Case 1:21-cv-02819 Document 1 Filed 10/20/21 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 42

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 21-cv-2819

ESTATE OF ZACHARY GIFFORD;

Plaintiff,

v.

TRACY WEISENHORN, individually;

QUINTEN STUMP, individually;
CASEY SHERIDAN, individually;
SHERIFF FORREST FRAZEE, in his official capacity;
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF KIOWA, a/k/a KIOWA
COUNTY, COLORADO;

Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff, by and through its attorneys, HOLLAND, HOLLAND EDWARDS & GROSSMAN,

LLC, complains against Defendants and requests trial by jury as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Law enforcement may not stop unarmed, non-dangerous suspects who are trying

to flee by shooting them dead.

2. On April 9, 2020, after a traffic stop for an alleged failure to signal, Undersheriff

Tracy Weisenhorn and Deputy Sheriff Quinten Stump shot Mr. Gifford in the back three times as

he ran away from them, killing him.

3. Zachary Gifford was known to be unarmed, not displaying any weapons, not

threatening these officers or anyone else, and obviously running away from them in an empty
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field located in Brandon, Colorado. Brandon, Colorado has a population of around 20 or less and

is often referred to as a “ghost town.”

4. As Zachary Gifford ran away from these officers, they shot him in the back

multiple times. Undersheriff Weisenhorn shot first and Deputy Stump shot shortly thereafter. Mr.

Gifford continued running away while these officers kept shooting him in the back for no reason.

By the fourth shot Zachary Gifford had run approaching 100 yards away from where the

shooting started.

5. The fourth shot was fired by Deputy Stump from 24 yards away, 18 seconds after

the third shot. During those 18 seconds, Undersheriff Weisenhorn was close by watching, doing

nothing to stop Deputy Stump as he took aim and finished what she had started.

6. This final shot caused Zachary Gifford to drop on the spot. Here is a picture of

Mr. Gifford’s covered body where he fell, bled out and died:

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7. This is a panoramic of the empty field where Mr. Gifford was killed:

8. The killing of Zachary Gifford flouted all applicable constitutional principles

governing the use of deadly force by law enforcement, which prohibit deadly force to seize

fleeing suspects unless the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to

the officers or others.

9. Zach Gifford posed no danger at all. Instead, Mr. Gifford was a passenger in a

truck pulled over for failing to signal when turning right off a rural state highway onto a dirt

road, a pretextual stop intended to search for drugs.

10. Neither Deputy Stump nor Undersheriff Weisenhorn were disciplined by Kiowa

County Sheriff’s Office for their killing of an unarmed fleeing man in an empty field. At least

two other times in the six months prior to this shooting, Deputy Stump used deadly force to stop

a suspect from fleeing without probable cause to believe that either suspect posed a significant

threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or others.

11. Kiowa County Defendants took no action in response to the prior incidents or to

the killing of Zachary Gifford, because it was actually the policy, custom and practice of this

Sheriff’s Office to use unconstitutional deadly force.

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12. In January of 2021, Deputy Stump was indicted by a grand jury and criminally

charged for his role in the shooting of Zachary Gifford.

13. Zach Gifford was a much-loved member of his community, described by a

Magistrate Judge from Eads Colorado and former Deputy Sheriff, as a man “well-met and well-

liked.”

14. Sheriff Sheridan resigned in reaction to the public outcry about this killing.

II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND NOTICE

15. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including

Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1983 and §1988. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343,

and 2201.

16. This case is instituted in the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 as the judicial district in which all relevant events and

omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.

III. PARTIES

17. At all times relevant hereto, the decedent, Zachary Gifford was a resident of the

State of Colorado and a citizen of the United States of America.

18. Plaintiff Estate of Zachary Gifford is open in Kiowa County, Colorado, with his

father, Larry Gifford, appointed as the Personal Representative. Mr. Gifford was a resident of the

State of Colorado and a citizen of the United States of America.

19. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Undersheriff Tracy Weisenhorn was a

citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Colorado and was acting under color of

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state law as the Undersheriff of Kiowa County, employed by the Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office.

At all times relevant hereto, this individually sued Defendant was acting within the scope of her

employment.

20. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Deputy Sheriff Quinten Stump was a

citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Colorado and was acting under color of

state law in his capacity as a law enforcement officer employed by the Kiowa County Sheriff’s

Office. At all times relevant hereto, this individually sued Defendant was acting within the scope

of his employment.

21. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant former Sheriff Casey Sheridan was a

citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Colorado and was acting under color of

state law as the Sheriff of Kiowa County, employed by the Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office.

Defendant Sheridan is sued individually for his own deliberately indifferent actions while he was

the Sheriff of Kiowa County. At all times relevant hereto, this individually sued Defendant was

acting within the scope of his employment.

22. Defendant Forrest Frazee, Sheriff of Kiowa County Colorado, in his official

capacity, is the Kiowa County Sheriff and a final policy maker for Kiowa County with respect to

all matters concerning the Sheriff’s Office, (hereinafter, “Sheriff Frazee”). Defendant Sheriff

Frazee is sued for the entity level actions of the Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office. This party is the

proper Defendant for any declaratory or injunctive relief granted, in addition to damages.

23. Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Kiowa County Colorado, a.k.a.

Kiowa County, Colorado (hereinafter “BOCC” or “Kiowa County”) is the local governmental

entity responsible for Kiowa County, including its final delegated policy maker, the Kiowa

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County Sheriff’s Office. The Defendant BOCC represents, oversees, funds and sets policy for

Kiowa County Colorado and/or delegates responsibility for law enforcement, including

conformity with constitutional law, to the Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office and the elected sheriff.

24. Defendant Sheriff Frazee and the BOCC are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

Kiowa County’s unconstitutional policies, customs, training and supervision, which were

moving forces in the complained of constitutional violations and resulting claimed injuries,

damages and losses.

25. The BOCC, Sheriff Frazee, and the Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office are referred to

variously throughout as “the County,” “Kiowa County,” or “KCSO.”

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

26. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other preceding paragraphs, as if they were fully

set forth herein.

27. On April 9, 2020, Mr. Gifford was helping his friend, Bryan Morrell, unload a log

splitter off a truck in Brandon, Colorado.

28. Also on April 9, 2020, Undersheriff Weisenhorn was in Brandon, Colorado to

watch a house in the area for drug activity. She had been watching the house for a few weeks

before this date.

29. Undersheriff Weisenhorn saw Mr. Morrell and Mr. Gifford outside of this house

near the truck they were unloading.

