in malaria prevention and education, who were each
charged with training another cohort of leaders. In this way, FUH organizers hoped to engage a
network of 300,000 faith leaders in the fight against malaria. 51

Despite initial international interest and a large funding network, however, it is unclear whether the
program has been successful. Jay Winston, the Associate Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health
has noted that anti‐malaria campaigns first have to overcome local perceptions about malaria, such as
the assumption that it is caused by too much sun rather than by mosquito bites, and the complacency
that has developed from living in an endemic area for decades. It is also notable that FUH’s efforts have
only focused on Muslim and Christian communities, and have not included resources for leaders of

46 Sam Hiersteiner, "Nigerian Faith Leaders Launch Campaign Against Malaria," in Presbyterian Church USA,

December 10, 2009, https://www.pcusa.org/news/2009/12/10/nigerian-faith-leaders-launch-campaign-against-

mal/, accessed 6 November 2013; "Daily Press Briefing by Offices of Spokesperson for Secretary General", US Fed
News, 25 April 2009, https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-215188715.html, accessed 6 November, 2013.
47 Amuchie, "Global Action Against Malaria.”
48 Ibid.
49 Hiersteiner, "Nigerian Faith Leaders Launch Campaign Against Malaria."
50 Aaron J. Leichman, "Nigeria's Religious Leaders Launch $1B Effort to Tackle Malaria," The Christian Post, 11

December 2009, http://www.christianpost.com/news/nigeria-religious-leaders-launch-1b-effort-to-tackle-

malaria-42233/, accessed November 6, 2013.
51 Hiersteiner, "Nigerian Faith Leaders Launch Campaign Against Malaria"; Jay Winsten, "The Sultan and the

Archbishop: Joining Hands, Saving Lives," The Huffington Post, 9 December 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-winsten/the-sultan-and-the-archbi_b_386381.html, accessed November 6,
2013.
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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016
indigenous religions. 52 The resources FUH has developed also fail to take into account any internal
diversity within Christianity and Islam. The “sermon starters” provided in FUH materials are presented
as universally applicable within a given religion, although it is entirely possible that a Pentecostal
sermon might require a different approach than an Anglican one. Although an analysis of the
effectiveness of FUH is unavailable as of this writing, NIFAA continues to work on the ground to engage
faith leaders in the fight against malaria. 53

52 "Faiths United for Health: A Toolkit for Faith Leaders in Nigeria in the Fight Against Malaria," Pamphlet, Nigerian
Inter-Faith Action Association, n.d.
53 "World Malaria Day—UN Calls for More Efforts to Curb Deaths," Vanguard, 26 April 2013,

http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/world-malaria-day-un-calls-for-more-efforts-to-curb-deaths/, accessed
November 6, 2013.

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 Country Profile: Nigeria 2016

Case Study: Interfaith Peacebuilding

Between February and May 2004, over 700 people were killed, and 45,000 displaced, in conflicts
between Christians and Muslims in and around the town of Yelwa in the Shendam local government
area of Plateau State. 54 The crisis in Yelwa sparked violent riots elsewhere in the region, ultimately
leading the government to declare a state of emergency in Plateau State in spring 2004. 55 During the
state of emergency, the interim administrator, retired General Chris Alli, launched an ambitious six-
month peacemaking initiative, which culminated in the signing of a peace agreement negotiated by
Imam Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye in November 2004.

Administrator Alli’s peacemaking initiative, known as the Plateau Peace Program, included plans for
dialogue among religious and community leaders, a statewide peace conference, and a truth and
reconciliation commission. 56 The peace conference convened in August 2004, with the purpose of
reviewing causes of the conflict that had been submitted by the community and proposing solutions to
the government. The resolutions it produced, however, consisted primarily of policy recommendations
for the national and state governments and seemed to favor Christian groups. 57

During July 2004, the Interfaith Mediation Centre spent at least twelve days working on a variety of
peacemaking projects in Plateau State, which took a very different approach. These included a five‐day,
faith‐based workshop for youths in Jos. The workshop drew 100 participants from each of the local
government areas of Plateau State and provided training in mediation and reconciliation. Perhaps
more significantly, the Interfaith Mediation Centre also convened a three‐day interfaith workshop for
forty women and fifty community/religious leaders from Yelwa, which addressed both conflict
resolution and trauma counseling. As a result of this meeting, participants created an Inter-Faith Group
for the Shendam local government area, tasked with sustaining peace in the area by working with both
governmental and non-governmental organizations. 58

In November 2004, Administrator Alli invited Wuye and Ashafa to help address ongoing tensions
between Christians and Muslims in Yelwa. 59 Wuye and Ashafa brought together leaders from the
local Christian and Muslim communities for a five-day meeting, during which they combined

54 Uthman Abubakar, "Yelwan Shendam—Five Years After," Daily Trust, 3 July 2009,

http://allafrica.com/stories/200907030151.html, accessed November 6, 2013.

