1. MARBURY V.

MADISON
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace
and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act.
The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary
before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of
State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of
this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as
president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were
invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.
Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus
to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.”
Issues
1. W/N the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void
2. W/N Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution
3. W/N the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret
the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation
of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.
2. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution (US).

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in
 all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in
which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the
Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior
courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is
entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original,
and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate,
the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
3. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise

of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an
officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original
action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Fallo
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.

2. JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which
was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said
Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on
August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said
Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention
began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its
Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30,
1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to
the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
 Josue Javellana filed Case against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries
of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their
subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose
Constitution not found in the present Constitution” — referring to that of 1935. The petition
therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered
voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated,” was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the
facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President
had announced “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including,” and that the latter “are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction
in implementing the said proposed Constitution” upon the ground: “that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create
the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same “are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ...”; “that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed Constitution”; and “that the election held to ratify the
proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.”

Issue: W/N the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partakes of the nature of a political, and,
hence, non-justiciable question

Held: No. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political
questions is the principle of separation of powers — characteristic of the Presidential
system of government — the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of
their nature, into three (3) categories, namely: 1) those involving the making of laws, which
are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerned mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same,
which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own
sphere — but only within such sphere — each department is supreme and independent
of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or
field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass
upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made
by the other departments — provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within
the area allocated thereto by the Constitution.

This principle of separation of powers under the presidential system goes hand
in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which each department is vested
by the Fundamental Law with some powers to forestall, restrain or arrest a possible or
actual misuse or abuse of powers by the other departments. Hence, the appointing power
of the Executive, his pardoning power, his veto power, his authority to call the Legislature
or Congress to special sessions and even to prescribe or limit the object or objects of
legislation that may be taken up in such sessions, etc. Conversely, Congress or an
agency or arm thereof — such as the commission on Appointments — may approve or
disapprove some appointments made by the President. It, also, has the power of
appropriation, to “define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,”
as well as that of impeachment. Upon the other hand, under the judicial power vested by
the Constitution, the “Supreme Court and ... such inferior courts as may be established
by law,” may settle or decide with finality, not only justiciable controversies between
private individuals or entities, but, also, disputes or conflicts between a private individual
or entity, on the one hand, and an officer or branch of the government, on the other, or
between two (2) officers or branches of service, when the latter officer or branch is
charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so,
when a power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute or
unqualified, the acts in the exercise of such power are said to be political in nature, and,
consequently, non-justiciable or beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of justice would
be arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon another
branch of the service to the exclusion of the others.

What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not
judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass law or submit a proposed constitutional
amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not
merely because they involve political questions, but because they are matters which the
people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature.

The term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy” in matters concerning the government of
a State, as a body politic. It refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

The Supreme Court has neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing
upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation to settle it. Courts have a duty,
rather than a power, to determine whether another branch of the government has kept
within constitutional limits. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended — as it is
in our 1935 Constitution —then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid.

Considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the method or

procedure for its amendment, the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV
is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it is not only subject to judicial
inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court’s bounden duty to decide such question.

3. LAGMAN VS MEDIALDEA

FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report
to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the
Constitution).

The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi
City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to
establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other
parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has
plagued Mindanao for decades.

Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:

LAGMAN PETITION

Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A.

Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to assail the President’s
declaration of Martial Law.

Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual basis
– arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also
contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to
create an appearance of capability for the Maute group.

The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was refuted by several
media networks and news articles because they turned out to be false or untrue. Among
these was the report about the attack on Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the
Landbank of the Philippines, and the burning of several schools.

CULLAMAT PETITION

The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show any acts of
rebellion and invasion outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial Law for the
whole island of Mindanao has no sufficient basis. Cullamat also reiterated the false facts
in the president’s report, as pointed out in the Lagman petition.

MOHAMAD PETITION

The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy of
last resort. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed
sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial
law.

OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should only review
Proclamation 216 under the lens of grave abuse of discretion, and not on the correctness
of facts.

The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined
based on the facts/information that were available to the president at the time he made
the determination. Doing otherwise will impose an impossible standard on the president’s
exercise of discretion.
ISSUES:

1) WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.

2) WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress
jointly or separately.

3) WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1)
calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and (3) declaration of martial law.

4) WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a
citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.

