A Wholesome

Anthropocentrism:
Reconceptualizing the
Value of Nature within
the Framework of an
Enlightened Self-interest
Bartlomiej A. Lenart

Non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics face problems that can-

not be resolved within a holistic framework of natural value since such frame-
works posit abstract and general properties as the bearers of intrinsic value and
thus ignore the moral claims of individual organisms. Two paradigm examples of
such approaches, Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic and Arne Neass’ Deep Ecology suffer
from this problem. Christine Korsgaard’s argument for the conceptual separa-
tion of intrinsic and instrumental valuing, however, serves as a strong theoretical
grounding for a reconceptualization of the value of nature, which can best be
described as an enlightened anthropocentrism, while preserving the spirit of Leo-
pold’s and Naess’ proposals.

Introduction
Many environmentalists and philosophers troubled by today’s increas-
ingly serious environmental problems have complained that the worth
and importance of the environment is being evaluated through the lens
of a “humanistic” ethic concerned with anthropocentric values and goals.
Kenneth Goodpaster worries that since “[m]odern moral philosophy has
taken ethical egoism as its principal foil for developing what can fairly
be called a humanistic perspective on value and obligation” (2005, 54),
philosophers tend to approach “questions of conservation, preservation
of the environment, and technology assessment…simply as application

ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 25, no. 2 (2020), 97–117

Copyright © The Trustees of Indiana University  •  doi: 10.2979/ethicsenviro.25.2.05
 questions” (2005, 54), which address environmental concerns merely
in terms of anthropocentric ends, “[b]ut there is something distressingly
uncritical in this way of framing such issues—distressingly uncritical in the
way that deciding foreign policy solely in terms of ‘the national interest’
is uncritical” (2005, 54). Goodpaster’s criticism of anthropocentric evalu-
ations of the environment is echoed by the views and philosophical con-
templations of influential environmentalists like Arne Naess and Aldo
Leopold. Leopold writes:
There is yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the ani-
mals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus’ slave-girls, is
still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing privi-
leges but not obligations. (1993, 374)

Odysseus, upon returning home from the Trojan War, hangs a dozen
slave-girls, who belong to his household, merely for suspected “misbehav-
ior” during his absence. Leopold observes that “[t]he ethical structure of
that day covered wives, but had not yet been extended to human chattels”
(1993, 373). Leopold goes on to suggest that the environment is similarly
“unprotected” by the ethical structure of our day.
As a remedy to the ethical egoism Goodpaster blames for the insuffi-
cient ascription of human obligations toward the environment, Leopold
proposes his Land Ethic, which “enlarges the boundaries of the commu-
nity to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land”
(1993, 374). In a similar manner, Naess’ first principle in his (and George
Sessions’) “Deep Ecological Platform” also emphasizes a non-anthropo-
centric evaluation of the environment.
The two dogmas of Environmental Ethics, then, as Andrew Light
points out, are: (1) “the assumption that axiologically anthropocentric
views are antithetical to the agenda of environmentalists, and to the devel-
opment of environmental ethics” (2002, 429); and (2) the assumption that
non-anthropocentrism should be extended beyond individualism, which
includes sentientism of the sort advocated by Peter Singer (1990, 2011)
since “individualism or sentientism is inadequate for an environmental
ethic because it fails to offer [direct] reasons for the moral consideration
of ecosystems, wilderness, and endangered species” (Light 2002, 431).
Thus, arguments for the “intrinsic value” of holistic systems (like ecosys-
tems) have become quite common in the literature.
This paper discusses Arne Naess’ and Aldo Leopold’s accounts, which
arguably constitute paradigm examples of proposals that ascribe intrinsic
value to ecosystems. Such accounts, however, are open to various objec-
tions, which can be avoided by a more anthropocentric approach to envi-
ronmental ethics. The approach I propose is one that adopts an enlightened
self-interest grounded in Christine Korsgaard’s (1996) distinctions in

98 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

goodness: (1) the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goods, and
(2) the distinction between ends and means.

Two Holists on the Intrinsic Value of the Environment

Aldo Leopold
Aldo Leopold understands ethics as originating from the “tendency
of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation”
(1993, 373). He is concerned with the lack of an ethic that deals with the
relation between human beings and the land, where the “land” includes
various systems, the waters, the soil, and the numerous and diverse inhab-
itants of the “land.” Leopold’s land ethic aims at enlarging the boundaries
of the “community,” which presupposes interdependency of the various
parts that constitute a given whole, to include soils, waters, plants, and
animals as fellow members of an intricately interdependent system whose
survival and “health” depends on an appropriate understanding and eval-
uation of the various interdependencies. “In short, a land ethic changes
the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain
member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and
also respect for the community as such” (1993, 374).
Leopold criticizes conservation systems based solely on economic
motives; he states that such conservation systems do not assign value to
most of the members of the “land-community” because most members do
not have any economic value. However, the land ethic points to the fact that
such members, being integral parts of the biotic community, contribute to
the stability of the entire system. Therefore, a system of conservation based
solely on the economic self-interest of human beings “assumes, falsely…
that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the une-
conomic parts” (1993, 178). Although Leopold does not explicitly state it,
one can infer that in such a manner, short-sighted economic self-interest not
only destroys the integrity of the environment upon which the stability of
the various life-generating (as well as resource-generating) systems depends,
but also, by direct entailment, endangers the very resources it values (since
their existence is deeply intertwined with the stability of the entire system).
Leopold offers the metaphor of The Land Pyramid, which consists of
interrelated layers of energy transfer. At the bottom layer, plants absorb
energy from the sun, which continues to flow upward through a circuit
called the biota (represented by the layers of the pyramid). The bottom
layer consists of the soil with a plant layer resting on top of it and “an
insect layer [resting] on the plants, a bird and rodent layer [resting] on the
insects, and so on up through various animal groups to the apex layer,
which consists of the large carnivores” (1993, 378). Each layer depends
on the one below it for food and various other services. The lines of