30. Undersheriff Weisenhorn knew Mr. Gifford and believed there were rumors that

he engaged in drug use.

31. Mr. Morrell and Mr. Gifford got into the truck and drove away from the house,

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looking for place to offload a log splitter from the back of the truck. The log splitter was too

heavy for the two of them to get off a truck without being able to back up into a ditch to get it to

ground level.

32. Undersheriff Weisenhorn began following the truck.

33. While following the truck, Undersheriff Weisenhorn aired to dispatch to run the

license plate. At that point, Undersheriff Weisenhorn had no reasonable suspicion of any illegal

activity by either man.

34. She learned through dispatch that the truck was registered to Joanna Beightel and

Cade Gustason. She continued to follow the truck.

35. Mr. Morrell made a right turn off State Highway 96 onto Main Street, a dirt road.

This intersection is in a rural area with very few people around, and looks like this:

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36. Undersheriff Weisenhorn then initiated a traffic stop, pretextually for failing to

use a turn signal before turning on to this little traveled dirt road.

37. The real purpose of this “traffic stop,” however, was to try to concoct a reason to

search the occupants and/or the truck for drugs.

38. It was an expectation and custom of Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office for officers to

use traffic stops to look for other offenses and search vehicles.

39. Deputy Stump heard this dispatch traffic and recognized the name of Cade

Gustason as a person he suspected of being a drug dealer.

40. Although Deputy Stump was actually under suspension by the County at the time,

and Undersheriff Weisenhorn had not even requested back up or indicated the need for another

officer to assist in what was ostensibly a traffic stop, Deputy Stump responded to the scene.

41. Undersheriff Weisenhorn asked Mr. Morrell for his license and registration. Mr.

Morrell, who was only a block from home, didn’t have his license on him and was driving his

daughter’s truck.

42. Mr. Morrell provided Undersheriff Weisenhorn his information and indicated

where he lived. He also gave Undersheriff Weisenhorn his daughter’s name, Joanna Beightel, the

person she had just confirmed through dispatch owned the vehicle.

43. During this interaction, Mr. Gifford searched for the registration and provided the

valid registration to Undersheriff Weisenhorn.

44. Undersheriff Weisenhorn asked Mr. Gifford his name and date of birth, which he

truthfully responded was July 15, 1980.

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45. Undersheriff Weisenhorn wrote Mr. Gifford’s name and date of birth on her arm,

along with Mr. Morrell’s information, and then went back to her car to contact dispatch.

46. During this interaction both men behaved appropriately and did not do anything

suspicious. At no point did Undersheriff Weisenhorn see the occupants of the truck doing

anything suspicious.

47. Undersheriff Weisenhorn turned off her body cam while she contacted dispatch

and/or spoke with Deputy Stump.

48. Through dispatch, Undersheriff Weisenhorn confirmed that Mr. Morrell did have

a valid license and there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest.

49. Undersheriff Weisenhorn gave dispatch the wrong birthday for Zach Gifford of

June 15, 1980, rather than July 15, 1980, just as he told her minutes earlier. Dispatch thus

couldn’t find any one named Zach Gifford with the wrong birthday she provided but did find a

Zach Gifford with the birthday of July 15, 1980.

50. While Undersheriff Weisenhorn was in her car, Deputy Stump approached the

vehicle and talked to Mr. Gifford and Mr. Morrell.

51. Undersheriff Weisenhorn returned to the truck and ordered both men to step out.

52. At that time, Undersheriff Weisenhorn had no lawful reason to instruct either of

these men out of the truck – instead she manufactured reasons to get them out in service of her

unconstitutional desire to search them for drugs.

53. Undersheriff Weisenhorn told Mr. Gifford that dispatch reported his birthday as

July 16, 1980, which intentionally misstated what she was told by dispatch. She accused Mr.

Gifford of lying about his birthday, which was untrue and contradicted by the information she

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just received.

54. Undersheriff Weisenhorn used her own manufactured evidence about the birthday

as a pretext to remove Mr. Gifford from the truck and institute an unlawful search.

55. She decided to have both men patted down for weapons, even though they had not

done anything suspicious.

56. Neither officer had any reasonable or articulable suspicion that either man

involved in this traffic stop was armed or dangerous.

57. Further, both officers previously knew Mr. Gifford and had no reason to believe

he was violent or dangerous based on any interactions or knowledge they had.

58. Evidencing that she was not concerned for her own or anyone else’s safety,

Undersheriff Weisenhorn did not even have Mr. Morrell turn off the truck before he got out.

59. Undersheriff Weisenhorn patted down Mr. Morrell, and Deputy Stump conducted

a pat down of Mr. Gifford.

60. These pat downs were unconstitutional searches in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

61. Deputy Stump considered this to be a “Terry Frisk,” which is a pat down for

weapons. Deputy Stump conducted a thorough pat down of Mr. Gifford, following his routine

pattern for such pat downs, and closely checked his waistband, his pockets and his body for

weapons.

62. Deputy Stump found Mr. Gifford to be in possession of a Leatherman, a box

cutter, and a pliers combination tool.

63. Deputy Stump’s search was thorough enough to find every tool Mr. Gifford had

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on him at the time.

64. Revealing that Deputy Stump had no concern that Mr. Gifford was dangerous, let

alone a reasonable or articulable suspicion of the same, Deputy Stump did not even confiscate

these items. Deputy Stump did not take these from Mr. Gifford because, as he told investigating

officers after the fact, he considered them just tools, not weapons.

65. Deputy Stump admitted to subsequent CBI investigators that he found nothing on

Zach Gifford’s waistband or on his person during his search that would cause him any concern

about weapons. He said in response to this precise question: “Uh, I don’t think so.”

66. Deputy Stump was not actually searching for weapons out of any concern that Mr.

Gifford was armed in dangerous, and instead was clearly looking for drugs. After finishing this

“pat down,” Deputy Stump put his pinkie finger into the small coin pocket on the right side of

Mr. Gifford’s jeans to pull it open to see if anything was in that pocket.

67. Deputy Stump had already determined that there was no weapon in that area and

clearly knew that his pocket was too small to contain any weapon. At no point did Deputy Stump

have any reason to believe anything in the coin pocket was a weapon.

68. In Deputy Stump’s unconstitutional search of the coin pocket during his

unconstitutional pat-down, he saw a plastic bag he thought contained drugs and told Mr. Gifford

not to move.

69. Mr. Gifford immediately started to run away but was quickly tackled by Deputy

Stump.