2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is
completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in

the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand,
Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not be set
aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the

pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data
available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court,
Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in
an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism
is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction
or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to
review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of
facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive
domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order
which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does
not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President
prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to
the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual
bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if
there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on
the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents
thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed,
and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving
the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report;
along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that
more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

4. AQUINO, JR. V. ENRILE

FACTS
According to Chief Justice Makalintal:
These nine cases are all about the petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having
been arrested and detained unlawfully by the military by virtue of Proclamation no. 1081
dated September 21, 1972 through the President exercising his powers he assumed by
virtue of Martial Law.
The petitioners were arrested pursuant to Gen. Order no 2 “for being participants or for
having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
country and to take over the Government by force…” (September 22, 1972).
The provision of the 1935 constitution reads “the President shall be commander-in-chief
of all armed forces in the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when
the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.” Art VII Section 10(2)
Accdg to Castro, J.:
On Sept 21 1972, the country was placed under Martial Law. From Sept 22 to 30,
petitioners were arrested by the military authorities and detained, some at Fort Bonifacio,
Rizal, Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame. They aver that the arrest and detention were
illegal having been effected without valid order of a court of justice. Writ of habeas corpus
were directed by the Court directing respondents to produce the bodies of the petitioners
in Court. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, answered that such arrests were
legally ordered by the President pursuant to Proclamation of Martial Law as “participant
or as having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power
and to take the government by force.” Hearings were held on 26 and 29 September and
October 6. Meanwhile, some of the petitioners, with leave of Court, withdrew their
petitions, others were released from custody under certain restrictive conditions. Voltaire
died after his release, the action was deemed abated.
Only Diokno AND Benigno Aquino was still in military custody (September 9, 1972—the
date of the supposed promulgation of the nine cases.) On September 11 1972, the
petitioner Diokno was released. Eleven members voted to dismiss Diokno’s petition as
being “moot and academic” except Castro, who find Diokno’s derogatory imputations
grave and highly insulting.
On August 23 1973, petitioner Ninoy filed an action for certiorari and prohibition with this
Court, alleging that on 11 August 1973 charges of murder, subversion and illegal
possession of firearm were filed against him, that his trial held on August 27, 29, 31 was
illegal because the proclamation of Martial law was unconstitutional and that he could not
expect a fair trial because the President could reverse any judgment of acquittal by the
military court and sentence him to death. “Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission
No. 2”
On the other hand, December 28 1973, Jose Diokno filed a motion to withdraw his petition
filed in his behalf, imputing the (1) delay in the disposition of the case, (2) that the decision
of the Court in the Ratification cases contrary to the Court’s ruling that the 1973
Constitution was not validly ratified and (3) the action of the members of the Court taking
an oath to the new Constitution and which becomes a different court in which he filed his
petition.
Diokno asserts that “a conscience that allows man to rot behind bars for more than one
year and three months without trial—of course, without any charges at all—is a
conscience that has become stunted, if not stultified..” and “… I can not continue to entrust
my case to them; and I have become thoroughly convinced that our quest for justice in
my case is futile.”
Issue(s):
 1. Whether or not this court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation no 1081. Is
the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of power to declare
martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or justiciable in
character?
2. Whether or not the petitions for writ of habeas corpus should be suspended
contending that the proclamation of Martial Law was unconstitutional.
Held:

1. YES. Five justices held that the question is political and should not be determined
by court. (Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino) Fernandez adds
that as a member of the 1973 Convention he believes that “the as a member of the
Convention, they have put an imprimatur on the proposition of the validity of a
martial law proclamation…” Barredo believes that political question are not per se
beyond the court’s jurisdiction, judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being
all-embracing and plenary but as a matter of policy should abstain from interfering
with the Executive’s Proclamation. Esguerra finds that the declaration of martial law
is final and conclusive upon the courts. Antonio finds that there is no dispute as to
the existence of a state of rebellion and on that premise emphasizes the factor of
necessity for the exercise of the president under the 1935 Constitution to declare
martial law.

Four on the side of justiciability: Castro, Fernando, Teehanke and Munoz Palma. The
constitutional sufficiency may be inquired into by court and would thus apply the principle
laid down by Lansang although the case refers to the power of President to suspend
habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability in Lansang is there distinguished from the
power of judicial review and is limited to ascertaining whether the President has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of the act. The Test is whether in suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, the president he did or did not acted arbitrarily (bias, capricious). Applying
the test, the Justices find no arbitrariness in the President’s proclamation of martial law
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. The bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus, with regards to the existence of a state rebellion in the country, had not
disappeared but had even worsened.

