VIGEYE VANI

Quarterly Newsletter
Central Vigilance Commission
January to March 2016
 From the Lecture Series under the
Commission's Knowledge Management Initiative

Shri Shashi Kant Sharma, Comptroller and Auditor General of India interacts with audience on 27.01.2016

Shri Bibek Debroy, Member, NITI AAYOG interacts with audience on 30.12.2015
From the Editor's Desk

T. M. Bhasin
Vigilance Commissioner
Guest Editor

I am happy to accept the request of the Editorial Board of VIGEYE VANI to share my thoughts on prevention of frauds through
this guest editorial.
Commercial and Financial Frauds are not new to mankind. As early as in the 3rd century BC, Kautilya had in his treatise
“ARTHASHASTRA”, detailed forty ways of embezzlement that can be committed by a public servant; along with penalties for
commission of such frauds and rewards for detection and disclosure of frauds.
According to the definition in the Indian Penal Code (IPC); “Fraud is any behaviour by which one person intends to gain a
dishonest advantage over another.”
RBI guidelines state that; “Fraud is a deliberate act of omission or commission by any person, carried out in the course of a
banking transaction or in the books of accounts maintained manually or under Computer System in banks, resulting into
wrongful gain to any person for a temporary period or otherwise, with or without monetary loss to the bank.”
IT Act (2000) states that; “Any criminal activity that uses a computer either as an instrumentality, target or means for
perpetrating further crimes come within the ambit of Cyber Crime.”
In simple words we can say that fraud is a criminal act backed by a criminal intention, resulting in a financial gain to the
fraudster or for his intended beneficiaries, thus causing loss to an individual or a group of people or to the
Government/Exchequer.
Lack of awareness and non-adherence to laid down systems and procedures; deficient training, grooming and lack of
updation of skill sets in the ever changing work environment; and lack of monitoring of the flash points emanating from the
system lead to commission of frauds.
Fraud is like a serious disease. Once diagnosed, treatment must start without wasting time and the first step in this direction is
investigating internally as to what went wrong and plugging the loopholes to avoid recurrence of such acts. In large number of
cases there is procrastination in declaring a fraud, owing to accountability and accounting issues. Delayed acknowledgement
of fraud is detrimental to the financial health of concerned organisation as also to the financial system. If launch of prescribed
criminal/other actions are delayed, it facilitates the perpetrators of the fraud to successfully siphon off a substantial part of the
assets and even go absconding. Hence, it is important to identify and declare a fraud in time and proceed with recovery
efforts, money trail, forensic audit and if required, using the expertise of detective agencies for identification of assets of
fraudsters, to get them attached through courts to recover the lost money.
It is generally stated that Investigative and Punitive Vigilance is painful, demotivating and demoralising. During the year
2015-16 special emphasis is being laid on “Preventive Vigilance ” by the CVC and all Central Govt. organisations.
Central Vigilance Commission has been exhorting the Central Govt. Departments, Ministries, PSUs, PSB, PSEs and the Govt.
undertakings, to take effective steps to thwart attempts at frauds in a proactive manner, so as to minimise, if not eliminate, the
likely losses to the exchequer on this account.
Mitigating fraud risk calls for a comprehensive approach including change in the mindset.
The Commission is continuously encouraging Central Govt. organisations to fine tune the work processes, standardisation of
reporting systems, updation and revision of Circulars, Manuals and Information Booklets; putting more and more information
in public domain through websites, intranet for easy access. Commission is also playing an active role in sharing and adoption
of Industry Best Practices in elimination of frauds.
I am sure this special issue of VIGEYE VANI will make an interesting reading, offer a lot of intelligent learning and help all of us
to make our organisations strong, vibrant, resilient and FRAUD PROOF.

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From the Archives

The Union Minister of State for Home, Shri O.M. Mehta addressing the
Chief Vigilance Officers, New Delhi, February 12, 1976

Source: “The Untiring Eye” published on the Golden Jubilee of CVC

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Preventive Vigilance
Vijay Dube
CVO, State Bank of Mysore

Systemic improvements in Preventive Vigilance areas - Effective check / control on

incidents of frauds
' LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP ' is an adage that we all have heard and this emphasis on deliberating
on our actions and their consequences before moving forward is an important philosophy that
every public servant should understand and follow. Thus, Preventive Vigilance should be the corner
stone of all thoughts and actions of a public servant.

In the competitive scenario prevailing today, Public Sector Banks (PSBs) work in an environment that
is fraught with risk, both under credit and operational areas. Although the PSBs are adopting
various preventive vigilance measures over the years, the advancement of technology and
increasing competition has multiplied the risk they are facing. Towards this end, constant review of
guidelines, instructions, simplification of systems and procedures and up -gradation of technology
etc., as systemic improvement in preventive vigilance areas are required to be taken up on priority.

The following are some suggestions that would bring in systemic improvements in preventive
vigilance areas:

1. Deficiencies pointed out in Surprise Inspections, Audit Reports and CAG : Many a
times, the inspecting officials bring out irregularities in various areas of functioning and a critical
analysis of these observations is required to initiate preventive steps in the highlighted areas of
deficiencies. We could bring about more meaningful improvements by focusing on areas such as
systems/procedures, IT systems, Integration and data flow etc.

2. ABC Analysis: In the present days diversified /complex banking scenario a constant review
of existing Systems and Procedures including manuals and identifying vulnerable areas on a
dynamic basis are a must. An ABC analysis through categorization of functional areas may be
taken up as under –
A – Most Vulnerable
B – Vulnerable
C – Less Vulnerable

The focus of course should be more towards 'A' Category functional area.

3. Wilful default – a criminal offence: It is no secret that Banking Sector as a whole is saddled
with high value NPA accounts involving high profile borrowers who have taken away thousands of
crores of lendable resources besides adversely affecting the income / profit portfolios of the banks.

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Under the RBI norms issued in July 2012, a wilful default is said to have happened
l when either a borrower has not paid the bank even if he is in the capacity to repay,
l when the funds sanctioned by the bank have been diverted by the borrower for other
purposes,
l when the borrower has siphoned off funds sanctioned by the bank or
l when the borrower, without knowledge of the lender, has disposed of the property or moveable
assets which were pledged for availing the loan.

Every such wilful default for the reasons mentioned above, should be made a criminal offence to
have a deterrent effect on misuse / diversion of funds by high profile borrowers.
4. Action against Chartered Accountants / Credit Rating Agencies/ Advocates /
Valuers' etc., (For providing wrong certification/ rating): A notable feature of huge NPAs
faced by Banks, at present, is that the companies rated as 'AAA' by External Credit Rating Agency
(ECRA) were downgraded to 'D' within a short span of time. Similarly, many cases of frauds have
been detected where, the companies submitted manipulated financials /Balance Sheets certified by
Chartered Accountants and also got their properties overvalued which enabled them to avail
substantial financial assistance from PSBs. In such cases, when the account turns into NPA /
identified as fraud, these third party entities often get away without any punitive action. The general
experience is that the concept of 'Self regulation” under which these professionals work has not
been very effective in the past. Hence, punitive criminal action for wrong certification / rating will
certainly act as a deterrent on such collusions by third party entities.

