COUNTERING

DISINFORMATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
CSC White Paper #6

CO-CHAIRMEN
Senator Angus King (I-Maine)
DECEMBER 2021 Representative Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin)
 CONTENTS
Executive Summary 2

Introduction – Why Disinformation Is a Cyberspace Issue 4

Section I: The Commission’s Strategic Approach and

Recommendations as They Pertain to Disinformation 5

Section II: The United States’ Information Ecosystem 6

Section III: The Federal Government’s Role 11

Section IV: Current Federal Government Efforts 12

Section V: Recommendations for Combating Disinformation 17

Conclusion 28

Abbreviations 29

Endnotes 30

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I n its March 2020 Final Report, the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission called on the U.S. government to promote
digital literacy, civic education, and public awareness in order to build societal resilience to foreign malign cyber-enabled
information operations. As the scourge of disinformation swept across the globe and expanded its scope beyond elections,
the Commission decided to conduct a deeper examination of cyber-enabled disinformation and propose steps that the
United States could take to begin building greater resilience to disinformation, particularly from foreign actors. While
many facets of the Commission’s original strategy of “layered cyber deterrence” can be applied in the context of combating
cyber-enabled disinformation, further action is needed from policymakers and lawmakers to enable the United States to
better prevent, withstand, and respond to disinformation.

In the context of disinformation, the United States faces stark foreign threats from nation-state adversaries, including most
prominently China, Russia, and Iran. These governments leverage intelligence operators, foreign media outlets, businesses,
and expatriates to spread disinformation in an effort to weaken confidence in key institutions, sow civil discord, and under-
mine U.S. pillars and instruments of power. These malign foreign actors leverage traditional and social media to create and
disseminate disinformation to pursue broader geopolitical goals, amplify acute crises, and exploit societal fissures.

Yet even despite this clear and defined threat, the federal government must tread carefully when wading into the fraught
world of disinformation. Its role must be defined narrowly and in a way that recognizes the inherent limitations on how a
democratic government should influence the information space, including but not limited to the guardrails enshrined in the
First Amendment. Further complicating this role is the notion that education—commonly ascribed a high level of impor-
tance for building societal resilience to disinformation—is a policy area largely within the purview of states and not the
federal government. Still other areas, like the training of journalists, introduce concerns about the appearance of inappropri-
ate government influence and are better addressed by other stakeholders. The federal government must therefore focus on
building key partnerships with relevant stakeholders around the country and enabling these partners to do the right thing.

This is not to imply that the federal government is not taking and cannot take important steps to counter disinformation.
Indeed, elements of the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence currently
engage in programming designed to protect the American people from the adverse effects of disinformation. Congress too
has recognized the need for action, and members have introduced dozens of bills that seek to confront the challenge of
disinformation. The federal government, working with key partners, must chart a path forward that brings coherence to
national efforts by prioritizing those threats that are most harmful and then taking steps to address them.

This white paper sets out seven recommendations to both reduce the prevalence of disinformation in the information eco-
system and build greater individual and societal resilience to disinformation and malign foreign influence:

• Recommendation 1: Congress should establish a Civic Education Task Force, enable greater access to civic education
resources, and raise public awareness about foreign disinformation.

• Recommendation 2: Congress should ensure material support to nongovernmental disinformation researchers

2 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Recommendation 3: Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to nonprofit centers seeking to
identify, expose, and explain malign foreign influence campaigns to the American public

• Recommendation 4: Congress should create a capability within the Department of Homeland Security to actively
monitor foreign disinformation

• Recommendation 5: Congress should create a grants program at the Department of Homeland Security designed to
equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources necessary to identify foreign disinformation cam-
paigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies

• Recommendation 6: Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and direct the Federal
Communications Commission to introduce new regulations in order to improve media ownership transparency in the
United States

• Recommendation 7: Congress should grant a federal entity the authority to publish and enforce transparency guidelines
for social media platforms

This white paper is the result of research and deliberation by Commission staff and commissioners. It seeks to explain
how the Commission’s original recommendations and strategy of layered cyber deterrence can be applied in the context of
disinformation and contributes a set of comprehensive policy recommendations that lay a firm foundation upon which the
United States, working with allies and partners, can build to combat disinformation and protect our most valuable demo-
cratic institutions.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 3

INTRODUCTION – WHY DISINFORMATION IS A CYBERSPACE ISSUE

INTRODUCTION – WHY DISINFORMATION

IS A CYBERSPACE ISSUE

T he United States Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) was created by Congress in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 to answer two fundamental questions: What strategic approach will
defend the United States against cyberattacks of significant consequences? And what policies and legislation are required to
implement that strategy? While disinformation is considered by some an issue largely separate from cybersecurity or network
security,1 the Commission addressed disinformation in the very narrow context of elections in its final report in March
2020. As the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe, the Commission revisited the issue, this time in the context of
disinformation about the pandemic itself, noting, “Our adversaries’ disinformation campaigns focused on the pandemic
illustrate that disinformation activities can reach far beyond the political and electoral contexts with which Americans are
best acquainted.”2

Over the course of the intervening months, the Commission received demand signals from constituents within Congress
and the executive branch to treat the topic of disinformation and potential policy recommendations more extensively. The
Commission has previously been reluctant to delve deeply into the topic of disinformation for two reasons.

First, disinformation as a policy issue, unlike many aspects of cybersecurity policy, has been marked by a strong partisan
divide. Researchers have identified an association between strong partisanship and vulnerability to misinformation;3 more
than two-thirds of U.S. citizens believe that Republicans and Democrats disagree about basic facts;4 and while U.S. citi-
zens in both major parties agree that disinformation is a problem, they disagree about who is responsible for it and what
ways to tackle the threat are appropriate.5 Although this partisan divide persists today, it is the sense of the members of the
Commission that there is room to reach some agreement on core issues.

Second, as noted above, disinformation is seen by many as an issue largely separate from cybersecurity and cyber policy in
the United States. While the Commission understands this view, continuing to bifurcate these issues has become untenable.
From a strategic perspective, the United States and its policymakers do themselves a disservice by continuing to differentiate
between the two when our adversaries do not.6

In order to craft a comprehensive strategy to defend the United States from cyberattacks of significant consequence, policy-
makers must account for the entire arsenal employed by adversaries to cause harm in cyberspace, including information. It
is also important to take a more operational or risk management perspective: disinformation campaigns waged against the
United States by foreign actors are often carried out by many of the same threat actors as are active in cyberspace and are
often the consequence of cyberattacks.

For these reasons, members of the Commission believe that elements of the topic of disinformation are within our man-
date. This white paper is the result of deep research, interviews with experts, and deliberations by the Commission. It seeks
to explain how the Commission’s proposed strategy of layered cyber deterrence applies to combating disinformation and
contributes a set of policy recommendations to better position the United States to prevent, counter, and withstand the
consequences of disinformation launched against it.

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 SECTION I: THE COMMISSION’S STRATEGIC APPROACH AND
RECOMMENDATIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO DISINFORMATION

SECTION I: THE COMMISSION’S STRATEGIC

APPROACH AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS
THEY PERTAIN TO DISINFORMATION

L ayered cyber deterrence, the strategic approach proposed by the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission in its March
2020 Final Report, combines a number of traditional deterrence mechanisms and extends them beyond the government
to develop a whole-of-nation approach. By shaping behavior, denying benefits, and imposing costs on adversaries, the
approach seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of cyberattacks of significant consequence. In combating disinforma-
tion, the United States should adopt the same approach, and several CSC recommendations from the March 2020 Final
Report pertain to disinformation.

In the March Report, for example, the CSC made recommendations aimed at ensuring robust U.S. capability to respond
to cyberattacks using cyber and non-cyber tools, including through defend forward operations and law enforcement action.
These same recommendations can be applied in the disinformation context. The executive branch should clarify the concept
of “defend forward” and its applicability in preventing and responding to adversary disinformation campaigns, and Congress
should strengthen non-military response tools. Further, the CSC recommended that “the U.S. government develop a
multitiered signaling strategy aimed at altering adversaries’ decision calculus and addressing risks of escalation.”7 In addition
to signaling about cyber, such a strategy should seek to communicate capability and resolve, delineate thresholds of behavior
that will trigger a response, and convey intent behind U.S. actions in the information space.

The report also emphasized the importance of resilience in managing cyber risks. Such management includes strengthening
public resilience against the pernicious messaging promoted by disinformation. The complete elimination of disinformation,
like the elimination of all traditional cyber threats, is not a realistic outcome. Understanding the malicious actor’s or nation’s
strategic objectives and finding ways to deny those objectives, regardless of the means being used, provides a sustainable and
agile approach that can mitigate harm even as the adversary changes tactics. This was the thinking behind the CSC recom-
mendation on teaching digital literacy and reinvigorating civic education to counter the erosion of trust in democracy and
democratic institutions that is so often the goal of disinformation.

Still other recommendations from the CSC’s subsequent white papers may also apply to combating disinformation in the
United States. For example, in its May 2020 “Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic” white paper, the CSC recom-
mended that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence create the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center
(DTAC) to act as a convening and sponsoring authority for social media companies and other third parties that will coop-
erate in collating social media data to facilitate analysis of foreign threat networks, analysis of foreign influence operations,
and information sharing.8 While policymakers are still debating the institutional home of the DTAC, this center should be
created and staffed to carry out its mandate. Further, in the same white paper, the CSC advocated for improving the capac-
ity of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)to identify and counter foreign disinformation and influence campaigns. This
recommendation remains as compelling as before.

To date, however, the CSC has neither fully treated nor proposed a suite of complementary recommendations aimed directly
at the challenge of combating disinformation. Before doing so, it is critical to grasp the intricacies of the United States’
information environment, including the threats and soft targets, and to understand existing government efforts aimed at
addressing disinformation in the U.S. information ecosystem.

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SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES’ INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES’

INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

T he question of how best to describe harms in the information environment has been the subject of scholarly disagree-
ment,9 and terms like “disinformation,” “misinformation,” “malinformation,” “information operations,” “influence
operations,” “information warfare,” and “malign influence,” to name just a few, are all used in various contexts by experts. It
is important not to use them interchangeably, because they describe specific phenomena, each of which requires a different
policy solution. The CSC focuses on the problems of disinformation, or “false information that is deliberately created or
disseminated with the express purpose to cause harm,” and misinformation, or “information that is false, but not intended
to cause harm.”10 Both disinformation and misinformation are tools used in the broader context of “influence operations,”
which the RAND Corporation defines as “the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemina-
tion of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent.”11 In many cases, the information activities of
adversaries involve explicitly false information; in others, such activities rely on misleading information, taken out of context
or presented in an inflammatory manner, and employ a kernel of truth to conceal the otherwise malign actions. The CSC
concentrates on disinformation and misinformation as elements of broader influence operations because this focus creates a
more narrow and appropriate scope for federal action.

Adversaries of the United States, operating out of both foreign and domestic locations, conduct operations to spread both
disinformation and misinformation in the United States in an effort to undermine public confidence in core democratic
institutions, sow discord and polarize the population, and place the health and safety of Americans at risk. While the
elections of the past decade have newly drawn attention to the issue of disinformation in the United States, the malady is
not confined to the context of elections. Adversaries of the United States have taken advantage of dis- and misinformation
campaigns to weaken public trust in all our institutions, undermine public health (both during and before the COVID-19
pandemic), and create friction or confusion during U.S. military and diplomatic engagements abroad.

A. THREATS

Adversaries of the United States leverage influence operations and disinformation campaigns in an effort to degrade con-
fidence in key institutions, sow civil discord, and undermine U.S. pillars and instruments of power. Although most states
and, increasingly, many non-state actors deploy information as a means of influence over other states, foreign adversaries
using disinformation campaigns to undermine U.S. national security interests include Russia, China, and Iran. In taking
such actions, each of these countries seeks not only to undermine U.S. objectives but also to pursue their own diplomatic,
military, and economic objectives. In addition, within our own borders, domestic political actors wittingly and unwittingly
wield or amplify disinformation in furtherance of political goals.

