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Psychoanalytic Inquiry: A
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The past unconscious,

the present unconscious,
and interpretation of the
transference
a c d e
Joseph Sandler Ph.D., M.D. & Anne‐Marie
b c d
Sandler Lic. es Sc.
a
Sigmund Freud Professor of Psychoanalysis and
Director of the Sigmund Freud Center for Study
and Research in Psychoanalysis , Hebrew University
of Jerusalem
b
Visiting Professor in the Department of
Psychology and Senior Consultant in the Mental
Health Clinic for Children and Adolescents of
Ezrath Nashim, (Hadassah Medical School) ,
Hebrew University , Jerusalem
c
Training and supervising analysts in the British
Psycho‐Analytical Society
d
Israel Institute of Psychoanalysis
e
35 Circus Road, London, NW8 9JG, England
Published online: 20 Oct 2009.

To cite this article: Joseph Sandler Ph.D., M.D. & Anne‐Marie Sandler Lic. es
Sc. (1984) The past unconscious, the present unconscious, and interpretation
of the transference, Psychoanalytic Inquiry: A Topical Journal for Mental Health
Professionals, 4:3, 367-399, DOI: 10.1080/07351698409533552

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07351698409533552

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 The Past Unconscious, the Present
Unconscious, and Interpretation of the
Transference
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J O S E P H S A N D L E R, Ph.D., M.D., and

A N N E-M A R I E S A N D L E R , Lic. es Sc.

ERTON GILL'S CAPACITY TO FOCUS On critical issues

M in psychoanalysis is generally acknowledged to be outstand-
ing. While earlier he was perhaps most renowned for his contribu-
tions in various areas of psychoanalytic psychology, he has more re-
cently turned his full attention to one of the most fundamental
aspects of psychoanalytic technique —the analysis of the transfer-
ence. The views expounded in the two recent monograph volumes
(Gill, 1982; Gill & Hoffman, 1982) elaborate a very special tech-
nical stance which had been adumbrated in a number of earlier pub-
lications (see Gill & Muslin, 1976; Gill, 1979).
Gill's emphasis on the need to listen for transference manifesta-
tions from the very beginning of an analysis and to give priority to
the interpretation of these in the here-and-now of the analysis, is
clear-cut. So too is his insistence on the need for the analyst to be

Joseph Sandier is Sigmund Freud Professor of Psychoanalysis and Director of the

Sigmund Freud Center for Study and Research in Psychoanalysis at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.
Anne-Marie Sandier is Visiting Professor in the Department of Psychology, the Hebrew
University, and Senior Consultant in the Mental Health Clinic for Children and Adolescents
of Ezrath Nashim (affiliated with The Hebrew University-Hadassah Medical School),
Jerusalem. Both authors are training and supervising analysts in the British Psycho-
Analytical Society and at the Israel Institute of Psychoanalysis.

367
 368 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

sensitive to —and to interpret where appropriate—the inevitable

impact of his interventions (or lack of them) and attitudes on the
patient's material. What the patient produces is, for Gill, first and
foremost the outcome of an interaction between what is pressing
forward to the surface from the patient, on the one hand, and a con-
tribution (similar to the day's residue in the dream) from the side of
the analyst, on the other.
Probably in very similar fashion the response of any practicing
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analyst to Gill's formulations will reflect the interaction between

the analyst's own technical attitudes and biases, rooted in his clin-
ical experience, and the ideas put forward in the two monographs.
With this in mind, we should like to approach our discussion of
Gill's position by first stating, as well as we can, some relevant as-
pects of our own views in regard to technique. We hope that this
will allow us to focus more precisely on the difference between Gill's
position and our own, as well as to underline what are, in our view,
some significant aspects of his contributions to the theory of
technique.
What one actually does in working as a psychoanalyst is of course
intimately related to one's aims in the analytic work. If the aim is to
make the patient intellectually familiar with the content of his prim-
itive childhood wishes and fantasties, then the analyst might follow
the intellectual route of interpreting the symbolic meaning of the
patient's communications. Although there must be few analysts
who espouse such an aim nowadays, not every analyst can be com-
pletely satisfied with Freud's statements that analysis aims to make
the unconscious conscious or to replace id by ego. Our own (possi-
bly rather idiosyncratic) view has been put as follows:
The analyst aims to help the patient eventually to accept the in-
fantile wishful aspects of himself which have aroused painful
conflict and have become threatening during the course of his de-
velopment. As a consequence he strives to get the patient to toler-
ate the derivatives of these parts of himself in his conscious
thinking and fantasies. To put it another way: a major analytic
goal is to get the patient to become friends with the previously
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 369

unacceptable parts of himself, to get on good terms with previ-

ously threatening wishes and fantasies. To do this means that the
analyst has to provide, through his interpretations and the way
he gives them, an atmosphere of tolerance of the infantile, the
perverse and the ridiculous, an atmosphere which the patient can
make part of his own attitudes towards himself, which he can
internalize along with the understanding he has reached in his
joint work with the analyst (Sandier & Sandier, 1983).'
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This formulation of the analytic aim can be understood as a vari-

ant of the statement that analysis aims "to make the unconscious
conscious." It is, of course, commonplace to speak of the patient's
"unconscious" when referring to all the processes and contents that
exist outside his conscious awareness, and there is little doubt that
the concept was used flexibly by Freud (as Gill showed so clearly in
his 1963 monograph, Topography and Systems in Psychoanalytic
Theory). Flexibility of usage of the concept of the unconscious has
been demonstrated by most analysts since, the property of concep-
tual elasticity being a necessary characteristic of many concepts in
our field (J. Sandier, 1983). In order to attain a somewhat greater
degree of precision in describing our own theoretical approach to
problems of technique, we have found it useful to distinguish be-
tween what we have called the past unconscious and the present
unconscious.
The past unconscious can be conceived of as containing the
whole gamut of immediate, peremptory wishes, impulses, and re-
sponses of the individual that have been formed early in his life (J.
Sandier, 1974). By this is meant something more than instinctual
wishes of one sort or another. We include the immediate and spon-
taneous modes of reacting in any given psychological situation, at
any given moment, in any particular set of internal or external cir-
cumstances. The peremptory impulses that belong to the past un-

1
The paper from which the quotation is taken dealt with the concept of the "second censor-
ship" and described what was referred to as the "three-box model," a preliminary attempt at
formulating a theoretical structure for the further consideration of problems of technique.
 370 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

conscious can be regarded as reactions to any "demand for work"

placed on the individual, arising from any source whatsoever. The
origin of these demands may be instinctual but need not necessarily
be so. Thus, for example, solutions to conflict devised or elabo-
rated in early childhood acquire a peremptory quality, as do all
sorts of responses aimed at avoiding dangerous situations and
preserving safety, triggered off by unpleasant affect-signals.
In the past unconscious we can see peremptory fantasies (cf. G. S.
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Klein, 1967, on peremptory ideation) elaborated relatively early in

life, fantasies which have a problem-solving, reassuring and wish-
fulfilling quality. In the past unconscious the motivation for such
wishes will include narcissistic injuries and threats of object loss, as
well as a host of other anxieties, including fears of castration or
other forms of bodily mutilation. It is worth commenting that the
concepts of fixation and regression apply well to the contents of the
past unconscious, provided that we sever the exclusive theoretical
connection of these concepts to the notion of libidinal drive energy.
The "child within the adult" represented by the past unconscious
is, moreover, an object-related child, and his object relationships,
both in reality and fantasy, are far more complex and interpersonal
than can be described or explained simply in terms of the cathexis of
objects with instinctual drive energy (Sandier & Sandier, 1978). In
the adult the past unconscious contains such relationships as con-
stituents of the inner world of "the child within." To this inner
world we have to allocate highly developed interactions with the in-
ternal representatives of childhood figures, relationships that ex-
press themselves in the fantasies belonging to the past unconscious.
The inner world referred to here is a world still unconsciously domi-
nated by primitive forms of thinking2 and by use of the defense
mechanisms characteristic of the early years, defenses containing
strong elements of displacement, projection, and denial. The con-
struction of the thoughts and fantasies that enter into the past un-