70. Undersheriff Weisenhorn joined in and tased Mr. Gifford.

71. Deputy Stump also tased Mr. Gifford and tried to choke him.

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72. Mr. Gifford was not violent or a threat toward the officers or anyone else, and

instead was trying to flee.

73. Neither officer perceived, nor could have reasonably perceived, Mr. Gifford to be

a danger to them or anyone else, and instead both knew he was simply being disobedient by

trying to run away.

74. The scuffle and the tasings were directly caused by the unconstitutional search.

75. After he was tased, Mr. Gifford continued to try to run away.

76. Deputy Stump yelled ‘let him go’ but Undersheriff Weisenhorn instead threatened

to ‘fucking shoot’ Mr. Gifford if he tried to run away. She drew her gun and stuck it point blank

on his back.

77. While this was happening, Mr. Gifford was able to get out from under the officers

and again started to run away.

78. Undersheriff Weisenhorn, who was wearing a bullet proof vest, pointed her gun at

him as he ran away in a deserted field parallel to a county road. She stood up, aimed her gun at

his back, and shot him.

79. When Undersheriff Weisenhorn shot, Zach Gifford was known to be unarmed.

He was not suspected of any crime besides, perhaps, resisting arrest by trying to get away or at

the most, drug possession. He was running away in a deserted field with no one nearby. He made

no threatening gestures. Undersheriff Weisenhorn did not have probable cause to believe that he

posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to herself or others. Mr. Gifford was

a threat to no one, and no reasonable officer could reasonably perceive otherwise.

80. This first shot hit him in the back and the officers heard him yelling out in pain.

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81. Though hit, Mr. Gifford continued to run in the empty field.

82. A few seconds later, Deputy Stump also fired a shot at Mr. Gifford’s back.

83. At the moment of this second shot, Deputy Stump likewise knew Mr. Gifford to

be unarmed. He was not suspected of any crime besides, perhaps, resisting arrest by trying to get

away or at the most, having a plastic bag that might have drugs in it. Deputy Stump also knew

that he had already been shot, was injured and was running away in a deserted field. He made no

threatening gestures. Deputy Stump did not have probable cause to believe that he posed a

significant threat of death or serious physical injury to himself or others. Mr. Gifford was a threat

to no one, and no reasonable officer could reasonably perceive otherwise.

84. Shortly thereafter, Undersheriff Weisenhorn fired another shot at the back at this

still fleeing traffic stop passenger.

85. At the time of this third shot, Mr. Gifford was far away from the officers, known

to be unarmed, known to have been shot, and known to not pose a threat to anyone. He was still

a threat to no one, and no reasonable officer could reasonably perceive otherwise. He still made

no threatening gestures. Undersheriff Weisenhorn did not have probable cause to believe that he

posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to herself or others.

86. Out of these first three shots, Mr. Gifford was hit twice in the back.

87. After this third shot, Undersheriff Weisenhorn and Deputy Stump both knew that

he had been hit twice.

88. While still able to keep trying to get away, he was obviously seriously injured,

and these officers understood he would have to stop soon and be easily found. He was near no

one, there was no one in the direction he was running, and he was known to be unarmed.

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89. It is obvious and well-known to any officer that you can’t use deadly force to

effectuate an arrest in these circumstances. Furthermore, to the extent that Undersheriff

Weisenhorn and Deputy Stump wanted to arrest Mr. Gifford for misdemeanors including

potentially having a baggie with drugs in his coin pocket while a passenger in a truck that failed

to use a turn signal – or even for resisting by fleeing from an unlawful search – they knew it

could easily be accomplished by catching up with him by car or waiting for him to collapse and

taking him to the hospital.

90. Instead, 18 seconds later, with Undersheriff Weisenhorn behind him watching,

Deputy Stump took aim and fired again, hitting Mr. Gifford for the third time in the back and

dropping him immediately to the ground.

91. At the time of the fourth shot, Mr. Gifford was approximately 24 yards from the

closest officer. This final shot was depicted by CBI in the Arrest Affidavit for Defendant Stump

as follows:

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92. Both Undersheriff Weisenhorn and Deputy Stump used objectively unreasonable

and grossly excessive force, and each were also part of a collective use of force.

93. Undersheriff Weisenhorn as a collective part of that use of force is thus also liable

for the final shot and all those that preceded it. She completely failed to intervene to stop the

final shot, despite ample opportunity to do so. Instead, she watched as her subordinate took aim

at a man already shot twice, threatening no one and running away.

94. Mr. Gifford had three gunshot wounds, and each officer shot two bullets.

95. This following picture was taken by investigators after the shooting. The orange

cone at the bottom of the picture represents where Mr. Gifford fell, and the orange cone by the

tree represents where Deputy Stump was located, with the cones being about 24 yards apart:

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96. This picture shows the location from an aerial view. The red circle on the photo

shows the field Mr. Gifford was running into, with the tree at the top of the circle being the same

tree Deputy Stump was standing next to when he fired the final shot. Mr. Gifford was running to

the right in the picture, i.e., away from the few abandoned buildings in that area:

97. As Zach Gifford lay in a field dying from these multiple gunshot wounds, he used

his last breaths to ask officers to tell his parents that he loved them. Even while he was bleeding

out, curled up in a fetal position, and taking his final breaths, Undersheriff Weisenhorn actually

used her pink personalized handcuffs to handcuff this dying unarmed man.

98. The Coroner depicted the three shots that hit Mr. Gifford’s back as follows:

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99. The coroner determined that the manner of Mr. Gifford’s death was a homicide,

and that he died from the combination of multiple gunshot wounds, finding:

OPINION: It is my opinion that Zachary Gifford, a 39 year old male, died as a

result of multiple gunshot wounds. The bullets collectively perforated the right
lung, mesentery and stomach, resulting in massive blood loss and his subsequent
death. Investigation and autopsy findings are consistent with these wounds being
the result of the actions of another person or persons.

100. In their interviews with CBI, Deputy Stump and Undersheriff Weisenhorn lied

about key facts pertaining to Mr. Gifford’s pre-shooting conduct and the incident.

101. At the time of the incident, it was clearly established that officers could not stop a

fleeing unarmed, non-dangerous suspect who was not a significant threat of death or serious

physical injury to them or to others by shooting him dead.

