Betty A. Dobratz, Lisa K. Waldner, Timothy Buzzell - Power, Politics, and Society - An Introduction To Political Sociology-Routledge (2019)

POWER, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
Power, Politics, and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology

discusses how sociologists have organized the study of politics into
conceptual frameworks, and how each of these frameworks foster a
sociological perspective on power and politics in society. This includes
discussing how these frameworks can be applied to understanding current
issues and other “real-life” aspects of politics.
This second edition incorporates new material on cultural divides in
American politics, emerging roles for the state, the ongoing effects of the
Great Recession and recovery, the 2016 election, social media, and the
various policies introduced during the Trump administration and how they
affect people’s lives.
Betty A. Dobratz is Professor of Sociology at Iowa State University. She

has authored, co-authored, or co-edited 14 books or issues of journals and
more than 50 research articles, chapters, and pieces on teaching. Her co-
authored book, White Power, White Pride! The White Separatist Movement
in the U.S., with Stephanie Shanks-Meile, received two sociology book
awards, one from a section of the American Sociological Association
(ASA) and the other was from the North Central Sociological Association
Scholarly Achievement Award. The book also was one of sixteen sociology
books to be included in Choice’s Outstanding Academic Books list for
1998. Her earlier work focused on contemporary Greek politics, and she
spent ten months in Greece on a NATO postdoctoral fellowship.
Lisa K. Waldner is currently Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean

of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of St. Thomas, where
she teaches courses in research methods, statistics, and sexuality. Her
published work covers topics such as political activism, hate crimes, gay
and lesbian issues, and violence in intimate relationships. She has received
several teaching awards including being named a John Ireland Professor
(2015) and is a recipient of the university’s Undergraduate Research and
Collaborative Scholarship award (2006) for her work with students.
Timothy Buzzell is Professor of Sociology in the Department of History,
Culture and Society at Baker University in Baldwin City, Kansas. He
teaches courses in Criminology, Deviance, Politics and Society, Religion,
Ritual and Belief, as well as Theory in Sociology. In addition, he currently
serves as the Coordinator of the Social Justice program. His research on the
nature of computer crime and deviance has appeared in the journals Deviant
Behavior, Sexuality & Culture, and Criminal Justice Studies. Prior to his
appointment at Baker University, he served as the Director of the Iowa
Center for Law & Civic Education at the Drake Law School in Des Moines,
Iowa.
POWER, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY
An Introduction to Political Sociology
2nd Edition
Betty A. Dobratz
Iowa State University
Lisa K. Waldner
University of St. Thomas
Timothy Buzzell
Baker University
Second edition published 2019
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 Taylor & Francis
The right of Betty A. Dobratz, Lisa K. Waldner, and Timothy Buzzell to be identified as
authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered

trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Pearson 2012
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dobratz, Betty A., author. | Buzzell, Tim, author. | Waldner, Lisa K., author.
Title: Power, politics, and society: an introduction to political sociology /
Betty A. Dobratz, Timothy Buzzell, and Lisa K. Waldner.
Description: 2nd Edition. | New York: Routledge, 2019. |
Revised edition of the authors’ Power, politics, and society, c2012. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2018045501 (print) | LCCN 2018048074 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781315148618 (Master Ebook) | ISBN 9781351372978 (Web pdf) |
ISBN 9781351372961 (ePub) | ISBN 9781351372954 (Mobipocket) |
ISBN 9781138553491 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138553507 (pbk.) |
ISBN 9781315148618 (ebk)
Subjects: LCSH: Political sociology.
Classification: LCC JA76 (ebook) | LCC JA76 .D598 2019 (print) | DDC 306.2—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018045501
ISBN: 978-1-138-55349-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-55350-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-14861-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman

by codeMantra
CONTENTS
Figures and Tables

Text Boxes
Preface
Chapter 1 POWER
Metaphors and Paradox: Sociological Tools in the
Study of Power
Power: The Fundamental Concept in Political Sociology
Metaphors of Power Arrangements
The Conceptualization of Power in Political Sociology
Pluralist
Elite-Managerial
Social Class and Politics
The Traditional Frameworks Today
New Directions after the Traditional Frameworks
Rational Choice
Political Culture
Institutionalist
Postmodern Political Sociology
Conclusion
Power Is Concentrated in Democratic Societies
Power Operates in Direct but Also Indirect Ways
Politics Is Not Just about the State but All Social
Relations
References
Chapter 2 ROLE OF THE STATE

What Is the Modern Nation-State?
Defining the State
Emergence of States
Differentiating Government from the State
Features of Stateness
Differentiating Nation and State
Emergence of Nations
Different Forms of the Nation-State
Democracy
Democracy and Undemocratic Practices
Undemocratic State Forms
Theoretical Views on the State
Pluralism
Elite Views of the State
Class-Based Views of the State
Updated Marxist Theories of the State
State-Centric
Political Institutional or Institutionalist
Other Emerging Views of the State
Rational Choice
Postmodern
The Welfare State
Types of Welfare States
Role of Race and Gender
Future of the State
Conclusion
Endnotes
References
Chapter 3 POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

Culture and Politics
Politics, Culture, and Theoretical Frameworks
Pluralist
Elite-Managerial
Class Perspective
Rational Choice
Institutionalist
Postmodern
Political Socialization
Values and Democracy
Modernization and Value Shifts
Ideology, Beliefs, and Public Opinion
Sources of Political Culture
Religion, Political Values, and Ideology
Media and Political Culture
Media and Political Knowledge
Media and Political Values
Politics, Symbolism, and Performance
Political Culture and Place
Nationalism
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4 THE POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE: POLITICAL

ECONOMY
Theoretical Frameworks
Pluralist
Elite-Managerial
Class/Marxist
Postmodern
Rational Choice
Institutionalist
Class-Domination Theory of Power
Capitalism and Democracy
Neoliberalism
The Great Recession
Causes of the Great Recession
Government Policy Responses
Consequences of the GR
The Middle Class
Taxation
Taxes on Individuals
Corporate Taxation
International Comparison Regarding Taxation
Summary
The Welfare State
Corporate Welfare
Social Security
Public Assistance
Debt and Bankruptcy
Household Debt
Student Debt
Who Goes Bankrupt and Why?
Infrastructure
Bridges
Levees
Hurricanes
Hurricane Sandy
Conclusion
Endnotes
References
Chapter 5 THE POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE: SOCIAL

INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
Education
Charter Schools
A Note on School Violence and Shootings
Marriage and Family
Family Law
Same-Sex Marriage
Health Care
U.S. Health Care Uniqueness
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Public Opinion on the ACA
Civil Liberties and National Security
Twenty-First Century: War on Terror
Public Opinion on National Security, Civil Liberties,
and Snowden
Race and Ethnic Relations in the Racial State
Explaining the Racial State
Color-Blind Policies
Racial Identity
The Racial State, Law Enforcement, and Black Lives
Matter
Public Opinion
The Racial State, Law Enforcement, White
Nationalists, and Counter-Protesters
Immigration: A Major Ethnic and Racial Issue Facing
the United States
Zero Tolerance and Separation of Families
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
Muslim Americans
Advantages and Disadvantages of Immigration
Public Opinion
Public Opinion and Muslim Americans
Summary
Politics and Sports
Conclusion
Endnotes
References
Chapter 6 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation as Power
Pluralist
Elite-Managerial
Class
Rational Choice
Postmodern
Political Participation and Its Many Forms
Early Typologies of Political Participation
Contemporary Typologies of Political Participation
Institutional Forms of Political Participation
Campaigning and Canvassing
Political Talk/Political Discourse
Political Participation and Social Media
Noninstitutional Forms of Political Participation
Graffiti
Protest and Demonstrations
Social, Political, and Revolutionary Movements
Group Context, Social Networks, and Participation
Politics and Social Capital
Themes in Research on Social Capital and Political
Participation
The Changing Nature of Political Participation
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7 ELECTIONS AND VOTING

Pluralist
Elite-Managerial
Class
Rational Choice
Postmodern
Institutionalist and Political Culture
The Functions of Elections
Electoral Systems and Turnout
Voting Behavior Research
Social Cleavages or Characteristics
Social Class
Gender Gap
Racial Cleavages
Religious Cleavages
Political Views and Issue-Based Voting
Liberalism and Conservatism
Partisanship
U.S. National Elections
2000 Presidential Election
2006 Midterm Election
2016 National Election
Voting and Elections Other than United States
Conclusion
Endnotes
References
Chapter 8 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Definition of Social Movement
Pluralism and the Classical Collective Behavior Model
of Social Movements
Elite Theory and Resource Mobilization
Class Framework or the Political Process Model
Rational Choice
Postmodern
Old and New Social Movements
Post-Materialism, Polarization, and NSMs: Emergence
of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street
Collective Action Frames and Local Land Use
Criticisms of NSMs
Other Approaches to Movements
Collective Identity
Framing
Emotions
Toward a Synthesis of Structuralist, Rationalist, and
Culturalist Frameworks
The Life Cycle of Social Movements
Social Movement Emergence and Mobilization
Mobilizing Structures and Networks
Social Movement Outcomes, Influence, and Decline
Social Media as a Tool for Mobilization: Occupy and
Black Lives Matter
Repression: The State’s Reaction to Movements
Globalization and Transnational Movements
Conclusion: Social Movements as Part of Political
Sociology
Endnotes
References
Chapter 9 VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

Political Uses of Hate
Genocide
Defining Genocide
Conditions for Genocide
Sociological Causes of Genocide
War Making
Theoretical Views on War Making
Future of War Making
New Wars
Terrorism
Defining Terrorism
Labeling Terrorism
Types of Terrorism
Critical Perspective on Terrorism
Terrorism and Sociological Theories
Collective Action Theory
Political Economy
World Systems Perspective
Framing
Categorical Terrorism
Causes of Terrorism
Microdynamic and Social Psychological Variables
Mesodynamic
Macrodynamic or Structural
Responding to Terrorism
Security and Response
Repression
Alleviating Structural Causes
Eliminating Political Opportunities
Peacebuilding
The Future of Terrorism
Optimistic View
Pessimistic View
Future Directions
Research
Conclusion
Endnotes
References
Chapter 10 GLOBALIZATION
What Is Globalization?
Defining Globalization
Critique of the Term
Components of Globalization
Theoretical Perspectives on Globalization
World Systems Theory
Theories of Global Capitalism
Postmodern Views on Globalization
Network Society
Cultural Theories of Globalization
McDonaldization Thesis
Globalization Debates
Is Globalization Occurring?
What Is the Evidence for Globalization?
Impact of Globalization on the Nation-State
Withering State Debate
Strong-State–Weak State Thesis
Competing Globalization Camps
Theoretical Views on State Power
Public Policy
Welfare State
Nationalism
Democracy and Globalization
Is Democracy Spreading?
Role of Globalization
Exporting Democracy
Antiglobalization Movements
Future of Globalization
Future Trends
Future Sociological Research on Globalization
Conclusion
Endnotes
References
Index
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1.1 The Pluralist Metaphor of Power: Groups and Coalitions at the
Political Table
Figure 1.2 The Elite-Managerial Metaphor of Power: Dominance at Top
Figure 1.3 Concepts in the Institutionalist Framework
Figure 2.1 Differences between Major Models of the State
Figure 3.1 Materialist Mixed, and Postmaterialist Populations in Britain,
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the
United States by Age Group
Figure 3.2 Respondents Who Identify Themselves as Liberal, Moderate, or
Conservative in the GSS, 1974–2016
Figure 3.3 TV as a Source of Political Information for the Presidential
Voters, 2016, American National Election Studies (ANES)
Figure 3.4 Newspapers as a Source of Political Information for the
Presidential Voters, 2016, American National Election Studies
Figure 3.5 Internet as a Source of Political Information for Presidential
Voters, 2016, American National Election Studies
Figure 4.1 Major Categories of Federal Income and Outlays for Fiscal Year
2016
Figure 4.2 The Social Control Model of State Response to Insurgency
Figure 4.3 Total Bankruptcy Filings in the United States Trustee Program
(USTP) Districts, Fiscal Years 2006–2015
Figure 4.4 The Federal Government’s and State and Local Governments’
Spending on Transportation and Water Infrastructure, by Type of
Infrastructure, 2014
Figure 7.1 Secrecy Folder for Absentee Voting in Iowa
Figure 7.2 Official Absentee Ballot for Story County, Iowa, in the 2016
Election
Figure 8.1 A Political Process Model of Movement Emergence
Figure 9.1 Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide from 1970 to 2017
Figure 9.2 Incidents of Terrorism in North America and the Middle East,
North Africa from 1970 to 2017
Figure 9.3 Terrorist Groups by Ideological Motivation
Figure 9.4 Location of Perpetrator and Victim in Terrorist Incidents
Figure 10.1 Pre- and Post-Reform Voting Power in the IMF

Table 1.1 Typologies in the Study of Power
Table 1.2 Mann’s Four Networks of Power
Table 1.3 Varieties in the Definition of Power
Table 3.1 Four Gods and Political Leanings
Table 3.2 Percent Using Media Sources for News About Presidential
Campaigns, 1992–2016
Table 3.3 Four Currents in American Nationalism
Table 5.1 Percent Supporting Gay Marriage across National Surveys, 2004–
2017
Table 6.1 Contrasting Traditional Typologies of Political Participation
Table 6.2 Types of Political Participation Reported in the 2016 NES
Table 7.1 Voters among the Total Population (Eighteen plus). Citizens and
Registered Voting-Age Populations, 1964–2016 Presidential
Elections
Table 7.2 National Election Political Preference from 2000, 2004, 2008,
2012, and 2016 CNN Exit Polls (in Percentage) by Selected
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Table 7.3 National Election Political Preferences from 2000, 2004, 2008,
2012, and 2016 CNN Election Exit Polls (in Percentages) by
Political Attitudes
Table 7.4 Popular Votes and Electoral College Votes in Presidential
Elections 1960–2016
Table 8.1 Characteristics of Old and New Social Movements
Table 8.2 Characteristics of Pro-Growth and Smart Growth Movements
Table 8.3 Comparing Theoretical Frameworks on Social Movements
Table 10.1 Theories of Globalization
Table 10.2 Three Globalization Camps
Table 10.3 Globalization Indicators
Table 10.4 Differing Theoretical Views of the Impact of Globalization on
the State
Table 10.5 Democracy Index Comparing 2008 and 2017
Table 10.6 Antiglobalization Entities
TEXT BOXES
1.1 Surveillance and Types of Power

2.1 The Alamo: An Example of Texas Nationalism
2.2 Undemocratic Practices of American Democracy
3.1 Political Socialization through the Life Course
3.2 Religion, Ideology, and Political Extremism
3.3 Is There a Liberal Media Bias?
3.4 Political Birds of a Feather?
4.1 Corporate Involvement in Politics
4.2 Populism and the Tea Party: Is the Tea Party Populist? Is It Grassroots?
4.3 The Occupy Movement: What Was It and What Did It Accomplish?
4.4 Neoliberal Neighbors?
4.5 Should Public Colleges and Universities Provide Free Tuition?
4.6 I-35W Bridge Collapse: Does Government Bear Any Responsibility?
5.1 Marriage, Culture, and Everyday Life
5.2 Civil Liberties and Ruby Ridge: Any Heroes? Any Costs?
5.3 Charlottesville and Its 2017 Controversies by Madison Wiegand and Betty Dobratz
5.4 Politics, MLB, and the NFL
6.1 Social Media and Politics: More Questions than Answers
6.2 Does Nonviolent Protest Matter?
6.3 Hate and Violence in the White Separatist Movement
7.1 Should Disenfranchised Felons Be Allowed to Vote?
7.2 Should We Abolish the Electoral College?
7.3 The Aftermath of Citizens United: Money in Political Campaigns
7.4 What is the Alt-Right? By Luke Turck and Betty Dobratz
8.1 The Framing of the White Separatist or White Nationalist Movement
8.2 Why Social Movements Matter
9.1 Get Involved
9.2 Was the Boston Tea Party an Act of Revolution or Terrorism?
9.3 The Repercussions of Being Labeled a Terrorist
10.1 TNCs and Fighting HIV
10.2 Exporting Democracy to Iraq
PREFACE
We open the second edition of this study of power and politics with the
same observation we made with the first edition: Do you know that ancient
proverb you get when you open a fortune cookie? “May you live in
interesting times.” That’s not deep political sociology. But, the simple
phrase captures our sociological moment in so many ways. We continue to
live in one of the most fascinating periods in political and social history. In
2008, Americans elected the first African-American president. The election
of 2016 marked a new era in use of social media, power relationships on a
global scale, and conflict in political culture. As we observed with our first
edition of this text, there is perhaps no better time to be a political
sociologist.
While political sociology has often been described as divergent,
abstract, and fragmented, it continues to be an important subfield in
sociology because a number of themes consistently explored by political
sociologists are particularly relevant to the development of a sociological
perspective. We believe undergraduate sociology students should be
exposed to these themes, so we have written this text with two central goals.
First, introduce undergraduate students to core concepts and research in
political sociology. Second, highlight how sociologists have organized the
study of politics into conceptual frameworks, and how each of these
frameworks fosters a sociological perspective on power and politics in
society. This includes discussing how these frameworks can be applied to
understanding current issues and other real-life aspects of politics.
We begin with a discussion of the central concept in political sociology:
power. Chapter 1 explores the core concepts in the study of power not only
in formal systems, but also in informal contexts, all of which define the
agenda in the study of power. The theoretical frameworks in political
sociology organize the work of political sociologists, and each framework
presents very different arguments about how to understand the connections
among power, politics, and society. The new edition updates a recent work
in the study of power at many levels of social organization. Chapter 2
examines how various sociological perspectives conceptualize the state and
differentiate this political institution from nation. This edition explores the
current political climate and characteristics of contemporary democracy,
power of the state, and current research, which is looking at global changes
in nationalism. In Chapter 3, we integrate the study of power and politics to
align with our understanding of political culture. Here, we examine the
more traditional features of political culture, such as political values and
ideology and the study of how these values are acquired. The chapter in the
second edition also goes deeper into the cultural divides in the United States
and the impact of ideology and value differences on politics in the United
States.
As Mills suggested, private concerns connect to public issues. In
Chapters 4 and 5, we give special treatment to describing how political
sociologists have come to understand this important facet of the politics–
society nexus. Both chapters in the second edition underscore the highly
dynamic and changing political context surrounding economic policy,
health care, education, and equality. Chapter 4 especially focuses on the
interplay between politics and economics. When we first conceived this
chapter, we understood how the middle class was losing ground, but we did
not foresee how the economic woes of banks and the stock market would so
dramatically influence us all. We thus modified our focus to include the
Wall Street versus Main Street issue. The second edition focuses on
neoliberalism and significant changes surrounding individual and corporate
taxes, our welfare system, and our worsening infrastructure. Those who
were well off before the Great Recession have recovered much more
quickly than the rest of society. Chapter 5 illustrates how the political
process impacts the institutions of education, including charter schools,
marriage, especially the controversial issue of same-sex marriage in light of
the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision. Since the election of 2016,
important changes are being made in national policy. This chapter would
not be complete without considering the politics surrounding medical care
and the state of health-care reform today. The concerns of civil liberties and
national security including the Snowden revelations are addressed as well,
and we point out that the state remains a racial state where minorities daily
encounter law enforcement and where government clearly influences our
immigration policy including what happens to families seeking asylum and
to undocumented youth who came to the United States with their parents.
As we predicated, today, race and immigration remain significant to politics
and power struggles in society. The second edition continues to identify the
importance of these issues globally and nationally, and adds discussions
about Muslim Americans and about the relationships between politics and
sports.
In Chapter 6, we move the analysis into a fairly comprehensive
discussion of the nature of political participation. This area of political
sociology is extensive and provides great insights into the ways in which
individuals, political groups, the state, and other elements of the public
sphere all come together in the contest for power. The typologies of
political participation presented in this chapter are good examples of the
many ways in which political sociologists have examined the question:
What power do individuals have to shape the political and social events of
the day? The chapters that follow look at specific kinds of political
participation: voting, movements, and terrorism.
In Chapter 7, we analyze voting, which is likely the most direct way for
a majority of individuals in a democracy to influence politics. Elections
perform numerous roles for individuals and society as candidates are
selected for political office. The United States has one of the lower turnout
rates for elections and some of the reasons for this may be associated with
our electoral system. We look at a number of social, demographic,
economic, and political factors to explain why people vote for the
candidates they do. The new edition explores how political sociologists
understand the implications of increasing political party polarization and the
controversies of the historic 2016 election, with Hillary Clinton winning the
popular vote, but the Electoral College outcome giving the presidency to
Donald Trump. The relative importance of social class, populism, and
authoritarianism is especially examined. Also included is a first analysis of
the mid-term elections of 2018 and the Russia Probe.
In Chapter 8, we discuss the importance of social movements that use
both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political activities to achieve
their goals. Old and new social movements are compared and contrasted,
noting that some movements are more likely to focus on class issues,
whereas others are more concerned with identity politics. We identify how
important concepts such as collective identity, framing, and emotions are
for the study of movements. In detail, we examine the life cycle of social
movements, including emergence, mobilization, political opportunity
structures, outcomes, and decline. The second edition brings more attention
to movements focused on climate change, race, and gender. After
discussing why social movements matter, we conclude by arguing that
social movements should be viewed as a key part of political sociology.
Political violence including war, genocide, and terrorism is the focus of
Chapter 9. We begin by considering the political uses of hate that can result
in genocide and other forms of state-sanctioned violence against state
citizens. A variety of sociological causes of terrorism are considered as well
as state responses, including the threat to democracy posed not only by
terrorists themselves, but also by democratic states that attempt to keep
citizens safe, as security measures are often in conflict with basic civil
liberties. The second edition expands our discussion of current terrorist
organizations and the movement of terrorism into new frontiers of social
life.
A question first asked in Chapter 2 “what is the future of the state?” is
the central theme of Chapter 10, which considers the political implications
of the complex phenomenon called globalization. Sociologists are
vigorously debating the meaning of globalization as well as what the future
holds for the political institution we call the state, using a variety of
theoretical perspectives that provide conflicting, yet stimulating views. We
consider both the potential negative and positive impacts of globalization,
including the exporting of democracy. In all of these chapters, we hope not
only to provide a current snapshot of both empirical and theoretical
directions in political sociology, but also to stimulate questions that will be
asked and eventually answered by future political sociologists.
This book endeavors to foster and instill the sociological perspective
and to encourage students to pursue even greater sociological insights into
the many connections between power, politics, and society. The project, in
fact, begins with what C. Wright Mills (1959) taught about the Sociological
Imagination. The personal is indeed public:
In the midst of a student movement, Betty was involved in during the

1960s, Senator Robert F. Kennedy wrote To Seek a Newer World.
Perhaps our book helps students realize how essential concepts such as
power and politics are to understanding the world we live in. Along the
way, Betty observed many who worked for a better world including
Robert F. Kennedy, a politician; Richard M. Ragsdale, a courageous
doctor; Arthur G. P. Dobratz, her father and a World War II veteran
who served on the U.S.S. Missouri; Ronald A. Dobratz, her brother
and a history teacher; and Patricia Keith, her friend and fellow
sociologist.
In 1938, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt wrote This Troubled World,
reflecting on the need for world peace and the failure of international
organizations to sustain it. Lisa is reminded that over eighty years later,
Roosevelt’s words are still relevant. She hopes students will ask
impertinent questions and critically examine the “taken-for-granted
view” that is rarely challenged. Lisa is grateful for ordinary women
and men who work every day for change in their own communities to
bring about a more just and fair world. She is especially thankful for
all the men and women of the U.S. armed forces who risk their lives,
including her children: Brandon Haugrud, a former U.S. Marine who
served three tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan and Ashley Cross, a
former U.S. Army Sergeant who served for eight years, including a
tour of duty in Korea.
Of course, any endeavor like this is part of our families and those we
love.
For Betty: extremely grateful to both her mother Helen and her father
Arthur and like her brother wishes that his wife Donna and his children
Theresa and Patricia and his grandchildren Tyler, Stacy, and Faith
experience a better world. I also want to thank my neighbors Donna and
Ghazi and my friends Arlene, Betty, Leslie, Nancy, Terry, Verna, and
Wendy for their help and encouragement. Last but not least Betty also
appreciates her co-authors Lisa and Tim with whom she has worked not
only on this project but several others. She is grateful we remain friends as
well as colleagues.
For Lisa: I have the privilege of sharing with students my interest and
passion for sociology, and my favorite moments as a professor are always in
the classroom. My interest in politics goes back to high school in Minnesota
and the incredible opportunities I received to see politics up front through
programs such as Close Up and Project 120 facilitated by my social studies
teacher, Mr Wayne Hendershott. My part in this project is dedicated to my
family including parents Mike and Reva, wife Rebecca, and children
Ashley, Brandon, and Claryssa. May my grandchildren, Cody, Caitlyn,
Noah, and Aaron, embrace the challenges and opportunities of this very
complicated world. For Tim: Growing up in Iowa and working through
undergraduate and graduate classes was an exciting “laboratory” for the
study of politics. This second edition continues to be a product of endlessly
asking questions. Inquisitive students of all ages, also asking questions
about politics and power, sustain my political sociology. My students are
prepared with hope and creativity as they enter the future. And, ultimately,
this work is dedicated to my mom and dad, and my sister and brother, and
those nieces and nephews now exploring their inquisitive side.
The success of a book involves the labors of so many people, catching
the errors, pointing out the confusion, or just cheering us on:
At Iowa State University (ISU), special thanks go to Rachel
Burlingame, Dwight Dake, and Renea Miller. Of course to all those
colleagues at ISU, the University of St. Thomas, and Baker University,
thanks for your encouraging words and understanding the costs of seeking a
better world.
To those who reviewed earlier drafts of this work, thank you. Teaching
and research colleagues in political sociology have provided extremely
valuable guidance in helping prepare this introduction to the field.
Many thanks to the various members of the Taylor & Francis team for
their assistance. This new edition wouldn’t be possible without them.
In the end, responsibility for oversights and errors belong to us. If you
have thoughts or comments, feel free to contact the authors:
Betty A. Dobratz, Ph.D. Professor of Sociology,Department of

SociologyIowa State UniversityAmes, [email protected]
Lisa K. Waldner, Ph.D. Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences and
Professor of SociologyUniversity of St. ThomasSt. Paul,
[email protected]
Timothy Buzzell, Ph.D. Professor of Sociology,Department of History,

Culture & SocietyBaker UniversityBaldwin City,
[email protected]
CHAPTER
1
Power
Power is everywhere, in every social interaction between individuals, groups,

and global actors, and is a critical element of study in many things
encompassed by sociology. Have you ever thought about that? Where does
power affect your life chances and choices, or your everyday life? C. Wright
Mills, the sociologist who taught us the insights gained from the Sociological
Imagination (1959), set out to develop among all of us a self-awareness that
was inherently about biography, power, and politics in a historical context.
The sociological imagination, as taught in introductory sociology,
connects us to essentially political themes: personal troubles, public issues,
and the interplay between biography and social history. The troubles we hear
about, for example, public education, unemployment, providing mental health
services to war veterans, and terrorism all have a personal dimension, a
human face, and very real biographies.
What Mills wants us to understand is that these personal troubles are often
really public issues that are the result of larger, social, and global forces.
These forces are even more apparent at this point in social history, as
technology and globalization push societies in new and different ways,
structuring interactions in patterns never seen before. Mills was influenced by
his own historical influences in 1959, but nonetheless, was offering timeless
lessons for political sociology about the nature of power, and the role of
biography and the public. Mills believed that the sociological perspective
brought great “promise” to the study of politics and power, valuable to
building insights into the study of power, politics, and society, ultimately
distinguishing political sociology from other disciplines of study.
While Mills was captivated by the role of science—namely social science
—much of his work focused on how sociologists could most successfully
explore the relationships between society and politics. This textbook is a
summary of the very diverse scientific and humanistic understandings that
make up political sociology today, and in many ways, celebrate Mill’s
ingenious perspective on the connections between society, politics, and
power.
This text begins with a definition of power, bringing focus to how
political sociologists define a very abstract concept about social life. The
insights that come about through the use of two analytical tools commonly
used in the study of power—theoretical metaphors and paradox—help us to
better understand how power works all around us. The strengths of theory and
research behind a rich history of exploration are found in the three
foundational theoretical frameworks in political sociology—pluralist, elite-
managerial, and social-class perspective. These classical frameworks set the
groundwork for a number of new explorations in political sociology, guided
no doubt by the sociological imagination, in the study of power and politics.
Political sociology has been instrumental in pinpointing how power works in
a variety of social contexts through history. We start with this basic idea:
power is a fundamental social process and is in all things social. As Mills
observed—and we hope that you agree—the study of power is inherent in the
“intellectual craftsmanship,” which is known as political sociology. It invites
students of sociology and politics to the “sociological imagination our most
needed quality of mind” (Mills 1959: 13).
METAPHORS AND PARADOX: SOCIOLOGICAL

TOOLS IN THE STUDY OF POWER
Students studying power, politics, and society will find that insights
developed thus far come from applications of the sociological imagination.
These insights are typically conveyed through the use of metaphors and
paradoxes. These are useful tools in sociological thinking.
Metaphors are analytical devices commonly used to depict ideas or
concepts, especially when we as sociologists are “trying to make sense of
mysteries” (Rigney 2001: 3). Rigney finds that sociologists frequently use
metaphors, such as models or pictures, to illuminate what are otherwise
abstract ideas about social life. Models or pictures are useful in describing
how social forces like power influence interactions. For example, recall that
functionalists typically describe societies as social systems. A metaphor for a
social system might be a car. The car (society) is made up of certain
components like the transmission, engine, or electronics (subsystems) that all
operate together to make the car (society) move forward. Each subsystem, in
turn, has its various parts that are required in order for the whole (car, or
society) to move forward. If we think of a society as made up of various
components all working together, we create a metaphor for describing the
nature of social dynamics.
Metaphors have been constructed to explain in detail the nature of power
in society. According to Hindess (1996), power has historically been
described as a type of capacity for either action or obligation. He argues that
action and obligation are central to the role power plays in political
processes. The metaphor he uses to understand power as capacity comes
from the science of physics. When a series of physical events are put into
motion in nature, such as a bowling ball being hurled down the hallway of a
college dorm, there will be a number of reactions from this initial force (e.g.
the ball hits the resident assistant’s door at the end of the hallway and breaks
the door, a roommate stumbles into the hallway and his toe is run over by the
rolling ball causing great pain, etc.). Using this metaphor, we are prompted to
ask what started the ball rolling. The capacity to force a bowling ball through
a hallway represents an ability, skill, or wherewithal to set up a series of
actions. It also suggests that someone had an interest or desire to roll the ball
down the hallway, and command of the resources to get a bowling ball, pick
it up, and use it as a way to act on these interests. The metaphor here
describes power as capacity to achieve some outcome or act on a particular
interest.
Capacity for action is distinct from capacity for obligation and duty.
Hindess argues that here is where we find the essence of politics and power
moving from the individual to the societal level. Obligation is hidden at a
different layer of social interaction, and power is not always action on
interests or desires, but rather, power is acquiescence or duty. In democratic
societies, social order is achieved through duty to the law. Law is created by
the sovereign or in many cases by a legislature or parliament that, in
principle, represents the citizenry and their interests. When citizens follow
the speed limit, or pay their taxes, or immunize their children before school
begins each fall, they may grumble, but for the most part, they oblige the
state through compliance. A useful metaphor for describing this second
distinction is that of the parent. The state is a parent—it creates, monitors,
and enforces rules, including punishing violators to keep things in order. The
power of the state or parent derives from the fact that we come to understand
the state as legitimate authority; we give it power by agreeing to obey. This
dimension of power is perhaps more subtle but nonetheless effective in
describing the concept of legitimate power in shaping social patterns.
Another analytical tool used in sociology is paradox (Crow 2005). For
political sociology in particular, we find that life in a democratic society is
sometimes characterized by contradiction or patterns of power that are
contrary to expectations, public opinion, or values about democratic life.
Political sociologists grapple with a number of paradoxes about the
distribution of power in order to bring attention to important research
questions. This analytical tool, much like metaphor, is about explaining
contradictions. Consider, for example, a paradox in American political
values: are all Americans politically equal as suggested by the Constitution
of the United States, or the Declaration of Independence? Voting is a form of
power in a democratic system. But are all votes truly equal? Only within the
last century have women become more equal as a result of being granted the
right to vote in 1920. Women did not have this power in the political system
prior to the 19th Amendment to the Constitution. Or consider the argument
made by some that the Iowa caucuses give Iowans more influence in the
process of selecting a presidential candidate than citizens in states who vote
later in the presidential nominating process. Much of this argument rests on
the belief that the winner in Iowa gets more media attention, and thus can
ride a bandwagon effect (the media call it a “bump” from winning early
nomination primaries), resulting in more positive polls and campaign
donations. Paradoxically, this means all votes are not equal in the
sociological sense, suggesting that early-voting states may have more
influence than later-voting states. Identifying paradoxes in social systems,
social outcomes, and social interactions is an important analytical goal of
political sociology.
What insights are gained from the exploration of metaphors, paradoxes,
and the application of the sociological imagination to the study of power and
politics? By focusing on the disagreements, mysteries, and contradictions
about power in social life, we develop keen insights into the nature of politics
in society. Moreover, political sociology makes use of sociological tools to
map out its focus for research. Or, as Lewis Coser (1966) concluded, these
tools when used in sociological analysis help to build
that branch of sociology which is concerned with the social causes and consequences of
given power distributions within or between societies, and with the social and political
conflicts that lead to changes in the allocation of power.
(1)
Many of our perspectives in political sociology are constructed around

two elements: power and order/conflict. This definition of political sociology
reflects the “state” of sociology in the late 1950s and 1960s. Since then, the
field has examined what Coser described as the foundational questions
related to (1) attention to the state and institutions, (2) organization of power,
(3) competition and order among groups, and (4) development of political
associations. The sociological approach stands in contrast to the work of
political science, which typically focuses on the nature of the state and its
various manifestations. Political sociology casts its analytical net more
broadly to capture the nature of the many power-based relationships between
social structures, culture, and individuals. And, as we will learn, political
sociology today builds on these foundational questions in many ways.
POWER: THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT IN

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
If we begin with the idea that politics is “the generalized process by which
the struggle over power in society is resolved” (Braungart 1981: 2), at the
outset, we can understand that power is at the heart of the work of political
sociologists. The goal is to explain the connections between social
interactions, social structures, and social processes altered by struggle and
resolution. We must define what we mean by power. Defining power is not as
straightforward as one might think. Certainly, we all have experienced power
in some way, perhaps the influence of a friend who cajoles and pushes us to
go to a political meeting, or the force of a mugger who confronts us, taking
an iPod at gunpoint. Power is encountered every day and everywhere. Let’s
take a look at several definitions, identifying as we go the differences that
reflect debates on how power is conceptualized.
The works of Karl Marx and Max Weber are foundational to much of the
work in political sociology. Marx, writing in the mid- to late 1800s, famously
analyzed the ways in which power in society was historically restructured
based on economic forces and the relationships between individuals and what
he would describe as upper classes. Much of his analysis of power was based
on his observations of how the Industrial Revolution was beginning to
change social order throughout Europe. Marx established that economic
structures like corporations, owners of financial capital such as banks and
financial institutions, and more immediately, the boss represent societal
sources of power. The use of wages to influence worker performance or
attendance is a significant creation of capitalist society. According to Marx,
the relationship between worker, wage, and class interests was the source of
alienating individuals not only from pursuing non-work-related self-interests,
but also from each other, and from their own labor and the product of their
labor. For Marx, power has an economic context rooted in the relationships
between and among social classes.
Weber picks up this theme and offers one of the first formal political
sociological analyses of power. Max Weber, who also wrote on the massive
historical and social changes brought on by the Industrial Revolution,
expands the study of power in his work in the early 1900s. Unlike Marx,
Weber located power in a variety of social spaces including both economic
and noneconomic contexts. For Weber, power was rooted in formalized
social systems such as organizations or bureaucracies, as well as in social
institutions such as religion and law. Weber differed from Marx in that he
argued that power was not simply just about economic relationships, but also
a function of social interests, patterns of social organization, and culture.
These early approaches to the study of power offer one of the first debates in
political sociology about the nature of the society–politics relationship.
Weber developed many of the early formal statements about power and
politics, defining power as “the chance of a man or a number of men to
realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others
who are participating in the action” (1947: 152). Since Weber’s study of
power in the early 1900s, social scientists have focused on what is meant by
the distribution of power in society, as well as identifying what kinds of
resources make some individuals and groups powerful or powerless. Others
have extended the notion that politics is inherent in most if not all aspects of
social action and expression in human interactions.
VANCOUVER, CANADA—OCTOBER 23: Hundreds of people marched
the streets to protest against corporate greed, as part of global Occupy
movement, in Vancouver, Canada, October 23, 2011
Credit: Sergei Bachlakov / Shutterstock.com
Metaphors of Power Arrangements

Political sociologists have revealed the forms and nuances of the abstract
notion of power by creating typologies of power. These various typologies
highlight the nature of power in situations or the characteristics of power, as
they play a role in the construction of capacity, exchange of resources, and
distribution of power in society. These various typologies and
conceptualizations of power share the notion that society shapes and is
shaped by individuals, groups, organizations, governments, and other
societies in a broadly interactive process. The classic and contemporary
typologies point to at least three types of power of interest to the study of
society and politics:
1. coercive and dominant power
2. authority and legitimate power
3. privileged and interdependent power.
Weber launched the sociological analysis by claiming that power existed
in two forms: coercion and authority. Table 1.1 summarizes the variety of
typologies that have been presented to better understand the contours of a
rather abstract concept. We turn our focus to three types of power that have
been central to the work of political sociology.
COERCIVE AND DOMINANT POWER

When we think of power, we most likely start with metaphors or pictures of
coercion and dominance. For instance, coercive power in the form of
physical force is clearly exercised as one nation-state invades and conquers
another. The resources used to coerce may include brute force, military
prowess, and the strength of large armies. Perhaps this type of power is the
raw or most pure form. Dominance also reflects the use of resources with
consequences for others in society. In this regard, Parenti (1978) reminds us
that “To win a struggle is one thing, but to have your way by impressing
others that struggle would be futile, that is power at its most economical and
most secure” (78). Coercion and dominance share a central tenet of
command of resources with immediate and future submission by subjects to
this form of power.
Table 1.1 Typologies in the Study of Power

As we will see in Chapter 9, war and terrorism have identifiable and
unique dynamics as a result of the brute use of dominance and coercion.
Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958), studied the social
and cultural influences that gave rise to Nazi Germany. The influence of
economic hardship, fear of outgroups, control of political party apparatus,
use of propaganda and creation of a military state are common to the
creation of such regimes. Although totalitarianism as a form of political rule
seems to be on the wane, the documentation of coercive forms of power is
important to understanding the nature of power in ruling systems. Since the
Al-Qaeda attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in 2001, considerable
attention has been given to finding what causes terrorism, especially as a
tool designed to advance political demands and fear. The nature of modern-
day terrorism has ushered in yet another field of study in which questions of
coercion and domination through violent excursions or political disruption
must be better understood.
The use of coercion for political gain or outcome is an important aspect
of power not limited to studies of conquering figures in history. The modern
democratic state uses coercion in other ways to preserve social order.
Marger (1987: 12) equated coercion with force, which is based on “the
threat or application of punishment or the inducement of rewards to elicit
compliance.” Periodically, we are reminded that the police power which we
extend to specific agencies of the state is inherently coercive. Police power
to control rioting, protests, or dissent is not uncommon, as seen during the
civil rights protests of the 1960s or more recently during the August 2014
riots in Ferguson, Missouri. The coercive nature of police work in a free
society can test the paradox between freedom to act and seek changes in the
nature of rule through protest while also attempting to maintain a semblance
of social order through enforcing the law.
AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMATE POWER

Authority is a form of power that emerges from the acquiescence of
individuals and groups based on a sense of legitimacy and obedience or
duty. Individuals and groups within society create order by recognizing the
power of law, tradition, or custom. They behave based on the belief that the
power of the state protects members of society while preserving community
interests. Consider the legitimate power of a police officer in the United
States. Police act with authority, which is distinguished in the general
population by a uniform and badge. The authority is strong as police officers
are one of few agents in the United States who can—with cause—stop free
individuals, ask questions, and apprehend. The extent of police power is
best symbolized by the fact that police officers carry weapons which can be
used to force compliance with the law. The legitimacy of this power is
found in the idea of representative lawmaking and the duty to obey as a
member of the community.
Weber wrote extensively about the nature of authority in an industrial
society. In particular, he focused on the authority that would come from
individuals and offices in large-scale organizations created to structure
interactions based on law and procedures. He identified three types of
authority:
Charismatic authority emanates from the personality or character of

leaders. Weber suggested that charismatic power and influence flow
from an individual’s heroic status or other achievements. Thus, the
people follow swayed by the conviction, style, and projection of the
leader. Martin Luther King, Jr was a charismatic leader, and his
influence in a time of significant social unrest was important to
bringing about changes in civil rights law in the United States. Even
though he held no formal political office, he retained national influence
in efforts related to social justice for racial-ethnic minorities as well as
the poor.
Traditional authority gains its legitimacy through custom and tradition.
There is a certain sacred dimension to these traditions or appeals to
customs that results in acquiescence to authority. Monarchies are a
good example of traditional forms of governance in some societies.
The Queen of England, for example, retains authority through appeals
to tradition and custom, typically enacted through symbolic and
ritualistic dramas that reinforce her authority. Similarly, the Pope, as
the leader of the Roman Catholic Church, retains power through
appeals to custom and tradition, holding influence over Church policy.
Rational-legal authority is grounded in rules by which people are
governed. Legitimacy stems from an appeal to law, commands, and
decision-making that is regarded as valid for all in the population. A
good example is the constitutional order of the United States. Recall
the election in the year 2000, when George W. Bush won the electoral
vote, but Al Gore won the popular vote. The outcome of the election
was contested in Florida, and legal claims about voting were made by
both sides. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court made a ruling that
resulted in the election of Bush to the presidency. The legitimacy of
law and rational-legal authority was seen in this acceptance of the
outcome. In societies where there was no rational-legal authority to
make such decisions, riots may have broken out, or revolution. Life
went on in the United States—order was maintained as a result of the
legitimate exercise of power by constitutional authorities.
As we will see in Chapter 2, the power of the democratic state is defined

by its legitimacy to rule in contrast to authoritarian states. Weber’s work
marks an important beginning in the study of authority and political rule.
Studying this type of power forces us to ask questions about the state, law in
everyday life, political socialization, as well as attempts to shape coalitions
to legitimize state rule.
INTERDEPENDENT POWER
Power can operate in more subtle ways, resulting in dramatic changes in
social interactions and the distribution of power in society. Certainly, the
typologies that focus on coercion or authority share this view, but a third
body of research in political sociology encourages us to dig deeper into
power relationships themselves. In many ways, political sociology advanced
beyond the simplicity of thinking of power as coercion or authority. As
research on power evolved, especially in the 1960s, power came to be
understood as quite complex. The idea of interdependent power depicts
power relationships between individuals and social groups as reciprocal.
That is, power is a two-way street where actors, even though they may think
they have no influence, actually do, given the way in which the social
system is set up. One insight from this approach explores power that quietly
wraps around systems of inequality that constructs differences in who has
what, when, and how.
Piven (2008) and Piven and Cloward (2005) have brought attention to
something they call “interdependent power” and urge political sociologists
to consider more fully the role of rule breakers in the study of reciprocal
relationships. Their analysis highlighted how most of political sociology has
focused on “rulemaking,” which emphasizes the role of lawmakers or
administrative bodies that create laws or policies to direct social
interactions. Sometimes these rules are challenged. When societies
experience protest and challenges to the distribution of power, political
authority can be undermined. Challenges by rule breakers may not be
coercive but rather, seek to “subvert the dominant paradigm.” In other
words, the power exercised in certain social contexts is intended to be
disruptive to bring attention to claims.
The model of power that Piven and Cloward describe takes current
political sociology about power in an alternate direction. Most studies begin
with the assumption that power is about the distribution of resources among
individuals, groups, and social structures. Piven and Cloward believe that
power is more complex than the mere distribution of resources (e.g. wealth,
knowledge or skills, property). Their notion of power is based on the idea
that power is meaningful in social connections, or “interdependencies.” In
other words, power derives its significance when individuals exchange
resources of many kinds in these interdependencies. Power is in the
connections themselves.
Complex organizations are stages for seeing power as a function of
social interdependencies. For example, a university in many ways is a small
social system where each part of the system (e.g. the food service staff,
faculty, financial aid office, campus security) contributes to the order of the
larger system called a university. Traditionally, models of power would have
focused on the distribution of resources to understand who is powerful. For
example, students pay tuition which brings in financial resources that help
pay the salaries of the vice presidents. The administrators, as the university
elite (much like society), hold more wealth in comparison to the food
service staff or hall janitors. If the food service staff become angry about
their pay, they can go on strike or negotiate for a wage increase. Or, they
could walk off the job and most likely be replaced with new employees who
might, in fact, be paid a lower wage as they come into entry-level positions.
Thus, the distribution of resources would change again.
But, what if the entire faculty at a university stopped teaching? Given
the shortage of professors in some fields, would the university be able to
offer majors or continue to offer degrees? Piven and Cloward would point to
this type of leverage in an interdependent system as an example of power
not extensively considered in political sociology:
People have potential power, the ability to make others do what they want, when those
others depend on them for the contributions they make to the interdependent relations
that are social life. Just as the effort to exert power is a feature of all social interactions,
so is the capacity to exert power at least potentially inherent in all social interaction.
And because cooperative and interdependent social relations are by definition
reciprocal, so is the potential for the exercise of power.
(2005: 39)
Their argument is that protest or challenges to the core purpose of an

interdependent relationship (e.g. faculty teaching courses is a core purpose
of the interdependencies that constitute the organization we call a
university) are where power can be wielded in the social structure. If all
middle-class Americans agreed to not pay income taxes for one year as a
protest against unethical behaviors in Congress, would they wield power?
Piven and Cloward suggest considering these interdependent social
connections. Political sociologists can study power under this model by
identifying leverage points in social embeddedness, connections that build
trust, strengthen relationships, or achieve goals. The focus shifts from who
controls the resources in society, who has the most education, and what
groups compete for votes, to what power comes from the connections
themselves, and what systems collapse or are changed if the connections are
severed.
NETWORKED POWER
Another way of thinking about power is found in the ambitious project
outlined by Michael Mann (1986). His historically based study finds that
“Societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting
sociospatial networks of power” (Mann 1986: 1). Rather than seeing power
as organized in a linear, hierarchical, or static way, he suggests that power is
quite fluid and dynamic, evolving as relationships within social networks
constructed at many levels of society—from the localized to the global—
change through time:
Conceiving of societies as multiple overlapping and intersecting power networks gives
us the best available entry into the issue of what is ultimately “primary” or
“determining” in societies. A general account of societies, their structure, and their
history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four
sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP)
relationships. These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions,
levels, or factors of a single social totality. This follows from my first statement. (2)
They are also organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. Their
primacy comes not from the strength of human desires for ideological, economic,
military, or political satisfaction but from the particular organizational means each
possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be.
(Mann 1986: 2)
Table 1.2 Mann’s Four Networks of Power
The metaphor of networked power focuses on human relationships that

at one level include what many would describe as institutional, structural
patterns, namely organizations. In other words, Mann teaches that power
must be seen as the work of collectives driven by “the ability to pursue and
attain goals through the mastery of one’s environment” (1986: 2).
Organizations and networks then navigate cooperation, conflict,
exchange, and other interactions in sphere he identifies as economic,
military networks, as well as networks of the state, parties, and interest
groups. Culture, including the ideological, includes the ideas and values that
drive the pursuit of particular goals within the society. Table 1.2 summarizes
this sweeping work, highlighting various temporal power arrangements at
selected points in history.
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POWER IN

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
Weber’s early study of the types of power in society, as well as politics (he
called it “party”) in social life, combined with Marx’s historic examination of
capitalist societies at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution represents a
beginning in political sociology. Political sociologists have traditionally
organized the study of the relationships between society, politics, and power
into three frameworks: the pluralist, the elite-managerial, and the social-class
perspective. These frameworks represent very different views of how power
is distributed in society, how politics is socially organized, and the
significance of individuals, groups, organizations, and the state. In this
section, we examine the basic assumptions of each framework. The
discussion also looks at the works of classical and contemporary thinkers
associated with each framework. Finally, we consider recent criticisms of
each framework as these are important to the development of new ways of
conceptualizing the nature of power in society. Here we see the tools of
metaphor and paradox applied to theorizing about power.
Pluralist
The pluralist approach to the study of politics and society is based on the
assertion that power is distributed throughout society among a “plurality” of
power centers. These power centers include individual citizens, voters (and
nonvoters), political parties, interest groups, civic associations, and a variety
of other social actors. According to pluralism, these various centers within
society compete for power. Thus, pluralism finds that power is fragmented,
dispersed, often changing as one group wins and another loses, or that
coalitions are formed only to fall apart over time perhaps as a result of
changing values in new political and social contexts. The pluralist
framework views power as balanced as a result of the many groups
bargaining for roles in the political processes, including the policymaking
process that affects the distribution of resources in society (Figure 1.1).
The groups that compete for power vie for control of the state, that is, the
governing apparatus of society. Pluralists view the state as a structure that
retains legitimate power (authority) to guard the rules of the political
process, especially as they involve access to the governance structure,
selection to office, or the maintenance of social order. The state itself is
characterized by checks and balances, with groups or individual citizens
serving as an ultimate check on the potential concentration of power in
democratic societies. Pluralists also have understood the state as a collection
of various power centers, such as different branches of government, or a
system of federalism. Chapter 2 will provide a more extended discussion of
pluralist views of the state.
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PLURALIST

APPROACHES
One of the earliest studies of politics in the United States brought attention
in a unique way to the social nature of how power was structured in the
newly created republic. After completing his own studies of the French
Revolution of 1789, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) was intrigued by
the ways in which the government of the United States created equality in
contrast to the ruling aristocracy found in France. During his famous travels
throughout the United States in the 1830s, de Tocqueville recorded what
would come to be understood as aspects of American character, or culture
contributing to basic democratic processes. His observations were the basis
for his two-volume study called Democracy in America (1835).
FIGURE 1.1 The Pluralist Metaphor of Power: Groups
and Coalitions at the Political Table
Source: Figure created by Tim Buzzell
The historical and ethnographic insights in de Tocqueville’s work offer a

timeless contribution to understanding American democracy in the 1800s
and today. A unique sociological characteristic of the early American
democracy, de Tocqueville claimed, was the ability of citizens to create
associations of many kinds, including trade organizations and civic groups,
or to gather in town hall meetings. He concluded:
In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used
or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in America. Besides the permanent
associations which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and
counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private
individuals.
(198)
In this passage, we find a number of sociological insights. First, de

Tocqueville offers an understanding that association in a social sense has
different levels. Not only is association understood as a function of
individuals taking initiative (agency) to form private groups, but association
also has a broader social characteristic, as individuals are organized into
townships and cities. Second, he suggests that association has been
paramount to the functioning of social order and the articulation of the
common good. This is viewed as an essential principle of social life
guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States. This associational
nature of the early American republic reflects quite vividly the pluralist
argument that power is found in organizing. De Tocqueville advanced the
basic pluralist assumption that social groupings constitute power centers in
society to accomplish civic outcomes.
A century later, social scientists began to rigorously test the assumptions
of the pluralist view of power in the United States. In a classic study of
politics in the city of New Haven, Connecticut, Robert Dahl (1961) found
that groups and coalitions compete for victory in elections for city office, or
coalitions would be formed to address city issues of concern. Community
life, Dahl would suggest, was indicative of the nature of power in the United
States. Moreover, he found that while the citizens of the community
participated in elections to select city leaders, the business of governing was
dispersed into sectors reflecting economic, social, and political interests.
Each sector in the community was made up of groups and associations with
the requisite resources (e.g. wealth or prestige) to influence decision-making
processes. Dahl described an image of a division of labor in governance,
whereby power was dispersed among interest centers within the community.
There was no concentration of power per se, mostly as a consequence of a
social process characterized by negotiation and exchange of “this for that”
in order to make decisions that affected the larger community. New Haven
was essentially a mirror of the larger social pattern that Dahl and other
pluralists believed to have best described American democracy in the 1950s
and 1960s.
Following Dahl, various research projects (Hunter 1953; Polsby 1963)
advanced knowledge about power at the local level and were key tests of
basic pluralist assumptions. Studies of New York City (Sayre and Kaufman
1960) and Chicago (Banfield 1961), and Miller’s (1970) cross-cultural study
of Seattle, Bristol (England), Cordoba (Argentina), and Lima (Peru)
confirmed a pattern of shared power across groups rather than
concentrations of power. These studies of community politics in the 1960s
came to be known as the community power studies. The pluralist
conceptualization of power was supported by these early studies of local
politics.
However, the focus would shift as the social upheaval of the 1960s
prompted political sociologists to examine social movements, collective
behavior, and eventually the arrangement of political groups around an
increasingly complex state. The idea that power was dispersed across groups
and sectors would be tested amidst a social backdrop of social conflict and
change. Pluralist assumptions were challenged as segments of society asked
whether power in society was truly equal and whether individual citizens, as
well as those organized into interest groups and associations, could exercise
power to achieve policy outcomes. Women, youth, and racial and ethnic
minorities organized into collective protests to demonstrate that power was
not equal. But pluralists would acknowledge, as a result of protest and
collective action, the system of governance responded and accommodated
citizen demands for reform. For example, the civil rights movement in the
1950s and 1960s resulted in changes in election laws and employment laws
and, in 1972, the voting age was lowered to eighteen as a result of protest.
The civil rights revolution was broadly seen as a response to demands of
organized citizens. Traditional pluralists would recognize that governance in
the United States demonstrated its responsiveness to organized coalitions
and collective citizen action.
In the 1990s, explorations of pluralism took different directions,
motivated by concerns about declines in voting. The focus shifted to what
some argued was the disappearance of engagement in collective political
action like that seen in the 1960s and 1970s. This suggests a paradox that
pluralists could not explain. In a discussion of “civic engagement,” Skocpol
and Fiorina (1999) observed that
Even as more voices speak up on behalf of social rights and broad concepts of the
public interest, millions of Americans seem to be drawing back from involvements with
community affairs and politics. Most prominently, voting rates have dropped about 25
percent since the 1960s. Moreover, the proportion of Americans who tell pollsters that
they “trust the federal government to do what is right” has plummeted from three-
quarters in the early 1960s to less than a third at the turn of the twenty-first century.
American civil society may also be weakening.
(2)
The decline of civil society—civic associations and connections—struck

a theme in pluralist research and was connected to the weakening of social
ties that de Tocqueville celebrated as the strength of American democracy.
Researchers turned to explaining how citizens build trust and social
solidarity through associations and social connections, revealing a new
complexity in the character of group membership and civic connectedness.
Research on social capital found that individuals who are more connected
in groups and associations (e.g. Parent Teacher Associations, soccer club,
Rotary) are more likely to participate in politics (Coleman 1990; Putnam
2000). Membership in social groups, according to this pluralist line of
analysis, fosters a sense of the collective, which the nineteenth-century
sociologist Emile Durkheim famously argued contributes to the ability of
the community to solve problems in cooperative, collaborative ways. This
sense of civil connection is an important claim in the pluralist approach, that
voluntary associations are essential to the exercise of power in democratic
systems of governance.
CRITICISMS OF PLURALIST
Theory The pluralist explanation of power and politics in society is not
without criticism. The pluralist framework has in many ways stood as the
baseline for counterargument and paradox in political sociology. Much of
this has to do with the fact that pluralism in many ways fits best with the
assumption of a U.S. democratic society. Critics of the pluralist framework
identify a number of ways it fails to account for observed distributions of
power in modern societies. In tests of alternative frameworks, a number of
weaknesses in the pluralist model of power have been identified:
1. Much of the research that had gone into building the pluralist framework
was based on U.S. democratic society; few tests of the pluralist model in
a global context exist (Marger 1987).
2. The emphasis on groups assumes that individuals participate in political
processes as a result of their group memberships. This assumes that
individuals in the social system have equal access to political groups and
associations across the horizon of state and public spheres. Some
research indicates that this is not the case (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999).
3. There is also evidence that individuals who join politicized groups and
associations tend to come from high-status segments of the population.
This is also true for individuals who participate through voting. Thus,
pluralism cannot account for significant differences in associational and
political activity based on wealth, gender, or race.
4. These social cleavages, in turn, can create polarization and not a
consensus of values as pluralism maintains. In many ways, the winner-
take-all election rules exclude those who lose in the political game:
typically those with fewer resources (Piven and Cloward 1988).
5. As will be seen in the following section, some argue that bureaucracy
trumps democracy (Alford and Friedland 1985). In other words, the
reality of politics is such that experts, bureaucrats, and policy
professionals influence the state more so than the masses who typically
participate on a cyclical (elections every two or four years) or periodic
basis.
Elite-Managerial
The elite perspective in political sociology stands in stark contrast to the
pluralist perspective. The focus of this framework is on the concentration of
power in society in upper strata or small groups distinguished by shared
characteristics such as expertise, social ties, or membership in select groups.
The elite perspective explains the concentration of power by focusing on
social networks, organizations or bureaucracies that reach into managing
power, and elite circles of interaction. Elite power centers control the
distribution of resources in society through its various structures and
complex organizations.
FIGURE 1.2 The Elite-Managerial Metaphor of Power:

Dominance at Top
The elite perspective thus places significant emphasis on how the
concentrated power centers of society control the state and its governing
apparatus. Studies of the state based on the elite framework originally
focused on the bureaucracy in particular. Much of this emphasis is founded
on Weber’s classic argument that postindustrial life would rely on complex
organizations and rationalization processes to manage social order. The ways
in which a social elite controls these complex organizations and ultimately
uses bureaucracies to exercise power is a principle focus of traditional elite
approaches in political sociology.
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ELITE-

MANAGERIAL APPROACHES
The elite-managerial perspective has its first detailed articulations in the
works of four European scholars heavily influenced by their observations
and experiences of the Industrial Revolution: Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto,
Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels. While each described society to be
made up of a ruling elite and the ruled masses, they contributed very
different conclusions about the characteristics of elite rule.
The contributions of Max Weber to the elite-managerial framework are
perhaps the most significant. His writing served as the foundation for a great
deal of work not only in political sociology, but also in sociology more
generally. Briefly, his study of the nature of bureaucracies in the creation of
a truly “managerial” elite, the nature of leadership within complex
organizations as they were evolving during the Industrial Revolution, and
the types of power exercised in society were three significant foundational
ideas in early political sociology. Because Weber demonstrated how
bureaucracy emerged as a part of the modern state to manage the
complexities of industrial society, we will address the state more fully in
Chapter 2. Weber’s central contribution to the elite-managerial is that
complex organizations and bureaucracies are at the heart of elite rule in
society. These are the instruments of power, especially in industrial and
postindustrial society. Weber teaches us that bureaucracies are social
systems that harness the resources in society—financial, technocratic, and
legal—over long periods of time. The result is a concentration of power in a
small group of individuals or social networks.
Vilfredo Pareto (1935) described industrialized European societies
differentiated by elites and masses. At the pinnacle of social interaction,
with control of key organization was an elite that emerged as a result of
achievement or placement in key military, educational, and financial
positions. Pareto argued that elites exercised power through “force and
fraud.” He described the elite strata of society through analogy—that of
lions (those who use force) and foxes (those who rule by fraud). Power was
realized through the exercise of brute force or through sly cunning. Pareto
found that membership in the governing and nongoverning elite circulates.
In other words, individuals can move between the governing apparatus of a
society and membership in nongoverning circles. This suggests a dynamic
within the elite structure dictated by connections among lions and foxes in
the ruling elite.
Gaetano Mosca (1939) also, in observing Italian and European societies
during the Industrial Revolution, described the elite to be made up of its
own layers of membership circles, with control of the pinnacles of power
based on struggle between the various substrata of the elites. He suggested
that while power was concentrated in the top positions of rule in society,
there was a group of civil servants, bureaucrats, and military operatives all
retaining a certain expertise that shapes understandings of social problems,
political issues, and the interests, on occasion, of the masses. Mosca argued
that the “political class” efficiently directed the goals of society, with elite
arraignments changed by periodic ebbs and flows in the exercise of power.
This approach casts elite rule as expertise to achieve social outcomes, rather
than viewing elite rule as a matter of personality or achievement as
suggested by Pareto. Shifts in power are based on social conditions such as
wars or economic crises, the nature of organizational structure, or the rise of
leaders within the elite structure.
Robert Michels (1962 [1915]) offered a fourth variant in the early
conceptualization of the elite framework. We refer to his “iron law of
oligarchy” to describe the fact that a few typically tend to run organizations
and groups. He draws upon the sociological notion of a division of labor to
explain why this occurs. Simply stated, elite rule is reinforced by the fact
that experts and specialists are rewarded in advanced industrial societies as
legitimate leaders with political expertise to solve social problems. These
are the individuals the masses defer to because the masses have little interest
in the complexities of state leadership, policy creation, or more generally
stated, solving the problems of society. Elite formation assured that power
was concentrated in the hands of a few, predisposed to preserving power in
the oligarchy and resistant to changing over to rule by others within the
elite.
From these classical, early twenty-first-century studies of the elite-
managerial perspective emerge a variety of contemporary applications. The
work of C. Wright Mills was influential in building insights into the nature
of elite rule in the United States, the largest democracy in the world. Mills
(1956) coined the term the power elite to describe the upper strata where top
politicians, top military leaders, and corporate executives interacted to
exercise power over the government, military, and corporate institutions of
society. What Mills revealed in his study of the power elite of 1950s was
that America was governed by a cohesive body of rulers, who were at times
able to trade positions (e.g. military leaders who became politicians, or
corporate leaders from wealthy families who became politicians) to create a
power center in the United States. This research challenged the metaphors
of power found in the community power studies by Dahl, Polsby, and
others.
The study of elites in the United States today focuses on the connections
between concentrations of wealth, military power, or political power at the
top, and aspects of political life. Mintz (2002) concludes that research on
two aspects of elite rule—corporate elites and upper-class elites—shows
how economics influence policy making. Her summary of research
highlights how concentrations of social networks within the upper strata
exercise significant power. In addition, studies of elite power show how
networked concentrations of membership work and reveal the extent to
which elites exercise influence throughout the civil sphere (e.g. media,
political associations, education, religion). Evidence suggests that elites
have power through financing of electoral campaigns, participation in policy
groups or think tanks, and the creation of interest groups to lobby
policymaking bodies. Similarly, Gilens and Page (2014) found in their study
of 1,779 “policy outcomes” that the financial interests of “economic elites
and organized groups representing business interests” were favored more
often than not, over the interests of what they call “average citizens.” Higley
and Burton (2006) show how elite patterns of rule have emerged alongside
global patterns of political change. They conclude that within democracies
around the world, elite power has emerged as a dominant force of rule:
Elite theory holds that those who have serious and sustained effects on political
outcomes are practically always few in number, are fairly well situated in society, and
are mainly individuals who see some clear personal advantage in political action,
despite its risks. These individuals and the tiny groups they form—elites—mobilize
large numbers of people into more or less reliable blocs of supporters for various
measures and causes. In this respect, all politics, whether autocratic or democratic, are
elitist in character.
(202, emphasis added)
This conceptualization of regimes throughout the world is a good example

of how the elite framework continues to be a dominant model in describing,
explaining, and predicting political outcomes in society.
CRITICISMS OF THE ELITE-MANAGERIAL

THEORY
This framework has not fully explained all aspects of the society–politics
relationship. Marger (1987) identified three major criticisms of the elite-
managerial argument:
1. It is ambiguous as to whether or not elites are, in fact, cohesive enough
to rule as a single unity. There is some evidence that membership in the
elite, much like Michels suggested, circulates. Thus, with membership
in the elite changing, can we pinpoint a group with leadership that sets
the agenda for power and governance? Moreover, as we will see from
the research by Domhoff (2014), it is unclear if the elite is a ruling
segment of society or, in fact, a social class.
2. Another argument especially relevant for the United States is that
masses still have some power to challenge elites, especially given the
diversity of both. One line of research that raises questions about the
ability of the masses to participate is the role the Internet plays in
dissemination of political information through websites or political
blogs. Are these controlled by the elite or an example of how elite rule is
challenged through the adaptation of Internet technology for the
expression of political interests by the masses? This implies too that the
masses may include a new layer of technologically savvy, regulation-
and law-focused experts who hold a higher-participatory position in the
upper end of the triangle where the masses have traditionally been
relegated. For instance, Figure 1.2 suggests that a subelite made up of
experts, technocrats, and lawyers serves elite rule by working with the
masses.
3. Related to this idea is that the old elite–masses model is too simple and
it may not be dichotomous; is there room here for other layers? As the
masses have become more educated since the Industrial Revolution, and
as the middle class has grown to include financial assets that correlate
with participation, additional layers of power may be found just below
the elites, further distinguishing the masses into strata not previously
identified by the research.
Social Class and Politics

The class perspective in political sociology, to some extent, is consistent
with the elite framework, arguing that power is concentrated in the hands of
a few. But the class framework suggests that the basis for the concentration
of power is not necessarily based on characteristics of individuals who hold
power. Rather, the traditional class argument asserts that economic interests
are the basis for power in society. More directly, the class perspective studies
how control of capital, labor, markets, and raw materials is maintained by
the capitalist classes. This framework is based on Marxist theories that
power rests in the classes that control the means of production, that is,
factories, financial capital, and technologies that harness the raw materials
(e.g. coal, iron) of economic production.
The class approach would thus consider politics and associated structures
as “captured” by the capitalist class. The governing apparatus, bureaucracy,
political parties, and methods of selecting individuals for political office are
shrouded in class interests. Variations on this basic argument are numerous
and will be discussed throughout this textbook. At this point, remember that
the class framework, much like Marx suggested, which originally sees the
state as a social structure that grows out of economic interests in society,
ultimately serves the interests of those who control wealth and the
reproduction of relationships that result in the accumulation of capital. Thus,
the state plays a key role in the distribution of resources in society, usually to
advance economic demands of the owners of capital, or to placate the
periodic uprisings of laborers.
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CLASS

APPROACHES
The class framework is rooted in the work of Karl Marx. The essence of
Marx is best summarized by a key statement in his 1859 work, A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are
indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to
a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real
foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite
forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life
determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It
is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their
social being determines their consciousness.
(Bottomore 1973: 51)
These dynamics stand in contrast to societies organized historically

around the principles of feudalism or slavery. This historical analysis was
comparative (capitalism compared to feudalism) and Marx pinpointed the
paradoxes of what was at the time thought to be nineteenth-century
advances in the democratic experience. For Marx, power in capitalist
society was found in broad social forces and social structures created
through the relations of production, the economic structure of society, and
the superstructures. These superstructures Marx identified as social
institutions including law, often written to protect capitalist class interests,
or family, tasked with the production of more workers, or culture, which
fosters the values and political thinking necessary to justify the class
relationships as they existed in society.
Marx refers to the relations of production in a society as the day-to-day
interactions between individuals along several dimensions. This concept
rests on the notion that such day-to-day interactions are organized around
the basic needs of human life. The relations of production are changed in
capitalist society by the creation of wage–labor relationships that ultimately
work as a result of relationships between workers and their products,
workers and submission to authority, and how facets of production are
owned and distributed in a society. The modes of production are the
technologies used in production such as coal, crops, steam engines, or
farmland. In the Industrial Revolution, these social relationships were
structurally rearranged to assure that labor converted raw materials into
consumable productions.
The “superstructures” Marx claimed are those institutions arising out of
the substructures. Once these superstructures evolve, they work to maintain
the oppression of the working class. In other words, political organizations,
ideology, religion, and other superstructures contribute to the dominance
found in relations of production. The superstructures generate the necessary
conditions to assure that the working class is subservient to the owners of
capital through control over the means of production, influencing the
relationships among workers, dominating workers, and through the
ownership and distribution of labor-based outcomes (material goods)
distributed in a society for profit. The extent of this dominance is significant.
Based on the concept of materialism, Marx and Engels wrote:
The production of ideas, conceptions of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven
with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the real language of life
… The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at
the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking,
the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.
(Marx and Engels, in Collins 1994: 4–5)
This dominance based on materialism and ideology, Marx concluded,

was a unique characteristic of the nature of power in advanced capitalist
societies. This dynamic is the key variable in exploring how economic
structures dictate the conscience of members of society.
The struggle between the capitalist and working classes in a capitalist
society occurs as a result of the inequality in the ownership of scarce
resources and the means of production. The bourgeoisie, through private
ownership, controls these resources that fueled the industrial economy such
as factories, markets, use of raw materials, and labor itself. The result of the
capitalist superstructures is the exploitation of the labor sold by the
proletariat in exchange for what amounts to a minimal wage. The profits
taken by the capitalists are the surplus value of those goods produced by the
exploited workers. The superstructures that develop as a result of this
dynamic in capitalist society serve to maintain control by the bourgeoisie.
Such dominance continues until, according to Marx, the proletariat is
enlightened and asserts its interests, thus overthrowing the dominant class
through revolution. The conflicting interests of these two classes are the
focus of Marxist notions of inequality. This conflict emerges from the
materialist tendencies of humans; thus Marx asserts, all social action is
determined by economic structures and not the consciousness of man.
According to the basic class argument, the essential characteristic of all
social relationships in society is conflict. Simply stated, as substructures
change, new superstructures emerge, and as superstructures are destroyed,
new relationships between substructures are developed. This cyclical
characteristic is how Marx accounts for patterns of social change. More
specifically, he argues that the conflict inherent in a capitalist society occurs
between classes. This moving force of history which arises out of industrial
production as owned by the bourgeoisie and produced by the labor of the
proletariat is the essence of Marx’s concept of class conflict and the
resulting political patterns.
Max Weber made a number of significant contributions to the study of
power and society that built on the works of Karl Marx. As mentioned
earlier, Weber developed a typology of power, descriptions of bureaucracy
and the state, and for the class perspective, a political sociology based on the
interactions between what he called “class, status, and parties.” He argued
that classes were “clearly the product of economic interests” (Runciman
1978: 45). The term class is appropriately used when
(i) a large number of men have in common a specific causal factor influencing their
chances in life, insofar as (ii) this factor has to do only with the possession of economic
goods and the interests involved in earning a living, and furthermore (iii) in the
conditions of the market in conditions of labour.
(Runciman 1978: 44)
Throughout his analysis of classes, Weber, like Marx, demonstrates how

the control of property or other economic interests is the basis for unique
social associations of political interests. He too suggests that these
associations contribute to the emergence of a phenomenon described by
Marx as “class consciousness.”
The term status is defined by Weber as a distinct phenomenon and, for
the most part, unrelated to class. Status
means a position of positive or negative privilege in social esteem which in the typical
case is effectively claimed on the basis of (a) style of life, (b) formal education, whether
based on empirical or rational instruction, together with the corresponding forms of life,
and (c) the prestige of birth or occupation.
(Runciman 1978: 60)
Status can transcend economic conditions, and thus, power in a status

position may flow from prestige, occupation, or expertise. However, as
Weber demonstrates, each of these elements is often related to economic
conditions. As he notes, class is often associated with the relations of
production, while status can be associated with the principles of
consumption. In other words, status is a way in which education,
occupation, or social position creates power of its own namely through
influence by reputation.
The concept of “parties” was used by Weber to describe more directly
power relationships within society, although class, status, and party are all
working elements of power in a society. He observed that class is based on
economic order, status is based on social order, and parties are concerned
with social power. The purpose of parties is to influence communal action
by forming association around a common interest. In this sense, party differs
from class and status in that it is intentionally established to exert power
over the apparatus of state or economic order. The party has an objective
plan of action with specific goals to be achieved, typically a plan of rational
action to bring about certain outcomes. Implementing this plan requires that
members of the party be placed in positions of control and influence in a
bureaucracy.
Weber’s analysis of class is agreeable with Marx’s notions of class in
that both find economic forces dictating the emergence of certain
associations within society. The notion of status provides clarification of
how workers may be detached from the outcomes of production as well as
how consumption patterns in a society contribute to differentiation between
the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Finally, Weber’s use of the concept of party
suggests how those who dominate the structures of a society control it. This
notion is similar to Marx’s argument that those who control society are
those members exercising power over the forces of production. In these and
other ways, Marx clearly influenced the analysis offered by Weber.
From the foundations of Marx and Weber, the class perspective in the
study of politics and society has taken divergent paths. In some ways, the
class perspective has fragmented into so many different directions, that it is
difficult to claim that the framework offers a unified conceptualization of
power. We include Weber in our discussion of the class perspective (he
serves as a foundational thinker in the elite framework too) because his
approach to politics included, much like Marx, an emphasis on the role of
power differences and how these differences affected individuals, groups,
classes, and the status structures of society. At least three distinct
approaches to the study of politics have emerged from the Marx–Weber
traditions. This collection of approaches in the class tradition suggests that
the framework is comprised of many different versions of the original
teachings, including class conflict and political structures, the nature of class
consciousness and views of power, and the effects of inequality for different
groups in society. The latter reveals how power in society is used to exclude
persons from politics.
CLASS, POLITICS, AND STRUCTURALISM
The first track of inquiry in the class tradition has emphasized how class
conflict described by Marx and Weber are the social root of political
structures, including a state controlled by ruling-class interests. The
“structuralists” place an emphasis on understanding how the state itself,
political groups, and policy outcomes represent ruling-class interests.
Structuralism finds that the ruling class protects and preserves its position
by dominating less powerful interests in society. The state is a
superstructure that is created in capitalist societies in order to use law and
policy to advance the interests of the capitalist class.
In an extensive study of social class and power, Domhoff (1967, 2014)
has elaborated on the power exercised by a “ruling class” in the United
States. By studying power as who benefits, who governs, and who wins,
Domhoff provides evidence of what he calls a “class-domination theory of
power” (2002: 181). Consistent with the class perspective, Domhoff traces
power to those holding dominant positions in corporations and economic
institutions. Power is held in a small set of social networks. As a result, the
ruling class constitutes a unified effort to capture positions of political,
cultural, and economic power in the United States. The upper class benefits
as it controls the state to assure protection of economic and cultural
interests.
CLASS AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The second line of work in the class framework has examined how, as Marx
observed, consciousness is changed by class dynamics. Here, the emphasis
has been on describing the nature of distractions from the pursuit of self-
interest. Recall that Marx believed that once workers understood the nature
and extent of their exploitation, they would rise up in revolution.
Historically, this has not played out as Marx predicted. One explanation for
this is that the consciousness-changing power of advanced capitalism
continues to blind the working class from exerting power in society.
Marx and Engels in the German Ideology (1947 [1886]) observed that
“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas … its
ruling intellectual force” (39). Political sociology in the class tradition has
described this societal capture of ruling ideas as “hegemony.” Antonio
Gramsci, who’s writing in the 1920s was based on the observations of labor-
class oppression in Italy, advanced this notion as a world outlook that
workers incorporate into their own thinking much to their disadvantage.
Hegemonic power is based on ruling-class culture, ideology, law, and
everyday practices (routines). According to Carnoy (1984),
Hegemony involves the successful attempts of the dominant class to use its political,
moral, and intellectual leadership to establish its view of the world as all-inclusive and
universal, and to shape the interests and needs of the subordinate groups.
(70)
A modern example of this apparatus is the media, which are corporate

entities dedicated to creating worldviews, opinions, and shaping tastes of the
vast American middle class. Modern campaigns are geared toward the
manipulation of candidate images and themes, and thus, candidates from the
ruling class use the media to advance worldviews consistent with ruling-
class ideas rather than working-class needs. Mantsios (1995) argues that the
media help to hide a basic understanding of the class structure in the United
States, noting that since 1972, on average 80 percent of the respondents in
the General Social Survey identify themselves as members of the middle
class. Images or language in society that places a greater value on being a
part of the great American middle class—even though the gaps in wealth are
significant—is an example of hegemonic thinking about class distinctions in
the United States.
THE CRITICAL CLASS THEORISTS AND POWER

IN SOCIETY
Finally, the work of Marx has given rise to understanding the significance of
using power to exclude persons from power. This includes the study of the
role of gender, race, and ethnicity, and sexual orientation, or the nature of
citizenship in the modern political era as sources of social difference used to
exclude some from holding power in various social contexts. Research on
feminism, racism, citizenship, and the nature of upper-class dominance and
power in society are considered extensions of what came to be known as
“critical class theory.” This tradition challenges power centers in society and
utilizes knowledge of class inequalities to expose the hidden divisions of
power. Early critical theory was associated with the work of scholars at the
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany, in the early 1920s.
These scholars would conceptualize power differently from traditional
Marxist notions, emphasizing instead the nature of human relationships in
language, cultural symbols, ways of life, and daily interactions. The
Frankfurt School developed a program of study that exposed how power
was used to create social inequalities, social differences, and paths of
exclusion.
T. H. Marshall (1950) explored how modern political life was changing
the nature of citizenship. In his work on citizenship and social class, he
argued that the evolution of capitalism changed the definitions of
citizenship. He conceptualized citizenship as legal and political rights which
would grow out of class and economic interests reflective of their historical
era. The eighteenth-century rights were focused on individual freedoms (e.g.
free speech). Debates over these rights changed with the Industrial
Revolution to political rights, characterized mostly by voting (e.g. the
suffrage movement in the United States). In the twentieth century,
citizenship was framed in economic terms as rights related to social welfare
and economic security. The significance of Marshall’s work is that he cast
citizenship—a political sociological concept—in terms of social evolution,
following a historical progression that in each era revealed how certain
groups in the society were excluded from citizenship. Questions of
citizenship and social inequality remain an important part of the agenda in
political sociology (Kivisto and Faist 2007; Turner 1993).
A great deal of work in political sociology has been done using the
feminist perspective on the nature of power in society. In their recent global
analysis of women holding positions of power, Paxton and Hughes (2017)
concluded that “Although women have made remarkable inroads into both
higher education and traditionally male occupations, the political sphere
remains an arena where women have far to go” (3). Their research shows
that despite progress in increasing the presence of women in political
authority structures, this increase has only marginally affected power
differentials. For example, in their study of 185 countries, 36 percent of the
nations have women holding 10 percent of the seats in the national
parliamentary body—this is the highest proportion of female representation.
While representation brings voice to feminist concerns, for most
parliamentary systems, 10 percent is insufficient to exercise broader power
in the political process.
The politics of race also holds a significant place in the study of power
differences in society. Omi and Winant (1994), for example, trace the role of
the state in changing the nature of how race is contested in the civil sphere.
They argue that the civil rights movement of the 1960s offered one way that
society conceptualized race (political rights). After the 1960s and 1970s,
race was conceptualized as policies of equal employment, or job
discrimination (economic rights), which, Omi and Winant suggest,
continued ruling-class (White capitalist) dominance in economic spheres.
Political questions of race were transformed from one struggle to another,
with power being maintained by the white ruling class.
CRITICISMS OF THE CLASS PERSPECTIVE

Some have argued that social class is a dead concept in political sociology,
and more generally in sociology. This is a significant criticism leveled
against the basic assumptions of the class perspective. In summarizing the
weaknesses, Marger (1987) suggests that the class approach fails in the
following ways:
1. One of the strongest crosscurrents in the class perspective right now is
that the traditional class model does not give attention to influences of
key social factors such as sex, age, or issue politics. A recent study of
populist politics suggests this pattern. Frank (2004) asks, “What’s the
Matter with Kansas?” to highlight how voters and political groups are
distracted by single issues such as abortion or gay rights, often to the
detriment of their own social-class positions. Why would laborers and
farmers squelch their own economic interests in the political process to
contribute to the success of political coalitions that in the end support
policies to their detriment? The assertion of labor-class interests into
contemporary political processes has perhaps disappeared.
2. Politics are not simply influenced by economics, and they can be shaped
by other aspects of social change and social life. Religion, for example,
has had significant influence in political change, in some cases
revolution, and this appears to be a global phenomenon. Much like
Weber observed about status, the role of technology and expertise can
create what Derber, Schwartz, and Magrass (1990) called a “mandarin
class” of experts whose power is found in their bureaucratic, legal, and
scientific expertise.
3. Groups emerge that cannot be accounted for by the class model, such as
a new class or elites of managers who do not necessarily emerge from
the modes of production. As Marger (1987: 49) states, the class model is
unable to fully explain the pattern that “The few dominate the many
regardless of the nature of property relations.” From this perspective,
elites, rather than upper classes, have power. This criticism highlights
the fact that much research in the class tradition fails to distinguish
between a ruling elite and a ruling social class.
THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORKS TODAY

The three frameworks that we know as the pluralist, the elite-managerial, and
the social-class perspective are at the foundation of the ways in which
political sociology has conceptualized power. As theories have been tested
through research, addressing unexplained paradoxes and political realities not
captured by the metaphor of a particular theory, the theories have been
revised. The struggle in political sociology to explain political processes has
created tensions between the frameworks. Lukes (1974) highlights the
tensions created by the three frameworks. His analysis of politics in society
—which he revised in 2005 to elaborate on conflicts between models of
politics—highlights the differences between the pluralist and elite/class
approaches.
Lukes builds a three-dimensional understanding of politics. The first
dimension guides us to see politics as the observable exertion of power with
tangible outcomes of decisions. For example, the first dimension would focus
on how voters concerned about health-care policy choose between
Republicans and Democrats. The second dimension of politics would ask the
question: How does health care become an issue of concern in an election,
and just as important, how do we explain when the issue is ignored during an
election by political candidates? The second dimension of politics, according
to Lukes, requires us to uncover the less visible role of agenda setters who
exert influence over what is on the table for deliberation. Democratic Party
leaders may encourage candidates they fund to avoid discussing health care
because it is too complex for voters to understand. The third dimension is
even more subtle, according to Lukes. The third dimension is invisible,
where cultural and hegemonic forces are at work shaping the beliefs and
values in society that alter decision outcomes and choices in agenda setting.
Health care is never addressed because the upper-middle and upper classes in
the United States for the most part enjoy basic health-care coverage. The
belief that employers can sustain private health-care insurance is sustained in
a capitalist belief system that perpetuates the argument that government-
funded health care is “evil” or “inefficient and wastes money.” Often,
candidates do not even spell out their arguments against government-funded
health care; they just label it “socialized medicine” as if this in and of itself is
sufficient to dismiss it as a policy option. Lukes’ purpose with his study of
power is to suggest that the first dimension (pluralist) and the second
dimension (elite) do not fully explain political outcomes.
Overall, Lukes highlights a persistent question in the study of power:
What happens when we think of power as acquiescence or nondecision
where outcomes are a function of subjective forces (socially constructed)
rather than objective (rational) forces? To extend this criticism of
commonplace assumptions about democratic societies in particular, Egan and
Chorbajian (2005) identified what they call “vernacular pluralism” (xvii).
Much like Lukes pushes us to think beyond tacit assumptions and unchecked
beliefs, these authors argue that:
As long as there are social classes and other social divisions, there will be different and
opposing class interests. Vernacular pluralism conceals this and contributes to making
people naïve or apathetic and ultimately easier to manipulate and control. In this sense it
is dangerous and holds back rather than promotes the strengthening and extension of
democracy.
(xviii)
As a result of these ongoing paradoxes in current studies of power and

politics, political sociology has turned to a number of alternative frameworks
to describe the nature of the relationship between society and politics.
Lukes warns that modern political processes may manipulate members of
the civil society—that is, the democratic community in total, where what is
best for the community is seen as a standard for rational democracy—to
become characterized by fear or guilt, or to jealously guide choices. In other
words, Lukes explains that power will continue to be concentrated in the
hands of a few when the few convince if not dissuade citizens to act in ways
that are in fact not in the interests of the community as a whole. This work
and others have pushed political sociology to address failures in the pluralist
notion of democracy, or the inability of the elite-managerial framework to
account for changes in political regimes, to construct new theories of power.
Perhaps, this is admittedly an oversimplification. But questions posed by
political sociologists have resulted in new directions in conceptualizing
power and politics in society, building on the research of the past century.
NEW DIRECTIONS AFTER THE TRADITIONAL
FRAMEWORKS
After a comprehensive assessment of the state of political sociology in 2005,
Janoski, Alford, Hicks, and Schwartz argued that the debates between the
frameworks and the continued studies of power and politics highlighted
unexplained patterns in politics and power. In particular, they identified three
“challenges” that confronted political sociologists at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
The first challenge is “where to put culture” in the study of politics.
Increasingly in the last two decades, sociologists have given more attention
to the study of culture. While there are many definitions of culture used, we
find that as political sociologists incorporate the study of culture into their
work, they ask about the role of culture—values, beliefs, customs, traditions,
symbols, and knowledge found in society influence politics, but how?
The second challenge has to do with other research that increasingly
embraces the basic assertion that individuals and social groups act in rational
ways, seeking to maximize benefits in certain situations. For political
sociologists, this means understanding how groups in society use power to
realize positive outcomes for particular groups, and understand through
competition in politics described as a “game.”
The third challenge focuses on claims about power developed by the
growing theoretical tradition commonly referred to as postmodernism. While
some may argue that this framework has its roots in social critique and the
work of Marxist or conflict sociology, postmodernists argue it avoids labels
and instead attempts to identify the ways in which power in society is subtly
structured by dominant social forces. This framework is associated with the
influences of Michel Foucault (1977, 1980), who traced through time the
ways society maintains differences in power through language, ideas,
inherited practices, or social “narratives.”
As any field completes its research agenda, it develops theoretical
revisions, identifies new paradoxes, and builds new theoretical metaphors.
Contemporary political sociology builds on the successes and failures of past
understandings of power in society and has developed a number of new
perspectives. Some of these incorporate lessons from the past. For example,
there is now a more solid connection between the elite-managerial
perspective and some aspects of the social-class approach. Domhoff’s (2014)
work is a good example of how the class framework and elite-managerial
framework have been tied together to understand the nature of a ruling elite.
We introduce four current directions in the study power, each building
interesting alternative metaphors for the social bases of politics: the rational
choice approach, the institutionalist approach, studies of political culture, and
postmodern sociology. Throughout the textbook, we show how these
emerging theories of politics as well as the classical theories of political
sociology inform our understanding of all facets of power.
ASHEVILLE, NC—SEPTEMBER 12: Close up of a protester’s sign at a

Donald Trump Rally saying “No One For President” on September 12, 2016
in downtown Asheville, NC
Credit: J. Bicking / Shutterstock.com
Rational Choice
Rational choice theories begin with the assumption that individuals and
groups are moved to action by articulated desires and goals. In this sense,
choices made reflect actions that are assumed to reflect the group’s efforts to
achieve certain goals. Criminologists have applied rational choice theory to
explanations of crime by depicting certain criminal acts as a function of
motivations and goals of an offender, the likelihood of detection or arrest by
systems of social control, and how these rewards and risks change given
certain opportunities for crime (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1987). In
simplest terms, an offender might rob a business if he or she thought that the
cash take would be high value with low likelihood of being caught. The
outcome in this case might yield high dollar rewards with low risk. Rational
choice theorists in political sociology suggest similar assessments of the
risk–reward–opportunity in the political landscape. Are there potential gains
for an interest group going to the expense of organizing a get-out-the-vote
campaign to win a majority on a city council, or to lobby Congress to change
policies that might benefit the group?
Are interest groups motivated to achieve rewards from the government?
Most likely so, and they have organized to see that their interests are, in fact,
recognized in policy outcomes. Are there costs or risks to pushing interest-
group agendas? One could say yes, that the risk may be inherent in a game
that has limited resources, such as a state budget. What political
opportunities arise to see that rewards are maximized and risks or loss
minimized? Interestingly, political opportunities for interest groups may
emerge when new political majorities gain power in Congress or the state
legislature, or when interest groups work together to create coalitions to
lobby a bill through Congress (opportunities for action). The old saying
“politics makes for strange bed fellows” perhaps captures this idea that,
when interests are realized, the rational thing to do is align with others to
achieve those interests. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) worked with groups from the pornography industry to oppose
congressional attempts in the 1990s to regulate pornography on the Internet.
The alliance was perhaps an odd combination on the surface, but the shared
goal of the ACLU and pornographers was similar enough to create a
coalition to support claims to First Amendment rights. On the other side was
an even stranger coalition of feminists and religious conservatives opposed
to the acceptance of pornography of any kind. The rational choice approach
would understand these coalitions as an outcome of rational group behavior
designed to bring about success in policy decision-making in the policy
arena.
Using exchange models of human behavior, rational choice situates the
study of power in the incentive-based connections between individuals,
groups, and institutions. Participation in politics is assumed to be linked to
reward structures. For example, one question addressed by this perspective
is, which is more powerful in shaping policy benefits, Congress, or executive
branch bureaucracies? Individuals and advocacy groups lobby government
agencies that award grants or set regulations, much in the same way they try
to influence members of Congress. Grants and entitlements are incentives for
policy outcomes, and the details of how these are awarded may sometimes
modify congressional intent behind legislation creating the program.
Rational choice research would focus on the flow of incentives from
governmental agencies and the formation of groups to influence agencies
that behave according to bureaucratic power rather than congressional.
Many rational choice theories depict much of the political process as a
game, with different interests competing in the game, which is constrained
by certain rules, in some situations, laws. Individuals, organizations, and
nation-states are all players in an arena where there is competition for scarce
resources. Nation-states as rational actors may compete in a foreign policy
game over oil. We know that the competition for oil can, in fact, become
intense enough to result in war or armed conflict. A war requires an army of
individuals, in some cases paid for a career in the armed services, or in other
situations, drafted into service by the nation-state. Thus, the risk of life is
seen as a willing expenditure on the part of nation-states that go to war to
protect or control interests in the Middle East. Rational choice perspectives
or game theory would understand the exercise of power by studying the self-
interests of actors.
Political Culture
As the study of culture has flourished, so have explorations in the role of
culture in the society–politics relationship. When Weber defined culture as a
“switchman” on a train track of life decisions, he was highlighting just how
significant culture is in shaping social interactions, including the nature of
political interactions at the individual, group, organizational, and societal
levels. Interest in the interconnections between culture and politics is
organized around a number of themes (Berezin 1997; Jasper 2005). In
broadest terms, the study of political culture currently focuses on (1) values
and belief systems in society that affect politics; (2) the nature of ritual,
symbolism, and the construction of meaning in political systems; and (3) the
nature of agency in shaping political culture, which stems from individual
understandings of power in society. As will be seen throughout the text,
culture now plays an important role in shaping how individuals and groups
see influence, or act based on motivating symbols or belief systems.
When we are introduced to sociology, we typically develop an
understanding of culture as a system of norms, values, and beliefs assumed
through socialization processes across the life course. The ways in which
values and beliefs about power and politics are shaped have been studied in
a number of ways. Inglehart (1990, 1997), for example, has found that
historical events such as wars, periods of scarcity or wealth, and the
experiences of generations throughout history can result in variations in
belief systems about lifestyles as well as politics. He suggests that prior to
World War II, individuals had a materialist conceptualization of the world as
a result of experiencing World War I and the Great Depression. As a result,
their political preferences were oriented toward pragmatism. In contrast, he
found that the postmaterialists were influenced by periods of sustained
economic growth. Political action was understood as a way to achieve rights
to protect certain lifestyles. For example, debates about legal recognition of
intimate partners (e.g. gay marriage) or regulations about what constitutes a
suitable family environment for children (e.g. adoptions by same-sex
couples) reflect contemporary lifestyle choices shaped by generational belief
systems.
Political groups and organizations typically stage rituals and symbolic
expressions of meaning attached to political agendas. These rituals may be
helpful in communicating what one group or political party believes is an
important theme about the nature of power in society. Current research on
far-right-wing political groups focuses on the role of ritual and symbolism in
constructing a political agenda that, in some cases, seeks separation from the
U.S. government, or a social reorganization of power based on race, gender,
or sexual orientation. For example, sociologists have found that the Ku Klux
Klan and neo-Nazi groups have staged rallies and protests to bring attention
to their demands for white separatism (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997).
The use of staged rituals or rallies on state capitol steps or courthouse lawns,
where leaders wear Nazi uniforms and display swastikas, is a protest
technique that uses Nazi symbolism to bring attention to the political
demands of the group as part of “new social movements” (Jenness and
Broad 1997). Political sociologists who study these rallies examine the
nature of the protest rituals, or what Tilly (1986) calls “repertoires of
contention,” that is, techniques or methods of challenging current power
arrangements inevitably rooted in the cultural stock of the society.
If values and worldviews shape individual perceptions of power, and
ritual and symbolism are further manipulated to constrain political demands
or beliefs, then one is left with questions about what impact these cultural
influences have on individual and group political action. The nature of
agency, or the ability of individuals to shape culture, to push back as it were,
becomes an important question in the study of political culture. Giddens
(1990), for example, has written extensively on the role of state power and
authority in the lives of modern citizens. He argues that all individuals retain
a “dialectic of control,” where, even in the most dire situations, they can
exercise some power against formalized rules or authority. For example,
Best (2002) uses this concept to suggest that an individual being imprisoned
can exert control against the authority through suicide, a hunger strike, or
refusing to leave the prison cell. Albeit small, the individual has agency in
this sense, shaping the influences around him by, at the very least, not
complying.
Institutionalist
Sociologists define institutions as enduring or lasting patterns of social
organization, usually significant in shaping not only individual actions but
also social outcomes. Similarly, the institutionalist approach in political
sociology argues that there are significant enduring, stable, historical
patterns related to struggles over power in society. As a result, there are
patterned political outcomes. As the name suggests, institutionalists examine
what creates these patterns of organized political processes. The focus takes
two tracks. At one level, institutionalists study structures, namely interest
groups, unions, organizations, international corporations, and parties, as well
as the state and associated other structures typically with a political focus. At
another level, institutionalists understand political processes as patterned by
political norms, practices, belief systems, and traditions. Thus, political
outcomes such as public policy or political movements are understood as a
combination of organizational influences as well as cultural influences. The
institutionalist model is a hybrid of sorts, which incorporates aspects of
organizational and structural sociology with political culture.
The concentric circles in Figure 1.3 depict the relationships suggested by
the institutionalists. The overlaps between the state, interest groups, and
culture point to areas where political sociologists find concurrent influences
in politics that traditionally were treated as separate concepts. For example,
we can think of routines or political phenomena associated with the work of
certain groups in society, advocacy organizations, or social institutions (the
left circle in Figure 1.3), such as religious organizations. Groups in society
may seek limits on behaviors, and thus policies are created by the state,
reflecting demands by the polity for addressing a particular concern (the top
circle in Figure 1.3). Some policies are likely to emerge under certain
cultural conditions or as a result of values or attitudinal influences in the
legislative body where policy is made (the right circle in Figure 1.3).
Institutionalists would hypothesize that a policy, such as banning gay
marriage, emerges as a result of the work of advocacy groups around
changing definitions of marriage, how groups over time elect legislators who
share this view or shape the work of a particular political party, and that
groups and legislative leadership on gay marriage prohibition evolves out of
a cultural pattern associated with religious, economic, and political
conservatism in the polity. The point is that institutionalists attempt to bring
these concepts together to explain political outcomes, political structures,
and aspects of political culture.
FIGURE 1.3 Concepts in the Institutionalist Framework

A recent example of research extending the institutionalism framework

concludes that a vast global system of organizational networks and groups
provide an international cultural context for the creation of policy. Beckfield
(2003) finds that policy ideas such as educational change, regulation of
same-sex relationships, laws related to population change, and others can be
influenced by “policy scripts” that are dominant in “rich, core, Western
societies” (401). He uses the concept of a “world polity” as a global cultural
backdrop of sorts where tracks about what constitutes effective policies in
these areas are enacted as a result of international nongovernmental
organizations’ influences on societies throughout the world. In other words,
interest groups working throughout the world will tend to follow similar
paths of creating policy regardless of the system of government in a
particular country. What institutionalists study is this path of policy creation,
such as identify the policy problem, document the problem through the use
of experts or research, prepare model legislation, activate aligned interest
groups in the society to gain local support, and approach appropriate state
actors for policy implementation. This institutionalist approach demonstrates
that culture, policy ideas, organizational actions, and policy outcomes blend
together to reveal the institutionalist model in explaining global politics.
Studies using this framework will be reviewed in our discussions of the
state, political organizations, and policy.
Postmodern Political Sociology

A distinct alternative path in the study of the relationship between society
and politics is that represented by the influences of what we call here
postmodernism. Rooted in the philosophical and empirical challenges to
sociology as science in the 1960s and 1970s, the postmodern turn in political
sociology has generated a unique and significant perspective on the study of
power.
Because postmodern thought takes many different forms, it is difficult to
summarize its central argument. Yet, there are several themes running
through this body of work, and we highlight what postmodernism especially
has to say about the nature of power. The first theme found in this work is
that power must be understand in the subtle, hidden aspects of everyday life.
For example, current research on what is referred to as the surveillance state
(Marx 2004; Staples 2014) documents how power has shifted to those who
control forms of watching the behaviors of others, such as cameras on ATMs
or cameras installed on street corners and traffic signals (see Text box 1.1).
The nature of being watched shifts power over the body, movement, and
privacy to other authorities. The second theme in this work emphasizes that
power will no longer be understood merely as a function of social structures
per se. The emphasis shifts from the study of the state or social groups to the
construction of individual identities in the face of social resistance. Here
language becomes important. Power is found in the discourse about human
sexuality, for example, and the nature of making others less powerful by
enacting historical scripts about homosexuality or sexual expression in
general. The third theme found in this work emphasizes power in a global
context. The nature of communication and social interaction is such that
human connections take electronic forms and transcend geographical and
time boundaries. In this regard, power is exercised in the command of
information or technologies that shape global awareness about groups. We
will explore these themes throughout the text, finding that the postmodern
turn in political sociology casts a very different light on understanding
power.
TEXT BOX 1.1

Surveillance and Types of Power
As we will see later in this chapter, some sociologists who study power in
its various forms at the end of the twentieth century argue that technology
has played a significant role in changing the ways power is
expressed/exercised in our day-to-day interactions. These sociologists see
power as taking the form of surveillance, and they suggest that
everywhere individuals are watched by different power centers in society.
“Eye” in the pyramid on the one dollar bill
Credit: Photo by yurchello108/Shutterstock.com.
French philosopher Michel Foucault concluded that science had come

to be used in many different ways to control different categories of
people. The diffusion of techniques of surveillance benefited significantly
from this technology. For example, the science of criminology was
eventually used to design “state-of-the-art” prisons that would use forms
of “rehabilitation” as well as architectural designs to control individual
routines and interactions. Often justified as a form of crime control or
security, science to promote surveillance expanded the tools available to
armies, law enforcement, school resource officers, deans of students and
parents! Foucault talked of the “gaze” or that knowing we are being
watched causes us to reflect on our actions and behaviors. Power systems
often use surveillance without our awareness. The state often utilizes
surveillance to control citizens. College students are no exception!
Conduct an inventory of your day-to-day interactions and note which
aspects of your person are being watched by others. Look for the
following:
cameras mounted on university buildings or in classrooms;

images and interactions on Facebook, Snap Chat, or Web pages;
cameras on street corners or buildings in town;
ways ATMs monitor transactions;
ways students are tested for things other than material learned in
class (e.g. drinking habits in college, psych-metrics psychometrics to
measure motivation to learn, etc.);
cell phones that record still or moving images;
geographical positioning systems (GPS) in cars and smartphones.
When you start to inventory the various ways a person can be

observed, watched, monitored, or tracked, or that someone can know
where you are at all times, you are clearly subject to surveillance. But
who is watching? What figures of power (authorities and nonauthorities)
are monitoring your behaviors?
Warning sign at a metro bus stop
Credit: Photo by Lisa K. Waldner
Do you think that being watched is a form of coercive, or legitimate

power? Is your conclusion based on “who” is watching?
Does monitoring behavior represent an informed rational willingness
by citizens to promote social order? Or does monitoring and tracking
of behavior suggest elite management of security interests? In light
of the 2013 claims by Edward Snowden about governmental
surveillance of emails, texts, tracking cookies, and other electronic
information, what kinds of power are involved in questions of state
security?
Using Lukes’ three-dimensional understanding of power, how would
you explain the role of surveillance in contemporary society?
One of the key figures in this perspective is French scholar Michel

Foucault who wrote extensively on the nature of power. His insights are
intriguing. In fact, he might be critical of our attempts to define power as we
did at the onset of this chapter; he suggests that power “can be identified
better by what it does than what it is” (quoted in Fiske 1993: 11). In this
sense, power is a part of everything social, and the social consequences of
power relations are, according to postmodernists, to be exposed and
revealed. Postmodern analysts trace the nature of societal power throughout
history, finding that many consequences of power relationships are subtle
and hidden. Such was Foucault’s 1977 study of discipline and punishment in
society, which demonstrated how through time, the exercise of state
authority to punish through public executions in the town square were
transformed by the state into controlled, private, nonpublic spaces away
from observing masses. When the eyes of the masses are unable to see the
exercise of punishment, what happens to legitimacy or authority? Foucault
argues that it becomes even more dominated by experts such as “corrections
officials” or experts cloaked in the traditions of psychiatry. Because
punishment was moved by the state from public venues to hidden prison
cells, Foucault claimed that the philosophy of self-rule through diligent
citizen monitors was given up to social control by experts watching the
once-diligent citizenry. Clearly, Foucault has offered an important way of
understanding power in an age of technological change and social
complexity.
Other contemporaries have taken postmodernist views of politics in
similar directions, building on the theme that all things social are political—
all things societal are about power. Anthony Giddens (1985), a prominent
British sociologist, considers power to be at the heart of relationships
between politics and social institutions including family, religion, education,
and the economy. One theme that runs throughout much of his work is that
the modern state blurs the lines between the state, public, private, and market
spheres as we described earlier in this chapter. The exercise of power in this
sense is all around us as resources are allocated by social systems (e.g.
physical things such as money) or as authoritative resources (e.g. power to
supervise employees) are allocated by social systems. In this regard, and
much like Foucault, Giddens treats power relations as ubiquitous. Political
sociology using this approach studies the nature of many social entities that
control the allocation or exercise of authority in all aspects of life.
These frameworks each reveal different dynamics in society–politics
relationships. Pluralist approaches to politics will ask different questions
about the nature of power than the elite approaches do. And now we ask
what role does culture play in shaping elite preferences, or class-based
expressions of resistance. In this regard, the various frameworks represent
continuing debates about politics in society, highlighting a number of
questions that will be addressed in the decades ahead. These many
metaphors for power are built around resolutions to paradoxes of political
and social life. Clearly, the work of political sociology is not complete. The
chapters that follow explore the many questions being studied today.
CONCLUSION
A conceptual mapping of the various paths in political sociology is helpful
for visualizing the analytic territory of this introduction to political sociology.
We are in a position to take advantage of research on the social bases of
politics over the past 100 years. Coser offered an important conceptual
baseline of sorts when he identified the four core topics of political sociology.
But our understanding of power in its social context has greatly advanced in
just the past fifty years. As a result, we can conceptualize the work of
political sociology as that described recently by Hicks, Janoski, and Schwartz
(2005):
The very nature of the field that makes political sociology sociological comes from civil
society in the broadest sense—everything about society that is either not the state or
whether the state has overlapped into other arenas.
(21)
Thus, the study of power takes in a variety of directions, arenas, or

spheres of social and political interaction. Power is exercised through the
authority and legitimate rule in the state sphere. Power is dynamic and
conflictual in the public sphere as social groups compete for attention or
control of the state. Power is economic and rational perhaps in the market
sphere, where rules of capitalist economies dictate the allocation of
resources. And in modern times, the private sphere, the day-to-day social
place of interaction among family members, friends, and among intimates,
also becomes subject to the exercise of power by the state, the market, and
the actors in the public sphere. These spheres constitute “civil society” and
map the terrain for the study of power in political sociology.
Civil society then presents a stage where paradoxes are played out. These
paradoxes emerge perhaps from belief systems that guide actors in the civil
society. For example, societal discourse about abortion represents one issue
where we find conflict between the private sphere (family and sexual
relations), the public sphere (social movements and voluntary associations),
and the state (judicial branch and police). Thus, the work of political
sociologists is in several domains of the civil society. Researchers may turn
their attention to studies of pro-life advocacy associations, the impact of
abortion laws on teens and their families, or the ideological backgrounds of
members of the judiciary. All of these areas of analysis constitute the focal
points for political sociology.
We conclude this chapter by identifying three major themes that continue
to characterize the study of power in political sociology. Some of these
themes emerge as a result of challenges to our commonsense views of
politics in democratic societies, or the tensions and conflicts created locally
by global influences:
1. power is concentrated in democratic societies;
2. power operates not only in direct but also in indirect ways;
3. politics is not just about the state but characterizes all social relations.
These themes are important to how much of the research in political
sociology is organized. This is not to suggest that all of political sociology is
about just three concepts; it’s more complex than that to be sure. Rather, we
suggest these ideas as we close the first chapter of this textbook and
challenge students of political sociology to orient their thoughts to ideas ripe
for inquiry. Debates between conceptual frameworks and emerging theories
are the focus of this text as we prepare to move into more detailed
considerations of the pluralist, elite-managerial, and social-class frameworks,
especially considering attempts to synthesize these frameworks into a more
unified political sociology; and to consider these frameworks in light of
emerging research pushing the field into new vistas of understanding.
Power Is Concentrated in Democratic Societies

Power is concentrated, even in democratic societies. The Enlightenment
thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau believed that freethinking
rational individuals could engage in self-governance. This was in contrast to
the pre-Enlightenment thinking which created a power structure in society
based on divine right of the monarch. The experiences of the Industrial
Revolution were the focus on sociological attention in what is considered the
founding writings of the discipline. Marx brought attention to the ways in
which class conflict and the concentrations of wealth created a paradox in
Enlightenment hopes of self-governance. How could a parliament of elected
citizens self-govern when the representatives in the parliament were owners
of property, industry, and capital? Has the Enlightenment philosophy of self-
governance met its ideal expression? Or have the struggles over power and
the resolution of these struggles favored a few instead of the many?
Power Operates in Direct but Also Indirect Ways

Power operates in direct and indirect ways. The early studies of power
focused on the direct exercise of power usually in the form of capacity for
action as described in the previous paragraph. We can all think of obvious
examples of direct forms of power—coercion, for example—where force is
used to bring about compliance with interests or desires. Weber documented
the role of bureaucracies in organizing human action into outcomes that
would be legitimated through something as simple as writing things down in
a procedures manual. His concept of rationalization would highlight the
paradox of constrained will in democratic societies. Rationalization of
society, according to Weber, was the transformation from informal
exchanges between social groups to interactions and exchanges that more
and more were governed (power) by the appeal to procedures and rules. The
forces of rationalization including the creation of “more law” to govern an
increasingly complex society after the Industrial Revolution would become
part of the social mindset. Weber would highlight how deep into social
interactions these rules would go, suggesting that power is understood in its
many subtle, more indirect forms found in the values, beliefs, and customs
(culture) of complex societies.
Politics Is Not Just about the State but All Social

Relations
For political sociologists, power is about more than overt forms of
governance found in political institutions. Early works of political scientists
focused on the nature of governmental systems. But these works were
criticized for being too systems focused. Consider the work of feminist
sociologists in the last fifty years. While they focus on the impact of
governmental structures on policy outcomes for women, or the fact that
women do not hold a majority of the seats in Congress, the work of feminists
has also identified the nature of power in all social interactions. Power in the
workplace has typically been exercised by men which has resulted in a
“glass ceiling,” a discriminatory barrier to women’s advancement into key
positions of corporate governance. Prior to the 1980s, the idea of “sexual
harassment” had no form in law or in describing the nature of sexist
language, which creates oppressive environments for women and men
through language. Identifying barriers, impediments, language, norms, and
structures that differentiate people into social groups with power and social
groups without power is a key task of political sociology. The field offers a
deeper understanding of politics by emphasizing the role of social status and
social institutions, in addition to politics, culture, and global influences.
Politics and power are central concerns of sociology and have been since
the birth of the discipline. The ways in which power is played out in social
networks of all kinds constitute one of the core areas of study. This chapter
has shown how Marx, Weber, and Durkheim called our attention to the
questions of social order, how it was maintained through the exercise of
power—as manipulated masses, or as moralists following the need for order
in the community. This chapter also suggested that the exploration of
political sociology assumed a significant place in the discipline of sociology
thanks to the work of C. Wright Mills, who, in the 1950s called our attention
to age-old themes in the study of who wins and who loses as essential to the
work of sociology. His application of the sociological imagination to power-
based relationships in society marked a significant shift in how sociologists
would study politics. Throughout the text, we will come to understand the
role of the sociological imagination in understanding current debates about
the nature of politics in contemporary society.
The tools political sociologists bring to the study of power have offered
much insight and understanding about things that sometimes challenge our
commonsense beliefs about the nature of politics. As a result of these
analytical approaches, political sociology is rich with metaphors that reveal
greater insights into the nature of power at many levels of society. Moreover,
these tools have been helpful in identifying the nature of social paradoxes
related to power. Consider now the many definitions of power as
summarized in Table 1.3. These definitions offer evidence of a field of study
characterized by diverse views about power and social and political
processes.
Some definitions of power emphasize outcomes as a result of coercion or
influence. Other definitions give more attention to the importance of physical
or culture resources in power exchanges. Drawing from these many
approaches, we define power as individual, group, or structural capacity to
achieve intended effects as a result of force, influence, or authority.
Table 1.3 Varieties in the Definition of Power
This chapter builds upon these ideas which are intricately part of the
sociological imagination found in political sociology. With this brief
introduction to power in mind, this chapter has described in more detail the
ways in which political sociology has defined power and the typologies
(metaphors) constructed to help understand the forms of power studied. The
second portion of the chapter presented the three theoretical traditions
(metaphors) that have evolved in political sociology. These traditions and
others that are now developing tackle head-on the paradoxes that generate
the questions and work for the field of political sociology. These theoretical
approaches to understanding power are taking new forms as a result of
debates and controversies in how power is understood in contemporary
society.
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CHAPTER
2
Role of the State
It is undeniable that the state influences many different aspects of our lives
(Olsen and Marger 1993) through what Michael Mann (1988, 1993)
identifies as infrastructural power, or the ability of the state to penetrate civil
society.
The state can assess and tax our income and wealth at source, without our consent …
(which states before 1850 were never [emphasis Mann’s] able to do); it stores and can
recall immediately a massive amount of information about all of us; it can enforce its
will within the day almost anywhere in its domains; its influence on the economy is
enormous; it even directly provides the subsistence of most of us (in state employment,
pensions, in family allowances, etc.). The state penetrates everyday life more than did
any historical state. Its infrastructural power has increased immensely.
(Mann 1993: 315)
While Mann wrote these words over twenty-five years ago, the ideas
expressed seem even truer today, given technological advances in
surveillance and the willingness of government, even in democratic societies,
to collect information on citizens (e.g. Johnson 2017). Similarly, the state has
the power to regulate (Skrentny 2006) the most intimate aspects of our lives
including whom we can marry, which sex acts between consenting adults are
permissible,1 and how parents may discipline their children. A functioning
state, regardless of type, has the ability to restrict anyone under its
jurisdiction. For Pierre Bourdieu, the state exists both outside and inside
individuals.
State thinking penetrates the minutest aspects of our everyday lives from filling in a
bureaucratic form, carrying an identity card, signing a birth certificate, to shaping our
everyday thinking and thought: it is the public at the heart of what we consider eminently
private.
(Loyal 2017: 73)
Bourdieu believes that the state affects how individuals think through the
structuring of everyday social life. This structuring occurs through the
imposition of things that organize our lives such as transportation schedules,
time zones and daylight savings time, declaration of holidays, and
designation of fiscal year. The state is a political institution because it wields
power and, for this reason, is a focus for political sociologists.
Historically, the state has not always been the primary political institution
(Bottomore 1979; Tilly 1985) nor is it clear that it will continue to occupy
such a central role. This is not to say that political institutions will disappear;
to the contrary, the institution that manages political power may transform
into something very different from the traditional state. Meanwhile, the state
and the nation-state are important concepts for political sociologists. The
focus of this chapter is, what is the state and how does it differ from a nation;
how is the state different from government; what are various state forms;
how do different sociological theories view the state; and what does the
future hold?
WHAT IS THE MODERN NATION-STATE?

Defining the state is problematic because there are two conceptually
different issues involved: What does the state look like and what does the
state do or what are the institutional and functional dimensions (Mann
1988)? What we call “the state” is in reality a number of interacting
institutions and organizations (Miliband 1993) comprising people occupying
defined positions with specific responsibilities. The “modern nation-state” is
an entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force linked to a specific
territory recognized as sovereign by other nation-states and residing within
its borders are groups sharing a common history, identity, and culture. The
modern nation-state, with a centralized structure and elaborate bureaucracy,
is a relatively recent human innovation (Bottomore 1979) having been in
existence for only approximately 6,000 years (Berberoglu 1990).
Prior to the rise of the state, kinship relations or religious rituals
determined authority with no specific group charged with decision-making
responsibility (Bottomore 1979). For example, the decision to make war or
peace with a neighboring tribe might be made by all the adult members or
only by some, although one person is the undisputed leader. Bureaucracy
and rationalization, or the adoption of consistent practice and procedures
rather than capricious decision-making, are the hallmarks of the modern
nation-state. While we often link the concepts of nation and state, there are
important distinctions.
Defining the State

Max Weber contends that “a state is a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force [emphasis
Weber’s] within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills 1946: 78). The state,
then, has the ability to make and enforce laws and is run by those occupying
positions in the state bureaucracy (Nagengast 1994). In short, the state has
power over the lives of its citizens as well as persons currently residing
within its borders. Robert Dahl (1963) argues that only the state decides
who can use force, under what circumstances, and the type of force allowed.
The state does not have to use force nor does a monopoly mean that only the
state can use force; however, only the state decides when force is
permissible. There are three components to a Weberian view on the state.
COMPULSORY
Weber views the state as “a compulsory association with a territorial basis”
(Heydebrand 1994: 26). The compulsory nature of the state is clear in that
short of revolution, we have no choice but to submit to state authority as we
physically reside within its borders. For example, a U.S. citizen traveling in
Russia cannot refuse to obey Russia’s laws while under Russian
jurisdiction.
MONOPOLY
The state has a monopoly on the use of legitimate force within its borders
(Runciman 1978). This does not mean that the state must use force. State
domination is evidenced by the ability to have commands followed without
the need to resort to coercion (Skrentny 2006). Recall the earlier metaphor
of parent for understanding the state. Parents do not always need to threaten
children with a spanking for compliance. Children usually comply because
they accept the right of parents to punish even if they do not agree with the
punishment.
As described by Michael Mann (1988), there are two types of state
power: despotic and infrastructural. Despotic power is the use of physical
force or coercion administered by the military or police as agents of the
state. Infrastructural power is a more modern power and refers to the
ability of the state to influence and control major spheres of our lives
without using physical force. Pierre Bourdieu refers to a related concept,
symbolic violence. He contends that the state has a monopoly on the use of
both physical and symbolic violence and emphasizes the latter in his work.
For Bourdieu, symbolic violence is a condition for the ability to exercise a
monopoly on physical violence. Symbolic violence is
the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so
much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal
loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety—in short, all the virtues honoured by the code
of honour—cannot fail to be seen as the most economical form of dominion.
(Bourdieu 1977 cited by Loyal 2017: 30)
Symbolic violence is not recognized because it is something imposed

by the dominant over those being dominated. Symbolic violence exists
when those with less power view themselves through the lens of those in
power. In other words, we are complicit in our own domination. How do
you view voting versus protest as a form of political expression? Even
peaceful protests are loud, inconvenient, disruptive, and cost the
government money. If citizens prefer voting over protest, even with
evidence that protests could be more effective in creating social change, this
is a form of symbolic violence. We are conditioned to view voting as an
important civic obligation that is held in higher esteem than marching in a
protest or demonstration. We do not criticize citizens that exercise their
right to vote, but marchers are often seen as troublemakers depending on
the cause and may attract counter protests such as the progun rights rallies
held as an oppositional response to the 2018 youth-driven “March for Our
Lives” rallies in the wake of school shootings. The point is that the state
need not resort to force because we readily accept as legitimate a lens that
promotes subjugation and may ultimately limit political expression without
any threats or use of violence. Legitimacy is the third component of
Weber’s view of the state.
LEGITIMACY
A driver obeys a police officer not only because a police officer carries a
gun, but also because citizens recognize the right of a police officer to make
traffic stops on behalf of the state. For Weber, “If the state is to exist the
dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be” (Gerth
and Mills 1946: 78). However, the force that is being used must be
“permitted or prescribed by the regulations of the state” (Runciman 1978:
41). What permissible varies between nations and, within the United States,
between jurisdictions. What is constant across all is that only the state
determines legitimacy.
In Texas, lethal or deadly force is permissible to protect one’s life and,
under some circumstances, property, including that of one’s neighbors
(Texas Penal Code:
www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/PE/htm/PE.9.htm#9.42). In other
jurisdictions, lethal force is only justified to protect one’s life and the
danger must be imminent. This means that, within the United States,
someone who kills an intruder may be treated differently depending on
local laws.2 Weber observed that fathers sometimes physically discipline
their children. The State may limit parents’ ability to use physical
punishment to correct their children’s behavior. Some modern nation-states
severely restrict corporal punishment to prevent child abuse (e.g. Sweden).
In the United States, parents cross the line between discipline and abuse
when physical punishment causes bodily harm, leaves a permanent mark, or
is considered inappropriate given the age of the child, size, and location of
the injury (for a comparison of fifty states, see
http://www.gundersenhealth.org/ncptc/center-for-effective-
discipline/discipline-and-the-law/punishment-vs-abuse/).
Symbolic violence may make this more difficult but citizens believing
that the state has overstepped its boundaries may take action against the
state through civil disobedience, protest, or even revolution. The “Black
Lives Matter” (BLM) movement is challenging the legitimacy of state
agents (e.g. the police) and calling attention to the treatment of persons of
color by law enforcement. The movement is a response to several well-
publicized shootings of African-American males. One of the aims of BLM
is to protest “state sanctioned violence”
(https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/). Ultimately,
collective society assigns legitimacy to the state, and this means that
authority bestowed on the state can be rescinded, as was the case with the
American Revolution. Grievances must be extreme before groups will take
on a more powerful state; yet, anti-statist movements are on the rise and
weaken not only a specifically targeted state, but all states (Wallerstein
2003). Anti-statism takes on various forms ranging from a neoliberalism
perspective of cutting regulations and privatizing government services to
those who want to eliminate the state or drastically reduce its influence
(Gallaher et al. 2009). Thoreau’s well-known quote from his essay Civil
Disobedience “That government is best which governs least” (2018 [1849])
expresses this view.
Emergence of States
Consistent with Weber’s view, Tilly defines the state as “relatively
centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less
successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence
within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory” (1985: 172).
Where Tilly departs from Weber and others is in his view on state
emergence. Rather than taking the Hobbesian view that equates the rise of
the state with the need for a social contract, or trading submission to the
state for protection, he argues that wars make states and that both war
making and state making more closely resemble organized crime as those
involved are “coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs” (1985: 171). Tilly
contends that just as a racketeer creates danger and then provides protection
for a price, the state protects citizens against threats, both real and imagined,
that are the consequences of the state’s own activities. Citizens tolerate this
because the benefits of other state services (e.g. fire and police protection
and public schools) outweigh the costs.
In the past, professional soldiers and tax collectors held the right to use
violence on behalf of kings. Kings eventually recognized the threat posed by
private armies and roving bands of decommissioned soldiers and acted to
consolidate power by disarming private armies and maintaining a standing
one under monarch control. This approach was especially useful for keeping
internal rivals in check.
Tilly contends that war making and capital accumulation created states
because those controlling specific territories needed to extract resources
from populations under their control to fund these efforts. Those in power
warred to check or overcome their competitors. Capital accumulation
through taxation provided a more permanent solution for financing wars
than temporary measures such as selling off assets, coercing capitalists, or
acquiring capital through conquest.
One of the advantages of Tilly’s thesis is that he accounts for the variety
in state forms and the different routes to state building (Goldstone 1991).
Tilly (1990) identifies two settings in which states emerge: “capital
intensive” and “coercive intensive.” In the first setting, resources are in the
form of money controlled by capitalists and often concentrated in cities.
States are smaller, city centered, and more commercialized with strong trade
links. This results in a weaker state structure as capitalists collaborate with
state building. In a coercive-intensive setting, resources are in the form of
raw materials (e.g. grain and timber) and land. Large empires with fewer
cities are a result with weaker trade links necessitating “high-level coercion
structures” (Scott 2004: 5 of 10) as states developed without the cooperation
of local capitalists.
For Tilly (1985), the activities of war making and other uses of state
violence, such as state making or neutralizing rivals inside a power holder’s
base, and protection, or eliminating threats to citizens, are interrelated with
and dependent on extraction (i.e. taxing) or acquiring the resources to carry
out the first three activities. Due to the interdependent nature of extraction,
war making, and state making, these activities depend on a centralized
organization and increasingly large bureaucracy. For example, efficient
extraction of resources in the form of taxes necessitates a bureaucratic
apparatus (e.g. Internal Revenue Service), which, in turn, increases state
making. External pressure to create states increases as territories organize
into states to defend against other global powers.
While Tilly’s discussion concerns European states, he notes that
decolonized, independent territories (e.g. 1947 partitioning of British India
into India and Pakistan) acquired their military from outside. As a result,
these states did not go through the process of negotiation between the rulers
and the ruled, which expands civil or nonmilitary aspects of the state. This
is important because civil society is an important counter balance to the
state. Furthermore, newer states are more dependent on others for arms and
expertise. As a result, the military comprises a larger proportion of the
newer state apparatus. The recognition of the sovereignty of these states by
influential nations such as the United States or Russia provides an incentive
for ambitious individuals to use the military to take over the state. An
example of this is Pakistan which has a history of the military subverting the
democratic process. General Perez Musharraf’s 1999 takeover was preceded
by several previous military coups divided by periods of democratically
elected governments. Pakistan became a democracy again in 2008 but is
considered a fragile democracy with limited experience in transitioning
power from one elected regime to another and where Prime Ministers often
do not finish a full term. For states where the military dominates the state
apparatus, Tilly argues that the analogy between organized crime, state
making, and war making is even more accurate.
Goldstone argues that although Tilly’s analysis is ground breaking, his
“war-centered framework” (1991: 178) oversimplifies state formation by
ignoring other factors that contribute to state making, including ideology
and revolution. Goldstone points to the example of England and the role of
the Reformation and religious conflict in shaping the state, or the role of
nationalism in Italy.
Bruce Porter (1994) contends that the timing and type of war shaped the
different paths of state development. The Continental path of state building
created absolutionist states and resulted first in civil war and then
international war. A Constitutional path of state formation created
constitutional monarchies with deliberating bodies, but leaner administrative
bureaucracies. This path was followed when a state was able to avoid
international war, but still had to contend with internal pressure and conflict.
The Coalitional path is the result of states that were able to avoid civil war,
but were often involved in international conflicts. These states avoided
pressure to centralize and tended to build more republican forms of
government. Finally, states that experienced both internal and international
conflicts, often simultaneously, tended to form dictatorships. Although an
important contribution, Porter’s work is criticized for overemphasizing
military determinants of state formation at the expense of other variables
(Kestnbaum 1995).
Differentiating Government from the State

The state is not a single entity but a network of organizations. Following the
lead of Tilly and Skocpol, Ann Orloff describes the state as “potentially
[emphasis Orloff’s] autonomous sets of coercive, extractive, judicial, and
administrative organizations controlling territories and the populations
within them” (1993: 9). Ralph Miliband (1993) provides a detailed
description of the types of organizations that comprise the state. He
subdivides the state into the following categories: government,
administration, military and police, judiciary, subcentral governments, and
legislative or parliamentary bodies.
GOVERNMENT
The state is often confused with government because the latter speaks on
behalf of the state (Miliband 1993). Government is “the specific regime in
power at any one moment” (Alford and Friedland 1985: 1). In the United
States, power switches back and forth between political parties with
political appointees occupying important positions of power, yet
government is less permanent because the state endures regardless of which
party captures the presidency (Olsen and Marger 1993; Stepan 1988).
ADMINISTRATION OR BUREAUCRACY
Administration is the sphere that manages the day-to-day affairs of the
state. Political appointees head U.S. departments such as State and
Homeland Security, but civil servants remain regardless of which political
party is in power. Generally, administrators are not simply instruments of
government but take an active role in formulating policy (Miliband 1993).
Perhaps this recognition is why some government officials allow political
considerations to influence which persons are selected for nonpolitical
government appointments. In 2007, hearings over the firing of nine U.S.
attorneys revealed that politics influenced hiring decisions at the U.S.
Department of Justice, which is a violation of civil service laws. One job
candidate was allegedly rejected for a prosecutor job because she was
perceived as a lesbian while another received favorable reviews because he
was conservative on the three big Gs: God, guns, and gays (Lichtblau
2008). Political appointees sometimes transfer into civil service jobs where
they are difficult to fire. The practice of “burrowing in” happens during
every presidential transition. Congressional Republicans warned the Obama
administration after the 2016 election to avoid allowing political appointees
to convert to career positions (Rein 2016).
Miliband asserts that the administrative feature of the state extends far
beyond the traditional state bureaucracy and includes public corporations,
central banks, regulatory commissions, and other bodies “enjoying a greater
or lesser degree of autonomy … concerned with the management of the
economic, social, and cultural and other activities in which the state is now
directly or indirectly involved” (1993: 278). Miliband’s definition is
broader than state bureaucracy, but the latter is necessary as a “material
expression of the state” and is an outcome of public policy shaped by
politics (Oszlak 2005: 483). Furthermore, the state bureaucracy uses a
myriad of resources including human, financial, technological, and material
to produce programs or services, regulations, and even national symbols
(Oszlak 2005). One example is the programs associated with what political
sociologists call the welfare state. President Trump’s former advisor, Steve
Bannon, has called for the “deconstruction of the administrative state”
seeing regulations, trade deals, and taxes as infringing on U.S. sovereignty
and threatening economic growth (Rucker and Costa 2017). The state
bureaucracy is certainly a powerful entity that has much influence on the
lives of citizens and noncitizens alike.
MILITARY AND POLICE

Kourvetaris (1997) contends that there is little consensus among political
sociologists regarding whether the military and police are considered part
of the state system or a separate institution. Given that both act at the behest
of the state and are under the authority of a political leader who occupies a
government position (e.g. mayor, governor, or president), it seems
reasonable to consider both aspects of the state. Miliband agrees, calling
police and military forces as the branch concerned with the “management
of violence” (1993: 279). Skocpol’s (1993) definition of the state also
includes the police and military. Finally, Tilly (1975) argues that the
repressive features of the state including taxation, policing, and the armed
forces were historically essential for the making of a strong state. For an
authoritarian or nondemocratic state, the military either controls the state or
is in charge of its coercive capabilities (Stepan 1988).
For democracies, there is concern regarding the role of military and
intelligence organizations. Nations need a strong defense, but when the
military and state security apparatus is not accountable to civilian
authorities or when “security organizations … attempt to act with secrecy
and autonomy, democratic control of policy is severely challenged” (Stepan
1988: ix). While Stepan was writing in the aftermath of the Iran–Contra
scandal,3 the current “war on terror” waged by the United States and its
allies renews these concerns because of the more controversial aspects of
the U.S. Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Patriot Act amends
FISA and makes it easier for the U.S. government to gather intelligence on
U.S. citizens. Stepan advocates for the development of the capacity within
civil society “to speak with knowledge and authority on complex matters of
geopolitics, arms, security, and peace” (1988: x) as a counterpoint to the
state. Political sociology is ideally suited to prepare individuals who take
seriously Stepan’s call to action.
JUDICIARY
Skrentny (2006) argues that the United States is a legal state with political
actors using the law and courts to meet political ends. Courts have a
substantial impact through policy making regardless of whether jurists are
conservative or liberal. Not only is the U.S. judiciary independent of
politicians heading the government, but it also acts to protect persons under
state control. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in two different
decisions rejected the position of the George W. Bush administration that
enemy combatants held at the U.S. Naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,
are beyond the jurisdiction of American courts. This allowed detainees the
right to challenge their captivity before a federal judge (Gearan 2004;
Savage 2008). Sociologists need to pay more attention to the role of both
law and the courts in state building and the making of public policy
(Skrentny 2006).
SUBCENTRAL
Miliband’s fifth element is defined as “an extension of central government
and administration, the latter’s antennae or tentacles” (1993: 279). This
component not only communicates and administers from the center to the
periphery, but also brings citizen concerns from the periphery to the center.
Despite centralization, these units are also power centers in and of
themselves as they “affect very markedly the lives of the population they
have governed” (1993: 280). Miliband does not give specific examples, but
branch offices of federal agencies fit this category. The FBI, Immigration
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Department of Justice all have
regional offices that not only communicate and administer federal
mandates, but also communicate local concerns and issues back to
Washington. These regional offices are examples of “diffusion of control”
or having a national presence that is diffused throughout the country
(Oszlak 2005).
Subcentral units of government may manifest themselves differently in
other democratic societies because of cultural differences. One example is a
rural village located in central Chhattisgarh (a state of India) that is remote
due to inaccessible roads and the lack of electricity. Residents had little
direct interaction with lower state officials.4 State officials interact with the
village chief or Patel. Village residents view the Patel as the most powerful
village elder, as he is associated with divine legitimacy. Some villagers
even believe the gods (Froerer 2005) choose the Patel. This places the Patel
above the law. For these villagers, their experience with the tentacles of
central government is mediated by a figure that is endowed with traditional
authority as well as divine legitimacy.
LEGISLATIVE OR PARLIAMENTARY
Miliband characterizes the relationship between the legislative body of a
state and its administration or the chief executive as both cooperation and
conflict. Legislative bodies are independent power centers that are often in
conflict with the chief executive. Like subcentral units, these bodies also
serve a communication function by articulating to the state the needs and
concerns of the populations they represent as well as acting as a conduit
articulating state priorities to a local population.
Because the state is comprised of various units with varying degrees of
autonomy, Bottomore (1979) reminds us that the state is not a unified force.
For example, the United States has an independent judiciary where judges
make decisions that may conflict with the policies of the executive or
legislative branches. In the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as
unconstitutional some of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal programs
designed to combat the Great Depression. There were several legal
challenges to an executive order enacted for national security reasons by
President Donald Trump to restrict entry into the United States of
individuals from mostly Muslim majority countries. The U.S. Supreme
Court allowed the travel ban to take effect, while those challenges make
their way through lower courts.
TEXT BOX 2.1

The Alamo: An Example of Texas Nationalism
Texas was for a time an independent country and that sense of regional
pride and identity are evident today. Texans fly the state flag at the same
height as the American flag and celebrate their history of independence.
The Alamo shrine is a top Texas tourist attraction and also known as the
“cradle of Texas liberty.” The Texas General Land Office has managed
the Alamo site since 2011. The Daughters of the Republic of Texas
(DRT) operated the site from 1905 to 2010. Built in 1718, the Alamo
originally housed Spanish missionaries. It is where a few hundred men,
including Davey Crockett, Jim Bowie, and William B. Travis held out
for thirteen days against the Centralist army of General Antonio López
de Santa Anna. The Alamo fell on March 6, 1836. Approximately a
month later, the Texan Army under Sam Houston shouted, “Remember
the Alamo!” when the Texan Army defeated Santa Anna at the battle of
San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. The website for the Alamo contains a
page titled “Rules of Reverence”
(www.thealamo.org/visit/grounds/rules/index.html) with eleven
prohibitions including loud talking and obscene or offensive clothing.
The Alamo complex contains several buildings, including the mission.
Upon entering, there are several signs reminding visitors of the
sacredness of the building. When operated by the DRT, a plaque placed
by the DRT proclaims “Blood of heroes hath stained me; let the stones
of the Alamo speak that their immolation be not forgotten.” Another sign
reads “Quiet. No Smoking. Gentlemen Remove Hats.” A plaque on
another wall reads “Be Silent Friend. Here Heroes Died to Blaze a Trail
for Other Men.” The message is unmistakable. This is sacred ground
transformed by the blood of those who died defending Texas liberty.
Inside the great hall are several tables with glass tops that display and
protect artifacts. Lines of people snake around these tables to get a
glimpse of a wooden peg from the Crockett cabin and a locket with a
snippet of Crockett’s hair. This is no ordinary piece of wood or hair.
These have become sacred objects. Signs forbid the taking of pictures or
talking in loud voices as this is hallowed ground.
Plaque placed at the Alamo by the Daughters of the Republic of Texas

Features of Stateness
Oszlak (2005) contends that features of “stateness” include diffusion of
control, externalization of power, the institutionalization of authority, and
the capacity to reinforce a national identity. Diffusion is subdivided into two
processes: (1) the ability to extract necessary fiscal resources for performing
state functions and reproducing the state bureaucracy and (2) the
development of a professional group of civil servants that has the expertise
necessary to carry out administrative functions. Externalization of power is
the recognition of a nation-state by others. The institutionalization of
authority refers again to Weber’s ideas regarding the monopoly on coercion.
Finally, the capacity to reinforce a national identity requires producing
symbols that inspire loyalty to a nation-state as well as a sense of belonging
and unity. This sense of shared culture, belonging, and unity is captured in
the concept of nation.
Differentiating Nation and State

The concepts of nation and state are often confused or considered
synonymous. These concepts are distinct as nation refers to a shared culture,
identity, and a desire for political self-determination (Bottomore 1979),
while the state is a legal entity. Nation and state may coincide as the United
States is recognized as a nation-state, because there is both a shared sense of
national unity and a distinct geographical area controlled by U.S. laws that
other nation-states recognize. Political sociologists have contributed to this
confusion by overemphasizing the organizational character of the state at
the expense of the importance of nation (Vujačić 2002). Perhaps because of
the rise of ethnic nationalism and conflict, only recently have sociologists
recognized the political importance and value placed on the perception of
nations by citizens (Greenfield and Eastwood 2005).
NATIONALISM
Nationalism is “a ‘perspective or a style of thought,’ an image of the world,
‘at the core of which lies … the idea of the nation’ which we understand to
be the definition of a community as fundamentally equal and sovereign”
(Greenfield and Eastwood 2005: 250) with sentiments such as “we the
people” capturing the essence of nation. While nation and state are often
linked, a sense of nation can independently exist where there is no state,
such as in Gaza or Palestine. In some areas, a region may wish to break off
and form a separate nation such as the creation of South Sudan in 2011.
Not all nationalist expression necessarily leads to separation, because a
culturally distinct group might prefer to maintain its sense of national
identity within a multinational state, such as French-speaking Québec,
which is considered a nation within a state. State and nation can be
mutually reinforcing but need to be conceptualized as separate entities
(Vujačić 2002). The state is a legal creation, while the attachment to nation
is emotional. While the process of separation is oftentimes bloody (e.g.
Yugoslavia), it need not be, such as with the mostly peaceful breakup of the
former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (Vujačić 2004).
When nationalism coincides with a specific territory that is recognized
as an autonomous political unit, it is termed a nation-state. Nationalist
ideology that coincides with a state is advantageous because it provides
“the state with a new source of legitimacy and dramatically increase[s] its
mobilization potential in comparison to traditional state structures” (Vujačić
2002: 136).
An important question for political sociologists is whether nationalism
is a cause or a consequence of the increased fragmentation of larger
political units or the breaking of states into smaller units (e.g. Yugoslavia
into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro,
and Serbia). Schwarzmantel (2001) argues that it is both, but this depends
on the nature of the nationalist movement in question. For example,
nationalism based on ethnicity is more fragmentary, as its appeal will be
limited to members of that ethnic group. Nation-building in areas where a
variety of ethnic groups coexist cannot rely on a nationalism that is
primarily based on ethnic identity. Nationalism that comes at the expense of
another ethnic, race, or religious group may result in political violence
including genocide.
CIVIL RELIGION
Nationalism is often an expression of civil religion or “attaching sacred
qualities to certain institutional arrangements and historical events” (Scott
and Marshall 2005: 71), which celebrates state or civil society and serves
the same function as religion, including social cohesion and value
socialization. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Emile Durkheim
distinguishes between the sacred and the profane. “Sacred things are things
protected and isolated by prohibitions; profane things are those things to
which the prohibitions are applied and that must keep at a distance from
what is sacred” (Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 38). The profane is ordinary and
the sacred extraordinary. When the profane transitions to the sacred, the
totius substantiae is transformed (Durkheim 1995 [1912]). Both people and
inanimate objects5 are eligible for transformation. When that happens
the powers thereby conferred on that object behave as if they were real. They
determine man’s [sic] conduct with the same necessity as physical force … If he has
eaten the flesh of an animal that is prohibited, even though it is perfectly wholesome,
he will feel ill from it and may die. The soldier who falls defending his flag certainly
does not believe he has sacrificed himself to a piece of cloth.
(Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 229)
There are many examples of civil religious symbols in the United States,
with the flag being the most common. There are prohibitions concerning
how the flag is displayed, handled, and disposed including “don’t let the
flag [sacred] touch the ground [profane].” One of the most dramatic U.S.
examples of civil religious symbols is Constantino Brumidi’s fresco “The
Apotheosis of George Washington” depicting Washington ascending into
the heavens and is painted on the interior ceiling of the capitol dome. In
writing about Brumidi’s Apotheosis, Dove and Guernsey (1995) claim “the
religious connotation was clear: here was a man so virtuous and beloved
that he surely had ascended to heaven, escorted honorably by classical
personifications of freedom and liberty.” The ascension is both a symbolic
and the literal rebirth of Washington from ordinary man to extraordinary
and is but one of many examples of the deification of Washington that
occurred after his death. This association of Washington with virtue
continues with a national myth involving an axe and a cherry tree.
Vujačić (2002: 137) argues that this “sacralization of the political sphere
remain[s] a permanent feature of modern nationalism.” Greenfield and
Eastwood (2005) take issue with equating nationalism with civil religion
arguing that, by definition, religion excludes the secular. Yet we believe that
Durkheim’s concepts of the sacred and profane are applicable to
understanding the cultural meaning and significance of some national
symbols. For an example of civil religion and regional nationalism, see
Textbox 2.1 on the Texas landmark, The Alamo
Constantino Brumidi’s fresco, “Apotheosis of George Washington,” in the
Rotunda of the U.S. Capitol building
Source: Architect of the Capitol
Emergence of Nations
Greenfield and Eastwood (2005) argue that nationalism is cultural and not a
structural phenomenon, yet there are a variety of views on what leads to the
emergence of nations and whether modernity is required. In their review,
Greenfield and Eastwood note that the “modernists” have become popular
since the 1980s, and scholars in this group believe that nation is a result of
specific social and economic processes including capitalism,
industrialization, and the rise of the bureaucratic state. For the modernists, a
bureaucratic state is one of several conditions necessary for the emergence
of nation, suggesting that the state must come first. As anthropologist Carole
Nagengast writes in summarizing various views about nations, “nations do
not produce states, but rather states produce nations … In short, the
integrative needs of the modern state produced nationalist ideology, which
created the nation” (1994: 118). Therefore, the state comes first and the need
to unify society necessitates the creation of nationalist symbols and other
common cultural markers.
While there can be no doubt that nationalism serves the state by
providing a unifying cultural force, the view that the state must precede the
development of nation is disputed by the real sense of nation that exists
independent of a state such as the Kurdish homeland in northern Iraq or
Palestine. If either the Kurds or the Palestinians achieve their dream of an
independent state, it will be an example of a nation that existed prior to the
legal creation of a state. Vujačić (2002) disagrees with the primacy of the
state and challenges state-centered theories of nationalism. Perhaps there are
multiple paths to the emergence of nation-states, and it is not necessary for
state to precede nation.
TEXT BOX 2.2

Undemocratic Practices of American Democracy
President Donald Trump faced criticism for his executive order banning
people from six countries from entering the United States (Chad, Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen). Civil libertarians criticized George
W. Bush for the detention of enemy combatants outside of the United
States as well as for the Patriot Act, which allows for warrantless
wiretaps and other potential civil rights infringements. Neither Trump
nor G. W. Bush is the first American president to suspend or impede civil
liberties in the name of safety and security. The internment of Japanese
citizens ordered by Franklin D. Roosevelt on the advice of the War
Department after the attack on Pearl Harbor was considered by the
American Civil Liberties Union “the worst single wholesale violation of
civil rights of American citizens in our history” (Goodwin 1994). In the
following paragraphs, we describe several other historical examples.
John Adams: The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were passed
during a time of fear of rebellion. The residency period for citizenship
was increased from five to fourteen years. The president was granted the
right to expel any foreigner deemed “dangerous,” although Adams did
not expel anyone. The Sedition Act
made any ‘false scandalous, or malicious’ writing against government, Congress, or
the president, or any attempt ‘to excite them … the hatred of the good people of the
United States, or to stir up sedition,’ crimes punishable by fine and imprisonment.
(McCullough 2001: 505)
Historian David McCullough notes that this was clearly a violation of

the First Amendment of the Constitution. Several individuals faced fines
and/or imprisonment including Vermont Congressman Matthew Lyon.
Abraham Lincoln: Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus,
meaning that persons could be held indefinitely without trial. In the
beginning, this was restricted to smaller geographical areas, but later
became nationwide and had a chilling effect on public dissent. Lincoln
biographer David Donald writes, “Editors feared that they might be
locked up in Fort Lafayette or the Old Capital Prison if they voiced their
criticisms too freely” (1995: 380). He also notes the arrest and
imprisonment of Clement Vallandigham, an Ohio peace Democrat, for
giving a speech where he referred to the president as “King Lincoln.”
Previously, in a speech made in the House of Representatives, he had
charged Lincoln with creating “one of the worst despotisms on Earth”
(1995: 416).
Dwight D. Eisenhower: George W. Bush faced criticism for
circumventing the Geneva Convention protocols by classifying captured
Taliban fighters and other insurgents from Iraq and Afghanistan as enemy
combatants. He is not the first to do so. In the aftermath of World War II,
Eisenhower served as the military governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone.
He reclassified German Prisoners of War (POWs) as Disarmed Enemy
Forces (DEFs), which allowed ignoring Geneva Convention protections.
The advantage of this was the ability to lower the food rations given to
DEFs (History News Network 2003). In fairness, much of Europe was
facing massive food shortages and starvation.
Different Forms of the Nation-State

Political sociologists recognize several different nation-state forms. Tilly’s
analysis of Western Europe suggests that when citizens contested war
making and state making, leaders made concessions resulting in the
expansion of civil liberties and other practices associated with democracy.
In contrast, newer states created after World War II, where the military
dominates the state apparatus, are more likely to fit an authoritarian model.
The three basic models of the modern state include democracy,
totalitarianism, and authoritarian. Before discussing distinctions among
these types, it is important to understand that these taxonomic categories do
not mean that regimes are static and unchanging. Furthermore, regimes may
be a hybrid with a mix of democratic and undemocratic practices with
concepts like democracy or authoritarianism referring to specific “phases or
episodes through which politics evolve, allowing for a shift of our attention
from essential characteristics and stable structures to differences, transitions,
and change” (Brachet-Márquez 2005: 462).
Democracy
A democracy is a “political system in which the opportunity to participate in
decisions is widely shared among all adult citizens” (Dahl 1963: 8). Markoff
(2005) contends that there is a great deal of variation in “democratic”
nations, with some having widespread violations of civil liberties despite
holding free elections and others so inefficient at providing basic
government services that they are termed low-quality democracies. Three
basic types of democracy—direct, representative, and liberal—are not
mutually exclusive.
TYPES OF DEMOCRACY
Examples of direct democracy, where citizens participate in decision-
making, include the ancient Greeks as well as New England town hall and
rural township meetings. This type is best suited for small geographical
areas and local politics where citizen input is easily gathered and quick
decisions are not necessary. A more common form is representative
democracy, where citizens elect someone to vote and voice concerns on
their behalf in a type of legislative body such as the U.S. Congress or the
British Parliament.
The last type, liberal democracy, is characterized by freedoms including
expression, assembly, political participation, and property ownership. Some
term this “liberal capitalist” because of the freedoms associated with private
property ownership and pursuit of profit (Babu 2006; Callinicos 2006;
Spanakos 2007). Liberal democracies are usually representative
democracies.
Using Dahl’s definition, democracy exists on a continuum as the
opportunity for citizen participation varies. The ancient Greeks did not
allow women or slaves to participate, and historically, women and
minorities were disenfranchised. Only since the addition of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1971 have adults younger
than twenty-one been allowed to vote. Currently, some states prevent felons
from voting after their release from prison. This disproportionately affects
African-Americans and some believe this has affected election outcomes
since the 1970s (Manza and Uggen 2006).
Democracy is a process that can be undone and often involves serious
conflicts between parties, including social control agents such as the police
(Markoff 2005). Markoff notes that sociologists such as Seymour Lipset
and Barrington Moore see democracy not as a process, but as a state of
affairs associated with economic development (Lipset) and the
accumulation of wealth (Moore). Viewing democracy as a process and the
potential “undoing” of democracy is a recognition that sometimes
democracies engage in practices that violate democratic principles.
Democracy and Undemocratic Practices

Brachet-Márquez (2005) illustrates two categories of undemocratic
practices:
when democratic procedures are used as a legitimate cover in order to send out
undemocratic messages [and] when democratic procedures are made to systematically
misfunction for some groups (black, immigrants, women, the poor), thereby covering
up prejudice, exclusion, or downright aggression. In the first case, democracy lets in
undemocracy by extending its legal mantle too far, whereas in the other, it fails to
extend it far enough.
(480)
Brachet-Márquez’s systematic misfunction or the failure to extend the

legal mantle is easy enough to understand. Examples include lack of equal
protection before the law and the failure to provide services such as
adequate police protection, sanitation, or education in low-income or
impoverished areas. Brachet-Márquez challenges sociologists and others not
to think of these examples as mere inefficiencies, but rather as a lack of
democracy. Using John Markoff’s (2005) phrasing, systematic misfunction
is allowing a “low-quality” democracy that affects only certain
disadvantaged groups, while those with privilege experience all the rights
and advantages such as safe neighborhoods and quality public schools.
Sudhir Venkatesh’s book Gang Leader for a Day (2008) describes the real
and very personal implications of systematic misfunction affecting residents
of Chicago’s Robert Taylor Homes. He describes residents who do not
bother calling the police or an ambulance because no one responds. As a
result, residents are forced to create informal networks to meet basic needs
including relying on crack-dealing gang members for security and bribes to
the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) to take care of broken appliances or
apartment repairs. Some of these informal arrangements involved
exchanging sex for a needed service. Venkatesh explains:
Then there were all the resources to be procured in exchange for sex: groceries from the
bodega owner, rent forgiveness from the CHA, assistance from a welfare bureaucrat,
preferential treatment from a police officer for a jailed relative. The women’s
explanation for using sex as currency was consistent and pragmatic: If your child was in
danger of going hungry, then you did whatever it took to fix the problem. The women
looked pained when they discussed using their bodies to obtain these necessities; it was
clear that this wasn’t their first—or even their hundredth—preference.
(2008: 215)
Those of us who live middle- or upper-class lives cannot fathom and

certainly would not tolerate such a complete lack of government service and
protection. Charles Tilly suggests that citizens accept the danger posed by
the state in exchange for other services such as hospitals, libraries, and
parks. The fact that “low-quality” democracy exists within “real”
democracies, where some citizens actually receive something in return for
being ruled while others do not, is something that needs more attention from
sociologists.
Brachet-Márquez’s first case, extending the legal mantle too far, occurs
when a democratic state uses its authority to promote undemocratic practice.
This includes holding elections to establish an undemocratic regime that
does away with the rights of women or some other group or legally
tolerating child pornography as “free speech,” but failing to protect the
rights of minors (Brachet-Márquez 2005).
Historical examples applicable to the United States include the Kansas–
Nebraska Act of 1854 that allowed settlers to vote to on whether to permit
slavery. The logic behind voting is popular sovereignty or will of the people.
The problem with popular sovereignty is what Tocqueville (1945 [1835])
has termed the tyranny of the majority which trumps the rights of the
minority. It is paradoxical that the democratic process of voting determined
something undemocratic—whether whites in a specific territory could own
other human beings. Prior to the Obergefell v. Hodges U.S. Supreme Court
decision in 2015, some states (e.g. Maine, Maryland, and Washington) had
referendums with voters approving same-sex marriage. While these
referendums legalized same-sex marriage in three states prior to 2015, the
notion that voters could decide something undemocratic, denying gays and
lesbians the right to marry someone of their choosing, is a more recent
example of the potential for the tyranny of the majority. Brachet-Márquez’s
insights are a call to action for those living in democracies to be vigilant and
not take civil rights for granted. See Text Box 2.2 for examples of decisions
made by U.S. Presidents that could be considered “undemocratic.”
Finally, any examination of democracy should consider the concept of
polyarchy. The term originates from Robert Dahl (1956), and as modified by
Robinson refers to “a system in which a small group actually rules on behalf
of (transnational) capital and mass participation in decision-making is
limited to choosing among competing elites in a tightly controlled electoral
process” (2004: 442). Robinson argues that U.S. foreign policy promotes
polyarchy rather than full democracy to protect capitalism. We consider
Robinson’s arguments more fully in Chapter 10.
Undemocratic State Forms