2
We refer here not simply to primary-process functioning but also to thinking that has
come to be dominated by relatively primitive secondary processes. The "child" referred to
here is, in Piagetian terms, a pre-operational child (A. M. Sandier, 1975).
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 371

conscious is influenced by primitive theories of the world, and such

assumptions as the talion principle are taken for granted. And the
past unconscious contains conflict solutions which, precisely be-
cause they have been developed to deal with painful situations, ac-
quire a peremptory character whenever the pain or anxiety linked
with the specific conflict (or any signal of unpleasant affect) arises.
It is a fundamental characteristic of the past unconscious, as we
conceive of it, that all the tendencies it contains were, at some spe-
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cific time in the child's development, consciousness-syntonic, but

have become dystonic during the course of later development. Al-
though they persist and are active in the present, they are
unacceptable to the adult, and can only find expression in modified
forms—and it is these modified forms with which we shall be con-
cerned in our discussion of Gill's views of transference. What has
rendered the responses and impulses in the past unconscious
unacceptable has been the successive developmental and other con-
flicts that have ultimately led to the erection of the repression bar-
rier, coinciding with the crystallization of the superego and the en-
try into latency. Following Freud (1900, 1917), we can refer to all
the processes of modification, distortion, adaptation, and defense,
culminating in the massive repression that normally ends the
oedipal phase, as the first censorship.
In treating the past unconscious as corresponding, from a devel-
opmental point of view, to the first four to six years of life, we are
certainly guilty of oversimplification. Nevertheless, we have been
impressed by the degree to which the repression barrier does seal off
relatively direct access to the individual's early life, which is for the
most part only reconstructed in analysis, reconstruction which is
usually reinforced by those scattered memories that are available
from the first years of life, but which can only be understood in the
light of later reconstruction. While repression as a defense mecha-
nism is certainly in use before the age of about five, it is only at that
age that it acquires a special strength. Before that, defenses mostly
involve denials, displacement, and various forms of projection and
externalization, so that what is defended against tends to be de-
flected and distorted rather than forcibly kept down.
 372 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

Although the past unconscious is active in the present, and is

stimulated by internal or external events occurring in the here-and-
now, what we have termed the present unconscious is conceived of
as a very different functional organization. Topographically, it can
be regarded as a system lying between the past unconscious, on the
one hand, and consciousness and motility, on the other. In many
(but certainly not all) respects it corresponds to the system Precon-
scious of the topographical model or to the unconscious ego of the
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structural theory. Whereas the past unconscious acts and reacts ac-
cording to the past, the present unconscious is concerned with
maintaining equilibrium in the present, and regards the impulse
from the past unconscious as intrusive and upsetting.3
Because of the inappropriate (and often potentially disruptive)
quality of the impulse from the past unconscious, it has to be dealt
with in suitable ways by the present unconscious. In this regard we
can distinguish two sets of adaptive processes, both of which func-
tion to render the impulse less uncomfortable. The first of these is
that the past is updated to the present. Thus if the analyst makes a
remark that the patient feels to be demeaning, the patient may react
with an immediate response of (say) a peremptory reassuring gran-
diose oedipal fantasy, produced by the past unconscious. But this
fantasy belongs to the distant past and has to be made consonant
with the present in order to achieve a better "fit" with the here-and-
now, i.e., to be less dissonant or dystonic. The process of making
the reaction from the past consonant with the present is, of course,
well known to analysts as the process of "repeating the past in the
present." But this repetition is, to the extent that it occurs in the
present unconscious, quite outside conscious awareness. And, we
would emphasize, it is at this point in the process that we can begin

3
Let us emphasize again that the impulse from the past unconscious referred to here is not
necessarily an instinctual impulse—and even when it is, it would be a highly modified and
elaborated form of the drive wish, attached to wishful fantasy content, affected by the de-
fenses (and other adaptations) which have operated throughout the first few years of life, and
so on. In the context of the past unconscious we shall use the term impulse for any peremp-
tory act or response stemming from childhood, which moves forward toward the surface
without regard to its appropriateness to the present.
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 373

to speak of transference, as and when the person of the analyst is

drawn into the here-and-now version of the childhood impulse, for
the content of that early impulse will inevitably, in one way or an-
other, involve an interaction between self and object. Transference
impulses, like any other content of impulse in the present uncon-
scious, represent adult forms of infantile wishes.
If the modified, updated form of the childhood impulse (as in the
example of the peremptory fantasy we mentioned)4 does not arouse
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conflict, with associated anxieties or other painful feeling-signals,

then it can be allowed to proceed in the direction of surface expres-
sion without hindrance, and the patient may find himself having a
daydream which is a simple transposition of a fantasy from the past
into the present. He may then report this to the analyst. In our expe-
rience, however, such simple transposition without any degree of
defensive distortion or disguise is rare. If, as is usual, the childhood
impulse, now updated in the present unconscious, arouses conflict
then a second set of adaptive processes will come into play. The im-
pulse will have to be modified (or checked) by defense. It is "oper-
ated on" in the present unconscious, and the elements that enter
into it are reorganized, changed, and rearranged. What we get is a
(still unconscious) derivative of the childhood impulse.5
Following Freud's suggestion that a "second censorship" exists
between the Preconscious and Conscious systems of the topograph-
ical model, we have suggested, on the basis of clinical experience,
that a similar second censorship can be postulated as lying between
the present unconscious and consciousness, and that the present un-
conscious can
4
Rather to our surprise, we find it necessary to comment that impulses directed toward nar-
cissistic replenishment, wishful fantasies that aim toward restoring self-esteem, motivated by
the pain of narcissistic depletion can (a) be very powerful and (b) be involved in conflict, just
as much as derivatives of instinctual wishes.
5
It is useful (although perhaps not strictly accurate) to refer to the impulse in the present
unconscious, arising from the past unconscious, as the childhood wishful fantasy, and to re-
gard the revised version of this fantasy in the present unconscious as the current wishful un-
conscious fantasy. The advantage of referring at times to fantasies rather than impulses lies
in the fact that, in all these impulses, relations between self and object representations are in-
volved, and that the defensive transformations that occur in the present unconscious involve,
to a substantial degree, modifications of the fantasy interaction between self and object.
 374 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

be regarded as having depth, in that certain contents can be

thought of as being more readily tolerated in its deeper layers
than in those closest to consciousness. . . . '[it] has, then, a
deeper and a shallower end, and content can be admitted . . .
into the deep end, tolerated within the system, but be further de-
fended against or resisted as it moves in the direction of con-
scious awareness. . . . A further characteristic . . . needs to be
remarked on. Although it can make use of the most complicated
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secondary processes, it has a high tolerance for contradictions.

