PARTS OF THE CONSTITUTION

1. Constitution of Government
-defines the powers of government and distributes it among various organs
*Executive Department; Legislative Department; Judiciary Department; Commissions

2. Constitution of Sovereignty
-provides for the methods and procedures for amending or revising the fundamental law

3. Constitution of Liberty
-guarantees the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens

ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

1. Consti II is about trying to balance the individual rights or individual liberties on the one hand
and the state authority on the other.
2. Not all rights are found in the Bill of Rights. (e.g., right to marry, right to education,
employment, etc. are in the Constitution or sometimes they are in laws but not in the Bill of
Rights.)

*The framers in the Constitution decided that there are certain rights that are so fundamental
which are so important and they want to place it beyond the power of Congress, and so these
were put under Art. III, Bill of Rights.

Content/Arrangement of the 22 Sections:

1. Sections 1-11 Civil and Political Rights

a. Civil Rights are those which we enjoy as members of a political society
*freedom of religion
*right to form associations
*right to information on rights and other concerns
b. Political Rights allows us to participate in the affairs of government (indirectly)
*suffrage (Art. V)
*freedom of speech, freedom of association

2. Sections 12-22 – Rights of suspects, those on trial or those convicted of offenses (crime-related
rights or rights during trial
*e.g., rights during custodial investigation; rights under/against double jeopardy

3. The Bill of Rights do not guarantee Economic, Cultural and Social Rights
*These kind of rights are not actually in the Bill of Rights
Functions of the Constitution:

1. To establish government powers

2. To limit government powers
3. To define government powers
4. To distribute powers

Basic Concepts:

Bill – declaration which is made in the Constitution

Bill of Rights – the list of right that the State cannot interfere with
- It does not exhaust all rights of the citizens as other rights are embodied in statutes and laws
- Affirmative rights are not included in the Bill of Rights. It includes only negative rights.
- Purpose: The Bill of rights is a restriction on government power. The State cannot interfere.
- Structure: It is placed in the constitution because these rights are more important than the laws.
It puts rights in a higher category and limits the power of the government.

BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN BILL OF RIGHTS

*Limitations on State Power (State Authority v. Individual Liberty)

1. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are SELF-EXECUTING (ready for use)

*If there’s a case against somebody, they can immediately invoke the bill of rights anytime.
*The provisions of the Bill of Rights are self-executory because even in the absence of any
legislation, the Bill of Rights can be used as a defense or may be invoked as a cause of action in
litigation without the need of any statute from Congress, which means, you can automatically go
to court and have them enforced.

Pamatong v. COMELEC
Issue: Did the act of the COMELEC violate petitioner’s right to “equal access to opportunities for
public service” under Sec. 26, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution?

Held: No. There is no constitutional right to run or hold a public office. The provisions under
Article II are generally not self-executing. The provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action.

2. They can be INVOKE AGAINST THE STATE (not against private individuals)
*The Bill of Rights can only be invoked against the state and not against private individuals.

People v. Bongcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 (2002)

*The baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was
only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any governmental function.
 Cadajas v. People, GR No. 247348, Nov. 16, 2021
The photographs are admissible. While the Bill of Rights protects the right to privacy, one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is intended to protect private individuals against government
intrusions. Hence its provisions are not applicable between and amongst private individuals. In
this case the items were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of
the State. Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the
admissibility of evidence under Art. III of the Constitution must affect only those pieces of
evidence by the State through its agents.

People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

The protection of fundamental liberties is the essence of constitutional democracy.
Protection from whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights govern the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individual. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare
some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.

3. BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS ARE SUPERIOR to property rights.

PBLMO v. PBMCI, 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

While the Bill of Rights also protect property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Xxx Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill
of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs
– political, economic or otherwise.

4. Its provisions have NO RETROACTIVE application.

Art. 4, Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”
Art. 22, RPC: “Penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal...”

*The Bill of rights gives rights. It does not punish unlike penal laws. If the law is favorable to the
accused, the provisions of the Bill of Rights have no retroactive application.

*Penal Laws is not the same with the Bill of Rights;

*Penal Laws involves penalty, while Bill of Rights does not.

Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 263 S222 (1996)

Held: While Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,” what is
being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which
is obviously not a penal Statute. A Bill of Rights is a declaration of the individual rights and
privileges which the constitution is designed to protect against violations be government, or by
individuals or groups of individuals.
 5. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO ALIENS

*If we study the entire Bill of Rights, there is only one (1) provision that is applicable to Filipino
citizens only (access to information in Section 7)

*All other Sections/provisions in the Bill of Rights, applies to everybody whether citizens or
aliens. (e.g. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property without due process of law –
meaning all persons (citizens or aliens) have the right to life, liberty, etc.)

6. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are GENERALLY SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS or are NOT
ABSOLUTE

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression ….

Is that absolute? NO.

Since rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute, how do we know whether the restrictions impose by the
State are valid?

Tests Applied by Supreme Court (to determine the validity of the imposed restrictions)

a. Strict Scrutiny Test

- applied in relation to statutes interfering with (1) fundamental rights (freedom of speech,
expression, assembly, religion, privacy, right to travel) or (2) to classifications based on race,
alienage or national origin and religion. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 252578, December
7, 2021)

- Effect: In this instance, the court starts with the heavy presumption that the law is
unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the restriction (i) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
[Calleja v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 252578, December 7, 2021]

b. Intermediate Scrutiny Test

- applied when the challenge restriction (1) does NOT involve fundamental rights or (2) “suspect
classes” (classification based on gender, legitimacy, financial need and age). Also, if the restriction
on speech is content-neutral. Chavez v. Gonzales, 555 SCRA 441 (2008) (no heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality/substantial government interest) [Aquino v. Aquino, Dec. 7, 2021]

c. Rational Basis Test

- applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.
- (Applies to exercise of police power that tend to restrict property right, or other rights which are
not regarded as fundamental).
- Lawful subject and lawful method
BAR QUESTIONS:

2005, No. 11:(2) Emilio had long suspected that Alvin, his employee, had been passing trade secrets to
his competitor, Randy, but he had no proof. One day, Emilio broke open the desk of Alvin and discovered
a letter wherein Randy thanked Alvin for having passed on to him vital trade secrets of Emilio. Enclosed
in the letter was a check for P50,000.00 drawn against the account of Randy and payable to Alvin. Emilio
then dismissed Alvin from his employment. Emilio’s proof of Alvin’s perfidy is the said letter and check
which are objected to as inadmissible for having been obtained through an illegal search. Alvin filed a
suit assailing his dismissal.

Rule on the admissibility of the letter and check. (5%) [Are they admissible?]
Answer: YES. It is admissible because it is done by a private individual. Bill of rights can be invoke
against the State only and not against private individuals.

2007, V. The Destilleria Felipe Segundo is famous for its 15-year old rum, which it has produced and
marketed successfully for the past 70 years. Its latest commercial advertisement uses the line:
“Nakatikim ka na ba ng kinse anyos?” Very soon, activist groups promoting women’s and children’s
rights were up in arms against the advertisement.

(a) All advertising companies in the Philippines have formed an association, the Philippine
Advertising Council, and have agreed to abide by all the ethical guidelines and decisions by the
Council. In response to the protests, the council orders the pull-out of the “kinse anyos”
advertising campaign. Can Destilleria Felipe Segundo claim that its constitutional rights are
thus infringed?

Ans.: NO. because the advertising companies are private entities

(b) One of the militant groups, the Amazing Amazonas, call on all the government-owned and
controlled corporations (GOCC) to boycott any newspaper, radio or TV station that carries the
“kinse anyos” advertisements. They call on all government nominees in sequestered
corporations to block any advertising funds allocated for any such newspaper, radio or TV
station. Can the GOCCs and sequestered corporations validly comply?

Ans.: YES, because GOCC are government entities, constitutional rights can be invoke.

1992, No.2:
Sheila, an actress, signed a 2-year contract with Solidaridad Films. The film company undertook
to promote her career and to feature her as the leading lady in at least 4 movies. In turn, Sheila
promised that, for the duration of the contract, she shall not get married or have a baby;
otherwise, she shall be liable to refund the film company a portion of its promotion expenses.

If Solidaridad Films tries to enforce this contract judicially, will Sheila’s constitutionally
protected right prevail?

Ans.: YES, because Sheila’s human rights is superior.

2000, 11: On Oct. 1, 1985, Ramos was arrested by a security guard because he appeared to be
“suspicious” and brought to a police precinct where in the course of the investigation he admitted he
was the killer in an unsolved homicide committed a week earlier. The proceedings of his investigation
were put in writing dated Oct. 1, 1985 and the only participation of counsel assigned him was his mere
presence and signature on the statement. The admissibility of the statement of Ramos was placed in
issue but the prosecution claims that the confession was taken on Oct. 1, 1985 and the 1987
Constitution providing the right to counsel of choice took effect on Feb. 2, 1987 so it will not apply to
Ramos. Is that correct?

Ans.: YES. Because Bill of Rights do not have retroactive application

2002, No. 8: One day a passenger bus conductor found a man’s handbag left in the bus. When the
conductor opened the bag, he found inside a calling card with the owner’s name (Dante Galang) and
address and a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. He brought the substance to the
NBI for laboratory examination and it turned out to be “shabu”. Galang was charged and convicted. On
appeal, he contends that the plastic bag and its contents are inadmissible in evidence being the
product of an illegal search and seizure. Is he correct?

Ans.: No. Because the search was done by a private person – a conductor. The Bill of Rights cannot be
invoked.

2012, No. 10. What do you understand by the term "hierarchy of civil liberties"?