Markoff and Brachet-Márquez’s ideas underscore that, in practice,
democracies are far from perfect. Significantly, though, democracy does
allow for dissent and possible revision of state practices. The following
summarizes undemocratic state forms such as totalitarianism and
authoritarianism characterized by an absence of civil liberties and protection
from state violence. Like democracies, these undemocratic state forms are
not static; these labels describe a regime at a specific point in time rather
than a permanent, stable category.
TOTALITARIANISM
In contrast to democracy, totalitarian states allow for no meaningful citizen
participation; political expression is severely limited. For example, the
former Soviet Union held elections, but only members of the communist
party were on the ballot. Most scholars agree on three components of
totalitarianism: (1) a comprehensive ideology detailing all aspects of social
life with those opposed exterminated as enemies of the state; (2) a centrally
controlled state bureaucracy that promotes this ideology via complete
control of the communication and information infrastructure and a terror
system for identifying and eliminating state enemies; and (3) a state-
controlled political party that involves mass participation, whether willing
or forced. Other scholars include components such as a sole political party
with one leader and a focus on militarist expansion (Brachet-Márquez
2005).
The distinction between totalitarianism and other nondemocratic forms
of government is not always completely objective, but subject to political
concerns and propaganda. During the height of the cold war, there was a
tendency to label any fascism or communism as totalitarianism. More
recently, some scholars view Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union as
the only true examples of totalitarianism (Brachet-Márquez 2005).
What is the distinction between fascism and totalitarian? According to
Brachet-Márquez, the difference is the degree of ruthlessness used in the
pursuit of the ideological program and the degree of control exercised with
fascist states having less of both. Brachet-Márquez uses Mussolini’s Italy as
an example of fascism as there was less control with the state needing some
cooperation from preexisting institutions and elites.
AUTHORITARIANISM
This category reflects the degree of variation in political systems that are
neither wholly totalitarian nor democratic as authoritarianism occupies a
mediating position. While authoritarian systems have less control over a
society than a totalitarian system, this does not mean that there is less death
and violence inflicted on citizens. For Stepan (1988), the distinguishing
feature is the presence or absence of civil society (voluntary civic and
social organizations), which is nonexistent in totalitarian regimes. These
organizations are present in an authoritarian state albeit restricted.
Unfortunately, the repressed nature of civil society inhibits an authoritarian
state from transitioning toward democracy (Brachet-Márquez 2005).
Another distinction is the lack of an overarching ideology guiding
societal transformation. Markoff (2005) finds that authoritarian states are
more pragmatic and pluralistic in their ideology. Similar to totalitarian
regimes, authoritarian governments also rely on bureaucratic structures and
technology for citizen repression (Brachet-Márquez 2005).
Saudi citizens do not elect their rulers and have limited civil liberties,
with men having more rights than women. Despite ranking eighth overall in
authoritarianism6 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2016), Saudi Arabia lacks
some of the characteristics of a totalitarian regime such as a comprehensive
state terror network. Pakistan is another example of nation-state with
limited civil liberties and where the military at times dominates the state
apparatus. In 2007, Pakistan President General Musharraf declared a state
of emergency, imposed press restrictions (“Pakistan Says More Than 3000
Freed” 2007), and had over 4,500 persons arrested, including his political
opponents (Perlez 2007). Although Musharraf was victorious in the 2007
election, this election was boycotted by his political opponents. The
Pakistani Supreme Court subsequently ruled the 2007 election invalid.
Musharraf responded by dismissing the Supreme Court judges and filling
judicial posts with his supporters who dismissed election challenges (Gall
2007). Then President George W. Bush called on Musharraf to “have
elections soon, and you need to take off your uniform” (Rohde 2007),
voicing disapproval for a military leader controlling the state apparatus.
Musharraf was ousted from the presidency of Pakistan in 2008 with the
election of Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of former prime minister, and
assassinated opposition party leader Benazir Bhutto (Perlez and Masood
2008). Since then, the Pakistani Supreme Court ruled Musharraf’s actions
invalid, including the installation of judges supporting his emergency rule
(Shahzad and Toosi 2009). Although Musharraf was removed peacefully
and democratically as head of state, does this mean that Pakistan is now a
democracy? Using Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s as
examples, Stepan (1988) describes an important distinction between
democratization and liberalization, which can be applied to Pakistan. Under
liberalization, media censorship may be lifted, political prisoners released,
and perhaps some free speech tolerated. In contrast, democratization
involves the right for open and free elections, where any qualified adult can
run for political office. Whether the current democratically elected regime
will be allowed to govern without another military takeover remains an
open question, given Pakistani history of democratically elected
governments being disrupted by military takeovers. At best, Pakistan is
currently considered a hybrid or a cross between a weak democracy and an
authoritarian regime (Economist Intelligence Unit 2016). In a post-
presidential speech, George W. Bush also raises the point of making a
distinction between real democracies and those regimes that may allow
some liberalization, but free and fair elections are not possible under the
current regime. He remarks “No democracy pretends to be a tyranny. Most
tyrannies pretend they are democracies” (2017).
China is another example of a state that is not currently totalitarian. The
Tiananmen Square massacre is a powerful reminder of extreme political
repression with thousands killed including those protesting in several
Chinese cities besides Beijing between April 15 and June 4, 1989. Yet, this
massacre is usually considered an example of authoritarianism rather than
totalitarianism because it occurred after the death of Chairman Mao when
the Chinese government made some economic and political changes
including offering minority factions a token presence in government in
exchange for unconditional regime support (Brachet-Márquez 2005). More
recently, the Chinese government has enacted some economic reforms, but
it has been slower to bring about political reform that would allow an entity
other than the Communist Party control of the government. Perhaps
because of some lessening of societal control, China is a hybrid state that is
not purely totalitarian (Orum 2001).
Complicating the ability to differentiate between democracies and
authoritarian regimes is the tendency for some Western democracies to
accept authoritarian regimes as democracies merely because elections are
held. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (www.hrw.org), an independent,
nongovernmental organization, has charged Western democracies with
failing to hold regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kenya, and Russia
accountable (“U.S. Is Too Quick to Accept Nations as True Democracies,
Rights Group Says” 2008; “Washington Welcomes Saudi ruler, Mohammad
Bin Salman” 2018). According to the HRW, false democracies hold
elections but fail on other measures including the right of assembly, a free
press, and a strong civil society. Kenneth Roth, the executive director of
HRW, argues that the willingness of Western democracies to ignore
authoritarian practices is related to how strategically or commercially
important an authoritarian regime is rather than the actual abuse of political
and civil rights. This is related to Robinson’s (2004) charge that the United
States supports polyarchy rather than democracy because it benefits the
transnational elite, or those from across the globe who are wealthy and
powerful. Whether or not elites dominate the political process is only one of
the issues debated by dueling theoretical perspectives on the state.
THEORETICAL VIEWS ON THE STATE

Sociological theories of the state have attempted to answer four basic
questions: “(1) in whose interests does the state act?; (2) who influences and
controls the state?; (3) to what extent do the masses hold political elites
accountable?; and (4) how do states change?” (Olsen and Marger 1993:
252). Alford and Friedland (1985) recognized three basic models of power
summarizing state–societal relations including pluralist, elite (managerial),
and class or Marxist views of the state. Rather than championing one
specific theoretical model, Alford and Friedland argue that all three theories
are useful depending on the level of analysis, with pluralism for the
individual, elite for examining the state as a set of networked organizations,
and the class model for society. Additionally, there are newer perspectives
such as institutionalism, rational choice, and postmodernism.
Pluralism
Alford and Friedland (1985) contend that pluralists do not really refer to the
state per se. Instead pluralists substitute phrases such as political system, the
polity, or the pluralist system. Nonetheless, pluralists have a view of the
state with important distinctions when compared to other theorists,
including worldview, the nature of political institutions, and the relations
between them. Some of these distinctions will be discussed later, but it is
important to remember that there are important nuances between different
theorists operating under the same theoretical umbrella, which cannot
possibly be captured in a brief overview.
Pluralism is associated with sociologists Talcott Parsons and Seymour
Lipset as well as political scientists Robert Dahl and Ted Gurr. According to
Marvin Olsen (1993), one of the basic premises of pluralism can be traced
back to Tocqueville who argued for the creation of voluntary associations to
combat the potential for “tyranny of the majority.” Tocqueville believed that
the latter was an outcome of mass equality occurring in the absence of a
hierarchical power structure that typifies feudal societies. The growth in
voluntary associations leads to the development of a strong civil society that
functions independent of the state. By virtue of this independence, voluntary
associations have their own power base. Olsen (1993) mentions several
characteristics these organizations share, including voluntary membership
based on shared interests and concerns, limited sphere in the lives of
members, being private or not connected to government, an ability to
connect grassroots activism to the national level, and sufficient resources to
influence political leaders.
Olsen acknowledges that some of these organizations are political, such
as political parties and nonpartisan political action groups. However, these
groups may also be nonpolitical in nature, such as professional associations
or religious or civic groups termed “parapolitical actors” (1993: 147) that
become involved only when their direct interests are at stake. Pluralism,
then, involves an arena of competing organizational actors that attempt to
influence the state. The state favors no particular set of actors. Although
individuals independently do not have a great deal of power and influence,
their concerns are heard through their membership in these voluntary
associations.
According to pluralists, the core function of the state is to “achieve
consensus and thus social order through continuous exchanges of demands
and responses by social groups and government” (Alford 1993: 260). In
contrast to elite and class perspectives, the pluralist model rejects that the
state represents one dominant group at the expense of others or that the state
is controlled by elites. For pluralists, the state is “an impartial arbitrator
among competing pressure groups” (Alford and Friedland 1985; Olsen and
Marger 1993: 255). Pluralists recognize the state as an institution that deals
with power but oppose the idea that the state has any interests of its own
(Olsen and Marger 1993). If the process works as intended, the state and
society’s interests are one and the same (Alford and Friedland 1985). This is
in direct opposition to state-centrics who view the state as having its own
interests. Pluralists also oppose Marxists regarding the importance of social
class. For pluralists, social class is only one of many competing interest
groups (Alford 1993).
Olsen is quite right when he remarks that pluralism is “the unofficial
political philosophy of the United States” (1993: 150), as pluralism sounds
very similar to what grade school children are taught about democracy. In
fact, democratic is one of the many terms writers have used when writing
about pluralism (Alford and Friedland 1985). Class theorists take this a step
further and argue that pluralism is a deliberate falsehood taught to hide the
real source of power in any capitalist democracy: big business. In
comparing the pluralist perspective to others, Alford and Friedland write “In
both managerial [elite] and class perspectives, popular identifications with
the state or with local political party organizations are products of elite
manipulation or false consciousness deriving from the illusory universality
of the capitalist state” (1985: 24).
Regardless of which theory is correct on this latter point, the pluralist
paradigm suffers from some important weaknesses. Expanding on more
general criticisms summarized in Chapter 1, six weaknesses of this model
are viability, harmony of interest, difficulty of new organizations to enter the
political process, iron law of oligarchy, lack of sufficient power resources,
and the lack of viable political channels (Olsen 1993). Viability refers to the
question of whether individuals really are connected to and involved with
voluntary organizations. While one might be a card-carrying member, this
does not equal participation. This is an important criticism because one of
the premises of pluralism is that voluntary associations provide an
opportunity to develop the skills necessary to become more politically
effective. Furthermore, without active member participation, organizations
will not be effective conduits between society and government. With Robert
Putnam’s book Bowling Alone (2000) concluding that involvement in
voluntary associations is declining, there is little evidence of viability. More
recent research suggests that the downward trend in voluntary association
membership is continuing (Painter and Paxton 2014).
Harmony of interests assumes that despite competing interests, there is a
basic consensus on core values. Olsen (1993) contends that when this is not
the case, pluralism may result in societal paralysis and even destruction. In
Chapter 1, we found that those with less power resources typically lose in
the political process (Piven and Cloward 1988). Resource procurement is
difficult for newer organizations undercutting the ability to participate in the
society–state mediation process (Olsen 1993). At worse, these groups
become simply mouthpieces for government as they lack resources needed
to maintain autonomy. Further, even with resources, if there is no
mechanism for influencing the state, effectiveness is limited. In other words,
pluralism “specifies the role that intermediate organizations should enact in
political affairs, but says nothing about how this role should be carried out”
(Olsen 1993: 151). Olsen’s final criticism concerns Robert Michels’ “iron
law of oligarchy” or the tendency for all organizations to become
centralized and controlled by only a few (Zeitlin 1981). If this is the case, it
would seem that civic organizations and other voluntary associations are not
really a training ground for future leaders as folks do not join, and of those
who do, most will not have the opportunity to assume a leadership role.
Elite Views of the State
Alford and Friedland prefer managerial to elite or bureaucratic to describe
this perspective as they emphasize the “organizational base of elites and
their control of the state” (1985: 161). We use the term elite because this is
the more common label. Prewitt and Stone (1993) contend that elite theory
is based on two principles: (1) society can be divided into two groups, the
masses and the smaller number that rule them; and (2) the nature and
direction of any society can be understood by understanding the
composition, structure, and conflicts of those who rule.
The core function of the state is maintaining the dominance of existing
elites (Alford 1993). Like class theorists, elite theorists believe that power is
concentrated, but disagree that it is based on class position. For elite
theorists, managerial control is more important than property ownership
(Alford and Friedland 1985) as power is the result of holding positions of
authority in bureaucracies that control resources, and these complex
organizations manage every important sphere of social life. Important
bureaucracies may be political or governmental institutions, but can also be
banks, corporations, religious organizations, or the media, to name only a
few (Alford 1993).
Unlike pluralists who believe that ordinary citizens can be influential
through voluntary associations, elite theorists view those controlling the
state bureaucracy “as relatively insular and rarely influenced by other
members of society” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 255). What makes elites
inaccessible also explains why elite control is so successful. “The
combination of expertise, hierarchical control, and the capacity to allocate
human, technological, and material resources gives the elites of bureaucratic
organizations power not easily restrained by the mechanisms of pluralistic
competition and debate” (Alford 1993: 259).
While elite theorists argue that real power rests with those who occupy
positions within dominant organizations, this does not mean that elites are
unified. Quite the contrary, elites compete with other elites for control and
influence and use their positions to manipulate information and frame public
opinion. In short, they manipulate the masses. There are a variety of
different “flavors” of elite theory, but key types include classical elite,
power elite, and class domination views.
CLASSICAL ELITE THEORY
Theorists including Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, and Gaetano Mosca
are often lumped together under one rubric when ignoring important
distinctions in their social theorizing. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, there
are some important commonalties including the view that elite rule is
necessary. Michels takes a less negative view of the masses by leaning
more toward the ideas of Max Weber, including his view of bureaucratic
structure by noting the inevitability of such organizations as well as
potential negative outcomes. Marger (1987) argues that compared to his
contemporaries, Michels is the most sociological, and for this reason, we
focus on his ideas.
Michels believed that the real power struggle was not between the elites
and the masses, but between old elites and newer ones challenging the
former for leadership positions. Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” was based
on his analysis of the German Social Democratic (GSD) party. The GSD
was deliberately chosen to illustrate that iron law, or rule by only a few,
occurs even when an organization is governed by democratic principles
(Marger 1987).
POWER ELITE
Unlike some classical elite views, C. Wright Mills was critical of elite
control and bureaucracy, believing that they undermined democracy. Like
Michels, he believed that society was controlled by elites, specifically, “the
power elite” comprising three interlocking groups: corporate, political, and
military. Elites can use their position in one domain to become dominant in
another. An example is the number of past U.S. presidents who were
military generals (e.g. Washington, Grant, Jackson, and Eisenhower) or
wealthy Americans who translate wealth into political power (e.g. Kennedy,
Rockefeller, Bush, and Trump). Unlike classical theorists, Mills also
conceptualized a mediating level between “the power elite” and the masses
termed middle levels of power or organized special interest groups. The
third level is the unorganized masses (Mills 1956).
Mills believed that three factors explained the cohesive and unified
nature of the power elite: common socialization as a result of similar career
paths and educational experiences, the maintenance of continued personal
and business ties (e.g. marriage and business arrangements), and the
interdependent nature of the triangle of power (Olsen and Marger 1993).
CLASS DOMINATION THEORY
G. William Domhoff is an intellectual heir of C. Wright Mills and also
credits E. Digby Baltzell, Paul M. Sweeney, and Robert A. Dahl as
important influences (Domhoff 1993). While some describe Domhoff as an
“empirical Marxist” (Lo 2002), he explicitly rejects this label (Domhoff
1993) and criticizes elite theory and prefers what he calls “class domination
theory” (Domhoff 2006). We include him under the elite rubric because he
shares with other elite theorists a belief that there is a dominant group in
society with elite membership based on both having wealth and holding a
position of power. He is best known for his analysis of four intertwining
power structure networks: policy planning, candidate selection, special
interests, and opinion shaping (Domhoff 2006).
Domhoff argues that the power elite are a “corporation-based upper
class” comprised of both owners and top-level corporate executives. The
power elite control enough money and wealth, occupy enough positions of
power, and win enough of the time to conclude that the federal government
is dominated—though not necessarily totally controlled, by the power elite.
While Mills emphasizes similar socialization experiences and current
interpersonal ties through business and family connections, Domhoff
emphasizes the similarity of social backgrounds by investigating social club
membership, private school membership, and attendance at prestigious
universities (Domhoff 2006, 2014). For example, though Bill Clinton was
not born wealthy, he shares with other elites his membership in prestigious
organizations, social clubs, and educational experiences (e.g. Yale Law
School, Georgetown University, and Oxford). Domhoff argues in the latest
edition of “Who Rules America” that the
corporate community and the upper class are basically two sides of the same coin and
the corporate rich are one and the same, so there is less emphasis on members of the
upper class ‘controlling’ the corporate community and greater use of the concept of a
‘corporate rich’ to express this basic unity of corporation and class.
(2014: vii)
Critics of elite theory question whether elites are truly cohesive enough
to rule, whether the masses are really dominated by elites, and whether elite
models are too simplistic. Domhoff criticizes other elite theorists for not
acknowledging the ability of the corporate elite to dominate political elites
such as elected officials. Although Domhoff encourages us to consider the
importance of class domination, he does not hold to other tenets of
Marxism such as the primacy of class struggle and the means of production
(Domhoff 1993).
Class-Based Views of the State

While class-based theories are more a theory of society than a specific
theory of state (Alford and Friedland 1985), Olsen and Marger (1993)
contend that the ideas of class theorists represent “one of the most
comprehensive explanations of the state and its power” (252). As previously
discussed, there are a variety of neo-Marxian perspectives on the state, but
these perspectives share some core concepts and assumptions.
For Marxists, economics determines the actual nature of the state and
the role played in influencing other aspects of social life. All institutions are
shaped by the mode of economic production. For this reason, class theorists
use the term capitalist state rather than only state to underscore the role of
capitalism. Under capitalism, “the state is controlled by and acts in the
interests of the productive property-owning class” (Olsen and Marger 1993:
252).
The core function of the state is to maintain and reproduce the existing
class relationships using both formal (law and the courts) and informal
(socialization of children in schools and families) means (Alford 1993).
Skocpol argues that “the crucial difference of opinion is over which means
the political arena distinctly embodies: fundamentally consensually based
legitimate authority, or fundamentally coercive domination” (1993: 307).
Class-based theorists believe the latter and that the state emerged as a
mechanism for controlling the masses. Class conflict is managed by both
force and control of ideology (Nagengast 1994).
Viewing the state as shaped by economic forces and dominated by the
capitalist class challenges the pluralist view of an institution that arbitrates
between competing interest groups and an autonomous state that acts on
behalf of greater society. However, neo-Marxists disagree on the exact
nature of the relationship between the dominant capitalist class and the form
and functioning of the state. According to Gold, Lo, and Wright (1975),
there are three Marxist theories of capitalist states—instrumental, structural,
and Hegelian–Marxist—that seek to answer two basic questions: “Why does
the state serve the interests of the capitalist class?” and “How does the state
function to maintain and expand the capitalist system?” (Gold, Lo, and
Wright 1993: 269).
INSTRUMENTAL
Ralph Miliband is perhaps the most well-known proponent of this view that
gives primacy to understanding the ties between the ruling class and the
state (Gold, Lo, and Wright 1993). Quite simply, the state serves the
interests of the capitalist class because the state is an instrument or tool
used by this class to dominate society. This does not mean that dominant-
class members directly rule by holding office; rather, they rule indirectly by
exerting control over state officials (Olsen and Marger 1993).
This perspective has driven a research agenda that has examined the
direct ties between members of the capitalist class and the state as well as
other related institutions such as political parties and how the capitalist
class shapes government policy to fit their interests (Gold, Lo, and Wright
1993). This shaping can be direct through the development of state policy
or indirect through pressure and influence. Gold and colleagues argue that
this view has been important for the development of the sociology of the
capitalist class. Research from this perspective documents both the
existence of a dominant class and the connections between members and
the state apparatus. Nonetheless, there are criticisms of instrumentalism,
including a failure to consider state autonomy, historical exceptions, and
causation.
The failure to include autonomy includes two types: that of the state and
other related institutions. As Gold and colleagues argue, “There are also
state policies which cannot easily be explained by direct corporate
initiatives but which may come from within the state itself” (1993: 271).
For example, to preserve the capitalist state, the state may need to enact
policies such as social security payroll taxes or import restrictions that are
opposed by capitalists (Block 1993). This would not be possible without an
autonomous state. Furthermore, culture and ideology are promoted by the
state and not simply manipulated by the capitalist class (Gold, Lo, and
Wright 1993). As Block argues, this view “neglects the ideological role of
the state. The state plays a critical role in maintaining the legitimacy of the
social order, and this requires that the state appear to be neutral in the class
struggle” (1993: 296). Even if the instrumentalists are correct, the fact that
the state must appear neutral calls for a more nuanced and complicated
framework for analyzing state policy (Block 1993).
Related to the argument of state autonomy is the criticism of historical
exception. This argument suggests that not all policies enacted by a
capitalist state are interests of the dominant class. Gold, Lo, and Wright
(1993) note that business leaders were opposed to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
New Deal programs. In fact, these leaders considered Roosevelt, a member
of the upper class, a “class traitor” (Brands 2008). Gold, Lo, and Wright
(1993) also note that even if some of the reforms implemented by the state
on behalf of the working class ultimately co-opt the working class, to
assume that all reforms are a co-optation denies the possibility of class
struggle over reform.
Finally, the issue of causation challenges the assumption that state
policy can be explained by the voluntary acts of powerful persons rather
than an acknowledgement that the actions of the ruling class can be limited
by structural factors. Gold, Lo, and Wright (1993) contend that this view of
causation is the result of an instrumentalist view that rose to challenge a
pluralist view of the state. Both views contend that social causes are due to
actions of dominant actors that act on behalf of their own interests. The
difference is that instrumentalists see one dominant actor, the ruling class,
whereas pluralists believe that there are many groups attempting to control
the state. This view of a dominant class that acts in a manner consistent
with its own interests assumes that the ruling class is cohesive and unified
(Block 1993). In Fred Block’s “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule”, he
argues that a “viable Marxist theory of the state depends on the rejection of
the idea of a conscious, politically directive, ruling class” (1993: 305). This
alternative view is a structural theory of the state.
STRUCTURAL
Just as Miliband is associated with an instrumental view of the state, Nicos
Poulantzas is a main proponent of the structural view. The historical
Miliband–Poulantzas debate was the dueling neo-Marxists’ perspectives of
instrumentalism and structuralism. While agreeing that the state acts to
maintain capitalism, Poulantzas rejects instrumentalism, arguing that state
functioning is a direct consequence of both structure and the contradictions
of capitalism.
Because society is dependent on a functioning economy, state officials
must protect the economy and, in doing so, serve the interests of the
dominant class (Olsen and Marger 1993). According to Gold, Lo, and
Wright, structuralists are interested in “how the state attempts to neutralize
or displace these various contradictions” (1993: 271) in order to maintain
the capitalist system. In Poulantzas’ (1975) influential book, Political
Power and Social Classes, he argues that there is a contradiction between
the social character of production and the private appropriation of surplus
product, threatening the current system through working-class unity and
capitalist-class disunity.
Capitalist-class disunity is fostered by competition. Far from being
unified, capitalists compete with each other for surplus, and therefore do not
always share economic and political interests. The only way to protect the
long-term interests of the capital class, as opposed to short-term
individualized interests of specific capitalists, is to have a state that
maintains some autonomy, even if the state, from time to time, enacts
working-class concessions such as minimum-wage laws. The long-term
survival of capitalism is dependent on providing these concessions in an
attempt to prevent working-class unity. Without such concessions, workers
might band together and overthrow the capitalist state.
In summarizing the structuralist view, Gold, Lo, and Wright (1993) note
that the degree of state autonomy varies depending on the degree of conflict
between classes, the intensity of divisiveness within classes, and which
factions constitute a dominant-class power bloc. Gold et al. argue that the
lack of any discussion that might explain how these functional relationships
are regulated weakens this approach to understanding the capitalist state.
HEGELIAN–MARXIST
This final neo-Marxist perspective begins with the question, “what is the
state?” The answer is a mystification or an institution that serves the
interests of the dominant class though it appears to serve the interests of
society as a whole. This shows that the state is an illusion, with most
writers exploring how this mystification process occurs. Most writers
emphasize the role of ideology, consciousness, and legitimacy. Although
these ideas have advanced the understanding of politics, they are not a
coherent theory of the state much less of the relation between the state and
society (Gold, Lo, and Wright 1993). Thinkers associated with this
perspective (e.g. Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, and Georg Lukacs)
include what is called the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.
Updated Marxist Theories of the State

In reviewing Marxist theories of the state, twenty-five years after the classic
description of Gold, Lo, and Wright (1975), one of the original authors,
Clarence Lo, argues that there are four “currents” of Marxist theories of
state that he labels empirical Marxism, socialist democracy, postcolonial
Marxist political theory, and critical theory of the capitalist state. This
section is based predominantly on this summary (Lo 2002).
EMPIRICAL MARXISM
Scholars working in this area have transcended the famous Miliband–
Poulantzas debate by incorporating both perspectives. Lo argues that
Domhoff’s research on the American power structure fits under this rubric
because class domination and class conflict are the foci of Domhoff’s
analysis of power. Work that “analyzes class power in its situational,
institutional, and systemic forms” is also classified under this label (2002:
198), including examinations that theorize the role of class power both on
the formation of the welfare state and its impact on social classes. Lo
believes that empirical Marxism has made several contributions to Marxist
thought by demonstrating why state policies benefit capitalism and by the
precise measurement of concepts and causal models developed by the
analytical Marxist, Erik Olin Wright.
SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY
Lo describes this current as that which criticizes the structural approach of
Poulantzas and others. This Marxist model theorizes a socialist democracy
where political practice and protest are motivated toward creating a society
characterized by democratic practices, egalitarianism, meeting of basic
needs, and a production cycle free from the need for profit maximization.
Those working within this tradition reject the notion of a working class
organized around only economic issues and see individuals with multiple
identities such as gender, race, and ethnicity. Because the classic Marxian
idea about the inevitability of class struggle is rejected, Lo contends that a
major problem for both theorists and practitioners is specifying under what
conditions individuals could be unified and organized, given their shifting
conflicts and multiple identities.
POSTCOLONIAL MARXIST POLITICAL THEORY

This strand is the heir of the early Hegelian–Marxist model as it relies on
some of the earlier writings of Karl Marx and also sees the state as a false
universal. Marx’s earlier writings are combined with postcolonial theories
of literature that critically examine the colonizer’s view and interpretation
of third-world culture and the construction of race and ethnic identities.
One of the more influential works to come out of this theoretical thread is
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire.
Specifically, Empire is a political organization of global flow and
exchanges that has no geographical boundaries (Hardt and Negri 2001).
Sovereignty is exercised through transnational institutions (e.g. North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], the World Trade Organization, and
the G77), the dominant military power of the United States and its allies,
and international control of monetary funds by elites through other
transnational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank. Although Hardt and Negri rely on a variety of
theoretical traditions, Lo argues that Empire is framed within a Marxist
tradition for several reasons, including the belief that “the sovereignty of
Empire is interrelated with the processes of capital accumulation … that
global sovereignty is a false universal, … and that the cultural prerequisites
for labor activate the facilitative power of persons that will undermine
empire” (Lo 2002: 313).
CRITICAL THEORY OF THE CAPITALIST STATE

While drawing on the writings of those associated with the Frankfurt
School of critical theory, Lo associates this strand with Claus Offe (1996),
whose work demonstrates that pressure outside of the capitalistic system
intensifies internal conflict, which poses three challenges to the state:
political sovereignty, popular legitimacy, and economic effectiveness. Offe
argues that the economic inefficiency of the state is due to weakening state
sovereignty and political legitimacy. Lessening state sovereignty is
evidenced by the inability of the state to intervene in either the economy or
other aspects of social life. The state capacity for regulation has been
weakened by globalization as well as lack of legitimacy. As Lo explains,
“people simply do not trust the state to act to reflect the general will; rather
they see the state as pursuing particularistic aims of interest groups, experts,
bureaucrats, or clients” (2002: 219). Like many questions posed by political
sociologists, this view of the state is hotly contested. One of the alternatives
to a class-based approach is a state-centric view that became popular
because of inadequacies with all three basic perspectives (Amenta 2005).
State-Centric
Theda Skocpol’s influential introduction to the edited volume Bringing the
State Back In summarizes this approach (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
Skocpol 1985), in which the state and other large political institutions are
situated at the center of political sociology (Amenta 2005). Her work is
influenced by Max Weber and conceptualizes the state as a “set of
organizations with unique functions and mission” with “state structures and
actors having central influence over politics and states” (Amenta 2005: 96–
97). In the words of Skocpol, this “organizational” or “realist” view of the
state
refuses to treat states as if they were mere analytic aspects of abstractly conceived
modes of production, or even political aspects of concrete class relations and struggles.
Rather it insists that states are actual organizations controlling (or attempting to control)
people and territories.
(1993: 311–312)
This is a departure from Marxist, elite, and pluralist views of state that
respectively give primacy to class domination, ruling elite, and interest
groups. Quite simply, this more Weberian approach advocates that the state
is an independent actor not beholden to class interests or merely an arena for
political mediation (Skocpol 1985). This does not mean that class or
dominant groups are unimportant. To the contrary, “linkages to class forces”
and “politically mobilized groups” along with the structure of state
organizations and their location within the state apparatus are deemed
important especially for those attempting to explain state stability as well as
revolution or change (Skocpol 1993).
While Skocpol acknowledges the diversity of neo-Marxian views on the
“role of the capitalist state,” she argues that this perspective also suffers
from a society-centered view that cannot account for the role of a state as an
independent actor. She writes:
virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply embedded society-
centered assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states are
inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand
modes of production. Many possible forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled
out by definitional fiat.
(1985: 5)
According to Skocpol, even the neo-Marxist structuralist perspective

that considers the “relative autonomy of the state” falls short of considering
true autonomy necessitated by a need to maintain order, the international
orientation of states, and an organization that creates a capacity for state
officials to develop and implement their own policies. She further criticizes
neo-Marxists for ignoring variations in state structures that lessens the
utility of these approaches in comparative research (Skocpol 1985, 1993).
For example, Skocpol asserts that neo-Marxist models are better at
comparing states “across [emphasis Skocpol’s] modes of production, rather
than across nations within capitalism” (1985: 33). In other words, neo-
Marxist models have less utility for understanding contrasts between
advanced capitalistic states with concentrated technologies (e.g. Japan,
United States, and Germany) and other capitalistic states whose economies
may be more based on agriculture and resources extraction (e.g. mining and
logging).
Skocpol (1985) contends that even the United States can be shown to
have state autonomy despite its fragmented system of dispersing authority
throughout the federal system, division of sovereignty among the various
branches, and lack of a centralized bureaucratic structure. Most importantly,
the degree of state autonomy is not a fixed feature, but varies as a result of
structural transformations due to both internal and external factors including
crises necessitating a response from elites and administrators. Autonomous
state action is most likely when career bureaucrats occupying positions
within the state bureaucracy are insulated from external pressure.
A state-centric approach considers both state autonomy and state
capacity, which are not synonymous. As Orloff explains, “state capacities
are based on financial and administrative resources; stable access to
plentiful finances and a loyal and skilled body of officials facilitates state
initiatives” (1993: 9–10). Pedriana and Stryker (1997) suggest that state
capacity is also linked to statute interpretation with a more liberal
interpretation linked to a greater capacity for state action.
While capacity refers to resources available to state managers, state
autonomy refers to independence or the ability of state actors to act freely
without interference from outside forces. In writing about state autonomy,
Skocpol contends that “states conceived as organizations claiming control
over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not
simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or
society” (1985: 9). The implication of this view is to see the state as a
“structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to,
or fused with, the interests of the dominant class of society or the full set of
member groups in the polity” (Skocpol 1993: 308).
While Skocpol and associates brought “the state back in” to deal with an
overly Marxist view that equated state control with class domination, this
has not gone unchallenged. In theorizing about the rise of a global capitalist
class brought about as a result of globalization, Robinson argues that
the case for ‘bringing the state back in’ has been overemphasized, tending to equate
states with the institutional form they have taken in the nation-state. In contrast, a new
transnational studies requires that analysts ‘take out’ the crippling nation-state
framework into which states, social classes, political systems and so have been
pigeonholed.
(1998: 565)
Political Institutional or Institutionalist

State-centered scholars created the way for a political institutional theory.
This perspective emphasizes both the state and other political institutions,
including the social, economic, and ideological factors precipitating policy
formation (Orloff 1993). While state-centric was the initial phrase,
institutionalist is the preferred terminology (Amenta 2005) as it is less likely
to convey the idea that factors external to the state are unimportant (Orloff
1993). In his review of the institutional approach, Amenta describes several
varieties of political institutional theory. We limit our discussion here to
whom he terms the new institutionalists (2005: 103) or those who view
states as organizations and thus apply organizational theory.
The scope is not limited to the state as other major political
organizations are also considered, including electoral systems and political
parties. A political institutional approach places more emphasis than the
state-centric approach on “the impact of political contexts on politics more
so than the role of bureaucratic state actors” (Amenta 2005: 104). For
example, in the United States, issues that appeal to a wide variety of
constituents from all over the country are more likely to be dealt with in a
system that elects congressional representatives based on geographical
distribution. A related political context, fragmentation, includes the lack of
integrated vertical or horizontal political authority. As explained by Amenta,
The United States has a presidential and non-parliamentary system that allows
intramural conflict. Members of Congress from the same party can defect from the
President’s legislative program without risking loss of office and can initiate competing
programs … Any laws that make it through this [legislative] maze can be declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.
(2005: 108)
Fragmentation, then, is an example of a political contextual factor that

affects the formation of state policy, including what sociologists call “the
welfare state.” The political institutional approach considers this as well as
other contextual factors. See Figure 2.1 for a comparison of the four main
theories of the state (pluralist, elite, Marxist, and state-centric/institutional).
FIGURE 2.1 Differences between Major Models of the

State
OTHER EMERGING VIEWS OF THE STATE
Rational Choice
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) views all political entities as rational actors.
Lobbying, foreign policy, or the relations between other nation-states, as
well as domestic policy, are seen in terms of a game where various players
vie for scarce resources, including power. Kiser and Bauldry (2005) argue
that RCT has only recently become influential in political sociology and that
this is due to the development of a sociological version that bypasses earlier
criticisms by incorporating the influence of history, culture, and institutions.
Because RCT has only recently emerged as a viable perspective for political
sociologists, there is not a fully developed theory of the state. Yet,
researchers have applied this theory to actions of political actors, including
the state. Examples of substantive areas of research guided by RCT include
nationalism, congressional policy making, and the existence of red tape in
bureaucracies (Kiser and Bauldry 2005). RCT has also been applied to
social movement participation (Chapter 8) and the state response to
terrorism (Chapter 9). Despite the promise of RCT, it still needs to
synthesize several different approaches to develop a more general theory
and is not useful in situations where there is a high degree of uncertainty
about the benefits and costs of actions or when both costs and benefits are
low (Kiser and Bauldry 2005).
Postmodern
Some postmodernists may claim that politics is dead, or rather “politics is
secret, veiled, or now even subpolitical” (Agger and Luke 2002: 162), with
the study of politics moving from traditional power centers such as
parliament or congress to the capitalist economy and culture. Agger and
Luke embrace the postmodern turn in political sociology, believing that it
challenges all political theorists to “rethink politics” (2002: 160), which will
result in a broadening research agenda.
Postmodernism is heavily influenced not only by Marx and critical
theory thinkers but also by philosophers and other humanities scholars. This
broad perspective is not bound to a single discipline or to a narrowly
focused question such as “what is the state?” Postmodernists seem more
interested in describing the consequences of the state or declaring the state
obsolete, rather than defining the state itself. While Lo (2002) characterizes
Hardt and Negri’s work as an example of what he terms a postcolonial
Marxist perspective, their work shares with a postmodern view a look at the
political beyond the state to Empire as well as power in a global context.
Many of the themes examined in subsequent chapters are influenced by
a postmodern perspective. Chapter 9 reviews some of the implications of the
“surveillance state” related to the implementation of the Patriot Act and the
creation of what Giorgio Agamben (2005) calls the “state of exception.”
Chapter 10 considers the causes and consequences of globalization,
including predictions for the future of the nation-state. Although there may
not be a postmodern theory of the state per se, the ideas of many key
philosophers connected to this perspective, such as Foucault’s, are currently
used to address key concerns of both political sociology and political
science (Torfing 2005). Both rational choice and postmodern theories will
continue to influence political sociology but will most likely be combined
with “rather than [used] as a replacement for, the neopluralist, conflict, and
state-centric” approaches (Hicks, Janoski, and Schwartz 2005: 17).
We began with a closer look at what the state is and various sociological
theories of the state. The rest of this discussion is more concerned with the
question “what does the state do?” Part of this answer involves examining
the “welfare state.” Many different theoretical perspectives have been used
to explain the welfare state (Hicks and Esping-Andersen 2005), but this has
been an especially important topic for those using a state-centric or
institutional approach. Future chapters will also examine what the state does
by reviewing issues such as immigration, education, business, and the
“politics of everyday life.”
THE WELFARE STATE

The welfare state refers to the social and economic managerial role of a
nation-state (Melling 1991). In “state corporatism,” social and economic
organizations are controlled by the state. This dictatorial rule is a feature of
state–society relations under totalitarianism. In contrast, “liberal
corporatism” involves the state sharing space with other groups that are
organized voluntarily and are recognized as representing various sectors of
society such as gun owners, business, labor, or specific occupational groups
that are recognized as a channel of political representation. These groups
work with the state to negotiate competing interests. Not all democracies are
corporatist states, but in states that are both corporatist and democratic,
corporatist groups are recognized in exchange for submitting to the primacy
of the state (Streeck and Kenworthy 2005).
In their review of public policy and the welfare state, Hicks and Esping-
Andersen (2005) describe three types of welfare states—liberal, social
democratic, and conservative—differentiated by population coverage, role of
the private market, target population, decommodification, defamilialization,
recommodification, and poverty reduction through redistribution of income.
It is important to note that these concepts are ideal types with specific
nations perhaps illustrating hybrids of two or more types.
Types of Welfare States

All welfare states vary in terms of the types of social programs that are
enacted as a function of state capacity. States with a higher degree of
capacity will initiate social welfare programs earlier than those with a more
limited capacity (Orloff 1993). The types of welfare states or “welfare
regimes” differ by the degree of state capacity as well as cultural values that
define who is considered worthy of receiving state support and the role that
family is supposed to play in supporting its members.
LIBERAL
The United States has avoided corporatism and has opted for a liberal-
market state where there is little state control over the economy and where
there are many competing interest groups. Liberal states initiate programs
in reaction to market and family failures and also initiate their programs
later than social democratic or conservative welfare states (Orloff 1993).
The welfare state is much more restricted and conceived more as a safety
net targeted toward the needy through the use of means tests. Private
market solutions are preferred over broad policies that might extend
universal health care coverage or family benefits such as paid maternity or
paternity leave. Calls to privatize social security are an example of a
proposed private market solution.
Liberal welfare states tend not to “defamilialize” or to encourage the
shift from the family to paid providers of responsibilities such as child care
or elder care. This means that the state does not subsidize the cost of day
care for young children or the elderly, with the exception of welfare
mothers participating in job training or other required employment
programs as a condition of receiving benefits. Liberal welfare states also do
not support women-friendly employment policies such as paid maternity
leave or efforts to recommodify individuals with job training or other
programs designed to ensure full employment for adults. Compared to the
other two types of welfare regimes, liberal-market states have a lower
capacity for proactive public policy as these states initiate their welfare
policies much later than other welfare states (Orloff 1993).
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
The social democratic welfare state as illustrated by some Scandinavian
countries is an example of a democratic corporatist state. These nations
have a more extensive welfare state that is more inclusive and includes not
only the poor or some other narrowly defined groups, but also universal
programs that attempt to provide “cradle-to-grave” security such as health
care, subsidized day care for children and elders, as well as minimum-
income guarantees. Private market solutions are rejected in favor of
government-run programs covering all citizens. There is a strong
commitment to gender equality through defamilialization or providing
external resources for traditional family obligations such as day care. High
tax rates mean that income is redistributed to fund social welfare programs
with a high commitment to poverty reduction including recommodification,
which maximizes the market power of the individual in the labor market
through income guarantees and opportunities for job training and retraining.
These states have also tried to buffer workers from volatile markets through
decommodification. All of the benefits provided by this type of welfare
state means that a worker need not accept just any job.
Korpi (2003) notes that structural changes in the economy such as
postindustrialization or the shift to a more service sector base have led to a
retrenchment or scaling back of the welfare state in Western Europe. In
addition to economic factors, Orloff (1993) adds demographic changes and
international economic competition as other reasons for cutting back on
services and eligibility. Whether globalization causes welfare state
retrenchment is hotly contested and will be examined more fully in Chapter
10.
CONSERVATIVE
This type of welfare state practices corporatism based on occupational
groups, such as unionized coal miners or dock workers, which target male
breadwinners for social welfare programs. These programs are based on the
primacy of the male breadwinners and the need for families to look after
their members, both young and old. Like social democratic welfare states,
the private market is not embraced as a solution for meeting typical welfare
needs such as pensions or health care. Similar to liberal states, there is low
commitment to poverty reduction, income redistribution, and
defamilialization. Examples of nations classified as having this type of state
include Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (Hicks and Esping-Andersen
2005). While Esping Anderson’s classic work, The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism (1990), is widely regarded as having instigated a valuable
debate in the social policy literature, it also is widely criticized. One such
criticism is for ignoring the role of gender (Bambra 2007).
Role of Race and Gender

The U.S. welfare state provides some respite from poverty by redistributing
income, but at the same time, it also acts to reinforce a stratification system
(Esping-Andersen 1990) that reflects class, race, and gender bias as
minorities and poor women are overrepresented in the public assistance
sphere (e.g. food stamps and public housing), while white men are more
often found in the more generous social insurance sphere with private
pension and health insurance (Misra 2002). Misra calls on sociologists to
explore how welfare policy has been shaped by bias. For example, in the
United States, some programs using a means test such as income eligibility
have often excluded African-Americans entirely or paid out smaller benefits
in order to ensure an adequate supply of low-paid agricultural workers
(Quadagno 1988). Gender stereotypes are also reinforced through welfare
policy as a conservative welfare state targets only male breadwinners and
defamilialization is rejected as families should take care of their own. This
reinforces more traditional gender roles of the female homemaker and male
breadwinner.
FUTURE OF THE STATE

In recognizing the era of government deregulation and the increasing
privatization of traditional state functions, Oszlak (2005) asks, “Does this
mean that the state is no longer necessary?” Oszlak cites Ohmae (1995) who
argues that the nation-state will be replaced by a supranational state because
it has lost its capacity to generate real economic activity in an era of
increasing globalization. The rise of transnational corporations and
international nongovernmental organizations is a globalization outcome,
which may further weaken the nation-state (Haque 2003; Lauderdale and
Oliverio 2005). Robinson (1998, 2001) argues that nation-states are being
replaced by national states that are part of a transnational state apparatus.
The authors of Empire, Hardt and Negri (2001), also contend that a
supranational entity will succeed the state, with the process well under way.
There have been several criticisms of the Empire thesis, including the
failure to provide empirical data (Arrighi 2003; Tilly 2003), not
distinguishing politics and the state from the economy (Steinmetz 2002), and
not being historically grounded. Despite Oszlak’s empathy for the weak-state
thesis, he himself argues that the state plays a role that cannot be delegated
and that the size of the state, as measured by the number of agencies, its
budget, and the percentage of the labor force employed by the state, means
that the state will not be disappearing anytime soon.
Yet many scholars debate the impact of globalization on the state.
Important state functions such as waging war are believed to be shifting
from nation-states to larger sociocultural entities (Huntington 1996) such as
NATO and the European Union. The state’s role in formulating social policy
is largely influenced by economic forces that are less and less under the
control of a nation-state (Falkner and Talos 1994).
As discussed earlier, Tilly (1985) views security as one of the main
functions of the state. Globalization is linked to declining state legitimacy,
which impacts security by delegitimizing the state further. Wallerstein (2003:
65) explains,
The more they do so the more there is chaotic violence, and the more there is chaotic
violence, the more the states find themselves unable to handle the situation, and
therefore the more people disinvest the state, which further weakens the ability of states
to limit the spiral.
In areas where the state is already weak, the elite may hire and pay their
own security forces, threatening the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use
of force.
For Wallerstein, the loss of state legitimacy is caused by changes in the
world capitalist system (1998, 2003). He challenges the view that states are
autonomous entities with unlimited power, but rather are institutions of a
larger world system. While Wallerstein is adamant that the world is
transitioning from the current capitalist order to something else, and that this
period of transition will be difficult, he does not argue that the state will
necessarily disappear. What he does argue is: (1) it is impossible to know
definitively what the future will look like, and (2) those with privilege will
do what they can to ensure that the new world order will perpetuate their
advantage by “replicate[ing] the worst features of the existing one—its
hierarchy, privilege, and inequalities” (Wallerstein 2003: 270).
CONCLUSION
It is clear that political sociologists have a long list of potential hypotheses
that need empirical testing before deciding whether the state survives or is
on the decline. Just as Tilly (1985) and Bottomore (1979) contend that the
state has not always been the main regulator of power with a monopoly on
the legitimate use of force, we see no reason to assume that it will always be.
While many of the ideas on the future of the state are theoretical and
need empirical verification, what cannot be denied is the importance of
political institutions and the ways in which these entities impact every facet
of social life. Whether future political sociologists will study the effects and
interactions of the nation-state, the transitional state apparatus, or Empire,
we expect that there will continue to be rich diversity in both theoretical
perspectives and empirical approaches. That diversity will be a direct result
of the past and current debates taking place among pluralist, elite, Marxist,
and political institutionalists who continue to refine their arguments to
overcome weaknesses identified by competing perspectives. Rational choice
and postmodern views will also continue to be influential. Future chapters
will take a closer look at the impact of the state on our everyday lives,
theoretical contributions for understanding other political processes such as
voting and other forms of political participation, and the many globalization
debates.
Endnotes
1. On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v.
Hodges that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry. Prior
to this decision, there was inconsistency with some appeals courts
overturning state bans on same-sex marriage (Fourth, Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth), while the Sixth Circuit found that Ohio’s ban on same-sex
marriage did not violate the U.S. Constitution. Historically, there have
been statutes that prohibit sex acts between consenting adults such as
premarital sex, extramarital sex, gay sex, and even certain sex acts
between spouses such as oral sex. While many of these statutes were
not enforced, gay sexual acts were an exception. Both U.S. Supreme
Court cases Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
began when law enforcement arrested persons engaging in consensual
same-sex sexual acts in the privacy of their homes. Until Lawrence,
which overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, states could prohibit same-sex
sexual activity while considering similar acts by heterosexual couples
as legal (e.g. oral sex). The Lawrence decision was based on the right
of sexual privacy or that sex acts between consenting adults are off
limits to state regulation. Note though that the state, through the
judiciary, is in the position of deciding what does and does not come
under state regulation.
2. On November 14, 2007, after calling 911, sixty-two-year-old John
Horn, a resident of Pasadena, Texas (a Houston suburb), killed two
men he suspected were burglarizing a next-door neighbor. While the
911 operator pleaded with Horn to stay inside and wait for the police,
he replied “I am going to kill them.” He redialed 911 and said, “They
came in the front yard with me, man. I had no choice. Get somebody
over here quick.” A Texas grand jury refused to indict Horn (Lozano
2008). In contrast, Kyle Huggett, a 32-year-old Danbury, Wisconsin,
resident was bound over for trial for the January 2009 killing of John
Peach, who broke through the front door of Huggett’s residence to
confront him. The two had been exchanging harassing text messages.
Peach was the ex-boyfriend of Huggett’s girlfriend who was pregnant
with Huggett’s child. Huggett testified that he was afraid of Peach and
feared what Peach might do to his girlfriend and their unborn child.
Burnett County District Attorney, Kenneth Kutz, denied that the
accused was facing imminent danger arguing “I think Mr. Huggett
panicked and shot John Peach when he came into the house—a
reasonable person wouldn’t have reacted that way” (Beckmann 2008:
6A). A Wisconsin judge who ruled that Burnett County officials denied
the defendant due process by failing to listen to or transcribe voice
mail messages left by John Peach (Xiong 2009) eventually dismissed
homicide charges. The Burnett County district attorney appealed the
ruling (Rathbun 2009). The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to hear
the appeal, meaning that Huggett will not have to stand trial
(Beckmann 2010).
3. The Iran–Contra affair was a political scandal during the Reagan
administration in which weapons were sold illegally to Iran and were
used in Iran’s war with Iraq, while the latter was a U.S. ally. Weapon
sale proceeds were used to fund the Contras’ (anti-communist) fight
against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. The Sandinistas or the
Sandinista National Liberation Front is a Nicaraguan political party
based on Marxist ideology.
4. The national government of India controls the harvest of tendu leaves
that are used to make Indian cigarettes. The tendu committee is a local
group that oversees the harvest on behalf of the forest department. The
harvest is a major source of cash income for locals with an opportunity
to earn five to ten times the average daily wage. The committee
appoints a munshi who is responsible for organizing the leaf collection,
keeping harvest and payment records, and distributing cash payments
to the villagers. In the situation described by anthropologist Peggy
Froerer (2005), the munshi for a specific village was also the Patel or
traditional leader who had been cheating the villagers out of their
entitled share of the proceeds for several years. The villagers were
hesitant to approach the tendu committee and request a new munshi.
Her description of how the villagers were eventually able to override
the Patel and have a new munshi appointed illustrates how those
holding traditional authority in order to maintain their power use the
state and how those villagers were able to use that external state power
to remove someone who abused his authority.
5. In his classic work, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim
notes that no object is inherently incapable of being transformed and,
in a footnote, he refers to scholarship on the religious quality of
excrement.
6. Saudi Arabia uses a discriminatory male guardianship system. Women
cannot travel, leave prison, or marry without permission from a male
relative. The ban on women driving is scheduled to end by June 2018
(Human Rights Watch World Report 2018). Saudi Arabia is classified
as an authoritarian regime and is tied with the Democratic Republic of
Congo at 159 out of 167 countries with a Democracy Index score of
1.93. The Economist’s index of democracy uses five criteria including
electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of
government, political participation, and political culture. Nations are
divided into four categories including full democracies, flawed
democracies, hybrids, and authoritarian. The index ranges from 10 to 1
with Norway, the top-rated democracy in 2016 with a score of 9.93,
and North Korea, the least democratic nation with a score of 1.03.
Notably, the United States is classified as a flawed democracy with a
ranking of 21 and a score of 7.98. In contrast, in 2007, the United
States was classified as a full democracy with a rank of 17 and an
index score of 8.22. The U.S. drop in rank is due to the rise in the lack
of trust in government institutions. For more information on
methodology or a comparison of 2007 and 2016 rankings, see
www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pd
f (Kekic 2007) and http://felipesahagun.es/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Democracy-Index-2016.pdf.
7. The G7 is an international forum represented by the governments of
Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and the
United States. The G7 used to be the G8. Russia was suspended in
2014 after the annexation of Crimea. Russia announced in 2017 that it
had no intention of rejoining the G8.
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CHAPTER
3
Politics, Culture, and Social

Processes
T. S. Eliot once observed that culture is made up of those things that make
life worth living (1948). Culture in this sense refers to things that come to be
known as “high taste,” or artifacts such as music, expensive art, or gourmet
food. As sociologists, we understand that culture has both material and
nonmaterial dimensions. For example, material forms of culture are displayed
in museums and archives. The Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence on display in the National Archives in Washington, DC, are
examples of symbolic forms of material culture, including the architecture of
the temple-like National Archives building. Nonmaterial forms of culture
include music played or speeches given on the Fourth of July to celebrate the
principles in those documents. As the study of culture has grown in
sociology, it has confirmed the fact that culture is essential to the functioning
of society and its component social structures and groups.
Over the past several decades, sociologists have made great strides in
understanding the role of culture in guiding social and personal interactions.
Much of this work builds on foundational concepts originally outlined by
Weber, Durkheim, and to some extent, Marx. Political sociology has
extended much of this work in the study of culture, and effectively highlights
many nuances in the relationship between culture, power, and political
arrangements in society. In this chapter, we explore just a few ways in which
culture and politics intertwine. The goal here is to briefly describe how
political beliefs, values, ideologies, and other symbolic systems in society are
related to the exercise of political power in its many different forms, such as
formations of political groups and associations, or participation in political
action.
CULTURE AND POLITICS

What is culture? C. Wright Mills (1959) observed that “the concept of
‘culture’ is one of the spongiest words in social science” (160). While there
are many approaches typically connected to various disciplines, we
conceptualize culture as comprised of values, knowledge, beliefs, symbols,
language, and artifacts found in all societies. Culture is essential to the
facilitation of social interaction. Weber described the concept in a fascinating
observation about the nature of religion and culture in guiding social action:
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very
frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen,
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests.
(Weber 1946: 280)
Weber’s insight is that images and ideas shape interests and guide social
interactions. Think of the importance of language, for example, in creating
stories about one’s choice of a particular candidate in a political campaign.
This language draws upon symbols, knowledge, and emotions—world
images—that convey meaning in political actions.
In his treatment of culture, Talcott Parsons (1951) identified three
elements of culture—knowledge, values, and symbolic expressions—all of
which are transmitted, learned, and shared in the critical processes of
socialization. Knowledge is the store of experiences, findings, facts, and
ways of comprehending the world. For instance, since the Enlightenment,
science has evolved into a complex tradition of knowledge. Schools
obviously play an important role in preserving this knowledge and sharing it
with successive generations. Values are made up of beliefs or mental
benchmarks for assessing the world. Parsons also suggested that norms,
including folkways and mores, were part of this element of culture. In
addition, Parsons brought to our attention the significance of symbolic
expression as an element of culture. This includes art, music, poetry, rituals,
and religions as manifestations of emotions and tastes. Language too is an
essential symbolic expression especially for facilitating interaction. It gives
human beings a mechanism for expression through utterances, words,
verbalizations, and signs. In a classic study of values in the United States,
Williams (1970) concluded that freedom, equality, democracy, individual
success, progress, work, material comfort, efficiency, morality, science,
patriotism, and the superiority of some groups over others have consistently
served as guides to social interactions in the United States. Interestingly, all
of these, of course, have political characteristics. All of these social
situations have cultural characteristics.
Ann Swidler (1986) defined culture as a “tool kit” of habits, skills, and
styles from which people construct strategies of action. The tools we are
given in the socialization process help us navigate social interactions as we
move through social groups and social institutions. Understanding culture as
a tool kit for interaction in society made up of elements that help forge the
tools provides an important analytic tool for considering the role of culture in
politics. As revealed in the study by Williams (1970), values play a
significant role in deciding power relations in society. As Weber argued so
persuasively in his early work, culture governs social actions, including
social conflicts, be it conflicts among social classes, status groups, or other
structures in society. The mechanisms for transmitting information about
political candidates, or how individuals learn about citizenship, are examples
of forms of political knowledge linked to socialization processes of many
kinds. Certainly, we can think of politics as having symbolic expressions too.
The more obvious are associations with patriotism, such as flying a flag.
Language can also play a role in legitimizing power relationships, or quite
literally, creating vocabularies that express inclusion or exclusion as
dimensions of citizenship. In this case, the tools in the kit are labeled in such
a way that we access them when considering aspects of power and politics.
The work on culture has advanced considerably within the last twenty
years. Granted, culture at one level is about a complex of values and attitudes
that, in turn, influence social interactions. But the sociological understanding
of culture goes beyond that. Hall, Neitz, and Battani (2003) build on the
classical sociological, anthropological, and historical treatments of culture
and define culture to
encompass: (1) ideas, knowledge (correct, wrong, or unverifiable belief), and recipes for
doing things; (2) humanly fabricated tools (such as shovels, sewing machines, cameras,
and computers); and (3) the products of social action that may be drawn upon in the
further conduct of social life (a dish of curry, a television set, a photograph, or a high-
speed train for example).
(7)
As this definition suggests, culture is more than just values and belief
systems. The study of values and beliefs, however, constitutes an important
part of research in political sociology. The study of political culture offers a
different view of politics, asking questions such as:
1. How do citizens develop ideas and values about power?
2. Where does political knowledge come from and what effect does it have
on politics?
3. What role does technology such as the media play in the creation of
political ideas or values?
4. How do political groups use symbolism to construct citizen beliefs about
power?
As we shall see in this chapter, these and many other questions about the
connections between culture and politics are unique and important “terrain”
for political sociology (Berezin 1997).
USA—CIRCA 1965: A stamp printed in USA devoted to 750th anniv. of the

Magna Carta, the basis of English and American common law, circa 1965
Credit: Shutterstock by Alexander Zam
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORKS
Early works in political sociology made references to culture and especially
the significance of cultural contexts to the social psychology of politics. For
example, Bendix and Lipset (1966) suggested that “interaction among
individuals occupying the same economic position is also conditioned by
cultural, social-psychological and situational determinants” (27). In building
the research agenda of the growing field of political sociology in the 1960s,
Coser (1966) described how power had a number of cultural dimensions
worthy of greater research:
While political science had concentrated mainly on the specifically political sphere,
political sociology claimed that to understand the political process fully one had to relate
politics to the entire social structure. These sociologists emphasized the ways in which a
particular political order as well as specific instances of political behavior—for example
voting—must be studied with reference to ostensibly non-political factors such as the
socialization of the young, the formal and informal patterns of association in which men
are variously enmeshed, or the complicated ways in which systems of beliefs and
ideologies color the perspective of political actors.
(2)
The concept of ideology is used to picture the arrangement of values and

belief systems that citizens, policymakers, leaders, and even nonparticipants
create about power and power structures. The study of ideology has held a
prominent position in social and philosophical inquiry since the concept was
described by Destutt de Tracy in the late eighteenth century. Influenced by
Enlightenment philosophers, this French citizen charged with rebuilding
French intellectualism after the revolution used the term ideology in a plea
for a science, or logic, of ideas. In the fields of philosophy and social
psychology, ideology has emerged as a concept related to the individual’s
interpretation of various events or aspects of the environment. The writings
of Karl Marx focused on ideology as a superstructure, its expression in
various forms of the division of labor, in the forces of economic history, and
its use by the ruling class. Marx suggests that ideology emerges from the
superstructures creating false consciousness among the working class.
Mannheim (1936) argued as did Marx that ideology was a historically
captured notion, representing the thinking of the times. Specifically, he
suggested that ideology was expressed by individuals as particularistic, or
ideology was totally emanating from the forces of culture and social history.
Oakeshott (1962), a philosopher aligned with the British idealists, treated
ideology in yet another vein. He, argued that ideology be conceptualized as a
connection with the practical, day-to-day actions of the human being. For
example, citizens would find interest as rational actors in how political
parties would treat minimum-wage policies or tax credits as incentives to
buy an energy-efficient car. Politics, in this sense, is an appeal to social
action, bringing about change in routine existence rather than some
unattainable ideal. Goran Therborn (1980) cast ideology as a set of attitudes,
values, and beliefs about the distribution of power in society and the
resulting social actions that flow from this set of views. In many ways, it is
useful to understand ideology as mental pictures as well as social actions.
Larrain (1979) concludes that
Ideology is perhaps one of the most equivocal and elusive concepts one can find in social
sciences; not only because of the variety of theoretical approaches which assign different
meanings and functions to it, but also because it is a concept heavily charged with
political connotations and widely used in everyday life with the most diverse
significations.
(13)
This description of the nature of power in society reinforced the claim

that socialization, values, beliefs, and ideologies should be studied in order
to understand better the distribution of power and conflict. The major
theoretical frameworks over time would address each of these “nonpolitical
factors” in unique ways; political culture matters. The various conceptual
perspectives in political sociology highlight different aspects of the nature of
values, beliefs, and orientations to power, and how these are connected to
politics in society.
Pluralist
Culture has always played an important role in pluralist thinking about
politics and power. Pluralists view culture as the seedbed for the beliefs,
values, symbols, and orientations necessary to support the political process.
For example, children learn in school that being a good citizen is defined by
obeying the law as well as active participation in the governing processes,
especially voting. These values, as Parsons would say, are important to the
maintenance of the political system.
Tocqueville (1945[1835]) conducted one of the earliest studies of the
new political system in the United States, highlighting the pluralist nature of
the new American republic. He viewed nineteenth-century America as one
of the most democratic countries in the world. Intrigued by the notion that
democracy in America brought to its citizens (i.e. White adult males) social,
economic, and political equality, Tocqueville’s focus was especially on the
role of citizen participation in the new democracy and how individuals
would not only be engaged in voting, but also be active in civic groups and
associations. Tocqueville predicted great success for the new nation because
of values in society articulated around:
1. a division of authority throughout society which would enhance
individualism and diversity of viewpoints;
2. a federal system that divided power among three branches of
government as well as a division of power between state and federal
governments;
3. a sense of local control which would check outsiders as a threat;
4. the right to a free press;
5. the right to freely associate, preventing the centralization of economic or
social functions beyond government.
In many ways, these five observations from Tocqueville reflect key pluralist
assumptions about politics and power. Power is viewed as dispersed among
groups and associations of citizens, not concentrated, but rather balanced as
a result of fair elections and exchanges of opportunities to govern. Values
and beliefs are supported by cultural structures, and in some cases, these
values are reflected in the language of the Constitution or the Declaration of
Independence. These values make their way into political narratives about
equality, justice, and what it means to be a good citizen over 200 years later.
One of Tocqueville’s most important observations dealt with the
frequency with which Americans tended to organize into voluntary
associations for social, economic, and political purposes. He believed that
this tendency grew out of values rooted in Enlightenment ideas about
equality and the social contract—that is, the set of expectations that come
from living in a community where the individual also gains from the
collective life of the community. Tocqueville brought attention to the fact
that political participation grows out of association and group formation
oriented around political goals. Tocqueville recognized that conflict was an
important source of social evolution; however, he was optimistic about
American society’s ability to handle this conflict. Conflict, he believed,
would be balanced by giving emphasis to local governance and solving
communal problems, and strengthened by voluntary association. As
American democracy emerged, collective action through association was
equated with power.
In Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963, 1989) made one of the
earliest arguments for emphasizing the role culture played in shaping
politics. From their study of citizens from the United States, Great Britain,
Germany, and Italy, they concluded that political culture is the cement that
holds together democratic societies in a number of ways. First, culture is
“the political system internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and
evaluations” (1963: 27) of the citizenry that fosters a healthy tension of sorts
between full participation on every policy decision (pure democracy) or the
choice to not participate at all. In other words, political culture creates a
social context in which the business of governance occurs as a result of
consensus. This allows a cadre of political leaders to act in the best interests
of the society based on consensus about shared social values, such as
equality, individualism, or achievement. Second, citizens learn that trust is
crucial to the business of governing. A plurality of groups or coalitions of
interest are created to address the concerns of society. Consider, for
example, the significance of a peaceful transition of power in the United
States. The president’s term of office is limited, and when a term ends, the
power of the presidency is peacefully handed over from one individual to
the next. Despite the contentious election of 2000, when the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in Bush v. Gore, George W. Bush was
peacefully sworn in as the forty-third president of the United States. Or as
seen in the election of 2016, Hillary Clinton won the popular vote, yet the
rules of the nation’s electoral process, namely the Electoral College, resulted
in Donald Trump winning the Presidency. Almond and Verba (1989) would
argue that political culture creates trust in these processes of governance.
Consensus is maintained around the value of peaceful transitions of power
and recognition by citizens that the party or majority elected in a fair
electoral process has a legitimate claim to rule.
Consensus about the nature of political rule is another feature of the role
of culture in politics. Equality is clearly a key theme in democratic systems.
Individuals are considered to have certain rights that provide them access in
the competition for power. Pluralists treat culture as an essential component
to the understanding of how the masses offer support for the political
system, or how changes in values and beliefs result in corresponding
changes in configurations of political coalitions that result in changes in who
rules. As we shall see in this chapter, there are important connections
between governance and culture.
Elite-Managerial
In contrast to the pluralist framework, the elite-managerial approach shifts
the emphasis from conceptualizing politics to conceptualizing power as held
in the hands of a few, because the competition among interest groups is
guided by the rules of a fair process. The elite framework treats political
culture as a source for values resulting in acquiescence to elite rule. This
perspective argues that elites construct the political culture to reinforce elite
rule.
Weber played a significant role in identifying what role culture would
play in sustaining patterns of institutional rule, namely through
bureaucracies. Two contributions are worth noting here in our study of
politics and culture: the role of religion in fostering capitalism and
associated patterns of government, and the impact that he called
“rationalization” had on values about interactions between citizens and
larger organizations.
Weber argued that religion and systems of power were associated in
ways that created a value system in a society which supported institutional
arrangements. Weber’s analysis of how capitalism emerges in societies
alongside Protestant beliefs in particular was a critical contribution to a
cultural understanding of social inequality and stratification. In his famous
study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–1905), he
described how Protestant attitudes contributed to the rise of capitalism in
several ways. These aspects of Protestant belief systems included the idea of
predestination or being God’s chosen people, the notion that wasting time
was a sin, or that work and occupational choice were a calling divinely
inspired (Collins 1985). The strength of these attitudes, according to Weber,
created a cultural system that would foster adherence to a managerial system
of work and politics. Those with higher status conclude that their position in
society is “providence”: “This internal situation gives rise, in their relations
with other strata, to a number of further characteristic contrasts in the
functions which different strata of society expect religion to perform for
them” (Runciman 1978: 183). For those with lower status, the hopes for
salvation in the afterlife maintain a sense of complacency and acceptance of
their social situation.
By understanding culture as a way of life, Weber also shed light on the
structural ways in which the Industrial Revolution was changing the power
of elites and their everyday existence. Weber’s description of complex
organizations and bureaucracy contributed to understanding how what he
called the forces of rationalization changed social patterns and social
arrangements, especially power and politics. Weber found that rules,
procedures, laws, and the formality of social interactions were becoming
institutionalized. As a result of the forces of rationalization, value is placed
on efficiency, predictability, and adherence to procedure. Culture shaped by
these forces would foster the expansion of bureaucracies and the impersonal
nature of law and procedures. Lawyers, bureaucrats, scientists, and experts
would hold positions in the elite and assure adherence to this way of life.
The works of Mosca also extended the elite framework’s argument that
those who rule craft a ruling ideology. Mosca wrote of a “political formula”
which the elite used to “justify its power on the ground of an abstraction”
(Meisel 1962: 55). Mythological references to providence, divine right, or
perhaps vision for leadership are formulas that justify political actions.
Mosca wrote of this symbolic system of beliefs that resulted in elites
electing elites to positions of authority, or using expert justification to assure
elite appointment to positions in governing bodies. Mosca saw the formula
as a cultural element as a distraction from the reality that power was not “of
the people,” but rather in the hands of a few.
Fifty years later, in his analysis of politics and social change, Daniel Bell
(1960, 1973, 1976) came to the conclusion that elites dominated the political
culture of the 1970s by creating distinct belief patterns. He argued that elites
would preserve power through the creation of what he called more
“inclusive identities.” These psychological attachments would overshadow
social-class divisions in many ways, for example, shifting individual
orientations to focus on geography, nationalism, or gender identity. Related
to this shift, he argued that elites would play a role in redefining what
equality meant in the modern state. Moreover, identities linked to work
would change with the onset of postindustrial life, as knowledge and
education would become more important. Thus, elites would command the
right skills or credentials required for rule. As a result of these and other
global forces, Bell was one of the first to argue that political ideological
struggles would be reduced to whether or not capitalism or socialism was
the best model for social political economic systems. Bell argued that the
“end of ideology” meant that social life was being transformed into
managed life, where values would be redefined by an elite made up of
diffuse centers of power.
Class Perspective
Marx originally treated the notion of culture as a superstructure, that is,
culture emerged out of the economic relationships of society as well as
preserved social-class divisions. In this regard, political culture would
include those values, beliefs, and ideologies that preserved capitalism, the
concentration of wealth in the capitalist class, the obedience of the laboring
class, and the psychological power of money. For class theorists, culture has
an important role to play in the preservation of unequal distributions of
power in society.
Marx and eventually Engels concluded that each class had its own
worldview in the history of class struggle, and its resulting tradition. This
outlook was described as “class consciousness,” which, for Marxists, is the
source of political ideology. Marx suggested in fact that all aspects of human
thinking came from economic interactions and ultimately, was shaped by
relationships between the social classes. Class consciousness is determined
by economic interest. For political sociologists grounded in the class
perspective, political culture is understood as a function of ruling interests
weaved into ideology and worldviews. The symbolic aspects of culture are
controlled to promote economic gain for capitalist leaders. The capitalist
ideology (or consciousness) is reproduced and distributed in books, letters,
church pulpits, and media of all forms. The extent of this control assumes
that the upper class, often with the assistance of the intelligentsia, can
produce ideas to maintain or legitimize inequalities.
The essence of Marxist notions of culture, especially ideology as we
shall consider it later in this chapter, is best summarized by a key statement
made in Marx’s 1859 work, A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy:
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are
indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to
a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real
foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite
forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life
determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It
is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their
social being determines their consciousness.
(Bottomore 1961: 51)
Because property is the basis for economies, which creates classes, Marx
believed that the role of the state was to protect the property interests of the
owners of production. Property is owned because the state creates “rights” to
ownership. The state and associated structures would create the requisite
ideologies to support these outcomes.
In his efforts to describe Who Rules America (2014), Domhoff identifies
what he calls “Americanism” as a unique mix of values which support the
capitalist system and its associated governing structures. Based on decades
of refining a class-based model of power in the United States, Domhoff
concludes that the unique ideological makeup of the United States has
fostered the creation of the corporate ruling class through history.
Specifically, he argues that individualism and a corresponding support for
free enterprise yields at the least acquiescence to political outcomes
favorable to the ruling class. As a result, few individuals challenge what are
considered to be taken-for-granted assumptions in a capitalist society. This
ideological characteristic of U.S. culture is one of the elements of American
social history that Domhoff identifies as a component of the foundation for
ruling-class dominance of politics in the United States.
A second cultural dimension found in Domhoff’s (2014) research
focuses on the creation of cohesion among individuals in the ruling class.
Early in his research, he revealed the role of the Bohemian Club and its
camp north of San Francisco in creating literally a retreat for America’s
wealthy and elite. Interestingly, this retreat has become a place for corporate,
political, and social elites to gather for fun and relaxation. Cohesion is
fostered in this environment. Interestingly, Domhoff describes a number of
rituals which contribute to the cohesion. One of the most intriguing of these
rituals takes place near the beginning of the annual retreat when the
responsibilities of corporate, political, and social leadership are symbolically
burned in the “cremation of care.” In this elaborate ritual, responsibility and
care are personified in a muslin-wrapped wood skeleton placed in a coffin;
later, the coffin is burned on an altar before a large carved owl, the symbol
of the Bohemian Club and Bohemian Grove camp. This symbolic letting go
of the affairs of banking, corporate finance, the affairs of state, or cares that
go with being a celebrity creates cohesion among the membership much like
rituals found in other groups. According to Domhoff, this ritual and the
various activities found at the retreat foster interaction, loyalty, and cohesion
among the ruling-class members attending.
Derber (2006) proposed that the history of political rule in the United
States be characterized as a series of regimes. One of the “pillars” of regime
rule is the role of ideology, or political culture, manipulated to create
“hidden power.” Derber poses an interesting challenge to the pluralist
thinking about fair and open governance in the United States:
Do you believe in black magic? You should, because the regime survives through its
own amazing form of it. All regimes weave hegemonic myths and stories that help to
win the allegiance of the people and keep the regime in power. These can be called
regime ideology or, more bluntly, propaganda. In democratic societies, the role of
propaganda is to partly cloak what Teddy Roosevelt called the “invisible government”
of the regime itself.
(121)
In his historical analysis of regimes in the United States, especially since

the Industrial Revolution, Derber argues that intellectual centers, corporate
leaders, and the media have all played a significant role in weaving what the
people come to believe is true about the state of political affairs. The goal of
this belief system is to preserve wealth and power in the hands of a few.
Regimes create ruling-class hegemony, that is, a belief system that diverts
people from acting in their own economic self-interest and instead becoming
loyal to nationalistic or moral beliefs that ultimately do nothing to advance
the causes of those who suffer or are excluded from the societal systems of
power.
Rational Choice
Ideology, political values, hegemony, or symbolic systems of power that
foster adherence to political rule are themes in the pluralist, elite, and class
frameworks. In many ways, political culture has been an important topic for
political sociologists and has never been removed from the agenda of
research in political sociology, especially as sociologists have recently
brought new life to the study of culture in general. Rational choice theory
has come to occupy a prominent position in current explanations of power
and political outcomes. It emphasizes treating politics as outcomes of
interest based on rational actors operating within the bounds of a system,
shaped by the social allocation of resources or the distribution of power in
the community, which ultimately results in political action understood as a
matter of choice. In other words, political institutions as well as political
individuals act in their best interests based on the resources they have or
come to earn. Following the assumptions of rational choice theory in the
study of politics, we could make the case that values and orientations, no
matter what the source, guide the choices of individual citizens (e.g. voting
choices, action to address a community problem).
Kiser and Bauldry (2005) identify six ways current research in the
rational choice tradition is making use of concepts in political culture. First,
they note work on a concept called “focal points,” which researchers argue
constitutes information, values, and beliefs in an organization that become a
point for agreement, negotiation, and consensus building. This creates a
basis for coordinating action within the organization and marshaling
resources directed at certain goals. Second, they note that information and
knowledge play a role in rational choices in organizational or institutional
dynamics. As an element of culture, knowledge can guide choices. In this
sense, political sociologists are now studying what role information sources
play in directing actions of bureaucracies as well as political activists. The
role of norms in political groups and the creation of ways to maintain
membership in the groups is the third cultural dimension to the rational
choice approach to the study of politics. Fourth, legitimacy of authority is an
important dynamic in emerging rational choice models of politics. Related to
the role of norms is the idea that some power centers in the game of politics
command greater credibility to rule than others. This line of research would
examine how legitimacy is created by political groups acting in the political
arena. This connects to a fifth theme identified by Kiser and Bauldry, the
role of ritual in pulling together collectives for political action. Political
rituals, such as political conventions, rallies, and candidate debates, can
reinforce membership and loyalty to a group, thus affecting the ability of
organizations to again marshal the resources necessary for achieving
political goals. Sixth, more recent rational choice approaches have started to
examine the role of nationalism as a cultural component to coordinating
political action. As we will see later in this chapter, the rational choice
approach raises interesting questions for political sociologists who consider
cultural dimensions in their research as some find nationalistic tendencies to
be powerful motivators for political action. As we will see in other chapters,
the impact of culture continues to appear in the work of rational choice
theorists, reinforcing the role cultural elements play in decision-making and
political outcomes.
Institutionalist
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we believe that the new institutionalist theories
in the social sciences are in many ways a hybrid of theories of politics that
have focused on structures such as organizations, bureaucracy, and the state,
and have incorporated aspects of culture that emphasize culture as habits,
symbolic guides to political processes, or traditions in politics. Because the
institutionalist approach emphasizes the effects of culture, it’s important to
consider what role culture plays in politics when contrasting the various
frameworks in political sociology. There are many concepts associated with
this approach: the role of social ideas that affect political outcomes, the role
of experts in influencing political processes, and the reliance on scripts or
narratives as norms that also guide political action. An important question in
political sociology is “How is public policy made?” A cultural turn in
answer to this question suggests that there are ideas, or what Burstein (1991)
calls “policy domains”—“a component of the political system that is
organized around substantive issues” such as education, crime, or welfare
(328). These domains make up arenas of action where citizens, politicians,
interest groups, parts of the bureaucracy, courts, and legislators come
together with a particular policy focus. In this sense, a variety of structures
are moved to address policies in these domains or areas of interest. These
domains are focused on determining how issues become part of the public
agenda, or how policy options are chosen. Burstein’s notion of policy
domains is a useful tool for thinking about what political institutions are at
work, such as political actors, rules, and eventual policy outcomes. The
policy domain as a clustering of structural activity around an idea explains
the influence that interest groups, protest organizations, or even judicial
actors have when they come together in a pattern of social action around
issues like public education, defense, or health care.
Similar to the notion of the policy domain is another cultural concept
referred to as a normative context for politics. Norms play a role in guiding
the work of policymakers, lobbyists, or civil servants. One way of thinking
of these contexts, or fields as suggested by Campbell (2002), is as “taken-
for-granted world views of policy makers” that “constrain the range of
policy choices they are likely to consider when formulating economic,
welfare, national security, and other public policies” (22). These are
typically important normative assumptions about the nature of work or
family or education. For example, there may be normative boundaries in
policymaking that follow the “get tough on crime” attitude typical of
campaigns which emphasize to legislators the taken-for-granted cultural
expectations regarding punishment of crimes that are considered particularly
harmful to society.
Policymakers as well as candidates seeking office often turn to experts
for advice on political processes. The role of experts as retainers of
knowledge and experiences in political action is another field of research in
the institutionalist framework. Manza (2000) studied, for example, a
constellation of experts who played a critical role in the creation of the New
Deal reforms initiated by President Roosevelt in the 1930s and 1940s. He
finds that
At the center of the efforts of these reformers were advocacy organizations such as the
American Association for Labor Legislation and the American Association for Old Age
Security. These organizations provided intellectual and political leadership for early
pension reform campaigns, and eventually at the national level during the New Deal.
(312)
As an element of culture, knowledge in this regard is seen as an

important variable in explaining actions of the state. A cadre of intellectuals
or experts typically plays an important role in bringing areas of specialty to
bear on political processes, including policy processes and electoral
activities of campaigns (e.g. pollsters or campaign strategists).
Another stream of inquiry associated with institutionalist political
sociology has explored “narratives” in politics. Jacobs and Sobieraj (2007)
describe narratives as “templates for orienting and acting in the world: by
differentiating between good and evil, by providing understandings of
agency and selfhood, and by defining the nature of social bonds and
relationships” (5). In this sense, political culture is a source for ways in
which stories about public problems or concerns are told, with situations,
actors, and even scripts for telling the story. In their research, they study
how members of Congress weaved what the researchers called “a
masquerade narrative” to shed light on fake or illegitimate nonprofit groups.
The power of these stories is revealed by how public perceptions were
molded by members of Congress who wanted to maintain their image as
champions protecting legitimate nonprofit groups that help people, and at
the same time criticizing the nonprofit sector for taking advantage of the
taxpayer through tax exemptions or high salaries paid to CEOs of nonprofit
groups. Narratives in this regard originate in the power of storytelling as a
way to persuade voters or describe groups in context of a political debate or
conflict. We will revisit the importance of narrative and the story creation to
motivate political participation.
Postmodern
The postmodern analyses of politics, political structures, and political
processes in society are perhaps in essence cultural in their approach. This
body of work focuses on inherently cultural themes, such as the power of
language and social discourse in creating exclusion of segments of society,
the emergence of social identities related to values and beliefs unique to
postmodern life, the understanding of history as culture, as well as the
evolution of political configurations of symbols, meanings, and structures
across time. Torfing (2005) summarizes this approach, concluding that
“Poststructuralist discourse theory is a tool for analyzing the more or less
sedimented rules and meanings that condition the political construction of
social, political and cultural identity” (153). The postmodern framework as
we describe in this text is an introduction to diverse works perhaps not as
unified as the previous traditions, but nonetheless significant to studies of
political culture.
A key feature of the postmodernist notions of power is that language and
words themselves structured into patterns of meaning create the realities that
people comprehend; language creates pictures in the mind that we carry with
us to grasp the world around us. Thus, power distributions in society are
understood as what is commonly referred to in this framework as narratives.
These narratives are (to oversimplify perhaps) patterns of social actions
created as/by systems of power. They reflect the “sedimented rules and
meanings” in language and interaction that Torfing describes. Two key
works by Foucault shaped this approach. In his study of mental illness,
Madness and Civilization (1973), he proposed the idea that some groups of
people can be separated because they are not adherents to reason. Separation
was created not only physically, but also through narratives. For example,
society created a named category of persons with mental problems—the
mad, and this named category literally separated this group of people out
from the non-mad. Eventually, the narrative of mental illness was
commanded by doctors and scientists, who described these conditions as
medical conditions. In Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault traces the
narratives of punishment. Prior to the 1800s, societies created spectacles of
pain and torture often in the name of the monarch or church. Science
changed this narrative with the invention of a science of punishment. The
modern prison, invented in the early 1800s, was structured to allow the
“gaze” of the watchful state, maintaining control and surveillance of those
convicted with large prisons designed to control every move of the body as
well as watch every aspect of daily prisoner routines. The science of
punishment would also invent narratives related to reform and rehabilitation,
again with the idea that criminality was sickness, or bad choices, which
could be changed. The language of these forms of control in society was
changed by science, experts, and the state. Narratives mark these shifts in
thinking about control of deviant populations.
Another example of the postmodern approach to politics and culture is
found in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985; Mouffe 1991), who offer a
framework where citizenship is redefined in terms of the creation of
discourse to describe a cultural guide of sorts to steer individuals to come
together to tackle common problems. Mouffe suggests that individuals
create a common bond when they share a concern or problem. They draw
upon cultural rules and manners of talking relevant to conceptualizing
problems in order to get things done. Mouffe refers to the cultural sources
that guide manners, talk, and conceptualizations of social issues as
citizenship emerging from the res publica:
Those rules prescribe norms of conduct to be subscribed to in seeking self-chosen
satisfactions and in performing self-chosen actions. The identification with those rules
of civil intercourse creates a common political identity among persons otherwise
engaged in many different enterprises. This modern form of political community is held
together not by a substantive idea of a common good but by a common bond, a public
concern. It is therefore a community without definite shape, a definite identity, and in a
continuous re-enactment.
(1991: 77)
In this sense, the exercise of political power can appear and disappear
depending on the public concern addressed, as well as on the makeup of any
given community that expresses its concerns and, at the same time, is
motivated to act against the political authority. Politics is not thought of as
interest group against interest group (pluralism), elites against the masses
(elitism), or upper class against working class (class), but rather politics is
constructed by citizens working together using cultural resources (e.g.
discourse, symbolism, cohesion of a community) to create civic bonds that,
once forged, are useful in addressing public concerns.
This approach to understanding politics requires the political sociologist
to see the exercise of power by collectives in its civic context, or, consistent
with the terminology of this approach, politics occurs in certain social
spaces. For example, in his study of AIDS activism in Canada, Brown
(1997) found that individuals in urban areas came together to address the
public concern of how to care for AIDS patients. Political action was not
just about lobbying the state for resources to help AIDS patients, but it was
also about creating groups of volunteers in neighborhoods to care for
patients or to educate the community about AIDS. In addition, Brown
discovered that activism also involved families in a way to create care
networks of sorts for individual patients. What Brown discovered was that
the “radical democracy” that Mouffe and Laclau talked about was revealed
in the way of life associated with the particular city studied. The res publica
was a cultural basis for the norms and rules of action involving the state
(national and urban), community (neighborhoods), and families (the private
sphere). Politics emerged to address the concern of AIDS. Urban life
fostered this new space of political action.
Culture and structure foster the emergence of political action. Political
action at any given moment can appear as individuals define political
concerns through discourse, and find a configuration of collective action that
works for the problem. Culture is the sources of rules about forming action,
beliefs about what is valuable action or what issue is in need of concern, and
ideas for solving problems. This action may then disappear once it’s felt it
has been addressed. Thus, because of the heavy influence of culture in this
approach outlined by Laclau and Mouffe, political action is always
changing. Although complex, this conceptualization of politics and culture
is a good example of the postmodern orientation to politics and power.
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
How does an individual learn about the practices of politics in society or
acquire the tools for citizenship? How is knowledge transferred or language
practiced? We call the social process by which members of the social group
acquire the tools, skills, and beliefs for political action and the exercise of
power, political socialization. The acquisition of political knowledge,
comprehension of political symbols, or manipulation of values for political
ends is better understood if we consider how society transmits culture to
future generations. This is referred to as the process of political socialization.
The early studies of political socialization focused on the nature of
political learning, especially in childhood and adolescence. Greenstein
(1965) defined political socialization as “the deliberate inculcation of
political information, values and practices by instructional agents who have
been formally charged with this responsibility” (5). Reflecting a system’s
orientation, political socialization was understood as a process for schools, as
organizations of the state are assigned the responsibility of fostering political
learning. In this context, Easton and Dennis (1969) concluded that a child’s
attachment to political systems revolves around three “attitude objects.” All
children first understand the political community, that is, the localized social
group brought together through political influences. For example, children in
early elementary grades learn about their city or community and the actors in
it, namely police officers, fire safety officials, or the postmaster. The second
set of objects is political authorities. Occupants of key political roles, such as
George Washington or Abraham Lincoln, who occupied the political role of
president, are studied. The third object is the regime, which although a bit
more abstract for children, is the focus of law, rules, duty, and obligation
connected to the notion of citizenship. Good citizens follow the rules, and
participate in political institutions by voting in elections. Mock elections,
where children are encouraged to vote, are examples of learning processes
where political roles such as voter are learned.
This early work described political socialization as developmental,
meaning that the acquisition of attitudes, values, and orientations about
politics and power takes place throughout the course of life (Braungart and
Braungart 1990). This model of political socialization is a process not
limited to childhood or adolescence (see Text box 3.1). It explains the
dynamics of values and understandings as occurring throughout life. The
transmission of knowledge, values, and symbolic expressions from one
generation to another has been suspected of having significance to a society’s
political systems. The patterns of socialization culturally create a basis for
generalized support of democratic structures in society. As Easton and
Dennis (1969) noted, these patterns develop “diffuse support” for the
political system as the individual critically analyzes the political world. This
diffuse support contributes to the forces necessary for acceptance of the
political order and its institutions. The “benevolent leader hypothesis”
confirms this by showing how the positive image of the president developed
during childhood influences subsequent beliefs about political institutions
and leaders (Greenstein 1960). This may take the form of looking to the
president as a problem solver or person responsible for addressing social ills
or as a source of protection in times of threat. According to Dawson, Prewitt,
and Dawson (1977), the significance of the stages of development in political
knowledge and values was that “adult political behavior is the logical
expression of values, knowledge, and identification formed during childhood
and youth” (73). This assertion, however, was never fully supported as much
of the research on political socialization died out since few links between
childhood attitudes correlated with adult political behavior.
The socialization process is constructed by what are called agents of
socialization. Agents of socialization include parents, family members,
teachers, religious leaders, and media figures. These agents represent social
structures that play an important role in learning about politics and power.
Think, for example, of the role of police resource officers in elementary
schools and how they teach about relationships with legal authority. How do
these agents of socialization shape political values, beliefs, and symbols of
politics? To date, research on political socialization has thus focused, in
particular, on family, school, and social groups, with some attention to the
role of workplace in the formation of attitudes, values, and knowledge about
politics (Jennings and Niemi 1981).
Families play an important role in the early inculcation and development
of political beliefs, values, and attitudes. The primary function of the social
institution of family is to transmit norms, roles, and statuses to children.
Roles related to power and authority are some of the first learned in the
family environment. For example, working-class parents tend to display
more authoritarian patterns of discipline with children (Kohn and Schooler
1969; Schooler 1996). These patterns are learned and then associated with
persons in positions of leadership or authority. Families are where children
also learn about identification with political parties, which in most cases lasts
into adulthood. Republican parents tend to raise Republican-identifying
children. The more visible parents are in voting or participating in politics,
the more their children seem to learn that participation is important.
Schools play an important role in the process of political socialization.
There is clearly an explicit role for the social institution of education in that
it claims a social mandate to instruct and teach children about the nature and
characteristics of government, and the more generalized role of citizenship.
In early grades, the benevolence of public servants is reinforced with visits
from law enforcement officers or trips to the state capitol to meet legislators
or the governor. Children learn to view authority as looking out for the
interests of the community. In adolescence, the focus of the socialization
process shifts to preparation for citizenship. Most direct is enrollment in
civics courses designed to provide instruction in the characteristics and
operations of the state apparatus. Students may be engaged in community
service projects that emphasize the role of the citizen or seek out volunteer
roles in campaigns or community organizations. These connections between
the school and the political apparatus are designed to reinforce aspects of
citizenship that are assumed to carry through to adulthood. Education beyond
the K-12 experience increases the likelihood that an individual will become
more active in politics (Dalton 2016). Whether this is a function of “greater
knowledge” or other factors is unclear. Nonetheless, years of schooling
correlate strongly with civic activism and growth of democratic forms of
governance.
TEXT BOX 3.1

Political Socialization through the Life Course
In the 1960s and 1970s, studies of political socialization applied
advancing psychological and educational models about learning. Dawson,
Prewitt, and Dawson (1977) identified a number of dynamics that occur at
different stages in what Braungart and Braungart (1990) would later call
the “life-course understanding” of political socialization. Erikson,
Luttbeg, and Tedin (1988) identified the following stages in political
socialization:
Preschool (ages three to five): Children become aware of a political

world in very simple terms. They are aware of the authority of the
state, namely through role models, and they are aware of a political
community fostered by saying the Pledge of Allegiance or becoming
familiar with the flag.
Early Childhood (ages six to nine): Children begin to understand in
very basic terms that government and the president have power
which is similar to the hierarchy found in many families.
Interestingly, children start to develop a party identification mostly as
a result of familial identification. Hess and Torney (1969) reported
that 55 percent of the children in a 1963 sample of grade school
children were able to identify themselves as being a Democrat or
Republican. The child is capable of labeling himself or herself, but is
unable to articulate the meaning of a political party.
Late Childhood (ages ten to twelve): The child begins to learn
about voting for the person not the party as a political value in
democracy. Interests in public affairs, voting, and getting others to
vote are viewed by the child as definitions of good citizenship (Hess
and Torney 1969). Children develop the capability to distinguish
between persons and institutions. The president is now known as an
individual who holds an institutionalized position of authority.
Adolescence (ages thirteen to eighteen): This stage is characterized
by a great deal of change and, for all practical purposes, the
crystallization of political views. Adelson and O’Neil (1966) note
that the child is now able to distinguish self-interest from community
interest. Policy conceptions at this stage are more coherent and the
child is able to think in terms of ideology. Adolescents in their early
teens hold a positive view of government and the constitutional
structure in general.
Political Adulthood: The effects of life-course experiences after
high school are notable in the political socialization process.
Understanding and commitment to the regime, authority, and politics
can be influenced by life experiences, group membership, and aging.
Partisan attachment is generally stronger during middle to late adult
years. Abramson (1983) found that the electorate tends to
“Republicanize” as it becomes older. Taking stands on political
issues could be affected by some events such as a war, a corrupt
administration, or others. During one’s life, events such as these
could change basic political views. Social forces are capable of
changing the party orientations acquired during childhood as one
ages. Early patterns of socialization may be influenced by
experiences later in the life cycle, and so early patterns have little
subsequent effect on political behavior.
Social groups also play an important role in shaping political values and
orientations. Drawing on findings from other fields of study that conclude
that peers matter, this body of knowledge confirms that peers play an
important role in shaping political ideas among citizens. For adolescents in
particular, peer groups can serve as a reference point for political information
by communicating about political events such as elections, as well as a place
to explore defining role behaviors related to citizenship. These patterns carry
into adulthood.
The media have also played an increasingly important role in political
socialization processes, but Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson (1977) noted early
on that this role is secondary in contrast to the power of the three socializing
agents described previously. Since the 1960s, the role of television,
especially in politics and campaigning, has grown remarkably. Since the
1990s, the Internet has also launched important changes in the nature of
media-oriented politics. Obama’s campaign for president made very effective
use of the Internet, including the solicitation of significant campaign
contributions. For children, the media are an important source of imagery
and information. Children and adolescents are more likely than adults to
report getting their understanding of political events or issues from TV
sources. This may be changing as the Internet and other media forms take on
a significant role in the lives of adolescents especially. What impact this has
on socialization processes related to information sharing or the construction
of political orientations or images is unclear. Clearly, we cannot ignore the
role of TV in the last half of the twentieth century, especially in conveying
political world images and knowledge. For example, presidential and vice
presidential debates continue to generate considerable interest among the
TV-viewing public. Thanks to technology and changes in the media industry,
this all may be changing.
LAS VEGAS, NV—NOVEMBER 08: Election night in Las Vegas strip on
November 08, 2016, CNN election broadcasts were projected on a giant
screens
Credit: Shutterstock photo by Kobby Dagan
The study of political socialization remains important to understanding

how a society transmits norms, values, skills, and roles related to power
(Torney-Purta 1990, 1995). A guiding question in most of this research was
what aspects of socialization build commitment to democratic institutions,
especially values that support the legitimacy of democratic processes, and
encourage participation in democratic processes (Dalton 2016; Inglehart and
Welzel 2005). One way to think about political culture beyond socialization
processes is to examine the study of political culture by taking two very
distinct directions. Political culture, on one hand, is seen as crucial to the
preservation of democratic processes. In other words, this approach to
political culture would ask how does culture instill loyalty among citizens
and what processes are involved in assuring a “tool kit” for participation in
civic life? In contrast, conflict theorists studied political culture especially
after the early work on political socialization, with a sense that culture is
about social processes that create a loyalty of the masses to the ruling
regime, often against their own interests, and thus, preserve power in the
ruling class.
VALUES AND DEMOCRACY

The groundbreaking work The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba 1963)
concluded that democratic societies would evolve out of changing societal
milieu, namely one characterized by higher levels of industrialization and
education. In other words, knowledge and greater material wealth were
aspects of culture that fostered democracy. Politics would be changed as
citizens in societies characterized by modernization would embrace
traditional political participation, self-governance, and government led by
principles of civil service rather than elite dominance. In 1997, Inglehart
concluded that
The political culture approach today constitutes the leading alternative to rational choice
theory as a general explanatory framework for political behavior. The political culture
approach is distinctive in arguing that (1) people’s responses to their situations are
shaped by subjective orientations, which vary cross-culturally and within subcultures,
and (2) these variations in subjective orientations reflect differences in one’s
socialization experience, with early learning conditioning later learning, making the
former more difficult to undo. Consequently, action cannot be interpreted as simply the
result of external situations: Enduring differences in cultural learning also play an
essential part in shaping what people think and do.
(Inglehart 1997: 19)
This argument suggests that it is not economic or political outcomes that

dictate choices (the assumption of rational choice theories), but rather the
modernization of societies and related historical events that alter generational
experiences, and as a result, lead to cultural adaptations. This chapter now
takes a detailed look at the work of Inglehart, and examines how processes
of socialization, generational experiences, and modernization shape values
and political beliefs.
Modernization and Value Shifts

One of the most comprehensive projects dedicated to studying how social
change affects political culture and thus, political dynamics in society, is the
project led by Ronald Inglehart. His studies of political culture in the United
States and more recently worldwide (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) focus on
explaining how historical, socioeconomic changes in the last 100 years have
fostered changes in the values of citizens. Inglehart defines culture as “a
people’s strategy for adaptation.” That is, the toolkit that includes ways of
understanding political events, cognitive skills for making political
decisions, and values that would influence political choices is altered by
structural and historical forces. These strategies are altered in response to
economic, technological, and political shifts, and ultimately affect politics.
This study of political culture has highlighted how economic effects
experienced by different generations change political values and attitudes.
Inglehart’s initial studies in the United States (1977, 1990) hypothesized
that economic changes since World War II (WWII) have resulted in changes
in values and personal skills. Specifically, he observed that cultural change
in Western society is “deemphasizing economic growth as a dominant goal”
with a corresponding decline of economic criteria as the standard for
rational behavior. By studying two cohorts (individuals born before and after
WWII), Inglehart found differences in value orientations and what he
described as “skills” related to work and political involvement. He referred
to these cohorts as materialists (those born before WWII) and post-
materialists (those born after WWII). As seen in Figure 3.1, a greater
percentage of older persons reported holding materialist values, while a
greater percentage of younger persons reported postmaterialist values. Those
with mixed value patterns did not vary by cohort.
Political culture and democratic processes are critically linked. Inglehart
and Welzel (2005) find that much of the inquiry into political culture has
followed generally three “competing approaches” each with different
questions about the effects of modernization. The “human development”
approach is that most directly connected to the work of Inglehart, who looks
at the role of values as expressions of freedom and liberty as societies
change. The second approach focuses on questions much like those asked by
Tocqueville identifying changes in the nature of civic association and the
social contract, including roles related to political participation. The third
approach is the “legitimacy camp,” which Inglehart and Welzel suggest is
about confidence and belief in the ways in which the democratic order is
arranged and operates.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
altered by modernization results in shifts in lifestyle values. According to
Inglehart, the value sets common to the post-WWII generation focus on
lifestyle issues (e.g. aspects of sexuality, religious and spiritual pursuits,
environmentalism). The appeal to social class is no longer significant as
economic development has equalized much of the individual’s need to feel
economically secure. Change in orientations toward state authority and
legitimacy of national institutions have also been significant. As a result of
relative prosperity, individuals shift their emphasis, from economic and
physical security to belonging, self-expression, and quality-of-life issues.
This shift follows the expansion of the welfare state and economic growth
after WWII, which by the 1970s had turned into postmaterialist support for
exploration of differing lifestyles especially in contrast to the values of the
pre-WWII generation.
FIGURE 3.1 Materialist Mixed, and Postmaterialist

Populations in Britain, France, West
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and the United States by Age Group
Source: World Values Survey 1981–2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. World
Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer:
ASEP/JDS, Madrid. This graph was created using the World Values Online Data Analysis,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
CIVIC PARTICIPATION
is affected by political culture. Industrialization and socioeconomic change
since WWII has resulted in a change in what Inglehart refers to as the
political community. He suggests that individuals require different skills for
social and political interaction, which reflects how people conceptualize
political community. The postmaterialist political community is national,
complex, and driven by technology. Postmaterialists (those in the post-
WWII cohort) acquired skills that facilitate participation in a national
political community. Inglehart suggested that generational differences
existed in what he called “cognitive mobilization” or essentially the skills
needed for political action in modern political communities. These skills
include education, information, and participation in organizations or
networks. These are elements we associate with modern societies. Inglehart
argues that these mechanisms of social transition may raise the potential for
political participation.
Shifts were also found in types of political participation. Specifically,
Inglehart identified changes in loyalties to political parties. No longer does
party identification represent class or socioeconomic status (SES) cleavages.
Postmaterialists transcend traditional labels and tend to support parties
seeking political change in general. Postmaterialists are far more likely to
engage in protest politics such as petition drives, demonstrations, strikes, or
boycotts. And according to Inglehart, postmaterialists gained access to elite
groups in the United States. Those with postmaterialist values are now
achieving positions of authority in society. Members of this cohort now
serve in parliaments or congress, and hold occupations in the elite
occupational groups (e.g. educators, lawyers, labor leaders, media reps).
Political socialization entails many mechanisms by which members of a
society or social group understand the formalized operations of power in
society, namely the ways in which the state works, and its legitimacy as a
system of rule. Knowledge is conveyed regarding the nature of government,
the duties and obligations associated with the role of citizen, as well as the
skills necessary for participating in the political process. At another level,
political socialization affects the values and political orientations of
individuals. These values shape the ways in which individuals make
judgments about the distribution of power in society, or the acceptability of
certain policies advocated by the state (Halman 2007; Weakliem 2005).
Political values are shaped not only by the agents of socialization described
earlier, but also by what political sociologists describe as period effects or
influences associated with societal events at a particular period in history.
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have identified similar shifts in other
countries, again connected to global economic modernization. Based on
surveys of values from 120 societies, Inglehart and Welzel have created a
model of political culture that emphasizes a connection between economic
growth, human choice, and strength of democratic processes. Those
societies that tended to be more secular (in contrast to traditional religion),
and embrace free expression (in contrast to focused on survival), created a
democratic culture. Specifically, they conclude that
Each of the three components of human development is a distinct manifestation of a
common underlying theme: autonomous human choice. Socioeconomic development
increases people’s resources, giving people the objective means that enable them to
make autonomous choices. With self-expression values, people give high priority to
acting according to their autonomous choices. And democracy provides civil and
political liberties, granting people the rights to act according to their autonomous
choices.
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 287)
Inglehart’s studies have tested this claim and provided evidence that the
relationship between cultural shifts and political attitudes and behavior is
strong.
A very similar study of political culture in the United States has looked
at how norms about citizenship are changing. Dalton (2016) finds that a
significant portion of younger citizens in the millennial generation are
motivated to be “engaged citizens” preferring a variety of political acts such
as voluntarism, protest, and active political discussions as a way to assert
ideas about power. This stands in contrast to what he calls “duty-based
citizenship,” which originates out a sense of obedience to the law, civic
pride, or a sense of obligation, primarily thought of as voting. Dalton
connects these norms that define citizenship to generational shifts, changes
in economic and workplace experiences, a more diverse population, shifting
gender roles, and education levels. He concludes that
… the balance in a democratic political culture often arises from different people
following different sets of norms—and articulating the importance of the views of
citizenship—and then society and the polity reflect the relative weight of these distinct
groups.
(180)
Social norms change and as a result so does the political culture that
shapes the character of how citizens understand politics in society.
IDEOLOGY, BELIEFS, AND PUBLIC OPINION

As shared at the beginning of this chapter, ideology is an important element
of political culture and this is reflected in the classical theories of politics and
power, as well as the contemporary frameworks reviewed in the opening of
the analysis. One useful way of thinking about the many approaches to the
concept of ideology is by categorizing the vast research on ideology in four
ways that highlight the interplay between culture, power, and social action:
(1) ideology understood as an ability to comprehend power expressed in the
social context, (2) political attitudes and beliefs that make up a constellation
or collection of orientations about power, (3) beliefs about issues and politics
changed by deliberation or talking about politics, and (4) ideology as a
function of historical and social-class influences that conceal or distort to
assure power. Each of these research traditions has to date generated a great
deal of understanding about the interactions between individual citizens,
their political thinking, and structural influences that have effects on the
nature of power in society.
IDEOLOGY AS POLITICAL “SOPHISTICATION”

Early studies of ideology were designed to test the basic assumptions of
democracy that voters are informed, keen decision-makers. In other words,
social scientists were interested in the assertion that democracy required
citizens to be informed using what they understood about issues and
candidates to come to logical conclusions to make decisions. Much of the
early work on ideology in American politics began as a result of two studies.
In 1964, Converse asserted that most American voters had little ideological
sophistication. Rather, understanding politics was a function of “constraints”
that had little to do with comprehension of issues, or thinking in a critical
way about the pros and cons of policy positions held by political candidates.
In the classic study of American voting, this lack of sophistication was
confirmed. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) found that,
indeed, a larger portion of American voters did not vote based on what was
then described as a sophisticated view of political positions. These studies,
combined with the arguments of sociologists at the “Columbia School” of
voting, indicated that other influences were important to vote choices, and
launched decades of study around the nature of ideology and what were
called “mass belief systems.” Converse defined a mass belief system as “a
configuration of ideas and attitudes in which elements are bound together by
some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse 1964:
478). Ideology was understood as a system of ideas among the citizenry that
was shaped, or “constrained” by idea elements.
Political sociologists have examined this argument about ideological
thinking and sophistication in very interesting ways. The research has
continuously focused on determining whether the American electorate could
be characterized as sophisticated in its reasoning about politics. In 1990,
Luskin concluded:
… a person is politically sophisticated to the extent to which his or her political
cognitions are numerous, cut a wide substantive swath, and are highly organized or
“constrained.” Some psychologists write in this vein of cognitive complexity, meaning
the extent to which a person’s cognition of some domains are highly differentiated
(roughly, numerous and wide-ranging) and highly integrated (organized or constrained).
Others refer equivalently to expertise, meaning the extent to which the person’s
knowledge of the domain is both extensive and highly “chunked.” Political
sophistication is political cognitive complexity, political expertise.
(115)
Dalton (2014) more recently concluded that although citizens may not be
rational and logical experts on politics, they are “reasonable thinkers” using
what information they have to make relatively stable decisions. Dalton
proposes that mass belief systems be understood as a “hierarchy” of policy
opinions based on (1) general orientations to politics shaped by group
memberships, religious views, or economic conditions; and (2) principles or
values connected closely to fundamental notions about how politics should
look. For example, ideological thinking about health care may emerge from
principles related to the role of government in helping people or furthering
the free market. These give rise to orientations focused on government-
sponsored insurance in certain circumstances or for certain populations.
These general orientations may, in turn, shape specific opinions on a
particular proposal, such as universal health-care insurance, support for caps
on Medicare payments to doctors, or other specific policy outcomes. What
Dalton concludes is that ideology in an electorate works in such a way that
the citizenry comes to “reasonable” conclusions about political things such
as stands on political issues or evaluations of candidates. These
ideologically based evaluations are not necessarily highly sophisticated
conclusions based on idealized forms of civic thinking.
IDEOLOGY AS A SET OF POLITICAL BELIEFS

After the 1960s and 1970s, research on political ideology tended to measure
this orientation of value sets and attitudes as a spatial concept, with
ideology understood as a place on a continuum between liberal and
conservative (Gerring 1997; Knight 2006). Not only were individuals found
to have fairly consistent political orientations on this continuum, but the
measure of conservative–liberal was applied to understanding officeholders
as well as political groups. This “spatial” notion of ideology finds that
individuals and groups can hold a number of positions on selected beliefs
about the nature and role of government, power, civil liberties, foreign
policy, and the relationship between state and citizen in a pattern consistent
with liberal or conservative philosophies. How do Americans describe
themselves ideologically? Figure 3.2 shows that most respondents to the
General Social Survey (GSS) since 1974 have consistently seen themselves
as “moderates.” More respondents have consistently described themselves
as “conservative” than “liberal” in the last four decades, however, since
2004 more respondents have started to describe themselves as “liberal.”
However, how individuals see themselves ideologically can differ from
their actual cognitions to how they respond to political questions. The so-
called objective measures of ideology, in contrast to those that measure self-
placement, have been developed to give ideology a “spatial” (Knight 2006)
characteristic along the liberal–conservative continuum. When individuals
are asked to assess specific policy outcomes, such as support for foreign
interventions in global markets, or agreement with the statement that prayer
in schools should be banned, the American polity tends to look a bit
different when asked to rate themselves as conservative, moderate, or
liberal.
FIGURE 3.2 Respondents Who Identify Themselves as
Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative in the
GSS, 1974–2016
Source: Davis, James A., Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden. General Social Surveys,
1972–2016: [Cumulative File] [Computer file]. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research
Center [producer], 2009. Storrs, CT: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University
of Connecticut; Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Berkeley, CA: Computer-Assisted Survey Methods Program
(http://sda.berkeley.edu), University of California [distributors], 2016
IDEOLOGY AS DELIBERATION AND DISCOURSE

Another approach to ideology draws upon the idea that citizens are engaged
in conversation or dialogue about the nature and distribution of power found
in society (Eliasoph 1996). Marx and Hegel observed that this dialogue was
constructed by the ruling classes to assure that the outcome of the dialogue
would favor preservation of wealth in the capitalist class. The concept of
dialectic was used here to describe societal understandings created by each
human being gaining some experience, then observing and comparing this to
other experiences, and then making a judgment. There is a mental dialectic
characterizing all such interactions between the person and the object in the
environment.
Billig et al. (1988) suggested that ideology be viewed as a mindset about
politics constructed for contrasting sometimes conflicting themes
encountered in daily life, placing an emphasis on thesis and antithesis, or
ideology created through dialectic processes. These authors argue that
dilemmas emerge out of shared beliefs and social values. The response of
the person to the dilemma, however, according to this framework is a
function of the preconditions of the decision if one is involved. Out of the
contrary themes that emerge from daily interactions is the need for
argumentation and discourse. Billig et al. propose that dilemmas around
common sense result in thinking processes. Social beliefs are the foundation
for these debates. The shared beliefs lead to new forms of thought or beliefs,
as patterns of discourse dissuade the utility of older value sets, or reinforce
the stance of the common sense that the individual has grown with.
Discourse and argument are at the foundation of the theory of ideology
described by Billig. The individual’s expressions in discourse or debate may
reflect the challenge between a lived and intellectual ideology. Ideology
based on this model is a dynamic, fluid concept that is a function of
historical influences on the contextual interactions of the human existence.
Billig et al. (1988) have developed a typology of ideology based on
these frameworks of thought. The lived ideology refers to a “society’s way
of life.” Billig et al. admittedly treat ideology in many ways as synonymous
with culture. This type of thinking about power in everyday social patterns
is contrasted with intellectual ideology. This refers to specifically articulated
frames of reference. Often, as the name implies, intellectual ideology is
associated with great thinkers or philosophical advocates who have
formalized their interpretations or demands. The lived and intellectual
ideologies are often the source of the dilemmas that Billig et al. argue make
up the dialectic of social action.
IDEOLOGY AS HEGEMONY
The traditional class perspective has analyzed ideology more in terms of
historically relevant views of politics, economics, and daily human
interactions. Marx saw ideology as giving rise to the legitimation of the
relations of production and continued exploitation of labor. Others
conceptualize ideology as a function of historical forces and experiences
related to economic determinism and resulting positions in the class
structure.
An approach to political culture developed by proponents of the class
perspective addresses the more subtle influences of culture on ideas and
values. Antonio Gramsci (1971) used the term hegemony to describe that
general cultural milieu created by the ruling classes, where ideas and values
are shaped in compliance with ruling-class objectives. The intent with this
cultural dimension of ruling-class dominance is to preserve the stability of
class differences through the power of ideas, emotions, loyalties, and beliefs.
Thus, power is exercised through the manipulation of ideas. Gramsci used
the concept to explain why the upper economic classes maintained power
even when compliance with upper-class demands was against the best
interests of the working class.
One example of how hegemony works is found in the work of political
sociologists who study power differences between and among men and
women. Masculine hegemony is described as made up of a set of ideas such
as aggression, competition, winning in a game, or deceit in order to attain
interests. In their global analysis of women’s representation and
participation in political systems, Paxton and Hughes (2007) find that
hegemonic influences in countries described as patriarchal create cultural
barriers to women attaining positions in the political system. They conclude
that cultural forces such as attitudes in society about roles of men and
women, especially those shaped by religion, “matter for women’s
acquisition of political power” and can “influence women’s decision to run
for political office” (120).
In his study of the emergence of Protestantism and socialism through the
Enlightenment, Wuthnow (1989) found that how societies constructed views
of power could be connected to a culture and social structure. His historical
analysis demonstrated how Protestantism, the Enlightenment, and Socialism
emerged from cultural movements as a result of periods of “exceptional
economic growth” (9). Periods in history were also characterized by a
unique process of cultural development. Ideology grows out of the social
processes of cultural production. He suggested that ideology be thought of
as “an identifiable constellation of discourse” connected to social groups,
patterns of social interaction, and institutions. He is suggesting here that
ideology comes from three forces in society bound up in their historical era
—environmental, institutional, and action sequences. Ideology is created,
torn down, and then recreated through cycles in history. As Mannheim
(1936) concluded, every epoch or age has an ideology unique to that frame
in time.
Wuthnow concludes that socialism comes from an ideology made by its
environmental conditions, institutional contexts, and actions connected to
each. The environmental conditions include the social, political, or
economic conditions of a particular period in history. For example, wars or
famine can create shifts in how resources in society are distributed.
Institutional contexts shape this distribution process. By institutional
contexts, Wuthnow is describing the work of organizations or bureaucracies.
The masses connect to these contexts in schools or universities,
governmental agencies, reading or scientific societies, newspapers, or
political parties. Action sequences flow from environmental conditions and
institutional contexts. That is, ideas associated with ideological movements
(e.g. socialism) are produced in these settings and, at the same time, seek
changes in the institutional contexts and eventually environmental
conditions. Imagine, for example, how wars in nineteenth-century Europe
were a focal point of conversations in coffee shops or cafés in France or
Germany. Ideas about the effects of the war, such as what to do with those
who fought in these wars and lost their livelihood, might eventually become
the ideological basis for creation of social insurance programs such as
pensions for the aged or medical care. This cyclical nature of historical
conditions giving rise to ideas about power and the distribution of resources
in society, according to Wuthnow, characterizes how ideology changes
historically.
Contemporary work exploring the emergence of hegemonic power in
other ways has grown significantly with the study of globalization. As an
oversimplification perhaps, globalization argues that the beliefs and ideas
associated with U.S. capitalist culture have been extended to all parts of the
globe. As a result, ideas influence consumer choices in nations characterized
as newcomers to capitalist life. For example, as China has embraced some
forms of capitalist market activity in the past several years, consumer
choices for things like McDonald’s products or Western music have become
hallmarks of change in a traditionally anti-capitalist society. In his recent
study of the impact of the Internet and digital technologies on societies
throughout the world, Drori (2006) suggests that Internet communications
represent “a totalizing and individualizing form of power, allowing each
person a voice while also imposing on individuals a hegemonic structure”
(121). Although people are led to believe that the World Wide Web offers a
forum for free speech or communication, the truth is that the communication
is virtual and typically becomes a place for the distortion of identities (e.g.
gender-bending in a chat room, faking a profile). We believe we can
anonymously communicate using these digital communications, but the
rules of online interaction are structured by the creators of the device being
used. If this replaces face-to-face communication, intent or genuineness is
more difficult to test. Drori concludes, “In the age of globalization, where
the global is regarded as the homogenizing force and the local as a unique
scene, technology—like other forms of knowledge—is an instrument of
power” (121). Hegemonic influences are practiced through the structure of
the World Wide Web, which is made real in the small space of the computer
screen throughout the world.
The four faces of ideology suggest that it is a complex notion in the
study of public opinion, thinking about power, and the creation of political
culture. Martin (2015) offers a useful conclusion about ideology and its
significance to political sociology “ideology… actor’s theorization of their
politics, that is, it is their attempt to come up with an abstract representation
of the political alliance system in which they are in, and the nature of their
opponents” (26). In this sense, constraints, sophistication, knowledge,
hegemony, and narrative each reveal something different about how those in
society come to conclusions about candidates, issues, policies, and
membership in political groups. Ideology is a critical force in political
culture, and as a result, shaped by a variety of social influences.
In the past two decades, there has been increasing attention to what is
described as a significant division in American politics. The claim is that
there is a widening gap in our two-party system (Democrat v. Republican) is
the function of a number of significant changes in American politics. Part of
this division no doubt is a function of sharp differences in how the masses
have come to conclusion about policy issues and political leadership. We
know these attitudinal and value-based conclusions to be ideology. What
does the research show us regarding ideological splits in the United States?
There are several conclusions based on a number of research projects.
The PEW Research Center has tracked political thinking in the United
States in a major project that focuses on values and ideology. By surveying
adults since 1994, they note a number of significant patterns that describe
political polarization, or more specifically, political movement away from
what once considered the great political “center” of American politics.
Much of the change has to do with social and political attitudes about issues
such as the role of government in helping individuals, environmental
concerns, tax policy, immigration, and the role of the United States in global
affairs (PEW Research Center October 5, 2017). The growing disparity
between ideological opinions is notable: “But the bottom line is this: Across
10 measures that Pew Research Center has tracked on the same surveys
since 1994, the average partisan gap has increased from 15 percentage
points to 36 points” (PEW Research Center October 5, 2017: 3). The role of
ideology, understood here as positions on policy issues, is behind the
growing divide between the two major political parties (Democrat and
Republican).
The same study by PEW Research Center in the summer of 2017
focused on how values influence policy positions, and ultimately ideology.
The researchers identified nine configurations of political ideology with their
study of 5,000 adults. The typology is telling in that it reveals the nature of
ideological polarization in the United States, which, in turn, affects the
dynamics of the electoral process. The nine typologies from this study
include:
Core Conservatives—made up of 13 percent of the population, and 20

percent of the politically engaged; dominantly Republican, seeking a
smaller role for government in the lives of Americans, firmly
committed to economic growth as a vision for America.
Country First Conservatives—estimated to be 6 percent of the
population, and 6 percent of those politically engaged; dominantly
Republican, conservative on social issues such as gay rights, and fear
threats to “American identity” as a result of immigration.
Market Skeptic Republicans—approximately 12 percent of the
population, and with 10 percent estimated to be politically engaged;
mostly identify with the Republican Party, and prefer economic policies
that are fair to potential economic success of most Americans.
New Era Enterprisers—estimated to make up 11 percent of the
population, and 9 percent politically engaged; young conservatives that
lean Republican, approve of Republican economic policies, and
socially accepting of gay rights and more accepting of immigration.
Devout and Diverse—9 percent of the population, and 6 percent
estimated to be politically engaged; identify with the Democratic Party,
support a role for government in creating a “social safety net,” and tend
to hold attitudes that are more conservative on social issues, including a
belief in God in the role of the nation.
Disaffected Democrats—14 percent of the U.S. population, and 11
percent politically engaged; lean Democrat, see business in America as
favoring a powerful few, and interestingly suspect of a government that
is “inefficient.”
Opportunity Democrats—12 percent of the population, and 13 percent
politically engaged; tend to be more liberal on economic and social
issues, supportive of U.S. global involvement in markets, and are
committed to the idea that hard work can help achieve the American
Dream. This group leans Democrat.
Solid Liberal—16 percent of the population, and 25 percent
characterized as politically engaged; this group is dominantly
Democrat, liberal on economic and social policies, focused on the lack
of fairness for all in achieving the American Dream, supporting a
stronger role for government in solving society problems including
social inequalities.
A group called “bystanders” are in the middle, estimated to make up 8

percent of the population, described as watching the political process, but
rarely engaged. The authors conclude that these ideological patterns reveal
“a political landscape increasingly fractured by partisanship” and that “the
divisions with the Republican and Democratic coalitions may be as
important factor in American politics as the divisions between them” (PEW
Research Center October 24, 2017; 1).
How do we explain these patterns in contemporary American politics?
Schier and Eberly (2016) find that social influence including increasing
levels of education, resulting in a greater political sophistication, plays a
significant role. Constructing a constellation of somewhat more informed
policy positions and taking these positions into campaigns has formed a
more ideological public. Related to this is increased political activism by
individuals with greater ideological orientations to politics. Citizens with
strong ideological positions can be activated to engage in candidate and
issue campaigns. Finally, the authors argue that as a result of this ideological
shift to more liberal, and more conservative, America’s political parties have
fewer liberals and moderates within the party. They conclude that “Liberal
Republicans and conservative Democrats gradually are becoming as scarce
as hula hoops and cassette tapes, to mention two once-widespread relics of
the past” (Schier and Eberly; 131). Many factors shape the nature of
ideology in American politics today. In the next section, we look at the role
of a just a few.
SOURCES OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Religion, Political Values, and Ideology
There is no doubt that religion plays a significant role in shaping the values
of individuals. We also find that those values are related to behaviors that
include political choices, forms of activism, and expressions about policy.
We continue to learn about just how the complexities of membership in
religious groups including churches and denominations, spirituality, and
religious worldviews affect political values. C. Wright Mills (1959) used the
phrase “vocabularies of motive” to describe various attitudes and beliefs, no
matter how shaped, to lead to political action. Goffman (1974) talked about
“frames” as constellations of understandings about the world that create
perceptions of reality, and thus, social behavior. Does religion motivate and
frame political values and ideology?
Interest in the connections between religion and politics is not new. In
fact, one can easily argue that prior to the Enlightenment, religion, as Weber
suggested in his many studies of religion, was the social base for the
legitimization of power. Think, for example, about the concept of divine
right of kings. Rule of the monarch was justified by appeals to the intentions
of God. Enlightenment thinking and the age of revolution changed this basic
philosophy of rule. Political power would move from a religious base to a
focus on the ability of free persons to think and choose rulers and policies.
The role of religion in politics since then has changed. In the last two
centuries, appeals to religious thinking have been used to justify political
acts such as wars, declarations of independence, the abolition of slavery, and
the intervention of the state in human reproduction and death.
In very recent history, American politics in particular entered an era
where religion played an important role in shaping political outlooks, thus
organizing citizens into various forms of political action. The 1980s and
1990s were described by some political sociologists as polarized, suggesting
significant divisions between a variety of citizen groups. Hunter (1991)
coined the term culture wars to describe the intensity of what emerged as a
debate about the perceived morality of American society and the role of the
state and religious organizations in defining social values. Why is religion
important to our understanding of politics? It serves as a basis for structuring
moral imperatives about the nature of life, and thus, social conflicts that may
become political questions.
NEW HAMPSHIRE, UK—A sign for election night prayers at the Church
of Our Savior in Milford, New Hampshire
Credit: Shutterstock by Andrew Cline
In the United States, the social institution of religion has undergone three
significant changes in the past century:
1. decline in size of mainline denominations with growth in conservative
denominations;
2. decline in denominationalism (ecumenical, cross church);
3. emergence of “direct action, special purpose” spiritual groups.
As a result of these changes, the role of religion in politics has taken on new
forms. Hunter describes this as a key influence in the culture wars, because
the purpose of many of the emergent religious groups is “about power—a
struggle to achieve or maintain the power to define reality” (1991: 52). It is
within this environment that groups like the Moral Majority in the 1980s
marshaled political resources including money and churchgoers, and the
Republican presidential candidacies of Pat Robertson, a televangelist who
placed a surprising second in the 1988 Iowa Caucuses, Mike Huckabee, a
former Arkansas governor and minister in the Southern Baptist Church who
won the Iowa Caucuses in 2008, and the winner of the 2016 Iowa caucuses,
self-described religious conservative Senator Ted Cruz.
Some scholars have argued that since the 1980s, religion has played an
important role in politics as a source of social critique of culture and
morality, mostly in reaction to modernity, globalization, and everyday life
(Marty and Appleby 1995). The growth of fundamentalist religious beliefs is
worldwide, involving especially two of the largest global religious
traditions: Islam and Christianity. The shift to religious fundamentalism,
which is based on believing literally in key religious texts such as the Bible,
reflects a significant shift in religious thinking at the end of the twentieth
century having an impact on national and global politics. The key point is
that religion serves as a significant source of values that, in turn, construct
political orientations and dispositions that foster variations in individual and
group values, attitudes, and resulting political actions.
How exactly does religion shape political values? Many link individual
views of power to views of the supernatural. For example, in a study entitled
America’s Four Gods, Froese and Bader (2010) discovered that individuals
vary in ways in which they see God as a judgmental or nonjudgmental deity.
This dimension of deep religious thinking relates to how one thinks about
God’s sense of justice, and standards of right and wrong. How far God
intervenes in the daily life of individuals is sensed by individuals as highly
engaged, or not at all engaged, changing life through miracles, or a sense of
personal guidance. Froese and Bader found four different conceptualizations
of God based on levels of judgmentalism and engagement. We note here in
Text box 3.1 the political orientations of each.
Table 3.1 Four Gods and Political Leanings

Authoritative and distant views of God are related to more clear political
identities. In contrast, the benevolent and critical God views are connected
to mixed political values. This national study suggests how individual
religious definitions shape political views and political choices. But these
influences are complex and vary as individuals reconcile religious views
with political values in general.
Similarly, McDaniel (2016) pinpointed the effects of what he described
as the “social gospel” and the “prosperity gospel” as significant religious
narratives influencing differences in political ideology. The “social gospel”
draws from a religious tradition that focuses on addressing inequality, such
as taking up the needs of the poor, or embracing suffering caused by
inequality through expressions of diving love. The “prosperity gospel”
focuses on adherence to religion doctrines acts necessary to God’s favor.
McDaniel found that persons oriented to the social gospel “is associated
with promoting attention to the social cases of problems… lower levels of
support for social conservatism and decreased identification with the
Republican Party” (17). Those identifying with the prosperity gospel were
more likely to be socially conservative and Republican, and “promotes
targeting individuals as the cause of social problems” (17). These political
orientations based on religious beliefs were fostered in church membership
and activity, and to some extent, imagery fostered in the various ways the
individual experienced religious teachings.
Manza and Wright (2003) find that these values create “religious
cleavages” in voting patterns in the United States. For example, they
conclude that denominational membership and a commitment to dogma or
religious teaching influence how people vote for president. Others have
identified the role of religious values in structuring more radical forms of
political protest and extremism as we will see in Chapters 8 and 9.
Sociologists studying radical forms of political protest, rallies, and the
emergence of extremist Web sites have found that religion plays an
important role in the construction of attitudes and beliefs that are used to
justify racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia. Text box 3.2 provides an
example of this research.
TEXT BOX 3.2

Religion, Ideology, and Political Extremism
Religion has historically been a powerful force in shaping the
motivations and eventual acts of kings, crusaders, revolutionaries, and
activists. The role of religion in serving as a catalyst for political actions
such as terrorism or war has been studied. Even today, we find examples
of religious frameworks transformed into what some believe are
justifiable acts of political violence. Because values and religious beliefs
are involved, there is controversy in defining the exact relationship
between religion and politics. Some bristle at the label “political
extremism” based on religious ideology. But religious values are a
powerful motivator.
In May 2009, abortion provider Dr George Tiller was murdered while
attending services at his home church in Wichita, Kansas. Scott Roeder, a
self-proclaimed antiabortion activist in Kansas who had created an
antiabortion Web site and had participated in protests at Planned
Parenthood clinics in the Kansas City area, was convicted of the murder.
Law enforcement officers also linked Roeder with a right-wing
movement known as the “Freemen,” which was an anti-government
movement in the Midwest claiming to operate under its own system of
common law. Roeder has claimed that his use of deadly force was
“justifiable” to defend unborn children. There are clues in this case that
religion and beliefs in conspiracy shaped Roeder’s beliefs about abortion.
In an effort to examine the role of religion in contemporary politics,
some groups monitor the acts of religious groups organized around
political agendas. Abortion has become a highly politicized topic in the
last fifty years. In a study entitled Toxic to Democracy: Conspiracy
Theories, Demonization, and Scapegoating, Chip Berlet (2009) claims
that religion helps form out-groups in politics and establishes social
divisions that rationalize the use of political violence. Religion plays a
role in building that narrative. He observes,
From the work of several scholars, we learn that “dualistic apocalypticism,” or the
concern that a conflict between good and evil will culminate in a massive change for
the country or the world, tells the story of a conspiracy in which there are
scapegoated villains that are blamed for feared outcomes.
(35)
According to the study, there are four “tools of fear” commonly used
by groups and individuals associated with what we know as right-wing
political movements. These tools include (1) dualism, (2) scapegoating,
(3) demonization, and (4) apocalyptic aggression. The report also details
how each of these goals are commonly pursued by various groups that
make up far-right followings. Many of these groups are part of a larger
social and political ideological movement in the United States.
Go to the link listed in the source to download your copy of this
study. Then using these four goals and news reports on the Roeder case,
identify how religion and conspiracy are used to construct a justification
for political violence. Find specific examples of statements or law
enforcement testimony or reports that demonstrate dualist thinking about
abortion, blaming and demonization of abortion doctors, and the use of
violence and aggression.
Source: Chip Berlet. “Toxic to Democracy: Conspiracy Theories,

Demonization, & Scapegoating.” Public Eye.Org, the Web site of
Political Research Associates, retrieved July 29, 2009 from
http://www.politicalresearch.org/resources/reports/full-reports/toxic-to-
democracy/
Media and Political Culture

The mass media have assumed a unique role in the dynamics of modern
political culture. On one hand, the media have been treated as a source of
information and knowledge about political candidates, political events, and
global political changes. The media have also been studied as a significant
actor in the processes of political socialization described earlier in this
chapter. For social constructionists, the media have been understood as key
players in the manipulation of political symbols and expressions related to
deliberation, ritual, and outright political mythologies. Text box 3.3 explores
another direction of research which tests the claim that the media have a
liberal bias in its treatment of candidates and issues. The holy grail of sorts
in the study of media effects on political attitudes and behavior is being able
to identify the direct impact of TV ads, or exposure to images, or time spent
reading on specific political outcomes. After decades of research, few
studies have been able to make such direct links (Preiss et al. 2006). What
we understand now about the role of media in shaping elements of political
culture is that sociological variables are important—education of the viewer,
economic status of target audiences, predispositions created by other societal
influences or reference groups, and group membership more generally.
Needless to say, the connections between media and political outcomes are
complex. Political sociologists typically focus on the role of the media as a
social institution and mass media organizations created for reasons of profit,
or to claim a voice in political discourse. Domhoff’s study (2014) of the
ruling class in the United States and its connections with media
corporations, entertainment, and more recently social media shape political
culture in important ways:
The media can say what people think is important, but the news they stress reflects the
biases of those who access them—corporate leaders, government officials, and policy
experts. Even here, there is ample evidence that the views of liberal critics make
frequent appearances in newspapers and magazines, and that corporations and
establishment politicians are regularly criticized.
(117)
TEXT BOX 3.3

Is There a Liberal Media Bias?
The perception that the media are biased is widespread. As Donald
Trump began his Presidency, he pointed to the media in general as the
source of “fake news” furthering the notion that the media reports with
bias. A Google Internet search found 2.2 million hits for “liberal media
bias” compared to 1.5 million for “conservative media bias.” This
perception is backed with opinion poll data revealing that 45 percent of
Americans believe that the media are too liberal compared to 35 percent
who say the media are about right and 15 percent who believe the media
are too conservative (Gallup Organization 2009). Partisanship influences
perception. In other words, Republicans perceive liberal bias, while
Democrats perceive a conservative slant (Morris 2007). Sixty-three
percent of Americans believe that news stories are inaccurate and 74
percent believe that news organizations are influenced by powerful
people and organizations (Pew Research Center 2009). Not surprisingly,
the majority of Americans (55 percent) report having little to no trust and
confidence in the mass media (Gallup 2009). How accurate are these
perceptions?
Those advocating that a liberal media bias exists cite studies showing
that journalists have more left-of-center views on social issues (e.g. Dye
2002) and that when researchers ask reporters to make hypothetical
journalistic decisions, the reporters choose responses consistent with their
partisan views (e.g. Patterson and Donsbach 1996). However, responses
to hypotheticals do not prove actual bias in reporting (Niven 1999). Gans
(1980) points out that reporters do not have control over headlines or
story placement and editors are careful to weed out any trace of political
bias.
In their review of media bias research, Covert and Wasburn argue that
past studies fail to ask “More or less conservative (or liberal) than what
other specific news sources” and assume that bias does not vary over time
or by the issue (2007: 690). In a comparison of twenty-five years (1975–
2000) of news magazine coverage, mainstream sources such as Time and
Newsweek are centrist in their coverage of crime, environment, gender,
and poverty compared to the markedly more conservative National
Review or liberal Progressive (Covert and Wasburn 2007). Niven (1999)
also found, using an objective baseline, no liberal bias in his analysis of
newspapers.
In contrast, other studies have found that Fox News, self-promoted as
an alternative to the “liberal media,” has become friendlier to Republican
views since its inception (Morris 2005), with news coverage more
supportive of the Bush invasion of Iraq (Aday, Livingston, and Hebert
2005). Fox News viewers were also more likely than others to believe
incorrectly that there was a link between Al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein
and that weapons of mass destruction were found after the 2003 invasion
(Kull 2003). Fox viewers also underestimated the number of U.S.–Iraq
war casualties compared to other viewers (Morris 2005).
Domhoff (2014) argues that media bias is not influential because
consumers gravitate toward media sources that fit their ideological views.
For example, Republicans tend to choose Fox News as their primary
source (Morris 2007), so any relationship between news viewing and
behavior is probably more a function of previously established political
attitudes. However, a more fragmented media market may result in a
more polarized public, making consensus building more difficult. Morris
contends that previously, a more homogenized news environment
exposed viewers to different points of view. In today’s more fragmented
media, viewers choosing news consistent with own point of view reduce
their exposure to alternative ideas.
Morris (2007) contends that Fox News benefits from the persistent
perception of liberal bias, having become one of the most popular news
sources in the United States, as those who believe that the media have a
liberal slant are also more likely to report Fox News as their primary
news source. Moreover, a recent study by the PEW Research Center
(2014) finds that conservative audiences tend to a single source of TV
news, FOX, while liberal viewers are diverse in their choice of news
outlets (CNN, MSNBC, and others). A larger audience share means
increased advertising revenue. This raises an important question: Is there
really a liberal media bias or is this only a gimmick to attract viewers and
advertising dollars?
Political sociologists approach the study of mass media in many

different ways. We organize this vast body of research around the basic
notions of political culture in that culture—given our use of a fairly simple
definition—includes values, knowledge, and symbolic systems in society. In
this sense, we have learned that the mass media play a powerful role in
influencing political values, political knowledge, and the symbolic
dimensions of American politics in particular. The mass media, which we
define to include here the news gathering and reporting organizations, the
entertainment industry, and most recently, the Internet, are a collection of
organizations that are outside the formal apparatus of the state (although in
countries other than the United States, the mass media can be an arm of the
state). The media are part of the civil sphere in that they may target not only
citizens or popular audiences (mass), but typically the work of the mass
media can influence the behavior of state actors.
Media and Political Knowledge

We begin with the work on the relationship between exposure to mass media
and citizen behavior. This is where much of the research has focused. We
can connect this long-standing research agenda to the early voting studies in
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, which basically painted a picture of a fairly
unsophisticated American electorate, as described earlier. As the media
emerged to hold a greater presence in society by the 1960s—only fifty years
ago—studies of what impacts the mass media had on changing the relative
sophistication of the American electorate became more common.
One critical assumption in American democracy follows the dictum of
Thomas Jefferson, who argued that educated citizens would be active
participants in the processes of governance. At first glance, we do find a
connection between the use of various forms of media and news and forms
of political participation. As Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, individuals who
voted for president in 2016 reported a greater use of television as a source of
political information than newspapers. Reading newspapers or news
magazines has over time become less prominent a source of news for many,
and the rise of the Internet as a source of political information is only now
being studied. Moreover, the impact of media on citizen’s knowledge about
politics is at best described in the research as a complex pattern (Bishop
2004; Glynn et al. 1999; Markus 2007; Norris 2000). The link between
information from media sources and political participation or interest in
politics is changed by other influences. For example, the relationship
between watching C-SPAN and CNN or reading the New York Times and
Time magazine tends to be a function of interest in politics to begin with. In
other words, the effects of this vast potential for gathering political
information at the mass level have not resulted in increased mass
participation or mass interest in politics. Wei and Lo (2008), in a study of
how individuals used information in the 2006 U.S. midterm elections,
described a learning process “driven by motivation, necessitated by
exposure, and enhanced by attention and elaboration” (347). Citizens
sometimes seek out information or are exposed to it haphazardly, and use
bits and pieces sometimes filtered through ideology and bias, leading to use
of the information in sometimes not-so-rational ways.
FIGURE 3.3 TV as a Source of Political Information for

Presidential Voters, 2016, American
National Election Studies (ANES)
Source: The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). The ANES
Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan,
Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor]. This graph was created at the
Computer-Assisted Survey Methods Program (http://sda.berkeley.edu), University of
California [distributors], 2016. (These materials are based on a work supported by the
National Science Foundation and a number of other sponsors.)
FIGURE 3.4 Newspapers as a Source of Political
Information for Presidential Voters, 2016,
American National Election Studies
In a recent review of studies of how media affects political knowledge,

Goldstein and Ridout (2004) concluded that TV advertising in political
campaigns actually creates knowledge as a “by-product” (211). In other
words, the intent of political ads is to persuade voters to choose one
candidate over another, or to convince citizens to support a particular
proposition. Brians and Wattenberg (1996) found that even for individuals
watching TV news and reading newspapers, TV political ads contributed
more to political learning. Others who tested a similar hypothesis did not
find support for the notion that political ads contribute to the knowledge of
voters. Rather, the effect is present only under certain conditions, such as if
the ad is sponsored by a political candidate, or the audience has low interest
or low information to begin with (Just et al. 1996; Pfau et al. 2002).
Therefore, there is not a clear picture of the extent of the overall effect of
media on knowledge about politics and under what conditions this effect
consistently appears. More research needs to be conducted.
But, as sociology teaches, technology is a critical “driver” of social
change, and politics has not escaped the dramatic influences of what we now
call Social Media. As we discussed earlier, the Internet and World Wide
Web are a new form of mass media communication. Table 3.1 shows the
dramatic rise in the use of the Internet as a source of political news for
voters. Based on their national studies of use of technology, politics, and
journalism, the PEW Research Center conforms how in a twenty-year
period, the Internet has dramatically altered the political media landscape.
Over the same time period, the role of print media has slowly declined
(Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Percent Using Media Sources for News

about Presidential Campaigns, 1992–2016
Only recently have researchers started to examine what role the Internet
plays in political sophistication and knowledge (Margolis 2007). Given the
relative youth of this form of mass media (only twenty years), researchers
have yet to untangle the many influences hypothesized to have effects,
especially on younger citizens who have grown up with this new form of
political communication. Bimber (2003) finds that much like other media
sources, the Internet has relatively little impact on political knowledge or
information for the general population. Rather, cyberspace has become a
place for activists to post information about political events (e.g. posting
comments on a blog after a president’s speech). These sites tend to be visited
by activists rather than the mass public seeking information by which to
evaluate political outcomes. Yet, data collected by the National Election
Studies (Figure 3.5) from voters in the last four national elections do show
that more voters reported accessing the Internet for information. More
research will be done for sure as sociologists continue to sort out what the
Internet means to activists, voters, and the public at large.
Media and Political Values

One popular notion is that the media shapes values about politics as well as
moral concerns, and as a result, the media are typically a source of scrutiny
by interest groups seeking regulation of media images or even vocabulary.
Research on attitudes and values suggests that for the most part, these are
relatively stable in adulthood, and the media have only minor effects on
major shifts in these attitudes and values. Political values are not likely to
change for the greatest portion of individuals in society. As we saw earlier
from the research on postmaterialism and the personality of modernity,
values tend to be altered as a result of cohort or generational effects,
including crises such as war, or economic depressions. The media do not
significantly change political values per se. If anything, values tend to
dictate what kinds of media are sought out or accessed by politically aware
individuals.
In their review of the vast literature in this field, Graber and Dunaway
(2015) find that individuals tend to pay attention to news media sources such
as TV or print media as a result of existing dispositions. For example,
individuals predisposed to liberal or conservative values seek out sources
that confirm these positions (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Becker and
Kosicki 1995; Erikson and Tedin 2005; Glynn et al. 1999).
FIGURE 3.5 Internet as a Source of Political Information
for the Presidential Voters, 2016, American
National Election Studies
Graber and Dunaway (2015) arrange this mixed picture on media effects
into three frameworks of research. These three camps in media research
have evolved in an attempt to explain and describe patterns of media use
based on values, lifestyles, and personal dispositions:
Uses and Gratification—this research suggests that individuals seek out media stories
that fit personal uses or interests. “Put simply, proponents of this approach contend that
individuals ignore personally irrelevant and unattractively presented messages. They
pay attention to the kinds of things that they find useful and intellectually or emotionally
gratifying if time and effort constraints permit it” (Graber and Dunaway 2015: 279). As
some point out, these uses of information or media sources can vary across time and
across experiences in life. What may be attractive for a college student participating in a
political campaign for the first time may change as the student leaves the campaign and
joins other causes.
Selective Exposure—individuals tend to avoid unpleasant things, and if one ever
watches the evening network news, it tends to be filled with stories of death,
destruction, war, disease, corruption, murder, and other negative topics! Moreover,
people tend to listen to those who hold similar attitudes. “Selectivity reduces the already
slim changes that exposure to different views will alter an individual’s established
beliefs, attitudes, and feelings. Selective exposure therefore helps to explain the
considerable stability that exists in orientations, such as party allegiance or foreign
policy preferences” (Graber and Dunaway 2015: 282).
Agenda Setting—this body of research challenges the other two frameworks and
suggests that the media does change values and attitudes through a process of agenda
setting. “When people are asked which issues are most important to them personally or
to their communities, their lists tend to correspond to cues in the news sources that they
use” (Graber and Dunaway 2015: 284). Thus, media sources can, in some ways, alter
what groups of people value as political priorities or issue concerns. But, Graber warns
that this influence “varies in potency.” New concerns, for example, are more likely to be
influenced by the media polls or reports as well as information required for
understanding new issues.
These three perspectives are examples of competing findings in the

current research on the impact of the media on citizens. The results are
complex and tend to vary from social group, social context, and historical
environment.
Politics, Symbolism, and Performance

As we know from sociological work in the field of symbolic interaction,
symbols are powerful mechanisms for building interpersonal understanding,
the formation of social connections, the formation of group cohesion, and
using symbolic cues to identify belonging to a group as well as individual
differences. The symbolic system studied most extensively is language.
Think about how words, phrases, tones, or inflections are used to connect to
others. Early in the study of power, Deutsch (1955: 23–54) identified at least
five symbolic systems significant to the ways in which power is understood
by individuals, and in some cases, manipulated in political processes:
1. abstractions (e.g. ideas, sayings, chants)
2. pictures (e.g. flags, animals, buildings, relics)
3. people (e.g. heroes, presidents from the past, saints)
4. places (e.g. national shrines, parks, tombs)
5. organizations and institutions (e.g. courts, synagogues, military).
These symbolic systems are sources for influencing political values,
knowledge, or more abstractions about power. The media use imagery to
invoke emotions that can construct important political belief systems
through the depiction of symbols. Television, print media, and more
recently, the Internet all use technology to convey images about elections,
world politics, war, political candidates, political groups, and political power
generally. What these images mean to the viewer is of interest to political
sociologists.
In a series of works beginning in 1964, Edelman (1964, 1971, 1988)
suggested that for the most part, American politics was about spectators
watching the symbolic manipulation of governance by the elites. He
suggested that the spectators, for the most part, played little role in actual
decision-making in the rule of the country. Rather, they were placated as
spectators of sorts, reassured by the symbolic expression of the ruling elite.
For example, Edelman described what symbolic expressions are used in the
modern political convention. American politics, in particular, was about the
manipulation of nationalist symbols. If you watch the Democratic or
Republican National conventions on TV, you witness a highly
choreographed event. You will see symbols used to invoke party loyalty and
bring attention to the candidate nominated for president that are organized
around patriotic themes (e.g. red, white, and blue balloons or flags and
banners), or you will hear speeches filled with symbolic phrases that may
end up as sound bites on the evening news or become campaign slogans
(e.g. in 2008 Barack Obama, the Democratic nominee for president, invoked
change). These “spectacles,” as Edelman describes them, were common
dramas in the modern media age created to portray the American political
process as open and inviting the participation of the masses.
Political sociologists have advanced the idea that modern politics in
America is indeed “spectacle.” This focus builds on the work of Jean
Baudrillard (1983, 1989), who argued that advanced capitalist society uses
spectacle and the creation of new symbolic orders to enhance consumption.
His work explored how systems of consumerism blur the lines between
reality and simulation. For example, Disneyland perhaps has become a
metaphor itself for the nature of modern life, where fantasy is created in
exchange for subtle exchanges of money. Political culture today may in fact
follow the Disney model. In an analysis of the role of a celebrity in politics,
van Eletern (2013) pinpoints who “celebrity politicians have come to rely
upon the techniques and methods of Hollywood in the performance of their
political role” (265). TV shows, Twitter, Facebook, movies, the mobility of
social media, and even political candidates themselves are elements in this
creation. He poses an interesting question: How do political leaders, on the
one hand, legitimately govern in the realm of state, law, and electoral
institutions, while, on the other hand, distorting realities that are necessary
for performance in the modern media culture?
Political Culture and Place

The study of political culture has also revisited Durkheim’s classical
argument that values and social orientations are a function of social context.
Researchers are exploring the connections among values, attitudes,
ideologies, political action, social context, and place. More specifically, one
path in this line of work explores the distribution of various political
communities throughout society. As we will see in this section, place and
social context have also been connected to nations and the development of
nationalism.
One of the first major projects dedicated to understanding the link
between place and political institutions as well as values was that of Daniel
Elazar (1984, 1994). He proposed a model of state–federal institutional
relationships based on a configuration of political value patterns found in the
United States. He described political culture as “the particular pattern of
orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded”
(1984: 112). The importance of these patterns is manifest in the ways in
which government and citizens interact in the creation of the public good.
This theme is important not only to Elazar’s work, but also to the early
writings on civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963, 1989). The purpose of
this work was to find what roles local contexts, patterns of values, and
attitudes play, and in which ways political power was used.
Elazar’s theory of political culture established an explanation for how
“patterns of orientation” affect power in the geographical structures created
as states. He concluded that three influences were at work. Specifically,
political culture affected state politics as a result of:
(1) the set of perceptions of what politics is and what can be expected from government,
held by both the general public and the politicians; (2) the kinds of people who become
active in government and politics, as holders of elective offices, members of the
bureaucracy, and active political workers; and (3) the actual way in which the art of
government is practiced by citizens, politicians, and public officials in light of their
perceptions. In turn, the cultural components of individual and group behavior in the
various political systems make themselves felt at three levels: in the kind of civic
behavior dictated by conscience and internalized ethical standards; in the character of
law-abiding-ness displayed by citizens and officials; and, to a degree, in the positive
actions of government.
(Elazar 1984: 112)
According to Elazar, these cultural dimensions of political life were

especially significant to patterns of federalism in the United States.
Specifically, localized political cultures played a role in fostering national
unity while contributing to tensions as a result of conflicts between
regionalized political cultures.
Elazar went on to suggest that three traditions of political values were
found in regions throughout the United States, and in subregions within the
fifty states. His early work identifies three distinct political cultures:
moralism, individualism, and traditionalism.
Moralist—values that see the state as a way to achieve communal good; healthy civic
competition with all citizens participating is a way to articulate this desire for the
common good; the state serves a higher communal moral interest; associated with the
upper New England states and northern tier of states continuing through Oregon and
Washington.
Individualist—approaches the state as an arena for the fair exchange of ideas
dedicated to the smooth operation of governmental functions; government is like a
business in that rewards of hard work and competition are shared with participants;
political competition is seen as a contest between organizations rather than ideas;
confined to lower New England and the industrial Midwest.
Traditionalist—the state preserves the existing social order; political participation is
associated with the interests of a political elite dedicated to “taking care of” the affairs
of public policy on behalf of the current social order; participation is based on family
connections or social ties within the community; predominant in the South.
According to Elazar, states and regions of the country could be

characterized by these dominant patterns of value and political orientations.
He also suggested that, within states and regions, there were variations or
pockets of beliefs. For example, while the northern tier of states from Maine
to the northwest were predominantly moralist in their cultural
configurations, these states also typically blended individualist cultural
characteristics. Within each state, more localized subcultures were also
distinguishable such as the moralist and traditionalist locales in the desert
southwest.
USA—A nation of value communities
Credit: Shutterstock by Robert F. Balazik
While much of the work was criticized for failing to measure aspects of
“political culture” on a consistent basis, a number of researchers have taken
up the challenge of developing very detailed models of political culture in
the United States.
Lieske (1993, 2007) has found, using county-level measures of religious,
racial, economic, educational, and immigrant diversity, that distinct
communities of political culture can be mapped throughout the United
States. His work has suggested that there are “regional subcultures” with
predominant normative patterns that affect political behaviors, party
identification, and political attitudes. He identifies eleven distinct localized
political subcultures in the United States:
Heartland—creates a belt from Kansas through Iowa, Illinois, and Ohio

through Pennsylvania;
Latino—southwest including south Texas and New Mexico and parts of
California and identified with the Catholic Church;
Nordic—along the North Dakota and Minnesota northlands with
identity linked to the Lutheran church and church organizations;
Border—throughout California and Arizona with heavy concentrations
of immigrant populations;
Mormon—concentrated in Utah;
Global—scattered throughout the United States; concentrated in urban
areas associated with cosmopolitan and urban lifestyles;
Blackbelt—south and through the Appalachia communities;
Native American—pockets in the West;
Germanic—scattered through the Nebraska, Northern Iowa, and
Wisconsin through Pennsylvania;
Rurban—scattered throughout states west of the Mississippi with
concentrations of rural and highly educated communities;
Anglo-French—upper New England, especially Maine.
Clearly, as Lieske suggests, these subcultures are not marked by easily

identifiable borders, but rather are best described as fluid pockets or
concentrations of groups of people based on ethnicity, rural/urban
environments, economic orientations, and religious identities. Woodard
(2011) conclude that these patterns are the result of historically rooted
regional settlements and conflicts in America. He suggests that the United
States is made up of regional cultures, which he describes as “eleven rival”
influences of fairly distinct political values creating national tension. He
concludes that in many ways the political conflicts of today have deep
historical roots based on patterns of settlement and ethnic identity. Chinni
and Gimpel (2011) find a similar clustering of likes into what they describe
as a “patchwork nation” of communities where tastes, ideologies, and
lifestyles reflect twelve identifiable patterns of subnational cultures.
An important question in the research on political subcultures and
political geography is whether it matters to political processes or the
distribution of power? A few studies have started to examine this (Miller,
Barker, and Carman 2006). One significant argument is that these various
expressions of political subcultures create regionalisms in the United States.
This has historically been significant to electoral outcomes. Recall that the
balance of power in the creation of the U.S. Congress, for example, was to
some extent an issue of geography. Seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives were apportioned to states based on population, and seats in
the Senate were apportioned equally to each state—two per state. Thus,
policy in Congress can be changed when a southern bloc of conservative
senators hold up a nomination for the U.S. Supreme Court, or when “blue
dog” Democrats (fiscal conservatives primarily from the Midwest and the
South) in the House of Representatives effectively block ways to fund
health-care reform. In this sense, the political values of the regions in the
United States are expressed in the policy-making process and have impact
on policy outcomes. Putnam (2000) predicted that these divisions would
result in greater civic disengagement over the long term. Text box 3.4
explores what Bishop (2008) describes as a sorting of American society into
homogeneous neighborhoods. These studies suggest that pockets of political
cultures are perhaps behind the nation’s social and political disunity.
Nationalism
One could conclude from the previous section that the United States is a
nation divided based on cultural distinctions. Certainly, those who argue that
the “culture wars” have pitted the Northeast against the South and West
suggest that political culture in the United States is dispersed. What holds us
together then? An interesting track in the study of political culture has only
recently examined the nature of nationalism, not only in the United States,
but in other parts of the world. Nationalism is in many ways how we
conceptualize the cultural dimensions of the nation-state. Some scholars
treat the state as a structural element, and view nationalism as a cultural
element. Values and beliefs about the state or national identity result in
patterns of behavior associated with loyalty or even patriotism.
According to Greenfield and Eastwood (2005), the study of nationalism
has taken two basic paths. Early works were described as “structural.”
Citing the works of Earnest Gellner, they describe nationalism as a “form of
consciousness” (248) that surrounds state structures, especially those that
enforce or create social order. Gellner theorized that nations retained a
“shared culture” (248) inherent in the nation as a community or a group: “a
very distinctive species of patriotism, and one which becomes pervasive and
dominant only under certain social conditions, which in fact prevail in the
modern world, and nowhere else” (quoted by Greenfield and Eastwood
2005: 248). Using a similar cultural approach, Anthony Smith defined
nationalism emerging out of “a named human population which shares
myths, memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland, economic
unity and equal rights and duties for all members” (quoted by Greenfield and
Eastwood 2005: 248). Nationalism, according to structuralist views,
connected cultural elements to structures of state, nation, and territory.
TEXT BOX 3.4
Political Birds of a Feather?
Emile Durkheim used the term homophily to describe forms of social
cohesion driven by interests, jobs, religion, neighborhood, and social
interests. He believed that people with similarities tended to settle
together in communities. Some would argue that political interests may
be reflected in this pattern of settlement or place. Recall in this chapter
that Elazar and others suggested that there were distinct political cultures
in the United States based on a geographical diffusion of political values
and ideologies. This pattern is now getting more attention as the nature of
political cultures appears related to geographical and electoral patterns.
Bishop (2008) finds evidence of a “clustering of like-minded”
Americans in what he calls “the Big Sort.” As the nation grows more
diverse demographically, individuals are choosing to live in enclaves
where they tend to be more alike with neighbors across economic,
religious and ethnic, as well as educational factors. Chinni and Gimpel
(2011) created a map of these various political communities based on
interviews and extensive use of census and election data. Explore the
map created by Chinni and Gimpel (2011) at www.patchworknation.org.
Columnist Robert Samuelson (2008) suggests that this sociological
pattern has important political implications, specifically agreeing with
Bishop that “The increasing segregation of America by social and
cultural values—not just by income—helps explain America’s growing
political polarization… Views become more extreme. People become
more self-righteous and more suspicious of outsiders” (A17). Samuelson
argues that the effects of this segregation will make it more difficult to
create the “great middle” or centrist majority necessary for governance in
the United States:
What impact does political culture have on the ability of the state to create majorities
necessary for governing? What effect might political cultural clustering have on
democratic processes in the future? Is your community diverse, or a pattern of
settlement much like that described in these studies? What effect does a community
all being the same have on understanding difference or experiencing social change?
Greenfield and Eastwood call the second approach to nationalism
“constructivist.” Citing the works of Benedict Anderson, they find that this
body of analysis casts nationalism as a projection of sorts of the members of
the nation-state: “because the majority of inhabitants or members of any
given nation do not know each other and do not meet face to face, they
cannot be, presumably, a ‘real’ community but can only constitute an
imagined one” (Greenfield and Eastwood 2005: 249). Using this approach,
we can understand nationalism as reliant on symbols or myths that construct
a sense of belonging or membership. For example, it has become a tradition
to begin sporting events in the United States with the national anthem. As
audience members sing along, we assume that membership in a nation is
constructed through that sense of the moment.
The cultural roots of nationalism are varied. One source is the collective
memory of the people in a given territory, who over time craft a symbolism
and imagery that creates national heroes or principles celebrated in the
collective memory. For example, in his studies of President’s Day and the
mythology surrounding George Washington and Abraham Lincoln,
Schwartz (2008: 78) shows us how ritual constructs societal recollections:
Collective memory, whose content holidays sustain, refers to the social distribution of
beliefs, feelings, and moral judgments about the past. The primary vehicles of collective
memory are history—the establishing and propagating of facts about the past through
research, monographs, textbooks, museums, and mass media—and commemoration; the
process of selecting from the historical record those facts most relevant to society’s
ideals and symbolizing them by iconography, monuments, shrines, place-names, and
ritual observance. Mediating the relation between history and individual belief, holidays
are major parts of all commemorative repertories.
In other words, members of the group draw upon the collective

representations found in the elements of culture (e.g. art, mass media,
architecture, museums, knowledge) and incorporate themes into enacted
rituals. Nationalism is created through this social context.
Another variable in understanding nationalism springs from the
intricacies related to membership as related to the territory and state. The
creation of the community requires boundaries or definitions of who
belongs, and consistent with social history, who doesn’t belong. Research on
nationalism has also typically grappled with the role and significance of
ethnicity (Lane and Ersson 2005; Vujačić 2002). On one hand, ethnic
identities (especially race and religion) have served as the basis for creating
a unified group that resulted in the creation of a nation-state. For example,
separations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into
distinct nations were guided by ethnic and regional identities. On the other
hand, identities force separation of the state—the USSR are no longer
united. The example of the USSR shows that ethnicity can also serve as the
basis for challenges to nationalism. Moreover, history is filled with what
results when ethnic identity reaches extremism, as found in Hitler’s Nazi
Germany. Nationalism in this regard resulted in ethnoviolence and genocide.
The role of ethnicity in defining our conceptions of nationalism, including
cultural nuances, and especially as nationalism is cast as inclusion or
exclusion of groups, will play a significant role in future research in an
emerging field of political sociology.
A third way of characterizing contemporary dynamics of nationalism
focuses on current debates and reactions related to globalization. As patterns
of social organization create global interconnections and result in embracing
Western values and beliefs (culture), where does nationalism fit? One
argument is that the forces of globalization may, in fact, reinforce nationalist
identities. For example, while China appears to embrace Western capitalist
practices in the global economy, and McDonald’s and the Internet find their
way into Beijing, China is finding ways to resist these influences. In Chapter
10, we examine the relationship between nationalism and reactions to
globalization. As Vujačić (2002) observes, global economic interests
eventually prevailed over some hardline nationalist interests when the
European Union (EU) was created. Now ironically, after the June 2016 vote
in the United Kingdom to exit the EU, it may appear that these nationalist
influences have regained some sway in Europe, and with the election of
Donald Trump in the United States. The interactions between nationalism
and globalization will no doubt continue to be of interest to political
sociologists.
Certainly, we think of nationalism as a set of values, feelings and
attitudes about state, territory, or principles of how power is structured in a
society. To advance the understanding of nationalism, how it is defined, and
its presence in American political culture, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016)
found four distinct dimensions of nationalist cognitions and feelings. Their
analysis measures closeness to nation, sense of being a true American, pride
in America’s past, and a sense of American exceptionalism or being better
than other nations. Using these dimensions, they studied to the General
Social Survey and found four nationalistic cultural patterns, with each
pattern having a distinct population of followers (Table 3.3):
Table 3.3 Four Currents in American Nationalism
As the authors conclude, these categories are in many ways not set by clear
boundaries characteristics; in some ways, they mix into fluid and sometimes
changing categories. For example, periods of economic crisis, war, or threat
they suggest can alter how these forms of nationalism might be expressed.
The effects of these forms of nationalism on political behaviors, such as
voting, party activism, volunteerism, or protest, will continue to be studied.
CONCLUSION
Culture plays many roles in the social processes associated with the
distribution of power in society. As you can see from this chapter, political
sociologists have examined the role of culture in politics in different ways.
These various paths of research take us in different directions. What is
exciting is that more research is being done to further refine our
understanding of what role culture plays in political processes. For example,
the field of political socialization has been relatively dormant for thirty years.
Only recently have social scientists begun to revisit early findings in light of
advances in research related to developmental psychology, political
cognition and value formation, and generational studies of political attitudes.
Revisiting political socialization processes seems likely in the work ahead.
Some of the work on how people develop political values and attitudes
has been advanced by innovations in research. The study of world values and
contrasts in how people view power and politics has gained much from
comparing citizens from different countries around the world. By comparing
belief systems, ideologies, the role of subcultures, or the impact of media on
systems of political values, cross-cultural studies will develop much needed
insight into the significance of culture to politics in societies throughout the
world. Here too advances in the study of the many forms of mass media
further highlight the nature of culture and politics in the modern world. As
we conclude that TV has “mixed effects” on values, attitudes, and beliefs,
but that these effects vary by social group, the door opens to future research.
Only recently have political sociologists begun to track what impact the
Internet and emerging forms of mass media and mass communication have
on politics. These are fascinating times indeed for political sociologists.
The significance of political ideology to the study of politics and culture
has not died out in spite of continued struggles over how to define ideology.
We know that broad-based political orientations in society play a role in
patterns related to political systems, as well as in choices of political
groupings and affiliations. This research has reminded us that social context
matters. We also know that political culture and place have an apparent
connection. Social groups, including peer groups, workplace groups,
communities, and larger geographical units such as towns and counties,
follow Durkheim’s principle of homophily—birds of the same social feather
do tend to flock together.
Renshon (2004) identified three questions of interest that build on more
than forty years of research, and are still relevant to the study of political
culture. He argues that contemporary social changes are behind three new
orienting questions in political socialization research:
1. What impact does globalization have on nationalist identities? For
example, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States
appear to have significant impact on nationalist identities in the United
States. What aspects of the socialization process are crucial in shaping
these types of identities?
2. How will immigration and changing demographic patterns in the United
States influence socialization processes? As the population of the United
States becomes even more diverse, interactions among individuals of
differing ethnic and racial backgrounds will become more frequent, much
like those during the Industrial Revolution. The ways in which citizens
adapt to these changes will no doubt be found in the socialization
processes associated with schooling in particular.
3. How have changes in civic education in the last decade influenced
socialization outcomes? For example, some research notes declining
levels of civic literacy, suggesting that schools have not lived up to the
expected role of socializing future citizens into informed roles (Niemi
1999). Of course, the role of technology, especially social media, will
play a role here, as learning and knowledge creation about politics are
dramatically affected.
In the chapters ahead, we continue to explore the significance of culture to
politics. The discussions ahead move us to consider the politics of everyday
life and political participation, including voting, policy outcomes, politics
and corporations, and globalization. As we will see, aspects of culture play a
role in all of these key concepts.
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CHAPTER
4
The Politics of Everyday Life:

Political Economy
In this chapter and in Chapter 5, we are especially interested in pointing out

how certain key institutional features in our society have political aspects
that influence our lives. What we identify are certainly not things that are on
every person’s mind all the time, but they have the potential to influence
most of us during important parts of our lives. According to their book
Sociology in Everyday Life, Karp, Yoels, and Vann (2004: 1) believe that a
key ingredient of sociology’s importance lies in its “power to let you see
everyday behaviors and situations in a new way.” Sociologists frequently
study how people behave and analyze how ordered and predictable people’s
everyday lives may be.
One of the major concepts that helps us better understand everyday life is
power. In Chapter 1 of this book, we pointed out C. Wright Mills’
contributions to the study of power, and here, too, we examine his ideas
about the connections of individuals’ everyday lives to what is happening in
society currently and also how our lives intersect with global world history.
Mills (1959: 3) argues, “Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a
society can be understood without understanding both.” For example, when a
war happens, an insurance salesperson may become a marine, a spouse may
live alone, a child may grow up without a parent, and a person in the
National Guard may be activated and go to the front several times.
Developing the sociological imagination enables people to understand the
connections between their everyday lives and the course of history (Mills
1959: 4, 6), and we hope your sociological imagination is stimulated in this
chapter and throughout the book.
For Mills, it is important to distinguish between troubles and issues.
Troubles are private or personal problems regarding the individual’s
biography, whereas issues are public matters going beyond the limited
environment of the individual. Mills uses the example of unemployment: if
one person is unemployed in a community of 100,000, it is a personal
trouble, but if fifteen million people in a county of fifty million jobseekers
are unemployed, this is an issue that many would argue the government
should be responsive to.
An individual troubled by war used political graffiti to express his or her
concern. C. Wright Mills would consider stopping war a social issue
Credit: amanalang / istock.com
Dividing society into the public and private spheres of life places the
state and thus politics into the public sphere, distinct from other major social
institutions like the family, religion, education, economics, and the media.
This separation has made it more difficult to recognize the politics in our
everyday lives. Yet politics is changing at least in part due to basic
alterations in our economic and social life such as the development of
postindustrial capitalism, global transportation, advances in medical
technology, the rise of mass culture, and the growth of the media and the
Internet, and possibly, as some argue, a decline in religion. Agger and Luke
(2002: 162) suggest that “politics has been dispersed” more so than the
postmodern claim that politics has ended. The 2008 U.S. government
bailouts of major financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the insurance conglomerate American International Group,
Inc. (AIG) by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve illustrate just how
politics, the state, and the economy are tightly linked. House Speaker Pelosi
questioned, “how these captains of the financial world could make millions
of dollars in salary, and yet their companies fail and then we have to step in
to bail them out” (Andrews 2008).
Our goal in this chapter and in Chapter 5 is to show how politics plays an
important role in our major institutions of economy, education, work, and
family, and in other aspects of our lives related to the infrastructure, health
care, civil liberties, and race and ethnic relations. Throughout, we look at
public opinion to help us understand what the “typical” American may be
thinking on various issues and what their values may be. Our examples
illustrate how politics affects our everyday lives in various ways. In this
chapter, we consider politics and the economy, including a look at the
infrastructure that affects the economy and society.
The term political economy has been coined to refer to the relationship
between politics and economy. Perhaps the relationship between the state
and the economy is the most influential in people’s lives and involves the
most significant displays of power in our society. Marger (1987: 92) argues
that “political power in a society can be understood only as a synthesis of the
actions of governmental and economic institutions…. The consequences of
the actions of business and government leaders affect all people” including
jobs, taxes, prices, public services, and war and peace.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
The various theoretical frameworks give us differing views of the
relationships between politics and economy. In addition to our discussion of
the pluralist, elite-managerial, Marxist class, postmodern, and rational
choice frameworks, we also consider Domhoff’s class-domination theory of
power.
Pluralist
In the pluralist interpretation of society and politics, the key focus is on the
relationship between the political system and democracy. Pluralists
recognize that some maldistribution or inequality of economic resources
exists, but the inequities can be corrected. The social values in the United
States support a capitalist system, extolling the virtues of free enterprise and
hard work. The profit that corporations make is generally deserved and is a
return for investing and engaging in some risk. Typically, workers are not
exploited, but are rewarded on the basis of their work ethic and skills
(Alford and Friedland 1985). Generally, the government develops Social
Security (SS), employment, and other welfare policies to benefit its citizens
and reduce social inequality. The state is typically pictured as neutral, trying
to determine the policies that are in the best interest of voters and
consumers while helping businesses that are contributing to the welfare of
the society (Neuman 2005).
Elite-Managerial
In the elite-managerial perspective, C. Wright Mills identified the power of
the corporate, military, and political elites, stressing how power was being
centralized so that “the economy … has become dominated by two or three
hundred giant corporations, administratively and politically interrelated,
which together hold the keys to economic decisions” (Mills 1956: 7). The
major source of bureaucratic power rests in the control of significant
institutions, especially the corporation and the executive branch of the
government. The power elite is generally cohesive, with the state typically
operating to protect the institutional arrangements that benefit the dominant
elite (Marger 1987). Drawing on data from 1980 to 1981, Dye (2002)
identified three sectors of the power elite. The corporate sector, composed
of industrial corporations, banks, insurance, and investment companies, had
nearly 60 percent of the power elite leadership positions. This is followed
by the public interest sector, which is comprised of mass media, law,
education, private foundations, and civic and cultural organizations, with
around 37 percent. The government sector had less than 4 percent of the
power elite leadership positions.
While an elite and a subelite exist, the masses, generally most people,
are being manipulated and taken advantage of by the elite. The classical
conservative elite theorists like Michels and Pareto distrust the masses, who
have generally been viewed as apathetic and wanting others to lead them.
The masses are typically viewed as unable to make rational decisions,
incompetent, and either not willing or not capable of governing or
participating thoughtfully in politics. The more contemporary or radical
version of elite theory suggests that the masses are not being provided with
adequate information that would enable them to make educated economic
and political decisions, and thus, they are being taken advantage of by the
power elite (Marger 1987). If the masses do express their discontent on
economic issues, they may be granted minor reforms or symbolic changes
that tend to placate them.
Class/Marxist
Instead of viewing power as being in the hands of major government and
economic organizations as in the elite-managerial perspective, in the
class/Marxist perspective, power is viewed as being in the hands of the
capitalist class. Class theory is extremely critical of the capitalist economic
system and the capitalist state that supports it. The key power group
according to this theory is the ruling class, which can be defined as those
who own and control the means of production (Marger 1987). To make a
profit, the ruling class exploits the working class who has only its labor to
sell. A person’s class position significantly influences many aspects of his or
her life. Many workers feel alienated from the work they do, as their labor
creates wealth for the capitalists. Workers, though, ultimately develop a
sense of class consciousness and move toward an overthrow of the capitalist
system. Some class theorists believe that the capitalist system will
experience crisis after crisis that will ultimately result in the collapse of
capitalism and the triumph of the working class.
Berberoglou (2001) points out that certain Marxist theorists support the
view that “the state in capitalist society is both controlled by and, at the
same time, relatively autonomous from the various fractions of the capitalist
class” (41). Other Marxist theorists recognize that the state needs to
consider more than the ruling class when it makes its policy. According to
Szymanski, “State policy is always influenced to some extent by the various
classes, even while it is normally under the domination of the [ruling] class”
(quoted in Berberoglou 2001: 56). Text box 4.1 describes differing
interpretations of corporate involvement in the political process.
Postmodern
Postmodernism is placed “in the context of the ‘disorganized capitalism’ of
the consumer society and cultural mass production of the late twentieth
century. … The world now has a messy and highly uncertain feel to it”
(Best 2002: 42). This uncertainty especially affects economic life. Instead of
developing class consciousness, people “create their own thoughts and their
own bonds of community” in a fragmented society which is undergoing
numerous changes (Best 2002: 266). Without the economic interests of
classes, politics becomes irrational and unpredictable. Power is not rooted
in class domination, but rather it is seen in the “micro-process invading the
bodies, discourses, habits of people in their everyday lives” (Agger and
Luke 2002: 181).
The economic form of postmodernism is viewed as late capitalism or
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is discussed later in this chapter. Two
important characteristics though involved free-market ideas and strong
belief in individualism. Government is viewed as too big and thus should
not be involved in social issues like health care or in intruding on free
markets (Tudor 2012).
Rational Choice
Rational choice theories are rooted in ideas from economics (Neuman
2005). Macroeconomics refers to that area of economics that focuses on
theories and methods that deal with relationships among government
policies and expenditures, inflation, unemployment, and income. The
government’s fiscal policy involves how it spends money to provide goods
and services and what methods it uses, including taxes and borrowing, to
finance its expenditures (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007). Weighing risks and
benefits is an important aspect of the rational choice model and we will see
that banks and other companies were willing to take major risks in order to
get back high benefits.
TEXT BOX 4.1

Corporate Involvement in Politics
A topic of major debate focuses on how much business is and should be
involved in shaping politics. Ideally, the government should be
functioning to maintain society to benefit the people it serves, and the
marketplace should be operating to provide and distribute needs, goods,
and services to its customers. The state serves as an arbiter between
those with conflicting interests as it decides “who gets what, when, and
how” (Robertson 1981: 485). Lehne (2006) examines the advantages and
disadvantages of involvement of business in politics.
Those who are supportive of corporate involvement argue that the
corporate community’s political agenda favors economic growth and
supports basic social and political values, especially those related to free
enterprise, individualism, and democracy. Lehne (2006) identified three
particular benefits corporate activity has provided to the political system.
First, corporations have given their employees and others a very good
standard of living. In order to do this, the corporate sector needs to have
favorable governmental policy, so that it can offer employment and
returns on people’s investments. If corporations could not participate in
politics, the government might not implement policies that promote a
successful economy.
Second, business involvement in politics helps document the success
of pluralism in the American system. Business is one of the “multiple
power centers within a diverse society but the expanding influence of
government in American life jeopardizes the autonomy of other social
institutions” (Lehne 2006: 137). Corporations are certainly one of the
more powerful nongovernmental organizations in society, but they also
function as potential allies for other groups to form coalitions or to fight
against too much government power.
Third, corporations can help protect individual liberties by defending
their own rights to freedom of association, due process, and freedom of
speech. Such a defense could also help strengthen people’s claims for
these same rights.
Those concerned about too much corporate power argue that
corporate resources are used to dominate the process and hinder other
groups from significant influence. Corporate influence advances their
own interests often at the expense of most people in society, especially
the poor. Inequities become even more accentuated. In addition, they
suggest that business involvement does not limit possible abuse of power
by government or protect societal diversity. Most business contributions
to politicians tend to support people already in office (Lehne 2006).
Kinloch (1989) too argues that the economic institution promotes
inequality, and economic interests are overrepresented in politics. The
tremendous lobbying influence and political power of corporations
negatively affects political and legal policies. For example, tax laws are
formulated that benefit those with greater economic resources, whereas
welfare and social services budgets may be reduced. Elected officials
may be indebted to those who have made substantial campaign
contributions.
Which of these two views do you tend to support more? Why?
Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007) point out that only Keynesian and supply-
side economics have had a major influence on government policy. A
Keynesian believes that government should take a positive role in
stimulating the economy by promoting economic growth, reducing
unemployment, and lowering inflation (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014). A
typical Keynesian presidential candidate would stress his interest in “getting
America working again” and “maintaining the economic integrity of
working Americans” (2007: 45). The fiscal policy would likely include
incentives for income maintenance programs like unemployment insurance,
SS benefits, and interest deductions for consumer debts. Tax cuts and
investment in public work programs may also be used to stimulate the
economy. President Obama’s advisors tended to be Keynesian. A president
using supply-side economics would likely stress “getting the government
off of people’s backs” and “getting America to invest, save, and work”
(2007: 45). The fiscal policies would likely include tax cuts, and
deregulation actions also intended to stimulate the economy. President
Ronald Reagan’s administration serves as a prototype for supply-side
economics. President Trump’s tax program also reflects such a view (Davis
and Rappeport 2017).
Institutionalist
In his assessment of political institutional theory, Amenta (2005) points out
how this framework overlaps with other sociological ones including
pluralist, elite-managerial, and class/Marxist. Institutionalist theorists often
use a comparative historical approach to examine political phenomena. For
example, in her work on the welfare state, Skocpol (1992) uses a
“structured polity” perspective that emphasizes how politicians and
administrators are influenced by political organizations. In addition to
cultural patterns and socioeconomic relations, state and party structures
shape how groups organize and develop consciousness. In the late 1800s
and early 1900s in the United States, working-class consciousness was
relatively weak and patronage party officials and legislators influenced
social welfare policies. For example, Civil War pensions provided benefits
for veterans and their dependents. Moral and political criteria were used to
guide that policy rather than socioeconomic criteria. Veterans were seen as
having made sacrifices for the good of the nation and worthy of reward.
Many poor people, however, were seen as undeserving. As pointed out in
Chapters 2 and 3 of our book, political values thus play a key role in
determining who is worthy of benefits. In other Western welfare states,
officials in government bureaucracies employed socioeconomic standards to
formulate labor regulations and policies to benefit workingmen, and the
working class developed a stronger sense of consciousness than in the
United States (Skocpol 1992).
Class-Domination Theory of Power

G. William Domhoff has dedicated numerous years to the study of power
and class, especially the upper class and power elite, in American society.
His class-domination theory, though certainly related to Marxist and power
elite frameworks, deserves separate treatment here in the discussion of the
economy and everyday life. Domhoff (2006) sees two major coalitions: a
corporate–conservative coalition and a liberal–labor coalition. The leaders
of the corporate–conservative coalition are top executives and corporate
heads who are supported by many patriotic, anti-tax, and single-issue
organizations. There is also an uneasy alliance of the corporate leaders with
the Christian Right. For the liberal–labor coalition, unions remain the
largest and best-financed segment even though they have lost considerable
influence. Other segments of this coalition include liberal university
communities, liberal churches, most minority communities, and local
environmental organizations.
The majority of people are not strongly loyal to either of these coalitions
although the coalitions are competing for people’s support. Domhoff
believes that the reason for these people’s lack of attention to policy issues
is that these people often concentrate on their everyday life concerns
including their families and job challenges. Although some describe such
people as being apathetic or ignorant about politics, Domhoff argues that
their behavior actually makes sense because of the “many time-consuming
necessities and pleasures of everyday life” (Domhoff 2006: xviii), the
problems in reaching consensus on policy issues, and the amount of time
and patience needed to bring about change.
We might add, though, that the corporate–conservative coalition does
certainly influence people’s everyday lives. The following issues which
Domhoff (2006) identifies as class or economic conflicts certainly affect us
all: (1) concern about the distribution of profits and wages, (2) rate and
progressivity of taxation, (3) the role of labor unions, and (4) the degree of
government regulation of business. Domhoff recognizes how well
organized those who wield the most power are. He describes their influence
as “dominant” because of their great power; however, he also recognizes
that there are limits to corporate power.
In Chapter 3, concerning culture, we noted the importance of values in
politics. Domhoff (2006: 112) identifies the following key principles of an
American value system: individualism, equality of opportunity, free
enterprise, competition, and limited reliance on government in our everyday
lives. The power elite engage in the opinion-shaping process that uses an
individualistic ideology, which emphasizes personal effort and
responsibility as well as benefitting the successful and blaming the victims.
Many people blame themselves rather than the system even though they
intellectually realize that there are many injustices and barriers to equal
opportunity. Most people accept the power of the dominant class because
that class has shaped “the rules and customs through which everyday life is
conducted” (Domhoff 2006: 199).
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Technically, the U.S. economic system has been labeled “mixed,” suggesting
the involvement of both private and public institutions. To Marger (1987), a
significant feature of the U.S. economy is how major corporations dominate
the economy. In a capitalist economic system, there is private ownership of
property, private and competitive pursuit of profits, and inequality in the
distribution of society’s resources. Ideally, the competition for profit makes
society stronger and more efficient and motivates individuals to work hard,
although, in reality, things may not always work that way.
As an economic system, the United States is a capitalist system, and
politically it is regarded as a democracy. Although ideally in the political
system citizens are entitled to vote, have equal rights before the law, and
have access to their politicians, their economic resources influence these
aspects. Robertson (1981) points out that part of the possible dilemma about
understanding the complex relationship between politics and economy
revolves around differing interpretations of freedom, a value most of us
strongly endorse. More specifically, some emphasize liberty in their
definition of freedom, while others stress freedom as promoting equality.
Robertson believes that both liberty and equality are important values in
American society, but the two concepts are not very compatible because the
exercise of liberty may negatively affect the degree of equality in society,
and vice versa. In the United States, liberty is emphasized, and that results in
inequality, but socialist countries value equality at the expense of individual
liberty. Somewhat similarly, Marger (2008) identifies the contradiction of
capitalism and democracy, with capitalism founded on liberty that creates
inequality and democracy grounded in equity (fairness for everyone).
Neoliberalism
During the 1970s, capitalists tended to feel threatened by the 1973 surges in
oil prices, a rise in union and consumer power, manufacturing competition
from Japan, etc.; therefore, the large-firm corporate sector mobilized to push
for a smaller state, economic deregulation, and lower taxes. This led to the
success of a neoliberal policy model that privileged the market over
regulatory solutions (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011).
Neoliberalism is a politically conservative economic philosophy that
emphasizes the ideals of free markets and free trade. It tends to oppose
government actions such as programs for health care and education or
increasing the minimum wage because they believe that it interferes with
free markets (Sernau 2017). Neoliberalism as an approach to government is
based on
the assumption that governments cannot create economic growth or provide social
welfare; rather, by trying to help, governments make the world worse for everyone
including the poor. Instead private companies, private individuals, and most
importantly, unhindered markets are best able to generate economic growth and social
welfare.
(Bockman 2013: 14)
Such an explanation clearly suggests a smaller role for government and

a greater role for capitalists in society. It involves reducing trade barriers to
promote free markets and a global movement of capital and labor to
different parts of the world often resulting in lower labor costs. Government
regulations would be limited (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014). Conservative
U.S. President Reagan’s administration (1981–1989) and British Prime
Minister Thatcher’s government (1979–1990) exemplify neoliberal politics,
but liberal political leaders have engaged in such policies as well.
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011) point out that neoliberalism tends to
be associated with the financialization of the U.S. economy.
Financialization refers both to the increasing importance of financial
services firms in U.S. society including economic, social, and political
aspects, and to nonfinancial firms increasing their involvement in financial
activity. Financial sector profits grew especially after 1980. Before 1980,
workers in the finance sector had similar income to other employees, but by
2000, their average compensation had drastically increased, so that they
were 60 percent higher than the national average. Tomaskovic-Devey and
Lin maintain that financialization involves a system of income
redistribution. Put another way, we suggest that neoliberalism likely
involves a shift toward greater inequality in society with Wall Street
triumphing over Main Street (the average person).
Jacobs’ research (Jacobs and Dirlam 2016; Jacobs and Myers 2014) has
stressed the importance of linking political variables to neoliberalism and
the explanation of social inequality in the United States. In the 1980s,
President Reagan’s administration used neoliberal policies to limit the
government’s regulation of financial markets. Financialization was an
important indicator explaining income equality in their models (Jacobs and
Myers 2014). Particularly important was the finding that loss of union
strength led to growing income inequality. This loss contributed to the
stagnation of income for those near to the middle of income distributions
and, thus, led to greater social inequality. Also, government supporting
financial deregulation helped increase inequality. Jacobs and Dirlam (2016)
analyzed income tax statistics to argue that national-level neoliberal
political factors are especially important in explaining the extraordinary
increase in U.S. income inequality since 1980. Their findings also suggest
that during the last year of presidential terms, income inequality was
reduced probably, so that voters would be more likely to vote for the
incumbent or the person nominated by the incumbent’s party in the national
presidential election.
Outside of the United States, Mijs, Bakhtiari, and Lamont (2016)
examining the effects of neoliberalism in Europe compared Western Europe
with Eastern Europe. The rate of adoption of neoliberal policies seemed to
vary with how the citizens of these two regions drew symbolic boundaries
concerning ethnoreligious otherness and moral deservingness, especially
related to the poor. The authors associated the “logic of market
fundamentalism” (free markets with little constraint from government) with
less public spending and lower support of the welfare state; therefore, they
looked for a narrower conception of social membership based on the ideas
of “individual responsibility for risk and social positions, … and stronger
boundaries toward the poor” (Mijs et al. 2016: 2). Western Europe moved
toward integration in the 1990s and Eastern Europe experienced the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and these changes were important factors in
shaping two varieties of neoliberalism. As neoliberalism increased in
Central and Eastern Europe, there was more blaming of the poor (less
deserving), but boundaries toward Muslims declined. The opposite was
more likely in Western Europe, where blaming the poor declined, but
negative attitudes toward Muslims increased.
THE GREAT RECESSION
By the end of 2007, the United States entered a recession that some suggest
may be the worst since the Great Depression. While many were losing their
jobs, the value of stock was declining rapidly, many financial institutions
and corporations were receiving bailouts, and Wall Street continued to hand
out bonuses. White (2009) reported that “despite crippling losses,
multibillion-dollar bailouts and the passing of some of the most prominent
names in the business, employees at financial companies in New York …
collected an estimated $18.4 billion in bonuses for the year [2008].” White
also found that, as if this wasn’t enough, outside the financial industry, many
corporate executives received fatter bonuses, while the economy lost 2.6
million jobs. For top executives other than CEOs, the average supposedly
performance-based bonus was $265,594 (White 2009). People on Main
Street typically make much less than that as yearly income, let alone
bonuses.
DALLAS, TX—SEPTEMBER 04: A conservative Tea Party Express

protest of big government and Obamacare in Dallas. Taken September 04,
2009 in Dallas, TX
Credit: Ken Durden / Shutterstock.com
Perhaps the most frustrating case regarding bonuses involved the AIG,
which had received over $170 billion in taxpayer bailout money, but
announced in March 2009 that it was planning to give about $165 million to
executives in the business unit, who had led the company to near collapse in
2008. AIG defended its position, arguing that the bonuses had been
promised much earlier, and thus, it was legally bound to provide them. Also,
the bonuses were needed to retain high-quality executives (Andrews and
Baker 2009). Because of growing pressures, AIG Chief Liddy asked
employees with bonuses over $100,000 to return them. Although much of
the anger was directed at AIG because of the huge bailout it received, other
companies were doing much the same.
In addition to people losing jobs, many of those who had jobs also had
problems. For example, many companies, including FedEx, Eastman Kodak,
Motorola, General Motors, and Resorts International, cut their contributions
to worker 401(k) retirement plans at the same time workers were seeing the
value of their retirement accounts drop drastically. Cutting back on
retirement contributions makes it more difficult to retire securely (Williams
and Bernard 2009). In addition, those working may feel great stress and
want to change jobs. One study by Hochwater has found that 55 percent of
bosses or supervisors had become more demanding of their workers and
more than 70 percent of employees indicated that their stress levels had
grown since the recession began. Many employees felt that they were doing
the work of employees who had lost their jobs, as well as their own work.
Employers realized that, with the high unemployment rate, it would be easy
to fill open positions if someone left (Bruzzese 2009).
TORONTO, CANADA—OCTOBER 15: Protestors mocking the
unemployment rate of Toronto with signs and banners during the Occupy
Toronto Movement on October 15, 2011 in Toronto, Canada
Credit: arindambanerjee / Shutterstock.com
Not only was the jobless rate increasing at mid-year 2009, but, for those
with jobs, wages were declining due to furloughs, pay freezes, and pay cuts
(Aversa 2009). Several states had implemented or were considering
implementing furloughs to deal with their budget problems. Furloughs may
be particularly problematic for states. Private companies that use furloughs
often have a decrease in workload; however, when state agencies use
furloughs, typically government services are delayed. In addition,
government services are in greater demand when the economy is doing
poorly (Seelye 2009).
In January 2009, President Obama labeled Wall Street bankers giving
themselves bonuses of nearly $20 million in the face of government bailouts
and the rapidly worsening economy as “shameful.” Then in February, the
Obama administration proclaimed a $500,000 cap on bonuses for top
executives of corporations obtaining the largest shares of the bailouts. He
declared that this was not only being fair, but also reflecting “basic common
sense.” The public, though, was not appeased, and two weeks later,
Congress passed a $787 billion stimulus package that included tougher
restrictions on those in top positions in the most troubled corporations
(“Executive Pay” 2009). In July 2009, the House Financial Services
Committee, in support of the Obama White House’s proposal, approved a
bill that gave shareholders the right to vote on executive salaries and
bonuses, although their vote would not be binding. Regulators were to have
authority to stop inappropriate or risky compensation packages for regulated
financial companies (Labaton 2009a).
The media devoted considerable attention to the anger felt by ordinary
citizens. Newsweek’s cover story on March 30, 2009 was entitled “The
Thinking Man’s Guide to Populist Rage.” In that issue, historian Michael
Kazin defines the core of populism as “a protest by ordinary people who
want the system to live up to its stated ideals—fair and honest treatment in
the marketplace and a government tilted in favor of the unwealthy masses”
(“The Outrage Factor” 2009: 24). In 1892, populists created their own
political party, but it didn’t survive very long. Also in the 1930s at the time
of the Great Depression “populist movements challenged elected officials to
serve the hard working majority instead of the ‘plutocrats’” (“The Outrage
Factor” 2009: 24). Kazin believes that the current “widespread disgust”
(“The Outrage Factor” 2009: 24) gave the Obama administration an
opportunity to reshape politics that would include placing strict regulations
on the financial industry.
Causes of the Great Recession

Leicht and Fitzgerald (2014) identified four major causes of the Great
Recession (GR). First, they note the strong encouragement for people to
own their own home and ease with which people seemed to be able to
arrange mortgages. Second, they pointed out government policies and the
lack of adequate regulation. It appeared that government regulators failed to
keep up with what was occurring in the newly deregulated financial markets
(especially after the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed in 1999). Third,
bankers and mortgage leaders encountered high incentives to continue to
promote the housing boom selling mortgages to investors. They became less
concerned about the creditworthiness of those they loaned money to and
whether the financial transactions were in the best interest of either their
employers or consumers. Fourth, investors and investment banks often
borrowed money to purchase asset- and mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
using loopholes in government regulations to borrow money to buy their
investments. Investors used credit default swaps to protect themselves from
credit risk of their MBS. Credit default swaps are similar to insurance
policies which are bought by investors to protect themselves if something
major goes wrong as it did during the GR. For example, AIG could not
cover its swap contracts, so the government bailed them out as AIG was
considered too big to fail (Amadeo 2017a).
A debate sponsored by Intelligence Squared U.S. focused on the
proposition “blame Washington more than Wall Street for the financial
crisis.” Historian Niall Ferguson supports the proposition and argues that,
while it is easy to blame the bankers for everything, he blames the
politicians even more citing four key components of government in
particular:
the Federal Reserve Board, which allowed the housing market to get
out of control;
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which allowed the
banking system to spiral out of control;
Congress, which didn’t supervise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac very
well;
the White House under the G. W. Bush administration, which made
statements like “We want everybody in America to own their own
home” (“Who’s to Blame: Washington or Wall Street?” 2009: 30).
In the debate, Neill Minow, editor of The Corporate Library, a corporate-

governance research firm, partially challenged the proposition that blamed
the government more. He countered that Wall Street relied too much on
poor statistics and had a bad incentive program that should have been based
on the quality of transactions rather than quantity. He also blamed
shareholders, especially big shareholders who supported “insane pay
packages” (“Who’s to Blame: Washington or Wall Street?” 2009: 31).
Finally, Minow identified Washington, posing the question,
Do you think the fact that from 1998 to 2008 over $600 million was spent on lobbying
to get rid of regulations, to get rid of capitalist requirements on banks—do you think
that might have had an effect on it?
(“Who’s to Blame: Washington or Wall Street?” 2009: 31)
The financial crisis involved widespread and systemic fraud in the MBS
industry. Fligstein and Roehrkasse (2016) found that more than half of the
largest sixty financial firms in the mortgage origination area reached
regulatory settlements over alleged malfeasance. The banks that packaged
mortgages into securities misrepresented the quality of their loans and how
carefully they were practicing due diligence. They deceived their own
shareholders about their own MBS holdings. Mortgage originators
misrepresented loan terms and eligibility requirements in order to sell loans
that they understood were likely to go into default. Securities fraud and
predatory lending were practiced by the largest and most integrated
financial firms. It is also significant to look at financial deregulation as a
cause of the problems since the fraud was so widespread. Lax regulation
was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the fraud and opportunism
done by the mortgage securitization industry. Another important factor was
that the supply of mortgages started to decline about 2003, so, in order to
maintain or increase profits, mortgages originators lowered credit standards
and then engaged in predatory lending. Fligstein and Roehrkasse (2016)
suggest that regulators need to better understand how firms make profits and
monitor what is developing with competitive conditions and structural
changes in markets, so that they could better understand why and when
firms could engage in illegal behavior.
Pernell-Gallagher (2015) also examined the banks and their
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that heavily exposed them to credit
risks. CDOs provide a means for banks and others to package together
different forms of loans (e.g. auto, mortgage, corporate) that can be sold to
investors (Amadeo 2017b). Banks were willing to sell them and reduce their
own risk because they are “competitive, profit-minded organizations, and
they anticipated that this activity would bring them value” (Pernell-
Gallagher 2015: 31). Banks concentrated especially on making money by
improving their share price, and this shareholder value model of corporate
government led them to implement compensation practices that rewarded
those that had increased share price. Thus, many bankers seem to have
pursued risk strategies that would generate larger returns, which would lead
to higher compensation. Pernell-Gallagher is concerned because, even six
years after the crisis, the strategies of the banks are risky and similar to what
they have done in the past.
Pernell, Jung, and Dobbin (2017) point out that early in the 2000s,
government regulators were trying to introduce policies that would control
bank risk-taking, and many banks responded by appointing their own chief
risk officers (CROs). These expert CROs tended to maximize risk-taking in
order to generate higher profits quickly. Pernell et al. (2017) suggest that
government policymakers need to be more watchful and understand when
CEOs, CROs, and fund managers’ interests (e.g. maximizing risk to
increase returns) are not in agreement with the interests of lawmakers and
the public. Providing appropriate incentives through organizational
arrangements to reward CEOs and others for limiting too much risk-seeking
could be helpful. For example, a few corporations have adopted long-term
incentive plans, so that executives hold equity and retreat from short-term
bonus performance pay. More corporations should do this according to the
authors although this isn’t likely in this era where bank executives can
become “immensely wealthy overnight” (p. 534).
Government Policy Responses

In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified a new
high-risk area that called for “modernizing the outdated U.S. Financial
Regulatory System,” proclaiming, “Having a vibrant, healthy financial
sector is critical to the United States” (GAO 2009: 11). The report
recognized that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 reversed restrictions
that were a key part of the financial regulatory system created in the 1930s
as a response to the Great Depression. Also the “largely unregulated
investment bank securitization of mortgage loans” and the “nonbank
mortgage lenders, which generally are not subject to direct federal
oversight” (p. 13) were important in subprime mortgage lending that
resulted in “the worst financial crisis in more than 75 years” (p. 12). During
the five presidential administrations before Obama’s, fewer restrictions were
placed on branch banking, and loan restrictions were abandoned. The
deregulation of banking not only expanded the availability and types of
credit, but also helped to facilitate disturbing, and sometimes fraudulent,
lending practices (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007).
The federal government decided that the mortgage lending system and
big banks were “too big to fail” fearing that the problems created by
housing would affect other parts of the economy as well. About $700 billion
was quickly spent to bail out banks and support the financial system (Leicht
and Fitzgerald 2014). In an attempt to avoid future problems, the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed by
Congress and signed by Obama in 2010. It was viewed “as one of the most
extensive interventions in U.S. financial markets since the New Deal era
reforms of the 1930s” (Williams 2015: 119). It mandated 348 rulemakings
involving twenty different agencies with regulations related to proprietary
trading, capital requirements, and greater market transparency, including
authorizing a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that has an
independent budget and director. The SEC, a government agency tasked
with protecting investors, facilitating capital formation and maintaining fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, was designated to oversee credit default
swaps (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014; Williams 2015). The chair of the SEC in
testimony in 2010 acknowledged that many in the SEC had come to believe
that markets were “self-correcting and self-disciplined, and that the people
in Wall street will do a better job protecting the financial system than the
regulators would.” However, she understood that it was not necessarily an
appropriate philosophy (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011: 538).
Implementation of the legislation has been problematic due to intense
industry lobbying from Wall Street as well as resistance, delay, and
circumvention. The idea of “too big to fail” might also have emboldened
Wall Street (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014; Williams 2015). Regulators
encountered increased “push toward quantification and associated
evidentiary challenges” that were “part of a larger industry strategy to
dodge Dodd-Frank” (Williams 2015: 144). Bell and Hindmoor (2014: 342)
studied bank reform in the United States and the United Kingdom
concluding that although government leaders in both countries seemed to
have won “high profile policy victories” after the crises in their nations,
“accepting a large complex and constantly evolving financial system with
high levels of systemic risk, they have unwittingly placed themselves at a
continuing disadvantage in the regulatory arena.” Further they argue that
risky trading activity and systemic risk have not been rectified, but rather it
might have encouraged “risk-taking within banks and the growth of the
‘shadow’ banking system” due not only to issues with government’s
administration capacity, but “more fundamentally from ideas about the
value of finance held by state authorities” (Bell and Hindmoor 2014: 344).
Ford (2013) too looking at financial innovation on Wall Street called for
reevaluation of the assumption that such an innovation is beneficial virtually
by definition. She argues that regulation of innovation in the financial sector
has not recently been successful, if we as a society care about
accountability, transparency, and the market being oriented toward greater
social benefit and a “public-minded, future-oriented policy perspective”
(Ford 2013: 94). Leicht and Fitzgerald (2014) and Williams (2015) shared
somewhat related concerns about the message being sent to Wall Street that
banks and other major corporations may be so essential to the economy that
they can’t be allowed to fail.
With the election of President Trump and the Republican majority in
both houses, the future of Dodd–Frank is in question. Trump issued an
executive order in February 2017 telling the Treasury Secretary Steven
Mnuchin to consult with regulators about changing Dodd–Frank, so that
taxpayer-funded bailouts would be prevented and economic growth would
be enhanced (Puzzanghera, Memoli, and Koren 2017). In May 2018, about
a decade after the global financial crisis and the U.S. recession started, a law
was passed that retained the central structure of Dodd–Frank and did not
change the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which watched over
banks. It removed certain restrictions on community and local banks and
allowed banks with less than $250 billion in assets to avoid certain
regulatory restrictions. It continued to provide strict federal oversight
relations for the biggest banks which most likely are only twelve or less
(Rappeport and Flitter 2018; Werner 2018). It is possible that there may be
more modifications of the Dodd–Frank legislation.
Consequences of the GR
It is virtually impossible to document all the agony of people who
experienced or continue to experience job loss, mortgage foreclosures,
family disruptions, homelessness, etc. associated with the GR. Although
statistics certainly do not tell the complete story, we provide data to help
understand the enormity of the economic and human cost. According to
Leicht and Fitzgerald (2014), global markets declined $50 trillion in 2008 in
market value, that is, approximately $8,334 for each man, woman and child
on the planet. Put another way, to spend $1 trillion, a person would need to
spend $34 million every day of their life for eighty years. Estimates suggest
that it will take around twenty years to recover most of the wealth.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Luttrell, Atkinson, and Rosenblum
2013) was unsure when or if the U.S. economy would return to the precrisis
growth trend and estimated a $6–$14 trillion output loss. Assuming that it
will return to its earlier growth trend, this would mean $50,000–$120,000
loss for every U.S. household. One study that the Federal Reserve Bank
examined on subjective well-being estimated a cost of $14 trillion due to
loss of security in the workforce because of rising unemployment. The GR
also resulted in a major loss of trust in the institutions of government and
the capitalist system.
The GR was not a typical recession, but one with extreme and long-
lasting effects on the labor market outcomes. Two major movements
developed in the United States in response to the GR. One was the Tea
Party Movement, a conservative or right-wing response (see Text box 4.2).
The other was a left-wing radical one involving the Occupy Movement (see
Text box 4.3). Although one might have predicted that the GR would result
in greater support for the left (e.g. the Occupy movement), an alternative
view could be that the government spending on bailouts and “too big to
fail” would result in a counterreaction on the right including support for the
Tea Party and the Trump campaign (Brooks and Manza 2013; Redbird and
Grusky 2016).
TEXT BOX 4.2

Populism and the Tea Party: Is the Tea Party
Populist? Is It Grassroots?
Populism as a phenomenon can actually be seen as emerging from the
right, left, or even center of the political spectrum. Here, we focus on
right-wing populism that Canovan (1999: 3) suggested involved “an
appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and
the dominant ideas and values.” Since populists represent “the people”
over “arrogant elites,” they see themselves as legitimate representatives
of power. Kazin (1995: 1) defined populist as a “language whose
speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded
narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and
undemocratic and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” He
believed that only after World War II did American populists become
more focused on issues of race and conspiracies including “fear of the
black and immigrant poor” (p. 6). As Spruyt, Keppens, and Van
Droogenbroeck (2016: 336) suggest, a key ingredient of populism thus is
that the ultimate source of legitimacy is based on the will of the people.
If a movement seems to be generating its support from “the people,” it
would be considered to have grassroots support. On the other hand, if its
source of actual support really comes from elites who are trying to
dominate or control the movement, then the term astroturf is applied to
suggest that its roots are fake rather than rooted in the people.
The Tea Party Movement developed especially in response to the
effects of the GR in 2008–2009. According to Fetner (2012), Tea Party
(TP) supporters have been antiestablishment, anti-government, anti-
intellectual, and anti-Obama. Skocpol (2012) points out that there is not
a single organization or even a network that defines the TP. She suggests
that it includes three different forces: (1) a grassroots-type movement;
(2) media that is right-wing (e.g. Rush Limbaugh); and (3) the efforts of
“professionally run ultra-right policy advocates and funders to leverage
activist energy on behalf of cutting taxes, on the right, slashing or
blocking regulations on business, and privatizing Social Security and
Medicare.” Here, we focus on the relationship between the first and third
elements.
The TP developed in response to the GR and used populist rhetoric
claiming that “hard-working productive middle-class citizens are being
squeezed in an economic vise-from above by high government taxes,
onerous regulations, and monetary politics set by greedy bankers, and
from below by lazy, sinful, and subversive parasites” (Scher and Berlet
2014: 109). Many members of the TP would see themselves as critical of
government, giant corporations, and greedy bankers (Johnson 2012;
Miller 2012). However, Miller (2012) and Johnson (2012) point out that
many of their events and political candidates have been funded by major
corporate sponsors, such as Americans for Prosperity supported by
billionaire businessman David H. Koch. Koch also provided resources to
train and educate TP supporters concerning policy and political
organizing (Miller 2012). TP members cast votes, but it is the big
corporations who supply the money and the organization, so that, if
politicians are elected, they “will understand that the big money can go
after them just as well as it went for them” (Johnson 2012: 137).
Mayer (2016) researched Charles and David Koch, the brothers who
have consistently been among the ten richest Americans, regarding their
support of a variety of conservative causes and political groups including
the TP. She suggests that, while the idea of the TP being a spontaneous
grassroots phenomenon is not completely incorrect, there are numerous
other factors to consider in determining what type of movement it is. The
Koch brothers and a few other very rich associates were actually trying
to develop a movement promoting an “antitax Tea Party theme” by the
1990s (p. 168), as they funded nonprofit “grassroots” groups and through
Americans for Prosperity tried to stage TP protests that were not very
successful. However, by the time Obama was elected and the economy
was going through the GR, there were already “rudiments of a political
machine … in place, along with a network of paid operatives expert in
creating colonially garbed ‘Astroturf’ groups to fake the appearance of
public support” (p. 169).
Do you think that the TP movement fits the definition of a populist
movement? Is it a grassroots movement or an astroturf one? Does it
matter which it is? Explain your answer.
TEXT BOX 4.3

The Occupy Movement: What Was It and What Did
It Accomplish?
On September 17, 2011, activists started to occupy Zucotti Park, a
privately managed plaza in lower Manhattan, the financial district of
New York City, creating a protest and encampment labeled Occupy Wall
Street. It eventually captured the nation’s attention with its chant that
“We are the 99%,” pointing out that Wall Street had been bailed out but
not the rest of the people. Like the TP, it was channeling anger at
inequality and injustice, but Barber (2012) suggests that it was turning
anger to more constructive civic purposes than the TP. Occupy was a
horizontally based movement against hierarchical decision-making and
embracing consensus-based participatory democracy and has been
referred to as an example of “prefigurative politics” in the sense that it is
attempting to “foreshadow a democratic social practice inside the
movement itself” (Milkman 2012: 14). College-educated millennials,
children of the baby boomers, played a significant role in its creation and
development and it was a relatively diverse group in terms of race,
ethnicity, and social class (Milkman 2012). Social media including
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Tumblr played an important role in
getting the word out concerning Occupy Wall Street and others that
ultimately, one source reported, totaled 951 cities in eighty-two countries
(Petrick 2017). (See Chapter 8 concerning how important social media
were for Occupy.)
Quite possibly one of the most significant issues had to do with how
Occupy was organized basically in a horizontal rather than vertical
manner. It is one of the movements that have “struggled to create
alternative forms of organization, sometimes called anarchist,
emphasizing internal direct democracy” (Piven 2013). This process of
participatory engagement involved successive meetings considering any
suggestion and every amendment requiring a great deal of talk, debate,
and deliberation as well as patience and tolerance. It included the use of
a “people’s microphone” due to New York City’s ban on any electronic
voice amplification equipment. It was “a clumsy process that makes
complex and nuanced speech difficult. But it forces relatively
straightforward speech” (Barber 2012: 16).
In comparison to two German groups, Leach (2013) found that
Occupy had a very complex structure and resulted in a significant part of
the general meetings being devoted to teaching newcomers how it works
so they could participate correctly. There became a kind of
“bureaucracies of anarchy” that had the unintended consequence of
silencing some people in order to follow the correct process and be
efficient. Leach stressed that, in such circumstances, highly unstructured
groups need to develop a certain kind of organizational culture to help
facilitate the use of consensus-based democratic decision-making.
Petrick (2017) also suggests that the internal processes of ensuring
Occupy’s survival as a mini city made it difficult to think much about
long-term political goals and building a lasting social movement
infrastructure to challenge global capitalism and corporate greed.
As Piven (2013: 192) points out,
ironically it was after the authorities cleared the encampments that the fuller
potential of an Occupy-inspired horizontal movement began to emerge. Occupy had
succeeded in putting the issue of extreme inequality in the political spotlight, had
made Wall Street its target, and had reached out to find allies, especially workers,
students and the poor.
Occupy activists got involved in a number of activities including

helping those with high debt and/or facing foreclosures, those affected
by Hurricane Sandy, Walmart workers in 1,000 locations in the United
States, fast-food workers and others advocating “$15 and fairness,” etc.
(Manilov 2013; Petrick 2017). In spite of these things, Occupy was not
successful in removing money and its influence on politics or eradicating
corruption in politics or capitalism (Petrick 2017). The limited successes
and the problems Occupy faced remind us how difficult it is to achieve
consensus-based participatory democracy.
Your class may wish to consider the following: In what ways are the
Tea Party and Occupy similar? How are they different? Is trying to
achieve consensus-based participatory democracy a worthy goal? Is it
likely to be achieved? Why or why not?
Brooks and Manza (2013) thoroughly evaluated the responses from the
American public to the GR. They found that instead of the recession leading
to demands for more government, there was lower support for the
government playing a major role in solving economic problems. In
examining numerous surveys of public opinion data trying to explain why
this was the case, they found exceptionally large partisan-based divergence
in government responsibility preferences from 2008 through 2010.
However, not all individuals experienced the same trends and thought the
same way. What they found was that those more strongly identified with the
Republican Party distanced themselves from government involvement much
quicker than those identified with the Democratic Party moved toward
support of government involvement. Further Brooks and Manza (2013)
compared Congressional roll call votes for House members with American
public opinion data. Although they found partisan identifiers likely took
some of their ideas from political elites, they also found a degree of
divergence between mass and elite-level data during the GR. Again it was
the Republican partisan identifiers who moved more sharply to the right in
their opposition to big government than did Republican House Members.
Democratic identifiers were more similar to House Democrats between
2008 and 2010. Brooks and Manza suggest that this could mean that other
sources than political parties were influencing Republican voters. Text box
4.2 on the TP suggests that one of these influences could have been coming
from the Koch brothers and their organization Citizens for Prosperity
(Mayer 2016).
THE MIDDLE CLASS

As Marger (2008) points out, most people identify themselves as members
of the middle classes, which represent the large majority of the population.
Also he recognizes that at various times, parts of government policy have
indeed benefitted the middle classes. For example, compulsory public
schools have been regarded as an important way to promote an equal-
opportunity structure as has been the establishment of land-grant colleges
and universities. The establishment of a progressive income tax in 1913 was
also ideally to help equalize the income distribution. In the face of the Great
Depression, the SS system was created to provide a safety net for those who
retired or were no longer able to work in the paid labor force. The Wagner
Labor Relations Act of 1935 allowed industrial workers to organize into
labor unions, and the G.I. Bill of Rights after World War II and other
legislation encouraged returning veterans to attend college and made home
ownership more available. It became quite apparent in the first decade of the
twenty-first century, however, that the middle classes have been declining
for several decades even in the face of increasing productivity and high rates
of profitability.
Forgrave (2008) documents how the middle class is being squeezed
especially in terms of household income, gas prices, medical insurance, and
college cost. The median household income has declined 1 percent between
1999 when it was $50,641 and 2007 when it was $50,233 (adjusted for
inflation). The average annual payment made by workers for medical
insurance is $3,354, illustrating a 65 percent increase since 1999. The
average cost for a public school education has also increased 35 percent
from 1999 to 2007 (Forgrave 2008: 1A, 11A).
Pew Research Center (2008) conducted a survey in January and
February 2008 that also documented a middle-class squeeze.1 The survey
reported “middle-class blues” with 78 percent of the middle class indicating
that, compared with that five years ago, it was more difficult to maintain
their standard of living. When asked who or what was responsible for the
middle-class squeeze, the responses were quite diverse, but the government,
at 26 percent, was the most frequently mentioned. Remembering that G. W.
Bush was president at the time, note that 35 percent of the Democrats named
the government as the reason, while only 16 percent of the Republicans did.
Also middle-class Republicans were much more likely to blame the people
themselves for their situation (17 percent of Republicans and 8 percent of
Democrats).
More recently, Pew Research Center (2015) showed that the middle
class continues to lose ground in both the percentage of the population and
its income. Early in 2015, there were 120.8 million adults in what the
research center considered middle-income households, while 121.3 million
adults had incomes higher or lower than that of the middle-income group
defined as those adults with annual household income two-thirds to double
the national median, which would be about $42,000–$126,000 annually in
2014 based on a household of three people. The percentage of middle class
based on income tiers has gradually fallen each decade beginning with data
from 1971 that showed 61 percent middle class, 16 percent lowest class, 9
percent lower middle class, 10 percent upper middle class, and 4 percent
highest group. By 2015, this was 50 percent middle class, 20 percent lowest,
9 percent lower middle, 12 percent upper middle, and 9 percent highest
group. Groups on both the higher and the lower ends have increased. By
2016, though it appeared that the percentage of middle class was no longer
falling according to Pew Research Center, the median income for the middle
class was about the same in 2016 as it was in 2000. The lower class income
was higher in 2000 than in 2016, while the reverse was true for the upper
class (Kochhar 2018). In addition, if one looks at the data on wealth, upper-
income families are the only group that has more than recovered from the
GR. Indeed, the wealth gap of upper-income families with other families is
greater than it has ever been recorded (Kochhar 2018).
Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007) focus especially on the difficulties of the
middle class2 and compare the current situation of middle class with that of
peasants in past agrarian societies. Doing research on the middle class,
supposedly “the bedrock on which economic prosperity is based” (xv),
enables one to see how increasingly precarious life has become for much of
society. The authors provide compelling documentation to support their
argument about the struggles of the middle class that have led to a “general
politics of displacement” due to “tax cuts for the wealthy, deregulation,
corporate tax avoidance, and an overall shifting of tax burdens onto earned
income” (13). The consequences of the continuing deterioration of the
middle class are great, resulting in an “overall coarsening of American life”
(128) that encourages a “we versus they” outlook that divides Americans.
Citizens’ trust in government has declined. Members of the middle class
develop a cynicism toward politics, seeing “little support from politicians
and other elites, believing they don’t understand the realities of everyday
life” (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014: 133). Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007, 2014)
maintain that neither Republicans nor Democrats seem attentive to the
cultural and economic issues facing the middle class.
Further, Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007, 2014) offer several suggestions for
improving the situation of the middle class and society at both the individual
and collective levels. We consider only three here. First, middle-class
prosperity needs to be reconnected to the accumulation of capital. Workers
need to be rewarded when economic times are good. It is not simply about
giving bonuses to those at the top of the corporate ladder. Second, if
American society values families, a strong economic base is needed for
those families. Good jobs with fair wages would help improve the tensions
over money in the family. Instead, what we see is that national wages aren’t
keeping pace with inflation. Leicht and Fitzgeald (2007, 2014) also add that
taxes need to be progressive rather than regressive. Third, people need to
recognize and understand that inequality is truly a social problem and
society needs to do something about it. Rather than debating whether
inequality motivates people to work hard, the focus needs to be on ways to
reduce the extreme levels of inequality. Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007, 2014)
believe that if politicians and economic elites are held accountable for
creating policies that support economic health for the nation, this could
result in greater confidence in government also.
TAXATION
One of the slogans of the American Revolution was “no taxation without
representation,” which suggests how strong people’s concern was about
paying unfair taxes. Benjamin Franklin is the likely source of the statement,
“In this world nothing is certain but death and taxes” (McKenna and
Feingold 2004), which suggests the pervasiveness of taxation. As already
noted, tax policy is a basic tool available to governments to help administer
the economy. The U.S. Constitution states in Article I, Section 8 that
“Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States” (Blum et al. 1963: 814). In 1912, the Sixteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to tax incomes without
apportionment, and Congress then adopted a graduated income tax on
individuals and businesses. Individual states also develop their own policies
on taxation. See Text box 4.4 which compares and contrasts selected tax
policies in Kansas and Colorado.
TEXT BOX 4.4

Neoliberal Neighbors?
The state must extract tax revenues from the masses to implement the
policies enacted by the legislative branch. Neoliberal political and
economic ideology characterizing the last forty years has seen a shift in
policies to minimal state services, deregulating industries to promote
economic activity, and expansion of free-market choices. In other words,
this particular ideology advocates for removal of constraints by the state
considered to limit individual freedom and toward relaxing governmental
regulation of economic behavior. But, has neoliberalism created
paradoxes in policy outcomes? Consider the neighboring states of
Colorado and Kansas. Localized political cultures perhaps have resulted
in very different approaches to generating tax revenues—one state
through the legalization of marijuana, and the other state through
elimination of taxes on corporations and upper-income categories. What
has been the effect of moving toward the libertarian goal of expanding
freedom in two experiments of sorts; less taxes, less government control
of marijuana?
KANSAS: In 2012, the Governor of Kansas led repeal of incomes
taxes on those individuals in the top-earning income brackets and on
330,000 corporations as a way to “stimulate” job creation in the state.
This was especially important after the 2008 recession had a significant
impact on the unemployment rate both nationally and in the state of
Kansas. The Kansas Legislature adopted the proposed tax restructuring in
2012. The effect was a significant drop in state revenues. By 2017, the
state legislature was grappling with nearly $1 billion in debt, and a
Kansas Supreme Court decision that found that the state was not meeting
its state constitutional requirement of fair and equal education for all
Kansas children. In late May 2017, the Kansas Legislature approved
legislation that created a new income tax bracket for upper-income
households, and restored taxes on the 330,000 corporations and business
exempted in 2012. The Governor vetoed the bill, arguing that tax
protection for upper-income individuals and for businesses and
corporations was the best policy to create jobs in Kansas. But, in late
May 2017, the legislature marshaled enough votes to override the
Governor’s veto, challenging the political boundaries of neoliberal tax
policies for the state of Kansas.
Did the tax repeals for the upper-income brackets create jobs as
claimed? Neoliberal views of state tax policy would predict that a free
market characterized by wealth in the hands of individuals and
corporations, rather than government, would result in broad economic
success.
Turner and Blagg (2017) concluded there was no net job gain as a
result of the new tax policy. An analysis of Bureau of Labor
Statistics data of new jobs created (Bloomberg News 2017) found
the Kansas “lagged behind” the national average.
In fact, Debacker et al. (2017) examined the economic behavior
created by the 2012 tax policy, and concluded that the effect was
“tax avoidance rather than real supply side responses” (2017: 1),
meaning the effect of having more in the wallet for upper tax
brackets and businesses did not result in investments that created
new jobs.
COLORADO: After nearly twelve years of legal and political battles

in Colorado, the voters in 2012 approved by a 55 percent yes vote for the
legalization of marijuana, allowing use of small amounts of marijuana for
recreational and medical purposes. The initiative passed, and Colorado
becomes one of the first states in the nation to legalize marijuana for
recreational purposes, repealing a nearly century-old ban on this
particular drug. One argument in the movement to legalize was a
neoliberal argument for deregulation, privatization of cannabis sales, and
profit from a fairly new market opportunity. Other neoliberals pointed to
the potential revenues that would come from the regulated sale of
marijuana in Colorado.
According to the Colorado Department of Revenue (2016), state tax

revenues have increased by 57.2 percent from FY 2015–16 to FY
2016–17. Most of this money has gone to funding Colorado K-12
schools and public health programs (Colorado Office of State
Planning & Budgeting 2016).
Kang, O’Leary, and Miller (2016) identify an emerging “marijuana
tourism” that brings significant tourist revenues to the State of
Colorado, with jobs in restaurants, hotels, and entertainment.
The State of Colorado requested a study of the economic impact of
legalization. That study in 2016 found a net $2.39 billion impact in
2015 and the creation of an estimated 18,005 jobs in the same year
(Light et al. 2016).
How do these two cases of neoliberal tax policy differ in approach?

Clearly, policies of the state have an impact on what drugs we use, arrests
and court appearances for violating state laws, how schools are funded,
and ultimately how much discretionary money is left in household and
corporate budgets at the end of the tax of year. What impact has the
neoliberal theory of the state had on everyday life in these states and
others?
While few would ever say they enjoy paying taxes, many might well
agree with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that “taxes are
what we pay for civilized society” (McKenna and Feingold 2004: 230).
Taxes go for services people need in order to function in a complex society,
including public education, fire and police protection, roads, military
defense, and social welfare programs. Despite desiring essential services
from the government, citizens frequently express concerns about how much
they pay in taxes.
Key questions about taxation are who pays taxes and how taxes are
spent. As shown in Figure 4.1, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (2018)
reports that for fiscal year 2016, personal income taxes made up 40 percent
of the nation’s income, followed by 29 percent of income from SS,
Medicare, unemployment, and other retirement taxes. Corporate income
taxes made up only 8 percent of the income. Borrowing to cover the deficit
made up 15 percent, while excise, customs, estate, gift, and miscellaneous
taxes 8 percent.
The largest expenditure (42 percent) was for SS, Medicare, and other
retirement programs for the disabled and medical care for the elderly. The
second largest was money spent for social programs (23 percent) including
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), health
research, unemployment compensation, and other social services. The next
largest category (21 percent) was for national defense, veterans, and foreign
affairs. Physical, human, and community development was 7 percent. Net
interest being paid on the debt was 6 percent.
FIGURE 4.1 Major Categories of Federal Income and

Outlays for Fiscal Year 2016
Source: Internal Revenue Service 2018. 1040A Instructions (2017). Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office. https://www.irs.gov/instructions//i1040a
Taxes on Individuals
Although federal taxes take the largest sum of money from most people,
this tax rate is graduated or progressive; as one’s income increases, one’s
tax rate rises proportionately. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith points out
that “the only effective design for diminishing the income inequality
inherent in capitalism is the progressive income tax” (quoted in Marger
2014: 261). Since 1955, federal taxes on income have actually declined as a
means of taxation for the middle class; however, this decrease has been
more than compensated for by increases in payroll taxes and state and local
taxes. State and local taxes tend to be regressive; they place a heavier
burden on those with lower income.
Government tax policies influence the patterns of inequality in the
nation. While corporations and the wealthy have seen their taxes decline,
those whose income is near the median family income have seen theirs
increase. Drawing on the work of Piketty and Saez who have analyzed tax
return data, Johnston (2007: 272) points out that the wealthiest 300,000
citizens had nearly as much income as the 150 million citizens at the bottom
of the income distribution. Johnston compared the income distribution
pattern to slices in a pie. From 1980 to 2005, the income pie grew by 79
percent, while the population increased by one-third. In 1980, the income of
the great majority of people represented about two-thirds of the pie, but this
declined to just over half of the pie in 2005. The top 10 percent saw their
slice of the pie increase from about one-third in 1980 to nearly half in 2005.
Even more, the top 0.1 percent (30,000 persons) saw their share increase
from 1.3 percent to a little more than 5 percent in 2005 with incomes of at
least $9.5 million in 2005. This means that the average income of the great
majority of people dropped slightly from $29,495 in 1980 to $29,143 in
2005 (Johnston 2007: 272–274). In addition to the increase in income for
the rich, the tax rates on the top incomes have actually declined (Johnston
2007: 278).
The George W. Bush-era tax cuts have benefitted the rich much more
than those in other classes, while government spending created very high
budget deficits (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007). Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007)
believe that because the tax system is biased against the middle class who
seem to be paying more than their fair share, cynicism about politics has
grown among the middle class. More specifically, they argue that the elites,
in the form of what they call a new landlord class, dominate political life by
using political action committees and their special access to politicians who
have modified the tax system and regulations to benefit the upper class
(132). As we have already discussed, this results in “middle-class
alienation” where people “suspect something is wrong and that the system
is rigged against them, but coherent political action to combat these trends
seems to be beyond their reach” (13). At the very top of the class hierarchy,
the richest 400 Americans paid an average tax rate of less than 20 percent in
2009 (Marger 2014). The Republican Party especially is particularly
opposed to raising income taxes (Marger 2014).
Corporate Taxation
Corporations have contributed a much lower percentage of their income
than have individuals to tax revenue. Corporate taxes have made up a
declining proportion of total federal government revenue throughout the
twentieth century (Hurst 2010: 355). Indeed, a study by the GAO revealed
that 1.2 million U.S. companies, or two-thirds of U.S. corporations, did not
pay any federal income taxes between 1998 and 2005. About 38,000 (68
percent) of foreign companies that did business in the United States also did
not pay corporate taxes. Combined, these companies had $2.5 trillion in
sales (Kerr 2008: 5A).
U.S. corporations have increasingly used a technique called
“inversions” that became legal under U.S. law in 2002. U.S. companies
have incorporated parts of their businesses as subsidiaries in certain
countries such as the Cayman Islands possibly to avoid paying corporate
taxes. Subsidiaries could also be created to take advantage of sales
opportunities or favorable labor situations. These countries are called tax
havens because they have little or no taxes, limited effective sharing of
information with foreign tax authorities, and no transparency in legislative,
administrative, or legal provisions (GAO 2008). The IRS estimated that in
2001, about $70 billion may have been lost in taxes due to tax havens
(Hurst 2010). The 2008 GAO study identified that 83 of the 100 largest
publicly traded U.S. corporations had subsidiaries in jurisdictions labeled as
tax havens. Also, 63 of the 100 largest publicly traded U.S. federal
contractors had subsidiaries in tax havens (GAO 2008). Some of the
companies with subsidiaries in tax havens have received federal bailouts.
For example, Bank of America Inc., Citigroup Inc., and Morgan Stanley
were part of the $700 billion financial bailout approved by Congress, and
AIG received about $150 billion in bailout money (Thomas 2009). U.S.
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), who requested the 2008 GAO report,
estimated that at least $100 billion a year is now being lost due to abusive
tax havens and offshore accounts (Thomas 2009). In May 2009, President
Obama argued for legislation that would limit offshore tax havens and
corporate tax breaks. He estimated that the changes would result in $210
billion in increased tax revenues over the next ten years. This would help
compensate for the tax cuts he was proposing for the middle class. The
president of the Business Roundtable, however, countered that Obama’s
plan would hinder the ability of U.S. corporations to compete abroad
(Calmes and Andrews 2009).
In September 2017, Trump proposed his tax plan stating “This is a
revolutionary change and the biggest winners will be the everyday
American workers” (Davis and Rappeport 2017). However, there was little
detail about how the working class would benefit although there were more
explicit benefits for those who are wealthy and corporations. The plan
attempted to simplify and cut taxes for the middle class in part by
approximately doubling standard deductions and reducing the tax brackets
to three, 12, 25, and 35 percent. The corporate tax rate would be decreased
from 35 to 20 percent, which neoliberal supporters maintain would help
make U.S. companies more competitive with others (Davis and Rappeport
2017).
There were some alterations made in the plan but President Trump
signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on December 22, 2017, after it passed
Congress. The corporate tax rate was lowered from 35 to 21 percent
beginning in 2018. This is the lowest tax rate since 1939. On average, the
effective rate average is 18 percent though (Amadeo 2018). The top
individual tax rate drops to 37 percent. The legislation reduces tax rates,
doubles the standard deduction, and did away with personal exemptions.
Most itemized deductions are eliminated, but student loan interest,
retirement savings, and charitable contributions remain as deductions.
Mortgage interest deductions are limited, while deductions for medical
expenses increase in 2017 and 2018.
Beginning in 2019 the act repealed the Obamacare tax on those who did
not have health insurance. Given this, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimated that thirteen million people, typically the more healthy
persons, would drop their plans. Repealing the mandate to have health
insurance according to the CBO would likely result in higher health-care
prices for those who buy the insurance.
Amadeo (2018) maintains that the tax plan helps businesses more than
individuals and among individuals it helps higher-income families the most.
For example, the Tax Foundation estimated that those in the 20–80 percent
range receive a 1.7 percent increase, but those in the 95–99 percent receive
2.2 percent increases in after-tax income. The Tax Policy Center estimate
divided the earning groups into quintiles with the lowest fifth having their
income increase 0.4 percent, second lowest 1.2 percent; middle quintile 1.6
percent, second highest quintile 1.9 percent, and the top-earning fifth
increasing their income 2.9 percent. Tax rates would likely be lowered for
everyone, but lowered the most for those with the highest income. Less
income tax money for the government would mean that the national debt
would increase the debt by $1 trillion over the next ten years according to
the Joint Committee on Taxation (Amadeo 2018).
WASHINGTON, DC—APRIL 15: Protester at the tax day tea party rally at
the Washington monument on April 15, 2010 in Washington, DC
Credit: Rena Schild / Shutterstock.com
Survey data tend to suggest that most Americans do not support a tax
cut for corporations. An August 2017 survey by Pew Research Center
(2017a) found that just less than a quarter (24 percent) favored lowering the
tax rate on corporations and large businesses, while slightly more than half
(52 percent) favored increasing it. The other 21 percent wanted it kept the
same. A majority of Americans (59 percent) think business corporations
make “too much profit” and the breakdown by partisanship reveals 73
percent of Democrats and only 43 percent of Republicans believe that (Pew
Research Center 2017b). Another question asked about whether those with
household incomes over $250,000 should have their taxes raised or
lowered. A total of 43 percent felt their taxes should be raised, while 24
percent felt they should be lowered compared to 29 percent who believed
the rate should stay the same. Republicans were much more likely to
support lower tax rates for both than were Democrats (Pew Research Center
2017a).
Dodson (2017) studied tax attitudes associated with unemployment rates
in nine advanced capitalist democracies including the United States. He
found that under conditions of higher unemployment rates, high-level
professionals and managers reduced their support for tax progressivity, but
blue-collar workers, low-level professionals, and low-level managers
increased their support for tax progressivity. He suggests that these findings
illustrate class polarization and class politics with working classes in favor
of more progressive fiscal policies and those who are in higher classes
supportive of more financially conservative policies. Not only are the
political parties, but also the social classes seem to be polarized on the issue
of taxation, especially if the economic situation worsens.
International Comparison Regarding Taxation

In general, research tends to show that the United States in comparison with
other developed countries is at the low end of the tax range (DeSilver
2017b). The U.S. taxation policy is different from many Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in that the
overall tax burden as the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) tends
to be lower than that of many developed nations. More specifically,
according to 2004 OECD data, the U.S. tax revenue was 25.4 percent of
GDP, whereas countries like Sweden, France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Canada, and Australia had tax revenues ranging from 31.6 to 50.7
percent of GDP. Japan’s percentage was very similar to that of the United
States (Marger 2008: 249). More recent 2011 OECD data continue to find
overall tax burden remains much less in the United States. We see, for
example, that the U.S. rate is 24.1 percent as a percentage of GDP
compared to the United Kingdom at 34.3 percent, Germany at 37.3 percent
and Sweden at 46.7 percent (Marger 2014). In the early 2000s, the U.S.
corporate tax percentage was only 1.5–2 percent of GDP (Leicht and
Fitzgerald 2007).
Summary
In the United States, a large part of the individual tax burden has been
shifted toward the middle class. This clearly affects most U.S. citizens
because more of their income goes to pay taxes, while the government loses
possible revenue from the upper classes. In the twenty-first century, this has
resulted in budget deficits and the inability of the government to provide all
the services society needs. The loss of money from corporations adds
further to the government’s problems of providing services to the public.
Also corporations creating subsidiaries abroad may be looking for cheap
labor, so they can reduce their higher paid labor force in the United States.
As Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007) have suggested, as the public realizes they
are losing ground and other individuals and corporations are not paying
their fair share, they become increasingly alienated and lose their trust of
politicians and government.
THE WELFARE STATE

Although the word welfare makes many people picture the poor and may
even evoke the welfare recipient who takes advantage of the system, it is
important to realize that social welfare in the United States comprises a
number of different social programs. Some of these are called social
insurance programs such as SS and Medicare, which may be paid for
through payroll taxes. All people in American society may benefit from
these programs. The other part of the welfare system has been referred to as
public assistance programs that are funded through general government
revenues. The phrase means-tested indicates that recipients have to prove
their need according to certain criteria. Before we turn to a discussion of
public assistance programs, we will consider benefits that have helped
corporations, and then examine the SS system, which has benefited and
possibly will continue to benefit millions of people.
Corporate Welfare
Corporate welfare is sometimes called wealthfare or phantom welfare. As
we have already seen, many corporations do not pay taxes at all. Corporate
tax loopholes are great, and tax havens have also helped corporations avoid
or reduce taxes. Certain industries and companies such as airlines,
commercial agriculture, and defense contractors are provided considerable
subsidies to help them. For example, the sugar industry has received $1.4
billion annually (Marger 2008: 252–253). Indirect subsidies include
highway construction, which helps the trucking industry, and airport
construction, which helps the airlines. Trade restrictions against foreign
imports by means of tariffs also benefit certain industries. In the early
1990s, Huff and Johnson estimated the benefits from phantom welfare to be
$150 billion to $200 billion per year (Hurst 2010: 364).
In addition, government has a history of bailing out major industries
when those industries encounter financial problems. For example, in the late
1980s, the bailout of the savings and loan industry cost taxpayers billions of
dollars. The multibillion-dollar rescue of financial institutions in 2008–2009
also illustrates government support of the elite (Hurst 2010). In trying to
alleviate the financial crisis, AIG, the largest insurance company in the
United States, received $173 billion alone and by mid-2009 one estimate
was that more than $10 trillion had been committed to help deal with the
global financial situation (Marger 2014). An interesting question to consider
may be why most people tend to focus more on the benefits given to the
poor rather than on corporate welfare.
Social Security
The Social Security Act was signed in 1935 during the Great Depression;
the first taxes were actually collected in 1937. Currently, SS provides
retirement, disability, family, and survivor benefits. Both the employer and
the employee (for most occupations) contribute to SS through payroll taxes.
Self-employed persons pay both the employer’s and employee’s
contribution. One must normally be sixty-two years or older to receive
retirement benefits. The amount of an individual’s earnings determines the
amount of monthly benefits, and an individual must have forty credits or
quarters to qualify. The retirement benefits were to provide a foundation for
one’s retirement, but were not intended to be the sole source of support.
SS has been quite effective in limiting the number of elderly who are in
poverty. Data suggest that 40.5 percent of seniors would have incomes
below the poverty line if one did not count SS benefits. When one takes into
account the SS income, only 8.8 percent of seniors are poor according to the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) (Romig and Sherman 2016).
Put another way, 15,067,000 elderly aged sixty-five or over were lifted out
of poverty. In addition, children have benefitted, as 1.1 million children
under eighteen were lifted above the poverty line as were 5,944,000 adults
aged eighteen to sixty-four.
At various times, the government has encountered the issue of how to
preserve SS for future generations. The G. W. Bush administration pushed
for privatization of part of the SS system, but they were not successful.
Feldstein (2005) argues for an investment-based component in the form of
personal retirement accounts that he believes will likely increase benefits.
Kloby (2004) offers a class/Marxist interpretation of the campaign to
privatize SS. While there is a tremendous concentration of wealth among
the richest Americans, there is also a shortage of profitable investment
outlets. Capitalists try to expand their markets, so they search for new areas
of profitability. Privatizing SS would have meant expansion of the
brokerage business and an increase of billions of dollars in broker’s fees.
Hiltzik (2005), who strongly opposed privatization, documented Gallup
Poll results that found that the majority surveyed are opposed to private
accounts that would sharply cut their basic benefits from the current pay-as-
you-go arrangement. By a 2-to-1 margin, they supported raising the payroll
tax ceiling and limiting benefits for wealthy retirees. Also, only 30 percent
felt that investing in stocks and bonds with their private accounts would
give them better benefits (218). Congress discovered many people seemed
to mistrust Wall Street even around 2005, well before the stock market
problems of 2008–2009. People worried that market volatility could tear a
major hole in the social safety net and make the system financially less
stable (Diamond and Orszag 2005; Hiltzik 2005).
A report by the National Academy of Social Insurance (2014) of a
multigenerational public opinion study revealed how favorable Americans
were toward SS. A total of 77 percent of those surveyed believed that it was
critical to maintain SS benefits even if it meant working Americans paid
higher SS taxes. Political party preference of respondents revealed some
differences, but included 84 percent of Democrats, 76 percent of
Independents, and 69 percent of Republicans (Walker, Reno, and Bethell
2014). Indeed, 86 percent of Americans felt that SS benefits did not provide
enough money for retirees and 72 percent wanted the government to
consider increasing future benefits from SS. Most were supportive of
gradually doing away with the current cap on earnings that are taxable for
SS and gradually raising the SS tax rate that workers and employers pay.
The 2017 annual report on the “Status of the Social Security and
Medicare Programs” by the Social Security and Medicare Boards of
Trustees (2017) projected that SS’s total income would exceed its total cost
through 2021, just as it has since 1982. After that, there would be enough
resources to offset its deficits until 2034, following which scheduled tax
income would become sufficient to pay about three-fourths of the benefits.
The large baby boom generation entering retirement and the lower-birth-
rate generations entering employment are important factors helping explain
the shortfall in funding. It is recommended
that lawmakers take action sooner rather than later to address these shortfalls so that a
broader range of solutions can be considered and more time will be available to phase
in changes while giving the public adequate time to prepare.
Romig (2017) from the CBPP summarized the situation about SS facing
“real but manageable financial challenges and are neither unaffordable nor
‘bankrupt,’ as critics claim.” (For more discussion, see the section on debt
later in this chapter.)
Public Assistance
At times, there are heated debates about what should be the role of
government in the welfare state. For example, two surveys (Pew Research
Center 2008; Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2009) asked
whether government should take care of people who can’t take care of
themselves. Since 1987, the percentage of people endorsing this idea has
ranged from 57 to 71 percent. In 2009, 63 percent supported this view, but
again, it was supported much less by Republicans (46 percent) than by
Democrats (77 percent) (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
2009). In the separate survey of the middle class (Pew Research Center
2008), 56 percent of the middle class agreed. A 2017 Pew Research Center
study found that 50 percent of people surveyed agreed that the government
should do more to help needy Americans even though it means going
deeper into debt. In terms of political party preference, 71 percent of
Democrats and only 24 percent of Republicans agreed illustrating a very
strong partisan gap (Pew Research Center 2017b). Thus, while about half
support the idea that government should care for people who can’t care for
themselves, a significant minority question this statement.
Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007) suggest that the middle class may resent
welfare recipients because the middle class pays so much of the taxes that
support the welfare state. For the middle class, to channel their frustrations
against the wealthy who have profited so much from the productivity of the
middle class is extremely difficult; the tax structure is basically out of their
control. It is much easier to resent the more visible and subordinate poor
who have limited resources.
As you may recall in Chapter 2 on the types of welfare states, the United
States is a liberal welfare state. Generally, this means that only after family
and market principles break down does public intervention occur.
Assistance is limited, short term, and frequently stigmatizing or punitive
(Myles 1996). Put another way, the U.S. policy is relatively inexpensive and
basically incomplete in the services it provides (in comparison to many
Western European nations) (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988). Such
programs limit the chances of people on traditional welfare to get off
welfare.
Many people and some researchers think that those on welfare use the
ideas of rational economic choice theory. They believe that potential
welfare recipients calculate the relative benefits and costs of participation
weighed against other choices (Van Hook and Bean 2009). Often, too, these
supporters of rational choice believe that inequality plays a key role in
motivating people to improve their positions by working hard, obtaining the
appropriate education and training, and so on. Inequality is a powerful
incentive (Smeeding 2006). Republicans’ views on these issues seem to be
possibly supportive of the rational choice perspective. For example, 65
percent of Republicans and 18 percent of Democrats agree that “Poor
people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without
doing anything in return,” and 59 percent of Republicans and 28 percent of
Democrats support the statement “Blacks who can’t get ahead in this
country are mostly responsible for their own condition” (Pew Research
Center 2017b).
According to Williams (2017), the term “personal responsibility” is
actually associated with a reduction in government services. Neoliberalism
emphasizes that individual citizens need to demonstrate greater personal
responsibility for their situations. Two government reports in 1986
represented the first federal government recognition “of an opposition
between government aid and individual responsibility” theorizing concepts
like “voluntary poverty” or “poverty by choice” (Williams 2017: 230). The
idea of the U.S. social welfare system providing a social safety net has
experienced a great deal of change beginning in the early 1990s (Tach and
Edin 2017). More specifically what has happened is that cash safety for the
nonworking poor has declined dramatically, while there has been increased
support for working poor parents. As already discussed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 replaced the
cash welfare program in the United States and gave more benefits to those
considered more worthy, particularly workers. Two programs that have
benefitted are Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). However SNAP was cut back in
terms of funding in 2014.
Recent research suggests that those at the very bottom of the social class
hierarchy, the poorest of the poor, have suffered greatly since various
welfare reform strategies. For example, nonworking mothers experienced
dislocation from both work and the welfare system facing limited options
for child care, transportation concerns, and mental and physical health
programs. Survival strategies included using charities or support from
relatives, selling plasma or food stamps for money, “scrapping,” informal
jobs, and going without basic necessities. Research is needed to find out
how the generation of children who experienced the welfare changes are
now doing in adulthood (Tach and Edin 2017).
Just how successful have public assistance programs that are means
tested been? In his testimony before the Human Resources Subcommittee of
the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Greenstein
(2015), the President of the CBPP institute, suggests that policies are more
effective than often recognized, but the safety net programs helping people
with low or moderate incomes need to be improved. However, findings
suggest that the programs cut poverty approximately in half. Researchers
have tracked children over several decades and have found that providing
benefits like SNAP and the EITC assistance for children have been able to
increase their test scores and educational attainment, which has tended to
increase employment and income in their adulthood. Put succinctly,
Greenstein argues that helping children receive basic necessities leads to
improved longer-term outcomes.
Analysis of 2012 census data found that the safety net provisions cut the
2012 poverty rate by more than half after corrections were made for
underreported benefits. More specifically, 29.1 percent of people would
have been in poverty without counting all government assistance (after
taxes) and correcting the underreported benefits; after doing, both the rate
was 13.8 percent. For those under age 18, the poverty rate declined from
29.8 to 13.5 percent (Greenstein 2015). Data for 2014 showed that the
poverty rate for people without government assistance (after taxes) was 15.3
percent. For those under age 18, the percentages were 27.8 percent before
and 16.7 percent after government assistance. No corrections were made for
underreported benefits in 2014 (Greenstein 2015).
What programs seem to reduce poverty the most? SS lifted more than
27.4 million out of poverty in 2012 and was the single most important
program to lift people out of poverty. Various means-tested programs helped
lift persons out of poverty. Two programs, SNAP and the combined Earned
Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit for low-income working
families, each lifted 10.3 million people out of poverty (Sherman and Trisi
2015). The latter was slightly more likely to lift children out of poverty (5.3
million vs. 4.9 million). Housing assistance programs reach fewer
households than other means-tested programs like SNAP or the EITC but
they are very effective in lifting those they reach out of poverty. Those
programs lifted 4.0 million people including 1.5 million children out of
poverty. TANF lifted 1.3 million out of poverty, 0.7 million of whom were
children (Sherman and Trisi 2015).
Even with the various programs, the U.S. safety net is less effective in
reducing poverty than most developed societies. In a study of 33 OECD
nations in 2011, the U.S. poverty rate before the effect of various programs
was about average, but, after the adjustments for benefits and taxes, the
poverty rate for the United States was the seventh highest among the thirty-
three countries (Greenstein 2015).
As noted earlier, in liberal welfare states, it is often difficult for people
to get off welfare because the program is quite limited. Would more
generous welfare policies help fight poverty and improve the chances of
people to get off welfare? Some theorists view welfare expansion as a
means to extend social and political rights and thus promote good
citizenship (Fording 2001: 120). In that sense, a strong welfare system may
provide certain benefits for all of us in society, as it promotes social
solidarity and reduces tension. A weak welfare system may promote social
discord. As an example, Fording (2001) cites studies that found that a
decline in welfare generosity is associated with a rise in incarceration rates.
A rise in prison rates leads to more costs as the inmate population increases
and demand for building new prisons increases. Incarceration rates have
been at unprecedentedly high levels and greater than in other nations
(Schram et al. 2009). As our society deals with the enormous costs of
poverty, one may ask whether it is better to establish and maintain a strong
welfare system or pay higher costs for such things as incarcerating
prisoners.
Empirical studies have documented that political leaders frequently
respond to mass unrest by expanding the welfare state (Fording 2001). For
example, Piven and Cloward (1979) in their analysis of the welfare rights
movement in the 1960s found that the welfare system was vulnerable to
protest and disruption by the poor. The disruption of the welfare system
followed by an electoral crisis would likely encourage leaders to promote
policies to limit the polarization of the electorate over the protests
concerning the welfare system.
An important theoretical issue is why the state responds the way it does.
Fording (2001) tested whether a social control perspective that has been
advanced by neo-Marxists, or a neopluralist perspective best explains this
theoretical issue. In the social control model, the state acts in the long-term
interests of elites or the ruling class to limit or reduce the effects of the
insurgency. The state can do this in two ways: repressing the protest
(coercive) and increasing the benefits of the welfare system (beneficent).
Neopluralists, on the other hand, view the insurgency as an effort of the
relatively powerless to secure access to the policymaking government
agenda. The protest gives them increasing visibility, so that they can
“effectively compete and bargain with other interests to obtain policy
changes favorable to their interests” (Fording 2001: 115). Using black
insurgency data including Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) recipient rates and state imprisonment records (to measure
repression), Fording finds strong support for the social control perspective
(illustrated in Figure 4.2). The state responds to reduce the protest or
insurgency that threatens the stability of the system by offering more
welfare benefits. It also becomes more punitive by increasing the
incarceration rates, which serves to limit the protest. However, Fording also
recognizes that conventional electoral channels contribute to welfare reform
as well. The two theoretical frameworks and Fording’s findings help us
understand better why government may respond as it does to providing
welfare benefits.
FIGURE 4.2 The Social Control Model of State
Response to Insurgency
Source: Richard C. Fording. 2001. P. 116 in The Political Response to Black Insurgency: A
Critical Test of Competing Theories of the State. © 2001 American Political Science
Association. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
In addition to the costs of incarceration, another issue that also has

consequences for taxpayers is how poverty influences the ability and
achievement of children. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (2000) point out several
key statistics about social and also financial costs of poverty:
Poor children are:
at 1.7 times higher risk for child mortality;

at 2.0 times higher risk for a short stay in the hospital;
at 2.0 times higher risk for grade repetition and dropping out of school;
4 times as likely to have a learning disability;
1 times as likely to have teenage out-of-wedlock births;
at 6.8 times higher risk for reported cases of child abuse and neglect.
Statistics like these help illustrate why there are significant concerns
about the welfare system particularly as the debate has shifted to family and
child well-being (Lichter and Jayakody 2002).
Brady (2009) documents that poverty is the result of politics more than
of individual characteristics and abilities. He used data from eighteen
countries over more than thirty years to provide an institutionalized power
relations explanation rather than examine individual problems or labor
markets. Variation in poverty rates is shaped by variation in the generosity
of countries’ welfare policies. Where leftist political organizations and
parties along with coalitions supporting egalitarianism are able to shape
welfare policies, poverty is less, and support for equality has been
institutionalized. In the United States, poverty is widespread, and support
for equality has not been institutionalized.
Early in this chapter, we identified a possible conflict over the meaning
of freedom: emphasizing liberty or equality. Esping-Andersen (2007)
examines the relationship between the U.S. welfare state and equal
opportunity, a value many Americans endorse. He finds the income
distribution in the United States to be unusually unequal. The United States
ranks very high in poverty as well as inequality. Smeeding (2006)
documents that cross-national comparisons show U.S. poverty rates to be at
or near the top when compared with other rich nations. Esping-Andersen
(2007) points out that 19 percent of children in the United States live in
poverty, which is twice that in Germany and five times that in Sweden.
Further, he notes research by economists that documents less equality of
opportunity, less mobility, and more inheritance in the United States than in
Germany, Canada, or Scandinavia. He labels the United States as an equal-
opportunity underachiever (Esping-Andersen 2007: 23).
Although education is a key to social mobility, Esping-Andersen (2007:
23) argues that the “seeds of inequality are sown prior to school age on a
host of crucial attributes such as health, cognitive, and noncognitive
abilities, motivation to learn, and more generally school preparedness.”
Recent research documents that “early child investments matter most” (25).
Heckman estimates that for every dollar invested in early-childhood
programs, the return is $5.70. Esping-Andersen (2007: 27) argues that “if
we care about fairness and seriously subscribe to an equal-opportunities
standard, the case in favor of corrective measures is strong indeed.” He
further maintains that the United States needs a comprehensive family
policy in its welfare program. As part of this plan, access to affordable and
high-quality childcare would limit inequalities of employment and income
as well as narrow the learning gap among children. This would result in less
wasted human talent. Thus, Esping-Andersen makes a strong case for the
U.S. government to expand its welfare program even though many nations
have instituted or are considering retrenchment.
Marger (2014) suggests that in a comparative perspective with the
countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, the U.S. welfare system
tends to stand out as different in scope and size, range of coverage, and
distributive effects. The lack of universal health care in the United States is
in contrast to that of many advanced societies. Even with the passage of the
Affordable Care Act in 2012, the United States is “uniquely a profit-driven
system dominated by private insurance companies” (Marger 2014: 273).
Further the U.S. welfare system tends to be less redistributive than others.
For example, comparing “before taxes and transfers” with “after taxes and
transfers” related to child poverty rates, the United States and Japan are
much less generous in reducing child poverty than several other societies
(Marger 2014). Marger suggests that a basic distrust of government as well
as U.S. traditions of individualism, the power of business, and the weakness
of labor help explain these differences. The belief that “government is the
problem, not the solution” became a major belief of many during the
Reagan presidency in the 1970s. Marger (2014) argues that it tends to be
associated with not only Republicans but also many Democrats, so that the
idea has resonated strongly with many people in the United States during at
least the last three decades even though there is a long history in the United
States of government distrust. A Pew Research Center (2017b) survey
found that 63 percent of Republicans and 30 percent of Democrats agreed
with the statement “Government regulation of business usually does more
harm than good” and 69 percent of Republicans and 45 percent of
Democrats agreed that “Government is almost always wasteful and
inefficient.”
In contrast to the United States, Marger recognizes that, in other
societies, there are some suspicions about government, but also “there is a
perception of the state as a necessary and beneficent institution” (Marger
2014: 276). Still neoliberal policies have spread throughout many societies
with Bockman (2013: 15) noting that neoliberals argue that unhindered
markets are the best strategy to provide social welfare and economic
growth. Those who do not compete well in such an environment (e.g. the
homeless, the incarcerated, or previously incarcerated) are “excluded from
full citizenship, abandoned” (Bockman 2013: 16).
DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY
We focus here on two different types of debt that are relevant in the
discussion of the politics of everyday life. They are government debt and
household debt. Because the state has great power and resources, including
the ability to print money, it is highly unlikely that the government will go
broke even though it is in debt and pays interest on the debt. Since 2000,
though, great concern has been expressed about the accumulation of debt.
With the recession that started late in 2007 and the government bailouts,
even greater concerns about the federal deficit have been expressed. In July
2009 the federal deficit grew to $1.27 trillion. That month was the fifteenth
consecutive month that receipts by the government were lower than the
same month in the prior year (Associated Press 2009a).
As of July 31, 2017, the debt for the federal government reached
$19.845 trillion based on Treasury Department information analyzed by the
Pew Research center (DeSilver 2017a). There is a statutory national debt
limit or ceiling on almost all of that debt as has been done in the past and
currently Congress and the White House raise the debt ceiling when needed
or face shutdowns in certain government services. At this point, debt is
greater than yearly GDP. It is important to understand that 27.6 percent of
that debt (about $5.48 trillion) is actually owed to another part of the federal
government; the largest holder is SS’s two trust funds, which hold more than
$2.9 trillion in special non-traded Treasury securities. SS had numerous
years of surplus and by law had to invest that money in Treasuries (DeSilver
2017a). The Federal Reserve holds another $2.5 trillion or 12.4 percent of
the debt. Although concerns are frequently expressed about China holding
much of that debt, it holds 5.8 percent or $1.15 trillion. The average interest
rate on the federal loan is low at 2.232 percent or $276.2 billion in fiscal
year 2017. U.S. government debt has been thought of as having little risk,
and demand for it has stayed quite strong. However, this could be changing
especially for short-term securities (DeSilver 2017a).
It is unclear, at this point, what will happen with the national debt, but,
after Hurricane Harvey, the debt ceiling was increased through December
2017. One way economists suggest to help with the deficit is to reduce or
eliminate tax loopholes and so-called carveouts in the tax code. This would
possibly include eliminating tax advantages for activities such as charitable
giving or borrowing to buy a home that result in lower tax rates. However,
various loopholes are guarded by powerful lobbying groups (Benjamin
2017). The last major tax code reform was done in 1986 when Congress
simplified the code and reduced the number of tax breaks. However, since
then Congress has amended the code and brought back many loopholes
(Benjamin 2017).
There are, of course, other reasons for the U.S. debt situation. When
George W. Bush became President in 2001, there was actually a budget
surplus. However, two tax cuts, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the GR and its
$831 billion stimulus package, baby boomers retiring and receiving SS, and
Medicare adding the drug supplement are some of the reasons for the deficit
(Benjamin 2017). It will be interesting to see what if anything Congress
proposes and who is more likely to benefit and to lose in the process.
If we look at government debt globally, we see that the debt exceeds
$63.1 Trillion based on a Pew Research Center analysis of International
Monetary Fund data. The U.S. ranks first with almost $20 million followed
by Japan with about $11 trillion. Often debt is analyzed in relation to GDP,
and Japan has by far the highest debt-to-GDP ratio. Greece, Italy, Portugal,
the United States, and Belgium have ratios above 1. Debt as a percentage of
GDP increased between 2006 and 2016 in thirty-four of the forty-three
countries studied. A study by Moody’s Analytics identified several countries
including Japan, Italy, and Greece as problematic, but nations like the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom were considered “safe”
(Budiman and DeSilver 2017).
Household Debt
Because many consumers were in serious debt and angry at the extreme
punitive changes and high interest rates, Congress passed legislation to
place restrictions on the credit card industry. Some of the rules of the Credit
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act took effect in
August 2009 and others in 2010 (Pugh 2009). Credit card companies though
created new ways to generate revenue such as charging customers a
surcharge to receive their statements by mail. Morgenson (2010: 1) claimed
that such practices were “Proof, yet again, that if you close the door, they
will come in through the window. And if you close the window, they blow
through the door.” In general, there has been a great deal of concern about
credit card and mortgage companies using deceptive practices.
By the first quarter of 2017, U.S. household debt had actually peaked
above the record 2008 levels during the GR. In 2008, it was $12.68 trillion,
while, in 2017, it was $12.73 trillion (Davidson 2017). Leicht and
Fitzgerald (2014) considered how the rules have changed regarding middle-
class life; a couple of them especially are related to the two largest
components of household debt, mortgage, and student debt. One old rule
suggested that people should achieve the American dream by buying a
house as soon as possible, live in it, pay off the mortgage before they retire,
and have their home be their major financial asset. Instead, for much of the
middle class, paying off the mortgage has become very difficult and an
“elusive dream” in part because jobs are more likely to be short-term
employment (p. 6) in the neoliberal era. Following the new rules what
families often do is borrow against the equity in the house to buy the
consumer items typically identified with middle-class life (Leicht and
Fitzgerald 2014). The mortgage part of U.S. household debt increased from
$8.4 trillion in 2008 to $8.6 trillion in early 2017 (Davidson 2017).
Student Debt
Average student debt has increased, although about one-third of students
receiving a bachelor’s degree have no student debt. The median student debt
was $19,999 in 2007–2008 for Bachelor’s degree graduates, an increase of
5 percent from 2003 to 2004. These figures from the College Board,
however, did not include parents’ borrowing, credit card debt, informal
loans from relatives or friends, or loans for graduate school (Lewin 2009).
Regarding student debt, the old rule involved parents providing their
children with a good education in order for them to be upwardly mobile in
society. The expectation was that with the child working during the summer
and parents providing support through their savings and their current
earnings, the children could get a college education and a steady job without
anyone acquiring major debt. However, the new rule suggested that a rather
large portion of the college education would be funded through loans.
Tuition increases as states cut back on funding their public universities and
that helps drive the costs of schooling up. Young people wanted to attend
college in part because, during the GR, jobs were hard to find and the
earnings of youth without a college degree have declined. A quite likely
scenario under the new rules is that the student graduates and finds a job
that prevents downward mobility, but there is no guarantee that there will be
upward mobility (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014: 5–7). Students and their
parents may both experience debt due to the high costs of education.
Student debt was in third place at $506 billion in 2008 regarding
household debt, but moved to second place at $1.34 trillion in 2017
(Davidson 2017). According to Hillman and Orosz (2017), the federal
student loan system started in 1965 when the Higher Education Act was
authorized. At that point, borrowing was rather uncommon if one compares
it to current times. There are direct subsidized and direct unsubsidized
loans. The former are available only to undergraduates with financial need,
and the government rather than students pays the interest. There are also
Parent PLUS loan programs and Graduate PLUS programs available based
on credit checks. Student loan debt involves 41.5 million Americans and, in
the last ten years, this kind of debt has tripled. The median debt balance is
approximately $14,245, and about 40 percent of undergraduates take out a
federal loan annually, but there does not appear to be any typical student
debt experience. It is estimated that earning a college degree results in, on
average, a $830,000 benefit over one’s lifetime. Text box 4.5 discusses the
possibility of having tuition-free colleges.
TEXT BOX 4.5

Should Public Colleges and Universities Provide Free
Tuition?
During his 2015–2016 campaign for the Democratic Party nomination
for President, Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat Vermont) proposed that
tuition should be free to all attending public colleges. Instead of relying
mainly on government, Hillary Rodham Clinton proposed her own plan
later in 2015 that expected families to make a “realistic” contribution to
tuition and expected students to contribute by working ten hours per
week (Healy 2015). President Donald Trump during his 2016 campaign
proposed a repayment plan that would cap a student’s monthly payments
at 12.5 percent of their earnings and have the unpaid balance forgiven
after fifteen years (Price 2016). In 2017, Senator Sanders modified his
ideas and introduced legislation that would provide free tuition to all in-
state students at community colleges, as well as for those in four-year
public schools if their families earn less than $125,000 a year (Lobosco
2017). Some states and cities have already introduced and/or adopted
their own programs related to free tuition at public schools.
Pro
Winograd (2016) fears that with rising student debt, the United States is
abandoning its traditional historical commitment to education. He
believes that U.S. economic success depends on a highly educated and
skilled workforce that is able to compete in the twenty-first-century
international economy. He suggests tuition-free public schools are
needed to encourage millennials and others to complete their college
education in order to be able to achieve upward economic mobility and
ensure that the United States does not lose its global competitive edge.
Others argue that all students should have the opportunity to attend
college, and providing free tuition would be one means to help level the
playing field for students who are currently underserved by colleges.
Santiago (2016) maintains that such a program would especially improve
the access of Latinos to college in part because many Latino families
currently don’t even consider attending college because of the high cost.
Goldrick-Rab (2016) maintains that targeting financial aid to low-income
students is not sufficient as it provides too little to too few. Families get
divided into two groups: (1) those who are deserving of aid but don’t
receive sufficient resources to effectively attend school and graduate and
(2) those in middle-class families that are informed that they can achieve
their goals through loans alone. This is divisive and engenders middle-
class resentment that is similar to the way many perceive “welfare
recipients” as unwilling to work and lazy. She suggests that one could
contrast this to people’s more positive perceptions of programs like
Medicare and SS that benefit all senior citizens. Affordable universal
public higher education should benefit the economy and also promote
democracy.
Con
Staisloff (2016) suggests that if public college tuition becomes free, we
would risk undervaluing a college education. He argues that the question
that should be asked is “Why does college cost so much to begin with?”
Rather than providing free tuition, colleges should invest in programs
that result in greater efficiencies at college and provide seed money for
innovations such as competency-based education and open educational
resources. Answering this could also lead to fewer degree programs, less
research being conducted at nonresearch institutions, appropriately larger
class sizes, and more efficient administrative services.
According to some experts, colleges may not be able or willing to
accept many additional students, so this could mean that better ranked
public colleges become more selective rather than increase their capacity.
One possibility then could be that many poorer students who have
attended high schools with fewer resources and fewer college
preparatory programs could not attend the better ranked public colleges
(Price 2016).
Kelly supports Staisloff’s argument pointing out that California
community colleges, known for their inexpensive community college
fees, turned away 600,000 students during the recession when
enrollments grew quickly, but the state budget for higher education
declined (Kelly 2016). He points out that free tuition isn’t really free; it
just shifts costs from students to taxpayers. Tuition-free public colleges
could add to the strain on public budgets especially if colleges don’t
improve their efficiency. Also he argues that federal grants tend to cover
tuition costs for average low-income students in community colleges. In
spite of free tuition, only one-third of students from the bottom income
quartile who started community college in 2003 finished with a degree or
certification by 2009. Even only 42 percent of two-year students from the
top income quartile finished community college. Kelly recommended the
scarce federal money be targeted toward those who needed it the most
and allow them to choose public or private college that is appropriate.
Thus, we see that a crucial issue is whether to target certain groups of
students for benefits like free tuition or provide them to all students.
What do you think? Should there be free tuition in public universities for
all students?
Statistics show that one in six borrowers are able to repay their loans in
five years, but, on the more negative side, 28 percent of those who
borrowed have defaulted within five years of being in repayment. The
average repayment rate has not been less than ten years since the late 1990s.
First-generation college attendees tend to borrow more money and have
higher default rates (Kelchen and Li 2017).
There tends to be an interesting paradox in two different federal loan
accountability tools that suggest federal effort to improve an outcome like
avoiding loan default could well make it more difficult to improve another
outcome such as lowering loan rates. Further, Di and Edmiston (2017)
looked at federal loan policies and maintained that including low income
borrowers with high debts could result in high costs for federal income-
driven loan programs because of current debt forgiveness rules. Trump has
suggested the possibility of long-term loan forgiveness, but this could result
in students borrowing more since they think that their loans could be
forgiven in the future (Price 2016).
An interesting and somewhat unanticipated finding is that older
Americans including retirees are taking on more student debt than
previously and are now the fastest growing group of borrowers. On average,
those over sixty owe $23,500, up from $12,000 in 2005 and total $66.7
billion (Edwards 2017: 22). There are two major reasons for this. First, they
often cosign student loans to help their grandchildren or other family
members. Second, they take on student loans to help themselves gain new
skills or improve their credentials for an opportunity for new and/or better
jobs. This is particularly true for blue-collar workers who were laid off
during the GR.
Who Goes Bankrupt and Why?

One of the issues frequently debated and to which there does not appear to
be consensus is the question of who goes bankrupt and why. As with
explanations of poverty, there are both individual and structural frameworks
to guide us. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly the middle-class family is more
likely to end up in bankruptcy in the first decade of the twenty-first century
than ever before (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007; Warren and Tyagi 2003). The
families in the worst financial trouble are neither the elderly nor the very
young; rather, they are parents who have children at home. Indeed, what
Warren and Tyagi (2003) find from examining data from the 2001
Consumer Bankruptcy Project is that “having a child is now the single best
predictor that a woman will end up in financial collapse” (Warren and Tyagi
2003: 6). They also conclude that “bankruptcy has become deeply
entrenched in American life” (6) and foreclosures of homes have more than
tripled in less than twenty-five years (7). In addition, these families are in
greater debt than those of the 1980s (7). Also, based on the criteria
frequently used to define middle-class status, 90 percent or more of those
filing bankruptcy could be classified as middle class (7).
The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project asked those who filed for
bankruptcy why they went bankrupt, and 87 percent of them named only
three reasons for bankruptcies: family breakup or divorce, medical
problems, and job loss (Warren and Tyagi 2003). The authors reject what
they label as the overconsumption myth or the myth of the immoral debtor.
Warren and Tyagi (2003) believe that, instead of being immoral or
overconsuming, there are great societal pressures on the family and if
something, at least in part, beyond the family’s direct control goes wrong, it
could face financial disaster.
Himmelstein et al. (2009) surveyed a random sample of 2,314
bankruptcy filers in 2007 and from the 2001 survey and found an increase in
the percentage of bankruptcies associated with medical bills. A conservative
estimate is that 62.1 percent of the bankruptcies stem from medical bills.
Most of these bankruptcy filers had middle-class occupations, were well-
educated, and owned homes. Between 2001 and 2007, health-care costs
increased, the number of uninsured and underinsured increased, and
Congress passed stricter bankruptcy laws. In 2003, collection agencies
contacted 37.2 million people about their medical bills and there were 15.6
million underinsured, but this grew to 25.2 million in 2007. Twenty-nine
percent of low- and middle-income households that had balances on their
credit cards used the credit cards to pay off medical expenses over time
(Himmelstein et al. 2009). The authors conclude that “the U.S. health care
financing system is broken, and not only for the poor and uninsured.
Middle-class families frequently collapse under the strain of a health care
system that treats physical wounds, but often inflicts fiscal ones”
(Himmelstein et al. 2009: 745–746).
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) contained procedural barriers to make filing for bankruptcy
more expensive and difficult. The credit card industry supported these
changes including placing an income means test on those who could file
using Chapter 7 bankruptcy where debts could be eliminated (Himmelstein
et al. 2009; Leicht and Fitzgerald 2007). Lawless et al. (2008) tested
whether the change in the law, which was supposed to protect against abuse
of the bankruptcy process by “high-income deadbeats,” is effective. Their
findings support the beliefs of some legal scholars that while stopping those
who were unfairly taking advantage of the system was used as the rationale
for the law, it was instead “a general assault on all debtors” (Lawless et al.
2008: 1).
Juliet Schor (1999) examines American culture and how individuals are
conducting their lives. She argues for a change in people’s relationship to
consuming goods, so that the focus is on “quality of life, not just quality of
stuff” (Schor 1999: 2). For her, a key problem is “the new consumerism,”
which she defines as “an upscaling of lifestyle norms: the pervasiveness of
conspicuous, status goods and of competition for acquiring them; and the
growing disconnection between consumer desires and incomes” (2). People
try to compete or at least keep up with the social group with which they
identify, which tends to be the upper middle class or the rich. She rejects
what she labels as the conventional view that consumers are rational, well-
informed, and have consistent and independent (of other consumers)
preferences. Challenging the image of the rational and in-control approach,
she points out that most people with credit cards do not intend to borrow on
them but two-thirds do, and there has been an “explosion of personal
bankruptcies” (4). She recommends a politics of consumption that in
addition to stressing quality of life calls for a distinction between needs and
desires. She advocates a “decent standard of living,” democratizing
consumption practices (e.g. Martha Stewart’s brand at K-Mart), and a
consumer movement to “articulate a vision of an appealing and humane
consumer sphere” (8). Holt (1999) believes Schor’s new politics of
consumption idea would not influence social inequality. Holt argues from a
postmodern perspective that “postmodern market conditions lead to
overconsumption problems” (17). The market promotes a sense of freedom
from constraint that results in the personal debt crisis and environmental
problems.
Warren (2006, 2007) clearly disagrees with Schor about
overconsumption and maintains that it is not about designer clothes,
restaurant meals, or Michael Jordan athletic shoes like Schor claimed.
Rather it focuses on what is safe for the family, educating children, paying
for transportation, childcare, and other things that are necessary for work.
Warren (2006: 4) further suggests there may be “a politics of living on the
edge” and “everyday, middle-class families carry higher risks that a job loss
or a medical problem will push them over the edge.” Warren recognizes that
individuals certainly bear some responsibility and make mistakes, but there
are other considerations that could be improved:
there can be no doubt that some portion of the credit crisis in America is the result of
foolishness and profligacy…. But that is not the whole story. Lenders have deliberately
built tricks and traps into some credit products so they can ensnare families in a cycle
of high-cost debt.
(Warren 2007: 11)
There is little to encourage mortgage companies to provide much

assistance to consumers to help consumers out of their debt, even though in
2009 there was a $75 billion program to help homeowners prevent
foreclosures. The mortgage companies collect high fees on delinquent loans
so the longer the loan is delinquent, the better the opportunities to collect
fees (Goodman 2009). According to a New York Times (2010) editorial, 4.2
million loans were currently in or near foreclosure. The antiforeclosure
efforts by the Obama administration had resulted in less than 500,000 loan
modifications in eighteen months. Labaton (2009b) points out how both
large and small banks and their trade associations are involved in strong
lobbying attempts to kill or weaken any new agency trying to both write and
enforce new regulations.
FIGURE 4.3 Total Bankruptcy Filings in the United

States Trustee Program (USTP) Districts,
Fiscal Years 2006–2015
Source: United States Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Trustees.
n.d. United States Trustee Program Annual Report of Significant Accomplishments Fiscal
Year 2015 p. 5 (taken from material from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) copied
August 27, 2017 from https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/ar_2015.pdf/download
A ten-year profile of bankruptcy filings from 2006 to 2015 is shown in

Figure 4.3. Bankruptcy filing peaked in 2010 with more than a million and a
half of them followed by a gradual decline between 2011 and 2015 (United
States Department of Justice [DOJ], Executive Office for United States
Trustees, n.d.). The DOJ’s USTP combats fraud and abuse perpetrated by
creditors, debtors, professionals, etc. and helps oversee bankruptcy
professionals. In 2012, it played an important role in the National Mortgage
Settlement of $25 billion that involved the federal government, forty-nine
state attorney generals, and the largest mortgage servicers in the United
States. In 2015, it settled with JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. and Wells Fargo
Bank for more than $130 million to provide help to homeowners (United
States Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Trustees
n.d.).
INFRASTRUCTURE
The GAO (2009) not only identified the U.S. financial structure as high risk,
but also identified the U.S. infrastructure as high risk beginning in 2007. As
the GAO (2009: 67) points out, “The nation’s economic vitality and its
citizens’ quality of life depend significantly on the efficiency of its surface
transportation infrastructure.” Peter R. Orszag (2008: 1), while director of
the CBO, noted that “infrastructure is notoriously difficult to define because
it can encompass such a wide array of physical assets.” In its 2017 report
card on the infrastructure, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
gave grades to sixteen different areas. Their grades were as follows: B: Rail;
C+: Bridges, Ports, and Solid Waste; D+: Energy, Hazardous Waste, Parks
and Recreation, Schools, and Wastewater; D: Aviation, Dams, Drinking
Water, Inland Waterways, Levees, and Roads; and D−: Transit (ASCE
2017).
Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007) argue that the condition of public
infrastructure including roads, bridges, dams, and airports declined, as
spending for their maintenance was reduced. This decrease was a political
effect of supply-side economics that called for cuts in government spending
and taxes as well as deregulation or basically what we referred to as
neoliberalism. Herbert (2007), in a New York Times editorial, cited “politics
and ideology” as the major reasons for the government not investing in
infrastructure due to pressures for small government and not raising taxes.
The federal government spends much of its money on transportation, but
state and local governments actually spend more on transportation and water
infrastructure. Regarding capital expenditures (purchasing new structures
and equipment and improving or rehabilitating them) on transportation and
water infrastructure in 2014, the federal government spent $69 billion of the
$181 billion or 38 percent of the total, while state and local governments
spent $112 billion or 62 percent. States and local governments spent more
money ($208 billion) and a higher percentage (88 percent) of the amount on
operation and maintenance costs (providing services, carrying out minor
repairs and doing other activities such as research and development) for
transportation and water infrastructure (Congressional Budget Office 2015).
Figure 4.4 breaks down government spending by type of infrastructure
showing that, while the federal government spent more on highways than
any other type of infrastructure, its 28 percent of the total was smaller than
the percentage it spent on aviation, water transportation, and water resources
when compared to spending by state and local governments.
FIGURE 4.4 The Federal Government’s and State and
Local Governments’ Spending on
Transportation and Water Infrastructure, by
Type of Infrastructure, 2014
ASCE (2016) examined the failure to act to close the infrastructure
investment gap and its effects on the economic future of the United States. It
argued that the United States has been paying only half of America’s
infrastructure bill resulting in an investment funding gap that is hurting the
U.S. economy, workers, families, and businesses. The consequences are
severe as the report argues the following:
Poor roads and airports mean travel times increase. An aging electric grid and
inadequate water distribution make utilities unreliable. Problems like these translate into
higher costs for business to manufacture and distribute goods and provide services.
These higher costs, in turn, get passed along to workers and families.
(ASCE 2016: 6)
The report estimates that the cost to U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
will be $3.9 trillion by 2025, while businesses will have lost $7 trillion by
then and 2.5 million jobs will also be lost. The cost to families was judged to
be $3,400 per year, or, put another way, every American family is losing $9
each day. They further argue if the United States invests $3 more a day per
family until 2025, the costly investment gap could be eliminated (ASCE
2016: 6–7).
During his political campaign, President Trump had called for $1 trillion
to improve roads, bridges, waterworks, etc., which could create millions of
jobs as part of a public-private partnership (Moser 2017; Thrush 2017).
Moser (2017), however, identified some possible myths about infrastructure
including the following three: new infrastructure projects would lower
unemployment; private investment leads to infrastructure projects; and
infrastructure spending will spur growth. Passing a bill increasing funding
on infrastructure seemed like it could be a bipartisan effort and potentially
unifying possibility (Thrush 2017), but, as of early January 2019, this had
not occurred.
We will now briefly look at two key examples of infrastructure, bridges,
and levees, to illustrate the problems that have existed.
Bridges
ASCE (2005, 2009a, 2017) has given bridges higher grades than it has
assigned most other parts of the infrastructure but still in 2017 of only a C+.
ASCE’s 2017 report on bridges revealed that 9.1 percent (56,007 of 614,387
bridges) of the nation’s bridges are structurally deficient (ASCE 2017). This
was, however, an improvement over earlier years. On average, this meant
though about 188 million trips were made across a structurally deficient
bridge each day (ASCE 2017). Penn (2018) reported the top ten deadliest
bridge collapses in the United States in the last fifty years. The highest
number of deaths was 114 when the Hyatt Regency Walkway in Kansas
City collapsed and the lowest were ten deaths each from the Schoharie
Creek Bridge in Fort Hunter New York and the Sydney Lanier Bridge in
Brunswick Georgia.
The tragic collapse of the busy interstate I-35W bridge that dropped 108
feet into the Mississippi River occurred in Minneapolis on August 1, 2007.
It resulted in 13 deaths and 145 injured. The state of Minnesota has paid
more than $37 million to the families of victims and survivors (Associated
Press 2009b). The state of Minnesota and some victims have filed lawsuits
against the engineering firm, the URS Corporation. The National
Transportation and Safety Board released its final report in November 2008
proclaiming that the gusset plates that were used to hold the steel beams
together were not of the proper size and gave way when a contractor placed
tons of equipment and repair material in one location (Diaz 2008a; Wald
2008). Although the cause was a design failure, the I-35 bridge was one of
over 74,000 bridges or 12.3 percent of the total that were rated structurally
deficient at the time. Since then in the last ten years, more money has been
allocated for bridges. For example, in 2006, $11.5 billion total was spent on
bridges, but, by 2012, the federal government estimated that $17.5 billion
was being spent on bridge capital projects (Hale 2017). The new I-35W
bridge with a 100-year life span opened on September 18, 2008, about three
months earlier than scheduled (Minnesota Department of Transportation
n.d.). Text box 4.6 discusses the I-35 bridge collapse in greater detail.
TEXT BOX 4.6

I-35W Bridge Collapse: Does Government Bear Any
Responsibility?
On August 1, 2007, a 1,907-foot forty-year-old bridge that spanned the
Mississippi River linking Minneapolis and St. Paul collapsed during rush
hour, sending fifty to sixty cars into the river (Levy 2007) with 13
fatalities and approximately 145 injuries. Tapes of the 911 calls reveal
the horror as people described vehicles on fire and bloodied and injured
victims. Brian Sturgill was in Minneapolis driving on I-35W having just
flown in from San Diego. In an interview with the Star Tribune, he
describes the horror of seeing the road break in front of him and the
feeling of terror as his car fell into the water and his struggle to escape.
He sees people covered in both blood and oil and wonders what could
have happened to him had he been just a few feet in front or behind
(McKinney and Smetanka 2007).
According to Tilly (1985), we allow the state to exert coercive
control in exchange for protection. Although initially this protection was
from invaders, we also rely on the state to protect us from other dangers
including terrorists, bad food, and unsafe business practices. Much of
what the state does is through regulation, but the state also provides
much of the infrastructure that we need to stay healthy and safe,
including clean water, sanitation, and transportation. Unlike the situation
in many developing countries, we do not worry about the safety of a
bridge or road. We assume that it is safe because government has the
responsibility to build and maintain it using tax dollars for both.
What then caused the I-35W Bridge to collapse and why didn’t the
Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) know this bridge
was unsafe? According to the report released by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a design flaw led to a failure of the
gusset plates which are used to connect beams to load-bearing columns.
Specifically, the designers failed to do the proper math calculations,
which resulted in undersized plates that were not designed to carry the
extra weight (Diaz 2008b). At the time of the collapse, there were 287
tons of construction materials on the center span that were needed for a
repaving project. NTSB members were surprised that neither the
contractors nor state officials had considered whether the bridge could
hold the additional weight (Diaz 2008b). According to NTSB director of
the Office of Highway Safety, Bruce Magladry, “had the gusset plates
been properly sized, this bridge would still be there” (Diaz 2008b). This
bridge had been labeled structurally deficient since 1991; yet the NTSB
did not find that the age, corrosion, or poor rating was a factor in the
collapse. According to NTSB Chairman Mark Rosenker, “A structurally
deficient bridge is not ready to fall down” (Diaz 2008c). Others though,
place some responsibility on MnDOT. A study commissioned by the
Minnesota State Legislature blamed lack of funding and a confusing
chain of command at MnDOT (Kaszuba 2008a). Minnesota Governor
Tim Pawlenty, a Republican, appointed his Lt Governor, Carol Molnau
to also serve as the state transportation commissioner. This was
considered by some as “inappropriate” and a “huge mistake” (Kaszuba
2008a). Molnau was later removed as transportation commissioner by
the DFL-controlled (Democratic-Farmer Labor party) state legislature.
Also, earlier that year, the governor vetoed a nickel gas tax increase
wanted by the state legislature to pay for road and bridge upkeep. While
passing a tax increase in May would not have prevented the August
collapse, others argue that there were warning signs ignored by the state.
In 2000, a consulting firm trying to drum up a state contract
recommended “supplemental plates” and “a new oversized gusset”
(Kaszuba 2008b). Instead, MnDOT went with the consulting firm URS
Inc., which recommended less costly strategies. URS had recently hired
a former MnDOT state bridge engineer (Kaszuba 2008b). In Ohio, a
bridge of similar design collapsed in 1996 because of undersized and
corroded gusset plates; yet MnDOT officials were unaware of the
incident despite subscribing to civil engineering journals and attending a
conference where the Ohio incident took place (Kaszuba 2008a). Finally,
photos taken four years prior to the collapse showed that the gusset plate
connections were bowed (Kennedy 2008) suggesting that MnDOT
should have known the gusset plates were failing. Democrats then, fault
the Republican administration for not spending enough money on
maintenance and the NTSB for giving “short shrift to concerns about
bridge maintenance, aging, and corrosion” (Diaz 2008c). Although the
NTSB is nonpartisan, agency head Mark Rosenker was a George W.
Bush appointee, and a lifelong Republican raising concerns that NTSB
findings were in some part politically motivated (Diaz 2008b). The probe
authorized by the Minnesota State Legislature was also criticized as
politically motivated because the DFL controls the legislature and has
been a sharp critic of both Governor Pawlenty and MnDOT (Kaszuba
2008a).
Wikipedia (2018) reported twenty-four bridge failures in the United
States between 2000 and August 31, 2018. The most recent was the
collapse of the Florida International University walking bridge in March
2018 in which six people died (Madhani 2018).
Although infrastructure ratings for bridges are better than for most
types of infrastructure, what, if anything more, should be done to prevent
future collapses? What should be the role of the government, if any, in
such prevention?
Hale (2017) points out that the investment in the bridges is not sufficient
and the nation’s bridges are getting older with an average age of forty-three
years and most bridges were designed to last fifty years and are now over
fifty years old. What is needed is a sustainable and adequate source of
funding that possibly would involve raising the federal motor fuels tax,
which has not been raised since 1993.
Levees
Levees have also been a key concern, although it was not until 2009 that
ASCE included levees in its report card. ASCE’s (2009b) grade for levees
was a D: “the state of the nation’s levees has a significant impact on public
safety. … Many levees are integral to economic development in the
protected community”.
The 2017 ASCE (2017) grade for levees is also a D. It documented
30,000 miles of levees that protected critical infrastructure, communities,
and valuable property. This included protecting more than 300 colleges and
universities, 30 professional sports venues, 100 breweries, and an estimated
figure of $1.3 trillion in property. A discussion of the failure of levees
associated with Hurricane Katrina follows in the next section on hurricanes.
HURRICANES
Hurricanes destroy or harm many types of infrastructure and are responsible
for the deaths of numerous individuals. Hurricane Katrina is believed to
have killed more than 1,600 people in Louisiana and Mississippi and
damaged property worth an estimated $40 billion (Associated Press 2009c).
The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina involved the breakdown of New Orleans’
levees. Although certainly not all the damage of the August 2005 hurricane
was due to breaches of levees, the ASCE estimated that damages from
flooding in levee-related areas amounted to almost $16.5 billion. The human
costs are difficult to evaluate. After more than three years of “nomadic
uncertainty” for those without permanent homes in the Renaissance Village
trailer park, students were behind in school, they acted out, and they
experienced extraordinary rates of illness and mental health problems
(Dewan 2008). Parents also had problems coping. Although victims from
the hurricane were told they had to abandon their Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) trailers by the end of May 2009, the Obama
White House staff announced that victims could buy the FEMA trailers for
$5 or less (Dewan 2009).
The reaction of government agencies including the G. W. Bush
administration to the hurricane was at best questionable. Tierney (2006: 207)
discussed how people were “astonished by the sheer incompetence of the
government response to the largest catastrophe to strike the nation in the last
one hundred years.” Further, people became angry when they realized that
the terrible devastation in the Gulf had been predicted, contrary to G. W.
Bush’s statement that the flooding could not have been anticipated. Tierney
(2006), who uses a vulnerability sciences approach, sees the Katrina disaster
as similar to other disasters. The catastrophic effects resulted from failures
in protective systems, structural factors that led to high vulnerability for
many, and emergency systems that didn’t properly care for or protect the
victims (Tierney 2006: 208).
Political finger-pointing occurred with a Democratic governor and a
Republican White House administration: each blamed the other for failing to
act appropriately. Krugman (2007) expressed his concern that “there’s a
powerful faction in this country that’s determined to draw exactly the wrong
lesson from the Katrina debacle—namely, that the government always fails
when it attempts to help people in need.” Krugman fears that this cynicism
about government may aid conservatives who argue for limited federal
government involvement. Yet Krugman feels that the issue is more about the
type of beliefs and practices of a particular government and it also influences
governmental response rather than calling for a broad generalization about
the effectiveness of government involvement. The National Committee on
Levee Safety called for consistent comprehensive national leadership
combined with new state levee programs to address the levees (ASCE
2009b). The ASCE (2009b) concluded:
Due to their impact on life and safety issues, and the significant consequences of failure,
as well as the financial burden of falling property values behind levees that are not safe
and are being decertified, the nation must not delay addressing levee issues.
Yet by the tenth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, $2.5 billion of the

money set aside for reconstruction had not yet been spent and FEMA had
not revealed a timetable for finishing the projects. The storm had killed at
least 1,833 people and some were still trying to rebuild homes (Rushton
2015). New Orleans still seems to be composed of two very different cities:
one is booming more vibrant that previously and trying to expand into the
other part of the city that was again encountering problems of poverty and
routine violence, but now with a sense of dislocation as well (Robertson and
Fausset 2017). The child poverty rate of about 40 percent and the overall
poverty rate of about 30 percent were similar to that of year 2000. By 2013,
there were nearly 100,000 fewer black residents than in 2000, and it
appeared that these absences cut across all income levels for blacks, while
the white population decreased by about 11,000, but was wealthier. Rents
increased rapidly, but low wages remained. In a ranking of 300 American
cities by income inequality, New Orleans was listed in second place with the
gap along racial lines. The median income for black households was 54
percent lower than that of white households. In struggling New Orleans
East, some felt the black middle class was being forced out of the area
where many Black middle class lived (Robinson and Fausset 2015).
Robertson and Fausset (2015) concluded:
From the moment the storm surge of Hurricane Katrina dismantled a fatally defective
levee system, New Orleans became a global symbolic of American dysfunction and
government negligence. At every level and in every duty, from engineering to social
policy to basic logistics, there were revelations of malfunction and failure before,
during, and after Katrina.
Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane or Superstorm Sandy on the Jersey shore struck on October 29,
2012, and until Hurricane Harvey in August/September 2017 was regarded
typically as the second most costly hurricane in U.S. history. Bates (2016), a
sociologist, studied its destruction and the reconstruction that followed. A
total of 147 people in the Caribbean and United States (twelve in New
Jersey) died. Economic costs included mainly property damage to more
than 346,000 homes or nearly one in ten homes in New Jersey. Almost
19,000 businesses reported at least a quarter million dollars in damage. It
was estimated that total economic losses were over $8 billion. In the early
stages, government representatives seemed to have relatively good relations
with those affected by the superstorm especially in comparison with Katrina
(Bates 2016). A year after Sandy, a Monmouth University/Asbury Park
Press poll found that 27 percent of the people rated the job done by local
officials as excellent compared to the county (17 percent), state (22
percent), or federal government (17 percent). Ratings of poor or fair were
highest for federal government (27 percent) followed by state (22 percent)
and 20 percent for local or county government. Not surprisingly, faith in the
governmental bureaucracies declined over time. What people thought
government could do often did not coincide with what government was in
reality able to do due in part to budgetary and regulatory constraints. Bates
(2016: 118–119) pointed out Freudenberg’s concept of recreancy that he
defined as
A retrogression or failure to follow through on a duty or trust…[or] behaviors of
persons and/or of institutions that hold positions of trust, agency, responsibility, or
fiduciary or other forms of broadly expected obligations to the collectivity, but that
behave in a manner that fails to fulfill the obligations or merit trust.
The public especially becomes concerned and suspicious when actual

corruption is identified with that particular form of government.
Daily life for many was disrupted and the lack of getting back to normal
added to their stress. Three years after the hurricane struck New Jersey,
recovery was uneven. Most of the boardwalks along the Jersey shore had
been replaced, improvements were made on bridges and highways, some
homes had been replaced, others remodeled and elevated, other lots were
empty, and many homes still needed repairs to be livable. Many residents
found themselves with new debt loads to pay for repairs or waiting for
insurance payments, while others left the area. Some were renting while
waiting for their homes to be repaired; the rental costs increased because the
demand for rental units grew and some units had been destroyed. Bates
concluded that not only economic interests, but also deep emotional ties to
the geographical environment remind us that economics, politics, and social
relationships are tied together not only for people in the shore but also in
general (Bates 2016).
In 2017, major hurricanes such as Harvey, Irma, and Maria occurred
with costs that could disrupt the national debt and several state budgets and
Puerto Rico. It appears that Houston costs alone could likely be more than
that of Katrina and possibly exceed $180 billion (Milman 2017). While
Houston will rebuild, Milman (2017) suggests that it is unlikely that the city
plan will include rebuilding in a better and safer way leaving more areas of
“green and natural infrastructure such as grass, woodland and wetlands to
soak up water.” Sociologist Bullard points out how the color (white, black,
Latino) of individuals has affected who lives where and their vulnerability
to flooding. He argues for a more “equitable recovery, equitable
development” for Houston (“Will Houston’s Post-Harvey Recovery
Exacerbate Inequities or Build a More Just City?” 2017).
Hurricanes Irma and Maria especially affected Florida and Puerto Rico.
Monetary contributions for relief by early October 2017 were the highest
for Houston, the first of the three hurricanes. Being the first of tragic events
generally receives more donations. Some wonder though if the lower
contributions for Puerto Rico were due in part to racism. In addition, many
Americans did not understand that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and
Puerto Rico is a U.S. commonwealth (della Cava 2017). It was not until
August 2018 that the Governor in Puerto Rico changed the estimate of the
death toll from 64 to 2,975 due at least in part to research from George
Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health.
Hurricane Katrina is believed to have killed 1,000 to more than 1,800
people (BBC 2018; Fink 2018). Puerto Rico is trying to repair its
infrastructure and power grid and is requesting $139 billion from Congress
to help recovery efforts. President Trump has been criticized for excess
praise for the U.S government’s response to the hurricane and some critics
suggested that he showed more concern about the residents in Texas and
Florida (BBC 2018). Dr Goldman, Dean of the Milken Institute told
reporters: “I think we fail to appreciate the multitude of ways these major
disasters impact people’s health and lives” (Fink 2018).
VEGA BAJA, PUERTO RICO/USA—OCTOBER 21, 2017: Telephone
poles were snapped like toothpicks in the winds of Hurricane Maria
There are no doubt extensive social, political, and economic costs to

hurricanes. They also illustrate the significant costs of failure for various
facets of infrastructure. Infrastructure maintenance and improvement are
vital for the economy and people’s lives in general. The economy and the
infrastructure intertwine with politics and society providing numerous
examples of how people’s everyday lives are affected.
CONCLUSION
We began this chapter discussing C. W. Mills’ idea that to understand the
life of a person or our own lives, we need to be able to understand the
history of the society and how it relates to the individual. We focused on
politico-economic issues of our times to show how they affect our everyday
lives regardless of what social class we are in. However, social class also
plays a significant role in such experiences. Corporations may downsize,
outsource, or lay off workers. Another way to decrease labor costs is to
employ undocumented workers. Those with limited skills in the United
States may find it difficult to make a living wage as their wages likely suffer
or they become unemployed. Between 1976 and 2007, the average inflation-
adjusted hourly wage dropped by more than 7 percent (Frank 2010). In
September 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that one in seven people
were living in poverty; this was the highest number in the half century the
government has kept such records (Morello 2010). Even with the recovery
from the GR, wage earners are not doing particularly well. As shown in
Bureau of Labor statistics, real hourly wages have actually declined over the
past year (July 2017–July 2018) from $10.78/hour to $10.76 per hour
(Hardy and Webber 2018). Further, as Gordon, a senior research consultant
at the Iowa Policy Project, put it, “I think … nationally the big story of the
last 18 months is that the economy is booming without bringing up wages”
(Hardy and Webber 2018: 1A).
Some of those who are employed became concerned about the high
taxes they think they are paying to help the unemployed and others on
welfare. Corporations are sometimes able to pay taxes on only a small
percentage of their profits and/or find tax havens, thus limiting revenue that
would enable the government to support social programs. The new
legislation on taxes has greatly reduced the corporate tax rate and the overall
new law seems to benefit those who have high incomes more than those
with low incomes. Businesses have often benefited from government
welfare and CEOs have often received large bonuses.
Most people consider themselves part of the middle class, and the
middle class in general has been losing ground for decades. Will this trend
continue? Also bankruptcies and foreclosures happen frequently in the
middle class. The poor receive certain benefits from government assistance
programs, but the benefits are not as great in comparison to other advanced
societies. For the nation and the economy to thrive, a strong infrastructure is
also needed, but currently, in the twenty-first century, our infrastructure
faces numerous problems.
Chapter 3 discussed how culture influences political beliefs and politics.
A key value that helps explain our attitude about government centers around
individualism or autonomy. Individual hard work and achievement are
valued. Neoliberal values are generally associated with a laissez-faire or
hands-off approach to government involvement in economic affairs. Yet in
complex societies, government always plays a role in our lives. What
lessons do we take from the GR? Some believe that it means we need
stronger and improved regulations over financial institutions, while others
think that we need fewer rules as they do more harm than good. How will
the regulations or lack of them continue to affect the economy? Whether
government involvement in our lives decreases or increases, who benefits,
and who is harmed will continue to be important questions. A collectivist
rather than an individualist orientation likely favors more government and
community involvement on behalf of its citizens, but this too requires that
the state acts in a democratic and equitable fashion.
Regardless of our answers to these questions, the intertwining of
economy and politics will continue to play a significant role in our lives. We
now turn to Chapter 5 which examines the politics of everyday life
involving social institutions and social relations.
Endnotes
1. The Pew Research Center (2008) results are based on a nationally
representative sample of 2,413 adults. Their use of the label middle-
class is interesting. The survey asked respondents to put themselves in
one of the five groups—upper class, upper middle class, middle class,
lower middle class, and lower class. About half (53 percent) classified
themselves as middle class, while another 19 percent indicated upper
middle class and another 19 percent lower middle class. However, the
Pew Research Center combined upper middle with upper class and
lower middle with lower class to form a three-class stratification
profile.
2. Leicht and Fitzgerald (2007) define the middle class mainly as based
on socioeconomic status (SES) characteristics, but they also consider
cultural factors. Typically, middle-class people have incomes between
$35,000 and $75,000 annually and tend to work as upper- and lower-
level managers, professionals, and small business owners. They have
graduated from or at least attended a four-year college. Further, their
major source of wealth is home ownership.
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CHAPTER
5
The Politics of Everyday Life: Social

Institutions and Social Relations
Mills (1959: 135) pointed out in his book The Sociological Imagination, “In
terms of power … the most inclusive unit of social structure is the nation-state.
The nation-state is now the dominating form in world history and, as such, a
major fact in the life of every man [sic human].” Mills continued by discussing
how power and decision-making, our institutions, and where we live our public
and private lives are all organized within the nation-state. Brewer (2003: 37)
suggests that Mills really saw a fourfold interaction “between the social
structure, individual biography and experience, historical events and
constraints, and the political process.” The major purpose of this chapter is to
unravel some parts of these interactions and thus make one aware of how the
state specifically and politics in general significantly influence people’s lives in
ways one may not have previously considered. There are multiple institutions
and topics we could analyze; however, in order to provide some detail about
the complex processes involved, we focus on how politics plays a crucial role
in the major institutions of education and family, health care, civil liberties, the
racial state, immigration, and finally, sports. We look at public opinion to help
us understand what the “typical” American may be thinking on various issues.
This, of course, does not necessarily mean that politicians will follow public
opinions, but it does give us information about similarities and differences
between the two and these differences can result in activism that becomes part
of some people’s everyday lives.
EDUCATION
Like the economy, education is a major institution in our society. Greater
education may increase people’s cognitive skills, including their ability to
understand politics. It may improve their political participation in part because
it enhances their sense of civic duty and responsibility and helps them
understand the procedural matters involved in voting and in other political
processes (Orum and Dale 2009). Various government bodies play a key role
in how education operates. While many countries see education as a national
enterprise, in the United States, the various states and communities, including
local school boards, are quite important.
Pluralists tend to emphasize the roles of parents, teachers, and interest
groups in shaping schools that teach pride in country and democratic skills as
well as prepare students for the workplace. Elite theorists emphasize the role
of school administrations that serve to maintain dominance of elites and
inequality in society. Class theorists point out how social class influences both
the quantity and the quality of one’s education (Alford and Friedland 1985;
Kinloch 1989; Neuman 2005). From a postmodern perspective, education may
be constantly in flux due to uncertainty and chaos, but if students are properly
indoctrinated, they should be able to control their own behavior without much
direct government intervention. For theorists like Foucault, extra-political
venues like education and family are important places for the production and
distribution of power (Agger and Luke 2002). Rational choice theorists likely
support the need for students to plan for their future, including obtaining the
proper credentials to succeed in the workplace. Those using the institutionalist
framework tend to focus on the interactions among local school boards and
state and federal governments.
Miliband (1969) points out that although teachers generally avoid
appearing partial to a particular political party or cause, schools do engage in
political socialization “mostly in terms which are highly ‘functional’ to the
prevailing social and political order” (239). Miliband believes that nationalism
is typically used to promote national allegiance that supports the existing
order. Further, Best (2002: 8), drawing on the ideas of Anthony Giddens,
points out how power relations characterize our institutions and that
“institutions such as schools, attempt to control the lives of individual people
by the use of rules, which become deeply embedded in our everyday lives.”
In part because property taxes often form part of the available resources for
school districts, social class plays a key role in one’s educational opportunities
(Robertson 1981). Conservatives who focus on liberty likely argue that parents
should be free to use whatever resources are at their disposal to benefit their
children. Liberals tend to be more concerned about employing resources to
promote equity and prefer to distribute tax revenues more equally among rich
and poor school districts (Marger 2008).
Bowles and Gintis (1976, 2002, 2004) and Bowles, Gintis, and Meyer
(2004 [1975]) offer a class analysis as they examine the relationship between
education and the economy. Bowles Gintis, and Meyer (2004 [1975]) refer to
the hierarchical structural similarity between education and economic life that
helps explain how the educational system reproduces an obedient “amenable
labor force” (114). It is the “lived experiences of daily life” (115) learned in
school and the family where the young are taught “cooperation, competition,
dominance, and subordination” (116). Bowles and Gintis (1976) suggest that
by being taught to compete for rewards, children are being socialized for
economic activities in a capitalist society.
The social relations that develop in schools are associated with the
different social-class backgrounds and race and ethnic composition of the
entire school and the individual classes. Schools with more arbitrary and
coercive authority structures that emphasize behavioral control and rule-
following tend to be associated with working-class and minority student
bodies, whereas more open systems that encourage student involvement,
student electives in courses, less direct supervision, and internal motivational
control tend to characterize more affluent white-collar and white schools
(Bowles Gintis, and Meyer 2004 [1975]). Schools also “immerse children in a
structure of rewards and sanctions” (Bowles and Gintis 2002: 13). Students are
rewarded for prosocial attitudes such as doing something to help the school
even when it may not be advantageous for the student. In an article in
Enriching the Sociological Imagination, Bowles and Gintis (2004) affirm their
earlier findings and argue again for the importance of “embedding the analysis
of education in the evolving structure of the economy and the polity, and
giving attention to the non-cognitive as well as conventional effects of
education” (111).
For the U.S. FY19 budget, the federal government is spending $41 billion
on pre-primary through secondary education, while the state is spending $6.8
billion and the local governments $619.6 billion. For tertiary education, the
federal government pays $24 billion, while the states have the largest burden at
$302.1 billion and local government $53.5 billion (US Government Spending
2018).
Still, federal policies play an important role and change in part depending
on who is President. Under President Obama, the 2017 Fiscal Year Budget for
education tried to address the deep inequalities in educational opportunity
especially for the poor because “Equality of opportunity is a core American
value that helps form our national identity, solidify our democracy, and
strengthen our economy” (U.S. Department of Education 2016: 3). For
example, $15.4 billion was set aside for Title 1 Grants to Local Educational
Agencies. Another Obama priority included expanding support for school
leaders and teachers through a number of initiatives to help local education
agencies, states, and institutions of higher education. Particularly targeted were
about 200 high-need schools and helping teachers improve their teaching and
meet students’ needs as well as improving working conditions. A third area
involved providing access to postsecondary schooling that could aid students
in obtaining good-paying jobs. President Trump’s 2018 budget (U.S.
Department of Education 2017) called for maintaining support for the most
vulnerable students and simplifying funding for postsecondary education
including expanding Pell Grants to year-round. Also $9 billion was saved by
streamlining or eliminating existing programs that were ineffective or
redundant.
Charter Schools
Obama had increased support for the Charter Schools’ programs by $16.8
million in 2017 but Trump increased the support for charter schools by $167
million. According to President Trump’s 2018 budget, expanding school
choice would ensure that “more children have an equal opportunity to receive
a great education” (U.S. Department of Education 2017). Trump’s 2019
budget provided $1.5 billion to provide more choices for more families. This
included $500 million, an increase of $160 million to assist state and local
areas in starting charter schools or expanding and improving charter school
facilities (U.S. Department of Education 2018).
According to Karaim (2017: 219), charter schools
are tuition-free, taxpayer-supported, independently run public schools that operate under a
charter, a kind of contract, often with a particular mission, such as fostering college
preparation or education for low-income students. They can be run by non-profit groups,
school districts, for-profit companies or others. Charter students must take all required
standardized tests.
Teachers are expected to use innovative educational approaches to help

students learn. Charters are part of a broader movement for “school choice.”
Charter schools have grown rapidly from one in 1992 to more than 6,800 by
2015–2016 (Karaim 2017).
Because states regulate charters and different states have different
standards and requirements, it is extremely difficult to evaluate their general
success. There is considerable variability regarding accountability and
transparency among charter schools that use public money, but have private
school boards rather than elected ones. In thirty-five states, they do not have to
report to the public how they spend their money. Many are not subject to
open-meeting and public records laws. Issues associated with transparency
and accountability and others related to profitability and possible tax breaks
make charter schools more vulnerable to possible corruption (Strauss 2014).
Overall, there are mixed results on how traditional public schools and charter
schools compare. On standard test scores, 25 percent of charter schools did
better in reading, while 56 percent were the same and 19 percent worse than
traditional schools in 2013. In math, 49 percent were the same, 29 percent of
charters better, and 31 percent worse than traditional schools (Karaim 2017).
Karaim (2017) suggests that at times, there have been some very successful
charter schools especially in low-income areas. For example, Thurgood
Marshall, a college prep charter high school in Washington D.C., has almost
all of its graduates accepted for college and about 2/3 have graduated, a rate
that is eight times greater than for the city’s public schools overall. On the
other hand, Zernike (2016) points out that Michigan, more than any other
state, allowed a number of institutions to create charters and gave those
institutions (public school, districts, community colleges, and universities) a 3
percent share of the money that went to charter schools. Thus, for-profit
companies took advantage of the opportunity to create charters. In 2015, a
federal review for a Michigan grant proposal discovered an “unreasonably
high” number of charters in the worst performing 5 percent of public schools
in Michigan (Zernike 2016).
Supporters of charter schools stress the importance of giving parents a
variety of choices and alternative approaches to learning and discipline with
fewer constraints in order to better teach students with varying interests and
capabilities. Charters also maintain that they do more with their resources
because they eliminate the bureaucracy that exists with traditional public
schools. Some critics of charter schools suggest that their students might do
better because of the manner in which students are selected for membership in
a charter. At times, charter schools may focus on high-performing students,
which tend to cost less per pupil and thus increase profits. For example,
Strauss (2017) using a post by Carol Burris found that the eighteen BASIS
charter schools in Arizona were composed of 32 percent Asian compared to 3
percent among all Arizona students in public and charter systems, 10 percent
Latino compared to 45 percent Latino more broadly, 51 percent white
compared to 39 percent in public and charter systems, and 1.23 percent with a
learning disability in BASIS compared to 11.3 percent in Arizona public
schools. BASIS charter schools seemed to be targeting affluent areas by where
it locates and by not providing any transportation to its school or free-lunch
programs. Thus, some critics of charter schools argue that the composition of
charter schools should be similar to that of the district’s overall student
population including students with disabilities and immigrants (Karaim 2017).
Also of significant concern is that there is only so much money that is
available to fund education, and thus, allocating more money for charter
schools could be draining resources from traditional public schools that need
it and could become under-resourced (Strauss 2014; Zernike 2016). Finally, as
Strauss (2014) points out, “Choice alone doesn’t guarantee quality and it
hasn’t solved the larger problems facing public education.”
A father and his daughter wait their turn to speak in favor of the charter school
proposal at a Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) board meeting to
vote on a LAUSD resolution that would invite private charter school
operators, local communities, and even the mayor’s office to submit proposals
for operating fifty new schools as well as two hundred existing
underperforming schools
Credit: Newscom
A Note on School Violence and Shootings

From the Columbine shootings to May 2018, one cannot ignore the shootings
that have occurred at school. Indeed, we now have a “Mass Shooting
Generation” and many student survivors want change, although the kinds of
change vary. Many U.S. students have talked about threats and appropriate
safety steps and practiced active shooter drills and procedures for lockdowns
(Burch, Mazzei, and Healy 2018). With the Parkland Florida Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in February, 2018, it became clear
that “thoughts and prayers” were not enough to satisfy many of the surviving
students. They have talked with politicians and engaged in rallies and protest.
Various groups worked on voter drives including in conjunction with student
walkouts at the anniversary of the 1999 shooting at Columbine High School in
Colorado.
Parkland students started a “Never Again” campaign. In June 2018, some
Parkland students engaged in a tour of “March for Our Lives: Road to
Change.” It focused on “encouraging people around the country to educate
themselves on their vote, to get out there and turn voting into more of an act
of patriotism than a chore” according to Cameron Kasky, a student at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School who founded “The March for Our Lives”
(Rozsa and Zezima 2018). Many of the stops on the bus tour targeted
registering students especially in areas where politicians have been supported
by the National Rifle Association (NRA). Other groups such as Rock the Vote,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Mi
Familia Vota, and Headcount worked with the bus tour as well to support both
in-person voter registration and digital.
The Washington Post has collected a database on school shootings (Cox et
al. 2018) to help determine any possible patterns in the school shootings. The
federal government does not systematically track school shootings. The Post
determined that at least 141 children, teachers, and others have been killed
with an additional 287 injured. Put another way, more than 215,000 children
at 217 schools have experienced shootings. Children of color were
proportionately more likely to experience school shootings. This was
particularly the case for black students who make up about 16.6 percent of the
population, but 33 percent of those experiencing school shootings. Seven in
ten of the shooters were under the age of eighteen and, when it could be
determined, 85 percent of them obtained their guns from home or from
relatives or friends. This suggests the possibility that adult negligence played
a role in the children having access to guns.
According to Cameron and Granados (2018), the U.S. is only one of the
three countries in the world whose constitution protects the right to own guns
for self-defense. The authors also report that the U.S. rate for gun ownership
is much higher than other developed countries according to the Australian
research site gunpolicy.org. These data show that the United States has
slightly over 100 guns per 100 people. Each other developed nation has less
than 40 guns per 100 with Germany, Austria, and Iceland having the most
guns per person.
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

In addition to education, the family serves as a major socializing institution.
Pluralists would focus on the diverse types of families and that families and
marriage promote balance, political order, and harmony in society. The
political socialization of children (Ferrante 2008; Kinloch 1989) means that
political preferences and values are to some extent passed down from one
generation to the next. Elite and class theorists are particularly interested in
how social inequality is passed down from one generation to the next. Social
class, region, race, religion, and other factors associated with the family shape
one’s voting and political attitudes. Children of the elite are socialized to
achieve positions of power and influence in society (Domhoff 2006). Laws are
formulated by the state to maintain social control of families. Elite theorists
especially recognize the power arrangement in families, with men dominating
both women and children and thus representing “the basis of political
authority” and “of economic stratification in terms of age, sex, and social
origins” (Kinloch 1989: 215). From a class perspective,
the family, not the individual, is seen as the basic unit of class membership. People all
begin life in the class of their parents. This reality is further reflected in the fact that most
people marry within their class…. And it is through families that property is passed on.
(Liazos 1982: 33, drawing on the ideas of Paul Sweezy)
For class theorists who draw on social reproduction theory, parents’ class
position tends to be reproduced or recreated in their children. The class
structure in society remains, so the ruling class continues to rule (Hurst 2010).
Drawing on a comparative study of childhood, society, and development in
Nordic nations, Dencik (1989: 155) considers “the transformations of the
everyday life of parents and children” in postmodern society. Dencik points
out that there is an “eternal triangle” that includes the state as well as parents
and children (163). It is the state that provides benefits, and possibly legal
assistance, for children. Laws against certain forms of corporal punishment or
abuse and laws to provide an education or nurturance for children are
significant. Representatives of the state, such as teachers and medical
professionals, are expected to report potential problems in child–parent
relationships.
For Dencik (1989: 172), “the family is fragile in the post-modern epoch”
as it tries to provide a zone of stability and an intimate sanctuary under chronic
uncertainty and the quickening pace of everyday life. Dencik believes the
younger generation may be “less willing to accept things as they are, more
open-minded and outspoken, and perhaps a good deal less conscientious”
(176) and concludes that “life is beginning to look like a never-ending
examination situation” (177). This uncertainty likely influences children’s
worldviews. If Dencik is correct, more open-minded and outspoken children
could influence and possibly bring about political change.
Family Law
Drawing on English common law tradition, a marriage is a contract or
voluntary agreement between a man and a woman. Similar to education, many
of the laws regulating marriage are state laws. For example, many states
require a couple to have a marriage license issued by a county clerk or clerk of
the court before they can marry. Some states have stopped requiring blood
tests, but some require tests for venereal disease. Civil ceremonies are usually
performed by judges, whereas religious services are frequently conducted by
pastors or other religious leaders. States limit people to one spouse at a time
(“Marriage” n.d.).
If a person is getting married again, he or she needs to be legally released
from the previous marriage through death of the spouse, annulment, or
divorce before he or she can marry (“Marriage” n.d.). States permit divorces
in order to serve the public good, but individuals do not have a constitutional
or legal right to divorce. Before laws were passed to promote more equalized
property allocation, the wage-earning spouse, typically a male, received a
more favored property distribution. Now the courts tend to recognize marital
property acquired during the marriage and separate property acquired before
the marriage that did not change substantially in value. The judge typically
tries to divide the assets equitably, which may not be equally. If children are
involved, there may be child support (“Divorce” n.d.).
When children are involved in divorces, child custody becomes an issue as
the court tries to decide “the best interests of the child,” which can be quite
complex. Joint legal custody gives parents equal rights in decision-making
regarding the child. If only one parent has custody, the other parent receives
visitation rights unless that person is deemed harmful to the child(ren) (“Child
Custody” n.d.).
Adoption occurs when an adult other than a child’s biological parent
becomes the guardian of the child and takes on the responsibilities of a parent.
The Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to adopt. States have
various policies regarding who may adopt. People who have physical or
mental disabilities, criminal histories, or unstable employment, or who are gay
or lesbian or single may be disqualified. There is an investigation of potential
adopters followed by a report from the state adoption agency (“Adoption”
n.d.).
All these laws help illustrate the roles of government, especially the states,
in marriage and the family. We will now turn to the controversial issue of gay
marriage that clearly illustrates the importance of the national and state
governments in defining who may or may not marry.
Same-Sex Marriage
In the United States and generally elsewhere, heterosexuality has been more
valued and accorded higher status than is homosexuality, and in some places
homosexuality is viewed as an aberration and those who are gay or lesbian are
stigmatized. One manifestation of the dominance of heterosexism has been the
political controversy centered on gay marriage (Hurst 2010). Masci (2009)
suggests that from the 1960s to 2015, some gay Americans have been
advocating the right to marry or have formalized legal arrangements, but
same-sex marriage developed as a national issue in the last twenty to twenty-
five years in the United States. An important spark for the debate was in 1993
when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the state legislature needed to
demonstrate a compelling reason for banning same-sex marriage. The Hawaii
legislature then passed a bill in 1994 that marriage was intended for “man–
woman units” capable of procreation (Masci 2009).
Legislatures then in more than forty states followed, passing acts that
defined marriage strictly as a union between a man and a woman. In 1996,
President Clinton signed a federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
Congressional sponsors stated the law was devised “to define and protect the
institution of marriage” and “to make explicit what has been understood under
federal law for over 200 years; that a marriage is the legal union of a man and
a woman as husband and wife” (Hurst 2010: 361). Supporters of the DOMA
attempted to frame the legislation in moral terms as preserving traditional
family values, as they believed many people perceived homosexuality as
immoral. The DOMA declared that no state has to recognize a same-sex union
from another state as legal. Benefits such as family medical leave and Social
Security (SS) were not allowed for gay couples. Indeed, the General
Accounting Office (1997) identified 1,138 federal rights associated with
marriage. SS survivor benefits, veterans’ benefits, estate taxes, family leave,
living together in nursing homes, and so on are all benefits associated with
marital status (Hurst 2010; Peplau and Fingerhut 2007). In 2003, the highest
court in Massachusetts ruled that same-sex marriages were guaranteed by the
state’s constitution. The G. W. Bush administration pushed for a U.S.
Constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage across the country.
However, in both 2004 and 2006, the proposed amendment did not receive the
requisite two-third majority in both houses of Congress (Hurst 2010; Masci
2009).
Obama declared his support for a legislative repeal of the DOMA (“Same-
Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships” 2009) and, in June
2009, he extended certain benefits to domestic partners of federal workers,
such as long-term care insurance. However, he said that under current federal
law, same-sex couples cannot be provided the full range of benefits that
heterosexual couples enjoy. He called on Congress to enact legislation
regarding this. While some gay rights supporters welcomed the changes, other
activists felt that these were very small steps and were frustrated by the lack
of progress (Stone 2009).
Peplau and Fingerhut (2007) reviewed the literature on same-sex couples,
noting that with the increasing visibility of same-sex couples, more studies are
conducted. Still, research is hampered as some gays and lesbians are reluctant
to indicate their sexual orientation, and there is a lack of public records on
same-sex marriages and divorce. The 2000 U.S. Census identified about
600,000 same-sex couples living together.
A gay couple is being married in a religious ceremony. Yet some state
legislatures and agencies are trying to use religion as a reason not to recognize
gay marriage or provide services for it even after the Supreme Court decision
in 2015 that legalized gay marriage in every state
Credit: Queerstock, Inc./Alamy
In 2009, five states, four in New England (Massachusetts, Connecticut,