1. Russia

Russia employs a mix of methods to muddy the information environment in pursuit both of long-term objectives, includ-
ing undermining the instruments of U.S. power and trust in democratic institutions, and of short-term objectives, such as
cultivating civil tension over specific issues like race relations or influencing elections.12 In the United States, Russia draws
on print, online, television, radio, and social media to construct divisive narratives and spread mistruths. The three primary

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 SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES’ INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

Russian intelligence agencies—the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU)—each conduct information operations that impact the U.S.
information environment.13 In addition, the Russian government distributes propaganda and disinformation through official
channels, like those issuing official government statements; through state-funded entities, including foreign-facing media
like Russia Today; and through proxy sources, including Russia-aligned outlets with global reach and English-language out-
lets such as the Strategic Culture Foundation, Global Research, New Eastern Outlook, and Geopolitica.ru.14 Many of these
proxy outlets obfuscate their Russian state connections by employing American or other Western authors and academics.
Peace Data, for example, was a Russian site that paid real journalists to produce content in order to lend it legitimacy even as
it was producing false and misleading content.15

In furtherance of their information objectives, Russian influence operators have become adept at leveraging social media
networks and fringe websites to infiltrate communities of interest in the United States using false personas, to stand up
campaigns to undermine institutions, and to amplify protests or broader civil discord.16 Russia also routinely conducts cyber
operations in order to steal sensitive private information and leak it to the press.17 While such information is not necessarily
false, it does saturate the media ecosystem and distract public attention from other issues, thereby shaping public opinion.
All in all, Russia’s disinformation efforts have focused on volume, leading RAND Corporation analysts to coin the expres-
sion “firehose of falsehoods” to describe how Russian disinformation is inundating the media environment.18

2. China

China, like Russia, is involved in a long-term strategic influence operation aimed at shifting values around the world and
positioning itself as a new ideologue.19 During the COVID-19 pandemic, China began operating an increasingly com-
prehensive international influence apparatus, using both overt and subtle tactics in an attempt to erode U.S. and partner
countries’ influence. These efforts have included propaganda related to the coronavirus and to the United States’ handling of
the outbreak.20 In some of the most egregious cases, they have also involved attempts to stop European government sources
from reporting on its COVID-19 misinformation efforts.21 However, its disinformation campaigns are not confined to the
issue of COVID-19; they have extended to areas such as the state’s treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang, technology compe-
tition, the U.S.-China relationship, and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.22 These campaigns have been fueled by
the aggressive use of social media (the same social media to which China denies its citizens access) as Chinese government
officials promote narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).23

Overtly, a new class of vocal and vitriolic diplomats, colloquially referred to as “Wolf Warriors,” often take the lead in
propagating conspiracy theories via official Twitter accounts, interviews, and press releases.24 In addition to the push by
individual high-level diplomats, a dedicated community of state-paid internet users, often called the “50 cent party,” echoes
these talking points amid praise of the CCP across the internet.25 At a more subtle and subversive level, China’s COVID-era
escalation of its disinformation campaign against the United States continued during the 2020 presidential election with
the use of fake Twitter accounts to push out misleading videos, which were then echoed by Chinese bots. Most notably,
Chinese-linked accounts published footage purporting to show a man burning ballots marked for Donald Trump, which
then received upward of 1.2 million views.26 Such tactics are similar to those pioneered and deployed by Russia in the 2016
election campaign and point toward the CCP’s increasingly active and hostile disinformation posture.

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SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES’ INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

China’s Propaganda Efforts in Xinjiang

In 2017, growing attention began to focus on China’s repression and forced detention of Uighurs, members of an ethnically
Muslim minority who live primarily in China’s western Xinjian province, under the guise of antiterrorism efforts.27 Since then,
journalists have obtained piles of evidence documenting the mass detentions.28 Estimates in 2019 were that more than 1
million Uighurs were being held in internment camps;29 and even as leaders claimed that the program was “winding down,”
the construction of new camps has continued.30

As international criticism has mounted,31 China has engaged in a global propaganda campaign to deflect attention from its
practices by criticizing the human rights practices of other countries,32 co-opting ordinary citizens into its efforts to reshape the
narrative,33 and amplifying social media content in favor of its version of events.34

In one notable action detailed by the New York Times, Chinese authorities have facilitated the production of hundreds of
videos from supposedly ordinary citizens extolling the freedom they enjoy in Xinjiang.35 These videos are uploaded to Chinese
platforms like Pomegranate Cloud or Douyin and then recirculated on YouTube and Twitter in an apparently coordinated
campaign. Some of the Twitter accounts pushing these videos have been suspended for violating the site’s policies regarding
spam and platform manipulation.

3. Iran

Iran is a smaller but still powerful player focused on gaining regional influence, controlling its citizens’ access to informa-
tion, and preserving its national image.36 Researchers who have studied and tracked Iran’s efforts have focused on the use of
sockpuppets (false online identities) to launder information and push distorted narratives, especially with respect to Israel
and Saudi Arabia.37 Iran’s propaganda and disinformation efforts heavily feature a sense of exaggerated moral authority. For
example, following the U.S. government’s killing of Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, Iran mounted a propaganda campaign
that promised vengeance or retaliation.38 Pervasive Iranian disinformation efforts continue to address the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the possibility that the United States might reenter the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).39 A
recently declassified report by the Director of National Intelligence evaluated with high confidence that Iran launched a
multipronged disinformation campaign connected to the 2020 elections that was aimed at denigrating then-President
Trump and sowing discord domestically.40 In one of its more brazen efforts, Iranian actors sent threatening emails to voters
in Florida in an attempt to make them change their votes. While Iran’s efforts became more frequent, its tactics remained
technically unsophisticated. The report concludes that in their efforts, Iranian actors relied mainly on low-cost cyber tools
supplemented with information operations (including spearfishing campaigns). Further analysis indicated that multiple
actors within the Iranian government took part in the disinformation campaign, suggesting that Ayatollah Khomeini prior-
itized a “whole-of-government” approach.41 Much like both Russia and China, Iran is seeking in these campaigns to subvert
trust in democratic institutions and sow discord between political parties around the world.

B. VECTORS

In the context of disinformation, vectors represent the ways in which information spreads. In the United States, any discus-
sion of disinformation necessarily involves social media platforms.42 This attention is largely merited as, according to Pew
Research Center, 53 percent of American adults read the news on social media.43 In Q2 of 2020, Facebook alone removed
more than 7 million posts that contained fake news and labeled 98 million posts with “warning notices about coronavirus
misinformation.”44 in the following quarter, sites producing provably false content generated 1.8 billion interactions on

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 SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES’ INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

Facebook.45 However, while social media plays an important role in amplifying disinformation and is a primary vector
through which disinformation spreads, disinformation existed long before the advent of social media. Online sources—
including websites (like the Russian proxy websites) with links to or run by foreign intelligence agencies—print media,
television, radio, and in-person networks all contribute heavily to the creation and dissemination of disinformation in the
U.S. media ecosystem.

How Disinformation Spreads across Platforms

While researchers have called for greater access to social media data so that they may fully understand the spread of
disinformation across platforms including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,46 some studies and anecdotal evidence
have already demonstrated how disinformation appears on fringe platforms, migrates to more mainstream social
media platforms, and finally is picked up by traditional media sources in newspapers and television.47

For example, fringe platforms, social media, and mainstream media have all been involved in the spread of conspir-
acy theories about COVID-19 and the safety of COVID-19 vaccines.48 Fringe platforms like 4chan and 8kun showed a
spike in conversations about the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine in November 2019, following the company’s announcement
of positive results from its Phase III clinical trials. Many of these conversations relied on links to known conspiracy
sites and affiliate sites, which are used to launder information,49 as well as to Russian state media and sites known to
push pro-Kremlin narratives. These links then spread to Facebook and Twitter, in some cases generating thousands of
interactions.

The proliferation of misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines has generated sustained media attention, as main-
stream news outlets attempt to assure Americans of the vaccines’ safety and efficacy.50 Even though much of this
coverage focuses on debunking conspiracy theories and misinformation, experts describe it as a win for the perpetra-
tors, whose main goal is amplification.51

C. DISINFORMATION AS A TOOL TO AMPLIFY ACUTE CRISES AND EXPLOIT

SOCIETAL FISSURES

Disinformation threatens to broadly undermine public confidence in the United States government’s ability to govern
effectively. Different threat actors leverage different topics to sow discord, create confusion, and damage trust in the U.S.
government, society, and economy. While adversaries often find and focus on targets of opportunity, many campaigns share
the goal of weakening faith in democracy and seek to exploit public anxiety regarding race relations, economic inequal-
ity, and public health. No system of government is perfect, and adversaries exploit citizens’ frustration with democratic
outcomes and the sometimes slow and messy process by which democracies fashion their policies. By contrast, autocratic
adversaries like Russia and China—unimpeded by basic protections for citizens’ rights or by processes that involve hashing
out disagreements among competing interests—are able to place stricter controls on information, silence opposition, and,
if need be, respond with great flexibility to populist impulses swayed by disinformation. These advantages do not make
autocracy preferable to democracy: the features that make democracies uniquely vulnerable to disinformation perpetrated
by adversary nations are precisely the features worth protecting. But the need to operate within the constraints of democracy
does introduce unique challenges for countries seeking to compete with comparatively untrammeled adversaries.

Disinformation can represent a sharp tool with which key adversaries can create or exacerbate acute crises related to health,
safety, and security. China, for example, has relied heavily on disinformation to push narratives throughout the COVID-19

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SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES’ INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

pandemic, focusing efforts on undermining democratic responses to the pandemic, disputing the origins of the virus, and
causing widespread panic by amplifying false messages.52 However, the targeting of public health issues in the United States
is not limited to the context of COVID-19. For the better part of two decades, the Russian state has sought to undermine
the American public’s confidence in vaccinations. This effort has involved using Russian content polluters to sow discord
about vaccines, which researchers suggest may damage public health because “normalizing these debates may lead the public
to question long-standing scientific consensus regarding vaccine efficacy.”53 Some have therefore concluded that the Russian
government believes in “the anti-vaxxer/pro-vaccination debate as one of the fissures within American society that it can
exploit.”54 The intent of this misinformation is to undermine the American public’s faith in U.S. institutions, a decline that
would in turn weaken the United States and our ability to counter the Kremlin.

In addition, other wedge issues, such as race relations, have provided fertile ground for disinformation campaigns to take
root. As Americans took to the streets in June 2020 to protest police brutality and racism in the United States, foreign media
outlets in Russia and China “piggybacked onto hashtags linked to George Floyd . . . to push divisive messages and criticize
Washington’s handling of the unfolding crisis.”55 This tactic prompted the Department of Homeland Security to issue an
intelligence bulletin to law enforcement agencies containing the assessment that foreign adversaries had sought to capitalize
domestic political tensions for geopolitical goals.56 Perpetrators of disinformation sought to impersonate black Americans by
using fake social media profiles and to leverage content focused on Black Lives Matter protests to express support and crit-
icism of both presidential candidates, Biden and Trump.57 Though foreign actors latched on to the recent protests to push
disinformation, these tactics were not new: according to a Senate report after Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential
election, black Americans were the largest target of Russian social media disinformation.58 Domestic racial tensions are just
one arena in which foreign adversaries have used existing divisions or ongoing events to sow chaos.

Further, Russia is among the adversaries that have actively manufactured and spread disinformation to reduce the influence
of the United States and its allies in the international arena.59 Over the past decade in particular, Russia has used disin-
formation to undermine various arms control norms and institutions. An ongoing disinformation campaign orchestrated
by the Kremlin seeks to conceal the illegal use of chemical weapons by itself and its allies. In 2018, Russia violated the
Chemical Weapons Convention by using a nerve agent in an attempt to assassinate Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy, in
the United Kingdom.60 Subsequently, the Russian state is alleged to have employed its disinformation machine to deflect its
responsibility for the attempted murder of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny via a Novichok-class nerve agent.61
After German doctors confirmed that a nerve agent was responsible for Navalny’s illness, Russia immediately denounced the
accusations, calling the announcement a “smear campaign” against Russian authorities.62

Finally, military service members and veterans are especially ripe targets for disinformation, and adversaries like Russia have
focused their efforts on these individuals. A 2019 report by Vietnam Veterans of America “documented persistent, pervasive,
and coordinated online targeting of American servicemembers, veterans, and their families by foreign entities who seek
to disrupt American democracy.”63 An earlier report from 2017 detailed Russian attempts to hack, spearphish, and target
service members and veterans with disinformation, relying on tactics such as “posing as attractive young women to gather
intelligence” and distributing propaganda on social media after friending service members on Facebook.64 The same report
suggests that Russia uses platforms targeted at veterans in order to push pro-Russia propaganda and partner with other
Russian front organizations.65 In addition to targeting service members and veterans, adversaries have made the U.S. military
the object of disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories: during the pandemic, Russian and Chinese news sources
sought to stoke fear regarding martial law and the National Guard’s role in response to the pandemic.66 Other disinforma-
tion episodes, seeking to undermine NATO exercises in Europe, have spread allegations that members of the U.S. Army
killed a Lithuanian boy.67 Some of this targeting may be enabled by online platforms like Facebook that continue to allow

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 SECTION III: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE

advertisements to target military personnel.68 In 2019, at a hearing held by the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee on online
disinformation targeting veterans, one disinformation expert testified that veterans are targeted because they “are highly
respected members of society who positively influence their country and their community.”69 The goal of these particular
foreign disinformation campaigns is the same as that of others: “to further amplify and exploit the existing frustrations in
the veteran community” and, in so doing, “to wear away veterans’ faith in the U.S. system.”70

SECTION III: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE

S ubsequent sections of this white paper discuss current federal efforts under way to deal with the problem of disinfor-
mation and propose specific recommendations for the federal government, but it is important to note at the outset the
limitations and unique circumstances of the U.S. federal government as it seeks to address disinformation. Protected by
the First Amendment, freedom from government interference in speech and access information is a fundamental American
value. In addition, the United States is home to many of the world’s leading media and social media companies, which own
and operate much of the information environment not only domestically but also internationally. These realities pose unique
challenges and opportunities for the United States, including the need to determine the appropriate scope of the role of the
federal government and to manage collaboration between the federal government and the private owners and operators of
the information space.