The question of the validity of the Proclamation no 1081 has been foreclosed by the
transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution (Art XVII. Sec 3 (2)) that “all proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and
effective even after … the ratification of this Constitution.”
The political or justiciable question controversy has become moot and purposeless as a
consequence of the referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question which was
overwhelmingly voted upon by a majority of voters, even between 15 and 18 years of age
in affirmative: “Under the 1973 Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue
in office beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under martial law?”
2. YES. The petitions should be dismissed with respect to petitioners who have been
released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still
subject to certain restrictions. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension
of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained
for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation: to suppress invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger
thereof.

RULING SUMMARY:
1. That the proclamation of Martial Law in September 1972 by the President was
within the 1932 Constitution
2. That because the Communist rebellion had not been abated and instead the
subversion had proliferated throughout the country, the imposition of martial law
was an “imperative of national survival.”
3. that the arrest and detention of the persons who were “participants or gave aid and
comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to
take over the Government by force” were not unconstitutional nor arbitrary
4. that subsumed in the declaration of martial law is the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus
5. that the fact that the regular courts are open cannot be accepted as evidence that
rebellion and insurrection no longer imperil the safety of the state
6. that actual armed combat has been and still raging in parts of Mindanao, Bicol and
Cagayan
7. that the hosts of doubts with respect to the validity of the ratification and effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution has been dispelled by the national referendum of July
1973
8. that the issue of the validity and constitutionality of the arrest and detention of all
the petitioners and of the restrictions imposed upon those who were freed, is now
foreclosed by the transitory provision of 1973 CONSTITUTION (Article XVII Sec 3
(2)) which validates all acts made by the President.
**Habeas Corpus- the purpose of the writ is to inquire into the cause or reason why a
person is being restrained of his liberty against his will and if there is no legal and/or valid
justification shown for such restraint the writ will forthwith issue to restore to that person

5. ENRILE V. SALAZAR

Summary and Doctrine

This case is a Petition for habeas corpus. Enrile was charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, contrary to the Hernandez doctrine.

The Court has ruled in People vs Hernandez, that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, hence there is no crime of rebellion with murder and or frustrated
murder only simple rebellion which is a bailable offense

FACTS:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile
was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case
No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed
in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March
2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it
was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as
such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion –
which is bailable.

Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him.
He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling
of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it
was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the
case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge
may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable
cause has not been complied with.

For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be
abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes
like murder.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.

2) Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the

case at bar.

RATIO:

1) No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there
was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez
doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with
rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of
the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the
Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal
 Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only
interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC
suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is
correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such
as murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion – which is
bailable.

2) Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour
and twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to
him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record
from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge
follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge
Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within
which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

I. DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and
the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
The Court’s earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for
any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

6. ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
On June 5, 2014 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged by the Office of the
Ombudsman with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). The case is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the
Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to fix bail and Motion for Reconsideration on the
following grounds: (a) The prosecution failed to show conclusively that Enrile, if ever
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; (b) The prosecution failed to show that
evidence of Enrile’s guilt is strong; (c) Enrile is not a flight risk.

Issue:
Whether or not Enrile can bail YES

Ruling:
1. The purpose of the bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial.
2. It is the Philippine’s responsibility in the international community under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights “….of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process…under the obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail”.
3. Enrile is not a flight risk because of his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon being charged in court.
4. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health is a compelling justification for his
admission to bail. (Chronic hypertension, diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular
disease, Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia, etc.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

− Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The grant of bail is a special
accommodation for the petitioner.
− The prosecution should have been given the opportunity to rebut the allegation
that petitioner suffers from medical conditions.
− The invocation of a general human rights principle does not provide clear legal
basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. It is neither presently provided
in our Rules of Court nor found in any statue or provision of the Constitution. This
sets a dangerous precedent for the granting of bail on the basis of humanitarian
conditions, which is determined by the personal discretion of the trial judge.
− The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
constitution.
7. ILAGAN VS. ENRILE,

Summary and Doctrine:

This case gave birth to the Marcos-era legal principle established by jurisprudence wherein a writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available after criminal information is filed against the person detained and an arrest warrant or a commitment order is
issued by the court where the said information has been filed. In what would be known as the “Ilagan doctrine”, the
unlawfulness of an arrest becomes moot and academic or an illegal arrest becomes “legal” once charges are filed in a court
of law.

This doctrine was promulgated by the Supreme Court in October 21, 1985. Ilagan refers to Laurente Ilagan, a legal luminary
in Davao City and former chairperson of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) Mindanao who was arrested without warrant
together with fellow lawyers Antonio Arellano and Marcos Risonar by elements of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated
National Police (PC-INP). Enrile refers to then Minister of Defense (and now Senator) Juan Ponce Enrile.