Vermont, and New Hampshire) and one in the Midwest (Iowa), allowed gay
marriage. Because Iowa was the only state not on the East Coast, gay citizens
from other states, especially in the Midwest, married in Iowa. In the first three
months after same-sex marriages were initiated, approximately 45 percent of
the 676 known gay marriages were for out-of-state couples (Olson 2009).
It was not until 2013 that the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor
declared the DOMA unconstitutional because it barred federal recognition of
gay rights since it defined marriage as a union of one man and one woman
(Gorman 2015; Peralta 2013). At about the same time, the court did not decide
on a gay marriage ruling in a case involving California Proposition 8, a ballot
measure proposal that outlawed same-sex marriages in Californian. Instead
the Supreme Court referred it back to a lower court to be dismissed (Peralta
2013).
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court made gay marriage legal in all fifty
states. By that time, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia had already
allowed gay couples to marry. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision
(Obergefell v. Hodges) was a 5-4 decision with the majority of justices ruling
that states had to both license same-sex marriage and recognize gay marriages
performed legally in other states. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the
majority “No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the
highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice and family” (Gorman 2015).
The U.S. joined twenty-one other countries in recognizing gay marriage
(Gorman 2015). By the end of 2017, twenty-six countries had recognized gay
marriage (Donnelly and Scimecca 2017) and others were in the process of
doing so.
As Ghaziani, Taylor, and Stone (2016) point out, legalizing gay marriage
did not stop antigay legal initiatives. In the year after the landmark court
decision, legislation was introduced in seventeen states to create or alter
existing state religious freedom laws to allow county clerks and their
employees to refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex applicants.
Sometimes, such Religious Freedom Restoration Acts included allowing
businesses to refuse to provide goods and services for same-sex weddings. As
of June 2018, twenty-one states have broad “religious exemptions” laws that
could be used to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) individuals and families and two states allow government officials to
refuse to issue marriage licenses (Movement Advancement Project and
Family Equality Council 2018).
In June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission found that the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission did not adequately take into account the religious views of baker
Jack Phillips who refused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. In order
to obtain a wide majority of supporters, the Supreme Court opinion though
withheld judgment on how future cases might be decided if the state displays
no religious animosity. According to Justice Kennedy, future cases need to “be
resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs,
and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and
services in an open market” (Barnes 2018). Future cases are quite likely from
florists, photographers, and other bakers who claim that they are being forced
to provide their wedding services to gay and lesbian couples in violation of
their religious beliefs. Not only have the courts and states changed their
positions on gay marriage rather recently, but so has public opinion and we
turn to that next.
PUBLIC OPINION ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

According to Peplau and Fingerhut (2007), a Kaiser Family Foundation
survey found that more than two-thirds of Americans favored provisions such
as SS, health insurance, and inheritance rights for same-sex couples. Also, 74
percent of lesbians and gay men would like to marry in the future. Same-sex
couples engaged in commitment ceremonies, and a growing number of
employers offered domestic partner benefits to same-sex partners.
Using American National Election Survey data for 2012 and 2013, Flores
and Barclay (2016) studied the effect of same-sex marriage policy including
the end of DOMA and the adoption by six states and the District of Columbia
of same-sex marriage on public opinion. They identified four possible
reactions. First, there could be backlash against the minority. Second, the
decision could result in greater acceptability to the issue and thus legitimate
it. A third possibility would be polarizing public opinion and thus
strengthening and widening the differences between supporters and
opponents. Fourth, instead these policies could simply reflect the growing
consensus of public opinion on the issue suggesting no real effect on public
opinion. The authors found that the consensus and legitimacy models were
most appropriate.
Various surveys of attitudes toward same-sex marriage have shown a shift
from more people opposed to same-sex marriage to more people supporting
it. Text box 5.1 examines these changes from 2004 to 2017 across a number
of surveys by different organizations.
TEXT BOX 5.1

Marriage, Culture, and Everyday Life
For many citizens of the United States, everyday expressions of intimacy,
love, and partnership are highly valued aspects of freedom. The cultural
debate about sexuality, intimacy, and marriage is a good example of how
political culture affects everyday life. Social change is important to
politics. Tracking studies from various national surveys including the
General Social Survey (GSS), Gallup polls, and the Pew Research
Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, the Pew Research Center
confirms major shifts in the acceptability of same-sex marriage (Table
5.1).
Table 5.1 Percent Supporting Gay Marriage across

National Surveys, 2004–2017
What is behind this shift in political culture? A recent study by

Inglehart, Ponarin, and Inglehart (2017) concludes that much of the change
in support for gay marriage in the United States is a function of gradual
shifts in values about social norms related to sexuality and political
questions. They conclude the emergence of a unique set of “individual-
choices norms,” which are gradually replacing traditional norms of
sexuality that have viewed sex as related primarily to procreation. Much of
this change started in the 1980s, and in the United States especially, the
shift has been gradual. But in 2010 and beyond, the change “accelerated.”
Why? These researchers conclude that economic prosperity contributes to
rapid change in norms related to acceptance of homosexuality, abortion,
divorce, and gender equality. This pattern is consistent with Inglehart’s
Modernization Theory (Inglehart et al. 2017), which finds that norms shift
in societies where anxiety about survival is mitigated by relative
prosperity, and where adherence to secular ways of thinking including a
scientific worldview, are on the increase. The general economic security
since the 1980s is behind the shifting norms as is the growth of new
generations of citizens, namely Millennials and Generation X.
The value shifts related to individual choice and equality identified by
Inglehart, Ponarin, and Inglehart are one way of explaining changes in
support for gay marriage. Moreover, the role of generational shifts in
values is significant. This is reflected in data collected by the PEW
Research Center, showing how the WWII generation and baby boomers
are the least supportive of gay marriage. But that has changed as PEW data
show an increase in support for gay marriage by 20 percent just in the last
ten years. A majority of Millennials have, in that same time period,
supported gay marriage, and by 2017, PEW research shows this support
increasing to nearly 75 percent of those Millennials surveyed. As older
generations are replaced by younger generations, the political and cultural
significance of the issue will change.
There is another dimension to changing norms about marriage and
equality. Think about these two aspects of everyday life, displays of
affection, and business transaction. Approval or disapproval of gay
marriage and support for equal rights is one thing. But this collides with
everyday life. Here’s how.
Using data from a national survey, Doan, Loehr, and Miller (2014)
found that individuals tend to think of gay marriage in two ways: as a
“formal right” and as an “informal privilege.” Acceptance of the legal
right of marriage as we have seen has grown. Everyday life is
affected by the recognition of two individuals of the same sex granted
constitutional protections to marry. But these authors found less
support for lesbian and gay partners engaging in everyday acts of
intimacy such as holding hands or kissing. They conclude that gender
norms are still powerful factors in guiding acts of intimacy, and that
there is a difference in recognition of the legal rights over these
privileges of relationships.
Now the debate shifts to the U.S. Supreme Court. Can the everyday
business practices of say, a florist or catering business, include not
serving gay partners wanting the rituals of a traditional wedding in
America because the business owner objects to gay marriage on
religious grounds? The Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS) skirted ruling on precedent setting principles that would
have answered that question in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. et al. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission et al. (2018). In writing the
Majority opinion, Justice Kennedy zeroed in on First Amendment
tensions of belief, speech, and expression in everyday life:
“When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of
the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious
grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without
denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion. This refusal
would be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of
religion and exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept
without serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth. Yet if
that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who
provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse
to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma
inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that
ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations.”
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., Et Al v. Colorado Civil Rights

Commission Et Al. 584 U.S. ____ (2018). No 16-111. Supreme Court
of the United States (June 4, 2018) page 10.
As Tocqueville (1820) said in his 1820 observations of American

politics, eventually all things political become legal questions.
It’s in the everyday lives of individuals where we find social conflict over
citizenship. As political culture changes, so do the struggles. Have the
political shifts that brought the Trump Presidency and Republican control
of Congress in 2016 affected policies related to the lives of LGBT
Americans? since then? Have rights shifted since President Trump has had
the opportunity to appoint two new justices to the U.S. Supreme Court and
made other federal judicial appointments?
Opinions about same-sex marriage are associated with political party

identification and other political attitudes. Republicans are much less likely to
support gay marriage than Democrats, but, by June 2017, Republicans appear
to be about evenly divided with 48 percent opposing it and 47 percent
supporting it (Pew Research Center 2017a). Democrats favored same-sex
marriage, 76–19 percent. (Don’t know responses or no answers made up the
rest of the responses.) Age of respondents has also influenced the preferences
of both Republicans and Democrats. Regarding the youngest cohort of
Millennials, 60 percent of Republicans and 87 percent of Democrats
supported same-sex marriage. Among Baby Boomers, for example, 42
percent of Republicans and 70 percent of Democrats supported same-sex
marriage. Among the oldest group, the Silent generation, only 29 percent of
Republicans and 56 percent of Democrats supported same-sex marriage.
Race, education, and ideology play an important role as well. Whites are most
supportive of gay marriage as are those with college educations. Those who
identify as conservative within either political party are less likely to support
same-sex marriage (Pew Research Center 2017a).
PRO AND CON ARGUMENTS

Often supporters of same-sex marriage frame their argument by stating that
marriage should be a civil right for all, whereas those who oppose it often see
same-sex marriage as a religious and/or morality issue (Hurst 2010). The
latter point out that various religions, including Christianity and Islam,
condemn homosexual relationships and that the homosexual lifestyle is
immoral (Hurst 2010; White 2009). Those who advance the civil rights
argument have sometimes compared same-sex marriage to the Civil Rights
Movement’s struggles for racial equality in the 1960s. Opponents, though,
tend to argue that homosexuality is a choice, unlike one’s race, but the
scientific literature, while not conclusive, suggests that one’s sexual
orientation may be determined before birth or shortly thereafter (White 2009).
In the 2004 election campaign, President G. W. Bush was quoted as
stating, “The union of a man and a woman is the most enduring human
institution, honored and encouraged in all cultures and by every religious
faith.” Those who oppose same-sex marriage believe that marriage
traditionally has been and should continue to be a committed relationship
between a man and a woman. They feel changing marriage would greatly
contribute to the erosion of the institution of marriage, which is already
threatened by the high divorce rate (White 2009). Sprigg (2009), for example,
claims that same-sex relationships are not by definition eligible for marriage
because marriage is the union of a man and a woman. Others have argued a
type of slippery-slope approach, suggesting that if same-sex marriage is
allowed, polygamy, incest, and even bestiality could follow (Rimmerman
2008). Hurst (2010: 135) summarizes part of the argument of those opposing
same-sex marriage: “It is feared that unless gays and lesbians are held in
check, traditional morality and family structure as foundations of our society
will become contaminated and seriously weakened.”
Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum (R-Penn.) argued how popular
culture and the media condemn those like him who oppose same-sex
marriage: “We know that the American public doesn’t approve of same-sex
marriage, but they are uncomfortable about it because, again, the public
perception is if you feel that way, you’re a bigot or a hater” (“An Argument
against Same-Sex Marriage: An Interview with Rick Santorum” 2008).
Part of the argument for same-sex marriage is a practical one based on the
substantial economic advantages that are associated with legal marriage,
including items noted previously such as joint filing of tax returns, surviving
spouse SS benefits, and health insurance. Another supportive argument is that
in a truly democratic society, there should be equality for all citizens. Also
there may be tremendous psychological benefits, including increased self-
esteem, from achieving the right to marry. Some argue that gaining this right
could benefit both the lesbian and gay communities and society, in general, by
enhancing the stability of gay relationships and encouraging monogamy
(Rimmerman 2008).
A study of 288 gays and lesbians sheds some light on possible advantages
and disadvantages of same-sex marriage. Almost all of those surveyed
thought that legalization of same-sex marriage would be an indicator of first-
class citizenship, illustrating fairness and equal rights (Peplau and Fingerhut
2007). From their point of view, the positive side would also include the
following:
1. Marriage could strengthen their relationships, helping couples feel closer.
2. It would also create structural obstacles to dissolving a relationship,
possibly encouraging couples to work harder to improve their
relationships.
3. Marriage could reduce the strains that same-sex couples experience by
increasing the couples’ legal rights, reducing societal prejudice, and
diminishing any internalized homophobia.
The gays and lesbians surveyed also expressed possible disadvantages,
including the idea that legalization might pressure gays to get married or
create status hierarchies that would value marriage and stigmatize those who
do not marry. In addition, some feared that legalization of same-sex marriage
could result in pressures to assimilate and thus follow heterosexual family
norms that could alter the special and unique features of the gay–lesbian
community (Peplau and Fingerhut 2007).
On the other hand, Jonathan Rauch, an openly gay advocate, argues that
same-sex marriage would have positive unifying effects for society:
Far from hastening the social decline of marriage, same-sex marriage shores up the key
values and commitments on which couples and families and society depend. Far from
dividing America and weakening communities, same-sex marriage, if properly
implemented, can make the country both better unified and truer to its ideals.
(Rauch, quoted in White 2009: 122–123)
SAME-SEX FAMILIES AND CHILDREN

One important focus of the same-sex marriage debate has been on the welfare
of children. While certainly some same-sex couples who marry would not
have children, some would, using adoption, artificial insemination, surrogacy,
sperm donation, and so on. Also many children who live with same-sex
parents were born within heterosexual marriages that ended in divorce or
separation.
Those who oppose gay and lesbian adoption disapprove of the gay and
lesbian lifestyle and thus question whether gays and lesbians would make
excellent parents. Some are concerned that children with gay or lesbian
parents will experience ridicule and harassment (Belge n.d.). In 2004, the
American Psychological Association’s (APA) Council of Representatives
adopted a resolution that stated, “The APA opposes any discrimination based
on sexual orientation in matters of adoption, child custody and visitation,
foster care, and reproductive health services” (2009 [2004]: 195). The council
found that social science research has not supported any of the negative
stereotypes that promote concerns about children of lesbian and gay parents
(APA 2009 [2004]). In 2012, the APA (2012) concluded that based on a very
consistent body of research on gay and lesbian parents and their children,
there is no scientific evidence supporting a relationship between parental
sexual orientation and parenting effectiveness. In other words “lesbian and
gay parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive and
healthy environments for their children.”
Stacey and Biblarz (2001) point out that social scientists have in part
tended to emphasize a no-differences approach in comparing children with
lesbian or gay parents with children having heterosexual parents. Researchers
are politically sensitive to the fact that those who oppose lesbian and gay
parental rights are looking for evidence that children with lesbian or gay
parents are at greater risk for negative outcomes. The authors reviewed
twenty-one psychological studies that generally reported no or few
differences in parenting or child outcomes. Among the few differences, they
found that children, especially daughters of lesbian parents, were less likely
to conform to sex-typed cultural norms. For boys, the relationship was quite
complex because, on some measures, sons of lesbian parents were less
traditional in masculine behavior, but, on others, they showed gender
conformity. One study found a moderate level of parent-to-child transmission
of sexual orientation. Regarding mental health, the children of lesbian
mothers tend to do at least as well as children of heterosexual members and
sometimes better.
In addition, children with lesbian or gay parents seem more open to
homoerotic relationships and are less traditionally gender-typed. Stacey and
Biblarz (2001: 178) point out the possible political effects of such findings:
We recognize the political dangers of pointing out that recent studies indicate that a
higher proportion of children with [lesbian or gay] parents are themselves apt to engage
in homosexual activity. In a homophobic world anti-gay forces deploy such results to
deny parents custody of their own children and to fuel backlash movements opposed to
gay rights…. It is neither intellectually honest nor politically wise to base a claim for
justice on grounds that may prove falsifiable empirically. Moreover, the case for granting
equal rights to nonheterosexual parents should not require finding their children to be
identical to those reared by heterosexuals. Nor should it require finding that such children
do not encounter distinctive challenges or risks, especially when these derive from social
prejudice.
Not surprisingly, Sprigg (2009), who is against adoption by gays and

lesbians, cites certain findings of Stacey and Biblarz, as he argues that
children raised by homosexual couples are different from other children.
Dailey (2009) argues that few homosexual relationships actually include
children and most homosexual relationships are not really committed and
stable. He maintains that engaging in a social experiment redefining marriage
and family would do great harm to children “by denying them both a mother
and a father in a committed marriage” (201).
Biblarz and Savci (2010: 493) found strong support that “children raised
in gay parent families enjoy high levels of psychological well-being and
social adjustment but less is known about their gender repertoires and sexual
orientations.” There is little research on LGBT families of color or from
diverse social classes. Some recent studies suggest that lesbians and their sons
may experience unique challenges that are not found with lesbians raising
daughters.
Reczek et al. (2017) found similarities and differences among different-
sex married families, same-sex married families, same-sex cohabiting, and
different-sex cohabiting families. Differences were found for emotional
difficulties and activity limitations with same-sex marrieds having more
emotional difficulties and activity limitations than different-sex married
families. The authors suggest the possibility that issues of minority stress
caused by institutional and social discrimination could be related to a child’s
emotional and behavioral problems. Regarding activity limitations, this could
be due to the fact that same-sex married families are more likely to have
adopted special needs children in their families.
Individual states determine the rules for adoption. As of mid-2009,
twenty-two states had allowed gays or lesbians to adopt, depending on other
rules governing adoption. Eighteen of those twenty-two states, though,
allowed gay and lesbian adoption only in certain parts of the state. Some
states, though, permitted second-parent adoption where the legal guardian
retains custody, but the other person gains legal rights as well. Once the U.S.
Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage though, aspects related to
adoption by LGBT individuals have been changing. In March 2016, a federal
judge ruled that Mississippi’s prohibition on same-sex adoption was
unconstitutional. Other states that had banned adoption by same gender
couples including Alabama, Florida, Nebraska, and Michigan had already
been overturned. Given the ruling regarding Mississippi, Reilly (2016)
proclaimed that gay adoption was now legal in all fifty states.
However, this may not be so nearly clear-cut on a variety of issues
affecting LGBT people. For example, in 2017, Texas passed a bill that
maintained state-funded adoption and foster care agencies could decide about
child placement based on “sincerely held religious beliefs” (Bever 2017).
Legal and policy director for the Texas chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) Rebecca Robertson suggested “We think the
primary purpose of this is to permit lesbian, gay and transgender parents to be
turned away” (Bever 2017). This could mean that if a state permitted state-
funded, faith-based child placement agencies to determine who is allowed to
adopt based on the agency’s religious values, same-sex couples could be
prevented from adopting their children. In spring 2018, eight states allowed
taxpayer-funded child service agencies to refuse to offer services to children
and families, including LGBT people and same-sex couples, if it conflicts
with their religious beliefs (Movement Advancement Project and Family
Equality Council 2018).
Further federal appeals courts in Chicago and New York have used Title
VII to overrule decisions concerning gay and lesbian workers even though
Title VII does not mention protection on the basis of sexual orientation. The
courts had ruled it was covered under the ban on sex bias. The Obama
administration supported the idea that LGBT discrimination claims were part
of sex discrimination based on Title VII. However, in a New York case, the
Trump administration filed a brief maintaining that Title VII was not intended
to protect gay employees and it withdrew Obama-era suggestions to educators
to treat claims of transgender students as sex discrimination (Sherman 2018).
In addition, while lower courts have supported extending civil rights
protections to LGBT workers and students, it is not clear what the Supreme
Court will do. Sherman believes that a number of lawsuits concerning LGBT
rights are going to continue for the foreseeable future. Courts will be busy
dealing with two broad types of cases: whether sex discrimination laws apply
to LGBT people and whether businesses can claim religious exemptions to
avoid complying with antidiscrimination laws in such aspects as placing
children with adoptive or foster parents, serving customers, providing health
care, and hiring and firing workers (Sherman 2018).
For the time being, the courts and legislatures are likely to continue to be
involved in various issues especially related to the lives of LBGT people. We
now turn to health care, another divisive issue that affects people’s everyday
lives.
HEALTH CARE
By the time Barack Obama was sworn in as President of the United States, it
was clear that there were major concerns about the health-care system. In a
2009 article, Begley (2009) reported that approximately forty-six million
people in the United States did not have health-care insurance and others were
underinsured. Many argued that health-care costs had spiraled out of control.
Indeed on February 23, 2009, President Obama referred to the rising cost of
health care as “the single most pressing fiscal challenge we face by far”
(“History: Presidential Statements Barack H. Obama—2009” 2009).
According to the National Coalition on Health Care, the typical American
family had seen their premiums for employer-sponsored coverage doubled
from $5,791 in 1999 to $12,680 in 2008 when figures were adjusted for
inflation (“Plan Gives Insurance Firms Time to Change” 2009: 3A). Consumer
Reports National Research Center survey of January 2009 found almost 70
percent of 2,004 adults who regularly took prescription drugs followed certain
dangerous strategies often to reduce their health-care costs. For example, 23
percent put off a doctor’s visit, 18 percent put off a procedure, and 16 percent
skipped filling a prescription (“Dangerous Strategies for Saving Health-Care
Dollars” 2009: 1).
In this part we explore the theoretical frameworks related to health care,
the uniqueness of the health-care system in the United States, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Trump administrations
reactions to the ACA, and public opinion about ACA.
Turner (2004) applies Mills’ (1959) sociological imagination framework to
medical care by trying to connect individuals’ personal experiences of illness
to a larger frame of issues related to political economy, health inequality, and
the power of the medical elites in society. He argues, “The private narratives
of illness tell a powerful story about the public issues of wealth, power, and
status” (Turner 2004: 313). It is also crucial to understand that the autonomy
of the medical profession is “owed to its relationship to the sovereign state
from which it is not ultimately autonomous” (Freidson 1970: 24).
PLURALIST
Both the pluralist and elite frameworks consider a similar list of organizations
as relevant for health-care issues although they interpret their roles somewhat
differently. These include the American Medical Association (AMA), a major
professional society and lobbying group that represents physicians; the
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture drugs; the insurance companies;
manufacturers of medical devices; profit and nonprofit hospitals; health
maintenance organizations; and patient advocate groups. For pluralists, these
represent interest groups that lobby to influence policy. Cunningham and
Cunningham (1997: 142) describe the passage of Medicare in the mid-1960s
as “the cumulative product of what Odin Anderson called ‘the riotously
pluralistic policy-making system of the United States.’”
ELITE-MANAGERIAL
Although somewhat simplistic, it can be claimed that physicians represent
part of the elite and patients the masses. Brint (1994: 59) notes the scientific
training of doctors and how doctors are taught to objectify their patients to a
much greater degree than are other human services professionals. While
discussing some astute statements of his patients, Toth (2007: 148)
commented, “Patients are indeed smarter than we often give them credit for.”
This statement seems to suggest that many doctors do not view their patients
as particularly intelligent. Another physician, Groopman (2007: 25)
acknowledged that while patients often recognize a physician’s negativity,
they don’t understand how it affects their medical care. “Rather, they often
blame themselves for complaining and taxing the doctor’s patience.” The
power relationship between doctor and patient that the state sanctions can
thus at times end up harming patients. Cockerham (2007: 249–250) suggests
that the “professional dominance” of the doctor in general is declining due to
(1) increasing government regulation, (2) managed care, (3) doctors being
hired as employees by corporations and thus losing some of their autonomy
as these companies control more of the medical marketplace, and (4) patients
educating themselves as they desire more “consumer-oriented health care”
and wish to participate in the decision-making process.
In 1980, physician Relman (2007: 28) used the term new medical–
industrial complex to call attention to the increasingly commercialized face of
U.S. medicine. Wilensky (2009) is concerned about the high administrative
costs of the medical–industrial complex and the chaos resulting from the
complicated combination of private and public regulations of the health-care
system. He identifies insurance companies as the dominant political barrier to
national health insurance.
CLASS
According to class analysis, the medical profession, insurance companies, and
drug companies struggle to maintain and/or expand their power, financial
resources, and profit by influencing and possibly decreasing government
regulation. Drawing on the Fortune 1,000 reports, in 2007 health groups
earned $71 billion. There has been a rapid increase in the annual profits of the
top fifteen health insurance companies from $3.5 billion to $15 billion from
2000 to 2007. Pharmaceuticals and medical equipment were third and fourth
on the list of fifty-two industries in terms of profits as a share of revenue
(Goldhill 2009). Forty-two health-care companies made the 2017 Fortune
500 list of companies with the highest revenue including seven health-care
providers, nine health insurance companies, eleven pharmaceutical ones and
fifteen health-related companies. Many health systems are not-for-profits and
thus are not included in the Fortune 500 (Advisory Board 2018). Four of the
forty-two were in the fifty most profitable list including Pfizer, a
pharmaceutical company, with $21,308.0 million in profit and United Health
Group, a health insurance group, with $10,558.0 million in profit (Fortune
2018).
Lupton (1994) maintains that good health includes having access to both
material and nonmaterial resources that help sustain or promote life. Under
capitalism, a primary focus of health care is to make sure workers and
consumers are healthy enough to contribute to the capitalist system. Health
care is viewed “as a commodity in which the seeking of profit is a major
influencing factor” (9).
POSTMODERN
Foucault argues, “Power is embodied in the day-to-day practices of the
medical profession within the clinic” (Turner 1997: xi–xii). Doctors in clinics
and hospitals tightly control information and knowledge about medicine and
their patients. The patient is expected to follow the knowledgeable doctor’s
recommendations. From the postmodernists’ point of view, knowledge is a
form of power that is not always used to benefit patients or the general public
(Kendall 2007).
RATIONAL CHOICE
The rational choice framework embraces the idea of rationality and the value
of scientific research and study. Rational choice theory emphasizes how
doctors use their scientific knowledge to calculate risks in the management of
diseases and decide on treatments. This knowledge gives them power. The
concept of the marketplace can be applied to health care. For example,
patients (or buyers) ideally make rational choices based on the medical
information received, their ability to compare alternative doctors (or sellers),
and their evaluation of the price and quality of medical care in a competitive
environment.
INSTITUTIONALIST
Frenk and Durán-Arenas (1993: 29) point out that the state, the medical
profession, and bureaucratic organizations form a complex triangle of
relationships that need to be studied. The state plays an important role in
licensing doctors and in malpractice suits. The medical profession gains a
grant of monopoly from the state as only members of the profession can treat
patients, order certain medical tests, and write prescriptions (Starr 1982).
Physicians interact not only with complex bureaucracies such as hospitals,
clinics, drug companies, and insurance agencies, but also with federal
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration and the National Institute
of Health. Large health-care conglomerates provide employment, offices,
equipment, hospital privileges, and possibly salary guarantees to physicians.
Working for the corporation reduces the doctors’ autonomy and shapes their
pace and routines of work. The corporate culture values maximizing profits,
offering efficient services, and controlling costs. Such changes modify the
doctor–patient relationship (Cockerham 2004).
U.S. Health Care Uniqueness

Wilensky (2009) documents how the United States’ health-care system is
distinct from that of other rich democracies. Other rich democracies have
centralized budget control using compulsory contributions from employers
and individuals and/or government revenues to provide national health care.
They also allow private purchase of health services to supplement the
government health-care programs. In contrast, the United States lacked
national health insurance and had a very large private sector involved in health
care and a uniquely expensive arrangement based in part on a poor cost-
benefit ratio with the United States paying a much larger percentage of its
gross domestic product (GDP) for health care than other countries.
Wilensky (2009) examined three possible reasons for the United States’
uniqueness. The first is that its public policy has historically focused more on
technologically intensive health care rather than raising the number of people
who have access to that health care. According to Wilensky, the second and
most important reason is the U.S. government’s structure, including
federalism that has resulted in a decentralized and fragmented system. This
includes electoral laws that make it difficult for third parties to exist, let alone
push for health-care reform, and also the unique policy of the Senate that
allows a political party with minority support of 41 percent to filibuster an
issue, so that it cannot be voted upon. For example, in December 2009,
Democrats and two independent senators were able to break a filibuster and
pass health-care legislation. While Congress was attempting to find
compromises between the health-care bills passed in the Senate and House,
Republicans gained a forty-first Senate seat in a special election in
Massachusetts to replace the late Edward M. Kennedy. This meant that if all
Republicans acted together, they could possibly filibuster in the Senate to
prevent a new vote on any compromise legislation on health care. To avoid the
filibuster in the Senate in 2010, there was a reconciliation process where the
House accepted the Senate version of the health-care bill, and later some
modifications were made.
Wilensky is more critical of the third explanation advanced by some for
the uniqueness of health care in the United States. That explanation points to
American culture and values such as free enterprise, individualism, and
concern about too much government involvement in society. Mechanic (2006:
22) though believes that there are two currently competing worldviews about
health-care reform that can be identified with the two major political parties.
The Republican Party and its supporters tend to see health care as similar to
other commodities or products and services, best handled in the competitive
marketplace with limited regulation. They do not see health care as a right and
they support private insurance companies, fee-for-service medicine, and cost
sharing that supposedly would foster prudent decision-making in using the
health-care system. The Democratic Party and its supporters are more likely to
see health care as an individual right and a public service instead of a
commodity like many goods and services. They believe health-care service
does not do well in the profit-oriented marketplace with limited regulations
and favor a public option or national health care.
At the individual level, health-care reform seems to evoke powerful
emotions including fear, anger, and hate, so “people are unable to balance
their emotional reactions with rational ones” (Begley 2009: 43). Begley
further believes that such situations are not helped when political figures
express their concerns about end-of-life counseling that some have labeled
death panels. Town hall meetings and tea parties helped fuel populist
emotions including one person’s demand to “keep your government hands off
my Medicare” (43). The reality is that Medicare is a government program and
misinformation complicates attempts at reform.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

In a historic vote in March 2010, the House of Representatives supported a
health-care bill that had been passed by the Senate on Christmas Eve 2009.
No Republican supported the legislation that was estimated to help 24–30
million people without health insurance to afford such insurance (“Health
Care Reform” 2010; Murray and Montgomery 2010). According to the
legislation, people who refuse to buy insurance will face fines. Insurance
companies would no longer be able to impose lifetime limits on patient
benefits or drop people who develop major illnesses. The Medicare program
was changed ideally to provide care at a reduced cost and more efficiently.
People were added to the Medicaid rolls and government helped subsidize
private coverage for many people in the lower and middle classes. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the new law would cost $938
billion over the next ten years, but this would result in decreasing the federal
budget by $138 billion over the same period (“Health Care Reform” 2010).
President Obama signed the bill a couple of days after the House had passed
it. This was followed by the passage of several modifications of the bill that
had been agreed upon earlier. As previously noted, the passage of the
legislation involved a reconciliation process because the Democrats lacked a
sixtieth vote to break a potential Senate filibuster.
According to Beland, Rocco, and Waddan (2016: 155), “The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the most important health-care
reform in the United States in more than forty years, and it is likely to remain
a subject of political controversy in the near future.” Skocpol (2012) suggests
that major social policy programs like ACA are contentious for years, but
Starr (2011: 260) argues that the threats to the ACA’s constitutionality had to
be defended legally and carried out politically and not simply implemented in
the typical manner. Starr (2011) identifies the key problem of polarization
between the two major political parties as a factor in dealing with the
implementation of the ACA, also known as Obamacare. Dawes (2016: 186)
suggests “The Affordable Care Act has survived many brushes with death,
proving that it has more lives than a cat, and is most likely to experiences
more bushes as time passes.”
The ACA has been successful in reducing the number of people without
insurance. This was due more to changes with Medicaid than with private
health insurance. According to Pear (2017), roughly seventy-five million
people are enrolled in Medicaid with this number increasing by about one-
third because of the adoption of ACA. About ten million people buy coverage
from private insurers through the health law’s marketplace. These exchanges
are online shopping sites where Americans who aren’t able to buy insurance
elsewhere can purchase a health insurance policy. Among people aged
eighteen to sixty-four, the percent with private health insurance is roughly the
same as it was in 2005. However, the percentage of people receiving public
insurance coverage increased from 11.5 percent in 2005 to 19 percent. Under
the ACA, this does not include the larger segment of this age group that
benefits from tax subsidies from the health insurance from employers. In that
same age bracket, the proportion without health care has declined from 19 to
12.5 percent. The federal government has subsidized on average about three-
fourths of the premium for more than 75 percent of those who buy insurance
through the ACA marketplace (Pear 2017).
The figures released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) stated that 11.8 million Americans had signed up for ACA health
insurance for 2018. CMS Administrator Seema Verma tweeted it was “the
most cost-effective and successful open enrollment to date” (Goldstein
2018a). A total of 70 percent of the customers had incomes that would have
qualified them for less expensive deductibles and other lower out-of-pocket
expenses due to cost-sharing reduction subsidies to ACA insurers, but
President Trump has ended that (Goldstein 2018a).
Early in the Trump administration, Congress voted and President Trump
signed a tax bill that included repealing the requirement that people have
health insurance by 2019. Those effects are yet to be determined but it is
likely that at least some relatively healthy people will decline health insurance
and that could likely result in higher health-care premiums for the ACA plans
(Pear 2017; Przybyla and O’Donnell 2017).
In their brief review of Medicaid expansions as part of the ACA, Sohn and
Timmermans (2017) note that this was the largest driver of improved
insurance coverage between 2013 and 2015 citing that 60 percent of insurance
gains were attributed to Medicaid, providing health insurance to about thirteen
million people under age sixty-five. U.S. states could choose to participate in
federally funded Medicaid expansion for persons with household incomes
below 138 percent of the federal poverty level. Seventeen states did not
choose to participate (Cunningham 2018).
A 2017 Consumer Health Access Survey in Kansas and Missouri
examined access to health care in those two states for those aged nineteen to
sixty-four years. Neither state had opted into the Medicaid expansion
program. The study found that, among this age group, 20 percent in each state
did not receive health-care coverage; this percent is comparable to estimates
from a 2018 national survey for states that did not expand Medicaid but
appears to be higher than that for states that opted in. Also 28 percent of those
surveyed in Kansas and 34 percent in Missouri were living in households that
reported difficulties paying their medical bills in the last year. This
represented 1,154,900 adults in Missouri and 462,300 adults in Kansas (RTI
International 2018).
In June 2018, the Trump administration declared that it would not defend
the ACA against the most recent legal challenge to its constitutionality that
was filed by the Texas Attorney General on behalf of twenty Republican
states. That suit argued that since the mandate for Americans to carry health
insurance was ending, the other consumer insurance protections under the
ACA would not be valid. Then federal Attorney General Sessions noted that
the decision to refuse to defend an existing law is not unprecedented, but does
deviate from history. Unlike the state petition that evidently wanted the entire
ACA declared unconstitutional, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) stated
that it believed certain provisions of the ACA could remain legal. A group of
seventeen Democratic-led states filed a brief also trying to defend the ACA
(Goldstein 2018b). In December 2018 a Texas judge supported the Republican
attorneys general by ruling that the insurance requirement could not be legally
separated from the rest of the ACA and thus all the ACA was invalid.
However pending the appeal process, the ACA remains in place.
Also, in June 2018, Trump declared a new rule that would make it easier
for smaller business associations (e.g. city chambers of commerce to national
wide industry groups) to join together to offer health-care insurance though a
large-group market. The concern though is that these associations would be
circumventing ACA requirements and thus not providing certain health-care
essentials like mental health care, emergency services, and prescription drugs
(Pear 2018).
The ongoing debate about the future of the ACA is likely to continue at
least for the short term. It is part of the larger discussion about how much of a
role will and should the government play in health care and what are its goals
in terms of coverage for people. Should government focus on working toward
equal access to health care suggesting it is a right or not? Another major focus
will center on the issue of cost containment.
Public Opinion on the ACA

For the first time, a Pew Research Center survey (Fingerhut 2017a) in
February 2017 found that a majority of people supported the passage of the
2010 health-care bill. This trend continued in the November–December 2017
survey, when public approval went slightly higher with 56 percent approving
the ACA and 38 percent disapproving it (Fingerhut 2017b). Back in 2010, 44
percent disapproved and 40 percent approved it. According to the February
2017 survey, both Democrats (71–85 percent) and Independents (36–53
percent) increased their support over time, while Republicans remained about
the same (11–10 percent). In a different phrasing of the health-care question
that asked if the ACA has a positive or negative effect on the country, the
November–December survey found the highest approval rate with 44 percent
mainly approving it, 35 percent disapproving it, and 14 percent indicating that
it has not had much effect (Fingerhut 2017b). According to both surveys,
women, Blacks, Hispanics, young people, and better educated were more
likely to favor ACA.
Maxwell and Shields (2014) explored the effects of racial resentment and
ethnocentrism on attitudes toward health-care reform among whites. Racial
resentment involved antiblack affect and traditional American moral values
associated with the Protestant Ethic, while ethnocentrism was based on
thermometer scales (0–100) feelings toward the in-group/whites vis-à-vis the
average score of their out-group ratings of African-Americans and Latinos.
Ideology included a scale from very liberal to very conservative. When the
authors introduced racial resentment and ethnocentrism into their regression
analysis after the political and socioeconomic variables had been added, their
ability to explain (r2) significantly increased by 0.11 and totaled 0.508. Being
educated, female, party identification, ideology, and political sophistication
were also significant in their model without interaction effects. Thus, racial
resentment and ethnocentrism add to our understanding of opinions about
health-care reforms even after controlling for the aforementioned key political
variables.
On the issue of whether government has responsibility to ensure health
coverage for all, a 2017 Pew Research Center survey found that 33 percent
favored a single national government program and 25 percent wanted a mix of
government and private programs, 33 percent did not feel government is
responsible, and 5 percent indicated no government involvement of any kind.
Democrats were much more likely to support government’s role in health
care. Support for the single payer option increased from only 21 percent in
March 2014 to 33 percent in June 2017 (Kiley 2017).
A 2018 survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation showed broad support for
retaining the ACA’s protections for individuals with preexisting conditions
(Kirzinger, Wu, and Broadie 2018; Rau 2018). A total of 76 percent supported
prohibiting health insurance companies from denying coverage because of a
person’s medical history; this included 88 percent of the Democrats, 77
percent of Independents, and 58 percent of Republicans. Findings were
relatively similar although a little less supportive of the provision prohibiting
health insurance companies from charging sick people more. A total of 72
percent supported this restriction including 85 percent of Democrats, 70
percent of Independents, and 58 percent of Republicans. In spite of these
findings and as noted above, President Trump’s administration has announced
that it will no longer defend these ACA’s protections.
How much of a role should and will the government play in health care is
likely to be an ongoing discussion for some time in Congress and throughout
the country. Debates will likely focus on the government’s role in promoting
social justice by working toward equal access to health care and whether
health care is a right and if so whether that right should be extended to
undocumented workers. Another major focus will center on the issue of cost
containment including the failure of the bill to grant the Medicare program the
right to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies to reduce the costs of drugs
for those eligible for Medicare. Attorney generals in various states are also
challenging the constitutionality of the health-care legislation.
What will happen to ACA remains to be seen in the years ahead. Beland,
Rocco, and Waddan (2016: 153) had previously noted the vulnerability of
ACA when they pointed out that it could be repealed or changed in the years
ahead. They wrote “The ACA’s regulatory reforms are by no means faits
accomplis—that is, immune to future political battles. Federal regulations
could ostensibly be overturned by a future presidential administration, and
state cooperation, given the right conditions, could turn into dissent.” We now
turn to another contentious issue on civil liberties and security concerns.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Provisions and guarantees for civil liberties characterize democratic societies.
Although, in the abstract, people give support to democratic values, they often
may not “translate abstract principles into democratic patterns of behavior”
(Dye and Zeigler 1972: 131). There is a rather long history of debate
surrounding civil liberties. Difficulties exist when conflict may be perceived
between the demands for national security and for civil liberties or between
possibly protecting society and the rights of the individual. Lyon (2015) points
out that “It seems amazing that the ‘security’ slogan that has dominated global
politics as well as many realities of everyday life for more than a decade lacks
clear definition.” Farber (2008: 1–2) though gives us some help in
understanding both civil liberties and national security. He defines civil
liberties as including “issues relating to freedom of expression, due process,
restrictions on government surveillance, and the discrimination against
minority groups” and “national security as involving a perceived violent threat
that implicates either the stability of the government (subversion), the general
safety of large numbers of members of society, or the government’s ability to
engage successfully in armed conflicts.”
Law professor Geoffrey R. Stone wants a balance between civil liberties
and security. He argues “our nation needs citizens who have the wisdom to
know excess when they see it and the courage to stand for liberty when it is
imperiled” (Ojeda 2004: 15). In examining the relationship between liberty
and security, Holmes (2008) argues that it is important to distinguish between
private or individual liberty and public liberty of citizens who examine,
criticize, and work to change policy and leaders. Further he believes,
That we may increase our security by giving up your privacy makes at least some sense.
What makes no sense at all is the government’s implicit boast that it will do a better job of
protecting national security if it is never criticized or forced to give an informed audience
plausible reasons for its actions.
(216)
It can be argued that freedom of expression—freedom of speech, press,

association, assembly, or petition—forms the cornerstone for civil liberties and
is essential to maintain a free society (American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU]
2004 [1997]). This commitment to freedom of expression has been sorely
tested since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment
guaranteeing freedom of expression. Indeed, the Constitution was drafted
without the Bill of Rights. Particularly in times of “national stress, like war
abroad or social upheaval at home, people exercising their First Amendment
rights have been censored, fined, even jailed” (30). People with unpopular
views have been repressed at numerous times. In a dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. U.S., Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D.
Brandeis argued that speech should be punished only if it presents “a clear and
present danger” of imminent harm. Ultimately, this was accepted as the
standard. Defining clear and eminent danger may be quite difficult, however.
There are important exceptions to the rules including libel, defamation, words
of conspiracy, and so forth (Delgado 2004).
Students may be wondering why, in the politics of everyday life, civil
liberties are discussed, because many people haven’t directly felt that their
civil liberties are being threatened. That doesn’t mean it won’t happen or that
other liberties valued by students won’t be threatened. The frequently cited1
lines from Martin Niemöller, a German Protestant pastor, help explain the
importance of civil liberties for all. During the time of the Nazis in Germany,
he stated that the Nazis came for various groups such as the Jews, the
Communists, the labor leaders, and the socialists and he did not object. Then
when they came for him, no one remained who could protest (“Niemöller,
Martin” n.d.). Put simply, if some of us may be threatened, others may be in
the future. Even if not threatened, maintaining democratic values is important.
Gerry Spence, the lawyer for Randy Weaver in the controversial Ruby
Ridge case, tries to make it clear how civil liberties issues involve all of us
when he states: “When the rights of our enemies have been wrested from
them, our own rights are lost as well, for the same rights serve both citizen and
criminal” (1995: 7). Text box 5.2 discusses the Ruby Ridge case in greater
detail.
TEXT BOX 5.2

Civil Liberties and Ruby Ridge: Any Heroes? Any
Costs?
A little-known example of a civil liberties dispute is a shootout frequently
labeled the “Ruby Ridge” tragedy. Among those on law enforcement’s side
were the U.S. Marshal Service, the FBI, and a hostage rescue team that was
called in. The challengers included Randy Weaver, his wife Vicki, and their
children as well as Kevin Harris. U.S. Marshal Degan, Sammy Weaver, the
fourteen-year-old son of Randy and Vicki Weaver, Vicki Weaver herself,
and a family dog were killed. The details include the following:
Randy and Vicki Weaver were considered by law enforcement to be
white supremacists. Randy Weaver accepted that they were white
separatists based on his interpretation of the Bible that the races should be
separate. The Weavers attended some events at Aryan Nations (AN) but
were never formal members. In 1990, federal agents asked Weaver to spy
on AN and other movement supporters. Previously, one of the informants
had enticed him to sell sawed-off shotguns. Government officials suggested
that law enforcement would go easy on him for having sold sawed-off
shotguns if he agreed to become an informant. Weaver refused and through
a ruse was caught by government officials when he left his isolated cabin.
He faced a magistrate who incorrectly told him if convicted he could
possibly lose his land that he was putting up for bail. Weaver then decided
to hole up and refuse to come down from his mountain cabin. On August
21, 1992, a surveillance mission watching him and the cabin was “bungled”
(Miller 1992: A6). Supposedly, the marshals got too close to the cabin, and
a family dog caught their scent and chased after the marshals. Probably
wondering what was bothering the dog, Randy Weaver went on one path
and his son Sammy and family friend Kevin Harris went on another. The
dog, Sammy, and Kevin caught up with the marshals. A shootout ensued
and U.S. Marshal Degan, Sammy Weaver (shot in the back), and the dog
died. Once this incident occurred, the FBI took over the investigation and
brought in the hostage rescue team, which surrounded the cabin. Not
knowing they were surrounded since no one had asked them to surrender,
Randy, his oldest daughter, and Kevin Harris left the cabin and were fired
upon. Randy and Kevin were wounded and Vicki was killed opening the
door for the retreating individuals. Several days later the Weavers and
Harris surrendered. Several investigations of the event occurred. Senator
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) criticized the culture of law enforcement finding
fault with the new “swashbucklers” who preferred hostile solutions over
negotiations stating: “At Ruby Ridge this culture led to a military buildup
that would have impressed Saddam Hussein” (Subcommittee on Terrorism
1997: 10–11). In this case, it is important to note that, in federal court,
Randy Weaver was convicted only of failure to appear in court and having
committed a crime (carrying a gun) while on pretrial release. Kevin Harris
was not convicted of anything.
There are many ways to describe a situation according to Zald (1996:
269), who discusses how different sides take part in a competitive process
to define the situation. Goffman (1974: 21) used the idea of framing as
“schemata of interpretation” that help people “locate, perceive, identify and
label” grievances. Certain coercive actions by authorities can be seen as
simply enforcing the law and doing what is needed to protect people in
society, while others may view it as oppression of those who disagree with
the government. (For a detailed discussion of framing, see Chapter 8.)
Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina (1982) examine a legitimating frame in
which people do not question the authority of the person in charge and an
injustice frame that suggests that authority could indeed operate unfairly.
Dobratz, Shanks-Meile, and Hallenbeck (2003) argue that what authorities
did during the investigations of Ruby Ridge was to “yield ground” in order
to maintain the legitimacy frame. As Gamson (1968: 114) has pointed out,
“by giving a little at the right time, authorities may prevent later more
important modifications.”
The U.S. government settled two civil suits out of court regarding the
deaths and woundings at Ruby Ridge. In the first, the three remaining
Weaver children each received $1 million and Randy Weaver $100,000.
Later Kevin Harris received $380,000. In neither case did the government
admit any wrongdoing (Associated Press 2000; Dobratz et al. 2003). At the
end of the second case, the U.S. Assistant Attorney General declared: “This
settlement resolves this long-pending case in a way that is fair to the United
States and all those involved.”
The investigation by the Subcommittee on Terrorism (1997: 1105)
concluded that the marshals approached the Weaver residence too closely
and unnecessarily made noises that risked a response without having any
specific plan for retreat. Also, why the three people retreating to the cabin
were fired upon was questioned. While two government reports did not
challenge the “second shot” that went through Kevin Harris and killed
Vicki Weaver, the Subcommittee on Terrorism believed the shot was indeed
unconstitutional and inconsistent with the FBI’s standard deadly force
policy and the rules of engagement.
The subcommittee’s investigation was done not only to discover what
happened, but to show that the government was interested in justice and
accountability. “This country can tolerate mistakes made by people like
Randy Weaver, but we cannot accept serious errors made by federal law
enforcement agencies that needlessly result in human tragedy”
(Subcommittee on Terrorism 1997: 1097). The report noted “a disturbing
absence of leadership” from many law enforcement officials and “the
unwillingness of some high ranking people in every agency to accept
responsibility…. Accountability is essential to public confidence” (1097).
These government officials want to assure the American people that
they were accountable and that government could be trusted. Gerry Spence
(1995: 47), Randy Weaver’s lawyer, stressed:
The lesson of the Weaver trial must never become the vindication of Weaver’s beliefs,
but instead the need of all Americans freely to believe as they will without risk of
persecution by a government or by a majority or by a power clique.
On the one hand, the investigation of the Senate Subcommittee on

Terrorism and the out-of-court settlements may be viewed as a means to
ensure us of government’s accountability, encourage us to trust the
government, and convince us of government’s legitimacy. On the other
hand, these events could lead us to question government’s accountability,
weaken our trust, and view elements of government as unjust or opposed to
dissent.
Who do you think was most responsible for the deaths at Ruby Ridge?
Why? Do you think it was appropriate for the government to make
payments to the family of Vicki Weaver and to Kevin Harris? Explain your
reasoning.
Twenty-First Century: War on Terror
Activities by the government against terrorism in the twenty-first century have
clearly been shaped by the terrorist attacks in 2001. On September 11, 2001,
terrorists hijacked four airplanes and attacked the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. Thousands were killed and billions of dollars of damage resulted.
Chapter 9 discusses terrorism and the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act. Therefore, here we will focus only on how general
concerns of civil liberties were generated after calls for Congress to provide
new powers to law enforcement to fight terrorism. President G. W. Bush
declared war on terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda, and U.S. troops moved into
Afghanistan against the Taliban and later invaded Iraq. By mid-2002, the G.
W. Bush administration was divided between those associated with Secretary
of State Colin Powell, who stressed coalition building and democratic
initiatives, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who argued for the
invasion of Iraq. Rumsfeld seems to have won out, which resulted in the
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
There are arguments for and against sacrificing some civil liberties in
order to win the war on terror. For example, those favoring limits on civil
liberties argue that the costs of not obtaining important information are great
because thousands could be killed and great economic damage inflicted. Using
new ways of surveillance and data collection may mean terrorists will have to
change their tactics and could help law enforcement better determine who the
guilty people are. Also the checks-and-balances system should prevent the
government from becoming too extreme in their tactics (“Should We Sacrifice
Some of Our Civil Liberties to Help Fight the War on Terror?” n.d.).
Those who argue we should not sacrifice civil liberties believe that the loss
of civil liberties would harm our definition of what it means to be an
American and such a loss thus would allow the terrorists to be victorious.
Such sacrifices would likely violate our Constitution and its associated rights.
Racial profiling, which enhances discrimination, would likely be used. They
maintain that once it is clear to others that the United States abuses the rights
of people, more and more citizens of the United States and other societies
would lose faith in the U.S. government or enhance their negative views of it.
Once some civil liberties are sacrificed, future administrations may want
further sacrifices (“Should We Sacrifice Some of Our Civil Liberties to Help
Fight the War on Terror?” n.d.).
On the one hand, the debate between civil liberties and national security
has followed certain patterns over time. Farber (2008) identifies three key
similarities between terrorism in the twenty-first century and earlier. They are
as follows: (1) presidents have concentrated on national security with little
attention to civil liberties, (2) partisan politics also characterizes the response
of opponents to the president as they emphasize civil liberties, and (3)
disputes over national identity are frequently part of the conflict between civil
liberties and national security (20–21). Holmes summarized the war on terror
as being almost as serious as the greatest of America’s earlier wars and
considered the Bush administration to be “not more restrained than its
predecessors” (2008: 213).
On the other hand, there are differences such as the current war on terror
doesn’t have an end point and that contributes to the difficulty of assessing
how serious the threat actually is and how successful the United States is in
dealing with it (Holmes 2008: 214). Further, the Bush administration relied on
unprecedented levels of secrecy and limited itself to input from a small group
of advisors. In addition, the courts have shown a greater sense of judicial
independence than previously, and finally, technological advances have
provided opponents’ greater means to communicate secretly, organize, and
use techniques of large-scale destruction (Farber 2008; Holmes 2008).
Obama, a former constitutional law professor, did alter some of Bush’s
policies; for example, he signed an executive order banning torture, but his
national security team did continue other of Bush’s methods maintaining they
were necessary to protect Americans (Shear 2015). Obama supported
domestic bulk data collection once he became President. In 2013, Edward
Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who had
been hired by a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, leaked numerous
documents from the NSA. Obama’s support for bulk surveillance only seemed
to lessen when the Guardian, the Washington Post, Der Spiegel, and the
Intercept, among others, continued to publish revelations from what Snowden
made available. According to Ackerman (2015), “The Snowden revelations
began a process of classic Obama vacillation, bringing him from public
defender of domestic mass surveillance to its reluctant and partial critic.”
Shear (2015) though suggested that Obama was “trying to balance national
security and civil liberties.” It does though appear as Farber suggested that
being President meant a greater focus on national security concerns than when
he was a Senator.
U.S. DOJ charges against Snowden included two counts of violating The
Espionage Act of 1917 and stealing government property. Snowden ultimately
received asylum from Russia and apparently lives there. Lyon (2015: 13)
identifies a number of key points about what the release of the NSA
documents tells us about surveillance, which Lyon defines as a “general
activity; ‘collecting information in order to manage or control.’” Lyon (2015:
13) suggests the United States is not only a surveillance state and a
surveillance society, but also now a “surveillance culture. Surveillance is not
just practised on us, we participate in it. This is very recent.” It is ironic to
Lyon that social media and our handheld devices that have been promoted as
offering freedom and fun help provide material for government surveillance.
Snowden’s release of material illustrates that government agencies like the
NSA use Facebook posts, cloud services like Google Docs, Twitter feeds, and
smartphones to gather information about us. We indeed actively participate in
our own surveillance as we willingly share information about ourselves on the
online public domain. This indeed could make privacy precarious and,
depending on how it is used, also put democracy at risk.
The USA Freedom Act was passed at least in part because of Snowden’s
disclosures that, for example, documented the bulk surveillance programs
including using phone records. For example, the first document ever published
from Snowden’s material revealed that the secretive Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court had ordered Verizon to provide their logs of all calls made
to and from its customers (Kadidal 2016). The 2015 USA Freedom Act ended
this bulk phone records gathering, but there are still other ways in which the
government can obtain phone information. It is, however, important to
recognize that what the government typically receives about an individual’s
calls does not include the specific content of the call. The Supreme Court back
in 1978 decided that individuals had voluntarily given the list of phone
numbers one called to a third party and that “third party doctrine” means your
list of calls and dates is provided. Use of this doctrine now permits the
government to subpoena many other things as well including banking
transaction records, web surfing information, and where and when you used
your credit card (Kadidal 2016).
The USA Freedom Act banned the bulk collection of telephone calls and
Internet metadata and restricted the government’s data collection to the
“greatest extent reasonably practical”—which means it could not ask for
everything available from a service provider or geographic region. However,
if the government provides evidence that it has “reasonable” suspicion linking
a suspect to a terrorist organization, it can collect material from phone
companies (Washington Post 2015). Among other things, the law also
extended the time period of three of the expiring Patriot Act provisions.
In June 2018, the Supreme Court (Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402)
in a 5-4 decision supported the right to privacy with one’s cell phone location
even if the records were in the hands of a third party. This was a break with
earlier decisions. There were exceptions to this such as emergencies like child
abductions, bomb threats, need to pursue a fleeing subject, and imminent
harm. In the case under consideration, the person’s cell phone location had
been mapped for 127 days. The issue of whether limited government requests
for location data would need a warrant was not directly considered although
Chief Justice Roberts felt that access to seven days of data would likely raise
Fourth Amendment concerns (Liptak 2018).
Public Opinion on National Security, Civil Liberties, and

Snowden
In January 2006, the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
conducted a public opinion survey among 1,503 adults about the trade-off
between fighting terrorism and protecting civil liberties. Only one in three
surveyed indicated they had a major concern that the government has “gone
too far in restricting civil liberties.” A plurality of 46 percent believed that the
government has not gone far enough to protect the country. These results were
similar in 2004 and 2005 (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
2006a, 2006b).
In a later survey conducted by Pew Research Center June 12–16, 2013,
shortly after the release of the initial Snowden material, 54 percent of those
surveyed believed that Snowden should be prosecuted. Independents were less
likely to think that than were either Republicans or Democrats. Regarding
whether the release of classified information about government phone,
Internet data collection program was in the public interest or not, 49 percent
felt it served public interest, while 44 percent believed it did not (Pew
Research Center 2013). Republicans, Democrats, and Independents answered
this question in a similar way. Interestingly, at the same time, 48 percent of
those surveyed approved of the actual government collection of phone and
Internet data as a part of anti-terrorism efforts, while 47 percent did not.
Democrats were much more likely than Republicans and Independents to
approve of the policy (from 58 to 45 percent, then to 42 percent) (Pew
Research Center 2013). This was likely in part due to the fact that a Democrat
was President.
Regarding whether respondents believed the NSA Data Collection
Program actually helped prevent terrorist attacks, 53 percent felt that it had
and this also varied somewhat by political party with 59 percent of
Democrats, 52 percent of Republicans, and only 48 percent of Independents
feeling that way (Pew Research Center 2013). Americans were more likely to
disapprove of the government surveillance program itself in the ensuing
months (Geiger 2018). On a different question about whether government
surveillance had encouraged people to change their habits, a total of 34
percent of those who knew of the government surveillance programs indicated
they had done at least one thing to hide or shield their information from the
government, such as changing their privacy settings on social media (Geiger
2018).
Most Americans believed that it was not acceptable for the United States
to monitor American citizens in general (57–40 percent), but, on the other
hand, they believed that it was acceptable to monitor citizens of other
countries. Sixty percent of those surveyed believe that it was acceptable to
either monitor American leaders or leaders of other countries. A very strong
majority (82 percent) felt that it was acceptable to monitor communications of
suspected terrorists (Geiger 2018).
Over time, surveys since 9/11 (from 2004 through 2016) by Pew Research
Center (2016) have typically found that more Americans are concerned about
protection from terrorism than they are about protection for civil liberties.
This percentage has varied, but, if one compares 2004 with 2016, the results
have been quite similar. In 2004, 49 percent felt that the government had not
gone far enough to protect the country from terrorism, while 29 percent felt
that it had gone too far in restricting civil liberties. In 2016, it was still 49
percent “not gone far enough to protect country” and now 33 percent
indicated that it gone too far restricting civil liberties. However, what has
changed rather dramatically is reflected in the increased political polarization
of the parties in the United States. While the difference in views for the parties
was only 8 percent in 2004, by 2016, 68 percent of Republicans felt that anti-
terrorism policies haven’t gone far enough to protect the United States and
only 46 percent of Democrats felt that way.
Whether the issue is really national security versus civil liberties is not all
that clear, although it has frequently been phrased that way. However, one
could wonder if instead of either/or should individuals be able to have both?
In general, public opinion polls indicate what people think about issues, but
their views might not necessarily be listened to by politicians. However, like
with the political parties themselves, divisions between those surveyed are
tending to illustrate greater polarization of views than previously.
RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE RACIAL

STATE
Ezekiel (1995: xxxiv–xxxv), who has studied African-Americans and white
racists, points out that
the issue of race is absolutely central to American life. Our lives are deeply affected by the
conceptions that segments of our society have of one another and by the institutions that
have grown up over the years to embody these conceptions. Nothing more befogs the
critical relationships of wealth, power, poverty, and the common good than the racism of
our culture.
Thus, racism is often a part of our everyday life whether we are more or less
privileged according to race. The state plays a key role in fostering or
hindering the perpetuation of racism.
In spite of the strong connections between race and politics, there has been
little dialogue until recently between the literatures on the social construction
of race and on political sociology (James and Redding 2005). Pluralists tend
to support normative theories that explain prejudice and discrimination within
a perspective of values and beliefs and how people conform to the dominant
views about minorities (Marger 2009). The state can be seen as both shaping
and being shaped by the norms or basic guidelines of behavior people seem to
follow. The pluralist framework emphasizes that either the assimilation of
various ethnic and racial groups, so they are absorbed into mainstream society,
or the coexistence of a variety of distinct racial and ethnic groups in society is
acceptable. Thus, current policies by the state should facilitate either
assimilation or racial or ethnic pluralism (Kendall 2007).
The elite-managerial framework would emphasize how state-enforced
racial policies contribute to the development of race identities. Unlike the
pluralist view that sees the state as a neutral arbiter, the state shapes racial
inequalities that tend to especially advantage elites (James and Redding 2005).
Redding, James, and Klugman (2005: 546) point out that “race has always
involved politics as both cause and effect.” Further, the authors argue, “the
color conscious policies of the past created race inequalities that are durable”
(546). In the United States, race-conscious and race-neutral policies have
especially been encouraged by “white elites in political arenas” (564).
The class theoretical perspective emphasizes the importance of class in
explaining what has happened to ethnic and racial minorities. Marxist
theorists maintain that capitalists advocate the principle of “divide and rule,”
and ethnic or racial antagonisms provide an important basis on which to
divide the working class in America and thus hamper the development of any
class solidarity. As Marger (2009: 74) summarizes,
Ethnic prejudice, therefore, is viewed as a means of sustaining a system of economic
exploitation, the benefits of which accrue to the capitalist class. Though capitalists may
not consciously conspire to create and maintain racist institutions, they nonetheless reap
the benefits of racist practices and therefore do not seek to completely dismantle them.
By passing and enforcing the policies, the state can help maintain or restrict
institutional discrimination, “the day-to-day practices of organizations and
institutions that have a harmful impact on members of subordinate groups”
(Kendall 2007: 261).
According to James and Redding, the political sociology of race has failed
to develop a theory of the racial state despite the pressing need to consider
“how variation in the political institutionalization of racial practices affects
racial inequalities and identities” (2005: 193). Yet they are encouraged by an
emerging literature that links the political process to identity construction and
inequality. Before we consider the important issues of the racial state raised by
Omi and Winant (1994) and James and Redding (2005), who review an
emerging political sociology of race, it is important to note that not everyone
agrees with the continuing significance of race and the racial state
perpetuating racism. William Julius Wilson’s (1978) The Declining
Significance of Race does not deny the importance of racism but does
emphasize class issues. D’Souza (2009 [1995]: 182) points out that “racism
undoubtedly exists, but it no longer has the power to thwart blacks or any
other group in achieving their economic, political, and social aspirations.”
Steele (2009 [2005]: 220) stresses the idea “that greater responsibility is the
only transforming power that can take blacks to true equality.”2
Explaining the Racial State

Omi and Winant (1994) see the state as comprising institutions or agencies
that carry out policies that are supported by various rules and conditions. In
addition, the state is embedded in the ongoing social relations in the society.
According to them, every state institution is a racial institution although each
state institution does not operate in the same way and may even be working at
cross purposes: “Through policies which are explicitly or implicitly racial,
state institutions organize and enforce the racial policies of everyday life….
They organize racial identities by means of education, family law, and the
procedures for punishment, treatment, and surveillance” (83). For example,
the state formulates and enforces discrimination policies including its agencies
like the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that handles
concerns about residential segregation.
Concerning the historical development of the racial state in the United
States, Omi and Winant (1994: 81) argue that “for most of U.S. history, the
state’s main objective in its racial policy was repression and exclusion.” The
Naturalization Law of 1790 defined the eligibility of American citizenship as
limited to only free “white” immigrants. In counting people for the purpose of
representation and direct taxes, the Constitution defined nonfree persons
(especially slaves) as three-fifths of a person. Omi and Winant (96) also argue
that “race is not only a matter of politics, economics, or culture, but of all
these ‘levels’ of lived experiences simultaneously,” so it is a social
phenomenon affecting a variety of aspects including individual identity,
family, community, and the state. The 1950s and 1960s marked major
transformations in racial identity and the racial state in the civil rights era
(97). Major civil rights laws were passed in the 1960s including the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that resulted in a huge
increase in black voter registration.
James and Redding (2005) take an interesting and different position than
Omi and Winant, specifying that a state is considered a racial state only if it
uses race as a criterion for the enforcement of state policies. James and
Redding are explicit in maintaining that a racial state designation is not
defined by policy outcome, and point out that their definition differs from past
conceptualizations like Omi and Winant’s. James and Redding (187) critique
Omi and Winant’s stance that states are racial “because all states have effects
on racial inequalities” in part because such views provide no understanding of
how states create racial inequalities or identities or the variations between
“racist” and “race-neutral” states.
Color-Blind Policies
Despite their criticisms, James and Redding praise Omi and Winant for
illuminating “how states in racially divided societies produce racially unequal
effects whether the state policy being enforced is explicitly racial or not” and
note that “color-blind policies often create, maintain, or exacerbate racial
inequalities” (James and Redding 2005: 194). Because color-blind policies
ignore the effects of past discrimination thereby safeguarding white privilege
(Bonilla-Silva et al. 2003), color-blind policies are racist. State practices are
influenced by citizen attitudes and those occupying positions of power. For
example, one of the themes of color-blind racism is abstract liberalism, which
refers to those who in principle support equal opportunity, but are not
supportive of governmental programs like affirmative action to help eliminate
racial disadvantage (Bonilla-Silva et al. 2003). Looking at the situation in
2018, post Charlottesville, Bonilla-Silva (2018) recognizes that pockets of
racists could be growing and getting louder due to Trump’s vacillations on
race and who is responsible for events like those in Charlottesville. However,
Bonilla-Silva argues that racial domination is not really due so much to those
white supremacists, but rather “the collective effect of the actions and
inactions of the many. The more we focus on just poor, uneducated whites, the
less we study and fight against structural racism” (26). For Bonilla-Silva, the
key issue is structural racism woven into the fabric of society, so that practices
and behaviors seem to be color-blind or beyond race. Put another way, our
social institutions including government, education, and the economy operate
to insure that certain groups of people occupy lower or higher unequal
positions in society (Marger 2008).
Somewhat similar to what Bonilla-Silva (2003) calls color-blind racism is
the concept of “color coding” that Wilson and Nielsen (2011) examined as a
relatively new form of racism. “Color coding” has also been labeled “aversive
racism,” “symbolic racism,” “racial resentment,” and “laissez-faire racism”
(Wilson and Nielsen 2011). Instead of the blatant segregation of races that
included “Jim Crow” prejudice that considered biological differences in
people’s races, a more subtle form of prejudice or color coding has emerged
that includes support for racial equality in principle, but includes negative
stereotypes of African-Americans as lazy or lacking in work ethic (Wilson and
Nielsen 2011). The authors researched how this color coding influences levels
of support for government spending policies. They found that the subtle forms
of racism do indeed strongly influence people’s attitudes on spending on
government welfare policy, but only moderately affect people’s views on
spending related to crime and do not seem to influence spending on addiction
or urban spending. The authors state that they “suspect that crime, similar to
welfare and race, triggers prejudice because of powerful socialization agents,
including racialized depictions of criminals” and influences from family and
friends (Wilson and Nielsen 2011: 185). Thus, people engage in racialized
interpretations of welfare and crime specifically.
Racial Identity
Individuals perceive racial identities and act on them in both exclusionary
(Jim Crow segregation) and inclusionary (affirmative action) ways. In the case
of a state that has a policy of equal opportunity, there is a mechanism for
policy enforcement such as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). The EEOC is a federal agency charged with enforcing
fair employment laws and investigating claims of discrimination. If race
discrimination did not occur, the state would not need an EEOC. This view
takes racial categories and the impact of those categories on individuals as
something that the state responds to rather than seeing the state as a cause of
racial categories. While the former is certainly true, James and Redding
(2005) argue that the role of the state in shaping racial identities also bears
scrutiny. In other words, state policies should be viewed not just as an effect
of racial identity and inequality, but also as a cause. Using the U.S. Census as
an example, they argue that developing and labeling certain racial categories
is significant because it attributes a certain characteristic to some individuals
and further it enhances the likelihood that such people will then identify
themselves as belonging to that group, which has implications for political
mobilization as well as the application of practices that either enable or
disable racial inequality.
While the state has a powerful role in the creation and maintenance of
racial categories, groups also influence the state. Various groups pushed for a
multiracial category for the U.S. Census and beginning in 2000 respondents
are able to select one or more than one of the designated racial categories.
James and Redding conclude that institutional arrangements matter, and
theorizing about the relationship between state making and race making
should guard against both dismissing the importance of race and
overemphasizing it to the detriment of other factors, including gender and
social class.
The Racial State, Law Enforcement, and Black Lives

Matter
Katel (2016) suggests that the race-centered conflicts calling for reforms are
now stronger than any other time since the civil rights movement(s) of the
1960s. Protesters are often criticizing police tactics and calling for reforms. A
Washington Post database (Sullivan et al. 2018) tracks fatal shootings. From
2007 to 2015, police across the United States shot and killed nearly 1,000
people each year. The number of unarmed black males though killed in 2017
dropped from two years ago. In 2017, police killed nineteen down from the
thirty-six in 2015, and about the same as the seventeen killed in 2016. There
were ninety-four total fatal shootings of unarmed individuals in 2015, but that
number has been reduced to fifty-three in 2016 and sixty-eight in 2017.
Soss and Weaver (2017: 565) “argue that studies of the liberal-democratic
‘first face’ of the state must be complemented by greater attention to the
state’s more controlling ‘second face’” that examines police practices of
“coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation,
discipline, and violence” used to control “race-class subjugated communities.”
According to then (2016) Attorney General Loretta Lynch, this is the “only
face of government [residents] see” (quoted in Soss and Weaver 2017: 584).
Durán (2016) examined shootings including a subset of 218 controversial
police involved in shootings that occurred in Denver, Colorado, from 1983 to
2012. He found that the shootings involving police officers help show how the
law can be used to justify the use of deadly force even in quite questionable
circumstances. Instead of finding fault with the law or restricting the authority
of law enforcement officers and their deadly force discretion, a few “bad
apples” tended to be blamed and reprimanded. Upholding the law continued
to benefit those in power.
Kramer, Remster, and Charles (2017) examined 3.3 million New York
police department investigative pedestrian stops between 2007 and 2014 in an
attempt to determine if policy and training changes would influence the
relationship between race, stops, and violence. In general and at any age,
Black individuals stopped by police were more likely to experience force.
What surprised the authors especially was that more than seven Black children
aged ten to thirteen were stopped by police each day during 2007–2014. Black
youth (ages ten to seventeen) were 41 percent more likely to be victims of any
police use of force than white youth and more than 50 percent more likely to
find themselves looking down the barrel of a gun. Overall Desmond,
Papachristos, and Kirk (2016: 857) seem correct when they point out that
Numerous studies document stark racial disparities in police maltreatment, finding that
black boys and men are disproportionately subject to excessive and sometimes deadly
police force, even after accounting for situational factors of the encounter (e.g., resisting
arrest) and officer characteristics (e.g., age, training).
Although no police officer was involved in the 2012 shooting of Trayvon

Martin, the police were involved in the 2014 choking death of Eric Garner
followed shortly thereafter by the shooting of Michael Brown, which
especially helped facilitate the creation and development of Black Lives
Matter (BLM). About the time a jury announced that Zimmerman, the shooter
of Trayvon Martin, was acquitted, many African-American activists were
meeting in 2013 in Chicago and organized a protest. Also Alicia Garza, an
experienced organizer, posted the phrase “Black lives matter” and shortly
thereafter her colleague Patrisse Cullors created the hashtag
#BlackLivesMatter, which went viral on Twitter and other social media. Juries
failed to indict either police officer in the deaths of Garner and Brown. On the
day it was announced that Brown’s shooter would not be indicted, Twitter
users associated with BLM sent 2.4 million tweets and later when Garner’s
acquittal was announced 4.4 million tweets were sent over a seven-day period.
BLM has become well known for organizing protests due to fatal shootings of
unarmed African-American men by police (Milkman 2017).
Milkman (2017) identified several key characteristics of BLM including
such social characteristics as being comprised basically of outsiders of color
who tended to be Millennials. Their members and leaders are intersectional
such that many of them are female and/or, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and queer (LGBTQ) struggling against racism, sexism, classism, and
heterosexism. They are a bottom up movement led by educated youth who are
very critical of the hierarchical and male-dominated leadership of the civil
rights movement. Their main goal is “to expose and challenge the legitimacy
of racialized police violence and mass incarceration” (24–25). They are
organized in nonhierarchical, “leaderful” style. In terms of strategy, they
prefer direct action that can be disruptive as they challenge the basic social
structure and criticize conventional politics. They want significant systemic
changes, but have also advocated for a jobs program and voting rights.
NEWARK, NJ—JULY 25, 2015: More than one thousand activists gathered
for a rally & march against police brutality
Credit: a katz / shutterstock.com
BLM has been praised but also questioned, including being criticized for
their name/slogan. Hinkson, a sociology professor, points out the relevance of
the slogan because “We’re told in so many ways that ‘no, your lives don’t
matter’” (Katel 2016: 36). Obama and others have argued that the slogan is
not suggesting other lives do not matter but referencing a very specific issue
for African-Americans. Some police officials and others though have argued
that the slogan is anti-police and not recognizing that most black homicides
are committed by African-Americans themselves (Katel 2016). Other slogans
including “Blue Lives Matter” and “All Lives Matter” have been used at times
to challenge “Black Lives Matter” (Kramer, Remster, and Charles 2018).
Katel (2016: 36) notes that “Criticism of the movement [BLM], however,
grew more heated after a handful of African-Americans were accused of
attacking police.” Clayton (2018) is concerned that some consider BLM as
divisive and confrontational. However, Clayton also recognizes that “It is the
purpose of social movements to be disruptive, to use combative tactics, and to
interrupt business as usual” (p. 475) and credits BLM with placing the issues
“of police brutality and criminal justice reform at the top of the national
agenda” (p. 475). He does suggest though that BLM try to gain more support
from mainstream America.
Ince, Rojas, and Davis (2017) examined tweets from hashtags that co-
occurred with “#BlackLivesMatter” during three phases of 2014: (1)
beginning of 2014 through August 9, the time period before and until the date
Michael Brown was shot; (2) from August 10 to November 24, the period
after Brown’s shooting until the grand jury decided not to indict Darren
Wilson who killed Brown; and (3) hashtags from November 24 through
November 30, 2014 which is after the release of the grand jury decision.
There were a total of 66,159 tweets with by far the largest (45,844) being
during the short time period included after the non-indictment of Darren
Wilson. Ince et al. (2017) in their detailed analysis focused on the top 100
hashtags. Five elements of BLM framing were examined: Ferguson (18
percent), movement tactics (16 percent), police violence (23 percent),
movement solidarity (25 percent), and counter-protests (4 percent). Prior to
the shooting death of Brown, #BlackLivesMatter was only mentioned 373
times, but its dramatic escalation after that demonstrated that the protests after
Brown’s death “catapulted the movement to national consciousness” (Ince et
al. 2017: 1824). Discussions of solidarity and protest tactics such as boycotts,
die-ins, and the National Day against Police Brutality increased. Finally, there
was a counter-protest movement especially directed toward subverting the
typical #BlackLivesMatter collective response to Ferguson and the grievances
against the state. Brown’s death “represented a failure of the state” (1827) and
Ferguson “represented the larger issue of state violence against the African-
American community” (1827).
The U.S. DOJ (2015) investigated the Ferguson Police Department from
September 2014 through March 4, 2015, and concluded that the department’s
approach to law enforcement reflected and reinforced racial bias that
overwhelmingly and disproportionately harmed African-Americans. This
could not be explained by any difference in the rate at which people from
different races violated the law. DOJ found that the distrust of the Ferguson
Police by the African-American community was longstanding and basically
due to Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement that included “patterns of
unnecessarily aggressive and at times unlawful policing” (5).
Much of the Ferguson law enforcement practices were strongly influenced
by Ferguson’s desire for revenue generation rather than public safety
concerns. There was aggressive enforcement of Ferguson’s municipal code
with promotions and evaluations tied to the number of citations issued.
African-Americans were often viewed more as sources of revenue than as
constituents needing to be protected. Supervisors and leadership did little to
ensure that the officers were acting within the law and rarely provided
meaningful response to civilian complaints (DOJ 2015).
A Missouri attorney general’s office 2018 report confirmed that problems
still remain finding that black drivers were 85 percent more likely to be pulled
over in traffic stops than whites in 2017, the highest difference since stops
data have been collected (eighteen years ago). Multiple citations tended to be
the pattern when African-American drivers were ticketed. “Driving while
black” can also result in blacks being arrested for violations or for unpaid
fines. One interviewee mentioned: “It’s a money thing; they stop people for
the least little thing so they can give you a ticket, so you will have to pay”
(Lartey 2018).
Public Opinion
Although, on the 0°–100° “feeling thermometer”-type question on the police,
the large majority consider the police officers positively, there are major
differences between blacks and whites (with Hispanics in-between) and
between Democrats and Republicans. Seventy-three percent of whites were
somewhat warm or very warm, 55 percent of Hispanics and only 30 percent of
blacks were that warm. The racial and ethnic differences were consistent with
previous Pew Research Center findings. Republicans viewed the police more
favorably than Democrats with Independents in-between (Fingerhut 2017c).
Regarding the issues of being color blind, structural racism, and racial
discrimination, we see that Pew Research Center (2017b) found in a June–
July 2017 survey that 41 percent of Americans indicated that racial
discrimination was the main reason many blacks cannot get ahead. This was
the highest percentage of Americans who felt this way in the twenty-three
years this question has been asked. However, 49 percent of Americans agreed
that blacks who cannot get ahead are mostly responsible for their own
condition. While the former could be interpreted as referring to structural
racism, the latter could be suggesting that some blacks as individuals are
simply not willing to work hard enough to be successful.
The Racial State, Law Enforcement, White Nationalists,

and Counter-Protesters
While various minority groups are protesting, so too there are small groups of
whites who want their own white nation. Many of these groups rallied
together in “Unite the Right” events in Charlottesville Virginia August 11–12,
2017. See Text box 5.3 on the events in Charlottesville where white nationalist
protesters and counter-protesters from numerous groups including BLM
demonstrated and confronted each other.
TEXT BOX 5.3

Charlottesville and Its 2017 Controversies by Madison
Wiegand and Betty Dobratz
Like several other southern communities, Charlottesville faces the issue of
what to do with statues of leaders who fought for the Confederacy during
the Civil War (1861–1865). Rushing (2018: 18) argues that issues over
Confederate statues in public spaces provide important opportunities to
both understand and contest “historically embedded institutional
processes” and removing them “serves the public interest by challenging
both messages and practices of exclusion, discrimination, and racism.”
The Robert E. Lee statue has been in Charlottesville since 1924, but the
NAACP and other groups called for its removal. Zyahna Bryant, a high
school student, petitioned the City Council to remove it and, in May 2016,
a special committee in the City Council discussed its removal, relocation,
or historical contextualization. In February 2017, the City Council voted to
remove it. According to Hunton and Williams (2017: ix), “the action
triggered a series of events that brought hatred, violence and despair to our
community. Three people lost their lives, and numerous other lives were
dramatically and unalterably changed by what happened in our
community.” The opposition to removal sued and the removal is being
challenged in court and held up in part by litigation and interpretation of a
state law regarding war memorials.
Prior to the events of August 11–12, 2017, there were two other 2017
protest events: May 13–14 and July 8 from which ideally law enforcement
and others should have learned. We reply heavily on the “Final Report:
Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville,
Virginia” (Hunton and Williams 2017) to discuss the various events. Jason
Kessler, a local resident of Charlotte ville, and Richard Spencer, a well-
known white nationalist associated with the National Policy Institute,
organized the first protest events (May 13) (Hunton and Williams 2017: 1)
although they did not seem to be promoted in advance and no permits were
obtained for them. Spencer talked of a war of genocide against whites and
praised Robert E. Lee and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson as white heroes
whose statues were being threatened. The evening of May 13 there was a
torch lit march by more than 100 demonstrators who shouted “we will not
be overcome.” The mayor of Charlottesville stated that the event was
“either profoundly ignorant or designed to instill fear in our minority
populations in a way that hearkens back to the days of the KKK” (Hunton
and Williams 2017: 28).
There were very prompt and strong counter-protests to these events
including a candlelight vigil, May 14. Kessler tried to disrupt the vigil and
he and a counter-protester were arrested. It became clear that the possible
removal of the Lee statute was becoming part of the “national debate on
race and cultural heritage” (Hunton and Williams 2017: 31). About three
weeks after the May events, the Charlottesville City Council unanimously
voted to change the name of Jackson Park to Justice Park and the name of
Lee Park to Emancipation Park.
The July 8 Loyal White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan rally was also
about the Lee statue. The Charlottesville Police Department (CPD) was the
major coordinating organization with its most important assistance from
the Virginia State Police (VSP), which commits personnel and other
resources to local police agencies to help them prepare for and handle large
events. It appeared that CPD frequently shared and updated information
with VSP, but the latter did not do likewise.
On the positive side, law enforcement protected free speech of
protesters and counter-protesters and public safety without violating the
First Amendment rights of anyone. There was no serious injury, wide scale
disorder, or property damage on July 8 (Hunton and Wiliams 2017).
However, problems occurred including: (1) various government agencies
were not well integrated in part because there was no joint training for all
personnel. (2) The operation plan created by CPD did not create enough
space between the competing groups. This poor planning resulted in
unlawful-assembly declarations, which required aggressive responses from
law enforcement to enforce the declarations. (3) Negative attitudes toward
law enforcement were fueled by the use of tear gas that was dispersed by
VSP orders that were outside the well-defined chain of unified command.
(4) Law enforcement could not easily access their riot gear, which was not
close by.
CP Chief Thomas explained that he did not have sufficient time to do a
careful review of the July 8 events because CPD had to plan for August 12.
This was a mistake because the July concerns resurfaced in the August
events. On May 30, Kessler initially applied for the August permit for the
Unite the Right rally at Emancipation Park, but the City at nearly the last
moment decided it should be at McIntire Park and informed Kessler of the
change, August 7. Kessler refused this and with the support of the
American Civil Liberties Foundation of Virginia and the Rutherford
Institute, he sued the City on August 10. On August 11, the court supported
Kessler’s request for Emancipation Park.
The Unite the Right group secretly planned to have a Torch-lit rally
near the University of Virginia, but anti-racist activists and students from
the University of Virginia discovered this plan and confrontations occurred.
Eventually, the University Police Department requested assistance (10:16
pm), but by then much of the disorders around the Jefferson monument
were over with participants fleeing or dazed (Hunton and Williams 2017:
118). CPD arrived immediately (10:17 pm) and an unlawful assembly was
declared at 10:24 pm, the area was cleared by 10:29 pm, and by 10:43 pm
the officers departed the area. In the aftermath, one person was arrested and
several were treated for exposure to pepper spray.
On August 12, commanders from CPD and VSP had radio contact with
their respective subordinates, but not with each other even though Chief
Thomas had expected them to use linked communications channels. VSP
troopers stationed in and around Emancipation Park went “Off-plan” and
decided not to order troopers to go over their barricades and engage the
crowd if their safety was compromised. Although many officers had
wanted to be dressed in riot gear or have the riot gear with them, Chief
Thomas did not approve that. The lack of gear and special training helps
explain too why when participants on both sides asked officers for help,
they often refused to go outside their barricades. The typical pattern of
confrontation seemed to be that as a Unite the Right group approached
Emancipation Park, the counter-protesters would block them. The Unite the
Right group would use their shields, flags, flag poles, and fists to start
fights, which would be broken up by pepper spray. The counter-protestors
would eventually though be forced to allow them entry to the park.
Although the CPD officers were typically not engaging protesters and
counter-protesters even in the face of violence, at 11:01 am they were
ordered to go to Zone 4 and put on riot gear. At the supply trailer officers,
many of whom had never worn the gear, searched through bins to find the
appropriate equipment. While the fighting continued especially on Market
Street and clouds of pepper spray rose every few minutes, two persons later
reported that Chief Thomas stated “Let them fight, it’ll make it easier to
declare an unlawful assembly.” It was not until 11:31 that an unlawful
assembly was declared.
Tammy Shiflett, a school resource officer stationed at 4th Street NE and
Market Street, did not have protective gear and felt in danger as crowds
passed by her. One officer went to help her and they left that area, but no
one was notified to fill her position so the zone was left unsupervised in the
midst of the chaos. About 1 pm, allegedly James Alex Fields Jr, again
allegedly a supporter of Unite the Right rally, drove his car into counter-
protesters at 4th St and Water killing Charlottesville resident and counter-
protester Ms. Heather Heyer and harming numerous others. Hours later, a
VSP helicopter monitoring the activities crashed killing the two troopers
inside adding to the death toll.
The independent review found that City officials and law enforcement
failed to protect both free expression and public safety with the most tragic
failure involving the death of Heyer. The attempt to keep the Unite the
Right supporters and counter-protesters separate failed miserably, and this
was accompanied by failures to intervene in violent disorders and
unwillingness to respond to requests for assistance. The CPD operational
plan for the rally was disconnected and inadequate and, like on July 8,
tactical gear was not readily available to officers when needed. The VSP
did not share its own plan with the CPD. Residents of Charlottesville and
others intensified their distrust of the City and law enforcement.
The independent investigation recommended that Charlottesville
restore confidence in its City government, its police department attempt to
better understand and respond to community needs, and diverse
stakeholders and residents in the city listen, participate, and cooperate with
each other (“not yell at each other”) to reduce the divisions in the
community (Hunton and Williams 2017: 177). After the independent final
report was released, Police Chief Thomas retired.
Kessler considered another rally on the one-year anniversary at
Charlottesville, but then decided to focus his attention and those of others
on the Unite the Right II in Washington D.C. Both Charlottesville and the
state of Virginia though declared a state of emergency for the first
anniversary of the Unite the Right rally. On August 11–12, there was
extraordinary police presence although white nationalist organizations did
not show up, but hundreds of protesters did. Many questioned the strong
law enforcement presence with their checkpoints, metal detectors, fencing,
and barricades, while others felt their presence was needed to make sure
that everyone was safe (McCoy 2018). McCoy identified only two arrests
and that the city remained divided on how forcefully institutional racism
should be confronted (McCoy 2018). Fausset (2018) reported that, on
Sunday, there were “few if any far-right deomonstrators….the most
palpable tensions developed between left-wing protesters and the police,
whose presence in the city was heavy and, some argued, heavy-handed,”
but there were only a handful of arrests.
Charlottesville will likely continue to deal with the fallout from the
August 11–12, 2017 Unite the Right rally and the issue of the Robert E.
Lee statue for some time. Beckett (2018) pointed out that local activists
tend to believe that there are “Some residents seeing the neo-Nazis as
outsiders who invaded the town and demeaned its good reputation, and
others who see white supremacism as part of the city’s daily reality, one
that will require a much deeper fight to dislodge.” The new mayor Nikuyah
Walker stated that there were many who desired a return to normal, but, as
she noted, many black, Hispanic or low-income whites don’t want to return
to that. Charlottesville residents might be more aware of these issues
related to race and social class, but many communities likely face similar
concerns as well.
Questions to Consider: Are you aware of other communities that face
similar issues as those Charlottesville is dealing with? What should cities
do when approached for rallies by the alt-right or white supremacists? Do
you think counter-protesters should confront supporters of groups like
Unite the Right or should they as some recommend hold their own get-
togethers elsewhere to promote racial harmony? Why? What are the
strengths and weaknesses of these two strategies? What other possibilities
are there for dealing with such rallies?
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA—AUGUST 2017: Memorial flowers and notes
are left at the spot where Heather Heyer was killed and others were injured
when a car plowed into a crowd of protesters during a rally
Credit: Kim Kelley-Wagner / Shutterstock.com
President Trump initially spoke out about the 2017 events in

Charlottesville by condemning the “hatred, bigotry and violence on many
sides” stressing the “many sides” twice (Helmore and Beckett 2017), but did
not forcefully single out white nationalists. Two days later, he stated “We
condemn in the strongest possible terms the egregious display of hatred,
bigotry and violence. It has no place in America” and added “Racism is evil
and those who cause violence in its name are criminals and thugs, including
the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists and other hate groups that are
repugnant to all that we hold dear as Americans” (Nakamura 2017). Later, he
again seemed to equivocate and, in a speech in Phoenix Arizona, expressed
his dissatisfaction with the “weak, weak people,” who were supporting
removal of the Confederate statues stating “They’re trying to take away our
culture. They’re trying to take away our history” (Bradner 2017).
A Washington Post-ABC News poll conducted from August 16 to 20
found very strong support across party lines for the statement that it was
unacceptable to hold white supremacist views with only 9 percent believing
such views were acceptable. Concerning Trump’s views, 42 percent felt
Trump was placing white supremacists on equal standing with those who
oppose these groups, but 35 percent believed that he was not doing so.
Another 23 percent had no opinion. More than 60 percent of the Republicans
approved of Trump’s response to the protests, while about 20 percent did not
and another 20 percent had no opinion (Clement and Nakamura 2017).
Unite the Right II rally occurred in Washington D.C. with very few
supporters (two dozen to less than forty) participating (Fausset 2018; Helm et
al. 2018). While it seems paradoxical, the 2017 Charlottesville Unite the Right
seemed to “represent a zenith in the rise of the alt-right, and the beginning of a
shift” that showed signs of collapse due in part to internal divisions and the
actions of those opposed to the movement (Lenz 2018: 32).
It appears that events such as Charlottesville and the President’s reactions
to them and to other aspects related to race and immigration have contributed
to making race an important consideration in the 2018 election and beyond
(Karni 2018). With all the attention given to white nationalists in places like
Charlottesville, Ray (2018: 21) cautions that this is an incomplete picture of
white supremacy because
White supremacy has always been mainstream. The electoral college, the dilution of non-
White political power through gerrymandering and voter suppression, attacks on
affirmative action, disparate lending practices, and residential segregation all contribute to
intractable racial inequalities and are, in many cases, more consequential in shaping the
lives of people of color than is the far right.
There are many types of social and political changes that are needed to reduce
white supremacy that affects politics and people’s everyday lives. More
government resources and better laws, for example, are needed to improve
schools, where many minority students attend and equal access to housing in
various neighborhoods could help advance equality in people’s everyday
lives.
We now turn to another important issue, immigration, which also is a
major issue of racial or ethnic contention and shows significant differences in
people’s views.
IMMIGRATION: A MAJOR ETHNIC AND RACIAL

ISSUE FACING THE UNITED STATES
Brooks, Manza, and Cohen (2016) point out that in numerous developed
countries, immigration has actually transformed the populations there, which
has resulted in intense conflicts about social inclusion and citizenship.
Waldinger (2008: 306) clearly identifies how political and controversial the
issue of immigration is in the United States when he states, “Immigration is
roiling American politics, with controversy continuing and no clear solution in
sight.” He explains how governments at various levels “create differences
between the people of the state and all other people in the state” (306) such as
the divide between citizens and noncitizens. Illegal immigrants may not be
able to obtain a driver’s license or other benefits reserved for American
citizens, they can be deported if convicted of a felony, and they cannot vote.
He points out how our democratic values are being sacrificed: “The damage,
rather, is to the American democracy, decreasingly a government of and for the
people, when barely a third of all foreign-born persons living on U.S. soil are
eligible to vote” (306). Waldinger contrasts the approaches to citizenship in
Canada and the United States. In the United States, the government follows a
laissez-faire or neutral approach with no impediments to vote for legal
immigrants, but individuals have to obtain citizenship on their own. In Canada,
the state actively supports and encourages citizenship and has multicultural
policies helping citizens retain ties to their country of origin.
Janoski and Wang (2005) examine Gimpel and Edwards’ (1999) work that
suggests that by 1982, political parties had become intensely polarized on the
issue of immigration policy. Those who favor expansion of immigration on the
basis of expanding citizenship rights are more likely to be Democrats. The
mainly Republican “free-market expansionists” are less interested in
citizenship aspects, but want to ease labor shortages and thus also support
increasing immigration. Some of those who want to restrict immigration do so
because they focus on doing what is best for labor and African-Americans
rather than for new immigrants. Others want to protect American–European
culture and thus want to restrict immigration. Some social scientists emphasize
that state elites shape the immigration policy often to benefit themselves or
corporate elites (Janoski and Wang 2005).
Douglas, Saenz, and Murga (2015) applied the key ideas of Bonilla-Silva’s
color-blind racism to their review of immigration policies and practices during
the eras of both explicit racialization and the more subtle use of racialization
beginning in 1965. Marger (2015: 199–200) drawing on the ideas of Bonilla-
Silva and others explains color-blind racism this way:
the tendency for white Americans to maintain that the United States, in the post-civil rights
era, is now a meritocratic society in which color no longer matters (Bonilla-Silva and
Dietrich 2011; Forman 2004). Hence, whatever shortcomings remain for blacks are the
result of individual effort, obviating the need for compensatory measures like affirmative
action.
Therefore, many whites have come to believe that racial inequalities are no
longer an important concern for the government.
Douglas et al. (2015: 1445) identified common themes such as “a border
out of control, protect the border, ease tax burdens of Americans, fairness and
integrity, and deportation of criminal aliens” used in Congress since 1965 to
justify, for example, the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) passed in 1996. Nearly twenty years since the passage of the
IIRIRA, the authors believe that attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants are
even harsher than in 1996 and Congress has become even more polarized
within political parties. Immigration policy has been color-coded favoring
Whites and continues to be “anything but non-racial” (1447). Since 1965, there
is a new framing of “‘illegal aliens’ as the current culprits for all of the
nation’s woes and includes: they take jobs away from deserving citizens,
utilize scare resources, and have no respect for the rule of law” (1147), making
it difficult for nonwhite immigrants to be treated fairly and equally. Douglas et
al. conclude that despite what color-blind supporters maintain, race remains a
significant feature of life in the United States. Vickerman (2018: 25) points out
that racism “operates culturally through colorblindness, and persists in
structures that disproportionately harm people of color.”
Data from 2015 indicate that there were 11 million unauthorized
immigrants in the United States. Pew Research Center estimates the number
for 2016 at 11.3 million. Unauthorized immigrants compose about 3.4 percent
of the total U.S. population in 2015 and account for about 5 percent (8 million)
of those working or looking for work in the United States. In the last decade,
at least Mexicans comprised the majority of the unauthorized immigrant
population, but, in 2016, they appear to be just half, the first time that number
has been less than a majority in recent times. The percentage of unauthorized
immigrants that have lived in the United States for more than a decade is
increasing (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn 2017). There are approximately thirty-
four million lawful immigrants in the United States. Many of them reside in
the United States and work after they have received lawful permanent
residence (often called the green card). Others could be on temporary visas
available to students or workers. There are also about a million unauthorized
immigrants that have temporary permission to live and work in the United
States due to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and Temporary
Protected Status. In 2016, 84,995 refugees were admitted, but this declined to
53,716 in 2017 due to a lowered admissions cap and in 2018 it was set at
45,000 by the Trump administration (Krogstad and Gonzalez-Barrera 2018).
Records indicate that 804,793 people received family-based U.S. lawful
permanent residence in fiscal year 2016. Such people can receive a green card
if they already have a spouse, child, sibling, or parent that is a U.S. citizen and
is living in the United States. A single country cannot account for more than 7
percent of all green cards issued each year, so some applicants can wait for
years before they receive a green card (Krogstad and Gonzalez-Barrera 2018).
There have been discussions to change the current U.S. system that
emphasizes family reunification and employment-based migration toward a
points-based system in which immigrants with certain education levels and
employment qualifications would have priority. The Trump administration
seems quite interested in such a change (Krogstad and Gonzalez-Barrera
2018).
Zero Tolerance and Separation of Families

The Trump administration for a short time in 2018 introduced its “zero
tolerance” policy that separated families seeking asylum at the southwest U.S.
border until a public outcry resulted in its being stopped (Hawkins 2018).
According to then Attorney General Jeff Sessions,
If people don’t want to be separated from their children, they should not bring them with
them. We’ve got to get this message out. You’re not given immunity….you will be
prosecuted if you bring, if you come illegally, and if you bring children, you’ll still be
prosecuted.
(Hewitt 2018)
More than 2,500 children were separated from their parents when the
policy was started with Attorney General Sessions’ announcement of a “Zero
Tolerance” policy at the southwest border of the United States on April 6,
2018, and ended by President’s Trump’s executive order on June 20 when he
stated that migrant families would be kept together after they are detained at
the border (Hegarty 2018). In 2017, John F. Kelly, serving at the time as
homeland security secretary and then through part of December 2018 as
Trump’s chief of staff, proposed the idea of separation of children possibly as
a deterrence policy. Supposedly it was not approved then but data reviewed by
the New York Times in an article published on April 20, 2018 (Dickerson
2018) showed that more than 700 children had been taken from adults since
October 2017, including more than 100 under the age of 4.
On June 26, Judge Dana M. Sabraw allowed a preliminary injunction
requested by the ACLU that permitted only fourteen days for the return of
children under age five to their families and thirty days for the return of other
children. He criticized the Trump administration for “a chaotic circumstance
of the government’s own making” that was a sharp departure from “Measured
and ordered governance, which is central to the concept of due process
enshrined in our Constitution.” Further, he criticized the poor record keeping
of migrant children that “are not accounted for with the same efficiency and
accuracy as property” (Barrett et al. 2018).
In an article published on August 10, 2018, Shapiro and Sharma (2018)
found that more than 2,500 children had been separated from their parents or
other adults in spring 2018. Not all of these had been reunited by Judge
Sabraw’s deadlines. As of August 9, 2018, 559 children were still separated
while 1,992 had either been released or reunited. Records indicated that the
parents or those connected with 299 children were no longer in the United
States either having been deported or left voluntarily. There were also 163
children that either waived their reunification rights or were against
reunification. However, ACLU has filed court papers alleging that parents
who waived reunification either did not understand what was being said or
were under duress. Red flags were triggered on the backgrounds of parents for
another eighty-seven children and, for eighty-eight children, there was other
unspecified litigation preventing reunification.
SAN FRANCISCO, CA—JUNE 30, 2018: Thousands of protestors in a
“Families Belong Together” march to City Hall, protesting Trump’s “Zero
Tolerance” policy and the separation of more than 2,000 children
Credit: Sheila Fitzgerald / Shutterstock.com
Even when reunification is achieved, the effects for children, especially

young children, are traumatic and can even carry into adulthood including
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), future depression,
substance abuse, violent tendencies, and difficulty forming relationships down
the line according to Dr. Jeff Temple, psychologist at the University of Texas
Medical Branch. He also points out that these children likely had already
encountered stressors associated with why they left their home and the
journey to the United States. Other experts suggested the children may suffer
“irrevocable harm” and “lasting neuropsychological damage”. Some nuanced
issues could occur about establishing relationships, controlling emotions, and
trusting others (Ducharne 2018). Healy (2018) found that a typical sequence
for children experiencing separation is protest, despair, and detachment with
the latter happening in less than a month’s time. Further, evidence suggests
that “Such an experience casts a shadow well into adulthood and that the
effects may even extend beyond a single generation.”
A couple of opinion polls showed that while Republicans were much more
likely to support the Trump administration’s policy of prosecuting
immediately those who illegally cross the U.S. border and then request
asylum, Independents and especially Democrats were quite opposed to it. A
Quinnipiac University poll released in June 2018 asked one’s opinion about
Trump’s policy prosecuting parents seeking asylum, which meant separating
parents from their children. Sixty-six percent of those surveyed responded that
they opposed the policy including 91 percent of Democrats, 68 percent of
Independents, and only 35 percent of Republicans. Fifty-five percent of
Republicans supported it with another 11 percent not knowing or did not
answer. Blacks, Hispanics, younger people, women, and more educated
whites were likely to oppose such a policy (Matthews 2018). An Ipsos poll
exclusively for the Daily Beast framed the deterrence rationale prominently
asking whether respondents agreed with the following statement: “It is
appropriate to separate undocumented immigrant parents from their children
when they cross the border in order to discourage others from crossing the
border illegally.” Only 14 percent of Democrats, 29 percent of Independents,
and 46 percent of Republicans agree with that statement; 75 percent of
Democrats, 32 percent of Republicans, and 56 percent of Independents
disagreed with the statement. The remainder either neither agreed nor
disagreed or didn’t know. While the two studies have somewhat similar
findings, in the Ipsos poll less than a majority of Republicans agreed with the
pro-Trump statement (Matthews 2018).
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

Recent comprehensive national legislation on immigration has been debated,
but not passed even though President Trump has advocated for it including for
building a wall along the southwest border. We focus here particularly on
President Obama’s 2012 Executive Order Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals known as DACA. The Development, Relief and Education for Alien
Minors (DREAM) Act was first introduced in Congress in August 2001,
before 9/11. It was intended to offer legal residency and a path to citizenship
for unauthorized immigrants who had come to the United States as children.
The act called for them to finish two years of college or serve two years in the
military along with other requirements (Milkman 2017).
While various versions have been proposed or included in legislation, it
has never passed. Thus, Obama declared the executive order. Obama’s version
provided that such individuals needed to be under the age of sixteen when
they came. Individuals would apply for protection from deportation and after
passing a background check, they were able to get renewable two-years
permits to work and study in the United States. According to Krogstad (2017),
nearly 790,000 young unauthorized immigrants out of possibly 1.1 million
had obtained deportation relief and work permits by fiscal year 2017. Then, in
2017, Trump announced that permits would begin to expire in March of 2018.
Those who opposed DACA argued that it rewarded illegal immigration and
was not something Obama had the power to do. Democrats typically support
DACA, but most Republicans and President Trump want to pair that
legislation with added border security and measures to deter illegal
immigration. Trump wants funding for a border wall and reductions in family-
based migration (Kopan 2018). Those who came to the United States as
children became known as Dreamers. Like BLM, the activists and leaders are
typically viewed as outsiders based on their color and at times their LGBTQ
status. Unlike BLM, they have tended to use traditional forms of organization,
work “inside the system,” and engage in conventional politics (Milkman
2017).
Dreamers tend to be highly educated with one survey in 2011–2012
finding their average age as twenty-one and 95 percent had at least attended a
postsecondary educational institution (Milkman 2017). Until DACA, they
were not allowed to work in the formal economy. Dreamers generally support
intersectionality of race, class, gender, and sexuality. They have become
increasingly impatient with the struggle for acceptance and more independent
of mainstream immigrant rights. They were often successful in gaining in-
state tuition and access to college financial aid and to drivers’ licenses. Some
have turned to more militant tactics according to Milkman (2017).
Gonzales (2011) found that the experiences of Dreamers has resulted in “a
turbulent transition and has profound implications for identity formation,
friendship patterns, aspirations and expectations, and social and economic
mobility” (602). The public school system protected them as it helped
integrate them into U.S. society. Gonzales wrote about Dreamers’ experiences
prior to Obama’s executive order but as of 2018 Dreamers’ situation remains
in flux. This seems to be an important issue that needs resolution.
Muslim Americans
In the United States, many did not think much about Muslim Americans until
the terrorist attacks in 2001. Muslims represent a religious faith rather than a
racial or ethnic group. Roughly half of Muslim immigrants (56 percent) have
come to the United States since 2000 from a number of countries. No single
region or country accounts for a majority of them. The plurality of all U.S.
Muslims is white (41 percent), with 28 percent Asian, 20 percent black, 8
percent Hispanic, and 3 percent other or mixed. Foreign-born Muslims are
more likely to be white than U.S. born (45–35 percent) and more likely to be
Asian (41–10 percent). Put another way, U.S. born are more likely to be black
(32 percent) or Hispanic (17 percent). U.S. Muslims identified seventy-five
countries of origin with some of the most frequent countries of origin being
Pakistan, Iran, India, and Afghanistan. Muslim immigrants are more likely to
have higher household income and have a college degree than U.S. Muslims
(Pew Research Center 2018).
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), greatly stirred up the
debate over immigration although none of the terrorists were immigrants per
se. They were from Middle Eastern countries and generally held tourist or
student visas. The numbers of legal immigrants from Middle Eastern or
mainly Muslim countries are not large. However, shortly after the terrorist
attacks, more than 12,000 Middle Easterners were rounded up by federal
agents. Most were released or deported by August 2002 (Katel, Marshall, and
Greenblatt 2008). Marger (2009) points out that being Arab and being Muslim
are not the same thing. Americans had viewed Arabs with suspicion even
before 9/11 due in part to the oil crisis, but the suspicions and negative images
grew considerably after that. Marger (350) argues that the “government-
induced environment of fear, following the September 11 attacks” has created
and sustained the negative images of Muslims. Tumlin (2004: 1175) supports
Marger’s view by stating, “A hallmark of terrorism policy’s control over
immigration policy since 9/11 is the institution of what I call an immigration-
plus profiling regime which targets immigrants of certain national origins and
presumed Muslim religious identity for increased scrutiny.”
Aizpurua et al. (2017), drawing on survey data collected only months after
9/11, found as expected that the public supported increased security in the
United States. Both support for policies criminalizing Muslims (e.g.
forbidding all visitors or immigrants from Islamic nations to come to the
United States) and perceived personal threat (being worried the person or their
family would be a victim of a terrorist attack) predicted support for criminal
policies intended to maintain security. Older people, conservatives,
individuals less likely to support individual freedom, and those living in the
South or the Northeast were most likely to support enhanced security.
Since President Trump took office, he issued three different travel bans
especially although not only related to Muslim countries to enhance U.S.
security. They were challenged in the lower courts, but the third ban was
initially allowed by the Supreme Court to go into effect while it was being
litigated. In June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the ban in a 5-4 decision. It
bars almost all travelers from five mainly Muslim countries—Syria, Yemen,
Libya, Somalia, and Iran—as well as restricting government officials from
Venezuela and travelers from North Korea (Totenberg and Montanaro 2018).
The plaintiffs had argued that Trump’s negative characterizations of Muslims
during his Presidential campaign needed to be taken into account in deciding
the case (Totenberg and Montanaro 2018). However, Chief Justice Roberts
who wrote the opinion for the majority focused on whether Trump’s ban itself
was justified by national security concerns. He wrote the ban was “expressly
premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be
adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices”
(Liptak and Shear 2018). Sotomayer in her dissent though believed the court
should have found that the policy was inspired by “animosity toward a
disfavored group” (Barnes and Marimow 2018).
Muslim Americans comprise about 3.1 million or 1 percent of the U.S
population and are the second largest religious minority in the United States.
Christians are the majority group followed by Jewish Americans (Yukich
2018). Yukich (2018) suggests that while certainly not all Muslim Americans
are progressive, many of them are concerned about President Trump’s views
and policies, including his anti-Muslim policies and rhetoric. Drawing on
significant websites, newspaper sources, and social media, Yukich identified
eight ways Muslim Americans are responding to the Trump presidency:
1. Educating non-Muslims about Islam. In response to Trump’s presidency,
some Muslims are trying to counter the negative stereotypes and anti-
Muslim beliefs that exist. There are a number of fringe anti-Muslim
groups that have especially appealed to Republicans. Lectures by Muslim
speakers have been given at Churches, community centers, synagogues,
etc., to help educate people. Some Muslims write op-ed pieces and
numerous Web sites such as “True Islam” provide replies to some of the
misconceptions about Islam.
2. Resistance to the Educator Role. It should be pointed out though that some
Muslims also resist filling the role of “defender of Islam” because of both
principle and pragmatism. Resisters feel it inappropriate to constantly
apologize for themselves in order to be accepted and convince others that
they are not terrorists. Some believe “that oppressed groups should not be
responsible for convincing those in power that they should not be
oppressed” (Yukich 2018: 231). Others believe educating non-Muslims
about Islam involves too much simplifying of complex ideas and
traditions.
The following three responses all involve working for religious change within
the Muslim faith. They include (3) the promotion of more progressive forms
of Islam that would discourage radicalism; (4) strengthening ties between
immigrant and African-American Muslims; and (5) building interfaith
relationships through partnering with Christians, Jews, and others, and thus
calling on fellow people of faith to promote Muslim civil liberties.
Two other responses involve what Yukich labels “Activism for Social
Change” (235). Thus, (6) involves defending the civil rights of Muslims and
includes such activities as mobilizing Muslim communities against Trump’s
Muslim ban. Number (7) is based on “working for a more just society.” Many
Muslim Americans had already been involved in social justice work, but
Trump’s presidency seems to have provided even new motivations for such
activities. This would include supporting the New Sanctuary Movement that
tries to provide a safe place for undocumented immigrants who fear
deportation.
The final form of activism Yukich labels “Embracing Trump” as some
estimate 13 percent of Muslims likely voted for him (Yukich 2018: 238).
Some support Trump because he is a Republican including his fiscal
conservatism on economic policies and his “tough on terrorism” position.
Others maintain that Trump’s policies toward Muslim-majority countries are
not any worse than those of Clinton, Bush, or Obama. Still others possibly
believe that those who actually are Muslim terrorists threaten the United
States as well as other nations. Thus, as Yukich points out, there is actually a
broad range of possible responses to the Trump administration by Muslim
Americans, a marginalized group in American society.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Immigration

An important consideration of the debate on the issue of immigration,
especially illegal immigration, revolves around the economic benefits and
costs. The most important reason the majority of immigrants come to the
United States is to better their economic position. Those who support
increasing immigration argue that there is a demand for certain types of labor.
While we focus on the demand for unskilled labor, note that many of the
newest immigrants may have important skills in areas such as computer
technology and medicine that are needed to fill positions for which it appears
that there are not enough qualified citizens (Marger 2008). Evaluating the
economic effect is indeed as controversial today as it has been in the past. The
effects vary in part with the rate of unemployment and the health of the
economy in the United States as a whole. What benefits business does not
necessarily help less-skilled workers.
There is some agreement that immigrants filling slots for unskilled labor
may be driving down the wages of native workers. The disagreement though
is on how strong this effect is (Lowenstein 2006; Marger 2008). Light (2006)
in Deflecting Immigration argues that the effect is substantial. In his study of
low-skilled workers immigrating to Los Angeles from Mexico and Central
America in the 1980s, wages were driven down, housing supply decreased,
and housing prices increased (Calavita 2008). A 2002 study of illegal workers
in Chicago found that two-thirds worked low-wage jobs, with wages
depressed by 22 percent for men and 36 percent for women (Katel et al.
2008). American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations’ (AFL-CIO’s) Avendano does not want the AFL-CIO to have to
choose between domestic workers and foreign workers, but he recognizes that
illegal immigrants push wages down (Katel et al. 2008).
Hanson, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, argues that the
connection between undocumented workers and high unemployment needs to
be recognized. Employers are aware that in illegals they have cheap labor that
will not organize and can often be paid in cash with few government
deductions and little expense. He advocates strongly enforcing existing laws
and stiff employer sanctions (Katel et al. 2008). Tilove (2007), a reporter from
Newhouse News Service, supports Hanson, pointing out how this pliant
immigrant labor force benefits employers. He is concerned that blacks are
becoming marginalized. He argues that “because immigrants who are hired
instead are regarded as minorities, employers run little risk of running afoul of
antidiscrimination laws or their own sense of shame” (215). Swain (2007: 12)
too makes it clear that disadvantaged groups in the labor force suffer
disproportionately:
Moreover, immigrant-supporters do themselves and their country a disservice when they
fail to consider all aspects of the problem and the national obligations to historically
disadvantaged groups such as Native Americans, African Americans, poor whites, and
legal Hispanics and Asians.
In spite of these arguments about the costs of immigration, Lowenstein

concludes with a rather positive view about the economic effects of
immigration:
The economic effects generally tend to be perceived as positive though since they provide
scarce labor, which lowers prices in much the same way global trade does. And overall,
the newcomers modestly raise Americans’ per capita income. But the impact is unevenly
distributed; people with means pay less for taxi rides and household help while the less
affluent command lower wages and probably pay more for rent.
(2006: 1)
Not only do immigrant workers expand the supply of labor, but they also
consume products and services, which help businesses.
Myers (2007) in Immigrants and Boomers tends to support this view using
a “demographic lag” approach that, as the current baby boomer generation
ages, we need younger people, including immigrants, to help the economy
including buying homes and contributing to SS (Jenness et al. 2008). In 2007,
it was estimated that undocumented immigrants improved SS’s cash flow by
$12 billion (Van de Water 2008). Campbell (2016) explains that the Social
Security Administration collects billions of dollars, but doesn’t know who
actually paid them. The money is placed in an Earnings Suspense File, where
it remains unless people can prove they are the ones who paid it. It could be
some people filled out their tax forms incorrectly by accident. On the other
hand, it could have been contributed from unauthorized immigrants who are
unlikely to ever claim this money. They could have obtained U.S. birth
certificates, SS cards, etc. from those who Campbell describes as having
created a “thriving market” for fake material. It is believed that undocumented
immigrants have been largely responsible for the growth in the Earnings
Suspense File, which has about 340 million unclaimed tax forms now in the
file compared to 270 million about a decade ago. The Social Security
Administration estimated that about 1.8 million immigrants were working
with either stolen or fake SS cards in 2010 (Campbell 2016).
Johnson and Lichter (2016) demonstrate how Hispanics accounted for the
majority of population growth in the United States between 2000 and 2010.
There has been a low and declining fertility and increasing mortality rates
among the U.S. aging non-Hispanic population. They argued that
A new generation of Hispanics and other minorities … may provide a demographic
lifeline to America’s aging white population … they will shape—and even reinvigorate—
local commerce, labor market processes, and economic development and will contribute a
growing share of resources to the nation’s retirement programs.
(Johnson and Lichter 2016: 723)
The health of the economy is linked with the issue of immigration. On the
one hand, when there is a recession or depression creating unemployment, like
the one starting in late 2007, many citizens want less immigration. On the
other hand, if the economy is doing well, concerns about immigration are
defused (Janoski and Wang 2005).
The general social implications of immigration are important for society.
Some American citizens see that immigrants are having a positive effect on
society by contributing to multiculturalism, but others perceive that the new
immigrants threaten the social order and the shared culture of the American
way of life that unites people (Bloemraad 2008; D’Angelo and Douglas
2009). Bloemraad (2008: 298) argues that “although economic considerations
are important, the politics of race, social cohesion, and culture cannot be
ignored.” Edwards (2007: 60), an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute,
maintains that the largest problem cannot necessarily be expressed in dollars
and cents but rather “the greatest harm … may be to our ability to preserve a
sense of common culture and community in a rapidly changing world.”
Huntington (2009 [1996]) argues that the United States should not turn
into two different communities or civilizations. Further he warns:
Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into
mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves—
from Los Angeles to Miami—and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the
American dream. The United States ignores this challenge at its peril.
(Quoted in Massey 2007: 146)
Taking the opposite point of view, Etzioni (2007) argues that Mexican
immigrants help strengthen the community because of their dedication to their
family and community as well as respect for authority and moderate moral
views (Bloemraad 2008). In addition, Legrain (2009: 35) argues that
“diversity also acts as a magnet for talent,” suggesting that research indicates
diverse groups of talented people actually perform better than nondiverse
ones. According to him, opening U.S. borders would benefit our society,
including our culture and economy, while spreading freedom and increasing
opportunity. Etzioni supports this view as well, arguing that the traditional
black/white identity politics will change due to the added multiethnic and
racial backgrounds of immigrants, and this should help normalize American
politics:
One should expect that Hispanic (and Asian) Americans will contribute to the
depolarization of American society. They will replace African Americans as the main
socially distinct group and will constitute groups that either are not racial (many Hispanics
see themselves as white or as an ethnic group and not as a member of a distinct race, black
or brown) or are of a race that is less distinct from the white majority (as in the case of
Asian Americans). By increasing the proportion of Americans who do not see themselves
as victims and who intermarry with others, these immigrants will continue to “normalize”
American politics.
(Etzioni 2007: 203–204)
While Etzioni seems optimistic about a possible decline in the politics of

race, we suggest that the racial state needs to deal better with the issues raised
by black-white tensions and develop an immigration policy that deals fairly
with those whose parents brought them to the United States when they were
young and also with other immigrants seeking better lives.
Public Opinion
Fetzer (2000), in a comparative study of attitudes toward immigration in the
United States, France, and Germany, concluded that in the United States,
concerns about economic interests were not as important as social issues:
“U.S. immigration politics seems to bring into question the ascendancy of the
traditionally dominant majority’s cultural values” (107). Those who are well
educated, have higher occupational prestige, or are Catholic are more tolerant
toward immigrants.
A major political values survey by Pew Research Center in 2007 (Doherty
2007) found that a majority of people surveyed favored giving undocumented
immigrants the possibility of citizenship (59–37 percent), but, at the same
time, a strong majority favored restricting immigration more than what was
being done in 2007. Responses were much more evenly divided over the
issues of building a fence along 700 miles of the border with Mexico (46
percent favored, 48 percent opposed) and whether immigrants were a threat to
traditional American values (48 percent agreed, 46 percent disagreed). Those
who identified with the Democratic Party were more likely to give
undocumented immigrants a chance at citizenship, while Republicans were
more likely to want to build a long fence, restrict immigration, and see
immigrants as a threat to traditional values (Doherty 2007).
In a 2009 survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life and Pew
Research Center for the People & the Press 2009), participants were asked if
there is a lot of discrimination against certain groups. Nearly 60 percent of
those surveyed believed that Muslims experienced a lot of discrimination. The
only group that was identified by more people was gays and lesbians.
Hispanics were named by just slightly more than a majority of people.
Another 2009 Pew survey (Morin 2009) asked about perceived conflicts
between different types of social groups. A higher percentage of people
believed that there were strong conflicts between immigrants and people born
in the United States than any other group named.
A majority of Americans (65 percent) stated in 2017 that they believe
immigrants strengthen the country with their hard work and talents, while 26
percent felt they burden the United States by taking jobs, housing, and health
care (Pew Research Center 2017b). This represents a significant change from
1994 when responses were basically reversed with 63 percent feeling
immigrants were a burden and only 31 percent believed they strengthened the
United States Back in 2011, about as many stated that immigrants
strengthened the United States (45 percent) as those who stated that they
caused problems (44 percent) (Pew Research Center 2017b).
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) examined several surveys from the
United States, Canada, and Western Europe, and found that attitudes toward
immigration were not strongly related to one’s personal economic
circumstances. Instead, opinions on immigration were strongly related to
sociocultural issues and, to a lesser degree, economic impacts on the nation as
a whole. They also found that higher education was related to less restrictive
immigration views and prejudice and ethnocentrism have been positively
associated with greater restrictive immigration views.
De Jong et al. (2017) reported support also for both economic and social-
cultural arguments to help explain how receptive Americans were to Hispanic
immigration. They found that where unemployment rates were higher, there
were more negative attitudes toward immigrants, but this applied only to new
and non-destination areas for immigrants and not to areas where immigrants
have traditionally settled. The education and skill levels of the native
population (not necessarily the immigrant population) were particularly
important in influencing people’s attitudes toward immigrants. Thus, again
cultural and economic factors play an important role in shaping attitudes on
immigration.
In addition, political attitudes especially related to party preference are
significant as well. Back in 1994, Democrats and Republicans were very
similar in their views to 30 percent of Republicans and 32 percent of
Democrats believing that immigrants benefitted the United States. Most of the
change in attitude has come from Democrats who in 2010 were positive at 48
percent, but, by 2017, were at 84 percent. Republicans increase their support
to 42 percent. Polarization is clearly reflected in the 42 percent difference in
2017. Republican views have changed somewhat, but the proportion believing
that immigrants have strengthened the United States has never been higher
than the proportion suggesting that immigrants were a burden (Pew Research
Center 2017b). Higher levels of education and younger people are associated
with a more positive view of immigrants. Hispanics (83 percent) are most
likely to believe that immigrants strengthen the United States followed by
blacks (70 percent) and then whites (60 percent).
Using a 2013 Pew Research Center survey, Gravelle (2016) examined the
effects especially of party identification, contact and contexts on public
attitudes toward illegal immigration. Some research had argued that personal
contact with an unauthorized immigrant would be important. As anticipated,
Republicans were less likely to believe that one should allow unauthorized
immigrants to stay in the United States, but, as the contextual variables
Hispanic population in the county increased and proximity to the U.S.-
Mexican border increased, the political party preferences diverged more
suggesting greater polarization of the parties. Contact with an unauthorized
immigrant did not influence the relationship suggesting that it may be the
context of the situation more than actual contact that influences one’s beliefs
about immigration. If the percentage of Hispanics in a county increases, then
one may become more concerned or worried about unauthorized immigrants.
Brooks, Manza, and Cohen (2016) examined the influence of political
ideology (liberal–conservative) on what individuals think about immigration.
They found that liberals and conservatives had very different responses to
specific individuals or groups who could be immigrating to the United States.
Using a nationally representative sample of data collected in 2013, they found
that, in the Fitting-In experiment, those who were conservative tended to be
less positive than liberals about certain immigrant groups coming to the
United States. However, when the experiment was manipulated to suggest low
levels of symbolic threat combined with high levels of immigrant skills,
conservatives and liberals showed similar attitudes. Data from the Ethnic
Names experiment also strongly supported their findings as conservatives
differed significantly with liberals for the names Ramon Sanchez and Rashid
Siddiqui. Overall ideology seems to be an important factor in shaping views
on immigration especially when individuals and immigrant groups are
portrayed as having a high degree of symbolic or ethnic dissimilarity (Brooks,
Manza, and Cohen 2016).
In a survey in January 2018 about the American public’s views
specifically on DACA, 74 percent supported legal status for immigrants who
were brought to the United States illegally as children compared to 21 percent
who did not. Sixty percent opposed expanding the border wall, while 37
percent supported it (Tyson 2018). A follow-up survey in June 2018 found
somewhat similar results with 73 percent favoring legal status for immigrants
who came illegally when they were young (Doherty 2018). Regarding the
wall that survey showed slightly more support for it at 40 and 56 percent
opposing it. Whites were equally divided at 48 percent for it and against it.
More than 70 percent of blacks and Hispanics were against it. The young,
Democrats, and the well-educated were more likely to oppose it, while white
evangelical Protestants strongly supported it (70 percent).
Public Opinion and Muslim Americans

Here we first consider the opinions of Muslim Americans about themselves
and their lives in America. We then turn to consider how the U.S. general
public views Muslims. Seventy-five percent of Muslim Americans believe
that there is a lot of discrimination against them in the United States with 50
percent also indicating that things had gotten more difficult recently versus 44
percent who believed that being Muslim in the United States had not changed
much. In addition, 68 percent felt Trump worried them, while 31 percent did
not; 74 percent believed Trump was unfriendly toward Muslims, 12 percent
felt he was friendly, 9 percent neutral, and 5 percent didn’t know. In spite of
these things, 92 percent agreed that they were proud to be Americans. They
also believed most people can get ahead with hard work and 55 percent felt
American people were generally friendly to Muslim Americans. The survey
determined that 66 percent of U.S. Muslims were very concerned about
extremism in the name of Islam around the world and 49 percent very
concerned about it in the United States. For both Muslims and the U.S. public
in general, concern about extremism is higher in 2017 than in 2011. Muslims
are more likely than the U.S. public to believe that there is little or no support
for extremism among U.S. Muslims (73–55 percent) (Pew Research Center
2017c).
Regarding political attitudes, Muslims have been strong supporters of the
Democratic Party over the decade of these surveys. Two-thirds of them
disapprove of the manner in which Trump is handling his position as
President, and three-fourths supported Hillary Clinton in the 2016 Presidential
election. Regarding political ideology, 30 percent see themselves as liberal, 39
percent moderate, and 21 percent conservative, while respondents in general
label themselves 28 percent liberal, 32 percent moderate, and 36 percent
conservative in the 2017 survey. Both Muslims and the general public
consider themselves slightly more liberal than in 2007 (Pew Research Center
2017c).
The general public continues to express mixed views of both Islam and
Muslims. For example, the feeling thermometer (0–100) shows “warmer”
feelings toward Muslims than ten years ago and a large and increasing number
of those surveyed agree that Muslims face a lot of discrimination. At the same
time, though 50 percent of those surveyed indicate that they do not view Islam
as part of mainstream American society, 43 percent think it is and the
remainder do not know or did not answer. In addition, 44 percent believe that
there is a natural conflict between Islam and democracy, while 46 percent
disagree. The differences by which political party one supports are very large
on these questions. For example, 68 percent of Republicans and only 37
percent of Democrats believe that Islam is not part of the mainstream
American society, and 65 percent of Republicans and 30 percent of Democrats
feel that a natural conflict between Islam and democracy exists. Again
political polarization is great with at least a 30 percent divide on those two
questions and others as well asked during the survey. Younger people and
more educated ones also tend to be more supportive of Muslims, but the age
and education differences are not nearly as great as the political party ones.
Summary
Immigration is both a significant sociopolitical and political economy issue.
Economically, there are concerns about “absorbing new, generally non-
English-speaking populations into an economy that may have to provide
increasing public support” for them, and socially there is a concern about
whether society’s “traditions and values clash with those of the newcomers”
(McKenna and Feingold 2009: 277). There are also numerous benefits to
society from the work that immigrants do including often paying taxes and SS
that some will likely never benefit from. Also employers may receive greater
benefits from immigrants’ labor than do the immigrants themselves. There are
also political and ethical consequences in how the United States is viewed by
other countries and peoples if immigration is strongly restricted. Political
party polarization remains an important feature dividing people and may
mirror in some ways what is going on in Congress as well including the
difficulties of passing legislation related to immigration. Individuals may need
to further mobilize into groups to pressure Congress or develop social
movements to protest in order to have their voices heard.
We now turn to a discussion of the relationship between sports and
politics. Race and ethnicity intertwined with power also play roles in this
discussion as do other considerations.
POLITICS AND SPORTS

Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2011) point out that race and especially color-blind
racism are significant in sports, one of the most powerful institutions in the
United States. Whenever one discusses the achievements of black professional
athletes, the discussion seems to focus on their natural physical abilities,
strength, and athletic prowess. However, when attention is given to the
successes of white professional athletes, discussion turns not only to their
athletic skills, but also to their intelligence, leadership skills, and hard work
(Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011).
If one looks at the major professional teams, one sees that, in the National
Football League (NFL), only two owners are of color, Major League Baseball
(MLB) has only one, and the National Basketball Association (NBA) has
three. Further, the lack of diversity also extends to management and coaching
as well. Yet at the player level, almost 81 percent of NBA players are of color,
followed by 73 percent in the NFL, and about 43 percent in MLB (Garcia
2018). The percentage of Latino players in MLB has increased to 31.9 percent,
but black, African-American, or African-Canadian have actually declined to
7.7 percent; the lowest percentage since such studies started in 1991 (Lapchick
2017).
Green and Hartmann (2014: 87) point out that although on the surface
sports and politics seem unrelated, “sports are part of and implicated in the
political process.” They identify three key functions of sports. First, they
suggest that, for politicians, almost all publicity is good and politicians
identifying with sports provide a safe stage from which they remind the public
that they exist. Second, politicians act like the typical sports fan and this thus
helps them solidify their identity, reputation, and social position. Third,
politicians desire to be associated with positive, happy, and exciting events that
illustrate excellence and success. Such identification can occur whether they
are attending a sports event or receiving sports champions at the White House.
See, for example, the picture of President Obama with the Chicago Cubs after
they won the 2016 World Series.
US-POLITICS-OBAMA-CHICAGO CUBS: US President Barack Obama
poses with presented jersey as he welcomes the World Champion Chicago
Cubs baseball team to the White House in Washington, DC on January 16,
2017
Credit: YURI GRIPAS/AFP/Getty Images
The politics of sports is especially tied with culture in America or what

Green and Hartmann (2014: 92) refer to as “cultural politics.” Social scientists
have frequently studied what brings people together and helps them develop
civic attachments and community pride. Sports provides such a venue for
people to develop collective identity whether it be a Friday night high school
game especially in small towns or a team finally winning the World Series or
the Super Bowl. Green and Hartmann suggest that sports typically have a
conservative or social reproductive function supporting the status quo which
can especially benefit politicians or political parties that are in office. A
Marxist perspective would suggest that sports serve as “the ‘opiate of the
masses’—something mindless to occupy the working class’s time and energy,
which might otherwise be invested in creating drastic political change” (Green
and Hartmann 2014: 94–95).
Sports have also served as a means for promoting national pride including
a cultural superiority or even possibly for some a sense of genetic superiority
or moral superiority (Green and Hartmann 2014). The Olympic Games and its
counting of gold, silver, and bronze metals would be an example of these
aspects. The Olympic Games have served as an example of political protest in
which sports were used to generate attention to various forms of inequality and
the need for social change. In spite of this aspect, Green and Hartmann (2014)
stress that sports tend to be much more about maintaining social order and the
status quo. The singing of the national anthems, displays of flags, and even
military personnel would reinforce the social order. See, for example, in Text
box 5.4 how President Trump got involved in the protest of kneeling of some
NFL players during the singing of the national anthem before football games.
Last but certainly not least Green and Hartmann point out how sports
metaphors and images are tied in with political discourse. Sport imagery
suggests a level playing field in which talent, hard work, and a competitive
spirit are associated with American values of hard work, competition, fairness,
and justice. The ideal of one pulling oneself up by the boot straps,
individualism, and team work apply to sports and to life itself. It helps
reinforce too that if people aren’t successful, it is a personal failure rather than
a societal issue.
Although Green and Hartmann (2014) don’t specifically discuss this,
sports owners often make large financial contributions to political campaigns.
Almost all the owners of MLB, the NFL, NBA, and the National Hockey
League (NHL) contribute nearly tenfold more to conservative causes such as
Republican campaigns, candidates, and Super PACs (Political Action
Committees) based on Federal Election Commission records for the 2015–
2016 election cycle. Owners often contributed to Super PACs, which can
spend unlimited sums of money to help or oppose politicians, but are not
allowed to directly contribute to a politician or a political party (Graham
2016).
NFL owners contributed the most money, $8,586,072.30 in the 2015–2016
political campaign scene of which $8,052,410.00 was directed toward
Republican efforts. MLB owners were second with $6,204,732.07 of
$7,316,801/63 going to Republicans. NBA owners were the most likely to
donate to Democratic causes with $1,049,876.13 of $6,125,198.71 directed
toward them. Interestingly, in the 2016 Presidential campaign though,
contributions to Clinton’s campaign were much greater than those to Trump
(Graham 2016).
TEXT BOX 5.4
Politics, MLB, and the NFL
Historically, the great pastime for American families has been watching
MLB. While we may debate whether the most popular sport is now baseball
or football, we should not lose sight of the fact that politics and sports
interact in significant ways. Although politics affects many aspects of MLB
and the NFL, we limit our discussion to four specific illustrations: the
political economy of the sport especially as it relates to the use of the
public’s resources, the steroid issue, the antitrust exemption, and most
recently the protests of some NFL players kneeling during the national
anthem before football games and the condemnation of such protests by
others including President Trump.
Johnston (2007: 21) maintains that “while some teams are profitable,
overall the sports-team industry does not earn any profit from the market.
Industry profits all come from the taxpayers.” The first issue discussed here
is the political economy of the sport. Neil deMause (2007), co-author of
Field of Schemes: How the Great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money into
Private Profit, testified to the House Subcommittee on Domestic Policy that
government subsidies for Major League stadiums and Minor League
facilities from 1995 to 2006 totaled more than $10 billion and may now be
averaging more than $2 billion a year. DeMause (2007: 2) estimates that job
creation is actually very costly ($250,000 per new job) and stadiums do not
revitalize urban neighborhoods. He identifies “sports industry’s dirty little
secret: New stadiums don’t make money” (DeMause 2007: 7).
Further, deMause testified that team owners claim that their stadiums
are obsolete and threaten to move if demands aren’t met. In the 1980s,
teams used to pay rent and share their ticket and concession revenue, so the
public’s investment could be returned, but now there are often rent rebates,
and possible revenues are often forgone from future parking, property taxes,
construction, sales tax, and so on. For the fans, new baseball parks have
resulted in ticket prices being raised by an average of 41 percent (5). The
so-called cheap seats often end up being fewer and farther from the field
since the corporate boxes push the upper decks higher. DeMause (2007: 8)
recommended that Congress
close the loophole that allows teams to use federally subsidized tax-exempt bonds for
private sports stadiums … drastically restrict the business-entertainment deduction for
luxury box and club seat purchases … [and] put on the brakes for not just sport teams,
but all industries holding cities hostage for tax subsidies.
Second, we note that certainly all sports have been involved in illegal
drug use, but Congress has particularly been concerned about steroids in
MLB. Fay Vincent, MLB’s commissioner in the early 1990s, sent all the
teams a memo stating illegal drugs were prohibited by law and their use
could lead to discipline or expulsion. However, when Bud Selig succeeded
Vincent, he and the players’ union downplayed the issue (“Steroids” 2009).
As the twenty-first century dawned though, it was clear there was a major
problem, and drug testing of players began in 2003 followed by a
Congressional investigation in 2005.
The 2005 hearings before the House Committee on Government
Reform were entitled “Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating
Major League Baseball’s Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use.” The
committee’s chair representative Tom Davis explained that MLB did not
respond quickly to steroid use and that Congressional pressure had been
applied to get MLB to adopt a testing policy. Davis proclaimed, “Our
responsibility is to help make sure Major League Baseball strategy,
particularly its new testing program, gets the job done” (Committee on
Government Reform 2005: 3).
U.S. Senator Jim Bunning, a MLB Hall of Fame member, felt that the
new drug policy was “a baby step forward” with “puny” penalties (16) and
that if the policy doesn’t fix the scandal, then Congress should amend the
labor laws or repeal “the outdated anti-trust exemption that baseball alone
enjoys” (16). In 2007, former Senator George J. Mitchell released an
independent report for MLB that identified the issue as “a collective failure
to recognize the problem as it emerged and to deal with it early” (Wilson
and Schmidt 2007: 2). In the Congressional hearings, Mitchell report, and
the media, many famous players and record breakers like Sammy Sosa,
Barry Bonds, Manny Ramirez, Roger Clemens, Jason Giambi, and Andy
Petite were alleged to have used steroids (Committee on Government
Reform 2005; Schmidt 2010; “Steroids” 2009; Wilson and Schmidt 2007).
Schmidt (2010) credited Congress for helping Selig convince the players’
union to support tougher testing procedures. In 2009, Manny Ramirez was
suspended for fifty games for violating the drug policy. In 2010, after Mark
McGwire’s acknowledgment of drug use, Selig reported only two positive
steroid tests in 2009 and declared the steroid era “a thing of the past”
(Schmidt 2010: 1).
The third issue concerns baseball’s exemption from antitrust legislation
that Bunning and others have often threatened to try to repeal. Supreme
Court decisions first in 1922 and then in 1953 provided and reinforced
MLB’s exemption from competition. MLB thus has decision-making power
over who owns teams and where they play. The exemption also aids the
team owners in obtaining subsidies. Although individual teams are not tax
exempt, MLB is.
While Johnston (2007: 69) suggests that other sports leagues “are
effectively exempted from most of the laws of business competition,” the
issue is not so clear-cut. For example, in the NFL Raiders owner Al Davis
successfully won a legal case that allowed him to move his team in the
1980s. In January 2010, the Supreme Court heard a case brought by
American Needle that had manufactured hats of NFL teams until the NFL
sold an exclusive license to Reebok. The lower-level courts ruled against
American Needle, but the NFL was hoping for a Supreme Court ruling that
could be interpreted as a blanket antitrust exemption giving them
advantages of a single corporate entity (Pearlstein 2009). One entity cannot
be found guilty of forming a monopoly with itself to harm consumers
(Barnes 2010). Such a broad ruling could have led to the NFL transferring
all its broadcasts to its own network, killing free agency, dictating ticket
prices, and enhancing subsidies for the building or renting of stadiums. The
players’ union is opposed to any such exemption. Late in May 2010, the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled against the NFL in its request for broad
antitrust immunity. Justice John Paul Stevens described the teams as
“separate, profit-maximizing entities” rather than a single entity (Liptak and
Belson 2010). The specific case involving American Needle was referred
back to the lower courts. According to Edelman (2015), American Needle
won some important motions after being remanded, but it finally settled its
antitrust lawsuit against the NFL in February 2015. The terms of the
settlement were not disclosed. From the point of view of American Needle,
it made sense to settle out of court at least in part because its lawyer and
court costs were extremely expensive, but, from the point of view of those
following antitrust lawsuits involving leagues and their collective licensing
practices, it was a “colossal disappointment” (Edelman 2015).
In 2018, there are two cases that the Supreme Court could reconsider
related to the antitrust exemption of MLB. Neither case won in lower
courts, but they are appealing. In the first one, Wyckoff v. Office of the
Commissioner, two former scouts are arguing that MLB teams illegally
colluded to lower the market value of professional and amateur scouts. The
second involves Right Field Rooftops v. Chicago Cubs. The plaintiffs argue
that the Cubs bought a number of the rooftops from which fans watched the
games and blocked the view of possible fans from other rooftops, thus
monopolizing the market for “in person” watching of the ball games. Both
plaintiffs are asking for judgments about how broadly baseball’s exemption
should be allowed to apply rather than overruling baseball’s antitrust
exemption completely (Grow 2018).
The fourth case initially revolved around the NFL’s San Francisco 49ers
quarterback Colin Kaepernick’s decision to kneel rather than stand for the
national anthem played before the start of each football game. Kaepernick,
a black athlete, wanted to “draw attention to racial injustice in America. It
was supposed to start a long overdue national conversation” (Carpenter
2018). Part of Kaepernick’s concern was the role of law enforcement in
minority communities. Other football players including Eric Reid, the first
San Francisco player to join Kaepernick, kneeled in 2016 and in 2017 even
though Kaepernick did not play in the 2017 NFL season. Both Kaepernick
and Reid are no longer in the NFL and have filed lawsuits regarding
collusion to not offer them new contracts.
In September 2017, the protest drew greater political attention when
President Trump got directly involved by criticizing those who were
kneeling for disrespecting the flag and suggesting that owners should fire
current players who do that. As a sign of unity among the football players
and others including some owners, the Associated Press estimated that 204
players either knelt or sat during the national anthem (USA TODAY Sports
2017). Many members of teams linked arms and others were not present on
the field during the national anthem.
Still Trump continued with his tweets and encouraged fans to boycott
the games, boo, or walk out if players knelt. Vice President Pence walked
out of one game. In one of his tweets, Trump asked: “Why is the NFL
getting massive tax breaks while at the same time disrespecting our
Anthem, Flag and Country? Change tax law!” DeMause (2017) believes it
likely that Trump was referring to the use of tax-exempt government bonds
that help finance NFL stadiums. NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell quickly
responded “We believe that everyone should stand for the national anthem.”
DeMause commented
If the league succeeds in restoring the routine of all players standing before the flag
before each game—a practice that dates all the way to, ugh, 2009—presumably the
president will back down on his threat to the league’s bottom line.
DeMause further suggested that the use of tax-exempt bonds for sports
stadiums has provided “sports franchises with low-interest loans at the
expense of the federal treasury, has cost taxpayers an estimated $3.2 billion
across all pro sports since the turn of the millennium.”
A poll of 1,150 adults asking about the NFL protests and Trump’s
comments was taken by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public
Affairs Research from September 28 to October 2, 2017. The sample
intentionally included 337 African-Americans, a proportion greater than
their percentage in the U.S. population. The survey found 52 percent of
Americans disapproved of professional athletes who refused to stand during
the national anthem, while 31 percent approved. Regarding Trump’s call to
fire players who refuse to stand, 55 percent disapproved and 31 percent
approved. Regarding the strategy of linking arms in solidarity during the
anthem, 45 percent approved and 29 percent did not. Illustrative of the
racial divide on the issues, 55 percent of African-Americans approved of
players unwilling to stand for the anthem and 19 percent disapproved, while
62 percent of whites disapproved and 25 percent approved. For African-
Americans, even more disapproved of Trump’s calling for the firing of
athletes; 79 percent of blacks and 48 percent of whites disapproved, while 8
percent of blacks and 38 percent of whites approved (Associated Press
2017).
In May 2018, the NFL team owners announced a policy that if players
knelt during the national anthem, they would leave themselves open to
punishment or their teams would face possible financial penalties. Players
had the option though of staying inside the locker room during the pregame
ceremony (Futterman and Mather 2018). The National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA) union was not consulted on the policy. Trump
approved of the policy, but also stated that if a player isn’t standing for the
national anthem, “Maybe you shouldn’t be in the country” (Futterman and
Mather 2018). On the other hand, Chris Long, a player for the Philadelphia
Eagles, tweeted
This is a fear of a diminished bottom line. It’s also fear of a president turning his base
against a corporation. This is not patriotism. Don’t get it confused. These owners don’t
love America more than the players demonstrating and taking real action to improve it.
(Quoted in Futterman and Mather 2018)
In July 2018, the NFLPA filed a grievance claiming the policy infringed
on player rights. Shortly thereafter, the NFL and the NFLPA issued a joint
agreement stating “No new rules relating to the anthem will be issued or
enforced for the next several weeks while these confidential discussions are
ongoing” (Knoblauch 2018). In exhibition games, some players choose to
protest in various ways during the national anthem and President Trump has
tweeted in response (Hanna, Close, and Dotson 2018). This issue seems to
have subsided.
Questions to consider: Do you think MLB should have an anti-trust
exemption? Explain your thinking. Should professional sports teams
receive tax-exempt bonds to help pay for their stadiums? Why or why not?
Do you think that all players should stand for the national anthem? Are
President Trump’s statements helping bring the nation together or dividing
it quite possibly more along racial lines?
CONCLUSION
We began this chapter discussing C. Wright Mills and his concept of the
sociological imagination. Lacking a sociological imagination may encourage
individuals to blame themselves or other individuals for their troubles
(Ferrante 2008). However, as Charon (1987: viii) points out, “Our individual
lives and our personal problems are part of a much larger history and are
embedded in a society.” In this chapter, we identified a number of issues
defined as matters “that can be explained only by factors outside an
individual’s control and immediate environment” (Ferrante 2008: 9).
When one marries, one may not fully comprehend the rights and
responsibilities attached to marriage. Extending those rights to gay and lesbian
couples has occurred, but this issue remains contentious in society especially
related to whether individuals on the basis of their religious beliefs must
provide services related to weddings (e.g. cakes, photographing). Schools with
limited budgets face difficulties getting students to perform at grade level in
reading and mathematics. Charter schools have been proposed as one way to
improve education for children. Health-care issues, especially related to cost
and availability, continue to concern this country. The status of the ACA, also
known as Obamacare, is not clear since President Trump appears committed to
either changing it significantly or ending it. The state’s policies regarding civil
liberties have the potential to affect our freedoms to express ourselves as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Maintaining our civil liberties and also
making sure that citizens are safe from both domestic and international
terrorists is a difficult job for the government and for us in our everyday lives.
The state is clearly a racial state as it formulates policy related to racial and
ethnic issues. Issues related to law enforcement and especially the black
communities need to be greatly improved. Immigration policies, like health
care, clearly affect us all, in terms of both economic and social consequences.
Finally, although sports on the surface may seem like any unlikely institution
to consider, race and ethnicity certainly play an important role in the various
positions in sports and also politicians and politics play an important role into
sports in part because of its popularity, its influence in society, and its
economic impact.
In this chapter, we examined some of the significant ways that the state as
well as more local units of government including law enforcement make
decisions every day that impact virtually every aspect of our lives. The ways
we live our lives, including our political participation, also shape politics and
the policies of government. In Chapter 6, we turn to a discussion of political
participation.
Endnotes
1. The exact text of these lines is quite controversial as Pastor Niemöller
evidently quoted various versions at different occasions (Marcuse 2008;
“Niemöller, Martin” n.d.).
2. For various sources regarding the persistence of racism in the state, see
D’Angelo and Douglas (2009), especially issues 9 and 11.
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CHAPTER
6
Political Participation
In this chapter, we look at the various ways in which individuals and groups
participate in the processes of governance. We know from decades of research
that there is a great deal of variation in the ways and degrees to which
individuals participate in political processes. The chapter opens with a
discussion of citizenship as a social role of sorts in a system of politics. We
have found that there are many acts associated with citizenship as well as acts
associated with exclusion from rights, privileges, or expectations associated
with citizenship. Many of these role behaviors have been organized into quite
useful typologies of political participation. The chapter then looks at these
types of political participation in detail, including current research. This is
followed by a discussion of a contemporary debate around what some call the
decline of civic engagement in the United States, and the role of what
sociologists call “social capital” in this process. Finally, we look at current
debates about how to explain political participation changing as a result of
broad social forces. The rest of the textbook then moves us into detailed
chapters that describe voting and electoral processes, the extensive research on
political and social movements, and terrorism as political violence.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS POWER