A. RECOGNIZE FEDERAL LIMITATIONS

While the federal government has a diverse set of tools that can be applied to the challenge, not all of these tools are appro-
priate and should be applied. For example, with few exceptions, in developing policy that involves the content of speech
the federal government is constrained by the First Amendment.71 The protections that amendment affords are the lifeblood
of democracy, and censorship is inimical to the values that underpin a healthy, functioning information environment.
Furthermore, censorship erodes U.S. strength abroad by undermining American support not just for freedom of speech and
the press internationally but for an open information environment more broadly. Platforms themselves can moderate the
content that appears online, but the federal government can intervene only in extremely limited circumstances, subject to
strict legal scrutiny.72

Another constraint arises from the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to states the right to make policy in areas not dele-
gated to the federal government by the Constitution. As a result, state and local governments have had primacy over areas
like education, providing greater local control over what is taught in schools. The federal government can and does exercise
influence over education policy through instruments like funding.73 However, it should not dictate the content of the school
curricula.74

In other areas, federal action must avoid the appearance of inappropriate government influence over parts of society that
are better served by other stakeholders. The sphere of journalism, for example, was investigated by the CSC in the course of
researching and writing this white paper. The CSC considered recommendations that might bolster the ability of rigorous
independent journalism to counter disinformation. Not only can journalists play an important role in providing credible,
authoritative information to the American public,75 but they are also themselves targets of disinformation.76 However, the

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SECTION IV: CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

CSC abandoned the idea, in part because of concerns that the government might appear to be supporting certain media
outlets or propagandizing. Moreover, the media plays a crucial role in holding the government accountable (as at least
two-thirds of both Republicans and Democrats agree),77 and any government support that compromises the ability or
perceived ability of independent journalists to provide neutral and unbiased reporting on its activities does more harm than
good. When it comes to countering disinformation by bolstering journalism, other stakeholders from civil society or private
industry might be better positioned than the federal government to take the lead.

B. BUILD PARTNERSHIPS

In keeping with the importance of establishing an appropriate scope for the federal government’s role, partners will be essen-
tial to any national disinformation strategy. Private industry; state and local governments; and civil society are all crucial
partners for several reasons. Private industry, such as social media companies and traditional media companies, own and
operate the core infrastructure through which disinformation flows. States and localities are critical not only because they are
perceived as more trustworthy or reliable sources of information than is the federal government,78 but also because they have
jurisdiction over infrastructure or policies—including education policy and elections administration—that are central to the
disinformation challenge. Civil society organizations can provide credible research on the disinformation campaigns spread-
ing across platforms and can work to hold accountable both the private sector and government through rigorous journalism
and fact-checking.79 Each of these actors brings resources and expertise to bear on the problem, and they expand the set of
tools available for countering disinformation.

These partners can also help expand access to authoritative information and counter false or misleading narratives with
greater credibility than the federal government. A Pew Research Center survey from the fall of 2020 reported that the
proportion of Americans who trust the federal government, which has not passed 30 percent since 2007, has fallen to just
20 percent.80 And while the percentage of Americans who trust their state governments has also declined since the early
2000s, it has consistently remained above its lowest point (51 percent, in 2010).81 In 2018, fully 63 percent of Americans
expressed trust in state government and 72 percent expressed trust in local government.82 These statistics show that state and
local agencies can better serve as trusted sources for information than their federal counterparts and are, therefore, essential
partners in the effort to provide authoritative information regarding topics such as election integrity or COVID-19.

SECTION IV: CURRENT FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

O ver the past several years, the federal government has made strides in addressing the problem of online disinformation,
but important structural barriers to effective progress in this area remain. Efforts suffer from a lack of strategy, coor-
dination, and prioritization. Leadership on the issue is lacking, in part because there is no clearly designated department,
agency, or office around which all efforts should coalesce. Much as in the case of cybersecurity, multiple departments and
agencies have resources and expertise that come to bear on the problem of disinformation. And much as in the case of cyber-
security before the creation of the Office of the National Cyber Director, no single federal entity has the oversight, authority,
or resources to assume ownership for countering disinformation; nor is it clear that a single federal entity should assume

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such ownership. As a result, federal executive agencies including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have created a number of
centers, task forces, and initiatives meant to deal with the problem of foreign influence and disinformation.

Still, there is cause for optimism regarding the federal appetite to address cyber-enabled disinformation, particularly when it
emanates from foreign entities. Every National Defense Authorization Act since 2017 has made reference to the subject and
authorized federal action.83 Both the executive branch and Congress have demonstrated a willingness to respond to foreign
interference campaigns, particularly those affecting elections. The Department of Justice has indicted operatives tied to
disinformation campaigns—notably, those associated with the Russian Internet Research Agency.84 The Department of the
Treasury has also sanctioned Russian and Iranian entities and individuals engaged in election interference,85 using the powers
granted by Executive Orders 13757 and 13848.86

A. FEDERAL AGENCY INITIATIVES

On the heels of the news that Russia had attempted to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, the Trump administra-
tion’s 2017 National Security Strategy included a section on “information statecraft” under the heading “Preserve Peace
Through Strength.”87 Naming Russia and China among the adversaries seeking to “weaponize information” for strategic
gain and control the information available to their own publics, the document recognized that “U.S. efforts to counter the
exploitation of information by rivals have been tepid and fragmented. U.S. efforts have lacked a sustained focus and have
been hampered by the lack of properly trained professionals.”88 Similarly, although the Biden administration has not yet
released its National Security Strategy, the interim guidance published in March 2021 identified mis- and disinformation as
among the tools used by adversary nations to “exploit perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations,
erode existing international rules, and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance.”89

Reflecting the emphasis of current and former administrations on countering the threat of cyber-enabled disinformation,
federal initiatives have sought to increase information-sharing among federal agencies and between the government and the
general public on ongoing disinformation campaigns. They have also focused on public diplomacy and providing technical
assistance to foreign publics that may be affected by disinformation campaigns. The following list is not exhaustive but
rather provides an overview of some of the most notable ongoing efforts by federal departments and agencies.

1. Rumor Control

In the run-up to the 2020 election, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) launched rumorcontrol.
gov to prebunk—that is, to preemptively warn of and expose90—disinformation related to the integrity of the election
by providing authoritative information on election protection efforts.91 Some federal messaging campaigns have focused
on reaching specific audiences—CISA partnered with the Vietnam Veterans of America on the #Protect2020 campaign,
similarly designed to combat disinformation regarding the integrity of the election.92 In an attempt to replicate the success
of CISA’s website, other federal departments and agencies have created similar sites to address coronavirus-related disinfor-
mation. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Department of Defense, for example, both have “rumor control”
sites to help “distinguish between rumors and facts regarding the response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic,”
and both aggregate links to the pages of other federal departments and agencies involved in coronavirus response.93 The
Department of Justice’s website also provides information on how to spot coronavirus-related scams, as does the Federal
Trade Commission’s.94 States, too, have followed this model. Maryland, for example, established its own rumor control sites

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addressing the election and the coronavirus, as did Colorado.95 And in April 2021, a bipartisan group of 11 secretaries of
state asked the Department of Homeland Security to expand its efforts to push back against foreign disinformation cam-
paigns and thanked the department for its efforts during the 2020 election.96

2. Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation Team

The Countering Foreign Influence Task Force, established in 2018 within CISA’s predecessor agency, became in 2021 the
Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation (MDM) team, which “work[s] in close coordination with interagency and private sector
partners, social media companies, academia, and international partners on a variety of projects to build resilience against
malicious information activities.”97 In its approach to public awareness, the MDM team focuses on three stakeholder groups:
(1) subject-matter experts who enhance understanding of the threat, (2) “trusted voices” that can help amplify messaging,
and (3) the general public for which the team’s informational materials are designed. The team also seeks to “rout[e] dis-
information concerns to appropriate social media platforms and law enforcement.” These public awareness efforts have
included two graphic novels focused on identifying disinformation.98

3. Foreign Influence Task Force

In the fall of 2017 the FBI established its own task force, focused on the threat of foreign influence, which is intended to
coordinate the Counterintelligence, Cyber, Criminal, and Counterterrorism Divisions.99 Its work deals largely with investi-
gations, information-sharing, and private-sector partnerships.

4. Protected Voices Initiative

The FBI, DHS, and ODNI work together to run the Protected Voices Initiative and provide resources to political campaigns
desiring to protect themselves from cyberattacks and foreign influence campaigns.100 Their videos and materials have covered
topics such as business email compromise, cloud-based services, ransomware, multi-factor authentication, and social media
literacy. They provide tips and best practices for “protect[ing] your digital devices, social media accounts, and private infor-
mation from cyberattacks.”101

5. Global Engagement Center (GEC)

The Global Engagement Center (GEC) was established in 2016 by Executive Order 13721 for the purpose of coordinating
governmentwide communications to foreign publics on terrorist narratives.102 Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA amended
the GEC’s mandate, so that it now leads federal efforts “to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and
non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests.”103 GEC’s
functions include “identify[ing] current and emerging trends in foreign propaganda and disinformation in order to coor-
dinate and shape the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to expose and refute foreign misinformation and
disinformation and proactively promote fact-based narratives and policies to audiences outside the United States.”104 So
far, the GEC has released a report on Russia’s propaganda and disinformation efforts;105 its Technology Engagement Team
“leads U.S. Government innovation efforts by convening technology experts and programmatic authorities from the public
and private sectors,” and “has developed a dedicated effort for the U.S. Government to identify, assess, test and implement
technologies against the problems of foreign propaganda and disinformation.”106

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6. Office of the Director of National Intelligence

In April 2021, ODNI announced the creation of the Foreign Malign Influence Center to focus on “coordinating and
integrating intelligence pertaining to malign influence, drawing together relevant and diverse expertise to better under-
stand and monitor the challenge.”107 The center builds on existing efforts run through ODNI, including a series of
Intelligence Community Assessments on disinformation, mainly focused on elections.108 In addition, the 2021 Intelligence
Authorization Act required the creation of the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to facilitate public-private
cooperation on countering disinformation.109 The intelligence community plays an important role in bringing the broader
strategic context to conversations about foreign disinformation, highlighting the ways in which our adversaries leverage
disinformation in pursuit of their larger diplomatic, national security, and economic objectives.

B. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS

In the 117th Congress alone, legislators in both chambers have introduced more than 40 bills that contain the word
“misinformation” or “disinformation.” Dozens of other bills address similar topics of relevance to this white paper, including
foreign influence, civic education, media and advertising, and social media regulation, though without specific reference to
the problem of disinformation.. The breadth of the proposed legislation demonstrates that there is congressional appetite
to make progress on this issue. Like the recommendations contained in this report, these proposals attempt to address the
problem of disinformation and foreign influence over the American public using a variety of different tools. However,
partisanship is rampant: as shown below, nearly two-thirds of the disinformation-relevant bills introduced so far during the
117th Congress lack bipartisan co-sponsorship.

Congressional interest in addressing disinformation has risen since 2016, when Russian efforts to undermine the integrity
of the presidential election generated public anxiety about its role. During the 113th Congress (2013–14), just two bills
were introduced that contained the term “misinformation,” and none contained the word “disinformation.” Interest in
the topic rose steadily, however, and during the 116th Congress (2019–21), nearly 100 bills were introduced that referred
to “misinformation” or “disinformation.” That session also marked an important shift: for the first time, less than half the
bills pertaining to the topic had bipartisan support. Currently, just over a quarter of the way through the 117th Congress,
legislators are on pace to introduce a record number of bills related to disinformation and misinformation.

