India and Myanmar Borderlands Ethnicity Security and Connectivity - Pahi Saikia Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

INDIA AND MYANMAR
BORDERLANDS
This book explores the India–Myanmar relationship in terms of ethnicity, security and connectivity.
With the process of democratic transition in Myanmar since 2011 and the ongoing Rohingya
crisis, issues related to cross-border insurgency are one of the most important factors that determine
bilateral ties between the two neighboring countries. The volume discusses a diverse range of
themes – historical dimensions of cooperation; contested territories, resistance and violence in
India–Myanmar borderlands; ethnic linkages; political economy of India–Myanmar cooperation;
and Act East Policy – to examine the prospects and challenges of the strategic partnership between
India and Myanmar, and analyzes further possibilities to move forward. The chapters further
look at cross-border informal commercial exchanges, public health, population movements, and
problems of connectivity and infrastructure projects.
Comprehensive, topical and with its rich empirical data, the volume will be useful to
scholars and researchers of political studies, international relations, security studies, foreign policy,
contemporary history, and South Asian studies as well as government bodies and think tanks.
Pahi Saikia is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Indian Institute of Technology
Guwahati, Assam, India. She is the author of Ethnic Mobilisation and Violence in Northeast India
(2011). Her areas of specialization are international relations; foreign policy between India and
neighboring countries; ethnic identity politics, tribes and indigenous people in Northeast India;
governance and political development in developing areas; security issues in borderlands Asia; social
movements; and conflict prevention. She has published articles in books and in peer-reviewed
journals such as India Review on security concerns and risks of conflict in the South Asian sub-
region, subnationalist insurgency, ethnofederalism and marginalized tribal ethnic minorities in
India’s northeast.
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury is Senior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation’s
Neighbourhood Initiative, Kolkata chapter, India. She specializes in South Asia, forced migration
and women in conflict zones. Among her published work are the books Connecting Nations: India
and Southeast Asia (co-edited, 2019); State of Being Stateless (co-edited, 2015); Women in Indian
Borderlands (co-edited, 2011) and SAARC at Crossroads: The Fate of Regional Cooperation in South
Asia (2006). She is a regular contributor to peer-reviewed journals, newspapers and magazines
on energy crisis and subregional cooperation in South Asia, religious violence, connectivity and
refugee issues in South Asia.
INDIA AND MYANMAR
BORDERLANDS
Ethnicity, Security and Connectivity
Edited by Pahi Saikia and Anasua Basu

Ray Chaudhury
First published 2020
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CONTENTS
List of illustrations vii

Contributorsviii
Forewordx
Rakhahari Chatterji
Acknowledgmentsxiii
1 Conceptualizing India and Myanmar borderlands: ethnicity,

security and connectivity 1
Pahi Saikia and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury
PART I
India–Myanmar relations: ethnicity and security dimensions 19
2 State-territoriality, circulation of socio-cultural relations

and resistance in India–Myanmar borderlands 21
Pahi Saikia, Ingudam Yaipharemba Singh and Apurba K. Baruah
3 Crisis in the Rakhine state of Myanmar: bilateral relations

with India in perspective 44
Mihir Bhonsale
4 Reality on the Indo–Myanmar border: field observations

from Longwa and Hmaungbuchhuah on issues of ethnicity,
connectivity and security 63
Rajeev Bhattacharyya
vi Contents
5 Territoriality, ethnic contestation and insurgency in the

Indo–Myanmar borderland 79
Ngamjahao Kipgen
PART II
Proximity to connectivity: India–Myanmar in perspective 99
6 India–Myanmar relations: a perspective from the border 101

Alana Golmei
7 India–Myanmar borderland: pressing concerns in public

health hazards 114
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Sreeparna Banerjee
8 Employing proximity: boosting bilateral ties between India

and Myanmar 129
Pratnashree Basu
PART III
Changing political landscape and India–Myanmar
cooperation143
9 Political economy of subregional cooperation: ‘interests’

in reframing the peripheries of India and Myanmar 145
Rakhee Bhattacharya
10 Act East Policy and the importance of Myanmar and

Northeast India region 159
Nehginpao Kipgen
11 India–Myanmar relations: political transition and shared

borderlands174
K. Yhome
Index194
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
2.1 India–Myanmar Friendship Road 27
2.2 Movement of people on the India–Myanmar Border (along FMR) 28
2.3 Border pillar no. 81, Kwatha Khunuo (near Namjet Lok River) 36
4.1 A village in Longwa 66
4.2 Cardamom farming, Longwa 68
4.3 Hmaungbuchhuah village, Mizoram 72
4.4 Local shop in Hmaungbuchhuah village, Mizoram 74
6.1 Passenger terminal at Moreh in Manipur–Myanmar border 106
6.2 Border fencing in Manipur–Myanmar border 108
6.3 Road construction Near Lawngtlai (Mizoram–Myanmar border)
under KMTTP 110
7.1 IDU HIV Prevalence in Northeast India 119
7.2 ANC HIV Prevalence in Northeast India 119
7.3 FSW HIV Prevalence in Northeast India 120
Tables
3.1 Year-wise exodus of Rohingyas from Myanmar 46
9.1 India’s trade trend with Myanmar and ASEAN (Rs crores) 148
CONTRIBUTORS
Sreeparna Banerjee is a research assistant at the Observer Research Foundation

(ORF), Kolkata chapter, India. Her interest areas are gender studies and identity
politics.
Apurba K. Baruah is former Professor of Political Science and former National

Fellow Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi, India. He
is currently the Academic Adviser and Managing Trustee, Assam School of Journal-
ism, and the Academic Adviser, Assam School of Mass Communication and Media
Research. He has published a number of books and articles on ethnic identities and
democracy, student movements and elections.
Pratnashree Basu is Associate Fellow with ORF’s Neighbourhood Regional

Studies Initiative and Maritime Initiative, Kolkata chapter, India. Her recent publi-
cations include a Special Report titled India’s Maritime Connectivity: Importance of the
Bay of Bengal (2018, co-authored) and a Special Report titled India’s connectivity with
its Himalayan Neighbours: Possibilities and Challenges (2017, co-authored).
Rakhee Bhattacharya is Associate Professor in the Centre for the Study of North
East India, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,
India. Her current areas of interest include political economy, development eco-
nomics, regional economy, transnational economy and geo-economics, poverty and
inequality, geopolitics, India’s Northeast and its neighborhood. She is the author of
Northeastern India and its Neighbours: Negotiating Security and Development (2014) and
Development Disparities in Northeast India (2011).
Rajeev Bhattacharyya is a senior journalist and author based in Guwahati, Assam,

India. He has worked for The Times of India, The Telegraph, The Indian Express, Times
Now, Bengal Post and was the Managing Editor of Seven Sisters Post. He has authored
Contributors ix
two books – Rendezvous with Rebels: Journey to Meet India’s Most Wanted Men (2014)
and Lens and the Guerrilla: Insurgency in India’s Northeast (2013).
Mihir Bhonsale is Junior Fellow with ORF’s Neighbourhood and Regional Stud-
ies Initiative, Kolkata chapter, India. He is the coordinator of ORF’s South Asia
Weekly monitor and a regular contributor on Bhutan and Myanmar for the Weekly,
Kolkata chapter, India. His research areas include India’s Look East/Act East Policy,
Sino-Indian border, ethnicity, tourism and culture.
Alana Golmei is Director of Burma Centre Delhi, India, which was founded in
2008 to work for restoration of peace, justice, democracy and human rights in
Burma and to strengthen relationships between the people of India and Burma.
Golmei is also a social activist and the General Secretary of Northeast Support
Centre & Helpline based in New Delhi which was launched in 2007 with the aim
to prevent harassment, discrimination, molestation and abuses meted out to people
from Northeast India living in Delhi and NCR, particularly women.
Nehginpao Kipgen is Associate Professor, Assistant Dean (International Collabo-

ration) and Executive Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Jindal
School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, India. He is the author
of Myanmar: A Political History (2016) and Democracy Movement in Myanmar: Problems
and Challenges (2015). With specialization in comparative politics and international
relations, he has published several peer-reviewed academic articles and over 190
articles in various leading international newspapers and magazines in Asia, Africa,
Australia, Europe and North America.
Ngamjahao Kipgen is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Indian Institute of

Technology Guwahati, Assam, India. His major research interests are environmental
sociology, political sociology, religion and cultural politics. He has published several
book chapters and articles in journals such as Asian Ethnicity and SAGE Research
Methods Cases.
Ingudam Yaipharemba Singh is a guest faculty in the Department of National

Security Studies, Manipur University. Yaipha completed his doctoral research from
the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University,
India. His research interests include international relations, conflict resolutions and
border crisis.
K. Yhome is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi,

India. His research interests include India’s regional diplomacy, regionalism in South
and Southeast Asia and subregionalism in the Bay of Bengal and the Himalayas.
Before joining ORF, Yhome worked with the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. He is
the author of Myanmar: Can the Generals Resist Change? (2008) and has coauthored
Looking Beyond the Conflict: Changing Dynamics of India-Sri Lanka Ties (2013) and
coedited Emerging Trans-Regional Corridors: South and Southeast Asia (2017).
FOREWORD
In ancient times, Aristotle had defined the state as the highest form of human
community aiming at the highest good; but a modern definition of state, such as
by James Wilford Garner, would necessarily refer to territory as an essential com-
ponent of state. If the state has to have a territory it must be marked by a border
to distinguish one state from another. This is simple common knowledge today.Yet
the implication of this idea of a border when transformed into a palpable reality
through force, diplomacy or law is quite complex.
Border is a line that divides one country from another or a line that separates
two countries, so defines OED or CED. When border is marked by sea or barren
land it constitutes less of a human problem than when it runs through human habi-
tat. In the latter case it is supposed to divide two distinct communities with distinct
identities but more often than not it does not do so. It divides human groups or
communities having much commonality.The border idea was perhaps pushed to its
extremes in the case of division between India and East Pakistan where it often ran
through the same village or even the same family home. But even in less extreme
cases there are likely to be people on both sides of a border sharing common rituals,
languages, family relations, similar culinary practices and eating habits, trading prac-
tices etc. which are not quite like the mainstream practices in either country. Thus,
border people would likely have only thin commonalities with the mainstream
population. In this sense, a border truly means ‘margin.’ The mainstream identity
tends to evanesce as it moves toward the margin on both sides of the border leav-
ing the border peoples to ‘enjoy’ a semi-autonomous identity of their own across
the border. Border, then, becomes a space where the ‘self ’ merges with the ‘other.’
While this view of the border is more sensitive to the felt needs of the marginal
populations (or in cases such as the Indo–Myanmar borders, ethnies residing in bor-
derlands), this militates against the norm of the nation-state with its politico-legal
identity. One of the most prime features of the model nation-state, as it developed
Foreword xi
in western Europe, is that ‘it controlled a well-defined continuous territory’ which

was also ‘relatively centralized.’ And it wants to achieve this through ‘blending coer-
cion, co-optation, and legitimation as means of guaranteeing the acquiescence of
different segments of the population.’1
Thus, it is possible to conceptualize border in multiple ways. If the first view
advances the concept of border as a mental construct, the second view wants to
make the border concrete and palpable representing the limits of a state’s politico-
legal jurisdiction. If one view can be called liberal/constructivist, the other view
conforms to political realism. If one view tends to promote closer people-to-people
connectivity, substantial border trade and a relaxed approach to the border, the
other view emphasizes neat demarcation of the border, intensive border security
and omnipresence of the arm of the state.The beauty of this volume is that it delin-
eates and elaborates through different chapters these different conceptualizations of
border in the context of the concrete case of Indo–Myanmar border at the junction
of South and Southeast Asia.
The relaxed view of the border that I have just mentioned could be a product
of globalization which prophesied much closer than hitherto existing economic,
commercial and people-to-people interaction across international borders as the
process of globalization would proceed on the wheels of fast changing technol-
ogy and World Wide Web. As Gillette’s chairman was credited to have said, he finds
no country foreign (as his product had supposedly conquered the world).2 Books
like George Ritzer’s The McDonaldization of Society (1993) or Benjamin Barber’s
Jihad vs Mcworld (1995), while drawing attention to the process of melting sover-
eign boundaries of states under globalization regime, also highlighted the dangers
implicit in it. While Ritzer talked about the impending sameness that could engulf
societies across the globe, Barber posited that the struggle to retain ethnic identity
(jihad) could be at loggerheads with the forces of globalizing sameness. Such assess-
ments have largely been proved right as we find state’s backlash has come in the
form of a more rigid stance on border maintenance and securitization. The editors
rightly point out in the Introduction, territoriality became more noticeable post-
September 11 in the form of creation of ‘biometric borders, regulation on immi-
gration, tariffs and quotas.’ The creation of the Department of Homeland Security
by the US government was symbolic in this sense. The state’s approach to border
maintenance hardened in the face of unchecked immigration, human trafficking
and above all, the threat of terrorism.
In the Introduction, the editors have discussed numerous instances across the
globe where states have sealed their borders, erected fencing, constructed walls
and enhanced border vigilance, and they have pointed out how the circumstance
for doing these has proved to be fertile ground for the emergence of hard states
and authoritarian rulers. As borders have been securitized, surveillance states have
emerged.
South and Southeast Asia is going through this process as much as the US and
even Europe. Ultra-nationalism has emerged as globalization’s unwanted child. How,
under these very adverse circumstances, people living in the borderlands where
xii Foreword
India and Myanmar meet are trying to negotiate their existential needs, retain their
traditional rights, make use of contemporary technology and preserve their moral
universe is the subject matter of the different chapters in this edited volume.
The volume, in fact, goes even beyond that. The contributors examine the mul-
tifaceted nature of the Indo–Myanmar borderlands not only in the light of alter-
native conceptual constructs; in its different chapters they examine the complex
interplay of the forces of domestic and international politics as represented by India,
Myanmar and China and highlight the prospects of closer Indo–Myanmar relations.
This, I suppose, makes the subtitle of the book, ‘ethnicity, security and connectiv-
ity’ very apt indeed. I believe the volume will be a major contribution to a better
understanding of the nature and possibilities of Indo–Myanmar borderlands.
Rakhahari Chatterji
Advisor, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata and former
Professor of Political Science, Calcutta University, India
Notes
1 Charles Tilly (1975). “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The
Formation of National States in Western Europe, Charles Tilly, ed. (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press), 24–27. See also, Eugene Weber (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford:
Stanford University Press).
2 Benjamin R. Barber (1995). Jihad vs. Mcworld (New York: Ballantine Books), 29.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This volume is an outcome of a national seminar on “India–Myanmar Bilateral

Ties: Ethnicity, Security and Connectivity” jointly organized by the Department
of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati;
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata; and the Indian Council of Social
Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi held during September 25–26, 2016 at IIT
Guwahati.
We are grateful to Professor Manorama Sharma; Ambassador (Retd.) Rajiv Bhatia;
Dr Binayak Dutta, Department of History, NEHU; Professor Bipul Bhuyan,
Department of Physics, IIT Guwahati; Professor Akhil Ranjan Dutta, Depart-
ment of Political Science, Gauhati University; Dr Dilip Gogoi, Cotton University;
Dr Rupakjyoti Borah; and Pradip Phanjoubam, an eminent journalist, for help-
ing us conceptualize the theme and framework of the conference in a way that
could give opportunity to scholars, journalists and policy makers to discuss relevant
aspects in relation to India–Myanmar borderlands. The sub-themes covered in the
conference and subsequently in the volume received immense historical impor-
tance and international recognition in contemporary times.
We wish to thank the India Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New
Delhi for the financial support to organize the seminar; Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy Guwahati; and Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata for extending the sup-
port in this endeavor. We offer our heartfelt thanks to all the participating scholars
and contributors who have shared their ideas on India–Myanmar borderlands with
their learned contributions and extended their cooperation throughout the pro-
cess of making this volume possible. We are especially indebted to the volunteers
Aniruddha, Jimmy, Konkumoni, Pankaj and Bhasker for their hard work during the
conference. Our sincere thanks to Rubul Gogoi for helping us with the editing of
the photographs.
xiv Acknowledgments
Our friends and fellow colleagues in ORF, Kolkata deserve special thanks for
their moral and mental support in making our drive successful. We are especially
thankful to Professor Rakhahari Chatterji, Advisor, ORF, Kolkata for his academic
involvement and constant support in this project.
Finally, we wish to thank Rimina Mohapatra, Antara Raychaudhury, Shashank
Shekhar Sinha, Anandan Bommen and Anvita Bajaj for helping us with the prepa-
ration, copy-editing and the final completion of the manuscript.
We hope that the present volume will generate further interest amongst scholars
and researchers working in this field and the study would be useful to the teachers,
students, journalists and policy makers to understand the dynamics of the borders
and borderlands against the backdrop of India–Myanmar relations.
1
CONCEPTUALIZING INDIA AND
MYANMAR BORDERLANDS
Ethnicity, security and connectivity
Pahi Saikia and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury
Borders and boundaries are important frames and narratives used in the discourses
of nation, citizenship, sovereignty, state and territoriality. In the recent decades, bor-
der studies have mushroomed and taken a scholarly turn to include debates on
personal and group identity, gender discourses and ethnic minorities.This scholarly
transition is not simply a
reflection of ivory tower thinking but is fomented by real world phenomena

in the 1990s such as the fall of the Berlin wall, expansion of regional engage-
ments, enlargement of EU, spread of neoliberal political economy and the
upsurge in ethnonational politics.
(Wilson and Donnan 2016, 2)
These events demonstrate the interface of local and global forces and have made
borders and borderlands ‘new sites of empirical investigation’ (Wilson and Donnan
2016, 2).
A large part of the borderland studies in political geography or the field of
geopolitics is concentrated on the nature of borders from a military point of view.
National borders were understood from realist perspectives along static territorial
lines as policed and are considered as ‘empirical manifestations of a state’s territorial
power, located in specific contexts known as borderlands’ (Passi 2009). In the recent
decades, there has been a search for newer approaches to understand the dynamics
of borders and borderlands from diverse perspectives. From a liberal perspective,
borders have been re-imagined and deconstructed. Using this approach, some argue
that there has been a ‘new regionalist response’ and retreat of the state (Passi 2009).
There is a consistent move beyond the notion of borders as ‘bounded spaces’ toward
a borderless and post-national global system (Ohmae 1995; Strange 1996). From
similar perspectives, borders have become more porous and constitute points of
2 Pahi Saikia and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury
contact between peoples and cultures as well as socioeconomic linkages. Transna-

tional economic and political linkages across borders, cross-border mobility of pop-
ulation and creation of cultural networks are constitutive of these transformations
and therefore redefine power, norms and collective identity in the interconnected
global system. Borders are highly ‘mobile, diffused and proliferating’ (Mountz and
Hiemstra, 2016, 455).
From a constructivist approach, mobility and migration of people deconstruct
the notion of borders as ‘discrete, fixed and dichotomous’ (Houtum 2016, 406).The
focus has shifted from borders as ‘two-dimensional lines that delineate territori-
ally differentiated sovereignties to borders as transnational links’ (Houtum 2016,
406). Borders are conceptualized as ‘socio-spatially constructed mindscapes, mean-
ings and identities’ (Houtum 2016, 406). These studies have linked the study of
international borders and boundaries to larger approaches on ‘territory, identity,
sovereignty and citizenship’ (Megoran 2016, 475). They emphasize international
boundaries ‘are not fixed but evolving entities that permeate the fabric of nation-
states’ (Megoran 2016, 475). Examples may be drawn from various borderland areas
in North America, Europe and Asia. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
launched in 2004 offers multifaceted goals to create spaces of engagement between
the European partners through effective economic, security and cultural coopera-
tion (Brunett-Jailly 2016, 106). The aim is to ‘establish an area of prosperity and
good neighborliness founded on the values of the Union and characterized by
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’ (Brunett-Jailly 2016, 106). The
EU experience reveals permeability of borders. Similarly, the Canada–US border
deconstructed the notion of fixity of borders by creating transnational linkages and
a trade-friendly border between the US and Canada.
On the contrary there are debates that point out that despite the ‘erosion of
borders and shifting identities,’ state-territoriality has gained immense significance
in recent decades (Mountz and Hiemstra 2016, 456). Governments still exercise
their authority over the territorial borderlands. Scholars argue that nation-states
impose their border enforcement strategies and make territorial borders ‘impen-
etrable’ (Mountz and Hiemstra 2016, 456). Post-September 11, territoriality
became more noticeable in the form of creation of ‘biometric borders, regulation
on immigration, tariffs and quotas’ (Passi 2009, 4). Twenty-first-century ‘border
security,’ as studies suggest, is grounded in ‘the deployment of resources, manpower
and technology, (Chalfin 2016, 284). The constitution of the US Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and its associated division, the US Customs and Border
Protection (CBS) which exercises control at the borders, add to the border secu-
rity regime of the twenty-first century. Labor migration policies to regulate the
flow of mobility in the US–Mexico border are another aspect that is added to the per-
spective of securitization of borders. Similarly, the policy responses within the border
security framework of the Trafficking Protocol and the Migrant Smuggling Pro-
tocol within the UN Convention against Organized Crime to check human traf-
ficking and illegal sale of arms and drugs across borders add to the existing border
security regimes (Ford and Lyons 2016, 442). Such regimes became necessary to
India and Myanmar borderlands 3
regulate the flow of undocumented people and human trafficking in the con-
text of globalization. To take an example, the government of Indonesia passed the
Local Regulation No. 12 in 2007 on the “Elimination of Trafficking in Women
and Children” from places like the Riau Islands in Indonesia. Riau Islands form
a part of ‘Indonesia’s border with Singapore and Malaysia’ (Ford and Lyons 2016,
442). The Islands gained importance in the 1980s and 90s due to the trilateral
subregional cooperation between Indonesia-Malaysia and Singapore. In the 1990s,
a free trade zone and the cross-border growth triangle (IMS-GT) were estab-
lished between these three countries. As a result, Riau Islands became attractive
for international investments for tourism. These investments heavily depended on
the “recruitment of low skilled labor force” from different parts of Indonesia (Ford
and Lyons 2016, 442). Over time, the Riau Islands became ‘identified as a traffick-
ing hotspot, primarily of women and girls from other parts of Indonesia’ (Ford and
Lyons 2016, 442). The counter-trafficking measures taken by the government of
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are aimed to securitize and regulate the mobil-
ity of the ‘illegals, smuggled persons and migrants’ in the borderlands (Ford and
Lyons 2016, 442).
In the recent decades, there have been attempts to enforce border controls at
sea in Europe, North America and Southeast Asia. Florida in the US, Lampedusa
Island in Italy, Canary Island in Spain and the islands north of Australia are some
of the most attractive destinations for undocumented migrants and asylum seekers
through sea routes from politically unstable states in North Africa and Asia. It was
estimated that between 2005 and 2007, nearly 50,000 migrants arrived in Lampe-
dusa due to political unrest in countries like Tunisia and Libya (Mountz and Hiem-
stra 2016, 465). In the early 2000s, the European Union adopted strategies of ‘joint
policing and interception operations in the Mediterranean’ to regulate the flow of
asylum seekers. The FRONTEX, the EU agency was created to ‘coordinate the
control and surveillance of border security between the border states of EU.’ The
task of FRONTEX is to ‘deploy boats, helicopters and planes in the Mediterranean
Sea and along the coasts of North and West Africa to prevent boats with migrants
from entering the territorial waters of the EU’ (Houtum 2016, 410). Similarly, the
US adopted various immigration enforcement policies to prohibit undocumented
immigration through the US–Mexico border. The border is dotted with ‘various
technologies like electronic fencing, ground sensors, and digital surveillance towers’
to enforce immigration controls (Coleman 2016, 430).
In Central Asia, new borders were created and materialized between Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan after international boundaries were redrawn in the 1990s. The
borderlands in the region are marked by complex administrative boundaries and
geographies that were inherited from the earlier Soviet period (Megoran 2016,
475). The boundaries between these former Soviet republics, prior to 1990s, hardly
manifested in the ‘practices and imaginations of borderland dwellers’ (Megoran
2016, 475). Ethnic minorities crossed the borderlands to acquire education in their
mother tongue. Similarly, agricultural and industrial workers and pilgrims moved
across the borders on an everyday basis ferried by the Soviet-era bus services.
These networks, however, discontinued and were severely affected in 1993 when
the government of Uzbekistan ‘formally sealed its border with Kyrgyzstan to pre-
vent the movement of people and Russian rubles flooding the border economy of
Uzbekistan’ (Megoran 2016, 475). In continuation with Uzbekistan’s border con-
trol policies, in February 1999, the bus services were discontinued between the
two states, particularly in the Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces in the remote border
areas. These measures manifested ‘the official nationalism and a discursive tool pro-
moted by the politics of authoritarianism’ in the presidential regime in Uzbekistan
(Megoran 2016, 475).
In postcolonial South Asia, borders and borderlands are sites where contest over
inclusion and exclusion is a constant phenomenon. They make a division between
the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside,’ ‘sovereignty’ and ‘anarchy’ and also the ‘singular’ and
‘pluralistic space’ (Banerjee and Ray Chaudhury 2012, 27–29). Michel Agier (2016)
in his book Borderlands argues “we are living the whole time with borders and
thresholds, as soon as we move around to a minimum extent, we never stop crossing
these.”The border is a ‘place, a situation or a moment that ritualizes the relationship
to the other. . . ’ (Agier 2016, 7) and South Asia is no exception to it.
Therefore, borders are not merely cartographic lines on maps (Banerjee and Ray
Chaudhury 2012, 27–29). Rather, they are zones where the jurisdiction of one
state ends and the other begins. While borderlands are the common ground of two
or more states that share them, they also interpret their meanings in very different
ways to their citizens in their national narratives, history writing and collective spa-
tialized memories (Banerjee and Ray Chaudhury 2012, 27–29). In this context it
is noteworthy that in the South Asian scenario security concerns always loom large
over all other equally legitimate concerns and values and precisely, it is the notion
of military security that dominates over human security in the border region.
Enforcing barriers along the borders raises the fundamental question of politi-
cal citizenship ascribed to people living within the territorial limits of modern
nation-states. Scholars argue that citizenship and borders provide the institutional
framework of inclusion and exclusion of people and mark the contours of political
membership and socioeconomic justice (Gastelum 2005). Citizenship, as scholars
argue, serves as ‘instruments of social closure’ embodied in institutions and prac-
tices of suffrage, benefits, protection and territory in the national and global con-
texts (Brubaker 2009, x). The term has been extended to incorporate legal, social
and cultural dimensions of membership and occupies a crucial position in the
‘administrative and political culture of modern nation-states’ (Brubaker 2009, 23).
Citizenship in the context of borderlands is to be understood in relation to transi-
tional social practices across borders. Despite the presence of rigid state structures,
citizenship in the borderlands is manifested in various transnational sociopolitical
forms constructed through a process of continuous interaction of inhabitants along
the international borders. Cross-border exchanges of trade, access to schools, every-
day employment and other resources determine these interactions and the dynam-
ics of political membership of borderland communities. Borderlands are therefore
important sites of examining how the inhabitants in the remote borderlands relate
to the state conceptions of territoriality and citizenship. It is important to examine

how these inhabitants negotiate with state conceptions of political membership
and redefine their sense of belongingness to citizenship defined by modern nation
states. It is also important to examine how the borderlanders negotiate with a con-
tinuous process of exclusion from national structures of citizenship, the security and
entitlements tied to citizenship structures. Exclusionary policies of political mem-
bership and practices adopted by authoritarian states often resulted in involuntary
migration of marginal communities such as borderland inhabitants in search of asy-
lum and security across international borders. How do these groups of individuals
negotiate with citizenship claims and the framework of ethnic nationalities defined
by host states? How do border crossings of the borderland inhabitants in search of
physical protection in the wake of repression and human security threats impact
inter-state relations and the discourse of citizenship and nationality in modern
nation-states? These are pertinent questions that need to be addressed with refer-
ence to mobility across the India–Myanmar borderlands.
India–Myanmar borderlands in perspective