55 Lami Sadiq, “Yelwa-Shendam—Rising from Ashes, Nine Years After Bloodbath," Daily Trust, 7 September 2013,

http://allafrica.com/stories/201309070163.html, accessed November 6, 2013.

56 "Revenge in the Name of Religion: The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano States," Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.

49–51.
57 Ibid., 50–51; According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Muslim community rejected the proposals. ”Conflict in

Plateau State," United States Institute of Peace: Certificate Course in Interreligious Conflict Resolution.
58 Jibril Daudu, "Muslim-­‐Christian Groups Parley for Peace in Plateau," Daily Trust, 7 July 2005,

http://allafrica.com/stories/200507070551.html, November 2, 2013.

59 David R. Smock, "Mediating Between Christians and Muslims in Plateau State, Nigeria", Peaceworks, Vol. 17, No.

55 (2006).
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Western conflict resolution techniques with religious preaching. Although the meeting was initially
confrontational, by the third day the participants were able to agree on some of the core causes of
the conflict, including Christian accusations that Muslim non-indigenes failed to respect local leaders
and traditions. In a surprising turn of events, the Muslim leaders not only accepted the accusations
of the Christian participants, but agreed that the behavior of local Muslim groups needed to change,
made a formal apology, and requested forgiveness. 60

Astonished by the Muslims’ actions, the Christians also requested forgiveness for their part in the
violent conflict. On the last day of the meeting, participants in the negotiation formulated a peace
agreement which recognized and strove to address several of the underlying causes of ongoing
conflict. In contrast to the government-oriented perspective of the August peace conference
resolutions, the Yelwa Peace Agreement focused on local concerns and made recommendations for
actions that could be implemented by local leaders and community members. Among other
statements, those who signed the Peace Agreement affirmed the need to refer to His Royal Highness
the Long Goemai of Shendam by his formal title and grant him respect, condemned the use of
derogatory language to refer to groups and locations, and pledged to avoid using the media to spread
incorrect information or inflammatory messages. 61 On February 19, 2005, Yelwa held a gathering to
celebrate the peace agreement. Several thousand people attended the celebration, including many
people who had felt compelled to leave their homes when violence broke out the previous year. 62

As of September 2013, Yelwa remained peaceful, despite a lack of governmental aid in the years after
the crisis and ongoing conflicts in the surrounding areas.63 A group of individuals known as the Inter‐
Faith Peace Committee, which may be the same as or evolved from the Inter-Faith Group formed in
2004, has played a key role in maintaining the peace. Along with organizing ongoing dialogues and
events, the Inter-Faith Peace Committee also oversees a peace vigilante group, which includes Muslim
and Christian youths from the area who monitor the town to help prevent small crimes and diffuse
potential conflicts. 64

What is notable about the successful peace‐keeping initiatives in Yelwa is the grassroots nature of the
work and the local focus. While the government’s programs worked with state leaders and
representatives from religious umbrella groups, the work of Ashafa and Wuye in 2004 and that of the
Inter-Faith Peace Committee more recently focused on local actors and issues. By grounding their
work in the religious, psychological, and social needs of the local community, Ashafa and Wuye seem to
have created a foundation for the Yelwa community to continue the work of maintaining peace on their
own.

60 Ibid., p. 18.
61 Ibid., p. 18–19 .
62 Ibid., p.20.
63 Sadiq, " Yelwa-Shendam—Rising from Ashes;” Nasir Imam, "Yelwa: Stock Taking a Year After," Daily Trust, 27 June

2005, http://allafrica.com/stories/200506271343.html, accessed November 2, 2013; Abubakar, "Yelwan Shendam.”

64 Sadiq, "Yelwa-Shendam—Rising from Ashes.”

21