One fantasy can coexist alongside another with the greatest of
ease, contradictory theories and thoughts can be tolerated with-
out embarrassment, for all these constructions exist in the dark.
. . . The second censorship . . . has different developmental ori-
gins from the first. While it certainly contains other elements, its
fundamental orientation is towards the avoidance of shame, em-
barrassment and humiliation. In its origins it certainly begins
early in life, when the child can experience such emotions and be-
gins to substitute conscious fantasying for play that meets with
social disapproval. It reflects primarily the difference that ex-
isted in childhood between that which can be carried on in secret
and that which can be allowed to be seen by others.. . . The com-
ment 'Don't be silly' is one of the most powerful of the social pro-
hibitions of childhood, and the fear of being 'silly' or stupid is
profound.
As the child develops the increasing capacity to anticipate the
shaming reactions of others (with all the additions he has made to
his expectations arising from his own projections), so he will be-
come his own disapproving audience and will internalize the so-
cial situation in the form of the second censorship . . . only con-
tent that is acceptable to the internalized social judgment of the
second censorship will be permitted through to consciousness. It
must be plausible and not ridiculous or 'silly'. In a way the second
censorship is much more of a narcissistic censorship than the
first, but the narcissism involved tends to centre around fears of
being laughed at, being thought to be 'silly', 'crazy', ridiculous or
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 375

childish, essentially fears of being humiliated [Sandier &

Sandier, 1983, pp. 420-422].
From a developmental point of view we can assume that both the
past unconscious and the present unconscious exist from relatively
early on, but are probably not clearly differentiated from each
other—nor indeed all that clearly from consciousness —until the
point at about the age of five when so many changes occur. From
then on we can regard the two unconscious systems as being differ-
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entiated, although it should be borne in mind that the distinction

made here has been sharpened for our special purposes. "The sec-
ond censorship reflects the progressive socialization of the child
who, at the beginning of latency, enters school and is expected by
his teachers and peers to conform to what these groups consider to
be more adult models of behavior.... He makes strenuous efforts
to put childish things behind him' and to identify with the new ide-
als of behavior that are held up to him by external authority or by
his peer group" (Sandier & Sandier, 1983, p. 422).
We have mentioned earlier that in order to achieve what we re-
gard as the aim of the analytic work we need to bring the patient to
the point where he can tolerate, in a safer and more friendly fash-
ion, the previously unacceptable aspects of himself. In order to do
this he will need to gain insight, in an emotionally convincing man-
ner, not only into the content of his unconscious fantasies, but also
into the nature of what, for present purposes, we shall refer to as his
"inner world", i.e., his unconscious relation to his introjects, with
whom he has a continual unconscious internal dialogue (Sandier &
Sandier, 1978), his unconscious anxieties and conflicts as well as his
methods of resolving such conflicts. This includes, of course, an
understanding of his own usual defensive mechanisms and
manoeuvers, with particular reference to the projections and exter-
nalizations that occur in his unconscious fantasy life—the spectrum
of mechanisms that have come to be called projective identifica-
tion. To the extent that we can achieve our analytic aims we will, we
believe, be able to bring about the reduction of conflict and associa-
ted painful affects, and to permit a deflection of what was not pre-
 376 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

viously tolerated near consciousness into conscious or preconscious

thought and fantasy.
The material available to us for our analytic work is what the pa-
tient can allow to come to the surface. It is our task to work with the
patient in such a way that as much as possible of the content of what
has come close to the surface layers of the present unconscious can
be made readily available to consciousness. In our work we strive to
bring about the liberation of such material through appropriate in-
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terpretations, particularly the interpretation of conflict. But be-

cause what we have available is the adult form of the relevant un-
conscious content, in order to anchor the progressive mapping of
the patient's inner world and the central and recurring themes in his
present unconscious, we have also to reconstruct the patient's past
in a relevant way, just as much as we have to make constructions
about his current inner world (which is, of course, a direct descend-
ant of the inner world he formed in childhood); and we link the two
together. In other words, we aim to extend the patient's knowledge
and understanding of previously unconscious relevant aspects of
his representational world (Sandier & Rosenblatt, 1962). And, to
conclude this section, we would add that because of the patient's
constant striving toward the actualization of the wishful fantasies
in the present unconscious, we are in full agreement with Gill that
the most convincing route toward the elucidation of the contents of
the present unconscious is via the analysis of the transference.

The first volume of Analysis of Transference, is conveniently di-

vided, following the Introduction, into ten chapters. We follow
Gill's headings in organizing our discussion of selected aspects of
his point of view.
Gill introduces his monograph by stating (p. 1) that it "argues for
a shift of emphasis in . . . prevailing opinion both in conceptualiz-
ing and analyzing the transference," focusing "on the centrality of
analyzing the transference, not simply through classical genetic in-
terpretation, but also, more importantly, through an understand-
ing of the often largely implicit manifestations of the transference
in the current analytic situation." This should not be understood as
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 377

a "belittling of the importance of genetic transference interpreta-

tions." He sees the matter as one of priority.
Gill (p. 2) suggests that Freud "in practice. . . never gave the cen-
trality to transference interpretation that it should have," but in
contrast to Freud's technique there is a current and undesirable
trend toward nonresponsiveness on the part of the analyst, with the
rationale that inhibition of interaction with the patient makes "the
transference stand out as sharply as possible from its interweaving
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with the actual situation." For Gill the analyst's nonresponsiveness

is itself an essential part of the interaction, as all the behaviors of
the analyst in the analytic situation are potential components of the
patient's transference material.
Gill believes that in this monograph he has "achieved a systematic
organization and an emphasis which are in fact new." And so he
has. The work pulls together a number of previously unorganized
elements and dimensions of technique, and should be regarded as a
major and highly desirable shaking up of our views on the analysis
of transference. Gill's credentials for a study of this sort are impec-
cable, even though many colleagues will (to varying degrees) have
reservations about some of his propositions, we can expect that the
psychoanalytic theory of technique will never be quite the same
again.

1. What is Meant by Interpretation of Transference?

Gill begins this chapter by the understatement: "The interpreta-
tion of transference is itself somewhat unclear." He then proceeds
to make certain important clarifications, following a discussion of
the various ways in which the concept of transference was used and
described by Freud and a number of subsequent authors. He uses
Freud's notion of the "unobjectionable positive transference" (the
"friendly transference") as the basis for what he calls the facilitating
transference, and opposes this to those transferences which give rise
to resistance.
It is clear that Gill is very aware of the difficulties in defining
transference solely on the basis of regarding it as an inappropriate
 378 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