Borders and borderland studies as the preceding analysis reveals have proliferated
over the years. These studies have generated a number of intellectual traditions
across disciplines and therefore reflect the convergence of ideas on national security,
nation-state building, power, political economy, identity and citizenship, articulated
from realist, non-realist and social constructivist perspectives. This edited volume
intends to contribute to these debates on borders and borderlands and examines
three important dynamics: ethnicity, connectivity and security. The metaphor of
borders and borderlands are used to examine the convergence of debates on power,
inter-state relations and territory with issues of identity, culture and everyday poli-
tics using ethnographic case studies from interdisciplinary perspectives, a common
thread that runs through the chapters in this volume. The authors in this volume
demonstrate through case studies the multifaceted ways in which borderlands
between India and Myanmar respond to the processes of postcolonial bordering,
control and militarization of inter-state borders and at the same time, negotiate
with political, economic and social transformations generated by interdepend-
ent, deterritorialized relations in the new order of subregional political economy
between the two states.
In this volume we move beyond the classical geopolitical and international rela-
tions approaches where border is conceptualized as a geographical reality and take
cues from post-structuralist and critical debates in international politics (Passi 2009,
213–234). While drawing lessons from existing approaches, our aim is to under-
stand the creation of borders and borderlands as physical realities in India–Myanmar
borderlands through historically informed analysis. As borders in South and South-
east Asia have been redefined constantly in decolonized political order, the states in
these regions seem to be more connected and are no longer considered to be ter-
ritorially bounded entities.Yet, they are vigorously assertive (Rosenau 2006). How
do borderlands in India and Myanmar negotiate with these transformations and

changing narratives on the geopolitical borders? Our main concern is to address
this question with the help of bottom-up, locally grounded perspectives. Our aim
is to explore the continuous colonial and postcolonial challenges and prospects of
security and connectivity in the borderlands of India and Myanmar. We also exam-
ine the prospects and challenges of integrating ethnicities and the local polities
into transnational networks of economic and sociopolitical ties in the securitized
borderlands of the two countries.
The borderlands of Myanmar, as we argue in this volume, are inhabited by
multiethnic non-Burman ethnic nationalities like the Chins inhabiting the western
part of Myanmar along the borders of India and Bangladesh, the Mons inhabiting
the eastern and southern fringes of Myanmar along the borders of Myanmar and
Thailand and various other sub-groups such as the Naga, Lahu, Lisu among others.
Myanmar’s borderlands as scholars describe are “marked by unique ethnic cultures
and diversity that ranges from the Kayan (Padaung) on the Shan/Karenni borders,
where the ‘long-necked’ women wear extraordinary brass necklaces, to the Salum
sea-gypsies of sub-tropical Tenasserim and the once headhunting Naga along the
India frontier” (Smith and Allsebrook 1994, 17). Ethnic separatism and political
instability however marred the ethnopolitical landscape of the ethnic minority bor-
derlands. The political situation in these borderlands has been described by scholars
in these words, “In the deep mountains and forests of the borderland periphery,
over 20 armed opposition groups controlled, under their own administrations, vast
swathes of territory and continued to reflect an often changing alignment of differ-
ent political or nationality causes” (Smith and Allsebrook 1994, 17). Ethnic minori-
ties feared political domination and marginalization. The situation is complicated
in Myanmar where armed ethnic ceasefire groups are in control of the border eco-
nomic activities through special regions controlled by the ceasefire groups. Despite
declining fatalities, there have been only a handful of cases where ceasefires have
sustained or peace talks have been possible between the governments and the insur-
gent leadership. Most ceasefires have practically resulted in internal discord within
the insurgent group, or renewed existence of ‘quasi-independent armed groups’ or
opportunistic alliances between different insurgent groups (Cline 2015).
Evidence drawn from India’s eastern frontiers illustrates similar complexities.
India’s Northeast borderlands represent multiethnic composition and cross-border
ethnic ties with the border regions of Upper Myanmar. With the formation of
postcolonial borders and change of regimes, the region suffered from continuous
stirrings of violent insurgencies in varying degrees, produced by ethnocultural dif-
ferences among the inhabitants. To draw some recent examples of insurgent vio-
lence, on June 4, 2015 armed militants attacked a state security personnel convoy in
Manipur’s Chandel district bordering Myanmar. At least 18 soldiers from the Indian
army were reportedly killed, while 11 were injured. National Socialist Council
of Nagaland (NSCN-K), the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and a faction
of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) claimed responsibility for the attack
(Sharma 2015). In May 2015 the NSCN-K killed and injured security personnel
of the Assam Rifles paramilitary unit in Mon district of Nagaland. These attacks
were coordinated by a coalition of several active insurgent groups, including the
NSCN-K, the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-
Songhbhijit) (The Indian Express, June, 2015). These groups have been opposed
to negotiation, unlike their counterparts including the NSCN (IM) and NDFB
(R) ceasefire groups and pro-negotiation United Liberation Front of Assam. The
Indian army avenged by using preemptive strikes along two different locations in
Nagaland in Nokklak, Tuensang district and Manipur in Ukhrul district along the
India–Myanmar border (Pandey 2015).
Ethnic insurgencies in the region led to forcible displacement of population,
underdevelopment, complex inter-state relations, affected majority-minority rela-
tions and further contributed to illegal border crossings in the region. Moreover,
these insurgencies pose a serious challenge to the national modernizing projects,
human and regional security as well as the global political economy. Many of these
insurgencies thrived not only because of civilian support but also because of exter-
nal links and support of neighboring countries.
The recent democratic transition in Myanmar, however, opened up the scope to
capture the country’s experiences with colonialism, a ravaged political history, eth-
nic conflicts and possible outcomes through political and economic reforms. With
the rapid changes in the political conditions, followed by the electoral gains of the
National League for Democracy (NLD) in November 2015, changing media land-
scape, suspension of construction work on Myitsone dam since September 2011,
strengthening of economic ties with ASEAN countries, and the ongoing peace
talks with the Panglong Peace Conference comprising different ethnic minorities,
Myanmar raised the expectations for regional integration and strategic changes
in the subregion. At this juncture the Indian government vehemently pursued
the Look East Policy, recently refurbished as the ‘Act East’ policy to engage with
Myanmar. India’s policy is aimed at bridging the discontinuities of commercial links
with the Asia-Pacific including Myanmar, by breaking the notion of ‘spatial bound-
edness’ and transforming the peripherally located conflict-ridden borderlands as
flourishing zones of growth and economic development of an integrated economy.
Practical challenges of implementing the policy however occurred on account
of lack of physical infrastructure, endemic security concerns or underdeveloped
markets and lack of adequate industrial base in the border zones of these coun-
tries. The ASEAN-India summit held in Myanmar in November 2014 provided
an important platform for the Indian government to reiterate its commitment to
maintain regional peace and security and to combat international terrorism by
joining hands with its regional partners. Concerted moves recently undertaken by
India and Myanmar are designed to translate these challenges into opportunities.
At this point, it is also important to highlight the role of China in the entire
gamut of multilateral ties in the Southeast Asian region vis-à-vis India’s bilateral
ties with Myanmar. India and China’s competing interests on Myanmar is driven
by the process of democratization and the strategic location of Myanmar at the
‘tri-junction of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia.’ According to historical
writings, Myanmar was at the crossroads between India and China. Scholars argue
that ‘for Chinese traders and explorers, the dream was to make Myanmar, the south-
west access route to India.’ By the end of the twentieth century, China tried to get
closer to the borders of Burma and establish ‘a direct passage to India’ (Myint-U
2011, 3).The British and the French had similar aspirations and wanted to ‘connect
India and China through a passage across Burma’ (Myint-U 2011, 15). Accordingly,
‘soldiers, surveyors and scientists were sent by the imperial administrators to map
the unknown borderlands of Burma’ (Myint-U 2011, 15). A British intelligence
officer H.R. Davies in his account written in 1890s suggested ways to connect
India and China in these words, ‘In an age when railways are penetrating to the
most out-of-the-way places on the earth, it is impossible to suppose that India and
China, the two most populous countries in the world, would remain without being
connected by railway’(Myint-U 2011, 15). Strategic ties and interest between India,
China and Myanmar therefore dates back to history. The interests and competi-
tion became stronger with modern state formation in the Asian subregion. China’s
growing interest in Myanmar was articulated through the communist party that
established important links with the insurgent organizations like the Communist
Party of Burma (CPB) through military and financial aid since the 1940s. In an arti-
cle entitled ‘Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,’ published in the Beijing
Review on September 2, 1985, the former Chinese Vice Minister of Communica-
tions expressed the possibilities of finding ‘an outlet for trade from China’s land-
locked provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou, through Burma to the Indian
Ocean’ (Lintner 2012, 223). By the late 1980s, China had already signed bilateral
agreements on border trade with Myanmar. Chinese economic investments and
mega infrastructural projects are manifestations of increasing bilateral ties. Booming
markets in the border towns like Panghsang, located in the borderlands between
Myanmar and China, are other examples of the ties between Chinese officials and
the local governments located in the peripheries of Myanmar. It needs to be noted
that Panghsang, dotted with small shops with toys and trinkets made in China,
paved roads and casinos, flooded with Chinese goods and currency is controlled by
the United Wa State Army. The process of democratic however created difficulties
for further Chinese investments in various parts of Myanmar. China-Myanmar rela-
tions entered into a phase of uncertainty after 2011 when the military junta opened
up the political structure for reforms. Suspension of projects like the Myitsone dam
in 2011 and Letpedaung coppermine in 2013 are just a few examples of the strained
relations (Yhome 2018). Despite uncertainty, China’s long-term interests to build
up bridges between the Indian Ocean and China through Myanmar’s territory will
remain. At the same time, Myanmar’s domestic conflict in the peripheral regions
is advantageous for China. What would be the implications of China’s interests on
India’s projections of future economic and infrastructural ties with Myanmar? How
does this impact the bilateral ties between India and Myanmar?
It is within this framework that this book explores the implications that con-
temporary changes in Myanmar have on India–Myanmar borderlands in terms of
ethnicity, security and connectivity. Documentary evidence, interview narratives

and field experiences collected in the borderlands of India and Myanmar inform
the understanding of the issues related to ethnicity, security and connectivity dis-
cussed in the book. From a political economy perspective, we argue that the bor-
derlands located in the geographical margins of India and Myanmar is of immense
importance to determine the bilateral ties and the geopolitical security dynamics of
the two countries.We use the perspective of borders and borderlands to understand
a range of transborder connections.We argue that the security landscape in the bor-
derlands has been changing with response to transborder flow of people, goods and
information. Borderlands in India and Myanmar have become important for closer
scrutiny by the national governments because of untapped minerals and energy
resources, fluid territorial boundaries, continuing multidirectional exchanges, cross-
border ethnic ties and most critically, due to persisting challenges of nontraditional
security (NTS) issues such as transborder criminal networks, human trafficking,
public health and disaster relief, among others. Our focus is to deepen the ana-
lytical framework of understanding security by incorporating nonmilitary security
dimensions such as society and economy (Buzan 1998).
We argue that security concerns, especially issues related to cross-border insur-
gency and undocumented migration, is one of the most important factors that
determine bilateral ties between these two neighbors. For years, the northeast of
India has faced its own set of unique challenges and insurgency has crippled the
development of the region. Although the face of insurgency has been gradually
changing, many such groups take shelter across the border in Myanmar and continue
to plan and execute their will. Additionally, the recent Rohingya crisis raises issues
of cross-border migration, border management and security between the two coun-
tries. Mutual cooperation between the two countries in this regard therefore needs
to be strengthened. Additionally, people residing in India’s northeast and those across
the border in Myanmar often share common ethnic origins and the porous nature
of the border between these two countries allows free cross-border movement to
an extent.While people-to-people exchanges across the border is welcome and also
needs encouragement, it at times gives rise to law and order problems. Some mecha-
nisms that would allow people-to-people interactions while enforcing a check on
smuggling, informal trade and law and order have recently been agreed upon. For
instance, India and Myanmar signed seven agreements including the land border
agreement on May 10 and 11, 2018, to facilitate the movement of people across the
land border with valid documents.The agreements are aimed at providing assistance
to Myanmar for the restoration of religious sites damaged by earthquakes in Bagan,
enhancing tourism, pilgrimage, access to health and education services between the
two countries, providing training of Myanmar Foreign Service Officers and setting
up an Industrial Training Centre (ITC), as well as providing assistance to Myanmar
on the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (MEA, Press Release, May 11, 2018).
In December 2017, India also signed a MoU with Myanmar to assist Myanmar on
the Rakhine State Development Programme. The challenge would be to see how
these agreements are worked out at the ground level in the two countries.
Connectivity in the region holds the key to economic ties and people-to people
interactions. To this end, many infrastructural projects linking the two countries
and the region as a whole are in various stages of planning and implementation.
The book takes the position that connectivity has a lot of scope for fostering self-
sufficiency of the frontier minorities by enabling cross-border exchanges, for
instance through tourism and agro-based industry. The northeastern states of India,
which have huge potential for health and ecotourism and businesses in food grain
and indigenous products, have a vital role to play in this regard. Therefore, the
approach toward increasing and strengthening established modes of connectivity
need careful examination.
We also argue that the issue of ethnicity poses certain complex and unique
challenges in the bilateral relations between India and Myanmar. Behind the pos-
itive developments for reform undertaken since 2011 lay the real challenges of
democratic governance and problems of integrating Myanmar’s ethnic minorities.
Myanmar is known for its multiethnic composition. During the Tatmadaw regime
the separatist movements of the Karens, Shans and many other groups intensified
and led to political instability in the border regions. The outbreak of conflict in the
Rakhine State recently compounded the challenges faced by transitioning Myanmar.
Therefore, any collaborative efforts at the bilateral level between these two states
that have been undertaken and that will come up in the future will have to make a
balance between short-term commercial interests and long-term policy of inclusive
development that both countries need to undertake.
Overview of the chapters

Against this backdrop, using a bottom-up, locally grounded ethnographic perspec-
tives from the borderlands, this book examines the prospects and challenges of
India–Myanmar strategic partnership and analyzes further possibilities for bilateral
ties between the two countries. Apart from the Introduction, the book is divided
into three sections and each section deals with issues of ethnicity, security and con-
nectivity between India and Myanmar.
The first section entitled ‘India–Myanmar Relations: Ethnicity and Security
Dimensions’ has four chapters. Chapter 2 in this section authored by Pahi Saikia,
Ingudam Yaipharemba Singh and Apurba K. Baruah is entitled State-territoriality, cir-
culation of socio-cultural relations and resistance in India–Myanmar borderlands. The chap-
ter argues that postcolonial border drawing and political boundary making in South
Asia had an impact on ethnic ties, connectivity and people perceptions on security
along the international borders in the areas surrounding Myanmar and the vicinity
of India’s eastern frontiers. State building in India and Myanmar failed to discern
the complex patterns of historical mobility and construction of multiple identi-
ties in the peripheral regions of India’s Northeast and Myanmar. Using fieldwork
narratives from two border villages in the Moreh district of Manipur, this chapter
examines the persistence of a range of transborder connections, power narratives
and sociocultural boundaries. The chapter particularly looks at the establishment
of border regimes and border pillars in India and Myanmar borderlands and ways
in which village residents negotiate their ethnic identities. It uses the literature on
ethnic identity and borderland studies and examine the local politics embedded in
the borderland experiences of militarization. It argues,
In post-colonial states, particularly South Asia, nation-state building practices

since 1940s consolidated border regimes as a part of right sizing of bor-
ders and nation state making exercises and created new borderlands. Borders
became a marker of identity within specific contexts through mapping, scal-
ing, census making.
It also analyzes the reconstruction of ethno-political identities vis-à-vis state-

territoriality in the emerging phase of global and translocal dynamics. The chapter
points out that border restructuring in India and Myanmar redefine the ‘mundane
and localized ethno-politics’ of cross-border communities in these two villages.The
objective is to understand the power asymmetry created by border dynamics, prob-
lem of integration of borderland communities into the emerging political economy,
resistance and politics of defiance in India–Myanmar borderlands.
Chapter 3, entitled Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar: bilateral relations with
India in perspective and authored by Mihir Bhonsale, examines the political, stra-
tegic and cultural implications of large-scale cross-border movement of ethnic
groups such as the Rohingyas. It emphasizes that the Rohingya crisis has assumed
a regional dimension and therefore the refugee crisis has to be analyzed in the
light of contemporary relations between India and Myanmar. The chapter begins
with a historical analysis of the origins of the Rohingyas, their settlement history
in the Rakhine state and the evolution of the ‘majority-minority relations in the
Arakan.’ The chapter moves on to discuss the postcolonial developments and the
promulgation of the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act by the military regime
in 1970s which subsequently led to waves of out-migration of the Rohingyas in
Myanmar in the late 1970s, 1990s and 2000s to Bangladesh and other countries.
The last of the phases of out-migration began in 2012 when communal riots took
place in several places in Rakhine state. Also, in this phase, ‘fleeing poverty, rampant
physical abuse and statelessness, the Rohingyas took to sea in search of refuge,
beginning in 2014.’ Following the August 25, 2017 attacks on military outposts in
the Rakhine state, the largest exodus of Rohingya people in postcolonial history
of Myanmar has taken place.Yet as the author argues the international response to
the humanitarian crisis involving the Rohingyas has been inadequate. The state of
Myanmar too failed to take adequate measures to take the responsibility to protect
the Rohingyas. India adopted a ‘dual strategy,’ as the author argues. The Indian state
tried to ‘maintain good political relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh that
are central to its ‘Neighborhood First’ and ‘Act East Policy.’ At the same time, India
adopted a ‘push back’ policy toward the Rohingyas. India’s ‘two pronged approach’
of ‘deporting back the illegal Rohingya migrants while soft-pedalling on Myanmar
and at the same time also assuring Bangladesh that India is for a long-term solution
for resolving the crisis in the Rakhine state is an example of Indian realism in her
eastern neighborhood.’
Chapter 4, Reality on the Indo–Myanmar Border: field observations from Longwa and
Hmaungbuchhuah on issues of ethnicity, connectivity and security, authored by Rajeev
Bhattacharyya, analyzes the changing realities in the India–Myanmar borderlands.
The analysis in this chapter is grounded on field visits in two different border areas
along the India–Myanmar borderlands: Longwa and Hmaungbuchhuah. Field vis-
its indicate that the traditional notions about security, connectivity and ethnicity
are undergoing a change that are specific to ethnic linkages, local perceptions on
security and age-old connectivity across these border areas. The discussion in the
chapter also reveals that the cross-border access to socioeconomic activities like
primary education and informal economic exchanges are indispensable and have
been historically followed out of necessity in the livelihoods of the borderlands.The
chapter critically analyzes the literature on borders and borderland livelihoods to
support the argument.
Chapter 5 on Territoriality, ethnic contestation and insurgency in the Indo–Myanmar
corderland by Ngamjahao Kipgen is based on a case study of the Kuki-Chin people
of the Indo–Myanmar borderlands. Identified by different names, Kuki and Mizo in
India and Chin in Myanmar/Burma, the Kuki-Chin ethnic group is a fringe com-
munity and a non-state entity that has sustained a fluid identity under changing
historical contexts. The chapter discusses the Kuki-Chin community, ‘transborder
peoples’ who constitute the minority in the states they inhabit but have ‘connected
history.’ It tries to understand how their notion of ethnic identity and territory had
been displaced and fragmented by the colonial and postcolonial states boundaries.
The current engagement of the government of India with various insurgent groups
in the region makes it imperative to revisit certain problems related to the rise
of ethnic nationalism and to explicitly tackle the issues of overlapping territorial
demands. The article argues that such overlapping territorial claims, which have
their roots in colonial processes of ethnicization and territorial demarcation, need
immediate attention to bring durable solution. Such competing claims arose only
after colonially constructed categories of local people who shared local living spaces
began to claim exclusive ownership of the entire territory of certain administra-
tive units. Drawing on archival sources and ethnohistory, this article examines the
Kuki-Chin ethnic insurgents group operating in the Indo–Myanmar borderlands.
The chapters in the first section of the volume, therefore, understand the re-
bordering practices, power asymmetry, resistance and changing perceptions of
contemporary sociopolitical realities in the India–Myanmar borderlands. These
chapters also examine how border restructuring in India and Myanmar redefine
ground realities of cross-border communities and peripheral economies. The para-
dox of power asymmetries in India–Myanmar borderlands as the chapters in this
part argue can be much attributed to the persistence of ‘coloniality’ and postco-
lonial boundary making and administrative structures. British administrators had
drawn and redrawn the map of the South and Southeast Asia, integrating king-
doms and principalities under colonial administration. Redrawing of boundaries
had an impact on ethnic categorization, belonging and political choices of border-