Ans.: Basic Human rights is superior to property rights

1996, No. 1: Distinguish civil rights from political rights and give an example of each right.
What are the relations of civil and political to human rights?

Ans.: *Relations of Civil and Political Human Rights:

Human Rights is the general right. It includes civil, political, economic, social rights, etc.
Human rights – rights we possess simply because we are human beings. It is inherent. It is inalienable.

Bill of rights not a source of rights; it only guarantees it.

Section. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be deprived the equal protection of laws.

Not covered as “property”:

1. permits and licenses (SMGMC v. Balite Portal, 380 SCRA 145 (2002
2. private employment [Serrano v. NLRC, 323 SCRA 445 (1999)]
3. public office [COMELEC v. Cruz, 605 SCRA 167 (2009)]

SMGMC v. Balite Portal, 380 SCRA 145 (2002)

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491
hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. On Feb. 16, 1994,
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to Southern Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SMGMC), which in
turn applied for a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement over the land area covered by the permit.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which called for a study of
the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
Does Memorandum order No. 97-03 violate the non-impairment clause?

Held: No. Petitioner’s right under EP No. 133 is not total and absolute . EP No. 133 merely evidences a
privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest
so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. It does not vest in the grantee any
permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process
clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify
or amend the same in accordance with the demands of the general welfare.

Serrano v. NLRC, 323 SCRA 445 (2000)

Serrano was head of the Security Checker’s Section of Isetann Department Store. In 1999, as a cost-
cutting measure Isetann phased out the entire security section and engaged the services of an
independent security agency. Thus, it wrote a notice of termination to Serrano effective on the same
day, contrary to the provisions of Art. 283 of the Labor Code which requires a one-month notice. Was
the constitutional right of Serrano violated?

Held: NO. The employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial
of due process, but a mere failure to observe a procedure for termination. The reason is that the due
process clause is a limitation on government power, not on private power such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code. Secondly, the notice and hearing are required under the due
process clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. Under Art.
283, however, the purpose of the 30-day notice is not to give him an opportunity to be heard on the
charge against him, for there is none, but to prepare him for the eventual loss of his job. Thirdly, the
requirement of Art. 282 and Art. 283 of notice cannot be considered part of the due process clause
because the employer cannot be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.

(When you are dismiss without due process but you will be paid P30,000)
Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, Oct, 15, 2019
Is the requirement of a license to own and operate a firearm protected by the due process clause of
the Bill of Rights?

Held: No. The bearing of arms is a mere privilege granted by the State. There is no vested right in the
continued ownership and possession of firearms. Like any other license, the license to possess a firearm
is "neither a property nor a property right." As a mere "permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful," it does not act as "a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it
is granted[.]” There is no deprivation of the right to due process in requiring a license for the
possession of firearms. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution is clear that only life, liberty, or property
is protected by the due process clause.

*A license to own and operate a firearm is only a privilege and not a right

BAR QUESTION/S:

2006,- VI
Does a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR) constitute a property right protected by the
Constitution? 2.5%

Ans. No. PTCFOR is only a privilege but it is not a property right protected by the Constitution.

What about a franchise issued by the Congress?

[Manila Int’l Ports v. PPA, G.R. No. 196199, December 07, 2021]
On 06 January 1975, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 634
granting MIPTI a franchise to construct, operate and maintain modern container terminals, bonded
warehouses, storage depots, cold and refrigerated storage, cargo and transit sheds, conveyor piers,
docks, landing and berthing facilities, access roads, bridges, seawalls, bulkheads and filling at North
Harbor. On July 19, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) No. 30 revoking
MIPTI's franchise due to substantial violations of the MOA, which resulted in the deterioration of port
services, and authorizing PPA to undertake, on its own, the cargo-handling operation at North Harbor.
Can the franchise be revoked without observing due process?

Held: In our jurisdiction, a franchise is broadly defined as a special privilege that is not demandable as a
matter of right, and when granted, is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress:   On this
score, Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution further states that "for the operation of a public
utility," no "such franchise or right [shall] be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. With the
advent of democracy, the traditional distinction between franchise as a "privilege" and franchise as a
"property right" has faded as a result of the recognition that privileges previously granted to individuals
should not be taken through the "unfettered whims of government officials. “For that reason, the Court
has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between "rights" and "privileges" that once seemed
to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights. The Court has also made clear that the
property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real
estate, chattels, or money. We have come to recognize franchise as a property right that cannot be
revoked or forfeited without due process of law.

[Manila Int’l Ports v. PPA, G.R. No. 196199, December 07, 2021]
The Due Process Clause:
There are two components of due process. The first,  procedural due process, pertains to the
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property;  the
second,  substantive due process, to the justification for the denial or restriction on life, liberty, or
property.
While due process has no exact definition,  the standard in determining whether a person was
accorded due process is whether the restriction on the person's life, liberty, or property is  consistent
with fairness, reason, and justice, and free from caprice and arbitrariness.   This standard applies both
to procedural and substantive due process.

A. Procedural Due Process

Due Process: Procedural vs. Substantive
Procedural due process relates to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in
the enforcement and application of laws. Substantive due process pertains to the intrinsic validity of the
law interfering with life, liberty and property.

Exempted from procedural due process:

a. rule-making/quasi-legislative power
Quezon City PTCA v. Department, 784 SCRA 505 (2016)

b. abatement of nuisance per se

*nuisance per se – can be abated without due process (without notice or hearing)
*nuisance by accidens – cannot be abated without due process

c. preventive suspension of employees – no need for notice or hearing;

o different from suspension as a penalty

Del Rosario v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020

Can a statute be nullified on account of absence of public hearing prior to its enactment?

Held: No. The Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for the validity
of a statute. Article XIII, Section 16, [right to participate “in all levels of decision-making” and
[establishment of adequate consultation mechanism]] is a protection against any action which serves to
abridge the right of people's organizations to "effective and reasonable participation.”

Inquiry in aid of legislation?

*The Congress may (or may not) conduct public hearing in enacting a law
*Only Judicial and Quasi-Judicial needs Notice and Hearing
Due Process in Judicial Proceedings:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to determine the matter
before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property
which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing,

*Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

*Jurisdiction over the person (civil cases) – when summon is being issued or when the defendant
personally appears

Sps. Flores v. Sps. Estrellado, G.R. No. 251669. December 07, 2021
In a civil case, petitioners lost before the Regional Trial Court. Later, after the judgment had become
final, they discovered that the lawyer of represented them had been desbarred, yet he continued
representing them. They filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the
ground that their right to due process was violated. The CA dismissed the case. Was the Court of
Appeals correct?

Held: No. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution ordains that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Collateral to this right is the right to be assisted by
counsel for the purpose of ensuring that due process rights of litigants are truly observed. The right to
counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence,
life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. There is no reason why the rule in
criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law
applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who
is in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a
modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

Due Process in Administrative Proceedings: (Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940))

1. The right to a hearing which includes the right of a party interested or affected to present his on case
and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained on the
records and disclosed to the party affected;
6. The tribunal or judge must act on its own independent consideration and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision.

Two requirements:
1. Notice – to inform the party that proceeding is being taken against him
2. Hearing – to give him the opportunity to defend himself
Due Process in Discipline of Students;
1. The student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusation against him;
2. He shall have the right to answer the charges against him with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. He shall be informed of the evidence against him;
4. He shall have the right to adduce evidence in his own behalf;
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating body designated by the school official to
hear and decide the case. (ADM v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644 (1993))

Ochoa, Jr., v. De Buco, G.R. No. 216634, Oct. 14, 2020

Respondent, together with other officers of the Bureau of Customs, were found guilty of Grave
Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression, Gross Incompetence and Inefficiency, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and penalized with dismissal by the Office of the
President. The formal charges against him, however, did not include the offense of Gross Incompetence
and Inefficiency. Nevertheless, is the conviction for said offense proper?

Held: No. Two fundamental requirements of due process in administrative cases are that a person
must be duly informed of the charges against him; and that he cannot be convicted of an offense or
crime with which he was not charged. A deviation from these requirements renders the proceeding
invalid and the judgment issued therein a lawless thing that can be struck down any time. In the instant
case, the Formal Charge against Atty. Dy Buco did not include the charge of Gross Inefficiency and
Incompetence. Neither was there an allegation in the Formal Charge of conspiracy among respondents
which made the act of one as the act of all. Thus, there was a violation of due process with respect to
Atty. Dy Buco's right to be duly informed of the allegations and the nature of the charges against him
which included his concomitant right to an opportunity to defend himself adequately. The charge of
Gross Inefficiency and Incompetence is different from the other offenses of Grave Misconduct, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service which Atty. Dy
Buco was accused of in the Formal Charge.

Republic v. Dela Merced, G.R. No. 201501, Jan. 22, 2018

In administrative proceedings, such as the imposition of fines by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) for entities failing to comply with environmental standards, is there a
requirement of conducting a trial-type procedure, in order to comply with the Due Process Clause?

Held: No. In admin proceedings, there is no requirement of conducting a trial type procedure in order
to comply with the Due process clause.

Other situations:
1. Appeals - Rivera v. CSC, 240 SCRA 43 (1995) (Ansaldo v. Clave, 119 SCRA 446 (1982)
2. Publication of Laws (Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
3. Vague Laws

*The person who decide the appeal should not be the same person who decide the case
*Publication is a requirement of due process
What is a vague law?