Allegations Related to
Kiowa County’s Monell Liability and
Sheriff Sheridan’s Individual Supervisory Liability

102. At all times relevant hereto, Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office had a custom and

pattern of using deadly force to seize fleeing suspects, regardless of whether the officer has

probable cause to believe that the suspect is an imminent threat of death or serious physical

injury to officers or others.

103. In the shooting of Zach Gifford, this de facto policy is why the County

Undersheriff used such patently unconstitutional deadly force, and also why she did not stop her

subordinate from doing the same.

104. Undersheriff Weisenhorn is both a delegated final decision maker on the scene,

and an enforcer of the actual unconstitutional deadly force policy, custom and habit for the

department.

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105. That Undersheriff Weisenhorn started and continued shooting someone in his

back, someone who was unarmed and undeniably only trying to run away from a traffic stop

with potentially a small bag of drugs, evidences her understanding that this was Kiowa County’s

de facto unconstitutional policy regarding the use of deadly force.

106. That Undersheriff Weisenhorn did not even try to stop her subordinate Deputy

Stump from using deadly force to seize an already shot and injured man from fleeing without

probable cause to believe that he posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to

her or others, also evidences her understanding that this was Kiowa County’s de facto

unconstitutional policy.

107. This deadly de facto policy can also readily be seen by the Department’s response

to this obvious unconstitutional killing.

108. After killing Mr. Gifford, Tracy Weisenhorn was briefly suspended with pay,

remaining the Undersheriff until almost a year later. During her eleven months of continued

employment, Undersheriff Weisenhorn received no retraining, was not disciplined, or even

reprimanded for her part in shooting and killing Zach Gifford in an empty field. Indeed, she

remained on payroll and went on vacation with former Sheriff Sheridan to the 2020 Sturgis

Motorcycle Rally. Even after criminal charges were filed against her subordinate co-shooter, no

discipline was issued.

109. Undersheriff Weisenhorn was terminated on March 8, 2021, eleven months after

shooting Mr. Gifford. Her termination did not even mention her shooting a fleeing unarmed man

who did not pose a threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or others.

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110. Likewise, Deputy Stump was also not retrained, disciplined, or reprimanded for

shooting and killing an unarmed man in an empty field. He remained a Deputy Sheriff with

Kiowa County until he was finally terminated in September of 2020 for an unrelated incident in

which he drunkenly shot his service weapon at stop signs while off duty. Deputy Stump’s role in

Mr. Gifford’s killing was also not even mentioned in his termination.

111. Kiowa County Defendants, through former Sheriff Sheridan, ratified this use of

force in that they, knowing the basis for the conduct, authorized and approved of the killing of

Zach Gifford.

112. More specifically, after the killing of Zach Gifford, there were also no trainings,

discipline, or policy changes with any of the Sheriff’s Office personnel about the constitutional

bounds of when deadly force is permitted. Thus, in response to a CORA request for all

documents relating to any discipline or training responsive to the shooting of Zach Gifford and

when deadly force may be used, former Sheriff Sheridan responded with a signed letter,

admitting that “no records exist.”

113. Even after Deputy Stump was charged with a crime and the community was in an

uproar about this unjustifiable killing, County Defendants took no actions against former Sheriff

Sheridan, who ultimately resigned on his own because of the community response.

114. Both Deputy Stump and Undersheriff Weisenhorn reportedly left their previous

employments under questionable circumstances. For example, on information and belief, Deputy

Stump was terminated from his two previous places of employment as a law enforcement officer.

About his leaving Norwood, Colorado, the Town Administrator publicly stated “[l]et’s just say

he had made some mistakes and it didn’t seem to get any better. He wasn’t a good fit. He didn’t

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take direction very well.”

115. Prior instances, available just pre-discovery, show that this unconstitutional de

facto policy and custom of using deadly force against non-threatening fleeing suspects was well

known, condoned, tolerated, ratified and expected.

116. As shown below, at least twice in the six months prior to this shooting, Deputy

Stump used deadly force to stop a suspect from fleeing without probable cause that the suspect

posed a risk of death or serious physical injury to officers or the public. These events were

known to and/or reviewed by the Sheriff and Undersheriff with no discipline or re-training

imposed. This is because they actually met the above-described de facto policy, custom, habit

and practice of the department.

117. The Kiowa County Sheriff’s Department is small, only four to six people

including the Sheriff and Undersheriff. The following instances are not isolated ones in a huge

police force of a major city. Rather, they show the custom and training of the entire department.

Luis Hernandez Ramming Incident

118. On December 6, 2019, four months before the Gifford shooting, Deputy Stump

learned of a vehicle chase involving a felony suspect driving a Mercedes. The details of the

suspect’s alleged conduct were not then known to Deputy Stump.

119. He joined the chase.

120. Former Sheriff Sheridan was himself actively part of the dispatch that instructed

Deputy Stump to pursue the vehicle and Deputy Stump was aware that the Sheriff was listening

to him.

121. Deputy Stump was pursuing the vehicle when the suspect did a U-turn and tried to

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pass Deputy Stump.

122. Rather than let him get away, and, as he put it, to “end the pursuit,” Deputy Stump

waited for him to start to pass him and then used deadly force with his car, purposely turning left

into the suspect’s rear driver’s side. This caused the suspect’s car to spin out and crash, caused

significant damage to both cars, and rendered Mr. Hernandez unconscious. At the time he

rammed his vehicle into the fleeing vehicle, Deputy Stump was not in danger of being hit.

123. Deputy Stump’s dangerous vehicle maneuver was not a recognized or accepted

police practice of stopping a car and constituted unconstitutional deadly force.

124. This use of deadly force was intended only to stop the chase and was not based on

any probable cause that the suspect then posed a significant threat of death or serious physical

injury to officers or the public.

125. Prior to intentionally crashing his police car into the car of the fleeing suspect,

Deputy Stump announced over dispatch to the Sheriff that he was going to “try to pin him.”

126. Sheriff Sheridan thus knew that Deputy Stump intended to ram Mr. Hernandez

with his car but chose not to intervene to stop this use of deadly force. He and Kiowa County did

not investigate or discipline Deputy Stump because it was the custom, habit and practice and

official policy expectation that KCSO officers were authorized to use deadly force to stop fleeing

suspects without probable cause to believe the suspect posed any threat of death to the officers or

others at that time.

127. To Sheriff Sheridan’s awareness, Deputy Stump’s use of deadly force led to the

previously filed felony eluding charges against Luis Hernandez being voluntarily dismissed.

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Christopher Corbett Shooting Incident

128. On Christmas Day, 2019, Deputy Stump pursued Christopher Corbett in a car

chase.