land communities like Kukis, Chins, Mons and Shans. To understand these politi-
cal choices Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 evaluate the local narratives of identity, security,
connectivity and territoriality in the emerging phase of new phase of globalization
and wider bilateral dynamics between India and Myanmar.
Section II of the volume entitled ‘Proximity to Connectivity: India–Myanmar
in Perspective’ has three articles. Chapter 6 by Alana Golmei on India–Myanmar
Relations: a perspective from the border highlights the ‘strong historical and geographi-
cal links’ that the ethnic communities of the borderlands of India and Myanmar
share with each other. These relations, as the author argues, are rooted in shared
historical, ethnic, cultural and religious ties.The Chin and Mizo people for instance
share common historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. These linkages were
rejuvenated and opened the doors for cross-border migration of Chin people from
the other side of Myanmar borderlands in search of economic security and survival
to India. The estimated populations of the Chin state located in the western part of
Myanmar, bordered by Bangladesh and India in the west, Rakhine state in the south,
and Magwe and Sagaing Division in the east, is 500,000. According to the latest
report from the staff of Chin Human Rights Organization, approximately 50000
Chin refugees have settled in different parts of the state of Mizoram in India’s bor-
derlands.What implications would the bilateral relations between the two countries
have on these refugees who traverse these borderlands? In the context of increasing
subregional cooperation, India and Myanmar conceptualized and proposed several
bilateral ventures in the areas of ‘infrastructural development, communications, road
and rail connectivity.’ However, the main question that needs to be addressed is how
these connectivity projects impact the lives of people living in the India–Myanmar
borderlands. In a nutshell, the chapter argues that these mega projects would have
implications on the cross-border communities and would perhaps work in the favor
of cross-border communities only if the two countries are able to establish ‘vigor-
ous and meaningful people-to-people contacts in the India–Myanmar borderlands.’
In Chapter 7 entitled India–Myanmar borderland: pressing concerns in public health
hazards, Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Sreeparna Banerjee discuss the problems
of public health, particularly the threats ‘posed by infectious border diseases like
Malaria, Human Immuno deficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (HIV AIDS) and Tuberculosis (TB),’ in the borderlands of India
and Myanmar. The chapter attempts to establish the correlation between migra-
tion and the spread of diseases in the border areas. It also examines the ‘status of
diseases among the bordering states of northeast India and Myanmar.’ The chapter
argues that ‘the India–Myanmar border is an artificial line which is superimposed
on the socio-cultural landscape of the borderland.’ Owing to ‘historic ethnic link-
ages,’ people in the border villages particularly in places that share boundaries with
Manipur and Mizoram, share cross-border land/property and have common ‘socio-
economic interests’ across the borders. Migration of cross-border communities like
the Chins trying to escape the violence persecuted by the Myanmarese army in
the Chin state of Myanmar is visible in these areas.The Chins travelled to Mizoram
and settled in the state in search of livelihood. The Mizos on the other hand feel
threatened due to the migration of the Chins and their increasing settlement in
the border areas. The Chins are considered to be ‘illegal’ by the people of Mizoram.
Apart from increasing discrimination in the job markets, the Chins have been fac-
ing serious problems related to public health.The chapter therefore argues that HIV
and TB are likely to be caused by unregulated movement of people across the bor-
derlands. Unregulated drug-trafficking and involvement of refugee/migrant Chin/
Kuki women in the flourishing sex industry adds to the problem of public health
in the India–Myanmar borderlands. In conclusion, the chapter makes an attempt
to address the problem of public health through collaborative efforts between both
the nations for an effective border health infrastructure, management and disease
control strategy.
Chapter 8, Employing proximity: boosting bilateral ties between India and Myanmar by
Pratnashreee Basu discuses that regional connectivity can be viewed in terms of
bridging domestic goals and geopolitical ambitions.The chapter begins by concep-
tualizing ‘physical connectivity’ and gradually proceeds to discuss how the ‘political
complexities, security issues, difficult physical terrain and deplorable road links’
stood in the way of developing closer and faster connectivity and physical linkages
between India and Myanmar. The chapter further examines the prospects of estab-
lishing ‘bilateral engagements’ between India and Myanmar in ‘cross-border infra-
structural development; trade and services; cooperation in technology and tourism.’
The chapter reveals that nearly eight road connectivity projects were initiated by
the governments of the two countries, yet except the Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo
Friendship Road, none of these projects have advanced. The chapter highlights
that these projects (especially road links) have faced difficulties due to protests over
land acquisition, fear of displacement, environmental concerns and local politics.
Delays in these projects have also led to the escalation of costs of these projects.The
chapter also emphasizes on ‘soft connectivity’ projects between the two countries.
It argues that ‘cross-border fibre optic links providing high-speed broadband link
for voice and data transmission have been set up between India and Myanmar. The
first one, running for a distance of 500 km, was set up from Moreh (in Manipur) to
Mandalay in 2009.’ Finally, the chapter argues that ‘being neighbors, sharing a com-
mon historical past and cultural similarities’ the two countries have a wider scope
to ‘employ their geographical proximity to the greatest advantage.’
Section III of this volume focuses on Myanmar’s changing political landscape
and scope for strengthening cooperation between India and Myanmar. Chapter 9
in this section is titled Political economy of subregional cooperation: ‘interests’ in reframing
the peripheries of India and Myanmar. In this chapter, Rakhee Bhattacharya explores
the evolving dynamics and India’s current stand on subregional cooperation in Asia
in the context of both economy and security with emphasis on Myanmar. The
chapter gives an elaborate landscape of India’s ongoing bilateral engagement with
new Myanmar, and its heightened economic diplomacy to support all physical,
economic, social and educational infrastructures toward restructuring the nation,
which is devastated due to prolonged military regime and China’s extra activism.
As India aims to gain regional power, it has simultaneously started to shift the nar-
rative of its Northeast periphery as a ‘natural gateway’ toward achieving the goals
of subregional economic integration. In this context, the chapter also argues about
the shifting geopolitical theater toward Myanmar’s strategic Rakhine state, where a
new regime of power and ‘interests’ of various stakeholders are aiming to explore
the space for various economic activities. As Myanmar is also partnering with such
new subregional dynamics for its own economic gains, the state has created a secu-
rity perception by systematically targeting a particular community. The chapter
therefore ends on a cautious note for the need of a democratization process in
the approach of subregionalism where economic integration and gains can have a
bottom-up approach and remains meaningful for the peripheries.
Chapter 10, titled Act East policy and the importance of Myanmar and Northeast India
Region, authored by Nehginpao Kipgen, discusses Myanmar’s importance to the Act
East Policy (AEP), which, Kipgen argues, is defined by different factors, including
shared history, culture, ethnic relations and religious ties. The chapter adopts actor-
oriented approach to understand foreign policy making in International Relations.
India and Myanmar share 1,643-kilometer border in four Northeast Indian states.
They also share the waters of Bay of Bengal, including the strategically important
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Myanmar serves as India’s gateway to other ASEAN
countries and provides a geographical contiguity to the Asia-Pacific region. Due to
its geographical proximity, Myanmar also provides India a transit route to South-
ern China. On the other hand, the idea of the inclusion of ‘Northeast Develop-
ment Concern’ as an important component of AEP came up in 1997. The AEP
rightly aims at the creation of an enabling environment so as to end the landlocked
situation and isolation of the Northeastern region by opening up its borders and
integrating the region’s economy through improved trade and connectivity with
Southeast Asian countries. However, looking at the ground reality, the growth of
border trade and tourism between the region and ASEAN countries is still rela-
tively insignificant, especially its visibility in Northeast India. This chapter analyzes
the LEP-AEP’s development and challenges and argues that Myanmar and North-
east India are crucial for the success of the policy.
Chapter 11 by K. Yhome, titled India–Myanmar relations: political transition and
shared borderlands shows that Myanmar has witnessed a phenomenal political transi-
tion in recent years with huge implications on the country’s internal political and
socioeconomic landscapes as also on its foreign relations with the outside world.
Internally, the change has brought about an end to the five-decade long military
rule and set in motion a process of establishing a democratic system of government
in the country. So far, the most significant outcome of this process has been the
historic victory of the National League for Democracy and the coming to power
of the party in March this year. Externally, it has opened up room in the country’s
foreign engagements as well as for multiple external players to enter and engage
with the country. These internal and external changes have direct and indirect
implications on India and Delhi’s relations with Naypyitaw and the wider region.
Within this context, as political changes further redefine Myanmar’s politics and
its future, a few pertinent issues that need assessment in India–Myanmar relations
are: How does Myanmar’s democratic transition impact India–Myanmar relations?
In what ways do multiple political players shape India’s ties with Myanmar? Do
increased external players’ engagement with Myanmar affect its ties with India?
There are three areas where the implications of these changes will have a direct
impact, namely security, connectivity, and ethnicity. Importantly, these issues are
inter-related and the progress in one will have a positive impact on the other while
the reverse is also equally true. This chapter takes up each of these issues and exam-
ines the changes, challenges and prospects.
In a nutshell, this volume analyzes the emerging relations between India and
Myanmar. The focus of this volume is to highlight the enduring historical ties in
the borderlands of the two countries. The chapters in the volume examine the
prospects and challenges of cooperation in three key areas: ethnicity, security and
connectivity between the two countries, a major focus of the chapters in the vol-
ume. One of the major objectives was to understand the transborder linkages in
the India–Myanmar borderlands with the help of existing scholarly literature on
borders and borderlands. The main concern is to look at bilateral ties beyond clas-
sical neo-realist visions of inter-state relations and in turn, generate ideas on the
processes of transformations in the frontiers of Myanmar and India’s Northeast.
Besides new neighborhood policies on trade and economic ties, border cross-
ings of goods and people, sanctuary provided to insurgent groups, transborder
criminal networks, ‘hot pursuit’ counterinsurgency raids and the issue of territorial
sovereignty have been the cornerstone of the diplomatic meetings concerning
issues of subregional security. Therefore the attempt in this volume is to move
beyond methodological nationalism and understand the diverse links, the ethno-
geography and economic linkages that traversed these frontier regions through
trade as well as culturally significant migrations. As analyzed in some chapters,
cross-cultural encounters in the borderland regions surpassed the official percep-
tions of political boundary making reinforced by South Asia’s geopolitics and con-
temporary security concerns. Based on secondary source literature review, local
narratives and interviews, the arguments in the chapters of the volume are mostly
couched in a rich body of literature on multidisciplinary approaches on border
making and territorial governance of modern nation-states. The volume draws
from various approaches on borders and borderlands (Passi 2009; Baud and van
Schendel 1997; Scott 2010; Gellner 2013). While doing so, this volume adopts
constructivist perspectives on inter-state politics to examine the transformation
in a transborder subregion, the India–Myanmar borderlands. The borderlands gain
salience and occupy a significant political space within this discursive transforma-
tion of bilateral ties between the two neighbors.
To conclude, this collected volume provides a comprehensive view of the India–
Myanmar borderland covering ethnicity, security and connectivity dimensions. Each
chapter of this book covering a specific case study helps the readers understand the
gray areas of borderlands between India and Myanmar. The book may be used as
reference and recommended readings in colleges and universities for courses in
International Relations or Foreign Policy. The volume has an international appeal

in generating awareness regarding the presently prevailing opinion about Myanmar
and its engagement with its immediate neighborhood. Given that connectivity and
security are dominating the discourse on neighborhood studies, against the shared
ethnicity of the region, this volume will add to the existing literature.
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PART I
India–Myanmar relations
Ethnicity and security dimensions
2
STATE-TERRITORIALITY, CIRCULATION
OF SOCIO-CULTURAL RELATIONS
AND RESISTANCE IN INDIA–
MYANMAR BORDERLANDS
Pahi Saikia, Ingudam Yaipharemba Singh
and Apurba K. Baruah
On January 11, 2018, a team of police officials along with Assam Rifles personnel in
Moreh, ‘foiled the attempt’ of unidentified Myanmarese villagers to put fencing at no man’s
land located between ward no. 4 in Moreh and Myanmar.
(The Sangai Express 2018a)
The Manipur Police arrested two Rohingya Muslim men and a 20 year old woman,
suspected to be a trafficking victim, from Moreh. Police identified the two men as Mohd
Saifullah (34) and Mohd Salam (25) from Arakan province, which is now known as
Rakhine.The woman’s name was Toiba Hatu alias Nargis (20).
(Hindustan Times 2018)
On May 4, 2018, a combined team of Narcotics and Affairs of Border (NAB) and the
police officials of Tengnoupal district of Manipur arrested the members of a family for their
involvement in cross border illegal drugs trade between India and Myanmar border.
(The Sangai Express 2018b)
On June 12, 2018, unidentified gunmen open fired for half an hour at the residential
areas of Gamnom Veng in the Manipur-Myanmar border town. Some houses and vehicles
were damaged. Correspondent.
(The Imphal Free Press 2018)
The preceding incidents indicate how international borders and boundaries

become securitized and are located at the interface between ‘concrete manifesta-
tions of international law and cartography, tighter border regulation and controls’
on the one hand, and ‘newly developing frameworks of regional integration, cross-
border mobility and cooperative arrangements,’ on the other (Nugent 2012, 558).
These incidents also represent the infringement of border controls in the contested
borderlands of India and Myanmar. Porosity of the borders between India and
22 Pahi Saikia, et al.
Myanmar that are often beyond the bounds of the state makes these transgres-
sions easier. Smuggling of small arms, narcotic substances, human trafficking and
infiltration of armed groups contribute to the complex and hybrid character of
governance in the borderlands. In order to prevent such transgressions, the Indian
state considered construction of fences along the border areas. Accordingly, in 2003
the government of India and Myanmar conducted a joint survey along the borders.
Prior to this in 2001, a Group of Ministers (GOM) in India recommended the
government to enact effective border management policies by ‘converting all single
fences into double fences with concertina coils’ (Government of India 2001). In the
recent decade, the government approved border fencing of about 404 kilometers
along the Mizoram–Myanmar border but the plan has not been operationalized.
Additionally, the government identified a stretch of 14 kilometers for fencing near
the international boundary in the border district of Moreh in Manipur (Haokip
2015). The government made the decision to ‘fence the area between border pillar
no. 79 and 81 along the India–Myanmar borderlands’ (Saddiki 2017).
These activities initiated by the states in India and Myanmar represent continu-
ous nation-state making exercises mediated by ways in which the states institution-
alize political and military control of the territory and the people in the marginal
borderlands. A securitized border enacted by a variety of state and non-state actors
is experienced in the everyday practices of communities in the India–Myanmar
borderlands. The security check posts manned by the Assam Rifles along the base
of the Kuki hills for instance, in the India–Myanmar border zones, symbolize the
essentialized state presence and the complex nation-making practices. Bordering
activities in these zones emphasize protection, reterritorialization and erection of
segregated walls between lives, ethnicities and social relations of transborder com-
munities. At the same time, these practices are challenged and become ruptured by
a range of activities, everyday networks and connections between people who live
on both sides of the international border.
Using fieldwork narratives from two border villages in the Moreh district of
Manipur, this chapter examines the persistence of a range of transborder connec-
tions, power narratives and socio-cultural boundaries.The chapter particularly looks
at the establishment of border regimes and border pillars in India and Myanmar
borderlands and ways in which village residents negotiate their ethnic identities.We
use the literature on ethnic identity and borderland studies and examine the local
politics embedded in the borderland experiences of militarization. We also analyze
the reconstruction of ethno-political identities vis-à-vis state-territoriality in the
emerging phase of global and translocal dynamics.
The chapter argues that border restructuring in India and Myanmar redefine
the ‘mundane and localized ethno-politics’ of cross-border communities in these
two villages. The objective is to understand the power asymmetry created by bor-
der dynamics and the problem of integration of borderland communities into the
emerging political economy, resistance and politics of defiance in India–Myanmar
borderlands. As we argue further in this chapter, the narrative of everyday experi-
ences and localized ethno-politics in the borderlands of India and Myanmar is
Resistance in India–Myanmar borderlands 23
intricately linked to the discourse of ‘territorialization, a process, which Newman

describes as the process of creation and construction of borders through the actions
of states and individuals in the peripheries, located at the edges and beyond the
reach of the state’ (Gellner 2013, 4). Scholars have conceptualized territory as a
‘political category, owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled’
(Elden 2013, 3).
Everyday actions and narratives across the border areas of India and Myanmar
can be examined with the help of different sets of literature that emphasize (a) bor-
der reinforcement and territorial governance enacted in various forms of the state’s
bordering practices; and (b) everyday and mundane lives nested in local sociopo-
litical practices across borders. Often these practices challenge the sovereignty of
the state. These approaches provide a useful lens to understand the circulation of
sociocultural practices, people and trade across the borderlands in the Asian sub-
region. The mutual interactions and bordering practices in the Asian borderlands,
including India–Myanmar borderlands, as this chapter argues, are grounded in a
variety of historical constructions, geopolitical practices and cultural productions
across the international borders. The empirical setting and examples in this chapter
therefore requires detailed process tracing and historical analysis of the nature and
creation of physical borders, construction of identities, institutions of governance
and performativity in the borderlands. A historical analysis is crucial to evaluate the
continuities and discontinuities of interactions between ‘peoples and the states’ in
India–Myanmar borderlands.
Theoretical concerns
Scholarly debates on the study of borders and boundaries witnessed a shift in focus
from understanding borders as political entities to borders as socio-territorial con-
structs. From a neoliberal perspective, the paradigmatic shift signifies lowering of
concrete walls and borders and a move toward construction of a borderless and
deterritorialized world defined by neoliberal economic principles, ideas, identities
and deconstructed notions of citizenship. In the context of North America, Europe
and Asia, serious advances have been made to construct a deterritorialized world
by creating synergistic engagements between peoples, ideas and nation-states. We
also witness perpetual increase in transborder interactions that transcend national
borders and physical boundaries of modern nation-states.
Borders were conceptualized as ‘the sites of social, political and cultural change
that impact local and national politics’ (Su-Ann 2016, 1). Borders have also been
theorized as ‘physical lines that manifest the end of a state’s territorial power, geo-
graphical phenomena that demarcate the sovereign territories of states and are
located in specific contexts known as borderlands’ (Passi 2009, 7). From the per-
spective of political geography the spatial dimension of borders and the ideas of
border landscapes were used ‘to examine the physical and human environments
contiguous to the state boundary’ (Wilson and Donnan 2012, 8). From anthropo-
logical approaches, borders were reflected not merely as visible markers between
states but were also related to symbolic boundaries of identity and socio-cultural
categories such as ethnicity (Barth 1969). Studies on the anthropology of borders
emphasized ‘people’s experiences at the international borders, the symbolic pro-
cesses of culture and the ties of border peoples to other people in the neighboring
states’ (Wilson and Hastings 2012, 6).
Using diverse perspectives from social theories, border scholars also shifted their
attention to the ‘social, political and economic expressions’ of borders, frontiers and
boundaries in everyday lives as expressions of belonging or exclusion to ethnic and
racial identities, postcolonialism, nations, gender and sexuality. Borders in this con-
text are used as frames of reference to ‘cultural constructions of everyday lives’ and
master narratives to challenge the hegemonic national symbols and changing power
discourses on nations, states and other forms of individual and collective identity
(Wilson and Hastings 2012). Ethno-nationalist movements, substate and minority
nationalisms in Eastern Europe in 1990s, and the persistent rise in the number of
new social movements and cross-border activities added new dimensions to border
studies.
This study takes cues from existing literature on border landscapes, boundaries
and borderlands and uses the perspective of borders as a metaphor and a physical
construct. We use a multidisciplinary approach and use perspectives from ‘critical
and post-structuralist debates in International Relations, political geography and
anthropology to describe a range of transborder connections, socio-spatial identities
and how marginal groups negotiate the meanings associated with their identities as
members of nation-states’ (Passi 2009, 7). Borderlands as earlier scholars theorized
is used to analyze the ‘dynamics of place and space, a region, divided by physical
boundary lines between nation-states’ (Wilson and Hastings 2012, 8). Borderlands
constitute multiple cross-border connections, social identities and relations, both
legal and illegal (Baud and van Schendel 1997). Borderlands are created as a part of
the nation-building exercise of modern states.
In postcolonial states, particularly South Asia, nation-state building practices
since the 1940s consolidated border regimes as a part of right sizing of borders
and nation-state–making exercises and created new borderlands. Borders became
a marker of identity within specific contexts through mapping, scaling and cen-
sus making. The intellectual turn is to understand territorial governance in South
Asian borderlands. The attempt is to understand the divides between a ‘function-
ing core’ and disintegrated peripheries, between indigenous natives and immigrant
communities, between those who believe that ‘cultural and political boundaries
are intertwined’ and those who assertively sought for the reordering of local land-
scapes. Scholarly attention turned toward exploring various forms of governance
in militarized borderlands including India–Myanmar borderlands, where govern-
ance is often informed by statist policies without much dialogue with the people
in borderlands.
Militarization of the borderlands in postcolonial South Asia became crucial not
for the prevention of traditional wars but nontraditional security threats. State-
initiated bordering practices in South Asia, such as border fencing, are associated
with restrictions and regulatory practices to control mobility and illegitimate bor-
der crossings. A “physical” border fence, as the study argues, is ‘a barrier, a protective
system together with other engineering construction objects and sensors designed
to contend, detain or even destroy an adversary’ (Golunov 2016). Border fences
often supplemented by ditches, barbed wire, surveillance cameras, patrolling and
sometimes even minefields and rigid control at checkpoints became visible sites of
control (Golunov 2016).
Creation of borderlands and consolidation of border regimes in postcolonial
South Asia had profound consequences on everyday lives of people living in the
borderlands. These practices had profound effects on ‘borderland social structures,
local politics, culture and economy as demonstrated in the Bengal borderlands’
(Baud and van Schendel 1997, 19). In the postcolonial period, regular cross-border
economic and traditional commercial networks that were established and practiced
by the borderland people in the India-Bangladesh border region, for instance, were
disturbed and weakened due to restrictive state policies adopted by both India and
Bangladesh. Older links gave way to modified practices and advance web of rela-
tions often outlawed by the newly created border regimes of the two states.
Militarized practices to prevent cross-border movements, however, met with
local resistance. Borderland communities resisted against state directed protec-
tion and controls in these borderlands including the India–Myanmar borderlands
marked by violence and resistance due to the imposition of state control and milita-
rization. Unlike the performativity and stringent bordering practices along the bor-
ders between India and Pakistan, the India–Myanmar borders are marked by limited
performativity and dearth of strict bordering practices like walls or border fencing.
Instead the borderlands of India and Myanmar are characterized by porosity and
special arrangements for the mobility of people under the Free Movement Regime
(FMR). In the recent decades, however, the border between the two counties has
been characterized by a complex web of relations, ranging from visible performa-
tivity in the form of border check posts and controls of illegal crossings of goods
and people and continuous inter-exchanges of social relations and negotiation of
border culture and ethnic identities of the borderlanders.
The next section contextualizes creation of borders, boundaries, re-bordering
practices, circulation of socio-cultural relations and resistance in South Asian bor-
derlands, particularly in India–Myanmar borderlands.
Strategic borderland regimes in South Asia: an overview

Borderland regimes have been central to the hegemonic nation-state building pro-
cess in South Asia. Hegemonic nation-state-building in this study is understood as
calculated attempts made by states to direct their functions toward strengthening
the institutions and to increase their capabilities to manage and control the external
territories. Scholars argue that in the late 1940s and 50s states in South Asia were
‘deeply concerned with securing control of the borderland by means of expand-
ing their bureaucratic power, beefing up paramilitary forces and homogenizing the
borderland population’ (Schendel 2005, 257). In the case of India, the postcolonial
state-building process coincided with militarizing the borderlands, particularly on
the western frontiers. Underlying tensions on border claims between India-Pakistan
and India-China contributed to the shift in the official discourses on borderlands
and managing the borderland polities. In Northeast India, after the Chinese occu-
pation of the Thagla Ridge in September 1962 in Arunachal Pradesh, borderlands
were transformed from ‘neglected zones,’ not so much from a political economy
perspective but to a large extent from a military perspective, due to changing power
dynamics at a geopolitical level (Verma 2016). Managing the strategic peripheral
borderlands by allocating resources toward road construction became a priority and
symbolized demonstration of military bureaucratic and administrative structures
much to the discontent of people dwelling in the marginal borderlands where
peripheralization was imminent. Since then, despite problems of difficult terrain,
lack of adequate transportation and communication infrastructure and lack of sup-
port from the local population, Border Roads Organization constructed about
681.13 kilometers of roads along the international border in Arunachal Pradesh
(PIB, MOD 2018). About 1110.83 Kilometers of road construction are in progress
(PIB, MOD 2018).
India shares 4096 km long international borders with Bangladesh through
Meghalaya, Assam and West Bengal.The physical demarcation of the border is based
on the 1971 Treaty with Bangladesh.The India–Myanmar border based on colonial
boundaries of 1940s and an Agreement signed in 1967 passes through the states
of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Manipur. The India Nepal bor-
der based on Anglo-Nepal Treaty of 1816 passes through West Bengal, Uttaranchal
and Bihar and the India-Bhutan border accepted through the Treaty of Friendship,
1950 passes through West Bengal, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.
Borderlands in South Asia were created through the process of political partition of
the subcontinent. Extreme forms of violence accompanied partition and created con-
ditions for ethnic expulsion, breakdown in political order, flow of refugees across bor-
ders, threats and demands for further territorial divisions at the subnational levels. As a
consequence, devising rigid boundaries both real and imaginary and border regimes
became essential. External borders and security regimes were created while delimit-
ing external sovereignties, through regulation of cross-border economic exchanges,
securitization and militarization of borders along the eastern and western frontiers
of India. Erection of barriers and border security regimes was to prevent not only
the free flow of goods and people but also to put a check on internal security threats.
Borderlands in South Asia acquired significance in this particular context. These
geographical margins were heavily impacted by partition. Cross-border networks
such as socioeconomic activities were soon disrupted as Schendel notes due to
erection of barriers:
Before partition the Bengal-Assam-Arakan region had been integrated into

a web of complex economic ties. The region inhabited by tens of millions of
people, had a strong agricultural base and a large variety of industrial zones.
For many centuries it had been linked to global commercial networks, mainly
through agro industries producing silk and cotton textiles, indigo, opium, tea,
rice, sugar and jute fabrics.The events of 1947–48 precipitated what can per-
haps best be described as the political assassination of this regional economy.
(Schendel 2005, 148)
At the same time, these regions became sites of illegal crossings of ‘undocumented
transactions and criminal networks,’ which further necessitated the re-bordering
practices like fences and security check gates. These practices continued until 1980s,
1990s and early 2000s. In late 1980s, the Government of India decided to con-
struct concertina wire fencing along the 75-mile land border on the western frontier,
between Punjab on the Indian side and Pakistan. Border fences were designed to
restrain the movements of illegal weapons and insurgents. Border fences in the west-
ern zone however, failed to completely stop the transgressions. Illegal border crossings
continue through other means like tunneling, bribery of border guards and use of
forged documents to penetrate the protected territory. Unlike the western frontiers,
postcolonial states on the eastern frontiers of South Asia have not been able to estab-
lish physical barriers or construct border fences. Precolonial kinship ties and every-
day networks mark the spatial geographies of eastern borderlands. Cross-border ties
continue to exist along the porous India-Bangladesh border and the India–Myanmar
borderlands. On the Myanmar side, India had a special arrangement called the Free
Movement Regime (FMR) that permitted free movement of ethnic tribes, within
16 km across the international boundary. The government in India recently took
steps to build roads and also fence the area. The India–Myanmar Friendship Road,
also called the Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road, for instance, was initiated by India.
FIGURE 2.1 India–Myanmar Friendship Road.

Source: Fieldwork, April, 2016
FIGURE 2.2 Movement of people on the India–Myanmar Border (along FMR).