FACTS:

Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were arrested by the PC-INP on the basis of a Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) issued by the late strongman Ferdinand Marcos on January 25,
1985. A PDA legitimizes a warrantless arrest. First to be arrested and detained in Camp
Catitipan, Davao City was Ilagan on May 10. Arellano, meanwhile, was arrested when he
and 14 other lawyers from the Davao chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
visited Ilagan on the same day. Risonar was arrested on May 13 when he visited Camp
Catitipan to verify his arrest papers.

They were arrested, according to then Brig. Gen. Dionisio Tan-Gatue, PC-INP Region IX
Commander, for alleged “specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for
their leadership in the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)”. He cited as well the
participation of the detained lawyers in a Welgang Bayan (People’s Strike) in Davao City.
Gen Tan-Gatue also accused the three of “using their profession as lawyers as cover-up
for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives”.

Lawyers for Enrile, Gen. Tan-Gatue, and then acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos, named respondents in the case, justified
the arrest and detention of the lawyers by contending that it was conducted under a PDA;
that the writ of habeas corpus was suspended by virtue of Proclamation 2045-A; and that
courts do not have the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of
persons held pursuant to the suspension.

(Proclamation 2045-A stated that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains
suspended in the two autonomous regions of Mindanao and in all other places with
respect to persons detained or who will be detained for insurrection, rebellion, subversion,
economic sabotage, etc. It was an amendment to Proclamation 2045 that supposedly
lifted Martial Law on January 17, 1981.)
While justifying the arrest and detention of the lawyers as legitimate because of the PDA
and Proclamation 2045, the military’s lawyers filed an information for rebellion against the
detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City Branch X on May 27,
1985 or 17 days after Ilagan was arrested, which then became the basis of a warrant of
arrest.

No preliminary investigation was conducted. Lawyers of the military then asked the SC to
dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because it was supposedly already
rendered moot and academic by the said filing of information.

During the first hearing on the habeas corpus petition on May 23, 1985 the SC actually
ordered the immediate release of the detained lawyers on recognizance of their principal
counsels – former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes. But the military refused to honor the SC order to immediately release the
detainees with military officials saying that it had to be verified from higher authorities.
Then, as already mentioned, a case was hastily filed before a trial court in Davao City
four days later.

Petitioners argued that the arrests were illegal; that the Welgang Bayans were in
legitimate exercise of the constitutional right of expression and assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances; that the detained attorneys’ participation was
limited to serving in the legal panel and the negotiating panels; that Proclamation 2045
was unconstitutional because there exists no factual or legal basis for the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus as provided for in the 1973 Constitution; that the evidence
presented by respondents against the detained attorneys were of a doubtful and flimsy
nature; and that the PDA was unconstitutional because it violates the 1973 Constitution
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus should be granted in behalf of
persons arrested and detained without the basis of an arrest warrant.

RATIONALE:
On October 21, 1985, the SC ruled that the petition for habeas corpus was already moot
and academic since Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest by Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to a criminal case of rebellion filed
against them before the said court. It argued that the function of a special proceeding of
habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. But because the detained
lawyers’ incarceration was already by virtue of a judicial action in relation to a criminal
case (no matter if such case was filed more than two weeks after the arrests were made),
the remedy of habeas corpus supposedly no longer applies. The SC added that questions
to the legality of the arrest or lack of preliminary investigation should be addressed to the
Davao City trial court.

DISPOSITIVE:
Ten justices voted for the dismissal of the petition, namely Chief Justice Felix Makasiar
and Associate Justices Efren Plana, Venicio Escolin, Lorenzo Relova, Hugo Gutierrez Jr.,
Buenaventura Dela Fuente, Serafin Cuevas, Nestor Alampay, Carolina Aquino, and
Amurfina Melencio-Herrera. Three Associate Justices, however, offered dissenting
opinions – Claudio Teehankee, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr., and Vicente Abad Santos.

In his dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Teehankee, wrote:

“More than four agonizing months after this Court issued its near unanimous Resolution…
ordering the immediate release of the three petitioners-detainees… this Court has now
refused to enforce its own release order… It has instead dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus for having become moot and academic because of the arbitrary filing of
precipitate, vindictive, and oppressive charges against them for the capital crime of
rebellion without hearing or preliminary investigation and in gross violation of their
constitutional right and rudimentary requirements of due process and fair play”.