5. Credit Proposals - Approval of deviations: There are instances where credit proposals
belonging to high profile companies / individuals were received by PSBs which requires prior
approval of the competent authority for approval of the deviations in credit policy. The powers to
approve such policy deviations in the credit proposals without any upper cap /ceiling as of now
are vested with the Board level committees.

For example: There is an instance where approval was accorded by the Board level committees with
the following policy deviation in the credit proposal:
l Debt/ Equity ratio more than 100:1 against the norm of 2:1 implying the borrower is highly
overleveraged
l Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of 0.50 : 1 against the norm of 1.5:1 implying that the
revenue generation is just 50% of the loan instalment and interest to be repaid

It later transpired that the account turned into NPA and one of the reasons attributed was that the
company was already in the debt trap and 'approval of deviation' by the Board level committees
should have been avoided. Therefore, there is a need for bringing a cap /upper ceiling for approval
of deviations to be prescribed even for Board level committees.

6. The Forensic Audit capability to be improved: In view of large number of high-value

NPAs/ Frauds coming to light, there is a need for forensic audit of accounts. Forensic Audits
undertaken by private audit firms have not been effective. These firms often charge exorbitant fees

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without concomitant benefit to the banks. Therefore, the Forensic Audit capability of CBI needs to be
improved. This becomes all the more important in view of RBI guidelines with reference to 'Red
Flagged Accounts'. The CBI may also take Bank staff (Chartered Accountants) on deputation, which
would improve the quality of investigations by bringing in more domain expertise.

It is also suggested that teams of bank officers may similarly be trained in Investigations (by the
investigating agencies) so that their Forensic Audit capabilities can also be harnessed/ made use of
by the respective Banks for their immediate and emergent needs.

7. Cross-deputation: The system of cross-deputation of vigilance/ investigating officers (Scale

III/ IV) from other PSBs can be put in place in line with the cross deputation methodology currently
being followed for CVO's. This should bring in arms-length relationship, objectivity in investigation
and strengthen the support structure available to CVO's thus enabling them to take improved
decisions.

8. Diversion of Sale Proceeds by Borrowers: It is observed that in most of the cases, the
borrowers have opened Current Accounts in other banks outside the consortium / multiple lending
arrangements and diverted the sales proceeds resulting in the account becoming NPAs for the
lending member institutions. The Public Sector Banks (PSBs) are finding it difficult to obtain the
required information on diversion of funds from the Private Sector Banks / Foreign Sector Banks
especially in respect of high value credit limits. This is due to the non-cooperation on the part of these
banks, citing confidentiality of customer relationship. Therefore, sharing of information with Public
Sector Banks, especially in case of recalcitrant/ defaulting borrowers, should be made mandatory.
All banks, irrespective of the sector (public/ private/ foreign) deal with public money and defaulting
borrowers are a threat to the entire economy of a country. Hence, a suitable modification /
amendment to Banking Secrecy clause, if required, may obviate this problem.

9. Fraud in one Bank to be treated as a Fraud in all member banks: A fraud involves the
basic concept of 'mens rea' – hence a borrower who has been found to have committed fraud at one
of the member banks of a consortium would automatically have the preponderance of committing
fraud with other member banks also, though there may be a time lag. Currently, individual member
banks are focusing on accounting entries in their books of accounts before declaring the account as
fraud (though they are members of the same consortium/ multiple lending) and not considering a
holistic view of the borrower being fraudulent.

A study has revealed that there is considerable delay in declaring the account as fraud between the
members of consortium. The delay between the first and the last bank in declaring the account as
fraud could be as long as 24 months. Hence, fraud in one bank should be automatically treated as
fraud in all member banks. This would facilitate lodging of complaint with CBI and initiation of
concerted recovery measures without loss of time. It has been seen that the delay is mis-utilized by
borrowers for asset stripping.

10. Issues faced after Sale of Assets to ARCs: There are instances where fraud has been
detected in a borrowal account after the sale of assets to Asset Recovery Companies (ARC).
However, banks are reluctant to declare the account as fraud out of fear that this would jeopardize
the likely recovery prospects by the ARC, besides creating legal complications.

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The issue that needs to be understood is that 'Sale to ARC' is not an absolute sale ie the Banks
continue to retain the risk of loss of funds unless the ARCs are able to find a suitable buyer for the
assets and redeem the security receipts. Hence, any delay/ non-disclosure of fraud, subsequent to
'sale' to ARC, only further increases the pain for the bank since it continues to pay defined
'maintenance fee' to the ARCs for an asset that does not exist/ is fraudulent. Thus, the Bank
continues to 'throw good money after bad'. Further, any delay in declaration of fraud will have its
adverse impact on the recovery from assets already assigned, part of which may be genuine.

In view of the above, clear directions are required for further course of action in all such cases
where fraud is detected / declared subsequent to 'assignment of assets to ARCs'.

11. Job Rotation for staff members: In many frauds that have come to light, it is found that staff
members who indulged in fraud appeared to be very sincere workers and always helpful to the
superiors / customers. They had not availed any leave over the years. Therefore, ensuring availment
of leave at periodical intervals by all staff members, leading to automatic job rotation, is seen as one
of the most important preventive vigilance measures. Despite clear instructions from RBI, the
implementation of availing mandatory Leave by the staff has not been ensured in many Banks.
Enforcement of the same is required.

12. Access of Income/ Sales/ Tax details to Bankers: It has been experienced that fraudulent
borrowers maintain multiple books of accounts to defraud the banks. However, in general, they are
particular about submitting the correct figures to the tax authorities as they do not want to be on the
wrong side of the tax officials due to the likely stringent criminal penalties. In contrast, the bank
cases, if filed, take years of litigation by which time the borrower strips all her/his assets.

Hence, if a provision is made to inter-link the Income Tax/ Sales Tax / VAT web-sites and access
made available to Bankers so that all the details such as IT /ST / VAT details can be verified at one
instance, it would drastically reduce the probabilities of incidence of frauds, as the manipulation in
figures/ data submitted by potentially fraudulent borrowers gets immediately detected.

It should be remembered that Banks are dealing with public money and any loss to Banks has a
ripple effect across the economy including higher interest rates, non-availability of credit to genuine
borrowers etc which directly affects the growth of the country.

13. Moral Suasion of Corporate borrowers by Chambers of Commerce: It is common to

see high profile individuals / Corporate clients who despite having their accounts under NPA status
(with several Banks), continue to enjoy preferential treatment / attention and various benefits at
Chambers of Commerce. The Chambers of Commerce play an important role in development of a
rule based corporate culture in the country. Hence, in order to bring in value based corporate
norms, such unwarranted preferences / benefits to these high profile wilful defaulters should be
avoided by prevailing upon the Chambers of Commerce for Moral Suasion.