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle” [SPARK v. Quezon City, 835 SCRA 350 (2017)]

Sample of Vague Laws

*“For purposes of breaking the dangerous cycle of local infection and its responses to COVID-19 cases
within the Municipality, “NO MOVEMENT SUNDAYS” in the entire Municipality is hereby imposed for a
period of 3 months, beginning the first Sunday following the effectivity of this Ordinance.”

*CSC Memo Circular No. 14, Series of 1991:

Dress Code Prescribed for All Government Officials and Employees:
5. The use of too much costume jewelry, flashy bungles and similar accessories shall likewise be
prohibited.

BAR EXAMS

2010, XIV
ABC operates an industrial waste processing plant within Laoag City. Occasionally, whenever fluid
substances are released through a nearby creek, obnoxious odor is emitted causing dizziness among
residents in Barangay La Paz. On complaint of the Punong Barangay, the City Mayor wrote ABC
demanding that it abate the nuisance. This was ignored. An invitation to attend a hearing called by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod was also declined by the president of ABC. The city government thereupon
issued a cease and desist order to stop the operations of the plant, prompting ABC to file a petition for
injunction before the Regional Trial Court, arguing that the city government did not have any power to
abate the alleged nuisance. Decide with reasons. (3%)

ANS.: It’s a nuisance per accidens

*Once you wasted your opportunity to be heard, you waived your right to due process.

1994, No. 9:
A complaint was filed by intelligence agents of the BID against Stevie, a German, for his deportation.
The commissioner directed the Board of Inquiry to conduct an investigation. At the said investigation, a
lawyer of the Legal Department of the BID presented as witnesses the 3 intelligence agents who filed the
complaint. On the basis of the findings, report and recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry, the
BID unanimously voted to deport Stevie. Stevie’s lawyer questioned the deportation order:

1. On the ground that Stevie was denied due process because the BID Commissioners who rendered
the decision were not the ones who received the evidence, in violation of the “he who decides
must hear” rule. Is he correct?
2. On the ground that there was a violation of due process because the complainants, the prosecutor
and the hearing officers were all subordinates of the BID Commissioners who rendered the deportation.
Is he correct?

Ans.: No. There is no violation of due process on the rule that “he who decides must hear” on
independent consideration and not rely on the views of his subordinates. Pursuant to the case of
Ang Tibay v. CIR, if the records are forwarded to the superior/s and studies it then there is no
violation because they appreciated the evidence. There is no requirement that the person who
heard it will also be the one who will decide it. There is also no requirement that the
participants in the proceeding should all come from different bodies- this is not guaranteed by
the Ang Tibay case.

2000, No 3: The MARINA issued new rules and regulations governing pilotage services and fees, and the
conduct of pilots in Philippine ports. This it did without notice, hearing nor consultation with harbor
pilots or their associations whose rights and activities are to be substantially affected. The harbor pilots
then filed suit to have the new MARINA rules declared unconstitutional for having been issued without
due process. Decide the case.

Ans.: No need for notice of hearing or procedural due process.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Ways by which questions can be formulated:

(1) Is the law reasonable or is it an undue interference on life, liberty or property?
(2) Does the ordinance/statute violate due process?
(3) Is it a valid exercise of police power?
(4) Is the law valid?

POLICE POWER:
The power of the government to prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, education, good order
or safety and the general welfare of the people.

Tests for Valid Exercise of Police Power (Involving Property Rights):

Is the law reasonable? (Rational Basis Test]
1. That the interest of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class requires
such interference.
2. That the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. (US VS. TORIBIO)

1. Lawful subject
2. Lawful method
a. Rational relation between method and purpose [Ynot, Laguio]
b. Means chosen not unduly oppressive of another right
First Test: When is there a lawful subject?
1. -when it is intended to serve the interest of the public (Planters v. Fertiphil, 548 SCRA 485 (2008)
(fertilizer tax to make a private corporation viable);
2. -when it is related to a valid exercise of police power, i.e., to promote health, morals, education,
good order or safety and the general welfare of the people. Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (1988) –
penalized theater owners who require full payment for children between 7-12 years old

Illustrative cases:
1. U.S. v. Toribio, G.R. No. L-5060, Jan. 26, 2010
Act No. 1147 – Penalizes the slaughter of carabaos without a permit from the national treasurer
(valid)
2. Beltran v. Secretary, 476 SCRA 168 (2005)
RA No. 7719 – Phasing out of all commercial blood banks
-Requiring vacination of everyone against COVID-19?

Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, 693 SCRA 141 (2013)

• The City of Marikina enacted an ordinance regulating the construction of fences and walls within
the city. Its 1994 amendment partly reads: Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built
within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and
the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious
institutions. May the police power be exercised for the purpose of beautification?

• Held: The beautification purpose of the setback requirement is not valid. It has long been
settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the school of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes.

Manila Memorial v. Secretary, 711 SCRA 302 (2013)

• Traditionally it is said there is said to be “taking” in the exercise of police power when property is
destroyed to preserve public health, morals, safety and welfare, in contrast to eminent domain
where the property taken is devoted to public use. Considering that under RA No. 9257, the
owners of certain establishments are simply required to give a discount of 20% to senior citizens,
can the law qualify as a police power measure?
• Does the exercise of police power always require that property is destroyed in the interest of
health, safety, morals, etc?

• Held: Yes. There is another class of police power measures which do not involve the destruction
of private property but merely regulate its use. The minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price
control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours
to eight, and the like would fall under this category. Likewise falling under this category are:
Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18 of the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the
Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These laws merely regulate or burden the conduct of the affairs of business
establishments. In such cases, payment of just compensation is not required because they fall
 within the sphere of permissible police power measures. The senior citizen discount law falls
under this latter category. [Southern Luzon Drug v. DSWD, 824 SCRA 164 (2017)
Second Test: Lawful Method
When is there lawful method?
(a) means chosen are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose; and
(b) not unduly oppressive upon individuals

City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 (2005)

• On March 30, 1993, the City of Manila approved an ordinance prohibiting any person from
operating in the Ermita-Malate area “any business providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment”,
including sauna parlors, beerhouses discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. Those
already engaged in said business were given three months to wind up their operations or
transfer elsewhere. Is the ordinance a valid exercise of police power?

• Held: No. The promotion of morals is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of
Manila. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
community’s social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition . The closing down
and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance
have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and
moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. The
enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
welfare of the community. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs
inside the establishments.

Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers, 800 SCRA 313 (2016)

• The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309 in 2007 which imposed
a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entitled within Davao
City. The effectivity of the ban was three months after it publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Banana growers argued that the period to shift from aerial spraying to truck-
mounted boom spraying is inadequate. Does the ordinance violate the due process clause?

• Held: Yes. A valid exercise of police power requires that (1) the interest of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished. In this case, given the vast area of the affected plantations, the shift to another
mode of pesticide application within three months would be impossible. To require banana
cultivators to comply with the ban in a short period under pain of penalty like fine and
imprisonment and cancellation of business permit would be oppressive as to constitute abuse
of police power.
Evasco, Jr. v. Montanez, G.R. No. 199172, Feb. 21, 2018
• The City of Davao passed an ordinance regulating the installation and maintenance of outdoor
advertising materials. Among others, it prohibited advertising signs in residential zones, set
minimum distances from property lines abutting the road-right of way and designated certain
areas of the city as “regulated areas” to preserve the natural view of Davao River, Mt. Apo and
Samal Island. Is the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power?

• Held: Yes. An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it has a lawful
subject such as the interest of the public, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The purpose of the Ordinance is to: (a) safeguard the life and
property of Davao City’s inhabitants; (b) keep the surrounding clean and orderly; (c) ensure
public decency and good taste; and (d) preserve the aesthetic relationship of these structures as
against the general surroundings. To achieve its purposes, it employs the following: (a)
Minimum distances must be observed in installing and in constructing outdoor billboards (b)
Additional requirements shall be observed in locations designated as “regulated areas” to
preserve the natural view (c) Sign permits must be secured from and proper fees paid to the city
government; and (d)Violators are given 60 days from receipt of notice to correct and address its
violation. The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the
rules imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory.

Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, 693 SCRA 141 (2013)

• The City of Marikina enacted an ordinance regulating the construction of fences and walls within
the city. Its 1994 amendment partly reads:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one
(1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see thru; xxx

• Held: No. For the provision to pass the rational relationship test, the LGUs must show the
reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The
principal purpose of the Section is “to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of
prohibited or unlawful acts.”

• The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and
security. The means employed by the ordinance, however, is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have
not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence
would provide better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory
criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such exposed
 premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence
would be easier to bypass and breach.

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987

Presidential Decree prohibiting the inter-provincial transfer of carabaos

SJS v. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92 (2008)

• The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified parts of the city from
Industrial II to Commercial I. As a consequence, operators of industries which are not permitted
in designated places were given 6 months to cease and desist their operation or move
elsewhere. Among the businesses situated in the reclassified area are the so-called “Pandacan
Terminals” of multinational oil companies, some of which have been operating for about a
century. Is the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power?

• Held: Yes. A valid exercise of police power requires that: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise (lawful subject)
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (lawful method).  The ordinance was intended to
safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class.  The depot is  perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target.  As long as there is such a target in their midst,
the residents of Manila are not safe.  It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals
to dissipate the threat. 
To forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or
welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.    In this case, the means adopted by
the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance. It is not unduly oppressive because
the oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of Manila.   They may still very well
do so, except that their oil storage facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area.  
Certainly, there are other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct this specific kind of
business.