repetition of the past. If we look at the way analysts actually use the
concept, it is evident that they use it as a "pliable" or "flexible" con-
cept the specific meaning of which may change in different contexts
(J. Sandier, 1983). If one were compelled to give it a definition, it
would have to be the broad one of "relationship." Gill goes on to
make distinctions in regard to the relation of transference to resist-
ance, to wish, and to defense. Within the frame of reference we
sketched in the first part of this paper, we would have to say that, in
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its most general sense, transference occurs when the person of the
analyst is represented in any way in wishful fantasies and thoughts
in the present unconscious, or in conscious ideation. There are ob-
vious problems connected with such a broad view of transference.
Gill (pp. 15-20) now makes a distinction between "two major
kinds of transference interpretation [which] can be best character-
ized as dealing with two diffenent manifestations of resistance."
The first refers to the interpretation of what Gill calls an "allusion
to the transference," which is "the interpretation that a content
which is manifestly about something other than the transference in-
cludes a hidden allusion to transference." The second "is the inter-
pretation that a content which is manifestly about the relationship
is indeed transference in the sense of having important determi-
nants outside as well as within the current analytic situation." Gill
goes on to link the interpretation of allusions to the transference
with "resistance to the awareness of transference," and the second
type of transference, in which there is a transference distortion of
content overtly referring to the analyst, with interpretation of "re-
sistance to the resolution of the transference."
Gill's distinction relates to what we can call derivatives of uncon-
scious transference thoughts or wishful fantasies in the present un-
conscious. They may be relatively unchanged by the "second cen-
sorship," or they may be highly modified by it. They may contain
no overt reference to the analyst or to the analytic situation or may
(as they very often do) contain such overt references. But—as Gill
points out —direct references to the analyst "may also conceal indi-
rect allusions to the transference."
Gill makes the following distinctions with regard to interpreta-
tions: (1) Interpretations of resistance to the transference. (2) Inter-
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 379

pretations of resistance to the resolution of transference, subdi-

vided into (a) interpretations that work with the transference in the
here-and-now and (b) genetic transference interpretations, i.e., in-
terpretations of "a similarity between the transference attitude and
the past." (3) Extra-transference interpretations which make no ref-
erence to the analyst.
We do not feel entirely comfortable with Gill's second category of
transference interpretation because we believe that it is too closely
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tied to the notion of transference as inappropriate repetition of the

past, even though Gill ostensibly disavows this view of transfer-
ence. What is understressed by Gill in referring to the second type of
transference as "resistance to the resolution of transference," is the
element of defensive distortion of the latent transference fantasies.
It is our experience that overtly transference material has to be ap-
proached exactly like any other material brought by the patient. Of
course manifest transference material may be a repetition of a past
attitude or relationship, updated in the present unconscious, and al-
lowed to proceed through to the surface. But it may equally be the
outcome of resistance to awareness of the underlying unconscious
transference. We emphasize this point because it is all too easy to
slip into the assumption that all manifest transference content is es-
sentially repetition of the past. In both types of resistance the prob-
lem facing the analyst is, it seems to us, to get the patient to be more
accepting of the contents of his present unconscious. Where we are
wholeheartedly at one with Gill is in emphasizing the necessity for
the analyst to listen for allusions to the underlying transference,
even though the manifest content of what the patient brings may
not appear to have any direct connection with the transference.
And we agree too with Gill's stress on the need to work with the pa-
tient to expose the implicit unconscious transference material.

2. Transference and Resistance

Gill proposes that "if the unwarranted equation of defense and re-
sistance is abandoned, it follows that all resistance manifests itself
by way of transference." He suggests that the frequently used terms
 380 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

defense transference, transference of defense, and defense against

the transference are all related to the resistance to the awareness of
transference, while transference resistance connects with resistance
to the resolution of transference. However, Gill does not dismiss
the concept of defense and remarks (p. 30) that,
Any particular attitude on the patient's part falls somewhere
along a continuum, with emphasis principally on defense at one
pole and on wish at the other." He says that "by and large . . . if
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the patient is not talking explicitly about the relationship, the de-
fensive pole prevails, and we are likely to find resistance to in-
volvement in the transference or resistance to awareness of the
transference. On the other hand, if the patient is talking about
the relationship explicitly, transference of wish predominates,
and we are likely to describe the situation as one of resistance to
resolution of the transference.
We find ourselves very much in agreement with Gill in his empha-
sis on resistance rather than on defense when considering the tech-
nique of clinical analysis. The concept of resistance reflects much
more emphatically the struggle going on in the patient to protect
himself from getting in touch with and becoming tolerant toward
the previously unacceptable parts of himself that push forward for
expression, gratification, and actualization in the analytic situa-
tion. Where we are not so much in step with Gill, however, is again
with his distinction between the two major types of resistance (re-
sistance to involvement in the transference is added as a third cate-
gory in this chapter). In suggesting that when the patient's material
refers to the relationship with the analyst it is more likely to reflect
wish than defense, he reverts again, it seems to us, to the view of
transference as a repetition of the past, even though he has quite ex-
plicitly taken a broader view of transference earlier in his presenta-
tion. He again appears to underemphasize, as far as we can see, the
role of the current conflict and of the defensive manoeuvers taken
by the patient to transform transference fantasies and thoughts in
the present unconscious into manifest analytic material, even
though that manifest content refers directly to the analysis.
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 381

Gill's hesitation about the concept of defense as used in relation

to the clinical situation would probably apply equally to the notion
of censorship. In using this concept of Freud's we refer to a no-
tional barrier consisting of a whole set of processes which modify,
suppress, distort, displace, reverse, and in general delete or disguise
unconscious representational content associated with unacceptable
impulses or wishful fantasies. And whether or not the patient will
produce references to the relationship with the analyst will depend
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on the analyst's attitude, from the beginning of the analysis, toward

the interpretation of the resistance due to the operation of the sec-
ond censorship — but we cannot see that this has any special connec-
tion with wish rather than defense.
Gill begins his second chapter with the statement that "all resist-
ance manifests itself by way of transference," and ends it by stating
that "all, not merely most, interpretations of resistance are [should
be?] transference interpretations." This view is central to his ap-
proach and has to be examined with care. In the first place, we shall
have to assume that Gill uses the notion of transference here in the
broadest sense of the term, to include more than the repetition of
past relationships. Given this, and taking into account the fact that
the patient is in an interpersonal situation, we can assume that all
his productions and communications have an element of relation to
the analyst. In addition to this we can take it that unconscious fan-
tasies linked with the peremptory impulses in the present uncon-
scious have a wishful (as opposed to wish-fulfilling) component,
involving self and object in interaction. As a consequence there is a
push toward actualization in the here-and-now of the analytic situa-
tion, toward a gratification of the unconscious wish in the actuality
of the analytic relationship.6 Such wishes are, of course, the prod-
ucts of conflict, solutions to conflict which may or may not be
permitted past the second censorship, and (as has been emphasized
earlier) are not to be equated simply and exclusively with "uncon-
scious instinctual wishes."

6
This process has been discussed in terms of wish-fulfilment as a striving for the attainment
of an "identity of perception" (J. Sandier, 1976a, b).
 382 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

Given all of this, we are still faced with the question of whether or
not all interpretations of resistance should be in the form of trans-
ference interpretations. We could certainly agree that all the com-
munications of the patient have a transference element (in the
broad sense of transference). But whether this element is always the
most significant one for the patient at any given moment is a diffi-
cult question.
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3. Centrality of the Analysis of Transference

Basing himself on a careful dissection of Freud's views on transfer-

ence, Gill emphasizes that transference repetition may be "in the
psychical sphere" even though it may show itself in enactment (e.g.,
in attitudes, feelings, intentions, as well as motor activity). This re-
flects, for us, the very important point that while transference can
be taken as originating as wishful content in the present uncon-
scious, unconscious transference fantasies may express themselves
in a whole variety of derivatives, ranging from gross motor action
to dreams, recollections, and comments on reality, including direct
references to the analyst or the analytic situation. Gill's assertion
that the analysis of the transference is the analysis of the neurosis
thus makes a great deal of sense, because the conflicts that enter
into the neurosis are the central conflicts in the present uncon-
scious. His conclusion, after a review of the views of a number of
other authors, "that the analysis of the transference should have
overwhelming centrality in the analytic process" also seems emi-
nently correct, although we may still venture to ask just how over-
whelming this centrality should be.