14. Allocation of Unique Property ID: A large number of frauds have been perpetrated in
housing loans and other loans against immovable properties, through submission of fake title-
deeds, fake or multiple mortgages etc. Though, the centralized CERSAI database developed for
registering the charge on immovable properties which have been assigned to banks, the

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registration process is handicapped, in the absence of a unique property identification number in
the country, as no data validation is taking place whenever any property is registered. This defeats
the very purpose of having a centralized database as multiple mortgages can be registered on the
same immovable property in the database.

Hence, it is suggested to allocate a Unique Property ID for every property (especially residential
property) in the country which would be of immense help to the Bankers by eliminating the risk of
fraud through multiple mortgages.

15. Verification of Information submitted by Borrowers: The power of the internet should be
harnessed effectively by the bankers. There are several web sites which can be browsed for
verification of KYC documents / other vital information on the existing clientele / borrowers.
These websites should be made more familiar so that the due diligence part is taken care of at the
initial stage of loan processing itself.

Some of the important websites are as under:

Sl.No. Name of website for What to be verified

document verification
1 https://incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in-> PAN – of the borrower- of the employer
Select your jurisdictional A.O. as per Form -16
2 https://incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in-> TAN– of the borrower
Select know your TAN - of the employer as per Form -16
3 https://www.tinxsys.com/TinxsysInternet TIN of the borrower
4 https://cbeceasiest.gov.in/EST Service tax registration of borrower
5 https://contents.tdscpc.gov.in/ Verify with 7 digit certificate number on
form 16 (Non-traces) check with the
employer /deductor. Probe deeply
6a https://incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in -> Income tax return electronically filed by
Select-> ITR-V Receipt Status the borrower.
6b Income Tax Return filed manually at ITO Probe deeply–CA's certificate cross
verification
6c If income tax return shows tax as payable, please obtain & verify TAX paid challans.
7 MCA website - Ministry of Corporate Affairs To verify Financial Statements;
Registration of Charge details; Minutes of
Annual General Body meeting; Change
of Directors etc
8 " Aadhaar Verification Services" at http:/ Checking of a keyed-in 12 digit number of
resident.uidai.net.in/aadhaar verification Aadhaar data base & other particulars.
9 http://www.icai.org/new_post. To verify the details of Chartered
html?post_id=1812&c_id=92 Accountants who have audited/ verified
the submitted documents

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16. Aggregated data for Identifying Commonality of Interest: There is a need to develop a
website that would provide aggregated information on individuals listing the details of companies
where an individual is a Director, based on her/ his DIN number. Similarly, aggregated information
on the various group/ associate/sister concerns of a company based on say, CIN number is
essential, since operationally there are limitations in identifying the group concerns as defined in
terms of RBI guiding principle “being commonality of management and effective control”. Hence an
aggregated holistic view would ease the work of all bankers/ investors who need the information on
group concerns.
17. Joint Credit Auditors Forum: Every Bank has an internal system of periodic Credit Audit of
high value borrowal accounts under Standard category. In the current system, the credit audit
findings/ irregularities are in disaggregated forms with each credit auditor having access to the
books of accounts/ transactions of her/his respective bank in the consortium. Hence, an aggregate
view of irregularities and inter-bank movement of funds is not available to the consortium members.
Though, the operational/ branch functionaries of consortium members do meet at periodic
intervals, their focus is more on business development.
Therefore, there is a need for a regular meet of Credit Auditors in case of Standard category
accounts also, to have an effective insight into every aspect of a borrowal account such as
deficiencies in appraisal / sanction / conduct and compliance to terms of sanction. This would work
as an 'Early Warning Signal' for the consortium to take effective remedial steps, before the account
turns into NPA.
On similar lines, the Chief Vigilance Officers' meet, of consortium members, also should take place
at regular intervals particularly with regard to high value NPA accounts for taking a common
approach towards identification of irregularity, staff lapses and probability of occurrence of fraud.
In conclusion, it can be said that the high level of NPAs/ frauds being faced by the Banking sector
are a drain on the overall economy and a stumbling block towards the development of the country.
A number of measures can be introduced for further strengthening the preventive vigilance aspects
by the banks. But it needs to be understood that the Banks are not the creators of NPA – in most cases
they are the victims of unscrupulous borrowers who have misused their trust and taken advantage of
legal loopholes.
Hence, there is an immediate need to strengthen the criminal justice system of the country. The
present system of prolonged judicial proceedings and repeated adjournments needs to change.
There is a saying in Hindi “Bhay bin hoe na preet”. A strong message needs to be sent to people
involved in siphoning of bank funds / indulging in fraudulent acts that they cannot get away
unpunished. This is possible only if the following are present in the judicial system:
l Certainty of Punishment l Severity of Punishment
l Timeliness of Punishment l Fairness / Uniformity of Punishment
The demonstrative effect would act as a strong deterrent to the fraudsters / habitual offenders
indulging in nefarious acts.
It is said that “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty” – a culture of preventive vigilance in which
every citizen consciously participates is the need of the hour.

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Strengthening Preventive Vigilance
Mechanism In Public Sector Banks
LVR Prasad
Advisor Banking, CVC

While being vigilant is important in all walks of life, the observance of vigilance becomes more
critical in the financial sector and particularly for institutions like banks, which deal with public
money. The watchfulness enforced by the vigilance function is required to ensure that public money,
which banks hold in fiduciary capacity, is not allowed to be misused by the delinquent elements in
any manner.
As is the case in all organisations, vigilance activity in financial institutions has to be seen as an
integral part of the managerial function. The vigilance function should not be seen as an impending
factor in the decision making process and should be viewed as internal litmus test to identify the
bonafide decisions taken in the institution, irrespective of the fact whether the decision taken has
resulted in loss to the institution or not. It is not that all decisions which result in loss to the banks are to
be viewed as decisions taken with ulterior motives but, at the same time, the banks need to go into the
merits of each decision so that actions taken with ulterior motives and without clear adherence to the
laid down procedures can be recognised, segregated and dealt with incisively.
As is well known, there are three aspects to the vigilance administration – Preventive, Punitive and
Participative (surveillance and detection). In normal course, banks are expected to work towards
strengthening preventive vigilance functions by inculcating a sense of honesty and integrity among
its employees and establishing internal systems and controls, which would act as a defence against
malafide activity. Preventive vigilance function is, perhaps the most crucial and yet, the most
challenging of the three aspects of vigilance. It is crucial because it has the potential to prevent
lapses from occurring by stemming the rot at the initial stages itself. However, it is challenging
because it needs to be a continuous exercise across all levels of the organization and demands the
focussed attention of the management. Ownership of the vigilance function should not rest merely
with the few officials manning the vigilance department; it should traverse across the length and
breadth of the organization.
Strengthening participative vigilance function encompasses reviewing the existing systems and
control, identifying lacunae and putting in place sufficient red flags so that the scope for misconduct
is minimised and transgressions are detected swiftly. One of the manifestations of the vigilance
failure is a sharp increase in the number of high value advance related frauds in the public sector
banks. There are definitional incongruities surrounding fraud and there is a need to draw a clear
distinction between a crystallization of business risk taken in normal course and a fraud. It is
generally observed more often than not, it is the failure of the credit appraisal and post disbursement
supervision processes which results in accounts becoming non-performing or being classified as
fraud.