8. BROCKA ET. AL. VS. ENRILE

FACTS:

• Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a

demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a
petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ‘85
• Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before
RTC QC
• All petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as
leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended
• Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 ’85
a On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et
al’s provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each a Brocka, et al filed
respective bail bonds BUT…
• Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a respondents-
police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against
Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ‘85
o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al.
• Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and
spurious filing of this second offense as follows:
o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the
QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone call subsequently
received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM
o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a complainants’ affidavits
had not yet been received
 o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of
complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition
o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against
Brocka, et al had been officially received a informed that said charges were never
coursed through the Records Office
o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are,
almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for
Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a
matter of Constitutional right a appears that respondents have conspired to deprive
Brocka, et al of the right to bail
o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their
rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they
be given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients a no such
requirement required under the rules
• Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres. Marcos a
release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey
Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:
o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already
been released a four on Feb15 ’85 and one on Feb.8 ’85
o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and
academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an
invalid charge of inciting to sedition.
• Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend:
1. bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution
2. second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal – premised on one and the
same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a matter of defense in sedition
charge so, only issue here is…

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined – YES

RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the
second offense of inciting to sedition.

• GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,

preliminary or final

• EXCEPTIONS:
1. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions
3. When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
7. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground had been denied
11. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners

In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et al’s release from
detention BUT this PDA was issued on Jan.28 ’85 and invoked only on Feb.9 ’85
upon receipt of TC’s order of release a violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked
within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro, Manila
Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production, prosecution merely presented a purported
xeerox copy of it a violates Court pronouncement that “individuals against whom
PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate
original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the
PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)
2. SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the
information instead of a petition for Habeas Corpus

The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted that such course
of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing:
1. Spurious and inoperational PDA
2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation
Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the
second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest
anew

"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal

procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution.

If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this
case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that
charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted
THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.

9. OCAMPO ET AL. VS. ENRIQUEZ

Facts: During 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte publicly announced he would allow
the burial of Marcos in LNMB. After winning the elections, through Sec. of National
Defense Lorenzana, a Memorandum was issued to Chief of Staff of AFP, Gen. Visaya,
for the interment of Marcos, in compliance with the verbal order of the President to
implement his election campaign promise. AFP rear Admiral Enriquez issued directives
to the Philippine Army Commanding General to provide services, honors, and other
courtesies for the late Former President Marcos. Dissatisfied with the issuances and
directives, various petitioners filed petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
- Saturnino Ocampo, et. al., in their capacity as human rights advocates and
human rights violations victims
- Rene Saguisag and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers
- Edcel Lagman, as member of Congress
- Loretta Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of CHr, as victims of State-
sanctioned human rights violations during martial law
- Heherson Alvarez, former Senator, as concerned citizens and taxpayers
- Zaira Baniaga, as concerned citizens and taxpayers
- Algamar Latiph, former chairperson of regional human rights commission ARMM,
on behalf of Moros who are victims during martial law
- Leila De Lima, as Senator