Political participation is important to the field of political sociology because it
addresses fundamental characteristics of politics, the state, and organization of
power in society. Who participates in the political decision-making of the
community? Is this participation even and equal for all members of the nation;
is it divided, or concentrated in the hands of a few? Do some participate more
than others? What are the boundaries of legitimate participation encouraged or
fostered by the institution of politics and its associated structures? Are certain
forms of participation considered illegitimate, beyond the role the nation
conceptualizes for citizens? These are a few of the many questions that
political sociologists address in the study of political participation. Much of
the work begins with the study of citizenship.
Citizenship is both a political and a social artifact (Kivisto and Faist 2007;
van Steenbergen 1994). It is a creation of the state and, at the same time,
provides structure to individual roles in society; it takes on different forms of
action, expression, symbolism, and social organization. Power, state, culture,
and the everyday life merge in the social idea of what it means to be a citizen.
Citizenship traditionally refers to participation or membership in a community.
Marx found that citizenship is the creation of the modern state, a
superstructure that emerges from the dynamics of a class-based society. In this
sense, citizenship as a political creation obscures the class inequalities created
in the capitalist system:
The state in its own way abolishes distinctions based on birth, rank, education and
occupation when it declares birth, rank, education and occupation to be non-political
distinctions, when it proclaims that every member of the people is an equal participant in
popular sovereignty regardless of these distinctions, when it treats all those elements
which go to make up the actual life of the people from the standpoint of the state.
(Marx 1992[1843]: 219)
In contrast, Parsons emphasized the function of citizenship in maintaining

societies. Citizenship is recognition of membership in a community.
Citizenship is essential for social order according to the functionalist model.
Legitimacy to rule and assumptions of authority are reinforced through
participatory rulemaking. Thus, with membership in the larger social group of
citizens and civil society, we identify certain roles and norms for behavior.
From the elite power perspective, we are interested in understanding whether
this notion of “membership in a political community” is inclusive or
exclusive. What are the bases for citizenship? What power does citizenship
offer to those who hold membership? Is citizenship the basis for distributing
power among all members of the community? How is membership
reproduced?
One of the first studies of citizenship was the historical analysis developed
by T. H. Marshall (1950). By treating citizenship as rights-based and created
through the rules and procedures developed formally by the state, Marshall
saw rights as moving through a number of stages after the great revolutions of
the 1700s. His approach to understanding citizenship was designed to explain
how democracy and capitalism could work together as it evolved in the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Similarly, Immanuel Kant
viewed the state as an instrument of security, preserving social peace. Liberal
governments, in consort with trade and the involvement of people normally
considered outside the process of governance, would create a balance between
democratic institutions and capitalism. But T. H. Marshall’s study of this
relationship offered a different conclusion, especially after examining
experiences from the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression, and World
Wars I and II. Marshall suggested a paradox. Adam Smith argued that naked
power in society could be checked by the presence of a political system
alongside a system of commerce. A minimalist state could act as a watchman
to preserve economic growth. Marshall argued that capitalism and democracy
were incompatible for two reasons. First, capitalism required a “set of
practices” we associate with competition and define primarily in terms of
profit, whereas democracy emphasized equality, cooperation, and free access.
Second, capitalism survives only in an environment where those who
command the resources are deemed worthy, or perhaps competent, whereas
democracy assumes an equal distribution of power among members of the
community or society. This creates an inherent tension in society, which seeks
to extend citizenship and maintain the wealth of commerce.
According to Marshall, rights associated with modern citizenship could
only be understood in the context of what we know as the modern welfare
state. He concluded that social outcomes created as the welfare state evolve
around three axes of tension where social conflict would have to be balanced
or transformed to create some semblance of social order. These axes of
citizenship were known as the civil, political, and social axes. In the civil axis,
rights would be developed to assure necessary or fundamental individual
freedoms. As these first appeared in the eighteenth century, civil citizenship
took the form of laws where society would put principles of acceptable
boundaries of citizenship into constitutional form. Political citizenship
focused on extensions of participation and sharing of political power with the
masses. Here a relationship was created between citizen and legislature, with
tensions created in direction of rule or allocation of resources held in check by
elections. Social citizenship, according to Marshall, was about defining a
standard of life in one’s community or society. Broad-based social
relationships were built between the individual and services offered by the
state (education, welfare, etc.).
Emphasis on one axis over another is associated with different eras of
history, as well as different social institutions. The individual is thus situated
in a context of history and social structure, and Marshall suggested that
citizenship evolved and changed as a result of social struggle. Class struggles
of the feudal period resulted in changes in the extension of rights and legal
protections (e.g. Magna Carta, a common law in England). The constitutional
changes of previous periods in history were altered yet again in the 1800s as
economic inequality prompted demands for participation in democratic
processes traditionally run by the ruling class (e.g. enfranchisement of
working-class populations in England and the United States). According to
Marshall, once political rights were achieved, class struggle manifested itself
in conflict over demands for certain standards of living, and this reflects the
real class war. Although social rights have reduced some inequalities, the
conflict continues.
Turner’s work (1993) is a good example of how Marshall’s theory of
citizenship was extended. Turner suggests that modern citizenship especially
be thought of as “that set of practices (juridical, political, economic, and
cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which
has consequences for the flow of resources to persons or social groups” (1993:
2). He treats citizenship as more than just the formal extension of rights by the
state. The political sociology of citizenship in this regard emphasizes a
number of advances beyond Marshall. First, Turner highlights social practices
connected to group (social) membership. Historically, one of the essential
practices of citizenship has been to participate in the decision-making of the
community. This is an important tenet of democratic systems of rule as well.
Under authoritarian forms of rule, the practices of citizenship are restricted to
obedience to the commands of those in power. Second, Turner suggests that
social practices unfold in a number of social arenas including those related to
the laws of society, and the political and economic organizations and rules, as
well as the normative and cultural spheres of social life. Thus, to
conceptualize citizenship fully, we must look for social practices other than
just the political. Citizenship can be enacted in a number of social contexts.
Third, Turner highlights how social practices influence the distribution of
power in society. In his view, power is understood in a more traditional model
of resource allocation and scarcity of resources in society. Nonetheless, the
enactment of the social role of citizen can change the flow of resources in the
social group.
In many ways, current political sociologies of citizenship are shaped by
tensions between the traditional pluralist model of politics, and the class-elite
models that argue that citizenship is not equal by any means. Citizenship and
subsequent political participation were tied to Enlightenment philosophy
behind the historic shifts from monarchies to democracies. The essential
argument was this: human beings could rule themselves based on reason,
knowledge, and understanding of the social condition. In the Age of
Revolution, the notion of rule through divine right was transformed. We
associate the emergence of citizenship in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries with the philosophy of liberalism and the changing nature of the
relationship between individual and the state. As Hall and Ikenberry (1985)
conclude in their study of citizenship, liberalism, and the state, “the individual
is held to be the seat of moral worth” (5).
SAINT LOUIS, MO—NOVEMBER 8, 2016: Voters come to their polling

places to exercise their right to vote in the Presidential elections in Saint
Louis, Missouri
Credit: Gino Santa Maria / Shutterstock.com
Each framework in political sociology approaches the study of political
participation with different assumptions and perspectives. Nonetheless, each
examines the classic assumptions about democracy, the role of participation
by the masses, as well as the role of political action in the public sphere in
different ways. This work and its many directions over the past 100 years
offer a detailed political sociology of political participation in its many forms,
as we shall see.
Pluralist
The pluralist framework places a heavy emphasis on political participation, as
it argues that participation by the masses and competition among interest
groups are essential dynamics of democratic society. The plurality of power
in society rests with individual citizens influencing the allocation of societal
resources in a number of different ways. The pluralist view of political
participation links it closely to the creation of the state, and thus sees
participation by individuals and groups as critical to state function.
Participation is one mechanism by which a politics achieves consensus and
integration. Elections are taken as the final arbiter of political decisions and
conflicts over options presented by competing interests. “Majority rule” is
never challenged to the point where the society crumbles.
In their outline of the pluralist approach to understanding political
participation, Alford and Friedland (1985) identified forms of citizen action at
different levels of social organization. For example, widespread changes at
the societal level typically involve organization of citizens into sociopolitical
movements. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s is a good example of a
watershed movement resulting in changes in the distribution of power at
many levels of state action. Numerous policies and practices would
eventually change as a result of this movement’s concentrated efforts to
reform voting rights and employment practices, and raise societal concern
about racial, gendered, and age-based prejudice in society.
At another level of social organization, political parties structure
participation in governance by organizing citizens into party activities and
party voting. Parties may sometimes attempt to bring in social movements to
build coalitions to further their political agenda, as the Democrats did with
the Civil Rights Movement. In the United States, participation in the work of
a political party is a mechanism for exercising influence over policy. Interest-
group work and lobbying are other examples of the kinds of efforts that
formalized organizations use to create channels of political participation.
Interest groups typically activate citizens over single-policy issues. For
example, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) keeps its
members informed of federal and state legislation changing policies on Social
Security (SS), Medicare, or health-care reform. The AARP works with both
political parties in the United States to create favorable policy outcomes for
persons who approach retirement as defined by law, or to support programs
designed to help aging segments of the population. Members are typically
encouraged to send letters or contact their representatives in Congress when
policies concerning this segment of the population become a concern.
One of the more interesting statements of pluralist thinking in the modern
era was that offered by Theodore Lowi (1969). He argued that liberalism is a
product of advanced wealth in a society, and through history, this pushed
democratic societies to develop new forms of citizenship. Traditional
capitalism was the seedbed of American civic ideas about political
participation: “The United States is a child of the Industrial Revolution. Its
godfather is capitalism and its guardian Providence, otherwise known as the
‘invisible hand’” (3). It created a political culture or liberal philosophy that
civic life in America was a function of beliefs in individualism, rationality,
and nationalism. Thus, early American liberalism accentuated many basic
tenets of capitalism. These ideas went hand in hand in defining citizenship.
Lowi argues that, in the nineteenth century, the United States was
characterized by pure capitalism, a near laissez-faire philosophy about
economic activity with little government involvement. But, by the early
twentieth century, four factors changed the public’s ideological orientations
toward capitalism:
1. increased division of labor with a multiplication of roles;
2. specialization in the units of production and distribution systems;
3. multiplication of the units of social control;
4. spatial differentiation, urbanization, and population shifts.
Lowi suggests that all of this began in the late nineteenth century, after the
Industrial Revolution, as the progressive and populist political reform
movements placed a greater emphasis on state protection of individual and
group interests. Emphasis moved away from the capitalist philosophies of
self-regulation and the invisible hand, and shifted to formation of a state that
defined citizenship in a manner that would foster regulation of social
interactions.
The postindustrial period marks the entrance of activist government,
which is found in the modern liberal state. Lowi describes what emerged as
“interest-group liberalism.” After the Industrial Revolution especially, the
state was characterized by greater emphasis on interest groups influencing the
incremental development of public policies and associated governmental
agencies and civil servants working to support what was a growing role for
governmental regulation of social life. Class-based politics as witnessed in
Europe did not play out in the United States, as the United States did not
embrace worker or socialist reforms. Lowi concluded that competition among
interest groups would assure a state-centered society, because class unity is
avoided and replaced by pluralist forms of governance. Thus, liberalism as a
philosophy of citizenship in the early twentieth century treated politics as an
arena for conflict over political goals, with governance left to the bureaucrats
and the emerging class of civil servants loyal to the ideals of the craft of
governing.
As he witnessed the social changes of the 1960s, Lowi hinted at yet
another shift in how citizenship would be defined in the United States,
especially at the end of the twentieth century. But Lowi argued that the
changes of the last half of the twentieth century would threaten earlier forms
of the liberal state. He warned of dangers that would come from excessive
interest-group liberalism. Some of these paradoxes have become central to
the research agenda in political sociology:
1. atrophy of institutions of popular control, resulting in a tendency to turn
things over to leaders. This atrophy would create a dominance of
administration and bureaucracy in its negative sense with much greater
complexity and barriers to true public participation in all public decisions
and a lack of accountability for those who govern;
2. the maintenance of old and creation of new structures of privilege. In
other words, failures in civic participation would result in the protection
of leaders at the expense of the masses, and privilege preserved for the
administrators. He feared that interest groups would become more
specialized and deny public participation in the structures. Membership in
interest groups is transformed as group membership focuses on
volunteerism to a cause rather than loyalty to the agenda;
3. a weakening of popular government and the protection of privilege that
are aspects of conservatism or the preservation of the status quo. Interest
groups that capture public opinion would create administrative structures
that resist change.
This conceptualization of citizenship at the end of the twentieth century
suggests interactions with bureaucracies and large organizations captured by
what came to be known as the modern administrative state. The consequences
would include failures to address widespread social concerns and political
fragmentation.
The pluralist understanding of political participation rests on a view that
the state is an open policymaking system that can be influenced by those
who vote, organize, or influence others into action, and the expression of
opinions. The framework treats participation as a prerequisite for making the
system we call the state operate effectively. The balance of power is assured
through mass participation. That is, when citizens who have been granted the
power to participate in decisions and self-govern, and actually participate as
required, the consensus around policy outcomes is understood as legitimate
exercise of power, or governance. Thus, equilibrium and social order is
preserved. In states where mass participation is prohibited, competition
between factions or military rulers results in frequent changes in the state and
social disequilibrium. Mass participation is a key if not the principal orienting
theme for pluralist theories in political sociology.
Is mass participation in the political process as implied by the pluralist
framework a reality in the United States? Marger (1987) contends that the
democratic requirements of mass participation have evolved into something
quite different. He suggests that the pluralist assumptions fail in three regards.
First, rates of participation vary significantly from one democratic state to
another. Assuming high rates of participation could result in what Lipset
(1981[1960]) called “working class authoritarianism” (102) fostered through
the participation of middle- and working-class participants swayed by less
than sophisticated or fully informed claims to how society should be
governed. Second, the varieties of political participation make it difficult to
simply claim that participation is a function of demands by the masses being
translated into policy outcomes by those who rule the state. Political bodies
such as legislatures or chief executives do not necessarily respond to the
opinions of the electorate. This may be a function of knowledge, as legislators
elected to office for long periods of time hold greater expertise than the
electorate at large. These legislative experts may be challenged by protests
and social movements, or by letter-writing campaigns typically involving far
fewer citizens. The fact that the masses engage in many forms of political
influence, combined with the sometimes independent behavioral dynamics of
bodies of the state, creates a political process that is more complex than
pluralists describe. Third, Marger suggests that there is an uneasy marriage
between the governing masses and electoral participation. But beyond that,
the masses cannot participate in policy deliberations at all levels of the policy
decision-making process. Thus, nonparticipation by virtue of the way the
democratic state is designed creates points in the process that invite elite
decision-making. In other words, the complexity of policy creation may in
fact foster elite concentrations of power at certain levels of the state because
it’s more efficient than mass participation. These observations are common to
the critique of the pluralist framework and, as we shall see in the next section,
are at the core of the elite views of how political participation should be
studied.
Elite-Managerial
The elite-managerial perspective of political participation suggests that
avenues for the genuine influence over policy, allocation of resources in
society, or influence over decision-making are limited to a small group.
Participation by the masses then is perhaps symbolic, or merely sufficient to
generate legitimacy for the ruling elite to pursue selected actions. In 1943,
Joseph Schumpeter observed:
democracy is not a process of popular participation and representation; rather it is an
institutional method for selecting leaders. It is not an outcome (representation of popular
will) but a structure (elite competition).
(Quoted in Alford and Friedland 1985: 250)
In this sense, political participation involves various attempts by elites to

manage the political tensions emanating from the masses. In other words,
participation of the masses matters little in light of the fact that the few who
rule are the focus of power. The elite framework treats the participation as the
management of electoral competition between elite groups (e.g. political
parties), or the interactions between citizens and bureaucracies, or co-opting
the will of the masses into the agenda of competing elite groups.
Through extensive research, the elite perspective reveals a compelling
pattern in the institutional forms of political behavior. In the United States,
about half of all citizens participate in the electoral process—usually fewer
than half. Moreover, as we shall see in looking at the various typologies of
political participation, the more sophisticated the form of participation (e.g.
running for office, expressing an opinion to newspapers or elected officials, or
participating in a campaign), the fewer the number of participants. Elite
theorists argue that ours is not a democracy of mass participation. This is an
important beginning point for the elite perspective. Clearly, the ideal form of
mass participation suggested by a democratic state is just that—an ideal. The
political decisions of the society are in the hands of a few.
One approach by theorists in this tradition stands in contrast to the
pluralist interest-group model suggested by Lowi and mentioned in the
previous section. As a way of contrasting these perspectives, the work of Ralf
Dahrendorf argued in the 1950s that participation in political decisions was
essentially decision-making among competing elite policy groups and not
ordinary citizens:
There is a clear division between ordinary citizens who possess only the right to vote and
the elites, who are in the position to regularly exercise control over the life chances of
others by issuing authoritative decisions…. Citizens are not the suppressed class, but they
are a subjected class.
(Dahrendorf 1959: 293)
Dahrendorf (1959) argued that politics in society be understood as a

dynamic around conflict groups that are generated by the differential
distribution of authority or power in society in what he called “imperatively
coordinated associations” (ICAs). Building upon the works of Weber,
Dahrendorf argued that organizations and groups are built around conflicting
interests, or what amounts to contending associations for scarce resources in a
society. A struggle between those who control and those who are controlled is
always present. In industrialized societies, these ICAs serve as legitimations
of authoritarian relationships. The ICA is a concept borrowed from Weber,
which describes the organizations that focus on various social tasks, such as
unions, schools, and government. Moreover, we see in this conceptualization
the application of the Weberian view of legitimate power exercised in modern
society. This model of power relationships suggests that social interests are
structured according to an individual’s relationships with various levels of
social organization and a division of labor.
Dahrendorf argues, however, that the basic structure of these relationships
in the social order is a dichotomy between those in power and those under
domination. When groups or organizations assert opposing interests and
attempt to gain authoritarian status in a society, those dominating will resist,
giving rise to social conflict. Once conflict emerges, authority within the
social order is redistributed. Dahrendorf does not adopt Marx’s notion that
conflict is based on economic factors. Rather, conflict in society is based on
competing ICA interests. Stratification in this view involves the organization
of associations and competitions for power.
This framework studies participation in politics by examining the work of
elites and how they control or subject mass participation. Elite manipulation
of campaigns or the roles of political parties in absorbing social conflict are
typical topics of study. For example, the two-party system in the United
States is seen by elite theorists as an example of elite rule, with policy
outcomes of Democrats and Republicans considered quite similar, inevitably
protecting elite interests that are expressed through lobbying groups or
corporate interests that cooperate with party leaders and campaigns. The
masses have few choices in a two-party system where the winner takes all.
A good example of where political sociologists explore the elite’s
management of political participation is focused on money and politics. Much
of this research follows the elite approach that finds that competing groups
among the elites seek to influence politics by raising money and creating war
chests to be made available to favorable candidates or parties. Manza,
Brooks, and Sauder (2005) describe this elite dominance of electoral
participation:
1. political contributions to incumbents seeking reelection create a
“signaling effect” that can deter others from running against the
incumbent in races for Congress;
2. contributions to candidates build a war chest, which, in turn, can influence
election to public office only in that elections require money. Money helps
one get elected to office, whether it comes from private interest groups or
party organizations;
3. “there is little disagreement among analysts that PAC money buys access”
(225). This suggests that interest groups that do contribute may have an
advantage in opportunities to meet and discuss public policy.
In this regard, elites participate in the political process by influencing who
runs for office, building resources for campaigns, and accessing policy
processes. For the disengaged or the masses who participate in the electoral
cycle only as voters, participation and influence are dwarfed by the flow of
resources coordinated by competing elite interests.
Class
The class perspective concludes that political participation is allowed only as
far as it preserves the interests of the capitalist classes. Marx and Engels in
the 1848 Communist Manifesto suggest that the only genuine moment of
mass participation by the working class was that found at the revolution as
they predicted:
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their
ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let
the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to
lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working Men of All Countries, Unite!
(1961: 43–44)
But the workers’ revolution predicted by Marx for the most part has not
been realized as capitalism has advanced into many societies throughout the
world. The class approach has consistently confirmed that the working class
and the poor simply do not participate in large numbers in the many forms of
giving voice in a democratic society (Piven and Cloward 1989; Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).
The class framework argues that the power held by the upper class is
significant for assuring that the state apparatus protects the interests of those
with the most capital. The forms of participation in a class-stratified society
may be symbolic, or may, in fact, pacify the masses to a level of acquiescence
to ultimately preserve upper-class dominance. Such is the class view of
participation in the political process. That is, at best, participation by the
working and middle classes has miniscule impact on the reallocation of
power, let alone policy. This is especially true for policies related to taxation,
business, finance, banking, and commerce. As the Task Force on Inequality
and American Democracy created by the American Political Science
Association concluded, “ordinary Americans speak in a whisper while the
most advantaged roar” (2004: 11).
Political sociologists continue to study the connections between social
class and the complexities of political participation. Some have argued that
class-based participation focused on working-class interests has in fact
declined with the ascendancy of the modern democratic society since the
Industrial Revolution. Seymour Martin Lipset (1981[1960]) argued that class
differences in the structure of political parties in democratic societies have in
fact become the hallmark of the “democratic translation of the class struggle”
(320). In this sense, political participation as party activity represents one way
in which the class perspective explains the absorption of labor political action
into existing parties and unions rather than revolutionary movements. In other
words, the unrest of exploited workers is transformed into a belief or sense
that workers have a voice in the political process. As Lipset (1991) and others
have pointed out, class-based participation declined toward the end of the
twentieth century. We will examine this in detail in our discussion on voting.
While socioeconomic status continues to be significant in explaining some
differences in the various types of participation, the overall pattern in Western
democracies has been a decline in political action based on middle and
working-class connections. Others (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995;
Przeworski and Sprague 1986) have suggested that patterns in class-based
political actions change over time and it is too early to declare the class
perspective a theoretical dead end in the study of political participation. These
researchers point to the role of class identity in the formation of attitudes and
beliefs that, in turn, affect the ways in which individual citizens from the
working and middle classes participate in various political actions. The class
perspective continues to point to the significant influence that economic and
educational differences have not only on voting but also on protesting,
participating in social and political movements, and following politics.
Rational Choice
Rational choice models of political participation treat political action as
derived from economic interest or social action that solidifies an agreed-upon
or desired political outcome. In other words, persons, groups, or institutions
exercise whatever power they can to influence political outcomes in their best
interest. Recent rational choice approaches to the study of politics are known
as “game theory,” which suggests that individuals, interest groups, or even
nation-states will make strategic choices given a certain set of circumstances.
Game theory attempts to predict outcomes by knowing the interests of the
actors and the strategies used for making decisions. In many ways, rational
choice approaches to the study of political participation, especially voting,
have become a staple in how and why social actors participate in political
processes nationally as well as globally.
The basic argument of the rational choice approach was best summarized
by an early champion of the model, Anthony Downs, whose economic
models of voting were significant to the development of rational choice
theories. Downs (1957) observed: “Every rational man decides to vote just as
he makes all other decisions: if the returns outweigh the costs, he votes; if not
he abstains” (260). Downs offered five propositions about participation in
voting that are exemplars in many ways of how rational choice theory
conceptualizes participation:
1. when voting is costly, every citizen who is indifferent abstains, and every
citizen who has any preference whatsoever votes;
2. if voting is costly, it is rational for some indifferent citizens to vote and
for some citizens to abstain;
3. when voting costs exist, small changes in the perceived costs of voting
(e.g. national holiday on election day, relaxed voter registration
procedures, a ride to the polls) may radically alter the distribution of
political power;
4. the costs of voting act to disenfranchise low-income citizens relative to
high-income citizens;
5. it is sometimes rational for citizens to vote even when their short-run
costs exceed their short-run returns, because social responsibility
produces a long-run return (266–271).
These assertions are typical of the kinds of variables rational choice theorists
would study when looking at political participation: choice, costs or returns,
resources, and abstaining or participating. As we will see in Chapter 7,
rational choice models of voting constitute a larger body of explanations for
determining whether an individual votes, and the model has been applied to
other forms of participation as well.
Mancur Olson, Jr. (1965) offered another classic model of the rational
choice approach moving toward participation based not on a calculation for
voting, but rather participation in politics equated with collective action.
Individuals and groups would form into collective action around a desire to
create or enhance what Olson called “collective goods.” These creations of
group action would emerge in the marketplace of political interests such as
public sidewalks, schools, or a common defense. When individuals find some
benefit to participation in the creation of the public good, they are likely to
participate because benefits most likely will outweigh the costs. This
approach to collective action suggested that participation in the collective was
linked to incentives of some kind. The outcome gained was considered worth
the participation required. Olson gives us the important concept of the “free
rider problem.” This problem emerges when individuals contribute nothing to
the decision-making, yet experience equally high gains in contrast to all
others in the group. In other words, individuals may choose to not get
involved in decision-making processes, as to do so means little to no effort at
involvement, yet they benefit from group decisions. Moreover, this early
articulation of rational choice theory began to advance research on why
individuals would volunteer in various groups and associations, including
those with political goals.
Consider, for example, the recent concerns with declining voting rates in
the United States as well as the alleged decline in joining various civic and
community associations suggested by Putnam’s 2000 thesis in Bowling Alone,
or what Dalton aptly refers to as “the crisis of democracy literature” (2008:
163). This research laments the fact that over half of the eligible population in
the United States fails to vote in each presidential election, leaves more active
forms of participation to what amounts to less than one-fourth of the eligible
voting citizenry, and is increasingly characterized by civic isolation (Putnam
2000). Rational choice theorists would approach these patterns with an
assumption that disengagement from political participation of many kinds is a
sign that these forms of participation are too costly in terms of time,
knowledge or skills, or other resources. In this regard, lack of participation is
a rational choice based on the high costs of participation. Or equally as
plausible according to this perspective would be the conclusion that
nonparticipation is a choice reflecting satisfaction by citizens who require no
political action or attention to issues!
Postmodern
The postmodern theorist approaches political participation in a rather unique
way. Although perhaps an oversimplification, some of the postmodern
approaches to political participation treat participation as freedom to explore
the intersections between politics, everyday life, and social identity (Best
2002; Giddens 1992). Moreover, this framework is home to political
sociologists who conclude that politics after the modern era is about
redefining citizenship through the construction of new categories of inclusion,
exclusion, identity, and political association. Social solidarity to create new
political groupings around what some would call social narratives is designed
to challenge more traditional conceptualizations of citizenship, including the
nature of political participation.
We can begin to understand the postmodern view of political participation
by considering the critical assumption that life at the beginning of the twenty-
first century is guided heavily by consumerism, technology, globalization, and
distrust in the traditional forms of political participation. One of the key
figures in this framework is Zygmunt Bauman (1997), who has suggested that
societies today are composed of individuals who move from one social
context to another and fail to commit to the long-standing traditions of using
politics or science to understand and act in the social world. He identifies four
types of postmodern personalities migrating from one context or social
situation to another:
1. the stroller—someone who perhaps is oriented by superficial things,
especially related to fashion or looks;
2. the vagabond—the nomad who finds no particular social identity upon
which to land or settle;
3. the tourist—seeks out social lives as a way to experience new or different
things, perhaps even treating life as movement from one entertainment
setting to the next;
4. the player—it’s about the social game and being strategic in how the
social game itself is played; the player is never committed to an idea or
goal or outcome, but rather just plays the game (Bauman 1996).
These personality types created by the social conditions of the postmodern
era are indicative of what Bauman describes in many works as the altered
patterns of social interaction. Thus, politics is seen as politics of self-identity
and one participates by playing the definitions of self projected into the public
sphere.
What does this have to do with political participation? As we shall see in
Chapter 8, some political sociologists argue that political and social activism
around lifestyles, consumerism, feminism, race, and sexualities are all
oriented by this exploration of multiple social identities. These new social
movements are forms of political activism not oriented around labor or
social-class concerns, and the fight for civil rights per se, but rather are
movements organized to construct challenges to what are perceived as
dominant identities. Consider too, for example, how Internet technology
provides a place for individuals to pose as gay or bisexual and take on this
identity on a Web site or in a chat room. They may play the game of
advancing the identity, or pass from one chat room to the next trying on new
sexual identities. This is political participation in the postmodern sense in that
power is personal and expressed in a sphere of public space. In other words,
the technology for the new social movement provides a noninstitutional social
context for use, namely through the power of reconstructing identities.
Bauman and others would note that the freedom that comes from the
postmodern social condition is the freedom to exercise power around identity,
everyday practices, or newly created social groupings and connections.
Another example of the postmodern treatment of politics is that offered by
Jurgen Habermas (1989a, 1989b), a sociologist associated with the famous
Frankfurt School in Germany. In many ways, Habermas is interested in
preserving democracy by exposing ways in which advanced capitalism
distorts more traditional notions of democracy. For example, he is critical of
how dialogue about political issues in society is dramatically altered by
corporate interests to make profit, rather than rationally discussed to solve
social problems. This approach argues for a reconstruction of ways to
participate in politics. In other words, his work suggests that political
participation is fluid, always changing as persons and groups in society seek
out new social landscapes to challenge power.
The postmodernist argument outlined by Habermas is quite extensive and
goes well beyond the scope of this summary. But his critical sociology argues
in the postmodernist tradition: as politics, science, and religion lose their
credibility in guiding people’s everyday decisions, something must be
reconstructed in its place. He argues for an interaction and discourse where
members of society rebuild participatory democracy by coming to reasonable
ideas about addressing social problems. The state may no longer be the arena
for guiding decisions about how best to address problems of global warming,
for example. And so, individuals politicize their everyday existence by being
aware of the impact of carbon emissions on their environment, and choosing
to ride their bikes rather than drive to work! This is a form of political
participation that might catch on with others who also commit to riding their
bikes as a political action. Large systems such as governments, or certainly
corporations, fail in this regard. The discourse of global warming shifts to
coming to agreed-upon conclusions about “what I can do in my everyday”
life to participate in bringing an end to environmental problems.
What distinguishes the work of Habermas from Weber and Marx? Marx
believed emancipation from alienation and social conflict brought on by
capital accumulation would occur through enlightening the workers who
would organize into eventual class-based revolution. Weber offered little
optimism, describing instead the emergence of an “iron cage” of rationality,
constructed through bureaucracy and demanding an adherence to formalized
systems of law. Habermas, in the critical theory tradition, believes that
emancipation from the postmodern condition occurs through the social
interactions between people. Like many postmodern theorists, Habermas
draws upon the psychoanalytic approach and suggests that individuals come
to understand how their communicative rationality is taken from them when
they adhere to a technocratic ideology. By realizing how communications are
distorted by systems and structures, Habermas believes that individuals can
regain their communicative competence—that is, a politics devoid of
distortions created by traditional politics or ideologies. This is one example of
the postmodernist view of political participation; redefinitions of self-identity
against the monoliths of political and economic systems!
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ITS MANY

FORMS
Participation in the political processes of society can take many different
forms. As suggested earlier, some of these forms are a function of rules or
laws, others are formalized through social roles attached to the notion of
citizenship, and we also find that participation can be less formalized as
citizens participate at the everyday level in advocacy, resistance, and
politicized talk. There is a wide range of social activities that we can connect
to political participation.
Early Typologies of Political Participation

Political sociologists have developed a number of typologies to identify and
measure various types of political participation. These typologies have not
only proven useful in painting a picture of what people do when they act on
political attitudes or demands, but the typologies have also been useful in
organizing the large body of research on political participation, especially
voting. The typologies of political participation have also helped make
connections among ideology, attitudes, and values, which are assumed to be
the basis for social and political actions as we saw in Chapter 3. In this
section, we examine three early typologies that guided much of the later
research on political participation, and then consider a number of more recent
studies of types of political participation as updates of sorts to the earlier
frameworks.
Lester Milbrath (1981) developed one of the first typologies of political
participation in 1965. He suggested that political acts by citizens went beyond
mere voting, and were typically patterned into clusters of behaviors. Later,
Milbrath and Goel (1977) defined participation “as those actions of private
citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and
politics” (2). These actions were thought of as political roles now understood
as somewhat complex and multidimensional. Conceptualizing political
participation as multidimensional highlighted the significance of individual
intentions, resources, and skills. These roles emerged as a result of a person
first deciding to get involved in the political process in some way, such as
casting a vote on Election Day or attending a city council meeting. The action
then was altered by a second characteristic of participation, what they called
the direction of the action. Once a decision to participate (or not participate)
was made, the action could be understood in terms of duration and intensity.
The roles Milbrath and Goel identified in their typology varied in terms of
action, duration of the political act, and intensity of the political act. They
suggested that American citizens could be categorized into three modes of
political participation: (1) apathetics, or those withdrawn from the political
process; (2) spectators, or those showing minimal involvement, who have
decided to be engaged at a basic level; and (3) gladiators, or “active
combatants” in the political system. This typology suggested that political
participation was in fact arranged in a hierarchy, and thus, the typology
offered an important systematic explanation for why a significant percentage
of Americans simply did not participate in politics. Of course, there was great
interest in explaining not only why people did not vote or participate in
political party meetings, but also what influenced those who did. Political
participation was now understood as having many complex dimensions.
In addition to the three basic modes of participation (apathetics,
spectators, and gladiators), Milbrath and Goel identified seven specific forms
of participatory acts (these acts are listed in Table 6.1). These political acts
represent behaviors that vary according to difficulty and styles of influence.
Moreover, this typology helped researchers understand that political
participation is not a set of distinct behaviors, but rather, political
participation is a pattern of behaviors, much like the role set that sociologists
describe for all members of society. Like other social roles, those associated
with political participation are a function of skill, time, and energy. Clearly,
the strength of this typology then was to identify the forms of participation
common to democratic systems, and raise questions about what factors might
change political participation. For example, what influences the likelihood
that an individual will give the time and energy to protest or write a letter to
the editor?
At about the same time, Verba and Nie (1972), on the heels of the major
voting studies in the 1960s and 1970s, suggested an alternative typology.
They argued that political participation was influenced mostly by individual
goals for some political outcome. Verba and Nie defined political
participation as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less
directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the
actions they take” (2). Modes of political participation were the result of what
citizens believed they can change or influence, the extent to which the
participation involved conflict, the time and energy required for the
participation, and the need for cooperation with other political actors to
achieve any objective (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Verba et al. identified four
common modes of political participation in the survey project they
conducted: voting, campaign activity, community activity, and contact with
political leaders.
The typology developed by Verba and Nie brought attention to the fact
that political participation was seen as a mix of modes, much like Milbrath
and Goel had concluded. But they also found that this process of mixing
modes of participation was complex for some individuals. Some modes of
participation require greater resources for mapping out an objective, such as
getting a particular candidate elected to office, and being adept at engaging in
activities that would achieve the goal. This typology suggested that the modes
were not equal in terms of influence or energy required to change or show
support for political goals. Participation oriented to affect policy in Congress,
a state legislature, or local city council was understood as goal oriented, and
modes of participation were activated to achieve those desired policies.
A third typology of political participation took a different approach.
Marvin Olsen (1982) argued that such typologies focus on the political
sociology of power, and emphasize the connection between political action
and impact on various elements of the political system. In other words,
Olsen’s research examined just how much power was exercised by the
corresponding mode or role associated with positions in the polity. At the top
of the hierarchy he identified “political leaders,” those government officials
elected to office as well as civil servants who are able to affect policy on a
day-to-day basis. Clearly, these roles have greater power than those outside
the governing apparatus. “Activists” were also seen as having considerable
power, but it tended to be highly focused on a single issue or cause. Most
individuals play the role of citizen in the polity, and exercise a collective
power in each election. In this regard, influence is limited to participation in
choosing political leaders. Marginals and isolates were at the edges of
participation in the political process, typically unaware of politics and
uninterested in having an impact on the political system.
Table 6.1 presents the distribution of individuals participating in the
various surveys along the modes and categories of participation identified by
these researchers. While the comparison of typologies emphasizes different
variables that create the modes, there is fair agreement among the typologies
about the modes of participation in general. In addition, these surveys
identified a common distribution of the population across different modes.
Nearly one-fourth to one-third of those surveyed participate at the margins of
U.S. political activity. The more complex the mode of participation, the
smaller the proportion of the population participating. For example, less than
5 percent participate by seeking elected office.
Table 6.1 Contrasting Traditional Typologies of

Political Participation
This early research on types of political participation established two

important patterns. First, as seen in the contrasts between models, a few
individuals participate in the more influential or powerful types of political
action. Yet, most citizens are inactive or apathetic, and at the most, people
vote, and that’s about it. Using Olsen’s conceptualization, the power found in
participation rests with a small percentage of the populace. Second, these
typologies created two distinct categories of political action that would stay
with future research. Participation was considered to be either conventional or
unconventional. The conventional forms were associated with the role of
citizen, namely voting, contacting elected officials, or running for political
office. Unconventional forms of participation would include protest and some
activism. These were important findings for the sociology of politics and
power.
Using responses from the 2016 National Election Studies (NES), the most
recent survey of voters and their political attitudes and behaviors, we can
construct a sense of what percentage of the citizenry is involved in certain
types of acts. The 2016 election appears to have generated a great deal of
interest, and as a result, a strong percentage of citizens turned out to vote. The
NES also asked respondents to report on other types of political behaviors
they engaged in; many of those were reflected in these early typologies of
political participation. The 2016 results suggest similarities with the past. A
large percentage of citizens participating in the NES in 2016 did in fact vote
in the election. We see in Table 6.2, about half of those who responded to the
NES survey reported having talking to others about a candidate or party. One-
fourth of the sample had signed a petition. Eighteen percent of the
respondents indicated that they had given money to a political organization of
some kind. Less than 10 percent of the citizens had attended a protest or rally
or worked for a candidate or campaign.
Table 6.2 Types of Political Participation Reported in

the 2016 NES
Contemporary Typologies of Political Participation
Milbrath suggested that participation was more complex as individuals
moved up the hierarchy of participation from apathetic to spectator to
gladiator; factors that would foster higher levels of participation were
assumed to be more complex. In an ingenious test of Milbrath’s model of
participation, Ruedin (2007) conducted a computer simulation to explore the
hierarchical argument implied in Milbrath’s original model. In moving from
spectators to gladiators, Ruedin found that higher levels of participation are
not easily explained by knowing a few simple factors, such as socioeconomic
status or even hypothesized personality traits. Rather, this study argued that
greater activity in politics may best be explained by multiple influences. For
example, associating with individuals interested in politics and being
connected to networks of political communication are just two of many
factors that would predict gladiatorial type political involvement. Ruedin
urges more studies that go beyond just analysis of voting as participation and
focus on a range of influences in more complex forms of participation.
Zukin et al. (2006) more recently concluded that the role of citizen
participation has changed significantly in recent decades as a result of
technology and social structural changes around consumerism, community,
and generational values. They argue that the result has not been a decline in
the number of forms of political participation, but rather the emergence of
new forms, especially for the youngest cohort they refer to as the DotNets.
They find that participation for the youngest generation of citizens includes
Internet activism such as blogging. Community service also holds a
prominent role in the lives of this generation. In addition, they find that civic
engagement follows patterns of consumer-related behavior, such as boycotts
of products or support for those companies “going green” in the era of
environmentalism. These researchers link these forms of political
participation to values and attitudes that motivate young citizens in a different
way than older cohorts.
In a large-scale study of British citizens, Li and Marsh (2008) classified
civic participation as comprising political activists, expert citizens, everyday
makers, and nonparticipants. This framework seems consistent with prior
studies that suggested that a large portion of the population failed to
participate in politics (39 percent in their sample), and a small portion of the
population was described as activists (8.4 percent). The research by Li and
Marsh uncovers forms of participation in the middle of this range of
behaviors. Expert citizens (14.5 percent of respondents in their study) were
understood as problem solvers who would use social networks, knowledge,
and skills to negotiate or persuade others without being activists or without
being captured per se by a political party or political organization. Li and
Marsh find that expert citizens were perhaps at one time activists who played
a role in the political conversations of the polity. The everyday makers (37.3
percent) understand politics as local and tend to act on local concerns as duty,
fun, or personal interest rather than loyalty to a political party, ideology, or
national cause. Everyday makers, according to Li and Marsh, “typically think
globally, but act locally” (251). This typology is a good example of
contemporary classifications that regard political participation more broadly
than as defined by Milbrath, Verba, and Nie, and others.
As the study of political participation has evolved, political sociologists
now treat forms of political participation as either institutional or
noninstitutional. Traditionally, political sociologists have divided political
participation into two categories: conventional (voting, running for office,
etc.) and unconventional, or what some call contentious politics (Tilly and
Tarrow 2006), including riots and protests. Anthony Orum argues that the
main distinction between conventional and contentious political behavior is
how these activities “both treat themselves, and are treated by the established
authorities and institutions of a society, in radically different ways [emphasis
Orum’s]” (2001: 219). In other words, the actions of those engaging in
contentious politics are perceived by both the participants themselves and the
authorities, or those having legitimate power, as being outside of the
boundary of conventional behavior. We follow the work of Marger (2008)
who defines institutional forms of participation as “legitimate ways in which,
presumably, people can make their views known and pursue their interests
through the prevailing political system” (384). This includes voting, writing
letters to elected representatives, or seeking elected office. But as Marger
observes, “when people find that their political objectives cannot be met by
using the conventional institutions, that is the electoral system with its
attendant parties and interest groups, they may act outside the established
political framework” (384). The contrast and terminology here is important in
that it highlights citizenship as a role within a legitimate, institutional,
conventional framework including the norms, rules, and laws associated with
that role. The terminology here is significant in another way. As activism for
objectives deviates from the rules of the political system, it is noninstitutional
in the sense that it does not adhere to the traditions associated with the role.
These forms of political action include protests, movements, and revolutions.
INSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION
Institutional political roles for members of society reflect the traditional
expectations of behavior associated with citizenship. Traditional, formalized
means of participating in decisions about the distribution of power in society
have been studied extensively in political sociology. Voting is the institutional
form of participation studied most intensively. In fact, we dedicate an entire
chapter to the research on voting because it’s a significant type of political
action in the political system. In this section, we examine other institutional or
conventional forms of political participation as they too explain how
individuals interact with political groups and institutions to influence policy,
political outcomes, and distributions of power. These types of institutional
political action include engaging in political conversations, utilizing the
Internet for political action, and getting involved in campaigns or being
engaged in campaign work.
Campaigning and Canvassing

One of the assumptions behind the activation of citizens is that policy can be
influenced as a result of mobilizing voters to select a certain candidate, or
collect signatures on a petition to support a policy by a local city council.
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) suggested that individuals pulled into
efforts at mobilizing citizens to work on behalf of political parties, candidates,
or issues were motivated by what Verba et al. called the “civic voluntarism
model.” This model for explaining party activism, going door-to-door for a
cause, or giving time to a political party draws heavily on sociological and
psychological influences to explain participation. Dalton (2008) finds,
“people participate because they can, they want to, or someone asked them”
(58).
Participating in a political campaign or working for a political party as a
volunteer requires a motivating interest in the candidate, issue, or loyalty to a
party. In his analysis of election studies from a number of countries, Dalton
(2008) reports that individuals who are older, hold strong party attachments,
and report high political efficacy are more likely to engage in campaign
activity of various kinds. People who describe themselves as partisans are
surprisingly not more likely to expend the time and energy to work in a
campaign.
Components of campaign work include engaging in direct contact with
other citizens to raise money, supporting a candidate or cause, or voting. But
direct contact with others on a political matter can also take the form of
contacting a member of the state legislature or Congress to support a certain
position. Persons with higher education were more likely to engage in direct
contact with other citizens through door-to-door work or canvassing. Much
like involvement in campaign activity, older persons and those reporting
stronger party allegiances are more likely to engage in direct-contact forms of
political participation. This is especially true if one has worked on a
campaign where access to the elected official may come with greater ease as a
result of localized contact.
Age and party attachments are important determinants to these more
direct forms of canvassing and campaign activity. As Dalton suggests, as one
gets older, policies related to taxation, quality of education, or health care and
SS have direct impact on daily life, thus perhaps fostering greater interest and
willingness to get involved. Moreover, those who hold strong beliefs about
the ability of one political party to address these issues as opposed to another
are an important motivating force for involvement. These are social–
psychological factors at work. Sociologically, we know that having the
resources to participate in various forms of politics is associated with
occupational status and education level. Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996)
conclude that education is a key factor in many forms of participation. They
and others conclude that there is a link between cognitive skills and higher
education, which seems necessary for more active forms of participation as
well as the adherence to principles about democracy and citizenship. This is
consistent with the civic voluntarism model posed by Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady (1995) in that the higher good justifies political involvement.
Conway (2000) emphasizes an additional key point about participation in
campaigns, direct contact, and canvassing. She notes that these forms of
participation required more resources, including time and in some cases
money. She argues that using the rational choice approach, individuals who
are able to afford the costs of this level of participation are more likely to
become engaged in these forms of political action. This might explain why
older and more highly educated persons are engaged. The cost to them may
be lower and the benefits may be higher given that certain policies like SS
benefits or tax policies may affect individuals more as they progress through
life.
Political Talk/Political Discourse

The importance of talking about politics as a form of political participation
was discovered in one of the first studies of political behavior in America.
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) concluded that people discussed
politics with those holding similar viewpoints, which had the effect of
“stabilizing” voting intentions. Early studies of political participation
established the significance of talking about politics and political
conversations and treated the frequency of political discussion as an
important dependent variable, usually in the traditional measures of political
participation (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet 1944). More recent inquiries have generally supported the conclusion
that individuals frequently engaged in political conversations are more likely
to be politically active (Dalton 2008).
Discourse has also been linked to other political sociological concepts,
going beyond its historical treatment as merely one aspect of political
behavior. Inglehart (1990) uses the frequency of engaging in political
conversation as a measure of political skill. He finds that the rate of political
discussion positively correlates with Protestantism and higher levels of
education, and political conversations are more likely to occur in states with
advanced levels of capitalist development. Huntington (1991) suggests that
levels of political talk provide an important indicator of democratization in a
society. Knoke (1992) concludes that engaging in political discourse is the
medium by which social influence takes place in social networks. His analysis
demonstrates that individuals who are frequently engaged in political talk are
more likely to vote, persuade others to vote in favor of a particular candidate,
give money, or attend a political rally. Koch (1995) reports that reference
groups can in fact influence political attitudes as a result of conversational
processes. Clearly, political discourse has held an important place in
describing social interaction at different levels of social organization.
As a result of the importance of political discourse in research on political
behavior and political sociology, a number of analysts have only recently
started to examine what factors might quantitatively and qualitatively alter
different aspects of discussion. Based on research focusing on political
conversations in a variety of settings, MacKuen (1990) identified various
characteristics of social interaction that influence the mere presence of
political talk. These factors include the value the individual places on
expressing opinion, the presence of opposing viewpoints, and the degree to
which the individual perceives that viewpoints are skewed in a certain
situation. Weatherford (1982) found that perceived consensus by the actors in
a social exchange would also influence the overall “climate of political
discussion” surrounding the individual. These interaction-based dynamics
raise important questions about how rates of political discourse might be
influenced by environmental or structural forces.
Conceptualizations of human political thinking and ideology suggest that
there is a qualitative significance to engaging in political discourse in addition
to the quantity of political discourse (Gamson 1992). Rosenberg (1988) and
Billig et al. (1988) highlight the significance of discourse in the development
of individual political worldviews, ideologies, and political thought in general
as we saw in Chapter 3. Rosenberg in fact suggests that research has been
helpful in identifying those environmental factors which might in some
situations alter the nature of political conversations. The basic conclusion of
analyses like these is that discourse represents an important process in
reflective thinking, and reflective thinking is a key element in the formation
of ideology. Therefore, the construction of attitudes and beliefs about the
distribution of power in society or politics in general may be a function of
contexts and conversations about politics or power-related themes.
Current discourse about the extent to which the United States should
reform health-care policy provides a timely example of how talk and
conversation are important in shaping belief systems around this particular
public policy. Throughout the fall of 2009, and again in spring 2017, citizens
attended town meetings sponsored by members of Congress and various
interest groups to provide comments on what health-care reform should look
like. Interestingly, some of these town meetings turned violent as participants
engaged in shouting matches were booed as they spoke in favor or against a
particular position, or at some sites were assaulted by other participants.
LEWISTON, ME—FEBRUARY 22, 2017: Protesters rally to tell Senator

Collin that they want town hall meetings. Many of the protesters were upset
with Collin’s proposed ACA (Affordable Care Act) replacement
Source: Shutterstock by LALuzzi
Political Participation and Social Media

With the evolution of social media, political participation has changed. The
technology of the World Wide Web, blogs, Twitter, and other forms of
electronic communication, like any technological advances in society, has
made an imprint on the nature of politics. Because the technology changes
rapidly, research on what could be called e-politics (e for the electronic forms
of communicating in a global system of networks) is only now beginning to
catch up and create an empirical picture of just how technological change is
at work in the relationship between society and politics. In many ways, e-
politics creates new forms of political participation, including political talk
and conversation, the acquisition of news and information about candidates or
political issues, mobilization of participants, and, as some have suggested,
online voting.
Much of political sociology focuses on what role social media plays in
building political networks, sharing knowledge, and the politics of
impression. Researchers of political communication focused on television and
its effects on citizen knowledge and information and participation in politics,
ultimately voting (see Bimber 2003 for a history of these “information
revolutions” in American politics). One line of current research argues that
the Internet is different in that it requires greater interaction than the one-way
communication of TV. Individuals must search, select, and interact with Web
sites on political candidates or issues. In his study of Internet campaigning,
Klotz (2007) quotes author William Gibson:
Today’s audience isn’t listening at all—its participating. Indeed audience is as antique a
term as record, the one archaically passive, the other archaically physical. The record, not
the remix, is the anomaly today. The remix is the very nature of the digital. Today, an
endless, recombinant, and fundamentally social process generates countless hours of
creative product.
(3)
Thus, transmission of political information and knowledge online is

different in that the online experience itself is participatory. Rather than
receiving information as on TV, the Internet provides a social space for
citizens to combine or actively engage information sources about candidates.
A number of studies find that in spite of the exponential possibilities for
information shared through Internet interactions, the overall effect of the
Internet on institutional political participation to date is minimal. Tolbert and
McNeal (2003) studied recent NES to determine what impact online
information had on voting. Those who reported gathering greater online
information on politics were more likely to have voted in 1998 and 2000. But
this may be because individuals who seek out online political information are
more likely to vote anyway or are more politically engaged to begin with. In
his studies of the NES, Bimber (2003) concludes that citizens who found
information online “had not changed levels of engagements in any substantial
way” (224). Early clues suggest, however, that the Internet may be a useful
tool in mobilizing supporters for candidates or causes, and for increasing
donations to the campaign or distributing information about rallies and
meetings.
Other researchers are looking at the effects of Internet political activity on
factors associated with political participation, such as trust in the political
system or feelings of overall political efficacy. Shah, Kwak, and Holbert
(2001) found a relationship between information gained on the Internet and
increased feelings of trust and efficacy. Bimber’s (2003) study extended these
findings and revealed that persons who get political information online are
more likely to mistrust traditional news sources (e.g. TV or newspapers) and
place greater stock in personal exchanges of information from online sources.
His analysis of the 2000 NES found that this was especially true for those
with higher education and for younger voters
TEXT BOX 6.1

Social Media and Politics: More Questions than
Answers
Computer technology has changed everything! The Internet, Facebook,
Twitter, as well as the devices that work with computer networks have had
a significant impact on politics and power. Research in this area is
growing, and the rapid changes in this technology make it difficult to
empirically nail down what the effects look like. To date, it may be more
useful to think of the impact around three areas:
1. Political Information
Initially the Internet was viewed as a great resource to bring greater
information and knowledge to citizens. The democratization of access
to information meant having multiple sources from many perspectives,
informing political acts. And in the 2016 presidential campaign and
with the new president taking office, Twitter became an important tool
in communicating political information. In a major study of American
voters since 1996, Bimber and Copeland (2013) find that the increase
in access to digital media as a source of information has not
necessarily resulted in increases in voting, attending political events,
donating money, or campaign work. At best, it seems that political
information gathered from digital sources increase political discussion
among individuals and their social networks. A key question for
researchers is which comes first, political motivations, or use of social
media?
2. Social Networks
The Internet and Social Media in its various forms have altered how
individuals find political allies, interact and exchange political ideas,
and build political connections. Much of what we know about this
technology focuses on similar ideas from the research on social
networks, social capital, and politics. It seems that using social media,
for example, does in fact increase one’s online social capital, and can
enhance the likelihood of civic participation, but not necessarily all
types of political participation (Zhang et al. 2010). In other words,
social media helps build social networks, generally speaking.
3. Collective Action
Beginning in 2010 and lasting several years, political revolution
changed the nature of governments in counties of North Africa and the
Middle East. The term “Arab Spring” was coined to describe not only
the domino effect of overthrows of authoritarian regimes, but also new
collective citizen movements in states not associated with democratic
action. The Arab Spring was characterized as having made use of
social media to organize protest in many of these countries. Howard
and Hussain (2013) conclude that this was a significant use of
technology in collective action. The 2008 presidential campaign
marked a new era in using social media to fundraise as well as get-out-
the-vote efforts. Barak Obama’s campaign is credited with making
significant and effective use of the new technology. Earl and Kimport
(2011) conclude that social media have fostered new forms of
collective action, namely that of organizing political activity without
physical copresence or even highly structured movement
organizations.
Research will continue to examine what role social media plays in political
participation (Farrell 2012). What questions would you ask as this research
moves forward? Have you used social media to engage in any forms of
institutional and noninstitutional political participation? What role does
social media play in constructing your impressions of candidates, issues,
and campaigns?
NONINSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
The modes of political participation that move outside the traditional legal or
customary forms of influence are known as noninstitutional forms of political
action. These include protest, political violence, and terrorism. In a study of
political participation in European countries, Sabucedo and Arce (1991) found
that citizens perceived unconventional forms of political action in broad
categories that include legal and illegal actions. Unconventional legal acts
include protests or strikes and boycotts. Unconventional illegal acts include
unauthorized demonstrations or rallies, protests that disrupt local order, and in
some cases, political violence. We look at political violence and terrorism in
the chapters that follow because of their recent significance in U.S. domestic
and global politics. In addition, we explore participation in social and political
movements separately as this field of sociology has generated significant
advances in explaining why people participate in both violent and nonviolent
political movements of many kinds. As we will see in Chapters 8 and 9,
sometimes individuals participate in movements and acts of political violence
simultaneously. At this point, we introduce briefly the research on
noninstitutional political participation to develop a sense of how power is
resisted or challenged by individuals in society.
Graffiti
Typically, noninstitutional or unconventional political participation is thought
of as riots, protests, mobs, or acts associated with the potential for physical
violence as well as property damage. Certainly, not all forms of contentious
politics are necessarily violent. One form that is beginning to receive
attention from political sociologists is graffiti and politically themed street art
(Waldner and Dobratz 2013) although scholars in communication studies and
rhetoric have long examined strategies that graffiti writers use to advance
their political arguments from sites as diverse as Moscow (Ferrell 1993),
Northern Ireland (Sluka 1996), and Israel (Klingman and Shalev 2001), as
well as Palestinian city walls (Peteet 1996) and Nigerian (Obeng 2000) and
Ghanaian university student lavatories (Nwoye 1993). Furthermore, some
attention has been paid to art as a form of resistance (Reed 2005).
Labeling political graffiti and street art as a noninstitutional form of
political participation fits for several reasons. First, graffiti is perceived as
outside the course of normal or institutionalized political participation and
may be criminalized. For example, in some U.S. cities, it is illegal for those
under eighteen to possess spray paint (Peteet 1996). Many cities ban graffiti
or only allow it in certain areas although some cities are currently
encouraging street art as a means of discouraging tagging and to spruce up an
urban environment (e.g. Atlanta, Georgia) (Brown 2012). Ferrell (1993)
argues that moral panic is often the response to graffiti and that the war on
graffiti is similar to the wars on drugs and gangs. A moral panic is a process
for raising concern over a social issue (Scott and Marshall 2005), where “folk
devils” are implicated as the cause of a social problem. Folk devils are often
powerless to challenge the accusations. Graffiti is often construed negatively
by its association with vandalism and destruction (Klingman and Shalev
2001). More extreme responses occur when authoritarian regimes or
occupying military forces perceive graffiti as a direct threat to authority.
Writing on the walls in the occupied West Bank was treated as an illegal
behavior by the Israeli military, which acted to erase graffiti and sometimes
shot or beat writers (Peteet 1996). Somewhat less extreme are responses that
view the appropriation of foreign imagery in graffiti as an assault on national
identity.
Second, graffiti writing often contains an oppositional message that
challenges authorities and institutions (Jorgensen 2008), and those creating it
are often excluded from participating in mainstream politics. University
students in Ghana (Obeng 2000) and Nigeria (Nwoye 1993) write messages
on lavatory walls because they lack other means to effectively influence the
state. Anthropologist Julie Peteet contends that writing on the walls in the
occupied West Bank during the height of the intifada (late 1980s to early
1990s) “was a sort of last-ditch effort to speak and be heard” (1996: 142) and
“constituted a voice for those who felt voiceless in the international arena”
(145). Although individuals who use graffiti may be powerless or outside the
conventional political process, Peteet argues that graffiti is not merely a
message of defiance, but a “vehicle or agent of power … to overthrow
hierarchy” (140). It is an attempt to circumvent the power relationship
between the dominant and the oppressed.
Besides being a form of political protest, graffiti has several other political
functions, including communicating political ideologies and beliefs (Ferrell
1993; Sluka 1996) as well as creating a forum for debating political ideas
(Nwoye 1993; Obeng 2000), socializing with a targeted group or teaching a
targeted group political ideas and values (Ferrell 1993; Sluka 1996), creating
cultural meanings (Ferrell 1993; Sluka 1996), and acting as a safety valve for
releasing political tension that is much safer than directly challenging the
state (Nwoye 1993; Obeng 2000). Sometimes graffiti writing can be
interactional and serve as a type of public discussion board (Waldner and
Dobratz 2013). Another political function of graffiti is the contestation of
space. Taking over public and private space through appropriating billboards
and signs and altering the message using graffiti or street art is called culture
jamming and often challenges corporate interests and, therefore, is a type of
resistance (Sandlin and Milan 2008). Squatting, or the illegal occupation of
buildings, is also a way of contesting space and is sometimes associated with
street art action. For example, while traveling in Rome, two of your authors
saw several examples of illegally occupied space where well-known street
artists have painted murals on buildings both as a means of calling attention
to the lack of affordable housing in Rome and as a means of protecting the
squatters.
Billboards and signs become social spaces for graffiti as political contention.
What emotions or beliefs are evoked by the example of a defaced billboard in
this picture?
A good example of sites where graffiti as a protest can be seen is

billboards, road signs, and other public signs that command attention from
persons on a roadway. For example, the billboard in the following picture,
which appears to be posted by individuals or groups opposed to abortion, is
on a busy thoroughfare in an urban area, where numerous passersby can view
the message. But note the “Hitler” style mustache (we assume) on the
billboard’s photo. Is defacing a billboard in this particular manner outside the
normal bounds of political expression? Is the political ideology about
abortion countered by what we assume an attempt to depict this message as
fascist? It’s difficult to say for sure, but the allusion to one political ideology
(fascism) on top of another (antiabortion) offers a good example of the ways
in which graffiti takes on meanings in political protest.
Johnston (2006) contends that graffiti may appear to be the work of a
single person, but this is often misleading. We agree that graffiti is a
collective activity for several reasons. First, while lavatories are often chosen
by Nigerian and Ghanaian university students because of the privacy that
allows a graffitist to write messages without fear (Nwoye 1993; Obeng 2000),
it is far from a solitary activity. As Obeng (2000) points out, graffiti is often
sequential, with a statement followed by a response. Therefore, it is a type of
discourse where participants take turns reacting to each other’s messages. In
situations where privacy is not possible, such as public walls, participants
may organize in groups with members taking different roles such as provide
supplies (e.g. purchasing spray paint), serve as a lookout, or write (Peteet
1996).
Orum (2001) notes that contentious politics is similar to conventional
political activity in that both are organized and can involve well-educated and
respected members of a community. What do we mean by “contentious
politics”? This refers to political acts that are out of the ordinary, certainly
disruptions in what is expected about normal political behavior. Contentious
politics is typically designed to get attention from a variety of audiences by
virtue of its resistance and attack. Those who use graffiti as a form of
contentious politics share a desire to change the social order, but may lack
legitimate channels of power to do so or choose to use their artistic abilities to
communicate their political values and ideas. The lack of attention by
political sociologists to the use of graffiti and other underresearched forms of
protest adopted by the powerless and disenfranchised only serves to reify
more conventional political behavior as legitimate, further stigmatizing those
who fall outside more respectable forms of political participation. We hope
that as more political sociologists pay attention to graffiti and street art, this
form of resistance will become less stigmatized. Graffiti is also associated
with protest or political demonstrations that we discuss now.
Protest and Demonstrations

As Jenkins and Klandermans (1995: 8) point out, “Social protest is inherently
a political act, because the state regulates the political environment within
which protesters operate, and because social protest is, at least implicitly, a
claim for political representation.” The concept of protest has been used in
various ways (Lofton 1985: 1). For example, protest can refer to the
“unconventional and often collective action—taken to show disapproval of,
and the need for change in, some policy or condition” (Frank et al. 1986:
228). Therefore, protest can be legal or illegal, peaceful or violent. Others
view protest as one of the three major classes of action. According to this
tripartite conceptualization,
Protest struggle stands between polite and violent struggle, a kind of “middle force” …
protest eschews or at least avoids the extensive physical damage to property and humans
found in violent struggle on the one side and the restraint and decorum of staid politics on
the other.
(Lofton 1985: 261)
Eisinger (1973: 13) distinguishes between a generic definition of protest

as “any form of verbal or active objection or remonstrance” and the more
technical one that refers to a conceptually distinct set of behaviors, or a
number of types of collective action that are “disruptive in nature, designed to
provide ‘relatively powerless people’ with bargaining leverage in the political
process.” In protests, actors are trying to maximize their resources while
minimizing the costs. For some scholars, then, protests can be distinguished
from political violence by this attempt to minimize costs. Those engaging in
violence could experience major costs such as death, serious injury, or loss of
freedom. Protesters use the implicit threat of violence, whereas those using
violence are explicit in their intention to harm.
FERGUSON, MO, USA—NOVEMBER 25, 2014: Ferguson business owners
show support for city in the aftermath of riots in front of boarded up windows
Credit: Gino Santa Maria / Shutterstock.com
Gamson’s (1975) The Strategy of Social Protest seems to consider

violence as a form of protest. The objective of social protest activities is to
gain support for a movement’s cause (Gamson 1975: 140). People typically
engage in protest to achieve certain kinds of resources for the movement,
such as attracting new members, reinforcing solidarity of current members,
obtaining material rewards such as money or equipment, or gaining attention
for a particular ideological position. At times, protest activities hinder those
opposed to the movement, for example, by making the opposition look bad
(which can make the movement look good), destroying the opposition’s
resources, or eliminating key figures through political assassination.
As Gamson (1975: 140) notes, “The form that protest takes is viewed as
the result of an interaction.” Movement groups or individuals in the
movement engage in a show of strength that may or may not be challenged by
other groups, including law enforcement. Symbolic acts may be designed to
challenge the power of another group or governmental authority (Tilly 1970
cited in Gamson 1975). For example, the American flag was burned at a
white separatist protest rally in Pulaski, Tennessee, to challenge governmental
authority. Protest demonstrations, which include sit-ins, rallies, marches, and
pickets, are the most frequent form of publicly accessible movement activity.
A demonstration is
an organized, noninstitutionalized, extraordinary form of political expression; a gathering
of people (or a person if sponsored by or acting as a representative of an organized group)
engaged in the act of making known by visible or tangible means a public display of
group feeling.
(Everett 1992: 961)
At times, social protest activities may result in violence. In fact, violent

activities of movements are a common form of political participation (Tilly
2003). Political violence can be viewed as “the result of reasoned,
instrumental behavior” (Crenshaw 1992: 7). In general, those who are
discontented or involved in some protest “are no more nor less rational than
other political actors” (Gamson 1975: 137). Protest is now seen as an
accepted form of engagement among groups with political standing rather
than an activity of those at or near the bottom of the class system or on the
political margins (Wallace and Jenkins 1995: 132). Gurr (1989: 13) identifies
four significant changes in how group violence has been studied. First, most
social scientists have come to recognize that group violence is typically a
result of “real grievances over underlying social, economic, and political
issues” rather than pathological acts of misfits in society. Second, choices are
being made by the groups, their opponents, and authorities that all influence
the likelihood and the type of violence. Third, “authorities have substantial
responsibility for violence, either by their own action or through inaction in
the face of private violence” (13). Fourth, violence is often an effective tactic
in gaining recognition and concessions, particularly if it is the result of a
prolonged social movement.
What explains individual participation in protests? Political sociologists
have identified a number of factors, but membership in key social networks,
connections to work, family, and education matter, as does individual
identities and emotions. Initially, individuals find motivation to protest,
sometimes as a function of their identity or emotional sparks such as anger,
focused on a grievance (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013).
Individuals who are interested in politics, informed, and believe they can
make a difference are more likely to participate in protests than those who do
not, a set of factors that Schussman and Soule (2005) call “political
engagement” (1085). They also suggest that individuals who engage in
protest have a “biographical availability” (1085). This describes those
structural conditions that have been found to affect the likelihood of protest.
Being married and having children, for example, is associated with less
protest activity. But being young and a college student seems to be part of the
biography of free time and freedom associated with protest activity. Finally,
as we know from studies of political participation of many kinds, “social
embeddedness” (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013: 901) plays a
critical role. Membership in groups that can recruit people to protests, help
organize protest, and teach about protest activity are important characteristics
of an individual’s social structural context. These networks are a source of
information and motivation that mobilizes individuals to activity. Many
factors come to together in predicting whether or not an individual moves
through the various stages to actually participate in protest. As Schussman
and Soule (2005) note, protest participation is a “process,” and “must be
understood as developing through social interaction” (1097).
TEXT BOX 6.2

Does Nonviolent Protest Matter?
As seen in the first half of 2017, some protests in the United States and in
Europe turned violent, resulting in damage to property, injury to persons,
and some fatalities. For example, the counter-protests to the white
supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, 2017, resulted
in three deaths and over thirty injuries. Violent protest can attract media
coverage and bring attention to movement agendas. But what about civil
resistance as a form of protest; what impact does it have?
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have studied civil resistance and
nonviolent protest as a significant form of political participation, asking
which is more effective in having demands met by ruling regimes.
Interestingly, they find that since the 1970s, the number of nonviolent
forms of protest has increased alongside a general increase in the number
of violent campaigns. By examining in detail the outcomes of 332
different violent and nonviolent campaigns, they are able to compare
which has greater success. Interestingly, “non-violent resistance campaigns
were twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent
counterparts” (7). Here’s why:
Nonviolent protests are able to mobilize more participants than those
campaigns that are violent. As a result, more participation in
collective actions gets the attention of a ruling regime. Large numbers
of individuals engaged in protest and boycotts, for example, have
numerical impacts.
With more involved in the nonviolent resistance, barriers to physical
participation are relaxed. In other words, a wide range of civil
resistance protest activities are at the call of organizers list of tactics.
Violence is limited, but nonviolence can include “labor strikes,
consumer boycotts, lockdowns and sit-ins” (35) that can involve a
diverse crowd of activists of ages and abilities.
Large numbers of identifiable nonviolent leaders enhance the
likelihood of information about the campaign being disseminated.
Leaders in violent resistance may, in fact, not be visible for fear of
arrest or security of the campaign. Leaders in nonviolent campaigns
can remain visible and active in not only sharing the agenda of the
cause, but also fanning out to recruit others to the campaign.
Nonviolent resistance may have a broader moral appeal since
violence is not used. The moral cost to a person who eschews
violence is set aside in a nonviolent campaign.
In a related sense, some nonviolent campaigns result in “lower
commitment problems” in that nonviolence requires little training in
insurgency, no loyalty per se to protect recruits or leaders, allows the
routines of daily life to continue without interruption as a result of
arrest, or the fear of injury or even death in violent exchanges. Thus,
large numbers of protesters can commit to the cause more readily, as
costs for participation are comparatively low, and as long as they
have legitimacy as a movement.
Ultimately, Chenoweth and Stephan find that large numbers of

participants in nonviolent resistance make it difficult for a regime to
squash the efforts of what might be considered a radical few. Numbers of
participants matter.
Have you ever participated in a nonviolent protest? How was the event
organized and how were the demands made public? Did changes come
about as a result? What examples of civil resistance are found in American
history? Were these effective in changing policy?
Montgomery, AL, USA—JANUARY 28, 2017: Historic marker for the
Montgomery Bus Boycott in downtown Montgomery. The boycott marks
the beginning of the modern Civil Rights Movement
Credit: Shutterstock by Jnix
Social, Political, and Revolutionary Movements

In societies throughout history, we witness some of the more dramatic,
widespread forms of participation—those dedicated to changing the political
order through a social, political, or revolutionary movement. The “political
order” in this sense is broadly defined, and can include anything from the
political order shaped in public policies, order created through the extension
or denial of civil rights, or changes in the structure of the state or regime
itself. In recent decades, movements in the United States have brought about
changes in voting and civil rights, as well as laws related to abortion, drunk
driving, and human sexuality. In Chapter 8, we will look in detail at social
movements and explanations for how movements arise. But in this chapter,
we consider the nature of political participation in a noninstitutional sense,
and highlight a few findings from what is an extensive tradition of study
focused on social, political, and revolutionary movements.
Our understanding of participation in movements today faces a challenge
in that, as Tilly (2005: 423) observed, “diverse forms of political contention
—revolutions, strikes, wars, social movements, coups d’états, and others—
interact.” Some suggest that there is no clear line to separate the broad
spectrum of political actions categorized as “contentious politics” (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2005). This can range from organizing a
movement to change policies or laws, building a movement to champion a
social identity, overthrow the leadership of the state, or use violence and
terrorism to bring attention to a group’s political grievances.
Movements pose interesting questions at this point in our study of politics
for the nature of citizenship. As mentioned earlier, Tocqueville marveled at
the ability of Americans to create associations to address civil and political
needs. The nature of social, political, and revolutionary movements suggests
a path that may be characterized by conflict and tension (although not
always). Thus, in the study of noninstitutional forms of political participation,
it deserves attention. In Chapter 8, we focus on the nature of movements, and
in Chapter 9, we focus on terrorism and political violence. At this point,
however, we look briefly at the foundations for explaining participation in the
politics of challenge.
In describing the logics of early explanations of movements, Jenkins and
Form (2005) find that participation was explained by “strains, new resources,
opportunities, and ideas” (335). These early studies of collective action
broadly understood participation in agitations, crowds, or masses as a
contagion of sorts fostered through irrational forces. In other words,
participation in mass action was a function of aggression, hostility, or panic.
Studies by Turner and Killian (1957) and Smelser (1962) changed this picture
and suggested that movements in a society grew out of “emergent norms” and
attempts to deal with social strains brought on by social change. Emergent
norms grow out of group decisions making and action, and are values or
expectations that may replace current norms as a result of collective activity.
This shift in the research viewed participation in collective acts as being
connected to attempts to correct problems in society that were viewed as
creating stress or strain, or as a way to meet changing values and norms in
society.
An alternative explanation to participation in movements emerged in the
1970s, as these forms of challenges to the political order were understood to
be purposeful. McCarthy and Zald (1973), for example, found that
participation was a function of mobilization and leadership in movement
groups’ intent upon activating individuals and other resources. More recently,
participation in contentious politics has been connected to systems of
meaning (culture), definitions of grievances, and what C. Wright Mills
described in 1940 as the “vocabularies of motive.” A good example of how
political sociologists have studied movement language is found in Text box
6.1, where the vocabularies of motive used in the white supremacist
movement are discussed. The research on hate groups highlights the
connections between how movement participants use a logic of power in
society and how this logic corresponds to forms of noninstitutional political
action. The influences on participation in social, political, and revolutionary
movements vary as do the theories developed by political sociologists to
explain these forms of political action.
The nature and causes of institutional and noninstitutional political
participation as introduced in this section reveal the many ways in which
power is fluid and changing in society. The complexities of these various
forms of participation will be discussed in Chapters 7–9. A number of recent
theories on voting and electoral participation, as we will see, bring greater
attention to the role of social division, the effects of legal changes, and
demographic shifts in recent decades. As we will see in Chapter 8, various
contemporary explanations for participation in contentious politics focus on
social processes and structures, with some political sociologists concluding
that social change and culture continue to be key factors in the construction of
these movements. Before we conclude this chapter, we will consider a recent
debate about the role of group membership and social networks in various
kinds of political participation.
TEXT BOX 6.3

Hate and Violence in the White Separatist Movement
The label hate groups has frequently been applied to the white separatist
movement, and thus, it is not surprising that the movement is thought of as
very violent. Researchers (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Kaplan 2000)
have expressed concerns about studying this movement, given the media
and watchdog images about its supporters. Kaplan (2000: xxiii) refers to
the demonization of the radical right that makes it difficult for people to
understand this movement. Indeed, Kaplan, the author of many
publications on the movement, including Encyclopedia of White Power,
acknowledged that when he first started his research, he expected to find
“angry, violent men, so consumed by hatred that they could scarcely have
resembled human beings at all” (2000: xxx). Rather Kaplan (2000: xxxii)
points out:
What I found most puzzling was that the monsters of terra incognita, upon closer
examination, were not really monsters at all. They held political views that were
repugnant, and religious views based on fantastically eccentric interpretations of
sacred text. But whatever their belief structure, these were not monsters. They were
not the violent and hate filled people I had expected to find. Ezekiel (1995) developed
a typology of four kinds of movement members and their relation to violence:
The leaders often do not recognize the link between violence and a successful
movement.
Typical members are not fanatical and do not want to harm nonwhites. They want to
belong to a “serious” group and the possibility of violence suggests to them that
this is a serious organization.
The loose cannon is unpredictable and ready to explode. If that person disrupts, he is
likely to be imprisoned. The movement can gain notoriety from this person’s
unpredictability and the idea that the movement can be violent.
Potential terrorists firmly support the movement’s ideology. They need the
comradeship of the tight terrorist cell to try to accomplish their goals.
Ezekiel (1995) suggests overall that the movement needs the aura of violence to help
sustain it.
Like other movements, the white separatist movement has used a

variety of strategies ranging from participation in violent activities to
voting for political candidates who support their views. In the interviews
of 113 white separatists (Dobratz, Shanks-Meile, and Waldner 2008), the
majority (59) believed both that movement members should run for
political office and that, under certain circumstances, violence is justified.
Over 80 percent of the respondents answered yes when asked if violence
was ever justified in the movement. When asked an open-ended question
about under what circumstances violence might be justified, about 60
percent responded “in self-defense,” whereas 22 percent mentioned that
violence would be justified when it helps the white race.
Major Donald V. Clerkin, B.S., L.L.B. of the Euro-American Alliance,
Inc., commented on the issue of self-defense
as a last resort in most cases, but always in self-defense. We oppose gratuitous
violence— violence for its own sake, violence in order to terrify or intimidate. We
don’t allow members who merely want to inflict pain on someone else.
Richard Barrett of the Nationalist Movement also expressed his
position on self-defense and staying within the law:
We would encourage people to seek solutions that are peaceful but yet are self-
defensive. So, be self-defensive. Be confrontational. Don’t back down. Don’t
surrender your rights. But be aggressive only up to the point that you are still within
the law.
(Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997: 183)
Movement members have rather diverse views of the appropriateness

and effectiveness of violence. For example, according to Barry Peterbuilt,
a skinhead from Missouri:
It really depends on who you speak to and what their goals are. Right now we are in a
transition period … and it is unclear as to whether or not violence will be necessary.
Personally, I feel that violence is a very good motivation for governments and
institutions to take any group seriously.
Somewhat similarly, John C. Sigler, aka “Duck” of the Confederate

Hammer Skinheads, argued: “Violence works, contrary to the nonsense of
popular society, when the oppressed take up arms, the oppressor is forced
to recognize and appease him” (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997: 184–
185). Nocmar 3 Clan Rock also commented on the appropriateness of
violence, suggesting that its use can be effective at times, but it must be
limited:
People often specialize in different fields, I myself specialize in politics. When a
problem such as the ones we feel are important is not addressed on a broad scale,
violence is an excellent method to draw your views into the limelight. After this
happens violence must be abandoned or you can not continue to pull support from the
public.
(Dobratz, Shanks-Meile, and Waldner 2008: 9)
Others in the movement do not think that the movement should be

engaging in violence. For example, Jost (1993: 6) of National Socialist
Kindred pointed out how the movement had more than its share of
characters potentially harming the movement, including those who
believed now was an appropriate time for revolution:
We all know that the White racial movement is adorned with a dismally large number
of kooks, screwballs, sociopaths and government informers. But it is less known that
there are a growing number who live in a fantasy world of revolution and guerrilla
warfare…. At this time, revolution or guerrilla warfare is strictly for losers. The call
to arms and revolution is completely irresponsible, very dangerous, and it plays right
into the hands of our enemies.
From the statements shown here, it is apparent that there are mixed
views within the white separatist movement about the timing of violence
and whether to employ violence at all. Certainly, some believe that
violence promotes success, some see it as effective if limited, and others
are more questioning about whether violence is even an appropriate
strategy.
GROUP CONTEXT, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND

PARTICIPATION
Some of the earliest studies of political participation discovered that
participation in politics was influenced by the associations of individuals in a
number of group contexts (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954;
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). One of the first major studies of
voting behavior reported in the now classic book The People’s Choice
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944) discovered that variables such as
socioeconomic status, religion, residence, and group membership were
correlated with voting behavior. Replications of the analysis, however, led to
serious revamping of the entire model. In 1952, social scientists at the
University of Michigan proposed an alternative approach, focusing on three
psychological variables: individual attachment to party, orientation toward
issues, and orientation toward specific candidates. The findings suggested a
strong link between party identification and support for candidates of the same
party and issues often associated with the party. Interestingly, the significance
of group membership, social networks, and associations would take center
stage in debates about political participation in the new century.
Off and on since the Columbia studies of the 1940s and their emphasis on
group influences on voting, social scientists have studied the role of group
context in affecting many forms of political participation. Dennis (1987)
offered an important discussion of the basic assumptions that characterize the
group analysis of political behavior. Implicit in his work was that groups serve
as some filter for the individual, or perhaps even as a yardstick by which
political stimuli are considered. He observed that “Membership, identification,
commitment, likes and dislikes, and such, all filter the group through the
prism of person-centered responses” (325). He also argued that considerable
research showed how groups have personal meaning for individuals. Meaning
in this case would include both rational, calculation about connecting to the
group, and more emotional, affective ties to the group. Finally, Dennis
observed that groups are an important social-psychological source of attitudes
and thus eventual behaviors. These themes would be picked up more broadly
as Robert Putnam (1993, 1995) published a series of works in the 1990s that
recognized the importance of group membership to participation in civic life.
With his publication of Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community, Putnam generated significant academic and popular discussions
around the apparent collapse of citizen engagement in civic life. When
Putnam (2000) introduced the notion of “bowling alone” as descriptive of
American political culture and social malaise, he helped bring attention to
long-standing sociological themes. The phrase bowling alone struck a chord
similar to the terms anomie, alienation, and the lonely crowd and helped
introduce discussions about how connected individuals are in modern society
and what implications this lack of connectedness would have on democratic
processes. The “bowling alone” thesis offers political sociologists, however,
an opportunity to once again explore the significance of group cohesion and
group membership and the influences of these aspects of social context on
political participation. There is a long-standing research tradition in political
sociology that explores the impact of group membership on political
participation of many kinds. Specifically, attention was given to the
connection between group-belonging and participation in civic and political
life. This debate would bring a great deal of attention to the sociological
concept of “social capital.”
Politics and Social Capital

Early in this debate—and reminiscent of Toqueville’s observations—the
relationship between social capital and political participation was
hypothesized to be central to the “health” of contemporary democracy in
America (Foley and Edwards 1997; Miller 2009). Putnam (1995, 2000)
initially linked social capital and political power as a result of his studies of
Italian communities, and suggested that social capital in modern American
communities was related to declines in political engagement. The subsequent
research on social capital and civic engagement in many ways would build on
the well-established work within political sociology that highlights the
significance of social context to politics. This work shows that social
connectedness in the form of networks (Knoke 1992), neighborhood
identification (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), and group identity (Conover
1984; Miller et al. 1981) can influence ideology, political attitudes, and
political participation. Timpone (1998) confirmed that forms of political
participation and the associated dynamics are affected by “social
connectedness,” which is conceptualized as anything from a region of the
country to neighborhood-level interactions. This notion of connectedness is
an essential sociological argument in understanding political participation.
Interestingly, James Coleman observed years earlier that “the concept of
social capital constitutes both an aid in accounting for different outcomes at
the level of individual actors and an aid toward making the micro-to-macro
transitions without elaborating the social structural details through which this
occurs” (1988: S101). Coleman (1988, 1990) originally outlined social capital
as a theoretical construct to describe what are essentially by-products of
social interaction. He viewed social capital as a product of group
memberships and ties between individuals as a transformation of social action
into social currency (media), where exchanges of capital (financial, human,
and cultural) constitute basic social processes. Specifically, these products of
social capital include obligation and trust, information, and what he referred
to as effective norms (1988). For example, individual with strong ties to a
particular group will build trust in each other over time. This trust yields
connections that can be called on in times of trouble, or favors exchanged as a
result of trust and obligation. The forms of social capital reflect those aspects
of human interaction that facilitate the achievement of a particular goal. What
emerges from human interactions are “social-structural resources,” which can
be applied by individuals in different social contexts where action is directed
toward a particular outcome. According to Coleman, social capital cannot be
studied without consideration of social structures such as small groups, work
settings, and organizational contexts. Coleman’s framework places an
emphasis on understanding social capital as having functions, forms, and
contexts.
Coleman (1990) gave significant attention to voting in his original
presentations of the social capital framework, mostly in an attempt to provide
an alternative theoretical explanation to the rational school of voting. His
work shifted the study of voting toward a normative model that was more
closely aligned with sociological concepts. He makes several important
observations regarding voting and nonvoting. First, he notes that voting is
guided by emergent norms much like other choices in any given social
context. Pressures from friends and other social connections can encourage or
discourage an individual to vote. This model of voting suggests how social
process explanations overcome the limits of the rational voting model, which
asserts that if costs of voting outweigh rewards, the individual will not vote.
Certain qualitative aspects of personal networks mean that, in some situations
(“differential application of the norm”) (1990: 292), norms about voting may
be a factor in the choice calculus for voting. Second, Coleman notes that
Empirically, there is … a small positive correlation between social status and voting in
modern democracies where voting is not compulsory. That correlation is very likely due
to the fact that both interest in the election and social capital are lower among lower-
status persons.
(827)
Voting rates vary according to the level of social capital, and the eventual
decision to vote can be changed by the context or situation surrounding
lower-status individuals and categories of people.
Basing his work in a different set of theoretical assumptions, Bourdieu
(1984, 1986) argues that there are three forms of capital—financial, cultural,
and social—each caught up in the exercise of power: “resources … when they
become objects of struggle as valued resources” (Swartz 1997: 74). These
resources, much as Coleman suggests, emerge from the “possession of a
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 248–249). All forms of
capital are developed, invested, accumulated, and spent in power
relationships according to Bourdieu, and consequently, all forms of social
capital vary in volume (accumulated or saved) and accessibility (opportunity
to act); these variations ultimately create status differentials among
individuals within society. Some researchers have used this theoretical
perspective to study participation in social movements, and have found that
networks provide the social and cultural capital that facilitates activism.
Bourdieu’s theoretical conceptualization of social capital generally
focuses on three social processes that have relevance to the study of civic
engagement: transformation, fields, and stratification. All forms of capital
represent a social currency of sorts, eventually transformed into social
outcomes that Bourdieu suggests are practices, habits, and traditions. These
transformations and transactions take place in “fields” or a “structured space
of dominant and subordinate positions based on types and amounts of capital”
(quoted in Swartz 1997: 123), where social interaction is structured into
distinct patterns. One field Bourdieu (1990) studied is housing policy. Here,
the landlord–tenant relationship—the dominant and subordinate—represents
a pattern of capital exchange and transformation—rent for a unit and
obligation for a lease. The repetition of capital transformation in these
“structured spaces” creates more general forms of social stratification. Social
class becomes apparent in this type of field, and is created by social
processes, according to Bourdieu, out of repeated transformations of social,
cultural, and financial capital in certain fields. Politics would constitute one
such field of human action.
Both Coleman and Bourdieu conclude that the location of the individual
in a context of social ties is a source of variations in different forms and
volumes of capital. Coleman (1988) noted that there might be a “lack of
social capital” (S103) in some social contexts, and offered an important
observation that so far is underresearched. Specifically, he argued that
“certain kinds of social structure … are important in facilitating some forms
of social capital.” More generally, those who live in these structures arguably
retain less social capital, which inhibits participation in social processes like
voting. Similarly, Bourdieu claims that social capital varies in volume as a
result of context:
The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of
the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital
possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.
(1986: 249)
Both theorists clearly give significance to structures, networks, and social

context in creating forms and differences in social capital.
Themes in Research on Social Capital and Political

Participation
A number of sociologists have argued that the study of social capital helps to
account for the impact of variations in social context and structures on
participation in politics, shaping policy, and political activism. Flora (1998)
advances this argument, suggesting that researchers give greater attention to
understanding social capital as emerging from “social embeddedness.” He
identifies one form of social embeddedness as “entrepreneurial
infrastructures,” where community leadership, political coalitions, and citizen
support are found to vary, for example, in small rural towns. Mondak (1998)
makes a similar point when he noted that “Social capital may inhere in the
structure of all relations, but the form, character and consequences of that
social capital vary.… We should endeavor to learn about the relative nature of
social capital as it exists in various contexts” (435). Emphasis shifts to the
structural and contextual rather than treating social capital as a resource. His
observation extends the criticism often made that much of the social capital
research on civic engagement has focused on “voluntary associations” (e.g.
parent–teacher association, Lions Club) rather than on other social groupings
(Greeley 1997). The embeddedness model of social capital creates a contrast
to the rational choice models of social capital that cast the concept in terms of
more economic explanations of social behavior and emphasize social capital
exchange or accumulation.
To date most of the research has focused on explaining the connections
between social networks, groups, and associations on traditional forms of
political participation. As mentioned earlier, voting or engagement in
campaign work can be linked to having friends so engaged or being a
member of a group that urges these types of participation (Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995). Activism in a social or political movement has also been
linked to network memberships (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980;
Viterna 2006). Lim (2008) finds that the more social ties a person has to a
variety of groups, the greater the likelihood that person is politically
mobilized in a variety of political situations: “The key proposition in these
studies is that people participate in political and civic activities because they
are asked or encouraged by someone with whom they have a personal
connection” (961). Lim’s research finds that participation in a protest,
community politics, or contact with elected officials can be realized even
when the intensity of these personal connections varies from stranger, to
indirect tie, to close friend.
Other research finds that social capital may not have such a direct role as
that described earlier in recruiting, or cajoling friends to go vote (McClurg
2006). Walker (2008) summarizes current studies exploring this theme,
finding that “associations are consequential for political participation because
they promote political discussion (Eliasoph 1998), awareness of common
interests (Fung 2003), psychological engagement about politics (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and mobilization on issues of interest to
community members (Barber 1984)” (117). Walker’s own research shows
that the nature and tone of the groups an individual belongs to are key to
determining political activism. Similarly, McFarland and Thomas (2006) find
that youth voluntary associations such as those promoted in high school (e.g.
community service groups or public-speaking organizations) provide a
context that seems to bolster political participation later in life. What this
research tells us is that social ties matter to political participation as long as
the ties seem to provide a social context for learning and reinforcing certain
political skills. These studies of social capital, associations, and participation
reveal another side to the social bases of politics.
We end this section by coming full circle of sorts, noting with interest that
it was Tocqueville (1945) who traveled the United States in 1830 and 1831
and observed how the then new American republic was engaged in self-
governance. Many of the scholars currently debating the importance of social
capital, civic association, and social networks start their analysis with some
reference to Tocqueville, because he hypothesized that the associational or
group nature of the American “civil society” was one of its hallmarks. In light
of the research summarized here, it was perhaps Tocqueville who captured
something unique to the nature of democracy and political participation
nearly 200 years ago.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION
Recall from Chapter 3 that some political sociologists argue that demographic
patterns and the related value shifts in a society are particularly important to
the ways in which political values and beliefs emerge, which, in turn, affect
political participation including voting, involvement in political campaigns,
activism, and social movement activity. Two recent studies took a
comprehensive look at this thesis in light of what appeared to be a significant
youth presence in the 2008 presidential election. This influence was a clue to
what Dalton (2008) and Zukin et al. (2006) found as an important generational
change in the nature of political participation in the United States.
Using survey data from two national surveys of citizens fifteen years and
older, focus groups in four regions of the country, and interviews with experts
working with youth in different settings, Zukin et al. (2006) affirmed a “new
engagement” in the United States tied to different age cohorts. There were a
number of significant findings from this comprehensive multiyear study that
challenged the debate in political sociology whether citizens at the turn of the
century were less engaged in civic groups and civic life (Putnam 2000). This
group of political scientists found that civic participation was not in decline,
but rather changing. We highlight three significant findings from this study
that reveal how social forces are at work in altering the nature of political
participation.
Zukin et al. (2006), on the one hand, confirmed past research, showing
that close to half of the citizenry (48 percent in their study) are disengaged
from the civic life of society. On the other hand, they found that half of the
citizens were engaged fairly consistently in two kinds of civic life, with one
form ignored or underestimated in the older typologies. A large segment of
the population studied was active in political engagement or what in the
traditional definition was referred to as “activity that has the intent or effect of
influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of
people who make those policies” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, quoted
in Zukin et al. 2006: 6). These institutional forms of participation as we
described them earlier in this chapter include voting, writing letters to elected
officials, or seeking elected office. Equally significant to the nature of political
life in the United States is what Zukin et al. identified as civic participation.
This segment of the population is engaged in “organized voluntary activity
focused on problem solving and helping others” (7). Participation in the
political life of the society closely aligns itself with what Tocqueville
described in his observations of the American civic villages in the 1840s,
where individuals gathered in groups to address local problems as well as
consider the challenges presented to a national civic body.
The second pattern revealed in their study of the new engagement was that
citizens participated in twenty-four different dimensions of political life,
which Zukin et al. (2006) organized into four distinct patterns of social action:
1. “Political engagement” included those actions described previously and
consistent with past models of institutional participation: voting,
contributions to campaigns, and displaying yard signs or bumper stickers
for candidates.
2. “Civic engagement,” as described previously, was action around local
issues or problems. This form of participation involved joining a Parent
Teacher Association to address school issues, or participating in town hall
meetings about city or county tax issues.
3. “Cognitive engagement” described those citizens who basically indicated
that they follow the news about politics at many levels. This form of
engagement not only describes paying attention to media reports about
political issues, but also indicates a certain level of knowledge gained by
the individual as a way to keep informed about politics and to comprehend
political concerns.
4. Finally, Zukin and his colleagues described participation as creating
“public voice,” which refers to expressions through letters to the editor,
signing petitions, boycotts of consumer items, or using the Internet for
political expression.
As the authors conclude, these four forms of civic participation suggest a shift
in previous forms of participation studied by social scientists in the 1970s and
1980s.
The third and most significant finding from the study of new engagement
was the generational differences in the four forms of participation. In
categorizing respondents in the study by age cohort, Zukin et al. (2006) found
that “DotNets” (born after 1976) and “Gen-Xers” (born between 1965 and
1976) varied in their forms of participation in contrast to “Baby Boomers”
(born between 1946 and 1964) and “Dutifuls” (born prior to 1946).
Specifically, although patterns of involvement are complex in many ways,
Zukin et al. found that DotNets are less active in traditional political forms
overall, and equally as involved in forms of civic engagement as their parents.
In addition, DotNets tend to find ways to engage political voice at similar
rates of older cohorts, but in different ways. For example, DotNets are more
likely to participate in a demonstration, sign an e-mail petition, or participate
in a boycott than older citizens. Younger citizens are about equally as likely to
go door-to-door canvassing, sign a written petition, or send a letter to the
editor. The authors conclude that young citizens are not as disengaged as some
may have previously thought. In other words, while fifteen- to twenty-eight-
year olds may not vote at levels similar to older citizens, younger individuals
find alternative ways to participate at a rate equal to or greater than their
parents or grandparents.
In another comprehensive study of political participation and social
change, Dalton (2016) finds that the “norms of citizenship” are changing.
Based on extensive use of the 2004 and 2014 General Social Survey (GSS) as
well as survey data collected by the Center for Democracy and Civil Society
(CDCS), Dalton finds compelling evidence that suggests two kinds of norms
emerging beyond the earlier traditional notions of citizenship and
participation. He suggests that citizenship includes four dimensions. The first
is participatory sense, where citizenship is defined in terms of what we
traditionally think of as social actions of enfranchisement: voting or activity in
political groups. The second he calls autonomy, where citizenship is thought
of as keeping informed or paying attention to politics, much like Thomas
Jefferson suggested when he believed that the informed citizen was the
watchman of any democracy. The third dimension Dalton suggests is social
order. This theme connects citizenship to political behaviors such as obeying
the law or service on a jury or in the military. The fourth dimension of
citizenship is solidarity, where citizenship calls upon a higher ethic or morality
of the community or society, typically an appeal to altruism and helping
people in the community.
From these dimensions, Dalton (2016) identifies two norms of citizenship
and political participation. The first norm he describes as the “duty-bound”
notion. Participation in civic life is defined mostly in terms of traditional
notions of political action as well as helping to maintain the social order. The
“engaged citizen” is the second norm at work in contemporary society. This
norm orients individuals to actions around solidarity and autonomy.
Individuals engaged in this way are watchful, understanding, and altruistic,
while at the same time likely to vote in elections. Dalton argues that these
“two faces of citizenship” are distributed in varying ways across different
groups in society, especially age groups. Younger-age cohorts—who are
commonly referred to as Generations Y and X—are more oriented to the norm
of the engaged citizen. Those born prior to World War II and the Baby
Boomers are oriented to the norm of duty-bound participation. Dalton, much
like Zukin et al., concludes that as the younger cohorts age, and as the older
cohorts leave the population, the nature of political participation will most
likely change from what traditional models have described.
What kinds of political participation are consistent with the norms
identified in Dalton’s study? Consistent with prior typologies of traditional
modes of participation, Dalton finds that those adhering to the duty-bound
notion of citizenship vote, work for a political party or campaign, and donate
money to a campaign. In contrast, those adhering to the engaged citizen norm
sign petitions, participate in demonstrations, engage in boycotts, and use the
Internet for political activities.
The study by Dalton (2016) goes a step further and suggests a number of
factors influencing this shift in how participation and citizenship are being
defined. One of the most significant factors affecting this shift has been the
growing level of education in the United States since World War II. He finds
that the duty-bound norm is best predicted by “age, income, religious
attachments, and Republican party identification” (51). In contrast,
“Education, racial minority, and religious attachments significantly increase
engaged citizenship, but age, income, and Republican party identification
lower engaged citizenship” (51). Age was the strongest predictor of citizen
duty; education was the strongest predictor of the engaged citizen.
Interestingly, Dalton finds that these trends are similar to those found in other
advanced industrial democracies:
Generational change, educational effects, and the reshaping of life experiences are
producing a similar norm shift across the affluent democracies. This is consistent with a
large body of research on value change in advanced industrial societies, which argues that
citizens are shifting to post-material and self-expressive values that are analogous to the
norm shift described here.
(2016: 171)
Again, these findings paint a picture of generational change and its impact
not only on political participation, but also on political culture.
Both studies presented here are indicative of the complex relationships
between politics and social change. Social forces of modernization, affluence,
changing gender roles, and demographic shifts are antecedents to underlying
changes in the nature of political participation. Future research will no doubt
continue to track how the age cohort we call DotNet participates in the
political process at the national and local levels. How this cohort utilizes
technology to apply certain political skills in the political process, as well as
what issues or concerns attract attention, will be of particular interest.
Moreover, political sociologists will follow with interest the trend hinted at in
the last two presidential elections that suggested a turnaround in the decline in
voting by younger voters.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this chapter was to provide a description of various ways in which
political participation is conceptualized in political sociology. Each of the
theoretical frameworks approaches the study of political participation with
differing assumptions about the role participation plays in affecting the
distribution of power in society. The various typologies, both classical and
contemporary, suggest that we continue to find social spaces for forms of
political participation as expressions of interest, roles related to social
positions, and the interests in changing the nature of power. What follows is a
detailed study of current fields of analysis in political sociology related to very
specific forms of political participation:
voting and electoral politics
social and political movements
terrorism and political violence.
These particular areas constitute the focal points of political sociology

where researchers have been most active in understanding how these
particular forms of political participation affect power in society.
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CHAPTER
7
Elections and Voting
Most of us have learned from our government classes the importance of

democracy, with free elections being the key ingredient. Harrigan (2000: 178)
makes it clear just how essential the right to vote is: “Elections are the heart
of democracy; they give the people a voice in how they are governed.
Without meaningful elections there is no meaningful democracy.” Budge and
Farlie (1983: xi) point out that voting is the only time when most citizens can
directly act to influence government decisions as elections provide a means to
link government actions with public desires such as deciding whether to
increase property taxes or fund a sports stadium.
Some authors suggest that elections perform symbolic or ritualistic roles,
making voters feel they have fulfilled their civic duty and have contributed to
society. Milbrath and Goel (1977: 12) argue that a person votes more out of a
sense of civic duty than the belief that his or her vote will make a difference
—voting may be a means for voters to define themselves as good members of
the community. Milbrath and Goel contend too that one can vote without as
much information or motivation as needed for other political activities. Those
who focus only on the symbolic roles believe that voters “do not necessarily
make intelligent, informed decisions. Few know anything about candidates
… election results are uninterpretable” (Niemi and Weisberg 2001: 1–2).
Others suggest that nominated major party candidates are not that different
from each other (Tweedledum and Tweedledee), that one vote does not
matter, and elections are plagued by fraud (Niemi and Weisberg 1976, 2001).
In Chapter 6, we considered the theoretical frameworks related to political
participation, and here we will first examine how the various theoretical
frameworks view voting and the electoral process. Then, we will discuss two
social scientists’ evaluations of the functions of elections and look at electoral
systems and turnout. These sections will be followed by considerations of the
voting behavior research, the impact of social cleavages on voting, issue-
based voting, and finally, an examination of various U.S. presidential
elections.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS1
Pluralist
In the pluralist framework, voting and free elections are key ingredients of
the democratic state. Voting is a key strategy of political action that enables
one to influence government decisions, and thus, it demonstrates that the
public has power. Casting a ballot is seen as a major mechanism, perhaps the
single most important one, for individuals to express their political
preferences. The voter should be informed about the multiple issues in an
election, and the major political parties and candidates should appeal to the
majority of the voters. According to Alford and Friedland (1985: 106),
pluralists assume that
all voters were available to respond to candidates, issues, or party appeals, that their
behavior could be changed by the right appeals, and that moderate shifts of voting back
and forth from left to right constituted the full range of political choice available.
It is expected that citizens trust their elected leaders and that the minority
of voters are willing to accept the decision of the majority as legitimate.
Should the electorate turn to an extremist political leader, ideally there
would be checks and balances in place to return the system to greater
stability and harmony. Pluralists are concerned if there is a surge in political
participation; this may signal a lack of consensus or great disagreement that
could be viewed as disruptive to society (Alford and Friedland 1985).
Elite-Managerial
The elite-managerial framework interprets voting and elections quite
differently from pluralists. The heart of the issue is that elections are
pictured as “a fiction, a legitimation of elite control, sometimes a recipe for
political disorder” (Alford and Friedland 1985: 250). An elite theorist might
view elections as a device to manipulate the masses into believing that they
truly have a voice in government. Because political power and decision-
making are concentrated among elites, elections fail to offer meaningful
alternative candidates. Elections tend to be viewed as contests between
political elites whose views do not differ in significant ways as the system
maintains elite control and power. Elections and other democratic features
like political parties and legislatures have a symbolic function, suggesting
that they provide a form of democracy without actual democratic content.
Elections may also have a controlling function as they provide a mechanism
for peaceful participation and an outlet to express one’s preferences (259–
260).
Elites may also feel that it is better to have an apathetic mass rather than
citizens committed to true participatory democracy. Having less committed
citizens makes it less likely that there would be any attempts to make major
system changes. The focus in this framework is more on elites and their
strategies to maintain order and control, whereas issues of political
participation like elections and voting are of lesser importance. Conservative
elite theorists might well argue that the established elites serve as the
guardians of democracy and are the responsible and competent managers of
politics and society (Hamilton 1972: vii).
Class
Class theorists like elite theorists tend to believe that non-elite or lower-
middle- and working-class political participation does not provide an
effective means to influence or control political leaders. However, elections
do function as a means to legitimate the existing system. Class theorists
recognize the power potential of the lower classes, but believe that these
classes have little impact on the current power structure. Democracy can be
seen in a variety of ways according to a class perspective. Therborn (1978:
248) identified a paradox in what he labeled “bourgeois democracy—a
regime in which the exploiting minority rules by means of a system of
legally free popular elections.” This perspective shares with the elite
perspective the notion that elections mislead the lower classes into believing
they have real power. Alternatively, democracy might be seen as something
truly possible only if and when capitalism is overthrown.
Rational Choice
The central assumption of rational choice is that voters act to maximize their
utility or to exhibit goal-oriented political behavior (Brooks, Manza, and
Bolzendahl 2003: 142). Neuman (2005: 599) defined rational choice theory
as follows: “Individuals make instrumental decisions about whether to
invest time and effort into voting, and they vote if or when they believe it is
likely to make a difference for their immediate personal situation.”
According to Downs (1957), the rational citizen looks at the political
parties’ policies and platforms to evaluate the value of participation in the
long run and the expected value of change versus no change against the
costs of voting. Simply put, if the benefits to the potential voter exceed the
costs, the person will vote. Some argue that it is irrational for most people to
vote. Downs believed that the potential voter at times also considers how
close the election will be.
Some argue that it is rational to vote and thus fulfill one’s civic duty
(Niemi and Weisberg 1976: 26), but this is debatable. For example, some
people may feel that as citizens they are obligated to vote, but instead of
rationally considering the issues, they vote for the candidate with the most
pleasing smile or because they shook hands with the candidate. The early
work on the rational voter tended to emphasize mathematical modeling, but
more recent work has focused on the role of issues in voting (Niemi and
Weisberg 2001: 16).
Postmodern
Another framework is the postmodernist approach that emerged because
modernist theories emphasizing the concepts of capitalism, industrialism,
centralized administrative power in the state, and centralized control of
military power could no longer effectively explain how the world works
(Best 2002: 41). Instead, disorganized capitalism exists coupled with
disorder, flux, and ambiguity. There tends to be no strong participatory
democracy, and a decline in the importance of the nation-state. Individuals
are not actively involved in the political process, and politics exist without
established rules (52). It seems that the people are no longer tied together by
community, and they are trying to make sense of what is happening in the
world. Social-class ties also weaken in a postclass society. Unlike the ideas
surrounding the rational voter, political preferences lack any ordered means
of predictability (266).
According to Freie (2012), a basic belief of postmodernism is that
nothing is settled. In this sense, there may be continuous campaigning going
on. After one election, one needs to promptly plan for the next one including
raising money, developing strategies, etc. In such an environment,
partisanship and polarization increase and that likely makes it difficult for
democracy to thrive. Indeed, Freie believes that the President is likely to
have more authority (Freie 2012).
Institutionalist and Political Culture

Manza, Brooks, and Sauder (2005) identified a number of institutional
factors affecting the turnout of voters. Their list included how difficult it
may be to register to vote, negative campaigning and advertisements in the
media, the costs of voting (e.g. whether the polls are open on a workday or
weekend), and the range of ideological choices offered by the political
parties. Such factors could easily interact with political culture ones
including attitudes such as the public mood (Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl
2003). For example, the Tea Party Movement emerged to provide alternative
candidates to traditional Republican and Democratic ones and captured
some of the anger directed toward the economic stimulus package,
environmental issues, and health-care reform (“Tea Party Movement” 2010).
An additional example of how institutional and political culture issues
influence elections is the ouster of three Iowa Supreme Court justices in the
2010 election in Iowa. In 1962, Iowa introduced a merit selection system for
judges that called for periodic retention votes on justices. Justices serve for
staggered eight-year terms and their names appear on election year ballots
with voters having the option to vote “yes” or “no” regarding their retention.
In 2009, the seven Iowa Supreme Court justices unanimously ruled that a
law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional
because it violated the constitution’s provision for equal protection rights for
minorities including same-sex couples who wanted to marry. In 2010, out-
of-state organizations such as the National Organization for Marriage and
the American Family Association contributed money to the campaign to
remove the justices who were labeled “activist judges” in some negative ads.
In the 2010 election, none of the three Iowa Supreme Court judges who
were on the ballot were retained. Those against same-sex marriage saw it as
a victory for the voice of the people, while others saw it as severely
challenging an independent judiciary and the role of the courts as a protector
of minority rights (Sulzberger 2010).
We will now consider some more specific discussion of the functions of
elections and then turn to the empirical work in political sociology that
provides some insight into factors that influence both voting turnout and
choice.
The Functions of Elections

For a government to be democratic, “consent of the governed” is necessary,
and elections give meaning to the idea of consent (Dye 2003: 249). A direct
function of elections is to select officials who will occupy public office.
Voters can pass judgment on current officeholders by reelecting them or by
voting for someone else. Indirectly, voters may be able to shape policy
directions by choosing between or among candidates or parties with different
policy goals (Dye 2003).
Ideally, for elections to direct the formulation of policy, four conditions
need to be achieved:
1. competing candidates provide concise well-explained policy options;
2. citizens vote solely on the policy alternatives provided;
3. election returns clearly reflect the voters’ policy choices;
4. elected officeholders abide by their campaign statements.
As Dye (2003) points out, none of these conditions are fully achieved in U.S.
elections.
Domhoff (2006) acknowledges that elections have the potential for
voters to influence public policy by their support for candidates who would
represent their policy preferences. However, he believes that the U.S.
electoral process has not allowed for as much input by critics and
nonwealthy citizens as have most social democratic Western European
procedures. For Domhoff, elections have four functions:
elections provide a way for “rival power groups, not everyday people”
to resolve disagreements peacefully;
elections allow average persons to play a role in deciding which rival
power groups will be the major leaders in government;
citizens in many nations can have some input on social and economic
issues if they participate in electoral coalitions;
elections provide a means to introduce new policies if there are extreme
domestic problems caused by social disruption (135–136).
Domhoff believes that because the United States has only a two-party
system and such systems do not facilitate parties offering clear policy
alternatives, candidates tend to moderate their positions to appeal to voters in
the middle. Thus, the personality characteristics of candidates become
significant instead. The candidate-selection process is “in good part
controlled by members of the power elite through large campaign
contributions” (148). In addition to campaign contributions, the corporate
community can financially support politicians by giving them corporate
stock, purchasing some of their property at high prices, hiring them or their
law firms, and paying them for giving speeches at corporate and trade
association events.
According to Domhoff, the candidate-selection process in the United
States tends to result in certain types of elected officials, including those
frequently from the top 10–15 percent of the income and occupational
hierarchies: lawyers and a number of “ambitious people who are eager to ‘go
along to get along’” (156). Most successful politicians are either
conservative or quiet on controversial social issues and those in national
positions tend to be probusiness conservatives. Given these views on
elections and those elected, we will now turn to what seems to encourage
voters to go to the polls to vote.
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND TURNOUT

Studying electoral systems is important because these systems define how
the political system functions. “Metaphorically, electoral systems are the
cogs that keep the wheels of democracy properly functioning” (Farrell 2001:
2). In addition, electoral systems ideally reflect the preferences of voters,
facilitate strong and stable governments, create a sense of legitimacy, and
elect qualified representatives. The design of both electoral laws and
electoral systems impacts how the functions are carried out (3). For example,
many regard a secret ballot as a significant provision for democratic
elections. Figure 7.1 presents a device for ensuring secrecy even in absentee
voting.
FIGURE 7.1 Secrecy Folder for Absentee Voting in Iowa

One key component of elections involves the complex process of
translating votes into legislative seats based on proportional versus
nonproportional systems. In the proportional system, the number of seats
each party wins reflects as closely as possible the number of votes it has
received. In the opposite system, much greater emphasis is given to ensuring
whether one party obtains a clear majority of seats to increase the likelihood
of having a strong and stable government (Farrell 2001: 4–6).
In the majoritarian system (nonproportional), a candidate must receive a
majority (more than 50 percent) of the votes. This may mean two rounds or
more of voting if no candidate receives a majority in the first round. If a
second round takes place, voter turnout is often lower. The single-member
plurality system used in the United States is another example of a
nonproportional system. The contested seat goes to whoever has the highest
number of votes. Proportional systems, on the other hand, often offer lists of
candidates put forward by the political parties. The size of the lists depends
on the number of seats to be filled with the proportion of votes each party
receives determining the number of seats it can fill. Smaller parties thus have
greater chances to gain representation than if under either the single-member
plurality or majoritarian systems. Mixed systems combine both proportional
representation and single-member plurality. Generally speaking, turnout is
higher in proportional systems, perhaps in part because supporters of smaller
parties see some benefit from voting.
More and more people vote absentee or in advance of Election Day. To
provide for secrecy in returning absentee ballots, Iowa provided this folder
and these instructions for the 2008 election.
Analyses of voter turnout are less common than studies of why people
prefer a certain party or candidate. Kelley and Mirer (1974) examined “The
Simple Act of Voting,” but Dalton and Wattenberg’s (1993) title “The Not So
Simple Act of Voting” seems more appropriate. In the United States, voter
turnout has been characteristically low and, until very recently, seemed to be
declining. Reasons for low turnout include individual, structural,
socioeconomic, and political cultural factors (Blais 2006; Dye 2003: Chapter
5; Neuman 2005: Chapter 5). Studies on U.S. voting have conclusively
documented that those who are older, and have more education and higher
income tend to vote more, whereas minorities vote less.
According to the socioeconomic environment perspective, economically
advanced nations with high standards of living are more likely to have higher
turnout rates. Yet, there seems to be no relationship between downturns in an
economy and higher voter turnout. While a declining economy and hardships
might encourage certain people to vote, others become alienated and
withdraw from the political process (Blais 2006: 117). Other contextual
factors such as living in small countries, discussing politics with friends and
neighbors, and being contacted by a political party also contribute to turnout.
Political cultural values including individualism, egalitarianism, and
materialism, and participatory cultures may encourage voting. The subjective
orientation of citizens to politics may facilitate efficacious feelings, thus
leading to greater voter turnout. For example, individuals who trust their
government may feel that their vote is important and therefore go to the
polls.
Jackman (1987) stresses how political and legal institutional
arrangements have significant impact on national rates of voter turnout. He
examined nineteen industrial democracies in the 1960s and 1970s, and
postulated that nationally competitive electoral districts, unicameralism
(power concentrated in one legislature), and compulsory voting laws that
mandate voting tend to increase turnout. On the other hand, turnout is less
when there are many parties and when minor parties must accumulate lots of
votes to achieve a given degree of representation in the legislature. Jackman
concludes that “where institutions provide citizens with incentives to vote,
more people actually participate; where institutions generate disincentives to
vote, turnout suffers … turnout figures offer one gauge of participatory
political democracy” (419).
Blais (2006) disagrees with Jackman, suggesting that the impact of
institutional variables may be overstated. More specifically, he argues that
the effects of unicameralism on turnout are mixed and that, while
compulsory voting increases turnout, it is unclear if light sanctions are
effective in generating turnout. While research supports that proportional
representation promotes turnout for well-established democracies, it is not
clear why that is the case and the finding does not necessarily apply to other
societies. For example, Morgenstern and Vazquez-D’Elia (2007) have found
that standard electoral system variables did not predict different aspects of
parties and party systems in Latin America. Further, studies suggest that
sociologists do not have a very good understanding of the relationship
between turnout and number of parties. For example, a study of fifteen East
European countries (Kostadinova 2003) found that proportional
representation increased turnout, but the number of parties decreased it.
Voters may be confused when there are too many parties competing. Also,
close competition between major parties did not predict turnout.
Table 7.1 shows U.S. voter turnout rates for the presidential elections
from 1964 to 2016 with lower turnout for the years in which there are no
presidential elections. Because the number of citizens is less than the total
population, turnout percentages using number of citizens are always higher
than turnout percentages using total population of age eighteen and above.
Generally, turnout has been declining, although it was higher in 1992 and
again increased somewhat in 2004 from the previous two elections. The year
2008 was similar to 2004, but then, in terms of percent voting, it declined in
2012 and 2016.
Table 7.1 Voters among the Total Population (Eighteen

plus). Citizens and Registered Voting-Age
Populations, 1964–2016 Presidential
Elections
Felon disenfranchisement, or the loss of voting rights following a felony

conviction, also affects turnout. The laws concerning such
disenfranchisement in the United States are rather unique in the democratic
world. As of 2016, it is estimated that 6.1 million people are disenfranchised.
This is an increase from 1.17 million in 1976 to 3.34 million in 1996, and
5.85 million in 2010 (Uggen, Larson, and Shannon 2016). Put another way,
about one of every forty adults or 2.5 percent of the total U.S. voting-age
population is disenfranchised due either to a current or previous felony
conviction. State laws vary considerably on whether a felon who has served
his term can vote once they are released. If a felon is on probation, thirty
states deny them the right to vote. Even if a person has served their sentence
and if required their parole or probation, twelve states do not allow some or
all of them to vote. Interestingly those in prison who can’t vote total only 23
percent of those disenfranchised. The other 77 percent are living in
communities where they have either fully completed their sentences or are
being supervised while on parole or probation. Indeed, 51 percent or
3,092,471 are post-sentence (Uggen, Larson, and Shannon 2016).
The United States follows a system of federalism, whereby the individual
states have significant powers to pass laws that disenfranchise felons,2 thus
the rules vary considerably by state. Manza and Uggen (2006: 165–180)
estimate that in presidential elections from 1972 to 2000, 35 percent of
disenfranchised felons would have voted, compared to 52 percent of the
electorate. While the turnout rates of disenfranchised felons would certainly
be lower than the rest of the electorate, over 1.5 million currently
disenfranchised citizens would likely have participated in the 2000 and 2004
elections if they had been eligible. A variety of characteristics of the
disenfranchised felon population suggest that they are more likely to be
African-Americans than whites, have lower incomes and levels of education,
come from poor or working-class backgrounds, and are more likely to
support the Democratic Party (182–183). It is likely that disenfranchisement
policies impacted the results of seven U.S. Senate races between 1970 and
1998 as well as the Florida voting in the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential
election (Chung 2017). Text box 7.1 discusses the pros and cons of allowing
felons to vote.
TEXT BOX 7.1

Should Disenfranchised Felons Be Allowed to Vote?
Various states have different restrictions on the voting rights of felons and
ex-felons. There has recently been some liberalization of laws for ex-
felons, but there is significant debate about whether felons or ex-felons
should be allowed the right to vote.
Pro
Disenfranchisement laws deprive citizens of their right to vote and thus
their ability to participate in political and social institutions. This is
counterproductive to the ideal of promoting democracy and involving
citizens in the political process, and it poses a threat to political equality.
“Democracy rests on universal participation, even among those citizens
who have committed criminal offenses. Their exclusion affects everyone
and diminishes the democratic polity as a consequence” (Manza and
Uggen 2006: 233).
Reenfranchising felons helps them reestablish connections as
stakeholders in politics. Some evidence suggests that participating in
elections reduces the rate of recidivism (Uggen, Manza, and Thompson
2006). Civic reintegration could serve as a link between voting and
desisting from crime, thus benefiting society (Manza and Uggen 2006:
125). Stigmatizing felons makes it more difficult for them to fulfill the
duties of responsible citizenship such as participating in the paid labor
force, paying taxes, and raising children. Voting could promote respect for
the law and for those who enforce the laws.
It is mainly poor people and people of color who are “locked out” of
the democratic process, and this is unfair. According to Uggen, Larson,
and Shannon (2016), one in thirteen African-Americans of working age is
disenfranchised. While only 1.8 percent of the non-African-American
population is disenfranchised, over 7.4 percent of adult African-
Americans are. In four states (Kentucky, Virginia, Florida, and
Tennessee), more than 20 percent of African-Americans are
disenfranchised (Uggen, Larson, and Shannon 2016). Poor people are also
overrepresented as felons. When they are required to pay all fines, court
costs, fees, restitutions, and other legal financial obligations before
regaining the right to vote, permanent disenfranchisement is likely (Wood
and Trivedi 2007: 31). Groups that are overrepresented among the
disenfranchised are not fully represented in the political process.
Con
Hull (2006) divides the arguments supporting disenfranchisement into
three types.
The Pragmatic
1. Advocates of felon disenfranchisement argue that the possibility of
losing one’s vote helps deter people from actually engaging in crime,
or discourages them from committing further crime.
2. Loss of voting rights fulfills a possible need for retribution to punish
the guilty and, thus, help foster stability in the society.
The Principled
1. Citizens have certain obligations to the community and when they fail
to fulfill their responsibilities, the community has a right to punish the
criminal, including disenfranchising the felon.
2. Limiting or restricting the franchise helps the community define its
own identity.
The Philosophical Theories

1. “Civic Republicanism” maintains that society’s moral and physical
health depends on the virtue of its citizens. Voting is a privilege
awarded only to those who are worthy and loyal. Committing a felony
defines a citizen as unworthy because criminals are less likely to be
good citizens.
2. “Social contract” theorists argue that people give up some of their
freedoms to live under a government’s rules that protect them. When
people violate the rules, they lose their right to participate in decisions
affecting the community.
In addition, Clegg (n.d.), general counsel of the Center for Equal
Opportunity in Sterling, Virginia, points out that, although it is true that
blacks disproportionally comprise the felon population, there is no
discriminatory intent to bar them from voting. Also because an
overwhelming majority of states have disenfranchisement laws, it is
unlikely that racial discrimination is the reason for these laws.
Do you think that disenfranchised felons should have their voting
rights reinstated? Why? If so, does it depend upon the type of crime one
was convicted of?
VOTING BEHAVIOR RESEARCH

Two early traditions of voting behavior research emerged more than half a
century ago. One of these, the Columbia University approach, offered a truly
sociological approach to the study of voting by examining the flow of
information during a campaign, individual decision-making, group process
variables, socioeconomic status (SES) indicators (e.g. education, income,
class), and sociodemographic measures (e.g. race, ethnicity, religion, place of
residence). Researchers concluded that most voters’ party preferences were
rather inflexible although a minority of voters frequently switched their
preferences. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1968: 69) found that
although they believed people who switch parties were very thoughtful and
concerned about the issues in the election, such people actually had very
limited involvement in politics and the campaign. The Columbia researchers
thus were interested in “within campaign movement of voting intentions”
(Scheingold 1973: 718) including how parties motivate their regular
supporters to turn out and how they attract those who tend to switch parties
frequently. The flow of political information through various social groups is
key in a historical period of partisan realignment when individual and social
group preferences may be in flux.
The second tradition is the University of Michigan school, which focuses
on sociopsychological variables or political attitudes. In The American Voter,
Campbell et al. (1960) argued that voting is mainly the result of attitudinal
forces and sociodemographic background, and parental characteristics are
less influential at the time of voting.
The elements of national politics—the presidential candidates, questions of group
interest, the issues of domestic and foreign policy, the performance of the parties in the
conduct of government—are not simply perceived by the individual; they are evaluated
[emphasis added] as well.
(66)
Knoke (1974) proposed a causal synthesis of American voting behavior

based on these two traditions using both sociological and sociopsychological
variables in his model. None of the social variables (occupation, race,
religion, social class, or father’s party) had direct influence on voting,
although the three issue variables (social welfare, civil rights, and foreign
policy), party identification, and candidate evaluations did. Orum (1983:
229), in his survey of the literature on political sociology, concluded that, in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, issues assumed a more prominent position in
influencing voting behavior in the United States.
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES OR CHARACTERISTICS
While some studies may question the relevance of sociodemographic
characteristics in influencing turnout and specific voting preferences, others
support the relevance of what Miller and Shanks (1996: 212) term the
nonpolitical variables of “stable social and economic characteristics.” Miller
and Shanks find that current policy issues or the evaluations of candidates
explain only minor elements of the effect of social and economic differences
on voter choice in the elections for the period of 1980–1992. It should be
pointed out that these cleavages are not only characteristics of individuals,
but, based on group memberships, historical identification, and/or feelings of
belonging that include a sense of linked fate (Manza, Brooks, and Sauder
2005: 205). Below we discuss some of the research on social cleavages but
detail more recent literature while discussing the 2016 election near the end
of this chapter.
Social Class
Lipset’s (1963) classic Political Man clearly documents the significance of
social class for explaining both turnout and voting preferences in Western
democracies. More recently, others, including Lipset, argue that there has
been an important decline in class voting in postindustrial societies. Clark
and Lipset (2001: 39) maintain that “class is an increasingly outmoded
concept.” Other authors like Evans (1999a: 1) challenged this by suggesting
that the obituary on class voting is premature.
The argument for the decline in class voting has several different strands
or types of explanations hinging on the significance of the shift of advanced
societies to postindustrial or postmodern status. New social cleavages
develop that tend to reduce class-based conflict and thus class-based voting.
Various other identity groups, including gender, race, ethnicity, and public
and private consumption sectors, become more significant collectivities.
Postmaterialist values replace materialist or economic ones, become more
important as a basis of party preferences, and crosscut the impact of social
class. According to Inglehart (1997: 234), a change has occurred “from
political cleavages based on social class conflict toward cleavages based on
cultural issues and quality of life concerns.”
Hout, Manza, and Brooks (1999) support the frequent finding that, in the
United States, class positively influences voter turnout, and argue that there
has been a significant realignment of class voting rather than a decline since
1960. There is a split in the salariat, or those receiving salaries. Managers
tend to support Republicans who favor low taxes and deregulation, whereas
professionals have shifted rapidly toward the Democrats who support civil
rights, civil liberties, and the environment. Routine white-collar workers
have slowly switched to the Democratic side. The working class, especially
skilled workers, reflects a very volatile voting profile, swinging widely in
their preferences. They were originally strong Democrats, but often split
their votes; in 1988, they were strong Republicans. The decline in union
membership has harmed the Democratic Party, but the realignment in class
voting is independent of union membership.
The influence of several social variables on voting preferences in the
American Presidential elections of 2000 through 2016 is displayed in Table
7.2. The CNN exit poll data document the importance of income in
predicting voting preference. Those with incomes under $15,000 or those
with the lowest income were more likely to vote for the Democratic
candidate than those making over $100,000. The one exception to this was
Clinton who had slightly more support than Trump even for the highest
income group. Some voters likely perceived her as supportive of Wall Street
and she was not able to appeal strongly to the working and middle class or
the less educated (Bobo 2017). Generally, if someone in his or her
household was a union member, the voter was more likely to vote
Democratic. Education is not an indicator per se of social class, but it does
influence one’s social class. Those with less education and also those with
postgraduate training are most likely to support the Democrats. Again the
exception to this is that Trump received a higher percentage of the vote from
less educated persons. Whites and men were more likely to support the
Republican Party, while women and minorities supported the Democratic
Party. Protestants in general, but especially whites belonging to conservative
Protestant groups and/or frequently attending their place of worship
supported Republican candidates. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals strongly
support the Democratic Party most likely due to the more socially
conservative attitudes of the Republican politicians.
Nieuwbeerta and DeGraaf (1999) analyzed twenty democratic
industrialized societies from 1945 to 1990. There was a substantial decrease
in the levels of class voting in most of the democratic nations. Denmark,
Sweden, and Great Britain had high levels of class voting, whereas the
United States and Canada had the lowest. Differences in voting preferences
between the classes, though, varied considerably from country to country.
About one-fifth of the changes in the levels of voting by blue-collar or
white-collar classes within nations could be explained by changes in the
actual composition of those classes, while the remaining four-fifths of the
variation was due to changes in voting preferences of the subclasses in the
manual and nonmanual classes. Nieuwbeerta and DeGraaf suggest that
future studies need to focus on class-specific voting behavior such as that of
professionals or managers as well as the overall levels of class voting.
Table 7.2 National Election Political Preference from

2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 CNN
Exit Polls (in Percentage) by Selected
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Müller (1999) found no significant support for any class decline in
voting for ten surveys in Germany from 1976 to 1994, while Ringdal and
Hines (1999: 202) found that class voting declined in Norway from 1957 to
1989, but “Norway may simply be approaching an equilibrium level of class
voting similar to that in many other West European nations.” Using data
from the 1930s to early 1990s, Weakliem and Heath (1999) analyzed class
voting in Britain, France, and the United States. There was no convergence
in voting; rather there were differences in the levels of class voting and the
trends. There was support for the postmodern argument in the United States
and Britain but not in France. Weakliem and Heath argue that studies on
class politics “should begin from the assumption that class is an enduring,
but rarely or never a dominating influence on political behaviors” (133).
Clark (2001: 24) suggests that a key factor driving the decline of class
voting is the decreasing size of the manual labor force, while the size of the
service workers labor force has increased. The middle class has grown in
size, but that does not mean class politics is declining because political
parties “appealing to middle class interests is simply a new twist on an old
theme” (Evans 1999b: 330). Left parties, for example, may try to widen
their base of support by appealing more to middle-class interests. Further
examination is needed of how the changing shape of the class structure
influences parties’ strategies. Intensive national case studies by researchers
looking for common patterns are likely to contribute to theory building
(332).
Typically, much of the early research used the white-collar or nonmanual
versus blue-collar or manual dichotomy as the measure of social class. Class
needs to be reconceptualized to take into account the growing complexities
and shifting of the social stratification system in postindustrial societies,
where manufacturing finished goods has been replaced by producing
services and information. The numbers of service workers dominate over
those in manufacturing (Marger 2008). According to Weakliem (2001: 201),
researchers who have used more complex class measures tend to find that a
substantial part of the change in class voting suggests realignment instead of
decline, something that would not have been discovered using a dichotomy.
Weakliem argues that the “decline of class” perspective is not well
supported, but those who challenge it have not provided groundbreaking
clear alternatives explaining political patterns in voting at the cross-national
level.
Before turning to other types of cleavages, we should point out that class
sometimes competes with and sometimes coexists with the other divisions
such as race, religion, and gender for influence on voter preferences. For
example, Brooks and Manza (1997) examined social cleavages for the U.S.
presidential elections from 1960 to 1992. The racial cleavage has increased
significantly since 1960, and the gender cleavage gained modestly, while the
class cleavage seemed stable and the religious cleavage declined slightly.
Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza (2006) looked at class, religion, and
gender cleavage-based voting behavior in six postwar democracies from
1964 to 1998. Class is typically the largest social cleavage, but religion has
larger effects in the United States and the Netherlands. Unskilled workers
have declining attachments to leftist parties in Britain, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United States, but not in Australia or Austria. Gender
cleavage has an important effect mainly in the United States. We will now
look at gender, race, and religious cleavages separately and focus mainly on
the United States.
Gender Gap
Although in the United States, some states had previously granted women
the right to vote, it was not until 1920 that women were given the right to
vote through the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Only about
one-third of eligible women voted in that election, compared to two-thirds of
eligible men. The gap between turnout rates for men and women narrowed
somewhat from the 1940s to 1960s, but it was estimated by the University of
Michigan National Election Studies to be about 10 percent (Burrell 2004:
92). The Bureau of the Census initiated its national survey of voting in 1964
and found a difference of 5 percent in turnout between eligible males and
females. The year 1980 marked the first time a higher percentage of eligible
women than men voted, though the difference was a mere 0.3 percent (93).
By the 2004 election, the difference was 3.8 percent, with 56.3 percent of
males and 60.1 percent of females voting (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). In
general, younger women are more likely to vote than men, but once they are
sixty-five or older, women are less likely to vote than men of the same age.
Manza and Brooks (1998: 1235) tested various hypotheses that could
explain why a higher percentage of women tended to vote for Democratic
Party candidates than men. Analyzing National Election Survey data from
1952 through 1992, Manza and Brooks found that the changing labor-force
participation among women helped explain the gap. Working women’s
labor-force participation positively influences their views on social service
spending, and this, in turn, influences how they vote. In the 1992 election,
feminist consciousness emerged as an important variable and influenced
women’s voting behavior as well.
Women not only are more likely to vote than men, they also have been
more likely to prefer the Democratic Party candidates and less likely to think
of themselves as Independents. Exit poll data suggest that women are more
likely than men to support female candidates in Congressional elections. For
example, Hillary Rodham Clinton won the New York senatorial election in
2000 because women strongly favored her, while men were split about
equally between her and her opponent (Burrell 2004). According to CNN
exit polls (Table 7.2), males supported Bush, while females supported Gore
and Kerry, but they favored Gore more than Kerry. Hillary Clinton did not
receive a higher percentage of female votes than did Obama.
Kaufmann and Petrocik (1999: 866) argue that the gender gap between
men’s and women’s voting behavior was due mainly to men’s “dramatic
conversion” to the Republican Party. Men’s Democratic identification
steadily declined after 1964, and since 1980, it has not been above 50
percent. Men were generally more conservative than women, especially on
social spending and homosexuality. Women were more negative in their
evaluations of the national economy and personal finances. Race and social-
class differences stood out more than the gender gap, though, for predicting
party preference.
Inglehart and Norris (2000) studied the gender gap in voting and left–
right ideology in a comparative perspective using data from the World
Values Survey conducted in various countries from the 1980s to the 1990s.
They argue that in postindustrial societies, gendered relationships
increasingly converge as more women enter the paid labor force and take
advantage of educational opportunities. The family changes from more
traditional to modern, and gender equality becomes more highly valued. The
authors maintain that there is a realignment of political behavior with
women moving toward the left of men in advanced industrial societies but
not in developing or postcommunist nations.
On the other hand, Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza (2006) examined
112 nationally representative voter surveys in six Western democracies from
1964 to 1998. They found support for the growing partisan importance of
gender only in the United States. Gender cleavage is basically nonexistent in
Britain, Germany, Australia, and Austria, with recent data suggesting a small
cleavage emerging in the Netherlands. More research seems needed,
including in-depth considerations of gendered relationships, cultural
influences, and historical factors in various societies, before sociologists can
conclude much about a gender gap in voting, let alone explain it in a cross-
national perspective.
Racial Cleavages
Racial cleavages are certainly significant in numerous societies, but this
discussion concentrates on those in the United States where differences,
especially between blacks and whites, have been pronounced. Whites have
served as the norm from which the other races have been judged in the
United States. According to the CNN election exit polls shown in Table 7.2,
whites have tended to support Republican candidates, whereas racial
minorities have favored Democrats. We will look particularly at African-
Americans, Hispanics, and East Asians.
BLACKS
Blacks have always tended to strongly favor one political party or the other,
although it has not always been the same party. As part of President
Lincoln’s legacy of abolishing slavery, blacks strongly supported the
Republican Party during the Reconstruction era following the Civil War.
Orey and Vance (2003) claim that black voters played major roles in
determining the presidential winners in 1868 and 1872. Since 1930 and
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) presidency, blacks shifted toward the
Democratic Party, because FDR’s social programs contributed to their
support, as did his creation of a “Black Cabinet,” an informal mechanism
comprising many black civic leaders who were unofficially appointed to
advise the president. It is estimated that about 85 percent of blacks voted for
FDR in 1936 (208), and since then blacks have strongly supported the
Democratic Party. In the 1960 election, John F. Kennedy received about
two-thirds of the black vote. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 were passed after Kennedy’s assassination, during
Johnson’s presidency. Since 1964, black preferences for Democratic
presidential candidates have not dipped below 80 percent (212).
While blacks were strongly supporting the Democrats, white
dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party grew. Whites switched their
allegiance to the Republican Party, especially in the South. This realignment
favored Republican presidential candidates, who have won six of the nine
contests between 1968 and 2000. Registration and turnout figures for blacks
in the United States have increased substantially since 1965. In the 1970s,
civil rights workers mobilized many blacks in the South to register and vote.
Not surprisingly, blacks are more likely to turn out when a candidate is
of the same race or strongly endorses racial inclusion. Black voter
registration reached its highest level in 1984, when black minister Jesse
Jackson was an African-American candidate for president. In the 1988
presidential primaries, Jesse Jackson received 29.1 percent of the total
Democratic vote, carrying five southern states and the District of Columbia,
all of which had substantial black populations (Orey and Vance 2003: 234–
235). Since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the total number of black elected
officials has risen substantially (1,469 in 1970 to 9,040 in 2000) even
though it remains disproportionate to the black population. Interestingly,
34.5 percent of those elected officials in 2000 were female. For the 2004
election, 69 percent of blacks were registered to vote and 87 percent of the
registered blacks actually voted. This was less than non-Hispanic whites,
but more than Asians and Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). Recent
CNN exit polls (Table 7.2) show that 88–90 percent of blacks supported
Democratic candidates. Democrat Barack Obama’s candidacy did for race
what Hillary Clinton’s campaign did for gender by keeping both of the
cleavages at the forefront during the 2008 presidential nomination process.
As expected, Obama captured about 95 percent of the black vote in 2008
and Clinton gained somewhat less at 89 percent in 2016. These are
discussed in greater detail in the subsections on the 2008 election and on the
2016 election.
HISPANIC OR LATINO/A AMERICANS3

Hispanic or Latino/a Americans comprise a particularly interesting
grouping because they are now considered to be the largest American
ethnic/racial minority and there are several ethnicities or subgroups within
this category. Most Hispanics are considered white. According to the 2000
U.S. Census, 66 percent are Mexican, 15 percent Central and South
American, 9 percent Puerto Rican, 4 percent Cuban, and 6 percent other
Hispanic (Chavez 2004: 8). Generally speaking, Hispanics have lower
political participation rates than non-Hispanic whites. Reasons for this
include their lower SES, lower civic volunteerism in various organizations,
fewer mobilization attempts (not being recruited by organized interests to be
active or to register), and structural factors such as perceived discriminatory
practices that involve issues of citizenship status, bilingual assistance, or
intimidation at the polls (Garcia and Sanchez 2004: 123–131).
Citizenship of Latino/a Americans is a key concern because 41 percent
of Hispanics of any race were not citizens in 2004; thus, the voting rate for
Hispanics is about 28 percent of the voting-age population and 47 percent
of voting-age citizens. Among registered Hispanic citizens, 82 percent
voted. In comparison, non-Hispanic white voting rates are much higher
(U.S. Census Bureau 2006).
Traditionally Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have supported Democratic
candidates, whereas Cubans have favored the Republican Party. Cubans
tend to be better educated and have higher SES. A Washington Post 1999
survey that included 2,417 Latino/as found that a majority of all Hispanic
subgroups had voted for Clinton in 1996, but Cubans had the lowest (57.3
percent) support for him, while the support from other groups ranged from
71.9 to 97.1 percent (Garcia and Sanchez 2004: 140). In 1999, more than
half of the Cubans surveyed expressed preference for Bush. A question
about liberal–conservative ideology, though, found that most respondents
considered themselves conservative with scores showing Puerto Ricans
least conservative and Salvadorans most conservative (138).4
The exit polls for the 2000 election indicated that Gore won two-thirds
of the Hispanic vote with the greatest support from Puerto Ricans and
Dominicans, and more than 55 percent of support from voters of Mexican
origin. One significant regional variation was that more than 60 percent of
Mexican Americans in California voted for Gore, but about half of those in
Texas supported Bush (Garcia and Sanchez 2004: 143). George W. Bush
was the Governor of Texas prior to running for the presidency.
As seen in Table 7.2, CNN’s 2004 exit poll found that 44 percent of
Hispanics supported Bush, while 53 percent supported Kerry. Hernandez
(2007) argues that Hispanics are playing more and more important roles in
elections, especially in California, New York, Arizona, and Florida.
Hispanics strongly supported Obama in the 2008 and 2012 national
elections and Hillary Clinton in the 2016 one.
Using Pew Research Center findings, Varela (2015) examines the
Democratic margin of victory in Presidential elections from 1980 to 2012.
Hispanics have always voted more for the Democratic candidate, but, when
Republicans get 30 percent or more of the vote, they generally win the
election.
EAST ASIAN AMERICANS5

East Asian Americans are a particularly interesting minority group to
examine politically because they have relatively higher incomes and higher
education levels than most other minorities, yet have low political
participation rates. One possible reason for low turnout is that Asian
Americans have not joined either political party because they believe
neither party has treated them very well (Chi 2005: 122). The Immigration
Act of 1965 eliminated the discriminatory national-origin quota system that
had favored European immigrants, and the number of East Asian
immigrants rose substantially from 1.1 million in 1970 to 4.3 million in
2000 (6), with a major portion of this gain in the Korean population, which
surpassed the Japanese population. Chinese Americans remain the largest
East Asian ethnic group.
Nearly, one-third (32.5 percent) of Asian Americans are not citizens
(U.S. Census Bureau 2006: 6). Forty-four percent of the total Asian
American citizen population vote, whereas 85 percent of those registered
vote; these rates are somewhat similar to Hispanics. Two surveys of
political attitudes of Asian Americans suggest a shift in political ideology
away from the conservative and toward the more moderate or liberal view.
Koreans remain the most conservative followed by the Japanese and then
the Chinese. Party affiliations have changed as well, as might be expected,
such that all three groups identified with the Democrats in 2001 (Chi 2005:
17–20). The CNN exit polls (Table 7.2) show Asian Americans (not only
East Asians) favoring Gore, Kerry, Obama, and Clinton.
Religious Cleavages
Advocates of a postmodern or postmaterialist society, like Inglehart (1997),
argue that the overall influence of religious group membership and
involvement on voting may be declining. This is because of the growing
secularization of societies, whereby “fewer voters are integrated into
religious networks and exposed to the religious cues than can guide the
vote” (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993: 199–200). However, empirical results
do not necessarily support this line of reasoning. For example, in three of six
nations studied, Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza (2006) found stability in
religious cleavages with two societies declining and one possibly increasing.
Religion may be an enduring cleavage, but its form may also be changing
with more attention to divisions between those who are religious versus
those who are not and also between those involved in religious activities
versus those not involved. Ideological differences on the basis of religious
traditions may underlie certain current patterns of cultural conflict between
and within many societies (Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl 2003: 163). For
example, in Iraq differences between Shiites and Sunnis have made it
difficult to form a unity government.
At times, religion has played an important role in U.S. politics. It was
not until 1960 that a Catholic, John F. Kennedy, was elected president.
Protestantism consists of many denominational groups that, at times,
complicate the voting picture. One helpful, yet simplistic classification for
voting is that of mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catholics,
Jews, and the nonreligious, with other religions’ viewpoints sometimes
considered. Miller and Shanks (1996) found that, in terms of religious
affiliation, there were some dramatic shifts from 1980 to the early 1990s.
The percentage of mainline Protestants dropped from 36 to 24 percent, while
that of evangelical Protestants grew from 26 to 32 percent. The religious
commitment of mainliners also declined, but it flourished for evangelicals
and remained pretty much the same for Catholics.
Regarding trends in voter turnout from 1980 to 1992, both committed
and nominal Catholic supporters increased but committed mainline
Protestants and evangelicals declined. In 1992, nominal mainline Protestants
and Catholics shifted to the Democrats more than those more committed. On
the other hand, committed Catholics increased their party identification for
the Democrats more than did nominal supporters. Evangelicals marked a
key shift from 1980, when they supported Democrat Carter, to favoring
Republican G. W. Bush in 2000. This is particularly true of strongly
committed evangelicals. Utter and True (2004: xii) identify three key trends
in religious affiliation in the United States: (1) growing membership in
fundamentalist denominations, (2) decline in mainline church supporters,
and (3) growing numbers who do not identify with any religion. Those
labeled other, no religion, or Jewish are a strong part of the pro-Democratic
Party movement. Table 7.2 shows that those who frequently attend church
are more likely to support Republican candidates.
Romney in 2012, and Trump in 2016 The CNN Presidential exit polls
for the 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections (Table 7.2) consistently
support what the previously cited studies have found about religious beliefs.
Protestants and especially the white born again/evangelicals support the
Republican Party. Catholics are quite divided between the two major
political parties. On the other hand, those who are Jewish, other, or none in
their religious beliefs very strongly support the Democratic Party although
not quite as strongly as white born again/evangelicals. Nonwhite, mainly
black fundamentalists, are loyal to the Democratic Party.
Jewish voting has shifted somewhat to the right although still supportive
of Democratic candidates. In 2000, Democratic presidential candidate Gore
chose Jewish Senator Joseph Lieberman to be his vice presidential
candidate, and they captured 78 percent of the Jewish vote (Medoff 2002:
181–209). CNN’s 2004 and 2008 election exit polls show strong Jewish
support for Kerry and Obama, but Clinton’s support in 2016 declined
somewhat to 71%. Medoff (208) believes that Jewish votes in mayoral and
congressional races are changing in part because the size and influence of
the less liberal elements of Jewry are increasing.
POLITICAL VIEWS AND ISSUE-BASED VOTING

The American Voter, a major landmark in early electoral research,
proclaimed that voters were very unsophisticated in their views about policy
concerns. According to Campbell et al. (1960: 543), “We do not find
coherent patterns of belief…. [The public] is almost completely unable to
judge the rationality of government actions.” Dalton and Wattenberg (1993:
194) found that studies of other societies, particularly Western democracies
in the mid-twentieth century, also support the idea of unsophisticated
citizens.
Schulman and Pomper (1975) found that over time voting preferences
have been less strongly shaped by social characteristics and traditional
loyalties. Schulman and Pomper support Key’s (1966: 7) conclusion, though,
that the voter “behaves as rationally and responsibly as we should expect,
given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the
information available to it.” Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1979: 319) point out
that the issues and the way candidates present those issues have been
important in shaping the electorate’s vote: “If candidates offer clear issue
alternatives, voters are more likely to make political issues a criterion for
electoral choice.” The traditional school of thought on rationality views
voters’ competence negatively, but a revisionist approach maintains that
when parties take positions on the major issues, voters’ decisions may well
be rational. They vote for the candidate closest to them on the issues because
they perceive greater benefits from such a vote (Downs 1957; Niemi and
Weisberg 1976).
Budge and Farlie (1983) analyzed post World War II data for twenty-
three democracies and developed an important issue-based theory that
modified rational choice theory. They argue that voters evaluate political
issues on the basis of their location in one of the fourteen self-contained
issues, but if more than six or seven issues are introduced into a particular
election, confusion in the electors’ voting decisions may result. The four
major issues are (1) government record and prospects (current financial
situation and prospects, economic prosperity, satisfaction with democracy in
general, and economic stability), (2) candidate reactions (likes and dislikes
about candidates), (3) foreign policy relationships (e.g. membership in
NATO, entry to the European Community, and relations between Eastern and
Western European nations), and (4) socioeconomic redistribution (e.g. issues
of social justice, social service spending, and importance of social welfare).
According to Budge and Farlie (1983), political parties do not compete
with each other by debating directly on focused issues; rather, each party
tries to make its own areas of concern most prominent. This is different from
the rational choice notion of parties confronting each other with different
policies on the same issues. The expansion of welfare is associated with
leftist or socialist parties and law-and-order issues with bourgeois or rightist
parties. The political parties devote most of their attention to the types of
issues that favor themselves. Niemi and Weisberg (2001: 193–194) and
Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl (2003: 140) conclude that recent studies
suggest quite convincingly that issues make important contributions to
voting decisions and therefore to electoral results.
Table 7.3 National Election Political Preferences from

2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 CNN
Election Exit Polls (in Percentages) by
Political Attitudes
Table 7.3 contains information on selected political attitudes and issue
orientations related to voting preferences in CNN exit polls. In 2000, if
voters believed either taxes or world affairs were the most important, they
preferred Bush, whereas those who indicated education, economy/jobs, or
health care as important supported Gore. Prior to this election, the general
model forecasting presidential victory relied on the argument “that voters
support the incumbent (White House) party to the extent they favor its
economic and non-economic policies” (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2002: 174). In
2004, Bush still benefited from those who believed taxes were most
important, but those who believed terrorism or moral values were most
important even more strongly supported him. Kerry strongly benefited from
those who believed that economy and jobs, health care, education, or Iraq
was most important. In 2008, Obama also benefited from those who believed
that economy and jobs, health care, or Iraq was most important. In 2012,
Romney did better on the economy and the deficit. For 2016, Clinton rated
much better on foreign affairs and somewhat better than Trump on the
economy. However, Trump rated high on the issues of terrorism and
immigration.
Liberalism and Conservatism

Although liberalism and conservatism are difficult concepts to define and
measure, they include an evaluation of various types of political issues.
Conservatism is defined as
an ideological orientation that opposes social change, especially change away from
traditional cultural values and mores, and justifies its actions and values on the basis of
the presumed accumulated wisdom of the past inherent in traditional forms.
(Theodorson and Theodorson 1969: 73)
Liberalism is defined as
an ideological orientation based on a belief in the importance of the freedom and
welfare of the individual, and the possibility of social progress and the improvement of
the quality of life through change and innovation in social organization…. Liberals
believe that the government must take positive steps to ensure each person’s welfare.
(Theodorson and Theodorson 1969: 230)
Economic liberalism refers to the conventional issues of redistribution of

income, status, and power among the classes (such as welfare state
measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, and support of trade
unions), whereas noneconomic liberalism refers to support of, for example,
civil liberties for political dissidents, civil rights for ethnic and racial
minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immigration
legislation (Lipset 1959: 485). Currently, it seems appropriate to distinguish
between at least three dimensions of liberalism and conservatism: economic,
social, and foreign policy or defense (Harrigan 2000).
The majority of people are not “pure” in their ideological beliefs
(Harrigan 2000; Hero 1969; Lipset 1963). Although Campbell et al. (1960)
did not find much issue consistency among American voters, Nie, Verba,
and Petrocik (1979: 123) in The Changing American Voter suggested greater
issue consistency in the American public including the finding that “liberals
on traditional issues tend to be more liberal on new issues; conservatives are
more conservative on these issues.”
The meanings of liberalism and conservatism have certainly changed
over time (Harrigan 2000; McKenna and Feingold 2007). Early American
liberals like Thomas Jefferson favored less government, while conservatives
like Alexander Hamilton preferred government support of economic
enterprise. Currently, however, conservatives fear more government leads to
interference in people’s private lives, too much bureaucracy, regulation of
both people and businesses, and high taxes. On the issue of foreign policy,
conservatives now tend to support greater military expenditures and favor
government involvement to protect people from internal subversion and to
fight the war on terrorism. Progressive liberals or New Politics liberals who
were critical of the Vietnam War question whether the United States is or
should be the leader of the free world and criticize U.S. involvement in Iraq
and Afghanistan (McKenna and Feingold 2007: xviii–xxiv).
In terms of labeling oneself as liberal or conservative, few Americans
used to consider themselves radical or extreme liberals or conservatives, but
this is changing. A plurality of citizens thought of themselves as moderate or
middle-of-the-road (Dye 2003: 45; Harrigan 2000: 91). In the United States,
liberals are more likely to support the Democratic Party, whereas
conservatives support the Republican Party.
The exit poll data shown in Table 7.3 illustrate how strongly one’s
ideology influences one’s vote. At least 80 percent of liberals supported
Democratic candidates in all the elections identified, whereas 78–84 percent
of the conservatives supported Republicans. Moderates were much more
equally divided but supported Obama especially in 2008. More Democratic
voters have been describing themselves as liberal since 2000 when 44
percent described themselves as moderate, 28 percent liberal and 23 percent
conservative. By 2018, it was 46 percent liberal, 37 percent moderate, and
only 15 percent conservative (Pew Research Center 2018).
Partisanship
We briefly examine partisanship based on party identification of individuals
and also based on the political party affiliations of those in Congress and the
President. Partisanship or party identification, closely related to liberalism–
conservatism, is another key political attitude that predicts voting
preferences.
Interpreting the meaning of party identification is very complex and
begins with the question: “Are party identifications relatively fixed features
on the political landscape?” (Johnson 2006: 329). Early U.S. studies
answered yes; party identification is stable over time: “Identification is
characterized as a simple loyalty, learned early and largely unimpaired by
subsequent learning” (330). Only extraordinary events would bring about
change (Campbell et al. 1960: 151). An alternative approach though is that
party identification is “a readily updated sum of preferences” (Johnson 2006:
329), or drawing on Fiorina, “a ‘running tally’ of retrospective evaluations
based on reactions to current political happenings” (Niemi and Weisberg
2001: 322).
Using their American Trends Panel with six separate surveys from
December 2015 to April 2017, the Pew Research Center (2017a) found that
approximately 10 percent changed their party identification over a little
more than a year that included the 2016 Presidential election. More
specifically, 79 percent of Democrats including those who leaned
democratically remained Democrats over time, 9 percent changed but then
returned, and 10 percent identified or leaned toward the other party.
Republicans were very similar with 78 percent consistent, 9 percent leaving
and then returning, and 11 percent switching. Most of those who initially did
not identify with either party remained that way.
In general, Niemi and Weisberg (2001: 334) have concluded that “the
question becomes whether the amount of change that occurs is better
characterized as large enough to be meaningful or small enough to be
ignored under normal circumstances, and this is where analysts differ in
their interpretations.” Another key question yet to be resolved is: “What
does ‘Independent’ really mean?”
According to Johnson (2006: 347–348), U.S. studies indicate that there
is strong support for partisanship influencing opinions and values,
evaluations of candidates, and their positions on issues and on the vote itself,
but the evidence is much murkier cross-nationally. While the precise
interpretation of party identification varies, the CNN exit poll data shown in
Table 7.3 strongly shows that partisanship influences voting with 86–93
percent of those loyal to a party voting for its candidates. Independents were
relatively equally divided between parties in their voting preferences with
Obama benefitting the most in 2008 from the Independent vote.
Abramowitz (2010) in his book The Disappearing Center found many
political observers identified intense divisions during and after the 2004
Presidential election that signaled polarization as a fundamental political
problem in twenty-first-century America. Party leaders and elected officials
have become more ideologically consistent in their views on a number of
issues and this too then became an important source of polarization
especially among the more politically active part of the public. Partisanship
and ideology have become more consistent, and thus, instead of having
more individuals and politicians with ideologies in the middle, there is now
a bimodal distribution with Democrats/liberals on the left and
Republicans/conservatives on the right. In addition, Abramowitz (2010)
pointed out that with the ideological realignment, the electoral coalitions of
the FDR era in the 1940s changed. Thus, conservative southern whites, blue-
collar workers, and Catholics moved toward the Republican Party, while
African-Americans and liberal whites shifted even more toward the
Democratic Party.
Abramowitz also identified something else of major significance that has
occurred with more divided or mixed party control of the Presidency and
Congress. In other words, one party is now less likely to control the
Presidency and both chambers of Congress. This is a significant roadblock
to party governance and something impossible in many other parliamentary
democracies. In the United States, divided party control of the Presidency
and Congress only happened for six of the forty years between 1900 and
1946, but between 1946 and 2008, it occurred in thirty-eight of the sixty-two
years. We add that, from 2011 through 2016, there was a Democratic
President and at least one chamber Republican. Put another way, at least one
chamber of Congress and the presidency have been controlled by different
parties a majority of time since 1946. Bipartisan compromise has become
more difficult often resulting in gridlock especially on domestic issues.
The theory of responsible party government is based on majority rule
with the winning party implementing the policies that the majority of voters
wanted. However, Abramovitz (2010) identified a number of impediments to
majority rule in the U.S. political system which is unlike many other
democratic nations because there the political leader of a country is typically
elected by the parliament. Instead in the United States, many aspects were
deliberately designed to limit the will of the majority through a system of
checks and balances. For example, when there is divided control of the
Presidency and one or both of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
there is more likely to be gridlock. Other checks and balances according to
Abramowitz include the presidential veto, having two houses in Congress,
so that they may be dominated by separate parties, having two members
from each state in the Senate resulting in overrepresentation of less populous
states, and having a Senate cloture rule that allows for limiting debate of an
issue only if 3/5 of the full Senate approve such an act makes it difficult to
bring certain issues to a vote.
Back in 2010, Abramowitz predicted “Given the current level of
partisan-ideological polarization among political elites and engaged
partisans, successful efforts at bipartisan cooperation and compromise are
unlikely” (p. 170). Indeed, Obama in an interview (Chait 2016) recognized
early in his first term when he was contemplating the stimulus package what
the Republican strategy was:
If they [the Republicans] were able to maintain uniform opposition to whatever I
proposed, that would send a signal to the public of gridlock, dysfunction, and that would
help them win seats in the midterms….It established the dynamic for not just my
presidency but for a much sharper party-line approach to managing both the House and
the Senate that I think is going to have consequences for years to come.
At the 2010 midterm, the Democrats lost control of the House, and at the
2014 midterm, they also lost control of the Senate furthering polarization.
Jacobson (2016a) supports Abramowitz’s views about the significance of
gridlock and notes that Obama was a particularly powerful focal point of
political attitudes. Drawing on results from 36 polls during the first half of
2016, an average of 11 percent of Republicans, but 86 percent of Democrats
approved of Obama’s job performance.
Using 2016 data during the political campaign, Pew Research Center
(2016) found that, for the first time in surveys dating back to 1992, the
majority of people who identified with a political party not only expressed
unfavorable views, but also expressed highly unfavorable ones of the
opposite party. In 2008, 32 percent of Republicans had a very unfavorable
view of the Democratic Party, but, in 2014, it rose to 46 percent and, in
2016, 58 percent. Democrats followed this pattern as well rising from 37
percent in 2008 to 43 percent in 2014 and 55 percent in 2016. Fear, anger,
and frustration with the opposite party were also expressed with frustration
dominating. Those who were more politically engaged felt these ways more
than the less engaged.
Finally, before turning to U.S. national elections, we wish to point out
that there are major divides in values within both the Democratic and
Republican coalitions. The Pew Research Center (2017c) recently identified
four different politically oriented groups within each party which help
illustrate intraparty schisms as well as a bystander group between the
Republicans and Democrats. For example, one issue Republicans are
divided on is immigration. For more detail on the typology, see our Chapter
3.
U.S. NATIONAL ELECTIONS

The United States has an election system based on plurality of votes to win
the presidency or a seat in the House of Representatives or Senate. Every
four years, voters cast their ballots for the presidential candidate, but that
does not end the presidential process because the United States uses an
Electoral College system. Each state has as many electors as it has members
of Congress, and the presidential nominee who wins the plurality of votes in
the state, in most cases, garners all the electoral votes from that state.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there have been eighteen presidential
elections in which the winner did not receive a majority of the popular vote.
Table 7.4 provides Electoral College vote and popular vote results during the
last half-century. As shown, Kennedy, Nixon (1968), Bill Clinton (twice), G.
W. Bush (2000), and Donald Trump did not receive 50 percent of the vote
nor did G. W. Bush (2000) or Donald Trump win a plurality of the votes, but
they did receive a majority of the Electoral College votes. In the 1800s, three
other presidential candidates (J. Q. Adams, Hayes, and Harrison) did not
receive a plurality of votes, but became president. Over time, there has been
considerable conflict about the Electoral College system. Text box 7.2
presents a discussion of the positive and the negative aspects of the Electoral
College.
Table 7.4 Popular Votes and Electoral College Votes in

Presidential Elections 1960–2016
TEXT BOX 7.2
Should We Abolish the Electoral College?
The 2000 and 2016 elections brought home to many Americans that they
do not directly elect the president of the United States, and on a few
occasions, Electoral College vote and popular vote are not the same.
Some argue that the Electoral College has provided more benefits than
disadvantages, while others argue that it is an anachronistic institution.
Hardaway, a professor of law, counted 704 efforts to change or eliminate
the Electoral College (Lyman 2006).
Pro
The Electoral College should be abolished because it can alter the
outcome of an election. In the wake of the 2000 election, a New York law
professor suggested that the time was appropriate for Congress to begin
the process of constitutional amendment to replace that system with direct
election of the president and vice president by a plurality of votes (Lazare
2003: 100). That unfortunately has not happened yet.
The Electoral College violates the principle of democracy that values
political equality. The votes of some citizens are favored over others
depending on in what state one resides. Candidates often focus on a select
list of key battleground states, ignoring many voters. Edwards (2007: 41)
argues that the mechanisms allocating electoral votes among the states,
the differences in turnout by state, and the role of the size of the House of
Representatives result in an inherently unjust procedure. (Remember that
the number of electoral votes per state is based on the number of
representatives in the House plus the two senators. Every state, small or
large, begins with two votes based on its senators, resulting in
malapportionment.)
Direct election of the president could encourage candidates to
campaign throughout the nation and may increase turnout as well. One
vote will be as valuable as the other regardless of location. Such a change
will require a constitutional amendment that should allow for a plurality
of voters to determine the winner. It would no longer be possible for
someone to win with fewer popular votes than another candidate. This
clearly happened in the 2016 election with Trump having almost three
million fewer votes than Clinton had. As Pierson (2017: S118)
summarized, “Trump triumphed only because of the country’s unique and
antiquated Electoral College system.” Finally, abolishing the Electoral
College eliminates the possibility that electors would not support the
candidate who has won their state.
Con
The Electoral College has benefited the U.S. political system more than it
has harmed it. For example, it has helped preserve a two-party system
rather than encourage minor parties and minority candidacies that would
fragment U.S. society. The current arrangement prevents runoff elections
among the two top candidates and channels political struggles into state-
by-state contests for the most votes. Runoff elections could result in low
voter turnout that may not be representative of the people’s will
(McKenna and Feingold 2007).
The Bush and Gore 2000 election would have resulted in much
greater confusion, if there had not been an Electoral College. Requests
from both sides for recounts, challenges in every state, and hundreds of
lawsuits would have plagued the court system (Edwards 2007; Posner
2004). According to Gregg (2007: 45), “Abolishing the Electoral College
would dismantle the firewalls protecting all of us from a quadrennial
national nightmare that would turn over our elections to lawyers and
judges.”
The Electoral College system has stood the test of time and evolved as
American politics have developed. It has always given our nation a
president. It has ensured that the interests of rural America have been
represented as well as those of larger urban areas (Gregg 2007) and has
given power to small states as well as large ones. Finally, the system also
protects against voter fraud and maintains the principle of federalism.
Do you think the Electoral College should by abolished? Why or why
not?
Edsall and Edsall (1995) studied the impact of race and taxes on
American politics from 1968 to the early 1990s. They argue that during this
period, the Republican Party won five of the six elections and that the
traditional New Deal cleavages that benefited Democrats were disappearing.
From the 1930s to 1960s, Democrats benefited from the votes of two major
swing groups: (1) the white, Euro-Americans, frequently Catholic in the
north; and (2) the lower-income southern whites and white working and
lower middle classes. The rights revolutions, which have advocated for
various rights for minorities, women, immigrants, gays and lesbians, welfare
recipients, and the criminally accused have been resented by many in these
two groups. School busing and affirmative action led to a great deal of
ideological debate and resentment about the role of government and its
remedies for segregation and discrimination. Many whites feel threatened by
the perceived advances of minorities and the increases in taxes to support
welfare recipients who they believe are not worthy of support because they
are unwilling to work, engage in welfare fraud, and so on. The Republican
Party has attracted these voters, and these gains have helped them win five
presidential elections (see Table 7.4). In 1992, however, Clinton broke this
cycle when he defeated George H. W. Bush and was reelected in 1996. We
note that unlike traditional Democrats, Clinton ran on a more centrist
platform that included support for welfare reform and the use of the death
penalty. We next consider the more recent national elections individually.