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In the course of normal business operations, bank have to depend on many external service
providers like qualified engineers as valuers, advocates, Chartered Accountants, who are on the
banks' panel to provide various inputs to enable them to function effectively. It is quite frequently
observed that some of such external service providers, in connivance with borrowers, are
perpetrating frauds on banks, having huge financial ramifications. Therefore, it is imperative on
the part of Banks to evolve a mechanism, which on continuous basis, strengthens the process of
empanelling and reviewing the performance external service providers, so that black sheep among
them is weeded out.
The following are some Case-studies, where the frauds perpetrated on the banks,
could have been prevented by concerned officials, had they been more Vigilant:
Case I:
The branch in charge of Model branch of AAA bank, was on the look out for increasing the business
of the branch, to meet targets fixed to his branch. In the course of scouting for new business, he
came in touch with some middle men, who assured him that they would use their good offices, to get
his branch, bulk deposits sourced from different Government / Public Sector undertaking & large
corporates. In a few days they managed to get his branch, deposits to the tune of Rs. 600 crores.
The branch officials did not meet the authorized officials of the organizations, who made the
deposits. All the documents were provided by the middlemen, who sourced the business and the
deposit receipts were handed over to the middlemen for onward delivery to the beneficiaries
concerned.
Within a few weeks, the middlemen requested for loan against the deposits, by furnishing all
required documents in the name of depositor, and primafacie, all documents appeared to be in
order. The branch in-charge was very happy, as not only deposit targets, but even the advances
targets would be achieved by his branch, that too without any credit risk.
It later turned out that the loans against deposits were obtained by fraudulent means and without the
consent of the depositors and the loan proceeds were transferred to third parties. The loss to the
bank was in excess of Rs. 200 crores.
Modus-operandi:
l The branch did not make proper enquiries, while opening deposit accounts of non-personal
entities, by meeting the authorized signatory of the entity.
l Detailed scrutiny of documents related to constitution of entity / other related documents was
not done i.e effective KYC compliance was not ensured. The documents were obtained from
the middlemen and the original deposit receipts were handed over to the middle-men.
l The middle-men handed over fake deposit receipts to the beneficiaries and retained the
original receipt with them.
l Thereafter, the middle-men submitted loan documents in the name of the deposit holders, by
forging the signatures of the authorized signatories for loan against deposits. After sanction
of the loan, they got the funds transferred to new accounts opened in the name of beneficiary in
other banks and also to the credit of third parties, and siphoned off the funds in excess of
Rs. 200 crores, causing huge financial loss to the bank.

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l Though, the loans against deposits (beyond Rs. 2 crores) were sanctioned by the controlling
office, proper due diligence was not done at their end.
l The branch did not make enquiries, why a cash rich customer making huge deposists, would
require loans that too within a short period of time from the date of deposit.
l The Depositor denied having applied/taken the loan and ultimately claim had been
crystallized on the bank.
HOW THIS FRAUD COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?
l Had the branch officials carried out the KYC compliance & due diligence effectively, by visiting
the office of the customer and interacted with the authorized signatories of non-personal
entities, the fraud could have been avoided. This could have done, at least at the time of grant
of loans against the deposits, which was not carried out resulting in substantial loss to the bank.
Case II:
The branch in charge of Top-branch of BBB bank, was on the look out for increasing the Advances of
the branch, to meet targets fixed for the financial year. In the course of scouting for new business, he
came across a customer, who wanted a loan of Rs. 1crore for improving his business, and for that he
offered collateral security of vacant land, which was purported to be valued in excess of Rs. 3 crores.
The branch manager was very happy, as he was able to get new loan proposal of Rs. 1 crore, with
zero-risk due to availability of collateral security, which was three times the proposed loan amount.
By complying with all other guidelines, like getting the valuation done through panel valuer and
property -title checked through panel advocate, loan was disbursed after putting through the
mortgage transaction. The loan became bad in a very short span of period and the branch initiated
recovery proceedings. The branch could not get the amount recovered from the loanee, as he had
no intention of paying the amount and when they tried to auction the collateral security, it came to
light that its value was not more than Rs. 20 lakhs.
Modus-operandi:
l Banks depend on many external service providers like qualified valuers, advocates etc. in the
course of their business for various inputs.
l The borrower never had the intention of making payment of the loan in the first place.
l The property offered by the borrower as collateral security, was purchased by him 8 months
back at a cost of Rs. 18 lakhs and in connivance with the panel valuer, inflated the value of the
collateral security multiple times and offered the same to the bank.
HOW THIS FRAUD COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?
l The branch could have made proper due diligence on the borrower, as regards his business
instead of solely depending on the value of collateral security offered to the bank.
l A cursory glance at the sale deed would have revealed that the property was purchased at a
value of Rs. 18 lakhs 8 months back and its value would not have got multiplied to Rs. 3 crores,
in such a short span of period.

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Frauds and the
Indian Insurance Sector
Vijay Walia
GM & CVO, National Insurance Co. Ltd.

At its most basic level, fraud can be defined as a deliberate deception to secure unfair or unlawful
gain, or to deprive a victim of a legal right. At a broader level, a fraud could assume such large
proportions that it could even take the form of a 'scam'. The purpose of fraud may be to get
monetary gain or some other benefits (such as obtaining a credit card or a housing loan by way of
false statements and/or documents).

Insurance fraud
Insurance fraud has existed since the beginning of insurance as a commercial enterprise. Insurance
fraud is any act committed with the intent to obtain a fraudulent outcome from an insurance process.
This may occur when a claimant attempts to obtain some benefit or advantage to which they are not
otherwise entitled, or when an insurer knowingly denies some benefit that is due. The fraud could be
of three types:
l Policyholder/claims fraud - Fraud against the insurer in the purchase and/or execution of
an insurance product, including fraud at the time of making a claim.
l Intermediary fraud - Fraud perpetuated by an insurance agent/corporate agent/
intermediary/ Third Party Administrator (TPA) against the insurer and/or policyholders.
l Internal fraud - Fraud/mis-appropriation against the insurer by its management/staff.

Hard vs. soft fraud - Insurance fraud can also be classified as either hard fraud or soft fraud. Hard
fraud occurs when someone deliberately plans or invents a loss, such as a collision, auto theft, or fire
that is covered by their insurance policy in order to receive payment for damages. Soft fraud, which
is far more common than hard fraud, is sometimes also referred to as opportunistic fraud. This type
of fraud consists of policyholders exaggerating otherwise-legitimate claims, eg. when involved in
an automotive collision an insured person might claim more damage than actually occurred. Life
insurance fraudsters may even fake death to claim life insurance.

Broad categories of fraud risks in the insurance sector

Misrepresentation: Misrepresenting critical information relating to a profile (incorrect income,
educational qualification, occupation, etc), eg. the proposal form mentions that a client had a shop
in the market, whereas investigations reveal that the client was a footpath vendor.

Forgery or tampering documents: Forging the customer's signature in any document, proposal or
any supporting document, eg. a fake police report regarding an accident.