Issues:
PROCEDURAL
1. Whether Pres. Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at
LNMB poses a justiciable controversy
NO. The Court agrees with the OSG that Pres. Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. It is also under the Constitution and EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987) to allow
the interment in LNMB which is a land of public domain devoted for national military
cemetery and military shrine purposes. It is based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness. It is outside the ambit of judicial review.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct or personal injury
as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The interment of Marcos would have
no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life
considering that more than 27 years since his death and 30 years after his ouster have
already passed. Petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their
fundamental constitutional rights
 3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and hierarchy of courts
YES. Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts. They should seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and
directive before the Secretary of National Defense and give them the opportunity to
correct themselves, if warranted. If petitioners are still dissatisfied with the Secretary’s
decision they could have elevated it before the Office of the President which has control
and supervision of the DND.
Even though there are exceptions that would warrant a direct resort to the Supreme Court
under exceptional cases, the petitioners cannot brush aside the doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC which are not only
trier of facts but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has
the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone.
SUBSTANTIVE
1. Whether the issuance and implementation of the memorandum violates the
Constitution, domestic and international law
NO. The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Laws and Constitutional provisions cited by petitioner:
Art. II: Sec. 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27, and 28 – not self-executory
Art. VII: Sec. 17 – Faithful execution clause, it is consistent with President Duterte’s
mandate, the burial does not contravene RA 289, RA 10368, and the international human
rights laws cited by petitioner
Art. XIV: Sec. 3(2) – reliance in this provision is misplaced it refers to duty of educ
institutions to teach values of nationalism and patriotism and respect for human rights
Art. XI: Sec. 1 – not self-executory but RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees), RA 7080 (Penalizing Plunder), RA 9485 (Anti-red
Tape Act) was enacted pursuant to this
Art. XVIII: Sec. 26 – transitory provision and freeze order to recover ill-gotten wealth
RA 289 –authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as a burial place for
Presidents, National Heroes, and Patriots for the perpetuation of the memory and for the
inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn.
Petitioners failed to provide legal and historical bases that LNMB and National Pantheon
is one and the same. LNMB is distinct from the burial place envisioned in rA 289. The
National Pantheon does not exist at present. Also to apply the standard that LNMB is
reserved only for the decent and brave or hero, it will put into question all the mortal
remains therein. The name of LNMB is a misnomer, interment of Marcos remain does not
confer upon him the status of a hero.
RA 10368 – (compensation for Human rights violations victims during Marcos regime)
recognizes the human rights violations committed and gives them reparation. However,
the court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s logic that the reparation includes the prohibition
of Marcos’ interment when it is not provided. It is undue to extend the law beyond what it
contemplates. Legislators could have easily inserted a provision prohibiting Marcos
internment as reparation but they did not. The law is silent and should remain to be so.
We cannot read into law what is simply not there. That would be tantamount to judicial
legislation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – these are principles that call for an
enactment of legislative measures. The PH is compliant with its international obligations
evident by the various RAs, exec issuances, and even in the Constitution
Our nation’s history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte
to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petititoners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial
Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the
present generation of Filipinos.
2. Whether the Sec. of National Defense and AFP rear admiral commited grave
abuse of discretion when they issued the memorandum and directive in
compliance with the verbal order of Pres. Duterte to implement his election
campaign promise of Marcos interment in LNMB
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty prevails over the petitioners allegation of Duterte’s
utang na loob or bayad utang to the Marcoses. Petitioners should establish such claims
but failed to do so. Then again, the court is not a trier of facts.
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and
his cronies, and pronouncement of SC, nullifies his entitlement as a soldier and
former President to interment at the LNMB
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not. They are governed by
PVAO of DND. LNMB is a military shrine.
Magsaysay issued EO 77 – orders remains of war dead interred at Bataan to be reinterred
in McKinley to minimize expenses and accessibility to widows.
Magsaysay issued Proc. 86 – changing the name to LNMB
Garcia issued Proc. 423, Marcos issued Proc and General Orders, Cory issued EOs too.
The point is the PVAO manages military shrines which is under DND which is under the
Office of the President
AFP Regulations G 161-375 – who may be interred
a.) Medal of Valor awardee
b.) Presidents or Commander-in-Chief, AFP
c.) Sec. of National Defense
d.) Chief of Staff, AFP
e.) General/Flag Officers, AFP
f.) Active and retired military personnel
g.) Gov dignitaries, statesman,national artists and others as long as approved by the
C-i-C, Congress or Sec. of National defense
h.) Widows of former presidents
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and C-i-C, legislator, Sec.
of National Defense, veteran, medal of valor awardee.
Marcos does not have any disqualification. He was not convicted of moral turpitude nor
dishonourably discharged.
Marcos rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
THOSE WHO Are NOT QUALIFIED:
a.) Personnel who are dishonorably discharged
b.) Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude
Moral Turpitude – conduct that is contrary to community standards of justice, honesty, or
good morals.
4. Whether the Marcos family waived the burial of remains of Marcos in LNMB when
they entered into agreement with Gov. of PH as to the condition and procedures
by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the PH.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution nor its exercise be limted by legislature. As the
incumbent President, Duterte is not bound by the 1992 Agreement between ramos and
the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte, he is free to
amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to
determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed
wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was grave abuse
of discretion which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override
an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. The President through respondents
acted within the bounds of law and jurisprudence. The Court must uphold what is legal
and just and that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place in LNMB
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily,
the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.

10. VINUYA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.Petitioners
narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and
systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their
communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly
tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and
held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by
Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners
have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and
mental and emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached
the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in
filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied
by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUE: Did respondents commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them?

HELD: Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure." Certain types of cases often have been found to present political
questions.One such category involves questions of foreign relations.It is well-established
that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."

Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches.In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951.The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be
inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations withJapan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.For the Court to overturn
the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment
has been constitutionally committed. DISMISSED.

11. POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

FACTS:In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that
she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before
May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN
ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating

medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her
job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen
since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that
POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she
satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant
in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are
Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos.
Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the
Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based
on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely
exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the
country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention
Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new
domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace
Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by
the SC.