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SECTION IV: CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

Bills Introduced that Mention “Disinformation” or “Misinformation”

Bipartisan bills Bills with sponsors from a single party

117th Congress

116th Congress

115th Congress

114th Congress

113th Congress

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

C. SANCTIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Federal responses to ongoing disinformation campaigns have largely focused on law enforcement action and sanctions
against actors attempting to interfere in the media environment in the context of elections. The primary targets have been
Russian actors, though recently the Department of Justice charged an American citizen with election interference.110 In
the most notable case, a grand jury indicted 13 individuals and three companies associated with the Internet Research
Agency—a Russian operation that attempted to interfere in the 2016 presidential election—for criminal conspiracy to
defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft.111 In a more
recent action, the Department of Justice charged a Florida resident with interfering in the 2020 presidential election by
using social media to knowingly disseminate false information about voting.112

The Department of the Treasury has also levied sanctions against actors using cyber-enabled means to interfere in elec-
tions, relying on two executive orders (EOs) and one piece of legislation. In 2016, President Obama signed EO 13757, an
amendment to an earlier EO on cyberattacks,113 to authorize the imposition of sanctions against those “tampering with,
altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election
processes or institutions.”114 In 2018, President Trump signed EO 13848 to authorize sanctions against those determined to
have “directly or indirectly engaged in, sponsored, concealed, or otherwise been complicit in foreign interference in a United
States election.”115 Both of these EOs enable the Department of the Treasury to freeze the assets and block the transactions
of individuals who have been added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specifically Designated Nationals list because
they have behaved in the ways specified above. Both EOs also enable Treasury to sanction those who “materially, financially,
or technologically assist” others who engage in such behavior.

To date, Treasury has taken action pursuant to these EOs against more than 100 individuals for election-related interfer-
ence and cyber-enabled disinformation. Some of these actions have built on the above-mentioned indictments of Russian
individuals involved in efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election or have targeted Russian nationals and compa-
nies involved in interference in the 2018 midterm elections.116 Others have involved Iranian actors and entities, including
a number of Iranian government organizations, because of their interference in the 2020 presidential election.117 The
Department of Justice has also used its authorities pursuant to the Foreign Agent Registration Act and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act to seize domains used by Iran to target Americans and influence public opinion.118

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SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

COMBATING DISINFORMATION

T hrough intelligence and information-sharing programs, public diplomacy efforts, and a variety of cost imposition
measures, federal efforts have sought to shape the behavior of actors attempting to spread disinformation, and Congress
has responded to disinformation with a variety of approaches. What these federal efforts lack, however, is an underlying
strategy to combat disinformation and a clear articulation of roles and responsibilities for addressing different aspects of
the problem. As the federal government attempts to take on disinformation, it must pay attention to the interplay between
digital and analog systems. Disinformation is neither new nor unique to the online environment: it predates the Internet,119
and it spreads across radio, television, and print sources.120 Moreover, U.S. citizens consume news from a range of outlets.
While social media is an increasingly popular source of information, with slightly more than half of Americans reporting
they get news “sometimes” or “often” from digital platforms,121 more than 40 percent of Americans still prefer to get their
news instead from television, radio, and print sources and regard news on social media with skepticism.122 These statistics
vary across age groups, as more than half of adults age 50 and older say they “often” receive their news from television.123

Not all threats in the information environment are equally harmful. Nor does the federal government have the resources to
treat all threats as equally harmful. An effective approach to disinformation must enable the federal government to identify
and prioritize those threats that are most dangerous, while ignoring those that are not likely to have a significant impact.
The strategy and recommendations outlined in this white paper prioritize those threats that are most likely to do significant
harm either to democratic institutions or to health and human safety. In the past year alone, the American public has been
faced with disinformation campaigns that threaten both of these targets, demonstrating that dangerous threats are real and
pervasive.

In addition to identifying and prioritizing the threats that are most harmful, the federal government must develop a com-
prehensive strategy to deal with those threats. To date, the federal government has not crafted a coherent strategy for the
information environment, one that recognizes the unique vulnerabilities of democratic societies to disinformation and
their unique strengths in responding to it. Nor has the government developed a strategy that contends with the difficulty of
reconciling the United States’ respect for and promotion of free speech and access to information (including from abroad)
with the need to protect the American people from disinformation threats that undermine national security.

Recommendation 1: Congress should establish a Civic Education Task Force, enable greater
access to civic education resources, and raise public awareness about foreign disinformation

Disinformation robs democracies of the informed and engaged citizenry necessary for a government of, by, and for the
people. Along with providing recommendations to counter other kinds of malicious cyber activity, the Commission recog-
nizes that the most sustainable way to mitigate the impact of disinformation is to build public resilience against the perni-
cious messages that are being promoted. Our adversaries, often amplifying and amplified by domestic voices, hope to so
thoroughly muddle the truth that Americans give up trying to distinguish lies; to portray democracy and its institutions as
so broken that Americans give up on the prospect for change and reform; to so severely exacerbate divisions that Americans
lose sight of our fundamental shared values and sense of civic identity and civic responsibility. To counter these efforts, the
United States needs to reinvigorate civic education, thereby restoring a sense of shared values and empowering citizens to be

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more effective agents of change through constitutional means. A renewed emphasis on civic education should also include
media and digital literacy initiatives to help people become more discerning consumers of information and develop the skills
needed to understand the concept of civic responsibility in the digital age. It is a national security imperative for the U.S.
government to “promote and reinvigorate American understanding of the importance of democracy and our democratic
institutions, as a bulwark against foreign efforts to exploit divisions and complacency.”124

Civic education is also essential for developing the sense of civic responsibility necessary to meet national security challenges.
People who understand the Constitution and founding documents of the United States and feel a sense of responsibility to
their community and nation are more likely to make an effort to avoid sharing disinformation. Traditional cybersecurity,
too, is a shared responsibility between government, business, and individuals. However, if Americans do not have instilled
in them a sense of civic responsibility, they are far less likely to appreciate their role, at work and at home, in protecting the
cyber ecosystem. Similar concerns arise in the context of COVID-19 and other public health issues.

In support of the need to promote citizens’ engagement, Congress is considering bipartisan, bicameral legislation to reinvig-
orate civic education.125 Congress should move forward, with the urgency dictated by the national security imperative, to
put in place resources and programs that provide appropriate federal support for civic education at all ages. An assessment
by the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools revealed that the federal government annually spends roughly $54 per
student on STEM education (science, technology, engineering, and math) and only 5 cents per student on civics;126 as a
result, according to the last National Assessment, only 25 percent of eighth graders test as “proficient” in civics.127

Without overriding the principle that curricular content should be determined at the state and local levels, there is much
that the federal government can and should do to help remedy the shocking decline in civic education and meet our
national security needs. These actions include funding for state and local educational entities, grant programs, challenge
programs, and resource development, as well as other steps to enable greater access to civic education resources for students
and adults, to train teachers, to encourage excellence in civic education, and to raise public awareness about the threat of
disinformation. In all these efforts, Congress should prioritize and support programs and projects that build an understand-
ing of, and appreciation for, our Constitution and founding documents.

Civic Education Task Force

Congress should establish a bipartisan Civic Education Task Force at the Department of Education to design and make
publicly available civic education and digital and media literacy courses for the military, civil servants, and the broader adult
population. Courses should focus on the importance of our Constitution, founding documents, and the federal govern-
ment’s structure; on how the federal government interacts with all stakeholders, including state and local governments; and
on digital literacy and media literacy. The task force should include representatives from state and local governments and
government organizations, subject matter experts, and representatives from expert organizations, including, but not limited
to, academic organizations, nonprofits, and private-sector organizations.

To drive the widespread adoption of courses designed by the task force, the Department of Homeland Security and
Department of Justice should implement mandatory completion of civic education and digital literacy courses for employees
of state and local entities that receive federal funding, including state and local law enforcement. The Office of Management
and Budget should implement mandatory completion of similar civic education and digital literacy courses for federal
government employees. The Department of Defense should implement mandatory completion of civics and digital literacy

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training for members of the military regarding the role, structure, and organization of the military and the federal govern-
ment as an element of initial session training and as part of the Transition Assistance Program.

Civic Education Clearinghouse

Congress should authorize and appropriate funds for the Department of Education to create a clearinghouse of resources
for voluntary use by K-12 educators teaching civic education, applied civics, and service learning. In developing the clear-
inghouse, the Department of Education should be empowered to consult with state and local governments and govern-
ment organizations, subject matter experts, and nonprofit organizations, and it should place a particular emphasis on our
Constitution and founding documents, as well as on media and digital literacy. The Department of Education should also
produce a strategy for working with external partners to distribute the resources made available through the clearinghouse.
The clearinghouse should highlight the recipients of the award and recognition program and include information about the
Civic Education Fund, described below.

Student and Teacher Awards Program

Congress should authorize and appropriate funds for the Secretary of Education to create an award and recognition program
to highlight both excellence by students and excellence by teachers in delivering and teaching civic education, applied civics,
and service learning.

Civic Education Fund

Congress should create a Civic Education Fund and provide an initial investment of $500 million and commit $200 million
each year to state educational agencies (SEAs), local educational agencies (LEAs), institutions of higher education (IHEs),
and nonprofit organizations to enable grantees to develop and implement best practice curricula that incorporate civic edu-
cation, applied civics, and service learning across K-12 education and to provide teacher development opportunities in civic
education, applied civics, and service learning, with a particular emphasis on our Constitution and founding documents.
Congress should create an Office of Civic Education responsible for overseeing and administering the Civic Education Fund
and coordinating other civic education and service-learning initiatives of the federal government. The director of the office
should be confirmed by the Senate.

National Disinformation Awareness Outreach Program

Congress should direct the Department of Homeland Security to create the National Disinformation Awareness Outreach
Program to promote broader public awareness about disinformation through government-sponsored public service
announcement (PSA) campaigns run by nongovernmental organizations. The program should not develop the PSA mate-
rial itself, but instead administer a fund to which nonprofit organizations producing PSAs may apply. The sponsored PSAs
should focus on building awareness about how disinformation spreads and how it affects the general public, not the specifics
of recent disinformation campaigns.

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Partner Approaches: Media Literacy in Finland

Finland has invested heavily in media literacy programs that ultimately aim to counter disinformation and build societal
resilience. As of 2021, Finland continues to lead the European media literacy index rankings,128 which measure a country’s
resistance to disinformation. Because of collaboration across different sectors, Finnish schools have been able to actualize a
comprehensive media literacy education program.129 In order to develop specialized curricula focused on media literacy and
civics and implement Finnish national media education policy, media education professionals work with the National Audio-
visual Institute and the Ministry of Education and Culture.130 The Department for Media Education and Audiovisual Media
(MEKU) is legally tasked with promoting media education, improving youth media skills, and fostering a safe media environ-
ment for children;131 moreover, MEKU serves as the primary coordinator for media education at the national level.132 Finnish
civil society is also involved in creating curricula to bolster the media literacy of Finnish students. An NGO-run fact-checking
service called Faktabaari adapts professional fact-checking methods for use in schools, and provides digital literacy “toolkits”
that emphasize research and critical thinking skills.133 The government works closely with the media, business, and higher
education sectors in both formulating and implementing these programs.

Finland’s media literacy curriculum is integrated into a variety of subjects, helping students to better understand how the con-
cept applies to all types of engagement with information. For example, in a math lesson, “pupils learn how easy it is to lie with
statistics” and are brought to understand the importance of producing and analyzing data with integrity and nuance. In an art
class, students see how an image’s meaning can be manipulated or changed with photo-editing software.134 In history lessons,
students “analyze notable propaganda campaigns” and their consequences, while in language courses, “teachers work with
them on the many ways in which words can be used to confuse, mislead, and deceive.”135 Students are taught fact-checking
skills and reliable-source selection practices—not only while writing term papers but also in lessons that specifically address
social media and news. Ultimately, these more specific skills translate to improvements in students’ critical thinking and
ultimately to greater voter literacy: rather than focusing on debunking false claims or specific disinformation narratives, media
literacy workshops emphasize the development of both a strong national narrative and a well-informed, critical student within
that national narrative.

Recommendation 2: Congress should provide funding for nongovernmental disinformation

researchers

The federal government alone cannot address the complex set of questions regarding the nature and impact of foreign disin-
formation campaigns affecting the United States. Academic institutions, think tanks, nonprofits, and corporate entities have
all played important roles in the effort to identify and expose online disinformation campaigns, and the federal government
can support the work of these organizations by providing funding and research opportunities in conjunction with the Social
Media Data and Threat Analysis Center.136 The research task is multifold, and nongovernmental organizations can help
create richer understandings of disinformation campaigns, analyze medium- and long-term trends in the content and struc-
ture of disinformation campaigns, develop taxonomies and common definitions to enable further research, and study the
effectiveness of countermeasures aimed at diminishing the impacts of disinformation. This type of research is central both to
creating a more informed, resilient public by raising awareness of potential and ongoing threats and to building the evidence
base upon which future policy solutions to the disinformation challenge can be developed.