POLICE POWER and COVID-19 response:

1. What about a statute/ordinance requiring everyone to wear a face-mask?
(Valid Subject; Valid Method)

2. Or one requiring the wearing of face-shields?

Valid Subject; Not Valid Method – why require 2 when one will do

3. To undergo compulsory vaccination?

-What is the effect of refusal?
a. Austria: Quarantine all unvaccinated [Virtual House Arrest]]
b. Germany: No Culture and Leisure (PRRD: Can’t enter restaurants and resorts)
c. House Bill: Can’t enter public or private buildings where people are gather
d. Privately employed/civil service employee
 A and C are oppressive of other’s rights. A and C are questionable because they affect fundamental
constitutional rights. (Not property, where the rational basis test applies) (Strict scrutiny test –
compelling interest/means narrowly tailored)

Bar Questions:

1987, V: Is an ordinance prohibiting barbershop operators from rendering massage service to their
customers in a separate room valid?

Answer: YES.
How do you analyze it? By applying the (2) Tests.
1. What is the valid purpose of the ordinance? To protect morals. If you do barbering in a separate
room, you do not know what is happening there. That’s why in requiring them not to render
massage in a separate room, it will promote morals. The purpose is to protect morals.

2. Is the method not unduly oppressive of another right? Is there a logical connection? The first
one, I see no problem. There’s logic there – to ensure morals are protected: you do not render
massage in a separate room. Is that duly oppressive of the right of people who are involved in
this business? NO. Why? Because it did not say that, from now on, massage[s] are totally
prohibited. That will be unduly oppressive of the occupation of some people. That’s no longer
regulation, that’s prohibiting it.

(Asked 2 times) 2001, No. 13: The PPA issued an administrative order to the effect that all existing
regular appointment to harbor pilot positions shall remain valid only up to Dec. 31 of the current year
and that henceforth all appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be only for a term of one year.
Pilotage as a profession may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals, who have to pass five
government professional examinations.

The harbor pilots association challenged the validity of said admin order on the argument that it violated
their right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law and that the said order was
without prior notice and hearing. Are they correct?

Answer: This is based on an actual case. If you look at the question this is one classic, that I told you. It
raises two questions. It’s saying: Is there a violation of procedural due process? Is there a violation of
substantive due process?

As to procedural due process, you go back to the principle that I mentioned, when an entity exercises
quasi-legislative power there is no need of notice and hearing. Here, it is rule-making. Since it’s rule-
making, the PPA need not conduct notice and hearing. They need not observe notice and hearing, no
requirement of procedural due process.

However, the SC answered this [I forgot the actual caption of the case here]. The administrative order
violates the substantive due process. How did the Supreme Court reasoned it out? Pilotage is a
profession. Once you pass the examination, you have a right to practice it so the government cannot
simply remove that right and say, you’re subjected to another examination. That will be unduly
oppressive of the exercise of a profession, unduly oppressive of another right. It passed the first test
[procedural due process test] but it failed the substantive due process for that reason. There is a lawful
subject there, it can be safety that is why you have to undergo examination regularly. So, there is a
rational relation to require them into periodic examinations, so that no accidents can happen. But then
again, it is unduly oppressive of the exercise of a profession.

2010, XXI
• The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay City passed an ordinance requiring all disco pub owners
to have all their hospitality girls tested for the AIDS virus. Both disco pub owners and the
hospitality girls assailed the validity of the ordinance for being violative of their constitutional
rights to privacy and to freely choose a calling or business. Is the ordinance valid? Explain. (5%)

Answer: Almost the same. I think we have no problem with the purpose, there is a valid purpose: to
protect health, because hospitality girls can easily spread AIDS to their customers.

Is there a rational relation?

There is. To ensure that the AIDS will not spread, people in this vocation should undergo testing.

But is that unduly oppressive?

They are not really prohibited from exercising their calling or business, it does not say that they should
stop in exercising their profession. It’s only that they will have to undergo test[s]. That’s okay.

What about privacy?

It will be an issue of privacy if the results will be announced publicly, or published. But if the results will
just be for the use of the person who is the employee as well as the people in the health center so that
you can be treated, I do not see any issue of privacy. I believe the ordinance is still a valid exercise of
police power to promote health and it does not really prohibit you or unduly oppress another right.

V, 2009
• To address the pervasive problem of gambling, Congress is considering the following options: (1)
prohibit all forms of gambling; (2) allow gambling only on Sundays; (3) allow gambling only in
government-owned casinos; and (4) remove all prohibitions against gambling but impose a tax
equivalent to 30% on all winnings.
• [a] If Congress chooses the first option and passes the corresponding law absolutely
prohibiting all forms of gambling, can the law be validly attacked on the ground that it is an
invalid exercise of police power? Explain your answer.   (2%)

• Suggested Answer:
First question is, what is the valid subject?
This one is morals. Gambling and morals are so related. We have the Anti-Gambling Law to
protect morals. So there is no problem with the subject.
• Is there a rational relation?
No problem. To preserve morals, stop gambling.
• Is it unduly oppressive of your right?
I do not see any right in the constitution, like the right to gamble which will be affected. There is
no right there which would seem to be unduly burdened by that ordinance.
 • First option: If all forms are prohibited, it is valid. Why? Because the purpose is to promote
morals. Is it oppressive on another right? Do you have the right to gamble under the
Constitution? I don’t think there is such right. You have the right to enjoy yourself but that is only
one method that you are prohibited.
• Second option: Suppose Congress chooses number 2, allow gambling only on Sundays. How do
you challenge it?
• The main challenge is that there is no logical connection between the method and the purpose of
the law. Do you mean that it is immoral on Monday, moral on Tuesday, immoral on Wednesday.
and so on. There is no logical connection between the method and the purpose. Because if you
really want to promote morals, why would you allow gambling in casinos and not on the
sidewalks? There is a problem of logic because why would it be moral to gamble in casinos and
immoral on sidewalks for 10 pesos only?

2008, - VI -
• The Philippine National Police (PNP) issued a circular to all its members directed at the style and
length of male police officers' hair, sideburns and moustaches, as well as the size of their
waistlines. It prohibits beards, goatees and waistlines over 38 inches, except for medical reason.
Some police officers questioned the validity of the circular, claiming that it violated their right to
liberty under the Constitution. Resolve the controversy. (6%)

*If we belong to a certain agency, we are subject to its regulations.

*Basis: Reasonableness.

Quiz No. 1: True or False

1. In Southern Luzon, the Court held that the exercise of police do not always entail that the property is
destroyed to promote public welfare. (True)
2. Beautification can be a valid purpose of a police power ordinance. (True)
3. Investigations in-aid-of-legislation done by Congress is part of the due process requirement for those
who may be affected by the proposed law. (False)
4. In issuing regulations to implement a law (IRR), notice and hearing are not required as part of due
process. (True – IRR Quasi-Legislative)
5. In Mosqueda, had the City of Davao given banana growers three (3) years to shift from aerial
spraying to truck-mounted spraying, the court would likely have sustained the validity of the Ordinance.
(False)
6. Police power may be exercised by Congress even if the Constitution would not expressly grant it the
power. (True)
7. Police power is principally exercised by the Philippine National Police. (False)
8. Courts also exercise police power. (False – Courts with procedure)
9. In the exercise of police power, Congress can totally ban all forms of gambling, including inside
casinos. (True)
10. The protection of morals is always a lawful subject for the enactment of an ordinance by an LGU.
(True)
11. A law phasing out the use of taxis after one year of operation in the interest of public safety is valid.
(False)
12. A nuisance per se may be abated only after observing due process. (False)
13. Also a nuisance per accidens. (True)
14. In administrative proceedings, due process does not require a trial-type proceedings where cross-
examination is a right of an adverse party. (True)
15. The right to appeal an adverse judgment is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Bill of Rights,
says Cruz. (False)

Multiple Choice:

16. Which of the following, as explained by Justice Cruz, requires procedural due process? (a)
padlocking of theaters showing obscene movies; (b) suspension of a public officer for 3 days as a
penalty for an offense (c) revocation of a license to operate a cockpit; (d) destruction of a private
building on the verge of collapse

17. Which is an element of due process in administrative proceedings based on Ang Tibay? (a) the
decision must be based on the evidence presented or contained in the records; (b) the officer who
conducts the hearing must himself make or write the decision; (c) the hearing officer, prosecutor and
witnesses must not come from the same agency of the government; (d) the person deciding must consult
his subordinates as to their opinions about the case

18. Southern Luzon Drug holds that the 20% given to Senior Citizens is a valid exercise of: (a) police
power only; (b) police power and eminent domain; (c) eminent domain and taxation; (d) police power
and taxation

19. In Laguio (as summarized by Cruz), the ordinance prohibiting certain establishments in the Ermita-
Malate area enacted by the City of Manila was found by the Court: (a) to have no lawful subject and no
lawful method; (b) to be unduly oppressive and the method chosen has no relation to the purpose; (c)
to be outside the delegated legislative authority of LGUs; (d) to have been enacted without observing the
procedural requirement of notice and hearing

20. In Ynot v. IAC (as summarized by Cruz), the executive order prohibiting the inter-provincial transfer of
carabaos, was declared by the Court as unconstitutional, because: (a) it had no lawful subject; (b) the
means chosen was unduly oppressive; (c) the means chosen was not reasonably necessary to the
purpose; or (d) the President acted beyond his powers (ultra vires)
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be deprived the equal protection of laws.

Section 1: Due Process and Equal Protection

Equal protection pertains to the requirement that laws must treat all persons or things similarly
situated alike, both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.

Some comments:
1. The provision intends to promote equality, not identify of rights
2. All laws tend to classify – but classification by itself does not violate the provision

*Principle of non-discrimination; No favoritism.