4. How the Transference is Encouraged to Expand

within the Analytic Situation

When Gill says, in the opening sentence of this chapter, that the
analytic situation "itself fosters the development of attitudes which
significantly affect what the patient brings to the situation, i.e., his
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 383

transference," he might be understood to mean that everything the

patient brings to the analytic situation is transference. And if this is
really what Gill means, then it would seem that he has taken a leap
from the view that it is the interpretation of the transference which
should be central to the view that all the patient's material is in fact
transference.
Gill now takes a firm and important position in regard to analytic
technique. He says, (p. 59) "While the analytic setup itself fosters
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the expansion of the transference within the analytic situation, the

interpretation of resistance to the awareness of transference can
further this expansion. Contrary to the widespread belief that the
existence of the analytic situation alone is enough for the transfer-
ence to expand spontaneously within it, I am contending that only
with the interpretation of resistance to the awareness of transfer-
ence will appropriate expansion occur." We agree wholeheartedly
with this approach. The difference between the attitude advocated
here by Gill and that of waiting for the transference neurosis to de-
velop is probably one of the most significant differences between
analysts in the area of technique today. Gill (p. 62) agrees with
Glover that the analyst must take the initiative in transference inter-
pretations and that "the transference-neurosis in the first instance
feeds on transference-interpretation" (Glover, 1955, p. 130).
We turn now to another crucial statement. Gill (pp. 59-60) says,
"It is often the attitudes the patient believes the analyst has toward
him which the patient is least likely to voice, in a general sense be-
cause the patient feels that it is impertinent for him to concern him-
self with the analyst's feelings and in a more specific sense because
the attitudes the patient ascribes to the analyst are often attitudes
the patient feels the analyst will either not like or be uncomfortable
about." This statement connects again with our view of the role of
the second censorship. We suggested that its fundamental is orien-
tation toward the avoidance of shame, embarrassment, and humili-
ation, reflecting internalized social disapproval not only in early
childhood but developing after that as well. We consider that, from
the beginning of an analysis, the second censorship is externalized
on to the analyst, and that this externalization is a most important
aspect of the transference, one which has constantly to be inter-
 384 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

preted.7 Here we are again at one with Gill, although he emphasizes

the patient's sensitivity to what he assesses are the analyst's feelings,
and we have stressed the patient's internal conflicts over what he re-
gards in himself (and consequently fears the analyst will regard) as
"silly," "stupid," or "ridiculous." These two positions are quite
complementary, although we suspect that the greater emphasis we
place on the interpretation of conflict in the transference may not
be entirely accidental. Incidentally, in discussions with colleagues it
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has become clear that there is often unease about the interpretation
of conflict because of uncertainty about which "level" of conflict to
interpret (in particular, whether to interpret oedipal or preoedipal
conflict). This problem disappears if we direct our interpretations
of conflict to the here-and-now, guided by what we assess to be the
predominant affect as shown in the material (and also often in one
way or another in the countertransference). Because the patient's
conflicts are always related to the present, it is their current form
that is important; their origin in the past unconscious is of second-
ary concern, a matter to be dealt with as evidence for reconstruction
accumulates. And when unconscious conflicts are interpreted in
their current form, the second censorship has to be dealt with by in-
terpretation, as conflict over expressing the contents of the present
unconscious may be the prime source of resistance at that moment.
Consider the following example. A patient (a teacher) arrived late
for his last session before a vacation and proceeded to tell the ana-
lyst of the difficulty he had in controlling a most aggressive and de-
structive class of children and how he had to be most severe with
them. The analyst, guided by material of the previous session, inter-
preted that the patient was perhaps not comfortable, on the last day
before the holiday, about showing his angry feelings in regard to the
separation. He was severe with himself because he wanted to appear
"good" in the analyst's eyes. The patient confirmed this, his anger
with the analyst emerged, and useful work was done on the patient's

7
Naturally patients censor what is in consciousness as well, and in this respect we can speak
of a "third censorship." Often the analyst has to interpret what the patient has consciously
avoided saying. For practical purposes, however, we shall subsume the third censorship un-
der the second.
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 385

fears of being humiliated by showing the aggressive, bad aspects of

himself. The work in the transference related to the patient's second
censorship conflicts in the here-and-now and only later were con-
nected with intense childhood wishes to please his father. The ques-
tion of whether the current conflict was oedipal or preoedipal was
entirely irrelevant at the time.
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5. The Ubiquity of Transference Meanings

Gill's extensive and highly informative discussion of the literature

on transference, which forms the essence of this chapter, provides a
convincing exposition of the confusions and misunderstandings
that beset this area, and obscure basic differences in technical ap-
proach. It is perhaps a pity that he does not go in more detailed
fashion into the problems arising from the confusion between
transference and transference neurosis. Our experience is that
many problems have arisen in this area, not only because of intrin-
sic conceptual ambiguities, but because training institutes often re-
quire that candidates' control cases be neurotic and develop a trans-
ference neurosis, which has to be resolved before the candidate can
be given credit for the analysis of the case and allowed to graduate.
Because the assumption is made that what distinguishes neurotic
cases from others in analysis is the development of the transference
neurosis, a high premium is placed on its discovery and description.
Linked with this is the idea that early interpretation of any form of
transference might abort the development of the transference neu-
rosis and so should be avoided. In England, where it is well recog-
nized that truly neurotic cases are few and far between and that can-
didates tend for the most part to be sent cases of character disorder
or borderline disturbance, the problem does not arise. This is not to
say that the concentration of transference feelings normally sub-
sumed under the heading of transference neurosis does not
occur —of course it does.
Gill's view that transference resistance has to be analyzed from
the beginning is, as we have indicated, a welcome one. He coura-
 386 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

geously states (p. 84), "Freud's precept against early transference

interpretation resulted from his failure to recognize the manifesta-
tions of transference resistance in the apparently freely associating
patient." We would add that many analysts were led to take the view
that transference should not be interpreted early because of their
failure to appreciate the degree to which the concept of transference
had broadened and had consequently become less precise.
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6. The Connection of All Transference to the Actual