Elizabeth Dole’s bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1999
“was the longest and most serious bid by a woman for a major party’s
presidential nomination in the previous two decades” (Heldman, Carroll,
and Olson 2005: 315). Heldman et al. examined the print media coverage of
her bid for the nomination by comparing her coverage with that of five
males including G. W. Bush. Dole was the number two candidate in the
public opinion polls initially, but did not receive the amount of media
attention consistent for someone with that much support in the polls.
Heldman et al. suggested that gender biases existed, including the press
paying greater attention to her personality traits and appearance. She ended
her candidacy seven months after she entered the race and before the
primaries started.
In 2000, G. W. Bush was elected president and won back the White
House for the Republicans in one of the most controversial elections in
American history. Much of the controversy focused on the state of Florida,
where Bush’s brother was governor, and especially on Palm Beach County.
Some voters there, confused by the maligned “butterfly ballot,” ended up
voting for Buchanan when they meant to vote for Gore. Adams and Fastnow
(2002: 191) point out:
It was clear that if only a small fraction of Gore supporters in Palm Beach County—
roughly one quarter of 1 percent of his voters in the county—mistakenly cast their vote,
the confusion from the Palm Beach County ballot would have cost Gore the presidency.
Democratic National Convention delegates unveil a banner on 26 July, 2004,
at the Fleet Center in Boston, Massachusetts. The banner recalled the mired
2000 election that made the hanging chad a popular term
Credit: Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images
The closeness of the Florida election6 prompted a mandatory recount, and

concerns over paper ballots with “hanging chads” also raised questions
about voters’ intentions.
Florida law allowed the Gore/Democratic side to seek a recount in four
key counties. This prompted a hard-fought, partisan, legal battle that started
in the Florida Supreme Court, moved on to the U.S. Supreme Court, was
remanded to the Florida Supreme Court, and was ultimately decided in the
U.S. Supreme Court, which on December 12, 2000, reversed the Florida
Supreme Court, stating that though some voters were being denied equal
protection, there was not sufficient time to correct the problem (Brigman
2002). Whether the U.S. Supreme Court was correct or not, its decision was
final and Gore conceded the election.
If disenfranchised felons in Florida had been permitted to vote in the
2000 election, Al Gore would likely have won the Electoral College vote
and the presidency. It is estimated that there were about 827,000
disenfranchised felons in that state alone, and if one assumes about 27
percent of the felons would have turned out, Gore would have carried the
state by more than 80,000 votes (Manza and Uggen 2006: 192). The Florida
electoral reform law adopted after the 2000 election still did not address the
issue of felon purges, language assistance, and removing barriers for persons
with disabilities who came to the polls.
While much of the focus of the 2000 election was on Florida, the
national voting results with the blue and red state projections were also quite
interesting. The Democrats won much of the Northeast, with New York
having thirty-three Electoral College votes and Pennsylvania twenty-three; a
large part of the northern Midwest (Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, and Iowa); and the West, where California had the largest
number of Electoral College votes (fifty-four). The Republicans were
victorious in the West (except for the coastal states), the South (with Bush’s
home state of Texas having thirty-two Electoral College votes), and both the
East Coast and the interior. As Table 7.4 shows, Bush received less of the
popular vote (47.9 percent—500,000 fewer votes than Gore), but garnered
241 (50.4 percent) of the Electoral College votes.

In the 2004 election, the results were not nearly as controversial, although
there were some concerns expressed about polling procedures, particularly
in Ohio. G. W. Bush captured the majority of the popular vote (50.73
percent) and 286 of the Electoral College votes. Following the September
11, 2001, attacks on New York City and Washington DC, Bush began a “war
on terror” involving a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam
Hussein’s reign and military campaigns against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
National security issues thus played a key role in citizens’ voting in 2004.
Campbell (2004) identified three key fundamentals that help explain
election outcomes, and applied them to the 2004 election. First, public
opinion about the candidates at the outset of the campaign tilted toward
Bush. Second, early objective indicators of the economy indicated a benefit
for Bush, but the economy actually worked somewhat to Kerry’s advantage.
Third, Bush was advantaged because he was the incumbent. Generally,
voters thought Kerry was too liberal more than that they believed Bush was
too conservative. According to the exit polls, the ratio was 1.6 conservatives
for every liberal, which suggested that ideological labels were important.
On the other hand, Weiner and Pomper (2006) suggest that the “war on
terror” benefited Bush slightly, but his conduct of the Iraq War and his
economic record seemed to hurt him. Party identification was the most
significant factor even though Democrats slightly outnumbered Republicans.
Bush received 93 percent of all Republican votes, while Kerry won 89
percent of all Democratic votes. In addition, Republicans appear to have
turned out in greater numbers. Turnout increased nationally, including
among the young who supported Kerry 55–45 percent, but Christian
evangelicals increased their pro-Republican votes with 77 percent favoring
Bush. Bush was also regarded as a stronger leader, less likely to change his
mind, and more moral than Kerry. Weiner and Pomper conclude that party
identification is a key variable, but unlike what Campbell et al. (1960)
suggested in The American Voter, partisanship is deeply rooted in long-term
policy issues and much less on loyalties and attachments to parents and
various social groups.

In 2006, the Republican support declined with Republicans losing six
governorships and six seats in the Senate. The Democrats convincingly
gained control of the House of Representatives and barely had a majority in
the Senate but still found it difficult to bring about change on the issue of the
war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Democrats selected Representative Nancy
Pelosi as the first woman to serve as Speaker of the House.

The 2008 election will certainly not be remembered for its closeness, but
will be remembered as the first one in which a black man (technically the
son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas) was
elected president of the United States. Barack Obama, only forty-seven
years old, ascended rapidly in politics in spite of his lack of experience and
what many cited as his lack of substance about the issues in many of his
campaign speeches. Obama, president of the Harvard Law Review, had
spent eight years in the Illinois State Senate and only four years as a U.S.
Senator.
In the announcement of his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for
president in February 2007, Obama portrayed himself as a candidate for
change as he criticized the government in Washington DC for its cynicism,
petty corruption, and “smallness of politics” that divided the country. “The
time for that politics is over,” he stated, “It is through. It’s time to turn the
page” (“The Presidency of Barack Obama” 2009: 5). It is this framing of
bringing “change” to the political process that would facilitate his campaign
in the primaries and then in his contest with Republican nominee John
McCain. The Obama campaign was also able to effectively utilize the
Internet to his competitive advantage including raising funds and texting his
supporters about who would be his vice presidential choice.
Many candidates initially ran for the Democratic nomination, but the
three who did well in the first contest, the Iowa caucus in January 2008,
became the leading candidates. In that caucus, Obama received the most
support followed by John Edwards and then Hillary Clinton. In other words,
the front-runners were a black man, a white man, and a white woman.
Eventually, Edwards and other candidates dropped out narrowing the
competition to Obama and Clinton. Clinton was able to remain competitive
until the last primary elections in June 2008.
As Clinton’s campaign was struggling, more and more charges of “sexist
news coverage” surfaced (Seelye and Bosman 2008). Seelye and Bosman
point out that not many in the media perceived any need to change their
reporting although Katie Couric, the first woman solo anchor of an evening
news broadcast, posted a video on the Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS) Web site and stated, “Like her or not, one of the great lessons of that
campaign is the continued—and accepted—role of sexism in American life,
particularly in the media” (2).
A look at the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in
Journalism7 sheds some light on the coverage of the candidates in the
primaries and the election although it doesn’t necessarily help determine if
sexism per se existed. Early in the campaign in 2007, before any caucuses or
primaries, the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism and the Joan
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy (Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism 2007) reported that Barack Obama was getting the
most positive and the fewest negative stories among the four candidates. The
percentage of all stories favorable to Obama was 46.7 percent compared to
26.9 percent for Clinton, 27.8 percent for Giuliani, and only 12.4 percent for
McCain. Some articles were neutral, but 15.8 percent of the Obama articles
were negative compared to more than one-third for Clinton and Giuliani and
nearly half for McCain. Democrats received more positive coverage than
Republican candidates.
Bystrom (2008) examined a major newspaper in Iowa, the Des Moines
Register, and another in New Hampshire, the Concord Monitor, regarding
their coverage of the Iowa caucus and the New Hampshire primary. Both
newspapers endorsed Clinton, but said positive things about Obama. Clinton
received a little less coverage than did Obama in the Des Moines Register,
but considerably more in the Concord Monitor. More of Clinton’s coverage
was negative compared to that of Obama and Edwards. Bystrom (26) argues
that both “Clinton’s more negative, often sexist, and less issue-focused
coverage” and “Obama’s overwhelmingly positive coverage” were factors in
Obama’s victory in the Democratic presidential nomination process. This
finding is consistent with the previous literature that found that in the 1980s
and 1990s, female political candidates were covered less equitably than
male candidates, including the way Elizabeth Dole, Republican nominee for
president in 1999, was treated (Bystrom 2008; Heldman, Carroll, and Olson
2005; Kahn 1996).
Ultimately by June 3, 2008, it was clear that Obama had sufficient
delegates to win the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, so Clinton
ended her campaign in which she had received about 18 million votes.
However, many of her supporters, especially females, were unhappy with
Obama and more than one-third of them believed Clinton’s gender had
harmed her candidacy (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
2008a). Once it was clear that Obama and McCain were the candidates of
their parties, attention turned to who their choices for vice president would
be. Obama chose Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-Del.), who seemed to be a
relatively safe choice with decades of experience, especially in foreign
affairs. McCain countered by selecting Sarah Palin, the Republican governor
of Alaska. She received strong support from conservative Republicans, but
had only a few years of experience. She first attracted a great deal of media
attention and interest, but also made mistakes during some political
interviews (“The Presidency of Barack Obama” 2009). White (2016)
suggests that populism’s influence in the Republican Party in part had its
origins in McCain’s “unconventional vice presidential choice” (p. 273) of
Palin. She strongly criticized the political establishment and saw herself in
her acceptance speech as “not a member in good standing of the Washington
elite…I’m going to Washington to serve the people of this great country” (p.
274).
From September 8 to October 16, the media stories seemed to be more
positive toward Obama and very negative about McCain (Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism 2008). Since the economy was most people’s
number one concern, McCain made what some regard as a major mistake
when he claimed, “The fundamentals of our economy are strong” (“The
Presidency of Barack Obama” 2009: 8). A positive for McCain certainly
was his political experience, but the fact that he was seventy-two years old
likely did not benefit him. McCain struggled financially to mount a national
advertising campaign, while Obama’s campaign raised $750 million,
hundreds of millions greater than McCain and more than John Kerry and G.
W. Bush combined raised in 2004 (“The Presidency of Barack Obama”
2009).
Table 7.4 shows that Obama won quite strongly with almost 53 percent
of the vote compared to McCain’s 46 percent. He clearly won the Electoral
College vote as well. According to Table 7.2 and the CNN exit polls, Obama
had strong support from those making $50,000 or less and those who were
members of unions. His strengths were from the groups with the least and
the most education; also females were more likely than males to support
Obama. Protestants, especially white Protestant born agains and
evangelicals, were the religious groups least likely to support Obama. Those
who attended church frequently were also less likely to vote for Obama.
Although Democratic candidates had previously received very strong
support from African-Americans, Obama, not surprisingly, received an even
higher percentage (95 percent). Obama did very well among other minorities
as well, with 67 percent of the Latino/a vote and 62 percent of the Asian
vote. Although Obama received only 43 percent of the white vote in the exit
polls, he did slightly better than Kerry who received only 41 percent and
Gore with 42 percent of the white vote.
Table 7.4 shows the final results of the presidential elections. Also,
although not shown in Table 7.3, the CNN exit poll asked if the race of the
candidate was a factor in the election, but only 19 percent said it was a
factor at all. In addition, only 2 percent indicated that it was the most
important factor. Interestingly, among those 2 percent, 58 percent voted for
Obama (“CNN Election Center 2008 President Exit Polls” 2008).
It is apparent from the CNN exit poll results about political attitudes in
Table 7.3 that Obama strongly captured the vote of those who believed that
health care and Iraq were the most important issues. He also received 53
percent of the vote from those who identified the economy as a most
important concern. Among those who believed that terrorism was the most
important concern, McCain did extremely well. In addition to picking up
strong majorities of support from liberals and Democrats, Obama did well
among moderates and Independents.
Two major questions involving this election were what role race played
in the election and what were the implications of having a black president.
Clearly, these are difficult questions that we cannot answer definitively, but
we can shed some light on them. Bobo and Dawson (2009: 4) recognized
that Obama’s election as the first black president is “as much an
achievement defined by race as it is an achievement that signals a potential
for the transcendence of race.” The authors point out that national surveys
have documented an increase in the willingness of whites to vote for a black
candidate if nominated by their party.
Bobo and Dawson (2009: 5) identified four ways the Obama campaign
“had to navigate a quite treacherous field of racial division.” First, they
argued that Obama had to deal with the negative stereotypes of blacks in
spite of the fact that those images are now expressed with greater subtlety
than previously. Second, new types of racism have emerged, including
“shared collective racial resentments” (7) such as the sentiment that “blacks
have no compelling grounds to make special claims or demands on society”
(7). According to this view advocated by many whites, blacks should not
need special entitlements such as affirmative action to succeed. Third, the
collective racial resentment toward those perceived as receiving special
advantages has political relevance. Bobo and Dawson found that “as
collective racial resentments increase, so do the chances of identifying as a
Republican and of voting for the Republican presidential candidates,
particularly among white Americans” (8). Fourth, Obama adopted a strategy
that tried to move beyond both white resentment and black anger to focus on
overarching common problems facing the United States.
The 2008 CNN exit polls (“CNN Election Center 2008 President Exit
Polls” 2008) asked respondents what would happen to race relations in the
next few years. Fourteen percent indicated that they thought race relations
would get much better, 33 percent, get somewhat better; 34 percent, stay the
same; 10 percent, get somewhat worse; and 5 percent, get much worse.
Examining data from a June–July 2008 Gallup/USA Today survey, Hunt and
Wilson (2009) reported that African-Americans especially perceived that an
Obama victory would have symbolic significance rather than lead to
substantial racial progress. Hispanics were the most likely to believe that an
Obama victory would result in concrete societal changes benefiting blacks’
careers and opportunities in politics. Bobo and Dawson (2009: 12) did not
rule out some kind of transformation in race relations ultimately, but they
maintained that “the notion that Obama has fundamentally transcended race
and opened the post-racial epoch in the American experience is easy to
dismiss.” They cautioned that winning the election does not necessarily lead
to the kinds of changes Obama advocates. Winant (2009: 49) too recognized
that Obama would need to continue to deal with the “realities of structural
racism in the United States and the problem of exercising executive power
in an endemically racial state.”
An October–November 2009 Pew poll showed that 95 percent of blacks
viewed Obama favorably but only 56 percent of whites did, a decline of 20
percent from just before the inauguration. Also the percentage of blacks and
whites who believed Obama’s election would lead to improved race
relations declined dramatically (Kelly 2010). Obama’s approval rating was
below 50 percent for much of 2010. Obama acknowledged that he and his
advisers had underestimated the effects of the recession when they
formulated the stimulus package. However, many economists believe that
the stimulus bill coupled with bank bailouts and aggressive actions by the
Federal Reserve were significant in preventing full-scale depression
(“Barack Obama” 2010). In addition to the $787 billion stimulus bill, the
health-care bill passed in March 2010 and the financial regulatory reform
measure passed in July 2010 tend to be viewed as victories for Obama.
Obama signed the bill to repeal the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy
on gays in the armed forces. Also Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize in
2009 and appointed two female judges, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan,
to the U.S. Supreme Court through 2010 (“Barack Obama” 2010). On the
other hand, in spite of the economic stimulus, the unemployment rate
remained near 10 percent in 2010. Also, the record-breaking oil leak of
British Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico did not help the economy or
Obama’s popularity. Some of his promised actions either were slow to
develop or did not occur including immigration reform.
Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2011) argue that the election of Barack
Obama illustrates color-blind racism rather than that the United States is
becoming a post-racial society. Color-blind racism is subtle but “rationalizes
the status of minorities as the product of market dynamics, naturally
occurring phenomena, and their alleged cultural deficiencies” (191).
Obama’s victory supported the tenets of color-blind racism because of how
it became a cultural symbol with different meanings for people of color and
whites. For nonwhites, Obama represented the possibilities that America
could become more egalitarian and, for whites, it was compatible with the
idea that the nation was already color-blind. Also the authors argue that
Obama positioned himself as a color-blind candidate and President. For
example, he distanced himself from most leaders of the civil rights
movement and did not make whites feel guilty about racial affairs in the
United States. Rather, he “preached unity” (199). Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich
(2011) believed that “the tentacles of color-blind racism will reach deeper
into all the crevices of the American polity” unless there was a “return to
militant social movements to advance racial justice.” They were concerned
that Obama’s portrayal of unity would “simply reinforce the racial order of
white privilege” (203). We suggest that, even today, white privilege remains
strong in the United States and Trump’s election in 2016 helps support that
conclusion.

As with the primaries, midterm or nonpresidential elections have smaller
turnout of voters than presidential ones, and the 2010 election was no
exception. Also often the party that controls Congress and the presidency
loses seats in off-year elections. The Republican Party gained majority
control of the House of Representatives and increased its presence in the
Senate. Since 1912, when the number of Representatives in the House was
set at 435, only Presidents FDR in 1938, Warren G. Harding in 1922, and
possibly Woodrow Wilson in 1914 experienced greater off-year losses for
their parties (“Biggest Midterm Losses” 2010: 9A). One can stress the
“historic nature of what the GOP accomplished in this election” (Balz 2010)
or one can view it as “simply a return to the [center-right] norm” reversing
the Democratic wave of 2006–2008 (Krauthammer 2010). Republican
leadership viewed the election results as a clear repudiation of Obama’s
economic policies and health-care legislation. Obama, on the other hand,
attributed the results to voters’ perceptions that the economic recovery was
too slow or that government was too intrusive in people’s lives (Balz 2010;
“Obama More Open to Tax Cuts, Refuses to Budge on Health Law” 2010).
Whatever the reasoning, the Republican control of the House of
Representatives would signal further polarization and gridlock for the
remainder of Obama’s Presidency.
There was a dramatic swing in the vote of Independents who supported
Republicans by a margin of 18 percent in 2010, although they had favored
Democrats by 8 percent in 2008. Independents may have voted Republican,
but they were not supportive of either party when asked in exit polls how
they viewed the two parties. More specifically, 58 percent of Independents
indicated that they viewed Democrats unfavorably and 57 percent viewed
Republicans unfavorably (Balz 2010). Regarding ideology, only 20 percent
of those polled considered themselves liberal and 90 percent of these liberals
supported the Democratic candidate. On the other hand, 41 percent
considered themselves conservative and 84 percent of them supported
Republican candidates (“CNN Politics Election Center House Exit Polls”
2010). Voters have thus turned toward the conservative side compared to
2008.
In response to economic issues, especially the stimulus bill, the Tea
Party Movement emerged as a very diffuse, conservative political movement
that could be characterized as either anti-government or pro-limited
government. It has no charter or governing council and tends to be critical of
both the Republican and the Democratic establishment (Scherer 2010; “Tea
Party Movement” 2010). Scherer (2010: 28) describes the movement as
engaging in a “backlash against elites.” Midterm primary elections in
general tend to have low turnout that could advantage a small but
impassioned movement putting forth its candidates. The Tea Party
Movement seemed to channel an important part of mainstream frustration
(Scherer 2010). Sarah Palin, former governor of Alaska and vice presidential
candidate on the Republican ticket in 2008, campaigned for many Tea Party
candidates and seemed to energize the movement (“Tea Party Movement”
2010).
Although divisions between Democrats and Republicans are significant,
the splits between traditional Republicans and Tea Party candidates may also
not be easily resolved. Victorious Senate candidates supported by the Tea
Party Movement included Rand Paul (Kentucky), Ron Johnson (Wisconsin),
Marco Rubio (Florida), and Mike Lee (Utah). At least forty-six Tea Party
candidates won seats in the House (Srikrishnan et al. 2010). Four in ten
voters in the 2010 midterm elections indicated support for the movement in
exit polls (“Tea Party Movement” 2010). Defeats for the Tea Party
Movement in Senate races in Nevada and Delaware especially led some
politicians and media members to suggest that more traditional Republican
candidates could have been victorious in those states (“Tea Party
Movement” 2010).
Some believed that the Republicans controlling the House and
Democrats controlling the Senate provide important checks and balances
and this encourages the Republicans and Democrats to work together to
formulate policy, but others feared gridlock with little, if anything, being
accomplished. Basically the gridlock seemed to dominate for the rest of
Obama’s tenure.

In 2012 Obama was reelected as President winning the popular vote by a 4-
point margin over Mitt Romney, the Republican nominee (51–47 percent).
This was a modest margin of victory and Obama did make history when he
became the first reelected President to lose both Electoral College and
popular votes between his first and second election (Lewis and Ceaser
2012). It followed the typical pattern that incumbents have the advantage,
but it also marked another step in changing patterns, where national margins
of victory were becoming smaller but state landslides more numerous
(Lewis and Ceaser 2012).
White (2016) saw Romney as illustrating a variant of populist appeal by
strongly criticizing those lazy people who believe that they are entitled to
many of society’s benefits without working hard for them. Romney in a
statement that was not intended for the public denounced the 47 percent he
saw as society’s takers:
[They] believe that they are victims, who believe the government has a responsibility to
care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care…And the government
should give it to them….These are people who pay no income tax. My job is not to
worry about those people. I’ll never convince them that they should take personal
responsibility and care for their lives.
(White 2016: 274)
More attention will be given to populism in the discussion of the 2016

election that follows.
While Obama was successful in the 2012 election, the Tea Party did help
push the Republican Party more to the right in 2012 primaries. As Skocpol
(2012) suggested, the really big picture in those primaries was “the race to
the right by all candidates in the GOP race.” Fetner (2012) pointed out even
in 2012 the antiestablishment Tea Party rhetoric “left open the door for
Donald Trump and Herman Cain, who have never held elected office, to be
given more serious consideration by the news media than they might have in
another election cycle.”

Much like the 2010 midterm election, the Democratic Party was soundly
beaten. Not only was the House of Representatives controlled by the
Republicans, but so was the Senate after 2014. According to Jacobson
(2016b), the Democratic Party was nationally in its weakest position since
the 1920s.
2016 National Election

We especially devote a great deal of attention to this election because of its
likely significance and how recent it was. We consider a number of factors
that were important and point out that at this point, there is no consensus on
what was most influential. Possibly in time, the evidence may lead to more
agreement in the interpretations by social scientists although we are not sure
this will be the case.
The 2016 election of President Donald Trump has sometimes been
viewed as unprecedented (Bitecofer 2018; Warner and Bystrom 2018).
Although the outcome of the election was surprising, it was certainly not
unprecedented. Clinton was the first female to be nominated by a major
political party and she faced three important challenges through her
campaign. Her campaign was especially targeted and interfered with by
Russian sources in order to undermine citizen’s confidence in democracy. In
addition, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation was revealed
by Director James Comey, although traditionally such investigations remain
secret and are revealed only if the person is found guilty. Third, there was
concern expressed about how Clinton handled her emails on her private
server (Warner and Bystrom 2018). Clinton received a number of early
endorsements from prominent Democratic elites, but this did not stop Bernie
Sanders from competing against her even though he was not officially a
Democrat. He received more than 13 million votes, won 23 states, 43.1
percent of the Democratic Party’s primary votes, 39 percent of the delegate
total, and raised $235 million dollars (Bitecofer 2018).
Trump waged an unconventional campaign to become the first ever
President who had never spent a single year in either public office or
military service. Further, he had very high unpopularity scores when he
started his campaign and when he was elected. He conducted a very
unconventional campaign that limited money spent on advertising, field
offices, paid staff, and message testing. Trump’s campaign was very resilient
in spite of the numerous controversial and negative statements Trump made
such as referring to Mexican immigrants as rapists, characterizing Senator
John McCain and former candidate for U.S. president as a prisoner of war
rather than a war hero (Warner and Bystrom 2018) or suggesting that the
Russian government hack Clinton’s emails (Bitecofer 2018). See Figure 7.2
for sample ballot.
On the other hand, although the 2016 election had numerous
unprecedented features, it also “helped to highlight a number of other
important concepts that have long been well understood” (Schaffner and
Clark 2018: 1). We thus turn to an examination of populist and authoritarian
tendencies, class, race, gender, and geographical location. These concepts
certainly intersect with each other in very important ways. These dimensions
have been important in determining the vote in various elections but their
influence could be changing somewhat. While we look at them individually,
we do note in places how they intersect with other factors and we point out
that it is really the intersection of a number of these variables that have
shaped the 2016 Presidential election. We then consider what is a relatively
new factor concerning Russian influence in the 2016 election even though as
Warner and Bystrom (2018) point out, Russia has evidently intervened in
elections in Germany, France, Australia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Estonia.
Finally, we identify some relevant election studies in other countries that
have also experienced a turn toward extremist right-wing voting.
POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Populism has various definitions and has been discussed earlier in Chapter
4. Canovan (cited in Oliver and Rahn 2016a: 191) pointed out that
“Populists in established democracies claim they speak for the ‘silent
majority’ of ‘ordinary, decent people’ whose interests and opinions are
(they claim) regularly overridden by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians, and
strident minorities.” Berlet and Lyons (2000) see producerism,
conspiracism, and scapegoating as key attributes of populism. They (2000:
6) define producerism as “a doctrine that champions the so-called producers
in society against both ‘unproductive’ elites and subordinate groups defined
as lazy or immoral.” These definitions set up the relatively simple
distinction between “we” and “they” in society. Oliver and Rahn (2016a)
identify anti-elitism/antiestablishment, collectivisms (“we the people” vs.
“they”), and a simplistic “direct, emotional and frequently indelicate” (191)
style of rhetoric. They point out that thus nativism and racism are often
typical of populists especially in European democracies experiencing
immigration pressure. In the United States, they suggest that whites,
especially white working-class men, are most likely to support populist
ideas of the right including criticisms of the establishment. When the
populist leader is criticized, the links between the leader and his populist
base tend to be strengthened instead of weakened.
FIGURE 7.2 Official Absentee Ballot for Story County,
Iowa, in the 2016 Election
This official ballot for the state of Iowa shows eight candidates other than Clinton and
Trump for president. In the United States, the two-party system, however, makes it very
difficult for candidates other than the Democratic and Republican ones to win. See Table
7.4 for the final results of the presidential election
Oliver and Rahn (2016a) used content analysis of campaign speeches in

the 2016 primaries dividing the language into political populism (e.g.
mentioning the government, lobbyists, donors, special interests) and
economic populism (e.g. citing millionaires, wealthy, the rich, big banks,
Wall Street). They also examined the idea of creating a unified people and
the “we-they” construction. What they found was that Trump especially was
high in anti-elitist and collectivist (“the people”) statements, blame
language, ideas of “our” and “they,” and repetition as well as simplistic
language. Carson was the next highest, and both are seen as populists from
the political right who are frustrated with government because it supports
both big business and undeserving individuals often from minority groups.
Bernie Sanders’ language was highly related to economic populism and
blaming, but not to the “we-they” distinction. Sanders is typically regarded
as a left-wing populist challenging the power of big business and banks and
espousing anti-free trade policies. His language was more sophisticated and
complex than Trump’s.
Oliver and Rahn further suggested that populism seemed strong in 2016
due to a large “representation gap” because politicians had not been
responding to what a large portion of the electorate felt they needed. Finally,
they examined populism in a survey of 1,063 adults based on responses to
twelve different statements that were subdivided into three different
dimensions labeled anti-elitism, mistrust experts, and national affiliation
(identifying with American people). Trump and Carson supporters were the
only two that scored higher on average for all three dimensions. On other
attitudinal measures, Trump supporters were the most financially
pessimistic, conspiracy minded, nativist, and above average on anomie and
anger. Clinton supporters were basically the opposite of those supporting
Trump.
Some authors see authoritarianism as part of populism and others see it
as a separate although related concept (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Oliver
and Rahn 2016b). Based on political psychologists’ definition of
authoritarianism, Oliver and Rahn (2016b) define it as “a set of personality
traits that seek order, clarity and stability. Authoritarians have little
tolerance for deviance. They’re highly obedient to strong leaders. They
scapegoat outsiders and demand conformity to traditional norms.” The
authors found that Trump was second highest of 6 Presidential candidates
on authoritarianism. His score was slightly lower than Ted Cruz but the
authors acknowledge that the standard measures of authoritarianism
(respect for elders, obedience, good manners) are associated with
fundamentalist Christian beliefs that support strict child-rearing practices.
Fundamentalist Christians strongly support Republican candidates in
general making it difficult to determine if the primary motivation is based
on religious beliefs or authoritarianism. In general, the association of
religious beliefs with authoritarianism and other difficulties of
distinguishing populism from authoritarianism complicate the problem of
assessing how influential populism and authoritarianism have been in
explaining voters’ support for Trump.
MacWilliams (2016) partially supports what Oliver and Rahn suggest
but more strongly emphasize the importance of authoritarian voters in 2016.
He believes that the Republican Party did indeed play a key role but mainly
because party leaders were not able to coalesce behind one candidate
leaving a vacuum for an authoritarian candidate like Trump to emerge. He
(2016: 716) argues that “Trump’s rise is in part the result of authoritarian
voters’ response to his unvarnished, us-versus-them rhetoric.” MacWilliams
supports previous research findings that there has been a “slow but steady
movement of authoritarians into the Republican Party” (717) and argues
that it is the level of authoritarianism that is important in influencing one’s
political attitudes rather than what social class one belongs to.
Pierce (2017) too considers the authoritarian aspects of Trump’s
campaign and early administration focusing on authoritarian characteristics
of Trump supporters, the scapegoating of minorities as a tactic to redirect
economic anxiety, and the misinformation strategy of “seeming indifference
to truth.” He believes that it is too early in Trump’s administration to predict
how authoritarianism will play out in the Trump presidency. He further
suggests that Trump effectively played on the perceived cultural
marginalization of the white working class by offering racial and religious
minorities as a target for their concerns. For Pierce, it is not simply
economic marginalization, but the degree of economic inequality in a
society that likely influences authoritarian attitudes.
A key part of the arguments about the white working-class members,
especially men, voting for Trump is based on an analysis of the rhetoric
Trump has used in his speeches. Pierson (2017) argues that indeed Trump’s
rhetoric has appealed to populists, but now Trump is involved in actual
governing suggesting that there is a merger of populism and plutocracy. The
substantive agenda of the Trump administration seems to support the
economic elites and their calls for dramatic cuts in social spending that
affect the welfare system, tax reductions that mainly benefit the very rich,
and more restrictions on worker, consumer, and environmental protections.
Put succinctly, what Trump supports legislatively is much more likely to
benefit the rich. The change from campaigning to governing in the United
States could also illustrate how the separation of powers (executive,
legislative, and judicial) can potentially limit the power of the President.
Brewer (2016) suggests that the concepts of populism and authoritarian
help explain the success of Donald Trump quite effectively, but he also
identifies an important difference between the two terms as often used:
Authoritarianism has no requirement to lionize or empower the ordinary people. The
authoritarian leader only has to demonstrate to the people that she or he knows what is
best for them and promise to provide it. Authoritarianism also sees power as a virtue,
and virtually begs it leaders to use it to the fullest.
(Brewer 2016: 261)
Thus, we suggest that keeping the two concepts separate is very

important at this point since as Brewer suggests the discussion is still in its
early stages. We now turn our focus to a broader spectrum of social classes
and economic factors about inequality or feelings like one is disadvantaged
or losing ground in the social-class system.
OTHER SOCIAL-CLASS INFLUENCES

There are numerous ways to measure social class although the most
common are looking at people’s occupation, education, or income. As
already noted, the extent of inequality and ones’ own experiences relative to
others can be important. In an interview with Willig (2017: 194),
Hochschild discussed the role of anger among white blue-collar men, one of
whom told her “I chew on ice, just crush my anger away.” She felt many of
the men like him were trying to deal with their anger due to
the disappearance of the entire job sector that provided them with dignity and identity
—their humiliation and rage is to identify up, with power, with wealth, with aggressive
leadership….We borrow the strength of a sure-footed leader; through him, we’ll get
strong too.
Although she was referring to George W. Bush as the leader in that
quotation, she also studied Tea Party supporters in Louisiana finding they
felt on shaky economic ground, culturally marginalized, and part of a
demographic decline with fewer white Christians like them. They were
starting to feel like “strangers in their own land” (Hochschild 2016) and in
the primary supported Trump, an outsider in the Republican Party over
Cruz.
Stonecash (2017) finds the role of class in Presidential voting a puzzle
in which many authors have suggested that the working class has been
voting Republican since the 1980s. He however does not find support for
this and rather argues that it is the well-off and more educated that have
turned more toward the Democratic party over time. The working class, he
argues, whether all of it or just those who are white, basically changed its
voting pattern for President only after the 2008 election. Using income as
the measure of class, lower class whites supported Obama in 2008, but his
support dropped 4 percent in 2012. Obama’s support from higher income
voters actually increased 5.5 percent. Much more dramatically, however, are
the differences within each income group based on whether they felt they
were better or worse off economically. Those who felt they were better off
in the lower income increased their support for Obama in 2012 by about 18
percent, while those who believed they were worse off dropped their
support by 25 percent. Similar patterns existed for those who were in the
higher income group as well: those who felt they were less well-off were
more likely to favor the Republican Party in 2012 than in 2008.
Others (Carnes and Lupu 2017; Manza and Crowley 2017) also provide
data to challenge the primacy of the role of the working class and/or the
downwardly mobile or insecure middle class in explaining Trump’s success
in the 2016 Presidential election. Manza and Crowley used the American
National Election Study (ANES) January 2016 pilot survey and exit poll
data. Trump was quite popular relative to the other Republican candidates
and his popularity extended across all income and education levels although
loyalty was lower among those with college degrees and those earning more
than $100,000 a year. Other Republican candidates received more support
from higher income individuals, while a higher per cent of Trump
supporters had middle or low income. Overall, Trump voters were less
affluent than the typical Republican candidate but still more affluent than
each state’s median income. They conclude that Trump’s support for
becoming the Republican presidential candidate was not based on support
mainly from the most threatened parts of the working and middle class.
Carnes and Lupu (2017) also argue that most Trump supporters were not
working class and rather were mostly affluent people during the primaries
and during the election. One of their sources used the ANES November
survey, which updates the Manza and Crowley (2017) surveys. They found
two-thirds of Trump voters had incomes from the “better-off half of the
economy.” Regarding education, 69 percent of Trump supporters did not
have a college degree but among white voters lacking a college degree who
voted for Trump, nearly 60 percent were in the top half of the income
distribution. Indeed, one in five white Trump voters lacking a college
degree had household incomes over $100,000. Thus, they too challenge the
notion that white working class was mainly responsible for Trump’s
election.
Before we turn away from much of the argument on the importance of
the white working-class vote in the 2016 Presidential election, Roediger
(2017) interestingly makes several points including that mainstream
candidates rarely use the term “working class” and instead refer to “middle
class” or to “working families.” Further, it is difficult to discuss “class”
when trying to provide quick analyses of election results and what we have
examined are rather quick discussions and more sophisticated analyses are
yet to be published. Most measures of class thus far have been based on
crude definitions such as working-class individuals making less than
$50,000 or education being at the high school level. In addition, often only
one or two other variables are thus far being analyzed; much more complex
analysis will take more time. Finally, Roediger argues that most working-
class people do not vote as well as felons, transients, and undocumented
people.
TEXT BOX 7.3
The Aftermath of Citizens United: Money in Political

Campaigns
Louis Brandeis, Supreme Court Justice from 1916 to 1939 wrote “We
can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth
concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both” (Mayer
2016: ix). As noted by Brandeis, there tends to be some conflict over
capitalism and its ideal value of liberty and democracy’s emphasis on
equity. Political campaign spending has become a major political issue
recently reflecting this tension (Marger 2014).
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court in a controversial 5-4 decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission found that corporations
had the right to freedom of speech like individuals did and that no limits
could be placed on expenditures by corporations to super political action
committees (PACs). Put another way, what was put in place was a
system of unlimited spending by anonymous interest groups to possibly
attack candidates they disagreed with as part of constitutionally protected
free speech. The system changed from one with fiscal limits using PACs
to super PACs with no fiscal restrictions although they could not
coordinate their campaign with a particular candidate (Marger 2014;
Sernau 2017).
After the 2012 Presidential election, the Federal Election
Commission reported that companies, unions, and individuals funneled
in $933 million to campaigns. This money was basically used to pay for
advertisement; a little less than 90 percent of these ads were negative in
tone concerning a political candidate (Miller, McKenna, and Feingold
2015: 166–167). According to Gold and Narayanswamy (2016a), by
January 31, 2016, 680 companies or super PACs had contributed nearly
$68 million and their donations comprised 12 percent of $549 million
raised by these Super PACs. Many of the persons behind what they
labeled “ghost corporations” were able to stay anonymous sometimes
creating limited liability corporations to channel money into independent
groups, making it hard to determine the identities of those trying to
influence the presidential and congressional elections. By the end of
August 2016, Super PACs had collected more than $1 billion with only
10 mega-donors contributing nearly 20 percent of that amount. This total
easily exceeded the $853 million that super PACs collected in the 2012
cycle. In addition to the super PAC money, hundreds of millions have
been given to active nonprofits supporting either Democrats or
Republicans (Gold and Narayanswany 2016b). By the end of September,
super PACs had spent $791.5 million on ads and other forms of voter
outreach and had raised $1.5 billion. By November 1, super PACs had
spent a total of $968 million. There were 23 donors who gave more than
$10 million. Often some of the richest super PAC donors have spread
their money around supporting presidential candidates and also
congressional ones. They likely come from various sectors, but tended to
make their fortunes in energy or health care and on Wall Street
(Narayanswamy and Gold 2016).
In 2016, a U.S. District Judge ruled that the California attorney
general could not require the Americans for Prosperity Foundation
(APF) backed by Charles and David Koch to submit its donor list to a
state registry. Certain officials and donors to the group had been harassed
and received death threats, so part of their argument was that filing with
the state could become public and this would place “donors in fear of
exercising their First Amendment right to support AFP’s expressive
activity” (Gold 2016). The general argument of the issue of liberty vs.
equity finds that conservatives supporting liberty defend unlimited
campaign spending as an important opportunity for people to express
their opinions and support certain candidates if they wish without fear of
reprisal. Liberals, on the other hand, support equity and believe
excessive campaign spending unfairly skews the system to the benefit of
the wealthy since the nonrich do not possess such great resources
(Marger 2014). As Sernau (2017: 219) suggests, “Generous contributions
buy a great deal of access to power and attention to the contributors’
issues.”
Do you agree or disagree with Supreme Court Justice Brandeis’s
statement? Why or why not? What do you think about the 2010’s
Citizens United decision?
LOS ANGELES—OCTOBER 15: Demonstrator’s signs at City Hall in
Los Angeles, CA at the Occupy Wall Street LA protest on October 15,
2011. Police reports estimate more than 10,000 protesters
Credit: CURAphotography / Shutterstock.com
Another argument that has been suggested is that the rich and corporate
elites play highly disproportionate and powerful roles in influencing
American voters. The Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010 by
a 5-4 margin invalidated part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that
had prohibited certain types of “electioneering communications” (mainly
advertisements) by corporations and unions (Waterhouse 2018). Basically
the court viewed political spending as a form of protected speech, and
therefore, corporations or unions could spend money to either support or
criticize political candidates running for election. (See Text box 7.3 for
more information on the consequences of this decision.) Waterhouse
suggests that even though Clinton and Trump spent less on their campaigns
than Obama and Romney, it created certain conditions that allowed Trump
to win primary contexts because a number of Republican candidates stayed
in the race longer than they normally would have due to the large amounts
of campaign cash available to them. Thus, those that did not support Trump
(about 65 percent of Grand Old Party (GOP) primary voters) were divided
into several camps and unable to get behind one other Republican
candidate.
Economic issues remain central to the network of powerful conservative
interests aligned with the Republican Party (Pierson 2017: S110). Skocpol
and Hertel-Fernadez (2016) found that, since 2000, the Koch network
(named after two billionaire brothers Charles and David Koch) with its
Americans for Prosperity organization (and others) has pushed the
Republican Party farther toward the right, so that they not only are
disagreeing with the views of the public, but also with certain business
preferences as well and fostering more polarization especially of the right.
For example, most citizens do not want cutbacks or privatization of social
security, but now it appears that many prominent Republicans are
supporting these possibilities. In addition, it seems the Republican Party is
becoming the only major party internationally that is denying climate
change. The authors believe the Koch network “strengthens the ability of
right-wing corporate and ideological elites to steer American democracy
away from the wants and needs of most citizens” (696).
Vogel (2015) described the Koch political machine this way:
a privatized political and policy advocacy operation like no other in American history
that today includes hundreds of donors and employs 1,200 full-time, year-round staffers
in 107 offices nationwide. That’s about 3 1/2 times as many employees as the
Republican National Committee and its congressional campaign arms had ….the
staggering sum the network plans to spend in the 2016 election run-up—$889 million
—is more than double what the RNC spent in the previous presidential cycle.
The relaxed campaign finance laws since Citizens United helped facilitate
the growth of this network according to Vogel.
Organizations regarded as charitable have at times been influential in
shaping politics. David Horowitz’s Freedom Center is one that has received
more than $4 million yearly in the early 2000s and with the election of
Obama received even more contributions (O’Harrow Jr. and Boburg 2017).
It supported Trump as an outsider to the political establishment and is
known for its anti-Islamic rhetoric, including sponsoring an “Islamofascism
Awareness Week” on college campuses. On the other side of the political
spectrum, it appears that the FBI has been investigating the Clinton
Foundation on and off and appears to be ongoing as of early 2018. At least
part of that investigation concerns Clinton’s actions with its donors during
the time she was Secretary of State (Zapotosky and Barrett 2018).
It is unclear how much influence these networks have on how the
typical citizen votes in an election, but, given the importance of money to
fund campaigns, it appears that they influence what politicians will advocate
for and vote for. The reduction of the corporate income tax beginning in
2018 is an example of politicians not being very responsive to what the
public may consider appropriate. We next consider how race and ethnicity
affect people’s vote bearing in mind again that it intersects with class and
gender as well.
RACE AND ETHNICITY

We have already seen that race has been connected with populism,
authoritarianism, and social class especially when examining whites and
their support of President Trump. What various authors suggest is that the
emergence of Donald Trump and his racist rhetoric is not something
completely new but rather an extension or continuation of racist historical
trends (Bobo 2017; Hajnal and Abrajano 2016; Schaffner and Clark 2018;
Tesler 2016a, 2016b). As Hajnal and Abrajano (2016: 298) stated, “Trump
is not playing a particularly new game. He is borrowing from an old
playbook.” They identified three issues—immigration, race, and populism
—as key factors in American politics overtime.
Tesler (2016a) found that during the Obama presidency, racial attitudes
of whites especially for those with lower levels of education became more
strongly associated with identification as Democrats or Republicans. Whites
without a college education who had high scores on racial resentment were
roughly fifteen points less Democratic in 2012 than they were in pre-Obama
era. It was during the Obama presidency that a person’s attitudes on race
especially for whites with less formal education seemed to be more strongly
associated with their identification with the Republican or Democratic
Party. Using 2016 data, Tesler (2016b) found that the effect of racial
attitudes on party preference was greater by 2016. Even after controlling for
party and ideology, support for Trump appeared to be more strongly linked
to variables suggesting racial resentment than they were for McCain or
Romney. Tesler (2016b) suggests that this was true for the following
reasons: (1) Trump made more explicit appeals to white identity, racial
resentment, and religious intolerance than previous candidates; (2) during
Obama’s administration, American politics seemed to be associated more
with race than previously; and (3) Clinton’s rhetoric on race-related issues
tended more to the left than Obama’s because she wanted to retain minority
and liberal voters support in the election.
Somewhat similarly, Bobo (2017: S85) identified what he called “three
critical dilemmas of race that defined contours of the 2016 presidential
election.” First, there was both the growing economic inequality and the
increasing ethnoracial diversity in the U.S. population. Second, there was
the intensification of political partisanship and what Bobo calls “routine
racialization” (S94) of U.S. politics; and third, the failure of the Clinton
campaign to successfully appeal to the interests of working- and middle-
class families and also strongly attract the “previously powerful multiracial
Obama coalition” (S85). Regarding the latter, Bobo feels that Clinton did
not challenge the economic elite in the same way that Bernie Sanders did
and this hurt her chances for victory. He further pointed out that, in
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, the entire margin of Clinton’s loss
could be explained by the fact that she had smaller black turnout and
smaller black percentage of votes than Obama did.
Immigration is another important issue that could influence how people
vote. Trump focused on making America great again, “illegal aliens” and
“criminals,” while Clinton viewed immigration as “a family issue” seeing
deportation as breaking up families (Winders 2016). Winders (2016: 291)
suggests that “Trump’s talk of building walls and demonizing Mexican
immigrants was … out of step … with the demographic reality of
immigration in the U.S.” Although Mexicans remain the largest immigrant
group in the United States, fewer are migrating to the United States
currently. For example, in 2014, India was the leading immigrant-sending
nation, China was second, and Mexico third (Winders 2016). Asians are
currently likely to support the Democratic Party candidate.
The immigration issue ties in with the alt-right and its racist extremism
as another factor that has received a great deal of attention even though the
numbers of people voting likely are not that great. Hawley (Clemmitt 2017)
estimates that its core supporters total only a few thousand but much of its
activity involves anonymous online posts. For more detail, see Text box 7.4
which discusses the alt-right including three major groupings within it. The
alt-right has attracted interest in part because it has been able to play on the
concerns of some whites due to the changing demographic suggesting
whites will soon be a minority in the United States. Clemmitt (2017: 243)
argues the alt-right has gained more attention than other fringe movements
in decades “because of their ties to a major-party political nominee Donald
Trump, who won the presidency.” Trump’s anti-immigration rhetoric
especially has attracted favorable comments from a variety of white
nationalists who typically have not endorsed any candidates for President
from the Democratic or Republican parties.
TEXT BOX 7.4

What is the Alt-Right? By Luke Turck and Betty
Dobratz
The alt-right movement has emerged as a loose coalition of previous
groups within the conservative movement and has coalesced mainly
around support of Donald Trump according to researchers who have
studied white nationalists. Barkun (interviewed by Shivani 2017) points
out that the alt-right is not a cohesive movement, but rather composed of
certain groups and individuals that joined together because of their
strong hostility toward immigration and their concerns about the future
of Western culture. The alt-right seemed to publicly emerge suddenly
during the 2016 presidential campaign and Barkun noted that “its highly
vocal support for Trump was widely covered by the media, the attitude
of the campaign toward it was analyzed, and its possible electoral effect
was discussed, even though its numbers appeared minuscule” (Barkun
interviewed by Shivani 2017). Michael (interviewed by Shivani 2017)
agreed it is difficult to determine the size of the movement and also
pointed out that indeed unlike the growth of far-right parties in Europe,
there is no viable far-right political party strongly supporting the alt-
right’s objectives in the United States.
Kaplan (interviewed by Shivani 2017; Kaplan 2017) focused on the
alt-right’s mixture of American nativism coupled with fears of
immigration and Islamization that exist in both the United States and the
European Union. To him, Putin’s Russia seems to be catering to the far
right globally, while, in the United States, Russian interference with the
2016 election is being investigated and Trump and his associates face
concerns and possibly scandals about their finances and ties with Russia.
Vegas Tenold, who studied white nationalists for almost six years,
believed that these groups were “sort of vying for the affection of
Russia” and though there was money possibly available he didn’t believe
these groups had actually received much if any actual monetary aid
(Beckett 2018).
Now we briefly examine what characterizes the alt-right beliefs,
including views from both its supporters and others who oppose it. Many
of its ideas have been expressed before by other groups. Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC), an organization strongly opposed to the alt-
right, has defined it as follows:
The Alternative Right, commonly known as the Alt-Right, is a set of far-right
ideologies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that “white identity” is
under attack by multicultural forces using “political correctness” and “social
justice” to undermine white people and “their” civilization. Characterized by heavy
use of social media and online memes, Alt-Righters eschew “establishment”
conservatism, skew young, and embrace white ethno-nationalism as a fundamental
value.
(SPLC 2016)
Alt-right insider Andrew Anglin (2016), the founder of The Daily

Stormer, wrote his own guide to the alt-right. The Daily Stormer is
named after Der Stürmer, an anti-Semitic publication that played an
important role in Hitler’s propaganda machine (Holocaust Research
Project 2009). Anglin (2016) suggested that the alt-right was a “reboot of
the White Nationalist movement” and involved “a confluence of various
groups of White men who reached the same objective truths through
different avenues” and formed a new movement. They became
connected through Donald Trump’s campaign. One important segment of
the movement Anglin (2016) identified is the “manosphere” that
included white men “disillusioned by feminism.” Anglin believes
feminism was invented by the Jews.
Stephen Bannon, chairman of Breitbart Media in 2016, became
Trump’s campaign manager toward the end of his Presidential campaign
and was appointed his senior counselor and chief strategist once Trump
became President. Like many of Trump’s early appointees, he is no
longer part of Trump’s administration. In an interview with Mother
Jones, Bannon stated that Breitbart News had become “the platform for
the alt-right” explaining traditional conservatism had failed and he was
instrumental in making the alt-right into a populist nationalist movement
(Posner 2016). Daniel Kreiss (2017), an associate professor of Media and
Journalism at the University of North Carolina, examined the content of
Breitbart News during and immediately after the 2016 election and
concluded that this publication rejected multiculturalism,
cosmopolitanism, and globalization and supported “the triumph of white
Christian populist nationalism.”
Another way to examine the alt-right phenomenon is to consider
three of the major subgroups that are identified by alt-right supporters
(Bokhari and Yiannopoulos 2016). Those groups are (1) the racist
hardliners labeled “The 1488ers”, (2) “The Natural Conservatives”
identified by the authors and negatively labeled alt-light by the 1488ers,
and (3) the Internet trolls.
The first subpart of the alt-right is named 1488ers because this group
seems to have adopted white power supporter David Lane’s 14 words:
“We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white
children” and uses the 8th letter of the alphabet “H” twice as “HH”
standing for Heil Hitler. This is a group of hard liners whose main
motivation for belonging to the alt-right revolves around “white identity”
and its desire for a white ethno-state (Bokhari and Yiannopoulos 2016).
For them, the Trump presidency is seen as a step toward their goals. Its
most visible figure is Richard Spencer who coined the term “alt-right”
and is head of the National Policy Institute. An illustrative quotation of
Spencer’s views is “Our dream is a new society, an ethno-state that
would be a gathering point for all Europeans. It would be a new society
based on very different ideals than, say, the Declaration of
Independence” (SPLC n.d.a). Spencer surprised and upset some of his
associates (e.g. Jared Taylor of American Renaissance) when at the
National Policy Institute’s fall November 19, 2016 conference he called
out “Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!” to nearly 200 people and
a few returned stiff-armed salutes (SPLC n.d.a). At that time, Spencer
had been advocating free speech at various universities, rallies, and
meetings so that he could openly express his racist views and draw in
new recruits. However, universities over time seemed to adjust to dealing
with the alt-right including sometimes engaging in counter rallies and/or
heightening security. Spencer quietly ended his university speaking tour
on March 12, 2018 (Barrouquere 2018) and also distanced himself from
any Charlottesville-type first anniversary rallies as did many other white
nationalists (Lenz 2018). Bokhari and Yiannopoulos (2016) criticized
this segment of the alt-right for focusing too much on hatred of
nonwhites and Jews.
The second segment is the Natural Conservatives according to
Bokhari and Yiannopolis (2016). The 1488ers including Richard Spencer
(Cox 2016; SPLC n.d.a) negatively label this group “the alt-light” since
they view it as a less serious or less radical version of the 1488ers,
mainly because race and anti-Semitism are not their major focus. Instead,
the Natural Conservatives tend to concentrate especially on the threat to
white cultural values and challenge the “politically correct (PC)” cultural
sentiments expressed in the United States. “They are mostly white,
mostly male middle-American radicals, who are unapologetically
embracing a new identity politics that prioritises the interests of their
own demographic” (Bokhari and Yiannopolis 2016). They are focused
on preserving their own tribe and culture.
Yiannopoulos (BBC Tries to Ambush Milo 2016), when asked what
was driving the support for Trump, identified three issues that Trump,
unlike other candidates, was addressing: immigration; trade and
globalization; and political correctness especially revolving around free
speech. The third was the most important to Yiannopoulos who argued
that the range of acceptable thought in the United States has become
narrower and pushed further left. For example, groups like the
progressive left, feminism, and black lives matter are viewed as
controlling acceptable discourse, while mainstream conservatives are
unwilling to speak out or challenge these ideas (BBC Tries to Ambush
Milo 2016). The Natural Conservatives viewed the Trump presidency as
a major victory for them.
Yiannopoulos tends to use shocking and aggressive statements and is
not apologetic for his nonmainstream views although many mainstream
conservatives tend to be. He is a gay male who emigrated from Great
Britain, has been the key figure in this group, but was disgraced when a
video resurfaced in February 2017 in which he seemed to condone adult
men and women having sex with 13-year-old boys (Books Milo
Yiannopoulos 2017). He resigned his position as a senior editor of
Breitbart News and Simon and Schuster cancelled his book contract. In
June 2017, he self-published his book entitled Dangerous and the first
day the book was number one on the Amazon list for sales. At this point,
it is difficult to determine how Yiannopoulos will fare within the alt-
right, with various media, and the American public (Books Milo
Yiannopoulos 2017). Although his career could be in decline, he
continued his inflammatory comments including replying to reporters
who contact him stating “I can’t wait for the vigilante squads to start
gunning journalists down on sight” (Fleishman 2018). In Anglin’s Daily
Stormer publication, Richardson (2018) suggested it was about time for
Yiannopoulos to successfully rebrand himself with such statements and
claimed that “we’ve pushed Alt-Lite figures into becoming more and
more hardcore just to keep up.”
The third group is a very visible and unique part of the alt-right that
has promoted the other two groups’ narratives about the white race and
anti- PC culture. The Internet trolls are composed of rebellious youth
who derive pleasure from breaking social norms and being in other
people’s faces.
These young rebels, a subset of the alt-right, aren’t drawn to it because of an
intellectual awakening…They’re drawn to the alt-right for the same reason that
young Baby Boomers were drawn to the New Left in the 1960s: because it promises
fun, transgression, and a challenge to social norms they just don’t understand.
(Bokhari and Yiannopoulos 2016)
Anglin (2016) maintained that “in my view, the core identity of the
current alt-right originates from the highly intellectual meme and trolling
culture which was birthed on 4chann in the 00’s.” According to SPLC
(n.d.b), Anglin’s web forum has served “as a rallying point for the
Stormer Troll Army” which has perpetrated “harassment online at the
behest of Anglin.”
In April 2017, SPLC (2017) and its Montana cocounsel filed a suit
against Anglin for orchestrating a harassment campaign against Gersh, a
Jewish woman and her family during which they received more than 700
harassing messages from December 2016 to part of April 2017. The
harassment began after Anglin accused Gersh of trying to extort money
from Richard Spencer’s mother in Whitefish, Montana. SPLC President
Richard Cohen stated: “Andrew Anglin knew he had an online army
primed to attack with the click of a mouse” and “We intend to hold him
accountable for the suffering he has caused Ms. Gersh and to send a
strong message to those who use their online platforms as weapons of
intimidation” (SPLC 2017). Hankes (2017) reported that Anglin has
raised over $150,000 in a defense fund.
In general, the alt-right has managed to generate a great deal of
attention since 2015 when Trump declared his candidacy for the
Presidency. It is difficult to determine what will happen with this
movement although it is unlikely that the alt-right will ever work as a
unified coalition (Neiwert 2017). It is less clear if the loose grouping will
break into more distinct groups or remain associated under the umbrella
“alt-right.” Other issues include how satisfied the alt-right is and will be
with Trump’s actual policies (see Anglin 2017 for a list of his
expectations from Trump’s Presidency) and what if anything Trump will
declare about the alt-right and the white nationalist movement. Further,
what has been the alt-right’s role, if anything, in the 2018 Congressional
Elections? What do you think about the alt-right and its influence?
See Text box 8.1 in Chapter 8 for a discussion of the differences
between the newer alt-right and the older more traditional white
separatists.
GENDER
While there no longer was a Black man running for the presidency in 2016,
there was Hillary Clinton, the first female nominee for President from a
major party. Some therefore anticipated that there would be a major gender
gap in voting in the 2016 election (Burden, Crawford, and DeCrescenzo
2016), but that was not the case. The gender gap in voting between Trump
and Clinton was only slightly greater than in previous other elections and
that did not benefit Clinton. Based on exit polls, Burden et al. suggest that
there was a 13-point gender gap with 54 percent of females and 41 percent
of males supporting Clinton. They identified two major reasons why there
wasn’t a great deal of difference in the gender gap from recent previous
elections: first, both Clinton and Trump were already well-known public
figures before they decided to run for the Presidency and this likely made it
more difficult to influence public attitudes based on their gender. Second
and even more important, they argue the high levels of partisanship that
currently exist in U.S. politics make it less likely that other factors like
gender would influence their vote. Both candidates were very unpopular
especially with supporters of the opposite party.
New York, New York—June 10, 2017: People holding signs supporting
Islam to protest a march against Sharia in Lower Manhattan in 2017
Credit: Christopher Penler / Shutterstock.com
Looking at the results of the primaries and other polls, it appears that
men rather than women vacillated more in their views during the campaign.
This was particularly the case related to two important events: (1) the
release of a 2005 “Access Hollywood” recording in which Trump bragged
about his encounters with women that then led to a dozen women alleging
Trump had sexually harassed or assaulted them over the years, and (2) then
FBI Director James Comey’s letter about reopening the investigation of
Clinton’s emails. Men especially moved toward supporting Clinton
following the release of the tape, but after Comey’s letter, moved back to
support Trump. The authors speculate that had Comey’s letter happened
prior to the release of the tape instead of the other way around, “That
dynamic among men would have likely resulted in Clinton winning the
Electoral College” because Clinton could have picked up the 79,000 votes
in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin to win those electors.
With Trump’s victory, the United States remains one of the 90 of 146
nations studied by the World Economic Forum that has never had a female
head of government for at least one year in the past half-century. There are
currently only fifteen female world leaders in office and eight of them are
the first women leaders ever in their country. The fifteen women also
represent less than 8 percent of the 193 UN member nations (Pew Research
Center 2017b).
Donald Trump, joined by his wife Melania, takes the oath of office from
Chief Justice John Roberts to become the forty-fifth president of the United
States at the U.S. Capitol in Washington DC on January 20, 2017
Credit: Tampa Bay Times / Getty Images
GEOGRAPHY
Political polarization also characterizes various geographical areas. First,
we briefly look at the rural-urban continuum which typically has shown
Democratic support in the urban areas and Republican support in the rural
areas. Then, we look at the Rust Belt states that played a crucial role in
Trump’s victory. Trump was able to gain a higher percentage of votes than
previous Republican Presidential candidates in rural areas of the significant
“swing states” like Florida, North Carolina, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Pennsylvania leading Scala and Johnson (2017: 163) to conclude “The
polarization of urban and rural seemed especially stark in the wake of the
2016 campaigns.” However, the authors argue that it is better to see urban–
rural differences more nuanced as a continuum rather than a dichotomy.
Clinton’s support was quite similar to that of Obama in the most
populous areas of the United States, but in the “small suburbs” to the rural
areas, Clinton was not able to match Obama’s percentages resulting in her
defeat in key swing states like Florida, Michigan, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In their spatial regression analysis of
presidential elections, they found county’s position in the urban-rural
continuum remained statistically significant in estimating voting patterns
even after controlling for demographic, social, and economic variables
including geographic region, education, income, age, race, and religious
affiliation (Scala and Johnson 2017).
Somewhat similar to Bobo, but with more emphasis on the geography of
the “Upper Midwest Rust Belt Five” (Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa,
and Pennsylvania), McQuarrie (2017) claims that Trump won due to an
upper Midwest Rust Belt revolt that involved black and white working-class
voters because of the regional industrial decline. Poor and less educated
whites especially in certain Rust Belt states shifted their vote away from the
Democratic Party and Clinton. Regarding blacks, it was more that blacks
turned out much less than for Obama although Clinton also received a lower
percentage of votes from blacks. McQuarrie summed it up this way: “The
Democrats do not have a ‘white working-class’ problem. They have a
working-class problem and a Rust Belt problem.” Due to
deindustrialization, the upper Midwest manufacturing economy has been
replaced by a different knowledge, financial and service economy that has
especially benefited the coastal regions of the United States geographically
and advantaged professionals and knowledge workers in terms of social
class. The upper Midwest has been peripheralized in both economic and
political aspects. What was different in this election though was that Trump
offered white Rust Belt voters an opportunity to show their anger and
disappointment through their voting for someone that challenged the ideas
of free trade, globalization, and multiculturalism. For black voters,
McQuarrie speculates that it was Clinton’s economic policies and also “her
questionable record on mass incarceration” of blacks in prison.
Intertwined with geography is the issue of the Electoral College, the
constitutionally established means to elect a President. This is due in large
part to increasing geographic concentration of the two major parties’
electoral support and the disproportionate number of electors coming from
less populous and more rural states. Typically in discussing the Electoral
College and presidential popular vote, one examines the vote only for the
two major parties. This is especially important in the 2016 election because
about 6 percent of the vote went to minor parties or independent candidates
(Jacobs and Ceaser 2016). Further, Trump and George W. Bush in 2000 are
the only presidents in the modern era to have failed to receive the majority
of two-party votes.
If one compares Trump’s votes with those of Romney in 2012, one sees
that Trump did not lose any state that Romney won and he added Florida,
Ohio, Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Where Trump did
worse than Romney, it did not matter because of the Electoral College
system. On the other hand, Clinton increased her vote total mainly in states
that she was going to win anyhow. Jacobs and Ceaser conclude that
“Trump’s victory proved remarkably economical” (371). Also Trump did
much better than Clinton in less populous counties, while Clinton did well
in metropolitan urban areas. Counties that were considered competitive
totaled only 34.5 percent of the more than 136.5 million votes for president.
Trump won 251 of them (21.5 million votes), while Clinton won 277
(slightly more than 22.3 million votes) (Jacobs and Ceaser 2016). Looking
at trends in county voting over the last six elections, the 2016 election was
the most geographically polarized leaving the authors to conclude “Trump
voters and Clinton voters often reside in different places while presumably
living different lives and having little contact with one another” (372).
RUSSIAN AND OTHER INFLUENCES

Here we turn to an unusual focus of U.S. Presidential elections as we look
at a particularly complex set of issues involving Russian hacking in order to
influence the 2016 election. On October 7, 2016, the Department of
Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
on Election Security in a joint statement reported that “(t)he U.S.
Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government
directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and
institutions, including from US political organizations” (Berke, Bookbinder,
and Eisen 2018: 14). Prior to Trump’s inauguration, the U.S. intelligence
community in a public release of an otherwise classified document states
that “Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic
process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential
presidency” (Berke, Bookbinder, and Eisen 2018: 14–15). Further the report
concluded that “[Russian President Vladimir] Putin and the Russian
Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump”
(Berke, Bookbinder, and Eisen 2018: 15).
Multiple congressional committees have been involved in examining
Russia’s attempts to influence the election. In May 2017, the Department of
Justice appointed Robert Mueller as Special Counsel to investigate the 2016
election. Drawing on Yourish (2018), we divide this topic into three parts.
First is the Russian use of cyberattacks to create problems in the 2016
presidential election. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, the Russian
goals were for Trump to win the election and undermine Clinton and other
Democrats. As a result of some of the cyberattacks on The Democratic
National Committee (DNC), certain of their emails were revealed by
organizations like WikiLeaks. Some of these emails indicated that the DNC
favored Clinton over Sanders and led to the resignation of its chair Debbie
Wasserman Schultz (Schallhorn 2018).
Although given less national attention, additional hacking gave Russians
access to state and local election boards including their voter databases,
electronic poll book vendors, and election websites in 21 states (Perlroth,
Wines, and Rosenberg 2017). Part of this involved the use of social media
to spread misinformation, especially on Hillary Clinton. Timberg et al.
(2017) described the ads as follows: “The ads made visceral appeals to
voters concerned about illegal immigration, the declining economic fortunes
of coal miners, gun rights, African-American political activism, the rising
prominence of Muslims in some U.S. communities and many other issues.”
By November 2017, Facebook announced that more than 126 million users
could have viewed inflammatory political ads that were purchased by the
Internet Research Agency during the U.S. campaign (Castle 2017).
However, we do not know if or how many people actually decided to vote
for Trump because of advertisements like these.
By August 2018, Facebook and Twitter had again taken down numerous
disinformation sites that appeared to originate from Iran, which suggests
that the production of disinformation is a global endeavor involving
multiple governments. Oxford Internet Institute, a research lab associated
with Oxford University, identified active organized disinformation
campaigns on social media in 48 nations, an increase from 28 in 2017
(Timberg et al. 2018).
Facebook in July 2018 dismantled 32 pages and accounts that had
reached 290,000 people with posts, ads, and events on topics like feminism,
race, and fascism. Those accounts, unlike in 2016, were mainly critical of
Trump rather than supportive (Timberg et al. 2018). A Facebook executive
stated that although the material they removed was not directly related to
the 2018 midterm elections, they were watching to see what might happen
in the remaining 70 or so days before the election. In August, Microsoft
took down six websites created by the notorious Russian hacker group
APT28. Two of them mimicked ones from two think tanks that had been
critical of Russia. It also found that two political candidates had been
subjected to spear-phishing attacks (Timberg et al. 2018).
A second issue revolves around the connections between associates of
Trump and Russian officials and their intermediaries. There have been a
number of purported revelations about meetings, emails and phone calls
between people connected to Trump during his campaign and Russians that
were not initially acknowledged. Berke, Bookbinder, and Eisen (2018)
pointed out that Trump campaign officials reportedly were in contact at
least 60 times with Russian officials and individuals during the 2016
election cycle.
The third factor according to Yourish (2018) is whether Trump actually
interfered in the ongoing congressional or criminal investigations or knew
about and/or arranged or encouraged some of these meetings. For example,
although Trump has denied it, James Comey, former FBI chief, testified that
Trump requested him to stop the investigation of his former national
security advisor Michael T. Flynn. According to former law enforcement
officials, after President Trump fired Comey, law enforcement officials in
the FBI initiated an investigation into whether the President “had been
working on behalf of Russia against American interests” (Goldman,
Schmidt, and Fandos 2019).
We turn to consider a few of the important actors in the ongoing Russia
probe. Although there were discussions about Trump testifying, it was
finally agreed that he would answer a set of specific questions. When he did
so, he pointed out that he personally authored the replies rather than his
attorneys (Leonnig and Dawsey 2018).
In August 2018, Michael Cohen, President Trump’s former long-time
attorney, pled guilty to eight crimes that could implicate Trump in some of
his acts. He acknowledged he arranged in coordination with then candidate
Trump payoffs to two women to prevent their stories of alleged affairs with
Trump from becoming public. Among his crimes, Cohen pleaded guilty to
two campaign finance violations: “willfully causing an illegal corporate
contribution and making an excessive campaign contribution” (Barrett et al.
2018). The two campaign-finance violations involved Cohen arranging
during the 2016 presidential campaign payments to keep silent their sexual
encounters with Trump.
In December 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years in prison. In the
prosecutor’s sentencing memo it was apparent that squelching these stories
was “nothing less than a perversion of a democratic election—and by
extension they effectively accused the president of defrauding voters,
questioning the legitimacy of his victory” (Baker and Fandos 2018). Trump
dismissed the various filings and his lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, minimized
the importance of possible potential campaign finance violations (Baker and
Fandos 2018).
Shortly, after Cohen was sentenced to three years in prison, prosecutors
publicly reported that American Media Inc. the parent company of National
Enquirer, admitted it coordinated with the Trump campaign in illegally
paying a former Playboy model to stop her from discussing her affair with
Trump and to keep the affair from influencing the 2016 election (Hong and
O’Brien 2018). The key factor is for the Special Counsel to prove the
payment was done to influence the election or for some other reason.
Paul Manafort, a former Trump campaign chairman, was found guilty of
eight tax and bank fraud charges. A mistrial was declared on the other ten
counts. Since the charges involved financial fraud, it doesn’t appear to have
had anything to do with Russian interference with the 2016 Presidential
election. Another trial about Manafort’s possible connections to Russia and
the Ukraine could be forthcoming (Zapotosky et al. 2018). Manafort
eventually agreed to cooperate with the Special Counsel concerning his
contacts with representatives of the Trump administration and about his
interactions with a Russian believed to be associated with Moscow’s
intelligence services. However the Special Counsel determined that
Manafort lied about those things and others (Goldman and LaFraniere
2018). In what appears to be a redaction error by Manafort’s lawyers on a
court document, the Special Council was identified as attempting to show
that Manafort provided political polling data to a business associate tied to
Russian intelligence. It is unclear whether then candidate Trump was aware
of the data transfer (LaFraniere, Vogel and Haberman 2019).
Another key figure is Michael Flynn, former national security adviser to
President Trump, was a relatively early cooperator with the Special
Counsel. One issue under investigation involves whether Trump obstructed
justice possibly by asking James B. Comey, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) director, to go easy on Flynn. It is not clear if Flynn
could shed light on that issue. Flynn appears to have helped the government
obtain an indictment against two of his former business associates for
violating foreign lobbying rules. He admitted to lying to the FBI about his
contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States and about his
lobbying on behalf of a foreign government. At his sentence hearing, it
originally appeared that Flynn would not get prison time but the judge was
upset with Flynn’s lying about his activities and his lawyers’ filing to the
court the suggestion that the FBI had set Flynn up. Thus in December the
judge in consultation with Flynn’s lawyers agreed to delay his sentencing
for three months. During that time Flynn could possibly provide additional
helpful information (Barrett 2018; LaFraniere and Goldman 2018).
Baker (2019) reported that President Trump and President Putin have
met five times but Trump “has fueled suspicions about their relationship.
The unusually secretive way he has handled these meetings has left many in
his own administration guessing what happened and piqued the interest of
investigators.” On one occasion Trump took the interpreter’s notes
afterwards and ordered him not to disclose any information.
On a somewhat different front but related to the 2016 election, New
York Attorney General Barbara Underwood accused the Donald J. Trump
Foundation, once regarded as the charitable arm of the president’s financial
empire, of engaging in “a shocking pattern of illegality” that involved
coordinating with Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. The Trump
Foundation was charged with using its disbursements to gain political favor
and political support. Charitable organizations are not allowed to promote
the self-interests of its executives. In one case a note in Trump’s
handwriting directed his Foundation to spend $100,000 to settle a legal
dispute between his Mar-a-Lago resort and the Town of Palm Beach. The
foundation has agreed to dissolve and Trump and his three oldest children
could be forced to pay millions of dollars in restitution and penalties. There
is also the possibility that they could be barred from serving on boards of
other New York charities (Goldmacher 2018).
There have been numerous indictments against Soviet nationals for their
role in attempting to influence voting in the 2016 election. Thirteen Russian
nationals have been charged for using covert social media in a propaganda
campaign to promote discord among various Americans. A Russia-based
troll farm used deceptive social media postings and advertisements that
were fraudulently purchased using names of Americans to try to influence
the 2016 election. In addition, twelve Russian military intelligence officers
were charged in July 2018 for hacking the email accounts of the Democratic
Party and the Clinton presidential campaign and then releasing tens of
thousands of private communications (Associated Press 2018; Taylor and
Morris 2018). The Associated Press (2018) suggested the activities of the
twelve military intelligence officers was the most direct example of what
U.S. intelligence officials consider to be a broad conspiracy by the Russian
government to interfere in the 2016 election to help Trump. The hackers
attempted to break into Clinton’s network only hours after Trump invited
them to find the emails Clinton said she deleted from when she was
Secretary of State (Associated Press 2018). The twenty-five Russians are
unlikely to ever come to trial because they are not in the United States
(Associated Press 2018; Taylor and Morris 2018).
One Russian though, Maria Butina is in a U.S. prison, having pled
guilty of trying to influence U.S. policy by developing connections with
National Rifle Association officials and various conservative leaders and
candidates in the 2016 election. She worked with an American political
operative and was directed by a former Russian senator who is now the
deputy governor of Russia’s central bank. Butina has agreed to cooperate
with law enforcement. Hsu and Jackman (2018) point out how Butina is an
excellent example of a larger story of how Russians attempted to influence
the 2016 election.
As of December 2018, we have a partial picture of Russian attempts to
influence the 2016 election and whether or how much those attempts are
connected to persons associated with Trump or to Trump himself. It is likely
there will be other court cases and sentencings. How complete a picture we
will have and how much agreement there is about what that picture tells us
remains to be determined.
In the 2018 midterm elections, Democrats gained control of the House of
Representatives while the Republicans improved their control of the Senate
gaining two additional seats, so beginning in 2019, there will be fifty-three
Republicans and forty-seven Democrats. In the House there will be 235
Democrats and 199 Republicans with one election still undecided in
December 2018. Democrats gained seven new governorships but still were
in the minority with twenty-seven Republican governors and twenty-three
Democrats (New York Times 2018).
There have been suggestions that the 2018 midterms signaled a pink
wave and/or a blue wave. In the 116th Congress convening in 2019, there
will be a record number of women serving. Almost one-fourth of it its
voting membership will be women. The number of women has especially
increased in the last few decades. Women are much more likely to be
Democrats than Republicans. Altogether there will be 108 Democratic
women and 23 Republican ones in the new Congress (DeSilver 2018). Some
have referred to this success of women as a “pink wave” but Kelly Dittmar,
who is at the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers
University, asked if any single election could be a wave and pointed out that
“It’s taken us a long time to get even here” (Malpass 2018). Montanaro
(2018) referred to the Democratic success in gaining control of the House as
a blue wave, pointing out that this was the most House seats since the 1974
midterm elections following Watergate and President Nixon’s resignation
when the Democrats gained forty-nine seats. In the face of this, however, it
is important to remember Republicans actually increased their control of the
Senate.
Exit polls from 2018 Congressional elections tended to support the
already strong demographic and educational divisions from previous
elections although the division in terms of voters’ ages has changed
considerably since the early 2000s (Tyson 2018). Voters ages eighteen to
twenty-nine preferred the Democratic candidates 67–32 percent and 58 per
cent of those 30–44 also voted Democratic. Older voters were about equally
divided in their support. Following more traditional patterns, women,
blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and college-educated are more likely to vote for
Democratic candidates. If one examines gender, race, and education
together, women college graduates are especially more likely to support
Democratic candidates 59–39 percent while white men without a college
degree preferred Republican candidates by about two-to-one (66–32
percent) (Tyson 2018). Most of these findings support the idea that voters
too are quite polarized in their political preferences.
Also interestingly, the national exit poll found more voters were voting
to oppose President Trump (38 percent) than support him (26 percent)
although 33 percent indicated Trump was not a factor in their vote. Also
those who believed whites are favored in American society were extremely
likely to support Democratic candidates in the election to the House of
Representatives (87–11 percent). The reverse was true for those who
believed minorities are favored (12 percent Democratic and 85 percent
Republican). On the issue of sexual harassment in the United States, those
who believed it is very serious supported Democratic candidates over
Republican ones 72–26 percent. Those who believed it was not too serious
supported the Republican candidate over the Democratic one 79–20 percent
(Tyson 2018). Those with different sociopolitical beliefs on issues of race
and sexual harassment are also quite polarized.
It should also be noted that elections at the level of states are showing
polarization of the parties and “increasingly fractious struggle over power.”
The conflict in Wisconsin is a significant example of following North
Carolina’s model from 2016. The outgoing Wisconsin governor, Scott
Walker, signed legislation to limit the authority of the incoming Democratic
governor and attorney general as well as limit early voting and codify
Republican policies that include a voter ID law and work requirements for
people on Medicaid. Somewhat similar activities seem to be occurring in
other states as well and are being done by either Republicans or Democrats
(Smith and Davey 2018).
VOTING AND ELECTIONS OTHER THAN UNITED

STATES
We review three recent studies that have examined voting especially for the
far right using data from a variety of democratic countries. Then, we briefly
look at a few studies that focus on one or two nations dealing again with
voting for the right-wing parties. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2015)
studied financial crises and politics from 1870 to 2014 mainly in European
democracies, but also including Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United
States. They found that “Increasing fractionalization and polarization of
parliaments makes crisis resolution more difficult, reduces the chances of
serious reform and leads to political conflict at a time when decisive political
action may be needed most.” Indeed, research has shown that gridlock is
associated with slow recoveries from financial crises. Both before and after
World War II, voters were more likely to support conservative and far-right
political parties after a financial crisis. They did not do so during normal
recessions and nonfinancial macro disasters however.
The authors (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2015) suggested three
possible explanations for why only financial crises triggered the far-right
support. First, nonfinancial crises were viewed as “excusable” events
triggered by natural catastrophes, wars, or certain outside shocks like the oil
crisis. However, financial crisis could have been viewed as “inexcusable”
crises due to policy failures, moral hazard, or favoritism, and thus could and
should have been avoided. Second, financial crises resulted in bailouts of the
financial sector that were very unpopular with the public and thus they voted
against the party in power. Third financial crises seemed to have more severe
social repercussions than other kinds of crises and this could have triggered
citizens to vote for right-wing parties.
Another study focused on subjective social status defined as “the level of
social respect or esteem people believe is accorded them within the social
order” (Gidron and Hall 2017: S61). If one doesn’t receive sufficient respect,
one may develop “status anxiety.” This phenomenon particularly
characterized white working-class men who turned their support to
candidates and concerns of the populist right in the 20 developed
democracies studied. Gidron and Hall (2017) suggest that status anxiety is a
proximate cause due to a combination of both economic and cultural
developments that have occurred since 1987 and harmed these men who lack
a college education. Gradually low-skilled decent jobs have disappeared in
the last 30 years; more workers became employed in service sector positions
often with less pay and on temporary contracts. Even after controlling for a
number of variables that could influence partisan support, the subjective
social status of the voter remained significant in predicting support for the
populist right parties.
Inglehart and Norris (2016) examined 268 parties in 31 European
countries to study increasing support for populist parties in Western
societies. They compared the economic insecurity perspective that
emphasized how the workforce has been transformed in postindustrial
societies with the cultural backlash thesis against the progressive cultural
value changes that have been occurring. They included authoritarianism as
part of populism. To measure cultural values, questions were asked about
attitudes toward immigration, trust in global governance, trust in national
governance, authoritarian values, and left–right ideological self-placement.
In general support for populist parties was mainly based on negative
reactions to a wide range of rapid cultural changes that were seen as eroding
traditional values; therefore, the cultural backlash thesis was most important.
Supporters of the far-right parties in Germany (Alternative for Germany)
and France (National Front) were interviewed by Hillje and Salhoff, who
found that they likely voted for such parties because of uncertainties in their
personal future rather than being anti-migrant, anti-Islam, or anti-Europe.
They felt abandoned by their governments (Johnson 2017).
Mckenzie (2017) examined Brexit, the British vote to leave the European
Union, and found that class politics and cultural class distinctions in the
United Kingdom were especially influential in shaping the working-class
desire to leave the European Union (Brexit). There was anger and apathy
triggered by a sense of being “left out.” Mckenzie (2017) preferred using the
term “left out” arguing that the rhetoric of “left behind” hinders “genuine
understanding of the structural nature of deindustrialization, of class
inequality, and of class prejudice. Instead it patronizingly dismisses the poor
white working class as ‘old fashioned’ and unmodern” (S277). She also
argued against using the label “white working class” pointing out that “All
working-class people have seen falling incomes, declining opportunities for
their children to get on the housing ladder, find well-paid jobs, and enter into
higher education” (S277).
There are other issues about focusing on the “white working class” as
well. For example, regarding British politics, Flemmen and Savage (2017)
challenge the narrative that it is the disadvantaged white working class that is
especially racist and anti-foreign. They point out the difficulties especially in
measuring racism and advocate a mixed methods approach (quantitative and
qualitative methods). Although the working class was found to be more
racist in survey responses, their qualitative interviews did not support that
but rather they displayed antiestablishment nationalism. Further, they
reported a significant amount of “imperial” racism in advantaged social
groups including the elite.
Bonikowski (2017) too seems to suggest that the broad political,
economic, and cultural changes “have threatened the perceived collective
status of national ethnocultural majorities” generally. On the other hand,
Bhambra (2017) maintained that “data and arguments are being distorted to
support a particular narrative of the exceptional distress of these populations
[white working class] that is not borne out by the evidence” (S226). He
explained that what is happening is a relative loss of privilege but not really
“a serious and systemic economic decline that is uniquely affecting white
citizens” (S226).
Future research is needed to consider the broad spectrum of classes and
races as well as include gender rather than focus on white working-class
men. Economic, social, and political variables need to be included ideally in
each study to explain voting. Defining and measuring social class, racism,
authoritarianism, and populism can be very problematic and is further
complicated because of the complex ways race, class, gender, religion,
populism, and authoritarianism are related to each other. As various versions
of data sets including the American National Election Studies are released,
updated, and examined, sophisticated statistical techniques could be
especially helpful in distinguishing which factors are more influential.
Qualitative studies especially could then provide in-depth discussions of
what kinds of concerns shape voting.
CONCLUSION
The pluralist theoretical framework emphasizes the value of voting and
elections, while the elite and class or Marxist perspectives question their
significance. Much of the work cited in this chapter supports a pluralist
viewpoint assuming the importance of democratic elections. The rational
voter image emphasizes the significance of issues in voting, while
postmodernism holds that class influences are declining and politics are
increasingly chaotic. Studies of turnout have considered individual,
structural, socioeconomic, and political cultural factors. Structural variables
related to the electoral system including proportional representation, number
of parties, and compulsory voting have had significant influence on turnout
cross-nationally. Felon disenfranchisement has uniquely affected turnout in
the United States, a country with historically low turnout. Whether the
United States will develop a significant trend concerning turnout remains to
be seen.
One major school of thought stresses sociological influences on voting
preferences. Various social cleavages are examined by focusing on group
influences based on social class, gender, race, religion, and sexual
orientation. Social classes exhibit behavioral similarities and class awareness
as they share similar occupations, incomes, and lifestyles. Within the racial,
religious, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender groupings, members
potentially share a sense of peoplehood and historical identification that can
affect their voting. Those who favor a post material or postmodern approach
believe that the relevance of religious and class cleavages is declining, but
others challenge this, suggesting realignments rather than dealignments.
Racial cleavage remains strong, as divisions based on gender are present as
well. Generally speaking, minorities tend to support liberal or leftist parties.
According to the second approach, issues and political attitudes shape
voting. Issues vary by context and national history, but can be divided into
economic, social, and foreign policy concerns. In the United States currently,
economic problems, including jobs, social inequalities, health care, moral
values, and terrorism are key issues. Liberal or conservative ideology and
party identification are very strong measures of political attitudes predicting
voting behavior and populism and authoritarianism seem to be important as
well. Polarization and gridlock have increased since 2000.
Although much is known about how people vote, less is known about
why some turn out and vote a certain way and others do not. Most of the
comparative analyses of voting have been done in advanced industrial
societies so political sociologists need to extend their attention to a greater
variety of countries and also engage in comprehensive in-depth studies of
selected nations to understand the dynamic process of voting.
Endnotes
1. We draw heavily on Alford and Friedland’s book Powers of Theory for
our discussion of the pluralist, elite-managerial, and class frameworks.
2. For a list of felony disenfranchisement rules for various states, see
www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm, and click on “Felony Disen
franchisement in the United States.”
3. The term Hispanic is used interchangeably with Latino (male) and
Latina (female) here.
4. The scale was 1 = liberal to 3 = conservative.
5. In addition to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans, the term East
Asian Americans includes Filipino, Asian Indian, Vietnamese,
Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong Americans.
6. For a symposium on election 2000, see Dobratz, Buzzell, and Waldner
(2002: 173–260). The Brigman (2002) article contains a “Chronology
of Major Legal Developments in the 2000 Presidential Election in
Florida.”
7. For a detailed discussion of the methodology used, see Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism (n.d.).
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CHAPTER
8
Social Movements
BRANDON HOFSTEDT1 AND THE AUTHORS
During the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom on August 28, 1963,
Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963) declared from the steps of the Lincoln
Memorial, “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the
content of their character.” In 1969, Students for a Democratic Society, a
student activist movement in the United States, protested the Vietnam War by
staging a demonstration in New York’s Central Park, and some of its
members chanted, “Burn cards, not people,” and “Hell, no we won’t go” as
they threw their draft cards into a bonfire. In 1988, more than a thousand
protestors from AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) and other
groups and individuals sympathetic to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) issues stormed the Maryland offices of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), leading to a one-day shutdown. On January 9, 1993,
in Pulaski, Tennessee, the birthplace of the Ku Klux Klan, white separatists
paraded and chanted, “What do we want? White Power! When do we want
it? Now!” What do these events have in common? They are all part of social
movement activity that is designed to bring about change in the United
States.
Why study social movements? Depending on your interests, there are a
variety of answers. According to Goodwin and Jasper (2009: 4–5), studying
social movements helps one:
understand human motivations to act and cooperate collectively;
learn more about politics and public policies;
shed light on major sources of change and conflict in society;
see changes in values and new visions of society;
uncover the moral basis of society or the “moral sensibilities” that guide
our actions;
understand how to act effectively in groups and communities and to
influence societal change.
Perhaps you have participated in a social movement and you have your
own beliefs about those who also participated and about the success of the
movement.
In this chapter, we argue that social movements are a key part of the study
of politics and of the relationship between society and politics. Like Goodwin
and Jasper (2009), we maintain that studying social movements is critical to
understanding our social and political worlds.
DEFINITION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Early on, social movement scholars maintained that movements were part of
irrational, nonpolitical behavior. In their book on political participation,
Milbrath and Goel (1977) followed the traditional political science usage of
categories at that time and placed social movements under the label
unconventional political behavior. Conventional activities were regarded as
normal or legitimate. Today most political sociologists’ views of social
movement participants have changed, as political sociologists emphasize the
rational elements of social movements.
One of the numerous definitions of social movements is that they are
“organized efforts to promote or resist change in society that rely, at least in
part, on noninstitutionalized forms of political action” (Marx and McAdam
1994: 73). This definition suggests that social movements tend to use both
institutionalized political activities (e.g. lobbying, writing letters to
politicians, supporting political party candidates) and noninstitutionalized
activities (e.g. protests, street demonstrations, marches). Diani (2000)
criticizes certain characteristics used to define social movements, including
noninstitutionalized behavior and the distinction between public protest and
conventional political participation. His synthetic definition of a social
movement is “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of
individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural
conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (165).
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. waves from the Lincoln Memorial to
participants of the Civil Rights Movement’s March on Washington. He
delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech on August 28, 1963, from
this spot
Source: Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS
Meyer and Kretschmer (2007: 540–541) have identified several key

characteristics about social movements:
Although movements make demands for change in public policy, they

also make claims that affect the culture and values of society.
Social movements provide outlets for expressing constructed social and
political identities.
Discussing specific starting and ending points of a movement is
difficult. Many are deeply rooted in society, leaving significant legacies.
Generally, committed individuals and established organizations make
up a social movement. Different people and groups in a movement
share certain goals, but may differ on various issues. Thus, factions can
develop within the movement.
Social movements develop their own cultures but are not completely
separated from mainstream politics and culture. Therefore, there is a
reciprocal relationship between movements and the larger society, with
each contributing support and ideas to the other.
One of the main “vehicles” for organizing and mobilizing networks of

individuals, groups, and organizations within a social movement are what
scholars refer to as social movement organizations (SMOs). An SMO is
defined as “a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with
the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to
implement those goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1997: 153). For example, the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s was composed of many
organizations, including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). SMOs can be difficult to label
or define, in part because of their variety and form. For instance, SMOs can
be highly formalized, established nonprofits with a clear hierarchy (e.g.
executive leadership and board of directors) that focuses on mobilizing
people and public support (time) and tangible resources (e.g. money). Or,
SMOs can be an ad hoc group with no bylaws, no clearly identified
leadership structure, and horizontal or democratic input process that seeks to
mobilize potential constituencies against or for a cause. SMOs may also be
concerned mainly with challenging the political powerholders or they may
focus on the needs of their constituencies (those whose interests they
promote). For example, rape crisis centers and shelters for abused women
emerged from the women’s movement (della Porta and Diani 2006: 140–
144).
In this chapter, we discuss social movements as a theoretically distinct
concept (e.g. the Civil Rights Movement) and connect it to other forms of
contentious politics. We first examine the theoretical frameworks, look at old
and new social movements and other approaches to the study of social
movements, including a possible synthesis, consider the life cycle of social
movements, note transnational movements, and conclude arguing that social
movements are an important part of political sociology.
Theories related to social movements do not typically use the formal labels
of pluralist, elite, and class frameworks; however, there are definite
associations between social movement frameworks and political sociology
frameworks that we have already discussed in our earlier chapters. We
discuss McAdam (1982) especially because he has drawn important
connections between political sociology’s views of power and selected social
movement frameworks.
Pluralism and the Classical Collective Behavior Model

of Social Movements
Pluralists may find it difficult to explain why people engage in social
movements when they could instead join a group that is participating in
“rational, self-interested political action” (McAdam 1982: 6) in a relatively
open democratic political system. Pluralists tend to value moderate
democratic participation, and generally speaking, noninstitutionalized tactics
such as demonstrations and violent activities are viewed as a deviant form of
political behavior in healthy democracies. Those who have grievances may
indicate problems of political representation or blockages to individual
opportunity. Too much political participation in movements may signal a
breakdown in consensual political culture. At times, though, social
movements may use more institutionalized means, such as working with
interest groups to encourage parties to adjust to the demands of previously
unrepresented groups or to foster the creation of new political parties
(Alford and Friedland 1985: 9, 25, 83). Pluralists believe that the
challenging groups who use institutionally provided means (e.g. elections,
lobbying) rather than “the tactics of the streets” are likely to be successful
(Gamson 1975: 12). Pluralists tend to use the classic collective behavior
model, which focuses on stress, strain, and breakdown as factors
encouraging social movement participation. We discuss this in detail in the
section on the life cycle of movements.
Elite Theory and Resource Mobilization

While the pluralist model relies on social–psychological approaches to
movements, the elite framework provides a political and organizational
focus. The capacity of elites to rule may be threatened by social movements
that could fragment the state. Noninstitutionalized social movements could
suggest “an ill-constructed state structure or strategic failures of control by
state elites” (Alford and Friedland 1985: 25).
Because the masses lack power, resources, and political influence, their
movements are at a great disadvantage when they try to change the political
system. Therefore, the masses need resources from key elites for their
movement’s success, including money, publicity, and space, people
resources such as leadership and access to networks, and societal resources
such as legitimacy and name recognition (Jenkins and Form 2005). This
framework clearly considers movements as political phenomena and focuses
on the contributions of external groups to the movement. Resource
mobilization defines social movements as conscious actors making rational
decisions (della Porta and Diani 2006: 15). If selected elites support a
movement, it is likely that such a movement does not greatly challenge the
political system (McAdam 1982).
McCarthy and Zald (1997: 151–152) identify several characteristics of
the resource mobilization approach, including: (1) aggregation of resources
(e.g. money and labor) for collective pursuits in dealing with conflict, (2) at
least minimal organization to ensure resource aggregation by SMOs, (3)
recognition of the importance of individual and organizational involvement
outside the SMOs, and (4) an emphasis on costs and benefits for explaining
individual and organizational involvement in social movement activities.
Class Framework or the Political Process Model

Buechler (2002: 12) and others suggest that the political process model may
be a branch of resource mobilization, but McAdam (1982) argues that it is
distinct from resource mobilization and that the political process model fits
very well with the class or Marxist framework, and we agree with him. In
modern industrial societies, economic problems within the capitalist system
encouraged the growth and development of working-class struggle.
Although working-class political participation in the early 1900s may have
occurred more in the workplace (e.g. strikes, destruction of machines), it has
shifted more to the state and its representative bodies (e.g. Congress,
Parliament) for debates on employment, welfare, and the fair distribution of
resources (Alford and Friedland 1985: 346).
Both resource mobilization and political process models have wealth and
power concentrated in the hands of a few organizations and individuals;
however, the political process model is more likely to disagree with the idea
of elite inevitability. Insurgent groups are able to mobilize, form social
movements, and have success. If indigenous organizations contribute
significant resources, they are more likely to challenge the system by
demanding reform. The political process model especially stresses the
importance of political opportunities for a successful movement.
McAdam’s (1982: 40) political process model identifies three factors
that are needed to generate social insurgency: (1) the degree of
organizational readiness within the aggrieved population, (2) the structure
of political opportunities that exist in the more general sociopolitical
environment, and (3) the collective evaluation of the chances for successful
insurgency or insurgent consciousness. Cognitive liberation occurs when
people “collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change
through group action” (McAdam 1982: 51). As shown in Figure 8.1,
indigenous organizational strength, expanding political opportunities, and
shared cognitions join to facilitate movement emergence, which we will
discuss in greater detail later in the chapter. Like resource mobilization, the
political process model sees SMOs as acting rationally; thus, both models
have similarities with the rational choice model that we will examine next.
Rational Choice
Olson’s (1965) The Logic of Collective Action recognized the difficulties in
getting people involved in group action and the need for selective incentives
that would reward those who participated in movements more than those
that did not. Olson’s model, though, is based on the belief that individuals
have quite narrow self-interests (often economic). Now there is greater
awareness of the importance of social rewards like meeting like-minded
people, gaining new friendships, and the moral satisfaction of fighting for a
just cause (della Porta and Diani 2006: 100–103; Goodwin and Jasper 2003:
6–7, 91). In spite of this, a free-rider problem exists because people who
don’t participate in a social movement can also enjoy the benefits of a
movement’s accomplishments (e.g. gaining the right to vote, increased civil
liberties, or cleaner air) without the risk of participating.
FIGURE 8.1 A Political Process Model of Movement
Emergence
Credit: Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 by
McAdam. The University of Chicago Press © 1982 by The University of Chicago.
Citizen groups find it difficult to mobilize and engage in collective

action due to a number of factors, including, according to Dowding (2001:
38), “the relative costs of taking part in collective action, the size and
interactiveness of the group, the number of non-rival demands, whether the
affected interests involve potential losses or potential gains, … the quality of
personnel in a group.” Dowding (38) also argues that in a capitalist system,
“capitalists are systematically lucky because the welfare of everyone is
dependent upon the state of the economy and capitalism is the motor of the
economy.” In general, the rational choice model thus examines both the
incentives and benefits and the costs of movement involvement.
Postmodern
Although industrial society marked a rather clear distinction between public
and private spheres, the end of the twentieth century and the start of the
twenty-first century may well mark a blurring of the boundaries between
these two spheres as suggested in the postmodern and postindustrial
discourse (della Porta and Diani 2006: 49). The growing differentiation in
lifestyle also makes social identities even more problematic. Youth
movements and LGBT movements may illustrate the possibility for
oppositional countercultures to develop.
In the global age of information technology, the state declines in
significance and people search for a kind of community in their work,
religion, or social movements, but rarely do they completely commit
themselves to any one of these (Karp, Yoels, and Vann 2004). Postmodern
politics moves from party politics to single-issue and local movements,
which results in a “social and political system in which everything is open to
negotiation and everything is subject to change” (Best 2002: 65). We will
now discuss old social movements (OSMs) and new social movements
(NSMs) and suggest in very broad strokes how OSMs are more likely in
modern societies and NSMs are more likely in postmodern nations.
OLD AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Beginning around the 1960s in Europe and the United States, a distinction
was drawn between OSMs and NSMs. Some scholars believe that there was
a decline in social movements that was based on economic or class interests
and an increase in movements related to identity issues, quality of life, or
democratic procedures. The new movements tend to occur in postindustrial
rather than industrial societies (Best 2002; Goodwin and Jasper 2015).
Whereas resource mobilization and the political process frameworks have
concentrated on the organizations of social movements and the political
opportunities available from the state, theorists concentrating on NSMs often
downplay movements that engage in politics at the state level and focus on
movements that involve cultural conflicts in society (Nash 2000: 127). Table
8.1 provides a comparison between the characteristics of OSMs and NSMs.
Although there are several different ways of thinking about NSMs,
Buechler (1995, 2002) argues that there are two major different versions of
NSM theory. One is the neo-Marxist political view that suggests very strong
connections between the advanced stage of capitalism and the development
of NSMs. This perspective is macro in orientation, remains focused on the
state, and recognizes the complexities of the class structure in advanced
capitalism. NSMs are often supported by the new middle classes, especially
white-collar public-sector employees (Best 2002: 147), who are not tied to
the corporate profit motive and are not employed in the corporate world
(Pichardo 1997: 416–417). Working-class movements can also be effective,
though. Power is viewed as systemic and centralized under advanced
capitalism (Buechler 1995: 457). Buechler’s (1995, 2002) second version of
NSM theory is post-Marxist, cultural, and focuses on everyday life and civil
society rather than the state. In this approach, power and resistance are
decentralized and diffuse. Nonclass identity concerns, such as gay rights or
gender equality, define those who belong to NSMs. In addition, this theory
identifies “the central societal totality as an information society whose
administrative codes conceal forms of domination” (Buechler 2002: 16).
Table 8.1 Characteristics of Old and New Social

Movements
Hamel and Maheu (2001: 261) examined movements about collective

identity that they consider are beyond NSMs as these movements involve
resistance to new forms of domination and are more globally oriented.
According to Hamel and Maheu, “social movements continually challenge
the institutions of late modernity that they are also helping to define” (261).
Labor movements typify the older social movements, whereas NSMs often
focus on direct democracy and are more diverse and heterogeneous. The
more current forms of collective action tend to be more fragmented,
complex, and diverse than NSMs. Fragmentation involves a process of
dissolution that can involve the “break-up of overarching identities and
institutions,” as can be seen in the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the growth
of regionalist and separatist movements, and the development of various
different identities and subcultures (Schwarzmantel 2001: 386–387). The
World March of Women in the Year 2000, which advocated the improvement
of living conditions for women, is an example of such a movement. In
addition to signing support cards, there were world rallies or demonstrations
that may have ultimately contributed to the development of a cosmopolitan
citizenship (Hamel and Maheu 2001: 266). More recently, Eggert and Giugni
(2012) suggested that the effects of globalization blurred the line between
OSM and NSM. Using data from May Day (seen as OSM) and climate
change (seen as NSM) demonstrations in Sweden and Belgium, the authors
show a tendency toward homogenization (i.e. reduction in diversity or
difference) between OSMs such as labor movements and NSMs such as
environmental movement. We now turn to a more detailed description of
contemporary social movement activity surrounding the 2007–2008 financial
collapse as example of an NSM.
Post-Materialism, Polarization, and NSMs: Emergence

of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street
Over the last forty years, many Americans find themselves in increasingly
homogenous, like-minded communities (Bishop 2008; Johnston, Manley,
and Jones 2016). The result of this process is what journalist Bill Bishop
calls landslide counties, or counties where 60 percent or more of the vote
goes to one party. A number of factors drive the process, known as the Big
Sort, but one of which is a cultural and generational shift toward “post-
materialist” values (Inglehart 1977). Taken together, we see a sorting
process based on lifestyle choices that create sociopolitical arrangements
ideal for the emergence of NSM. For example, in the fallout from the
housing and financial crisis of 2007–2008, individuals, groups, and
organizations from like-minded communities across the country started
organizing and mobilizing. Interestingly, depending on one’s community,
mobilization looked entirely different in terms of ideology. In more
conservative leaning communities, groups called by the Tea Party started to
appear, whereas in more progressive, liberal communities a movement
coined “Occupy” emerged.
In early 2009, conservative communities across the United States
experienced political unrest over the government’s response to the financial
collapse and concerns over the political agenda of newly elected President,
Barak Obama. This unrest led to the emergence of the conservative
movement known as the Tea Party Movement—Tea referring to “Taxed
Enough Already.” Often associated with the February 19, 2009, viral video
of CNBC news editor Rick Santelli’s on-air outburst on the floor of Chicago
Mercantile Exchange over the Obama Administration’s mortgage bailout
proposal, Tea Party adherents began to rally against “big government” and
for fiscal responsibility and the “free market” (Boykoff and Laschever
2011). Tea Party movement activity correlated heavily with foreclosures
rates in conservative leaning communities across the country (Cho, Gimpel,
and Shaw 2012).
While Tea Party activists organized in conservative communities, a
movement under the name of Occupy Wall Street started to emerge in
progressive communities across the United States. For Occupy constituents,
phrases like “the 99 percent” and “the 1 percent” became rallying cries to
garner support from potential movement adherents and to show discontent
over the income inequality and money in politics (Levitin 2015). Motivated
by Adbusters, a progressive bimonthly magazine, to “occupy” Wall Street,
other Occupy Wall Street-style encampments started to emerge in nearly
every progressive leaning community in the United States. Just as the
organizing principles used in the original encampment site of Zuccotti Park,
general assembly meetings—a horizontal, leaderless organizing method—
accompanied these efforts (Schwartz 2011).
Collective Action Frames and Local Land Use

Smart growth is a community-oriented planning philosophy. It encompasses
a number of general principles, including comprehensive city planning,
protection of natural environment, and promotion of social equity. Over the
last decade, community SMOs interested in fighting urban sprawl and
environmental degradation adopted smart growth principles as their call to
action. These smart growth SMOs become the spearhead organization of a
broader smart growth social movement. Typically, smart growth movements
emerge in response to contentious land-use issues such as “big box” retail
developments (e.g. Wal-Mart) or large suburban housing developments.
Smart growth movements target the interests of local real estate developers
by pressuring local elected officials to halt development initiatives and to
implement a comprehensive land-use plan that adheres to smart growth
principles.
For smart growth advocates, the central concern regarding new
development relates to potential changes in overall quality of life such as
cost and maintenance of infrastructure, effect on existing businesses and the
natural environment, and potential for future tax burden, among others. For
example, one issue that may be seen as problematic is the proposed location
of a new development, perhaps located on the outskirts of town, in a flood
plain, on existing farmland, or in a wildlife refuge. Smart growth proponents
may argue that a given development is a threat to the environment because it
eats up valuable farmland or destroys the natural environment. If the
development is not within city limits or not close to other types of
developments, smart growth supporters may suggest that it may lead to
relying more on automobiles, which will also threaten the environment.
In addition, smart growth movements are concerned with land-use
designations that are not seen as being in the best interest of the entire
community. Movement participants may argue that a parcel of land is best
suited for planned industrial rather than commercial or residential uses. The
basic assumption is that industrial development brings high-paying, quality
jobs, as opposed to the low-paying service jobs associated with commercial
developments. Another concern of smart growth proponents is commercial
developments, such as “big box” retailers, that are a threat to existing
businesses—especially small, independent businesses—in the community. A
sprawling development may also raise concerns over increased tax burden,
including costs related to new infrastructure, the continued maintenance of
the infrastructure, building new schools, and expanding fire and police
protection. Finally, smart growth advocates may question how local city
officials make their decisions—in the interests of a few (such as developers
and large land owners) as opposed to the overall interests of the community.
Smart growth movements are often met with stiff opposition from
community leaders and groups that can be referred to as pro-growth
supporters. Pro-growth supporters may also develop into a coalition of
individuals and groups called a pro-growth countermovement. Table 8.2
compares the smart and pro-growth movements.
Table 8.2 Characteristics of Pro-Growth and Smart
Growth Movements
Criticisms of NSMs
Several scholars maintain that, especially in the United States, “new
movements” are really not that new because movements such as the
temperance movement, women’s movement, and religious movements all
existed in the nineteenth century (Buechler 1995; Calhoun 2000; Goodwin
and Jasper 2015). For example, Diani (2000: 163) argues that social
movements have a difference in emphasis rather than incompatible ideas.
Calhoun (2000: 150) also argues that the increase in NSMs does not mean
the end to movements that emphasize political and economic issues. Thus,
the newness of these movements may be overstated.
Although there is considerable questioning among sociologists about the
distinctiveness of NSMs and the relevance of the label, Buechler (1995:
459–460) contends that something relatively new could happen in collective
mobilization, and that could well focus on the issue of identity that may be
related to the blurring of the distinction between public and private.
Pichardo (1997: 425) agrees with this and points out that the contributions of
the NSM framework are in the areas of identity, culture, and the civic
sphere, which have previously been neglected in the study of social
movements.
OTHER APPROACHES TO MOVEMENTS

One of the many other ways to look at the development of theories about
social movements is to classify theories as structuralist, rationalist, or
culturalist (McAdam 1999; Walder 2006). The first way examines the social
organization of society by focusing on the existing patterned social
relationships. Structuralists explain the political choice of movement
participation by looking at what is happening in society, the activist’s social
position, and membership or social ties to formal organizations that could
influence them to participate. For example, people are more likely to protest
when societal ties weaken and they feel less attached to institutions and
mainstream organizations or when educational or career opportunities are
blocked (Flam 2005: 31). Both the resource mobilization and political
process approaches tend to fit the structuralist approach. As previously
noted, a rationalist examines the movement’s strategies and the benefits or
costs that will be incurred by participation. Resource mobilization and
political process also have rationalist components. A culturalist stresses how
the activists’ perceptions about participating fit with their beliefs and values
(Walder 2006). In this classification approach, collective identity and
framing are key concepts. The study of emotions also directs our attention
toward the micro level that is looking especially at individuals. We consider
collective identity first, then framing, and finally emotions, noting though
that all three in reality are complexly tied to one another.
Collective Identity
Polletta and Jasper (2001) claim that sociologists turn to collective identity
to fill gaps in the dominant political process and resource mobilization
frameworks. The structuralist explanations of political process and resource
mobilization focus on how rather than why and depend on rational
explanations of individual action. However, reasons to participate in
movements related to one’s identity seem to be a significant alternative to
participating in a movement due to material incentives. In addition,
examining identity issues helps explain how interests in a movement
actually emerge. Studying collective identity also allows one to better
understand the cultural impact of social movements.
McAdam (1994) also recognizes that resource mobilization and the
political process model did not give enough attention to the cultural or
ideational dimension of social action, although he does include the
importance of cognitive liberation in his discussion of black insurgency.
“Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective
meanings they attach to their situations” (McAdam 1988: 132). Taylor and
Whittier (1995: 353) maintain that collective identity is an important
concept for all social movements. It is generally assumed that people seek
collective identity due to “an intrinsic need for an integrated and continuous
social self” (Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield 1997: 279).
Taylor and Whittier (1995) point out that resource mobilization and
political process theories focus more on the macro level, which results in
downplaying the importance of group grievances. They argue that more
attention needs to be paid to how networks transform their members into
political actors. Collective identity is viewed as the shared definition of a
group that is based on members’ common interests, solidarity, and
experiences. Three key concepts that help us better understand collective
identity are boundaries, consciousness, and negotiation.
Boundaries refer to the physical, psychological, and social structures
that lay the foundation for differences between the dominant group and the
challenging group. Lesbian feminists, for example, adopted two types of
boundary strategies. First, the creation of separate distinct institutions such
as rape crisis centers and feminist bookstores, and second, the formation of a
distinct culture of women, which included values such as egalitarianism,
collectivism, and cooperation. Consciousness involves an ongoing process
by which members come to realize the significance of their common
interests, experiences, and membership in the collectivity in opposition to
the dominant system. For some lesbians, developing group consciousness
may result in establishing a lesbian identity that makes political alliances
with gay men unlikely. Negotiation refers to the ways by which social
movement activists try to change symbolic meanings and negative
definitions into more positive evaluations. They resist the negative
evaluations that devalue them and argue for fair treatment. Boundaries,
consciousness, and negotiations all interact to illustrate how lesbian feminist
communities develop a collective identity that facilitates women engaging in
various actions challenging the dominant political and social system. Taylor
and Whittier argue that their model of collective identity can apply to a wide
variety of social movements, both old and new.
Jenkins and Gottlieb (2007: 2) argue that identity conflict can be both
positive and negative. On the one hand, working toward a broader definition
of citizenship and fighting for minority rights and democratic reforms can
lead to a more just and equitable society. On the other hand, identity
conflicts could destroy social trust and a sense of security while promoting
ethnic hatred. Movement organizations are involved in identity work to
generate feelings of solidarity and loyalty. Activists try to recruit additional
supporters by framing or packaging identities that distinguish “us” from
“them” (Polletta and Jasper 2001). We now turn to the framing aspect of the
culturalist perspective that involves highlighting the positive aspects of a
movement.
Framing
The concept of frame is taken from Goffman, who refers to “schemata of
interpretation” that enable people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label”
things that occur (taken from Snow et al. 1986: 464). Snow and Benford
(1992: 137) define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and
condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding
objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one’s
present or past environments.” Social movements “frame, or assign meaning
to and interpret, relevant events and conditions” (Snow and Benford 1988:
198). Leaders of social movements try to get people to believe their version
of the world. “Because social reality is complex enough to allow for
completely different interpretations of what is happening, one situation can
produce a variety of definitions, sponsored by competing actors”
(Klandermans 1991: 9). Both della Porta (1992) and Snow et al. (1986)
emphasize how people’s perceptions are shaped by the frames they use to
understand events. For della Porta (1992), the events themselves are not
objective but can be misinterpreted or fabricated, and there are multiple
realities.
Snow et al. (1986) identify four types of frame alignment processes:
frame amplification, frame extension, frame transformation, and frame
bridging. Frame amplification refers to focusing, clarifying, or invigorating
an interpretive frame. Common values amplified are justice, democracy,
liberty, and equality. Beliefs can also be amplified, for example, the
stereotyped images about antagonists or the seriousness of a problem or
issue. Frame extension occurs when the boundaries of the primary
framework of the movement are extended to include interests or points of
view that are incidental to the primary objectives, but of considerable
importance to potential supporters of the movement. Frame transformation
exists when the programs, causes, and values of the movement are not in
line with conventional society, and the movement tries to gather support by
professing new values and redefining activities and events, so that they are
now “seen by the participants to be something quite else” (474). Frame
bridging involves linking two or more ideologically congruent, but
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or concern.
Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1993: 11) point out that framing concepts are
used to illustrate how “ideology or belief systems are interactional
accomplishments that emerge from framing processes.” Ideology is
continually being constructed, interpreted, and reinterpreted. Zald (1996)
notes that movement groups become involved in framing contests in which
they try to persuade possible recruits, authorities, and bystanders of the
correctness of their cause. They may create master frames that dominate
over other movement-specific action frames, so that “their punctuations,
attributions, [and] articulations may color and constrain those of any number
of movement organizations” (Snow and Benford 1992: 138). Gamson and
Meyer (1996: 283), however, point out that
the degree to which there are unified and consensual frames within a movement is
variable and it is comparatively rare that we can speak sensibly of the movement
framing. It is more useful to think of framing as an internal process of contention within
social movements with different actors taking different positions.
Benford (1993) analyzed frame disputes within the nuclear disarmament

movement by focusing on diagnostic, prognostic, and frame resonance
disputes. Diagnostic framing revolves around the question of what is reality
and considers the identification of a problem, whom to blame, or what are
the causal forces. Prognostic framing, on the other hand, considers how to
change the reality, with emphasis on solutions. Frame resonance involves
the extent to which frames will strike a responsive chord or seem credible
and thus encourage people to get involved in the movement. Benford found
that almost all frame disputes in the nuclear disarmament movement were
between different movement factions (moderate, liberal, and radical) rather
than within one faction, with the greatest number of frame disputes between
moderates and radicals. Text box 8.1 identifies the frames used by and about
white separatist groups.
As the framing perspective developed, Benford (1997) offered his own
“friendly” critique of the framework. First, he was concerned about the lack
of systematic empirical studies because of the underdevelopment of frame
analytic methods. Put another way, how does one operationalize frames?
Second, he noted that the empirical studies had been more descriptive than
analytical, with numerous frames identified rather than a few generic frames
that could be applied across movements. Emphasis has been placed on
frames as static objects rather than as dynamic processes being constructed,
negotiated, contested, reconstructed, and transformed. The framing of elites
in movements has been overemphasized to the detriment of examining rank-
and-file movement members, potential members, bystanders, and others.
Another problem is the tendency to reify frames, by which Benford (1997:
418) means “the process of talking about socially constructed ideas as
though they are real, as though they exist independent of the collective
interpretations and constructions of the actors involved.” This results in
some authors writing as though social movements frame issues when in
reality only particular activists or other participants do. In addition,
sometimes the role of human agency, as well as the role of emotions, is
neglected. At other times, the tendency has been to reduce interaction and
collective action to individual-level explanations. Finally, there has also
been the inclination to oversimplify or treat movements as monolithic rather
than as interactive processes that are negotiated in movement participants’
everyday involvements.
TEXT BOX 8.1

The Framing of the White Separatist or White
Nationalist Movement
The white separatist movement has been known by several labels,
including white supremacist, white power, neo-Nazi, white nationalist,
and racialist. Drawing on their interviews with white separatists, Dobratz
and Shanks-Meile (2006) found that movement members themselves do
not agree on the appropriate labels. Of 139 people interviewed, only six
did not use any of the following: white separatist, racialist, or white
power. Sixty-three used all three terms. Another forty used both white
separatist and racialist. (Racialist is typically interpreted as love of one’s
race.) Some resent the label white supremacist, such as Ingrid who
referred to it as “a term the enemy has coined to smear a legitimate
movement that is nationalist rather than ‘supremacist.’” Others consider
themselves as supremacists because they believe that the white race is
supreme mentally, physically, and even biblically (especially if supporters
embrace the religious belief of Christian identity). Generally, movement
supporters favor a diagnostic frame that sees minorities as a threat to the
white race, pointing out that whites will soon become a minority in the
United States. Their prognostic frame calls for the creation of a white
separatist state/ethnostate or homeland possibly in the northwest that
would allow whites to live in harmony without minorities polluting their
race through intermarriage.
Those who oppose the movement most frequently frame it as a white
supremacist one, noting how its members negatively label blacks as
niggers, Jews as kikes, and the government as ZOG (Zionist Occupied
Government). The organizations in the movement are framed as hate
groups and the Ku Klux Klan burns crosses rather than lights them. In
order to achieve frame resonance, white separatists try to transform the
stigmas of racist and white supremacist to discussions of love, pride, and
preservation of the white race and heritage. Berbrier (1998) suggests that
white separatists have developed a master frame he calls “Kultural
Pluralism” that portrays white racial activism and racism as everyday
routine behavior engaged in by normal people who are proud of their race
and cultural heritage. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (2006) argue that the
movement itself is too divided to have a well-defined master frame. They
support the appropriateness of Gamson and Meyer’s (1996: 283) point
that consensual or master frames may actually be infrequent.
The emergence and growth of the alt-right especially in the second
decade of the twenty-first century supports how difficult it is for this
movement to develop a master frame. Text box 7.4 in Chapter 7 discusses
how the alt-right sees itself as an alternative to the traditional
conservatives; it has received a great deal of attention because of its
association with Donald Trump’s campaign and his becoming President
in 2017. However, as Van Dyke (2017) points out, data from Southern
Poverty Law Center’s Intelligence Project show that far-right
mobilization has increased steadily since President Obama became
President in 2008. That year is also when Richard Spencer coined the
term alt-right. By applying the concepts of threat and political
opportunities used by McAdam, we see that some whites felt threatened
by Obama’s election victories and found that the alt-right provided
political opportunities to participate in and support the Trump campaign.
In a white nationalist movement already noted for its lack of
cohesiveness, the alt-right added a new layer of potential division.
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2017), the
disagreements seem to be more about strategy rather than ideology since
most believe that whites need to live separately from other races. What
they disagree about is how to achieve that goal. The older more
established group has typically used militant language, slogans, and
displays of items like the swastika, Klan patches, and Schutzstaffel (SS)
bolts. However, Andrew Anglin, a prominent voice for the alt-right at
times, challenged such displays and instead encouraged white nationalists
to look like “Something normal people can get behind” (ADL 2017). The
alt-right uses what they consider to be more unifying symbols like the
American flag although Matt Parrott from the more traditional older
white nationalist side thought the alt-right wanted to dress up “like frat
boys with American flags” (ADL 2017).
Some (Hatewatch Staff, 2017a; Tenold 2018; Wallace 2017, 2018)
have started to label the older group as White Nationalism 1.0 (WN 1.0)
vs. White Nationalism 2.0. (WN 2.0) often comprising members of the
alt-right. Some distinguish them by their strategy of vanguardism vs.
mainstream. Vanguardists (usually WN 1.0) tend to discuss revolution
and believe that society’s problems are due to the Jews who gained power
in the early twentieth century, so that now white racist beliefs, rhetoric,
dress, etc., are stigmatized (Wallace 2018). Mainstreamers, including
most alt-right supporters, believe that the rhetoric, appearance, and
messaging of WN 1.0 have been part of the problem causing the lack of
acceptance of white nationalist ideology. They believe that providing
more positive images would help attract many racists in the mainstream
and lead to a successful mass movement and their own ethnostate.
Wallace (2018) recognizes that “our people shift in between
mainstreaming and vanguardism” depending in part on how optimistic or
pessimistic they feel about the future of the white race.
The alt-right intended to show the mainstream a positive intelligent
image in the “Unite the Right” rally August 11–12, 2017, in
Charlottesville. (See Text box 5.3 and Chapter 5 on Charlottesville and
Text box 7.4 on the alt-right for additional information.) However, after
that event and other happenings, the Charlottesville rally is being framed
as marking the height of recent success for the alt-right and also the start
of its sharp decline. In Charlottesville, the turnout of support for the
movement was by far the largest in recent years with estimates of 500 or
more white nationalists present. One of President Trump’s comments of
“fine people on both sides” at the rally was acknowledged positively by
David Duke, a white nationalist and former Klan leader, who tweeted
“Thank you President Trump for your honesty and courage to tell the
truth” and major alt-right leader Richard Spencer who responded
“Trump’s statement was fair and down to earth” (Thrush and Haberman
2017).
There was, however, a large segment of the mainstream that
negatively reacted to the violence that occurred in Charlottesville
including Heyer’s death and also negatively to some of Trump’s
comments. A number of problems for the alt-right and other white
nationalists emerged since Charlottesville including bitter infighting over
leadership issues; a few key figures left the movement; others were outed
and harassed including some losing their jobs and still others being
subject to lawsuits. Their online presence which has been key to the alt-
right’s success was threatened, as Silicon Valley removed some extremist
sites, PayPal accounts were terminated, and Stormfront, a white
nationalist online presence since 1995, was shuttered (Buchanan 2018;
Fausset 2018; Hatewatch Staff 2017b; Lenz 2018; McCoy 2018). Hughes
(2018) suggests that white nationalists have had to shift how they
communicate with each other since their access to mainstream social
media platforms and television has become limited. Thus, their
conversations likely take place on more private online chat rooms, apps
like Gab, and websites like Reddit “creating an echo chamber of racial
resentment that still erupts publicly” (Hughes 2018). In those situations,
they are less likely to be in contact with people they refer to as “normies”
who use more mainstream outlets (McCoy 2018).
In a two part series, Shivani (2017a, b) asked Jeffrey Kaplan, George
J. Michael, and Michael Barkun, social scientists who conducted research
on white supremacy, the same set of questions about the alt-right. Barkun
(Shivani 2017a) described the public emergence of the alt-right during
the 2016 presidential campaign as both sudden and widely covered by the
media “even though its numbers appeared minuscule and no figure of any
political stature was known to be associated with it. That so seemingly
marginal a group of political actors should have attracted so much
attention is itself odd—indeed, in hindsight now that the campaign is
over, it seems stranger still.” He believes the emergence of the alt-right
publically reflects “a manifestation of a larger transformation in
American culture—namely, the gradual penetration of the fringe into the
mainstream.” Elsewhere Barkun (2017) expressed his concern that
President Trump has facilitated the fringe moving into the mainstream by
making it an important part of his 2016 political campaign and now his
presidency. He argues “Trump has therefore vastly accelerated what I
term the mainstreaming of the fringe, as a result of which the fringe is
being sanitized, stripped of its stigmas and its pariah status.”
Michael suggested that the strength and influence of the white
nationalist movement has been overstated and is still weak but “seems to
be making progress due to the revolution in communications and the
similarities of conditions in Western nations (for example, low native
birth rates, immigration from the Third World)” (Shivani 2017b). Kaplan
however warns that “It is sometimes too easy in the heat of rhetorical
battle to overlook the difference between the denizens of the cultic milieu
and those who people the mainstream shores” (Shivani 2017b). He
suggests that traditional white supremacists/WN 1.0 groups “have been
co-opted by the alt-right, by the Trump campaign and in the greatest of
all ironies, by the Russians as well” (Shivani 2017b). He believes that
some of their racist views have been used by the alt-right but the
traditional white supremacists “are not of the alt-right. They are not
invited to their parties and are unwelcome in their forums and chatrooms”
(Shivani 2017b).
Whether the white nationalist or separatist movement and the alt-right
will continue on what seems to be a downward slide or rebound quickly
is hard to determine. However, it is important to remember that this
movement really started back in late 1865, less than a year after the Civil
War ended when the Ku Klux Klan was founded in Pulaski Tennessee.
Like identity movements in general it has a long history, experienced
numerous changes, and strived for acceptance by the mainstream at
times. It most likely will endure on the fringe as long as racism continues
to exist in American society.
Use various search engines and look for current information on the
alt-right and white nationalism. How are the alt-right and white
nationalism framed? Are there multiple types of framing depending on
the source? What role do you think white nationalism and the alt-right
will play in forthcoming elections? How prevalent do you think racism is
in the mainstream of society? Why? Are hate crimes currently increasing
in the United States? Elsewhere?
White nationalists engage in a variety of social movement activities. In

January 2007, members of the National Socialist Movement, a white
nationalist 1.0 group, protested by burning books and articles they
considered anti-white publications
We now turn to one of Benford’s specific criticisms and focus on the role
of emotions in social movements. Polletta and Jasper (2001: 299) have
observed that there is still a lot to learn about collective identities and “we
know little about the emotions that accompany and shape collective
identity.”
Emotions
Supporters of the resource mobilization approach reacted against the social–
psychological collective behavior approach that devalued movement
participants as being involved in irrational behavior. Therefore, these
supporters emphasized the continuities between institutional politics and
social movements, but they “ignored emotions and implicitly accepted the
assumptions of rational choice theory, embracing the false dichotomy of
emotions and rationality” (Aminzade and McAdam 2001: 21). Further,
Aminzade and McAdam (23) argue that in the United States and Europe, the
dominant culture has seen emotions as not only irrational, but also
illegitimate in political decision-making. However, as they and Oliver,
Cadena-Roa, and Strawn (2003) point out, rationality versus emotion is a
false dichotomy. People, including movement activists, can be both rational
and emotional in their decision-making. As Jasper (1998: 407) notes,
“General affects and specific emotions are a part of all social life as surely as
cognitive meanings and moral values are. What is more, they are relatively
predictable, not accidental eruptions of the irrational.” Aminzade and
McAdam (2001: 18) also “see episodes of contention typically involving
both heightened emotions and an increase in rational, instrumental action.”
Goodwin and Jasper (2015: 7) acknowledge that although a number of
complex emotions are associated with social life in general, they are
especially clear in social movements where organizers may try to arouse
anger and compassion possibly by playing on fears and anxieties. Other
important emotions include excitement, hope for the future, and dedication
to the cause.
Emotions do not merely accompany our deepest desires and satisfactions, they
constitute them, permeating our ideas, identities, and interests…. Recently, sociologists
have rediscovered emotions, although they have yet to integrate them into much
empirical research outside of social psychology.
(Jasper 2003: 154)
Emotions can be divided into primarily affective and primarily reactive

ends of a continuum, with others in between. Hatred and love as well as trust
and hostility are primarily affective emotions relevant to protest, whereas
anger and grief are primarily reactive. Emotions that are in between include
compassion, enthusiasm, resentment, and resignation (Jasper 2003).
Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (Polletta 2001: 11–12) have identified four
different possible explanations of emotions. The first is biological, which
focuses on the degree to which emotions are innate or instinctive. The
second explanation is psychological and examines the “personality
structure,” including whether one has a positive or negative feeling about a
politician. The third is more social–structural, but also interactionist. For
example, relationships involving power differences, especially in one-on-
one engagements, may influence attempts to recruit another person to join a
movement. The fourth approach maintains that emotions are culturally or
socially constructed. Our culture influences what are considered socially
appropriate means to express our emotions. Emotions relevant to social
movements frequently tend to be more constructed than others. Fear of
someone lunging at you from the dark requires much less cognitive
construction than fear of the policies of the World Trade Organization or the
joy and hope from participating in a social movement that can possibly
result in a better society (12–13).
Emotions can be important building blocks for other social movement
concepts. For example, opportunities, identities, networks, and frames are
linked closely to emotions. Injustice frames draw upon feelings of
indignation and outrage (Polletta 2001: 14). As Gamson (1992: 32) points
out, “Injustice focuses on the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and
iron in the soul.” The participants’ emotions influence the course of
development of a social movement, while the movement’s development and
its victories and failures influence the participants’ emotions. In addition,
characteristics of the state (e.g. how open or closed it is to protest) and the
behavior or actions of the government or political elite (repressive or
tolerant) influence the prevailing emotions of a movement (Flam 2005: 32).
It is also important to realize the significance of the emotional reactions of
the public to the mobilization attempts of the movement and whether a
movement’s (re)framing of the issues has been effective (Flam with King
2005).
The study of emotions needs to be integrated into the field of political
sociology, including that of social movements and contentious politics
because “an analysis that ignores the emotional dimensions of attachments
and commitments is incapable of explaining activists’ determination in the
face of high risk and their willingness to endure suffering and self-sacrifice”
(Aminzade and McAdam 2001: 21) (Table 8.3).
Table 8.3 Comparing Theoretical Frameworks on

Social Movements
TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF STRUCTURALIST,
RATIONALIST, AND CULTURALIST
FRAMEWORKS
Although generally taking a structuralist approach in his landmark book
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970,
McAdam (1999) critiques the structuralist, rationalist, and culturalist
interpretations of social movements in the second edition of his book. Even
though structuralists have emphasized the role of formal and informal
organizations, including people’s network ties in recruiting people to social
movements, they have not generated a social–psychological explanation for
why people join movements. The role of individual decision-making is
undermined; the individual is acted upon rather than showing human agency.
McAdam generally recognizes the importance of incorporating a
culturalist viewpoint, but culturalists need to reflect more on the “process by
which existing collective identities get redefined so as to serve as the
motivational basis for emergent action” (1999: xxxiv). In addition,
culturalists need to ground their framework in a theory of human action and
motivation. Rationalists, on the other hand, fail to explain the origins of their
individual interests or preferences for social movement activity because they
tend to assume relatively fixed and well-defined interests of people, thus
making it difficult to understand why someone would join an NSM.
In his effort to combine concepts and ideas from the structuralist,
culturalist, and rationalist perspectives and to extend our knowledge of
contentious politics, McAdam identifies three key concepts: expanding
political opportunities and threats, mobilizing structures, and framing or
using other interpretive processes to develop a synthetic explanation of
social movements. As political opportunities and threats increase or decline,
the power relations are subject to change. Informal and formal collective
vehicles such as churches, civil rights organizations, and neighborhood block
parties may encourage people to organize, pursue their concerns, and look
for solutions. The shared meanings developed through framing and other
interpretive processes help link the political opportunities and structures to
actual social movement participation. Participants need to share their
grievances often about some perceived social injustice and believe that they
can improve their situations and/or their cause in general. As McAdam
(1999: xi) points out, “It is not the structural changes that set people in
motion, but rather the shared understandings and conceptions of ‘we-ness’
they develop to make sense of the trends.”
In his model, which attempts to combine or synthesize elements from the
three frameworks, McAdam recognizes the importance of both
institutionalized political groups and the previously unorganized new actors
who can be mobilized to participate in politics. In uncertain political times,
established political leaders, such as elites, political party leaders, and
government officials, may be divided over political goals and policies that
result in elite contention. This contention opens up political opportunities for
SMOs to develop and form new courses of political action called popular
contention. In this model, institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics
join together to form possibilities for social change. In addition, both the
state or other elite actors and the challenging group(s) go through similar
stages of interpretive processes, attribution of threat or opportunity,
appropriation of existing organizational or collective identity, innovative
collective action, and development of shared perception of environmental
uncertainty that can result in the emergence of contentious politics (McAdam
1999: xv–xxx). (More discussion of movement emergence follows in the
next section.)
Numerous other attempts to integrate key social movement concepts
from different frameworks have been proposed, including some qualitative
and quantitative analytical approaches (see Jenkins and Form 2005: 241–242
for more details). Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn (2003: 225–226) also
discuss the need for integrating structural and constructionist or culturalist
theories associated with social psychology and cultural sociology. They point
out that movements formulate rational and strategic actions and also use
cultural memories, values, and moral principles to define and redefine
situations. Broad macrostructural processes such as economic crises,
population pressures, and shifting political alignments clearly shape
contentious politics, but the starting points of contention are rooted in the
collective interpretations and behavior of individuals responding to such
environmental structural changes (McAdam 2001: 223–224). Much more
work remains to be done in synthesizing the various theoretical perspectives
to give us a more complete understanding of social movements. To advance
our knowledge of what happens as social movements develop, we now turn
to a more specific discussion about the emergence, mobilization, and decline
of social movements.
THE LIFE CYCLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Social movement theorists commonly address a number of questions
regarding the life cycle of social movements. What factors facilitate the
emergence of a social movement? Of these potential factors, which help or
hinder the social movement after it has emerged? What factors influence
whether a movement is successful? What happens after a social movement
has either succeeded or failed? The answer to each of these questions can be
quite complex. As a result, a common starting point is to assume that social
movements do not truly have a beginning and an end.
In the real world, it seems that social movements start and stop all the
time. For example, many identify the start of the modern Civil Rights
Movement in the United States as 1955 when the Montgomery Improvement
Association, led by Dr King, began the Montgomery Bus Boycotts.
However, this assumption disregards decades of work done by civil rights
activists who fought for African-American civil and human rights. Similarly,
some would argue that the Civil Rights Movement ended in the late 1960s or
the early 1970s. In particular, some target the assassination of Dr King on
April 4, 1968, as the end, if not the beginning of the end of the Civil Rights
Movement. Again, this assumption fails to recognize the important social
movement activity that occurred after Dr King’s death and continues to this
day. Regardless of what one identifies as the beginning or the end of the
Civil Rights Movement, the peak of social movement activity in the Civil
Rights Movement began in the early 1950s (e.g. Brown v. Board of
Education, the killing of Emmett Till, and the Montgomery Bus Boycott)
and continued through the end of the 1960s (e.g. Freedom Summer, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
We will assume the following: social movements go through a complex
life cycle; they seem to have a start and an end, although the start is not a
definitive one and the end may have many lingering remnants that morph
into another cause; what appears to be the start and the end instead marks the
peak(s) of social movement activity; and the emergence, mobilization, and
decline of social movements involve many different factors. For our
purposes, we will discuss these components as the life cycle of social
movements.
Social Movement Emergence and Mobilization

The traditional view of social movement emergence deals with three main
areas of research: social breakdown, political opportunity structures (POSs),
and existing conditions of social organization. Breakdown, opportunity, and
social organization relate to the external factors that help give rise to social
movement activity. These same factors help or hinder the mobilization of
social movements once they do emerge. Once an aggrieved population has
emerged, there are other important factors that influence the mobilization of
potential adherents. In particular, mobilization strength is strongly affected
by the interpretive or framing processes that work as a mechanism of
“micromobilization” to attract like-minded individuals and to convert those
who may have differing opinions.
STRAIN, CONFLICT, AND BREAKDOWN

Social movement theorists argue that social movements emerge as a
response to strain or breakdown in social order (Kornhauser 1959; Smelser
1962). Social breakdown has been discussed in many different ways,
including social conflict, structural strain, and social disorganization. Social
breakdown comes out of a Durkheimian tradition and has structural
functionalist roots, which suggests that, under normal conditions of social
organization, a sufficiently large number of individuals will have their
needs, wants, and concerns met by the social structure. If the social
structure becomes strained or begins to break down, a progressively larger
number of individuals start to feel marginalized. In other words, because the
social system is not working for a large group of people anymore, social
breakdown, whether real or perceived, leads to feelings of relative
deprivation. This, in turn, helps fuel the emergence of collective social
action.
Research has found that disruptions in social organization are a factor in
the emergence of social movements. In his study of a prison riot in New
Mexico in 1980, Useem (1985) used in-depth interviews with prison guards
and inmates to reconstruct the social organization of the prison. The data
depict how changes in the structure of the prison over the prior decade
helped foster the riot. Useem writes: “During the 1970s, the State
Penitentiary changed from a relatively benign and well-run institution, to
one that was harsh, abusive, painfully boring, and without the ‘regulatory
mechanisms’ that had been in place in the early 1970s” (685). The study
points to the importance of explaining social movement emergence in
relation to the disruption of social routines and expectations.
Social movement research has also explored the role of conflict and
competition in gaining control and power. NSM theorists, such as Alain
Touraine and Manuel Castells, have contributed extensively to this
discussion. Social movement emergence and mobilization are seen as
resulting from rising conflict and competition. For example, Castells (1983)
argues that social movements emerge as a result of the imposition of a
hegemonic order that conflicts with urban social realities and identities.
Castells (1977) gives specific attention to what he calls urban social
movements and urban ideology. Urban ideology is a system of interlocking
values and ideas that empower some groups while subordinating others.
When the subordinated group identifies this urban ideology, similar to
Marx’s false consciousness, collective action is highly unlikely. It is not
until the hegemonic order conflicts with an urban social reality that
movements emerge (Castells 1983).
In an in-depth examination of the rise and fall of the Mission Coalition
Organization (MCO) in San Francisco (1967–1973), Castells (1983) argues
that the emergence of the MCO resulted from urban renewal efforts prior to
1967. Most important was the role played by the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency (SFRA), a development organization that proposed
redevelopment initiatives that coincided with urban renewal efforts related
to two primary Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) stations in the heart of the
Mission neighborhood. The rise of the MCO was due largely to the negative
views that Mission residents held of previous SFRA-lead redevelopment
decisions. Many residents felt that SFRA redeveloped areas largely to
benefit private business elites, not to benefit local residents. There were also
major concerns over SFRA’s previous redevelopment initiative, which
resulted in the displacement of many Mission residents. The new
redevelopment initiative was viewed as posing the same threat of urban
displacement and gentrification. The proposal of two new transit-oriented
redevelopment projects in combination with SFRA’s history of
displacement in the neighborhood helped fuel the rise of the MCO (Castells
1983).
Similar to Castells, Touraine (1981, 1985) suggests that social
movements emerge as a result of the dominant social organization. Touraine
assumes that new forms of social organization, referred to as the
postindustrial society, have given rise to new forms of social movements.
These social movements are new because the nature of their conflict, their
desired outcomes, and even their makeup are unique from any other
movement of the past. They are defined less by attributes held by a group,
but more by resistance to dominant forms of power (Touraine 1981).
Touraine argues that the cause of conflict is for control of historicity or “the
capacity to produce an historical experience through cultural patterns”
(1985: 778). Self-production of society, or societal actors acting against
other actors within the social order to control historicity, creates order
(Touraine 1977, 1981). Thus, Touraine (1985) identifies the conflict over
controlling and defining historical experiences as the central conflict of the
NSM. The need or want to gain the capacity to control historicity is
recognized only when the system of domination that separates those who
have the capacity to control historicity from those who do not is uncovered
(Touraine 1981). The problem, however, is that domination is masked by
the new order of postindustrial societies. By controlling information and
knowledge, individuals who are in power are able to subordinate individuals
who falsely identify with the new social order (Touraine 1981). Once this
system of domination is uncovered, the likelihood of the emergence of
collective mobilization increases significantly.
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Breakdown, strain, and conflict are far from the sole determinants of social
movement emergence and the subsequent strength of collective
mobilization. Over the last thirty years, social movement research has
pointed to the importance of avenues for social movement activity
embedded in social structure. These avenues are referred to as political
opportunity structures. Eisinger (1973: 25) defines political opportunity as
“the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power to
manipulate the political system.” In a study examining riot behavior in
forty-three American cities, Eisinger found that protest activity was
positively related to POSs found within these different cities.
Jenkins and Perrow (1977) apply this concept by comparing two farm
workers organizations, the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) and the
United Farm Workers (UFW), between 1946 and 1972. The organizations
experienced drastically different levels of success. On the one hand, the
NFLU encountered a political environment where it received little financial
and political support from key allies, such as organized labor, and also
confronted a deeply partisan opposition that was not at all friendly to the
organization’s concerns and where elected officials strongly supported
agribusiness over labor concerns. The UFW, on the other hand, amassed
political and financial capital from a very sympathetic political environment
and experienced much more open and neutral public authorities.
Governmental elites were deeply divided over the concerns and well-being
of farm workers. Organized labor was much stronger and openly spoke out
against agribusiness public policy. The central argument of Jenkins and
Perrow supports resource mobilization theory because it points to the
importance of political environmental factors, which can help or hinder
social movement mobilization efforts over the internal makeup of the SMO.
As we have previously discussed, McAdam (1982) put forth a critical
advancement in social movement theory referred to as the political process
model. The political process model sees the emergence and mobilization of
social movements as a result of expanding and contracting political
opportunities that are dependent on broadscale structural changes, cleavages
of elite power, existent social organization, and cognitive liberation of
aggrieved populations. Political opportunities, in conjunction with existent
indigenous organization and subjective “transformation of consciousness”
(51), lead to movement emergence. Once a sufficiently organized
population has realized a shared grievance and identified and acted upon a
political opportunity, the possibility for continued movement development
or potential movement decline is impacted by a fourth factor, “shifting
control responses of other groups to the movement” (59). Whereas
recognized threat and seized opportunity impact the ability for a movement
to emerge, the combination of the state’s capacity for repression, elite allies,
and strength of other competing groups explains whether a movement will
succeed or fail. McAdam’s original model has undergone a number of
changes over the last twenty-five years, and each of the model’s main
components has received a great deal of attention as well.
First, the relative openness and closure of institutionalized politics can
vary regionally and nationally, as can the capacity and propensity for
repression by the state. In a comparison of antinuclear movements in four
democracies, Kitschelt (1986) found that both strategies and outcomes of
social movements are determined largely by the domestic POS. In other
words, it is not solely the type of strategy (e.g. disruptive protest tactics)
that shapes outcomes; it is also the established and institutionalized political
structure that is either more open and responsive (e.g. United States and
Sweden) or closed and unresponsive (e.g. France and West Germany). In
addition, it is the weak (e.g. United States and West Germany) or strong
(e.g. France and Sweden) state capacity to repress political demands that
shapes strategies and impacts potential movement outcomes.
Also, expanding and closing opportunities are highly related to the
relative stability or instability of elite alignments. Jenkins, Jacobs, and
Agnone (2003) found that from 1948 to 1997 governmental divisions in the
United States affected expanding opportunities for civil rights protest. The
frequency of civil rights protest was more prominent when northern
Democrats increased in strength and Republican presidential incumbents
experienced difficult Cold War pressures. A compromise was essentially
forced, which resulted in more opportunities for civil rights protesters to
successfully attain movement goals. The presence or absence of elite allies
is closely related to divisions in elite arrangements (Amenta and Zylan
1991; Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Meyer and Minkoff 2004).
Despite claims that social movement emergence is related to objective
POSs, some researchers have been able to show social movement
mobilization in the absence of any POS. Kurzman (1996) argues that the
perception of POSs is just as important as actual structural opportunities. In
a study of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Kurzman found that in the absence
of objective structural opportunities, insurgents were still able to mobilize
against an Iranian state. In essence, the Iranian insurgents perceived that
POSs existed, which led to the creation of political opportunities and the
eventual overthrow of the Iranian monarchy. Roscigno and Danaher (2001)
examined the role of radio stations in the mobilization of textile workers in
the South from 1929 to 1934. In an area of the country where organized
labor was nearly nonexistent and local elites had strong influence on the
content of local newspapers and could easily bypass new organized labor
laws, a large number of textile workers still mobilized against their
employers through organized walkouts and strikes. The authors found that
proximity to radio stations was significantly correlated with worker
mobilization.
In a final example, Einwohner (2003) found very similar results in a
study of Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto during World War II, where
structural opportunities were nonexistent. However, Einwohner also found
that the perception of lack of opportunity was also strongly present, and
suggested that the emergence of Jewish resistance was facilitated by the
view that resistance was equivalent to honor.2 Taken together, one can
deduce that, in order for a social movement to emerge, there must be the
perception of threat and opportunity as well as existing mobilizing
structures and objective structural opportunities (Goldstone and Tilly 2001).
EXISTENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The level and strength of prior organization with a given population is
equally as important to social movement emergence and mobilization as
POS. Like McAdam, Morris (1984) stressed the importance of existing
social organization. An aggrieved population must have a sufficient level of
existent social organization to mobilize successfully. Without prior social
organization in place, a group of individuals is highly unlikely to mobilize.
In an examination of the role of internal social organization to the sit-in
movements of the 1960s, Aldon Morris (1981) found that both black
southern churches and colleges provided resources and communication
networks that were crucially important to the emergence and mobilization
of the sit-ins. In particular, the majority of leadership was drawn from black
churches and colleges in the South.
Existing social organization not only affects the ability of a social
movement to tap into important leadership networks and to quickly
disseminate information to a broad coalition of individuals, but also plays a
central role in the recruitment of rank-and-file social movement
participants. Social movements have been found to recruit an overwhelming
majority of followers from preexisting, informal friendship and family
networks and from individuals’ links with other groups in which they had
previously participated (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). The
recruitment of individuals who have prior attachment to sympathetic or
like-minded organizations (Gould 1991) is of crucial importance. In
addition to affording opportunities for recruitment of members and using
communication as a means to quick mobilization, social networks also
create salient collective identities and socialize social movement
participants (Passy 2001).
Mobilizing Structures and Networks

Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, informal as well as
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3). Mobilizing structures, like
indigenous organizations from McAdam’s (1982) original model, refer to
available resources, networks of communication, and existent indigenous
organizations that allow for and guide social movement activity. Once the
movement emerges and groups organize, SMOs become the main
“collective vehicles” for organizing potential adherents, guiding movement
tactics, and attaining movement goals. In short, efforts by SMOs “influence
the overall pace and outcome of the struggle” (McAdam, McCarthy, and
Zald 1996: 13). For example, the leaders of the CORE staged fund-raising
activities after the Montgomery Bus Boycott that allowed them to increase
their staff and expand their work in the South (McAdam 1982: 148). As part
of a social movement’s chances for success, both the tactics employed by
SMOs and the goals of SMOs are paramount. Groups that use disruptive
tactics and have a single and nondisplacing goal have more favorable
outcomes than groups that focus on multiple goals and call for displacing or
removing antagonists from power (Gamson 1990: 41–46).
Although mobilizing structures play an important role in social
movement mobilization, the capacity to mobilize cannot be realized without
the establishment of formal and informal social networks. Networks
influence the flow of financial (money) and human capital (leadership and
membership base). Social networks also impact the avenues of
communication, which, in turn, influence such things as the ability to
quickly mobilize movement participants across a broad area. An early study
of the role of communication networks by Petras and Zeitlin (1967) found
that mobilization and participation in and around rural mining towns in
Chile increased as individuals moved closer to mining towns. The opposite
was true for those who were farther away from the mining towns.
COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

The framing perspective argues that mobilization of potential social
movement supporters is related to whether frames created by SMOs connect
on a social–psychological level with potential adherents.3 In other words,
do the collective action frames resonate with social movement participants?
In order for frames to resonate, they must be seen as credible and salient
(Benford and Snow 2000). The focus is on how “a critical mass of persons
collectively define the situation as ripe and persuade others on an ongoing
basis that their version of reality rings true” (Benford 1993: 199).
Snow and Benford (1988) make clear distinctions among a number of
framing processes. As noted previously, diagnostic framing is the process of
constructing meaning that identifies and defines a given problem, while
prognostic framing occurs after a problem has been identified and offers a
solution to the problem (Snow and Benford 1988). Also important though is
motivational framing, the process of frame construction that links the
problem and resolution to actualized collective action, or the frames that get
individuals to act for a cause (Snow and Benford 1988). Whether a frame
resonates with potential adherents and motivates them into action is
dependent on the credibility and salience of that frame. Frames are credible
when they are seen as consistent, articulated by a reliable source, and
empirically verifiable (Benford and Snow 2000). Consistency between
frames and SMO claims and frames and SMO actions is associated with
higher frame resonance (Zuo and Benford 1995). Frames resonate with
more intensity when the articulator, such as an expert, elected official, or the
media, is seen as legitimate. There must also be a “fit between the framings
and events in the world” (Benford and Snow 2000: 620). In addition, frame
salience includes three aspects: centrality, experiential commensurability,
and narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000). Centrality refers to how
important and relevant a frame is to a given population and suggests that the
more central a frame to a given community, the greater likelihood of
mobilizing potential adherents. Experiential commensurability, or how
applicable a frame is to the daily life of potential adherents, suggests “the
more experientially commensurate the framings, the greater the salience,
and the greater the probability of mobilization” (Benford and Snow 2000:
621). Narrative fidelity suggests newly created frames that align with the
“cultural narrations” of a target population, and therefore, carry cultural
significance are more salient and increase mobilization. Taken together, one
can make the argument that mobilization of potential adherents is largely
dependent on the identification of a legitimate problem, the suggestion of a
realistic solution, and the evidence of opportunity for change.
Social Movement Outcomes, Influence, and Decline

Outcomes are difficult to identify because they can vary greatly, “extending
from state-level policy decisions to expansion of a movement’s social
capital to changes in participants’ biographies” (Cress and Snow 2000:
1064). One of the primary areas of study for social movement outcomes is
goals. Goals are the intended target or direct outcome of an SMO. You may
recall that resource mobilization theory suggests that an SMO’s ability to
effectively attain its goals is directly related to resources available
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Essentially, SMOs that utilize available
resources will achieve positive social movement outcomes. Successful goal
attainment, therefore, does not rest on the aggrieved populations as much as
on the resources available to that population (Jenkins and Perrow 1977).
Generally speaking, social movement researchers have addressed
outcomes as a much more complex issue than simply as goal attainment. In
a study of fifteen homeless SMOs in eight U.S. cities, Cress and Snow
(2000) tracked SMO-related outcomes and found that the presence of
diagnostic and prognostic frames are a vibrant indicator of movement
outcomes that identify the presence of one or both in five out of the six
pathways to successful outcomes. Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) also
suggest that an important addition to collective action frames on successful
outcomes is the role of a viable SMO, or the combination of organizational
survival, frequency of meetings, and campaigns. In another study of social
movement outcomes, Halebsky (2006) found successful outcomes to be
positively associated with evidence of widespread opposition, broadly
framed threats to the community, positive coverage of the SMO by the
media, lack of countermovement forces, and missteps by the movement
antagonist.
We will discuss a number of important factors that influence the success
or failure of a social movement. These factors play a crucial role in
effecting the longevity of a social movement, the rise and sustained peak of
action, the decline or eventual demise of a social movement, and so on. We
will discuss these factors such as the makeup of internal SMO
characteristics, the employment of strategies and tactics, and the makeup of
the social and political context. For examples of successful local
movements, see Text Box 8.2.
TEXT BOX 8.2