Congress should provide funding for disinformation researchers through grants programs and legislation that ensures non-
governmental researchers access to data on disinformation.

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Disinformation Research Grants

Congress should enhance funding to the National Science Foundation (NSF) to provide grants for rigorous research on
foreign disinformation. Congress should boost funding to the Divisions of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, Social
and Economic Sciences, Computer and Network Systems, and Information and Intelligent Systems in support of further
research on:

• The actions of adversary nations in the information environment and their effect on the perceptions of U.S. citizens and
attitudes toward democracy;

• The economics of disinformation and how federal action can reduce incentives for the creation and propagation of
disinformation;

• The impact of manipulated media (also known as “deepfakes”) on the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of online
users; and

• Technical solutions for verifying the provenance of images, audio, and text in order to help identify, label, and contextu-
alize manipulated media that appears online.137

In addition, Congress should fund DHS, in consultation with ODNI, to provide grants for priority areas established
annually, and eligible grant applicants should be encouraged to work with the DTAC. Initial priorities should be building
baseline understandings of the threat landscape in the information environment and of the impact of information threats on
democratic publics—researchers should develop taxonomies of threat, identify metrics for evaluating the impact of disinfor-
mation campaigns, and identify metrics for evaluating the impact of countermeasures.

Congressional Research Service Study

Congress should task the Congressional Research Service with producing a study on federal laws that govern the sharing of
social media data, both analyzing how existing legislation constrains the ability of social media companies to lawfully share
those data in support of rigorous scientific research on disinformation and identifying potential solutions (either through
amendments to existing legislation or the drafting of new legislation) so that independent research on disinformation, its
spread across social media platforms, its impact on behaviors and attitudes of the American public, and the effectiveness of
countermeasures against disinformation can be carried out.

Ensuring Data Availability

Congress should task the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with working with social media compa-
nies and researchers to develop a voluntary standardized data transfer format for social media data, thereby enabling both
data portability for social media users and research on disinformation that crosses multiple social media platforms. “Data
portability” means the ability to take data from specific services and take it elsewhere.138 Although several major social media
companies have launched a Data Transfer Project to make it easier for users to move their data across platforms, privacy con-
cerns have hindered robust data portability efforts.139 Standardized data transfer formats and data portability could benefit
both consumers seeking to take their data elsewhere and, by making it easier to compare data across platforms, researchers
studying disinformation.140

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Recommendation 3: Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to

nonprofit centers seeking to identify, expose, and explain malign foreign influence campaigns to
the American public

As the damage caused by COVID-19-related disinformation makes clear, in addition to undertaking long-term public
education initiatives, it is imperative that the United States possess the capacity in real time to identify highly dangerous
disinformation activities and make them known both to the platforms that enable the activities and to the general public.
Civil society must also maintain a robust nongovernmental capability to identify these disinformation activities and their
malign infrastructure. It is critical that the U.S. government help ensure that social media companies, other media outlets,
and stakeholders in the private sector and civil society continue building the expertise and credibility necessary to sound the
alarm when disinformation campaigns pose an urgent threat to the American public.

To help bolster the nongovernmental capability to recognize and publicize such operations, Congress should fund the
Department of Justice to provide grants through the Office of Justice Programs (which may be administered through a com-
ponent of that office), in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and the National Science Foundation,
to nonprofit centers seeking to identify, expose, and explain malign foreign influence campaigns to the American public
while putting those campaigns in context to avoid amplifying them. The CSC included this recommendation in the May
2020 white paper, “Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,”141 and the continued spread of disinformation related to the
pandemic and the safety of vaccines reaffirms its importance.

Recommendation 4: Congress should create a capability within the Department of Homeland

Security to actively monitor foreign disinformation

The U.S. government should help identify, highlight, and shine light on foreign propaganda efforts and disinformation
in the U.S. media environment and present the American public with factual information. However, as researchers at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies note, “the intelligence community is limited in what it can do inside the
United States, particularly regarding influence operations. The FBI is focused on the counterintelligence aspects but not
leading a proactive public campaign, nor would we expect it to. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may be a
logical choice but has not been given the mission.”142 To effectively shine light on and communicate about these operations,
attribution is helpful, in the same way that some responses to cyber campaigns require the federal government to identify
the perpetrators. The public’s resilience against disinformation may be heightened if the disinformation is credibly linked
to a specific malicious actor. The federal government should ensure that it has the capabilities and resources necessary to
appropriately and reliably attribute disinformation campaigns in order to increase the effectiveness of policy responses and
enhance public resilience.

Congress should task the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the FBI, with creating a capability within DHS to actively monitor foreign propaganda narratives, terrorist pro-
paganda narratives, and violent extremist narratives in the U.S. media and social media environment; to inform the public
of their contents; and to present factual information on topics treated in such propaganda.

22 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATION

Creation of Capability

Congress should task the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, with
creating a capability within DHS to identify foreign state-sponsored propaganda narratives and violent extremist narratives
that affect the American public and with developing a Rapid Alert System to inform the public of the contents of such
narratives and present scientific, statistical, and empirical information on relevant topics.143 The capability should sit within
DHS but consist of personnel from DHS, ODNI, the FBI, and the Department of State, and it should be empowered
to collaborate across the federal government, as necessary. The capability should serve as a clearinghouse for information
sharing and joint efforts across the federal government in combating foreign propaganda, terrorist propaganda, and violent
extremist narratives. The capability should be authorized to enter agreements with social media platforms to share informa-
tion in both directions on foreign propaganda, terrorist propaganda, and violent extremist propaganda narratives and efforts.

Relationship with the Global Engagement Center

The capability should also be empowered to share information with and receive information from the State Department’s
Global Engagement Center, which focuses on identifying, analyzing, and countering foreign propaganda affecting U.S.
foreign policy interests as well as the interests of partner and allied nations. Congress should amend the FY17 NDAA to
clarify the GEC’s role and relationship to a DHS-housed capability for monitoring and countering domestic disinformation.
The GEC should focus its efforts on identifying and countering disinformation likely to affect foreign perceptions of U.S.
foreign policy or the health of foreign media environments, providing targeted financial support and training to foreign
media outlets and organizations aimed at identifying and exposing propaganda put forward by adversarial nations such as
Russia, China, and Iran. DHS should have primary responsibility communicating to policymakers and the public about for-
eign-backed disinformation designed to affect U.S. domestic policy or the social and political stability of the United States.

Data Sharing with Private Stakeholders

Congress should direct DHS, in consultation with ODNI and the FBI, to develop a plan for using data from such sources
as major social media platforms, open-source intelligence companies, and other private investigative bodies to inform and
increase public confidence in government-provided attribution. In producing the plan, DHS should develop and coordinate
a public-private process to facilitate the voluntary sharing of information with the federal government for the purpose of
attributing foreign and extremist disinformation campaigns and should develop options to swiftly impose consequences. In
addition, the plan should provide a blueprint for coordinating with partners and allies to promote multidirectional infor-
mation sharing between partner governments, the U.S. government, state and local governments, academia, and the private
sector.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 23

SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATION

Partner Approaches: The United Kingdom’s RESIST Disinformation Toolkit

The United Kingdom has recognized disinformation as a national security threat since at least 2019.144 In response to the
threat, the government has pursued several different mechanisms, including the development and publication of a RESIST
Disinformation toolkit.145 The toolkit is intended for government professionals, policy officers, special advisors, and other
public-sector communications professionals, regardless of agency, role, or issue. RESIST offers a step-by-step guide to aid
organizations and individuals in developing a response when disinformation affects the organization or individual directly.
In doing so, the toolkit is intended to (1) build resilience to disinformation and (2) prevent the spread of disinformation by
equipping government communicators with the skills and information necessary both to anticipate the impact of disinfor-
mation on their work and to reorient messaging strategies in response to ongoing disinformation campaigns.

Broadly speaking, the RESIST toolkit aims to provide a systemic and efficient approach to countering disinformation that
harms U.K. society and its national interests by helping civil servants “Recognise disinformation” by highlighting objec-
tives and principles of disinformation, and then providing “Early warning” through media monitoring and analytical tools,
“Situational insight” to make early warning more actionable, and “Impact analysis” to assess the likely goals, impacts,
and reach of disinformation. The toolkit finally offers “Strategic communication” guidance and helps policymakers “Track
outcomes.” The RESIST toolkit supports the “dissemination of reliable, truthful information that underpins . . . democracy,”
while ensuring that core democratic principles such as freedom of speech are protected. Notably, the toolkit emphasizes
that organizations must continue to deliver effective positive communications to the public on important issues, regardless
of a current disinformation presence, and offers methods for doing so.

Recommendation 5: Congress should create a grants program at the Department of Homeland

Security designed to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources
necessary to identify foreign disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into
public communications strategies

Given the relatively high levels of trust in state and local governments as compared to the federal government, one of the
most effective ways in which the federal government can counter disinformation is to enable state and local governments to
take the lead in some public communications. But like their counterparts in federal departments and agencies, the public
affairs teams in state and local government agencies are often underfunded and lack the capability to educate the public
about disinformation affecting state and local policy issues. The federal government should also ensure that state and local
governments, including state and local election officials and courts, can apply for funding to equip their communications
teams with additional personnel and the tools to identify and counter disinformation in areas likely to affect health and
human safety or the integrity of democratic institutions.

Congress should authorize the creation of a grant program administered by the Department of Homeland Security and
should appropriate sufficient funding for the program to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources
necessary to identify disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies as
government plans or policies affecting health and human safety or the integrity of democratic institutions are rolled out.

24 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATION

Allocation and Purpose

Grants should be allocated to those state government entities primarily responsible for plans and policies that affect health
and human safety or democratic processes and institutions, including, but not limited to, health departments and organi-
zations administering elections or state and local courts. Grants should be used to hire or train personnel or to acquire the
tools necessary to identify disinformation campaigns and incorporate counter-messaging strategies into communications
plans.

Use of Grants

Organizations applying for grants should submit detailed plans for the use of funds administered through the grant pro-
gram, and after receiving a grant they should report on the actual use of funds and associated outcomes. Such plans should
incorporate strategies for identifying and countering not only digital foreign disinformation but also foreign disinformation
circulating in broadcast or print media. Communications plans developed through the grant program should focus, to the
extent practicable, on evidence-based strategies for countering disinformation and on disseminating authoritative scientific
or statistical information in support of government plans and policies. Grant recipients should be empowered to consult
with local intermediary organizations, with the goal of identifying trusted community members with which they can partner
and gain help in reaching the populations most vulnerable to disinformation.

Duration and Evaluation

Congress should appropriate funds for the grant program to be distributed over two years, with grants awarded on a quar-
terly basis for a period lasting no longer than one year. The Secretary of Homeland Security should submit to Congress an
annual report on the funds administered through the grant program and, to the extent possible, provide metrics for evaluat-
ing the program’s outcomes. The second of these annual reports submitted to Congress, after the grant program concludes,
should make recommendations regarding whether the grant program should be continued and what modifications to the
program, if any, would enable it to better accomplish its purpose of equipping state and local government communicators
with the resources necessary to anticipate and counter disinformation affecting health and human safety or the integrity of
democratic institutions.

Recommendation 6: Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and direct the
Federal Communications Commission to introduce new regulations in order to improve media
ownership transparency in the United States

The level of trust in the ability of mass media to report the news “fully, accurately, and fairly” is falling. In 2000, 12 percent
of the adult population in the United States rated their trust level in mass media as “not at all”; by contrast, 51 percent had
either a great deal of trust or a fair amount of trust. In 2020, 33 percent of American adults had no trust in mass media,
while only 40 percent had a great deal or fair amount of trust.146 Many factors affect overall levels of trust in the media,
but American news consumers should be empowered to understand the sources of information in their news environment.
When media outlets are foreign-owned and operated, transparency regulations are crucial to ensuring that American news
consumers are aware of the foreign actors attempting to influence public opinion. When media outlets are domestic,
transparency rules are still crucial, for they help American news consumers contextualize the information they receive.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 25

SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATION

Competition in media markets is important for more than purely economic reasons—it is also central to ensuring that a
diverse array of voices and perspectives can be heard and that local news markets are responsive to local concerns.