129. Mr. Corbett was suspected of driving a stolen truck and drove into an empty field

with Deputy Stump pursuing him.

130. Deputy Stump exited his vehicle and jumped a fence to get closer to Mr. Corbett’s

truck.

131. Mr. Corbett was stuck in an arroyo and was rocking the truck back and forth to

become unstuck. Mr. Corbett didn’t look at Deputy Stump or try to hit him with his truck – he

was just doing what Mr. Gifford and Mr. Hernandez were – trying to get away.

132. While behind the truck, Deputy Stump opened fired on Mr. Corbett as he began to

get unstuck and drive away.

133. Deputy Stump admitted that at the time he fired his weapon, he was not afraid of

being struck by Mr. Corbett’s truck, nor did he believe that Mr. Corbett posed an immediate

threat of death or serious physical injury to him, other officers, or the public.

134. Nevertheless, Deputy Stump shot nine rounds into the back of the truck because

again, he was “wanting to stop the pursuit.” The admitted and only purpose of firing his gun was

to stop the chase.

135. Seven of the bullets hit the truck, including one that lodged in the headrest on the

driver’s side, coming very close to hitting Mr. Corbett in the back of the head, as shown below:

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136. The suspect escaped on foot and was apprehended elsewhere.

137. Using deadly force to stop an allegedly stolen truck from driving away in an

empty field was unjustified and unconstitutional.

138. Despite actually knowing Deputy Stump had used deadly force to stop a pursuit

twice in one month, former Sheriff Sheridan did not remove Deputy Stump off of the case or

initiate an internal investigation.

139. Instead, Sheriff Sheridan allowed Deputy Stump to present the District Attorney

with a search warrant to search Mr. Corbett’s truck, even though he was involved in the use of

deadly force against him. It violates all police practices to allow a deputy who has employed

deadly force on a suspect to remain an investigating officer into that suspect’s behavior.

140. The District Attorney informed former Sheriff Sheridan that Kiowa County

needed to have a policy to investigate officer involved shootings and explained that “[w]hen an

officer fires a weapon at another person – whether there is injury or death or neither – the case

must be investigated and reviewed by either your agency or another agency to determine whether

the use of force was either unlawful or justified.”

141. The District Attorney also told the Sheriff to contact another independent

Sheriff’s office and ask them to investigate whether charges should be brought against Deputy

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Stump, suggesting that he also conduct an internal investigation regarding whether any policies

were violated.

142. Former Sheriff Sheridan knew full well that such incidents needed to be

investigated but had no intention of doing so or removing Deputy Stump from the Corbett case

because, again, Deputy Stump did exactly what was expected of him under Kiowa County’s

unconstitutional deadly force practice – he used deadly force to try to seize a fleeing suspect.

143. Only after the DA told former Sheriff Sheridan that he needed to remove Deputy

Stump from the case, did anyone even interview Deputy Stump about this shooting incident.

Unsurprisingly, that investigation was a sham investigation, designed to cover up and justify

Deputy Stump’s use of force. Still, it unequivocally revealed that he lied about the justification in

his use of force report, and, in fact used deadly force without any perception that he or others

were in immediate danger.

144. In fact, in that investigation, contrary to his use of force report, Deputy Stump

admitted that: “I thought there for a moment he was going to hit me, then I noticed that he

wasn’t. I already had my weapon drawn, I was wanting to stop the pursuit, it had already started

in Kansas and it had already went this far and I didn’t know what else this guy was capable of

doing even if he did get away.” (Emphasis supplied).

145. Sheriff Sheridan was reportedly told by Sheriff Zordel of Prowers County, after

the Corbett investigation, that he should fire Defendant Stump.

146. Despite Deputy Stump’s admissions that he was not in fear for his own or others’

safety when he opened fire on Mr. Corbett, Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office issued no discipline,

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found that no policies were violated, and did not conduct any re-training. Instead, the matter was

closed.

147. Charges related to Mr. Corbett’s driving and eluding were also dropped because

of Deputy Stump’s egregious use of deadly force.

148. During the Corbett incident, Deputy Stump left his car at the scene, which was

unlocked and contained weapons. It was later discovered by a state trooper, who locked the car

and told Kiowa County that one of their vehicles containing guns had been left unsecured. No

discipline or re-training was issued to Deputy Stump for leaving his unlocked patrol car that

contained firearms in it on the side of the road.

149. As with Mr. Gifford, this shooting of a fleeing suspect took place in an empty

field, far away from anyone other than Mr. Corbett and Deputy Stump.

150. Just like with Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Gifford, Deputy Stump used deadly force

because he “was wanting to stop the pursuit” even though the suspect was not believed to pose

an imminent threat to him or others at the time. In all three instances, Deputy Stump used force

to stop the suspect from fleeing, without regard for any justification for the use of deadly force.

151. At the time of Gifford, Hernandez and Corbett incidents, the entire Kiowa County

Sheriff’s department consisted of between four and six people including the Sheriff and

Undersheriff, meaning more than half of the department engaged in, approved, condoned and

tolerated using deadly force against fleeing suspects who posed no immediate risk of harm to

officers or the public.

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152. In all three instances, no training or reprimand was issued because use of such

force to seize fleeing suspects, rather than to neutralize threats, was indeed the actual

unconstitutional policy, practice, and custom of the Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office.

Deputy Stump’s Dangerous Behavior in Other Fleeing Suspect Cases

153. Other instances of dangerous behavior by law enforcement in suspect chases

further illustrates the Sheriff’s Office expectation that its’ deputies effectuate an arrest no matter

the danger to the suspect or public.

154. On October 31, 2019, Deputy Stump witnessed a car driving at unsafe speeds and

initiated a high-speed chase. He pursued a car from less populated areas at extremely high

speeds, well over 100 miles per hour, into a populated area, until the car finally hit a restaurant

and then crashed into a light pole in the restaurant parking lot. No discipline or retraining was

issued or conducted after this obviously life-threatening dangerous behavior.

155. In January 2020, Deputy Stump chased yet another fleeing suspect in a populated

area at such a reckless rate of speed that he lost control of his car, driving through a fence and

into a ditch, causing significant damage to the patrol car. Sheriff Sheridan found that Deputy

Stump had “failed to provide due regard for the safety of the public.” Deputy Stump was trivially

“disciplined” for this January 2020 chase – but the discipline imposed was so minor as to amount

to no discipline at all. He was given one day off with pay. No training or re-training was

provided.