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 99

 dependency are called “food chains” and are, in effect, channels by which
energy is transmitted through the various layers in a complex arrange-
ment of such chains (or food webs). The pyramid, then, is a tangle of liv-
ing channels (a complex array of food chains) and its functioning depends
on the co-operation and competition of its diverse parts. “Food chains are
the living channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return
it to the soil” (Leopold 1993, 378), and although the circuit is not closed,
it is sustained. Without this complexity, normal circulation is unlikely and
the proper functioning of the entire system may be compromised.
Structure means the characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic
kinds and functions, of the component species. This interdependence
between the complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning
as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes. (Leopold 1993, 379)

The core of the land ethic, then, can be summarized as follows: “[a] thing
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 1993,
382). What emerges out of Leopold’s land ethic, then, is an axiology that
assigns intrinsic value to wholes.
J. Baird Callicott believes that human beings must have become ethi-
cal before they became rational because the evolution of reason does not
seem plausible without the pre-requisite development of complex linguis-
tic capabilities, but these, in turn, depend for their evolution on a highly
developed social matrix. “But we cannot have become social beings,”
Callicott argues, “unless we assumed limitations on freedom of action in
the struggle for existence” (1989, 79).
Callicott understands Leopold’s land ethic as implicitly assuming such
an evolutionary sequence of events and thus as embracing David Hume’s
(1751/2006) and Adam Smith’s (1759/1976) arguments that ethics rest
upon “feelings” or “sentiments.” Callicott writes:
Darwin’s account, to which Leopold unmistakenly (if elliptically) alludes
in “The Land Ethic,” begins with the parental and filial affections com-
mon, perhaps, to all mammals. Bonds of affection and sympathy between
parents and offspring permitted the formation of small, closely kin social
groups, Darwin argued. Should the parental and filial affections bond-
ing family members chance to extend to less closely related individuals,
that would permit an enlargement of the family group. And should the
newly extended community more successfully defend itself and/or more
efficiently provision itself, the inclusive fitness of its members severally
would be increased, Darwin reasoned. Thus…the “social sentiments,”
would be spread throughout a population. (1989, 79)

It is no surprise, then, that the section entitled “The Land Pyramid,” which
arguably constitutes the heart of Leopold’s monograph, opens as follows:

100 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

 An ethic to supplement and guide the economic relation to land presup-
poses the existence of some mental image of land as a biotic mechanism.
We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, under-
stand, love, or otherwise have faith in. (Leopold 1993, 378)

Callicott continues his analysis of “The Land Ethic” by outlining the con-
ceptual foundations underlying it. He states that Evolutionary Theory
provides the conceptual link between ethics, social organization, and devel-
opment. That is, it provides a sense of kinship with fellow creatures who
are at once fellow members of the biotic community as well as “‘fellow-
voyagers’ with us in the ‘odyssey of evolution’” (1989, 82). Furthermore,
Ecological Theory provides The Land Ethic with the conceptual link
between a sense of social integration of human and non-human nature by
emphasizing that “[h]uman beings, plants, animals, soils, and waters are
‘all interlocked in one humming community of cooperations and competi-
tions, one biota’” (1989, 83). Finally, Leopold also adopts the Copernican
Perspective, which reveals the Earth to be a tiny planet journeying through
an immensity of mostly empty and hostile space. Such an image of our
planet, Callicott argues, contributes to our sense of kinship, community,
and interdependence with all of Earth’s inhabitants. In Callicott’s more
elegant and poetic words: “[i]t scales the earth down to something like a
cozy island paradise in a desert ocean” (1989, 83).
A short reflection on Leopold’s text in the section entitled “The
Community Concept” makes Callicott’s analysis quite plausible. Let us
recall that Leopold writes: “[i]n short, a land ethic changes the role of
Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member
and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect
for the community as such” (1993, 374). Callicott concludes that “[t]he
land ethic, thus, has a holistic as well as an individualistic cast” (1989,
83), but soon afterwards adds:
The land ethic not only provides moral considerability for the biotic
community per se, but ethical consideration of its individual members
is preempted by concern for the preservation of the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community. The land ethic, thus, not only has a
holistic aspect; it is holistic with a vengeance. (Callicott 1989, 84)

Theoretically, then, the biotic community is the recipient of direct

moral considerability precisely because it is the biotic community itself
(as a whole) that has intrinsic value in virtue of its integrity, stability,
and beauty. Callicott states that “[t]he overriding holism of the land ethic
results…from the way our moral sensibilities are informed by ecology”
(1989, 87). Leopold endows wholes with intrinsic value and, if Callicott
is correct, this assignment is informed by the Evolutionary, Ecological,
and Copernican themes weaving themselves through the very heart of

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 101

 “The Land Ethic.” In fact, Leopold writes: “[a] land ethic, then, reflects
the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a con-
viction of individual responsibility for the health of the land” (1993, 380).
He goes on to define health as “the capacity of the land for self-renewal”
and conservation as “our effort to understand and preserve this capacity”
(1993, 380).
Leopold’s model of nature, given in the Land Pyramid metaphor, ele-
vates processes over the individual members of a given community or
system that engage in these processes. Callicott writes: “process precedes
substance and energy is more fundamental than matter. Individual plants
and animals become less autonomous beings than ephemeral structures
in a patterned flux of energy” (1989, 89–90). It is quite clear that “the
complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as an energy
unit” (1993, 379) is the source of intrinsic value on Leopold’s view. The
individual organisms that inhabit the land only posses value insofar as
they contribute to the complexity, stability, and integrity of the system as
a whole, which they do merely in virtue of numbers and complexity of
interactions they engage in with other members of the system and not in
any way in virtue of their individual existential or phenomenal properties.