Why Social Movements Matter
One of the most difficult tasks for social movement theorists is
identifying how social movements actually make a difference and how
they create social change. In general, there are three areas of agreement
about how social movements make a difference. Social movements can
influence political, cultural, and social changes. Political changes include
gaining (a) acceptance (i.e. recognition by formal political bodies,
representation in decision-making processes) and/or (b) new advantages
(i.e. ability to set/influence political agenda, influence public policy, or
influence long-term systemic change [Gamson 1975, 1990]). Cultural
changes include influencing (a) attitudes, opinions, and values of the
general public; (b) systems of knowledge or traditions (Earl 2000, 2004);
or (c) the emergence of collective identities (Polletta and Jasper 2001).
Finally, social changes include influencing (a) an individual social
movement participant (i.e. shaping their life path, occupation, political
involvement) or the life course patterns of large blocks of people (e.g.
influence of the 1960s on the life chances and life goals of the Baby
Boomers [Giugni 2004]) and (b) changes in social networks and the flow
of social capital (Diani 1997).
To demonstrate how social movements matter, let us examine the
case of three localized “smart growth” movements. First, in 2003 in
Ames, Iowa, a group of local citizens upset with a proposal for a new
mall formed an SMO called the Ames Smart Growth Alliance (ASGA).
The group led the charge against the proposed development and
promoted planned growth that balanced economic, social, and
environmental concerns. In 2005, in Brunswick, New York, after the
local newspaper ran an article about a proposal for a new Wal-Mart
Superstore and after learning about the proposal of four large residential
developments, seventeen people formed Brunswick Smart Growth
(BSG). BSG became the lead organization against the various proposals
by voicing concern over the adverse effect these developments would
have on the “town’s rural character.” Finally, in 2001 in Centreville,
Maryland, a local developer proposed the development of thirty
condominiums on land at the headwaters of the Corsica River referred to
as the “Wharf” property. Approximately sixty local area residents came
together to speak out against the proposal and formed the Citizens for
Greater Centreville (CGC).
One thing these three local social movements had in common was
that, in some way or another, they all “mattered.” For example, all three
social movements experienced some sort of political success. The
combination of the three cases suggests that a strong and vibrant SMO
with a clear identification of the problem and possible solution is
important for political success. In addition, the sociopolitical
environment must be favorable toward the movement; that is, there must
be (1) a period of crisis such as the experience of rapid development or
environmental degradation; (2) open POSs such as responsive public
officials, favorable state laws, nonpartisan elections, sympathetic elites,
and instability in local leadership alignments; and (3) public opinion
must be either supportive or at least ambiguous toward the issue. In the
case of CGC, the group’s message was simply “Don’t Develop the
Wharf.” The group argued to turn the property into a public space for all
citizens to use to enjoy the waterfront. CGC was well organized with
committed leadership and a clear division of labor and was able to raise a
substantial amount of money. In addition, CGC had very favorable
POSs. First, Maryland state laws are restrictive of development along the
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. Second, the town had just recently
dealt with rapid residential development that nearly doubled the city
population. The influx of people due to this new development strained
the city’s sewer treatment plant resulting in the dumping of raw sewage
into the Corsica River—the discovery of which led to regional and
national media attention, criminal investigation, and state and federal
sanctions. Finally, CGC had a number of sympathetic individuals on the
local town council as well as the town’s planning commission. The
combination of decisions by social movement adherents and the external
environmental factors afforded CGC and its members the opportunity to
influence public policy and sway the city’s planning agenda, gain
important representation in decision-making bodies, and most
importantly, stop the proposed development and force the county to buy
the land to develop as a public park.
Second, as noted before, social movements can influence cultural
changes. Typically, this refers to changes in attitudes, values, and
opinions; the emergence of new collective identities; or changes to
tradition or knowledge. Here, we will only explore collective identity. Of
the three social movements, only BSG displayed a unique and cohesive
collective identity. The members of BSG and supporters of the
movement had developed a distinct smart growth identity by
emphasizing activism and political involvement. This identity was
embraced by movement supporters and was demonized by movement
antagonists. Cultural outcomes related to collective identity appeared to
be the result of lack of POSs, highly organized SMO, and a clear
message. From the very beginning, BSG pushed vigorously for major
reform and to overhaul the town’s comprehensive plan in hope of
emphasizing “appropriate” and “affordable” growth options for the town.
Movement supporters were met with stiff opposition at nearly every turn.
First, none of the town board members were sympathetic toward the
goals of the movement; in fact, most were outright hostile. Also, BSG
maintained a devoted group of core activists, regular meetings, a clear
division of labor, and organized campaign efforts. And, from the outset,
BSG was fighting the proposed developments on the grounds that the
cumulative effects of the projects threatened the town’s “rural character”
and the only plausible and equitable solution was to reform the town’s
comprehensive plan policy. The group’s clear goals and committed
members helped attract participants, and the adversarial political
environment posed many unique and difficult challenges for BSG. The
combination of these factors provided a situation where group members
found support and pride in their efforts and threat and confrontation
within the town political structure culminated in a strong sense of
collective identity.
Finally, regarding social changes, ASGA was very successful. Here,
we will focus solely on changes in social capital, that is, the ability to
develop and foster new partnerships based on trust and open
communication with local leaders and organizations. In the case of
ASGA, the group became an important “go to” organization for
questions about growth and development within the local community
and was actively sought out by other nonprofit and activist groups for
input and guidance on local issues. Equally as important, a number of the
movement’s leaders were appointed or asked to take up other leadership
positions in the local community. ASGA’s success can be attributed to a
combination of factors including viability of the organization, high levels
of sustained participation by movement supporters, and regular coverage
by the local media. Like BSG, ASGA was a fairly active organization
with a clear division of labor, regular group activity, and a committed
core of individuals. The broader movement was also able to quickly and
effectively mobilize supporters for protests, letter-writing campaigns,
city council meetings, and so on. Last, but not least, ASGA was regularly
in the local newspaper—this included scores of letters to the editors,
guest editorials, and quotes from and about the organization. This is
noteworthy because the concerns of the ASGA and movement leaders
were regularly included in the pages of the local newspaper. This
coverage by the media helped legitimize the group and its concerns.
SMO CHARACTERISTICS AND RESOURCES

Resource mobilization theory surfaced in an attempt to remove a
problematic feature of strain theories: deciphering whether grievances
caused by strain were in fact objective reality or perceived threats.
Stripping away much of this ambiguity, resource mobilization theory
suggests that an SMO’s ability to mobilize and influence measurable
outcomes is connected to and shaped by the resources available to the
SMO. In other words, effective SMOs can attain goals through attracting
and maintaining adequate resources such as time, money, and movement
adherents (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978).
McCarthy (1987) found that two diametrically opposed social movements,
pro-life and pro-choice, both relied heavily on valuable resources to launch
successful mobilization efforts. However, the resources they tapped into
were very different. Pro-choice organizations relied heavily on financial
capital collected by a vast number of supporters, whereas pro-life
organizations received little financial contributions, but had a broad and
strongly committed volunteer base.
STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

McAdam (1983) suggests that with the introduction of new tactics comes a
heightened level of mobilization followed by increases in movement
success. Gamson (1990) also found that disruptive tactics, such as violence,
are positively associated with successful movement outcomes. For
example, the role of women’s groups between 1890 and 1920 in
transforming the educational lobbying system was due in large part to the
use of innovative tactics. Because women were barred from voting, these
women’s rights groups were forced to identify different means of creating a
new system that replaced “voting as the central act” with “the rise of a
political regime in which groups claiming to represent categories of persons
presented specific demands to legislatures, using the leverage of public
opinion, lobbyists, and expertise rather than sheer numbers of votes”
(Clemens 1993: 791). More recent discussions on the role of tactics on
movement outcomes have added the dimension of resourcefulness.
Discussed as strategic capacity, strategies increase chances of successful
outcomes with access to more resources, originality, and timeliness (Ganz
2000).
Even the most contrasting of social movements (e.g. the white
separatist movement versus the Civil Rights Movement) use and share a
common repertoire of tactics. The common use and copying of one another,
in a sense, help social movements live on. The Civil Rights Movement was
particularly innovative when it came to tactics and strategies, such as sit-ins
and freedom rides, that were used by aggrieved populations. This tactical
innovation (McAdam 1983) in part helped with the ultimate success of this
movement. The innovative use of resources made the Civil Rights
Movement so influential on other social movements throughout the latter
half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Similar to the preexistence of social organization, we assume that social
movements, even after they appear to have disappeared, still have the
potential to have some level of influence.
Social Media as a Tool for Mobilization: Occupy and

Black Lives Matter
Over the last decade, social movement activity has relied more and more on
online technologies and communication forums such as Facebook and
Twitter to rapidly disseminate information and mobilize social movement
participants. The need and want for activists to share information and to
quickly mobilize large groups of individuals is nothing new. In many ways,
it is the basis of how community organizes and how social movements
emerge and sustain. As captured by Wired journalist, Bijan Stephen:
In the 1960s, if you were a civil rights worker stationed in the Deep South and you
needed to get some urgent news out to the rest of the world … you would likely head
straight for a telephone … [You’d] dial the number for something call a Wide Area
Telephone Service, or WATS, line … On the other end of the line, another civil rights
worker would be ready to take down your report.. The terse, action-packed write-ups
would then be compiled into mimeographed “WATS reports” mailed out to
organization leaders, the media, the Justice Department, lawyers, and other friends of
the movement across the country. In other words, it took a lot of infrastructure to live-
tweet what was going on in the streets of the Jim Crow South.
(2015)
Today, the experience is fundamentally different. Social movement
participants have numerous technologies at their disposal to engage with
millions of people from around the global instantly. Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, and WhatsApp, among many others, can be used to share
information, receive feedback, coordinate activities, and pressure political
leaders in real time. Take, for example, the use of online technology by two
contemporary social movements—Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives
Matter—to demonstrate this point.
Occupy Wall Street’s use of online technology exemplifies “activism
during the age of the Internet and online social networking” (Vasi and Suh
2016: 139). Whereas early use of the Internet by social movement activists
focused primarily on informing through websites and email, the use of
social media platforms allows for real-time diffusion of information and
active organizing. In a study examining the effects of social media on the
spread of the occupy movement, Vasi and Suh (2016) show how Facebook
and Twitter helps predict occupy protests. The authors propose these online
technologies “precede and correlate with the emergence of protests,
presumably because they are both consequences of a third ‘unobservable’
variable: the presence of energized activists” (150). The use of online
technology eventually led social movement activity across the global and
encampments in nearly every major city in the United States.
In 2013, following the acquittal of the George Zimmerman, the person
who killed a young, black man named Trayvon Martin, a labor organizer
from Oakland posted the phrase Black Lives Matter on her Facebook page
(Stephen 2015). Black Lives Matter became the banner for community
activists from around the country to organize under—engaging in debate
and discussion on civil rights in the twenty-first century, strategizing on
tactical responses, shaping and challenging cultural narratives of racial
injustice, staging mass protests, creating a decentralized civil rights
movement, and living streaming examples of police brutality and use of
excessive force. Similarly to Occupy, Black Lives Matter groups and protest
activities emerged and spread swiftly and can be found in nearly every
major American city in the United States. The spread of these groups and
protest activities undoubtedly resulted in part from the use of online
technologies by activists.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

We will focus on the importance of the social and political context and how
this impacts social movement outcomes. For example, Amenta, Carruthers,
and Zylan (1992), in a study of movement outcomes and the role of political
context, found that, in sympathetic political environments, or environments
with both existing civic organizations that hold political capital and elites
whose interests align with movement concerns, successful SMO outcomes
are more likely to occur. However, when these elements are absent, either
the SMO does not succeed or more disruptive tactics are necessary to
mediate successful outcomes. Furthermore, political context is related to
structural changes that encourage protest, influence a favorable political
environment, and offer elite support (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Finally,
long-term social movement outcomes (e.g. number of black voters
registered, votes cast for black candidates in statewide elections, the number
of black candidates running for office in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
the number of black elected officials) are reactive to episodes of local
repression and are highly correlated with the strength of the local
infrastructure (Andrews 1997).
Social movement research has also explored the role of
countermovements in relation to mobilization and social movement
outcomes (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Countermovements are
networks of individuals and organizations that share many of the same objects of
concern as the social movements that they oppose … [but] … make competing claims
on the state of matters of policy and politics and vie for attention from the mass media
and broader public.
(1632)
Countermovements are likely to emerge when (1) the original social

movement shows signs of success, (2) elite interests are threatened by the
original social movement’s successes, and (3) the countermovement has
elite support in the political arena (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).
Interaction between movements and countermovements strongly influence
and shape the political environment, where “the opposing movements create
ongoing opportunities and obstacles for one another” (Meyer and
Staggenborg 1996: 1643). The relationship between movements and
countermovements is characterized by success of one side sparking the
other side and so on, effectively prolonging the conflict. However, without
successes, neither movements nor countermovements can sustain
mobilization and will decline (1647). We will now briefly examine the
likelihood of success of violent tactics in social movements.
SUCCESS AND VIOLENT TACTICS

First of all, it is important to recognize that success of movements in
general is typically very difficult to define and measure. Some movements
are really involved in bringing about social change, whereas others may
achieve only symbolic victories, such as having a piece of legislation passed
that is not enforced (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995: 283). Six
types of policy responsiveness have been identified, including:
1. government access—whether movement supporters testify in
congressional hearings;
2. agenda—whether a bill is considered by the legislature;
3. policy—whether the desired legislation is passed;
4. 4. output—whether the legislation is actually enforced;
5. impact—whether the legislation does what it is intended to do;
6. structural—whether the system is changed so that the movement has
more influence (284).
Determining the success of a movement is difficult in part because it
assumes that social movements are homogeneous phenomena when, in
reality, there may be disagreements within a movement regarding its goals,
and so on. Movement participants as well as observers and scholars
studying movements may disagree about the success of an individual
movement. With this in mind, we will look briefly at the literature on
violence in social movements.
Tilly’s (1978) resource mobilization approach maintains that movement
participants select their methods on the basis of what resources are available
at a particular time; collective violence should be viewed as a normal
activity in a struggle for power. In his work on group violence, Gurr (1989:
13) pointed out that violence is often an effective tactic in gaining
recognition and concessions, particularly if it is the result of a prolonged
social movement. Gamson’s (1975: 81) analysis of fifty-three challenging
groups supports this finding, although Gamson cautions that the relationship
between violence and successful outcomes is not simple. Violence needs to
be studied as an instrumental activity designed to advance the goals of the
movement group. Participants use violence because they believe it will
promote their cause. Giugni (1999) points out that other authors using
Gamson’s data but employing more sophisticated techniques have basically
supported Gamson’s findings.
Piven and Cloward (1977) studied four lower-class protest movements
during the mid-twentieth century and believed that violence or disruptive
activity was effective. They argue, “It is not formal organizations but mass
defiance that won what was won in the 1930s and 1960s” (xv). They
recommend strategies that escalate the momentum and impact of disruptive
politics (37). Instead, what tends to happen is that the leaders of the
disruptive movement try to create formal organizations and ask for
resources from the elites. Elites sometimes offer resources and encourage
the movement organizations that have emerged to “air grievances before
formal bodies of the state” (xxi). These are symbolic gestures rather than
means to provide a meaningful change. Insurgents “leave the streets” (xxi)
and many of the organizations fade away. Piven and Cloward conclude that
As for the few organizations which survive, it is because they become more useful to
those who control the resources on which they depend than to the lower-class groups
which the organizations claim to represent. Organizations endure, in short, by
abandoning their oppositional politics.
(xxi)
Various authors have found that disruptive tactics or the use of force
helps a movement accomplish its goals (Guigni 1999: xvii). Still other
authors challenge the success of violent tactics, especially in the area of
strike activity, where evidence suggests that labor violence and violent
strikes may be less successful than peaceful ones (Burstein, Einwohner, and
Hollander 1995; Giugni 1999: xvii). Giugni (1999: xviii–xxi) suggests that
the success of violence and disruptive tactics likely depends on the
circumstances under which they are adopted. As discussed previously, such
factors as the availability of political opportunities, the institutional
characteristics of the political system (e.g. representative democracy,
authoritarian leader), the tendency of rulers to repress protest activity, the
ability of the movement to develop innovative and disruptive tactics, and
the cultural climate may be key in determining whether violence is
acceptable. As noted earlier, movements are often not homogeneous entities
and may exhibit little agreement about what goals are most significant and
what constitutes success. While movements are rational efforts to bring
about change, their actual effects, whether positive or negative, also may
not have been what the movement participants wanted (unintended
consequences).
Repression: The State’s Reaction to Movements

One of the areas that clearly links social movements with the nation-state is
repression. (For a detailed discussion of the state, see Chapter 2.) Earl
(2006) suggests that until the last decade or so, research on repression
lagged behind that of many other topics of social movement studies. She
argues that what motivates research on repression has been a desire to
understand how nonmovement actors influence the form and level of
protest. The study of repression has focused on violent coercive state-based
acts rather than on the actions of private actors (e.g. a countermovement), or
acts that are less violent, such as channeling, “where carrots and sticks are
used to encourage or discourage certain types of actions on the part of
protesters” (130). Channeling includes things such as cutting off funding to
SMOs or making it difficult to obtain a permit to hold a protest. Earl further
argues that repression should be more appropriately labeled protest control.
Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 214) define repression as “action by authorities
that increases the cost—actual or potential—of an actor’s claim making.”
Davenport (2000: 5–7) points out that many people use the term repression
in various ways, and notes three different types. The first and the most
common use fits the negative sanctions tradition, which generally refers to
nonviolent behavior that involves limiting civil and political rights such as
censorship, propaganda campaigns, imposition of martial law, and mass
imprisonments. The second tradition involves violations of human rights,
including murder, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and forced
disappearance. The third area is state terror, which includes force/violence
or the threat of it to obtain compliance because of fear. (See Chapter 9 for a
discussion of terrorism.) Political sociologists, including social movement
scholars, are becoming more and more interested in the topic of repression,
in part because states have been recognized as “the number-one killers of
their own citizens, and they also significantly influence the decision of their
citizens to engage in contentious behavior against states” (3).
Social movements can be perceived by the state or its authorities as
threatening. A variety of conditions determine the perceived level of threat.
For example, if the objectives of the movement threaten the actual structure
of the state as opposed to the allotment of some resources (more benefits),
the more likely the state feels threatened and will use repression. If there are
unexpected events, the introduction of new strategies, or unexpectedly high
levels of involvement among protesters, the greater the perceived threat
(Davenport 2000: 3–5).
If the political leaders of a state are able to maintain control of the
military and the police, then the government can likely suppress any social
movement if it is willing to apply that much force. Put another way, there is
generally a major imbalance in power between the state and the movement.
Public opinion and possible disagreements among the elite may influence
the extent of repression. While repression can certainly weaken protest, it is
possible that it may backfire and anger and outrage participants and
observers, so that the protest is accelerated (Goodwin and Jasper 2003:
268). Studies show that when facing repression, dissidents have run away,
fought harder, or simply done nothing. Dissent increases the likelihood of
state coercion (Davenport 2000: vii–viii). As Davenport (2005) points out,
mobilization and repression have very broad-ranging implications on
citizens’ lives.
GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL

MOVEMENTS
We are now becoming more and more aware of the idea of global
interdependence and that “social action in a given time and place is
increasingly conditioned by social actions in very distant places” (della Porta
and Kriesi 1999: 3). Globalization has resulted in cross-national similarities
in protest mobilization. There is diffusion, or spreading, of direct
interpersonal and interorganizational ties among movements and participants
and a diffusion of information about movements from the mass media. For
example, the anti-apartheid movement outside of South Africa called for a
boycott of South African products, and this mobilization influenced the
political relationships between South Africa and various Western nations.
Police and demonstrators are in a melee near the Conrad Hilton Hotel on
Chicago’s Michigan Avenue on August 28, 1968, during the Democratic
National Convention. Student protests at the Democratic National
Convention resulted in the arrests of many demonstrators
Source: Bettmann/CORBIS
Wallerstein (2004: 91) invented the term antisystemic movements to

bring together the two concepts of social movements and national
movements. Both these types of movements have been formed because of
the development of the capitalist world system and the evils of capitalism.
They resist the existing modern world system and include the possibility of
overthrowing the system. Two major antisystemic movements have
fundamentally changed politics and society. The first was the world protest
of 1848 supported initially by urban workers in France that spread to
rebellions in another ten nations (Robbins 2008; Wallerstein 2004). The
second major transnational movement was that of 1968 and was
characterized in the United States by the student protests over the Vietnam
War, university demonstrations including the killing of students at Kent State
and Jackson State by the National Guard, and the protests at the Democratic
National Convention in Chicago, where demonstrators were beaten and
arrested by police. Elsewhere uprisings occurred, even in places as diverse as
France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Japan, and Mexico (Robbins 2008).
According to Wallerstein (2004: 87), the attack on the World Trade
Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC on September 11,
2001, signaled a turning point in political alignments as well as illustrated by
world political chaos. Those on the right supported the American display of
military strength and attempted to undo some of the changes in the areas of
race and sexuality that were associated with the world movement of 1968.
For Wallerstein, the system is in crisis with many acts of violence and yet it
also functions in its customary pattern. He maintains that, across the world,
people “are more aware, more willing to struggle for their rights, more
skeptical about the rhetoric of the powerful” (Wallerstein 2004: 89). The
growth of transnational movements has been due, at least in part, to the
increase in problems that transcend national borders including large-scale
pollution and transnational migration (Rucht 1999).
Rucht (1999) identifies several key problems that transnational
movements may face. In spite of the fact that modern communications
technology makes it easier for movement participants to contact each other
and share knowledge, it may be increasingly difficult to achieve coordination
and agreement of these groups and “if too many concerns and actors
compete with each other the audience becomes highly selective, or even
bored” (217). As these organizations become more institutionalized and
professionalized, they may become more bureaucratized and more interested
in maintaining the organization rather than making major transnational
changes. In other contexts, the movement organizations may overestimate
how successful they can be and ultimately disappoint themselves and their
sympathizers. There is a clear need for more research to determine the
impact of various transnational movements on the world.
CONCLUSION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS PART

OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
McAdam (2001) believes that the way sociologists study politics has
reinforced the distinction between contentious politics (e.g. social
movements, revolutions, and peasant rebellions) and the more routine forms
of institutionalized politics (e.g. voting, party politics, lobbying) in part
because most scholars concentrate their work on only one of these two areas.
He finds this both “unfortunate and analytically untenable” (230) because it
downplays the links between the two:
For it tends to obscure the dynamic and reciprocal relationships that almost always
characterizes the link between routine political processes and episodes of contention.
The point is, the latter always occur in an institutionalized political context and typically
are set in motion by more routine, political processes. In turn, these episodes have the
potential to reshape the formal systems of politics in which they are embedded.
(230)
In reality, social movement scholars have concentrated on studying

insurgents, and mainstream political sociologists have concentrated on the
state. We agree with McAdam that political sociologists need to explore the
relationships between the two topics in order to integrate social movements
with studies of the state.
In their article, “Challengers and States: Toward a Political Sociology of
Social Movements,” Amenta et al. (2002: 47) also find the disconnect
between the mainstream political sociologists studying the state, voting, and
so on, and the typical social movement theorist who “rarely relies on
political sociological insights into states.” Put another way, much of the
social movements’ literature focuses on political opportunity rather than
considering the state. Drawing on McAdam, Amenta et al. consider various
dimensions of political opportunity that influence movements such as how
open or closed the institutionalized political system is, the stability of elite
alignments, the presence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and
propensity for repression. For example, states that are not democratic, have
divisions among elites, and experience a decline in their repressive capacity
could well encourage revolutionary movements.
While states and the political opportunities associated with states
influence social movements, social movements also influence states. The
challenging movement may gain increased influence over the political
process, such as winning the right to vote for minorities, women, or the
disenfranchised poor. The challenger can obtain numerous benefits that could
range “from greater respect through official governmental representations to
having the group represented by the challenger recognized in state policies”
(Amenta et al. 2002: 74). Labor struggled for the rights to form unions and
bargain collectively. At another level, activists pushed the U.S. Census
Bureau to allow for more than one category on racial-background questions.
In general, Amenta et al. argue that researchers in this area need to focus
more on movements as challengers trying to gain collective goods through
states.
Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn (2003: 213–214) point out that since the
1960s, protest can be seen as an important addition to democratic politics
and an important influence in the transition from authoritarian to democratic
nation-states. The study of social movements has significant ties to political
sociology as well as cultural sociology, social psychology, and organizational
sociology. Those who study social movements view it as “politics by other
means” and recognize that noninstitutional and institutional politics are
intertwined and interdependent.
In Chapter 1, we drew on Coser’s definition of political sociology as
centered around the two key concepts of power and conflict. We also
discussed how the state is the legitimate source of power and how at times it
is willing to use coercion with or without force to control protest. It was also
suggested that political sociologists should examine the role of rule breakers
more thoroughly. These emphases on coercion, dominance, protest, conflict,
and rule-breaking help link social movements and more broadly contentious
politics to the state, and thus, to political sociology. In addition, if, as Weber
(1946: 78) argues, politics “means striving to share power or striving to
influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups
within a state,” then social movements and their organizations clearly should
be an integral part of what political sociologists study.
As Jenkins and Form (2005: 322) suggest “bringing social movements
into the core of political sociology promotes a better understanding of the
processes that generate change.” We argue that the subarea of social
movements is a key component of political sociology itself, just like
elections, political culture, political socialization, and so on. Politics involves
the study of power, and social movements attempt to gain power and to
influence the state, sometimes using protest and violence as mechanisms of
influence just as voters go to the polling places and deposit ballots in ballot
boxes.
Endnotes
1. Brandon Hofstedt is Associate Professor of Sustainable Community
Development and Faculty Director of the Center for Rural
Communities at Northland College.
2. Note this is what we refer to as collective action frames, specifically
motivational frames.
3. See earlier description for a more thorough discussion of collective
action frames.
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CHAPTER
9
Violence and Terrorism
The study of political violence falls within the sphere of political sociology
yet the study of war (Turner 2007), terrorism, and other political violence
“remains compartmentalized and incomplete” (Hooks and Rice 2005: 567),
despite ongoing global bloodshed. Specific to war making, Wimmer (2014)
somewhat disagrees arguing that while the sociological contribution to
studying war has been less influential than counterparts in political science
and international relations, and that this subfield is less integrated, he also
argues that there is an emerging sociological analysis of war that has been
growing over the past twenty years. In the case of genocide, Luft argues that
the inattention of scholars is confusing because research on “collective action
and social movements began in response to what was arguably the worst
genocide of the 20th century: the Holocaust” (2015a: 897). More than twenty-
five years ago, scholars argue that this blind spot regarding war is due to
classical social thought obscuring war (Hooks and McLauchlan 1992b) and a
failure to integrate war into social science theory (Hooks and McLauchlan
1992a) rather than a failure of researchers to investigate. In contrast,
Wimmer argues that continued criticism of sociology for failing to contribute
to scholarship on war “is increasingly unjustified” (2014: 175). In the case of
terrorism and other violence, the failure results from focusing on the
domestic rather than the international arena in which nation-states operate
(Hooks and Rice 2005). Exclusively focusing on “the state” as the unit of
analysis potentially inhibits sociologists from contributing to the discussion
and possible resolution of some of the most important issues of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries including human rights abuses, genocide, and
military atrocities (Hooks and Rice 2005) as well as the role of warfare in
bringing about globalization (Black 1998). Notable exceptions to this
domestic bias are globalization scholars and World Systems (WS) theorists.
Scott (2004) disagrees somewhat with Hooks and McLauchlan (1992b),
and calls the sociological neglect of war paradoxical given the degree of war
making over the twentieth century and the importance of war in early
sociological thought, including Marx’s ideas regarding the importance of war
for accumulating capital and Weber’s definition of state that emphasizes a
monopoly over the use of violence. Contemporary sociologists have not
contributed to these discussions at the same level as political scientists and
international relations specialists (Senechal de la Roche 2004; Tiryakian
2005; Wimmer 2014), yet an essential requisite for the continuing relevance
of political sociology is coming to terms with the importance of war making
and militarism (Hooks and Rice 2005). In this chapter, we provide an
overview of some of the most important insights offered by political
sociologists and other social scientists on political violence including
genocide, war, and terrorism.
POLITICAL USES OF HATE

Hatred of other groups serves a myriad of political purposes, including
consolidating power, claims-making, deflecting blame, and justifying a
leader’s self-interest (Levin and Rabrenovic 2004). Power is consolidated
when leaders eliminate political rivals from either their inner circle or a
challenger group. Sometimes nationalistic groups use cultural ideas of
superiority to rally members of an ethnic group behind them to claim
territories (e.g. Hitler’s 1938 annexation of the Sudetenland). Finger-
pointing by leaders to deflect attention away from the causes of economic or
political turmoil is also a common political strategy as illustrated by Hitler’s
successful scapegoating of Jews. Finally, some leaders use hate to appear
more politically relevant. The treatment of minority groups varies and can
include repression, oppression, ethnic cleansing, or genocide.
GENOCIDE
Over 1 million Armenians, 6 million Jews, 1 million Tutsis and moderate
Hutus, 10,000 ethnic Albanians, almost 2 million Cambodians, and millions
and millions under Stalin were just some of the victims of genocide from the
twentieth century (Jones 2006). We began the twenty-first century with the
ongoing violence in the Darfur region of Sudan, which has claimed the lives
of over half a million people (World without Genocide 2018). Despite the
recognition of South Sudan in 2011 as a separate nation from Sudan, the
killing and violence continues with over four million displaced from their
homes and government forces committing atrocities including sexual
violence against its citizens (Cumming-Bruce 2018). Genocide is a form of
political violence, but social scientists have not been able to agree on a
definition (Owens, Su, and Snow 2013) including whether or not the state or
other authority must direct the killing (see Campbell 2009, who argues that
genocides can occur without government or state involvement). Horowitz
argues that genocide is directed by the state against its own citizens and is a
type of state terrorism as it “must be conducted with the approval of, if not
direct intervention by, the state apparatus” (2002: 14). State terrorism is a
broader topic and will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Defining Genocide
Luft (2015a) argues that genocide is a form of “contentious politics,” but
what sets genocide apart from other forms such as protest, revolution, and
terrorism? Campbell defines genocide as “organized and unilateral mass
killing on the basis of ethnicity” (2009: 150). Owens et al. define genocide
as “sustained killing of massive numbers of one or more noncombatant
groups” (2013: 71) and argues that other elements must be present to label
mass killings genocide including (1) considering other acts that bring about
“physical destruction” including starvation and violence, (2) victimization
must be due to actions taken by perpetrators, and (3) victims are targeted
because of their group membership (e.g. ethnicity) as labeled by
perpetrators. Owens and his co-authors are attempting to analytically
distinguish genocide from other mass killings that occur in warfare. The
United Nations (UN) defines genocide as “acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” and
includes murder, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately
inflicting conditions that bring about physical destruction, imposing birth
prevention measures, and forcefully transferring children from one group to
another (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention 2018). Some
sociologists believe the definition of group should be expanded to include
social class (Horowitz 2002). According to Jones (2006), meeting the UN
criteria to label political violence genocide does not require killing every
member of a targeted group nor to kill anyone at all (Jones 2006). The UN
definition does require establishing both intent and one of the five physical
acts listed above (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention 2018).
Imposing birth control measures and sexual violence to discourage
reproduction accentuates the vulnerability of women in these types of
conflicts (Turner 2007). The UN definition is a legal rather than analytical
definition and is used to determine whether or not a crime has been
committed under international law.
The UN definition is criticized for excluding cultural destruction and
forced population transfer (see United Nations Office of Genocide
Prevention and Responsibility to Protect:
www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html). Defenders of the UN
definition argue that another term, such as “ethnocide,” could be substituted
for the suppression of language, religion, or culture, and narrow definitions
providing conceptual clarity are needed for research and theory
development. On the other hand, it can be argued that the impact of
genocide is much greater than the loss of life. In “I am Not a Witness,”
Native American poet Deborah Miranda (1999: 73) discusses the
eradication of her ancestors from Southern California. Lines such as “I
found photographs of bedrock slabs pocked by hundreds of acorn grinding
holes, but the holes are empty, the stone pestles that would curve to my grip
lie dead behind museum glass” and “Some of our bones rest in 4000 graves
out back behind the mission” reveal both the cultural and human loss caused
by genocide.
Skulls from a Mass Grave of Khmer Rouge Victims in a Glass Memorial
Tower at Cheoung EK (“Killing Fields”) Outside Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Credit: Photo by Alyssa Levy
Ethnic cleansing is a related but distinct term that has been used to
describe events in Darfur, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Jones 2006).
Ethnic cleansing is a strategy that includes killing males of fighting age,
expelling women, children, and older men into a neighboring territory, and
instilling hate and fear to ensure that the area remains free of members from
the targeted group. Ethnic cleansing is but one of many genocidal strategies.
There are political ramifications in using the genocide label. In 2007, the
Turkish government recalled its ambassador from Washington to protest a
nonbinding resolution passed by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Foreign
Relations panel that declared the killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks
(1915–1917) or the Meds Yeghern as genocide. Passing the resolution was
risky because 70 percent of air cargo supporting U.S. troops during the Iraq
War went through Turkey (“Turkey’s Ambassador in U.S. Ordered Home”
2007). Because of American dependence on Turkey as a key ally, as of this
writing, no sitting U.S. President has ever referred to the Meds Yeghern as
genocide (Bierman 2017; Samuels 2018). The United States is still
dependent on Turkey as an ally in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) (Arango 2015).
Conditions for Genocide

In the film, Hotel Rwanda, Hutu extremist groups refer to the Tutsis as
cockroaches. Leaders may dehumanize a group to deflect blame for societal
problems. Dehumanization is part of an organized campaign that paints the
targeted group as subhuman or evil. Dehumanization is less necessary when
targets are not members of perpetrator society as outsiders are often viewed
as inferior.
Sociological Causes of Genocide

Modernity, ethnic conflict, the aftereffects of colonialism, cultural and
relational distance, group interdependence, and the disruption of economic
and political systems that previously unified a society, albeit superficially,
are just some of the potential causes of genocide currently being examined.
Although genocide researchers do not equally embrace all of these ideas,
they provide a starting point for investigating the societal context of
genocide. What is problematic is applying these ideas to a variety of social
and historical contexts.
MODERNITY
Zygmunt Bauman (2000) contends that four features of modernity:
nationalism, scientific racism, technology, and bureaucratic rationalization
are requisites of genocide. Nationalism is a complex concept and is broader
than ideology although this is also a component. It is “a discursive and
cognitive frame through which people understand the world, navigate social
interactions, engage in coordinated activity, and make political claims”
(Bonikowski 2016: 430). Nationalism manifests itself through behavior,
speech, and discourse that “take(s) for granted the nation’s cultural and
political primacy” (2016: 431). As an ideology, nationalism is “an
ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity,
and identity of a nation” (Smith 1991: 74). Nationalism can be expressed in
activities as diverse as genocide in Kosovo or “silence of an American
audience” when the Star Spangled Banner is played (Schnee 2001: 1). As
noted in Chapter 2, nationalism is not inherently negative and can be a
means of resisting globalization (Jones 2006; Schnee 2001) by providing
societies with a sense of national identity and unifying symbols
(Bonikowski 2016). However, when national ideology is based on
perceptions of group superiority, it can result in genocide and other forms
of state violence.
Scientific racism is the overlay of an empirical cloak to justify old
prejudices and antagonism. The “other” is seen as a virus or pathology that
must be quarantined from the superior group and then removed like a
diseased body organ. Scientific racism differs from “old racism” in that the
justification for prejudice and discrimination is based on the so-called
scientific evidence such as that used by the early twentieth-century eugenics
movement. Deadly Medicine, published by the Holocaust Memorial
Museum, is a history of the use of medicine, genetics, anthropology, and
other social science disciplines to justify anti-Semitism and genocide. The
use of scientific racism is alive and well with white supremacy groups using
Herrnstein and Murray’s book The Bell Curve and other scholarship to
justify discrimination.
Bauman’s (2000) analysis of the Holocaust contends that modern
technology, including efficient transportation and execution equipment, was
a product of industrialization and increasing bureaucracy that transformed
the state into an efficient killer. A key characteristic of bureaucracy is both
specialization and fragmentation of tasks. This affords those doing the
killing a degree of psychological distance. “One did not commit murder per
se. Rather, one operated a railroad switch, or dropped a few cyanide pellets
into a shaft” (Jones 2006: 290). Jones notes two criticisms of Bauman’s
modernity theory: (1) there is no real substantive distinction between
modern genocide that occurred during the Holocaust and premodern forms
such as Genghis Khan’s invading Mongrel forces and (2) the Rwanda
genocide. In Rwanda, Hutus managed to kill over one million people in
twelve weeks using guns and machetes without the benefit of a centralized
bureaucracy to organize the killings or modern technology. Unlike
organized bureaucratic killings, these were not impersonal, as murders were
public and face to face (Jones 2006). Jones’ criticism is this: if Bauman’s
point is that it is much easier to kill in a bureaucracy where individuals can
perceive themselves as a mere “cog in the machine” and ultimately not
responsible, how then could the Hutus kill much more quickly and
intimately than the Nazis? In the Holocaust, the state orchestrated and
controlled the killing. In the case of Rwanda, one did not need to wait for
the bureaucratic memo. It was more of a free-for-all, where any Hutu could
grab a machete and kill using ethnic divisions as justification. Scott (2004)
contends that social instability combined with weak state power results in
ethnic wars that lead to genocide.
Recent research is attempting to understand how genocide occurs in
different contexts. Luft (2015a) argues for considering three key concepts:
framing, diffusion, and networks. Briefly, framing matters because for
genocide to occur, perpetrators must align diagnostic (problem) and
prognostic (solution) frames that scapegoat a particular group with mass
killings seen as a necessary action. Framing alone, though, cannot account
for the decision to perpetrate mass killing. Luft argues that diffusion is
necessary “to spread action repertoires [mass killing] throughout a
population” (2015a: 902). Citing other research, she argues that “the
diffusion of punishment for non-participation in genocide powerfully
influences individual civilians’ decision to subsequently join in the killing”
(2015a: 902). In other words, seeing someone being punished or killed for
not perpetrating genocide may cause others to overcome their initial
resistance to participation. She also cites the role of the media in
influencing genocide. Finally, social networks also matter. In writing about
the Rwandan genocide, she argues “social ties were important for pulling
people away from violence and for pulling people into it” (2015a: 903), but
that social ties were “mediated by the immediate context” (Luft 2015b: 159,
author’s emphasis), meaning that relationships matter, but other factors also
influenced whether someone joined or resisted killing. For example, one
perpetrator who had committed other killings not only let a Tutsi boy he
knew from the neighborhood go free, he pointed out an escape route. Had
the perpetrator not been alone but with others, the boy may have met a
different fate (Luft 2015b).
GEOMETRY OF GENOCIDE
Using Senechal de la Roche’s theory of collective violence and Black’s
“pure sociology” approach, Campbell (2009) argues that genocide can be
understood by considering the following factors: immobility, cultural
distance, relational distance, functional independence, and inequality.
Relying on Black, Campbell argues first that parties at risk for genocide
(victims and perpetrators) share social space and that immobility increases
the likelihood of genocide. In other words, genocide victims had fewer
options to leave and population transfer or deportation is not seen as a
practical option. For Jews living in Germany in the 1930s, “it was not
possible for Hitler to expel the millions of Jews living in Germany and its
occupied territories” (Jonassohn and Chalk 1987: 17 as cited by Campbell
2009: 160). A second factor is cultural distance and ethnic distinction. Not
speaking the same language and practicing different religions are examples
of cultural distance. Both more distance and the ease of ethnic identification
increase the probability of genocide. Relational distance or the nature and
frequency of relationships is also related with persons who interact less and
have lived in proximity for a shorter period of time at greater risk. A related
variable is functional interdependence. Groups that do not have to depend
on each other for livelihood or survival are more at risk for genocide should
a conflict occur. Finally, inequality is also related with genocide being less
likely to occur when ethnic groups have comparable resources and are of
similar size. When groups are unequal and ethnic conflict occurs, the group
with less resources is more likely to be victimized.
ETHNIC CONFLICT
Not all ethnic conflict results in genocide, but can lead to other forms of
political violence. James McKay (1982) describes a mobilization
perspective that views ethnic conflict as arising from a deliberate effort to
mobilize individuals around ethnic markers such as customs, language,
common history, origins, and other shared symbols. Individuals in all
societies practice what is called “ethnic work” (Henslin 2017), which can
be as innocuous as German-Americans celebrating Oktoberfest or Mexican-
Americans participating in Cinco de Mayo celebrations. When ethnic
symbols are mobilized for political or economic advantage, this can lead to
ethnic nationalism that, in its extreme form, can result in genocide. Ethnic
nationalism is not always negative (Kourvetaris 1997) as movements for
autonomy and civil rights can be a positive force when led by those
advocating for peace. A strong and autonomous state can reduce ethnic
nationalism, but states that are not neutral can worsen the situation by
enacting policies that lead to more tension and violence (Haque 2003). For
more information on international organizations that respond to genocide,
see Text Box 9.1.
TEXT BOX 9.1
Get Involved
The Genocide Intervention Network (www.genocideintervention.net)
was started by a group of students at Swarthmore College in 2004 in
response to the genocide occurring in the Darfur region. In 2010, the
Save Darfur Coalition and the Genocide Intervention Network merged to
create United to End Genocide (http://endgenocide.org). The student arm
of this organization, Students Taking Action Now: Dafur or STAND
(www.standnow.org), was started by Georgetown University students in
2004 and became an independent organization in 2013. Currently,
STAND has expanded its focus beyond Dafur to include other areas
affected by Genocide including Burma, the Central African Republic,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Syria. Chapters are located on
both high school and college campuses. World Without Genocide
(http://worldwithoutgenocide.org) is another organization that combines
education with advocacy and also establishes campus chapters. Check if
your school has a chapter of one of these organizations or consider
creating one.
Amnesty International (www.amnestyusa.org) has a broader focus on
human rights abuse that includes advocacy against genocide and state
terrorism as well as the use of the death penalty and the rights of sexual
minorities (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered) who are
routinely killed in some countries.
COLONIALISM
Imperial colonialism is where a core or developed state exploits a more
peripheral region through extracting raw materials and/or cheap labor or
subordinates an indigenous population and separates them from a ruling
power for an extended period of time. Imperialistic rule involves political,
economic, and cultural control. Though all types of colonialism have been
linked to genocide and other types of repression, internal colonialism is
considered to have the strongest tie (Jones 2006). Non-Arab Muslims in
Darfur, the Chinese in Tibet, and Russians in Chechnya are considered
either current or potential examples of genocide caused by imperial
colonialism (Jones 2006). Finally, genocide usually takes place within the
context of war leading some to contend that war is a necessary, but not
sufficient cause of genocide (Wimmer 2014).
WAR MAKING
Wimmer cites a common definition of war as “a violent confrontation
between armed organizations, at least one of which represents a
government” (2014: 174). Some see no distinction between war, genocide,
and terrorism because all of these involve violence and are motivated by
political goals. Henderson (2004) argues that it is too simplistic to state that
the only difference between war and terrorism is that war claims more lives
and is fought by governments. Rather, the distinction is whether the killing
of civilians is a goal or an outcome. Although, civilians die as a result of
war, armies are supposed to abide by the principle of avoiding civilian
targets. Genocide committed by armies means that this principle is not
always followed. Terrorists see the killing of civilians as a necessary goal
and this is even more the case with “new terrorism” in the age of
globalization (Martin 2007). The emergence of so-called “new war” makes
the distinction between war and other forms of political violence less clear.
Theoretical Views on War Making

Wimmer (2014) argues that examining state capacity, or the ability of a state
to make war is the most widely recognized contribution from sociology in
understanding warfare. In Chapter 2, Tilly’s (1990) argument about the
relationship between war making and state making was introduced. Briefly,
Tilly contends that the rise of nation-states took place within two settings,
“capital intensive” and “coercive intensive,” that are defined in part, by the
resources available for war making and the difficulty extracting those
resources from local capitalists. Others have also theorized on the
emergence of European states and the role of the military, including Rasler
and Thompson (1989) and Porter (1994). Even though there are important
differences between these three works (Kestnbaum 1995; Kestnbaum and
Skocpol 1993), all share a view that war making influenced the emergence
and organization of the nation-state, and they use the European experience
to illustrate these linkages. A criticism is the failure to look beyond
European states and to consider other parts of the world. Tilly is also
criticized for focusing exclusively on state controlled armies and not
considering the role of “irregular armies” such as guerrillas, warlords, and
police forces (Kestnbaum 2009; Wimmer 2014: 188).
Hooks and McLauchlan (1992a) offer an institutionalist view of U.S.
war making (1939–1989) that emphasizes the role of both bureaucracy and
technology. Two ideas are fundamental, including: (1) the military is
composed of a number of bureaucracies situated within the larger state and
(2) technology shapes war making. Three periods in U.S. war making
(1939–1989) are identified including (1) mass industrial warfare, (2)
strategic nuclear bombing, and (3) strategic nuclear missiles. Although the
type of technology defines the three phases, the key is not technology, but
political battles over selection that illuminates social influences on war
making. Shifts between weapons or warfare modes are not determined by
what is technologically possible, but by political processes determining
what is available for development and deployment. Each branch of the
military competes with one another and with civilian agencies for resources.
Both the international and the domestic political climate contextualize this
competition (Hooks and McLauchlan 1992b). Civilian agencies shape the
military and vice versa. Consider the power of the military. It is not simply a
matter of the state extracting resources at the behest of the military. The
state, through the Pentagon, “has wielded sufficient infrastructural power to
dominate scientific research and technological development and has actively
intervened in the production process” (762). Civilian agencies also impact
the military. For example, the geographic distribution of military bases after
World War II was influenced by congressional clout (Hooks 1994). In 1992,
Hooks and McLauchlan predicted that there would be difficulty in
maintaining U.S. military superiority due to record trade deficits and a
declining U.S. share of the world’s gross domestic product. As a result, the
U.S. military can no longer count on the ability to extract resources from the
world’s dominant economy that will rely increasingly on imported goods.
U.S. President Donald Trump has cited trade deficits with several trading
partners as problematic although when announcing tariffs he did not argue
that deficits threaten U.S. military supremacy, but he did cite national
security concerns (Werner and Kim 2018). Hooks and McLauchlan’s
warning seems even more appropriate given recent economic problems
exacerbated by globalization. What else does the future hold?
U.S. Marine Brandon Haugrud in Fallujah, Iraq (2006)
Credit: Photo courtesy of Brandon Haugrud (Lisa Waldner’s son)
Future of War Making

International Relations specialists Englehart and Kurzman (2006) argue that
wars between nation-states and civil wars are on the decline, but nonstate
actors are becoming increasingly important. They offer the following
reasons for a decline in intrastate and interstate war making: increased world
trade; the spread of democracy; more international bodies that mediate
disputes; international norms that discourage war; and a single hegemonic
state military power—the United States. Harrison and Wolf (2012, 2014)
argue that wars between states are actually on the upswing. Specifically,
“the frequency of bilateral militarized conflict among independent states has
been rising steadily over 130 years”. They cite the increasing number of
nations with more borders increasing potential for disputes and that
democracy brings with it an increased state capacity for taxation. Also, with
democracy and globalization, trade is easier and cheaper, which also
provides resources for war. Finally, they argue that the cost of war may also
be cheaper. In short, we make war “because we can.” Michael Mann (2018)
agrees that war is not on the decline, but that it is being transformed.
Even if Englehart and Kurzman (2006) are wrong about a downturn in
war making, they rightfully point out the potential for nonstate political
violence including terrorism. Reasons for a potential increase in other types
of political violence include: a downsizing of armies, liquidation of
weapons, decline in foreign aid, and vulnerable security.
The downsizing of organized state armies means that there are
multitudes of unemployed individuals, who have the skill set and
willingness to commit violence for pay. For example, the Iraqi insurgency
against the government installed after the removal of Saddam Hussein
attracted former Iraqi military personnel, who were angry at the United
States and possessed both weapons and the training to use them (Pfiffner
2010). A decline in war also results in excess weapons that are at risk for
being sold to terrorists. A reduction in foreign aid has weakened some
governments, increasing vulnerability to challenges by local warlords. For
example, the Afghan government does not have much control over things
beyond Kabul, and Yemen is a haven for terrorist groups (e.g. Al-Qaeda)
precisely because the government lacks strong internal control. The de-
Baathification order or the decision by the United States to bar Iraqis, who
held high positions within Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government, or Baath
political party and the disbanding of the Iraqi military are seen as two key
decisions that drove the insurgency resulting in a precarious security
situation for both Iraqi citizens and visitors (Pfiffner 2010).
The future of war is potentially more widespread global conflict, where
nation-states are replaced by larger entities that engage in conflict over both
territory and scarce resources (Huntington 1996). Edward Tiryakian argues
that there is currently a third type of global conflict characterized by nations
giving “partial support to one major combatant, the United States, which
made a de facto declaration of war” against terrorism “in the 2002 [G.W.
Bush] presidential State of the Union speech” (2005: 23). Terrorists have an
ideology, networks of supporters in a variety of countries, and the nation-
state itself may sponsor these networks or possess weapons of mass
destruction.
New Wars
Scholars may not be in full agreement about the prevalence of war, but there
is evidence that war is changing or being transformed (Mann 2018). Citing
theorist Randall Collins (1974), Mann argues that there has been a shift
from “ferocious” to “callous” indifference as increasing technology allows
one to kill from a distance. Today, a U.S. Air Force drone pilot in Las Vegas
can kill a target in Pakistan. Mann writes, “plunging sharp weapons into
flesh has been replaced by bombing at a distance” (2018: 50). Military
training emphasizes expertise and technical training rather than
ferociousness. While personnel in infantry units still need to have the ability
to engage in direct hand-to-hand combat, much killing in war is
accomplished at a distance.
Bryan Turner (2007) contends that “new war” is a recent conceptual
innovation in military sociology to capture how warfare has changed,
including the treatment of civilians. “Old wars” involve military conflict
between armies trained and supplied by nation-states. Attacking a civilian
population interfered with the primary objective of directly engaging the
opposing army. International law governing the treatment and protection of
civilians was compatible with old war military objectives. With new war,
violence of all types toward civilians, including sexual violence, becomes a
“functional activity” compatible with war making because the end goal is
the destruction of civil society. While the rape of civilians was not
uncommon during old wars (Brownmiller 1975), Turner argues that it was
unplanned.
In new war, causalities shift from military personnel to civilians, and
sexual violence, especially raping and killing women, occurs because it both
prevents reproduction of the targeted population and sends civilian males of
the same population a profound political message—that they are unable to
protect women. Children are an additional vulnerable population, treated
like “cheap and biddable combat troops” (Turner 2007: 6 of 15). Another
consequence of new warfare is the decreasing efficacy of military
techniques and institutions of nation-states. Turner argues that “tanks are
relatively useless against suicide bombers mingling in urban crowds on
urban subways” (6 of 15) and that this new style will replace the old
because nuclear wars between nation-states cannot be pursued without the
risk of annihilating both parties. The targeting of civilian populations and
the use of tactics like suicide bombing suggest that terrorism is a staple of
new wars. New wars are not fought by state-sanctioned armies, but by
warlords, guerrillas, private militias, and terrorists (Kestnbaum 2009).
New wars are also conceptualized as ethnic conflict with ethnic
cleansing and genocide as strategies for gaining control of the state. These
wars are believed to be a direct result of globalization’s weakening of the
nation-state (Kaldor 1999, cited in Scott 2004), which is discussed more
fully in Chapter 10.
“New war” scholarship has not escaped criticism but it has also highlighted new areas
of inquiry including an examination of how the state weakens itself by giving up its
monopoly on the use of force by accepting and perhaps even encouraging guerrillas,
private militias and other “irregular armies” and failing to deal with insurgents and
other threats to state power. “Thus, the state (and the armed forces) must be seen as a
potentially active participant in dismantling its own putative monopoly on force”
(Kestnbaum 2009: 241)
TERRORISM
In Chapter 8, we considered that social movements initiate terrorism. This
can be conceptualized as part of a continuum of nonconventional political
protest (della Porta 2004) and a type of political violence (Richards 2014).
Terrorism is a strategic fundamental to war making and state making
(Lauderdale and Oliverio 2005); yet, everyday discourse on terrorism
differentiates between rational and patriotic actors engaged in war and evil,
irrational terrorists. This view also impacts scholarship with “terrorism
studies,” conceptualizing this phenomenon as pathological compared to
more institutionalized means of political protest (della Porta 2004). This
distinction is false as states are not typically created in peaceful ways and
even democracies cannot claim the moral high road on the use of terrorism.
Because terrorism has replaced communism as “public enemy number one,”
some of the issues we raise may be troubling. Sociology though is a
discipline that asks “impertinent questions” (Nielsen 1990) by critically
challenging “taken-for-granted” views. We hope to raise questions that
encourage further exploration as you come to your own conclusions about
terrorism. See Text Box 9.2 for a discussion of the ideological baggage
associated with terms such as revolution and terrorism.
FIGURE 9.1 Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide from
1970 to 2017
Source: Figure created by Lisa K. Waldner using an online data tool provided by the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
(2017). Global Terrorism Database [Data file] at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Data from
1970 – 2017. Filtered data included only incidents that met three terrorism criteria and
excluded ambiguous events. Copyright University of Maryland 2018.
According to Figure 9.1, terrorism incidents worldwide have been on the

upswing until 2014 and have been declining since then. Until the September
11, 2001 attacks, U.S. sociologists had little interest in terrorism (Senechal
de la Roche 2004; Turk 2004), and sociological research in this area was
waning (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005).
Reasons for sociology’s relative silence include difficulties in data
collection and a bias toward studying social movements and protest
organizations (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004). Post-9/11 interest has increased
among sociologists specializing in social movements (Senechal de la Roche
2004), but not significantly among general political sociologists. This has
changed with the call for research issued by sociologists (e.g. Hooks and
Rice 2005) and the increased attention by several sociology journals as well
as specialty journals devoted to conflict, security, and terrorism. While
sociological research and theories are not well suited for explaining one-time
events such as the 9/11 attacks, they can and should be used for examining
general patterns (Neuman 2007). Although it is easy to fault American
sociologists for failing to take notice, North America has experienced
relatively low levels of terrorism compared to the Middle East. Further,
international terrorism has not always received attention in the U.S. media
(Kampf 2014) (Figure 9.2).
FIGURE 9.2 Incidents of Terrorism in North America

and the Middle East, North Africa from
1970 to 2017
Source: The top line denotes the Middle East and North Africa. Figure created by Lisa K.
Waldner using an online data tool provided by the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2017). Global Terrorism Database [Data
file] at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Data from 1970 – 2017. Filtered data included only
incidents that met three terrorism criteria and excluded ambiguous events. Copyright
University of Maryland 2018
TEXT BOX 9.2

Was the Boston Tea Party an Act of Revolution or
Terrorism?
The East India Company (EIC) was authorized by the British Parliament
(Tea Act of 1773) to export 1.5 million pounds of tea to sell in the
American colonies. The EIC was facing financial ruin due to
mismanagement, and this act of Parliament exempted it from paying
duties and tariffs and allowed its tea to be sold directly to American
merchants at a cheaper price. This undercut tea smuggling from Holland
that had almost completely taken over the American market. In fact, John
Hancock, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, smuggled Dutch
tea (Brinkley 2010). It was assumed that Americans would buy the
cheaper tea, the EIC would be saved from bankruptcy, and the authority
of Parliament to impose a tax would be upheld. Besides creating an unfair
advantage (EIC lobbyists had much influence in the British Parliament), it
also gave the EIC a monopoly over tea distribution. The potential for
other monopolies as well as renewed resentment of past policies of taxing
colonists without representation united the conservative mercantile class
and the more radical patriots. Past taxation imposed included: the Sugar
Act of 1764 (taxes on sugar, coffee, and wine), the Stamp Act of 1765 (all
printed matter including playing cards), and the Townshend Act of 1767
(glass, paper, paints, and tea). The Stamp Act was passed to pay for
protecting the colonists from the Native Americans and debt from the
French and Indian War. Although the Stamp Act and others were
repealed, the tax on tea was upheld as a symbol of Parliamentary
authority. One of the groups protesting the Stamp Act was the Sons of
Liberty led by Samuel Adams. This group was an underground
organization that had previously used physical violence and intimidation
against British stamp agents and prevented American merchants from
ordering British goods. Three ships loaded with EIC tea landed in Boston,
but were prevented from unloading their cargo. If the tea was not
unloaded in twenty days, it could be seized and used to pay custom taxes.
On December 16, 1773, the Sons of Liberty disguised themselves as
Mohawk Indians and boarded each of the tea ships. Armed with axes, 342
crates of tea were opened and then dumped into the sea over a three-hour
period. When they were finished, they swept the decks and made each
ship’s first mate attest that only the tea was damaged. The British
responded by closing Boston Harbor, sending more soldiers (four
regiments), and replacing the colonial governor, thus ending colonial self-
government (Intolerable Acts of 1774).
Revolution
The Boston Tea Party (BTP) was one of the events that sparked the
American Revolution and is revered worldwide as an important example
of principled resistance. Because the colonists were trying to secure basic
human rights—indeed their inalienable rights—their actions are an
example of a justified revolt against an oppressive government (Jaggar
2005). Furthermore, no one was physically harmed due to the actions of
the BTP participants. Revolution can be distinguished from terrorism
because it has a broader base of support and there is some ability to create
a new government to replace the one that was overthrown (Henderson
2004). There was a broad base of support among the colonists to resist
what was perceived to be unfair treatment, and the founding fathers were
able to constitute a democratic republic to replace British rule. Henderson
further argues that prior acts of terrorism may create the conditions for
revolution, and revolution may be accompanied by terrorist acts. Even if
the BTP is an example of terrorism, terrorist actions that are part of a
revolution are different from terrorist actions that perpetrate violence for
the sake of creating fear regardless of the political goals of those
involved. The actions of the BTP participants were not to incite fear in
innocent civilians, but voice concerns that an oppressive government had
refused to hear.
Terrorism
Historically, violence has been justified as a response to oppressive and
corrupt governments (Oberschall 2004), and the BTP certainly is an
example of colonists resisting repression. Bergesen’s (2007) definition of
terrorism seems to fit the BTP. There were perpetrators (the Sons of
Liberty) and victims as the tea thrown overboard belonged to the EIC.
The financial backers of the EIC also suffered a loss. One might also
argue that the ship crews were also victimized in that they were held
captive with the threat of physical harm if they interfered with the
destruction of the tea. The target, however, was not the crew or the EIC
but the British government because the participants were trying to
influence a taxation policy that they perceived as unfair. Butko’s (2006)
definition also seems to have been met as this violence was politically
motivated and innocent civilians (ship crew) were threatened with
violence. Furthermore, the colonists knew that their actions were illegal
because they disguised themselves as Mohawk Indians to prevent being
identified and tried for treason. Regardless of representation, it seems
unfair to expect the British government to foot the entire bill for
providing military protection to the colonists. The Sons of Liberty was
simply a terrorist organization using illegal physical violence and
intimidation for political and economic gain. Consider that John Hancock
gained economically because the cheaper and legal EIC tea was no longer
a threat to the market share captured by the illegally smuggled Dutch tea.
Which View Is Correct? You decide, but consider the possibility that
both terrorism and revolution are not mutually exclusive. In other words,
actions can be both. The BTP is an iconic event of the American
Revolution and any view that depicts this incident as anything other than
patriotic is controversial. In 2012, Texas parents and others were highly
critical of a lesson plan that asked school children to consider whether or
not the BTP was an act of terrorism. A sociological view enables us to
strip away hegemonic views that connote the American Revolution with
good and terrorism with evil.
Sources: www.bostonteapartyship.com/history.asp,
http://theamericanrevolution.org/events.aspx,
www.pbs.org/ktca/liberty/chronicle_boston1774.html, www.boston-tea-
party.org/darthmouth.html, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/26/boston-
tea-party-was-act-_n_2193916.html
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (2006: 10) describe a sociological

approach to terrorism as studying the “norms and social structure within
terrorist organizations.” We find this description of sociology’s contribution
to the study of terrorism much too limiting. There are many additional
sociological questions that researchers have posed, including but not limited
to: how does society define terrorism, what factors increase its likelihood,
how do individuals become terrorists, what role do the media play in
promoting or discouraging terrorism, and how can terrorism be prevented
(Turk 2004).
Defining Terrorism
There are more than one hundred definitions of terrorism, and few concepts
are considered as ideological (della Porta 2004), difficult (Lizardo 2008), or
contentious in this post-9/11 environment (Butko 2006; Kinloch 2005;
Richards 2014; Roberts 2015). Problems with contemporary definitions
include a lack of international consensus, historical changes in usage, and
inconsistent use by both media and government1 (Miller and File 2001). The
original use was popularized during the French Jacobin government’s
“Reign of Terror” when thousands of citizens were guillotined to deter
critics. As one philosopher writes, “it is worth remembering that the original
case was one of politically motivated violence carried out by a government
against its own citizens” (Jaggar 2005: 202). In contrast, the U.S.
Department of State defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents” (2016). Whereas some believe that academic
researchers and government officials have come close to a definitional
consensus (Bergesen and Han 2005), we believe that there are some
important distinctions between official and social scientific definitions.
Although Bergesen and Han (2005) acknowledge the importance of state
terrorism, the U.S. Department of State omits violence committed by a
government against its own citizens. For example, neither the 2018
crackdown on Nicaraguan citizens protesting their President (over 200
causalities as of April, 2018, Associated Press 2018) nor the killing of 138
anti-government protestors and the detention of over 6,000 persons
(including Buddhist monks) ordered by the then ruling military junta of
Myanmar (Casey 2007) is considered terrorism under the U.S. State
Department definition. In contrast, researchers are interested in both state
and substate actors, and current sociological definitions of terrorism tend to
include both (e.g. Tilly 2004). Roberts (2015) points out that because
sociology has adopted a Weberian view of the state (state has a monopoly
on coercion), this affects and distorts the definition of terrorism.
Substate terrorism includes individuals such as Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols who are responsible for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, and
networks such as Al-Qaeda. Regardless of whether the focus is on state or
substate actors, there are three common elements for a social scientific
definition including the actual or threatened use of violence, political aims
of those committing violence, and the threat of or actual harm to innocent
civilians (Butko 2006). Threats tend to be overlooked by official definitions,
but are important because of the potential to influence audience behavior
through fear (Gibbs 1989). Think of all the inconveniences associated with
air travel and the billions of dollars spent annually on security2 because of
the continued threat of terrorism. While many of the current air travel
restrictions are a reaction to 9/11 and related events, we continue to modify
our behavior on the premise that terrorists will strike again.
Terrorism undermines two pillars of democracy: personal security and
tolerance (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005). Perceptions of security are
lowered by both threats and actual incidents. We have advocated for a social
scientific definition that is broader than those used by some government
agencies. Yet, conceptual clarity necessitates that researchers distinguish
terrorism from other acts of violence such as homicide or suicide.
Political aim separates terrorism from general physical violence. The
motives of the 9/11 hijackers cannot be known with absolute certainty—was
it political or merely revenge for some perceived transgression? (Senechal
de la Roche 2004). However, researchers as well as government officials
infer motive when they classify incidents as terrorism. della Porta reminds
us that terrorists’ political goals are varied and include “gaining consent,
rather than merely terrorizing” (2004: 2 of 8).
Albert Bergesen agrees that terrorism has a political motivation but
argues that the distinguishing feature lies with the difference between target
and victim because “the victim is merely the means to affect the target…. In
all other forms of violence, the victim is the target” (2007: 112). For
example, the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were innocent people who
were killed or maimed, but the target was the U.S. government and public
opinion regarding its Middle East policy. In other types of violence, the
victim and the target are the same.
The connection between victims and targets exist because targets are
“symbolic representations of territorial, violence-monopolizing state actors”
(Lizardo 2008: 98). This connection is a means of influencing the behavior
of both victims and targets to instill fear (Beck 2007). The political sphere is
about gaining and using power to force others, including nation-states, to do
one’s bidding. Targets, then, are a means to obtain some political goal, and
terrorism is an attempt to exercise power. Another aspect of power is who
decides what constitutes terrorism?
Labeling Terrorism
Researchers as well as government officials need to use criteria when
classifying whether an incident of violence is terrorism. For example, the
Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016 is a terrorist attack as the shooter targeted
civilians and claimed allegiance to ISIS (Ellis et al. 2016). This labeling
seems appropriate given the incident. However, it is important to understand
that labeling an incident as a terrorist attack has political ramifications. One
of the most important sociological insights in the study of terrorism is the
realization that this label is socially constructed (Turk 2004), but this goes
beyond the cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”
Labeling someone a terrorist rather than a liberator and the inability of the
labeled party to renegotiate an alternative meaning signify the ability of the
labeler to stigmatize the actions of others (Gibbs 1989), and this can be a
tool used by those in power to delegitimize opponents (Richards 2014).
Värk (2011) argues that the application of the terrorism label potentially
says more about the person applying the label than the accused. For
example, the government of Bangladesh labeled critics as media terrorists
or intellectual terrorists, signifying the willingness of some states to use
fighting terrorism as a justification for eliminating political criticism and
opposition (Khondker 2008). Bangladesh is not alone. Governments often
describe terrorism in terms of “cowardly, criminal acts of desperate,
extremist minorities bent on revenge against powerful national elites”
(Kinloch 2005: 136) and communicate these labels to the global community
through official lists. Groups and individuals on these lists may face
financial and legal obstacles. In 2017, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) added “black identity extremists” to its list of domestic terrorism
threats. Being on this list purportedly allows the FBI to conduct
surveillance. Critics claim the “domestic terrorism threat” label allows the
FBI to monitor politically active blacks who may be protesting but are not
terrorists and that both persons of color and environmentalists are more
likely to be targeted (Irby 2017). The U.S. intelligence community also
considers white supremacists a domestic terrorism threat although critics
argue intelligence agencies need to take this more seriously (Kindy,
Horwitz, and Barrett 2017). The U.S. State Department has two
designations for groups and individuals, respectively, including Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs).3 An explicit intent of designating a group as an FTO is to
“stigmatize[s] and isolate[s] designated terrorist organizations
internationally” (U.S. Department of State, Office of Counterterrorism
2018a).
Sometimes labeled groups use the media to attack the terrorist label. The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) demanded that the
European Union (EU) remove FARC from its list. The EU joined the United
States in designating FARC as a terrorist organization in 2002. Raul Reyes,4
a FARC commander, argued in a letter “We are a political military
organization that has taken up arms against state violence to seek deep
social transformations” (“FARC Writes: Stop Calling Us Terrorists” 2007).
The point is that similar acts of political resistance are defined differently
and may be celebrated or condemned and that groups seeking redress
against alleged state terrorism are at a disadvantage in the labeling process.
Refugees lacking the protection of national citizenship may be the most
disadvantaged group of all, therefore any actions toward self-determination
are outside the law; this results in the transformation from refugee to
“terrorist” (Ukai 2005). Furthermore, other institutions may act to reify the
government label. For example, the American media typically does not label
official military attacks as terrorist even when civilians are victimized,
although attacks by nonstate guerilla forces, even when the targets are
military, are termed terrorist (e.g. the Israeli–Palestinian conflict) (Jaggar
2005). Similarly, the definition of terrorism used by the U.S. Department of
Defense includes attacks against American military targets (Enders and
Sandler 2006). Because the state or government has a monopoly on
legitimate power, we ask the question posed by other sociologists: “under
what conditions will the state define acts of deviance as acts of terrorism?”
(Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005: 166).
Oliverio and Lauderdale note that labeling is the result of a hegemonic
process or a society’s dominating view that is beyond question or reproach.
It is a taken-for-granted view of the world that most accept rather than
critically question. The American hegemonic view is that Western
civilization is superior to all others and that those who attack it are evil,
irrational, and fanatical. Furthermore, the mental image that most
Americans tend to associate with terrorism is not one of a government
victimizing its own citizens, but individuals committing violence against the
state. Not surprisingly, this view parallels all of the different definitions used
by U.S. government agencies. We are not suggesting that terroristic violence
is justifiable or excusable; however, understanding it necessitates looking
beyond hegemonic views.
The significance of hegemony comes from the work of Antonio Gramsci
(1971), who argues that the ruling elite may use coercion to achieve goals,
but is also able to use consensual means because the ruling elite uses its
position to define concepts such as equality, justice, and terrorism. This
occurs because those who rule “have a monopoly over moral and
intellectual discourse, and this—backed by coercive might—allows them to
create, construct or label ‘others’ within the global system as the enemy or
the ‘terrorists’” (Butko 2006: 149).
The international relations literature uses a non-Gramscian notion of
hegemony that is also useful for understanding labeling. In this context,
hegemony refers to a dominant nation-state (Evans 2008). The United States
is a hegemonic state, meaning that it has the power to internationalize and
enforce terrorist classifications (Butko 2006). “The State” (as opposed to
any specific state) is also a hegemonic organization and, compared to other
organizations or institutions, has more power to shape and create definitions
like terrorism that have legal repercussions. Because states create and
enforce legal definitions of terrorism and international bodies such as the
UN comprise member states, it is probably not surprising that the UN
emphasizes substate terrorism rather than state terrorism. The UN adopted a
UN counterterrorism strategy in 2006. Nowhere in this document is
reference made to terrorism committed by the state against its own citizens.
In fact, this statement makes clear the focus on substate terrorism. For
example, the counterterrorism strategy articulated in this document has four
main objectives, one of which is: “building States’ capacity [to prevent and
combat terrorism] and strengthening the role of the United Nations” (United
Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism 2006). In fact, citizens committing
terrorism against their government, regardless of the reason, may find
themselves at a disadvantage in the asylum-seeking process. In 2006 and in
2016, UN member states agreed
to prevent refugee status from being abused by the perpetrators, organizers or
facilitators of terrorist acts, also calls upon Member States to take appropriate measures
to ensure, before granting asylum, that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or
participated in the commission of terrorist acts.
(70/291. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review 2016)
Nations sometimes enact terrorism policies that do not seem to fit with their
respective national interest. Although it makes sense for the United States to
restrict individuals such as those who bombed the USS Cole at a Yemen
navel port in 2000, this policy also restricts those who fought against their
own governments as a U.S. ally (see Text box 9.3).
Hegemonic discourse on terrorism may also foster prejudice and
discrimination as Middle Eastern is becoming synonymous with terrorist
(Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005). This, of course, has implications for how
we view and treat persons who appear Middle Eastern regardless of the
likelihood that these individuals will engage in terrorist activities and
reminds us of the point made earlier, that responses to terrorism may erode
democracy (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005) because when states balance
the need for security against civil liberties, it is always those in the minority
who have the most to lose (Zedner 2005). Consider that those who are not
Muslim and have no Muslim connections have a much lower risk of arrest
and detention as an enemy combatant in a military jail (Dworkin 2003).
While the labeling perspective challenges us to consider the power of
the labeler and the consequences of being labeled, Albert Bergesen (2007)
asserts that terrorism is not only a label, but also a specific type of violence
that can and should be distinguished from other forms of violence, including
that arising from the practice of “contentious politics” (Tilly and Tarrow
2006). Although hegemonic discourse may favor emphasizing substate over
state actors, researchers need conceptual clarity (Gibbs 1989) to develop
explanatory models of both state and substate terrorism.
Types of Terrorism
Currently, there are three main categories of terrorism, including state or
regime, state sponsored, and substate. Furthermore, we often divide
terrorism into domestic and international, with domestic meaning that all the
parties involved are from the same country in which the terrorist incident
took place. In contrast, international or transnational terrorism occurs when
an incident involves victims, perpetrators, citizens, or governments of two
or more nations (Enders and Sandler 2006). Failing or failed states are at
risk for experiencing terrorism due to the lack of capacity for
counterterrorism measures, but also pose challenges for foreign terrorists
(George 2018).
TEXT BOX 9.3

The Repercussions of Being Labeled a Terrorist
Xo Chia Vue is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruit who
fought against the Laos government during the Vietnam War with other
Hmong tribe members (a hill tribe of northern Laos) recruited by the CIA
beginning in 1961 to stop the spread of communism. For fourteen years,
he fought against the Laotian government on behalf of the United States
including assisting in the rescue of two American pilots and the
evacuation of the remains of third pilot of a plane that crashed into a
mountain in 1971. Because Xo Chia Vue is classified as a terrorist for
activities committed against the Laotian government, he is barred from
entering the United States. His two granddaughters are also ineligible
because they provided “material support” by cooking for him, while he
evaded Laotian authorities in the jungle. Vue’s only hope for entry is a
legislative change or a waiver. As of 2006, only three waivers have been
granted and are available only to those who provided material support
and not to terrorists themselves (Husarska 2006). While Vue’s
granddaughters are eligible for waivers, he is not. Should Vue and others
like him be granted a waiver?
Pro
While Vue is certainly a terrorist, he was an agent of American-
sponsored terror. The United States should support individuals who
risked their lives on behalf of U.S. policies. Furthermore, the United
States should reject rigid policies that disallow the investigation of the
context in which terrorist activities took place. Should the United States
have barred the French resistance fighters who fought against the Nazi
Vichy regime? Barring evidence that would make him ineligible under
other criteria, he should be admitted. This law also fosters gender
discrimination by failing to recognize that women from other societies
may not have the ability to refuse to provide the kinds of services that are
defined as “material support.” Vue’s granddaughters should also be
welcomed.
Con
Allowing any terrorist to enter the United States (regardless of the
targeted regime) undermines credibility with the larger global
community. Isolating and stigmatizing terrorists and terrorist groups is
one of the tools of the “war on terror” and the United States needs the
cooperation of other nations to achieve the objective of a safer nation and
world. Otherwise, other nations will give safe haven to criminals who
threaten U.S. security. Although Vue’s past service is appreciated and
valued, a policy barring any terrorist from entering member countries
strengthens global cooperation and must not be undermined by the
circumstances of any one man. Nor can the United States provide entry
to every individual who assists the U.S. government. Reviewing every
case would only result in the substitution of the subjective “one man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” for an objective standard.
What Do You Think? What other arguments could be made for
either the pro or con positions? Which view is correct? More examples of
barred individuals can be found at:
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/exile-main-street-refugees-and-
america%E2%80%99s-ingratitude.
Update: In October 2007, the U.S. Departments of State and
Homeland Security announced that certain Hmong groups that provided
material support to terrorist organizations prior to December 31, 2004,
are exempt from laws that bar them from entry into the United States or
becoming legal, permanent residents (“Some Hmong to Get Waiver on
‘Terrorist’ Designation” 2007). This waiver does not apply to those
labeled as terrorists (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman
2007).
STATE OR REGIME TERRORISM

The state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of power and sometimes
uses this against its own citizens to further political goals. Josef Stalin,
Adolph Hitler, Pol Pot, and more recently, Saddam Hussein, as heads of
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, have used violence both at home and
abroad to further political goals. There is some disagreement whether
violent actions perpetrated by a state against its own citizens should be
called terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2006), with scholars from the
“rejectionist school” declining to apply the label precisely because the state
has a monopoly on authority (Sandhu 2001). Sandhu argues that
perpetuating the myth that all political terrorism is committed by substate
actors conceals atrocities committed by the state including ruling by fear
through kidnapping, assassination, torture, genocide, and forced
imprisonment without trial.
Generally, domestic variables associated with the use of state terror
include state strength, level of political self-mobilization, social
organization density in civil society, economic structure, and political
culture or structure. Generally, weak states are more likely to resort to
terrorizing their own citizens (Schmid and Jongman 1988), because strong
governments have legitimacy and opt instead for less extreme repression
such as internment camps during times of civil unrest (Cohen and Corrado
2005). Failing states engaged in warfare or experiencing political collapse
are more likely to both experience and produce terror (Coggins 2015).
When stronger governments use terrorism, victims tend to be unpopular or
distrusted segments of society (Duvall and Stohl 1988). States may resort to
terrorism because it is cheaper than engaging in armed conflict or for
ideological reasons (Värk 2011).
Using the historical cases of Chile, El Salvador, and Brazil, Petras
(1987) asserts that both higher levels of social movement activity in
nondemocratic societies and density of individuals in interconnecting
political activity networks are associated with an increase in state
repression. When wealth is sufficiently unequal, the state may resort to
torture to quell those who demand change, which threatens the economic
and political status quo (Cohen and Corrado 2005). In contrast, liberal
democracies with welfare programs and other mechanisms for transferring
wealth are able to mitigate poverty and other conditions that lead to
political unrest among citizens, which reduces the need for repressive
tactics. Authoritarian regimes often employ institutionalized torture systems
with trained torturers, written rules and policies, and a physical
infrastructure—in short, a torture bureaucracy.
Liberal democracies not only have less need to use torture, but also may
pressure other states to stop using it as a social control mechanism.
Globalization enhances the reach of liberal democracies and is
hypothesized to decrease the usefulness of state torture because of the
“needs and requirements of an interdependent global economy” (Cohen and
Corrado 2005: 105) with both agrarian- and industrial-based economies
susceptible to international pressure. Potential loss of foreign markets,
access to debt relief, and the need for economic growth all discourage
torture. Liberal democracies may block access to their markets and
influence global organizations (e.g. International Monetary Fund and World
Bank) to block credit or debt relief to offending nations.
Besides government, the media also play an influential role by utilizing
an extensive global network to publicize atrocities, so that nations and
organizations in a position to pressure an offending regime can do so. New
technological developments allow individuals and groups to directly appeal
for help when global media are blocked, as was seen during the anti-Iranian
government protests in 2009 when most news initially were available only
through Twitter and Facebook (“Crackdown in Iran” 2009). The ability to
pressure repressive governments depends on the degree of economic
dependency, which is lessened with the availability of alternative markets.
For example, Cuba was able to mitigate some of the impact of the U.S.
embargo because it had the Soviet Union as a trading partner. The fall of
the Soviet Union has limited alternative markets that human rights violators
can turn to when pressured by liberal democracies.
Economic relationships alone cannot predict whether a liberal
democracy will pressure a repressive regime (Cohen and Corrado 2005).
Other important variables include extreme religious fundamentalism and
specific crisis events. For example, the United States and its allies ignored
Russia’s use of torture against Chechnyan rebels because they feared the
spread of Muslim fundamentalism and potential political instability in a
region where multinational corporations had large investments in energy
infrastructure (Cohen and Corrado 2005).
James Petras argues that the United States was a driving force behind
authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in the “growth
and proliferation of state terror networks” (1987: 315) supported by both
Republican and Democratic administrations with the United States acting as
a “center state” supporting the creation and maintenance of a torture
infrastructure in a “client state.” In return, the center state receives support
for economic and political policies that benefit the elite of both center and
client states. Though there is no doubt that the United States has supported
authoritarian regimes for a variety of reasons (Carr 2006; Gareau 2004;
Huggins 1987; Lauderdale and Oliverio 2005; Robinson 2004), Petras’
analysis may not be currently relevant in a post-Soviet era with the
economic transformation of China and increasing global interdependency.
While Petras argued that support of a global terror network coincides
with a “decline in economic levers in imperial foreign policy” (1987: 317),
Cohen and Corrado (2005) counter that economic policy is a powerful tool
to coerce repressive state regimes to end the use of torture. Robinson (2004)
contends that U.S. interests explain why there has been a shift from past
support of authoritarian governments to democratic ones although he argues
that full democracy is not being supported but rather, polyarchy.
If global dependency decreases the likelihood that a regime will resort
to torture, the reverse must also be true with isolated regimes more likely to
use it (Duvall and Stohl 1988). Because of the disinterest of the
international community, torture is also more likely to occur in “less
strategically or economically useful” areas (Cohen and Corrado 2005: 126)
with recent examples including Cambodia under Pol Pot, and Darfur.
Because more lives have been lost to regime terror than terrorism
committed by substate nationals (Henderson 2004), it is imperative that
more attention be paid to this topic. While there is no consensus on whether
regime terror constitutes terrorism, what is less contentious is the
acknowledgment that some nations support terrorist groups.
STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM
For nations that support terrorism, the level of involvement can vary. Some
states may directly control terrorists with government officials choosing
targets and otherwise overseeing activity. Other states may not directly
control terrorist activity, but may provide support with funding, equipment,
or a safe haven. A state may tolerate terrorists. In other words, the state
does not direct or fund activities, but there is also no active effort to repress
these activities or to arrest those involved (e.g. Taliban regime in
Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001). Finally, a state may be so weak that
it simply cannot deal with terrorists operating inside of its borders (Värk
2011).
Nations sometimes aid terrorist groups to further their political goals
(Sandhu 2001). The downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, on December 21, 1988, killed 270 persons including everyone on
board. Libya was accused of aiding the individuals responsible for this
attack and eventually agreed to turn two Libyan intelligence agents over for
trial and to pay financial reparations to victims’ families. As of this writing,
nations labeled by the U.S. State Department as engaging in state-
sponsored terror include Iran, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea), Sudan, and Syria (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism 2018b). North Korea
was delisted in 2008, after it granted greater access for nuclear site
inspections (Richter 2008), but was added back to the list in 2017 (U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent
Extremism 2018b). Libya was removed in 2006 for cooperating in the
“global war on terror” including the ending of its weapons program (U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs 2007), but is considered
problematic because of its inability to administer its territory rendering the
country a safe haven for terrorists (U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2017). While still on the list, Sudan is described as “a
cooperative partner of the United States” (U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Terrorism 2017). Unlike Sudan, Venezuela is not on the
state sponsor list but “maintain[s] a permissive environment that allowed
for support of activities that benefitted known terrorist groups” (U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017). Why Sudan is
labeled a state sponsor and Venezuela is not suggests that other
considerations may also be a factor. Nations considered state sponsors of
terror face restrictions on arms sales, U.S. exports, economic assistance,
loss of diplomatic immunity, and other miscellaneous financial restrictions.
For nations that support terrorism, the level of involvement can vary.
Some states may directly control terrorists with government officials
choosing targets and otherwise overseeing activity. Other states may not
directly control terrorist activity, but may provide support with funding,
equipment, or a safe haven. A state may tolerate terrorists by making no
active effort to repress these activities or to arrest those involved (e.g.
Taliban regime in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001). Finally, a state
may be so weak that it simply cannot prevent terrorists from operating
within its borders (Värk 2011).
Critical Perspective on Terrorism

Some have argued that the United States is also a sponsor of terror for
historically supporting groups that have undermined democratically elected
governments in South and Central America (Lewellen 1990; Montiel and
Anuar 2002; Petras 1987) as well as communist ones. Quoting the
philosopher Derrida, “the reason of the strongest is always the best”, Ukai
argues that
when one looks closely at what it means to be called a rogue state [a government that
supports terrorism], it is not very difficult to see that those who coined the term and
impose it on others are rogue states themselves.
(2005: 247)
This perspective tends to (1) view western governments as the perpetrators

of terrorism, (2) argue that western governments manipulate the media to
serve its own political aims, and (3) challenge the belief that western
governments are always the victim and never the perpetrators of terrorism
(Kampf 2014). Obviously, these controversial statements challenge
hegemonic beliefs that researchers may need to set aside to study terrorism.
SUBSTATE TERRORISM
Individuals and organizations that commit violence against the state to
challenge state power are engaged in counterhegemonic political violence
(Butko 2006). Radical Islamic fundamentalists are challenging Western
hegemony. Yet, to focus only on Muslims is misleading because historically
they are only one of many groups that have perpetrated violence against
Western democracies and their allies. Between 1968 and 1990, terrorists
tended to be either leftists adhering to communist ideology (e.g. Red Army
Faction—Germany, Shining Path—Peru, Weathermen—the United States)
or ethno-nationalists (e.g. Irish Republican Army—Northern Ireland,
Palestine Liberation Organization—West Bank/Gaza). More recently, there
has been a shift from secular to religious, fundamentalist groups (Enders
and Sandler 2006; Martin 2007; National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2017; Schmid and Jongman 1988).
Homegrown terrorism or citizens attacking their own governments such as
Timothy McVeigh or the 1960s Weathermen are often overlooked in
contemporary terrorism discussions. Other shifts or changes since the 1990s
include the use of loose networks instead of a classic hierarchical
organizational structure, decreased specificity in the demands made by
terrorist groups, more global dispersion of targets, increased difficulty in
identifying motive as fewer groups claim responsibility, and violence that is
less discriminating in terms of victims (Bergesen and Han 2005). Some
argue that terrorism in the age of globalization or “new terrorism” differs
from older forms because it is characterized by asymmetrical warfare, the
use of high-yield weapons, and religious motivation (Martin 2007). We will
discuss some of these trends in the following sections (Figure 9.3).
The classic organization of a substate terrorist group is a pyramid
structure with the apex occupied by a few top leaders who plan overall
strategy and policy. The next level is the active cadre or a larger group of
individuals who perform attacks. There may be several smaller groups
within this level that specialize in certain operations such as bomb making,
intelligence gathering, and surveillance. The next larger level is made up of
active supporters who provide intelligence, safe houses, communication,
and other support activities. Active members divide themselves into cells to
preserve secrecy. A cell has only a few members whose activities and
identities are known only to identical cell members. The cell leader may
communicate with only one other cell. On the bottom are passive
supporters who may provide money and voice support for terrorist goals
(Frasier, as cited in Henderson 2004). In reality, most groups have fewer
than fifty members, and these individuals may shift between different
levels. Furthermore, most terrorist groups have little public support,
although there may be sympathy with group ideology. While the cell
structure maintains secrecy and helps protect the identities and plans of
other cells, it makes communication and coordination with other cells
difficult (Henderson 2004).
FIGURE 9.3 Terrorist Groups by Ideological Motivation

Source: Miller, Erin. 2017. “Ideological Motivations of Terrorism in the United States,
1970-2016.” College Park, Maryland. November. Retrieved July 26, 2018 from
www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IdeologicalMotivationsOfTerrorismInUS_Nov2017.pdf.
Copyright University of Maryland 2018
Modern terrorist structures are less hierarchical and more networked
(Matusitz 2013) and often consist of a small number of individuals who
commit actions in the name of the group5 and communicate using Web sites
or other social media communication strategies maintained by unaffiliated
but sympathetic supporters. One example is Earth Liberation Front (ELF),
an alleged international ecoterrorism group, which advocates for animal
rights and targets both the timber industry and urban sprawl with the recent
destruction of luxury apartments and condominiums in New York City.
Groups such as ELF hardly exist or function as an organization, with no
central structure or membership and decision-making concentrated at the
local cell level (Henderson 2004; Miller and Smarick 2012). Militant white
separatist groups in the United States have advocated the use of leaderless
resistance, which is a modified version of the communist cell structure
(Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). The leaderless strategy not only makes
intelligence gathering more difficult, but also may shield a national office
from both the legal and financial consequences of actions attributed to
renegade cells.6
Charles Tilly (2004) notes that it is important to distinguish between
different types of terrorist actors and by doing so realize the broad spectrum
of entities, ideologies, and circumstances involved with terrorism. Tilly’s
(2004, 2005) self-described crude typology is divided among two
dimensions: degree of specialization (i.e. specialists, nonspecialists) and
location of attacks (i.e. home territory, outside home territory). Specialists
are members of military forces that may be part of government,
nongovernment, or anti-government forces.
Conspirators are specialists who operate by striking targets away from
the home base. Intelligence or military agents such as those in Libya who
masterminded the Lockerbie bombing would fit here although this
constitutes a small number of actual incidents. Like conspirators, zealots
also operate away from the home base, but are not specialists or part of an
organized military force such as the 9/11 hijackers. This group inflicts a
significant amount of terrorism that occurs away from a group’s home base
and can include exiles who return to their homeland to attack their enemies.
For example, some young Somali males raised in the United States are
returning to Somali to train with Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group with ties to
Al-Qaeda, and have subsequently died in Somali committing suicide
bombing attacks (Walsh and Meryhew 2009; Yuen and Aslanian 2013).
Other U.S.-raised Somali youth have left to join ISIS forces and have died
fighting in Syria or Iraq (Temple-Raston 2015). Autonomists include
political groups that launch attacks on targets within their own territories
without becoming specialists in coercion. Because specialists are members
of an organized military force, nonspecialist autonomists commit substate
terrorism. Militias include specialist groups that are involved in incidents
inside their own territory. Specialists who are part of a government force
commit state terrorism, whereas organized anti-governmental forces engage
in substate terrorism. Ordinary Militants engage in other types of protests,
but from time to time engage in terrorist attacks either at home or abroad. In
the case of the disappearing Somali youth, counterterrorism experts fear
these individuals may not stay in Somalia, but return to their adopted
homeland and commit terrorism (Walsh and Meryhew 2009) although there
is doubt about whether Al-Shabaab has operational reach outside of
Somalia (Bergen 2015). Tilly’s typology suggests that individuals can shift
between these five types through changing social relations between activists
as well as between activists and their targets.
An example of a terrorist group operating in the United States is the
antiabortion group, Army of God (Miller and Smarick 2012). One of its
most notorious affiliates is Eric Robert Rudolph convicted of the 1996
Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, the 1997 bombings at a gay
nightclub and an abortion clinic in the Atlanta area, and the 1998 bombing
of a clinic in Birmingham, Alabama (CNN Library 2017). Using Tilly’s
typology, classifying Rudolph as an autonomist or an ordinary militant
would depend on whether he had also engaged in other forms of
nonterrorist antiabortion protest, such as picketing. Recognizing that
terrorism is one of many political and apolitical options that rational actors
may simultaneously employ (Tilly 2004, 2005) reinforces the uselessness of
conceptualizing terrorists as “crazy, irrational fanatics.” While this latter
hegemonic attribution reinforces how different we are from “them,” it does
nothing to enhance the understanding of terrorism or the development of
counterterrorism policies and tactics.
U.S. citizens’ concerns about terrorism fluctuate upward in response to
media coverage of recent attacks and drop during times of lower activity
(Norman 2016). A 2015 Gallup Polls shows that 16 percent of Americans
believe terrorism is the most important problem compared to 46 percent in
2001 after the 9/11 attacks and 5 percent in 2007 (Riffkin 2015). Gallup
polling also demonstrates an increase in the proportion of those polled who
are less willing to attend large events (38 percent), travel by airplane (32
percent), travel overseas (46 percent), or go into a skyscraper (26 percent)
due to terrorism concerns. Republicans express more fear than Democrats
do. Overall, seven in ten Americans largely trust the government to protect
them from terrorism (Reinhart 2017). When people avoid situations due to
fear, terrorists win. Beating terrorism requires understanding how terrorists
operate, their motivations, as well as structural conditions that create and
foster this activity.
Sociological theories provide a framework for moving beyond a
pathological perspective and toward answers backed by empirical data. A
sociologist asks “what social, economic, and political conditions create
terrorism?” Although the “sociology of terrorism” might be in its infancy
(Bergesen and Lizardo 2004), current theories are being applied in new and
innovative ways.
TERRORISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

There is some disagreement about whether a general theory of terrorism is
desirable and/or achievable. Some contend that terrorism should be
differentiated from other forms of political violence (Bergesen and Han
2005; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Black 2004; Senechal de la Roche 2004).
Yet, many theorists prefer to view terrorism as part of a larger conceptual
lens (e.g. collective violence, Lizardo 2008, or contentious politics, Tilly
2004). Given broad definitions of terrorism (Senechal de la Roche 2004) and
important distinctions between substate, state, and state-sponsored terror, it
seems unlikely that a single theory could explain all types. Even developing
a single theory of substate terrorism seems problematic as “a remarkable
array of actors sometimes adopt terror as a strategy, and therefore no
coherent set of cause and effect propositions can explain terrorism as a
whole” (Tilly 2004: 11).
Others argue against a distinct theory of terrorism because current
theories of political confrontation should be applicable to all types of
political action because “terrorism is only one of several modes of
confrontation ranging from peaceful and conventional political actions to
extremes of group violence” (Oberschall 2004: 26). Furthermore, those
adopting terror often alternate with other political strategies and even
inaction as only a small number of terrorists choose terror alone (Tilly 2004,
2005). If developing a single theory of terrorism is difficult, why assume that
other theories that lump terrorism with other forms of noninstitutionalized or
unconventional political behavior will be successful? Tilly (2005) explains
that terrorism is a strategy that includes interacting political actors. To
understand why terrorism is selected over other choices, we must analyze it
as a type of political process. This debate is likely to continue but in the
interim, several current theories are being applied, including Collective
Action Theory, Political Economy, World Systems theory a Framing
perspective, and Categorical Terrorism.
Collective Action Theory

According to Oberschall (2004), four dimensions must be met for collective
action to take place: discontent, ideology, ability to organize, and political
opportunity. First, there must be prevalent dissatisfaction that cannot be
alleviated through conventional political means as elites are either unwilling
or unable to provide relief. Second, the aggrieved must collectively define
that their complaints are legitimate. Third, individuals must have the
capability to recruit, raise funds, provide leaders, communicate, and make
decisions. Both social movement and terrorist groups are often built out of
preexisting networks. For example, Islamic terrorists use the network of
religious schools and mosques as well as family groups for recruiting
(Oberschall 2004; Smelser 2007) just as Red Brigade (an Italian Marxist–
Leninist group) members knew each other from the university where they
participated in leftist politics or factories where they worked (Carr 2006).
Liberal democracies report higher levels of terrorism7 (Enders and
Sandler 2006) because political opportunities are greater with civil liberties
that make organizing easier by protecting free speech, the dissemination of
information, and the right of association. Finally, political opportunities are
expanded when there is strong public support for terrorist activities, political
allies that are sympathetic to the cause, a supportive international climate,
and outside state support or sponsorship of terrorism (Oberschall 2004).
Political Economy
This perspective is a more interdisciplinary approach and is useful for
answering questions such as why liberal democracies are more prone to
terrorism, what is the net impact of media coverage or do the benefits of
coverage justify the risks, and what is the trade-off the public will accept
between declining civil liberties and increased protection. Sometimes called
rational choice, this approach argues that terrorists engage in terrorism
because it is a cost-effective means for a weaker party to challenge a
stronger opponent. The public tolerates both the economic and noneconomic
costs of airline security because we perceive that the benefits outweigh the
cost.
After the 9/11 attacks, the public was more accepting of the key
provisions of the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism)
Act, including increased electronic surveillance, expanded wiretapping,
reduced immigration rights, and the suspension of habeas corpus or
demonstrating just cause for imprisonment or detention (Enders and Sandler
2006). Subsequent public opinion polls reveal an interesting tension
between concern for civil liberties and fear of terrorism. While 74 percent
agree that they should not have to sacrifice their civil liberties to be safe
from terrorism and 54 percent disapprove of the U.S. government collecting
telephone and Internet data as a counter terrorism strategy, 49 percent say
the government has not gone far enough to adequately protect them (Gao
2015). Brooks and Manza (2013) suggest that the level of support for
counterterrorism policies including the erosion of civil liberties seems high
in light of the controversies involving torture and National Security Agency
(NSA) spying. The British are accepting of privacy intrusion with the
introduction of “bobby-cams” strapped to the helmets of police officers on
top of the already existing video surveillance network using four million
closed-circuit cameras with the typical resident being videotaped as much as
three hundred times daily (Satter 2007). About half of Britons polled would
give government security forces more power to gather intelligence (Bennett
2016).
A political economy approach assumes that all actors are rational
because decisions are based on a cost-benefit analysis. Governments must
weigh the costs of conceding to demands (encouraging attacks from
countergroups) against the cost of future attacks. If the cost of a future
attack exceeds the cost of conceding, a government may give in to demands.
Suicide bombings have become more commonplace8 because these kill
more victims than other methods and raise the anxiety level of targets.
Suicide bombings occur in liberal democracies because elected officials
perceive pressure to protect lives although making concessions encourages
future attacks (Enders and Sandler 2006). Not everyone agrees with a
rational choice interpretation. Scholarship examining the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict contends that suicide bombings are not cost-effective, given the
degree of repression that results after each attack, but that new attacks are
motivated by a “cultural logic of retaliation,” which perpetuates the cycle of
violence (Brym and Araj 2006). In other words, the continued use of suicide
bombing is motivated by the need to exact revenge from the Israeli
government.
World Systems Perspective

Some argue that international terrorism is best studied from a WS
perspective (Bergesen 1990). WS analysis refers to a set of related theories
from a variety of contributors (Hall 2002). By comparing the current wave
of terrorism with the political unrest of the mid-1800s, Bergesen and
Lizardo (2004) suggest a common set of international conditions conducive
to international terrorism including hegemonic decline, globalization,
empire or colonial competition, and autocratic semiperipheral zones.
Hegemonic decline is the rise and fall of dominant states. History
reveals a pattern of rising and falling empires with no region permanently
dominant. Hegemonic decline is inevitable “as the world-economy moves to
a new center based on more advanced production techniques” (Bergesen
and Lizardo 2004: 47). Political entities that cannot adapt to changing global
economic conditions will be replaced by political structures that can. These
transitions from one hegemonic center to another are not peaceful, as there
is no process for transferring advantage. A new power center emerges with
the destruction of the former hegemonic state.
If the WS perspective is correct, the ability of the United States to
maintain its hegemonic position will depend on maintaining its production
advantage. Whether it can continue to do so is unclear with some arguing
that the United States is in a state of decline that began with the Vietnam
conflict (Hall 2002; Wallerstein 2003) and coincides with the economic
downturn after 9/11 (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Wallerstein 2003). What
does all of this have to do with terrorism? Bergesen and Lizardo (2004)
suggest a number of possibilities, including signaling a power struggle, the
differentiation of war and terrorism, the role of semiperipheral zones, and
trigger events.
Hegemonic decline results in global instability. Outbreaks of
international terrorism may be analogous to a “canary in the mineshaft” that
signals the onset of state-to-state power struggles between a declining
hegemonic power and other entities vying for control (Bergesen and Lizardo
2004). For example, periods of international terrorism (1880s–1914)
preceded both World Wars (1914–1945). The reasons for an increase in
terrorism during hegemonic decline are due to strains in the system resulting
from the transition from one hegemon to another and the declining influence
of the current one (Lizardo 2008).
The semiperiphery exists between powerful core nations and the
economically undeveloped periphery. The periphery supplies both cheap
labor and raw materials to core economies. This exploitation enables those
residing in the core (e.g. the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom) to
have a standard of living that is subsidized off the backs of those living and
working in the periphery (e.g. Bangladesh, Vietnam). Although jobs are
provided, workers are paid poorly with little job security or access to
benefits such as health care. Deskilling or breaking down complex tasks that
previously were performed by skilled workers into less complicated tasks
that can be performed by unskilled laborers results in no transfer of
technology to the periphery. This and the lack of capital (land, buildings,
equipment, etc.) render it impossible for a periphery nation to set up
competing industries. The semiperiphery (e.g. Indonesia, Taiwan, and the
Middle East) is not as developed as the core but more so than the periphery.
This middle group has many functions including deflecting anger away from
the core, as the existence of a semiperiphery suggests that development and
a higher standard of living is possible over time.
Bergesen and Lizardo argue that international terrorism erupts in the
semiperiphery including Arab-Islamic states. Explanations for this trend
include a weakening of the hegemonic state that allows those living in the
semiperiphery to resist dictatorial rulers, a decline in support from core
states to dependent states in the semiperiphery, and a backlash against the
hegemonic state. An alternative role of the semiperiphery is to provide a
trigger event for a power struggle between competing core states. An
example of such a trigger may have been the assassination of the Austrian
Archduke and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, by Gavrilo Princip, a
Bosnian Serb student and member of Young Bosnia, a group that advocated
for independence from Austria–Hungary, which lead to the outbreak of
World War I. Weaknesses of this approach include a lack of historical
evidence for the existence of terrorism during the Spain hegemonic era
preceding the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), a failure to identify a specific
link between hegemonic decline and the onset of terrorism, and exactly why
terrorism originates in the semiperiphery rather than the periphery
(Bergesen and Lizardo 2004).
Framing
As previously discussed, the framing perspective was developed by social
movement theorists to recognize that individuals actively produce and
maintain meaning (Snow et al. 1986) as opposed to merely transmitting
movement ideology. Diagnostic framing articulates what is wrong with
society, government, or some other aspects of social life, and attributes
responsibility (Snow and Byrd 2007). Diagnostic frames are not fixed or
static, but change over time. In applying diagnostic framing to Islamic
terrorist groups, Snow and Byrd suggest that there is some evidence for a
shift from blaming Westernization and the United States to a more inwardly
based frame that focuses on oppression and inequality against Muslims
within their own countries. Religion, perceptions of oppression, and
historical grievances are all considered causes of terrorism (Matusitz 2013)
that provide the content for both diagnostic and prognostic frames.
Once groups articulate diagnostic frames (i.e. what’s wrong and who’s
to blame?), prognostic frames offer solutions to grievances. Frame
alignment occurs when organizers and potential members share a common
definition of both “what is wrong” and “what needs to be done” (Snow et al.
1986). Yet in Snow and Byrd’s examination of both the Iranian revolution
and the Sunni–Shi’a conflict in Iraq, they note that solutions do not flow
neatly from diagnoses and are often contested.
Although groups may be successful in aligning diagnostic and
prognostic frames, this does not automatically translate into individuals who
will readily act on behalf of the movement. As Snow and Byrd argue, the
problem of motivational framing is moving constituents “from the balconies
to the barricades” (2007: 128). Motivational frames must encourage people
to take action despite incurring risks in light of the possibility of receiving
the same benefits by doing nothing (i.e. free-rider effect). In their review of
writings on Islamic terrorist movements, Snow and Byrd note that clerical
leaders frame action as a religious and moral duty, but this is not always
sufficient. In the case of Palestinian suicide bombers, the appeal of special
rewards, both spiritual and worldly, is especially motivating.
The use of framing as an analytic tool promises a more nuanced and
complicated view of social movements because the three core framing tasks
can vary both within and among movements. For example, when comparing
two movements, a diagnostic frame may not be as important as a prognostic
frame and even within a movement, the importance of different types of
frames may shift over time as a reaction to the task at hand or the type of
social control or support encountered (Snow and Byrd 2007). Diagnostic
framing may not be as important when members are recruited from
preexisting networks as organizers can assume more shared values and
beliefs and thus devote more energy to prognostic and motivational frames
(Jasper and Poulsen 1995). There may also be differences between frames,
in the level of both development and coherence. While diagnostic and
prognostic frames might be well developed and cohesive, mobilization
frames may not be. Finally, frames may vary in relevance as perceived by
their intended audience. Because of these potential differences, Snow and
Byrd note that it is possible to find differences in both the “spread and
mobilization efficacy of a number of movements within the same category”
(2007: 130) including Islamic terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda or
Hezbollah.
Categorical Terrorism
Jeff Goodwin’s (2006, 2012) theory of categorical terrorism proposes to
explain violence or threats of violence against noncombatants or civilians.
Goodwin argues that terrorists do not attack civilians indiscriminately.
Because terrorists are interested in gaining the support of some segments of
the population, terrorists direct violence toward “complicitous civilians”
(2006: 2037) or persons who benefit from the actions of the state, support
the state, and/or are perceived as having an influence on state policy.
Civilians that provide political, economic, or military support to “their state”
are more likely terrorism targets (Goodwin 2012). The goal of categorical
terrorism is to influence civilians to stop supporting the state or to demand
policy changes favored by the terrorists. Goodwin identifies three factors
that he believes influence the decision to use categorical terrorism.
Terrorism is more likely when combatants perceive civilians as
“benefit[ing] from, support[ing], demand[ing] or tolerat[ing] extensive and
indiscriminate state violence or state terrorism [emphasis Goodwin’s]
against the revolutionaries and their presumed constituents” (2006: 2039). A
second factor is the size and strength of the civilian target. When the target
group is smaller or well protected because of wealth or social status,
violence is less likely. A third factor is the lack of political alliances
between revolutionaries and their supporters and the target civilians. When
ties or alliances do exist between supporters of categorical terrorists and
civilian targets, violence is discouraged because targeting these civilians
would jeopardize a potential political ally. Terrorism is less likely when
civilians have a history of cooperating with rebels or opposing states
(Goodwin 2012). All of the theories reviewed suggest various causes of
terrorism. The next section reviews some of the more popular ideas
discussed by social scientists.
CAUSES OF TERRORISM
Sociological theories generate questions that can be tested by empirical data.
Gathering such data can be difficult as terrorist events are performed by a
small number of individuals operating in relative secrecy and not directly
accessible to sociologists (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Smelser 2007).
Identifying terrorist events to study is difficult because this depends on
identifying the motive (Beck 2007; Tilly 2004) in an era when increasingly
groups do not make public claims of responsibility (Schmid and Jongman
1988) and violence may be due to vengeance or retribution (Senechal de la
Roche 2004: 2). Social scientists as well as government officials are forced
to use more indirect methods such as the posting of Web site videos and
background information on group ideologies. All of these sources are
helpful, but this information is limited and sometimes even misleading. In
the next section, we review recent empirical findings. Because the literature
focuses on substate actors, we do as well but acknowledge the seriousness of
state and state-sponsored terror.
della Porta (2004) argues that understanding terrorism involves dynamics
that operate at three levels, including micro, meso, and macro.
Microdynamics is a more social psychological approach that focuses on the
characteristics of individuals involved in terrorist organizations. The
mesodynamic level is concerned with group characteristics, whereas the
macrodynamic level is more focused on societal or institutional conditions
that foster political violence. A sociological approach to terrorism tends to
favor the macrodynamic level with calls for examining the political, social,
and economic context in which it takes place (Oliverio and Lauderdale
2005); yet, all three approaches provide valuable information.
Microdynamic and Social Psychological Variables

A microdynamic or psychological approach focuses on individual
personality characteristics including low self-esteem, lack of personal trust,
self-destruction, narcissism, or emotional disturbance (Kinloch 2005).
Unfortunately, there is little consensus on what psychological traits define
terrorists, with most experts agreeing that terrorists are essentially normal
(de Zulueta 2006). Irving Horowitz’s (1973) study of the biographical
details of terrorists in the 1970s suggest that most are male, young, middle
class, economically marginalized, self-destructive, willing to self-sacrifice,
and lack a well-defined ideological persuasion. The relevance of certain
psychological variables may depend on group position. Leaders give orders
and provide ideological motivation. They see themselves as agents of
change. The Idealist is a follower motivated by ideology and feelings of
oppression. The opportunist has antisocial characteristics, a record of
criminal misconduct that precedes affiliation with a terrorist organization,
and is motivated to join as a means of fitting in or deriving self-worth
(Taylor and Quayle 1994).
della Porta argues that focusing on militant characteristics fails to
address the question, “how can isolated and marginalized individuals
translate strains into collective action?” (2004: 3 of 8). It is not that
psychological or more microdynamic approaches are unhelpful, as this
approach aids in understanding why members stay (della Porta 2004). For
example, there is some evidence that individuals recruited into Al-Qaeda are
encouraged to cut off ties with friends and family who do not share their
extreme fundamentalist views (de Zulueta 2006). Because of extreme
isolation, terrorist groups became the only reference for members (della
Porta 2004). Contemporary research emphasizes collectively held beliefs,
perceptions of the group, and the risks and benefits of staying or leaving.
Fully understanding these issues necessitates a shift from the individual to
the group.
Mesodynamic
This type of explanation is interested in group characteristics such as shared
ideologies and how groups are able to attract and keep resources, including
money, members, and leaders. An additional area of inquiry is how groups
adapt their ideology, strategies, and structures to the external environment.
della Porta (2004) argues that isolation, a feature of clandestine groups,
limits the ability to adapt.
Individuals who are more socially isolated and believe it is easier to stay
with a terrorist group than to leave are more likely to do so. Perceptions
shared among group members include believing that society is unjust, can
be changed, should be changed, and it is one’s duty to do so (Moghaddam
2003). Other views collectively held by terrorists include believing that the
world can be divided into good and evil, that the ends of terrorism justify
the means, that terror is necessary, and that engaging in terrorism is a form
of self-improvement (Moghaddam 2003). Using framing terminology,
individuals share diagnostic and prognostic frames. For example, right-wing
terrorism in the United States is linked to grievances such as abortion rates
and female labor force participation (Piazza 2017).
SOCIALIZATION OF TERRORISTS
The vast majority of persons who suffer from poverty and oppression do
not become terrorists although they may be passive supporters according to
Frasier (Henderson 2004). What experiences increase the likelihood of an
individual becoming a terrorist and how do groups socialize members?
Terrorists are not born but are a product of the social and cultural
environment in which they are enmeshed. Groups such as families and
other socialization agents may socialize members to be more susceptible to
framing by terrorist groups. Staub (2003) argues that terrorists are more
likely to have childhoods characterized by extreme pain, suffering, and
harsh treatment with few opportunities for warmth and affection from
caring adults who modeled other ways of working for change. Socialization
is a lifelong process that influences our daily interactions. Smelser’s (2007)
review of the literature suggests that networks are important, with people
being influenced by friends, family, in-laws, and other associates.
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Others have argued that the need for a functioning collective identity can
explain a proclivity for terrorism (Taylor and Louis 2003). Collective
identity is defined as “a description of the group to which individuals
belong against which they can articulate their unique attributes” (172).
Sociologists refer to reference groups as the collective against which we
evaluate ourselves. Taylor and Lewis argue that individuals can have a
variety of collective identities because we belong to a variety of different
groups, including ones defined by ethnicity, gender, work, and leisure, but
the cultural group, which may or may not include religion, has special
relevance. This cultural collective identity specifies both what is valued in
society and the acceptable means for obtaining achievement and
recognition. The significance of collective identity is that one cannot have a
personal identity without the collective to serve as a backdrop.
Furthermore, a functioning collective identity exists only when there is a
means to achieve valued goals.
Although Osama bin Laden comes from a privileged family in Saudi
Arabia and is highly educated, because he had no opportunity to achieve his
ambitions, he constructed a new collective identity based on blaming the
West and specifically the United States for the economic deprivation that
exists in the Arab world (Taylor and Lewis 2003). Some of the 9/11
hijackers as well as the Russian revolutionaries known as People’s Will
(responsible for the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881) were highly
educated and came from the middle or upper social classes (Carr 2006;
Matusitz 2013). This does vary by position within a group with followers
having less education and status compared to leaders (Smith 2002). Social
alienation may also be relevant to understanding motivation (Smelser
2007). The London bombers also were not poor, but their social alienation
may have been an outcome of having no sense of belonging (Turner 2007).
Though much more empirical evidence needs to be gathered to
document whether collective identity issues and/or social alienation are
relevant explanatory variables, the importance placed on the interaction
between individuals and structural forces within their environment such as
the disconnect between cultural goals and opportunity structures to achieve
those goals is interesting. Merton’s (1968) strain theory of deviance may be
one lens through which we can view terrorism and the connection between
individual actions and structural forces.
STRAIN THEORY
Briefly, Robert Merton argues that deviance, or the violation of cultural
norms, occurs because of a break between cultural goals such as
achievement and culturally accepted means to achieve those goals, such as
education or employment. This disconnect is called strain, and results in
four types of deviance including the ritualist, rebel, retreatist, and innovator
(Merton 1968). Of these, the innovator and the rebel are especially relevant
to terrorism.
Innovative deviance occurs when individuals accept cultural goals, but
reject the means to achieve those goals. A classic example is a drug dealer
who accepts goals such as accumulating wealth, but rejects the accepted
means of achieving this goal through education or hard work. A terrorist
may accept cultural goals of achievement, but may use terrorism as a means
of success. In his examination of forty neo-Nazi terrorists, criminologist
Mark Hamm (2004) argues that celebrity is the goal for many.
In contrast, the rebel rejects both societal goals and means and tries to
actively replace both. Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, sent mail
bombs to airlines and universities for over eighteen years before being
detected. In his manifesto published in 1995 by the New York Times and
Washington Post,9 he argued that the bombs were necessary to call attention
to the evils of modern technology. He rejected cultural goals and the means
to achieve them by resigning from the University of California, Berkeley,
faculty and subsisting in a remote Montana shack by occasionally doing
odd jobs. He actively tried to replace societal goals and means by sending
mail bombs (Oleson 2005).
Employment is another traditional means of achieving success that is
blocked for some individuals. Neil Smelser’s (2007) review of motivational
factors notes that terrorists are often unemployed and reside in countries not
of their origin. Opportunity structures may be more difficult to traverse for
individuals who are trying to adapt to different cultures, and turning to
terrorism may be one outcome of failing to assimilate. Merton’s theory is an
interesting line of inquiry that has been applied to the Italian terrorist group,
Brigate Rosse (Ruggiero 2005). With strain theory, Merton attempts to
connect individuals to larger societal forces, including culture. Structural
factors operate outside the control of both groups and individuals and
constitute what della Porta (2004) refers to as a macrodynamic level of
analysis.
Macrodynamic or Structural
This level seeks to discover how social, economic, and political forces
create and sustain violence. This is not to say that the social structure of a
society is solely responsible for creating terrorists. We agree with Hallett
(2003: 65) that “one cannot say that the terrorists’ social milieu ‘creates’
him. To do so is to deny the terrorist his individuality, his moral agency.”
Disagreeing with Hallett, Black asserts that “every form of violence has its
own structure” whether it is dueling, lynching, feuding, or terrorism, and
that “structures kill and maim, not individuals or collectivities” (2004: 15).
Regardless of which perspective is correct, we must acknowledge that some
social contexts are more conducive to terrorism than others and that there
are outside social forces that influence and contribute to individual
behavior. Although recognizing the importance of phenomena operating on
all three levels, della Porta (2004: 7 of 8) argues that political violence
occurs when institutions are unable to direct conflict into a “peaceful
decision-making process” and that interactions between social movements
and the state are important for understanding the emergence of terrorist
organizations.
Structural conditions that breed terrorism include a lack of political
power, severe economic stress, rapid social change, perceived threats to
national interests, and political conflict (Taylor and Louis 2003). A political
climate supportive of the goals of the terrorist group is also associated with
activity. For example, Beck (2007) found that ecoterrorism in the United
States tends to occur in areas that primarily vote Democrat and have a
“youth bulge” defined as 20 percent or more of the population between the
ages of fifteen and twenty-four. Islamic societies with a youth bulge are
experiencing an upswing in terrorism (Hallett 2003). Most suicide bombers
are males between the ages of seventeen to twenty-three (Mahan and Griset
2007) yet women are involved in terrorism and even in religious terrorists
organizations the role of women has expanded over time (Margolin 2016).
For example, female suicide bombers are often the widows of men killed
(Pape 2005).
Marsella (2003) argues that terrorism will continue unless the root
structural causes, including global poverty, racism, oppression, and political
instability are addressed. Matusitz’s (2013) review of the literature cites
oppression, relative deprivation, and racism as causes of terrorism.
Similarly, Smelser argues that dispossession is a key predisposition for
terrorism and is defined as “perceptions on the part of the group that it is
systematically excluded, discriminated against, or disadvantaged with
respect to some meaningful aspect of social, economic, and political life to
which it feels entitled” (2007: 16). Globalization may feed perceptions of
exclusion and deprivation because, through instant communication and
increased tourism, it has become increasingly possible to compare one’s life
to those living in more developed countries and to also attribute blame to
those perceived as “fattening at the expense of the plundered majority of
earth inhabitants” (Galkin 2006: 79; Matusitz 2013).
Only a small minority of the world’s population lives in relative
comfort. Wealthy nations, including the United States, are perceived to be
the source of global poverty because consumption of cheap goods and
services is based on the exploitation of others, which fuels anger and
resentment. Globalization has created more economic inequality that led
working-class Arabs to embrace militant Islam (Martin 2007; Matusitz
2013; Toth 2003). Furthermore, globalization is not only an economic
phenomenon but also a social one, through the exporting of cultural values
and beliefs. There is a positive association between violent actions directed
at the United States and global economic interaction through foreign direct
investment and the expansion of world culture through international
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) affiliated with the UN (Lizardo
2006). INGOs enhance lives by pressuring governments to abide by
International Human Rights treaties, but as noted by Wiest (2006), this
expansion of world culture has empowered both human rights activists and
those who use violence against the state.
GLOBALIZATION
Globalization has contributed to the spread of Western values such as
individualism, materialism, and liberalism that challenge Islamic
fundamental views that stress collectivism and authoritarianism.
Increasingly, globalization has come to mean Westernization and
Americanization (Martin 2007; White 2003). Westernization is perceived as
threatening traditional hierarchies, including family and religious structures,
which leads to rising levels of violence. Some of the most popular
expressions of the argument predicting violence motivated by religion in
response to Westernization are Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations
thesis (1993, 1996) and Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld (2001).
Although Huntington’s arguments have been severely criticized, others
argue that this does not mean that the problems outlined by Huntington are
unfounded (Galkin 2006; Martin 2007; Turner 2007). Religion is a
powerful motivator of terrorism (Matusitz 2013), but other evidence
suggests that there is not a link between acceptance of the Quran as the
word of God and support for politically motivated violence, at least not for
American Muslims. In fact, researchers found an inverse relationship
suggesting that stronger adherence to Quranic authority was related to less
support for politically motivated violence (Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015).
In Jihad vs. McWorld, Barber agrees that resentment of Westernization
breeds the development of religious fundamentalist opposition, but, unlike
Huntington, he comes to the conclusion that McWorld will “win” because
in the end, Jihad must use the same strategies.
It is not simply a matter of clashing values but the perception that
Western values are penetrating the entire globe through mass media and
commercial exports such as Hollywood films and music. Every society
values the very things that make it unique including beliefs and customs.
Although terrorism is an extreme response to cultural identity threats,
consider how perceived threats to American culture evoke passionate
debate over issues like bilingualism and workplace accommodations and
proposals such as the one to build a fence across the U.S.–Mexico border.
Though none of these responses are as extreme as terrorism, surely we can
identify with the feelings of those who wish to protect their way of life
while still condemning terrorist actions.
America, Love It or Leave It
Credit: Photo by Karl Wagenfuehr and used under licensing agreement with
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/
Some may argue that avoiding Westernization is as simple as forgoing

Hollywood films and other cultural products. However, as a structural force,
the effects of globalization are beyond the making of individual choices;
refusing to see a film does not immunize someone from Westernization,
because globalization forces an interdependency through a variety of
systems, including transportation, telecommunications, and transnational
capital flow through organizations dominated by the West (e.g. World
Bank) (Marsella 2003). Many terrorists resent international organizations
they perceive as being dominated by the west such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) (Matusitz 2013). Not all researchers agree that a
Western homogenization of culture is an outcome of globalization
(Robertson 1992).
While globalization is considered a grievance that is a root cause of
terrorism, the changes in international terrorism are also a reflection of
globalization. For example, terrorist networks working across national
boundaries resemble global business networks. Terrorists operate with no
regard for national boundaries, and demands and pronouncements made by
terrorist groups decreasingly reflect a specific national interest (Bergesen
and Han 2005). Just as globalization has made it easier for people and
goods to flow across borders, it has also simplified transportation for
terrorists who freely mingle with tourists (Galkin 2006). Martin (2007)
argues that access to the media via the Internet and more integrated
economies defines “new terrorism.” This differs from older forms through
the use of asymmetrical methods, including the use of high-yield weapons
and religious motivation for violence.
Asymmetrical methods have transformed terrorism from the use of
“armed propaganda” (Martin 2007: 7 of 15) into a mode of warfare that
enables terrorists to confront a much larger and seemingly more powerful
enemy using creative tactics (e.g. using an airliner as an armed missile in
the 9/11 attacks). Launching a cyberattack that can disrupt communications
and financial transactions is a new threat enabled by globalization. While
terrorists have always had access to bombs and guns, the weapons of today
(e.g. AK-47 rifles and plastic explosives) are much more destructive than
their predecessors (Martin 2007). The potential to acquire weapons of mass
destruction (e.g. radiological, chemical, biological, and nuclear) also
dramatically increases the killing potential. Martin argues that although
terrorists in the past killed civilians, they tended to constrain themselves to
symbolic targets. With new terrorism, the entire population is viewed as a
legitimate target. Those religiously motivated may be less disturbed by the
targeting of civilians, believing that these actions will please God no matter
how violent and destructive.
POLITICAL OPPRESSION
Political oppression is also considered an important structural factor, but its
relationship with terrorism is not clear-cut. Oppression of a subnational
group by powerful central governments (e.g. China, Chechnya, perceived
treatment of the Palestinians by the Israelis) results in some groups using
terrorism as a means for calling attention to their oppression as well as
exacting revenge. Many Arabs and Muslims believe that the West is biased
against them and the perceived disproportionate support given to Israel is
considered proof (Galkin 2006; Marsella 2003; Wike 2012).
CIVIL LIBERTIES
Although oppression might be a grievance that might motivate terror, the
existence of civil liberties in a target area is a structural condition that
increases the likelihood of an attack. Democracies are prone to terrorist
attacks precisely because the freedoms inherent within them protect
terrorist groups. For example, Palestinian suicide bombers perceive
political oppression as a result of their experiences living in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, but carry out their attacks within Israel, a democratic
society, by targeting Israelis who are going to work, waiting for the bus, or
shopping (Enders and Sandler 2006).
SECURITY
Nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan are unstable and lack the ability to
provide basic services including security. Terrorism is seen by some as a
response to the ongoing instability. Citizens may tolerate and assist armed
terrorist groups operating in their area because some security is better than
none at all.
Many of the structural factors mentioned in this section including
political instability, globalization, and clash of cultural values are linked to
Westernization. Grievances are often motivators for terrorism, but are not
sufficient causes for violence (Black 2004; Schmid and Jongman 1988)
because other response options exist, including protest and inaction (Tilly
2004). Black (2004: 16) describes terrorism as “self-help, the handling of a
grievance with aggression.” What then explains whether individuals with
grievances caused by structural factors will engage in this sort of self-help?
GEOMETRY
According to Black, a grievance must be accompanied by “the right
geometry—a particular location and direction in social space” (2004: 18).
Relying on the work of Senechal de la Roche, Black argues that terrorism is
more likely when social distances are great (e.g. indigenous persons
resisting colonial rulers) and less likely when not. For example, terrorism is
less likely when grievances are individual rather than collective and when
conflict originates between adversaries that share social space, such as
members of a community or a shared ethnicity. Subnational terroristic
conflict is also less likely to be initiated by social superiors against those
with less or equal social power. Terrorism is more likely when a collective
has a shared grievance against an entity with more social power and this
collective is socially distant due to differing ethnicities or societal
membership.
Social geometry must also be accompanied by physical opportunities
that Black argues were not common until the twentieth century. Noting that
terrorists often try other political strategies first, Goodwin (2006, 2007,
2012) contends that the turn to “categorical terrorism” is more likely when
potential victims are perceived as complicit in the oppression of the
aggrieved group and unlikely to convert.
Black’s analysis may explain why WS theorists have failed to find
evidence of terrorism during the Spain hegemonic era preceding the Thirty
Years’ War, as this predates the technological advances that have allowed
civilians of differing social positions to come into frequent physical contact.
“Terrorism arises only when a grievance has a social geometry distant
enough and a physical geometry close enough for mass violence against
civilians” (Black 2004: 21). Recall that another weakness of WS is the
failure to explain why terrorism develops in the semiperiphery as opposed
to the periphery. Although the periphery and the semiperiphery share both
greater social distance and grievances against the core, the semiperiphery
might provide more opportunities for physical contact with potential
targets. Theoretical models that incorporate both a WS perspective and a
social geometric view of collective violence could become powerful tools
for explaining the structural causes of international terrorism.
RESPONDING TO TERRORISM
Terrorism is difficult to combat for a variety of reasons. As William Crotty
argues,
authoritarian governments … are likely to persevere; repression will continue; poverty,
ignorance, fear of modernity, and religious zealotry will not disappear; and military
action over any prolonged period of time is costly, debilitating to the nation relying on it,
and potentially destructive to the democratic values it has been enlisted to serve.
(2005: 523)
While military action and counter intelligence or security seems to be the

primary U.S. method for combating terrorism, other options exist, including
diplomacy, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid (Crotty 2005), and other
methods of peacemaking and peacebuilding (Wagner 2006). Ultimately,
terrorism cannot be eliminated without removing social and political
motivators (Galkin 2006).
Using the context of Muslim attacks against the West, removing social
and political motivators would require that grievances be addressed,
including global poverty and political oppression. For some, this is
considered the only real hope of ending violence (de Zulueta 2006). Any
action requires the long-term financial commitment of several nations and,
with the exception of military action, is unlikely to show any short-term
improvement. While military action has immediate short-term effects, its use
as a primary means of combating terrorism is unlikely to have sustainable
positive effects and may in fact be counterproductive by fueling more
terrorism (Butko 2006). We address several potential state responses to
terrorism including increasing security and repression, eliminating political
opportunities, alleviating structural causes, and peacebuilding.
Security and Response

Henderson (2004) distinguishes between two types of substate terrorism;
systematic that is based on global disparities such as poverty and other
economic, political, and cultural issues, and idiosyncratic or groups that
have absolute views on a specific issue such as abortion or animal rights.
The response to terrorism depends on which type is involved because
strategies that will work with one type will not necessarily work with
another. For example, antiabortion terrorist groups will stop their violence
only if laws are changed, rendering abortion illegal. Barring that, the only
appropriate response seems to be intelligence gathering and the hardening of
targets or rendering them less susceptible to attack. Preventing and
responding to terrorist attacks is a complicated process with a bureaucratic
structure that poses many organizational and technological challenges. For
example, in the United States, technology is often antiquated and the federal
bureaucracy is complex, with agencies such as the FBI and CIA resistant to
sharing turf.
The merging of security functions into the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) was intended to improve disaster responsiveness. But, even
within DHS, there are a myriad of agencies, including Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border
Protection, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service. These agencies have
different organizational cultures that can be hard to mesh, and congressional
oversight often pulls agencies in different directions with a potential for
mission creep or straying from intended mandates (Kettl 2004). While Kettl
contends that it makes sense to subsume FEMA into DHS because the needs
and priorities of first responders are similar for both terrorism and natural
disasters, this analysis predates FEMA’s flawed response to Hurricane
Katrina. Security and repression are less controversial strategies when
applied to idiosyncratic groups. Our subsequent discussion will consider
possible responses to terrorism committed by nonidiosyncratic groups.
Repression
The repression paradigm is a typical government response to terrorism
(Martin 2006). Some have termed current U.S. policies as an example of a
garrison state with treatment of immigrant detainees by the ICE and the FBI
as an example of state-initiated violence (Franz 2005). While everyone is
aware of the atrocities committed by the U.S. military at Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq, examples of abuse of Arab and Muslim immigrant detainees in the
United States documented by the Department of Justice include beating,
withholding of halal (Islamic dietary laws) food, and denial of access to
family members and legal assistance (Franz 2005). The treatment of
immigrant detainees, the indefinite confinement of enemy combatants at the
U.S. Naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (prior to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision), alleged torture of detainees, and the expanded surveillance
powers of the USA PATRIOT Act can be considered outcomes of what
Giorgio Agamben (2005) calls the “state of exception.”
Historically, states of exception occur when regimes are faced with
extraordinary crises such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These extraordinary
events provide the justification needed for extreme measures such as the
curtailing of civil liberties. The USA PATRIOT Act (Wong 2006) as well as
the British equivalent (Zedner 2005) was adopted with little challenge.
While the public initially supported the increased surveillance and other
curtailments of civil rights after 9/11, poll data suggest that this support has
declined (Best, Krueger, and Ladewig 2006; Gao 2015; Matthew and
Shambaugh 2005).
The danger of a state of exception is its potential to turn democracies
into authoritarian regimes. Consider some of the more controversial aspects
of the USA PATRIOT Act, including “sneak and peek” warrants (authorities
may search the premises without an owner present and delay notification),
roving wiretaps (allows wiretapping without the prior establishment of
cause), and the ability to easily obtain medical, employment, and
educational records as well as DNA samples (Wong 2006). Robert Weiss
contends that U.S. society has the ingredients for “conservative
totalitarianism” (2006: 135), given the history of state-sanctioned torture
combined with other violent proclivities. This is one potential outcome of
the state of exception.
Agamben believes that the state of exception is becoming the basis for
modern state power in the West. The extraordinary measures that are used to
respond to crises, such as the suspension of habeas corpus, become the rule
rather than anomalies. The implication for democracies is that legal
protections previously guaranteed to all are at the whim of law enforcement
and other judicial processes—no longer a guarantee. In a state of exception,
a citizen is at risk of becoming a homo sacer, or someone stripped of all
legal and civil protections (Agamben 1998). Creators of the Index of
Democracy argue that security- and terrorism-related concerns along with a
decline in political participation and weakness in government functioning
are having a “corrosive effect on some long-established democracies”
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 1).
As noted by Lauderdale and Oliverio (2005), Dwight D. Eisenhower,
former U.S. President and Army General, warned of state ability to
inappropriately use power to bring about change by evading government
checks and balances. What Eisenhower termed the Military–Industrial
Complex is alive and well with secret CIA prisons and the use of private
security contractors for jobs including interrogation. Military personnel
prosecuted for Abu Ghraib contend that CIA interrogators, army military
intelligence, and private contractors encouraged them to soften up prisoners
(Meixler 2004). Additionally, private security firms operating in Iraq have
been immune from criminal prosecution. An incident where thirteen Iraqi
civilians were allegedly killed in 2007 by Blackwater USA employees
prompted U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice to order security cameras
installed in all vehicles and to have U.S. State Department diplomatic
security guards ride with Blackwater conveys (Lee 2007). Blackwater USA
(now Academi) is only one of many nonstate private security companies
under scrutiny, including two investigated for Abu Ghraib abuses
(Lauderdale and Oliverio 2005). When nonstate actors commit abuses
against civilians that are financed by the state, it constitutes state-sponsored
terror.
Not everyone agrees that a state of exception exists, because although
liberal democracies initially respond to terrorism by giving security
precedence over the importance of human rights and civil liberties, these
practices are moderated over time with the pendulum forced toward the
center (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005). Whether this describes what will
ultimately happen to policies involving the “war on terror” is uncertain, but
many have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo of citizen fear and
repression justified by the promise of increased security.
Sociologists ask, “Who benefits from fear?” and besides the terrorists,
there is the state and business. It is easier for the state to be unfettered from
legal obligations such as warrants and speedy trials. Security companies
benefit from fear of terrorism just as alarm companies benefit from the
public’s fear of crime (Zedner 2005). An example is the aftermath of the
anthrax scare in 2001 that raised new fears about bioterrorism.
According to the authors of Marching Plague: Germ Warfare and
Global Public Heath, the public should fear the institutions (e.g. military,
government, business) benefiting from the weaponization of germs more
than they should fear the specter of bioterrorism itself. They contend that
using germs is not an effective military strategy due to the inability to
control weather conditions and the limited efficacy of germs in a single
indoor space. They argue that terrorists have “more profoundly symbolic
and terrible ways to kill” that are readily available (Critical Art Ensemble
2006: 32).
Alleviating Structural Causes

Galtung and Fischer (2002) call for dialogue and global education as the
first step toward addressing structural causes that breed grievances and
ultimately terrorism. A political and economic development approach
suggests that, in the long run, substate terrorism will only subside by
reducing the gap between developed nations and developing ones, or the
haves and the have-nots. Henderson (2004) refers to global disparities as the
engine that drives terrorism and predicts that dislocation due to global
warming and population and immigration pressures are future engines to
consider. Marsella (2003) argues that rogue nations foster terrorism both
within and beyond national borders and encourage diplomacy and economic
development as a means of diffusing precursor economic and political
conditions. It is impossible to stall or reverse globalization but actions could
mitigate some of the grievances associated with it. Curbing inequality in
developing countries that comes with globalization may eliminate
grievances that lead to terrorism.
Eliminating Political Opportunities

If Oberschall (2004) is correct, eliminating political opportunities should
curtail terrorism. In the case of international or transnational terrorism, he
argues that policy initiatives such as pressuring governments not to provide
a safe haven for insurgents as well as reducing the flow of resources from
citizens of other countries to terrorist groups (e.g. much of the cash raised
by the Irish Republican Army was from U.S. citizens) should go a long way
in curbing violence. Oberschall acknowledges that states agreeing to enact
policies aimed at reducing political opportunities may insist that target states
also engage to bring about a more peaceful political solution and that this
response is the first best choice for eliminating violence.
Peacebuilding
Terrorism based on ideology, or what Henderson (2004) terms old terrorism,
can be addressed by supporting the peace process as established in Northern
Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Spain. Oberschall (2004) suggests that, while no
terrorist group has been successful in the overthrow of a government, they
have ceased their activities when they have attained their goals, including,
on some occasions, power-sharing agreements with governments.
Governments that attempt to negotiate with terrorists have a more successful
outcome when they do not insist on cease-fires and other absolutes to
terrorist activities. Like Tilly (2004), Oberschall recognizes that terrorist
groups often have a variety of individuals who may practice both terrorism
and conventional politics. To insist on a complete moratorium puts the most
violent faction of an insurgency in charge. Thus, peacekeeping is unlikely to
bring about a long-term solution to the problem (Wagner 2006).
Peacemaking involves dealing with basic needs such as providing
security and economic resources to an aggrieved group as well as
negotiating solutions to previous injustice. Current peacemaking efforts tend
to deal with narrowly defined issues such as the control of a specific piece of
land or who can send representatives to a governing body. Long-term
peacemaking solutions need to deal with the basis of the conflict (Wagner
2006) such as the loss of land experienced by the Palestinians, treatment of
the Palestinians by the Israeli government (e.g. razing the homes of family
members of suspected terrorists), and the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish
state. Like peacekeeping, Wagner argues that peacemaking will not result in
an end to terrorism because peacemaking proposals do not build in a
mechanism for withstanding future conflicts.
Peacebuilding involves alleviating the causes of grievances as well as
developing realistic empathy between antagonists. Wagner explains that this
does not mean one has to agree or sympathize with the other party, but to
understand their perspective. True understanding comes from trying “to
walk in another person’s shoes” or what sociologists call role-taking (Mead
1934). In applying realistic empathy to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict,
Wagner suggests that Palestinians might then be able to understand Israel’s
real need for security precautions and that Israelis might begin to see why
Palestinians are angry over the loss of their homeland and their current need
for autonomy and self-determination. Terrorism is less likely when
aggrieved parties come to view the target group as potential allies. Goodwin
(2007) notes that the African National Congress (ANC) did not resort to
terrorism in their anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa because they came
to see whites as potential allies despite the fact that these same whites were
benefiting from the apartheid system.
THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM

The demonization of terrorism results in this label being used for every evil
act of violence in society and, when a term is overused, the “sin of the ism”
will disappear (Ukai 2005: 249). Richards (2014) also expresses concern
about the overly broad application of a concept that will result in the
inability to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence. While
terrorism may cease to be useful as a social science concept, the behaviors
themselves are still a concern. What do social scientists predict for the future
of terrorism? As expected, there is no single view, with both pessimists and
optimists making predictions.
Optimistic View
Black (2004) argues that increasing technology, including transportation and
electronic communication, has made physical geometry less relevant and
social geometry even more so. Terrorism increased because of opportunities
for those with great social distance to have closer physical contact.
Eventually, technology will reduce terrorism because of the potential to
decrease social distance due to greater global intimacy. Black’s argument is
based on the premise that terrorism occurs because of differences in cultural
values and having greater contact over time will dissipate these differences.
In the case of American targets, political scientist John Mearsheimer (2008)
disagrees by arguing that terrorists do not hate Americans because of who
they are, but terrorists do hate American policies. Citing the Wall Street
Journal, Noam Chomsky (2003) argues that a survey of post-9/11 attitudes
of nonterrorist Muslims with money (e.g. bankers, professionals) found that
there was much support for U.S. policies in the wake of 9/11 as well as
admiration for American freedoms, but there was also deep resentment of
U.S. support for repressive and corrupt regimes. Black’s prediction is
unlikely if terrorism is due to anger over U.S. foreign policy. For Jensen
(2015), technology is a double-edged sword that will make it easier for
terrorists, but also for those who work to counter these activities.
Pessimistic View
Terrorism works best when it inhibits the target’s behavior, enhances the
standing of perpetrators with allies, and influences third parties to cooperate
with terrorist organizations (Tilly 2004). Terrorism will continue because
there will always be weaker parties with grievances trying to level the
playing field and the inability of multiple governments to effectively
coordinate their anti-terrorist policies (Enders and Sandler 2006). If we
concede that a world without terrorism or the threat of terrorism is highly
unlikely, what can we expect to happen in the next few decades? Some
predictions have been made, including:
1. Domestic terrorism will continue to overshadow transnational terrorism.
2. Terrorists will continue to change tactics, venues, and targets as a means
of adapting to counterterrorism. Jensen (2015) takes this further arguing
that the most successful terrorists will be those who adapt to structures
that combine hierarchy and the use of networks.
3. Attacks waged by religious groups will continue to be more deadly per
incident.
4. Terrorists will continue to use the Internet and social media as a means
of coordination and communication.
5. Economic targets will continue to be vulnerable (Enders and Sandler
2006: 256–257).
6. Globalization will produce alliances between terrorist groups that are not
natural allies (e.g. white supremacists and Mexican drug cartels) (Jensen
2015).
7. It will be increasingly difficult to make distinctions between criminal
enterprises, terrorists, and other political actors (Jensen 2015).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Research
Albert Bergesen and Yi Han (2005) urge sociologists to consider two issues
as they conceptualize and implement future research. First, use a
comparative approach that captures which international conditions are
associated with terrorism and the cycles or waves of terrorism that occur.
They note that the current cycle is similar to that of 1878–1914, which they
describe as a leftist, anarchist-inspired wave preceding World War I.
Second, transnational terrorism needs a more nuanced conceptualization
that accounts for different degrees of internationalism. For example, they
note that the 9/11 attacks involved perpetrators from abroad attacking a
foreign target on its own turf, which is a much more aggressive attack than
perpetrators attacking targets on the home turf of the perpetrators or going
abroad to attack foreign interests that are located in neither the home turf of
the perpetrators nor targets. This conceptualization does away with the
domestic and international split. Domestic terrorism is simply the least
international of the four types (see Figure 9.4). This is important because
Bergesen and Han (2005) believe that domestic terrorism should not be
construed as a special category of political violence although they do
acknowledge that goals, recruitment tactics, and other issues might
significantly differ between the four types. They suggest that researchers
should ask three types of questions that are posed at different levels of
analysis.
FIGURE 9.4 Location of Perpetrator and Victim in
Terrorist Incidents
Source: Based on Bergesen and Han (2005)
The first level inquires about organizations, ideologies, demands made,

and types of violence used, such as are recruitment tactics different for
different types of “international” terrorism? The second level uses the wave
cycles (1870s–1914 and 1968–present) as the unit of inquiry, with
researchers examining wave development and indicators of a life cycle.
Finally, the third level should explore whether waves of terrorism are
historically unique or whether cycles are similar.
CONCLUSION
Drawing on Max Weber’s “Science as a Vocation” and “The Meaning of
‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” political scientist Jeffrey
Isaac argues that social scientists have an obligation to provide analysis of
significant events, including war. However, in times of war and civil unrest,
the freedoms scholars depend upon, such as the ability to “inquire,
communicate, and publicize” (2004: 476), are jeopardized. In Agamben’s
words, this is another outcome of state of exception democracies and it is up
to scholars to “mobilize their theories to explain how and why those conflicts
are unfolding” even if doing so discloses facts that are “inconvenient” to
government “its critics, the media, terrorist organizations, rogue states, and
clerical ideologues alike” (479). Disclosing “inconvenient facts” is the heart
of sociology and essential for a critical analysis needed to challenge
hegemonic notions (Lauderdale and Oliverio 2005) that are based on
ideology and prejudice rather than scientific truth. Isaac contends that
scholars have been impacted in numerous ways, including limitations on the
free movement of scholars and students, surveillance that undermines the
privacy of library and Internet users, and the emergence of campus
“watchdog” groups such as “Middle East Watch.”
Another concern is the misuse of scientific data and theories to justify the
dehumanization and mistreatment of others, including alleged terrorists. As
German scientist Benno Müller-Hill writes, “science is about knowledge and
truth. So, we must ask ourselves, how could German scientists support anti-
Semitism and the racial measures of the Nazis?” (2004: 485). In Deadly
Medicine, Müller-Hill provides a detailed account of how some non-Jewish
academics benefited from the anti-Semitism of the National Socialists even
if they did not agree with it (and of course others did). Ethical scientists
never let ideology or personal self-interest cloud their use of data or justify
violence against others rooted in perceptions of superiority–inferiority.
Human history is replete with examples of violence perpetrated by
nation-states against civilians, including their own citizens. We live in a time
where violence does continue in less conventional but equally brutal forms,
including genocide and terrorism. While most acts of terrorism occur
overseas, domestic prevention measures are a continuing concern as the very
protections afforded to citizens of a liberal democracy can also be used by
terrorists to hide their activities. The continuing need for intelligence
gathering and other security measures needs to be balanced against
protecting civil liberties lest we come to live in a society that no longer
resembles the democratic principles upon which it was founded. We predict
that terrorism, war, and genocide will remain a significant topic of discussion
in years to come and that political sociologists will increase their
contributions to the understanding of this complex phenomenon.
Endnotes
1. Terrorism is defined in Title 22 Chapter 38 U.S. Code § 2656f as
“means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents”; which is also used by the U.S. State Department and the CIA.
The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of
violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or
societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are
usually political” (www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-
doctrine/JP3_07.2(10).pdf). The DHS defines terrorism as any activity
that
(1) involves an act that (a) is dangerous to human life or potentially

destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (b) is a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or
other subdivision of the United States; and (2) appears to be
intended (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping.
(www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf)
The FBI defines it as “the unlawful use of force or violence against

persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives” (www.fbi.gov). The FBI splits terrorism into two
categories, international and domestic and, respectively, defines each
as “perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated
with designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-
sponsored)” and “Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by
or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse
extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or
environmental nature” (www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism).
2. The U.S. Air Transport Association (now known as Airlines for
America or A4A) estimates that compliance with post-9/11 security
measures costs U.S. airlines $4.5 billion annually (“Relief Effort”
2007). U.S. government funding for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has grown from $2.2 billion in 2002 to
approximately eight billion in 2013 (Gillen and Morrison 2015). The
estimated cost of U.S domestic homeland security measures was over
one trillion dollars between 2002 and 2011 (Mueller and Stewart
2011).
3. It is illegal to knowingly provide material support or resources to any
group labeled an FTO. Alien members of such groups are excluded
from the United States, and banks and other financial institution that
become aware that they are holding funds of an FTO must maintain
possession and report assets to the U.S. Treasury. More information on
the legal criteria for designating a foreign organization an FTO and the
ramifications of that designation are available at:
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. SDGTs are the label
given to individuals “who have committed, or pose a serious risk of
committing acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S.
nationals, national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States” (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent
Extremism 2017).
4. Raul Reyes was killed by Columbian security forces on March 1, 2008
(“Columbian Forces Kill FARC Leader” 2008). In 2016, Columbian
President Juan Manuel Santos reached a peace agreement with FARC
to end five decades of war that killed 220,000 people and displaced
seven million persons. Voters rejected this deal in a referendum. The
FARC deal was a major issue in the 2018 presidential election that
Santos lost to Iván Duque leaving the FARC peace process in doubt
(Daniels 2018).
5. Because it is becoming less common for terrorist groups to take
responsibility (Schmid and Jongman 1988), this has implications for
counterterrorism actions, but also for researchers developing theories
and explanations of terrorism.
6. The dangers to militants who do not use a leaderless resistance strategy
are illustrated by the example of the “White Rabbits 3 Percent Illinois
Patriot Freedom Fighters Militia” that used an encrypted e-mail
account to communicate with members and receive orders from the so-
called higher ups. The FBI was able to access the account and link it to
militia leader, Michael Hari who along with others was behind the
2017 bombing of the Dar al-Farooq Islamic Center in Minnesota and
other incidents in Illinois (Montemayor 2018).
7. Authoritarian governments are less likely to report terrorist activities
(Enders and Sandler 2006).
8. There has been an increase in the number of women who take part in
suicide bombings although women have been active in terrorist
movements including ones at the turn of the twentieth century.
9. Publishing the Unabomber’s manifesto was a controversial decision, as
government officials were reluctant to give him a forum for his views.
In hindsight, it appears that this was the right thing to do as
Kaczynski’s brother noted the similarities between the manifesto and
his brother’s letters and turned him into the FBI.
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CHAPTER
10
Globalization
Both the shift from an agrarian economy to an industrialized one

characterized by mechanized production and efficiency and the pull of the
city have transformed our institutions, including the polity. Globalization is to
the twenty-first century what urbanization and industrialization were to the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like urbanization and industrialization,
globalization also creates and necessitates more interconnectedness and
interdependence between geographic areas and artificially created political
units. Geographic disparity, where some locations are more influential than
others, is one of the political outcomes of globalization (Martin 2007;
Robinson 2007). This transformation has not gone unnoticed by sociologists,
with a significant increase in research and writing on globalization issues
(Hall 2002; Robertson and White 2007). Globalization continues to be
debated with some scholars doubting the validity of this concept
(Osterhammel 2013). Globalization first appeared in a dictionary in 1951 with
the number of articles published from 2000 to 2010 averaging a thousand per
year (Ghemawat 2011). The popularity of globalization remains strong.
Regardless of whether globalization will continue to dominate the
sociological agenda, sociologists are credited with being the first to notice this
phenomenon and its effects (Guillén 2001; Robertson and White 2007) with
both globalization and terrorism dominating the world we live in since the
close of the twentieth century (Wallerstein 2004). Current globalization
theorizing tends to examine four lenses of globalization including political,
social, economic, and cultural (Lizardo and Strand 2009).
By challenging sociologists to question whether society is the largest unit
of analysis (Robertson and White 2007; Robinson 1998, 2001), globalization
calls into question the “core organizing principles of modern social science—
namely, the state, society, political community and the economy” (McGrew
2007: 2 of 23). Like political scientists, political sociologists are especially
interested in the question of state sovereignty or the impact of globalization
on the power of the state. A related question is whether the modern nation-
state will continue (Lizardo and Strand 2009; Wallerstein et al. 2013). Indeed,
Weber’s notion of state characterized by a monopoly on the use of legitimate
power linked to a specific territory (Heydenbrand 1994) may become
obsolete, and indeed some are calling for a rejection of the Weberian
conception of state (e.g. Robinson 2001).
Both in Chapters 2 and 9, we raised the issue of the state as the preferred
unit of analysis or methodological focus. Globalization raises this issue as
well (Lizardo and Strand 2009; Nash and Scott 2001; Ohmae 1990; Robinson
2001; Sklair 1999), yet the idea that globalization is transformative is not
universally accepted (McGrew 2007) as there are globalization skeptics.
Most scholars are not skeptics and view globalization, and its many
processes as “the defining issue of our time,” but what globalization means
(Hall 2002; Held and McGrew 2002; Robertson and White 2007; McMichael
2005: 587; Robinson 2007; Sklair 1999; Staples 2008) or how it will
ultimately affect the state is not clear. In this chapter, we consider the
following questions: What is globalization? How do sociological theories
explain it? What are the implications for the nation-state? What is the
relationship between globalization and exporting democracy? How do
antiglobalization movements aid our understanding of globalization? What
does the future hold? Because globalization is one of the most contested and
debated topics in sociology and indeed the social sciences (Guillén 2001;
Kellner 2002; McGrew 2007; Robinson 2001, 2007), there are different
answers to these questions.
WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?
Smith argues that globalization is “one of those faddish neologisms that is
frequently invoked but rarely defined” (2007: 1). The lack of conceptual
clarity is also due to contradictory usage (Robertson 1992), the failure to
distinguish globalization from related terms such as internationalization or
neoliberalism (e.g. Kearney 1995; Sklair 1999), and a split between those
who emphasize the economic dimension of globalization and those who
define it more broadly (Robertson and White 2007; Lizardo and Strand
2009). The economic dimension is important to political sociologists as well
as the political dimension because of the potential impact on the state.
Ironically, the social and cultural dimensions of globalization have not
received as much attention from sociologists (Robertson and White 2007)
although others have pointed out that the cultural dimension has received
attention insofar as it is also linked with economic globalization (Lizardo and
Strand 2009).
Defining Globalization
There are several different sociological definitions of globalization, but most
share some commonalties. Most scholars concur that globalization: (1)
consists of a combination of several processes (Ritzer 2008; Robertson and
White 2007); (2) involves different societal facets or dimensions (e.g.
cultural, social, economic, political, and demographic [Lizardo and Strand
2009; Manning 1999; Robertson and White 2007; Robinson 2007; Turner
2007]); (3) transcends political nation-state boundaries with cross-border
exchanges involving people, goods, money, and culture (Guillén 2001; Held
et al. 1999; Robinson 2007; Staples 2008); (4) results in an increasing level
and depth of interconnectedness (Robertson and White 2007; Turner 2007);
(5) is a decoupling between space and time (Giddens 1990) or alternatively
the compression of both time and space (Arrighi 1999; Harvey 1989;
Robertson 1992; Smith 2007); and (6) results in an increasing consciousness
of the world as a single space (Robertson 1992; Robertson and White 2007;
Turner 2007).
In Global Families, Karraker defines globalization as “involve[ing] the
motion and absorption of goods and capital, politics and power, information
and technologies worldwide. But globalization also involves the
transmission of pollution, crime, and other social problems across and
beyond national, regional, and other special borders” (2008: 13). This
definition underscores the proverbial double-edged sword of globalization.
The so-called positive impacts of globalization such as new technologies,
easier travel and communication, and widespread access to goods, have the
potential to make the world relatively smaller and to improve the standard of
living in every corner of the globe. Yet, globalization also creates
undesirable problems and thus is a double-edged sword. Capitalists also are
not immune from experiencing both the promise and the curse of
globalization.
With the click of a mouse, capital can be moved to low-wage and low cost parts of the
world. Nevertheless, the very arrangements that make exit easier also create new and
more fragile inter-dependencies. Outsourcing is also two-sided. On one hand, it loosens
the dependence of employers on domestic workers. On the other hand, it binds
employers to many other workers in far-flung and extended chains of production …
that “depend on complex systems of electronic communication and

transportation that are themselves acutely vulnerable to disruption” (Piven
2008: 7).
Critique of the Term