Two ways of violating:

1. Classifying without basis (eye color/color blind]
2. Failure to classify when distinction exists

[Bar Q, 1989, No. 18: Villegas case]

An ordinance of the City for Manila requires every alien desiring to obtain employment of whatever
kind, including casual and part-time employment, in the city to secure an employment permit from the
City and to pay a work permit fee of P500. Is the ordinance valid?

Ans. No. Failing to classify aliens on the basis of Income.

The Villegas case is on the 1970s, P500 is a very big amount. The Supreme Court nullified it for the
violation of the equal protection clause. Aliens are not all similarly situated. Some have low income,
some are rich [high status, salaries]. If you will not classify them and require them to pay P500, that
would be unconstitutional. The Court saw it at that time as undue burden on the part of the poor aliens.
By failing to classify when there is a valid distinction you also violate the equal protection clause.

Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers, 800 SCRA 313 (2016)

(aerial to truck-mounted spraying in 3 months – Equal protection:

(1) it singled out aerial spraying only when other forms of spraying also produce pesticide drift – under-
inclusive (By classifying, e.g., regulating only aerial spraying, the ordinance made a classification
where no substantial distinction exists)
(2) it failed to make a distinction between spraying of pesticide and fertilizer -- over-inclusive)
(By not classifying, e.g., making no distinction between fertilizer and pesticide spraying when
substantial distinction exists, the law violated the equal protection clause.

Two ways of justifying:

1. When the Constitution allows it; or [Nunez and Almonte] {Cruz v. COMELEC]
2. When it passes the 4 tests for a valid classification
Tests for Valid Classification: (Rational Basis Test]
1. It must rest on a substantial distinction;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only: [Ormoc Sugar v. Ormoc City)
4. It must apply equally to members of the same class. (Ichong v. Hernandez – failed attempt)

But: Strict Scrutiny test: Applied in relation xxxx (2) to classifications based on race, alienage or
national origin and religion. Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 5 (2010)

[Sec. 5…. The free exercise of and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.]

Intermediate Scrutiny: When the challenged [restriction classification] does NOT involve “fundamental
rights” or suspect classes (classification based on gender, legitimacy, financial need and age). Chavez v.
Gonzales, 555 SCRA 441 (2008) (no heavy presumption of unconstitutionality/substantial government
interest)

Bar Question:
XVII. The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth Association (GBTYA), an organization of gay, bisexual,
and transgender persons, filed for accreditation with the COMELEC to join the forthcoming party-list
elections. The COMELEC denied the application for accreditation on the ground that GBTYA espouses
immorality which offends religious dogmas. GBTY A challenges the denial of its application based on
moral grounds because it violates its right to equal protection of the law.

(I) What are the three (3) levels of test that are applied in equal protection cases? Explain. (3%)
Answer:
a. Strict Scrutiny - if the classification is based on race, national origin or religion
b. Intermediate Scrutiny - does not involve suspect classes. It involves gender, legitimacy,
financial need and age.
c. Rational Test - the 4 tests

(2) Which of the three (3) levels of test should be applied to the present case? Explain. (3%)
Ans. Rational Test (Gay/Bisexual - It is not gender but sexual orientation)

This is not really classifying them based on gender. We still do not consider being gay or transgender as
another gender. We only have male and female. In the US, they call that discrimination based on sexual
preference. Since they do not fall under suspect classes or the second level, we apply the Rational Basis
Test.

Same-sex marriage- Falcis III v. Registrar, GR No. 217910, Sept. 3. 2019

U.S. Case: Obergefell v. Hodge, US Federal Supreme Court (2015)
Which of the tests should be applied?
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
Law prohibited members of non-Christian tribes from drinking foreign liquor, on the ground that their
low degree of culture and their unfamiliarity with this kind of drink rendered them more susceptible to its
effects as compared to their more civilized countrymen. Is it valid?

Yes. Before.

2016, -VIII-A law is passed intended to protect women and children from all forms of violence. When a
woman perceives an act to be an act of violence or a threat of violence against her, she may apply for a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO) to be issued by the Barangay Chairman, which shall have the force and
effect of law. Conrado, against whom a BPO had been issued on petition of his wife, went to court to
challenge the constitutionality of the law. He raises the following grounds:

• [a] The law violates the equal protection clause, because while it extends protection to women
who may be victims of violence by their husbands, it does not extend the same protection to
husbands who may be battered by their wives. (2.5%)

Judge: This has been answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Garcia v. Drilon.

Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)

R.A. No. 9262 defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. By seemingly favoring
women over men, does the law violate the equal protection clause? 

Held: No. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection. First, the
unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to
be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. Second, the distinction between men and
women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against
women and children. Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse, and it applies equally to all members of
the class.
Special 12 Division, CA, GR No. 194461, Jan. 7, 2020
  Zomer Development Company, Inc, owned three (3) parcels of land in Cebu City, which it mortgaged
to International Exchange Bank as security for its loan. The properties were later foreclosed and sold at
public auction. Later, Zomer sought to nullify the sale and declare Sec. 47, RA No. 8791,
unconstitutional.  It argued that Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791   or the General Banking Law of
2002, violates its right to equal protection since the law provides a shorter period for redemption of
three (3) months or earlier to juridical entities compared to the one (1) year redemption period given to
natural persons. This discrimination, it argued, gives "undue advantage to lenders who are non-banks.”
Does the law violate the equal protection clause?

Held: No.  Equal protection permits of reasonable classification . The difference in the treatment of
juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed — whether
these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used
for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed  necessary to reduce the
period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee banks to dispose sooner of
these acquired assets. The properties of juridical entities are also often used for commercial purposes.
Corporations will give more attention to assets that are income generating, and will also be equipped
with greater resources for the protection of these assets.   In contrast, the properties of natural persons
are more often used for residential purposes. They are also directly responsible for the liabilities they
incur and, often, are not equipped with the same resources that juridical entities may have. Juridical
entities, thus, cannot be considered a "suspect class." The rational basis test may be applied to
determine the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8971, Section 47.   There is, thus, a legitimate
government interest in the protection of the banking industry and a legitimate government interest in
the protection of foreclosed residential properties owned by natural persons. The shortened period of
redemption for juridical entities may be considered to be the reasonable means for the protection of
both these interests.

Sobrejuanite-Flores v. Commissioner, G.R. No. 251816. November 23, 2021

• Republic Act No. 10029 or the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009 mandated that all applicants for
registration to practice psychology must pass a licensure examination. However, Section 16 of
the law exempted psychologists from the examination if they possess the following educational
attainment and work experience, to wit: (c) Psychologists or employees holding positions as
Psychologists presently employed in various government and private agencies, who have a
bachelor's degree in psychology,  accumulated a minimum of ten (10) years work experience in
the practice of psychology as a psychologist, and have updated their professional education in
various psychology-related functions. "Professional education in various psychology-related
functions" shall mean completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training
programs across various areas and specialties in psychology conducted by duly established
national or international organizations of psychologists, psychiatrists, and other allied mental
health professionals, in the last five (5) years immediately preceding the effectivity of R.A.
10029.” Does this violate the equal protection clause?
 • Held: Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 is not in conflict with the equal protection clause
which simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a
similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The principle
recognizes reasonable classification which: (1) must rest on real and substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. The confluence of these elements is
present in the required "completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training
programs." There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between those who have a
Bachelor's Degree in Psychology and those who have graduated from advanced studies, Doctoral
Degree and Master's Degree in Psychology. The distinction is also aligned to the policy of the law
to regulate the practice of psychology and to protect the public from incompetent individuals
offering psychological services. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only since
its purpose is to nurture competent and assiduous psychologists who practices and services can
sustainably achieve excellence and competitiveness in the future both in the domestic and global
arena. Lastly, the requirement applies indiscriminately to all holders of Bachelor's Degree prior
to the enactment of the law who intend to avail the exemption from licensure examinations.

Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

• Manalo was married to a Japanese national. Later, she filed a petition for divorce against her
husband before a Japanese court. After it was granted on Dec. 6, 2011 , she sought to have the
record of her marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar of San Jose, Manila, cancelled .
Considering that Art. 26, paragraph 2, of the Family Code, only provides that: Where a marriage
between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law,” should the petition be granted?

• Held: Yes. While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for valid classification and
that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification
may be subjected to judicial review. The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. In this
case, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminates against the other.
Aquino v. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, December 7, 2021
• Miguel Aquino died intestate survived by several legitimate children. He also had a legitimate
son, Arturo, who died ahead of him. Arturo had an illegitimate daughter named Angela. "ART.
992. (New Civil Code) An illegitimate child has no right to inherit an intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child." Considering that Angela was illegitimate, can she
inherit from Miguel?

• Held: Yes. We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children,   regardless of the
circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants—such as their
grandparent—by their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether
born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other
ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same
degree as marital children. Nonmarital children of marital children are also removed from their
parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children of nonmarital children.

DOTR v. Philippine Petroleum, G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018

• The "Oil Pollution Management Fund," was created under Section 22(a) of Republic Act No. (RA)
9483 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), by imposing "ten centavos (10c) per liter
for every delivery or transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and tanker haulers." The fund
is intended for use in cases of containment, removal and clean-up of the environment arising
from oil pollution. Considering that only tankers, as distinguished from other vessels, are
made to contribute to the Fund, does this violate the equal protection clause?