Arne Naess
Arne Naess argues that “[c]onservation strategies are more eagerly
implemented by people who love what they are conserving, and who are
convinced that what they love is intrinsically lovable…They possess a gen-
uine ethics of conservation, not merely a tactically useful instrument for
human survival” (1993, 412). This statement implies that intrinsic value
ought to be lodged in non-anthropocentric evaluations of the environ-
ment; there is something in nature itself that is “intrinsically lovable” and
it is not merely dependent on evaluations based on human needs.
Naess’ and Sessions’ Deep Ecology Platform sheds a bit more light on
the source of the intrinsic value with which Naess wishes to endow the
environment. The first postulate states:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life on

Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inher-
ent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the
non-human world for human purposes. (1993, 412)

The non-human world, on Naess’ account, possesses intrinsic value inde-

pendently of whether it is of any use to human beings. Naess explains
that this formulation “refers to the biosphere, or more appropriately, to
the ecosphere as a whole (this is also referred to as ‘ecocentrism’). This
includes individuals, species, populations, habitat, as well as human and

102 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

non-human cultures” (1993, 412). Naess quite explicitly labels himself as
an ecocentrist, which implies a holistic approach to valuing nature. And
although human beings feature on his list of what he takes the biosphere
(or ecosphere) to consist of, he makes it quite clear that the value of the
biosphere is derived from a non-anthropocentric source.
The second postulate of his Deep Ecology Platform provides a clue
as to where the value of the ecosystem originates. The second postulate
states:

2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of

these values and are also values in themselves. (1993, 412)

Naess explains that “the second principle presupposes that life itself, as a
process over evolutionary time, implies an increase of diversity and rich-
ness” (1986, 413). In conjunction with the third and fourth postulates,
Naess’ formulation of Deep Ecology points to richness and diversity as a
source of intrinsic value, which are both similarly abstract and procedural
in character to Leopold’s postulation of stability and integrity as the bear-
ers of intrinsic value. The third and fourth postulates state:

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except

to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a
substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-
human life requires a smaller human population. (1993, 412)

As with Leopold’s focus on stability and integrity, richness and diversity

do not pick out any particular individuals as bearers of moral consid-
erability or worth. What is of value for Naess, then, is the stability of
the biosphere itself. Every individual is important in that every particular
individual contributes to the richness and diversity of the whole, but it
is to the richness and diversity of the whole that an environmental ethic
ought to grant moral considerability on Naess’ view, just as it is the integ-
rity and stability of the complex structure of the land that demands moral
consideration on Leopold’s account.
Both Leopold and Naess subscribe to the two dogmas of environmen-
talism outlined by Andrew Light (2002): (1) that an Environmental Ethic
must be non-anthropocentric and (2) that an Environmental Ethic must
be holistic. Moreover, both Leopold and Naess understand intrinsic value
in terms of ends. That is, nature, on their accounts, is to be valued as an
end in itself rather than a means to human needs. Such understanding of
intrinsic value entails that nature is objectively valuable because structural
properties of natural systems like richness, diversity, integrity, or stability

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 103

 are valuable in themselves and not merely valuable as means to something
else (e.g. human needs). Of course, understood in such terms, both views
entail quite bizarre and somewhat counterintuitive consequences, namely
that what is of value is some abstract property (or set of properties) of
natural systems.
Leopold’s preoccupation with integrity and stability is much more
comprehensive than Naess’ focus on richness and diversity especially once
integrity and stability are related to land health, which is necessary for the
flourishing of individuals. For this reason, it may be better to understand
‘richness’ and ‘diversity’ in Naess’ Deep Ecology as being essential prop-
erties of healthy ecosystems. However, viewed in this manner, richness,
diversity, integrity, and stability are revealed to be instrumentally, rather
than intrinsically, valuable since they contribute to land health (that is,
they are valuable insofar as they contribute to land health). Moreover,
land health, in turn, possesses instrumental value for the individual organ-
isms that populate the ecosystems since their individual well-being is
dependant on the health and integrity of the land. If this is the case, then
wholes lose their value as ends in themselves. This certainly is not the
kind of view Leopold and Naess want to promote, and this is not the only
problem facing their accounts.

Some More Problems with Non-Anthropocentric

Holism
There are several further problems with non-anthropocentric sources
of intrinsic value that tend toward holism. As Andrew Brennan points out,
the Theory of Succession states that certain pioneer species give way to
other species as an ecosystem develops over time (1995). Such a process, it
is said, eventually results in an apex of the succession, marked by the sys-
tem’s stability. Studying food-cycle relationships suggests that biotic com-
munities cannot be clearly distinguished into their biotic and abiotic parts.
Thus, it is quite natural to regard the ecosystem as a fundamental ecolog-
ical unit at the heart of which organisms with the capacity to transform
inorganic material into organic compounds (the autotrophs) perpetuate
the energy cycles, which are transported via the living channels Leopold
speaks of (that is, through the stomachs, as it were, of the heterotrophs).
Such a view of ecosystems is richly suggestive; it tends to understand
self-sustaining systems as comprising quite widely spatiotemporally
extended superorganisms analogous to the view of species as superin-
dividuals. Determining the precise source of moral obligation, however,
becomes difficult because the relations individuals have to such superindi-
viduals or superprganisms are much different than those they have to each
other. Andrew Brennan writes:

104 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

 The super-individual or global ecosystem may contain valuable com-
munities within it. But if we are to take seriously the claim that moral
value involves in part being in, or being capable of entering into, certain
relations with other things, then there is a real question over whether
Gaia herself can have moral value. (1995, 205–06)

Brennan claims that current results in ecology hardly support a superin-

dividual conception of ecosystems. Studies suggest that succession occurs
rapidly where there is an established competitive hierarchy. Brennan
therefore argues that even if environmentalists assume that entire systems
such as forests have value, it is a mistake to overlook the fact that “the
final stable state of the ancient forest is simply the outcome of competition
for resources at the level of individual trees, or of populations of trees”
(1995, 210). This fact should not be overlooked even if the theory of suc-
cession is called upon to ground the holist’s intuition that all systems tend
to stability in diversity (something which Brennan also contests).
Moreover, diversity itself may not be a naturally occurring phenom-
enon. Brennan points out that even if the planet itself is self-sustaining, it
is still a fact of the matter that regular interference by good, ecologically-
minded, foresters is required to maintain local diversity in some places.
This appears to suggest that local diversity may not be self-sustaining. If
the calls for non-intervention are to be heeded, then perhaps we may have
to come to terms with the fact that some local environments will naturally
tend toward uniformity rather than diversity. If this is the case, however,
then diversity may not be a sufficiently fundamental source of intrinsic
value.
Additionally, the variety manifested by certain communities (like for-
est ecosystems) is often the result of “‘a regular pattern of natural devasta-
tion’” (Brennan 1995, 211), such as the occurrence of forest fires, which is
why “[s]ome management, even in the form of human-engineered devas-
tation, may thus prove necessary to maintain what we regard as a pleasant
diversity of species in certain places” (Brennan 1995, 211).
Baird Callicott (1980) and Elliot Sober (1995) highlight a further
problem. Sober argues that environmentalists are typically concerned
with the preservation of that which is natural while Callicott is distressed
that the animal liberation movement fails to “draw a sharp distinction
between the very different plights (and rights) of wild and domestic ani-
mals” (1980, 330). Domesticated animals, according to Callicott are mere
artefacts (mere human creations).
They are living artefacts, but artefacts nevertheless…There is thus some-
thing profoundly incoherent (and insensitive as well) in the complaint
of some animal liberationists that the ‘natural behaviour’ of chickens
and male calves is cruelly frustrated on factory farms. It would make

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 105

 almost as much sense to speak of the natural behaviour of tables and
chairs. (Callicott 1980, 50)

Valuing that which is natural for the reason that it is natural becomes
quite tempting once the source of intrinsic value is located in the integrity
and stability of a system as a whole (especially when human interaction
with the environmental processes is viewed as interference and intru-
sion). Sober thinks that such extreme tendencies toward valuing only that
which is natural are absurd. First of all, such views suggest that since wild
organisms are not understood as having the function of serving humans,
whereas domesticated animals do serve such a function, “[c]heetahs in
zoos are crimes against what is natural; [whereas] veal calves in boxes
are not” (Sober 1995, 237). Secondly, Sober explains that human beings
cannot be viewed as existing outside of nature in some artificial realm.
Humans, just like cheetahs, are part of nature and thus everything they
do is part of nature and so all human actions are natural in that primary
sense. Sober writes:
When we domesticate organisms and bring them into a state of depend-
ence on us, this is simply an example of one species exerting a selection
pressure on another. If one calls this ‘unnatural’, one might just as well
say this of parasitism or symbiosis (compare human domestication of
animals and plants and ‘slave-making’ in the social insects). (1995, 234)

What Sober’s objection points out is that artificial systems ought to inherit
value from their natural counterparts (if natural systems are valued) since
blindly valuing one type of system, but not another is arbitrary. Sober
warns that environmentalists should look elsewhere for a defence of their
policies “lest conservation simply become a variant of uncritical conserv-
atism in which the axiom ‘Whatever is right, is right’ is modified to read
‘Whatever is (before human beings come on the scene), is right’” (1995,
235). After all, organisms transform their environments by interacting
with them. An ant-hill, according to Sober, is just as much an artefact as
is a highway (1995, 243). Furthermore, if the source of value is a holistic
one, which reduces to the maintenance of ecological balance and diver-
sity, the charge of environmental fascism soon surfaces. Sober writes: “It
is hard to know what to say to someone who would save a mosquito,
just because it is rare, rather than a human being, if there were a choice”
(1995, 241). It is difficult to see why ecosystem stability and diversity
must be the only (or an overriding) source of value.
Anthony Weston’s (1996) critique of the very notion of intrinsic value
unveils yet another difficulty for views like those of Leopold and Naess.
Weston states that the traditional requirement for intrinsic value makes
the concept too abstract. According to Weston, intrinsic value, tradition-
ally conceived, must be self-sufficient in the sense that “intrinsic values