Bogus business: Proposal forms submitted for non-existent customers, eg. an agent or broker logs in
a proposal of a non-existing client to generate commission.

12
Cash defalcation: Agent collecting the premium but not remitting the cheque to the insurance
company, owing to which the insured has no coverage, eg. the agent collects the premium and
pockets it; it comes to the insurer's notice only when he gets a lapsation letter.

Mis-selling: A selling practice wherein the complete, detailed and factual information of a product is
not given to the customer (also called product misinformation), eg. the customer is given a lower
cover than he deserved for the amount of premium paid.

Pre-signed forms: Obtaining pre-signed blank forms and filling the details without actually
physically seeing the client or satisfying oneself about the client or his premises/machinery etc., eg.
handing over a pre-signed cover note insuring a vehicle whose previous policy has already expired.

Doctor's nexus: Doctor being involved with the perpetrators in committing life insurance fraud, eg. a
doctor giving a clean medical report to a fraudster who influenced him for the same.

An overview of the Indian insurance industry

Presently, the insurance industry of India consists of 52 insurance companies of which 24 are in life
insurance business and 28 are non-life insurers. Highlights of the business of life and general
insurance companies in India, are given in the table below:

Insurance business in India, 2014-15

Life insurance General Insurance
Position of: Public Private Public Private
sector sector sector sector
Premium underwritten (Rs Cr) 239668 88433 42549 35090
New policies issued (lakhs) 202 57 678 505
No. of offices 4877 6156 8207 2200
Benefits paid/net incurred claims (Rs Cr) 144125 67054 31568 19430

Frauds by major general insurance sectors

Health care frauds - Health insurance is one of the fastest growing and major areas of general
insurance business. A fraud can be committed either by an insured person or by a health care
provider. It could consist of claims on behalf of ineligible members and/or dependents, alterations
on enrollment forms, concealing pre-existing conditions, failure to report other coverage,
prescription drug fraud, and failure to disclose claims that were a result of a previous or a work-
related injury.

The most common perpetrators of healthcare insurance fraud are Third Party Administrators (TPAs)
and hospitals. Besides adopting the abovementioned methods, they may also bill insurers for
treatments that are not covered by the patient's insurance policy.

Motor insurance – This type of insurance is another major area of non-life business. Fraudsters may
use a motor vehicle to stage an accident with an innocent party or simply show a vehicle which has
suffered an accident before inception of a policy as having taken place during the duration of a
13
fraudulently issued/back dated policy. In India, hundreds of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
(MACT) cases are clogging the courts with lakhs in claims being filed every year (as per one study
about 4 lakh new cases are added every year). About Rs 4000 Cr was paid as compensation by the
four Public Sector General Insurance Companies through Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT)
etc. for the claims lodged, as far back as in 2008-09. It may be much more now.

Property insurance - Possible motivations for this can include obtaining payment that is worth more
than the value of the property destroyed, or to destroy and subsequently receive payment for goods
that could not otherwise be sold. The majority of property insurance crimes involve arson.
Losses due to insurance fraud

It is hard to place an exact value on the money stolen through insurance fraud as all cases do not
come to light, unlike visible crimes such as robbery or murder. The best that can be done is to provide
an estimate. According to a newspaper interview, the MD & CEO, HDFC Ergo General Insurance
said, "Our estimate is that industry frauds are in the range of 10% of claims, which I feel is a
conservative one". According to MD, SBI General, a large chunk of frauds are also in motor
insurance.

Detecting insurance fraud

The detection of insurance fraud generally occurs in two steps. The first step is to identify suspicious
claims that have a higher possibility of being fraudulent. This can be done by computerized
statistical analysis or by referrals from claims adjusters or insurance agents. Additionally, the public
can provide tips to insurance companies, law enforcement and other organizations regarding
suspected, observed, or admitted insurance fraud perpetrated by other individuals. Regardless of
the source, the next step is to refer these claims to investigators for further analysis. Due to the sheer
number of claims submitted each day, it would be far too expensive for insurance companies to have
employees check each claim for symptoms of fraud. Instead, many companies use computers and
statistical analysis to identify suspicious claims for further investigation.

Fraud monitoring by insurance companies

The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) has issued an Insurance Fraud
Monitoring Framework (IFMF) in order to guide the implementation of measures to minimize the
vulnerability against frauds in the insurance sector, viz:

1. Anti-Fraud Policy: All insurance companies are required to have in place an Anti-Fraud
Policy containing well defined procedures for fraud monitoring, identification of potential
areas of fraud, coordinating with law enforcement agencies, framework for exchange of
information (among insurers and respective councils), due diligence, and regular
communication channels.

2. Fraud Monitoring Function: There should be a Fraud Monitoring Function to ensure effective
implementation of Anti-Fraud Policy across all lines of business. Function of fraud
monitoring should be either an independent function or merged with existing functions such
as risk, audit etc.

14
3. Risk Management Committee: The Corporate Governance guidelines mandate insurance
companies to set up a Risk Management Committee (RMC). The RMC is required to lay down
the company-wide Risk Management Strategy.

4. Periodic reporting to IRDAI: Insurance Companies need to put in place as part of Corporate
Governance Structure, Fraud detection and mitigation measures and submit Periodic reports
to the Authority. Statistics on fraudulent cases need to be reported to IRDA within 30 days of
the close of financial year.

Conclusion
Although a company cannot be 100% secure against unknown threats, a certain level of
preparedness can go a long way in countering fraud risks, limiting damages, and protecting
reputation. Today, we see a number of companies wanting to incorporate proactive fraud risk
management as compared to a few years ago. This is an encouraging sign, which indicates a
brighter future for fraud free insurance in India.

Source : cartoonstock.com

15
Commercial and Financial Frauds
in Banks: Causes & Remedies
Shri Atul Kumar
CVO, Union Bank of India

Fraud is a fundamental constant of organized human life and affects many organizations
regardless of size, location or industry. However, it becomes more complex and dynamic in
commercial organizations owing to the fact that business is all about an intricate balance between
risk and reward. Commercial Banks being financial institutions with core business of accepting of
money from public and lending the same in a profitable manner are more susceptible to such
transgressions.
History shows that fraud in one form or the other has haunted the business life for thousands of
years. Hammurabi's Babylonian Code of Laws was pronounced in 1780 BC and it deals with the
problem of fraud; “if a herdsman, to whose care cattle or sheep have been entrusted, be guilty of
fraud and make false returns of the natural increase or sell them for money, then shall he be
convicted and pay the owner ten times the loss”. Ancient economist, Kautilya, in his famous treatise
of public administration “Arthashastra” had described forty ways of embezzlement as early as in
300 BC. Kautilya had also addressed the problem of fraud not only by specifying the modes of fraud
by a public servant but also detailing the penalties for commission of such frauds and rewards for
detection and prevention of frauds. If we look closer, the roots of most of the apparently new fraud
schemes may be traced back to the Kautilya's laundry list.
Frauds in Banking sector:
The banking industry witnessed increase in number of frauds reported involving amount of more
than Rs 1 lakh per case as under;

FY No. of cases % Increase over previous year

2012-13 8,469 –
2013-14 10,170 20%
2014-15 19,361 90%
Source: Right to Information Query with Reserve Bank of India

Frauds can be broadly categorized as under:

(i) Advance related,
(ii) Technology related &
(iii) Other types of frauds viz KYC, Deposit Transactions, Money Laundering and Ponzi schemes
etc.