The multifaceted nature of globalization and the many different ways the
term is used create confusion and ambiguity (Nassar 2005). For example, an
environmental activist might criticize economic or corporate globalization,
but advocate environmental globalization or worldwide standards for air and
water purity. The fact that one can be for some aspects of globalization,
while against others is summed up by political scientist Charles Lipson
(2008), who remarked, “people that hate globalization talk on their Nokia1
while driving a Volvo.” Indeed, globalization has become a “negative
buzzword, something to employ as a source of blame for each and every
‘problem’ on the planet—indeed, in the cosmos” (Robertson and White
2007: 9 of 11).
That many different phenomena are being cast under the globalization
umbrella (Wallerstein et al. 2013) has not gone unnoticed or unchallenged
(Giulianotti and Robertson 2007). Scott and Marshall explain:
It is undoubtedly true that, on a planet in which the same fashion accessories … are
manufactured and sold across every continent, one can send and receive electronic mail
from the middle of a forest in Brazil, eat McDonald’s hamburgers in Moscow as well as
in Manchester, and pay for all of this using a MasterCard linked to a bank account in
Madras, then the world does indeed appear to be increasingly “globalized.” However,
the excessive use of this term as a sociological buzzword had largely emptied it of
analytical and explanatory value.
(2005: 250)
For sociological research on globalization to have value, globalization
needs to be “defined as something tangible and concretely measured and …
clearly differentiated from other precise phenomena—e.g., neoliberalism”
(Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007: 317). Breaking down globalization into
its various conceptual dimensions is one way to enhance the understanding
of a complex phenomenon. Nassar (2005) identifies interdependence,
liberalization, universalization, Westernization, and capitalism as
components of globalization.
Components of Globalization
INTERDEPENDENCE
Interdependence simply means we live in an interconnected world where we
need each other to survive. Interdependence is not a new phenomenon. In
The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim argued that the shift from
mechanical to organic solidarity as a basis of social order was due to a
division of labor that led to interdependence, exchange of services, and
reciprocity of obligations (Durkheim 1964[1893]). The difference in this
“age of globalization” is the shift from being dependent on others who live
in our community to those from afar. For example, Americans wear clothes
sewn in Chinese and Mexican factories (to name a few), eat food grown in
locations hundreds or even thousands of miles away, and interact with
customer service representatives in India. Because Internet technology and a
global communications infrastructure makes it possible for white-collar
workers anywhere in the world to compete for jobs, this has undermined the
stability and salaries of middle-class jobs globally (Collins 2013).
Publishers are one example with copyediting jobs moved from the United
States and Great Britain to other English-speaking parts of the world.
Indeed, a team in India communicated with your authors over e-mail to
copyedit the first edition of this textbook. Two of your authors co-edited a
sociology journal for several years and worked with a copy editing team
based in the Philippines and later Singapore.
Everyone is more vulnerable when depending on others, and
interdependence due to globalization is more fragile and easily disrupted
(Piven 2008). With interdependence comes interconnectedness, which can
result in problems that were once localized or isolated spreading to other
areas. Interdependence also has a cultural component as the ability to
communicate and interact depends upon having a common language. Nassar
(2005) argues that English, French, Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic are global
languages and may be evidence of an emerging global culture (Waters
1995). Because the United States is a singular world power, some argue that
English is becoming the lingua franca of the world (Alasuutari 2004).
However, other scholars disagree and conclude that there is not one global
language or emerging global culture (Guillén 2001), at least not yet.
LIBERALIZATION
Liberalization or neoliberalism is not globalization, but the ideological
justification of economic globalization or the free movement of capital and
goods without governmental inference in the forms of tariffs, price controls,
taxes, and the like (Chomsky 2003; Robertson and White 2007). This has
political implications because economic globalization is seen as an
“irreversible, law-like global process” to which there is no alternative, but to
enact neoliberal policies (Alasuutari 2000: 262). Globalization
commentators refer to this belief as “there is no alternative” or TINA (e.g.
Evans 2008) which is associated with the former U.K. Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher.
Neoliberalism is usually associated with political conservatives
(Wallerstein 1998) and Sklair (2016) argues spearheaded by former U.S.
President Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Those who identify with
and advocate for neoliberalism often call themselves neoconservatives
(Klein 2007). Neoliberalism is libertarian ideology influential in economics
and political science that became prominent in the 1980s and promotes the
rights of individuals against the coercive state (Centeno and Cohen 2012;
Scott and Marshall 2005). The state is viewed as the enemy of the free
market because in addition to interference, it often competes by providing
services (e.g. postal delivery, education, Social Security) considered best left
to the private sector. Neoliberalism promotes reducing government role in
the economy including regulation (Calhoun 2013). Centeno and Cohen
(2012) argue that the financial crisis of 2008, aka the Great Recession, has
loosened the policy influence of neoliberalism and that the George W. Bush
administration damaged the credibility of neoliberal programs and the belief
that political conservatives were best suited for managing the economy.
However, since the election of President Trump in 2016, we have seen the
uneven return of neoliberalization as reflected in some administration
policies. Imposing tariffs and threats to pull out of trade agreements are not
part of the neoliberal agenda, but other aspects of his administration do fit
with a neoliberal approach (e.g. removing government regulation,
privatization of government services).
On the international side, neoliberalization is associated with the spread
of capitalism and free market ideologies. Some perceive International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as promoting
American neoliberalism at the expense of less-developed economies
through the endorsement of the “Washington Consensus” (WC). The WC2 is
a list of economic policies, including the abolishment of barriers to foreign
investment and privatization of state services, free trade, and reductions in
“unnecessary” government spending, in other words, a neoliberalist agenda
for economic reform (Centeno and Cohen 2012).
The IMF, World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT, the forerunner of the WTO) were created in the aftermath of World
War II, in 1944, at the UN Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire. The IMF and World Bank are often called Bretton
Woods institutions. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.K. Prime
Minister Winston Churchill believed that the economic shocks of the 1930s
contributed to World War II. As a result, forty-three charter member nations
contributed to create the World Bank3 and the IMF4 (Robbins 2008). Both
institutions are headquartered in Washington, DC, and coordinate with each
other.
The WTO5 officially came into being in 1995 but grew out of the 1986–
1994 Uruguay rounds of GATT negotiations. As of 2016, the WTO has 164
member nations and is a forum for settling trade disputes, including
intellectual property rights. The WTO views its role as a means of
liberalizing trade between nations as well as providing a forum for
negotiation and mediation. Member countries are contractually obligated to
follow WTO agreements or the ground rules for international commerce.
How power is allocated in some of these organizations is often criticized
by development experts and other critics6 as developed countries with
stronger economies have more power. The United States is the largest
shareholder in the World Bank and is the only member country that has veto
power over changes in structure
(www.worldbank.org/en/country/unitedstates/overview). According to the
World Bank, the five largest shareholders (France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) each appoint an executive director,
whereas twenty executive directors represent the other 189 member
countries. The IMF allocates a quota based on the relative size of each
member’s economy. The quota determines several other factors, including
the country’s financial obligation to the IMF, voting power, and ability to
obtain financing from the IMF. According to the IMF, “decision making…
was designed to reflect the relative positions of its member countries in the
global economy. The IMF continues to undertake reforms to ensure that its
governance structure adequately reflects fundamental changes taking place
in the world economy.” Although a reformed quota system gives more voice
to developing countries, developed countries such as the United States,
Japan, France, and the United Kingdom still have more influence. Figure
10.1 portrays pre- and post-reform influences.
FIGURE 10.1 Pre- and Post-Reform Voting Power in the

IMF
Source and Credit: International Monetary Fund, “Country Representation,”
http://www.imf.org/external/about/govrep.htm. This figure is no longer available from the
IMF website although information on governance is found at: www.imf.org/en/About.
In contrast, the WTO does not have an executive board or an

organization head and decision-making is by consensus. While some
criticize IFIs for being more beholden to more powerful economies such as
the United States, Sklair contends it does not matter which member
countries are dominant because we should not assume that the “national
interests” of dominant member countries are necessarily being served.
Instead, he argues that
globalizing capitalists [including global bureaucrats that run organizations such as the
IMF] have no nation and the demands of the global market, not national interests drive
the global capitalistic system while the working class and the labour movement that
purports to represent it, calls on “its” state, politicians and business leaders to protect it
against the ravages of globalization.
(2016: 7)
The creation and evolution of organizations that do not answer to a

specific nation-state and that, at minimum, create more economic and
financial interconnectedness and interdependency provide some evidence of
globalization. At the other extreme, these organizations spread and enforce
neoliberalism as some consider the IMF and WTO as “chief enforcers of the
Washington Consensus” (Wallerstein 2007: 86).
Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism is a
scathing critique of American neoliberalism. Klein argues that capitalists,
and some corporations, profit when disasters strike, from the privatization of
the New Orleans public school system in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina7 to the Iraqi invasion.8 Others, such as Nobel Prize-winning
economist Milton Friedman, see neoliberal economic policies as a positive
development. While the 2008 financial crisis may have taken some of the
shine from neoliberalism, for a time it was a dominant paradigm with a
hegemonic status (Centeno and Cohen 2012). To the extent that neoliberal
policies are blamed for inequality in developing countries, globalization
may be a grievance used by some to justify terrorism. Although the
relationship is more nuanced and complicated, Lizardo concludes that
financial globalization … does have a positive association with anti-U.S. political
violence, supporting the contention that local grievances caused by inequality-fostering
mechanisms in the international economic arena are at lest partially responsible for
recurring bouts if anti-U.S. transnational violence action.
(2006: 178)
UNIVERSALIZATION
Nassar (2005) terms universalization as the potential weakening of state
sovereignty with corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
challenging the state. However, this terminology contradicts the fact that
corporations depend on states to enforce treaties and trade agreements
(Nassar 2005) and a need for strong state for capital accumulation to both
repress and appease dangerous classes (Wallerstein 2003). While agreeing
with the argument that increasing globalization threatens the power of the
state, the threat of terrorism reinforces the power of the state and its
institutions (Kellner 2002). We will examine these arguments more closely
when we discuss the political implications of globalization.
WESTERNIZATION
Cultural globalization is associated with westernization (Lizardo and Strand
2009) with some arguing that globalization results in homogenizing culture
with Hollywood films, television shows, and Western music distributed
worldwide. This is related to Waters’ (1995) notion of an emerging global
culture albeit a Westernized one. Although most scholars do not believe a
global culture is emerging, many non-Westerners resent Westernization and
even cite it as a grievance justifying terrorism. The diffusion of culture is
not a new or unique phenomenon. Culture changes over time and is
influenced by ideas and practices developed by others. The Greeks first
developed democracy, and the English language contains many words with
foreign origins. Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993, 1996)
thesis and Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld (2001) are perhaps the
most well-known treatises predicting conflict between the Western and
Muslim worlds due to Westernization enabled by globalization. The main
difference between these two perspectives is that whereas Barber argues the
divide is between consumer capitalism (McWorld) and retribalization linked
with religious fundamentalism (Jihad), Huntington sees conflict between
civilizations or Western versus Islamic (Alasuutari 2000). Barber’s
perspective is criticized for oversimplifying divisions and not adequately
presenting the contradictions within both Western and Muslim worlds
(Kellner 2002).
While Arabs and Muslims are usually the first groups Americans
associate with the resentment of Westernization, the French have long
resented the British and American influence on their culture, including
English words creeping into the French language, such as le t-shirt. These
words are called franglais (a combination of français (French) and anglais
(English)). The Toubon Laws or Loi Toubon (enacted in 1994)—named
after the Minister of Culture Jacques Toubon—mandates government
communication in French and bans the use of foreign words in business and
advertising without a French translation.
Despite the French Academy or L’Académie Française’s efforts to create
French expressions for English words including software (logiciel) and e-
mail (courriel), French manufacturers often borrow English phrases,
contributing to the proliferation of franglais. Business, including the
automotive, engineering, energy, telecommunications, and information
technology (IT) industries, has promoted the use of franglais. While no one
will be arrested for saying anti-lock braking system instead of anti-blocage
de sécurité or car showroom instead of salle d’exposition, businesses that do
not provide French translations of English text pay fines (“Franglais
Resurgent” 2008). Music is also restricted, with a law (1996) mandating that
“at least 40 percent of all songs played on the country’s 1,300 FM stations
be French songs” (Murphy 1997). More recently, it is not just words or
phrases that are being introduced into the French language, but also feminist
ideals about the use of gender inclusive language. Students of French know
that nouns are gendered into masculine (le aeroplane) and feminine (la
femme), but the male plural form is used to refer to both men and women
even if there is only one man in a group and thousands of women (e.g. ils
instead of elles). This is akin to the debate in English about replacing
mankind with humankind. The Académie Française is opposed to upending
grammar rules that would promote inclusivity (McAuley 2017) with the
French government banning the use of gender-neutral language in official
documents (Timsit 2017).
Cultural diffusion is not one-way or unilateral; ethnic restaurants are an
example of other cultures impacting American culture. What is profoundly
different though is the more pronounced degree of penetration with satellite
television and cable networks such as CNN and the BBC (although Al
Jazeera is an alternative information source) infiltrating all parts of the
world and the perceived accompanying ethnocentrism with American ways
being promoted as more modern or progressive. Galkin (2006) argues that
Westernization has a corrosive impact on religious, cultural, and linguistic
traditions and, specifically, that Islamic countries have been some of the
prime victims of globalization. A competing view contends that instead of
global influences overpowering the local or more traditional, the global and
local combine creating something new or “glocal” (Robertson 1992).
Capitalism: Some see globalization as simply a way to expand the
reach of capitalism by exploiting less wealthy countries by building
sweatshop factories where workers earn only pennies a day or extracting
cheap raw materials at the expense of the environment. In the United States,
many see globalization as migration that brings illegal immigrants and the
outsourcing of well-paying jobs to companies in developing nations, which
benefits company stockholders at the expense of American workers. While
in the past, unskilled workers was more at risk for being displaced by
cheaper immigrant labor or outsourcing, the communications technology
infrastructure places middle class and upper-middle class more at risk
(Wallerstein 2013) as a radiologist in India supervised by licensed physician
can view images and provide diagnoses for less cost than U.S. physician.
Globalization also allows developed countries to flood external markets
with cheap imports such as food, forcing indigenous farmers out of
business, and increasing inequality. One of the engines of global capitalism
(GC) is the transnational corporation (TNC), also known as MNC or
multinational corporation. TNCs are involved in cross-border exchanges and
their global reach has dramatically increased (Sklair 1999). TNCs are
powerful, with some corporations having assets and resources that rival
those of many smaller nation-states (Sklair 1999). Finally, the CEOs or top-
level managers of TNCs make decisions that affect the lives of citizens, but
they are not accountable to those whose lives are impacted by these
decisions (Staples 2008). For example, drug affordability is a huge problem
in developing countries trying to deal with infections such as HIV (see Text
box 10.1). Drug companies have been resistant to lowering the cost of
drugs, citing the need to recoup research and development costs. Capitalism
is an important component of several theories of globalization, including
World Systems Theory (WST), GC, and postmodernism.
TEXT BOX 10.1

TNCs and Fighting HIV
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), it is estimated that
over 35 million people have died of AIDS since 1981 and that there are
currently 36.9 million living with the disease (WHO HIV Fact Sheet
2018). An estimated 17.8 million children are classified as AIDS orphans
with the loss of one or more parents (WHO, “World AIDS Day: Business
Unusual: Time to end the AIDS epidemic” 2014). Sheer numbers
document HIV infection as a pressing global problem. One suggested
way to fight AIDS and the opportunistic infections that commonly occur
in AIDS patients is to sell affordable drugs through either licensing the
manufacture of cheaper generic drugs or negotiating with drug
companies for cheaper pricing. Disputes between drug companies and
countries in the past include:
Martin Shkreli’s company, Turing Pharmaceuticals (now called

Vyera Pharmaceuticals), hiked up the cost of Daraprim (used to treat
infections that are life-threatening for people with weak immune
systems such as AIDS patients). The pill costs around $1 to make
and his company hiked the price overnight from $13.50 per pill to
$750.00 in November 2015. Shkreli was sentenced to prison in the
United States and fined for defrauding investors, but not for hiking
the cost of this drug (Luthra 2018; Pollack 2015). Despite Shkreli’s
prison sentence, the cost of Daraprim still remains high (Johnson
2017).
GlaxoSmithKline and the Russian government over the price of
Combivir, an HIV antiretroviral (Wang 2009).
Roche and the Korean government over the price of Fuzeon, an
entry inhibitor HIV medication (Tong-hyung 2009).
South Africa and the U.S. government over a plan to allow South
African companies to manufacture drugs patented by U.S.
pharmaceutical companies (BBC News 1999).
Glaxo and the Indian drug company Cipla over a plan to
manufacture a generic version of HIV infection-fighting drugs
(Kamath 2000).
Nations that are members of the WTO risk violating the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement for
not protecting drug company patents. According to the WTO, TRIPS
patent protection for twenty years is necessary to reward drug companies
that invest in research and development. The WTO claims that there are
some public health safeguards built into TRIPS, including compulsory
licensing where a country authorizes the manufacture of a patented
invention without the owner’s permission (with compensation) and
parallel imports (product produced by a patent owner is imported from
another country where the price is lower). The WTO Doha Declaration
(2001) provides member states some flexibility for dealing with
emergency situations. Critics argue that persons living in impoverished
countries still do not have the resources to pay and that much of the cost
of drugs is attributable to the monopoly of pharmaceutical giants (Evans
2008). Others have argued that access to health care and medicine is a
human right, but conventional thinking about human rights is in the
context of protecting the individual from the state and ignores non-state
actors such as pharmaceutical companies that are playing a more
influential role. This view argues for finding a new legal framework for
binding companies to protect human rights (Ahmadiani and Nikfar
2016). Currently, differential pricing is touted as a method of providing
access for the needy, while still protecting intellectual property rights.
Under differential pricing, companies charge different prices in different
markets (WTO News 2001), so richer Americans would pay more for a
drug than a patient in Zimbabwe. Despite the public health provisions in
TRIPS, former U.S. President Clinton has argued that “American
companies have been too harsh” in lobbying the U.S. government to
restrict the manufacture of generics (“Clinton Announces New Programs
to Train 150,000 Indian Doctors” 2005). The Indian government has also
succumbed to pressure by passing a new patent law that prevents Indian
generic-drug companies from manufacturing recently patented
medications to be in compliance with TRIPS. The notion that companies
need to be compensated for expensive research and development is
somewhat disputed by the practice of pharmaceutical companies
patenting herbal remedies with no compensation to indigenous persons
who share their knowledge of these remedies (Hawthorne 2004) and by
research finding that, although development costs are used to justify high
drug prices, pricing in the United States is “on the basis of what the
market will bear” (Kesselheim, Avorn, and Sarpatwari 2016: 858).
Impertinent Questions
1. Globalization as a project legitimizes neoliberal policies (McMichael
2005) such as TRIPS. Does the framing of this issue as a property
right deliberately obscure the plight of millions of people in poor
countries? Should companies be legally obligated to protect human
rights and is access to health care and medication a basic human
right?
2. It is estimated that in 1998, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry lost
$500 million because of insufficient patent protection (Håkansta
1998). Estimates of how much drug development costs industry are
widely divergent from $2.7 billon per drug (study by the Center for
the Study of Drug Development Research which receives some
funding from the pharmaceutical industry) to $650 million on
average per drug (Harris 2017). Do TNCs deserve patent protection?
Are drug development costs a legitimate reason to limit generic
manufacture and licensing?
3. Ideological dominance is one way that TNCs exercise power (Evans
2000). If policymakers side with TNCs, is this an example of
Gramscian hegemony? If so, what ideology legitimizes this?
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
GLOBALIZATION
It is difficult to divide globalization scholars into mutually exclusive
theoretical camps. Hardt and Negri are considered postmodern, yet Robinson
(2007) classifies these scholars under the heading “global capitalism.”
Manuel Castell’s network theory is considered separately, but his work also
has a postmodern feel with an emphasis on how IT will transform production
and consumption. A postmodern classification also fits those emphasizing the
compression of space and time (e.g. Giddens 1990; Harvey 1990). Therefore,
do not consider this discussion definitive. Rather, understand that some
theorists fit multiple categories and that any classification oversimplifies a
very complicated body of scholarship.
World Systems Theory

WST is a predecessor of more recent theories of globalization (Robinson
2007). The first volume of The Modern World System (Wallerstein 1974) is a
“milestone” by recognizing that nation-states are components of a larger
system (Kearney 1995). Although Wallerstein does not approve of the
concept of globalization (Robinson 2007; Wallerstein 2000), he has used the
phrase (e.g. Wallerstein 2004). WST is a “cohesive theory of globalization
organized around a 500 year time scale corresponding to the rise of a
capitalist world-economy in Europe and its spread around the world”
(Robinson 2007: 5 of 16). The use of world should not be confused with that
of global as the world system of the sixteenth century did not encompass the
entire globe. The “world system” truly became global only in the late
twentieth century (Hall 2002). Yet, this process began centuries ago
(Wallerstein 2003) and is transitioning the world system to a postmodern era
(McMichael 2005).
Two periods are crucial to understanding globalization. The first is 1945
to the present, which represents one Kondratieff cycle or K wave of the
world economy. A K wave is an approximately fifty-year cycle in prices
with both an A (economic expansion) and a B (economic downturn) phase.
The A phase went from 1945 through 1967/1973. The current B phase began
at the end of the A phase and will continue for several more years. When
writing about the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, Wallerstein argued:
The financial collapse of the southeast Asian states and the four dragons [Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan] was followed by the disastrous interference of the
IMF, which exacerbated both the economic and political consequences of the crisis….
The world holds its breath, waiting for it to hit the United States. When this occurs we
shall then enter into the last subphase of this Kondratieff B-phase.
(2003: 57)
Are the subprime lending housing crisis, the onset of the credit crunch in
2008, and the financial bailout of Wall Street all indicators of the last stage
of the current B phase? The U.S. economy has improved over the last ten
years with the great recession ending in 2009. The economy is experiencing
the second longest expansion in U.S. history. Yet wage growth was stagnant
and the after effects of the housing crisis continue to affect economic
recovery. Only since the early part of 2018 have wages started to show some
growth despite labor shortages (Russell, Casselman, Cohen, Dougherty, and
Scheiber 2018). If the U.S. economy really is in a B phase, will there be
another phase of economic expansion? Wallerstein says yes, but argues that
the systemic crisis of capitalism will interfere.
The period from 1450 to the present represents the entire life cycle of the
world economy and specifically the capitalist world system. This life cycle
can be divided into three phases: the genesis, normal development, and
“terminal crisis” (Wallerstein 2003: 46), which may last over fifty years and
end by about 2050 (Robinson 2007; Wallerstein 2000). For Wallerstein, the
world system is transitioning into something else that will result in a struggle
between two camps. The first will want to retain the advantages of the status
quo. The second will want a more democratic and egalitarian system. This
transition will be characterized by more chaotic economic swings and
violence as state structures continue to experience declines in legitimacy.
While this sounds like a bleak forecast, Wallerstein insists that because the
outcome is “intrinsically uncertain,” it is “open to human intervention and
creativity” (2003: 68).
What role will the United States play in this transition? Hegemonic
cycles are related to but different from K waves. Non-Gramscian hegemony9
occurs when a state dominates another without overt coercion but through its
sheer economic and political power. Once power peaks, hegemony is lost or
diminished, resulting in intense interstate rivalry and competition. Hegemons
come to power through a global war (global as in world system). Currently,
the United States is in a state of hegemonic decline, which corresponded
with the beginning of the B phase of the K cycle. Another nation or political
entity will topple the United States and become the new hegemonic power.
While a “milestone,” WST is criticized as a theory of globalization for not
being a theory of social change that focuses on the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries and not having a concept of global in the WST
literature (Robinson 2007). Wallerstein predicts that the U.S. dollar will no
longer be the world’s reserve currency and will not be replaced by another
single currency, but by multiple currencies. This decline in financial power is
also accompanied by a decline in political power. The United States will not
be replaced by a new single hegemon, but is competing with eight to ten
other power centers. Too many alternating power centers results in a world
of alternating and fluctuating alliances creating uncertainty, while various
camps compete (Wallerstein 2013).
Theories of Global Capitalism

GC theorists share with WST an emphasis on historical analysis of large-
scale macroprocesses and are critical of capitalism. Robinson (2007) argues
that GC differs from WST in three fundamental ways. First, GC theorists
argue that globalization is a new stage in the evolution of capitalism.
Second, GC theorists perceive a new global system of production and
finance fundamentally different from earlier forms of capitalism. Finally, GC
theorists argue that globalization cannot be understood with a framework
that emphasizes the nation-state or an interstate system. Rather, national
states (as opposed to nation-states) are linked into a transnational state
(TNS) network with a transnational capitalist class (TCC). This group
consists of executives of TNCs, global bureaucrats (e.g. IMF and World
Bank heads), politicians, and other business elites (Sklair 2000, 2016).
TNCs have advantages in global trade with the ability to provide both
material rewards and sanctions and have ideological dominance. For
example, defenders of the interests of the transnational class use terms such
as free trade, intellectual property rights, and competitiveness in ways that
frame TNCs as working for the common good rather than for stockholders.
Furthermore, those opposing TNCs are labeled as not understanding the
rules of the game or pursuing their own interests at the expense of others
(Evans 2000).
Robinson’s (2007) GC theory emphasizes the TNS apparatus or network
of both supranational political and economic institutions (e.g. Trilateral
Commission, WTO) and national state apparatuses “that have been
penetrated and transformed by transnational forces” (6 of 16). As part of a
TNS apparatus, a national state will serve global rather than national
interests. A transnational class exists that forms divisions both across and
within borders. Additionally, Robinson argues that transnational production
transforms national economies linked through trade and finance to global
circuits of production and capital accumulation. A transnational or what
Sklair (2016) calls a TCC is thought to be currently emerging and can be
divided into four factions: corporate (who owns and controls TNCs);
political (politicians and bureaucrats with global reach); technical
(professionals with global reach); and consumerists or the media and
merchants. Combined, he argues that these individuals comprise the global
power elite or ruling class. He further argues that there are five global
features of the TCC.
First, members of the TCC are linked by global market interests rather
than by local or national interests. Second, TCC members share a similar
lifestyle. These commonalities include consumption of luxury goods and
high segregation from the masses because of private travel, and access to
exclusive resorts, clubs, and neighborhoods across the globe with controlled
access and surveillance. Higher education for the TCC comes increasingly
from business schools. Third, the TCC view themselves as citizens of the
world rather than being from a specific country linked to place of birth.
Fourth, TCC members have a more outward looking global perspective
rather than a more inward local or national view on most social, cultural, and
political issues. Finally, the TCC exercises control through the use of
consumeristic rhetoric that affects the workplace, domestic and international
politics. Workplace control is achieved through fear of job loss and
motivating workers to work longer hours with less pay least these jobs be
moved somewhere else (Sklair 2016).
Evidence that GC researchers use to support the existence of a
transnational class includes increases in foreign direct investment (FDI), the
number of TNCs, mergers and acquisitions across national borders, the
existence of global financial systems, and the number of interlocking of
positions within the global corporate structure (Robinson and Harris 2000).
Like postmodernists, GC scholars agree that technology is impacting
production, creating new patterns of capital accumulation (Robinson 1998).
For global capitalist researchers and theorists, the consequences of GC
are creating crisis in multiple dimensions including cultural, economic,
social, political, ecological, and the military. He argues that the global
capitalist system is in crisis and as a result, he warns of a rise of a global
police state (Robinson 2014). Sklair (2016) argues that GC increases
vulnerability for those already vulnerable including working-class people
and the poor.
Postmodern Views on Globalization

The postmodern view predicts dramatic consequences for all social
institutions, including the state. Postmodernists believe that capitalism is
being defined by post-Fordism (Kellner 2002) or the ways in which work has
been reorganized to adapt to the technological and market environment of
the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Scott and Marshall 2005). Post-
Fordism is associated with the decline of state regulation and the rise of
global markets and corporations and is characterized by different patterns of
consumption and production (Milani 2000). Corporations operating in a
postmodern world must be flexible by adapting to a constantly changing
market. Flexibility includes an increase in using temporary, part-time, and
home-based workers. Also, workers producing a single product need not be
located at the same place or even at a traditional factory production site.
Because of IT, “postmodernity has no need for physical movement. These
changes have a significant effect upon the nature of economic, cultural, and
political life. The world is being reconstituted into a single social space and
life has become delocalized” (Best 2002: 204). The use of IT dramatically
increases “the flow, rapidity, intensity, and volume of communications” and
greatly expands the number of international arenas in which we participate
(Karp, Yoels, and Vann 2004: 376). IT has compressed both time and space
(Giddens 1990; Harvey 1990), shaping local events by phenomena occurring
hundreds or even thousands of miles away. This delocalization is one of the
hallmarks of globalization.
Sassen (1991) contends that globalization is enabling a new spatial order
based on networks of global cities (e.g. New York, Tokyo, London) that
provide specialized services for moving capital in a global economy. These
“producer services” might be financial, such as banking or other corporate
services such as insurance, real estate, design, and accounting. In a modern
economy, global cities have been transformed from their role as producers
(manufacturing, Fordist production) to producer service centers (post-
Fordist), while production may take place in a developing or third-world
economy, where pay is minimal and benefits nonexistent. Sassen (2018)
argues that global cities are a new social formation and are at the center of
globalization processes. She contends that there are currently seventy-five
such cities including those that have had this status for a long time (e.g.
London, Shanghai) as well as others that have come to this distinction more
recently (e.g. Chicago, New York). Global cities are important because (1)
these locations serve as “command points” in organizing the world economy,
(2) key industries are located in these locations (centers for financial
services, innovation, etc.), and (3) these cities also serve as production sites.
In Empire and Multitude, Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) purport that the
GC of today is distinctly different from previous eras of imperialism and
capitalist expansion. The nation-state is withering away and is transitioning
into Empire. This entity is decentralized and accepts no boundaries of any
kind, including geographic, political, cultural, and economic. Unlike other
theories of globalization that view a TCC as a key agent of globalization,
Hardt and Negri identify no such agent, but conceive Empire as a power
structure that is not centered anywhere yet is everywhere as it faces
resistance from networked citizens or the multitude (Robinson 2007).
Empire is criticized for being ahistorical, lacking convincing empirical data
(Arrighi 2003; Tilly 2003), and failing to distinguish politics and the state
from the economy (Steinmetz 2002). Yet these writers have been very
influential, impacting scholars in various disciplines, including sociology.
Network Society
Castells (1996, 1997, 1998, 2016) uses “network society” to conceptualize a
global economy and culture grounded in communications and IT. Briefly, he
argues that technological innovations, including the computer, have allowed
for changes in communications and information processing, resulting in a
new “technological paradigm” (Castells 2000). Capitalism used this
technology to create a new system of “information capitalism” or the new
economy (Robinson 2007). Castells (2000) characterized the new economy
as informational, global, and networked using information technologies that
are fundamentally different from previous technological innovations (e.g.
printing press and the assembly line). Least this sounds benign, Castells’
work is developing a network theory of power. He views globalization as
“the organization of key dimensions of society (starting with the economy)
in global networks that became the operating units of much human activity”
(2016: 5). In terms of the nation-state, he argues that although the state is not
going away, it is being transformed. This transformation includes states
being rearranged into networks of shared sovereignty such as NATO or the
European Union (EU).
Although Castells’ network theory shares with WST, GC, and
postmodern approaches an analysis of capitalism (Robinson 2007), it
proposes that technological change and not capitalism drives globalization.
For example, the internationalization of the economy could never have
occurred had it not been for advances in telecommunications and IT. IT has
made the flexible production of a post-Fordist world possible; information
itself is a commodity. Production has also changed by shifting from
centralized large corporations to decentralized networks that comprise
organizational units of different sizes. Similar to postmodernism, a network
society approach also emphasizes flexible production and the power of
technology to communicate and transport people, goods, and information
over large distances in shorter periods of time.
In contrast to Network Society Theory and other accounts that stress the
importance of technological innovation for globalization, GC theorists, such
as Robinson, argue that this is a mistake. Rather, “technological change is
the effect [emphasis Robinson’s] of social forces in struggle” (2001: 169) to
get around barriers hampering the further development of capitalism created
by nation-states. A network society perspective also contends that
technological innovations have political implications for the regulatory and
welfare functions of the state. We will discuss these insights in a subsequent
section.
Cultural Theories of Globalization

There is no such thing as “Globalization Theory” (McGrew 2007), yet there
are theories of global culture (Robinson 2007) that seek to explain cultural
aspects of globalization. These theories can be distinguished from WST
because of the emphasis on culture rather than economics and, unlike WST,
global culture approaches do not view cultural globalization as an outcome
of economic globalization (Waters 1995). Robertson (1992), one of the main
proponents of cultural theories of globalization, argues that economic
globalization has received most of the attention and that other important
social and cultural dimensions, especially religion, have been ignored. Some
of the long-term cultural developments that Robertson deems important
include the rise in world religions, the globalization of sport, the spread of
human rights, the unification of global time, and the spread of the Gregorian
calendar (Turner 2007). There are different kinds of cultural theories, which
are divided into subcategories, including homogeneity, heterogeneity, and
hybridization (Robinson 2007).
As a phenomenon, globalization consists of two separate and indeed
contradictory processes: homogeneity and differentiation (Kellner 2002;
Scott and Marshall 2005) or heterogeneity. GC promotes both homogeneity
and heterogeneity (Robertson 1992). While homogeneity emphasizes global
sameness, heterogeneity emphasizes difference. Non-Westerners often feel
threatened by the potential homogenization of culture brought about through
Westernization. Even hybridization or the fusion of two different cultural
practices may be seen as threatening and contributing to the loss of cultural
distinctiveness.
Proponents of homogenization agree that convergence is taking place or
that the world is becoming more uniform or similar. For example, Ritzer
coined the term McDonaldization to refer to “the process by which the
principles of the fast-food industry are coming to dominate more and more
sectors of the American society as well as the rest of the world” (2008: 1,
2018). Homogenization researchers also look for evidence of an emerging
global culture (Waters 1995 as cited in Scott and Marshall 2005). In contrast,
heterogeneity highlights cultural clash (e.g. Huntington and Barber) and
resistance to globalization. Finally, hybridization emphasizes the continual
evolution of culture and the melding of different cultural forms (Appadurai
1996). For example, how democracy is practiced is influenced by other
factors, including culture.
Robertson (1992, 1994) has contributed to the heterogeneity–
homogeneity discussion through his concept of “glocalization”: an
interaction between the local and the global to produce highly localized
responses to global phenomena. He defines glocalization as “‘real world’
endeavors to recontextualize global phenomena or macroscopic processes
with respect to local cultures” (1992: 173–147), in other words, how human
beings reconstitute and redefine a global phenomenon and give it a local
flavor. “Glocalization registers the societal co-presence (emphasis
Giulianotti and Robertson 2007: 168) of sameness and difference, and the
intensified interpenetration of the local and the global, the universal and the
particular, and homogeneity and heterogeneity.”
Although glocalization emphasizes heterogeneity over homogenization,
Ritzer explains that it is not an issue of the local dominating the global or
vice versa but rather “the global and the local interpenetrate, producing
unique outcomes in each location” (Ritzer 2008: 166). Using the conceptual
lens of glocalization, the penetration of local culture through Hollywood
movies and CNN is less of a concern as it is only one input that combined
with local influences creates a unique point of view (Ritzer 2008). Ritzer
argues that glocalization minimizes or dismisses fear about homogenization
or the loss of cultural distinctiveness and proposes “grobalization,” a
combination of globalization and growth.
Ritzer also argues that glocalization ignores the ambitions of nations and
other organizations to dominate other parts of the world to increase power,
influence, and profits (Ritzer 2007, 2008). Grobalization is driven by three
subprocesses, including Americanization, capitalism, and McDonaldization.
In contrast to glocalization, grobalization is a deterministic force, where the
global overpowers and dominates the local and limits the ability of
individuals to act and react. Unlike glocalization, where news outlets such as
CNN are combined with local influences to create a unique point of view,
grobalization views CNN and its Arab counterpart, Al Jazeera, as “grobal
media powers” (2008: 168) that “define and control what people think in a
given locale” (2008: 167). Ritzer’s concept of grobalization is a
counterbalance to glocalization or an overly optimistic view of globalization.
Central to Ritzer’s ideas is McDonaldization, which is not globalization in
itself but is one of the “major motor forces of globalization” (2008: 166,
2018) and has four elements: efficiency, calculability, predictability, and
control.
McDonaldization Thesis
ELEMENTS OF MCDONALDIZATION
Efficiency occurs because the production process is deskilled or broken
down into smaller steps that all workers follow. A McDonald’s hamburger is
not made by one person, but by several, each going through the steps of one
part of the process, from toasting the bun, grilling the meat, dressing the
burger, and selling to a customer. Calculability is concerned with the
quantitative aspects of the production process or how quickly and cheaply
products are made and delivered. Quality becomes defined by quantity: How
many burgers were sold, and how many seconds does it take to place and
receive an order in a drive-thru?
Ritzer argues that calculability has also affected politics. As a result of
calculability, poll ratings have become more important. Political speeches
and the news stories about politics have become shorter as well. As a result,
speechwriters create “sound bites” that are more likely to be shown on
television or reported by the media.
Predictability refers to the notion that a product will taste the same no
matter where it is made, as the same production steps are followed. Do
Democrats or Republicans really offer different outcomes, or is there
predictability no matter who is in charge? Perhaps U.S. President Donald
Trump has upended that argument somewhat, but one needs to tease out
policy from style and protocol to see if the Trump presidency is more
unpredictable compared to past administrations. Finally, Ritzer argues that
managers, through a limited menu and strictly defined jobs, control both
workers and customers. Are voters’ choices constrained by a two-party
system that offers little choice? An elite theoretical view of voting argues
that voting does not offer the masses a real choice, but manipulates citizens
into believing that they actually have a voice (Alford and Friedland 1985).
Ritzer uses McDonald’s as a metaphor for the increasing importance of the
four elements at the expense of other criteria (e.g. quality, equity). Table
10.1 summarizes the similarities and differences between the major
theoretical perspectives and view of globalization.
Table 10.1 Theories of Globalization

GLOBALIZATION DEBATES
Clearly, world systems, postmodern, and cultural globalization theories
emphasize different aspects of globalization and, therefore, provide different
answers to the many different questions asked by globalization researchers.
In the next section, we review some of the main points of contention and
debate, including (1) is globalization occurring? (2) what is the evidence?
and (3) what is the impact? These questions have been extensively debated in
the social science literature (Guillén 2001; Robinson 2007), and there is no
shortage of opinions depending on what aspect of globalization is considered
and the theoretical perspective of the researcher.
Is Globalization Occurring?
Not everyone agrees that globalization is occurring and those who do often
disagree on its significance. There are three globalization camps: skeptics,
hyperglobalists, and transformationists.
SKEPTICS
Hirst and Thompson (1996) are considered one of the best documented
(Guillén 2001) cases for what Karraker (2008) and others (Başkan 2006)
call the skeptic (e.g. Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1992,
1996) and Guillén (2001) the “feeble view” of globalization. Briefly,
skeptics argue that the importance of globalization has been
overexaggerated and that globalization is neither unprecedented nor novel,
but a new phase of Western imperialism (Başkan 2006). Because both trade
and foreign investment are concentrated in the markets of Western Europe,
North America, and Japan, the economy is becoming more international, but
not yet truly global. In World 3.0, Ghemawat (2011) argues that the world is
only semi-globalized.
Skeptics argue that local governments still control their own economies
and that domestic investment is greater than foreign investment and that
most TNCs still locate their assets, owners, and top-level management in
their home countries (Guillén 2001). Sklair (1999, 2016) disagrees with the
view that this is proof that TNCs have national identity or loyalty, arguing
that TNCs may have “home” nations, but they are developing global
strategies and there is no evidence that TNCs or the TCC are loyal to their
home nations. Skeptics also believe that the cultural homogenization caused
by globalization is a myth and that we have instead a clash of civilizations
(Başkan 2006). However, skeptics tend to pay more attention to economic
rather than political or cultural issues (Başkan 2006). According to
Solakoglu, skeptics do not believe that a global governance or a global order
is emerging. He describes skeptics as believing that what “is happening in
the name of globalization is internationalism, regionalism, and neo-liberal
policies created by the capitalist order, but nothing else” (2016: 4). In
contrast to skeptics, both hyperglobalists and transformationists agree that
globalization is occurring.
HYPERGLOBALISTS
Hyperglobalists or globalists (e.g. Hardt and Negri 2000; Ohmae 1995)
believe that other aspects of social life are affected by the increasingly
global nature of capital and marketplaces. Finance and the production and
distribution of goods and services are more transnational and are less
encumbered by borders. Hybridization results when global forces interact
with national institutions such as the economy and the state. The result will
be a more denationalized and a more single-world society with transnational
networks of production, trade, and finance replacing national economies
(Başkan 2006). As a result, the role of the state is diminished and power is
ceded to global organizations such as the IMF, WTO, and World Bank
(Solakoglu 2016). Like skeptics, hyperglobalists also emphasize economic
rather than political or cultural globalization (Başkan 2006) although they
do take up the issue of state power.
TRANSFORMATIONALISTS
Transformationists (e.g. Giddens 2000; Ritzer 2007, 2008) also called post-
skeptics (Solakoglu 2016) agree that globalization is occurring and argue
that the world is becoming more interconnected across not only economic
and political systems, but also cultural and other social systems.
Transformationalists view global society as “more uncertain, risky, and
stratified” (Karraker 2008: 14), with some individuals and societies
benefiting more than others from open markets and cross-border flows.
Transformationalists disagree with hyperglobalists on the question of a more
unified world society. Rather than unity, there will be strife and conflict as
some will benefit from globalization at the expense of others (Başkan 2006;
Karraker 2008). From this perspective, the state is affected by globalization,
but still has a role to play (Solakoglu 2016). Skeptics, hyperglobalists, and
transformationalists disagree not only on whether globalization is occurring,
but also on the meaning of some of the structural transformations taking
place. Table 10.2 summarizes the similarities and differences between the
three globalization camps.
Table 10.2 Three Globalization Camps

What Is the Evidence for Globalization?
Some of the globalization indicators cited by Waters (1995) include (1) the
recognition of the world as a single place or shared consciousness
(Robertson and White 2007); (2) the proliferation of global organizations
(e.g. WTO, UN, IMF, Catholic Church) and events (e.g. Olympics, IKA
Culinary Olympics, World Games); (3) global patterns of consumption or
the worldwide importing and exporting of goods and services; (4) the spread
of world tourism; (5) cooperation among many nations to provide solutions
to world problems (e.g. global warming, pollution, AIDS, crime, and human
trafficking); and (6) the emergence of a global, cultural system. Ghemawat
(2011) disputes that economic data supports widespread globalization. In a
subheading of his book labeled “A Global Reality Check,” he argues that the
evidence of globalization is scant. For example, only 1 percent of snail mail
crosses national borders. Less than 2 percent of calls are international. Only
an estimated 17–18 percent of all Internet traffic crossed national borders.
He cites other data as well to dispute the notion that the world is truly
globalized. He does not disagree that there is an upward trajectory of
increased flows of people, good, and services across borders; he just does not
believe that globalization is as pronounced as others contend.
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION
Economic globalization has increased especially among affluent or wealthy
democracies (Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007). Economic indicators cited
by Guillén (2001) include foreign investment as a percentage of the world
gross domestic product (GDP), or the total value of all goods and services
produced in a given year, and trade including exports plus imports of goods
and services as a percentage of GDP. Data from the World Bank show an
increase in trade as a percent of World Gross Domestic Product between
1960 (24.061) and 2016 (56.20). World Bank data
(https://data.worldbank.org) also documents an increase in exports of goods
and services as a percent of the World Gross Domestic Product between
1960 (11.87) and 2016 (28.51).
FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION
Financial globalization is examined using indicators such as currency
exchange turnover and both cross-border bank credit and assets as a
percentage of the World GDP. Guillén (2001) claims that this dimension of
globalization has grown the fastest and some use these indicators as proof
that the sovereignty of the state has been diminished although others believe
this claim has been overstated (Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007). The 2008
global financial crisis dampened cross-border credit. While there has been a
modest improvement from 2010 to 2015, this is still below the 2000–2007
average (Ohnsorge and Yu 2016).
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION

Indicators of cross-border social exchange include tourism and international
telephone calls (Guillén 2001). Data from the World Tourism Organization
suggest that international tourist arrivals as a percentage of the world
population increased from 6.2 percent in 1980 to 17.5 percent in 2018. The
number of Internet hosts also increased from 213 sites in 1980 to over 1
billion in 2017. The percentage of the world population using the Internet
increased from 0.3 percent in 1995 to 54.4 percent in 2017; the highest
degree of penetration is in North America and the lowest is in Africa
(Internet World Stats 2017). According to the Union of International
Associations, the number of international organizations also increased from
approximately fourteen thousand in 1980 to over seventy-five thousand in
2017 and is considered an additional indicator of globalization (Guillén
2001). The very existence of the modern rationalized nation-state, which has
been adopted by most nations, is also an example of globalization and a key
feature of world society (Essary 2007; Waters 1995). An example of where
globalization is not having an impact is in the number of nation-states.
According to the UN, in 1980, there were 154 UN member countries, which
increased to 193 in 2011 and has remained so as of 2018 (www.un.org). A
World Bank study identifies 209 states and territories (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Masstruzzi 2007). Not all nations are members of the UN and some
“nations” receive only partial recognition. Guillén (2001) argues that
increases in the number of nation-states are due to the importance of
nationalism.
While the increase in the number of nation-states is viewed as evidence
against globalization, there has been a substantial increase in the growth and
influence of IFIs, including the IMF, World Bank, and other international
organizations such as the EU and the WTO (Huber and Stephens 2005).
Huber and Stephens note that the creation of the EU is historically without
precedent and has shifted many areas of decision-making away from the
nation-state although Brexit10 is an example of a nation resisting control of
a larger international organization. This raises an important point; it is not
only the number of organizations, but also the expanding role of
supranational organizations including IFIs. See Table 10.3 for a summary of
globalization indicators.
Table 10.3 Globalization Indicators

IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE NATION-
STATE
Perhaps the outcome most debated by political sociologists is the impact of
globalization on the nation-state with a variety of opinions on whether the
state will continue to exist, its importance, strength, and capacity. We review
some general observations made by a variety of globalization scholars and
then examine these questions in the context of the withering state debate,
strong-state–weak-state thesis, and competing globalizations views or the
skeptic, hyperglobalist, and transformationalist. Finally, we review how
different theoretical perspectives view the state.
Rotberg (2003) contends that states are important—not despite but
because globalization is increasing state capacity and capability. Yet, in
calling universalism a component of globalization, Nassar (2005) assumes
that a weakened state is an outcome of globalization. Indeed, much of the
globalization literature suggests that the state is losing its power to TNCs and
NGOs (Alasuutari 2000) as well as IFIs although some contend that this
argument is ideological and made by those who would like to see a weaker
state (e.g. neoliberals) and are making a TINA type of argument (Khondker
2008). Other sociologists are concerned about globalization’s impact on the
state and express concern especially in areas such as trade, security, arms
control (Pakulski 2001; Paquin 2002), and immigration (Janoski and Wang
2004). In summarizing Ulrich Beck’s (2001) view of the nation-state as a
“zombie concept,” or concept of limited conceptual or theoretical utility,
Ritzer writes
In Beck’s work, the nation-state in the age of globalization is such a concept, that is, the
nation-state continues to “live on”, to survive, as a concept in the contemporary context,
even though it is of reduced importance and being undermined by global processes (e.g.
terrorism, the flow of drugs) that it cannot control and that, in some cases increasingly
control it.
(2015: 414)
In a more nuanced argument, some contend that the state is adapting to

changing conditions (Ó Riain 2018) or that the state is being redefined, but
has not lost its significance (Sassen 1996, 2018).
Withering State Debate

Waters (1995) describes two camps in the “withering state debate”: realists
and modernists. Realists reject a declining state argument and argue that the
state is still the primary institution for organizing politics (e.g. McGrew
1992). Using the case of Malaysia and Vietnam, Jandl challenges the
withering state debate.
States are not hapless victims of globalisation, but active facilitators…The state makes
decisions about globalisation—either to engage in it or retreat from it—based on the
state’s perceived interests. Moreover, the state is perfectly capable of reversing these
decisions as state interests change over time.
(2009: 55)
In contrast, for modernists such as Held (1991) and Ohmae (1995), the
decline of the state is already occurring, with a shift toward a type of world
governance or in the case of Hardt and Negri (2000), Empire. Empire is not
a new global hegemon, but “a new global form of sovereignty” with national
and supranational entities linked together by a common logic (Steinmetz
2014: 87). A new position is also emerging: those who believe that the
nation-state is still important, but it is being redefined (Ó Riain 2000; Sassen
1996, 2018) and even transformed. For Sassen, cities are the new global
power centers. Robinson (1998, 2001, 2014) posits that the nation-state is
transforming into the national state, which is part of a TNS apparatus, but
this is different from a global state or Empire. Robinson (2014) warns that
national states are facing a crisis of legitimacy and authority because they
are unable to meet the grievances of citizens facing downward mobility and
other challenges and are unable to confront the ecological challenges facing
the world. He further warns of an emerging global police state to deal with
the crisis created by the global capitalist system. Cultural theories of
globalization also view the state as changing, but do not theorize a national
state or TNS network. As an example of a modernist position, we review
Held’s argument as summarized by Waters (1995).
First, Held contends the nation-state is in decline and will be replaced by
some sort of world government because globalization makes it more difficult
for governments to control both the flow of trade and ideas. As a counter
argument, we note some governments have attempted to restrict the flow of
ideas by blocking politically sensitive Internet sites11 (e.g. Iran, China).
Second, Held argues that state power is also diminished by TNCs. Third,
areas that have formally been considered under the domain of states (e.g.
defense, communications, and economic management) must be coordinated
between governments. Fourth, states have surrendered their sovereignty
rights for membership in larger political units (e.g. EU, IMF, WTO, NATO,
UN, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)). Fifth, a
system of global governance is emerging that will further reduce state power.
Finally, the previous conditions provide the prerequisites for the emergence
of a supranational state that will possess coercive power. While the fifth and
sixth points are somewhat tentative, there is some evidence that nation-states
have surrendered some sovereignty rights to become members of larger
political units. Waters (1995) discusses some of the historical events that
have resulted in this loss.
Waters notes that the treaty of Westphalia12 established three principles,
one of which is rex est imperator in regno suo, or that the state is not subject
to external authority. The Nuremberg tribunal, which punished German
leaders for atrocities committed during World War II, was a breach of
Westphalia and allowed the Allied nations to legitimize the defeat of the axis
powers and to punish their leaders. Westphalia was circumvented by
appealing to human rights, which has continued to be a method for states to
intervene as the 1948 UN Human Rights Declaration justifies intervention
when human rights are at stake.
Similar to human rights, environmental concerns have also impacted
state sovereignty as we have redefined parts of the planet as “global
commons” outside the control of any one nation-state, including outer space,
Antarctica, the high seas, the airwaves, and the atmosphere. In the case of
both human rights and environmental concerns, a global normative culture
promoted by grassroots organizations, social movements, and international
NGOs (Delanty and Rumford 2007) pressures states to comply. Climate
change may be the issue that forces nation-states to give up some of their
power to address a global threat. Michael Mann writes
Climate change is happening…The threat is global, since greenhouse gas emissions
anywhere affect people everywhere. These emissions come flanked by other disaster
scenarios: food and water shortages, polar icecap and tundra melting, seawater
inundation, etc. Millions of people are already dying prematurely as a result of global
warming and the survival of a few poorer countries will be threatened within twenty to
thirty years unless human societies radically change their development.
(2016: 93)
Strong-State–Weak-State Thesis
The strong-state–weak-state thesis also raises the question of relevance.
Evans (1997) acknowledges that globalization can undermine the state
because the neoliberal ideology associated with globalization is against a
strong state, yet he believes that the “eclipse of the state” is not likely
because the higher rates of cross-border exchanges associated with
globalization depend upon having a strong state. Furthermore, he argues that
having a strong state may give the same a competitive advantage in the
global market (65). Although Evans appears to be taking the realist side of
this debate, most scholars are not pure realists or modernists, but take a more
nuanced position. For example, while still positing a strong-state argument,
Evans also believes that TNCs have a dominating influence in the
international arena.
Ó Riain (2000) disagrees with the notion that with globalization comes a
weaker state as “globalization does not consist of an inevitable march to a
neoliberal order but is a political contested process in which different state-
market models of interaction come into conflict locally, nationally, and
transnationally” (188) and that states must balance these activities against
the interests of their citizens. States play a crucial role in three ways, by (1)
enabling the construction of markets by guaranteeing the rules of commerce,
(2) creating new markets, and (3) shaping market strategies (Ó Riain 2000).
Weiss (2000) agrees, arguing that globalization and state power are not
linked. Alasuutari (2000) argues that the state is still very powerful for
identity construction as the nation-state is for many an important cultural
system.
Different theoretical camps provide different answers on whether the
state is weakened by globalization. We begin our analysis by comparing the
skeptic, hyperglobalist, and transformationalist views and then compare and
contrast different theoretical perspectives, including World Systems, Global
Capitalists, Postmodernism, Network Society, and Cultural Globalization
theoretical perspectives.
Competing Globalization Camps

The skeptic, hyperglobalist, and transformationalist camps take a stance on
the question of diminishing state power. Başkan (2006) describes skeptics as
denying that the state is being undermined due to the increasing
internationalization of the economy. In direct opposition, hyperglobalists
such as Ohmae (1995) believe the state is in decline because it no longer is
able to control economic activities. Başkan describes hyperglobalists as
pointing to the increasing influence of IFIs and global elite that are not
controlled by any single nation-state as evidence of the decline in state
power. Contrary to the hyperglobalists, Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao (2007)
note that many studies have concluded that international financial managers
are not effectively monitoring or responding to states engaged in fiscally
questionable policies (Mosley 2003) and that the influence of these managers
is overstated (Wilensky 2002). Transformationalists (e.g. Giddens 1998) take
a position somewhere in the middle. They agree with skeptics that the state
power is not being diminished, but argue that state power is being
transformed precisely because of the rise in the number of IFIs and other
international governance institutions. The state is still important precisely
because there is currently no other alternative to the nation-state (Smith
1995).
Theoretical Views on State Power

World Systems Theory: WST contends that capitalists need strong states to
succeed, but states are increasingly suffering from the loss of legitimacy
(Wallerstein 2003). States are necessary for companies to acquire capital and
appease and repress the “dangerous classes” by providing legitimizing
ideology that encourages the have-nots to wait and be patient. Wallerstein
(1999) asks: What is the point of accumulating capital if you cannot hold on
to it? Capitalists need the state (Calhoun 2013), yet opposition to the state
has been growing worldwide. Wallerstein believes that the masses are
questioning the ability of states to maintain order and transform society.
Wallerstein (2003) describes a vicious cycle where individuals confront fears
about their own security by taking back this function from the state (e.g.
private citizens patrolling the border and “detaining” illegals) (e.g. Shapira
2013). This, in turn, breeds more chaos and fear as states become
increasingly unable to handle the situation, inciting more people to
“disinvest” from the state. States losing legitimacy also lose power to
execute functions for sustaining capitalism (e.g. controlling the dangerous
classes). Because there are more players due to globalization, no group has
the power to make decisions alone. Using the analogy of a car, Wallerstein
writes:
A wise chauffeur might drive quite slowly under these difficult conditions. But there is
no wise chauffeur … and the very fact that these decisions are being made by a large
number of actors, operating separately and in each his or her own immediate interests
virtually ensures that the car will not slow down … Consequently, what we may expect
is recklessness. As the world-economy enters a new period of expansion, it will thereby
exacerbate the very conditions that have led it into a terminal crisis. At the same time,
we may expect the degree of collective and individual security to decrease, perhaps
vertiginously, as state structures lose more and more legitimacy. And this will no doubt
increase the amount of violence in the world-system. This will be frightening to most
people; as well it should be.
(2003: 67)
In summary, WST views the state as an important political institution

that serves many functions necessary for capitalism but the state is losing
power in light of a legitimacy crisis in face of ever chaotic economic swings
as capitalism continues to run its course. Because the nation-state is still
considered primary and not transforming into another entity, WST views
states from the more realistic point of the withering state debate continuum.
GLOBAL CAPITALIST THEORISTS

William Robinson (2001, 2014) rejects the strong-state and competing
weak-state theses, arguing that globalization scholars need to move beyond
this dualism by developing the concept of a transnational state or TNS.
Globalization is a new stage in the development of world capitalism, but it
does not mean the rejection of the state. The state is neither primary nor
obsolete, but is being transformed and absorbed by the larger structure of
the TNS.
Briefly, Robinson argues that the state and the nation-state do not
necessarily share the same boundaries, and the fusion of the two concepts
has negatively impacted the ability of scholars to detect the “increasing
separation of state practices from those of the nation-state” (2001: 157). He
argues (as we have in Chapter 2), that nation and state are analytically
distinct concepts. He contends that the social science literature shares a
nation-state centrism that mistakenly assumes that phenomena associated
with the TNS are an international expression of the nation-state system
(1998, 2001, 2014). A global capitalist (GC) perspective recognizes that no
regions of the world are outside the sphere of global capital and rejects a
Weberian view of the state in favor of understanding the state both as a set
of class power relations and as a political institution. According to
Robinson, Weber’s mistake was focusing only on the state as a political
institution.
Because of the globalization of capital, the state is being transformed
into the TNS. First, class relations are becoming globalized, with capitalists
from different countries comprising a TCC that differs from a national
capitalist class by being involved in global (as opposed to local or national)
production and managing global circuits of capital accumulation. This class
also has a global identity rather than a link to a specific territory. The role of
the TNS is to maintain and perpetuate the hegemony of this TCC. The TNS
is a network of national states that have been integrated, as well as the rise
of supranational economic and political institutions.
National states have been reorganized by the rise of the transnational
class. Both processes are necessary for the TNS: (1) the transformation of
nation-states into national states and (2) the rise of supranational
institutions. Globalization, then, does not involve the diminishing or
withering away of national states, but does involve a transformation as the
national state is a component of a larger TNS. These national states are
“neoliberal states” that provide services essential for GC, including (1)
adopting fiscal and monetary policies enabling macroeconomic stability; (2)
providing infrastructure needed for global commerce, including
transportation, education, and communication; and (3) providing security
through both direct force and ideological persuasion.
Like Marxist-based theories of class, GC recognizes a contradiction
within the national state, as it becomes difficult to maintain social cohesion
at the same time national economies are becoming more integrated. This
failure results in the loss of legitimacy. Marxist views of the state theorize
the capacity for states to respond to these crises without constraints imposed
by the capitalist class. Robinson also poses similar questions regarding the
TNS: (1) “Is it possible for TNS cadre to acquire enough autonomy from
transnational capitalists to act independent of their short-term interests?”
and (2) “Can the TNS develop a long-term project of global capitalist
development beyond these interests?” (2001: 190). Robinson (2014) sees
the current crisis of GC and loss of national state legitimacy as a crisis of
humanity. He contends that the manifestations of the current global crisis
include: wars, collapsing states, terrorism committed by both state and non-
state actors, a pandemic of crime and interpersonal violence, ecological
degradation, etc.
In summary, GC views the state as an important and a powerful political
institution that is being transformed into a national state integrated into a
TNS. Like WST, the role of the TNS is to perpetuate capitalism despite the
challenge of potentially diminishing state legitimacy. Unlike WST, GC
views the state as transforming rather than unchanging and theorizes the role
of the TNS as perpetuating the dominance of a TNC. In terms of the
withering state debate, GC fits closer to the realist position although it does
theorize a transformation from the traditional nation-state into a network of
national states or TNS. Robinson (2014) suggests that the TNS is not able to
manage the current crisis of GC.
POSTMODERN VIEWS
Postmodern theorists are modernists contending that the postmodern
condition of the state is the end of sovereignty as the nation-state no longer
controls what is going on within its borders (Best 2002; Harvey 1989). “The
state is shrinking as its modern role in providing external defense, internal
surveillance, and citizenship rights are undermined” (Best 2002: 375). Arms
control and nuclear proliferation treaties, the decline in the military elite, the
spread of individualistic and libertarian philosophies, and membership in
organizations such as NATO all have undermined the defensive function of
the state (Best 2002; Pakulski 2001) as well as other state capacities.
International agreements and membership in international organizations
diminish state capacity to respond to economic crises such as
unemployment (Pakulski 2001). Even if states maintain the ability to act
unilaterally, global problems such as AIDS, pollution, illegal drugs, and
human trafficking are beyond the control of an individual state. The ability
of INGOs and supranational organizations to pressure other states into
following international norms (e.g. human rights) also is a threat to state
sovereignty.
In combination with global norms, the worldwide reach of the mass
media also decreases the capacity of the state to use violence against its own
citizens to maintain order. To do so anyway is politically risky (Best 2002).
For example, consider the 2009 protests in Iran after the reelection of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the resulting clash between civilians
and the police. The killing of a young non-protesting Iranian woman
resulted in an international public outcry after a video of her killing was
released on the Internet13 (Fathi 2009). The ability of individuals and groups
to use social media to not only organize protest activities, but also share
information to resist government makes it more difficult for the state to
control the narrative and to tamp down protest.
For Hardt and Negri, perhaps the two most popular postmodernists, the
nation-state is not only in a state of decline but is being replaced by “a
national form of sovereignty, a global empire” (2004: 3). This global empire
is conceptualized as a pyramid composed of several tiers. At the apex of
control is the only remaining superpower, the United States. At a
subordinate level within this first tier are the other nations that comprise the
G8 now known as the G7.14 These principals, along with the United States,
control IFIs. The second tier includes TNCs and other less powerful nation-
states that are subordinate to the interests of TNCs. Finally, the last tier,
which is the broadest and represents people, is made up of religious and
media organizations, NGOs, and other entities comprising global civil
society. Hardt and Negri note that individuals themselves or collectively, the
multitude, cannot advocate for themselves, but must seek representation
through other mechanisms, such as membership in organizations. In this
respect, multitude is analogous to a pluralist view that posits that citizens
exercise power through organization membership. Although the United
States may enjoy a privileged position within Empire, this is not a return to
old-style European imperialism. “Imperialism is over. No nation will be
world leader in the way modern European nations were” (2000: xiv).
In summary, unlike WST and GC, a postmodern perspective views the
nation-state as becoming irrelevant. Other organizations and entities are
replacing the nation-state and creating a structure of global governance. This
is different from Robinson’s GC perspective of the TNS, where nation-states
transform into national states as a building block of the TNS. Like GC,
supranational political and economic organizations are also important.
NETWORK SOCIETY
Power is found within networks. Individuals, organizations, and
governments are part of this network, but their ability to participate in the
network is dependent on whether or not, as a node, they can contribute to
the logic of that network. Castells views nation-states as being caught in the
middle between their citizens and the network. To the extent that states
represent the communities of people within them increases the risk of being
cut off from the network. If states follow the logic of the network, they are
no longer effectively representing their citizens and become nodes in the
network giving up their sovereignty (Nyíri 2004). Castells concedes though
that the network depends on “the coordinating and regulatory functions of
the state.” Because the state has the monopoly on the use of violence, “the
state constitutes the default network for the proper functioning of all other
power networks” (Castells 2011). Furthermore, the capability to gather and
process information with the help of technology has expanded the
regulatory capacity of the state. However, this same technology has made
the flow of information bidirectional, enabling civil society to keep the
state’s regulatory activities in check without damaging state effectiveness to
work on behalf of public interest. Because of this ability of civil society,
perceptions of state bureaucratic detachment and authoritarianism act to
delegitimize its power. This, in turn, brings about pressure for institutional
reform with the goal of creating a more responsive and flexible government
(Castells 1989).
In sum, while the state regulator role has been enhanced, the ability of
civil society to keep the state in check has also increased. The same
technological advances that have enabled global trade also enable strategies
that protest the excesses of globalization. Although not considered a
network society theorist, Evans makes this point quite well when he asks,
“Why shouldn’t the burgeoning growth of communications and movement
across national boundaries create new global strategies aimed at well-being
and equity at the same time that it stimulates transnational finance and
trade?” (Evans 2000: 230). Because Network Society Theory views the state
as important and primarily focuses on the impact of IT on both state
capacity and civil society, it falls closer to the realist camp in the withering
state debate.
CULTURAL THEORIES OF GLOBALIZATION

Robertson and White (2007) question the framing of the state debate. They
contend that the nation-state is an “aspect” of globalization rather than
something that globalization a priori diminishes, as we cannot talk about
globalization “were it not for the existence of nation-states” (6 of 11)
because, as the result of globalization, the nation-state is the global norm for
organizing the exercise of political power. For Robertson and White, the
issue is not about the decline of the nation-state but the changing nature
(emphasis Robertson and White) of the state. As an example of how central
the nation-state is, cultural theorists point to the impact of migration on
societal debates about the nature of national identity as one cannot have
national identity without a nation. Yet, cultural theorists do not believe that
the nature of the nation-state is static.
Robertson (1992) views globalization in five stages. Stage 1, the
“germinal phase” (1500–1750) is characterized by the expanding influence
of the Catholic Church, the spread of the Gregorian calendar, and the
beginning of modern geography. In the “incipient stage” or stage 2 (1750–
1875), the modern nation-state was established. The “take-off stage” or
stage 3 involves conceiving the world in terms of four reference points
(nation-state, the individual, an international single society, and a single
humanity). Stage 4 is the “struggle for hegemony phase” including World
War II, the Cold War, and the emergence of the United Nations. In the
“uncertainty phase” or stage 5, international relationships are more
complicated, global media are available, and there is recognition that
environmental problems are global rather than local. Giulianotti and
Robertson (2007) have added a sixth stage, characterized by more
pronounced local global penetration; yet, it is unclear what the implications
may be for the nation-state. Clearly, cultural theory does not fit the
modernist view of the demise of the nation-state. Rather, Robertson
contends that the state will be transformed, but does not go as far as
Robinson (1998, 2001) in defining the future of the nation-state. Because
the nation-state is still important, we place cultural theorists such as
Robertson closer to the realist side of the withering state debate.
In conclusion, there is a great deal of dissent and debate regarding
changes to the nation-state. Most theorists do not take a strict realist or
modernist stance in the withering state debate, but do view the nation-state
as transforming or changing. We agree with Delanty and Rumford, who
write,
The notion of the decline of the nation-state … should be replaced by the idea of the
continued transformation of the nation-state. The idea of a zero-sum situation of states
disappearing in a global world of markets or replaced by global structures of
governance, on the one side, or as in the neo-realist scenario the survival of the so-
called Westphalian state as a sovereign actor must be rejected.
(2007: 3 of 13)
Despite the differences, all the theories reviewed have something

interesting to add to our understanding of globalization. Besides the
question of the nation-state, other aspects of political globalization include
public policy, the welfare state, and nationalism. Table 10.4 summarizes
theoretical views regarding the impact of globalization on the state.
Public Policy
The debate on the potential weakening of the state emphasizes the declining
ability of states to mitigate the effects of globalization as some argue that
economic globalization and the accompanying involvement of nation-states
in international agreements diminish the ability to influence economic
performance, unemployment, as well as the allocation of rights and
privileges (Pakulski 2001). Blackman disagrees by arguing that precisely
because of the growth in global trade flow, nation-states are not irrelevant
“because there is an imperative to invest heavily in education and training,
research and development and infrastructure to position open economies” to
capitalize on these global trade flows (2007: 3 of 14).
Table 10.4 Differing Theoretical Views of the Impact

of Globalization on the State
Blackman contends that the nation-state is still relevant, not only because
it needs to enact policies to gain a competitive advantage, but also because
the globalized economy is the product of an international order based on
nation-states. Far from eroding or ending the role of nation-states,
globalization is redefining but not curtailing it. For example, many consider
the EU as an example of an outcome of globalization, European integration.
Yet, Blackman asserts that the EU is a creation of democratic nation-states
and not globalization. In fact, the 2016 Brexit vote, where the majority voted
to have the British government leave the EU, reinforces the relevance of the
nation-state. While the EU gives member states some latitude in determining
policies to mediate some of the negative impact of globalization, choices are
more constrained in an interconnected environment. Yet, Blackman argues
that some nation- states are increasingly using their policy systems as a
means to better situate economies for growth by investing in education,
research and development, health, and infrastructure. He argues for
conceptualizing the nation-state as a major player that still can significantly
impact the lives of its citizens and for rejecting the neoliberal ideology
calling for a smaller state that accompanies globalization. There is some
evidence that the Brexit vote was motivated by antiglobalization backlash as
those voting to leave the EU were more likely to oppose cosmopolitism,
globalization, multiculturalism, and opposition to immigration (Sampson
2017).
What governments do makes a difference in the globalized economy.
The neoliberal discourse that links globalization and its benefits to small
government is just that: a discourse that reflects the power and interests of
those for whom small government is advantageous. This is never likely to be
true for most people because of the need for smart public policies that have
real impact across key sectors … (e.g. education) and because democracies
are unlikely to tolerate the extent of income inequality that globalization will
fuel without intervention (Blackman 2007: 8 of 14).
Blackman is arguing that states can and should buffer their citizens.
While Blackman sees the role of the welfare state expanding in times of
globalization, others forecast welfare state retrenchment as a globalization
outcome. Other globalization researchers of course question whether or not
the state has the capacity to buffer their citizens if not in the interests of the
global elite. Globalization researchers should continue to examine the impact
of globalization on how the state both regulates and administers policy
(Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007).
Welfare State
Welfare states view economic globalization and neoliberalism as a threat
because of pressure from IFIs to open markets in what has traditionally been
defined as public service (e.g. water, sanitation, fire protection) despite
lacking evidence that welfare states are bad for economic growth (Blackman
2007). Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao (2007) describe three arguments
concerning the impact of globalization on the welfare state: expansion,
retrenchment, and curvilinear.
The expansion thesis suggests that the volatility and uncertainty
accompanying globalization causes expansion of the welfare state, whereas
the retrenchment thesis suggests that governments cut back on benefits as a
means of staying globally competitive to attract markets. The retrenchment
thesis is connected to hyperglobalization. Proponents of this view argue that
the emergence of a single global market and competition has eliminated the
latitude previously afforded nation-states. The imposition of neoliberal
policies means that governments must reduce intervention such as
unemployment benefits because extending benefits raises production costs
(Huber and Stephens 2005). The curvilinear thesis argues that globalization
initially causes expansion of the welfare state, but eventually leads to
retrenchment.
What is the empirical evidence? The effect of globalization on the open
market is highly disputed. Just because there is a parallel trend toward both
globalization and declining state intervention does not mean there is a causal
relationship (Huber and Stephens 2005). The consensus emerging among
researchers is that globalization has only a small effect on the welfare state
and is far less influential that other political forces (Brady, Beckfield, and
Zhao 2007). While welfare rollbacks have occurred in some areas, this was
due more to adopting neoliberal ideology (Huber and Stephens 2005) rather
than globalization per se. Citing Iverson (2001), Brady and colleagues argue
that welfare state growth is still likely due to an aging population that
pressures politicians to maintain these programs. Similar to Huber and
Stephens (2005), Brady and associates argue that “globalizations’ effects on
the welfare state might be better understood as a socially constructed
discursive device that legitimizes calls for efficiency and undermines calls
for egalitarianism” (2007: 319). In other words, it is not economic
globalization per se that impacts the welfare state, but neoliberal policies that
are enacted to respond to what is perceived by some as an inevitable and
unstoppable process where there is no alternative (TINA), but to contract the
welfare state. While economic globalization has received most of the
research attention, globalization also impacts culture. In the next section, we
examine research on cultural globalization and national identity.
Nationalism
Nationalism is a sense of identity collectively shared by people who define
themselves as belonging to or being citizens of a specific state. If
globalization results in homogeneity or cultural convergence, we might
expect diminishing nationalism. On the other hand, globalization may be
perceived as threatening cultural uniqueness, including national identity,
motivating a rise in nationalism. What is the relationship between
globalization and nationalism? The nature of the relationship between
nationalism and globalization has focused on the future of the nation-state
(Osterhammel 2013).
Başkan (2006) reviews some of the differing positions on the
relationship between globalization and nationalism. On the one hand, he
describes hyperglobalists who view globalization as a threat to national
identity because it eliminates borders, leading to a decline in the importance
of the nation-state (e.g. Ohmae 1995). Because the nation-state is the basis
for nationalism (Başkan 2006), its decline should coincide with decreasing
nationalism. A hyperglobalist asks whether nationalism will remain an
effective way of mobilizing people in a globalized world.
Başkan also describes an alternative argument, specifically, that
nationalism will rise as a form of resistance to any perceived cultural loss or
threat. In other words, if homogeneity is a globalization outcome, will this
spark a nationalism resurgence to resist homogeneity (Jones 2006; Schnee
2001)? Certainly, the sense of nation that persists despite the global flow of
capital is some evidence in favor of this view. As discussed in previous
chapters, nationalism can provide a sense of national identity and pride and
transform a state to a nation-state. Nationalism can also be seen as a
response to changing social and economic conditions. Asserting economic
sovereignty is a response to globalization (Osterhammel 2013). Brexit is an
attempt by Great Britain to reclaim both economic sovereignty and control
over immigration policy (Rapoza 2018). Robinson (2014) cites nationalism
as a component of fascist movements that come about as a result of capitalist
crisis and argues that some strains of this are already evident in the United
States and manifested as the Tea Party Movement, the emergence of the
Christian Right, the increase in right-wing extremists groups that promote
hate, and anti-immigrant movements. To be fair, left-wing groups also are
often motivated by grievances due to globalization including ecological
threats, the exploitation of cheap labor in other countries, etc.
Political psychologist Catarina Kinnvall (2004) makes a
transformationalist rather than a skeptic or hyperglobalist argument by
declaring that globalization increases uncertainty and insecurity, potentially
encouraging the growth of local identity. Specifically, globalization
encourages the rejection of traditional power structures. Once traditional
means are rejected, these need to be replaced to prevent insecurity. The
combination of religion and nationalism provides a particularly powerful
way of responding to times of rapid change and insecurity. Nationalism,
then, is like any other aspect of culture being transformed by globalization
and breeding the “new nationalism” (Kaldor 2004) or national identity
motivated by uncertainty and insecurity brought on by globalization.
Using the case of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey (MHP), Başkan
(2006) examines the methods used by an ultranationalist political party to
include globalization as part of its political discourse as well as how
globalization impacted its political success. The MHP drew its supporters
from those feeling most threatened by globalization, including farmers and
low-income workers. However, as part of a majority government coalition,
MHP supported Turkey’s membership in the EU as well as the
implementation of economic programs in collaboration with the IMF. As a
result, some supporters were alienated and left the party. MHP’s political
discourse was in line with a skeptic view defining globalization as primarily
an economic process that does not undermine the authority of the nation-
state. MHP party ideology also promoted a strong Turkish identity and love
for the state. Although MHP tried to ally itself with voters who were worried
about how the negative impacts of globalization would affect them, it
alienated its political base by pursuing policies that enhanced globalization.
Its appeal to voters was aimed toward those with a hyperglobalist or a
transformationalist view but it pursued the course of a globalization skeptic.
The resurgence of nationalism as an outcome of globalization possibly
occurs as a response to the loss of traditional structures. Sometimes those
structures are authoritarian, oppressive, and undemocratic. If democracy is
viewed as Westernization and an attempt to homogenize culture, nationalism
as well as other forms of resistance may rise. Democracy is one aspect of
neoliberalization or the ideology justifying some of the WC policies seen by
developing nations as benefitting the haves at the expense of the have-nots.
Does globalization explain the spread of democracy? Just what type of
democracy is being spread? What explains the role of the United States in
exporting democracy and is it successful?
DEMOCRACY AND GLOBALIZATION

Francis Fukuyama (1992) famously declared the “end of history” thesis or
the idea that liberal democracy is fated to triumph over authoritarian political
forms because of the human need for expression or “thymos” that leads to the
perfect political state, democracy. According to Fukuyama, now that
democracy has become globally accepted, we have reached “the end of
history.” Others disagree, arguing that the end of the Cold War and the fall of
former communist regimes have not brought about the end of history, but
“political anarchy, tribal warfare, genocide, and ethnic and religious warfare”
(Erler and Wood 2009: 122). Despite the criticism, there has been a large
increase in the number of democratic states (Blackman 2007), with many
scholars discussing “waves of democracy” (Huntington 1991; Markoff 1996)
and attributing this political outcome to globalization.
How widespread is democracy? Citing figures from the Wall Street
Journal, Kathleen Schwartzman (1998) contends that worldwide the number
of democracies rose from 25 percent in 1974 to 66 percent by 1996. In 2008,
the number of authoritarian regimes was approximately 31 percent, which
suggests that 69 percent of nations were democracies of some sort (ranging
from full democracy to hybrid regime, “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s
Index of Democracy 2008”), representing a 3 percent point increase from
1996 and, more significantly, a 44 percent point increase from 1974. In 2017,
the percentage of countries that are classified as authoritarian regimes
remained at 31.1 percent or fifty two nations (Economist Intelligence Unit
2017). While this may seem as if democracy is in fine shape as authoritarian
regimes are the minority, the figures mask some important changes between
2008 and 2017. First, the number and percentage of nations experiencing
“full democracy” has fallen from thirty (18.0 percent) in 2008 to nineteen
(11.4 percent) in 2017. Additionally, the percentage of the world’s population
who are living under a full democracy regime has fallen from 14.4 percent in
2008 to 4.5 percent in 2017. While the number of authoritarian regimes has
remained almost constant, the number of flawed and hybrid regimes has
grown. Further, the average worldwide Democracy score has decreased from
5.55 (larger indicates more democracy) in 2008 to 5.48 in 2017. Most of the
change appears due to full democracy being downgraded to flawed
democracy. For example, the United States was classified as a full democracy
in 2008, but a flawed democracy in 2017. See Table 10.5 for an overview of
democracy scores. To differentiate between various regime types, The
Economist Intelligence Unit uses an “index of democracy” consisting of sixty
indicators that fall into five categories, including electoral process, civil
liberties, government functioning, political participation, and political
culture. From these indicators, index scores ranging from ten through zero
are calculated with higher scores equated with democracy. Index scores are
broken down into ranges to classify nations into four categories: full
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.
The distinction between full and flawed democracies as well as the
existence of hybrid regimes that blend some democracy with
authoritarianism means that not all democracies are created equal and U.S.
involvement in exporting democracy is not without criticism. What is the
relationship between globalization and democracy?
The worldwide spread of democracy is a political and cultural outcome of
globalization as well as part of the neoliberal project (Hall 2002). Although
globalization is a double-edged sword, Kellner (2002) acknowledges the
“progressive features” of globalization, including the Internet. Expounding
on the possibilities provided by technology, Francis Fox Piven (2008)
foresees globalization as expanding both the availability and accessibility of
“popular power.” Hardt and Negri have stressed the possibilities of
democratic transformative struggle within Empire through “multitude.”
Although they argue that the current biggest threat to democracy is global
war, and that Empire, enabled through globalization, involves “new
mechanisms of control and constant conflict,” globalization also includes
“the creation of new circuits of cooperation and collaboration that stretch
across nations and continents and allow an unlimited number of encounters”
(2004: xiii). Does globalization enable the spread of democracy, and is it
actually spreading?
Table 10.5 Democracy Index Comparing 2008 and

2017
Is Democracy Spreading?
The percentage of countries categorized as “non-authoritarian” is at an all-
time high yet the Democracy Index results show that the spread of
democracy has stagnated and even regressed with the drop in the number of
full democracies. In the 1960s and 1970s, many social scientists doubted the
resilience of democracies, noting the success of authoritarian regimes in the
former Soviet bloc to control opinion and dissent, the preponderance of
“presidents for life” in Africa after colonialism, and authoritarian regimes
and practices in both Latin America and Asia (Markoff 1996). Beginning in
the mid-1970s and continuing into the 1990s was the reversal of this trend,
with the fall of communism and the endorsement of democracy in what is
called the “third wave” (Huntington 1991; Markoff 1996). While some form
of democracy is becoming a global political standard, we have not come to
“the end of history” as there is a wide variation in the quality of political life
under the “democracy” umbrella. How do social scientists differentiate
between different “democracy” types and what accounts for the third wave?
As we have seen in Chapter 2, there is a wide variation under the
democracy umbrella with “low quality” democracies failing to provide basic
services (Markoff 2005) and democracy often coexists with antidemocratic
forces and conflict (Markoff 1996, 2005). Yet, there seems to have been
substantial improvement since 1974. What role has globalization played?
Role of Globalization
Markoff (1996) contends that governing elites pay attention to what is
happening to their counterparts in other areas, sometimes resulting in
political convergence. Weaker states may attempt to become successful by
modeling themselves after stronger ones or strong states may impose their
political organization on weaker states. To explain the “third wave,”
Schwartzman (1998) contends that scholars examining the role of global
connections tend to focus on six main categories, including favorable
international climate, global industrialization and development, global
shocks, a shifting global hegemon, world system cycles, and foreign
intervention. The Arab Spring, or a series of pro-democracy rallies that took
place in Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Bahrain beginning in
2011 was hoped to be a fourth wave of democracy that has only resulted in
Tunisia transitioning to a constitutional democracy.15 Conflict continues and
repression by authorities continues in other countries with some calling this
period “the Arab Winter” (e.g. Tharoor 2018). The next section is based
mostly on Schwartzman’s (1998) summary pertaining to the third wave.
FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE

This is a type of domino argument suggesting that, as one nation falls away
from an authoritarian system of government, others follow suit. Clearly
linking this to globalization, Huntington (1991) argues that expansion of
global communications and transportation started the domino cascade.
Schwartzman criticizes this argument because it fails to answer several
questions, including what caused the first domino to fall, and why did this
not occur earlier after the Greeks first developed democracy? Further,
Schwartzman contends that it does not seriously consider social, economic,
and political processes operating at both global and domestic levels. She
concludes that the international climate argument does not contribute much
to our understanding.
GLOBAL INDUSTRIALIZATION AND

DEVELOPMENT
Global industrialization and development promotes democratization through
technological innovations in communication and transportation and
industrialization, contributing to a growth in both the middle and working
classes and global growth undermining nondemocratic states. The role of
communication and transportation in spreading democracy is criticized
because networks that can spread democratic ideals can also spread fascism.
In other words, networks are content neutral. Furthermore, this argument
does not explain the initial introduction of democratic ideas. However, the
growth in middle and working classes has the advantage of explaining why
democracy is the preferred regime as “revolution and democracy offer the
best opportunities for workers to satisfy their material needs” (Schwartzman
1998: 167).
GLOBAL SHOCKS
This explanation posits that economic shocks create a legitimacy crisis for
nondemocratic regimes because an intolerable gap is created between what
a state promises and what it is able to deliver, resulting in a loss of
legitimacy and possible overthrow. While democratic states also face a loss
of legitimacy during economic crisis, citizens do not overturn the state but
vote incumbents out of office. How might the recent 2008–2009 economic
crisis impact democracy? Rather than arguing that shocks will put only
nondemocratic states at risk with democratic ones experiencing only a
change in administration, Kekic (2007) argues that nations with “emerging
markets” and “fragile democratic institutions” face a higher risk of slipping
back into authoritarianism because free market capitalism and Western
ideology may be blamed for the economic crisis.
SHIFTING GLOBAL HEGEMON

WST posits that a shift in the global hegemon is one of the factors important
for understanding the third wave. Schmartzman notes that Wallerstein
(1991) does not agree that the collapse of Eastern Europe is a triumph of
Western democracy. Rather, the breakup of the former Soviet bloc is the
result of the decline in the hegemonic power of the United States because
the old war standoff allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union to
maintain dominance over their sphere of influence. German and Japanese
economic competition challenged U.S. hegemony. With U.S. decline, the
Soviets also lost their hold on the Eastern bloc, resulting in a wave of
democratic transitions.
WORLD SYSTEM CYCLES

According to WST, democracy has occurred more in the semiperiphery than
the periphery, as the former is impacted more severely by the shock waves
of the B phase. Summarizing Wallerstein (1984), the semiperiphery had
systems of labor control (e.g. tenancy or sharecropping) that were best
maintained under authoritarian regimes. Transitioning to democracy actually
works to maintain the power of the capitalist class because it provides a way
to peacefully organize a contentious working class. Schwartzman argues
that “the B-phase world-system perspective seems to offer the greatest
insights in deciphering the deeper significance of the Third Wave of
democratization” (1998: 179).
FOREIGN INTERVENTION
This literature emphasizes the positive role played by the United States in
promoting democracy and also examines the historic cases of former British
colonies. Schwartzman correctly notes that the United States has a long
history of ignoring nondemocratic regimes when there is a strategic interest
at stake such as access to resources or geographical positioning. Why then
the democratic shift? The short answer is that it must meet the needs of the
hegemonic power. Yet, this leaves an important question unanswered: “from
where comes this good will?” (Schwartzman 1998: 172). This argument
posits that a certain type of democracy provides a less contentious method
for dominant nations to control their interests. In the next section, we
examine some arguments for why the United States has shifted its foreign
policy from supporting nondemocratic regimes to exporting democracy.
Exporting Democracy
Although Westerners view the exporting of democracy positively, others
view this as threatening traditional structures resulting in the loss of
privilege or security (Kinnvall 2004). The United States invaded Iraq and is
supporting Iranian NGOs to create a more robust civil society (Esfandiari
and Litwak 2007). The United States has previously tolerated various
authoritarian regimes including that of Iraq’s deposed dictator, Saddam
Hussein. What explains the shift in its foreign policy, and does globalization
play a role?
Robinson (1996) posits that the rise of GC requires new forms of
transnational control and that the United States, as a dominant nation in a
highly stratified international system, is encouraging the replacement of
coercive means with consensual ones. On behalf of an emerging
transnational elite, the United States is promoting polyarchy or “a system in
which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-
making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by
competing elites” (623–624). The U.S. government has intervened and tried
to change other countries’ regimes numerous times under both democratic
and republican presidents (O’Rourke 2016).
Robinson criticizes polyarchy for focusing on the process of democracy
(e.g. elections) and not the outcome, resulting in a system characterized by
inequality. Because the process is “democratic,” polyarchy legitimizes
inequality much more effectively than authoritarianism. Furthermore, the
removal of dictatorships and other forms of authoritarian government
“preempts more fundamental change” such as a more fair or equitable
distribution of resources (1996: 626). Robinson (1996, 2004, 2007, 2014)
argues that American foreign policy began promoting polyarchy in the 1980s
and 1990s to circumvent change that would mitigate inequality. Polyarchy
assists elites by securing power over the state apparatus to bring it into the
global economy.
What does any of this have to do with globalization? Polyarchy provides
the basis for “Gramscian hegemony in a transnational setting” (Robinson
1996: 627), where a dominant class gains the permission of the ruled to be
dominated through active adoption of legitimizing ideology (Gramsci 1971).
Transnational domination becomes hegemonic when justification ideology is
accepted in both core and periphery regions. Globalization has spread
transnational hegemony into periphery regions such as former colonies in
Africa. Promoting democracy is combined with neoliberalism, enabling the
TCC to overcome disparate monetary, fiscal, and industrial policies.
Polyarchy works better than authoritarianism because it is a more “durable
form of social control” (Robinson 1996: 627) that promotes stability.
Polyarchy is also better equipped to deal with the social dislocation and
political reorganization that accompanies entrance into the global economy
and the need to deal with popular demands pressuring elites to reinstate
barriers that provided some protection against undesirable economic impacts
of globalization.
In the age of globalization, polyarchy is generally a more reliable political system for
containing and defusing mass pressure for popular social change. But it is not just a
superior mechanism of stable domination; it is also a more propitious system for
managing intra-elite conflict and competition, and for developing the political
environment for globalized economic intercourse for which the old regimes were ill-
suited.
(Robinson 2007)
Text box 10.2 focuses on the issue of democracy promotion in Iraq.

Despite the criticism of U.S. foreign policy, few would argue that
citizens are better off under authoritarian regimes. The transition to
democracy, even if imperfect, is an improvement over nondemocratic
government and so globalization is considered essential for creating
democracy as a global norm. Yet, globalization is criticized for perpetuating
many global ills including inequality, environmental degradation, and the
homogenization of culture. Antiglobalization movements are the main
resistance against the perceived negative effects of globalization.
ANTIGLOBALIZATION MOVEMENTS
Globalization may appear to be natural, inevitable, and/or logical, but we are
cautioned not to think of globalization as either because it is a human
phenomenon and thus can be altered (Evans 2005). Those who oppose
globalization may be against the ideology, actual globalization, or both (Hall
2002). Antiglobalization or counterhegemonic globalization is the “globally
organized project of transformation aimed at replacing the dominant
(hegemonic) global regime with one that maximizes democratic political
control and makes the equitable development of human capabilities and
environmental stewardship its priorities” (Evans 2008: 272). In sum, these
movements promote access to political power and equitable opportunities for
all, responsible land and resource management, and resistance to global
domination.
Drawing on Karl Polanyi’s ideas of the “double movement,” Evans
(2008) argues that the status quo is not sustainable because giving priority to
self-regulating markets cannot endure over the long run. Perhaps the most
well-known antiglobalization demonstration in the United States is the
“Battle of Seattle” (November 29, 1999 to December 3, 1999), resulting in
the arrest of over 500 demonstrators, 2.5 million dollars in property damage
(O’Hagan 2005), and the closing off of over twenty-five city blocks to
contain the protests. What types of organizations or entities have risen to
combat generic globalization?
Evans (2000) discusses three types of counterhegemonic globalization:
transnational advocacy networks, transnational consumer/labor networks,
and the labor movement. First, he reviews what Keck and Sikkink (1998)
have termed “transnational advocacy networks” that tend to focus on issues
such as human rights, environmental protection, and women’s rights. Groups
falling into this category have networks of activists that are motivated by
ideals and values and gain leverage by the spread of norms. With widespread
adoption, these ideas become cultural norms. Ironically, transnational
advocacy networks oppose globalization but take advantage of cultural
globalization to gain political leverage to bring about a more equitable and
sustainable planet (Evans 2005, 2008).
TEXT BOX 10.2

Exporting Democracy to Iraq
According to Index of Democracy ratings, Iraq is not a full or even a
flawed democracy but a hybrid regime, with a 2017 index score of 4.09
(ten is fully democratic) and an overall ranking of 112 out of 167
countries (Economist Intelligence Unit 2017). Hybrid regime is a
classification applied to countries with a score ranging from 5.9 to 4.0.
Iraq is on the low end of the scale, just above the demarcation for
authoritarian or nondemocratic regimes. While democracy is a slow
process even in the United States (just ask persons of color or women),
what is the prognosis for Iraq to develop as a democracy? According to
Erler and Wood (2009), the prospects for democracy “are dim” because
the Iraqi government lacks both the desire and the might necessary to
sustain democracy on their own. In their criticism of U.S. foreign policy,
Erler and Wood argue that the invasion of Iraq was “always ill-advised,”
that the goal was “imprudent and reckless,” and that the strategy was
“poorly conceived and executed” (131). Is there any substance to the
accusations? Erler and Wood argue that there is a theological–political
problem in Iraq. Specifically, that sectarian–religious division (with
secular Kurds, Shia, and Sunni Muslims) is incompatible with
constitutional democracy that requires the free exercise of religion.
Assuming that major theological differences between the Shia and Sunni
Muslims could ever be resolved, there is still the problem of the minority
Kurds. Furthermore, the fact that the government of Iraq cannot provide
security makes it difficult to engage in the deliberations necessary to
create and sustain democracy. Finally, they argue that the proportional
representation system that was created has resulted in an unstable
coalition government incapable of competently ruling. Robinson (2004,
2011) accuses the United States of using democracy promotion as a means
of catering to the interests of the transnational elite and the global
capitalist system. Furthermore, he asserts that it is polyarchy that is being
promoted and not true democracy. Although Saddam Hussein was a brutal
dictator who killed and tortured his own people, taking a critical
perspective requires us to ask some impertinent questions.
Who else (besides potentially Iraqis) benefits from democracy

promotion in Iraq?
Does the United States have the right to interfere in the internal
affairs of another country?
What is being promoted: democracy or polyarchy?
Can democracy be successfully exported to nations that do not share
the Western values (e.g. freedom of religious expression) upon which
constitutional democracy has been based?
Transnational consumer/labor networks are antiglobalization entities that

pursue corporations exploiting third-world workers (e.g. low pay, no benefits,
and harmful working conditions). They share with advocacy networks the
goal of establishing and spreading global norms, but target corporations
using consumer boycotts (e.g. Nike shoes). Finally, the labor movement is
also counterhegemonic as it tries to spread and sustain “core labor standards”
including the right to unionize. Citing Keck and Sikkink (1998), Evans
(2000) notes that antiglobalization advocacy networks are effective if they
can accomplish three tasks, namely transmitting information, invoking
norms, and shifting political venues.
Transmitting information is “simple but crucial” (Evans 2000: 232)
because punishment does not occur unless others have knowledge of a
transgression. Invoking norms or standards allows local groups to connect
with global allies, creating a sense of unity and power. Finally, the successful
use of “venue shifting” allows local groups to draw in global allies who use
political leverage to force change. This often involves connecting those who
are not always natural allies. Evans explains:
SEATTLE, WA—NOVEMBER 30, 1999: Marchers occupied Pike Street in
front of the Paramount Theater keeping the WTO from holding its opening
ceremony. The conference start, which was scheduled for 10 am, was
postponed until noon, and then cancelled as one of the largest protests in
Seattle’s history unfolded
Credit: Newscom
While organizations like the World Bank and the WTO appear from the outside to be
titanically powerful representatives of the “new world order,” they are in fact politically
vulnerable, not because they are attacked by environmentalists or labor activists, but
because these groups can so easily muster “strange bedfellows” as allies from the ranks
of conservatives …. Distrust of government in any form, combined with deep-seated
xenophobia, turns any institution of global governance into the enemy for so many
conservatives, despite the fact that the transnational corporate constituents who finance
the campaigns of these conservatives are acutely aware of the need for stable and global
governance.
(2000: 239)
Global alliances must be constructed in combination with local

organizing and in the case of transnational consumer/labor networks; the
connection between products and exploitation needs to be made clear by
“forcing affluent customers to acknowledge that what are for them marginal
gains are bought at the price of real misery” (Evans 2000: 237). Prior to the
successful boycott of Nike, consumers were unaware of the impact on
workers including low wages and harm from inhaling glue fumes.
Occupy Wall Street (OWS) is a more recent example of social protest that
was aimed at the elite and, more specifically, global financial institutions and
the impact of these powerful organizations on the other 99 percent (Flacks
2013). This occupation and the many others that sprung up across the United
States (Manilov 2013; Piven 2013) to protest housing foreclosures, extreme
inequality, student loan debt and other fallout from the 2008 financial crisis
are very different from the “Battle of Seattle” protests in that they were
primarily peaceful with decentralized organization. Unlike other movements,
it did not have charismatic leaders (Milkman, Lewis, and Luce 2013;
Rushkoff 2013) and is often labeled a “leaderless” movement. OWS like the
“Battle of Seattle” targeted powerful organizations, corporate interests, and
global elites and was comprised of a coalition of environmentalists, trade
union activists, and university students. Both protests share a horizontal
(rather than hierarchical) organization structure and target neoliberalization.
These movements also have a number of important distinctions with one of
the most significant being that OWS “went local” as activists took over
public spaces, and used democratic practices in attempting to solve local
problems such as home foreclosure and student debt (Hayduk 2013).
NEW YORK CITY—OCTOBER 11: Unidentified Occupy Wall Street
protesters camp out in Zuccotti Park, Lower Manhattan, on October 11, 2011
in New York City. The protest started September 17
Credit: Daryl L / Shutterstock.com
This discussion has focused on progressive antiglobalization activity. To

assume all activity of this type is progressive would be a mistake, as many
movements have their share of “irresponsible nilhists” and that the
alternative could be more authoritarian and oppressive (Evans 2005). Yet,
these movements challenge the TINA belief and remind us that human
intervention is always a possibility. What do sociologists predict for the
future? As usual, there is a great deal of contention and debate. Table 10.6
summarizes the types of antiglobalization organizations.
MINNEAPOLIS, MN—OCTOBER 8: Unidentified Protesters at the
Occupy Wall Street Protest, on Oct. 8, 2011 in Minneapolis. The Occupy
Wall Street Protests has spread across the U.S. to fight corporate greed
Credit: miker / Shutterstock.com
Table 10.6 Antiglobalization Entities
FUTURE OF GLOBALIZATION
Future Trends
It is difficult to predict the future of social institutions such as the state
(Mann 2013) or how social processes such as globalization will shape those
transformations. That has not stopped sociologists from making predictions.
PESSIMISTIC VIEW
The state will not disappear but “meaner, more repressive ways of
organizing the state’s role will be accepted as the only way to avoid the
collapse of public institutions” (Evans 1997: 64). Wallerstein (2000, 2013)
foresees a world system characterized by more chaotic economic swings
and more violence as state structures continue to experience declines in
legitimacy. Bryan Turner has criticized sociologists for having an overly
optimistic view and puts forth one of the bleakest views of the future. His
“neo-Malthusian sociology of globalization” (2007: 3 of 15) proposes
examining the connections between (1) environmental damage due to waste
and resource depletion, (2) radical politics grounded in fundamentalist
religion, (3) new wars and youth alienation, (4) rising importance of human
rights responses to failed states, and (5) the importance of religious ideas
including those that motivate violence. Only a few of his several predictions
are reviewed here. First, Turner argues that global governance needed to
regulate local conflicts and regional wars will require systems of domination
and regulation that cannot be provided by states. Second, dwindling
environmental resources too depleted to support population growth will
require the exploitation of outer space as states will struggle to maintain
natural resources for their populations. The struggle for scarce resources
will lead to war and increase tension between developing and developed
countries. The surplus of unemployed and underemployed men will be a
major factor in the development of new wars.
Consistent with others (e.g. Martin 2007), Turner predicts that religious
fundamentalism will continue to grow and replace political ideology as a
motivator for violence as radical religion is attractive to the socially
alienated, including the legions of unemployed and underemployed men
displaced in the world economy. Globalization will render catastrophes
more “general, immediate, and profound” because the world is more
interconnected, but lacks an effective global governance strategy (Turner
2007: 12 of 15) as the UN is weak and unwilling to step in unless backed by
the United States, but it is unlikely that the latter can continue to act as
either “a global policeman, or a global doctor.”
In this bleak future, it is “the world of Mad Max with roaming armies of
displaced men in search of gasoline, armaments, and drugs, where small
fortified hamlets of the rich and powerful would seek shelter, and secure
religious meaning from their cults and prophets” (Turner 2007: 12–13 of
15). The global neo-Malthusian crisis of spreading infectious diseases,
roaming displaced and socially alienated men, drug dependency,
environmental degradation, civil disruption, war lords, and the like will
drain away both economic resources and democratic civil liberties and it is
unlikely that the spread of human rights will stem this tide.
OPTIMISTIC VIEW
While Piven does not view globalization as resulting in the “dawn of global
democracy or global socialism” (2008: 12), she argues that globalization can
be harnessed for positive reform. In the case of human rights, access to
globalized media and communication has allowed some to reframe their
relationship with the nation-state by connecting with international allies that
pressure repressive nation-states (Kearney 1995). Wallerstein has a gloomy
forecast, but also argues for the possibility of positive human intervention.
Hardt and Negri deplore the transition into Empire, but also proclaim the
democratic potential residing within the “multitude.” Globalization is
happening but it is neither positive or negative nor monolithic or inevitable
(Guillén 2001). While globalization has undesirable social problems
throughout the globe, the same networks can spread global standards for
human rights, freedom, and environmentalism.
Future Sociological Research on Globalization

Robertson and White (2007) contend that although sociologists were the first
to initiate discussion of globalization, researchers have often ignored the
social dimension of globalization. Furthermore, while there has been much
theorizing about globalization, there is a paucity of empirical data (Staples
2008), with affluent democracies overrepresented in globalization research
(Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007). What does exist is subjected to
misleading statistical analysis and interpretation (Babones 2007). We need
more concrete empirical data on globalization, but books stressing “grand
theorizing” sell much better than those stressing empirical data on a more
narrowly defined geographic region (Alasuutari 2000). If true, this is a rather
ironic if not scathing critique of a discipline that prides itself on the objective
collection and interpretation of empirical data. Why might collecting data be
difficult?
Globalization is a difficult phenomenon to study. Researchers not only
struggle with competing definitions (Babones 2007), but the phenomena
itself is “fragmented, incomplete, discontinuous … and in many ways a
contradictory and puzzling process” (Guillén 2001: 238). Even answering
one of the most fundamental questions, when did globalization begin, is
difficult due to a lack of appropriate data. Babones (2007) argues that the
tremendous number of academic books and papers on globalization renders a
definition impossible to agree on, and agreement is not even desirable for
theory development. Yet, this lack of agreement creates methodological
problems because researchers tend to measure globalization in whatever way
may best fit the data, but not necessarily the way that is in line with the
theoretical perspective underlying the research. Babones writes, “one
suspects the plurality or even the majority of the hundreds of articles … use
globalization more as a rhetorical backdrop than as a variable to be
operationalized and measured” (2007: 2 of 15). In short, future research
needs to follow the rules of sound methodology, including grounding the
research in theory and measuring variables in ways that fit theoretical
definitions. If correct, much of the research on economic globalization in
particular may be problematic, making tentative any conclusions that are
drawn.
CONCLUSION
There is a great deal more disagreement than agreement among political
sociologists regarding the existence, duration, and impact of globalization.
Alasuutari (2000) has criticized sociologists for confusing cause and effect in
their examination of globalization. Using the compression of time and space
as an example, if this is an effect of globalization, what is the cause?
Sociologists are criticized for saying globalization! If the compression of
time and space is a characteristic of globalization, what causes that? Is it
technological innovation, the needs of capitalism, or something else? Readers
of this chapter have a variety of answers to choose from depending on which
theoretical perspective seems most convincing.
It may well be a long time before sociologists have a theory of
globalization, but that is not to say that efforts to understand globalization
have been fruitless. We have reviewed many interesting theoretical ideas and
sociological questions that will continue to stimulate research for decades to
come. To quote Guillén (2001), globalization is not “civilizing, destructive,
or feeble,” but it is a real phenomenon that is transforming every social
institution, including the nation-state in ways that have both positive and
negative consequences for all. Whether the nation-state is transforming into a
national state as part of a TNS, a global state, or a type of global governance
system such as Empire, or something else, is unknown. More importantly,
what type of political institution might make for a better future is also
unknown. Wallerstein and colleagues argue that “we are reluctant to call the
“state,” let alone “global state” the political structure of a better future. This
is in fact the biggest unknown” (2013: 187). Regardless, political sociologists
will be there to observe, explain, and critique the transformation.
Endnotes
1. Nokia began as a company based in Finland and Volvo is a Swedish
luxury carmaker that began manufacturing in 1927. Nokia dominated
the cell phone market until 2007 and then began losing market share to
Apple and Samsung.
2. The WC is a ten-point list: (1) impose fiscal discipline, (2) reform
taxation, (3) liberalize interest rates, (4) raise spending on health and
education, (5) secure property rights, (6) privatize state-run industries,
(7) deregulate markets, (8) adopt a competitive exchange rate, (9)
remove barriers to trade, and (10) remove barriers to direct foreign
investment (from John Williamson’s 1989 formulation as cited by
Ferguson 2008).
3. The World Bank has 189 member countries and consists of two
institutions including the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association
(IDA). The World Bank Group includes these institutions and three
more including the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes. According to its Web site, “the
IBRD” “lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-
income countries.” IDA “provides interest-free loans—called credits—
and grants to governments of the poorest countries”
(www.worldbank.org/en/about).
We provide low-interest loans, zero to low-interest credits, and

grants to developing countries. These support a wide array of
investments in such areas as education, health, public
administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector
development, agriculture, and environmental and natural resource
management. Some of our projects are cofinanced with
governments, other multilateral institutions, commercial banks,
export credit agencies, and private sector investors.
(www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do)
4. The IMF has 189 member countries. According to its official Web site
(www.imf.org), the IMF works “to foster global monetary cooperation,
secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty
around the world” (www.imf.org/en/About).
5. The WTO (www.wto.org) has 164 members and views its role as a
means of liberalizing trade between nations as well as providing a
forum for negotiation and mediation. Critics of the WTO accuse the
organization of emphasizing property rights rather than issues related to
workers. Evans (2000) observes that labor ought to be considered a
trade-related issue because the lack of “core labor standards” can lead
to unfair advantage by nations allowing child labor and preventing
workers from organizing for better wages. The WTO defends itself
against these accusations by arguing that “the WTO has never ruled on
child labour because the issue has never come up for a ruling.
Countries’ efforts to deal with child labour problems have never been
challenged in the WTO.” The WTO has a page devoted to dispelling
“incorrect facts about the WTO found on websites”
(www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/misinf_e/03
lab_e.htm).
6. See The Bretton Woods Project at
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=320869.
7. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, a school board oversaw 123 public schools.
Post Katrina has only four public schools with thirty-one charter
schools run by private organizations. Forty-seven hundred members of
the New Orleans teachers union were fired, with only a few rehired by
the charter schools at reduced salaries (Klein 2007). In 2016, a law
(ACT 91) establishing the Orleans Parish School Board with a
Superintendent now provide oversight to schools operating in Orleans
Parish (https://opsb.us/about/nola-schools-unification). According to
the Orleans Parish Board, 90% of public school students attend a
charter school and the website advertises a process for charter school
approval (https://opsb.us/schools/open-a-school).
8. Halliburton, the company run by former Vice President Dick Cheney
(1995–2000), provided logistical support to the U.S. Military by
building and running military bases. Blackwater (changed to Xe
Services and in 2011 renamed Academi) is a private security firm
accused of killing Iraqi civilians. Companies such as Health Net and
IAP Worldwide Services benefited from the then U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s expansion of the privatization of services.
IAP received the contract to take over many services at the Walter Reed
military hospital. Klein (2007) claims that, at the start of the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq, there was one contractor for every ten U.S. soldiers.
By 2007, this ratio became 1 contractor for every 1.4 U.S. soldiers.
“Since 2009, the ratio of contractors to troops in war zones [includes
Iraq was well as other conflict zones] has increased from 1 to 1 to about
3 to 1” (McFate 2016). The Trump administration reportedly
considered a plan to hire a mercenary army comprised of contractors to
solve the Afghanistan War (McFate 2017).
9. Non-Gramscian hegemony refers to domination of one nation by
another. Characterizing the United States as a global hegemon is an
example of this. In contrast, Gramscian hegemony refers to the
relationship between two classes where one class or group within that
class exercises control by gaining the consent of the dominated group.
In other words, the dominated agree that they should be dominated.
Adopting the ruling class ideology legitimizes domination (Robinson
1996).
10. In 2016, voters in the United Kingdom went to the polls in a
referendum to decide whether or not to exit the EU. By a narrow
margin, voters choose to leave. The British government is negotiating
its exit from the EU.
11. Green Dam-Youth Escort software is Internet-filtering software
developed by the Chinese to be installed on all new computers sold in
China. The Chinese government describes it as a method to protect
youth by blocking “unhealthy” Internet content. The software would
automatically download updated lists of banned content. Critics have
argued that it also blocks users from content critical of the Chinese
government. The Chinese government has delayed enforcement (Wines
2009) and later made it optional (Foster 2009), but is trying to control
access to social media as means of “cyber sovereignty” (“Forbidden
Feeds: Government Controls on Social Media in China.” 2018). China
has previously been criticized for blocking access to politically
sensitive information during the 2008 Olympic Games (“IOC Agrees to
Internet Blocking at the Games” 2008). Iran also uses software to block
politically or religiously offensive Web sites and blogs and threatened
to shut down the Internet for legislative elections in 2008 to “ensure
that the government had unimpeded Internet service for the elections,
even though the governments’ Internet lines had been upgraded”
(“Iranian Users Face Blockage During Coming Election” 2008). The
Iranian government cut off access to the Internet in some parts of Iran
as well as access to smartphone apps as a response to anti-government
protests (Chang 2018).
12. The treaty of Westphalia, also known as the “Peace of Westphalia”
signed in 1648, ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. It established
the right of nation-state sovereignty, or the principle that nation-states
have the right of political self-determination and should be free from
interference in internal affairs from other nation-states.
13. Neda Agha-Soltan, an Iranian bystander, was killed in June 2009 during
an anti-government protest. She was not an active protestor, but had
decided to watch the demonstrations with her singing instructor. They
were trying to get home after being caught up in a clash in central
Tehran. She was shot in the heart and died after saying “It burned me.”
Her killing was captured by video and posted on the Internet (Fathi
2009).
14. The G8 is an international forum represented by the governments of
Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Russia, and
the United States. In 2014, Russia was suspended from the G8 for its
annexation of Crimea. In 2017, Russia permanently left the G8 now
known as the G7. The G8/7 is considered less relevant than in the past
as it does not include the world’s most powerful economies including
China.
15. Tunisia is classified as a flawed democracy by The Economist
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy report.
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INDEX
Abramowitz, Alan J. 307–8

Abrams v. U.S. 197
abstract liberalism 204
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 424–5
Adams, J. Q. 312
administration, state 44
Affordable Care Act 153, 191, 193–4 see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA)
African-Americans 51, 67, 196, 202, 205, 207–8, 213, 230, 293–4, 300,
308, 317–18
African National Congress (ANC) 427
Agamben, Giorgio 65, 425
agents of socialization 88
AIDS 87, 445, 455, 462
AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) 351
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 151
Alford, Robert 24, 55–8, 247
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, bombing of 403–4
Al-Qaeda 7, 199, 403, 417
Al-Shabaab 412
Alt-Right 329–32, 363–5
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) 247
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 26, 190, 197, 215
American democracy 12, 106
American Family Association 289
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization
(AFL-CIO) 220
American International Group, Inc. (AIG) 124, 132, 133, 144, 147
Americanism 82
Americanization 421, 452
American Medical Association (AMA) 191
American National Election Study (ANES) 325, 340
American National Election Survey 184
American Political Science Association 251
American Psychological Association’s (APA) Council of Representatives
188
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 160–1
The American Voter (Campbell) 295, 304, 315
America’s Four Gods (Froese and Bader) 101
Anderson, Benedict 115
antiglobalization movements 472–6
anti-Semitism 103, 394, 430
antisystemic movements 382
“The Apotheosis of George Washington” 48
APT28 (Russian hacker group) 336
Arendt, Hannah 6
Asbury Park Press 165
Associated Press 337, 403
authoritarianism 53–4, 321–4
authority: charismatic 7; and legitimate power 7–8; rational-legal 7–8;
traditional 7
autonomists 412
“aversive racism” 204
Baby Boomers 279, 280

Baltzell, E. Digby 58
Bank of America Inc. 144
bankruptcy: debt and 153–9; reasons for 157–9
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)
158
Barber, Benjamin 421, 444
BASIS charter schools 179
“Battle of Seattle” 475
Baudrillard, Jean 111
Bauman, Zygmunt 253
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 371
BBC 444
Bear Stearns 124
beliefs 94–100
Bell, Daniel 81
The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray) 394
Bergesen, Albert 406
Bhutto, Benazir 54
Biden, Joseph R. 317
Bill of Rights 197, 231
bin Laden, Osama 419
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 325
“black identity extremists” 405
#BlackLivesMatter 206–8
Black Lives Matter (BLM) 42, 205–8, 217, 376–9
Blacks 149, 164, 195, 203, 209, 214, 217, 220, 223–4, 294, 301, 318, 334,
338, 363
Block, Fred 60
Bohemian Club 82–3
Bohemian Grove camp 83
boundaries, definition of 361
Bourdieu, Pierre 39–40, 276–7
bourgeoisie 19
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(Putnam) 56, 253, 275
Brachet-Márquez, Viviane 51–4
Brandeis, Louis D. 197
Bretton Woods institutions 442
Brexit 340, 456
bridges 161–3
Brigate Rosse (Italian terrorist group) 420
Bringing the State Back In 62
British India 43
British Parliament 51
British Petroleum 318
Brown, Michael 206–7
Brown v. Board of Education 370
Brumidi, Constantino 48
bureaucracy 15; state 44
Bureau of the Census 299
Burris, Carol 179
Bush, George W. 7–8, 45, 54, 80, 134, 139, 154, 312
Bush v. Gore 80
Butina, Maria 337
campaigning: and canvassing 260–1; as institutional forms of political

participation 260–1
canvassing, as institutional forms of political participation 260–1
capacity, definition of 63
capitalism 18; and democracy 129–31; globalization and 444–5
capitalist state 58
Castells, Manuel 370–1
categorical terrorism 417
Catholic Church 455, 464
Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS) 280
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) 147
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 194
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 200, 407, 424–5
centrality, definition of 374
“Challengers and States: Toward a Political Sociology of Social
Movements,” (Amenta) 383
The Changing American Voter 306
charismatic authority 7
charitable organizations 337
Charlottesville 209–313
Charter Schools 178–80
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) 52
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 358
children, and same-sex families 188–90
Child Tax Credit 150
Chomsky, Noam 427
Christianity 101, 187
Christian Right 128, 467
Churchill, Winston 442
Citigroup Inc. 144
citizenship 22; definition of 244
Citizens United 326
The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba) 80, 91
civic engagement 279
civic participation, and modernization 93–4
Civil Disobedience (Thoreau) 42
civil liberties 196–202; public opinion on 201–2; terrorism and 422–3
civil religion 48–9
Civil Rights Act of 1964 204, 301, 370
Civil Rights Movement 187, 247, 353, 369–70, 376
Civil War 301; pensions 128
Clash of Civilizations (Huntington) 421, 444
classical elite-managerial approaches 15–16
classical elite theory 57
class: and political consciousness 21; politics and 20–1; structuralism and
20–1
class-based views of the state 58–60; Hegelian–Marxist 60; instrumental
59–60; structural 60
“class consciousness” 19, 82
“class-domination theory of power” 20, 58
classical collective behavior model of social movements 354
class perspective: criticisms of 22–3; culture 81–3
Clinton, Bill 58, 312
Clinton, Hillary 80, 224, 300, 301, 316
Clinton Foundation 328
CNN 106, 303, 444
coercive power 5–7
cognitive engagement 279
cognitive liberation 355
“cognitive mobilization” 93
Cohen, Michael 336
Cold War 53, 372, 464, 468
collective action frames 374–5
Coleman, James 275–7
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 134
collective action frames, and local land use 358–9
collective action theory, and terrorism 413–14
collective behavior model 354
collective identity 361, 419; definition of 419; social movements 360–1
Collins, Randall 398
colonialism: imperial 396; internal 396; as sociological cause of genocide
396
Colorado Civil Rights Commission 184
color-blind policies 204–5
“color coding” 204
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) Web site 316
Columbia University 294
Comey, James 333, 336, 337
communism 53, 399, 407, 469
Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels) 251
complex organizations 8
conceptualization of power in political sociology 10–23
Concord Monitor 316
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 145
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) 353, 374
consciousness, definition of 361
conservatism 306–7
conservative welfare state 67
conspirators 412
Constitution of the United States 3
Consumer Bankruptcy Project 157
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 135, 136
Consumer Health Access Survey 195
Consumer Reports National Research Center 190
contemporary elite-managerial approaches 15–16
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx) 18, 82
The Corporate Library 134
corporate taxation 144–6
corporate welfare 147
Coser, Lewis 3
Counter-Protesters 209–13
Couric, Katie 316
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act 154
critical class theorists and power in society 21–2
“critical class theory” 21
critical theory of the capitalist state 61–2
criticisms of pluralist theory 13–14
Crotty, William 423
C-SPAN 106
Cullors, Patrisse 206
cultural globalization 443–4
cultural theories of globalization 451–2, 464
culture: class perspective 81–3; definition of 75; elite-managerial approach
80–1; institutionalist theories 84–5; material forms of 75; nonmaterial
forms of 75; pluralist 79–80; political 26–7; and politics 75–7;
postmodern analyses 85–7; rational choice 83–4; and theoretical
frameworks 78–87
culture wars 100
Customs and Border Protection 424
Dahl, Robert A. 12, 40, 55, 58

Dahrendorf, Ralf 250
Deadly Medicine (Müller-Hill) 394, 430
death panels 193
debt: and bankruptcy 153–9; household 154; student 155–7
Declaration of Independence 3, 75, 79
The Declining Significance of Race (Wilson) 203
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 182–4
deferred action for childhood arrivals 217–18
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and Temporary Protected Status
214
Deflecting Immigration (Light) 220
democracy 50–1; capitalism and 129–31; definition of 50–1; direct 51;
exporting 471–2; and globalization 468–72; liberal 51; “low-quality”
52; representative 51; role of globalization 469–71; spreading 469;
types of 51; and undemocratic practices 50–2; values and 91–4
Democracy in America (de Tocqueville) 12
Democratic National Committee (DNC) 335, 382
Democratic Party 23, 99, 139, 155, 193, 222, 224, 296, 300–1, 303, 307–9,
325, 328–9, 334, 337
democratic societies, power concentration in 33–4
demonstrations: as noninstitutional forms of political participation 267–71
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 335, 424
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 204
Der Spiegel 200
Des Moines Register 316
despotic power 41
Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act 217
diagnostic frames 416
dictatorships, and state formation 43
direct democracy 51, 138, 357
The Disappearing Center (Abramowitz) 307
Discipline and Punish (Foucault) 86
Dittmar, Kelly 338
The Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim) 440
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 135–6
Dole, Elizabeth 313, 316
domestic terrorism 428
Domhoff, G. William 20, 58, 82–3, 128–9, 290
dominance 5–6
dominant power 5–7
Donald J. Trump Foundation 337
DotNets 258, 279, 281
Downs, Anthony 252
Durkheim, Emile 13, 48, 111, 440
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 149–50

Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 412
East Asian Americans 302
Eastman Kodak 132
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 146
economic globalization 456
economic liberalism 306
education 176–80; Charter Schools 178–80; school violence and shootings
180
Edwards, John 316
Elazar, Daniel 111
elections, functions of 289–90
elections and voting: class 287–8; electoral systems and turnout 290–4;
elite-managerial framework 287; functions of elections 289–90; gender
gap 299–300; institutionalist and political culture 288–9; pluralist
framework 287; political views and issue-based voting 304–9;
postmodernist approach 288; racial cleavages 300–2; rational choice
288; religious cleavages 302–3; social class 295–9; social cleavages or
characteristics 295–303; theoretical frameworks 287–9; U.S. national
elections 309–38; voting and elections other than United States 339–40;
voting behavior research 294–5
Electoral College system 309–12
electoral systems and turnout 290–4
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Durkheim) 48
Eliot, T. S. 75
elite-managerial approaches 14–15; classical 15–16; contemporary 15–16;
culture 80–1
elite-managerial theory: criticisms of 17
elite theory and resource mobilization 354
elite views of the state 56–8; classical elite theory 57; class domination
theory 58; power elite 57
emotions, and social movements 366–8
Empire (Hardt and Negri) 61, 450, 458
empirical Marxism 61
“empirical Marxist” 58
Enders, Walter 403
engagement: civic 279; cognitive 279; political 279
Engels, Frederick 18, 21, 82, 251
Enlightenment 33–4, 76, 97
Enriching the Sociological Imagination 177
“entrepreneurial infrastructures” 277
e-politics 263
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 65–7, 152
The Espionage Act of 1917 200
ethnic cleansing 393
ethnic conflict, as sociological cause of genocide 395
ethnicity, and race 328–32
European Community 304
European Union (EU) 68, 116, 339–40, 405, 456
Executive Order Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 217, 224
existent social organization 373
experiential commensurability 374
extensive and indiscriminate state violence 417
externalization of power 47
extreme religious fundamentalism 409
Facebook 111, 201, 335, 378

families 88
families, zero tolerance and separation of 215–17
family law 181–2
Fannie Mae 124, 134
fascism 53, 267, 335, 470
favorable international climate 470
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 45, 321, 405, 424
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 164, 424
Federal Reserve 124
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 136
Federal Reserve Board 133
FedEx 132
Ferdinand, Franz 416
Ferguson, Niall 133
Ferguson Police Department 208
feudalism 18
financial globalization 456
First Amendment 26, 197
Florida International University 163
Florida Supreme Court 314
Flynn, Michael 337
“focal points” 83
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 192, 351
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 45
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 201
foreign intervention 471
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) 405
“form of consciousness” 114
Fortune 500 list of companies 191, 192
Foucault, Michel 24, 32
frame amplification 362
frame bridging 362
frame extension 362
frame transformation 362
framing: social movements 361–6; terrorism 416–17
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 21, 60, 254
Freddie Mac 124, 134
free trade 448
French Academy or L’Académie Française 444
French intellectualism 78
French Revolution 11
Friedman, Milton 443
Fukuyama, Francis 468
G7 61
Galbraith, John Kenneth 143
Gang Leader for a Day (Venkatesh) 52
Garner, Eric 206
Garza, Alicia 206
Gellner, Earnest 114
gender 332–3; welfare state and 67
gender gap, elections and voting 299–300
gender stereotypes 67
General Accounting Office 182
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 442
General Motors 132
General Social Survey 21
genocide 391–6; conditions for 393; defining 391–3; ethnic cleansing and
393; geometry of 394–5; Hotel Rwanda 393; Meds Yeghern as 393;
sociological causes of 393–6; United Nations (UN) definition of 392
“Gen-Xers” 279
geography 334–5
geometry: of genocide 394–5; as sociological cause of genocide 394–5;
terrorism and 423
George Washington University’s Milken Institute School of Public Health
166
German Ideology (Marx and Engels) 21
German Social Democratic (GSD) party 57
G.I. Bill of Rights 139
Gibson, William 263
Giddens, Anthony 32
“glass ceiling” 34
Glass-Steagall Act 133
global capitalist theorists 461–2
Global Families (Karraker) 439
global hegemon, shifting 470–1
global industrialization and development 470
globalists 454–5
globalization 438–78; capitalism and 444–5; competing globalization
camps 460; components of 440–6; critique of the term 440; cultural
theories of 451–2; cultural theories of globalization 464; defining 439–
40; democracy and 468–72; economic 456; favorable international
climate 470; financial 456; foreign intervention 471; future of 476–8;
future sociological research on 477–8; future trends 476–7; global
capitalist theorists 461–2; global industrialization and development 470;
global shocks 470; hyperglobalists or globalists and 454–5; impact on
nation-state 458–68; interdependence 440–1; liberalization 441–3;
McDonaldization thesis 452–3; nationalism 466–8; network society
450–1, 463; optimistic view 477; pessimistic view 477; political 456–7;
positive impacts of 440; postmodern views on 449–50, 462–3; public
policy 464–6; shifting global hegemon 470–1; skeptics and 454–5;
Smith on 439; social 456–7; strong-state–weak-state thesis 459–60;
terrorism and 421–2; theoretical perspectives on 446–53; theoretical
views on state power 460–1; theories of GC 448–9; transformationalists
and 454–5; and transnational movements 381–3; universalization 443;
welfare states 466; westernization 443–6; “withering state debate” 458–
9; world system cycles 471; world systems theory 447–8
globalization camps, competing 460
globalization debates: is globalization occurring? 453–5; what is the
evidence for globalization? 455–7
“Globalization Theory” 451
“A Global Reality Check” (Ghemawat) 455
global shocks 470
glocalization 451; definition of 451; heterogeneity and 452; homogenization
and 452
Goodwin, Jeff 417
Google Docs 201
Gore, Al 7, 302, 314
government, and state 44–6
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 135, 159
Graduate PLUS programs 155
graffiti 265–7; as noninstitutional forms of political participation 265–7
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 135
Gramsci, Antonio 21, 97, 405
Great Depression 27, 46, 139, 147, 244
Great Recession 131–9; causes of 133–5; consequences of 136–9;
government policy responses 135–6
group context and participation 274–8
Guardian 200
Gurr, Ted 55
Habermas, Jurgen 254–5

Hamilton, Alexander 306
Hamm, Mark 419
Harding, Warren G. 319
Hardt, Michael 61
Harvard Law Review 315
hate, political uses of 391
Hawaii Supreme Court 182
Headcount 180
health care 190–6; class analysis 191–2; elite-managerial frameworks 191;
institutionalist framework 192; Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act 193–5; pluralist and elite frameworks 191; postmodernists’ point of
view 192; public opinion on the ACA 195–6; rational choice
framework 192; theoretical frameworks 191; U.S. health care
uniqueness 192–3
hegemony: definition of 406; ideology as 97–100; non-Gramscian notion of
406
Hezbollah 417
Hispanics or Latino/a Americans 195, 208, 217, 220–4, 300–2, 318, 338
Hitler, Adolph 408
Hobbes 33
Holmes, Oliver Wendell 142, 197, 200
Holocaust 394
Holocaust Memorial Museum 394
homegrown terrorism 410–11
homophobia 103
Horowitz, David 328
Hotel Rwanda 393
House Financial Services Committee 133
household debt 154
Huckabee, Mike 101
human development, and modernization 92–3
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 54
Huntington, Samuel 421, 444
Hurricane Harvey 154, 165
Hurricane Irma 165–6
Hurricane Katrina 164, 166, 443
Hurricane Maria 165–6
hurricanes 163–6
Hurricane Sandy 165–6
Hussein, Saddam 315, 398, 408
hyperglobalists 454–5
ideology 78, 94–100; as deliberation and discourse 96–7; as hegemony 97–

100; as political “sophistication" 94–5; as set of political beliefs 95–6
Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 214
Immigrants and Boomers (Myers) 221
immigration 213–25; advantages and disadvantages of 220–2; deferred
action for childhood arrivals 217–18; major ethnic and racial issue
facing the US 213–25; Muslim Americans 218–19, 224–5; public
opinion 222–4; zero tolerance and separation of families 215–17
Immigration Act of 1965 302
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 45, 424
“imperatively coordinated associations” (ICAs) 250
imperial colonialism 396
individualism 112
industrialized European societies 15
Industrial Revolution 4, 10, 15, 18, 244
infrastructural power 41
infrastructure 159–63; bridges 161–3; levees 163
Inglehart, Ronald 91
Instagram 376
Institute for Social Research, Frankfurt, Germany 21
institutional forms of political participation: campaigning and canvassing
260–1; political talk/political discourse 261–2
institutionalist 28–9
institutionalist theories, and culture 84–5
institutions, definition of 28
instrumentalism 60
intellectual ideology 97
intellectual property rights 448
intellectual terrorists 404
Intercept 200
interdependence: globalization 440–1
interdependent power 8–9
internal colonialism 396
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 43, 142
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 441–3, 456, 458
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 61, 154, 408, 441–3, 448, 454, 455, 456
Internet Research Agency 335
Iowa Supreme Court 289
Iraq War 315, 393
Irish Republican Army 410, 426
“iron law of oligarchy” 16, 56
Isaac, Jeffrey 429
ISIS 404, 412
Islam 101, 187, 225
“Islamofascism Awareness Week” 328
issue-based voting 304–9
Jefferson, Thomas 106, 306

Jihad vs. McWorld (Barber) 421, 444
Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy 316
Johnson, Ron 320
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. 159
judiciary, and state 45
Kagan, Elena 318

Kaiser Family Foundation 184
Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 52
Kant, Immanuel 244
Kasky, Cameron 180
Kazin, Michael 133
Kennedy, Anthony 184
Kennedy, Edward M. 193
Kennedy, John F. 301, 303, 312
Kerry, John 302, 317
Khan, Genghis 394
King, Martin Luther, Jr. 7, 351, 369–70
Kinnvall, Catarina 467
Klein, Naomi 443
Koch, Charles 327
Koch, David 327
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 27, 212, 351
“laissez-faire racism” 204–5

law enforcement 205–8, 209–13
Lee, Mike 320
legislative state 45–6
legitimacy 7, 41–2, 93
legitimate power 7–8
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals 184, 351
levees 163
Levin, Carl 144
“liberal capitalist” 51
“liberal corporatism” 66
liberal democracies 51, 408, 414, 468
liberalism 306–7; definition of 306; economic 306; noneconomic 306
liberalization, and globalization 441–3
liberal welfare state 66
Lieberman, Joseph 303
Lincoln, Abraham 115
Lipset, Seymour Martin 51, 55, 251
Lipson, Charles 440
lived ideology 97
Locke 33
The Logic of Collective Action (Olson) 355
Lowi, Theodore 247
“low-quality” democracy 52
Lynch, Loretta 206
McCain, John 316, 321

McDonaldization 451; elements of 452; thesis 452–3
McDonald’s 98, 116, 452
McKay, James 395
macroeconomics, definition of 126
McVeigh, Timothy 403, 411
Madness and Civilization (Foucault) 86
Major League Baseball (MLB) 225, 227–9
Manafort, Paul 336
Mann, Michael 9–10, 39, 459
Mao Zedong 54
“March for Our Lives: Road to Change” 41, 180
Marching Plague: Germ Warfare and Global Public Heath 426
Markoff, John 51, 52
marriage, same-sex 182–7
marriage and family 181–90; family law 181–2; pro and con arguments
187–8; public opinion on same-sex marriage 184–7; same-sex families
and children 188–90; same-sex marriage 182–4
Marshall, T. H. 22, 244
Marshall, Thurgood 179
Martin, Trayvon 206
Marx, Karl 4, 10, 16, 18
Marxism, empirical 61
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. Et al. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission Et
Al. 184, 186
material forms of culture 75
“The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics”
(Weber) 429
Mearsheimer, John 427
media 89–90; and political culture 104–5; and political knowledge 105–8;
and political values 108–10
media terrorists 404
Medicaid 142
Medicare 95, 142, 154, 191, 193
Merton, Robert 419–20
metaphors: definition of 2; of power arrangements 5; as sociological tool in
study of power 2–4
Michels, Robert 15, 16, 56, 57
Microsoft 336
middle class 139–40
“Middle East Watch” 429
middle levels of power 57
Mi Familia Vota 180
Milbrath, Lester 255–6
Miliband, Ralph 44, 59
Miliband–Poulantzas debate 60, 61
military, and state 44–5
Military–Industrial Complex 425
Mills, C. Wright 1–2, 16, 34, 57
Minow, Neill 134
Mission Coalition Organization (MCO) 371
mobilizing structures and networks 373–4
modernity: as sociological cause of genocide 393–4
modernization: civic participation 93–4; human development 92–3; and
value shifts 91–4
modern nation-state 40–54; compulsory 41; defining the state 40–2;
democracy 50–1; democracy and undemocratic practices 51–2;
different forms of the nation-state 50; differentiating government from
the state 44–6; differentiating nation and state 47–9; emergence of
nations 49–50; emergence of states 42–3; features of stateness 47;
legitimacy 41–2; monopoly 41; undemocratic state forms 53–4
The Modern World System (Wallerstein) 447
modes of production 18
Monmouth University 165
monopoly 41
Montgomery Bus Boycotts 369–70, 374
Montgomery Improvement Association 369
Moore, Barrington 51
moralism 112
Moral Majority 101
Morgan Stanley 144
Morris, Aldon 373
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 133
Mosca, Gaetano 15, 57
motivational frames 374, 416
motivational framing 374, 416
Motorola 132
Mueller, Robert 335
Müller-Hill, Benno 429–30
Multitude (Hardt and Negri) 450
Musharraf, Perez 43, 53–54
Muslim Americans: immigration 218–19, 224–5
Muslim fundamentalism 409
Mussolini, Benito 53
myth of the immoral debtor 157
Nagengast, Carole 49
narrative fidelity 374
nation: definition of 47; differentiating state and 47–9
National Academy of Social Insurance 148
National Archives, Washington, DC 75
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
180, 353
National Basketball Association (NBA) 225, 227
National Committee on Levee Safety 164
National Day against Police Brutality 208
National Election Studies (NES) 257–8
National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) 372
National Football League (NFL) 225, 227
National Hockey League (NHL) 227
National Institute of Health 192
nationalism 47; globalization 466–8; as sources of political culture 114–17
Nationalist Action Party of Turkey (MHP) 467
National Organization for Marriage 289
National Rifle Association (NRA) 180, 337
national security 196–202; public opinion on 201–2
National Security Agency (NSA) 200, 414
National Transportation and Safety Board 161
nations, emergence of 49–50
nation-state: different forms of 50; impact of globalization on 458–68
The Naturalization Law of 1790 204
Nazi Germany 6, 53, 116
Nazi symbolism 27
negative sanctions tradition 379
negotiation, definition of 361
Negri, Antonio 61
neoliberalism 130–1
neo-Nazi groups 27, 212
networked power 9–10
network society 450–1; globalization 463
Network Society Theory 451
New Deal programs 46, 59, 135
new social movements (NSMs) 356–60; collective action frames and local
land use 358–9; criticisms of 360; emergence of the Tea Party and
Occupy Wall Street 358; polarization and 358; post-materialism and
358
Newsweek 133
new wars 398–9
New York Times 106, 159, 160, 215, 419
Nichols, Terry 403
Niemöller, Martin 197
19th Amendment 3
Nineteenth Amendment 299
Nixon, Richard 312
noneconomic liberalism 306
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 443
noninstitutional forms of political participation: graffiti and street art 265–7;
protest and demonstrations 267–71
nonmaterial forms of culture 75
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 61, 68, 304, 459, 462
NSA Data Collection Program 202
Nuremberg tribunal 459
Obama, Barack 44, 110, 128, 144, 200, 301, 302, 315; Executive Order
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 217
Obamacare 145, 194, 230
obedience 7
Obergefell v. Hodges 52, 184
Occupy Wall Street (OWS) 136, 138, 358, 376–7, 376–9, 474–5; emergence
of 358
Offe, Claus 61
Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security 335
“old racism” 394
old social movements 356–60
old terrorism 426
Olsen, Marvin 55, 256–7
Olson, Mancur, Jr. 252–3
ordinary militants 412
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 459
organizational readiness 355
The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt) 6
Orloff, Ann 44
Orum, Anthony 259
overconsumption myth 157
Oxford Internet Institute 335
Pakistani Supreme Court 54

Palestine Liberation Organization 410
Palestinian–Israeli conflict 414–15
Palin, Sarah 317, 319
Pan Am Flight 103, downing of 409
paradox, as sociological tool in study of power 2–4
Parent PLUS loan programs 155
Pareto, Vilfredo 15, 57
Parkland Florida Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting 180
parliamentary state 45–6
Parsons, Talcott 55, 76
partisanship 307–9
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 191, 193–5; health
insurance for 2018 194; implementation of 194; marketplace 194;
public opinion on 195–6; Trump and 195
Patriot Act 65
Paul, Rand 320
peacebuilding, and terrorism 426–7
Pelosi, Nancy 124
The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet) 274
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) 149
Pew Research Center 99, 107, 139–40, 146; Project for Excellence in
Journalism 316
Pfizer 192
Phillips, Jack 184
place, and political culture 111
pluralism 55–6, 354
pluralist, and culture 79–80
pluralist model of power: weaknesses in 14
pluralist theory 13–14
Polanyi, Karl 472
polarization, and NSMs 358
police, and state 44–5
“policy domains” 84
political beliefs: ideology as set of 95–6
political community 93
political consciousness, and class 21
political culture 26–7; elections and voting 288–9; institutionalist and 288–
9; media and 104–5; and place 111; sources of 100–17
political discourse: as institutional forms of political participation 261–2
political economy: class-domination theory of power 128–9; class/Marxist
perspective 126; definition of 125; elite-managerial perspective 125–6;
institutionalist 128; overview 123–5; pluralist 125; postmodernism 126;
rational choice theories 126–8; terrorism 414–15; theoretical
frameworks 125–9
political engagement 279
political geography: as sources of political culture 111–14
political globalization 456–7
political institutional or institutionalist 63–4
political knowledge, and media 105–8
Political Man (Lipset) 295
political movements 271–4
political opportunity structures 371–3
political oppression, and terrorism 422
political participation: campaigning and canvassing 260–1; changing nature
of 278–81; class perspective 251–2; contemporary typologies of 258–9;
early typologies of 255–8; elite-managerial perspective of 249–51;
forms of 255–8; graffiti and street art 265–7; group context, social
networks, and participation 274–8; institutional forms of 259–64;
noninstitutional forms of 264–74; pluralist framework 246–9; political
talk/political discourse 261–2; politics and social capital 275–7;
postmodern approach 253–5; as power 243–6; protest and
demonstrations 267–71; rational choice models of 252–3; social,
political, and revolutionary movements 271–4; and social media 263–4;
themes in research on social capital and political participation 277–8;
theoretical frameworks 246–55
Political Power and Social Classes (Poulantzas) 60
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970
(McAdam) 368
political process model 354–5, 372
political socialization 87–91
political sociology: authority and legitimate power 7–8; classical and
contemporary pluralist approaches 11–13; coercive and dominant power
5–7; conceptualization of power in 10–23; elite-managerial 14–15;
interdependent power 8–9; metaphors of power arrangements 5;
networked power 9–10; pluralist approach 11; postmodern 29–32;
power and 4–10; social class and politics 17; social movements as part
of 383–4
political talk: as institutional forms of political participation 261–2; and
political discourse 261–2
political uses of hate 391
political values, and media 108–10
political views and issue-based voting 304–9
politics 225–30; classical and contemporary pluralist approaches to study of
11–13; culture and 75–7; not just about state but all social relations 34–
6; performance and 110–11; pluralist approach to study of 11; and
social capital 275–7; social class and 17; symbolism and 110–11; and
theoretical frameworks 78–87
Pol Pot 408, 409
polyarchy 52
populism 321–4
Porter, Bruce 43
postcolonial Marxist political theory 61
postindustrial society 371
post-materialism, and NSMs 358
postmodern analyses, of culture 85–7
postmodernism 24, 65–6
postmodernists 65–6
postmodern political sociology 29–32
Poulantzas, Nicos 60
“poverty by choice” 149
Powell, Colin 199
power: authority and legitimate power 7–8; coercive and dominant 5–7;
concentrated in democratic societies 33–4; conceptualization of power
in political sociology 10–23; despotic 41; dominant 5–7; externalization
of 47; fundamental concept in political sociology 4–10; infrastructural
41; interdependent power 8–9; legitimate 7–8; metaphors and paradox
2–4; metaphors of power arrangements 5; middle levels of 57;
networked power 9–10; new directions after traditional frameworks 24–
32; operates in direct but also indirect ways 34; political participation as
243–6; sociological tools in study of 2–4; traditional frameworks today
23–4
power elite 16, 57
predictability, definition of 452
Princip, Gavrilo 416
“prosperity gospel” 102
protest: definition of 267; and demonstrations 267–71; as noninstitutional
forms of political participation 267–71
Protestant belief systems 80–1
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber) 80
Protestantism 97
public assistance 148–53
public opinion 94–100; immigration 222–4; race and ethnic relations in
racial state 208–9
public policy, and globalization 464–6
Putnam, Robert 56
Quinnipiac University 216
race: and ethnicity 328–32; welfare state and 67

race and ethnic relations in racial state 202–13; color-blind policies 204–5;
explaining racial state 203–4; public opinion 208–9; racial identity 205;
racial state, law enforcement, and Black Lives Matter 205–8; racial
state, law enforcement, White Nationalists, and Counter-Protesters 209–
13; theoretical frameworks 202–3
racial cleavages 300–2; Blacks 301; East Asian Americans 302; Hispanic or
Latino/a Americans 301–2
racial identity 205
“racial resentment” 204
racial state 205–8, 209–13; explaining 203–4
racism 103; scientific 394
rational choice, and culture 83–4
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 25–6, 65
rational-legal authority 7–8
Reagan, Ronald 130, 441
realistic empathy 427
“reasonable thinkers” 95
relations of production 18
religion: ideology and 100–3; political values and 100–3
religious cleavages 302–3
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 184
religious fundamentalism (Jihad) 444
representative democracy 51
repression: social movements and 379–81; state’s reaction to movements
379–81; terrorism 424–6
research, on voting behavior 294–5
Resorts International 132
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 405
revolutionary movements 271–4
Reyes, Raul 405
Robertson, Pat 101
Robertson, Rebecca 190
Robert Taylor Homes 52
Robinson, William 461
Rock the Vote 180
Roman Catholic Church 7
Romney, Mitt 320
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 46, 59, 85, 301, 442
Roth, Kenneth 54
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 33
Rubio, Marco 320
Ruby Ridge 198–9
Rudolph, Eric Robert 412
“The Ruling Class Does Not Rule” 60
Rumsfeld, Donald 199
Rutgers University 338
Rwanda genocide 394
Sabraw, Dana M. 215

same-sex families and children 188–90
same-sex marriage 52, 182–4; public opinion on 184–7
Sanchez, Ramon 224
Sanders, Bernie 328
Sandler, Todd 403
San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) 371
Santelli, Rick 358
Santorum, Rick 187
school violence and shootings 180
Schor, Juliet 158
Schultz, Debbie Wasserman 335
Schwartzman, Kathleen 468
“Science as a Vocation” (Weber) 429
scientific racism 394
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 133, 135
security: terrorism 424; terrorism and 423
September 11, 2001, attacks 218, 315, 382, 400
Sessions, Jeff 215
“sexual harassment” 34
“shared culture” 114
The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Klein) 443
Siddiqui, Rashid 224
Skocpol, Theda 62
Smelser, Neil 419
Snowden, Edward 200–1; public opinion on 201–2
social capital: politics and 275–7; themes in research on 277–8
social citizenship 245
social class: classical and contemporary class approaches 18–20; elections
and voting 295–9; and politics 17
social cleavages or characteristics 295–303
social democratic welfare state 66–7
social globalization 456–7
“social gospel” 102
social groups 89
social institutions and social relations: civil liberties and national security
196–202; education 176–80; health care 190–6; immigration 213–25;
marriage and family 181–90; politics and sports 225–30; race and
ethnic relations in the racial state 202–13
socialism 97
socialist democracy 61
socialization of terrorists 418
social media 107; political participation and 263–4; as a tool for
mobilization 376–9
social movement emergence and mobilization 370–3; colective action
frames 374–5; existent social organization 373; mobilizing structures
and networks 373–4; political opportunity structures 371–3; strain,
conflict, and breakdown 370–1
social movement organizations (SMOs) 353, 374
social movement outcomes (SMOs): characteristics and resources 375;
influence, and decline 375–6; social and political context 377; strategies
and tactics 375–6
social movements 271–4; class framework or political process model 354–
5; collective identity 360–1; definition of 352–3; elite theory and
resource mobilization 354; emotions 366–8; framing 361–6;
globalization and transnational movements 381–3; life cycle of 369–81;
old and new 356–60; other approaches to 360–8; as part of political
sociology 383–4; pluralism and the classical collective behavior model
of 354; postmodern 356; rational choice 355–6; repression 379–81;
success and violent tactics 378–9; theoretical frameworks 353–6;
toward a synthesis of structuralist, rationalist, and culturalist
frameworks 368–9
social networks and participation 274–8
Social Security (SS) 125, 142, 147–8
Social Security Act 147
Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees 148
society: critical class theorists and power in 21–2; pluralist approach to the
study of 11
sociological causes of genocide 393–6; colonialism 396; ethnic conflict
395; geometry of genocide 394–5; modernity 393–4
The Sociological Imagination (Mills) 1, 176
sociological tools in the study of power 2–4; metaphors 2–4; paradox 2–4
Sociology in Everyday Life (Karp, Yoels, and Vann) 123
Sotomayor, Sonia 318
sources of political culture 100–17; media and political culture 104–5;
media and political knowledge 105–8; media and political values 108–
10; nationalism 114–17; political culture and place 111; political
geography 111–14; politics, symbolism, and performance 110–11;
religion, political values, and ideology 100–3
Southern Baptist Church 101
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) 353
Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) 405
Spence, Gerry 197
sports 225–30
Stalin, Josef 53, 408
Star Spangled Banner 393
state: administration or bureaucracy 44; class-based views of 58–60;
definition of 40–2, 47; differentiating nation and 47–9; elite views of
56–8; emergence of 42–3; future of 67–8; government and 44–6;
judiciary 45; legislative or parliamentary 45–6; military and police 44–
5; other emerging views of 65–6; subcentral 45; theoretical views on
55–64; Tilly on 42; updated Marxist theories of 60–2; welfare 66–7
state, role of: future of the state 67–8; modern nation-state 40–54; other
emerging views of the state 65–6; theoretical views on the state 55–64;
welfare state 66–7
state autonomy, definition of 63
state-centric, definition of 62–3
“state corporatism” 66
state formation: Coalitional path of 43; Constitutional path of 43;
Continental path of 43; dictatorships and 43
stateness, features of 47
“state of exception” 425
state or regime terrorism 408–9
state power: theoretical views on 460–1; world systems theory (WST) 460–
1
state -supported terrorism 409–10
state terrorism 417
“Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs” 148
Stephen, Bijan 378
Stone, Geoffrey R. 197
strain theory 419–20
The Strategy of Social Protest (Gamson) 268
street art 265–7; as noninstitutional forms of political participation 265–7
strong-state–weak-state thesis 459–60
structuralism 60
student debt 155–7
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 353
Students for a Democratic Society 351
subcentral state 45
substate terrorism 410–13
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 149
surveillance state 29, 65
Sweeney, Paul M. 58
Swidler, Ann 76
“symbolic racism” 204
symbolic violence 41–2
Taliban 199, 315, 410

Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy 251
taxation 141–6; corporate 144–6; international comparison regarding 146;
taxes on individuals 143–4
taxes on individuals 143–4
Tea Party Movement 136–7, 319–20, 358, 467
Temple, Jeff 216
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 142
terrorism 390–430, 399–413; alleviating structural causes 426; categorical
417; causes of 417–23; civil liberties and 422–3; collective action
theory 413–14; critical perspective on 410; defining 403–4; domestic
428; eliminating political opportunities 426; framing perspective 416–
17; future of 427–8; geometry and 423; globalization and 421–2;
homegrown 410–11; labeling 404–6; mesodynamic 418–20;
microdynamic and social psychological variables 418; optimistic view
427–8; peacebuilding 426–7; pessimistic view 428; political economy
414–15; political oppression and 422; repression 424–6; research 428–
9; responding to 423–7; security and 423; security and response 424;
state or regime 408–9; state-supported 409–10; structural 420–3;
substate 410–13; types of 406–13; U.S. Department of State definition
of 403; world systems perspective 415–16
terrorism and sociological theories 413–17
terrorists: intellectual 404; media 404; socialization of 418
Thatcher, Margaret 130, 441
themes in research on social capital and political participation 277–8
theoretical views on the state 55–64; class-based views of the state 58–60;
elite views of the state 56–8; pluralism 55–6; political institutional or
institutionalist 63–4; state-centric 62–3; updated Marxist theories of the
state 60–2
theories of Global Capitalism 448–9
Therborn, Goran 78
Thirty Years’ War 416
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen) 67
Tiananmen Square massacre 54
Till, Emmett 370
Tilly, Charles 42, 52, 412
Time magazine 106
de Tocqueville, Alexis 11–12
totalitarianism 53
Touraine, Alain 370–1
traditional authority 7
traditionalism 112
transformationalists (or post-skeptic) 454–5
“transformation of consciousness” 372
transnational capitalist class (TCC) 448
transnational corporation (TNC) 445
transnational movements: globalization and 381–3
de Tracy, Destutt 78
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 424
Trump, Donald 44, 46, 50, 80, 136, 144, 312, 321, 328
Turck, Luke 329
Turner, Bryan 399
Twenty-Sixth Amendment 51
Twitter 111, 201, 206, 263, 378
2000 presidential election 313–15
2008 presidential election 315–19
2018 midterm elections 338
2004 presidential election 315
2014 midterm election 320
2006 midterm election 315
2016 national election 321–37; Russian and other influences 335–7
2010 midterm election 319–20
2012 presidential election 320
tyranny of the majority 52
unconventional political behavior 352

undemocratic state forms 53–4; authoritarianism 53–4; totalitarianism 53
Underwood, Barbara 337
UN Human Rights Declaration 459
Union of International Associations 456
United Farm Workers (UFW) 372
United Nations (UN) 455; counterterrorism strategy 406
United States: health care uniqueness 192–3; immigration and 213–25;
voting and elections other than 339–40
United States v. Windsor 184
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 45, 199, 414 see also
USA PATRIOT
Universalization, and globalization 443
University of California, Berkeley 419
University of Michigan 274, 295
University of Michigan National Election Studies 299
UN Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire
442
updated Marxist theories of the state 60–2
urban ideology 371
urban social movements 371
URS Corporation 161
USA Freedom Act 201
USA PATRIOT Act 45, 414, 425 see also Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act
U.S. Census Bureau 384
U.S. Congress 51, 113
U.S. Constitution 51, 141
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 44, 195
U.S. Department of State 403
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 205
U.S. Financial Regulatory System 135
U.S. House of Representatives 113
U.S. national elections 309–38; 2000 presidential election 313–15; 2004
presidential election 315; 2006 midterm election 315; 2008 presidential
election 315–19; 2010 midterm election 319–20; 2012 presidential
election 320; 2014 midterm election 320; 2016 national election 321–
37; 2018 midterm elections 338
USS Cole 406
U.S. State Department 405, 409
U.S. Supreme Court 8, 45, 46, 52, 80, 113, 184, 314
U.S. Treasury 124
values and democracy 91–4

Venkatesh, Sudhir 52
Verizon 201
Verma, Seema 194
Vietnam War 306, 351, 382
violence 390–430; causes of terrorism 417–23; future directions 428–9;
future of terrorism 427–8; genocide 391–6; political uses of hate 391;
responding to terrorism 423–7; terrorism 399–413; terrorism and
sociological theories 413–17; war making 396–9
“voluntary associations” 277
“voluntary poverty” 149
voting: behavior research 294–5; and elections other than United States
339–40; issue-based 304–9
Voting Rights Act of 1965 204, 301, 370
Wagner Labor Relations Act of 1935 139

Wall Street Journal 427, 468
war making 396–9; future of 397–8; new wars 398–9; theoretical views on
396–7
War on Terror 199–201, 315, 425–6
Washington, George 115
“Washington Consensus” (WC) 441–2
Washington Post 180, 200, 205, 302, 419
Water Resources Reform and Development Act 163
Weaver, Randy 197
Weber, Max 4, 15, 19, 429
welfare states 66–7, 147–53; conservative 67; corporate welfare 147;
definition of 66; globalization 466; liberal 66; public assistance 148–53;
role of race and gender 67; social democratic 66–7; Social Security
147–8; types of 66–7
Wells Fargo Bank 159
Western democracies 251, 295, 410
Westernization 421–3, 444; globalization 443–6
WhatsApp 378
White Nationalists 209–13
white supremacists 212
Who Rules America (Domhoff) 82
Wiegand, Madison 209
WikiLeaks 335
Wikipedia 163
Wilson, Darren 207–8
Wilson, William Julius 203
Wired 378
“withering state debate” 458–9
“working class authoritarianism” 248–9
World 3.0 (Ghemawat) 454
World Bank 61, 408, 441–2, 448, 454, 456
World Economic Forum 333
world system cycles 471
world systems perspective: terrorism 415–16
world systems theory (WST) 445, 460–1; globalization 447–8
World Tourism Organization 456
World Trade Organization (WTO) 61, 367, 422, 441–3, 454, 455
World Values Survey 300
World War I 27, 244, 416, 428
World War II 27, 50, 92, 139, 244, 280, 304, 339, 373, 397, 442, 459, 464
World Wide Web 98, 107, 263
Wright, Erik Olin 61
Zardari, Asif Ali 54

zealots 412
zero tolerance and separation of families 215–17
Zimmerman, George 206, 378

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POWER, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY

Power, Politics, and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology

Betty A. Dobratz is Professor of Sociology at Iowa State University. She

Lisa K. Waldner is currently Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2019 Taylor & Francis

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered

First edition published by Pearson 2012

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978-1-138-55349-1 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

Figures and Tables

Chapter 2 ROLE OF THE STATE

Chapter 3 POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

Chapter 4 THE POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE: POLITICAL

Chapter 5 THE POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE: SOCIAL

Chapter 6 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Chapter 7 ELECTIONS AND VOTING

Chapter 8 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Chapter 9 VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

1.1 Surveillance and Types of Power

In the midst of a student movement, Betty was involved in during the

Betty A. Dobratz, Ph.D. Professor of Sociology,Department of

Timothy Buzzell, Ph.D. Professor of Sociology,Department of History,

Power is everywhere, in every social interaction between individuals, groups,

METAPHORS AND PARADOX: SOCIOLOGICAL

Many of our perspectives in political sociology are constructed around

POWER: THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT IN

Metaphors of Power Arrangements

COERCIVE AND DOMINANT POWER

Table 1.1 Typologies in the Study of Power

AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMATE POWER

Charismatic authority emanates from the personality or character of

As we will see in Chapter 2, the power of the democratic state is deﬁned

Their argument is that protest or challenges to the core purpose of an

Table 1.2 Mann’s Four Networks of Power

The metaphor of networked power focuses on human relationships that

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POWER IN

CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PLURALIST

The historical and ethnographic insights in de Tocqueville’s work offer a

In this passage, we ﬁnd a number of sociological insights. First, de

The decline of civil society—civic associations and connections—struck

FIGURE 1.2 The Elite-Managerial Metaphor of Power:

CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ELITE-

This conceptualization of regimes throughout the world is a good example

CRITICISMS OF THE ELITE-MANAGERIAL

Social Class and Politics

CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CLASS

These dynamics stand in contrast to societies organized historically

This dominance based on materialism and ideology, Marx concluded,

Throughout his analysis of classes, Weber, like Marx, demonstrates how

Status can transcend economic conditions, and thus, power in a status

CLASS AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

A modern example of this apparatus is the media, which are corporate

THE CRITICAL CLASS THEORISTS AND POWER

CRITICISMS OF THE CLASS PERSPECTIVE

THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORKS TODAY

As a result of these ongoing paradoxes in current studies of power and