Analytic Situation

A number of authors, says Gill, have pointed to the "parallel be-

tween day residue and analytic-situation residue," and it can be
taken that all transference is connected with the actual analytic situ-
ation. Gill points out how analysts have increasingly limited their
behavior in order to keep the transference as uncontaminated as
possible. Nevertheless, the analytic situation is a real one, and this
reality does get drawn into the patient's material. The realization of
this should make the analyst freer, more spontaneous, and less arti-
ficial in his attitude to his patient.
Gill's reinforcement of the view that the analyst should no longer
be considered as a mirror is welcome and should help to counteract
the denial of reality and assumption of omnipotence which may be
encouraged in the analyst by the "reflecting back" analytic stance.
Unfortunately, the problem of handling the differentiation be-
tween reality elements and the distorting wishful (perhaps we can
say apperceptive) elements is not an easy one to solve. Much will de-
pend on the analyst's sensitivity and tact, on his capacity to know
when and when not to confirm one or another of the pieces of real-
ity that enter into the content of the patient's material. We take the
view that the amount of reality information given to the patient
should be kept to a minimum —but that minimum will have to be
judged according to criteria of appropriateness that will vary from
time to time, and from patient to patient. What the analyst should
not do is to deny reality, but he need not necessarily routinely con-
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 387

firm it either. If the patient says, "I think you are angry with me to-
day," it might sometimes be more appropriate to say, "What do you
think I am angry about?" or "Tell me more," than to confirm or
deny one's anger. There are, of course, times when the reality of one
or another aspect of the analyst's behavior or attitudes has to be
pointed out, but we would counsel caution in this regard.
In this chapter Gill provides us with a lengthy and useful
discussion of various versions of the therapeutic alliance. We find
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ourselves in agreement with much of what he says in this regard,

and it is particularly gratifying that he addresses himself to the mo-
tivation that different analysts may have in espousing "alliance"
concepts. What is worth emphasizing, perhaps, is that whether we
speak of alliance or of unobjectionable positive transference, this
aspect of the patient-analyst relation has to provide a basis for
maximizing the patient's acceptance of the infantile and irrational
aspects of himself, which, as a consequence, can then intensify in
the transference relationship. In a most basic sense the alliance pro-
vides an important counterweight to resistance due to the second
censorship. But in itself the therapeutic alliance cannot remove the
effects ofthat censorship. The inherent here-and-now second cen-
sorship conflicts, which become interpersonal when the censorship
is externalized onto the analyst, have to be interpreted as well.

7. The Actual Analytic Situation in Analysis of

Transference

The implications for technique of the fact of the connection be-

tween interpersonal and intrapsychic determinants of the patient's
attitudes are discussed by Gill in this chapter. He argues that the in-
terpersonal nature of the analytic situation implies "that the pa-
tient's attitudes from the past become as plausibly related to and
justified in terms o f . . . [the] restricted information about the ana-
lyst as the patient can make them." Gill also stresses that "There is a
great difference between a general acknowledgment of the role of
the analyst as a real person and the moment-to-moment taking into
 388 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

account of the real relationship between the patient and the analyst
by interpreting how it appears to the patient (p. 102). Gill develops
this theme in extenso and focuses on how transference interpreta-
tions have to be related to the reality of the analytic situation. He
points to the clumsiness of looking for transference parallels to ma-
terial about the actual analytic situation and of "mechanical" trans-
ference interpretation. It is gratifying to see that he does not hesi-
tate to ask the patient for help in finding connections betweeen
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what the patient is talking about and something that had actually
occurred.
Gill leans heavily on Strachey's (1934) paper and on Rosenfeld's
discussion of it (1972) to arrive at a differentiation of various steps
in the analytic work, steps he sees as being implicit, for example, in
Rosenfeld's approach. These are, first, the "clarification of extra-
transference material to get a clue to the allusion to the transference
which lies in it": second is "bringing this transference into
awareness": and third is "resolving the transference."
Gill puts his arguments about the relation of the current interper-
sonal situation to what we would call the content of the present un-
conscious most convincingly. Equally convincing is his emphasis on
the need to make such content explicit. What needs consistent clari-
fication in this chapter, however, as in the rest of the book, is the
major distinction between transference as any content which in-
cludes a reference to the interpersonal relationship between the pa-
tient and the analyst, on the one hand, and transference as an un-
conscious reexperiencing or repetition of an important past
relationship, on the other.
The final short section of this chapter is concerned with what Gill
calls "The New Experience," and it is here that it may be of value to
be much more specific about its nature and its relation to insight.
We shall return to this topic when we outline what may be a sub-
stantial area of disagreement with Gill's approach. But, before pro-
ceeding further, let us state our full support for what Gill calls an-
other shift of emphasis. He says (p. 120), "Even after some aspect
of the transference has been brought to awareness, instead of prior-
ity going to the resolution of such transference by relating it to con-
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 389

temporary or genetic extra-transference material, it should go to

further work within the analytic situation." We suggest that this
statement be amplified by reference to the fact that the patient is al-
ways in resistance to some degree and that it should therefore usu-
ally be only when the resistance drops below a critical level (as it of-
ten does following appropriate interpretation of a current here-
and-now conflict in the transference) that extra-transference or
genetic interpretations should be made.
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8. Transference Interpretation in the Here-and-Now

versus Genetic and Extra-Transference Interpretations

Again, taking as his departure point Strachey's (1934) paper, as

well as Sterba's paper of the same date, Gill (pp. 122-123) concludes
that "It is not that contemporary extra-transference and genetic
transference interpretations have no value, but the danger is always
that they will be employed as a flight from the immediacy of the
transference within the analytic situation." He describes some of
the dangers of too quick genetic or extra-transference interpreta-
tion and notes that the effect on the transference of transference in-
terpretations also has to be analyzed.
Gill states in this chapter that "attention to resistance to the
awareness of transference should come first and that, even though
priority in interpretation designed to resolve the transference
should go to interpretation within the analytic situation, working
through requires extra-transference, transference, and genetic
transference interpretations." It is a pity that this statement was not
printed in bold type on the first page of the monograph, for it might
have undercut the impression that the author was advocating analy-
sis on the basis of transference interpretations alone.
This might be an appropriate place to compare and contrast some
aspects of our own technical approach with Gill's. It must be evi-
dent that we are in sympathy with much of what he proposes, espe-
cially with the emphasis he places on understanding allusions to the
transference in order to interpret, as first priority, the patient's re-
 390 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

sistance to the awareness of transference. We would put our formu-

lations in this regard a little differently, however, and emphasize
that the primary preoccupation of the analyst in listening to the pa-
tient's material is in order to understand—and to interpret as
appropriate—what is going on in the here-and-now. For the most
part this will refer to the transference (in the most general sense of
the term), and certainly "tuning in to the transference wavelength"
must, in our view, have first priority. In theoretical terms we can
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put it briefly by saying that we want to interpret whatever is being

modified or held back by the second censorship, whether the mani-
fest material refers to the analysis or not.
At this point, however, our paths begin to diverge. Because the
processes in the present unconscious are intimately involved in con-
flict, and the second censorship also reflects conflict, in order to
make the conflict-arousing contents acceptable to the patient in an
emotionally meaningful way, we have to verbalize the dominant
conflict in the here-and-now. We would agree that we have to do
this whenever possible in the context of the interpersonal situation,
i.e., in the transference.
Another example may be appropriate here. A patient, a survivor
who had lost all her close relatives in childhood, began a session by
complaining of the selfish behavior of an Arab client who had not
paid her for work she had done for him. In the previous session the
analyst had clearly made a special effort to rearrange his schedule
so that she would not have to experience too long a gap between ses-
sions the following week. In our view (taking other material into ac-
count) the appropriate interpretations would be along the lines that
while she was happy to have had the schedule changed the previous
day, she found herself in the very unpleasant situation of feeling
that the analyst would regard her as selfish and be angry with her.
Because she felt unhappy about this, it was easier to see the Arab cli-
ent as the selfish one, and to be doing the accusing herself. Such an
interpretation would be aimed at (eventually) increasing the pa-
tient's tolerance for her "selfish" wishes —or, one could say, for the
selfish part of herself—and lessening her guilt feelings over having
anything for herself or being special in any way (other evidence
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 391