16
The frauds in advance related matters form the major part of all frauds reported by banks. As per a
recent survey, Advance/ Credit related frauds account form 78% whereas Deposits constitute 17%
of the total amount of fraud amount in banking industry.

Frauds
Other Areas
5%
Deposits,
17%
Advances,
78%

Advances
Deposits
Other Areas

(Data compiled from RBI sources)

In this Article, we will focus on Advance related frauds, its modus operandi, & mitigants to avoid
such kind of frauds.
Advance related Frauds:
Frauds related to the advances portfolio accounts for the largest share of the total amount involved in
frauds in the banking sector. Increase in the cases of large value fraud (involving amount of Rs 50
crore and above) is mainly due to the accounts financed under consortium or multiple banking
arrangements. Public Sector Banks account for a substantial chunk of the total amount involved in
such cases.
Modus Operandi in Large Value Advance Frauds:
An analysis of the modus operandi in some of the top large value advance related frauds reveals
that it is not just the ingenuity of the borrowers, but also the absence of stringent assessment and
monitoring on the part of banks, that has led to the commission of fraud. Some of them are being
mentioned below:
l Diversion/ Siphoning off Funds: It takes two forms, diversion within the system and diversion
outside the system. The usual pattern observed is that there is hectic migration of funds
between the company's own group accounts with various banks, before the funds are
siphoned off. Corporate are seen to be using their related entities and front companies as
conduits for such diversion of funds.
u Corporate branding fraudulent diversion of funds as business failure: Usually in such
type of cases borrower's distribution network is suspected to be largely made up of
related entities and a huge chunk of the receivables is due from these entities. In the
name of business failure, these entities default in payment to the company. Borrowers,
in turn, cite non-recoverability of their receivables for failing to repay to the consortium
banks. The challenge before banks is to segregate such camouflaged fraud from real
business loss, especially where receivables from overseas parties are involved.
u Diversion/Siphoning off Term Loan funds: This is done by the borrowers through

17
 several means like over-invoicing the machinery, much higher than its market price,
inflating value of assets purchased through fake invoices, thereby diverting bank's loan
funds, inflating erection costs etc.
l Fraud through Manipulative Accounting: Borrowers are using this tool of flexibility within the
accounting process, to present a preferred picture of the company. e.g.
u Creation of fictitious revenue e.g. advance received is shown as income,
u Advance revenue recognition e.g. income receivable is booked as income,
u Expenditure treatment & capitalization e.g. showing revenue expenditure incurred as
deferred expenditure or capital expenditure.
u Concealment of expenditure payable e.g. not providing for interest payable, mortgage
loans on other properties or newly acquired credit card debts in order to reduce the
amount of monthly debt declared on the loan application
u Manipulation in stock and stock valuation, for securing higher bank finance.
u Overstating book debts, for securing higher bank finance
u Suppression of obsolete stocks/sticky book debts, for securing higher bank finance
u Inflating value of assets purchased through fake invoices, thereby diverting bank's loan
funds.
u Booking loss on sale of assets by understating sale realization and diverting
unaccounted portion outside the system.
u Creating contingent liabilities and pushing liabilities to front companies, thereby
presenting a healthier balance sheet, for securing bank finance.
u Shifting of profits/losses through related party transactions.
u Round-tripping of funds.
u Acquisition and merger of other entities, especially related entities, on tweaked
valuations.
u Manipulating Off-Balance Sheet Exposure & submitting fudged and forged financial
statements.
Perpetrators of Frauds:
Kroll survey, 2015 findings indicate that the threat from within is on rise. The most common causes of
information/ data theft found in the survey were:
l Employee malfeasance 45%
l Vendor/supplier malfeasance 29%
l A attack by an external hacker on the vendor/supplier 7%
l An attack by an external hacker on the company itself 2%
In the banking sector, insider frauds are showing an increase as compared to the previous decade.
Prevention and Early Detection of Frauds:
As per Kroll survey, 2015 it was observed that in an environment where insiders are the source of

18
the problem, other employees who observe or become aware of what the fraudsters are doing are
the company's strongest defense. As per the survey top three methods of exposing fraud was found
as under:

Method of Discovery % of uncovered frauds exposed

Whistle Blower *41%
External Audit 31%
Internal Audit 25%
*Employees are our eyes & ears for spotting frauds.

General Mitigants suggested to avoid Occurrence of Frauds:

It is reported that there is an active involvement /connivance of employees in 45% of fraud cases &
in most of the cases the miscreants could perpetrate a fraud because of sheer negligence on the part
of employees. Therefore Management of human resources is utmost important to avoid frauds
along with other mitigants as under;
l Reinvigoration, continuous updation & strengthening of existing systems & procedures in
such a manner that neither the employee nor the miscreant gets an opportunity to perpetrate
fraud
l Promoting highest level of integrity amongst the employees
l Improving Job knowledge/performance/skills through the process of education and
trainings
l Popularizing and incentivizing Whistle Blowing Mechanism
l Targeted dialogue with the new recruitees
l Making use of available web-based tools like e-manuals, checklists, job cards etc.
Specific Mitigants suggested for managing Advance related Frauds:
The most effective way to prevent frauds in advances is robust appraisal, effective credit monitoring
mechanism and various diligent checks exercised during cycle of loan.
1. Audited Balance Sheet & related financial papers: We should ensure that auditors of
the Balance Sheet has incorporated following important information qualitatively:
a) Valuation of inventory: Manipulation in valuation to secure higher bank finance:
l Checking of stock, work in progress, finished goods etc should be done diligently.
l Variation in the sale of the stocks declared by the companies in their stock statement
for the year ending position in March and value of stocks should be compared &
analyzed.
l Overstating book debts, for securing higher bank finance should be checked
properly.
l Suppression of obsolete stocks/ sticky book debts, for securing higher bank
finance, if any, should be noticed.