106 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

hold the sufficient grounds of their worth within themselves” (1996, 288).
Moreover, traditionally conceived, intrinsic value must be abstract. This
is due, Weston points out, to the means-ends distinction since everyday
non-intrinsic values are integrated as means under fewer and more gen-
eral ends. This process, however, continues as the proximate ends become
means themselves to some still fewer and more abstract ends until one end
is enshrined as the ultimate source of all value. This, however, leads to the
fact that intrinsic value demands special justification because
Given their supposed self-sufficiency…[intrinsic values] cannot be jus-
tified by reference to other values. Given their abstractness, they are
too special, too philosophically fragile, to exist unproblematically in
the world. But merely to assert them is insufficient: that would make
them arbitrary…Value as such must be derived, ontologically, from
something else. Thus, intrinsic values have been construed as God’s
commands, as a priori truths about a special moral world revealed by
intuition, as deliverances of Pure Reason, as aspirations fundamental to
“human nature,” and so forth. (Weston 1996, 290)

The very existence of instrumental value, Weston argues, is supposed to

prove the existence of some intrinsic value. This is analogous to the argu-
ment that the occurrence of any event is evidence of the existence of a
“first cause.” Such a “first value” argument, however, begs the question.
Just as the first cause argument must assume that the chain of causes
it invokes cannot be infinite, so the “first value” argument assumes
that the long process of tracing means back to ends must have a final
stopping point. But actually this is just what it was supposed to show.
(Weston 1996, 293)

Weston states that a “non-anthropocentric environmental ethics may

simply be impossible within the inherited framework of intrinsic values”
(1996, 291). Weston, of course, introduces his Pragmatic Approach to
Environmental Ethics, but this is not relevant to the current discussion as
it falls beyond the scope of this paper.

Two Vital Distinctions: Korsgaard’s Distinctions in

Goodness
Christine Korsgaard (1996) urges the importance of keeping two dis-
tinctions of goodness separate: (1) the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic goods and (2) the distinction between ends (final goods) and
means (instrumental goods). Her focus is on “the goodness of objects,
purposes, lives, etc.… [rather than] the rightness or justice of actions, pol-
icies, and institutions” or “the moral worth or moral goodness of char-
acters, dispositions, or actions” (1996, 249), and more specifically, she
concerns herself with how we “sometimes judge particular things to be

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 107

 good absolutely, meaning that here and now the world is a better place
because of this thing” (1996, 249). She clarifies that “intrinsically good,”
by definition, does not refer to a thing’s being valued for its own sake, but
rather that a thing that is intrinsically good “has its goodness in itself”
(1996, 250). That is, labelling something as “intrinsically good” refers “to
the location or source of the goodness rather than the way we value the
thing” (1996, 250). Thus, the contrast between intrinsic and instrumental
value is a false contrast. The proper contrast to intrinsic goodness (the
value a thing has in itself), then, is extrinsic goodness (the value a thing
gets from some other source). Similarly, the natural contrast to a thing’s
being valued instrumentally (as a means to something else) is a thing val-
ued as an end (for its own sake). Thus, Korsgaard concludes, intrinsic and
instrumental are not correlative terms since they belong to two different
distinctions of goodness.
The correlation of intrinsic and instrumental (that is, taking intrin-
sic to be the opposite of instrumental) exists only under the influence
of a particular theory, which views the two distinctions as amounting to
the same thing. For example, if a theory equates extrinsic goodness with
instrumental goodness, then it is forced to say that if something is not
good in every circumstance, then it must always be a means or an instru-
ment. This way of thinking, Korsgaard argues, is implicit in theories that
tend to conclude that the final good must be some kind of experience such
as pleasure (1996, 251). For instance, if a theorist were to answer in the
negative when asked whether a sunset would be judged as “good” even if
the person engaged in the activity of observing it found the activity tedi-
ous or painful, then the theorist would view the goodness of the activity
of watching a sunset as a means to pleasure rather than viewing the occur-
rence of the sunset itself as intrinsically good.
The separation of the two distinctions in goodness
opens up another possibility: that of something which is extrinsically
good yet valued as an end. An example of this would be something that
was good as an end because of the interest that someone took in it, or the
desire that someone had for it, for its own sake. (Korsgaard 1996, 252)

Korsgaard claims that Immanuel Kant (1785/1993) uses this distinction

with some very interesting and desirable results. Kant, Korsgaard argues,
distinguishes between unconditional and conditional value. For Kant, of
course, only the “good will” is unconditionally good. Other goods, such as
“happiness,” for example, are only conditionally good; the end-means dis-
tinction refers to the “way” or “manner” in which we value things while
the unconditional-conditional distinction refers to the “circumstances” in
which or “conditions” under which things are objectively valued. Kors-
gaard explains:

108 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

 A thing is unconditionally good if it is good under any and all conditions,
if it is good no matter what the context. In order to be unconditionally
good, a thing must obviously carry its own value with it—have its good-
ness in itself (be an end in itself). Kant’s notion of unconditional value
therefore corresponds to the notion of intrinsic goodness. (1996, 257)

Thus, for Korsgaard, a thing is intrinsically good if it is “unconditionally”

good, extrinsically good if it is “conditionally” good (that is, if it is good
only if certain conditions are met), and a thing is objectively good either if
it is “unconditionally” good or if it is “conditionally” good and the condi-
tions of its goodness are met.
Here it is important to notice that ‘good objectively’ is a judgment
applying to real particulars…To say of a thing that it is good objectively
is not to say that it is the type of thing that is usually good…but that
it contributes to the actual goodness of the world: here and now the
world is a better place for this. (Korsgaard 1996, 258)