156. On April 8, 2020, the day before Mr. Gifford was shot, Undersheriff Weisenhorn

disciplined Deputy Stump for “insubordination”. Specifically, she gave him a warning for being

insubordinate to supervisors, using vulgar and insulting name calling, refusing to accept help or

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learn from other deputies, refusing to obey commands of supervisors, mocking and questioning

his supervisor’s decisions.

157. Even in this “discipline,” he was commended for “doing better with trying to find

other violations on your stops … and trying to search vehicles.”

158. Undersheriff Weisenhorn’s discipline consisted of a one-day suspension, set

specifically to start the next day April 9, 2020 at 8:00 am, and to write apology letters to her and

Corporal Swanson.

159. Deputy Stump refused to sign the discipline and was clearly not stopped from

working the next day despite his suspension, as he responded to the scene with Zach Gifford.

160. Undersheriff Weisenhorn was attempting to impose discipline for Deputy

Stump’s refusing to listening to her, not following her commands, mocking and questioning her

decisions and then did not even follow the discipline she imposed, without anything being done

by her to keep this dangerous and insubordinate deputy from working as an armed officer during

his suspension.

161. On information and belief, former Sheriff Sheridan intervened in this discipline

and allowed Deputy Stump to work on the day he and Undersheriff Weisenhorn killed Zach

Gifford.

162. One of the reasons Deputy Stump’s superiors allowed his behavior to continue

unchecked was because he was well known to be the top earner for the Sheriff’s Office through

fines generated from his extensive issuance of traffic tickets, which also provided substantial

revenue that the Board of County Commissioners relied on for County expenses. Deputy Stump

was frequently praised for going “above and beyond” in his “dedication to traffic stops.”

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163. When Deputy Stump was supposed to be off under suspension for

insubordination, he and Undersheriff Weisenhorn collectively shot Mr. Gifford.

Facts Relating to Damages

164. The Estate of Zachary Gifford has suffered significant damages, entitling it to

recover its compensatory and special damages, including for death, loss of enjoyment of life, loss

of relationships, pain and suffering before death, loss of earnings based upon the probable

duration of the victim’s life had not the injury occurred, and other damages, all in amounts to be

proven at trial.

165. The Estate is also entitled to recover for the value of the Zachary Gifford’s lost

life and lost pleasure of living, including the economic, moral, and philosophical value society

places on that life, including his enjoyment of the activities of life and his expectations of life’s

future prospects.

166. The Estate of Zachary Gifford is entitled to compensation for all his pre-mortem

suffering. The final minutes of Zach Gifford’s life were intensely dominated with pain and

suffering including his consciousness of impending death.

167. Each shot is to be valued and compensated. One bullet went through his right

thoracic back, perforating the skin, subcutaneous tissues, musculature, posterolateral right rib,

right lung, and the anterior right third intercostal musculature before exiting. Another bullet

perforated the skin, subcutaneous tissues, and embedded in the muscle of his right lower back.

Another bullet entered his left lower back and perforated the skin, subcutaneous tissues, left

psoas muscle, mesentery, and the stomach before exiting. The shot that missed him undoubtedly

caused additional trauma.

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168. These bullets ripped through his muscles, organs, and bones, causing

extraordinary pain and existential fear. The bullet that went through his lung caused horrible

suffering and difficulty breathing.

169. Mr. Gifford had considerable blood loss as he lay in the field and undoubtedly

suffered severe fear, dread, pain, and sadness, as he died asking the officers to tell his parents

that he loved them.

170. The Estate of Zachary Gifford is also entitled to compensation for his loss of his

many loving relationships for the period of his expected normal mortality table life span.

171. Zach Gifford was a man “well-met and well-liked.” He was a much loved and

valued member of his community. The outpouring of grief from his community evidences the

deep relationships that he lost.

172. More particularly, his estate’s loss of consortium damages encompasses the loss

of his relationships with his mother, his father, his siblings, Joshua Gifford and Noah Gifford, his

niece and nephews, and with numerous persons in his community, including his girlfriend Sherri

Linn Boulcher, as he had an intrinsically significant relational interest with each of them.

173. Below are pictures of Mr. Gifford alone and with his family:

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174. Zach Gifford’s mother has written about her son: “I love how much you grew to

love serving others. You were such a people person, bringing joy and laughter wherever you

went. In all your days you never changed.” His closeness with his mother was known to

everyone who knew them. He was so in tune with his mother that she could not stop stuttering

for months after he was killed.

175. Zach Gifford’s father describes his son as “always smiling, inquisitive,

industrious, always exploring and sometimes challenging Son.” His closeness with his father was

known to everyone that knew them.

176. Zach Gifford also had very close relationships with numerous members of the

community.

177. The day after his death, the local movie theater placard read “Zach” in honor of

his life and his work to help renovate the theater:

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178. The local community was outraged by this abuse of police power. There was an

outpouring of love in support of Mr. Gifford and his family – underscoring the depth and

veracity of the relationships he lost. Dozens of community members wrote descriptions of Mr.

Gifford.

179. Sherri Linn Boulcher has stated: “I could seriously go on forever about Zach and

his loving gentle kind family that he adored. He had a fun and close relationship with his mother.

. . His true idol was his father… I know he wished he was living closer to his brothers. . .but he

was extremely proud of them and loved them so much! His niece and nephews though they truly

held his heart.”

180. The current Mayor of Eads, Mayor Joseph Shields, described Mr. Gifford as

follows: “[H]e was definitely a people person and was always jovial, his outlook was positive

and he enjoyed life and the people around him.… He worked tirelessly and was constantly

focused on doing the best job possible. If you needed anything and he possessed it, it was yours.

He was always respectful to people and I believe that he bore no animosity to anyone. Zach

enjoyed life and I can’t remember seeing him when he was not smiling. To Zach, family was

everything and the feeling was reciprocated. He not only had his family by birth but he had an

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extended family of the Eads Community and all of the people he met and with whom he

associated. . .”

181. Eads Municipal Judge Campbell, also a former Deputy Sheriff of Hidalgo

County, spoke for the community and for the Estate of Zachary Gifford when he said, “Zach

Gifford’s life mattered.”

182. Zachary Gifford was known for always helping others. He loved working as a

handyman and living in a way he could support. He took great joy, pleasure and satisfaction from

his work including his service of others and from doing the many things and activities he loved.

183. As his Pastor Brett Ransom put it: “I don’t remember a time seeing Zach without

a smile on his face. He was truly a blessing to be around. He had a servant’s heart. . .”