• Held: No. While all vessels plying Philippine waters are susceptible to accidents which may
cause oil spills, this does not make them “similarly situated” within the context of the equal
protection clause. Aside from the difference in the purposes behind their existence and
navigation, it is internationally recognized that oil tankers pose greater risk to the
environment and people. As a matter of fact, this type of vessels have long been considered as
a separate class and are being given a different treatment by various organizations. For
instance, fire safety provisions are much more stringent for tankers than ordinary cargo ships
since the danger of fire on board ships carrying oil is much greater. Tankers are also required to
have double hulls, as opposed to single hulls. They have designated protective locations of
segregated ballast tanks. These show that a vessel that carries oil in bulk has been recognize
and treated as a separate class of vessels.

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 637 SCRA 78 (2010)

• The President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010. The ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices, and accessories during the previous administration,
and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Since the EO was tasked mainly to investigate corruption under the
administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, does it violate the equal protection clause?
 • Answer: Yes. No substantial distinction.

BAR EXAM QUESTIONS

1987, No. 6:
Marina Neptunia, daughter of a sea captain wanted to become a full-fledged marine officer but she was
not allowed to take the examination for marine officers because the law Regulating the Practice of the
Marine Profession prescribes that: “No person shall be qualified for examination as marine officer unless
he is:” Is the law valid? [Equal Protection?]

Suggested Answer: If you look at it, the only people who are qualified to be marine officers are male and
not female. It appears that this is a violation of the equal protection clause. While there might be a
substantial distinction between men and women for the purpose of making them officers of ships, it does
not seem to be germane to the purpose of the law because usually when we pass laws which
discriminate against women, the reason is to protect them or their health [like longer maternity leave;
prohibition against working in certain industries like underground mining]. In this case, prohibiting them
from working aboard ships as officers or as ordinary crew does not seem to in the interest of health
because the condition in modern ships now are so comfortable now. Thus, there is no reason to
discriminate against women in becoming marine officers. Also, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Congress and everyone for that matter is required to promote the fundamental equality between men
and women. So, any classification here would fall under the second category, intermediate scrutiny – the
government must show that it has a substantial interest in making the discrimination against women.

1994, No. 12: The DECS issued a circular disqualifying anyone who fails for the 4th time in the National
Entrance Tests from admission to a College of Dentistry. X who was thus disqualified, questions the
constitutionality of the circular. Did the circular violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

Suggested Answer: No.

Is there is a substantial distinction between those who enter dentistry and those form other professions?
Yes, because dentistry is involved in health. Going to the dentist like going to the doctor is a health
issue. Is it germane to the purpose of the law? Yes, to ensure that we protect the health of the public,
we screen people who want to enter the College of Dentistry; otherwise, they can pose danger. They
might pull out the wrong tooth or might poison their patients. After all, the equal protection clause does
not ensure identity of rights, only equality.

2020/2021 Bar Exam, N0. 7:

The Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court prohibited the conduct of daily prayers for Muslims
inside any room of the Hall of Justice even during break time. Among Muslims, five dail prayers (salah)
are mandatory. In all these daily prayers, Muslims need to face the qiblah. There is a noontime prayer
(Zhuhr) and an afternoon prayer (Asr). But unlike the other two prayers, these two can be recited
silently, but still on a prayer mat and with body movements.
There is a Supreme Court Resolution that allows Catholic Masses to be held during break time inside
Halls of Justice. There was only one dissent to this Resolution on the ground of strict interpretation on
the ground of strict separation of Church and State in relation to acts of worship. The Executive Judge is
a member of a Catholic institution perceived to be conservative.
Did the Executive Judge violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution? Explain briefly.

Answer: Yes. It violates. Apply Strict Scrutiny Test.

Quiz 2. True or False

1. The Equal Protection Clause can apply to Executive Orders issued by the President, not only to laws
enacted by the Congress. (True)
2. The Equal Protection Clause is a limitation on the exercise of Police Power. (True)
3. The equal protection clause treats as unconstitutional all laws passed by the Congress that tend to
subject to restrictions or disadvantages a group or a class of individuals. (False)
4. The constitutional prohibition on aliens from owning lands in the Philippines can be successfully
challenged under the equal protection clause. (False)
5. Height can never be the basis of a valid classification and discrimination. (False)
6. Cruz also suggests that it is permissible to discriminate against people on the basis of their skin color,
such as their being black or yellow. (False)
7. In some instances, it may be permissible to pass laws and give favors on the basis of gender. (True)
8. It might be permissible to pass laws that tend to discriminate against children. (True)
9. However, all laws that tend to favor women or give them benefits over men cannot be subjected
successfully to a challenge under the equal protection clause. (False)
10. Vasquez tells us that because public office is a public trust, public officials cannot invoke the equal
protection clause in all situations. (False)
11. Cruz says that a law tending to favor the Executive and the Legislative Departments over the Judicial
Department may be declared violative of the equal protection clause. (True)
12. A private employer who dismisses some employees, but not others, who refuse to get vaccinated
against the COVID-19 virus may be held accountable under the equal protection clause. (False)
13. A law which treats everyone equally even if they are not similarly situated may also violate the equal
protection clause. (True)
14. An ordinance enacted by a Local Government Unit can be assailed on the basis of the equal
protection clause. (True)
15. Cruz says a statute declaring appointive, but not elective officials, who files a certificate of candidacy
resigned, does not violate the equal protection clause. (True)

Multiple Choice:

16. In Biraogo, which invalidated an order of Pres. Aquino for the investigation of corruption under
PGMA, the Court held that the EO was NOT: (a) based upon substantial distinctions; (b) germane to the
purpose of the law; (c) limited to existing conditions only; (d) equally applicable to all members of the
class
17. Cruz says that the Ormoc ordinance imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled
at the Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries” violated the requirement that a
classification must: (a) be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) not be limited to existing conditions only; (d) apply equally to all members of the class
18. Which summarizes best what occurred in the Banko Sentral (digested by Cruz) case: (a) a law
declared constitutional at one time may be declared unconstitutional at another; (b) a law declared
unconstitutional at one time may be declared constitutional at another; (c) once a law is declared
unconstitutional at one time, no change of circumstance can influence the Court in altering its decision;
(d) once a law is declared constitutional, it will always remain ss such, and the dispute cannot be
reviewed anymore because of finality of judgment.

19. The Supreme Court, in Republic v. Manalo, declared Art. 26 of the Family Code as: (a)
unconstitutional, and considered the entire Article as null and void, as though it did not exist; (b)
unconstitutional, and permitted Filipino citizens to secure divorces abroad, whether their spouses are
aliens or Filipinos; (c) unconstitutional, and made Art. 26 applicable to any divorce, regardless of
whether obtained by the alien or Filipino spouse; (d) unconstitutional, because it violated the due
process clause of the Constitution.

20. Since Garcia v. Drilon involved discrimination by reason of gender, the Supreme Court, to determine
whether there was a violation of the equal protection clause, applied the (a) strict scrutiny test; (b)
intermediate scrutiny test; (c) rational basis test; or (d) the clear and present danger test
 SEARCH and SEIZURE CLAUSE

Article III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Notes:
1. At the core of the provision is the recognition of the need to protect the right to privacy
2. The 1935 Constitution did not have the phrase: “of whatever nature and for any purpose “
3. The 1973 Constitution had the words, after judge, “or such other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law”, which was omitted in the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution judicialized issuance of search and arrest warrants

*Only judges can issue search and arrest warrants.

Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990 (En Banc)
“Under the new “Constitution… it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one
case, it was declared that mayor may NOT exercise this power.”.. [Ponsica v. Ignalaga, July 31, 1987.]
“The Constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing on the basis thereof, warrants of arrests and search warrants
may only be exercised by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of
the phrase, “such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law…

RA No. 11,479 – Anti- Terrorism Act of 2020

Sec. 29. Detention without judicial warrant of arrest. – The provisions of the Revised Penal Code to the
contrary notwithstanding, any law enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having been duly
authorized in writing by the ATC has taken custody of a person suspected of committing any acts defined
and penalized under Secs. 4-12 of this Act, shall without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the
delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said persons to proper judicial
authorities within a period of 14 calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has
been apprehended or arrested, detained and taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or
military personnel. The period of detention may be extended to a maximum of ten (10) calendar days if
it is established that (1) further detention of the person is necessary to preserve evidence xxx
Calleja v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 252578, Dec. 7, 2021

How did the Supreme Court justify the conferment of the power to issue arrest orders to the Anti-
Terror Council, a non-judicial entity?

1. A person may be arrested by law enforcement officers only under the instances contemplated in Rule
9.2., arrest in flagrante delicto, arrest in hot pursuit and arrest of escapees, which mirrors Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court.

Arrest, Search and Seizure

1. Arrest Warrants
2. Warrantless Arrests
3. Search Warrants
4. Warrantless Searches
5. Exclusionary Rule

A. Arrest Warrants

1. How is the procedure for obtaining a Search Warrant distinguished from the procedure for
obtaining an Arrest Warrant?

Based on Sec. 2, the procedure is the same as in obtaining a Search Warrant. But in practice, it is not.

1. File a complaint before the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, attaching:

a. Affidavit-complaint
b. Affidavit of witnesses
c. Police Blotter
d. Medical/Death Certificate

2. Prosecutor either determines probable cause to file case in court if the offense is punishable
with prision correccional medium or less, but if it is higher he gives respondent 10 days to submit
evidence.

3. Under both situations, if he (prosecutor) finds no probable cause, he dismisses the case, but if
he finds one, he files an information in court

4. The judge reviews his (prosecutor’s) findings and if the judge finds no probable cause, he
dismisses it. But if he finds one, he issues an Arrest Warrant, unless the case falls under the
Summary Procedure
Probable Cause - (are facts and circumstances) sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial. Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court

DOJ Circular No. 16, Feb. 24, 2023:

Sec. 9. Consistent with the objectives of DC Nos. 008 and 008-A, no case shall henceforth be filed
with (first level courts if there is no reasonable certainty of conviction for the same.)