Congress should strengthen the Department of Justice’s ability to investigate potential violations of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA) by foreign media companies, remove exemptions for foreign media companies registered under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), and clarify how FARA’s requirements to file “informational materials” every six months
relate to social media and email content. Congress should also direct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
promulgate new regulations on media ownership transparency for all media companies operating within the United States.

Foreign Agents Registration Act Reform

Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act in 1938 in response to Nazi propaganda,147 with the intent not to
censor foreign propaganda but to promote transparency regarding the sources of information being disseminated to the
American public.148 Under the law, foreign agents are required to register with the DOJ and regularly file information
regarding their activities in the United States, including copies of “informational materials” disseminated in the course of
such activities. The law gives the DOJ the authority to investigate potential FARA violations, and to date, the DOJ has
taken action under FARA against certain foreign-owned media, including the Russian-owned RT media outlet.149 However,
current law stipulates that an individual or entity registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act need not register under
FARA, unless the individual or entity is acting on behalf of a foreign government or foreign political party.150 Because of
this exemption, the records collected under FARA contain an incomplete picture of individuals operating as foreign agents
within the United States.

Congress should therefore amend FARA to remove from the LDA exemption those foreign organizations that produce
media content for consumption by the public, including political advertisements, and ensure that filing requirements for
FARA registrants are sufficiently robust for the digital age. This narrowing of the exemption should be designed in such a
way that it does not require all foreign-owned private companies to register as foreign agents under FARA—exemptions
should continue to apply to foreign car manufacturers, for example, that register under the LDA. Furthermore, the amend-
ment should stipulate a process whereby media organizations from allied countries may apply for a license allowing them to
maintain the exemption.

Congress should also update FARA reporting requirements by amending the definition of “informational materials” to make
clear that social media and email communications are covered, specifying which types need to be included in FARA filings.
Several proposals to amend the law in this manner have been put forward by members of Congress, but none has yet been
adopted.151 In amending the definition, Congress should ensure that the DOJ adopts a records system that allows the social
media posts that are filed to be maintained in a dynamic form, along with comments, while preserving appropriate privacy
protections.152

Finally, Congress should grant the DOJ greater authority to investigate FARA violations, improve FARA compliance, and
enforce FARA disclosure requirements. A bill introduced in 2017, titled the Disclosing Foreign Influence Act,153 could serve
as a template for these reforms. The bill would grant the DOJ civil subpoena authority to investigate possible FARA viola-
tions, would remove FARA exemptions for those that register under the LDA, would require the development of a FARA
enforcement strategy, and would require reports from the DOJ Inspector General and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) on the enforcement strategy and effectiveness of the new law.154 A similar bill introduced in 2021, the
Chinese Communist Party Influence Transparency Act, would remove LDA exemptions for all Chinese corporations.155

26 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATION

Mandate Media Ownership Transparency

Congress should amend the Telecommunications Act of 1996156 to task the FCC with developing new regulations on media
ownership transparency. The FCC currently regulates foreign ownership of broadcast media;157 moreover, it requires foreign
media outlets to submit reports on their activities.158 The FCC also has numerous rules in place regarding media ownership
to ensure competition within American media markets, and by law, the FCC must review these rules every four years to
determine whether they are still necessary.159 But no regulation currently requires domestic media companies to disclose
their ownership, and as a result American news consumers often lack reliable information about the corporate entities that
own and operate local, regional, or national news outlets. Congress should task the FCC with developing new rules regard-
ing ownership transparency for all media outlets in order to empower Americans in evaluating the sources of their news.

Recommendation 7: Congress should grant a federal entity the authority to publish and enforce
transparency guidelines for social media platforms

Social media platforms have changed how people consume information. While not the sole purveyors of information,
platforms are leveraged by peddlers of mis- and disinformation to “provoke and amplify political and social discord in the
United States.”160 Because of their unique position in the information ecosystems, platforms can exert positive influence over
the media and information environment. Policymakers and lawmakers should resist the impulse to regulate content outside
of what is already exempted from First Amendment protections.161

Congress should direct the Biden administration to report back within 90 days with a plan to task an entity with establish-
ing clear transparency guidelines for social media companies. This entity should not moderate content but should be tasked
with developing rules pertaining to requirements for:

• Transparency reporting regarding content moderation policies and takedowns;

• Transparency and labeling of advertisements on platforms;

• Transparency requirements for information-sorting algorithms on platforms;

• Labeling of content created by FARA-registered agents;

• Labeling of bot accounts and content spread by bots; and

• Policies and processes to be developed by social media companies to disclose the use of bots and other such tools.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 27

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

D isinformation is a challenging policy issue. It touches on individual freedom and liberty. It involves foreign inter-
vention in our democracy while affecting national security and the foundations of U.S. democracy. It is inherently
political in that it sways hearts and minds. It weaves deftly through modern society and networks—visible only sometimes
but always threatening. The recommendations contained in this white paper are equally challenging, and policymakers will
find it more difficult to implement some—like regulation of social media companies—than others. While the recommenda-
tions are to an extent interconnected, they can be implemented individually—and each would represent progress in the fight
to combat disinformation.

28 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
COVID coronavirus disease
CSC Cyberspace Solarium Commission
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DTAC Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center
EO executive order
FARA Foreign Agents Registration Act
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Federal Communications Commission
GEC Global Engagement Center
IHE institution of higher education
LDA Lobbying Disclosure Act
LEA local educational agency
MDM team Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation team
MEKU [Finnish] Department for Media Education and Audiovisual Media
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NGO nongovernmental organization
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
PSA public service announcement
SEA state educational agency

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 29

ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

1 Laura Rosenberger and Lindsay Gorman, “How Democracies Can Win the Information Contest,” Washington Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2020):
75–96; Ashish Jaiman, “Disinformation Is a Cybersecurity Threat,” Medium, January 30, 2021, https://medium.com/swlh/
disinformation-is-a-cybersecurity-threat-335681b15b48; Jonathon Morgan and Renee DiResta, “Information Operations Are a
Cybersecurity Problem: Toward a New Strategic Paradigm to Combat Disinformation,” Just Security, July 10, 2018,
https://www.justsecurity.org/59152/information-operations-cybersecurity-problem-strategic-paradigm-combat-disinformation/; Laura
Fichtner, “What Kind of Cyber Security? Theorising Cyber Security and Mapping Approaches,” Internet Policy Review 7, no. 2 (May 15,
2018), https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/what-kind-cyber-security-theorising-cyber-security-and-mapping-approaches.

2 U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, “Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,” CSC White Paper #1 (May 2020), 11, available at
https://www.solarium.gov/public-communications/pandemic-white-paper.

3 Dimitar Nikolov, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer, “Right and Left, Partisanship Predicts (Asymmetric) Vulnerability to
Misinformation,” Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, February 15, 2021, https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/
right-and-left-partisanship-predicts-asymmetric-vulnerability-to-misinformation/.

4 Aaron Smith, “How Americans View Tech Companies,” Pew Research Center, June 28, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2018/06/28/public-attitudes-toward-technology-companies/.

5 Amy Mitchell et al., “Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical Problem That Needs to Be
Fixed,” Pew Research Center, June 5, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/
many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/.

6 Laura Rosenberger and Lindsay Gorman, “How Democracies Can Win the Information Contest,” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 2 (2020):
75–96.

7 U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, Report of the United States of America Cyberspace Solarium Commission (March 2020), 34,
available at https://www.solarium.gov/report.

8 CSC, “Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,” 12–13.

9 A Wanless and J Pamment, “How Do You Define a Problem Like Influence?,” Journal of Information Warfare 18, no. 3 (2019): 1–14.

10 Claire Wardle, “Information Disorder, Part 1: The Essential Glossary,” First Draft Footnotes (blog), July 9, 2018,
https://medium.com/1st-draft/information-disorder-part-1-the-essential-glossary-19953c544fe3.

11 “Information Operations,” RAND, 2021, https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html.

12 Renee DiResta and Shelby Grossman, “Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014–2019,” November 12, 2019,
available at https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication/potemkin-think-tanks.

13 Conor Cunningham, “A Russian Federation Information Warfare Primer,” Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, November
12, 2020, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/a-russian-federation-information-warfare-primer/.

14 U.S. Department of State, GEC Special Report: Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda (August 2020), United
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-
Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf.

15 Alicia Wanless and Laura Walters, “How Journalists Become an Unwitting Cog in the Influence Machine,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/13/
how-journalists-become-unwitting-cog-in-influence-machine-pub-82923.

16 U.S. Department of State, GEC Special Report: Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda.

17 James Shires, “Hack-and-Leak Operations and U.S. Cyber Policy,” War on the Rocks, August 14, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/
the-simulation-of-scandal/.

30 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 ENDNOTES

18 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to
Counter It,” RAND Corporation, July 11, 2016, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

19 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Global Information and Influence Campaign,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2021,
https://www.cfr.org/project/chinas-global-information-and-influence-campaign.

20 Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg, and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S.,
Officials Say,” New York Times, April 22, 2020; updated January 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/
coronavirus-china-disinformation.html.

21 Matt Apuzzo, “Pressured by China, E.U. Softens Report on Covid-19 Disinformation,” New York Times, April 24, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/world/europe/disinformation-china-eu-coronavirus.html.

22 Daniel Wood, Sean McMinn, and Emily Feng, “China Used Twitter to Disrupt Hong Kong Protests, But Efforts Began Years Earlier,”
NPR, September 17, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/17/758146019/china-used-twitter-to-disrupt-hong-kong-protests-but-efforts-
began-years-earlier; James Griffiths, “From Cover-up to Propaganda Blitz: China’s Attempts to Control the Narrative on Xinjiang,” CNN,
April 17, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/16/china/beijing-xinjiang-uyghurs-propaganda-intl-hnk-dst/index.html; Erika Kinetz,
“Anatomy of a Conspiracy: With COVID, China Took Leading Role,” AP News, February 15, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/pandem-
ics-beijing-only-on-ap-epidemics-media-122b73e134b780919cc1808f3f6f16e8; Dexter Roberts, “China’s Disinformation Strategy: Its
Dimensions and Future” (Atlantic Council, December 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CHINA-ASI-
Report-FINAL-1.pdf.

23 Erika Kinetz, “Army of Fake Fans Boosts China’s Messaging on Twitter,” AP News, May 28, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/
asia-pacific-china-europe-middle-east-government-and-politics-62b13895aa6665ae4d887dcc8d196dfc.

24 Joshua Kurlantzick, “How China Ramped Up Disinformation Efforts During the Pandemic,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 10, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-china-ramped-disinformation-efforts-during-pandemic; Sulmaan Wasif
Khan, “Wolf Warriors Killed China’s Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy, May 28, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/28/
china-grand-strategy-wolf-warrior-nationalism/.

25 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction,
Not Engaged Argument,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (2017): 484–501, available at https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/
files/50c.pdf?m=1463587807; “The China Deep Dive: A Report on the Intelligence Community’s Capabilities and Competencies with
Respect to the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, September 30,
2020, https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci_china_deep_dive_redacted_summary_9.29.20.pdf.

26 “Hundreds of Fake Twitter Accounts Linked to China Sowed Disinformation Prior to the US Election—Report,” Cardiff University: News,
January 28, 2021, https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/news/view/2491763-hundreds-of-fake-twitter-accounts-linked-to-china-sowed-disinformation-
prior-to-the-us-election,-with-some-continuing-to-amplify-reactions-to-the-capitol-building-riot-report.

27 Gerry Shih, “AP Exclusive: In Western China, Thought Police Instill Fear,” AP News, December 17, 2017, https://apnews.com/article/
china-religion-10207e125d564897934a27288855e34d.

28 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,”
New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

29 Chris Buckley and Amy Qin, “Muslim Detention Camps Are Like ‘Boarding Schools,’ Chinese Official Says,” New York Times, March 12,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/world/asia/china-xinjiang.html.

30 Emma Graham-Harrison, “China Has Built 380 Internment Camps in Xinjiang, Study Finds,” The Guardian, September 23, 2020;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/24/china-has-built-380-internment-camps-in-xinjiang-study-finds.

31 Emily Rauhala, “U.S., E.U., Canada and Britain Announce Sanctions on China over the Abuse of Uyghurs,” Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/xinjiang-sanctions-european-union/2021/03/22/1b0d69aa-8b0a-11eb-a33e-da28941cb9ac_story.
html.

32 Ken Moritsugu, “China Bashes US over Racism, Inequality, Pandemic Response,” ABC News, March 24, 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/
US/wireStory/china-bashes-us-racism-inequality-pandemic-response-76648636.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 31

ENDNOTES

33 Jeff Kao et al., “‘We Are Very Free’: How China Spreads Its Propaganda Version of Life in Xinjiang,” New York Times, June 23, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html.