19
 b) Dealing with group accounts: Normally this area is very important where diversion of
funds take place. We should examine the comments of CA to check whether:
l Transactions are at par with commercial transactions done with other parties.
l Investments in group companies are safe and sound.
l Shifting of profits/ losses through related party transactions.
l Loans and advances to group companies are camouflaged under sundry debtors to
avail book debt finance.
c) It should be analyzed whether any bad debt is included under Sundry Debtors, whether
loans and advances to group companies are camouflaged under Sundry Debtors to
avail book debt finance.
2. Regarding specific certificates/tasks: Banks should insist that the 'Statutory auditors' to
the company should give following certificates:
l Specific certificate with respect to infusion of capital or family loans.
l Monitoring of accounts with a specific objective.
l Certification of utilization of funds for the desired end use.
3. A well defined system to ascertain source of financing of margin/equity: Whether
margin is being financed from the borrower's own source or from Bank's finance.
4. Stringent norms while processing the credit proposals should be devised for dealing with
unsecured loan, share caution money and share premium account. Guidelines should be
clear for its treatment and strict penalty should be devised for any deviations.
5. Checks to be exercised during cycle of a loan: Any weakness escaping attention at
approval stage can be mitigated by effective post disbursement/ monitoring.
6. Strengthening of consortium mechanism, sharing of credit information on regular basis and
exercise of stringent diligence while taking over the accounts from other banks.
Conclusion:
Combined efforts at strategic & execution level may bring the desired result of mitigating frauds. At
strategic level, effective fraud risk governance, a thorough fraud risk assessment, strong fraud
prevention and detection strategies, framing effective policies and procedures, laying down strict
compliance processes, setting high integrity standards can significantly mitigate fraud risks. At
execution level, leveraging robust IT systems, developing efficient monitoring capabilities and
initiating strict punitive action against the culprits in a time bound manner as well as coordinated
and timely investigations and corrective actions will complement fraud mitigation efforts not only for
the safety of the banks but also for ensuring the stability and resilience of the overall financial system.
[The writer is indebted to Shri T.M. Bhasin for his article,” Bank Frauds-Current Trends and Mitigation Measures” and Dr.
K.C. Chakrabarty for his speech,” Frauds in the Banking Sector: Causes, Concerns and Cures”]

20
From the Coordination (Policy) Wing, CVC
Engagement of Defence Assistant in
Disciplinary Proceedings
The disciplinary proceedings of Central Services officers are governed by Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. Engagement of defence assistant by the Charged
Officer (CO) is covered under Rule 14(8) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal)
Rules, 1965. Rule 14(8)(a) provides that “ The Government servant may take the assistance of any
other Government servant posted in any office either at the headquarter or at the place where the
inquiry is held, to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the
purpose, unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner,
or, the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits.”
Engagement of a Government servant as defence assistant is subject to the condition that a
Government servant cannot be defence assistant in more than three cases at a time. The Rule also
provides for engaging a Government servant posted anywhere if the inquiring authority having
regard to the circumstances of the case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, so permits. Rule
14(8)(b) provides for engagement of retired Government servant as defence assistant.
However, the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) of the Central Government have their own Conduct,
Discipline & Appeal (CDA) Rules and therefore, engagement of defence assistant by CO would be
governed by the relevant Rules of that particular PSU. In a disciplinary case against an officer of a
PSU of the Central Government, the CO requested that he may be allowed to use the services of one
retired officer of the Central Government as his defence assistant. The relevant CDA Rules of that
PSU permitted a person in the employment of that organization alone to be appointed as defence
assistant. Hence, the Disciplinary Authority rejected the request on the ground that it was in violation
of the CDA Rules. The CO filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before
the High Court of Madras for issue of Writ of Mandamus directing the organization to permit the CO
to have the assistance of the retired officer in the disciplinary proceeding against him.
The main contention of the petitioner was that the Rules framed by the PSU do not have statutory
force and therefore, the petitioner cannot be denied fair inquiry relying on Rules which do not have
statutory force. The Counsel of the PSU submitted that the petitioner has got no absolute right to have
an assistance unless the statute or rules/standing orders provide for such right and the refusal to
grant the assistance of the choice of the petitioner would not amount to violation of natural justice.
The High Court of Madras vide its order dated 22.1.2016 dismissed the Writ Petition on the
following grounds:
i) A delinquent has no vested or absolute right of his choice to claim assistance of a particular
person unless such right has flown from the relevant statute or rules.
ii) The CO is bound by the restrictions in law or by statute in representation before the
departmental proceedings and in such cases, the charge sheeted employee cannot complain
of violation of principles of natural justice.
iii) Writ of Mandamus cannot be issued against statutory rules or regulations.

21
 CASE STUDIES

Checklist for Procurement Cases

Dinesh Kumar
Technical Examiner

1. Case study of a work pertaining to Civil Structural & Architectural work for
Main power plant Block of 2X250MW costing around Rs. 232 Crores, being
executed by a Central PSU for a State Power Corporation
(i) Award of work to an ineligible bidder:
l Qualification requirements stipulated experience of 60,000 cum concreting in RCC work
in two years.
l The L1 bidder submitted experience of total 62647.52 cum concreting in four and a half
years.
l From the certificate submitted it was not clear that experience was of PCC or RCC and that
out of total quantity, 60000 cum was executed in two years.
(ii) Poor Estimation:
l The estimate was prepared on the basis of SOR of Maharashtra PWD whereas, the work
was being carried out in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
l Estimated rates of major items were considered without any firm basis and were very
much on the higher side. Scrutiny of merely two items revealed that the estimated cost was
inflated by approximately Rs.55 Cr.
l This inflated estimate was made basis for justifying the rates quoted by the L1 bidder.
l Further, the quantities were not worked out with due diligence which had resulted in
abnormal deviations in quantities during execution.
(iii) Non recovery of WCT:
l During pre-bid meeting, the bidders were asked to include VAT on Works Contract (WCT)
in their rates.
l WCT was being paid by the client, directly to the concerned authorities and no recovery
was being made from the bills of the contractor.
l On raising the issue, the organisation has agreed to make recovery of WCT from the
contractor's bills.
(iv) Use of material other than specified make without cost adjustment:
l As per contract conditions structural steel of only 'SAIL' was permitted.
l During the course of execution, the contractor was permitted to use 2572.90 MT structural
steel of 'MAHAMAYA' make.
l No cost adjustment for allowing steel of other manufacturer was made, resulting in undue
benefit to the contractor.
(v) Post award change of conditions:
l Payment terms for reinforcement and structural steel were modified after the award of
22
 work by allowing payment of 100% material value on supply and omitting the provision
of secured advance against these items.
lAs per secured advance clause, an advance up to a maximum 75% of the value (Invoice
value) of the materials was only payable.
lBy making modification after award of work, in the terms of payment, more payment was
allowed to the contractor at supply stage.

(vi) Inadequate testing of material:

l As per quality summary (structural) furnished during intensive examination, ultrasonic
testing on plates above 25 mm thickness was not done, which was mandatory as per
technical specifications. Thus, contractor was unduly benefitted, besides compromise on
quality.

(vii) Delay established on part of contractor, penalty not imposed:

l After due analysis, the employer had found that there was a delay of 8 months on the part
of contractor (out of total delay of around 36 months). No penalty was imposed on him.
Whereas, as per tender conditions he was to pay compensation (penalty) to the employer.

2. Case study on a work related to Civil & Structural work including

barricading work by an oil sector PSU Costing around Rs. 114 Crores being
executed by an Oil sector PSU:
(i) Poor Estimation:
l Estimate prepared by consultant was accepted by PSU officials without scrutiny, in
violation of guidelines of CVC.
l During execution quantities of various items deviated largely besides execution of no. of
extra items.
l The agreement amount varied from initial Rs. 114.07 Cr. to Rs. 161 Cr. Commission's
guidelines states that role of consultants should be only advisory and final responsibility
should rest on the departmental officials only. Overdependence on consultant in the
instant case has resulted in abnormal deviations during execution.