Source: Fieldwork, April, 2016
To sum up this part of the discussion, borderlands along the eastern frontiers in
South Asia feature multifaceted cross-border networks that existed in the region
since precolonial times. These networks contributed to a complex web of interde-
pendence and shaped ethnic, local and translocal identities of people living across
the borderlands. India and Myanmar used various strategies to integrate the bor-
derlands.The attempts at integration, co-optation and coercion met with resistance
and added to prolonged peripheralization. Often, these borderlands were converted
into zones of extreme violence, disorder and defiance exhibited in various forms of
anti-state resistance. Cynthia Enloe’s work on ethnicity and state building perhaps
rounds up this debate (Enloe 1980). Enloe’s writing on ethnocentric, majoritarian
and highly centralized policies adopted by state-building elites is illustrative of how
political elites have a tendency to ethnicize the bureaucracy by creating ethnic
security maps. Enloe argues,
A wide-ranging survey of state militaries, past and present, reveals that in a

majority of cases the military has served chiefly to divide the citizenry on
either class of ethnic lines. In many instances the military’s impact was even
more deleterious for genuine nation-building in so far as the military became
so intimately identified with one ethnic group, which controlled its policy
making, that other social groups identify the state structure as the special
resource of one community to the exclusion of the others.
(Enloe 1980)
Where the conditions of enduring linkages between the state and nation are either
unclear or weak and where the regime is highly involved in augmenting the political
resources of the dominant ethnicity, distribution of economic resources and poli-

cies are skewed and strongly based on patron-client networks constructed around
ethnic loyalties. These conditions were noticeable in Burma where the tatmadew
regime sought ethnocratic nationalist policies to forcibly integrate peripheral eth-
nic communities (Enloe 1980; Ellinwood and Enloe 1981).
Circulation of violence and socio-cultural relations in India–Myanmar border-
lands, with a focus on the two case studies chosen for this study is examined against
the backdrop of these theoretical underpinnings and postcolonial developments.
Borderlands and ethnicity: historical background

India and Myanmar share an international land boundary of 1643 km. Moun-
tainous ranges mark the terrain along the international boundary. The Alpine-
Himalayan mountain belt turns southwards through Myanmar and forms the Patkai
belt of mountains (Park 2018). Further south, the Patkai hills, also known as Pat-
kai Bum in India, joins the Chin hills on the Myanmar side, the Lushai hills on
the Indian side and the Naga hills along the Indian borderlands. These ranges are
further subdivided into a ‘number of parallel and sub-parallel ranges intervened
by river valleys’ (Dikshit and Dikshit 2013). The Manipur river flows southwards
into Myanmar through ‘a deep gorge between Lumbang and Falam and the Chin
hills before it merges with the Myittha river, a tributary of the Chindwin and
finally the Irrawaddy river in Myanmar’ (Johnson 2007, 67). Similarly, the Tizu river
passes through the Naga hills and flows northwest and joins the Chindwin river
in Myanmar. The international border continues along the Kolodyne (pronounced
as Kaladan) river, which originates in the Chin state of Myanmar, then takes a
northward turn and forms the river boundary between the borderlands of India
and Myanmar. Kolodyne flows further north, meets the Tio (Tyao) river and heads
northwest into the state of Mizoram in India, where the river is locally termed as
Chhimtuipui (Singh 2017). On the southern side of Mizoram, the Kaladan river,
part of which forms a boundary between India and Myanmar, meanders through
Chin and Rakhine states of Myanmar before it falls into the Bay of Bengal at Sit-
twe, the capital of Rakhine state (Seekins 2017).
The India–Myanmar border passes along the states of Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland
and Arunachal Pradesh. Manipur has a long porous international border of 398 km
with Myanmar (Das and Thomas 2005, 1). The India–Myanmar border was origi-
nally an administrative line between the provinces of British India, Burma and
Assam until April 1, 1937. The British colonial government separated the jurisdic-
tion of Burma from British India, under the Government of Burma Act, 1935.
A brief historical overview of the colonial occupation of the region reveals that the
British established its commercial contacts with the kingdom of Ava (Burma) in
1619 and set up factories in Syriam (Rangoon) (Topich and Leitich 2013, 46–47).
Formal occupation of the Arakan and Tenessarim on the Burmese side and Assam
led by Ahoms, Manipur, Cachar and Jaintia on the British Indian side, took place by
the British government in 1826. In 1834, the boundary was demarcated between
Manipur and Chin hills and in 1837, the Patkai range was accepted as a boundary
between Assam and Burma (The Geographer 1968; Phanjoubam 2016). By 1852,
the joint forces of the British army and navy annexed the port of Martaban, the city
of Rangoon and Pegu. In 1886 the British government occupied Upper Burma
and included it as a province of British India (Topich and Leitich 2013, 48).
Meanwhile, the British government sent expeditions to the Chin and Lushai
hills in 1871. The expeditions were aimed to control the raids conducted by the
tribes in the Lushai hills where the British had already established its commercial
interests in the tea gardens. Due to these aggressions, in 1881, the British govern-
ment under the Political Agent Colonel Johnston appointed a Commission to ‘lay
down a definite boundary between Manipur and Burma by replacing the imagi-
nary line, known as the Pemberton line earlier drawn northwards from the Kubo
(present Kabaw in Tamu region of Myanmar) valley’ (Mackenzie 2012, 209). In
1882, the Commission completed the survey and marked the boundary of the
eastern frontier between Burma and Manipur. The boundary stretched from the
eastern slopes of the Malain range to Namia river, a few hundred yards east
of Kangal Thanna and turns east to the Talain river and then proceeds down
the Napanga river where it passes through a gorge in Kusom range. The
boundary was marked with pillars and a road connecting Namia river and
Talain river.
(Mackenzie 2012, 210)
In 1901, the colonial government demarcated the Lushai-Chin hills boundary (The
Geographer 1968; Phanjoubam 2016). The colonial boundary was inherited by
India and Myanmar.
Although the British colonial government had less commercial interest in a
geographically remote and relatively resource-poor Manipur valley, their control
and regulatory practices had a deep impact on the precolonial institutions in the
valley and the hills. British interest in the region was premised on grounds of open-
ing a buffer state through Kabaw valley and that traversed the entire frontier region
of Manipur and Burma. Distribution of power and authority during the colonial
period created newer forms of asymmetry between the valley and the hills. These
asymmetries between the Imphal valley and the disintegrated peripheries in the
Naga and Kuki hills continued as legacies in the postcolonial period. In the post-
colonial period the local polities in the hills witnessed resistance against incorpora-
tion into the larger Meitei nation and the dominant state-making enterprise. The
postcolonial period also witnessed intense forms of resistance led by the politically
dominant Meiteis in Manipur against the forcible merger of Manipur in 1949 with
the Indian Union.
The land boundary agreement between India and Myanmar finally took place in
Rangoon on March 10, 1967 (The Geographer 1968, 6). Both the countries agreed
that there is a need to modify the traditional boundary that India and Myanmar
inherited from the British period. The Instrument of Rectification was signed on
May 30, 1967 to bring modifications to the international boundary. However, the
actual boundary has not been demarcated.
The preceding discussion reveals how colonial and postcolonial boundaries were
reconstructed and negotiated as a part of the state-building practices in Myanmar
and India. These hegemonic geopolitical practices affected the everyday lives of
borderlands. The historical narrations of the border communities in the Imphal
valley (Meiteis) and the hill tribes (Kukis and Nagas) also point toward the perme-
ability and cross-border historical connections not only in the form of wars and
conquests but also in the form of trade as well as marriages that were established
in the precolonial period. Overlapping territories, and absence of distinctive ethnic
identities as well as coherent political boundaries between groups who lived in
these peripheries later contributed to intense discord on ‘membership,’ rights and
group claims on power divisions and territorial identities. Cross-border Kukis in
Manipur and Myanmar may fit this category.The Kuki-Chins are cross-border eth-
nic groups presently dispersed in the districts of Sylhet and Chittagong hill tracts of
Bangladesh, parts of Myanmar, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and North Cachar hills
(Dima Hasao) in Assam in Northeast India.
As far as origin and description of ethnic hills tribes are concerned, records
suggest that the terms were used to mean closely allied clans with well-marked
characteristics belonging to the Tibeto-Burman stock. As Lokendra notes, “The
hills with their heterogeneous slash and burn ethnic populations, were incorporated
into the political order in a patron-client relationship with annual presentation of
tributes.”1 Shakespear’s historical account on the Lushei Kuki reveals that the term
‘Kukis was loosely applied to most of the inhabitants of the interior hills beyond the
Chittagong hill tracts’ (Shakespear 1912). He further noted that
in Cachar the term generally meant some family of the Thado or Khawthlang
clan, locally distinguished as old Kukis (who made appearances in Cachar in
1800) and new Kukis (Thadous who came to Manipur from the Chin-Lushai
hills in the later part of the 18th century). In Lushai hills, the term was hardly
ever employed, having been superseded by the term Lushai. In the Chin hills
and generally on the Burma border all these clans were called Chins.
(Shakespear 1912)
Similarly, J. Ware Edgar in his account on the Lushai and other Kookies (Kukis)
written in 1871 notes, ‘The Kookie villages were found in Manipur, Sylhet, Cachar,
Tipperah and possibly in the hill tracks of Chittagong. These settlements came up
after the Kookies were driven out of Lushai hills’ (Mackenzie 2012, 426). ‘The
Kookies,’ as Edgar wrote ‘were divided into different clans ruled by chiefs from each
clan such as the Paitoos,Thados, Saihreems and Hraltes amongst others’ (Mackenzie
2012). Most of the tribes came under the influence of Christianity with traces of
traditional practices. Kukis, as some scholars suggest, have overlapping identities
undesirable to the cultural tradition when a dominant nation-state in the making
tries to imagine and impose a common identity on the minorities living within its
borders (Haokip 2014, 161). British colonial expansion and the bordering practices
had implications on the popular imaginings and the integration of these minori-
ties into the state-building projects of the colonial and (post)colonial state. The
dilemma faced by the peripheral minorities was whether to assert their historical
‘spaces of multiple sovereignties’ or to submit to the dominant cultural identity
(Scott 2010). The internal relations between the tribes in the bordering hills of
Manipur is best described by Edgar in these words, ‘All these were people of the
same race, speaking dialects of the same language, wearing the same dress, and hav-
ing same customs, form of polity and religious belief. But they were constantly at
war with each other’ (Mackenzie 2012, 426).
Mizoram shares a border of 410 km with Myanmar. The Chin state in Myanmar
has contiguous land borders with the postcolonial state of Mizoram in India. The
Mizo Hills district, currently, the federal unit of Mizoram was earlier known as Lushai
Hills. British administrative records referred to the tribes in the Lushai hills as Kook-
ies. The term Lushais as a distinct tribe acquired recognition in 1860s when the
British Government took a policy to deal with the ‘fierce and predatory tribes of the
North-eastern frontier of India’ (Woodthorpe 1873, 3). Existing historical accounts
reveal that the Lushais belonged to three different tribes: the Lushais, Pois and Paites/
Chins.2 The Zoumis are mostly populated in the Chin state of Burma and the states
of Mizoram and Manipur in India. The Chins in Burma in the pre-British period
failed to maintain complete independence from the Burmese kings. The Chin peo-
ple inhabiting the Chin Special Division of the northwestern part of Myanmar share
a lot in common with the groups across the borders in Mizoram, especially the Chin
sub-group known as the Pawi.3 As George A. Theodorson argued, ‘The major dis-
tinction is between the Northern Chins (called Mar) and the Southern Chins (called
Pawi). The Northern Chins are more closely related to the Lushai and belong to
the Lushai-Kuki tribes’ (Theodorson 1964). In the 1890s the Chin-Lushai hills and
the plains bordering the hills were annexed by the British, which further brought
the ‘transborder tribesmen’ into the fold of the colonial state-building process.4 The
colonial project of annexation was also aimed at introducing law and order in the
hills. Annexation of Lushai hills conducted in 1889 was followed by the spread of
Christian missionaries in 1894.
Ethnic relations between cross-border communities in the Lushai borderlands
between India and Myanmar can therefore be traced back to the precolonial his-
tory of the borderlands. Formal and informal networks between the borderland
ethnic groups continued during the nation-state building process in India and
Myanmar. Evidence of assertion of cross-border ethnic linkages can be drawn from
the activities of the Mizo Union during the nation-state making process in India
and the Zomi People’s Convention after the formation of Mizoram as a separate
state within India in 1987. These groups defy the official boundary demarcation
between India and Myanmar.The First Zomi World Convention held in May 1988
in the border region of Champai in Mizoram reiterated the demand for the unifica-
tion of Zo territories in Manipur, Mizoram in India and the Chin state of Burma
(Pau 2007). State-building efforts in postcolonial Myanmar led to restrictions on
civil liberties, forced labor, unlawful detention, intimidation, extrajudicial killings

and targeted attacks on the Chin ethnic minorities.5 Mobility of Chins continued
in the wake of state-building efforts, under the former military regime in Myanmar.
Chins were forced to cross borders and migrate to India, mostly bordering places
like Mizoram, rejuvenating cross-border ethnicties.
(Post)colonial boundary making and the larger nation-building project of the
Indian state therefore subsumed cross-border historical mobility of the ethnic tribes
in the Lushai, Chin, Naga and Kuki hills in the borderlands of India–Myanmar.
Self-governing asymmetrical power structures were created to integrate the diverse
historical and cultural groups in these borderlands. While these power structures
were created to accommodate local tribal interests, they subsequently unleashed
intense forms of resistance embedded in the politics of defiance and violence of the
larger nation-state project and demands for unification of cross-border ethnic tribal
minorities across the borders in India and Upper Burma.
Recent initiatives of boundary demarcation further added to complexities of
integration of the borderlands when the Indian government decided to construct
the border fence in 2013. Borderland resistance became visible when the border
pillar 78 was replaced by border pillar 21 erected in Moreh district and further
when the government decided that 99 border pillars would be constructed in the
border region (The Sangai Express 2016).
Re-bordering practices in India–Myanmar borderlands:

an analysis of circulation of socio-cultural relations and
resistance in Moreh
Moreh, a semi-urban settlement in the border region between India and Myanmar,
attracted the attention of journalists, policy makers and researchers in the recent
decades. Moreh, located in Chandel district of Manipur has a multiethnic popu-
lation of about 16,847 persons as per the district census of 2011. The religious
distribution of the settlement reveals that about 56.67 percent of the population
comprises of Christians, 26.14 percent comprises of Hindus, 13.97 percent are
Muslims and the rest of the population comprises of religious minorities like Sikhs,
Jains and Buddhists (Moreh Religion Data 2011). Located at the interface of trans-
national interaction and state-territoriality, Moreh symbolizes inter-ethnic con-
flict and asymmetrical power relations in the borderlands. This remote town along
the borders embodies complex and multifaceted networks and interdependencies
between borderland communities including tribes, insurgents, drug and gemstone
traders and commercial sex workers. The border town illustrates how these illegal
networks in the borderlands are deeply embedded in the process of state control
and state re-bordering practices.
In the recent years, the government of India decided to construct border fences
between the India–Myanmar border. In 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs, India
approved the fencing of border between Border Pillars 79–81 in the Moreh sector
in Manipur (Statement Made by Minister of State 2016). Accordingly, the wildlife/
forest clearance was obtained from the Ministry of Forests and Environment. The
Ministry of Home Affairs approved the Detailed Project Report (DPR) with the
cost estimates of Rs 35.99 crores for the proposed fencing project (The Assam Trib-
une 2018). By 2014 about 3.47 km of border fencing was subsequently completed
in the first phase of border fencing between Moreh Gate no. 2 to Govajang, which
started in 2010.
Govajang, which was selected as a microlevel field site for this study, is a border
village located between border pillars 79 and 80 in Moreh.6 As per the population
census of 2011, the village comprises of 35 households with a total population
of 123. Thadou Kukis constitute more than 98 percent of the total population of
the village. The primary source of livelihood in the village is rice cultivation. The
villagers mostly practice shifting cultivation. Border fencing that was initiated by
the central government between pillar 79 and 80 passes through Govajang village.
Once the border fencing gets completed Govajang would be divided between
India and Myanmar.Villagers claimed that the village church, playground and acres
of land in the hills would be merged with Myanmar. The village chief of Govajang
expressed a similar situation during our fieldwork to Govajang.
Re-bordering practices, however, met with resistance at the local level in the
India–Myanmar borderlands, especially in the border villages like Govajang. It was
reported that the village residents showed defiance against the display of reterritori-
alization and control of the borderlands by the central government authorities. Fear
of redemarcation of cultivable land, shifting of families to the Myanmar side and
moreover the fear of being disconnected with ethnic kin across the border mobilized
the residents to protest against the construction of border fencing through Govajang.
Village residents expressed how the erection of border fences would disrupt the
socioeconomic ties and the circulation of cultural relations among the Kukis living
on the other side of the border in Myanmar. A report suggests that local people
complained about the disruption of cultural and economic relations between peo-
ple residing on both sides of the fence. T.H. Thomsing, ex-president of Rural Peo-
ples Development Federation, expressed, ‘The fence will also divide the villagers, as
it would be very difficult for them to meet for cultural and other village activities’
(Thokchom 2013). The village residents revealed that
the actual border was along the foothills, while the fence was being con-
structed further up the hill. They also expressed that there was a difference
of 500 meters between the original border line and the line along which the
border fence was actually being constructed.
(Thokchom 2013)
Another interview narrative revealed the following:
The construction of the fencing by the government security forces was made
possible by the Govajang village chief who gave the permission to the con-
struction authority and in return it is said that the chief got the compensa-
tion. The actual compensation is still awaited.7
Another participant added,
The fencing was also done in a hasty manner with many irregularities
which involves certain vested interests. Originally the fencing process was
a localized issue of the Govajang village that was losing the land but now
with the involvement of many civil society groups the issue has become
larger and the media also reports it as a Manipur-Myanmar border pillar
disputes and territorial land protection measures by constructing the bor-
der pillars and fencing to demarcate the villages. In the process, the lives of
the villagers and our age-old connections get affected.8
Student activist organizations and civil society groups such as the Rural Peoples
Development Federation, the Kuki Students’ organization, the Hill Tribal Council
and the Kuki Chiefs Association among others also raised objections to the contested
border pillars and the way the borders are being demarcated without much con-
formity to the local interests. As a result of the local protests, the state government of
Manipur appealed the center to redemarcate the boundary in the contested villages.
Similar evidence has been collected from Kwatha Khunou, a small village located
near border pillar 81, along the borders of India and Myanmar in Tengoupal district.
Kuntaung, a Myanmarese village mostly inhabited by Kuki tribes, on the other side
of the border is a few kilometers away from Kwatha Khunou. Kwatha Khunou com-
prises of a population of about 120 villagers. The village comprises of both Meiteis
and Thadou Kukis. The village is located on a hilly terrain and the residents share
cross-border ethnic and social ties, including matrimonial ties with the people living
on both sides of the border. Local narratives suggest that people on both sides of these
border villages share traditional social norms and neighborly ties. They also share
common resources like water from a stream called Namjet Lok, which flows along
the boundary between Kwatha Khunou and Kuntaung.9 The terrain on the other
side of river is covered with rubber plantations and vast tracts of agricultural land.
Kwatha Khunou has been a site of conflict and contestation between the state
of Manipur and between India and Myanmar on one side and the village residents
on the other. The conflict is based on the claims that the original border pillar no.
81 established in the late 1960s has been shifted to a location about 300 meters
away from the original position. Subsidiary pillars have also recently been erected in
March and June 2018, between border pillars 81 to 82 in Khunou to make it easier
for the construction of the newly demarcated border pillar. Villagers claimed that
the new location of these pillars would lead to encroachment of the village land on
the Indian side of the territory, particularly Manipur that would have to part away
with about 400 meters of forest area in the village. An interview participant added,
Other than Khunou, half of Molphei, a Kuki village inhabited by Thadou

Kuki community will be demarcated inside Myanmar after the subsidiary
border pillar gets erected.The fixation of the pillar has taken place just beside
the Mayokpha tree (Arjuna myrobalan), which is considered sacred and wor-
shipped by the Meiteis of Kwatha Khunou, will now be divided due to the
construction of the subsidiary pillar.10
FIGURE 2.3 Border pillar no. 81, Kwatha Khunuo (near Namjet Lok River).
Source: Fieldwork in Moreh, July 2018, Courtesy: NGO, United Committee Manipur
Moreover, temporary pillars have been constructed under the supervision of the
Assam Rifles between border pillars 81 to 82 in these villages. The pillars have
signs that demarcate the territory, written in both English and Devanagri scripts
on the Indian side and Burmese script on the other side of the pillar. The claims
and counterclaims of territorial occupation resumed and led to further conflicts in
June 2018 when the District Commissioner visited Kwatha Khunou to oversee the
construction of the subsidiary pillars.
On the other hand, the competing claims on some of the contested villages by
the Myanmarese army and the villagers along the India–Myanmar borderlands added
to the complexities of securitization and hybrid governance structures that prevail
in these borderlands. Reports suggest that the village residents on the Myanmar
side with the assistance of the Myanmarese army made attempts to forcibly occupy
the territories of two border villages located in Moreh in the Tengnoupal district
of Manipur. The encroachers tried to occupy the territory on the Indian side by
dismantling and erecting their own border pillars between the border pillars no.
49 to 89 in Tengnoupal and Chandel districts in Manipur along the border.11 The
intruders also shifted the border pillars between 32 to 48 in Churachandpur and
Pherzawl districts, and 90 to 130 in Ukhrul and Kamjong districts to demarcate
their own territory by occupying the villages. The government of India earlier
demarcated these border pillars.12
These incidents of encroachment by Myanmarese villagers demonstrate how
borderland communities dispute statist claims on the borderlands. Borderlanders
along the border villages in Moreh tried to resist and undo the re-bordering prac-
tices of the Indian state. This further adds to the complexities and hybrid govern-
ance in the India–Myanmar borderlands.
As a response to the growing protests, an all-party delegation from Manipur
visited Delhi during the UPA government and raised the controversies on border
fencing. The central government decided to send a team to visit the contested site.
Accordingly, the Surveyor General of India visited the disputed villages. The team
of ministers and government officials made the decision that the construction of
the fencing along the contested border pillars would be stopped until further notice.
The protestors made further demands to conduct fresh surveys in the disputed
villages. While responding to these demands, on December 21, 2015, the govern-
ment of India sent a team of surveyors to Satang and Kwatha Khunou villages in
Moreh, Manipur. The District Commissioner of Chandel district accompanied the
central government official. Joint meetings were held several times in 2015. The
Indian authorities and the authorities from the Myanmar side participated in
the joint survey. The joint survey team was in favor of the construction of the bor-
der fencing. Nevertheless, the Congress government of Manipur led by Ibobi Singh
supported the protests and the local issues raised by the village residents. The state
government remarked in the following words,
There is an apprehension that the border fencing work would affect 11 vil-
lages including Kwatha Khunou, Satang, Leibi, Lamlong, Wakshu, Chatong,
Saivol, Morelthel and Chanringphai. The total population of these villages
is around 4000 and all of them speak Manipuri (Meiteilon) fluently which
implies none of them are immigrants from Myanmar. Now the border fenc-
ing work is all set to be resumed and subsidiary pillars have been already
erected. As a consequence, people of all the 11 villages are facing a critical
situation where they may lose Indian citizenship even though they possess
voter cards, ration cards and job cards.
(The Sangai Express 2016)
The agitation further delayed the process of construction that was decided upon by
both the Indian and the Myanmarese authorities. In 2018, the NDA government
resumed its discussions on border fencing, border security and management with
its counterpart in Myanmar. Accordingly, the government sent a team of senior
officials to Manipur to conduct the updated surveys and resume border fencing
along the eastern borders.The team constituted of the Surveyor General of India, Lt
Gen. Girish Kumar, the joint secretary (Border Management), Ministry of External
Affairs Sripriya Ranganathan and joint secretary (Northeast), Ministry of Home
Affairs, A.V. Dharma Reddy. The team of officials with the help of the BJP Chief
Minister of Manipur, Biren Singh and the state government officials interacted with
the village residents of Kwatha Khunou, members of political parties and civil soci-
ety organizations in Manipur. The Joint Secretary remarked, ‘Based on our records,
the position of the border pillar is correct but the villagers said as per the historical
data, it was located somewhere else. We will see the record and consider the villag-
ers’ complaint’ (Singh 2018).
The preceding interview narratives and the fieldwork indicate how border fenc-
ing becomes a visible site of the presence of the state in the borderlands.These bor-
dering activities in Moreh emphasize security, protection and the erection of border
fences by the Indian government in an area where demarcation of concrete borders
is yet to take place. They also indicate how these practices of border securitization
and the display of power impact the livelihood practices of the borderlands not just
once but in everyday forms. As the interview narratives conducted in Govajang and
Kwatha Khunou villages in 2016 reveal, the erection of border pillars by the gov-
ernment impeded the everyday lives and livelihood practices of the village residents
such as cross-border agricultural practices that are an important source of livelihood
in these borderlands.13
Summary and final thoughts