Sec. 2. There is reasonable certainty of conviction when a prima facie case exists based on the
evidence at hand including but not limited to witnesses documentary evidence, real evidence, and
the like, and such evidence, on its own and if left uncontroverted by accused, shall be sufficient to
establish all the elements of the crime or offense charged, and consequently warrant a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

Questions:

1. Must the judge personally examine complainant and his witnesses?

People v. Grey, 625 SCRA 523 (2010)

Ans. NO need for arrest warrant. (But this is necessary for search warrants.)
Why is this allowed?
Because the judge needs only to determine whether there is a probable cause based on the
records. It is for convenience.

So many criminal cases are being filed with the judge. I think in Davao City, I think every raffle
day, they can receive as many as 80 cases in a week. So if the judge calls all of those witnesses,
he will do nothing else but examine all the witnesses. However, search warrants are very few.

2. Can the judge rely on the certification of the prosecutor that there is probable cause for the
offense? Lim v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 (1991), Cojuangco v. Sandigan, 300 SCRA 367 (1998); Abdula
v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1 (2000); Talingdan v. Eduarte, 366 SCRA 559 (2002)

Ans. NO. The judge who issues the arrest warrant by relying on the resolution of the fiscal
commits grave abuse of discretion.
The judge must personal review the evidence attached to the records of the case. He cannot rely
on the conclusion of the fiscal. If he issues the warrant without going through the evidence, he
can be charged with grave abuse of discretion and the warrant is void.

3. Can a judge issue arrest warrants against “John Does”? Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599
[Warrants of arrests should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized.]
 Exception: If the “John Doe” is particularly described as “to distinguish him or set him apart
from others.”

Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1 (2000)

• In a murder case, accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that the warrant
of arrest issued against them was null and void because the judge “did not personally examine
the evidence nor did he call the complainant and the witnesses in the face of their incredible
accounts.” The judge in his Comment stated that there was “no reason for [him] to doubt the
validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was
conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the
Information filed,” so that he issued the warrant. Is the warrant valid?

• Held: No. The statement is an admission that the judge relied solely and completely on the
certification made by the prosecutor that probable cause exists as against those charged in the
information, and issued the challenged warrant of arrest. The Constitution commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. To be sure
it cannot be determined beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the examination of the records
should be. The extent depends on the exercise of sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require. But he cannot adopt the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause on his own without abdicating his duty under the Constitution.

A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC: Body Camera Rule

Rule 1, Sec. 1. Upon finding probable cause, the trial court shall issue an arrest warrant with an order
requiring the use of at least one body camera and one alternative recording device or a minimum of two
devices or such number as necessary to capture the relevant incidents during execution.

In case of unavailability of body-worn cameras, the law enforcement officers who will implement
the warrant shall file an ex parte motion, requesting authority to use alternative recording devices for
justifiable reasons.

-Effect- “NOT render arrest unlawful or evidence obtained inadmissible” (Facts relating to arrest
may be prove by other evidence/but police may be held in contempt]

Some Notes:

1. Constitutional basis of the Rule?

2. Could Congress have done it?
3. Could the Executive?
4. Can the court direct that the same procedure will be done in buy bust operations?
5. Consequence to law enforcers? (contempt, civil, criminal, administrative liability)
B. Warrantless Arrests

Valid Warrantless Arrests:

1. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; [Flagranti Delicto Rule]

2. Amended: When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. [Freshly
Committed Rule]

Original Provision: When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and [Freshly Committed Rule]

(3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.) (RULES OF COURT)

Must the police wear body camera or an ARD in conducting warrantless arrests? AM No. 21-06-08-SC

Rule 1, Sec. 3.- Where a peace officer effectuates an arrest under Rule 113, Sec. 5, of the RRCP and
insofar as it is practicable, the arrest shall be recorded using body cameras or an ARD in the same
manner as made with a warrant. Further in cases of warrantless arrests effected under Sec. 21 of the
CDD of 2002, the media representatives may be allowed to record the operation, subject to the custody
requirements under Rule 4, Sec. 123 of these Rules.

1. FLAGRANTI DELICTO RULE

In the act of committing a crime:

1. has committed,
2. is actually committing, or
3. is attempting to commit an offense

People v. Malado, G.R. No. 243022. July 14, 2021

• The police received information a civilian informer that 2 persons named Paul and Wharton
would be delivering drugs. They formed a team and together with the CI went to a residential
house where the suspects would come out. When the two went out the gate to the national
highway, the CI identified them. One was carrying a plastic bag while the other has a carton.
When one of the two was about to flag a taxi, the police approached them and asked them to
open the bag and the carton. They contained marijuana bricks. Was the arrest lawful?
• Held: No. Section 5(a) refers to an  in flagrante delicto  arrest, which requires the following for
it to be valid: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer ("overt act test").  Tested using
 the foregoing parameters, the warrantless arrest of Warton was illegal. The overt act test was
not complied with. Paul and Warton were not acting suspiciously when the PDEA agents
approached them. They were just waiting for a taxi near the national highway. By no stretch of
imagination was flagging a taxi a criminal act. Thus, there was no overt act indicating that they
have just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Jurisprudence
holds that disembarking and waiting along the highway for a tricycle is not a suspicious
activity.  In the same vein, the act of standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts.

2. “Hot Pursuit” or “Freshly Committed Exception:

Requisites: Has just been committed – Computed from the time of commission of the crime up to the
time of arrest

1. Time element: -Sinoc (1997) allowed 12 hours, - Del Rosario (1999) and Cendana (1999)
voided arrest after 19 hours, but Alvarez (1991) validated it.

- People v. Manago, 801 SCRA 103 (2016, & other cases) – disallowed 24 hours, but Recepcion
(2002) considered it valid after 35 hours.

• -FOR PURPOSES OF EXAMS – 24 HOURS IS THE CUT OFF

-Also modified by Continuing Offense Rule or the Umil Doctrine

2. Probable cause/[personal knowledge?]

“He has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it
• Jayson (homicide), Alavario (rape), Vinalon –hold-up of bus, victim and robber met at hospital

Tests: (a) A crime has been committed (b) victim of witness/es identifies the suspect.
Rejected by Fr. Bernas: “Thus, a police officer who learns about the recent commission of the
crime merely from a report does not possess the ‘personal knowledge’ needed to justify a
warrantless arrest.” See, Joaquin G. Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 181 (1996).

Other Cases:

• Cubcubin (seen by waitress drinking beer), Sequino (toilet paper)”

The report of witness must directly link the person arrested to the crime.
For cases where court rejected report of witnesses or facts gathered from investigation:

1. Posadas v. Ombudsman, GR No. 131492, Sept. 29, 2000

2. People v. Briones, GR No. 90319 Oct. 15, 1991

For a debate on how exception should be interpreted, see Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337 (2014)

-(that the crime was committed PLUS report that the person to be arrested was the one who
committed it)

-(PLUS report of victim/witness AND other circumstances that the person committed it)

People v. Martinez, Dec. 13, 2010

An informant told the police that he had information that a pot session was being conducted by
the accused inside a house. Without a warrant, the police raided the place and seized 115 plastic
sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil all of
which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Were the arrest and seizure valid?

Held: No. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based on probable
cause, which means actual belief or reasonable suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just
committed an offense.

1993, No. 9: Johann learned that the police were looking for him in connection with the rape of an 18
year old girl, a neighbor. He went to the police station a week later and presented himself [to the desk
sergeant [to clear his name]. Coincidentally, the rape victim was in the premises executing an extra-
judicial statement. The victim pointed to him as the rapist and he was arrested. Valid?

Suggested Answer: Apply the 2 requisites. First, that the crime has just been committed. Second,
probable cause. There is no problem with probable cause as he was pointed by the victim. Report of the
victim and witnesses is sufficient.

But, take note of the first element. He went to the police station one week after. Under that particular
circumstance, the 1st requirement cannot be satisfied. Take note that the cut-off is 24 hours based on
decisions. The period is from the time of commission until the time that the arrest takes place.

One week definitely can never be considered as “has just been committed”. It is immaterial that the
victim has personal knowledge. It cannot be a subject of arrest. The procedure is to file a case and give
him chance to submit a counter-affidavit to determine probable cause. The prosecution will then file it to
the court.
Bar Question, No. 10, 1997: A, while on board a passenger jeep one night, was held up by a ground of 3
teenagers who forcibly divested her of her watch, necklace and wallet containing P11. That done, the
trio fled. B, the jeepney driver, and A complained to the police to whom they gave description of the
culprits. According to the jeep driver, he would be able to identify the culprits if presented to him. Next
morning, A and B were called to the station and made to identify C and D. Was the arrest of C and D
valid? [People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406)

Suggested Answer:

When UP answered it, it stated that it is valid based on People v. Acol. But, if you read Acol, it is actually
different. It involved a robbery of a watch, necklace, in a jeep. But, when the police conducted a patrol,
they asked the victim. So, the victim rode a jeepney and they came upon teenagers. “There is the
holdupper.” One of them is even wearing the watch of the victim. So, the arrest then was considered
legal by the Supreme Court.

If you look at the facts here, it seems to be very problematic. My own thinking that this is not probable
cause anymore because take note here that the driver and the victim did not go to the police. It is not
them who pointed to the accused. They simply gave description. It seems that the police arrested
anybody who fitted the description.