(ii) Post award change of conditions:

lIn the work, the Contract conditions don't provide escalation. A lump sum amount of

Rs.10.5 cr. for escalation allowed after award of work in contradiction to contract
conditions and without rationality.
lAlso, there was no provision of mobilization advance in the tender document. However,

mobilization advance amounting to Rs.5.0 cr. granted to the contractor. Further,

Organisation's procedure allows interest at the rate of SBI PLR+2% (which works out to
16.75%). The mobilization advance was given with simple interest @ 12% per annum,
which is an apparent undue favour to the contractor.
lBesides above, the LD Clause was modified during execution by making 3 milestones

and dividing the maximum amount of LD of 5% to 1.5%, 1.5% and 2% maximum,

respectively for each milestone. The modified LD clause was beneficial to the contractor,
as in case of failure of only last milestone the maximum LD will be 2% as per modified
clause; whereas as per original clause it was 5% of the contract value. Thus undue favour
was granted to the contractor.

23
Important Activities in the Commission
l Shri K.V. Chowdary, Central Vigilance Commissioner delivered a lecture on the topic
“Preventive Vigilance : Key to Good Corporate Governance” on 15th Edition of
NALCO Foundation Day Lecture Series held on 6th January, 2016 at NALCO Bhawan,
Bhubaneswar.

l Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Vigilance Study Circle (Delhi & NCR) convened
the 2nd Round Table Interaction between Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) of the Public Sector
and their counterparts, the Compliance Officers from the Private Sector on 18th January,
2016. As Chief Guest, Shri K.V. Chowdary, CVC addressed the gathering and said that there
is need to bring some provisions in Whistleblowers Act to protect witnesses which would
provide confidence to those who expose corruption. He also said that we have to delve deep
into forensic investigation, instead of mere forensic accounting. He stated that automation can
help identify the issues and causes. While speaking on usage of IT to detect the fudging
activities, he said that awareness on the ways to fudge can help in detection and keep the
fraudsters away.

24
Shri K.V. Chowdary, Central Vigilance
l

Commissioner attended the Valedictory

session of the 3-Day Advanced Training in
Vigilance Investigation, which was held on
27th -29th January, 2016 at Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel National Police
Academy, Hyderabad.

Shri K.V. Chowdary, Central Vigilance Commissioner attended International HR Summit 2016
l

as Chief Guest, which was held on 4th February, 2016 at SCOPE, New Delhi.

25
l Shri K.V. Chowdary, Central Vigilance Commissioner attended the fifth anniversary
celebration of Vigilance Study Circle, Mumbai Chapter as Chief Guest, which was held on
18th March, 2016 at SCOPE, New Delhi.

l Commission invited eminent personalities to deliver lectures and interact with audience under
its Knowledge Management Initiative. These were webcast live by NIC to a wider audience
worldwide. These lectures can be accessed at the Commission's website www.cvc.gov.in.

Eminent Speaker Topic Date

Shri Bibek Debroy, Member, Niti Aayog "Making Governance Effective" 30.12.2015
Shri Shashi Kant Sharma, Comptroller "Accountability in Public Private 27.01.2016
and Auditor General of India Partnership"
Shri Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General of India "Sanction for Prosecution under 19.02.2016
IPC & PC Act-Role of CVC "
Shri Arvind Subramanian, "Economic Governance and 21.03.2016
Chief Economic Adviser Development"

26
Shri Shashi Kant Sharma, Comptroller and Auditor General of India delivering lecture on “Accountability in Public Private Partnership”

Shri Arvind Subramanian, Chief Economic Adviser, interacting with audience

27
l The Central Vigilance Commission has initiated training and capacity building of All India
Services and Central Services Officers posted as CVOs in Government Departments and
CPSEs. Apart from the induction training of newly appointed CVOs, customized domestic and
foreign training programmes are also being undertaken towards this end for officers in the
vigilance administration. The training programmes organized during this quarter by the
Commission are as under:

S.N. Training Programme Duration Participants

1 Advanced Training Programme on 03 days 30, includes CVOs and
Vigilance Investigation at SVP (27.01.2016 to vigilance officers
National Police Academy, Hyderabad 29.01.2016)
2 Vigilance related training programme 12 days 15, includes CVC officers and
at IACA at Laxenberg, Austria (01.02.2016 to CVOs of CPSEs
12.02.2016)
3 Vigilance related training programme 05 days 18, includes CVC officers and
at GFSU, Gujarat (22.02.2016 to CVOs, Vigilance officers from
26.02.2016) banking and insurance sector
4 Vigilance related training programme 5 days 25, includes CVC officers and
at IIM, Bangalore (07.03.2016 to CVOs, DGM, AGM of Banking
11.03.2016) Sector etc.
5 Vigilance related training programme 5 days 15, includes CVC officers and
at UC, Berkley (14.03.2016 to CVOs of CPSEs
18.03.2016)

28
Vigilance related training programme at IACA at Laxenberg ,Austria

Visit to the Head Quarters of UNCAC by the training group at IACA at Laxenberg ,Austria

29
30
Vigilance related training programme at UC, Berkley

Shri Ramesh Chandra,CTE,CVC receiving training certificate at UC, Berkley

31
Important Circulars/Guidelines
Issued by Commission
1. CIRCULAR No. 01/01/16 dated 6th January 2016
Sub: Pendency of cases with CVOs – Regarding.

2. CIRCULAR No. 02/01/16 dated 18th January 2016

Sub: Timely completion of disciplinary proceedings/departmental inquiry proceedings-
improving vigilance administration.

3. CIRCULAR No. 03/03/16 dated 7th March 2016

Sub: Action on Anonymous/Pseudonymous Complaints– Regarding.

4. CIRCULAR No. 04/03/2016 dated 4th March 2016

Sub: Acceptance of Bank Guarantee (BG) – Regarding.

5. Guidelines for Intensive Examination of Public Procurement Contracts by Chief Vigilance

Officers

Note: For details of above, visit Commission's website www.cvc.gov.in

Members of the Editorial Board:

Shri T.M. Bhasin
Vigilance Commissioner, Guest Editor

Smt. Sonali Singh

Additional Secretary, Chief Editor

Shri Ramesh Chandra

Chief Technical Examiner

Shri Asit Gopal

Director

Shri Keshav Rao

CVO, Pawan Hans Ltd.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in the articles etc. are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
policy or position of the Commission. In order to ensure brevity and readability, some articles have been abridged.

32
 From the Lecture Series under the
Commission's Knowledge Management Initiative

Shri Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General of India, addressing the gathering

Shri Arvind Subramanian, Chief Economic Adviser, Govt. of India, being felicitated by Sh. T.M. Bhasin, Vigilance Commissioner
CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION
Satarkata Bhavan, A-Block
CPO Complex, INA, New Delhi - 110 023
EPABX :- 011- 24600200 (30 Lines)
FAX : 011- 24651010/24651186
Email : [email protected]