This chapter draws on multidisciplinary perspectives on borders and borderlands to
examine the state-territoriality, circulation of socio-cultural relations and resistance
in everyday lives in the borderlands. The chapter uses borders to understand the
continuous process of borderization and hegemonic nation-state building exer-
cise that takes place in the borderlands. We tried to analyze how borderland peo-
ple negotiate with the nationalist and hegemonic nation-making practices. This
approach allows us to understand two perspectives, (a) territoriality, geopolitical
traditions and the role of ‘bounded territorial spaces’ nested in statism and carto-
graphic exercises and (b) cross-border interactions, socio-cultural ties, economic
networking and de-bordering practices. The chapter uses these various perspec-
tives to examine the inter-linkages between ethnicity, security and connectivity
in the context of India–Myanmar relations. While using borders as a sociopolitical
construct and a geopolitical necessity we adopt a bottom-up approach to examine
the grounded realities of governance, territoriality and the circulation of relations
including, the engagement of people through transborder activities and economic
interdependence across border on an everyday basis in India–Myanmar borderlands.
The chapter argued that postcolonial nation-state building was associated with
domestic policies to control mobility of border communities. It led to ‘bordering
in and ‘bordering out’ of ethnic minorities within ‘loosely’ defined geographical
entities. Sharper lines were being drawn between marginal groups located at the
edges of the nation-state, in the India–Myanmar borderlands and the hegemonic

interpretation of national identities. Border redrawing in colonial and postcolo-
nial states as discussed in the chapter thus separated societies with varying cul-
tural identities, created divides and barriers to movement and communication
between kin and communities belonging to same ethnicity for instance, Kukis,
Nagas, Meiteis and Chins in India–Myanmar borderlands. In the colonial period
imaginary borders and military pillars were drawn that was necessary and premised
on grounds of expanding British commercial interests and the opening of trade
routes that traversed this region. Small wars were conducted to manage borders, to
maintain peace in the borderland frontiers where the colonial rulers encountered
guerilla uprisings led by the ‘frontier tribes.’ Colonial brute forces were deployed
to manage turbulent borders. As one military historian puts it ‘In North-East sec-
tor, four battalions of Assam Rifles including Gurkha regiment were deployed to
contain Kuki rebellion in 1917’ (Roy 2015, 60–70). Alexander Mackenzie who
was instrumental in making the frontier policy during colonial India, traced the
political relations of the British Government with the Hill tribes of the Frontier
and noted in his report that a frontier policy was pertinent for ‘the tract which
embraced the whole of the hill ranges north, east and south of Assam valley, as
well as the western slopes of the great mountain system lying between Bengal and
independent Burma’ (Mackenzie 2012, 1). These kinds of policies became more
crucial in the postcolonial states, which inherited the colonial demarcations that
‘were often carved up with little regard to the coherence of historic, cultural, and
ethnic zones’ (Schendel 2005).
Physical features of borders became more visible in the postcolonial period and
were conceived in our mental maps in the form of fences and armed border secu-
rity forces. Redrawing of borders of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 however
acted a point of departure and disconnectedness.The important links of art, culture
and commerce discontinued. Unlike the profound sociopolitical and economic
transformations in the core owing to their incorporation into the colonial policies
and philosophies, these regions were excluded from imperial patterns of legisla-
tion and were thus accorded a marginal standing. Distribution of power and local
governance created newer forms of asymmetries. As another historian puts it in
these words, ‘these are regions that were disconnected fragments and victims of
cartographic surgery.’14 Local polities in these regions witnessed movements and
resistance against ‘incorporation into the framework of colonial state and postco-
lonial nation-building.’
These theoretical underpinnings were represented in this chapter and we briefly
discussed how the India–Myanmar borderlands experienced postcolonial chal-
lenges of integrating marginal frontier communities and the local polities into the
larger nation-state building exercises. Despite continuous re-bordering practices,
the porosity of the borderlands and the cross-border connections historically shared
by ethnic communities in these borderlands adds to the complexities of state-
territoriality and the transnational strategic and security interactions that the two
states are trying to create through these borderlands along the boundaries of India
and Myanmar. Moreover, as the case study analysis reveals in this chapter the impo-
sition of control and territoriality over the inherited borders from time to time
marked with the erection of border pillars, military check gates and fences, by
postcolonial states, evoked resistance from below. Borderland resistance as this study
reveals was witnessed in the India–Myanmar borderlands. The microlevel analysis
of fencing and the erection of border pillars in the Govajang and Kwatha Khu-
nou villages further demonstrate how militarized borders have consequences on
cross-border mobility and lives of borderlanders. The violent assertions of the bor-
derlanders in the borderlands of India and Myanmar further indicate how border
securitization practices may have consequences on postcolonial state formation and
the problems of integration of borderlands into the national imaginings of socio-
economic development.
While considering bilateral relations between India and Myanmar it is perti-
nent to emphasize the localized mundane encounters in the borderlands. We try to
understand how the India–Myanmar borderlands negotiate with the transborder
transitions in the newly developing political economy and how the state reordering
practices leave the impact on the borderlands that are deep, profound and lasting.
In the recent decades, the attempt has been to transform these ‘disturbed peripher-
ies’ into productive centers of a flourishing and integrated economy through mega
infrastructural projects such as the Trans-Asian Highway and the Kaladan multi
modal project. The national objective is to rejuvenate older links. It remains to be
seen how the postcolonial borderlands in India and Myanmar responds to these
currents of transformations and engage in the transnational development projects
in the face of complex governing structures, local incapacities and the politics of
violent defiance.
Notes
1 Discussion with the eminent historian in Imphal, April (2016). Also see, Arambam (2004,
67).
2 One of the British historical accounts reveals that the Lushais are a mix of Kooki (Kuki)
and Burmese tribes. Mackenzie (2012, 293).
3 The Chin tribal groups are subdivided into more than 60 ethnolinguistic categories,
spread out in Chin villages in Chin Hills of Burma and the neighboring regions of
Bangladesh and India’s Northeastern states of Manipur and Mizoram.
4 A term used to describe the tribes in Lushai hills by Nirmal Nibedon. See Nibedon
(2013).
5 The Chin state in Burma became the battleground during WWII, between the British
forces and the Japanese forces allied with the Burmese nationalist leaders like Aung San.
The nationalists formed the Burmese Independence Army, fought against the colonial
forces during the late 1930s and early 1940s and took control of Burma proper in
May 1942. The Chins supported the British. In 1943 the Japanese occupied Burma and
declared Burma as an independent nation. Later, when Japanese forces refused to give
away the power to the nationalists, the latter shifted their alliance and started negotiations
with the British seeking assistance to expel the Japanese. Aung San, the nationalist leader
also negotiated with the ethnic minorities including the Chins, Kachins amongst others
and signed the Panglong agreement in February 1947, which guaranteed the establish-
ment of the Interim government to be led to Aung San. The agreement also allowed
autonomy for ethnic minorities. Failure of implementation of the Panglong Agreement

led to discontentment and set the stage for ethnic conflicts in the minority states.
6 These pillars are located at about 3 km north of Moreh.
7 Interview conducted (June 12, 2018) with Rajendro (Name changed), Moreh, Imphal.
8 Interview conducted (June 12, 2018) with Shivachnadra (name changed), Moreh,
Imphal.
9 Interview conducted (July 22, 2018) with Iboyaima Kshetrimayum, Moreh, Imphal.
10 Interview conducted (June 12, 2016) in Moreh, Imphal.
11 Interview conducted (June 12, 2016). with N. Rajendro (Name changed), Moreh,
Imphal. Also see, Chakraborty (May 11, 2011).
12 Interview conducted (June 12, 2016). with Rajendro (Name changed), Moreh, Imphal.
13 Interview (June 22, 2016) with Rajendro (name changed) conducted in Moreh, Imphal.
14 Schendel (December 2002). Cited in Misra (2011).
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3
CRISIS IN THE RAKHINE STATE
OF MYANMAR
Bilateral relations with India in perspective
Mihir Bhonsale
The Southeast Asian country, Myanmar is at the center of the world’s gravest
humanitarian crisis.The exodus of an ethnic group known as ‘Rohingya’ the world
over but referred to as ‘Bengalis’ in Myanmar has drawn global attention for the
number of lives at stake and the severity of atrocities committed with alleged com-
plicity of the Myanmar state. More than a million Rohingyas have fled the Rakhine
state of Myanmar beginning from 1970 up to August 2018. Not recognized as citi-
zens in Myanmar, these refugees have also taken to sea in search of safe shores and
the countries they turned to in search of shelter have included Malaysia, Thailand
and Indonesia. Through Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees have also entered India.
The cross-border movement of such a large number of people has political,
strategic and cultural implications. The present chapter focuses on the Rohingya
refugee crisis in the light of contemporary relations between India and Myanmar.
Though, not strictly a bilateral issue between India and Myanmar, the Rohingya
crisis has assumed a regional dimension. The Indian state’s response to the Rakhine
crisis needs to be assessed for two dimensions – one as a recipient of Rohingya
people in the past one decade and second of its conduct of foreign relations with
two neighbors crucial to her ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighborhood First’ policy – Myanmar
and Bangladesh.
Background of the problem

On the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal, cut off from the Irrawaddy valley by
a series of near impassable Yoma mountains, lies the Rakhine state of Myanmar.
It shares an international border with Chittagong Division of Bangladesh in the
northwest. The northern Rakhine region and particularly the townships of Buth-
idaung and Maungdaw known till 1961 as the Mayu Frontier District that are
adjoining to the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh are ethnically distinct from the
Crisis in the Rakhine state of Myanmar 45
rest of Rakhine state. Located approximately 120 kilometers from the state capital
of Sittwe, these townships are home to a unique set of population who identify
themselves as ‘Rohingyas,’ practice Islam and speak Rohingya, closely related to
Chittagonian language spoken in parts of Bangladesh.
The ‘Rohingya’ identity is purportedly of a late origin. This ethnonym came to
be used in the 1950s by a section of Muslims living in Arakan (present-day Rakh-
ine state) though there exists to be a mention of this word in a precolonial English
text (Leider 2014, 9). The said text is Dr. Francis Hamilton-Buchanan’s article, ‘A
comparative vocabulary of some of the languages spoken in the Burman Empire’
where the word ‘Rohingya’ is mentioned as among the three dialects spoken in the
Burmese empire (Leider 2014, 5). The word ‘Rohingya’ or ‘Roewengyah’ in the
Rakhine language means the ‘dear ones’ or ‘compassionate ones’ or mutilation of
words ‘rwa-haung-ga-kar,’ ‘tiger from the ancient village; which means brave and
was a name given to Muslim soldiers who settled in Buthidaung (Yegar 1972, 69).
The Rakhine state that was earlier known as Arakan was independent till the
Burmese kings conquered it in 1784 (Yegar 2018, 2). It had political and cultural
contact with Islamic Bengal between the 14th and the 18th centuries (Yegar 2017,
2). Arakan had the influence of both Buddhism and Islam at different periods of
time. The period from the 13th to 14th centuries saw the emergence of Arakanese
kingship which was predominantly Buddhist. However, from 15th century through
the 18th century the impact of the Mughal Sultanate of Bengal on Arakan was
there (Bhonsale 2016, 631). While the Rakhine trace back their history to their
Buddhist past, the Rohingyas highlight the strong influence exercised by Muslim
Bengal on the Arakanese (Selth 2003, 12). The irreconcilable historical narratives
and memory of distinct past of the same land, Arakan (Rohingyas), is the reason for
the rift between the two communities.
At least two distinct positions have been taken by historians to classify the Mayu
Frontier district or the northern strip of Arakan (Bhonsale 2016, 634). Citing Brit-
ish records, Aye Chan makes a claim that the Rohingyas are second or third gen-
erations of Bengali immigrants who came during the British period as agricultural
labor and settled in Burma (Chan 2005, 402). At the advent of the British period,
the region between the Lemro rivers and Kaladan rivers was thinly populated and
only wild weeds grew in the land (Charney 1999, 279). Only after the exodus of
Bengali immigrants did the population of Arakan swell, especially in the Mayu
Frontier Area (Chan 2005, 397). Chan thus concludes that the region in Arakan
populated by Muslims is an ‘enclave’ (Bahar 2010, 51). An enclave is part of a coun-
try geographically separated from the main part by surrounding foreign territory
(Bahar 2010, 51). Civilian collaborators of the Burmese military claim of an exist-
ence of a Muslim enclave in the northwestern corner of Burma (Bahar 2010, 51).
Chan cites occupational interest as the only interest behind migrating to Arakan
first as seasonal migrants and who later settled over time (Chan 2005, 402).
The other position of the Mayu Frontier District in Arakan populated by Mus-
lims by the Rohingya School is that of a ‘Frontier Culture’ (Bahar 2010, 34). This
region geographically located at the intersection of South Asia and Southeast Asia
46 Mihir Bhonsale
oscillated between the influences of Burma and Bengal. Hence, this ‘marginal
land’ clearly has a ‘frontier culture’ developed with people of two racial groups –
the Rakhines and the Rohingyas (Bahar 2010, 34). Language and culture of the
Rakines and the Rohingyas though has witnessed a separate evolution, but until
recently, they have recognized one single history of Arakan (Bahar 2010, 34). The
different positions taken by historians show the contestations among scholars on
the identity of Muslims minorities in Arakan, while one school claims that Roh-
ingyas are of Bangladeshi descent, the Rohingya school believes that the Rohingya
have centuries old history of living in Arakan (Bhonsale 2016, 635).
The ethnic identity discourse in Arakan took a dramatic turn due to events
during the Second World War (Bhonsale 2016, 635). These have a lasting impact
on majority-minority relations in Arakan (Bhonsale 2016, 635). The period that
ensued also saw the political assertion of the Rohingya identity and a secessionist
Mujahid movement by a section of minorities who demanded the union of minor-
ity dominated northern Arakan with East Pakistan (Bhonsale 2016, 635).
Waves of Rohingya migration

The Rohingya migration from the Rakhine state of Myanmar to Bangladesh and
subsequently to other countries has occurred in waves since 1979.This section out-
lines the cycles or waves of migration and the reasons that led to their migration.
While historians claim that there have been antecedents to the first major flight
of Rohingyas in 1979, four major waves of migration can be identified beginning
from 1979 up to 15 August 2018, as shown in Table 3.1.
The first major wave of Rohingya refugees leaving Rakhine state in Bangladesh
was in 1979. Prior to this (1979), Myanmar’s then President, Ne Win had prom-
ulgated the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act that replaced National Registra-
tion Certificates with color-coded cards. Those residing lawfully in Myanmar were
divided into four colors viz. pink for those who are full citizens, blue for those who
are associate citizens, green for naturalized citizens, and white for the foreigners
(Ahmed 2004).The Rohingyas were quickly told that they do not fall under any of
these four colors and no such cards were issued to them (Ahmed 2004). There was
TABLE 3.1 Year-wise exodus of Rohingyas from Myanmar
Year Number of Displaced
1979 200,000
1992 250,000
2012 1,20,000
2013-16 1,51,000
2017-18 7,20,000
Total 15,41,000
Source: Prepared by researcher based on figures quoted in (Yegar 2018, 201)
(Tan 2016, 6) (UNHCR 2016) (Doctors without Borders, March 2018)
an exodus in the year following the Emergency Immigration Act, 1974. Rakhine
Buddhist people had forced thousands of Rohingya Muslims to flee to Bangladesh
in 1975 (Yegar 2018, 2). However, what led to the exodus in 1978 was a military
operation named ‘Naga Min’ or ‘Dragon King’ launched by Myanmar army to
recognize citizens and weed out foreigners from her land (Pugh 2013, 14). Alleg-
edly, persecuted by the local Rakhines of Arakan and the Myanmar army failing to
protect the Rohingyas from the violence directed by the Rakhine Buddhists, about
a quarter of a million Rohingyas were forced to leave Burma in search of refuge in
neighboring Bangladesh (Yegar 2002, 56).
The second wave migration of Rohingyas is said to have taken place in 1992.
Another military operation Pyi Thar Ya or ‘Prosperous State’ in 1991 by the Bur-
mese military was blamed to have led to the exodus of 250,000 Rohingyas to
Myanmar (Tan 2016, 6). In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) took charge in Myanmar after disavowing the results of general elec-
tions called by General Ne Win. Myanmar’s military presence in northwestern Ara-
kan was stepped up. Having violently put down the democratic movement, the
military Junta that was in firm control of the government in Myanmar in order
to give legitimacy to its rule among core constituencies that included the ethnic
Rakhine minorities and Buddhist community, began to deprive anyone it consid-
ered Rohingya of citizenship chapters (Klinken and Aung 2017, 358). The army
also forced the Rohingyas into road constructions and initiated settling of ethnic
Rakhine in the townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw leading to fresh confron-
tations between Rohingyas and Rakhine. This led to the second Rohingya exodus
between April 1991 and May 1992 and the number rose to 250,000 (Nemoto 6).
The third major wave of migration of the Rohingyas took place in 2012. It is
said to have killed over 192 people and displaced within Myanmar over 150,000
Rohingya Muslims. Though the migration was domestic i.e. within the Rakhine
state of Myanmar, the violence of 2012 initiated a trend of violence in the follow-
ing years leading to migration from Myanmar into Bangladesh. What began as an
inter-communal conflict in four townships in Rakhine state in June 2012 had by
October of the same year engulfed the whole nation including major urban cent-
ers of Yangon and Mandalay. A series of incidents are believed to have triggered
the June 2012 riots – the primary one being an alleged gang rape and murder of
a Rakhine Buddhist girl in Sittwe and subsequent arrests of three Muslims by the
police as accused (The Guardian 2012; Klinken and Aung 2017). By official count,
the first phase of violence killed a total of 98 people, injured 123 and destroyed
some 5,300 houses (Republic of Union of Myanmar 2013, 19).The communal vio-
lence against Rohingyas resurfaced in October 2012. But, a large number of these
attacks were allegedly orchestrated by local Rakhine political party cadres, section
of the Burmese monks and common Rakhine in association with police (Human
Rights Watch 2013). Another distinguishing feature of the violence that broke out
in October 2012 was that the violence was not just directed toward the Rohingyas
but against Muslims in general, an example being the Kaman Muslim; the latter are
also recognized as an ethnic group of Myanmar (International Crisis Group 2013;
48 Mihir Bhonsale
Human Rights Watch 2013). Killing of a Rakhine merchant by a mob for selling
rice to Muslims in Mrauk-U on October 21, 2012 is said to have unleashed a wave
of violence in a total of nine townships in three days (Physicians for Human Rights
2013). Mrauk-U Township, remained the worst hit in the second wave of violence
that left 94 dead (68 Rohingyas and 26 Rakhine) and 42 Rakhine and 3,234 Roh-
ingya homes destroyed (Republic of Union of Myanmar 2013, 19).
Fleeing poverty, rampant physical abuse and statelessness, the Rohingyas took to
sea in search of refuge, beginning in 2014. Their arduous sea journeys in the Bay
of Bengal and Andaman Sea in order to reach distant shores of Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia were reported by media. By May 2015 more than 5,000 Rohingya
migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh were found stranded in the sea (UNHCR
2015). Purportedly, rings of trafficking lured to undertake journeys via sea route
to reach foreign shores in search of a safe haven. The trafficking rings often left the
migrants stranded on boats without food and water.With lack of food and water on
the vessels ferrying the migrants across about 70 Rohingyas reportedly died in ships
abandoned by traffickers in May 2015 (UNHCR 2015). The media also reported
of mass graves off the Thailand coast at a captivity for illegal migrants before being
smuggled into Malaysia (Aljazeera, 24 May 2015).
The year of hope when the first civilian government in about five decades
assumed power in 2016 also unleashed brutality for the Rohingya, laying a founda-
tion of the worst exodus in the history of Rakhine state. The incident that trig-
gered the exodus was a coordinated attack on three border guard outposts near
Maungdaw in Northern Rakhine, killing nine police officers and injuring five on
October 9, 2016 (Myanmar Times, 10 October 2016). A statement from the office
of Myanmar’s President Htin Kyaw blamed the little-known ‘Aqa Mul Mujahidin’
with links to the Rohingya Solidarity Organization for the October 9th attacks
(Reuters, 14 October 2016; President’s Office, 15 October 2016). The government
claimed that the attacks aimed at instigating the majority Muslim population of the
area to engage in extremist violence. The military and the police forces launched
search operations to apprehend the terrorists and seize arms. By November 17,
300 persons were detained by the army. The army allegedly carried out excesses
on civilians, killing about 100 civilians and displacing many, some also fleeing to
neighboring Bangladesh. The area was cordoned off from the media and human
rights groups. Human Rights Watch (HRW) released images purportedly show-
ing 1,250 destroyed buildings in three villages in the Rakhine (International Busi-
ness Times, 21 November 2016). The military’s True News Information Team also
rejected claims that its soldiers had razed Rohingya villages (Lone and Lewis, 24
October 2016). Instead they released a statement on November 15, claiming that
the buildings had been ‘torched by members of the violent attackers in northern
Rakhine’ (Lone and Lewis 2016).
On August 24, 2017, a militant group by the name Arakan Rohingya Sal-
vation Army (ARSA) staged attacks on a military base and up to 30 security
outposts across the northern Rakhine state, killing 59 militants and 12 security
forces (Reuters, 24 August 2017). The said attack took place within hours after
a panel led by former U.N. chief Kofi Annan advised the government on long-
term solutions for Rakhine (Myanmar Times, 10 October 2016). Beginning from
August 25, the Myanmar army started ‘clearance operations’ in hundreds of villages
in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships. The operation known as
‘Scorched Earth’ was targeted toward eliminating the Arakan Rohingya Salva-
tion Army (ARSA) who had plotted and executed the attacks on the outposts.
The number of dead between August 25 and September 24 was 6,700 due to the
violence, including 730 children under the age of five (Doctors without Borders,
March 2018). By September 7, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
estimated that 164,000 Rohingyas had fled the Northern Rakhine state since the
violence began August 25, 2017 (UNHCR, 8 September 2017). The figure of
refugees fleeing to Bangladesh soared to 600,000 by the end of 2017 and reached
725,000 by August 15, 2018.
Response to the Rohingya crisis

The response to the humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine from the global com-
munity has been inadequate considering its nature and scale of the crisis. UN
Secretary General Antonio Guetteres described it as the world’s fastest growing
refugee emergency and carefully worded statements accusing Myanmar of perpe-
trating ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ and guilty of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide
were issued. The failure of Myanmar state to fulfill her responsibility to protect the
Rohingya minority group has been criticized. India’s response is excluded in this
section as it will be exclusively dealt with in the next section.
Political and economic reforms in Myanmar in 2010 had grabbed the attention
of the European Union and USA in what they foresaw as the ‘world’s last frontier.’
Despite calls by UN agencies and human rights watchdogs on deteriorating human
rights in Myanmar, especially pertaining to the situation of Rohingyas following
the 2012 attacks, in April 2013, the European Union lifted sanctions barring arms
embargo. Southeast Asian countries Malaysia and Indonesia who were most vocal
among the regional bloc Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN turned
back boats of Rohingyas desperate to reach their shores. These two Muslim major-
ity countries were joined by Thailand in refusing to Rohingya refugees to come
ashore. Only after pressure mounted on the respective governments of the ASEAN
countries did they allow Rohingya boats ashore.
Suu Kyi, the state counselor responsible for the Rakhine Affairs responded by
ordering an enquiry and later by also forming an advisory commission under for-
mer UN Secretary General Kofi Annan after a worldwide criticism on the after-
math of the 2016 attacks in Rakhine state. Bangladesh, immediately after the 2016
military operations, is also believed to have prevented the Rohingyas from entering
their territory by tightening the border controls but failed to prevent the exodus
from entering Bangladesh (Holmes and agencies 2016). Around 21,000 Rohingya
people had fled to Bangladesh between October 9 and December 2, 2016 (Inter-
national Business Times, 21 November 2016).
50 Mihir Bhonsale
Following the launch of army operations beginning from the end of August 2017,
there was more talk and little action. Despite extensive reportage of the plight of
the Rohingyas in the media, the response went little beyond condemnation and has
failed to translate into concrete actions (Parikh 2017).
The U.N. Security Council on August 30, 2017 convened a closed-door meet-
ing within a week of the August 24, 2017 attacks to discuss the situation in the
Rakhine state. They again met on September 12 at the request of members Sweden
and Great Britain when a statement was issued appealing to Myanmar to end vio-
lence against the Rohingyas (Reuters, 12 September 2017). Secretary General of
United Nations Antonio Guterres described the situation in Rakhine state as ‘eth-
nic cleansing’ arguing that one-third of the Rohingya population had to flee the
country.
Several world leaders assembled at the United Nations General Assembly in
New York trained barbs at Myanmar for prosecution unleashed by the army on the
Rohingya Muslims. Those who were reported to have prominently voiced their
opinion included Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who reportedly said
the international community has failed in the Rohingya crisis similar to that it did
in Syria (Daily Sabah, 19 September 2017). The Myanmar State Counselor Aung
San Suu Kyi refrained from participating in the United Nations General Assembly
in New York.
Suu Kyi, on September 19, 2017 in her first public address, said that her country
does not fear international scrutiny and the state has to determine whether the
allegations are based on evidence (McPherson 2017). She also said that conflicts and
military operations had ceased on September 5.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a Chairman’s state-
ment signed by ASEAN foreign ministers and unequivocally criticized the attack
launched by Myanmar authorities on August 25 and atrocities that killed civil-
ians, damaged houses and displaced Rohingya people. The 2017 ASEAN Chair,
Philippines also underscored the importance of increased humanitarian access to
the affected areas and assistance to be given to affected communities (Tempo.co, 25
September 2017).
Muslim majority countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey and
Iran condemned the violence against the Rohingyas. The Maldives Foreign Min-
istry even announced severing of all trade ties with Myanmar. The Organization
of Islamic Cooperation urged Myanmar to accept UN monitors to carry out ‘a
through and independent investigation of the violation of international human
rights and bring those responsible to justice.’
President of France Emmanuel Macron announced that his country plans an
initiative in the U.N. Security Council in relation to the crackdown on Myanmar’s
Rohingya population. In a joint statement issued by U.N. Principals called the
pushing over of 500,000 refugees into Bangladesh as the fastest growing refugee
crisis and a humanitarian emergency. The statement co-signed by Filippo Grandi,
United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR, 16 October).
A European parliament resolution called upon the military to immediately

cease the killings, harassment and rape of the Rohingya people and burning of
their homes.The European lawmakers also urged the European Union to clarify to
Myanmar that it was prepared to impose sanctions on Myanmar if it did not halt
human right abuses (DW, 14 September 2017). UK announced the suspension of
courses offered to the Myanmar military, lest there was an acceptable resolution to
the crisis (Coates 2017).The office of British Prime Minister Theresa May said that
the actions of military forces in Myanmar against the Rohingya people looks like
ethnic cleansing. Her spokesperson called it a major humanitarian crisis triggered
by the Myanmar military (The Independent, 13 November 2017).
US President, Donald Trump supported efforts to end the violence, to ensure
accountability for atrocities committed and to facilitate safe and voluntary return
of refugees. He also added that the US welcomes commitments by Myanmar gov-
ernment and is ready to support the implementation of the Rakhine commission
recommendations.
Despite attempts by Myanmar government to negotiate with China and Russia
for blocking a UN Security Council censure over Rohingya exodus, China sup-
ported UN Security council’s resolution to end violence targeting the Rohingyas
(Reuters, 6 September 2017) (South China Morning Post, 14 September 2017).
Reportedly China, expressing concern over the excessive use of force during
security operations in the Rakhine state called for immediate steps to end vio-
lence, its first such agreement to the Council’s statement on Myanmar after nine
years. However, in a turn of events, China refused to interfere in other country’s
matters and extended support to Myanmar’s efforts in safeguarding peace and
stability in the region and hoped all areas will realize peace, stability and develop-
ment (Worley 2017).
China even offered to mediate between Myanmar and Bangladesh to resolve the
Rohingya refugee crisis. Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi travelled to Dhaka and
Nay Pyi Taw in succession and met leaders of both countries, proposing a three-
phased solution to put a permanent end to the crisis.The three-phased solution had
a ceasefire as the first step with no further displacement of local residents. Second,
to encourage Myanmar and Banagladesh to keep communication in the bud to
resolve the issue and third a commonly agreed long-term resolution (Hindu Busi-
nessline, 20 November 2017). Regional intergovernmental organization ASEAN
in its statement made no mention of the Rohingya crisis except for highlighting
the importance of humanitarian relief provided for victims of natural disasters in
Vietnam, victims of a recent battle with militant in Philippines and affected com-
munities in the northern Rakhine state (Reuters, 13 November 2017).
China along with Russia and eight more countries opposed a resolution put
forward in the United Nations General Assembly urging Myanmar to end a mili-
tary campaign against the Rohingyas and appoint a UN Special Envoy. It asked the
Myanmar government to allow access to aid workers, ensure return of all refugees
and grant full citizenship to the Rohingyas. It requests that UN secretary general
52 Mihir Bhonsale
António Guterres appoint a special envoy to Myanmar (The Guardian, 24 Decem-