In the Acol case, the victim accompanied the police and pointed to the culprit. It is really based on the
report of the victim. But, for it to be based on the report of another person seems to be taking it a bit
further. It depends on you if you can reason out properly.

C. Search Warrants

Requisites for a Valid Search Warrant:

1. It must be based upon probable cause;

2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce;
4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

*Probable Cause – more likely than not

*Probable cause are such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

To determine probable cause in issuing search warrants, must the judge examine the applicant AND
the witnesses? Held: No.

The Supreme Court said that we need not literally interpret the Constitution. If the Judge is satisfied that
there is a probable cause after examining the witnesses, he can proceed with the issuance of the search
warrant. If he finds probable cause after he examined the applicant, that will be fine.
He need not be very literal about it. My argument in Panabo case is different because in actual practice,
the applicant is a high ranking official and has no personal knowledge of the facts. It is only the rank and
file policemen who will do the surveillance. Thus, why will you require the examination of the applicant
when he has no personal knowledge? It will be hearsay. That would be a waste time on the part of the
Judge. However, the Supreme Court now is very clear that once the judge finds that there is a probable
cause, he can only examine witnesses as to establish the probable cause. (People v. Gabiosa, G.R. No.
248395, January 29, 2020)

Questions on Probable Cause:

1. When the crime consists of possession of objects without a permit or license , what evidence is
necessary to establish probable cause? [PICOP and Estrada Cases] Guns and Drugs/ People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, Feb. 21, 2018 – lack of license to operate as brokers

Answer: In such a case, a certification from the appropriate agency that the offender has not license to
carry or possess the same should be attached to the application for the search warrant.

People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, Feb. 21, 2018:

• In People v. Hon. Estrada, the Court pronounced: The facts and circumstances that would show
probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances.
The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence
of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required
by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the
applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at
the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason during the examination by
the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant
can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home
and person.

2. What happens when a warrant is issued for the seizure of 2 items but there is only probable cause
for the issuance of one of them? [Salangguit]

People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001)

• The Search Warrant issued by the judge states:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
Rodolfo V. Aguilar, PNP and his witness SPO1 Edmund M. Badua, PNP, that there is probable
cause to believe that Robert Salanguit has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex “A”, the properties to wit: UNDETERMINED
QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.” Considering that during the deposition-
taking, no witness testified on anything about drug paraphernalia, should the warrant be
nullified for having been issued without probable cause?

• Held: No. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia were seized by the police. But none was taken by
 virtue of the search warrant. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of shabu about
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. It would be a drastic
remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the
items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.

Specific Description: General Warrants

A search warrant must specifically describe:

1. The place to be searched;
2. The objects to be seized; and
3. Issue only for one specific offense
Otherwise, they are regarded as “general warrants” and are void.

Rules on description of place illustrated:

1. If the place is under the control of one person, a general description may be sufficient (Yao, Sr:
Masagana 1 hectare compound, except PICOP – 155 hectares/over 1,000 structure]

Yao, Sr. v. People, 525 SCRA 108 (2007)

The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search on
MASAGANA compound located at Governor’s Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite
City. The compound consisted of 10,000 square meters with several structures in it. Did the
warrant satisfy the constitutional requirement of specific description of the place to be
searched?

Held: Yes. It appears that the raiding team had ascertained and reached MASAGANA
compound without difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other offices/plants in Trece
Martires, Cavite City. Moreover, Oblanca, who was with the raiding team, was already familiar
with the MASAGANA compound as he and Alajar had monitored and conducted test-buys
thereat. Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no
need to particularize the areas to be searched because, these structures constitute the essential
and necessary components of the petitioners’ business and cannot be treated separately as they
form part of one entire compound. The compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA.
What the case law merely requires is that the place to be searched can be distinguished in
relation to the other places in the community . Indubitably, this requisite was complied with in
the instant case.

PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999)

• Upon application by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the judge ordered the search and
seizure of firearms in possession of the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines “located
 at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.” Is the description of the place to
be searched sufficient?

• Held: No. The warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a
search of “the aforementioned premises,” but it did not specify such premises. It identifies only
one place, and that is the PICOP Compound. The compound, however, is made up of 200
offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous, all of which are spread out over one
hundred fifty-five hectares. Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus
illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP Compound.

2. If the place is a compound occupied by various persons, the warrant must specifically indicate
the unit to be searched [Estrada -5,000 square meters, with 15 structures (Applies to apartment
units, rooms in a house]

People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 (1998)

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City issued a search warrant upon application of the Bureau
of Food and Drug (BFAD) for violation of RA No. 7394 (Consumer Act). The warrant was issued
against Aiden Lanuza of 515 San Jose de la Montaña St., Cebu City, for the seizure of drug
products. The address turned out to be a 5,000 square meter compound with 15 structures used
as residences, offices, factories, workshops or warehouses. Is the warrant valid?

Held: No. The place to be searched had not been described with particularity considering that
Lanuza’s residence is actually at Lot No. 41, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in
a warehouse at Lot. No. 38 within the compound but owned by a different person. By merely
indicating the address of the compound, the warrant failed to segregate the private residence of
respondent from the other buildings. Thus, the warrant is a general warrant.

3. The police can only search the place described in the warrant, not an adjoining one. [Pp. v. CA)
People v. Francisco, 387 SCRA 569 (2002) Del Castillo v. People, 664 SCRA 430 (2012)

People v. CA, 291 SCRA 400 (1998)

Upon application by the police, the judge issued a warrant ordering the search of Abigail Variety
Store, Apartment No. 1207 in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, and the seizure of firearms and
explosives found therein. The police instead served the warrant not on the store, but at
Apartment No. 1, which was immediately adjacent to the store, resulting to the arrest of four
Pakistani nationals and the seizure of guns and explosives. The police claimed that the place
was what they had in mind when they applied for the warrant.

Held: The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises. It would concede to police officers the
power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not delineated in the warrant. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may be done only by the judge,
 and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting
the search.

4. Once the place is specifically described, there is no need to name the occupant or owner.

Quelnan v. People, 526 SCRA 653 (2007)

• The Search Warrant was issued against a certain Bernard Lim of Room 615 Cityland
Condominium, South Superhighway, Makati City. When the police searched the place they
found accused Quelnan and a few grams of “shabu.” Charged with violation of the dangerous
drugs law, accused claimed that the “shabu” is inadmissible against him since the warrant was
directed against Lim.

• Held: It is not required that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the
described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described
premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of
such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where
the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search
warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is
otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to
be searched. A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police officers were
ordered to make an immediate search of the premises mentioned and to seize and take
possession of “shabu”. Furthermore, they were directed to bring “persons to be dealt with as
the law may direct.” While Quelnan may not be the person subject of the search, the fact that he
was caught in flagrante delicto necessitated his warrantless arrest. Therefore, the fact that
Quelnan’s name was not indicated in the search warrant is immaterial.

Pagal v. People, GR No. 251894, March 2, 2022

Search Warrant: Place to be Searched:

• The Search Warrant issued by the RTC judge merely described the place be search as the "house
located at Barangay Basing Lingayen, Pangasinan"—a place with an estimated population of
2,770. However, it also identified it as owned by Johnny Pagal y Lavarias, the accused. When
the police searched the place, they found “shabu”. Did the description of the place satisfy the
constitutional requirement of specific description?

• Held: Yes. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.  Any description of the place
or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty
to locate such place or thing is sufficient. Here, the Search Warrant specifically refers to
petitioner, "Johnny Pagal y Lavarias," as a resident of Barangay Basing, Lingayen, Pangasinan.  It
also qualifies his ownership of the house to be searched.  The language of the Search Warrant
points to petitioner's house in Barangay Basing, Lingayen, Pangasinan, excluding all others.
 Petitioner did not deny that the house searched by the authorities was his house. The validity of
the Search Warrant is, therefore, upheld.

1990 Bar, No. 9, (Also asked in 2001 Bar]: Some police operatives, acting under a lawfully issued
warrant for the purpose of searching for firearms in the House of X located at No. 10 Shaw Blvd., Pasig,
Metro Manila, found, instead of firearms, ten kilograms of cocaine.

(3) Suppose the peace officers were able to find unlicensed firearms in the house in an adjacent lot,
that is, No. 12 Shaw Blvd, which is also owned by X. May they lawfully seize the said unlicensed
firearms? Explain your answer.

Suggested answer: No. The police may only search the place particularly described in the warrant.
They cannot search any other place not described in the warrant. In this case it is in No. 10, you have no
business in going to No. 12 anymore.

Rules on Description of Objects

1. Objects need not be described in precise details

People v. Policarpio, GR No. 227868, Jan. 20, 2021

The Search Warrant issued by a judge stated: It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court after
examining under oath the witnesses Fred Manabat and PSI Jaime De Vera that there is a probable cause
to believe that Jay-R Policarpio @ Dagul of Purok 4, Malvar, Santiago City committed and that there are
good and sufficient reasons to believe that the respondent has in possession and control the following
items: (a) Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as shabu; (b) Several
drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu.

Does the search warrant satisfy the constitutional requirement of specific description of the
objects to be seized?

Held: Yes. It has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as to
create a general warrant. Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or
dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional. A search warrant commanding peace officers to
seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held sufficiently particular. Tested against the foregoing
precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant. A further description would be unnecessary and
ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances.  Guided by the
foregoing principles, the Court finds that the phrase "Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride known as shabu; Several drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu" as stated in the
Search Warrant No. 0085 has satisfied the Constitution's requirements on particularity of description of
the items to be seized.
4.

5.