34 Eva Xiao, “China Used Twitter, Facebook More Than Ever Last Year for Xinjiang Propaganda,” Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2021, sec.
World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-used-twitter-facebook-more-than-ever-last-year-for-xinjiang-propaganda-11617101007

35 Jeff Kao et al., “‘We Are Very Free’: How China Spreads Its Propaganda Version of Life in Xinjiang,” New York Times, June 23, 2021, sec.
Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html.

36 Sonja Swanbeck, “How to Understand Iranian Information Operations,” Lawfare, February 19, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
how-understand-iranian-information-operations.

37 Emerson T. Brooking and Suzanne Kianpour, “Iranian Digital Influence Efforts: Guerrilla Broadcasting for the Twenty-First Century”
(Atlantic Council, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/IRAN-DIGITAL.pdf.

38 @DFRLab, “Tensions Escalate on Social Media Platforms after Soleimani’s Death,” DFRLab (blog), January 4, 2020,
https://medium.com/dfrlab/tensions-escalate-on-social-media-platforms-after-soleimanis-death-48f295ecec5e.

39 “Exclusive: Iran Steps Up Efforts to Sow Discord Inside the U.S.,” Time, June 7, 2021; updated June 9, 2020, https://time.com/6071615/
iran-disinformation-united-states/.

40 National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections” (March 10,
2021), I, 5–7, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

41 Ibid., 6.

42 Ana Lucía Schmidt et al., “Anatomy of News Consumption on Facebook,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 12
(2017): 3035–39, https://www.pnas.org/content/114/12/3035.

43 Elisa Shearer, “More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News from Digital Devices,” Pew Research Center, January 12, 2021, https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-news-from-digital-devices/.

44 Rachel Lerman, “Facebook says it has taken down 7 million posts for spreading coronavirus misinformation,” Washington Post, August 11,
2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/11/facebook-covid-misinformation-takedowns.

45 Karen Kornbluh, Eli Weiner, and Adrienne Goldstein, “New Study by Digital New Deal Finds Engagement with Deceptive Outlets Higher
on Facebook Today Than Run-up to 2016 Election,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 12, 2020,
https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-study-digital-new-deal-finds-engagement-deceptive-outlets-higher-facebook-today-run-2016.

46 Jacob N. Shapiro, Natalie Thompson, and Alicia Wanless, “Research Collaboration on Influence Operations between Industry and
Academia: A Way Forward” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2020), available at
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/03/research-collaboration-on-influence-operations-between-industry-and-academia-way-for-
ward-pub-83332.
47 Though this trend has been documented in case studies of specific disinformation campaigns, a team of researchers supported by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that surveyed existing academic literature on the subject found a notable gap in studies
surveying cross-platform influence operations and their impact on the beliefs and behaviors of audiences; Jon Bateman et al., “Measuring
the Effects of Influence Operations: Key Findings and Gaps from Empirical Research,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June
28, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/28/measuring-effects-of-influence-operations-key-findings-and-gaps-from-empirical-re-
search-pub-84824. See also Claire Wardle, “5 Lessons for Reporting in an Age of Disinformation,” First Draft, December 27, 2018,
https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/5-lessons-for-reporting-in-an-age-of-disinformation/.

48 Seb Cubbin, “Banned Sites and Pro-Russian Networks Are Driving Anti-Pfizer Vaccine Disinformation,” First Draft, March 31, 2021,
https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/anti-pfizer-vaccine-narratives/.

49 “Anatomy of a Disinformation Empire: Investigating NaturalNews” (ISD, 2020), https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/

uploads/2020/06/20200620-ISDG-NaturalNews-Briefing-V4.pdf.

50 Shannon Bond, “‘The Perfect Storm’: How Vaccine Misinformation Spread to the Mainstream,” NPR, December 10, 2020,
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/10/944408988/the-perfect-storm-how-coronavirus-spread-vaccine-misinformation-to-the-mainstrea; Geoff
Brumfiel, “Anti-Vaccine Activists Use a Federal Database to Spread Fear about COVID Vaccines,” NPR, June 14, 2021,

32 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 ENDNOTES

https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/06/14/1004757554/anti-vaccine-activists-use-a-federal-database-to-spread-fear-about-
covid-vaccine.

51 Wardle, “5 Lessons for Reporting in an Age of Disinformation”; Yariv Tsfati et al., “Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media
Dissemination of Fake News: Literature Review and Synthesis,” Annals of the International Communication Association 44, no. 2 (2020):
157–73, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23808985.2020.1759443.

52 Kurlantzick, “How China Ramped Up Disinformation Efforts During the Pandemic.”

53 David A. Broniatowski et al., “Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate,”
American Journal of Public Health 108, no. 10 (October 2018): 1378–84, available at https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/
AJPH.2018.304567.

54 Justin Anderson and Sarah Jacobs Gamberini, “Infodemic: Russian Disinformation Campaigns, Public Health, and COVID-19,” Inkstick,
March 25, 2020, https://inkstickmedia.com/infodemic/

55 Mark Scott, “Russia and China Target U.S. Protests on Social Media,” Politico, June 1, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/01/
russia-and-china-target-us-protests-on-social-media-294315.

56 Josh Margolin and Lucien Bruggeman, “Intel Bulletin Warns of ‘Malign Actors’ Targeting US over George Floyd Fallout,” ABC News,
June 11, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/US/intel-bulletin-warns-malign-actors-targeting-us-george/story?id=71184163.

57 Craig Timberg and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “Black Voters Are Being Targeted in Disinformation Campaigns, Echoing the 2016 Russian
Playbook,” Washington Post, August 26, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/26/race-divisions-highlighted-
disinformation-2016/; Craig Timberg and Shane Harris, “Chinese Network of Fake Accounts Targets Trump with English-Language
Videos,” Washington Post, August 12, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/12/china-video-network-trump/.

58 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S.
Election, vol. 2, Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views (2019), available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.

59 Sarah Jacobs Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization: The Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 99 (2020): 4–13, available at https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-99/jfq-99_4-13_Gamberini.
pdf?ver=Yoes_BQSvex7rNRLXvI08Q%3d%3d.

60 Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Russia Blocks Consensus at CWC Conference,” Arms Control Association, January/February 2019,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-01/news/russia-blocks-consensus-cwc-conference.

61 “Putin Is Running a Disinformation Campaign on Navalny’s Poisoning,” editorial, Washington Post, October 2, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/putin-is-running-a-disinformation-campaign-on-navalnys-poison-
ing/2020/10/02/0889ef54-0411-11eb-897d-3a6201d6643f_story.html.

62 Ibid.
63 Kristofer Goldsmith, “VVA Investigative Report,” September 17, 2019, executive summary of An Investigation into Foreign Entities Who Are
Targeting Servicemembers and Veterans Online, https://vva.org/trollreport/.

64 Ben Schreckinger, “How Russia Targets the U.S. Military,” Politico Magazine, June 12, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2017/06/12/how-russia-targets-the-us-military-215247/.

65 Ibid.

66 Paul Merklinger and Ryan Orsini, “Disinformation Disruption and Distance: Public Confidence in the U.S.
Military in the COVID-19 Era,” Strategy Bridge, July 28, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/7/28/
disinformation-disruption-and-distance-public-confidence-in-the-us-military-in-the-covid-19-era.

67 Andrius Sytas, “Lithuania Sees Fake News Attempt to Discredit NATO Exercises,” Reuters, June 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-nato-russia/lithuania-sees-fake-news-attempt-to-discredit-nato-exercises-idUSKBN1J92FC.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 33

ENDNOTES

68 Lily Hay Newman, “Facebook Ad Services Let Anyone Target US Military Personnel,” Wired, January 28, 2021, https://www.wired.com/
story/facebook-ad-targeting-us-military/.

69 Hijacking Our Heroes: Exploiting Veterans Through Disinformation on Social Media: Hearing of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 116th
Cong. (2019) (statement of Dr. Vlad Barash, Science Director at Graphika), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110183/
witnesses/HHRG-116-VR00-Wstate-BarashV-20191113.pdf.

70 Suzanne Spaulding, “Why the Kremlin Targets Veterans,” CSIS, November 8, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
why-kremlin-targets-veterans.

71 For example, defamation—false statements that damage a person’s reputation—is considered to possess little First Amendment value and
can lead to civil liability and even criminal punishment if intentional.

72 Kathleen Ann Ruane, “Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment” (Congressional Research Service, September 8,
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf .

73 Brendan Pelsue, “When It Comes to Education, the Federal Government Is in Charge of . . . Um, What?,” Ed.: Harvard Ed. Magazine,
Fall 2017, https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/17/08/when-it-comes-education-federal-government-charge-um-what.

74 Andrew Ujifusa, “GOP Leader: Biden Grant Plan Referencing Anti-Racism, 1619 Project Is
‘Divisive Nonsense,’” Education Week, April 30, 2021, https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/
gop-leader-biden-grant-plan-referencing-anti-racism-1619-project-is-divisive-nonsense/2021/04.

75 Darrell M. West, “How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation,” Brookings, December 18, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/

76 Wanless and Walters, “How Journalists Become an Unwitting Cog in the Influence Machine.”

77 Media Insight Project, “Holding Power Accountable: The Press and the Public,” chapter 2 of How the Press and Public Can Find Common
Purpose (American Press Institute, December 18, 2019), https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/
holding-power-accountable-the-press-and-the-public/.

78 A Pew Research survey suggests just 20 percent of Americans trust the federal government: “Americans’ Views of Government: Low Trust,
but Some Positive Performance Ratings,” Pew Research Center, September 14, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/09/14/
americans-views-of-government-low-trust-but-some-positive-performance-ratings/.

79 For fact-checking, see, for example, the International Fact-checking Network run by the Poynter Institute, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/.
Nonprofit organizations working on the disinformation challenge and on supporting journalists include First Draft News
(https://firstdraftnews.org/), the Digital Forensics Research Lab at the Atlantic Council (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/
digital-forensic-research-lab/), the Internet Observatory at Stanford University (https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/io), and the Commission
on Information Disorder at the Aspen Institute (https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/commission-on-information-disorder/).

80 “Public Trust in Government: 1958–2021,” Pew Research Center, May 17, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/05/17/
public-trust-in-government-1958-2021/.

81 Justin McCarthy, “Americans Still More Trusting of Local Than State Government,” Gallup, October 8, 2018, https://news.gallup.com/
poll/243563/americans-trusting-local-state-government.aspx.

82 Ibid.

83 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/
plaws/publ328/PLAW-114publ328.pdf; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283
§ 1287 (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-115publ91/pdf/PLAW-115publ91.pdf; John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 § 1239 (2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
PLAW-115publ232/pdf/PLAW-115publ232.pdf; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133
Stat. 1198 § 1282 (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ92/pdf/PLAW-116publ92.pdf; William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283 § 567 (2020), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395/text.

34 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 ENDNOTES

84 “Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States
Political System,” press release, United States Department of Justice, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-russian-individuals-and-three-russian-companies-scheme-interfere.

85 “Treasury Sanctions Iranian Entities for Attempted Election Interference,” press release,. U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 22,
2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1158; “Treasury Takes Further Action against Russian-Linked Actors,” press release,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 11, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1232.

86 Exec. Order No. 13757, “Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities,” 82 Fed. Reg. 1 (January 3, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/03/2016-31922/taking-
additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-significant-malicious; Exec. Order No.
13848, “Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election,” 83 Fed.
Reg. 46843 (September 14, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/09/14/2018-20203/
imposing-certain-sanctions-in-the-event-of-foreign-interference-in-a-united-states-election.

87 The White House “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (December 2017), 34–35,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

88 Ibid., 35.

89 The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” (March 2021), 7, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

90 Jon Roozenbeek, Sander van der Linden, and Thomas Nygren, “Prebunking Interventions Based on the ‘Inoculation’ Theory Can Reduce
Susceptibility to Misinformation across Cultures,” Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, February 3, 2020,
https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/global-vaccination-badnews/.

91 “Election Security Rumor vs. Reality,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, September 23, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/
rumorcontrol.

92 “#PROTECT2020: Disinformation Stops with You,” 2021, https://vva.org/protect2020.

93 Quotation from “Coronavirus Rumor Control,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, July 6, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/disasters/
coronavirus/rumor-control; see also “Coronavirus: DOD Response,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 27, 2021 [frequent updates],
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Rumor-Control.

94 “Coronavirus Response,” United States Department of Justice, October 27, 2021[frequent updates], https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus;
“Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: The FTC in Action,” Federal Trade Commission, 2021, https://www.ftc.gov/coronavirus.