ber 2017). Russia opposed the labelling of Myanmar army’s crackdown on Roh-
ingya Muslims as ‘ethnic cleansing’ as unhelpful and warned that it could aggravate
the situation. Moscow’s approach, a Russian emissary said, was to solve Rakhine
issue through politics (The Guardian 24 December 2017).
India’s response
The nuances of India’s response to the Rakhine humanitarian crisis is coded in
the dual strategy adopted by the Indian state viz. firstly to maintain good political
relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh that are central to its ‘Neighbor-
hood First’ and ‘Act East Policy’ and second as ‘push back’ policy adopted by the
Government of India toward Rohingyas that has disregarded the earlier tradition of
providing sanctuary to prosecuted minorities.
The public discourse on the Rohingyas within India in the recent years began
almost a month prior to the attacks in Rakhine state on August 25, 2017. Report-
edly, Kiren Rijiju, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Government of India
in a reply to parliament called the Rohingyas illegal migrants and accused them
of indulging in unlawful activities (Bharadwaj, 31 July 2017). The Minister noted
that illegal migrants like the Rohingyas enter into the country without valid docu-
ments in a furtive manner, leaving the state agencies with no data (NDTV.com, 31
July 2017). India is also believed to have taken up the matter with Myanmar and
has emphasized the need for safe, speedy and sustainable deportation of the Roh-
ingyas (Bharadwaj, 31 July 2017; NDTV.com, 31 July 2017). The Indian Ministry
of Home Affairs even directed the state governments to constitute task forces to
identify and deport illegally staying foreign nationals (Chauhan 2017).
The Union government of India told the parliament that the illegal Rohingya
population in India is 40,000 and has seen a fourfold rise within two years when
the population of Rohingyas was 10,500 (Sharma 10 August 2017). The Indian
government’s indication that manifold increase in the influx of Rohingya refugees
includes the post-October 2016 period i.e. following militant attacks in Rakhine
state and following that intrusion to India. The government in an affidavit to the
Supreme Court of India also said that the continued stay of the ‘illegal migrants’
posed ‘serious national security ramifications’ (Times of India 18 September 2017).
The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India however had a nuanced
position on the issue. A statement issued on August 26, 2017 following the attacks
purportedly by Islamic outfits on army outposts in Rakhine state, India’s foreign
ministry’s statement condemned the attacks by militants and expressed grief over
the loss of lives of Myanmar’s security personnel. There was no indication on the
continuing exodus of refugees to Bangladesh or for that matter on repatriation of
Rohingya refugees from host countries including India.
Closely on the heels of the August 25 attacks, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra
Modi made his first three-day state visit to Myanmar from September 5, 2017.
The Indian Prime Minister is also reported to have raised the issue of Rohingyas
illegally staying in India (Dutta 17 September 2017). During his visit, Modi also
offered Myanmar assistance for developing the Rakhine state, which his govern-
ment considered to be a medium-term solution for addressing problems in the
Rakhine state (Hindustan Times, 6 September 2017b). However, the silence on the
refugees was broken when Bangladesh intimated India of the tremendous strain
that it has got itself into following the coming of Rohingya refugees (Roy, 14
September 2017a). India in a statement issued on September 9 called for Myanmar
to restore peace and normalcy in the Rakhine state (Roy, 14 September 2017b).
India also launched ‘Operation Insaniyat’ that gave relief materials to affected
refugees who entered into Bangladesh from Myanmar. Union Minister of Exter-
nal Affairs, Sushma Swaraj during her visit to Bangladesh urged Myanmar to
handle the situation with restraint, keeping in mind the welfare of the population.
In a press statement issued after her visit, Swaraj is said to have called for a return
of the displaced persons to Rakhine state and that rapid socioeconomic devel-
opment and infrastructure upgrade are the long-term solution to the Rakhine
problem.
Indian Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar visited Myanmar on 20 Decem-
ber 2017. He inked the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rakhine State
Development Program. This program was the first of its kind intended to help
the government of Myanmar achieve its objective of restoration of normalcy
in Rakhine State and enable the return of displaced persons. India proposes
under the said program to take up, among others, a project to build prefabri-
cated housing in Rakhine State so as to meet the immediate needs of returning
people. During the Indian foreign secretary’s visit to Myanmar, India also signed
a $25 million MoU with Myanmar for development of the Rakhine State (Hin-
dustan Times 2017a).
India’s External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj visited Myanmar on May 10–11,
2018, she stressed the importance of ‘safe, speedy and sustainable return of displaced
persons to Rakhine State’ (Ministry of External Affairs- Government of India).This
is a departure from the previous position when it called for ‘restraint’ in handling
the situation in Rakhine (Yhome 2018). The shift in stance of the Indian Ministry
of External Affairs from that of ‘silence’ to ‘safe, speedy and sustainable return of
refugees to Rakhine state’ followed Bangladesh’s nudge to put pressure on Myan-
mar to take back the refugees. Even the use of the word ‘sustainable’ suggests that
India is echoing similar desires to Bangladesh (Bhattacharjee 2018). Bangladesh is
insisting on the ‘safe and sustainable return of the refugees,’ thus urging the long-
term resolution of the problem.
Since the early 1990s, India has consistently engaged Myanmar and India’s
response to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis and needs to be seen in this light. Hav-
ing said this, the Indian response is also calibrated by a close neighbour, Bangladesh,
who is the recipient of the maximum number of refugees and has sought India’s
intervention in tiding over the wave of refugees.
54 Mihir Bhonsale
Behind India’s response

The Rohingya crisis presents a ‘dilemma’ or ‘test of diplomacy’ to the Indian state
(Vembu 2017; Chandran, 20 September 2017). The debate about the Rohingyas is
being constructed as one between humanitarian obligations and national security
(Mehta 2017). The discourse is mostly focused around implications rather than
finding a solution to the crisis (Yhome 2018). India has ended a golden tradition
of confirming with international comity and good treatment of refugees like in
the past when it received refugees from every religion (Aiyar, 20 September 2017).
But, for the first time, religion has become a reason for rejection of the Rohingya
refugees, as Home Ministry’s September 2015 notification under the Passports Act
and the Foreigners Act exempts from usual entry and residential procedures ‘Hin-
dus, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Parsis and Buddhists’ facing persecution, wrote a former
union minister (Aiyar 2017). Noticeably, in the notification excepting Muslims,
people from all other religions have been given exemption. This line of argument
also reminds that the Indian state cannot ignore the 1951 UN Convention on
refugees and the 1967 protocol that mandates all United Nations member states to
adhere to non-refoulement that bars a member state from expelling or returning a
refugee to ‘frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion’ (Parthasarathy 2017).
In contradistinction to the earlier set of views is the opinion arguing against
giving the Rohingyas refuge in India. An article points out that despite India hav-
ing historically kept her doors open for persecuted minorities from many parts
of the world and that India’s sympathies lay with such refugees at this stage of
development, keeping an open door for persecuted refugees is borderline mad-
ness (Vembu 2017). However, the article says that New Delhi must persuade
Myanmar’s military rulers and Aung San Suu Kyi to set its own house in order.
Similarly, an article argues that India would eventually have to send the Rohing-
yas back to Myanmar and it is in India’s interest to see peace in the Rakhine state
(Unjhawala 2017).
Discernibly, two schools of thoughts explain India’s approach toward the Roh-
ingyas (Yhome 2018). The first school sees elements of consistency in India’s
traditional hesitation about automatically designating asylum seekers as refugees.
According to the first school, India has created disincentives for refugees to stay
permanently in India, citing the case of refugees from Bangladesh during the 1971
war (Jaishankar and Saraf 2017). This school also has advocates who have raised
the concerns of security in not allowing the Rohingyas a permanent asylum in
India. The second school argues that it is a departure from the past and analyzes
it from the perspective of potential implications on India (Yhome 2018). Accord-
ing to this line of reasoning, the government’s Rohingya approach has put at
stake the lives of thousands of Indian Diaspora communities in different countries
including Myanmar (Yhome 2018). The second school argues that the approach
of the Indian government toward the Rohingyas is short-sighted and could lead to
further radicalization of the oppressed and would have spill-over effects for India
(Vishwanathan 2017).
As most opinions emerging within India turned inwards on India’s decision
to deport back the Rohingyas, a few commendations turned to the Indian state’s
external relations. A few commentators on India’s position on the Rohingya have
also examined the geostrategic importance of Myanmar to the Indian state in
deciding her course of action over Myanmar. However, some also argue that the
Rohingya issue is a test case for Indian’s diplomacy to balance self-interest with
protecting the interests of her neighbor (sic Bangladesh) (Bhattacharjee 2017).
Commentators pointed out that a threefold imperative lends perspective to
India’s initial silence on the Rohingya issue (Sahoo 2017). First, security in the
North Eastern states, which have seen a niggling insurgency since India’s independ-
ence. Second, Myanmar’s importance as a land bridge to ASEAN countries, and last,
to check China’s increasing influence in South Asia, the latter New Delhi holds to
be in its traditional sphere of influence.
Beginning from the early 1990s, Myanmar has assumed significance as India’s
springboard for the ‘Look East policy,’ a foreign policy strategy aimed at improv-
ing political relations and intensifying economic cooperation with Southeast
Asian countries or the ASEAN bloc. When the military violently suppressed a
democratically elected government and staged a coup in Myanmar in 1988, India
criticized the military rulers and gave refuge to political dissidents from Myanmar.
India’s turn toward her eastern neighborhood and Southeast Asia in particular
was to mitigate the global shift from a bipolar to unipolar world and adjust to the
post-Cold War era. India’s rapprochement with the military Junta in Myanmar
through violent suppression of democratic parties had come to political power was
a major watershed in the political relations between the two countries tethered
into oblivion.
By launching joint operations with Myanmar military, India hoped to curb mili-
tancy and illicit trafficking in India’s North east. India’s connectivity with Southeast
Asia was the backbone of the economic pillar of the Look East policy and Myanmar
served as the natural bridge. India in the first decade of the 21st century took up
projects like the Rhi-Tiddim road, Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project
and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway project. Myanmar was also
rich in resources and Indian companies jointly engaged in tapping gas and oil at
Shwe gas fields. Lastly, sanctions imposed by Western countries on the military
regime in Myanmar had pushed the country to deepen its relations with China,
with the latter emerging as Myanmar’s largest donor and supplier of military hard-
ware. India through its Myanmar outreach hoped to supplant China’s influence in
Myanmar.
As the world erupted following the security operations carried out by the
Myanmar military following the August 25, 2017 attack, Suu Kyi led NLD and
the military in a rare show of unity on the issue of the Rohingyas as both con-
sidered the Rohingya as a ‘national security threat’ (Naing and Lee 2017). This
apparent unity of the two camps on the Rohingya issue might have pushed India
56 Mihir Bhonsale
to stand up for Myanmar in the period at a time when sanctions by the West are
looming large on Myanmar.
Conclusion
The Rakhine crisis has not suddenly dawned upon the world but has been built
through a history of alleged excesses and migration resulting there-from. It has
become the world’s longest running ethnic strife. This humanitarian crisis though
has attracted attention from media the world over but has failed to illicit strong
response from world community. There is little beyond statements issued by world
leaders to address the humanitarian crisis. Also imposing sanctions as the European
Union and USA have done has not helped bring the Myanmar state on the correc-
tive course. The failure of United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution
on the Rohingya crisis has further shrunk the intergovernmental council’s role in
Myanmar. Regional powers, India and China in the pursuit of their own inter-
ests have been soft-pedalling on Myanmar’s army’s complicity in genocide. They
have been insisting that any intervention from the world community would be an
infringement on Myanmar’s sovereignty.
The two-pronged approach of the Indian state in deporting back the illegal
Rohingya migrants while soft-pedalling on Myanmar and at the same time also
assuring Bangladesh that India is for a long-term solution for resolving the crisis
in the Rakhine state is an example of Indian realism in her eastern neighborhood.
But many questions could be raised at the diplomacy with Myanmar that India is
engaged in. Is India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world, ready
to forego her leadership in espousing humanitarian causes in the region for some
self-interest? Is the Indian establishment wary of losing Myanmar if it joined the
global community in censuring Myanmar? While turning the focus to a long-term
solution to the Rakhine crisis that is merely innovative and addressing the problem,
has the Indian state chosen short-sighted interests and short-term gains and fore-
gone long-term vision?
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4
REALITY ON THE INDO–MYANMAR
BORDER
Field observations from Longwa and
Hmaungbuchhuah on issues of ethnicity,
connectivity and security
Rajeev Bhattacharyya
The region known as the Indo–Myanmar border is a long stretch of land spanning
1643 km that mirrors the diversity in India’s Northeast and Myanmar. It is inhab-
ited by communities speaking different languages and following disparate customs
and religious practices since time immemorial.The borderland had remained out-
side the active sphere of the colonial regime since it was not considered neces-
sary for a variety of reasons. The border, which was hurriedly delineated in 1947,
divided the homelands of many ethnic groups although both the countries also
agreed to maintain the ‘free-border regime’ ensuring the unhindered movement
of people from both sides. A large chunk of the border region remained inac-
cessible during the subsequent decades owing to factors ranging from poor con-
nectivity to disturbed conditions that have also discouraged research and detailed
reporting. But undercurrents of change in all spheres of life are now palpable
in the region in varying degrees. The slew of policies unleashed by the govern-
ments, coupled with the changed aspirations of the younger generation and the
onset of improved modes of communication have engendered a situation differ-
ent from the earlier times. This chapter makes an attempt to analyze the changing
realities in the India–Myanmar borderlands based on field visits in Longwa and
Hmaungbuchhuah.
Field visits indicate that the traditional notions about security, connectivity and
ethnicity are undergoing a change that are specific to ethnic linkages, local percep-
tions on security and age-old connectivity across these regions. The discussion in
the chapter reveals that the cross-border access to socioeconomic activities like
primary education and informal economic exchanges are indispensable that have
been historically pursued due to the livelihood patterns of the borderlands. The
chapter also critically evaluates the literature on borders and borderland livelihoods
to support the argument.
64 Rajeev Bhattacharyya
Borders and borderlands: a theoretical overview

Borders are defined as ‘institutions and symbols that are used by states to repro-
duce territorial power’ (Passi 2009). Borders are considered as dynamic and crucial,
related to ‘changing societal power relations and have to be analyzed critically in
context’ (Passi 2009). An analysis of the literature on border studies suggests that the
persistence and disappearance of borders is a heavily contested domain. In Asia, the
studies show that an important aspect of borders in the region is ‘the way people
imagine the border as modern or pre-modern’ (Gellner 2013, 7). Asia inherited
both these types of borders, pre-modern as they are ‘fuzzy and contested and also
because the local population in many places have strong ties across borders’(Gellner
2013, 7). Daily lives are carried on across these borders. This applies to the India–
Myanmar border areas where the local population can move across the border on
a daily basis. The nature of interaction displays ‘ground level realities’ and the varia-
tions of economic and cultural relations over time in these borderlands.
Unlike the integrated borders in parts of Asia or Europe, the local economies
in these regions display unofficial forms modeled on local governance structures
where the regulatory practices of the state were missing. In the recent decade, there
has also been a change in the attitudes and perceptions of especially the younger
generation in these borderlands. More specifically, the perceptible changes in the
agricultural practices and the involvement of the younger generation in the Kon-
yak region as the rest of the chapter reveals demonstrated the ‘newer paradigm of
change’ in these borderlands. Perhaps the new generation has increasingly realized
the realities and benefits of becoming a part of the expanding market on either side
of the border regions in India and Myanmar. In the backdrop of this perspective,
borderlands seem to have created a niche to strike a reasonable balance between
the formal and informal provisions that have long been the prevailing features of
these domains.
In this chapter we define borders as a physical marker that allows the movement
of people, goods and information through acceptable means. Inter-exchange of
culture and identity allows us to examine the ‘symbolic and material processes of
social experiences’ that take place on both sides of the borders between the resi-
dents. Cultural constructions are normal and a routine process that goes into the
making of the lives of the people in the borderlands. Similar to Walker’s analysis of
the contemporary processes of development, cross-border exchanges and processes
in the upper-Mekong region, the India–Myanmar borderlands also exhibit ‘contra-
dictions, disillusionment and provides unevenly distributed benefits and opportuni-
ties’ (Walker 1999, 5).Walker also argued that there are variations and differences in
characteristics in different borderlands. This analysis can also be applied to under-
stand the day-to-day socioeconomic interactions between people and changes in
the India–Myanmar borderlands.
Although the focus is not so much on a borderless world as some scholars sug-
gest, in this chapter, we move away from a focus on state-centric analysis of borders
and the pragmatic relations between the India–Myanmar borderlands. State-centric
Reality on the Indo–Myanmar border 65
analysis examines the existence of strict security surveillance and bounded terri-
tories that prevent cross-border relations on a normal basis. These institutions are
suggestive of state regulated movement of goods and people across borders. The
complexity of these approaches on borders can be explained in Passi’s words, who
argued,
States are changing, but they are not disappearing. State sovereignty has been
eroded, but it is still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can
still throw their weight around. At certain times publics are more demanding,
but at other times they are more pliable. Borders still keep out intruders, but
they are more porous. The cultural roles of borders received more attention
around 1990, but scholars were still mostly concerned with concrete border
landscapes, which also implied that the complex roles of borders in the con-
stitution of the power relations sedimented in state-territoriality were very
much taken for granted.
(Passi 2009, 2–7)
This chapter draws from both these approaches and shows the coexistence of
check posts and people-to-people exchanges in both formal and informal ways in
the India–Myanmar borderlands. With the change of regime in Myanmar, alterna-
tive forms of livelihood have unfolded in the recent decades in these borderlands.
Mobility has increased and is much more visible not so much as a part of the inte-
grated economy but as peripheral agents of contemporary changes and exchanges
in the changing political economy of the borderlands.
Observations in Longwa
At the trijunction of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar is the border vil-
lage of Longwa straddling the international border. It is inhabited by the Konyak,
the largest among the Naga tribes, who were more famous for headhunting, which
primarily entailed fetching the decapitated heads of adversaries from neighbor-
ing villages. According to oral history, the village originated sometime in the 16th
century after being occupied by immigrants whose place of origin is still a topic
of debate.1 Due to the remoteness of the habitat, the pace of social change had
been slower which was similar to the situation in some Naga inhabited regions of
Myanmar in contrast to the trend discernible among the tribes in Nagaland where
Christianity and government policies had brought about a vast transformation. No
wonder the current social and economic indicators point to a wide gulf between
the eastern and other districts of Nagaland (Nagaland Vision 2030).
Besides remoteness, insurgency has also been a contributing factor to the back-
wardness of Longwa and the adjoining areas of Phomching Circle in Nagaland’s
Mon district. Although the separatist movement in Nagaland began from the late
1940s, the Konyak region became intensely associated after the birth of the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. For the first time, NSCN brought
a greater number of Naga leaders from both sides of the border on a common
platform, which included several Konyak functionaries. Mention may be made of
the venerable Khole Konyak, who ensured the support of almost all the villages
inhabited by his community and the contiguous regions in both the countries
after being assigned the role of deputy chief of the army in the new organization.
However, in 1988, the outfit split into the Khaplang and Isak-Muivah factions and
a deadly turf war ensued between the two groups for the control of territory. The
turnout of events in the subsequent years ensured a greater control of the Khaplang
faction (NSCN-K) over the Konyak region and the Naga inhabited more areas of
eastern Nagaland and Myanmar than the Isak-Muivah group.
Nestled at a strategic location, Longwa has a population of around 7,000 people
and is considered one of the bigger Konyak villages in the region.2 It is concen-
trated within a stretch of 1.5 kilometers with the highway running close to the
international boundary at several points. As in the previous decades, the border
has never been a barrier in the continuation of social and economic ties among
the villages, which is similar to the situation along the entire border that touches
as many four states in India’s Northeast. The ‘free-border regime’ allows residents
from one country to cross the border and journey to a distance of 16 km but the
travel sometimes entails reaching destinations at far-off places for different reasons.
Longwa has long served as a crucial link to important centers on both sides of the
border. It was connected to Challam Basti in Myanmar, the headquarters of NSCN,
until it was raided by the army in the mid-1980s.3 This was one of the first camps
FIGURE 4.1 A village in Longwa.

Source: Fieldwork, September 2016
of NSCN with a combined presence of rebel cadres from different states of India’s
Northeast and Myanmar, which was replicated at other places in northern Sagaing
Division.4 Years later, Longwa continued to be an important link with Taga where
the central headquarters of the Khaplang faction of NSCN is located and other
places like Lahe and Hkamti where Naypyidaw has a presence.5 And it is from
Longwa that the district headquarters in Mon can be reached and beyond to other
towns in Nagaland and Assam. A major attraction is the civil hospital at the district
headquarters at a distance of 42 km for treatment of ailments like tuberculosis since
the primary health center at Longwa is nonfunctional. The hospital’s infrastructure
received a boost after Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF)was engaged by the government
between 2010–14 when a pharmacy, operation theater and a new state-of-the- art
delivery facility came into being.
This researcher has visited Longwa on several occasions during the past one-
and-a-half decades but a different situation was observed during the last assign-
ment in 2016. While a section continued to engage in the conventional methods
of agriculture including shifting cultivation, there was greater concern among
the younger generation for alternate sources of livelihood and avenues of earn-
ing money. The evidence was discernible in the plots of cardamom cultivation at
regular intervals on both sides of the road between the district headquarters and
Longwa.There were cultivators enquiring about the market price in Guwahati and
elsewhere and details of the network for faster transportation of the item. Many of
them rued about the lack of government support in providing access to markets,
which could have nullified the role of middlemen (Bhattacharyya 2017). A major
portion of the produce is purchased by traders at the neighboring town of Sonari in
Assam at prices which the farmers claim ought to have been much higher. Unlike
the more commonly found green cardamom, the variety grown in Mon is black
cardamom which is darker and larger, which is also grown in Sikkim, Darjeeling,
and in parts of Nepal and Bhutan. Its aromatic seed capsules have a great demand in
the domestic and international market: a kilogram is sold at rates ranging between
Rs 800–1,200 which is several times more than the existing rates for rice, maize or
vegetables grown in the village. About 600 kilograms are harvested from one bigha
of cultivation every season in September. The success has also motivated the village
elders to encourage more farmers to take the plunge into cardamom cultivation
(Bhattacharyya 2017).
The change in the mindset was striking given that joining the rebel ranks was
considered a viable option until recently by a sizeable number of the youth in
such militancy-ravaged pockets in the Northeast.The transformation can be attrib-
uted to a combination of factors including war weariness, changed aspirations
of the younger generation, easy access to information through technology and
efforts made by the government to promote development in the eastern districts
of the state. More young men and women are venturing out to the neighbor-
ing towns in the state in search of jobs and those that have stayed back are look-
ing for avenues of gainful employment. Residents are also keen to attract more
tourists for the annual Aoling festival, which celebrates the arrival of spring and
FIGURE 4.2 Cardamom farming, Longwa.

Source: Fieldwork, September, 2016
the Konyak new year.6 Some families (from Nagaland) have even enrolled their
children in a Myanmarese school named Amaka Longwa Theinka Primary School
in the village with the hope of getting jobs in the neighboring country. Interest-
ingly, the trend is being noticed in spite of the presence of two schools under
the Nagaland government and a school run by missionaries in the village. Free
education in the Myanmarese school is an incentive but there is also the belief
that passing out of the school could offer employment in the development pro-
jects to be launched by Naypyidaw in the Konyak region in Myanmar. A newly
built non-concrete road meandering through the hills from Longwa was visible
that will soon link up with Loji and beyond to more settlements in Myanmar.7
Interestingly, this trend seems to be concurrent with the increase in the number of
young men from Myanmar arriving in Nagaland either for menial jobs or treat-
ment of diseases.8 The changed policy of Tatmadaw that has led to cordial ties with
the Nagas is undoubtedly a factor contributing to the increased and unhindered
movement of people across the border.
Gone are the days when Tatmadaw was viewed as a tyrant that would frequently
descend on the villages to loot and burn. Its policy toward the Naga inhabited
region underwent a marked change from 2001 when an informal understand-
ing was firmed up with the NSCN (K) which was later converted into a written
agreement in 2012 (Bhattacharyya 2014, 286). It may be mentioned that Tatmadaw
has concluded ceasefire agreements with numerous rebel groups in the country
since 1989 but only a few were written agreements, which proves the importance
accorded to the Nagas. This also explains why the army has been reluctant to
demolish the rebel camps and training facilities in Sagaing Division in spite of
repeated pleas from New Delhi. For the first time, the Naypyidaw distributed solar
panels at several villages in the region including Longwa, which was unthinkable
two decades ago.9 Even doctors were dispatched to some villages when news broke
out about people dying from a mysterious disease, which showed symptoms similar
to measles (Myint Kay Thi 2016). Myanmar government officials have also been
spotted on a couple of occasions in the past six years interacting with the inhabit-
ants at Longwa and gathering data on various aspects of the settlement.10
But there is hardly any awareness about border trade either among the inhabit-
ants or government officials despite the fact that Longwa has been cropping up
in academic discourses and government sponsored workshops from time to time.
Residents were totally ignorant about ‘Act East Policy,’ and about the plans by the
Indian government to link up with the neighboring country. A building was also
hurriedly constructed some years ago at the outskirts of the village for promotion
of trade, which now lies in a dilapidated condition. Electric poles were erected
decades ago but they were never connected to the grid for transmission of electric-
ity. The region across the border is even more backward, where modern traits of
civilization like roads, schools, hospitals and power are yet to be seen and where
money as a mode of exchange is just beginning to take root (Bhattacharyya 2014,
60).Villages in the Naga region were known as “Little Republics”; they were usu-
ally self-sufficient although scarcity of food sometimes becomes acute for some
months every year. Their needs are few and items like salt, rice, clothes and medi-
cines are imported through an informal mechanism from different centers in Mon.
Of late, residents from neighboring villages in Myanmar like Hoyat,Thailo and Loji
have also been noticed purchasing cellular phones from Mon town.11 Incidentally,
the network of cellular phones available in Mon also reaches several villages across
the border. In the given circumstances, the immediate prospect of border trade in
Longwa appears to be extremely dim which is also true of most villages along the
state’s border with Myanmar (like Pangsha) already earmarked as hubs of border
trade. But trade through the informal channels could grow albeit at a slow pace,
which is directly proportional to the increase in the income levels and growth of
population.
More items are exported from Mon but opium seems to be a commodity that
has been constantly imported since a long time from Myanmar. It is cultivated in
the remote hills covering a wide expanse of territory in the Konyak, Lainong and
Pangmi regions. It was also reported to be grown in certain pockets of Nagaland,
Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur but the government agencies have been destroy-
ing the cultivated tracts at regular intervals, which contrast sharply with the sce-
nario in the neighboring country. In Myanmar, NSCN (K) imposes a tax on
opium, which is a primary reason why its cultivation would continue to flourish at
least for some more time. During 2008–12, this researcher travelled to some Naga
villages in Myanmar but opium was found to be banned only in Hoyat. Opium
is a key ingredient for the manufacture of heroin but whatever is produced in
Myanmar is consumed locally and the surplus exported to villages in Nagaland