184. His friend Jamie Crockett said this:

You could write a book of essays totaling 100,000 words from people in the
community that Zach would help. I literally think it was against his nature to not
take advantage of every single opportunity he saw to help someone out. He was
the type of guy that would run across the street just to hold the door open for a
total stranger when he wasn’t even going into the store that they were entering.
He would mow lawns for elderly towns people just because. He would volunteer
hours a day, for months to help build the stage that would be used for multiple
events in the community. From graduations, to summer concerts and fair dances,
Zach was always there to help set up and tear down the stage. To my knowledge
he never was paid for the community work. He simply gave off his time, working
as hard for nothing as he would for pay.

185. His brother Joshua Gifford wrote: “He will not see the influence he had on his

niece & nephews. He will not be there when I need his help again. He will not hear how proud of

him I am. His opportunities for influence are gone, his craftsmanship resides in jobs done and

jobs unfinished, his hope to transform aged wood into art sits in his shed, his quiet serving and

giving to the community has been stolen, his wisdom and laughter have silenced, his future has

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been shot in the back.”

186. Mr. Gifford’s Estate has suffered damages for his loss of life, including his lost

pleasure, enjoyment, and future prospects over a normal period of mortality.

187. Zach Gifford liked climbing, hiking, fishing, golf, wrestling and pool among other

sports and had many skills. He enjoyed music and art. He enjoyed creating and working with his

hands.

188. Here are examples of his art:

189. In his world, he was a huge player, known, beloved, admired, friended and now

greatly missed by all. While he struggled with addiction, this was only an aspect of this man, and

did not alter his many enjoyments and pleasure with life.

190. Mr. Gifford’s Estate has suffered economic damages for his lost income and for

the value of his lost economic benefits and services that he provided to his community in

amounts still being ascertained.

191. Zach Gifford was a very hard worker and while he did work for needier others for

free, he also made money from his many handyman jobs. He was a general handyman, skilled at

plumbing, tree trimming, home repairs, and construction. He was very skilled at gardening and

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landscaping, working for years in the family business in Eads. He was good with computers and

technology.

192. The Estate of Zachary Gifford is also entitled to punitive damages against

individual Defendants, in that their actions were taken maliciously, willfully and with a reckless

and wanton disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

193. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988, pre-

judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.

V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Fourth Amendment Violation - Excessive Force Resulting in Death
(Estate of Zachary Gifford Against Individual Defendants Weisenhorn, Stump and Sheridan)

194. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

195. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:

Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
constitution and law shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other appropriate proceeding for redress . . .

196. Zachary Gifford was a citizen of the United States and Defendants Undersheriff

Weisenhorn and Deputy Stump are persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

197. Defendant Undersheriff Weisenhorn, at all times relevant hereto, was acting under

the color of state law in her capacity as the Undersheriff for Kiowa County.

198. Defendant Deputy Stump, at all times relevant hereto, was acting under the color

of state law in his capacity as a Deputy Sheriff for Kiowa County.

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199. At the time of the complained of events, Zach Gifford had a clearly established

constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from pretextual unjustified

detentions and searches of his person.

200. At the time of the complained of events, Zach Gifford had a clearly established

constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be secure in his person from unreasonable

seizure and death through excessive force.

201. Specifically, it has been clearly established since at least 1985 that it violates the

Fourth Amendment to use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon, let alone a mere misdemeanant

suspect, when the officer does not have probable cause (a reasonable basis supported by the

totality of the circumstances) to believe the suspect then posed a significant threat of death or

serious physical harm to the officer(s) or any other person. As the Supreme Court explained in

Tennessee v. Garner, it is not better that all fleeing suspects die than that they escape.

202. Any reasonable law enforcement officer knew or should have known of these

clearly established rights at the time of Mr. Gifford’s death.

203. Prior to the use of force, Mr. Gifford’s right to be free from unconstitutional

searches was violated when he was ordered out of the truck without a reasonable suspicion that

he was engaged in criminal activity, when the officers conducted a pat down without harboring

an articulable and reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, and when Deputy

Stump searched parts of Mr. Gifford’s pants that he knew could not contain a weapon and with

the sole purpose of looking for drugs.

204. Defendants Weisenhorn and Stump then seized Mr. Gifford by means of

objectively unreasonable and excessive, deadly force when they shot him to death without

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having probable cause to believe Mr. Gifford posed an immediate significant threat of harm to

either of them or the public. Defendants Weisenhorn and Stump did not have a legally valid basis

to seize Mr. Gifford in the manner and with the level of force used under the circumstances

present. The decision to employ deadly force by shooting Mr. Gifford in the back multiple times

and killing him as a proximate cause and result was excessive force under the circumstances.

205. Any reasonable officer in their position would have known that it was

unreasonable to use deadly force under the totality of the circumstances and that to do so would

violate Mr. Gifford’s clearly established constitutional rights.

206. These Defendants were engaged in a collective use of deadly force and are jointly

liable for all damages resulting from that force.

207. These Defendants also failed to intervene in each other’s use of deadly force,

despite opportunity to do so.

208. Defendants Weisenhorn’s and Stump’s actions were motivated by malice and/or

involved reckless or callous indifference to Mr. Gifford’s federally protected rights, and these

Defendants engaged in these actions and omissions intentionally, willfully, and/or wantonly, and

a reckless disregard for Mr. Gifford’s constitutionally protected rights.

Individual Supervisory Liability

209. Defendant Sheridan is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

210. Defendant former Sheriff Sheridan, at all times relevant hereto, was acting under

the color of state law in his capacity as the Sheriff of Kiowa County.

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211. Former Sheriff Sheridan was personally involved in the described retention,

training, policy setting, disciplinary decisions and hiring related to Deputy Stump and others in

the KCSO.

212. Defendant Sheridan was deliberately indifferent in setting and implementing an

unconstitutional de facto policy for Kiowa County Sheriff’s Office in the form of a tolerated,

condoned, and wide-spread custom, habit and practice of using deadly force to seize fleeing

suspects, even where the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the suspect was an

immediate threat of danger to the officers or the public.

213. Defendant Sheridan was repeatedly deliberately indifferent in training and re-

training Sheriff’s Office employees, including Deputy Stump, on the appropriate use of deadly

force.

214. Defendant Sheridan was deliberately indifferent in disciplining and failing to

discipline or terminate Deputy Stump for his reckless and unconstitutional police practices.