Korsgaard understands the Kantian postulate that only the “good will”
is unconditionally good to suggest that rational beings (who are intrin-
sically valuable in virtue of their “good will”) must be capable of con-
ferring value upon the objects of their choices, desires, and the ends they
set because rational beings must regard their ends as “good.” Moreover,
since other rational beings are also intrinsically valuable, “we must regard
others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices”
(Korsgaard 1996, 260). Therefore, the ends chosen by any rational being
take on the status of objective goods. “They are not intrinsically valuable,
but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has
a reason to promote them or realize them” (Korsgaard 1996, 261).
It could be objected that it is precisely the goodness of the chosen
object that makes the choice rational. Korsgaard replies that it is the rea-
soning that goes into the choice that certifies the goodness of the object
chosen. Therefore, Korsgaard claims, on Kant’s theory, “the goodness
of rationally chosen ends is a matter of the demands of practical reason
rather than a matter of ontology” (Korsgaard 1996, 261). Thus, on Kant’s
view, the goodness of most things (all but the unconditional goodness
of the “good will”) is relational (relative to the desires and interests of
rational beings). Korsgaard continues:
[However]…since it [the goodness of most things] must also be appro-
priately related to one thing that has intrinsic value [the “good will”],
it is not merely “subjective.” Value does, in Ross’s [1930/2007] extrav-
agant terms, “shine with a reflected glory,” and it is “borrowed rather
than owned” by most of the things that have it. But it does have an orig-
inal source that brings it into the world—the value-conferring power of
the good will. (1996, 262)

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 109

 Korsgaard gives the example of an extraordinarily beautiful painting
unsuspectedly (and perhaps even permanently) locked up in a closet. The
painting is valued for its own sake. Let us assume that the practically rel-
evant property of the painting is its beauty (though it may be valuable for
many other reasons as well). Moore’s (1903/2004) “isolation test” sug-
gests that a world with such a hidden painting is better than one without
it. However, since the painting is, in fact, hidden, no one knows it exists.
The Kantian/Korsgaardian account of value allows us to say that although
the painting is valuable for its own sake, so long as it remains undiscov-
ered (and thus unseen by anyone), the condition of its goodness (i.e. that
the painting be viewed) is not met. Even though the painting does not
possess intrinsic value, it may nonetheless be objectively good (good for
its own sake) because if it were viewed, and if the viewer were delighted
by its beauty, “then the painting would be an objectively good thing: for
the world would be, really, a better place for it” (Korsgaard 1996, 265).
Notice, too, that this does not in the least mean that we have to say that
the painting is only valued as a means to the experiences of apprecia-
tion. Those experiences are not an end to which the painting is a means,
but the condition under which its value as an end is realized. (Korsgaard
1996, 265)

Korsgaard’s distinctions in goodness suggest that it is sometimes artificial

to worry about whether we value things as means or as ends because the
conditions of our lives are often responsible for making things valuable
to us. “It is the conditions themselves that make the things good, that
provide the various reasons for their goodness” (Korsgaard 1996, 267),
and thus, the question is not one of ontology (of whether the objects we
value possess some special property or attribute), but rather a question of
whether the reasons we have for valuing the object are sufficient to estab-
lish its goodness. The reasons must be sufficient because not all desires for
certain objects are actually good. Some desires are quite harmful. How-
ever, “the criterion that reasons be universalizable will also, on Kant’s
account, limit the capacity of desires to serve as reasons and so to confer
value” (Korsgaard 1996, 268). Although a thing’s “desirability” is not a
sufficient condition of goodness, Korsgaard argues that it is often still a
main source of the goodness of many things. “In particular, ends whose
condition is their desirability can be justified by the rational choices of
human beings” (Korsgaard 1996, 268).
The advantage of Korsgaard’s approach is that it offers an account of
the objectivity of goodness without the need to assign some sort of prop-
erty to all good things that makes them intrinsically good. Only the “good
will” is intrinsically good on this account (and even the argument for the
intrinsic value of the “good will” is not ontological).

110 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

 If human beings have an intrinsic value by virtue of the capacity for
valuing things [by virtue of the power to justify their ends], then human
beings bring goodness into the world. The distinction between a thing
that is intrinsically good and a thing that is extrinsically good yet valu-
able as an end allows for the possibility that the things that are impor-
tant to us have an objective value, yet have that value because they are
important to us. Objective goodness is not a mysterious ontological
attribute. (Korsgaard 1996, 273)

The things that are important to us can be good for various reasons: they
can be good because we desire them or because we love them, they can
be good because of our interests in them or “because of the physiological,
psychological, economic, historical, symbolic and other conditions under
which human beings live” (Korsgaard 1996, 273).

Reconceptualizing the Value of Nature

If, following Korsgaard, we understand intrinsic value to be the
value a thing has in itself (rather than conflating it with being an end),
then nature, on Leopold’s and Naess’ views, becomes the bearer of its
own goodness. More precisely, richness, diversity, integrity, and stability
become valuable in themselves rather than deriving their value from some
other source. In other words, such things as diversity must be said to carry
their goodness in themselves. It is somewhat puzzling to see why diversity
in itself, for example, should be intrinsically valuable. After all, the diver-
sity of the criminal population in a given city does not strike me as being
a particularly good thing.
Alternatively, both Leopold and Naess might wish to equate richness
and diversity or integrity and stability with land health and thus insist
that land health is intrinsically valuable. But even then, it is difficult to see
why land health (the land’s capacity for self-renewal) should be valuable
in itself. It may very well be a good end to aim at, but to assign intrin-
sic value to this capacity seems somewhat curious. Arguably, a “healthy”
environment is good because it contributes to the flourishing of various
species of individuals.
Korsgaard’s distinctions allow us to grant objective value to “land
health” (and even such things as “diversity”) provided that the conditions
of their goodness are met. What Leopold and Naess endow with intrinsic
value, however, becomes extrinsically valuable. For example, land health
is valuable because it contributes to the flourishing of individuals, but
insofar as it does contribute to the flourishing of individuals, it is good
objectively. In other words, its contribution to the flourishing of individu-
als is a condition under which land health, though extrinsically valuable,
becomes an end that is objectively good.