and the eastern districts of Arunachal Pradesh. Addiction to opium continues to
be a bane among the people in this region, which originated during the colonial
era. Groups sitting around the hearth and inhaling long puffs of opium from a
bamboo pipe is not an uncommon sight in the evening in these villages. Addicts
were unequivocal that smoking of opium causes no harm and it cures stomach
ailments. There were varying estimates about the number of addicts in the village
but the majority view is that they were to be found in more than 50 percent of
the households.
However, the church and some civil society organizations are convinced that
addiction to opium causes long-term diseases. Some among them are also of the
opinion that the high incidence of tuberculosis in the region is the result of contin-
uous smoking of opium. Incidentally, Medicins Sans Frontieres treated a large number
of patients suffering from the disease at Mon Civil Hospital with newly created
facilities like special chest ward and designated microscopy center during 2010–14
(Nagaland India). Some groups in the village have also started a campaign against
opium and it is not unusual for teenagers to check the vehicles on the road between
Mon and Longwa for confiscation of the commodity meant for different destina-
tions across the hill state. They were of the view that disruption in the supply chain
between the production and consumption centers could contribute vehemently
toward checking further addiction. They explained that their efforts to eradicate
the menace have found support among organizations active in other parts of the
eastern districts in the hill state.
The network of local groups is fast expanding facilitated by technology, cellular
phone and social media, which are breaking traditional cultural barriers.The impact
is perceptible among the inhabitants of Longwa who not only take pride in identi-
fying themselves as Konyak but also for being part of a larger community residing
on both sides of the border. The Ang (chief) of Longwa exercises jurisdiction over
30 villages with his deputies stationed in every settlement. There are councils in
every village headed by an elder that keeps a tab on the progress of development
schemes sponsored by the government among other functions. The movement for
unity began decades ago, which picked up momentum in the early 1980s due to
the campaign unleashed by the NSCN. Some residents claimed that plans were
firmed up to erect a fence on the border in and around the village after the ambush
by separatist rebel groups in Manipur in 2015 which resulted in the death of 18
army personnel. Subsequently, representations were made from the village to the
Assam Rifles and the legislator voicing opposition to the proposal, which was soon
dropped. Some residents were even heard toying with the idea of making a repre-
sentation to the government with the demand to declare Longwa a ‘special zone’
without a border. Greater connectivity has reinforced ethnicity among the Konyak
themselves and has also contributed toward forging a larger identity as ‘eastern
Nagas’ which is evidenced from the unstinting support of the community and its
leaders to the demand of a separate state by the Eastern Naga People’s Organiza-
tion (ENPO).
ENPO is demanding that the districts of Mon, Kiphire, Tuensang and Longleng
be carved out from the state of Nagaland to form a separate state called Frontier
Nagaland. ENPO is the apex organization of six Naga tribes – Konyak, Khiam-
niungan, Chang, Yimchunger, Sangtam and Phom –inhabiting the four districts.
It had submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2010
urging him to accept the demand while asserting that only a separate state for the
six tribes would bring about socioeconomic development in the border region.
Prior to Nagaland’s attainment of statehood in 1963, the entire area was under the
Tuensang Frontier Division of NEFA and Mon, Kiphire and Longleng emerged as
separate districts after Nagaland was carved out of Assam.The demand was rejected
by the UPA government but it offered a special economic package, which came
only months after an autonomous council was proposed by the state government.
ENPO has refused to accept the package and has been persistent with its demand
for a separate state. A public rally was held on September 14, 2018 in Tuensang to
reaffirm the demand for a separate state, which was unanimously supported by the
representatives of village council associations, gaonbura (village chief) associations,
senior citizens and other groups.
Observation in Hmaungbuchhuah
Separated from Longwa by hundreds of kilometers along the circuitous border is
another village called Hmaungbuchhuah in Lawngtlai district of Mizoram which
displays a pattern of lifestyle and socioeconomic conditions which are similar and
dissimilar to other settlements. Located on the banks of the Sekul river in Bumth-
lang subdivision, the hamlet is inhabited by the Zakai or Rakhine Budhists as they
are called by other local communities. Like other border settlements, they have
ties with members of their community across the border in Myanmar’s Chin State.
The settlement is located 3 km ahead of the international boundary and separated
by a distance of 87 km from the district headquarters of Lawngtlai. According to
one estimate, the population of the Zakai in Lawngtlai would consist of around
2000–2500 out of a total population of 60,000 Budhists in Mizoram.12 Data about
Hmaungbuchhuah is extremely scarce and there is hardly any information avail-
able on the internet. Interaction with the inhabitants reveals that they are heavily
dependent upon jhum cultivation where a range of vegetables are grown through-
out the year. Only shrubs and grass are visible in the hillocks surrounding the vil-
lage with intermittent patches laid completely bare for cultivation. Occasionally,
there is a change in the vegetables that are grown although a few items like rice and
maize are grown every year. The gap between demand and production is fulfilled
by importing food items from Myanmar where cultivation is reportedly done on
a larger scale.
Many settlements on the borderlands are deprived in terms of education and
medical facilities and Hmaungbuchhuah is no exception. Perhaps it would fig-
ure among the hamlets with the least access to such facilities, which is similar to
the condition of some Lisu inhabited villages in Arunachal Pradesh’s Changlang
FIGURE 4.3 Hmaungbuchhuah village, Mizoram.

Source: Fieldwork, March 2018
district.13 A school that was constructed at Hmaungbuchhuah some years ago now
lies abandoned and the district administration does not have any answer to resolve
the issue. There are no teachers who know the Zakai language, nor any books
or syllabus designed specifically for the community. There are no schools across
the border where the children could have enrolled themselves. The few monks
stationed at the monastery in the village sometimes gather the children around
them for informal classes but they are irregular and inconsistent. Families who can
afford to bear the expenses have begun to send their children for studies to far-
off locations in Arunachal Pradesh where residential schools have been established
by Chakmas.14 There was also a young monk in the village who was stationed in
Bangalore but such cases were more an exception than the rule. Education is con-
sidered a privilege, which only a few families can afford for their children.
There is a high incidence of diseases like malaria and jaundice at Hmaungbuch-
huah besides the ailments related to the stomach. Every year, these diseases take a
toll in the absence of either health centers or hospitals in close proximity. The civil
hospital is located at the headquarters in Lawngtlai but availing its services could
depend upon availability of transport. Cases were heard when patients died on the
way to the hospital or within days after being admitted. There was also a patient
who breathed his last as he needed a surgery to be done but there was no surgeon
in the hospital. So, in the village, the adage goes that ‘Prevention is better than
a cure’ as there may not be a cure at all to some diseases. In terms of preventive
measures, some pills that are imported from Myanmar are kept handy, which are
popped whenever there are symptoms like fever and weakness. Besides the local
methods of filter for drinking water using sand and coal, some families also resort to
boiling the water fetched from the Sekul river before consumption. In the absence
of electricity, firewood is the fuel for all the households, which also become scarce
during the rainy season.15 Electric poles were erected early in 2018 but there was
no supply of power.
On a comparative note, the differences between Longwa and Hmaungbuchhuah
are more glaring than the similarities. The Rakhine or Zakai Budhists in Mizoram
are a minority in the district where the Lai have the maximum numbers. The
Lai are Christians, speak a different language and belong to the Kuki-Chin-Mizo
ethnic group that inhabits a wide expanse in Mizoram, Manipur’s Churachandpur
and the Chin State in Myanmar. The district has an autonomous council under the
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, which is one among three such bodies in the
hill state. These councils are called ‘state within a state’ and are meant exclusively to
promote development and protect the interests of local communities. But there has
hardly been any representation in the council from the Zakai since their numbers
are too small to really matter in the politics of the district. Nor is the village visited
by politicians asking for votes during elections, unlike other border settlements
in Mizoram and the Northeast.16 Under such circumstances, the dependence of
the Zakaion the government in Mizoram or its agencies is almost nil as they have
developed their own strategies of sustenance and livelihood. Two shops located at
the heart of the village offer a glimpse of the ties between the village and the settle-
ments across the border. These shops were found to sell a range of items including
shawls, bed sheets, blankets, trousers, hats, footwear, vegetables, dried fish, pickle,
chocolate, etc. manufactured either in China or Myanmar. A shopkeeper disclosed
that even large orders were accepted during certain events, which could take about
a week to deliver. He receives his supplies from locations across the border where
large volumes of all items are stored and which are regularly replenished through
routes linked to far-off cities in Myanmar.
But unlike the Naga inhabited region where an inhabitant can freely travel on
both sides of the border, the movement of the Zakai is restricted on due to disturbed
conditions on the other side of the border. In October 2017, at least 11 soldiers
of the Myanmar Army were killed at Paletwa on the Kaladan river following an
ambush by the Arakan Army along the border of Chin and Rakhine States (Weng
and Naing Zaw 2017). The Arakan Army is a rebel group of ethnic Buddhists and
part of the Northern Alliance consisting of insurgent outfits from the northern
region of Myanmar.The army retaliated with the same ferocity witnessed on several
occasions earlier at different conflict-ridden zones in the country. Zakai inhabited
villages suspected to have given asylum to the militants were burnt, bombed and
hundreds forced to flee their homes in different directions. A month later, a large
group of 1484 refugees including women and children streamed across the border
into Mizoram. Most of them who did not have relatives in these villages were put
up in school buildings and community halls in Zochachhuah, Laitlang, Dumzaut-
lang and Hmawngchhuah across the district. Relief in terms of food, medicine and
FIGURE 4.4 A Local shop in Hmaungbuchhuah village, Mizoram.

Source: Fieldwork, March 2018
clothes was distributed by the district administration, Assam Rifles and local organi-
zations such as the Young Lai Association (YLA) and Mizoram Thalai Kristian Pawl
(MTKP), the youth wing of the Baptist Church of Mizoram (Press Trust of India
2017). Continuous efforts were also on by the government agencies to ensure their
return; the Assam Rifles held a series of meetings with the Myanmar Army but
the task was easier said than done. By March 2108, only 996 refugees could be
persuaded to return while the others preferred to stay back at the refugee camps in
Mizoram. Weeks later there were conflicting reports from across the border but all
of them pointed toward an enhanced presence of the army combating to erode the
adversary’s support bases. According to some inputs, severe restrictions have been
imposed on the villages similar to some Rohingya settlements in the neighboring
Rakhine State of Myanmar. Resettlement has been permitted with a warning to
all residents to abstain from supporting the rebel group (Bhattacharyya 2018a).
Inhabitants from the villages in Mizoram have to produce identity cards and await
permission sometimes to visit neighboring destinations in Myanmar.17
Security forces in Mizoram are alert along the southern border of the state fol-
lowing reports and inputs from the Myanmar army that functionaries of Arakan
Army often take refuge at the Buddhist villages. During the rainy season, there are
areas along the border that remain disconnected for several weeks from the district
headquarters due to dearth of roads and bridges. Efforts are on to eradicate the gaps
and ensure greater surveillance along the entire stretch of the border.18 Another area
of huge concern for Mizoram is the increasing flow of synthetic drugs (like Yaba
and World is Yours) from Myanmar.The most prolific route is through Champhai on
the eastern flank but there are reports that Arakan Army is also involved in the illicit
trade. A section of officials are apprehensive that the rebel group could make efforts
to lure and engage the poor residents of Hmaungbuchhuah and Zochachhuahto
peddle the contraband item.19 However, it must be borne in mind that prolifera-
tion of drugs and weapons depends to a great extent upon connectivity and routes
that must remain hidden from security forces. Under the existing circumstances, it
remains to be seen if the Budhist villages in Lawngtlai can replicate the role of some
settlements in Champhai, which are engaged in the illicit trade.
Residents of Hmaungbuchhuah have pinned high hopes on the multi-crore
Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project envisaged as a key component of the
Act East Policy and aimed at providing an outlet for the landlocked Northeast to
Kolkata through Myanmar. They feel that they would be able to avail alternate and
lucrative sources of income after the project is completed. Their expectations may
not be based on false assumptions but hurdles in both countries have impeded the
project. Work on the project had been stalled many a time following an agitation
from landlords in Lawngtlai who are demanding compensation from the govern-
ment. The uproar is over a plot of 40 acres near a border outpost of the Assam
Rifles at Zochachhuah through which the Kaladan highway would pass through
to Myanmar. Officials are of the view that the impasse would soon be resolved
since the government is keen to offer a package to the landlords. No wonder, the
budget for the 87 kilometers highway between Lawngtlai and Zorinpui which is
financed by the Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways has been revised for
the third time with the initial estimate of Rs 507 crore swelling to Rs 1011 crore.
Two deadlines have already been missed and officials are reluctant to give the next
date for completion of the highway. In March 2018, only 70 percent of the project
was found to have been completed as per official records (Bhattacharyya 2018b).
It is not precisely known if any scheme has been sanctioned so far for widening
National Highway 54 from Lawngtlai to the state’s border with Assam, which cov-
ers a distance of 515 kilometers via Aizawl and Kolasib. Although road conditions
were found to be better than the other hill states such as Nagaland and Arunachal
Pradesh, it is unlikely that the highway would be able to handle a large volume of
traffic in the current conditions. There were bumpy stretches and potholes along
the entire stretch considered the lifeline of Mizoram. At some places, it was difficult
for two vehicles to cross without caution and deft maneuvering. The state govern-
ment has submitted a proposal to the ministry for widening the highway till Silchar
in Assam, which is also the point where the East-West Corridor begins.
In Myanmar, the construction of the Sittwe Port connecting the Kaladan river
in Rakhine State, construction of a river terminal 158 km upstream at Paletwa and
dredging of the river have been completed so far. There are reports indicating that
the impasse over the 109-km road project that connects Paletwa river terminal to
Zorinpui on the Mizoram border in Myanmar has drawn to a close. The 1,600-
crore project has been awarded to Delhi-based C&C Constructions in June 2017.
But the contractor had to wait till the next year for the mandatory clearances
from the Myanmar government to start the groundwork (Ranjan Bose 2018). The
Myanmar government might have been dragging its feet over the scheme owing
to the disturbed conditions in the region and the increasing activities of Arakan
Army. The road from Zorinpui to Paletwa passes through several strongholds of
the rebel group, which has already launched an offensive against the army. Conflict
had erupted again toward the fag end of 2018 after the army retaliated against
the rebels in northern Rakhine State (Hnin Pwint 2018). It remains to be seen
if the construction of the highway from Zorinpui to Paletwa takes off soon or if
it remains stalled due to the disturbed conditions. Therefore, under the prevailing
circumstances, it is hazardous to envisage an early timeframe for the completion of
the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project.
Conclusion
In retrospect, the issues of security, ethnicity and connectivity are found to be
interlinked in varying degrees along the Indo–Myanmar borderland, which have
been shaped by a gamut of factors ranging from the historical to the current devel-
opments. Longwa and Hmaungbuchhuah depict different scenarios where the
interplay of these factors has engendered different strategies of subsistence and
adaptation.The observations also reveal that the pace and direction of social change
depend much upon the nature and extent of social, economic and political ties with
power centers and social groups on both sides of the border. But irrespective of
these factors, awareness about Act East Policy and the plan to link up with Myan-
mar so assiduously promoted by New Delhi are extremely low along the border
which points to the inescapable conclusion that there exists a wide gulf between
the ground reality and the declared policies and objectives.
Notes
1 John Hutton’s view is that the Nagas immigrated from Borneo while other theories sug-
gest that they came from southeastern China. See Hutton (1921).
2 The Census of 2011 recorded 5132 inhabitants at Longwa in Nagaland. Also based on
interview (September 20–22, 2016) with Tongyei, the king (Ang) of Longwa and other
residents in Longwa (India & Myanmar).
3 Interview (December 2011–January 2012) with PareshBaruah, ULFA chief of staff,
Sagaing Division, Myanmar. Interview (December 23–24, 2011) with S S Khaplang,
NSNC (K) Chairman, Sagaing Division, Myanmar. Also see, Lintner (1996).
4 For more details, see Bhattacharyya (2014).
5 Based on a visit to northern Sagaing Division (13 October 2011–31 January 2012) to
interview ULFA Chief of Staff Paresh Baruah and NSCN-K Chairman S.S. Khaplang at
Hukwang Valley. The author returned through a route that began at Taga and ended at
Longwa.
6 Interview (September 20–22, 2016) with residents of Longwa.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview (September 20–22, 2016) with Abon Konyak, resident of Loji village in
Myanmar who stays in Longwa.
9 Interview (September20–22, 2016) with Abon Konyak, resident of Loji village in Myanmar
who stays in Longwa. Solar panels were also seen by the author at Longwa in September
2016.
10 Interview (September 20–22, 2016) with residents of Longwa.

11 Interview (September 23, 2016) with a government official, Mon.
12 Interview (March 1–3, 2018) with government officials in Lawngtlai, Mizoram.
13 The author visited a Lisu village near Namdapha National Park at Changlang in
Arunachal Pradesh in November 2013.
14 Interview (March 3, 2018) with residents of the Hmaungbuchhuah village, Mizoram.
18 Interview (March 5, 2018) with a police official, Aizawl.
19 Interview (5 March 2018) with a police official, Aizawl.
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5
TERRITORIALITY, ETHNIC
CONTESTATION AND INSURGENCY
IN THE INDO–MYANMAR
BORDERLAND
Ngamjahao Kipgen
In October 2016, the External Affairs Minister of India, Sushma Swaraj requested
the Myanmar Government to take steps in order to protect a banyan tree at Kham-
pat in Sagaing region of northwestern Myanmar, which is regarded as the Mizo
(Lushai) family tree (Assam Tribune, 13 October 2016; Barooah Pisharoty 2016).
About 60 miles from Kalemyo on the road to the border town Tamu lies astride a
small and insignificant town called Khampat,1 a walking distance from Muolcham,
the nearest village on the Indian side of the border. Much of the Kuki-Chin2 leg-
ends are indeed associated with Khampat – it has been known and recognized as
one of the earliest sedentary settlements of the Kuki-Chin people. Legend has it
that before the dispersal from the Kale-Kabaw valley,3 they planted at Khampat a
banyan tree (buong thing or bung pui) and took a pledge that they would return to
Khampat, their permanent home, when the sapling had grown into a tree and its
hanging roots had turned into new stems (Vumson 1986, 58–59). The myths of the
Khampat banyan tree were fostered by the Buddhist monks, and Kuki-Chin people
who have emigrated to the Kale-Kabaw valley have used the legend as justification
for their migration to the area (Lehman 1979). The legend depicts the Kuki-Chin
people lebensraum. The geographical divisions of the Kuki-Chins initially created
by the British colonialists, and were later reinforced by international boundaries in
the postcolonial era.
Often, the Indo–Myanmar borderlands have been seen only from the perspec-
tive of the colonial and postcolonial states which see the border as the “outer land
limits” (Nail 2016; Newman 2003). Cederlof (2014) situates the Indo–Myanmar
borderland at the crossroads of old commercial trade routes between India, Burma,
and China. Sanjib Baruah (2005) also strongly argued that Northeast India’s ties –
historical, cultural, social, and economic – do not stop at these international boundaries.
Far from this, the people of the Indo-Burma borderland share more commonalities
and have closer affinities with those of the Southeast than with their fellow men
80 Ngamjahao Kipgen
and women in the Indian mainland. According to Baud and van Schendel (1997)
borderlands are home to ‘borderland societies’ with a distinctive socio-cultural, lin-
guistic, economic, and political character. In fact Baud and van Schendel argue that
the ‘borderland people’ are so different from everyone else that they feel ‘ethnically
and emotionally part of another, nonstate entity’ (1997, 227, 233).
Drawing upon recent trends in historical researches, this chapter deals with a
marginal ‘hill people’ in Northeast India and Upper Burma who did not themselves
form a state, but had both resisted and collaborated with different state-building
projects in Burma/Myanmar and India. van Schendel (2005) has argued that if
we are to understand the state effect, we need to take seriously the experiences
and history of the people whose lives were turned upside down by the creation
of new international borders where none had existed before. The ‘ethnohistory’
(Dirks 2007 [1987]) and ‘ethnogenesis’ (Anderson 1999) of a fringe group like the
Kuki-Chin ethnic group demonstrates the nature of community–state relations
in an Asian borderland across the colonial and postcolonial periods. Reduced to
an ethnic minority, the Kuki-Chin had been at the imperial edge of the Brit-
ish Raj before it got sandwiched between the two modern nation states – India
and Burma (Myanmar). The chapter is a case study of the Kuki-Chins, known by
different names in the region and its neighboring states. Generally identified as
Kuki in other Northeastern states of India, they are called Mizo in the Mizo Hills
(Mizoram) and Chin in Myanmar/Burma. In general, it represents the perspective
of ‘transborder people’ (Weiner 1985; Campion 2017), who constitute the minor-
ity in the states in which they live (Asiwaju 1985, 1–2) today but have ‘entangled
histories’ (Randeria 2006).
The chapter tries to understand the Indo–Myanmar borderlands as a space where
colonial and postcolonial borders have had serious repercussions on the relationship
of people of the same ethnic community, and on the other hand the revival of rela-
tionships across the border through the efforts of the people themselves relatively
recently with the assertion and expression of ethnic nationalism. In other words, it
is an attempt to examine the connected history of ‘transborder’ people within the
broad framework of border and relationship. The emergence of Zomia, coined by
Willem van Schendel, as a culturally distinct area comprising upland/highland of
Northeast India and Southeast Asia against lowland civilization (van Schendel 2002;
Scott 2009) has set a new paradigm and perspective of area study beyond border.
Colonial record and rule: open borderland and fixed

boundaries
Colonial ethnographers and British officers who served in Burma (Myanmar),
Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh) and Northeast region of India have written
about the Kuki, Lushai (Mizo) and the Chins. They have emphasized the linguistic
affinities among these groups. A remarkable feature among them is that mem-
bers of different groups can converse with one another while using their respec-
tive dialects. The Kuki-Chins4 are an ethnic people comprising numerous clans.
Territoriality, ethnic contestation 81
These clans share a common past, culture, customs and traditions (Shakespear 1912;
Hutton 1929; Shaw 1929; Gangte 1993).
In colonial records, the first reference to the Kukis was made in 1777 A.D., when
these tribesmen attacked the British subjects in Chittagong when Warren Hastings
was the Governor General of Bengal (Shakespear 1912, 1). E. T. Dalton (1872, 44)
traces the use of the term to an article written by Surgeon McCrea in the Asiatic
Researcher (24 January 1799) who described the Kukis as a ‘nation of hunters and
warriors.’ C. A. Soppitt (1976 [1893]) in his book A Short Account of the Kuki-Lushai
Tribes on the North East Frontier wrote that all the tribes grouped under ‘Kuki’ had
much in common, both in terms of language, manners, customs, and in terms of the
system of traditional governance.
Similarly, Carey and Tuck, who were the first to bring the Chin under the system
of British administration recorded that the term Chin is ‘the Burmese corruption
of the Chinese ‘Jin’ or ‘Jen’ meaning ‘man or people’’ (Carey and Tuck 1976, 3).The
Chin and several of its synonymous names generally means ‘People’ and the name
Chinland is generally translated as ‘Our Land’ reflecting the strong fundamental
relationship they maintain with their land (Lian Uk 1968, 2). Evidently, the word
‘Chin’ had been used from the very beginning not only by the Chin themselves but
also by neighboring peoples, such as the Kachin, Shan and Burman, to denote the
people who occupied the valley of the Chindwin River.5
In Assam and Bengal, the Chin tribes who live close to that area were known as
‘Kuki.’ The term Kuki is Bengali word, meaning ‘hill-people or highlanders,’ which
was, as Reid described in 1893:
[O]riginally applied to the tribe or tribes occupying the tracks immediately

to the south of Cachar. It is now employed in a comprehensive sense, to indi-
cate those living to the west of the Kaladyne River, while to the west they
are designated as Shendus. On the other hand, to anyone approaching them
from Burma side, the Shendus would be known as Chiang, synonymous with
Khyen, and pronounced as “Chin.”
(Reid 1893, 238)
G. A. Grierson (1904) in his monumental work, The Linguistic Survey of India has clas-
sified the Kuki-Chin as a sub-family of the Tibeto-Burman family. In 1912, Lt. Colo-
nel Shakespear declared that the term Kuki refers to a group of closely allied clans,
having well-marked cultural characteristics and belonging to the Tibeto-Burman
stock. He stated that ‘on the Chittagong border, the term is loosely applied to most
of the inhabitants of the interior hills beyond Chittagong Hill Tracts.’ He concluded
by writing, ‘Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Kukis, Lushais and Chins are
all of the same race’ (Shakespear 1912, 8). William Shaw (1929, 16), a British civil
servant who served in Assam wrote that ‘the Koms, Aimols, Khotlangs, Thadous,
Lushais, Chins, Pois, Suktes, Paites, Gangtes and so on are undoubtedly all con-
nected,’ and are Kukis. If we analyze their customs, there is a ‘common principle’6
running through them all (Shaw 1929, 16).
82 Ngamjahao Kipgen
When the British colonizers suddenly intervened on the historical scene, the
process for the formation of paramount chiefs had been set in motion in the Chin
Hills and the Lushai Hills. The traditional territorial base of the Kuki-Chin was in
the Northern Chin Hills till large parts of this tract were ceded to the jurisdiction
of Manipur by the Boundary Commission of 1894. It is important to note that prior
to the advent of the British colonialists, Kukis were an independent people ruled by
their chieftains. In order to understand the territorial distribution and relative politi-
cal standing of the Kuki-Chin at the end of the 19th century AD, it is imperative to
look into the practices of Boundary Survey and administrative arrangement under
British colonial rule. On September 28, 1892, the Political Officer of Chin Hills
submitted “a scheme in detail for the future administration of the Chin Hills”7 (and
entered the number of tribes inhabiting the Northern Chin Hills as five in number,
namely, Nwite (Guite),Yoe (Zou),Thadou, Kamhow (Kamhau) and Siyin (Sihzang).
The first four mentioned are the northern most and the last the southern most.
The separation of British India and Burma in 1937 and the Partition of India in
1947 created arbitrary boundaries, dividing many ethnic groups such as the Kuki-
Chins and placed them into different nation-states. These borders were created by
uninformed and indifferent colonial overlords, who took decisions from a distance
by ignoring geographical and historical realities, ethno-demography and economic
interdependence, resulting in disorder to their lifeworld. This colonial geopolitics
has been exacerbated by the hardening of international borders ever since 1947.
Here, I concur with van Schendel that ‘borders not only join what is different but
also divide what is similar’ (2005, 9).
The Kuki-Chin ethnic groups have more in common with the population liv-
ing across the boundary than with their own nationals. So long as the national
boundaries which separated the different civilizations were relaxed, the ethnic
groups in the region lived in peaceful coexistence with each other and acted as a
buffer against the intrusion of people from the other side (Nongbri 1995, 53). The
affinity of groups with their kin groups across the border and the sense of support
(both material and non-material) they derive from them have had serious implica-
tions (Datta 2000). Furthermore, after 1947, there came into existence a bounded
nation-state due to endeavours by national governments and popular movements
to close off, regulate and suppress mobility across national borders more rigorously
than ever before, with a goal to defend national territory against foreign threats
and to secure national territory against internal disruption that might be fed by
forces across the border (Ludden 2003, 12). All these brought about the regulation
and restriction of mobility across borders in India’s northeast and worked against
the interests of the transborder communities such as the Kuki-Chins, who, despite
these divisions and restriction of movements, continue to maintain their age-old
ties. According to Karin Dean (2005), these communities have ‘creatively adjusted
to the dominating international system of the states’ and despite being citizens of
different states, they are ‘united through a tight unique kinship lineage network of
various spatial trajectories and social bonds, a commonly recognized lingua franca
and a variety of tangible ethnic features.’
In the next section,the chapter discusses that the Kuki-Chin are one people,a nation,
and were always independent before the British annexed part of their territory—
and may be regarded as part of the process of constructing an ‘ethnie.’ Here, my
analysis corroborates Anthony Smith’s seminal observation on formation and main-
tenance of ethnie, ethnic and nationalist identities (1986, 16).
Invoking an ‘Ethnie’: historical connection and