95 “Rumor Control for the 2022 Election,” Maryland State Board of Elections, 2021, https://elections.maryland.gov/press_room/rumor_
control.html; “Maryland Coronavirus (COVID-19): Rumor Control,” Maryland.gov, https://govstatus.egov.com/md-coronavirus-
rumor-control; “Rumor Control,” Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment / Colorado State Emergency Operations
Center,” September 23, 2020, https://covid19.colorado.gov/rumor-control.

96 Benjamin Freed, “Secretaries of State Ask DHS to Expand Anti-disinformation Fight,” StateScoop, April 19, 2021, https://statescoop.com/
secretaries-state-dhs-expand-anti-disinformation-fight.

97 “Mis, Dis, Malinformation: MDM Mission Overview,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, October 25, 2021,
https://www.cisa.gov/mdm.

98 “Resilience Series Graphic Novels,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, n.d., https://www.cisa.gov/
resilience-series-graphic-novels.

99 “What We Investigate: Combating Foreign Influence,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
counterintelligence/foreign-influence.

100 “What We Investigate: Protected Voices,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/
foreign-influence/protected-voices.

101 Ibid.

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 35

ENDNOTES

102 Exec. Order No. 13721, “Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center To Support Government-
wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad and Revoking Executive Order 13584,”
81 Fed. Reg. 14685 (March 17, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/03/17/2016-06250/
developing-an-integrated-global-engagement-center-to-support-government-wide-counterterrorism.

103 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, §1287(a)(2).

104 Ibid., §1287(b)(4).

105 “GEC Special Report: Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda” (U.S. Department of State, August 2020), available at
https://www.state.gov/russias-pillars-of-disinformation-and-propaganda-report.

106 “Technology Engagement Team,” U.S. Department of State, n.d., https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/

under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/technology-engagement-team.

107 Olivia Gazis, “U.S. Intelligence Community to Create Center to Address Foreign Malign Influence,” CBS News, April 26, 2021,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/intelligence-community-foreign-malign-influence.

108 See, for example, National Intelligence Council, “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections”
(ODNI, March 10, 2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

109 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, S. 3905, 116th Cong., §307 (2020), incorporated into the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, §5323(c).

110 “Social Media Influencer Charged with Election Interference Stemming from Voter Disinformation Campaign,”
press release, United States Department of Justice, January 27, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
social-media-influencer-charged-election-interference-stemming-voter-disinformation-campaign.

111 “Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies.” The Justice Department later dropped its charges
against two of the companies initially named in the indictment. See Ken Dilanian, Pete Williams, and Tom Winter, “Why Did the Justice
Department Drop Its Prosecution of 2 Firms Linked to a Putin Associate?” NBCNews, March 17, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/justice-department/why-did-justice-department-drop-its-prosecution-2-firms-linked-n1161886.

112 “Social Media Influencer Charged with Election Interference Stemming from Voter Disinformation Campaign,”
press release, United States Department of Justice, January 27, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
social-media-influencer-charged-election-interference-stemming-voter-disinformation-campaign.

113 Exec. Order No. 13694, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled
Activities,” 80 Fed. Reg. 18077 (April 2, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/04/02/2015-07788/
blocking-the-property-of-certain-persons-engaging-in-significant-malicious-cyber-enabled-activities.

114 Exec. Order No. 13757, “Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency,” 1.
115 Exec. Order No. 13848, “Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference,” 46844.

116 “Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks,” press release, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, March 15, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312; “Treasury Targets Assets of Russian
Financier Who Attempted to Influence 2018 U.S. Elections,” press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 30, 2019,
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm787.

117 “Treasury Sanctions Iranian Entities for Attempted Election Interference,” press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 22,
2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1158.

118 “United States Seizes 27 Additional Domain Names Used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Further a Global, Covert
Influence Campaign,” press release, United States Department of Justice, November 4, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
united-states-seizes-27-additional-domain-names-used-iran-s-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps.

119 Richard Tilley, “The Kremlin’s Return to Active Measures,” Lawfare, October 20, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
kremlins-return-active-measures.

36 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 ENDNOTES

120 Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, “Disinformation Primer” (United States Agency for International
Development, February 20210, 1, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XFKF.pdf.

121 Elisa Shearer and Amy Mitchell, “News Use across Social Media Platforms in 2020,” Pew Research Center, January 12, 2021,
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/01/12/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-in-2020.

122 Shearer, “More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News from Digital Devices”; Elisa Shearer, and Katerina Eva Matsa, “News Use across
Social Media Platforms 2018,” Pew Research Center, August 27, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2018/09/10/news-use-
across-social-media-platforms-2018/#most-social-media-news-consumers-are-concerned-about-inaccuracy-but-many-still-see-benefits.

123 Shearer, “More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News from Digital Devices.”

124 Suzanne Spaulding and Eric Goldstein, “Countering Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions: An Expert Report” (Center for Strategic
and International Studies, February 2018), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180214_Spaulding_
CounteringAdversaryThreats_Web2.pdf?EzqGtMwOAjQIIH8eRNNoZ10T49OV63lh.

125 Civics Secures Democracy Act of 2021, H.R. 1814, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1814/
actions (House version); Civics Secures Democracy Act, S. 879, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/
senate-bill/879 (Senate version)

126 Kimberly Adams, “What Federal Funding for Civics Reveals about American Political Discourse,” Marketplace, November 6, 2019,
https://www.marketplace.org/2019/11/06/what-federal-funding-for-civics-reveals-about-american-political-discourse.

127 “NAEP Report Card: Civics,” The Nation’s Report Card, [2019], https://www.nationsreportcard.gov/civics/results/achievement.

128 “Media Literacy Index 2021,” Open Society Institute Sofia, March 14, 2021, https://osis.bg/?p=3750&lang=en.

129 Audrey Quicke, “Media Literacy Education in Finland,” Australia Institute | Nordic Policy Centre, November 12, 2020,
https://www.nordicpolicycentre.org.au/media_literacy_education_in_finland.

130 National Audiovisual Institute, Finnish Ministry of Education, homepage, https://kavi.fi/en; Ministry of Education and Culture, Finnish
Government, homepage, https://minedu.fi/en/frontpage.

131 “Finnish Centre for Media Education and Audiovisual Media (MEKU),” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations: Media and Literacy,
September 30, 2013, https://milunesco.unaoc.org/mil-organizations/finnish-centre-for-media-education-and-audiovisual-media-meku/.

132 “Media Literacy in Finland: National Media Education Policy” (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2019),
https://medialukutaitosuomessa.fi/mediaeducationpolicy.pdf.

133 “Welcome to Faktabaari,” FaktaBaari homepage, https://faktabaari.fi/in-english/; Emma Charlton, “How Finland Is Fighting
Fake News—in the Classroom,” World Economic Forum, May 21, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/
how-finland-is-fighting-fake-news-in-the-classroom.

134 Quicke, “Media Literacy Education in Finland.”

135 Ibid., quoting Jon Henley, “How Finland Starts Its Fight against Fake News in Primary Schools,” The Guardian, January 29, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/fact-from-fiction-finlands-new-lessons-in-combating-fake-news.

136 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, §5323(c).

137 Daniel Kilman et al., “Dangerous Synergies: Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations” (Center for a New American
Security, May 2020), 1–36, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-Dangerous-Synergies-May-2020-DoS-
Proof.pdf?mtime=20200506164642.

138 Gennie Gebhart, Bennett Cyphers, and Kurt Opsahl, “What We Mean When We Say ‘Data Portability,’” Electronic Frontier Foundation,
September 13, 2018, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/09/what-we-mean-when-we-say-data-portability.

139 Data Transfer Project homepage, https://datatransferproject.dev; Lauren Feiner, “Facebook Calls for Data Portability Laws as It Expands
the Types of Info Users Can Transfer to Other Services.” CNBC, April 19, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/19/facebook-
expands-the-types-of-data-users-can-transfer-to-other-services.html; Mark R. Warner, “Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 37

ENDNOTES

Media and Technology Firms” (August 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-

0048-d-0104-155263.pdf.

140 Shapiro, Thompson, and Wanless, “Research Collaboration on Influence Operations between Industry and Academia.”

141 CSC, “Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,” 13.

142 Spaulding and Goldstein, “Countering Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions,” 13.

143 United States Efforts to Counter Russian Disinformation and Malign Influence: Hearing of the United States House Committee on
Appropriations—Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Dr. Alina Polyakova),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Alina-Polyakova-House-Appropriations-Testimony-July-10-2019.pdf.

144 House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report (House of Commons,
February 18, 2019), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf.

145 James Pamment et al., “RESIST: Counter Disinformation Toolkit,” Government Communication Service, 2019; updated August 24,
2021, https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/publications/resist-counter-disinformation-toolkit/. All descriptions of the toolkit are taken from this
webpage, which includes a link to the pamphlet.

146 Amy Watson, “Level of Trust in the Mass Media to Report the News Fully, Accurately, and Fairly among Adults in the United States from
2000 to 2021,” Statista, October 13, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/471240/perceived-objectivity-mass-media-usa.

147 Jacob R. Straus, “Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA): Background and Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, June 30,
2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46435.pdf.

148 Joshua R. Fattal, “The Justice Department’s New, Unprecedented Use of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,” Lawfare, December 18,
2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/justice-departments-new-unprecedented-use-foreign-agents-registration-act.

149 Josh Gerstein, “DOJ Told RT to Register as Foreign Agent Partly Because of Alleged 2016 Election Interference,” Politico, December 21,
2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/21/russia-today-justice-department-foreign-agent-election-interference-312211.

150 “FARA Frequently Asked Questions,” United States Department of Justice, n.d., https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/
frequently-asked-questions#22.

151 Foreign Agents Registration Modernization and Enforcement Act, H.R. 2811, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2811; Foreign Agents Registration Modernization and Enforcement Act, S.625, 115th Cong. (2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/625. See Straus, “Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA): Background and Issues
for Congress.”

152 Straus, “Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA): Background and Issues for Congress”; Daniel Fried and Alina Polyakova, “Democratic
Defense against Disinformation” (Atlantic Council, February 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
Democratic_Defense_Against_Disinformation_FINAL.pdf.
153 Disclosing Foreign Influence Act, S.2039, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2039/text.

154 “Disclosing Foreign Influence Act: Summary of Legislation,” Senate Committee on the Judiciary, October 31, 2017,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FARA,%2010-31-17,%20Disclosing%20Foreign%20Influence%20Act%20-%20
Summary.pdf.

155 Chinese Communist Party Influence Transparency Act, H.R.3390, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/
house-bill/3390/text?r=14&s=1.

156 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-110/pdf/
STATUTE-110-Pg56.pdf#page=1.

157 “The Public and Broadcasting,” Federal Communications Commission, September 2021, https://www.fcc.gov/media/radio/
public-and-broadcasting.

158 “United States–Based Foreign Media Outlets,” Federal Communications Commission, September 10, 2021,
https://www.fcc.gov/united-states-based-foreign-media-outlets.

38 Cyberspace Solarium Commission

 ENDNOTES

159 “FCC Commences 2018 Quadrennial Review of Media Ownership Rules,” Federal Communications Commission, December 13, 2018,
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-commences-2018-quadrennial-review-media-ownership-rules-0.

160 Robert S. Mueller III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019), 1:4, https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.

161 Ruane, “Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment.”

Cyberspace Solarium Commission 39

COMMISSIONERS

CO-CHAIRMEN
Angus S. King Jr., U.S. Senator for Maine
Michael “Mike” J. Gallagher, U.S. Representative for Wisconsin’s 8th District

COMMISSIONERS
Frank J. Cilluffo, Director of Auburn University’s Charles D. McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security
Thomas A. “Tom” Fanning, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Southern Company
James R. “Jim” Langevin, U.S. Representative for Rhode Island’s 2nd District
Patrick J. Murphy, Former Acting Secretary and Under Secretary of the U.S. Army & Former U.S. Representative for
Pennsylvania’s 8th District
Samantha F. Ravich, Chair of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Benjamin E. “Ben” Sasse, U.S. Senator for Nebraska
Suzanne E. Spaulding, Senior Adviser for Homeland Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

STAFF
STAFF SENIOR ADVISORS
Mark Montgomery Tatyana Bolton
Deb Grays Benjamin Jensen
Laura Bate Shawn Lonergan
Erica Borghard Brandon Valeriano
Tasha Jhangiani
LEGAL ADVISORS
Robert Morgus
Stefan Wolfe, General Counsel
WHITE PAPER LEAD WRITERS David Simon, Chief Counsel for Cybersecurity
Robert Morgus and National Security
Natalie Thompson PRODUCTION STAFF
Alice Falk, Editor
Laurel Prucha Moran, Graphic Designer

40 Cyberspace Solarium Commission