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 111

 Korsgaard’s account of objective goodness lends itself to an interest-
ing and, I think, quite plausible solution to some of the other problems
facing Leopold’s and Naess’ attribution of value to ecosystems as wholes.
First, Korsgaard’s distinctions in goodness can account for the kind of
foundation Eric Katz argues is necessary to “limit or to map out the
range of appropriate instrumental values” (1996, 309) though, of course,
Korsgaard’s approach takes on a somewhat different form since the nat-
ural distinctions, on her account, fall between intrinsic and extrinsic, and
final and instrumental goods (instrumental values, on her account, are
not the opposite of intrinsic values as Katz would suppose). However,
since the “good will” is unconditionally good, it becomes the ultimate
bearer of intrinsic value and as such is quite capable of grounding the
rational choices of human beings regarding the environment in an uncon-
ditional source of value, namely the good will. No rational being would
choose, if guided by a “good will,” to destroy the habitat that sustains
life (among which are counted the lives of other rational beings). The
mindless destruction of ecosystems would amount to self-destruction in
the most literal way; such self-destruction is neither rational, nor can it
be driven by a “good will.” Thus, although many of the concerns rational
agents have are inevitably self-centered, many others will have to be, at
least derivatively, non-anthropocentric in nature. As Callicott points out:
Somewhat like the paradox of hedonism…one can only secure self-
interest by putting the interests of others on a par with one’s own (in
this case long-range collective human self-interest and the interest of
other forms of life and of the biotic community per se).… “There is
no other way for land to survive the impact of mechanized man,” nor,
therefore, for mechanized man to survive his own impact upon the land.
(1989, 99)

Moreover, intrinsic value, on Korsgaard’s view, is not ontologically

grounded and thereby avoids Weston’s problem with postulating intrinsic
value in the first place.
Furthermore, the diversity, integrity, and stability of the ecosystems
that support us become valuable only given that certain conditions are
met. However, given that such conditions are met, diversity, integrity, and
stability of ecosystems can still be objectively good. A theory of enlight-
ened (albeit self-interested) environmental stewardship that is grounded
in Korsgaard’s distinctions can thus maneuver around the charge of envi-
ronmental fascism; this is because not every instance of diversity and sys-
tem integrity has to be judged as valuable. The conditions for value are
closely tied to the well-being of rational agents making it quite unlikely
that anyone would ever be faced with the choice of sacrificing a human
life to the diversity of mosquito species in a local ecosystem. This does

112 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

not, however, entail that the destruction of the ecosystem or the extinction
of species is allowable, since Korsgaard’s distinctions in no way dismiss
the claims of people like Leopold and Naess that diversity and integrity
are necessary for the health of ecosystems and the organisms that inhabit
them (in fact, the conceptual link between ecosystemic health and human
well-being may serve as a sufficient condition for making diversity and
integrity objectively good).
A view motivated by Korsgaard’s distinctions, however, does not rec-
ognize the unconditional value of diversity and integrity itself and so also
avoids the problems pointed out by Brennan that not all ecosystems tend
toward diversity and that the holistic story (e.g. the history of an ancient
forest) is actually a story of the individuals within an ecosystem com-
peting for resources. In fact, a Korsgaardian approach to environmental
ethics will focus more on individuals than on wholes, but this is precisely
what allows such an approach to avoid the objections levelled against
holistic views.
Finally, there need not be any appeals to only that which is “natural,”
for the conditions of value will be derived from a rather different source,
namely from our desires, interests, loves, and because of the physiologi-
cal, psychological, economic, historical, symbolic, and other conditions
of human life. Such conditions of value, however, do not presuppose that
what is natural cannot be valued. In fact, what is natural will be valued
(for the very reason that it is natural) precisely because the “naturalness”
of a certain object may become the condition under which it is valued.
Such an approach offers a sturdy theoretical foundation for views like
Sober’s “Aesthetic Account” (1995), which argues that (1) for both natu-
ral objects and works of art, our values extend beyond the experience of
pleasure, (2) both natural objects and artworks are valued more if they are
originals (that is why few individuals would substitute actually venturing
into the wilderness for a week in a “wilderness experience machine”), (3)
both natural objects and artworks are more valuable if they are rare, and
(4) it is important to preserve natural habitats for the same reason it is
important (to us) to preserve the entire city of Venice rather than particu-
lar beautiful specimens or artifacts that belong to it. This approach also
avoids Katz’s (1996) objection to Weston’s (1996) pragmatic approach,
which states that pragmatism about value results in a “swamp of subjec-
tive relativism” (Katz 1996, 315) precisely because Korsgaard argues that
… since “every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same
rational ground which holds also for myself” (G 249), we must regard
others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices
and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself
thus involves making that person’s ends as far as possible your own.
(1996, 260)

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 113

 Such rational choices of others, insofar as they are grounded in a fully
realized “good will” become objective goods (provided that the conditions
of their goodness are met). Thus, the motorboater and the wildlife lover
cannot simply base their choices on their own self-interested and self-
centered preferences, but must consider the rational choices and prefer-
ences of all other valuers. In fact, the motorboater may need to limit her
motorboating activities quite substantially given that pure selfish or ego-
istic reasons cannot be universalized.