showed that "survivor guilt" was an important element in her

pathology).
It is our conviction that such interpretation of conflict in the
transference differs in emphasis from Gill's, and more effectively
combines the intrapsychic with the interpersonal. And, in addition
to such interpretations, where Gill might reinforce the working
through in the transference with genetic transference interpreta-
tions, we would not only make reconstructions of the past (i.e., of
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what we have referred to as the past unconscious), but would try,

together with the patient, to make constructions about the inner
world of the patient so that he can build up a picture of his main
intrapsychic conflicts (anchored in the reconstruction of the past
linked with whatever he recalls from the past unconscious during
the course of his analysis). Such constructions and reconstructions
would, of course, only be made when the level of the patient's resist-
ance has dropped following effective here-and-now interpreta-
tions. (Differences between Gill's approach and our own may be-
come more evident when we come to consider the second of the two
monographs.)
As far as the "new experience" is concerned, the "corrective expe-
rience" may play some part in bringing about change, perhaps more
with some patients than others. In our view, it has its biggest role in
analyses of children (especially deprived children). What is taken
over from the analytic situation, however, is the tolerant attitude of
the analyst toward the previously unconscious infantile aspects of
the patient's self.

9. Kleinian Interpretation of Transference

Gill's discussion of the Kleinian position leads him to agree with

"its emphasis on the ubiquity of transference and the centrality and
priority to be given to transference interpretation." But he com-
ments (p. 136) that his disagreement "stems from the fact that...the
Kleinians do seem to make inappropriately deep transference inter-
pretations which fail to make adequate contact with the current re-
 392 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

ality of the actual analytic situation." His presentation suffers

somewhat from the fact that he was not aware that Paula Heimann
dissociated herself from the Kleinians after Mrs. Klein put forward
her theory of primary inborn envy of the breast, and that Pearl
King, while sympathetic to Kleinian views, was never a Kleinian.
Both these authors are cited extensively. But on the whole we would
agree with his conclusions.
Yet there are Kleinians and Kleinians, as there are Freudians and
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Freudians. Some will systematically give "deep" pseudotransfer-

ence interpretations which are out of touch with current conflicts
and the dominant affects. This leads to an "up in the air" sort of
analysis. But there are others with the highest degree of clinical sen-
sitivity, who are in touch with the patient's affects, and are particu-
larly aware of the ways in which defense externalizations and inter-
nalizations occur in the here-and-now of the transference situation.
And certainly we have learned much from our Kleinian colleagues
in this connection. This has been assisted by a shift in recent years
among some Kleinians toward "speaking to the adult part of the pa-
tient," with analytic work also being done on exposing current anxi-
eties, rather than assuming that the direct interpretation of "deep"
anxieties brings to the patient the greatest and most immediate re-
lief. In terms of the model we have put forward, we would say that
Kleinian interpretations that are affectively and cognitively "in
touch," when formulated in terms of the most primitive processes
and fantasies, provide "past unconscious" metaphors for processes
in the present unconscious and may thus function as effectively as
other metaphors in current use. In our view, however, Kleinian
theory suffers greatly from the lack of any sort of formal distinc-
tion between the past and present unconsciouses.

10. Freud's Legacy

Gill argues that Freud's techniques changed very little after the
early years of the century. He disagrees with those of Freud's critics
who say that Freud interacted too much with his patients. He disa-
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 393

grees, too, with the "major trend in current practice...to expunge

the personal relationship instead of recognizing it as part of the in-
evitably existing actuality of the analyic situation..." (p. 141). After
an exhaustive review of Freud's writings on transference Gill comes
to the conclusion that, "It is possible that Freud's failure to give the
analysis of the transference the primacy it should have in the ana-
lytic process has played a role in analysts' failure to interpret the
transference more actively despite the fact that it was he who in-
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vented the analysis of the transference and who explicitly stated

that all the patient's conflicts must ultimately be worked out in the
heat of the transference (p. 175)."
Gill's reference to "the heat of the transference" is important. We
agree completely with Anna Freud that the patient's conflicts must
not be interpreted when they are "cold" (Sandier & Freud, 1984),
but the transference, in the sense of the interpersonal component in
the patient's material, is not always very "hot," and we have to ask
ourselves whether strict adherence to Gill's rule that it is transfer-
ence that must be the focus of interpretation might not at times lead
the analyst away from the understanding of current sources of heat.

Conclusion

Gill now summarizes his essential position, and this provides us

with an opportunity to restate our own in the context of his
formulations.
A. Gill maintains "that the analysis of the transference should
play a greater and more central role in analytic technique than...it
does in prevailing practice." We agree wholeheartedly, provided
that we do not forget that, as Gill puts it, "the question is one of
emphasis."
B. Gill says (p. 177): "Rather than regard transference as primar-
ily a distortion of the present by the past, I see transference as al-
ways an amalgam of past and present. Insofar as the present is rep-
resented in the transference, it is based on as plausible a response to
the immediate analytic situation as the patient can muster." We
 394 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

agree that transference can no longer be seen as simply a distortion

of the present by the past, but Gill's description of transference as
an amalgam is, in our view, too simple. It implies that transference
(presumably in both its conscious and present unconscious aspects)
is a repetition of the past amalgamated with the present, and it is
here that we believe that Gill has failed to clarify sufficiently what
he means by transference.8 He cannot have it as the interpersonal
element in the patient's communications and at the same time the
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"amalgamated" repetition of the past, without making it clear when

he is using the concept in one sense rather than in the other. More-
over, his conception of transference—or of what has to be inter-
preted as transference—takes no account of the defensive transfor-
mations within the relationship that occur in the process of
object-related responses and tendencies coming to the surface.
These defensive transformations in the transference come about as
a result of the resistance to the emergence of consciousness-
dystonic content in the present, and contribute to the resistance to
the analytic process, which aims at making current consciousness —
dystonic material tolerable to conscious awareness. In addition,
Gill makes no provision for inclusion under the heading of transfer-
ence of the externalization of the patient's inner world, the "un-
packing of his mental furniture" as the analytic process develops.
This externalization of the patient's introjects and the attempts the
patient makes to actualize the dialogues which he has with the fan-
tasy objects that represent the introjects as they are in his current in-
ner world are highly important aspects of the transference (and of
the greatest significance for the countertransference).