12. VIVARES VS. STC

FACTS:
• Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
were graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
• Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party,
they took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments which
were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.
• Back at the school, Mylene Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s
high school department, learned from her students about the said pictures through
Escudero’s students respective personal Facebook accounts.
• Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
• Escudero reported the matter to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action. Thereafter, STC found the students to have violated the school’s Student
Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
• As penalty, the principal informed their parents the following day that they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises for graduation.
 • Thereafter, Rhonda Vivares, the mother of Julia, and Angela’s mother, filed a
petition in RTC against STC, praying that defendants therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction.
• They argued that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.”
They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of
the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data,
and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
• They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally
obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
• Respondents averred there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
• RTC denied the petition for habeas data.

ISSUE:
Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case
Whether petition for habeas data is the proper remedy

HELD:
No.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
• Although petition for writ of habeas data is the proper remedy in this case to
enforce one’s right to privacy, it will not prosper.
• The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
 • It is a remedy that seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
• In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s
right to informational privacy, among others.
• Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged
in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
• First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases
of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule
would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

• SC ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools,
and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is).
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his
“wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
• STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. Petitioners’ children’s privacy
right was not violated. They stated that the photos were “very private” and were
set to be viewable only to “Friends”. However, there was no privacy invasion since
it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
 unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
• Thus, without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within
the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

13. ISAAA VS. GREENPEACE

FACTS

• On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA),
University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP
Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research and
development project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer.
Other partner agencies involved were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding,
Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.
• The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the
field trial was described as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal toxin genes
from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the
eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to target insect
pests. The latter is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit
and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of eggplant.
• NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was
conducted from 2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of
experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with and no untoward
incident has occurred.
• On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued
biosafety permits to UPLB.
• Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites:
Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago
Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
• On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents
(Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right
to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151
was not secured prior to the project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for
human consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who were
fed Bt corn, local scientists likewise attested to the harmful effects of GMOs
to human and animal health
 - Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation under
Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
- The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it being a
classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health,
environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and
preliminary scientific evaluation indicates reasonable grounds for concern
that there are potentially dangerous effects on human health and the
environment
• The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA) of the Department of Agriculture (DA) from processing for field testing
and registering as herbicidal product Bt talong in the Philippines, stopping
all pending field testing, and ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.:
(1) to submit to an environmental impact statement system under the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR-EMB); (2) to submit an independent,
comprehensive, and rigid risk assessment, field tests report, and regulatory
compliance reports; (3) to submit all issued certifications on public
information, public consultation, public participation and consent from the
LGUs affected by the field testing; (4) to submit an acceptable draft of an
amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and (5) for BPI of DA to conduct
balanced nationwide public information on the nature of Bt talong and Bt
talong field trial, and a survey of its social acceptability.
• On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI,
FPA and UPLB, ordering them to file a verified return.
• The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
- All environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in
the affected communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement Law
- There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the
safety of Bt talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the field trial
stage as none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to suffer any
direct injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is only a
part of a continuing study to ensure that the field trials have no significant
and negative impact on the environment
• SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
• On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural issues
before the CA: (1) whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the petition
for writ of kalikasan; (2) whether the petition has been rendered moot and
 academic by the alleged termination of the Bt talong field testing; and (3) whether
the case presented a justiciable controversy
• CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace,
et.al. possess legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is capable of
repetition yet evading review; and (3) the alleged non-compliance with
environmental and local government laws present justiciable controversies for
resolution by the court.
• On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding
that the precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (the Rules) finds relevance in the case.
• CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB
and UPLBFI rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to academic
freedom. The writ stops the field trials of Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop
Bt talong research. Thus, there is no assault on academic freedom.
• CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a
genetically modified plant into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing act.”
• Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and
UPLBFI to reverse the CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field trials
for Genetically Modified eggplants.

ISSUES

1. WON Greenpeace, et.al. has a legal standing

2. WON the case is moot and academic
3. WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies
4. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects
involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
5. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents
in the processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing
6. WON the Precautionary Principle applies

RULING

1. Yes. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the tradional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature,” and aims to
“further encourage the protection of the environment.”

2. No. The case falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to
the mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable
among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public interest.
3. No. The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate remedy for
the respondents to determine the questions of unique national and local importance
raised in this case that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus
Greenpeace, et.al. is justified in coming to the Supreme Court.

4. Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly
petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS
system should apply to the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint
guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the
direct and indirect impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment and
ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate environmental protection
and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in incorporating environmental
considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the environment’s
impact on their project.” There are six stages in the regular EIA process. The
proponent initiates the first three stages while EMB takes the lead in the last three
stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least been
considered for EIA under existing regulations of EMB on new and emerging
technologies, to wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not listed
in any of the groups, e.g. projects using new processes/technologies
with uncertain impacts. This is an interim category – unclassified
projects will eventually be classified into their appropriate groups after
EMB evaluation. (Emphasis supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who
intend to undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment
are required to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to
undertaking such development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to

have significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse” and
which “include activities that have significant environmental consequences.”

In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the
potential hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into
the environment through field testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

5. Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only
legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly
provides that the NBF applies to the development, adoption and implementation of all
biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and in making biosafety decisions
concerning the research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement,
release into the environment and management of regulated articles.

The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which reads:

2.6. Using Precaution. – In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio

Declaration of 1992 and the relevant provisions of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Article 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8),
the precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions. The
principles and elements of this approach are hereby implemented
through the decision-making system in the NBF.

It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the concerned
agencies are expected to follow and which their respective rules and regulations must
conform with. In cases of conflict in applying the principles, the principle of protecting
the public interest and welfare shall always prevail, and no provision of the NBF shall
be construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of departments and
agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare in making biosafety
decisions.

Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and

participatory public consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting and
publication of notices and information sheets, consultations with some residents and
government officials, and submission of written comments, provided in DAO 2002-08.
The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply adhered to the procedures
laid down by DAO 2002-08 and no real effort was made to operationalize the principles
of NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt talong. Said failure means that the DA lacks
mechanisms to mandate applicants to comply with international biosafety protocols.
For these reasons, the DAO 2002-08 should be declared invalid.

Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was evasive
in answering the questions on whether his office undertook the necessary evaluation
on the possible environmental impact of Bt talong field trials and the release of GMOs
into the environment in general. While he initially cited lack of budget and competence
as reasons for their inaction, he later said that an amendment of the law should be
made since projects involving GMOS are not covered by Proclamation No. 2146,
entitled “Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical
and Within the Scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System Established
Under Presidential Decree No. 1586”.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMB’s lack of
serious attention to their mandate under EO 514 to ensure that environmental
assessments are done and impacts identified in biosafety decisions.
 Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST, DENR, DA and DOH to ensure
the allocation of funds for the implementation of the NBF as it was intended to be a
multi-disciplinary effort involving the different government departments and agencies.

The petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates in the
implementation of the NBF.

6. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the
normative idea that governments are obliged to “foresee and forestall” harm to the
environment. The Rules incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in

establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology

shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary

principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1)
threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future
generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal
consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.

When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm, and possibility of

serious harm coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. The
Supreme Court found all three (3) conditions present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable,
independent scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic
benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the environment associated with
the use of GE technology in agriculture, and serious health hazards from consumption
of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural and
unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous
and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the

crucial stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination
of the applicability of the EIS requirements to the GMO field testing, are compelling
reasons for the application of the precautionary principle.

There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and
eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.
 Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the principles
of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned
departments and agencies before allowing the release into the environment of
genetically modified eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders, including

marginalized famers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds from the
realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related
to public policy and involves an ethical dimension.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is permanently enjoined.

2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.
3. Any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and
commercialization, and importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined until a new
administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.

14. DISINI, JR., ET AL. V. SEC. OF JUSTICE,

Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his
laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other
computers and enable him, among other things, to:
• Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs
for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;

• Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the
general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and
read postings from them;

• Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;

• Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks,
stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals,
and schools; and

• Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or
telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous
and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to
the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication.
But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will
who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them
can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or
bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others,
the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false
representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to
the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well
as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They
accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those
computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has
the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Issues:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law
that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These
provisions are:
1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
2. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
3. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
 7. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
8. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
11. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;
12. Section 8 on Penalties;
13. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
14. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
15. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
16. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
17. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
18. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
19. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
20. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
21. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362
of the RPC on the crime of libel.
Hence,
VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications;
2. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time;
and
3. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or
block access to suspected Computer Data.
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
2. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
 3. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the
internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
4. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying
information belonging to another;
5. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;
6. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
7. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under
the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and
communications technologies;
8. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
9. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to
preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data
for six months;
10. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued
warrant;
11. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;
12. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data
after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
13. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime
investigations;
14. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC);
15. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
16. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1) Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to the original author of the post;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive
the post and react to it; and

2) Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of

cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1)
on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
 Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-
related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on
online Libel.
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct
application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of
the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription,
and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.