Revisiting Leopold and Naess

A Korsgaardian approach to value lends itself to an environmental
ethic grounded in enlightened self-interest. Although Leopold criticizes
enlightened self-interest, his criticism is actually aimed at economic
self-interest. Both Leopold and Naess understand that an environmen-
tal ethic must protect human and non-human organisms. Some of what
is suggested by this reconceptualized approach to environmental value
does, in fact, resonate with both Leopold’s and Naess’ views at least to
some extent. Although the non-anthropocentrism of Leopold and Naess
tries to steer away from value derived from human (economic, etc.) needs,
both thinkers understand ethics and moral obligation toward the land as
grounded in human feelings and sentiments.
First, when Leopold writes: “[w]e can be ethical only in relation to
something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in”
(1993, 378), his sentiment is remarkably similar to some of the conditions
for value Korsgaard discusses. The difference between Homo sapiens and
other species is that humans have the mental capacity to impact the envi-
ronment on a global scale; this is a mental endowment, however, also
capable of grasping our intimate kinship to the land that both sustains and
threatens us. It could be argued that this is the kind of sentiment Leopold’s
land ethic is suggesting (i.e. the feeling of kinship with the land). Although
the land would perhaps be “healthy” in the absence of human beings, it
is precisely our existence that requires that a land ethic be proposed in
the first place; and in virtue of our rationality, we have the capacity to
produce and implement such an ethic. It would truly be absurd if our own
ethic had nothing to say about our own well-being and even more curious
if this ethic were to bode ill for those who implement it (Lenart 2010).
Second, when Naess writes, “[c]onservation strategies are more
eagerly implemented by people who love what they are conserving, and
who are convinced that what they love is intrinsically lovable” (1993,
412), he is also appealing to the notion that ethics is grounded in feel-
ings and sentiments. Such feelings and sentiments might serve as excellent
condition-makers for value (e.g. a person’s love of the environment inevi-
tably confers value on nature).

114 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 25(2) 2020

 Moreover, Naess’ favourite formulation of Deep Ecology (Ecosophy
T), states that there is “only one ultimate norm: ‘Self-realization’” (1993,
418). Naess continues:
I do not use this expression in any narrow, individualistic sense. I want
to give it an expanded meaning based on the distinction between a large
comprehensive Self and a narrow egoistic self as conceived of in cer-
tain Eastern traditions of atman. This large comprehensive Self (with a
capital “S”) embraces all the life forms on the planet (and elsewhere?)
together with their individual selves (jives). (1993, 418)

A wider, deeper self contributes to concern for the environment because

the realization of a much wider, interconnected, and interdependent self
identifies nature (one’s environment and the relations it has to every other
existing thing and system) with the self and thus, caring for nature ulti-
mately becomes a matter of enlightened self-interest. Naess says that “we
have to kill in order to eat, but there is a basic intuition in deep ecology
that we have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient
reason” (Bodian 1995, 28–29). However, given sufficient reason (e.g. pro-
tecting our vital interests), we may very well be entitled to interfere with
(and perhaps even destroy—within reason, of course) the integrity and
stability of natural ecosystems.
Naess confesses that he has
a somewhat extreme appreciation of what Kant calls “beautiful actions”
(good actions based on inclination), in contrast with actions which are
performed out of a sense of duty or obligation…“Self-realization!” is in
part motivated by the belief that maturity in humans can be measured
along a scale from selfishness to an increased realization of Self, rather
than being measured by degrees of dutiful altruism. I see joyful sharing
and caring as a natural process of growth in humans. (1993, 420)

I think that Korsgaard’s distinctions are, at least in part, captured by what

Naess is after here. Self-realization, the widening of our notion of our-
selves, continues to allocate value under certain conditions. Value appears
to be ultimately derived from this widely realized Self. This is precisely
because of the intimate entanglement of the self with the environment;
I must care about the environment because it (the environment) is, at
least in part (and a very important part at that), directly my-self. It could
be argued that, in a sense, the wide self-achieved-via-Self-realization is
endowed with an unprecedented capacity for “good will.” After all, this
capital “S” Self values all life and realizes that all life, including the aboitic
parts of the systems that support it, are in an important sense irrevocably
interconnected with it. Such a Self values and loves nature qua nature as
well as nature qua Self (both become interchangeable on such a view), but
the value itself is conferred on nature by the Self-realized Self and thus,

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 115

 it need not be located in the richness and diversity of the biosphere or in
its health.

Conclusion
Although the hearts of environmentalists like Aldo Leopold and Arne
Naess are definitely in the right place, their views may be somewhat alienat-
ing to many prospective “nature-lovers” because of what comes across as an
uncompromising non-anthropocentrism (or even anti-anthropocentrism),
which seems ready to sacrifice the individual at the altar of holistic
intrinsic value. The account I propose, which is grounded in Korsgaard’s
distinctions in goodness, points to a less radical (and admittedly more
anthropocentric) approach to environmental ethics, but one that grants
objective value to ecosystems while grounding the conditions of such
value in the human desire to survive, human love of nature, etc. I believe
that human understanding and appreciation of the interdependencies of
human and non-human (as well as biotic and abiotic) existence is a strong
enough foundation upon which an environmental ethic can be built.
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Bartlomiej A. Lenart  is a faculty member with Libraries and

Cultural Resources at the University of Calgary where he is a Research
and Learning Librarian. Dr. Lenart holds a PhD in Philosophy and has
spent a decade teaching Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics at
the University of Alberta. His research in Environmental Ethics focuses
on anthropocentrism and self-interest within the context of Deep Ecology.
E-mail: [email protected]

Lenart A Wholesome Anthropocentrism 117

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