8
Gill's inability to resolve the problem of the definition of transference and his implict ad-
herence to its classical definition are clearly seen in the Introduction to Volume 2. There Gill
and Hoffman say, "The term 'transference' and the phrase *the patient's experience of the re-
lationship' are used interchangeably throughout this monograph... While we would ac-
knowledge that it may be useful conceptually to exclude certain aspects of the patient's expe-
rience of the relationship from 'transference,' what we are dealing with here are conflictual
and resisted aspects of that experience which we feel it is safe to regard as transferential. In
other words, these are aspects of the patient's experience that are probably governed by rela-
tively rigid schemata associated with childhood wishes and childhood attempts to deal with
early conflicts" (our italics).
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 395

C. Transference is, in Gill's view, present throughout the analy-

sis, but may show itself only in associations which are allusions to
the transference. Interpretation of these allusions is interpretation
of resistance to the transference "in contrast to the interpretation of
resistance to the resolution of transference." Gill sees the resolution
of the transference as resulting "primarily from the patient's his-
tory, which explains the origin of that aspect of the transference
which derives from the past." We would see the process somewhat
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differently. For us the interpretation of unconscious conflict, pri-

marily transference conflict, leads the patient to greater tolerance
of infantile aspects of himself. We base our interpretations on the
patient's "allusions," but include as possible allusions direct refer-
ences to the analyst or even the recall of memories of the past. In
this connection we believe that we give greater weight than does Gill
to the interpretation of defensive modifications of unconscious
transference urges and fantasies. And, as part and parcel of the in-
terpretative process, especially when the "heat" of a transference
conflict has been reduced, we anchor the patient's insight (into the
previously unacceptable aspects of himself) in a matrix of construc-
tions and reconstructions which give historical-biographical sense
to the recurring patterns that have emerged.
D. The therapeutic factors are, for Gill, first, the recognition by
the patient of his contribution to the present from his past. Second,
there is the "byproduct of the work," the corrective emotional expe-
rience. We would lay less stress on the latter factor than does Gill,
putting emphasis rather on the "releasing" effect of the patient's
identification with the analyst's tolerant attitude, as conveyed espe-
cially through the analyst's interpretation of resistance due to un-
conscious transference conflict.
E. Finally, Gill stresses again his increased emphasis on "work
with the transference" in the here-and-now, linked with a
deemphasis on interpretations outside the transference, including
so-called "genetic transference interpretations." He underscores,
too, the need for the analyst to "be alert to the repercussions on the
transference of his interpretations of it, just as he must be to the re-
percussions of any intervention he makes" (p. 179). It must be obvi-
 396 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

ous that we agree fully with this last point, although with the caveat
that this alertness is first and foremost an alertness in listening for
further development of transference material, with active probing
restricted to the search for necessary clarifications.

The second volume of Analysis of Transference is very difficult

to comment on. It is a courageous monograph, for Gill and
Hoffman show that they are very aware of the limitations of tran-
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scribed tape-recorded material. Such material is difficult to read

and digest. It inevitably presents a distorted picture because the af-
fects, emphases, intonations, and all the other nonverbal communi-
cations, which are essential for the analyst to "feel along" with the
patient, are missing. One inevitably experiences a sort of psychic
"color blindness," which puts severe limitations on the appreciation
of what both patient and analyst have communicated to each other.
It will certainly be a major task for future researchers to discover
why it is that the transcribed material of other analysts' sessions so
often makes one feel that they are very bad analysts indeed. This re-
action is far too frequent to reflect reality (can so many analysts re-
ally be so bad?) and so our negative reactions to most of the mate-
rial presented in this volume must be taken with considerable
caution. However, we feel bound to say that we were surprised to
note how much the analyst and patient — and this applies to all nine
sessions reported—seem to be in opposing camps, on opposite sides
of the fence, so to speak. We do not get the impression, in any of the
sessions reported, that the analyst is completely affectively in tune
with the contents of the patient's present unconscious. Throughout,
the analyst tends to appear as a superior figure and often (especially
in the latter sessions in the book) rather like an interrogator—albeit
a benign one. In attempting to get the patient to open up and to pro-
vide more material, he reinforces, for the most part, his role as a su-
perego figure. But Gill and Hoffman are clearly well aware of the
dangers of interrogation becoming persecution.
The most enlightening parts of this volume are, as might be ex-
pected, the comments made by the authors, and it is on the basis of
these that the work needs to be assessed. The interspersed observa-
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 397

tions of Gill and Hoffman are fully consistent with the formula-
tions given in Volume 1, and we shall restrict ourselves to very brief
comments on what might be regarded as a major dimension of disa-
greement between Gill and ourselves. Our areas of substantial
agreement have been spelled out earlier, and it is clear, that we wel-
come the emphasis on the interpretation of transference allusions in
the here-and-now.
The "unobjectionable positive transference" is of the greatest im-
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portance if an analysis is to work, but for us the prime source of this

aspect of the relationship between patient and analyst is the ana-
lyst's understanding (and the communication of that understand-
ing) of the painful dilemmas felt by the patient in the here-and-now.
These dilemmas embodied in (present) unconscious conflict lead to
defensive and adaptive solutions of one sort or another, and it is the
analyst's task to undo these in such a way that the unacceptable
(adult versions of) infantile wishful urges can become tolerable to
the patient in thought, fantasy, or socio-syntonic action. For this
purpose we need to communicate continually to the patient our
awareness of how difficult it is to deal with the current conflict, how
natural it is for him to find himself in a quandary, and how
humiliating it must be to reveal the "silly" or "stupid" parts of him-
self to the analyst. In this way we function to reduce the "second
censorship." In general, we would say that it is vitally important for
the patient to feel that the analyst is affectively in touch and in step,
even though this feeling will be affected by resistance and negative
transferences of one sort of another. Incidentally, this basic feeling
of rapport facilitates the development of the negative transference,
while its absence (we found little evidence of this rapport in the ses-
sions presented) will tend to inhibit overtly hostile transference atti-
tudes toward the analyst.
We agree with many of the comments made by Gill and Hoff-
man, although (very much to our regret) we miss their formulations
of the way in which they would phrase their interventions. We are
left to speculate about this, but the very fact that the authors did not
find it esential to spell out what they would actually say to the pa-
tient is perhaps significant. Our impression is that they would inter-
 398 JOSEPH SANDLER and ANNE-MARIE SANDLER

prêt an underlying thought, wish, or attitude of the patient, but that

they would not interpret conflict, with its associated anxiety, pain,
or discomfort. Take, for instance, a simple example from patient B
(p. 31). Gill and Hoffman, commenting on the patient's material,
say "Perhaps she feels the analyst is impatient with her for being
unable to start without being directed." This might be the basis for a
perfectly adequate interpretation, but it seems to us to be more ap-
propriate to say, in these particular circumstances, something like,
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"It must be very difficult for you because you do want to talk here,
and to tell me what you feel and think, but at the same time you are
afraid that it will all come out in a confused way and you will make
me angry. So of course it is very natural for you to want me to give
you a direction, so that you can bring your thoughts in an organized
way. Then you needn't be so frightened of me." The patient might
then be more likely, we believe, to bring associations that would in-
dicate her current fears of being criticized, and the content of what
she feels she would be criticized for. Moreover, we believe that such
interventions allow for the gradual elucidation of the structure of
the patient's inner world, particularly in its relation to current con-
flict. This is an area not explored at all by Gill and Hoffman.
Possibly the authors would argue that their interpretations con-
tain implicit references to conflict, and to a certain extent we could
go along with such an argument. But our experience is overwhelm-
ing that the explicit empathie verbalization of conflict in the here-
and-now of the transference is far more productive and more en-
couraging of appropriate regression in the analysis.
Whatever disagreements we might have with the approach pre-
sented in these two monographs, we have little doubt that the mon-
ographs represent an important step in the development of the psy-
choanalytic theory of technique, especially in the emphasis placed
on the analyst's need to be attentive to transference in the here-and-
now and to be alert to the immediate effect on the transference of
the analyst's moment-to-moment interventions. A period of im-
mersion in Gill should certainly play a significant part in every ana-
lyst's technical education.
 PAST AND PRESENT UNCONSCIOUS AND TRANSFERENCE 399

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