215. Defendant Sheridan knew that his acts or omissions were substantially certain to

cause KCSO patrol officers, including Defendant Weisenhorn and Defendant Stump, to violate

individual’s constitutional rights to be free from excessive deadly force, and yet he consciously

and/or deliberately chose to disregard this risk of harm in adhering to this policy, custom or

practice of failing to require, train, or supervise officers in the office to use deadly force against

fleeing suspects within constitutional limits, and/or deliberately chose not to provide adequate

training to KCSO officers in this area.

216. The deliberate indifference of former Sheriff Sheridan is affirmatively linked to

the constitutional violation at issue.

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217. Defendant Sheridan set in motion a series of events that he knew would cause an

individual in a similar situation as Mr. Gifford to be deprived of the constitutional right to be free

from excessive force at the hands of law enforcement. But for the above acts or omissions of

Defendant Sheridan, Mr. Gifford would not have been subject to a violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights, and such deprivation was a proximate cause and a natural and foreseeable

consequence of these acts and omissions.

218. As a result of the acts and omissions of Defendants Weisenhorn, Stump, and

Sheridan, Plaintiff Estate has suffered the above alleged injuries, damages and losses, including

the death of Zachary Gifford, entitling it to recover his compensatory and special damages, also

including the value of loss of his constitutional rights, loss of life and pleasure of living, pain and

suffering before death, lost economic benefits and services that he provided to his community,

lost earnings and earnings capacity for the expected productive working lifetime of Zachary

Gifford under the mortality tables, loss of consortium, and other damages recoverable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, all in amounts to be proven at trial.

219. Plaintiff Estate has also incurred special damages in the form of funeral expenses.

220. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.

221. In addition to compensatory, economic, consequential, and special damages,

Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against Defendants Weisenhorn, Stump, and Sheridan in

that the actions were taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the

constitutional rights of Plaintiff.

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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Monell Liability
4th Amendment
(Plaintiff Against Defendants BOCC and Sheriff Frazee)

222. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

223. The above listed instances and conduct reveal that, at the time of the incident,

Defendants had a policy, practice, habit and custom of authorizing, condoning and tolerating

officers to use deadly force against fleeing suspects to stop them from fleeing, regardless of the

crime they were wanted for and without regard to having probable cause to reasonably believe

the suspect posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or others

at the times deadly force was deployed.

224. Kiowa County Defendants were also on express notice that using excessive force

to stop fleeing suspects was a widespread problem in the department involving at least half of its

force. This practice, habit and custom was widespread and constituted the de facto policy of the

County Defendants.

225. Kiowa County Defendants were deliberately indifferent in failing to properly

train, supervise, and discipline its employees, including Undersheriff Weisenhorn, and Deputy

Stump with respect to the Constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force.

226. Kiowa County Defendants also knew “to a moral certainty that their police

officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons” and other suspects in the execution of their

official law enforcement duties. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). The

County armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, in

light of the duties and responsibilities of KCSO officers who are recurringly called on to arrest

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fleeing suspects, the need for more or different training of the deputies in Kiowa County

regarding the limitations on the constitutional use of force against fleeing suspects was so

obvious that repeatedly failing to do so was deliberately indifferent.

227. The unconstitutional searches that took place during the stop of Mr. Morrell and

Mr. Gifford were also part of a custom, habit, practice and the training of Kiowa County. As

discussed above, even in the discipline Deputy Stump was given the day before this shooting, he

was commended for “doing better with trying to find other violations on your stops… and trying

to search vehicles.” Using stops pretextually to find other violations, and “trying to search”

vehicles without regard for probable cause for a search, was a practice openly encouraged by the

Sheriff’s Department and even commended the day before the overreaching, unconstitutional

search of Zach Gifford turned deadly.

228. County Defendants were also deliberately indifferent in failing to discipline or

retrain Deputy Stump after repeated unconstitutional uses of deadly force despite being on notice

of the need for such discipline and instead made clear to him, to Defendant Weisenhorn and

others, that such behavior was tolerated, authorized, and condoned.

229. Defendants’ deliberately indifferent policies, customs, habits, practices, training,

discipline, retention, and supervision were all a moving force and proximate cause of the

violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

230. Kiowa County Defendants are also liable for the acts of its delegated final

decision makers, including Undersheriff Weisenhorn’s actions on April 9, 2020, as she was a

final decision-maker.

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231. At all relevant times, Defendant Sheridan was a final policymaker for the County

Defendants such that his acts and omissions represent the County’s official policy, and in that

capacity, he established and implemented policies, customs, training, and discipline for the

KCSO.

232. Kiowa County Defendants also ratified the shooting of Mr. Gifford by knowing of

the conduct and approving its basis.

233. As a result of the acts and omissions of complained of herein, Plaintiff Estate has

suffered injuries, damages and losses as set forth more fully in the statement of facts, including

the death of Zachary Gifford, entitling it to recover his compensatory and special damages,

including the value of loss of his constitutional rights, loss of life and pleasure of living, pain and

suffering before death, lost economic benefits and services that he provided to his community,

lost earnings and earnings capacity for the expected productive working lifetime of Zachary

Gifford under the mortality tables, loss of consortium, and other damages recoverable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, all in amounts to be proven at trial.

234. Plaintiff Estate has also incurred special damages in the form of funeral expenses.

235. Plaintiff is further entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1988, pre-judgment interest and costs as allowable by federal law.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff prays that this Court enter judgment for the Plaintiff and against each of the

Defendants and grant:

A. Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for the value of

Zachary Gifford’s life, his loss of enjoyment and pleasure of life, his pre death
pain and suffering, his loss of relationships and consortium on all claims, and as
allowed by 42 U.S.C §1983 to effectuate its remedial purposes in amounts to be

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determined at trial;

B. Economic losses including lost future earnings and the value of Zachary Gifford’s
services on all claims allowed by law;

C. Special damages in an amount to be determined at trial;

D. Punitive damages on all federal claims allowed by law against individual

Defendants in amounts to be determined at trial;

E. Attorneys’ fees and the costs associated with this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

F. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and,

G. Any other appropriate relief at law and equity that this Court deems just and
proper.

PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL BY JURY.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of October, 2021.

/s/ John R. Holland

John R. Holland
/s/ Anna Holland Edwards
Anna Holland Edwards
Erica Grossman
Dan Weiss
Rachel Kennedy
HOLLAND, HOLLAND EDWARDS & GROSSMAN, LLC
1437 High Street
Denver, CO 80218
303-860-1331
[email protected]

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