territoriality of the Kuki-Chins
Ethnic identification among the tribal groups in Northeast India and elsewhere
has centred on territorial affiliation (Sarkar 2006, 8) and claims for ancestral land
based on past history (myths, songs and lores). Traditional accounts of the origin of
the Kuki-Chin people have been obscured by myths and mythologies that together
with symbols, values and other collective memories are important elements of what
Clifford Geertz (1983) called ‘primordial identities,’ which so often define and dif-
ferentiate the Kuki-Chin as a distinctive people and nationality throughout history.
Here I follow Baud and van Schendel’s (1997) bottom-up perspectives on border-
lands, using oral history, by considering the experiences of the Kuki-Chins of India
and Myanmar. In their self-perception, the Kuki-Chin groups believe that all of
them originated from the same place, they have a common social origin and share
descent. All sources of Kuki-Chin traditions maintain that their ancestors origi-
nated from ‘Chinlung’ or ‘Sinlung’ or ‘Khul’ which always means ‘cave’ or ‘hole’ no
matter what the dialect.8 This myth of social origin from a khul is well-documented
in the writings of Shakespear (1912, 91–94), Shaw (1929, 24–26), Carey and Tuck
(1976 [1896], 142), Parry (1976 [1932, 4), and Gangte (1993, 14–16), who stressed
that the present day clans are descendants of the same progenitor.
This myth of social origin is narrated even today and is the subject of folk songs
and stories. The location of the particular khul is uncertain, but its enlivening sig-
nificance continues even today. The Kuki-Chin nomenclature acquired functional
administrative utility during the colonial period. Nevertheless a mythology of com-
mon brotherhood has affirmed kinship among all these cognate groups. Kuki-
Chin comprises numerous agnate clans with shared cultural roots. For instance,
Mizo became an official terminology when the Lushai Hills district of Assam was
changed in 1954 to the Mizo Hills district.
Territorial habitation has strongly defined Kuki-Chin identity and represen-
tation in colonial discourse. According to Volume 13 of the 1962 edition of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1962, 15), Kuki is the ‘name given to a group of tribes
inhabiting both sides of the mountains dividing Assam and Bengal from Burma,
south of the Namtaleik River.’ In this sense, the term Kuki is used as a reference for
a group of people living in a specific geography.
Captain R. B. Pemberton (1985 [1835], 16–18) made a remark that the Kukis,
inhabiting the inaccessible broad belt between Tipperah and Chindwin River, lived
in a state of splendid isolation.9 The Kuki-Chin claimed to have their own state
in the Chindwin Valley from where they fled the advancing Shan and Burman
84 Ngamjahao Kipgen
state-building projects.10 That they might at some point have settled in the valley
and lived in a walled city possibly under a ruler of their own, is corroborated by
their deep-seated oral traditions. Captain Lewin (1870) described the Kukis as ‘men
who live in the interior part of the hills.’ Later when he became the Deputy Com-
missioner of Chittagong Hill Tracts in 1870, he stated,
The Looseis [Lushais], commonly called the Kookis [Kukis] are a powerful
and independent people, who touch the borders of Chittagong Hill Tracts.
They extended in numberless hordes north and north-east until they reach
Cachar on the one hand, and the frontiers of Burma on the other.
(Lewin 1870, 130)
Dalton wrote, ‘The hill country occupied by them [Kukis] extends from the Val-
ley of the Koladyne, where they touch on the Khumis to Northern Kachar and
Manipur; a distance of about 300 miles’ (1872, 44). An excerpt that provides a
glimpse of the Kuki territory is available in the writing of G. A. Grierson (1904):
The territory inhabited by the Kuki tribes extends from the Naga Hills in
the north down into the Sandoway District of Burma in the south; from
Myittha River in the east, almost to the Bay of Bengal in the west . . . From
here a great mass of mountain ridges starts southwards, enclosing the alluvial
valley of Manipur, and thence spreads out westwards to the south of Sylhet. It
then runs almost due north and south, with cross-ridges of smaller elevation,
through the districts known as the Chin Hills, the Lushai Hills, Hill Tipperah,
and the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
The British managed to colonize Burma and thus the Chin Hills after invading as
many as three times before they finally defeated it in January 1886 (Donnison 1953,
28). Like much of Southeast Asia, the Chin Hills were subjected to colonial rule,
which lasted from 1824 to 1947. The Chin Hills were administered as part of Ara-
kan Division and the American missionaries began arriving in the 1890s and, by the
middle of the 20th century, most of the Chin people had converted to Christianity.
The ancestral domains of the Kuki-Chins were brought into British India and
British Burma after the ‘Anglo-Kuki war 1917–1919’ or ‘Kuki rising 1917–1919’11
(also recorded as Kuki Rebellion). Borders were drawn dividing the Kuki-Chin into
India, Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh) and Burma (Myanmar).There is some con-
sensus that they are now known in Burma/Myanmar, Bangladesh and India as Chin,
Kuki or Bawm and the Lushai or Mizo respectively (Lehman 1963). Subsequently
the British employed these terms to christen these ‘wild hill tribes’ living in the ‘un-
administered area.’ Colonial administrators eventually made these assigned titles legal.
The Kuki-Chin ethno-nationalist movement

The Kuki-Chin ethnic nationalist movement has continually raised issues of ethnic-
ity and identity.The origins of the Kuki-Chin movement can be traced back to the
Anglo-Kuki wars of 1845–71. This was a time when the British Empire expanded
its hegemony in various parts of India. British incursions into the Kuki territories
threatened the Kukis’ local self-regulatory powers and led to hostilities between
them and the British. Haokip (1998, 73) summarizes how, faced with threats to
their supremacy, the Kukis led by their chiefs held meetings at various places in the
hills to organize a concerted campaign against the British and drive them out from
their ancestral land (Zale’n-gam). They fought the British as early as 1845 and until
1871. The British themselves, who recorded it as the Great Kuki Invasion of the
1860s, have chronicled accounts of this Great War.12 A series of further battles in
1872 and 1888, followed by the Anglo-Chin war of 1889–90 in Burma, preceded
the Anglo-Kuki war of 1917–1919 in British India known as ‘The First Kuki War
of Independence.’13 After this Great War, the Kukis of this area were subjugated, like
the other communities, to British control and they dispersed to many more places.
Historically, it can be argued that the Chin Hills formed an independent state
entity, which was never part and parcel of the ancient kingdoms of Burma and India
(Stevenson 1943, iv–x).14 When the area was merged into the Union of Burma in
1947, the Panglong Conference Agreement with Burman leaders, sought to secure
some degree of continued autonomy for the Chin people. With the partition in
1947, the Panglong Agreement formed the Union of Burma,15 and the Chin state
leaders headed by Vumkhohau Thuantak, with Burman, Shan and Kachin leaders,
participated in the Panglong Conference which discussed the future of an inde-
pendent Union of Burma.16 The members of this conference believed that the
Shans, Kachins and Chins would more speedily achieve freedom by giving imme-
diate cooperation to the interim Burmese government.The members attending the
conference agreed to cooperate without any dissent.17
The Chin Hills representatives produced a Charter of Demands, to be presented
to His Majesty’s Government of Burma, submitted on 19 April 1947 at Maymyo
to the Frontier Enquiry Commission, signed by all 19 representatives from the four
subdivisions of the Chin Hills (Khupzago 1988, 114–119). Numerous demands
related to equal rights for the Chin people after federation with Burma, appropri-
ate representation of their voices and needs, financial provisions for local entities
and adequate community representation at central level. There was even a demand
for some form of affirmative action for access of tribal people to education and
employment. Significantly, item (xv) still refers to the possibility of secession in case
of severe disagreement, though there was a desire to become an integral part of
Burma (Furnivall 1960, 111–113).
However, the draft constitution was amended, betraying both in letter and spirit
of the Panglong agreement (Vumson 1986). Neither the Panglong Agreement of
February 12, 1947 nor the Frontier Enquiry Commission of April 19, 1947 yielded
any positive results and benefits for the Chins as expected by them. The hope of
the Shan, Kachin and Chin people that freedom would be more speedily achieved
if immediate cooperation was extended to the interim Burmese government was a
far cry (Maung 1961, 229). Much discontentment arose among the Chin leaders at
the obstinate attitude of the Burmese government, while poverty and underdevel-
opment in the region continued. Poverty led many Chins to serve in the Myanmar
86 Ngamjahao Kipgen
Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), instead of devoting themselves to local politics or other

activities. Indeed, this became the only career open for them (Fredholm 1993, 180).
The administration of free Burma soon fell into chaos, however, partly because
various ethnic minority nationals were preparing to severe ties with Burma, hop-
ing to declare independence for themselves. As ethnic insurgency grew in Burma,
in 1948, Captain Mang Tung formed the Chin People’s Movement for the Rights
of the People. This challenged the hereditary community leadership and led to the
birth of the Chin National Day on February 20, 1948. In 1957, the Chin People’s
Freedom League and the Chin Union were amalgamated to protect the rights of
Chin people under the constitution. In 1964, after General Ne Win’s military coup
in 1962, an Anti-communist Freedom Organization was formed to struggle for
the Chin people.18 In 1969, Pu Tial Khal formed the Chin Liberation Front and
became its president, with Thawmluai as vice-president and Thong Sei (Thawng
Sai) as secretary of foreign affairs.19
Also, in India, the Kuki National Assembly (KNA) was formed in 1946 with the
primary objective of fostering consciousness of common identity and making a sin-
gle political unit of the Kukis. KNA also planned to establish a pan-Kuki platform
for the Kuki-Chin groups of Manipur. The Kuki National Assembly had submit-
ted a representation to the then Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
wherein it demanded the creation of a Kuki state way back in 1960 (Kuki State
1960). Similarly, the Chins have launched an agitation in support of their demand
for the creation of an independent ‘Chinland’ comprising parts of India, Burma
[Myanmar] and Pakistan [Bangladesh].20 The Mizo National Front (MNF) formed
in 1963 adopted a similar map projection as Grierson’s (1904) Kuki country during
its movement from 1960s to 1986. The MNF demand creation of ‘Mizoram’ as an
independent and sovereign state. It was a major political movement of the ethnic
people since India gained independence. In 1964, Kuki National Assembly sup-
ported the Manipur Mizo Integration Council (MMIC) for a single administrative
unit.21 The Mizo People’s Convention was held at Kawnpui in Churachandpur
from 15–18 January 1965. The main agenda was ‘Territorial Integrity’ and crea-
tion of one Administrative Unit for the Kuki-Mizo people called ‘Mizoram State’
(Vumson 1986, 278).
In 1986, the Mizo Accord was signed between the MNF and the Government
of India. However, the Accord failed to achieve the principal objective of ‘Territo-
rial Integrity’ and one Administrative Unit. However, as mentioned above, the Mizo
Accord, signed with the Government of India in 1986, relates only to the erstwhile
Lushai Hills, which represents a fraction of Kuki country. Only the former Lushai
Hills became the state of Mizoram. The fall out of this lack of MNF leaders’ politi-
cal vision is immense, particularly in Manipur. Just six years after 1986, from 1992,
the NSCN (IM)-led Nagas carried out a massive pogrom against the Kukis, which
lasted until 1997.
On the Burmese side, official reluctance to grant more autonomy prompted
the reorganization of various Chin insurgent groups. Prominent among these are
the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) and Chin Liberation
Army (CLA). As discussed, by 1947–48, they were divided into three new postco-
lonial nation-states in their traditional territory. However, since amalgamation of
the Kuki-Chin territories of India, Burma/ Myanmar and Bangladesh is clearly
not possible across the various international boundaries, at present, the CNF/CNA
are India-based Myanmar movements and the KNA/Kuki National Organiza-
tion (KNA/KNO) is an India-based movement operating partly in Myanmar and
mainly in India.
Mention may be made here that the institution of church plays a fomenting role
in forging the Kuki-Chin ethnic group. Kuki-Chin Baptist Union (KCBU) was
formed as a federal union among the Baptist denominations. It began as a consulta-
tion of the Kuki-Chin Baptist leaders. The constituent members were Kuki Baptist
Convention (KBC), Chongthu Baptist Association (CHBA), Chin Baptist Associa-
tion (CBA), Gangte Baptist Association (GBA), Thadou Baptist Association (TBA),
Vaiphei Baptist Association (VBA) and Kom-Rem Baptist Association (KRBCA)
etc. The outcome of the various consultations was the publication of a research
book entitled In Search of Identity (Haokip 1986, 1–2) in 1986 and also the hold-
ing of a Conference from February 25-March 1, 1993 at Keithelmanbi village in
Manipur (Haolai 1994, 19). The KCBU has greatly contributed to the unification
of Kuki-Chin ethnic people spiritually, emotionally and politically.
The Kuki-Chin insurgency

The failure of the central and state governments to acknowledge the peaceful
demand of the Kukis for a separate state in the 1960s (Kuki National Assembly,
Memorandum), betrayal of Mizo National Front (MNF) in the 1980s and the terri-
torial acquisitiveness and hegemonic policies of the Meitei and Naga insurgents in
the past few decades have led to the emergence of Kuki revolutionary movement.
The attainment of Mizoram statehood by the MNF not only frustrated but also
greatly inspired the Kuki-Chins, at first especially in Burma. Within three to four
months, on June 20, 1987, the Zomi Liberation Front (ZLF) was formed to strive
for a free state for the Zomis in Burma, as done by the MNF for the Mizos.
In post-independent India, many tribal communities in the Northeast region
gained separate statehood in due course, while most Kuki communities were left
out which led to various insurgency movements. In response to this, on May 18,
1987, the Kuki National Front (KNF) was formed under the leadership of (Late)
Pu Nehlun Kipgen at Molnoi village (Myanmar) to secure a separate ‘Kuki state’
within the Indian Union by integrating all KUKI INHABITED areas of Manipur.22
In a statement, Pu Nehlun wrote that:
The long sufferings and sacrifices of the Kukis, the pains and the agony of our
forebears, are however not put into oblivion by the younger generation today.
Having witnessed and experienced the step-motherly attitude and treatment
from the Government of India for many decades since India’s independence,
the young generations of the eighties pledged to take up arms and resolved to
88 Ngamjahao Kipgen
fight until a separate state for the Kukis is carved out within the framework
of Indian constitution.
(The Shillong Times, 1 October 1993)
The birth of Kuki revolutionary organizations in the late 1980s was seen as a
continuation of the unfulfilled aspiration that was initiated by the Kuki National
Assembly (KNA). According to T. S. Gangte, the KNF was established to acceler-
ate the demand earlier raised by the KNA in the 1960s for creating a Kuki state
(Gangte 2007, 136).
The other group called the Kuki National Army (KNA) was founded in 1988
under the leadership of (L) Pu Thangkholun Haokip. Since then the KNA has been
fighting to carve out a separate homeland for the Kukis living in Myanmar. Noted
journalist Phanjoubam has observed that ‘the underground KNA aims at achieving
an independent sovereign Kuki state by carving out the Kuki-populated areas of
Myanmar and portion of Kuki inhabited districts of Manipur’ (2004, 171). Since
the late 1980s, the Kuki National Organization (KNO) and its arm wing KNA
have redrawn the map of Zale’n-gam by expanding the boundaries including some
other parts of NORTH EASTERN India.
Zale’n-gam is an ideological concept propounded by P. S. Haokip (Haokip 2008),
which means ‘freedom of the people in their land.’ It encapsulates and expounds
the essence of Kuki history and nationalism and the restoration of the erstwhile
Kuki territory in the precolonial period.23 To understand Zale’n-gam, I have drawn
upon Benedict Anderson’s (1991) concept of ‘imagined community.’24 As discussed,
the Kukis (India/Manipur), the Chins (Myanmar), the Mizos (Mizoram), although
separated by different political boundaries, share the same social origin as evident
in their common folklore, myths and legends.The motive and the intention behind
Zale’n-gam is their desire to unify all the Kuki inhabited areas into a single adminis-
trative unit.25 Oommen had argued ‘some nations are subjected to ethnification as a
result of a division of their ancestral homeland into two or more territories, thereby
endangering their integrity as nations’ (1997, 14). The KNO, under the leadership
of, has propagated the ideology of Zale’n-gam which will unite the erstwhile ances-
tral domain of the Kukis prior to British rule and restore the Kuki nation (23rd
KNO Raising Day Message, 24 February 2010).
The next section discusses the ethnic conflict arising from the question of “land”
and claims for “exclusive territory” vis-à-vis “identity” in the context of Manipur
state in India.
Politics of contiguous homeland and ethnic contestation

Fraser (1995) has rightly argued that the contention that the ‘struggle for recogni-
tion’ is fast becoming the paradigmatic form of political conflict since the later
part of 20th century. And one of the most obvious aspects concern articulations
of ethno-nationalist identities, groups seeking recognition and rights on the basis
of being a people, an ethnic group or a nation (Baruah 2005). Contestations over
claims and counter claims over territory on ethnic lines have been building up since
the British rule in the Northeast region of India. With such overlapping and some-
times opposing territorial claims, it can hardly come as a surprise to anyone that
ethnic mobilization and identity politics, more generally, easily take on a violent
and socially destructive character (Vandenhelsken and Karlsson 2016). The growth
of political consciousness among the hill people in contemporary Manipur, ethnic
belonging too has got tangled with the claims over territory. The present political
map of the state of Manipur is based on the creation of the British. In fact the term
Manipur ‘is not used at all until the British period’ (Parrat 2005, 14). As much as the
Kukis (KNF and KNA) claimed a Kuki homeland, the Nagas claimed large parts of
Manipur as Naga territory. Like the Kukis demand, the Nationalist Socialist Coun-
cil of Nagalim–Isaac Muivah (NSCN-IM), a Naga insurgent group established in
1980 also has the agenda of bringing the Nagas under one common political entity.
The history of inter-ethnic relationship in Manipur reached a turning point
when the ethnic clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis broke out in the early
1990s. These ethnic clashes have promoted ethnic nationalism. The territorial
claims of the Kukis pursued by the Kuki insurgents overlap the territorial demands
of the Nagas (NSCN-IM) in Manipur. In short, it is this overlapping territorial
interest which has embroiled the two communities and led to violent clashes dur-
ing the 1990s. The Nagas see the Kukis as an obstacle to their long cherished goal
of ethnic unification of all Naga inhabited areas. While the Naga insurgents have
been consistently demanding the integration of all Naga inhabited areas in north
east India (including the hill districts in Manipur), the Kuki insurgents have upheld
a separate Kuki state (Kukiland) with Manipur as its bastion within the Union of
India (Memorandum of KNF submitted to Prime Minister of India on August 2006).
A memorandum submitted by the Delhi-based Kuki Students’ Organization
(KSOD) to the Prime Minister of India on June 27, 2001, highlighted how the
landholdings of the Kukis on their ancestral land are greater than those of the Nagas
(Gangte 2007, 96). However, the Naga ethnic armies under the aegis of NSCN
(IM) made strategic attempts to wipe out the Kukis from their place of habitation
through ‘ethnic cleansing’ to strengthen their claims of a sovereign Nagalim.
It is worth recalling that the NSCN (IM) ‘ethnic cleansing’ policy against the
Kukis during the 1990s had killed more than 900 Kukis, uprooted more than 350
villages while over 50,000 Kukis had been displaced (Haokip 2004). Tarapot Phan-
joubam, a senior representative of Press Trust of India (PTI) based at Imphal, has
given the statistics that 534 persons, including 391 Kukis and 143 Nagas were killed
and 4900 houses, of which 2649 belonged to the Kukis and 2251 to the Nagas,
were burnt down.The highest toll occurred in 1993 wherein 320 persons including
260 Kukis and 60 Nagas were killed, 138 others injured inclusive of 69 Kukis and
Nagas each were injured, and 3520 houses inclusive of 2144 for Kukis and 1376 for
Naga were also burnt down (till the day of December 10, 1995). He further added
that during 1992 to 1999, more than 900 people inclusive of 534 Kukis and 266
Nagas were killed while others (257 Kuki and 223 Naga) sustained injuries, and
5724 houses of which 3110 belonged to the Kukis and 2614 to the Nagas were set
90 Ngamjahao Kipgen
ablaze (Phanjoubam 2007 [2004], 200).The Naga-Kuki clashes throughout North-

east India have left hundreds dead in the 1980s and 1990s. This indicates, in prin-
ciple, how conflicting homeland demands could lead to ethnic cleansing in pursuit
of ‘pure ethnic states’ (Bhaumik 2004, 231).
The issue of Manipur’s territorial integrity divides the Meiteis (Hindu-valley
dwellers), Nagas and Kukis.The Kukis and Meiteis protested the extension of Naga
ceasefire (NSCN-IM with the Government of India) to Manipur in 2001 for dif-
ferent reasons. While the Meiteis perceived it as a threat to the territorial integrity
of Manipur, the Kukis considered it as a significant step toward the Naga territorial
unification (of all Naga inhabited areas) process that would affect their territory
(ethnic homeland). The Kukis vehemently opposed NSCN (IM)’s ethnic cleans-
ing policy and communal war to create a Greater Nagaland. The Meiteis very
often question the need for separate states for both the Nagas and Kukis by citing
the existing provisions for protecting them. The Meiteis have persistently made an
attempt to abolish chiefship right over land, extension of Manipur Land Revenue
and Land Reforms Act 1960 (as amended in 1989) in the hill areas, opposition
of Sixth Schedule status to the present Autonomous District Councils (ADCs)
have created a deep sense of insecurity among the Kukis and Nagas. The Meiteis
opposed the tribes’ demands for more autonomy and constitutional protection on
the ground that these will usher the route to the formation of a Kuki state and
Nagalim. In the process, the Kukis have ended up fighting both the Nagas and
Meiteis, although more with the Nagas because of overlapping claims in the hill
areas.
Political negotiations and challenges

As discussed, the political mobilization of the members of the Kuki community
in support of a ‘Kuki homeland’ has revived their ethnic nationalism under the
aegis of Kuki National Organization (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF)
(Kipgen and Roy Chowdhury 2016; Arora and Kipgen 2017). However, things
have changed in the past few years. One important factor is the ‘Suspension of
Operations’ (SoO) [Ceasefire] signed on August 10, 2005 between the Army and
Kuki National Organization (KNO), followed by another SoO on August 22, 2008
signed between Government of India, KNO and the state Government of Manipur
(The Sangai Express, 23 August 2008; The Imphal Free Press, 3 August 2008).26 The
United People’s Front (UPF), formed in 2006, which is another umbrella organi-
zation comprising Kuki-Chin revolutionary groups, also signed the same SoO on
August 22, 2008. Both UPF and KNO’s political objectives are identical and focus
on the demand for separate statehood for the Kukis. In my personal interview
(May 2010) the President of KNO, P. S. Haokip, asserted the following:
Kuki identity and nationalism is rejuvenated under the aegis of KNO and
UPF (a conglomeration of several Kuki ethnic armed groups).The formation
of the UPF and the KNO as a common bi-platform for all the existing Kuki
armed groups has shown a new sense of hope for the political movement of
the Kukis once again.
According to Seilen Haokip, the spokesperson of the KNO, ‘[with the forma-
tion of UPF and KNO] . . . Kuki identity refashioned nearer to its historical
status also set grounds for tangible deliberations for a stable political future for
the people’ (Haokip 2010). It may be mentioned here that the Kuki insurgency
movement began in the late 1980s. Since then, many revolutionaries have sac-
rificed their precious lives. The biggest challenge is whether the signing of SoO
would lead to a political dialogue and address the problems of the Kukis. Some
of the Kuki communities are optimistic that the present SoO would find a last-
ing solution, while other sections are skeptical. They are apprehensive because
such SoO or ceasefires, as seen in other parts of the region have not resulted
in any effective resolutions of conflict and decline in violence. Will the Indian
Government be able to tackle and resolve the ethnic conflict and restore peace
in the region?
Current border impasse and conclusion

Since the early 1990s, under the new geopolitics of the region, India has dropped
its general attitude of neglect toward its eastern bordering countries. In the process
India and Myanmar has renewed their relationship – chiefly cooperation in devel-
opmental projects and trade, plus growing concern about counterinsurgency.These
two policy concerns are evidently connected, since India launched several institu-
tional and development projects through its ‘Look [Act] East Policy’ which would
be beneficial to both countries on both counts. However, a related result of such
concerns has been a quite aggressive effort to engage in border fencing between the
two countries. Time and again, the construction work of the border fence by the
Myanmar Army encroaches on Indian Kuki settlements. While the Government of
India has voiced its concerns over this with the Government of Myanmar, India
seems more concerned about controlling the insurgent groups in the region rather
than safeguarding its territorial integrity. In all these new developments Kukis are
again becoming victims by way of surreptitious ceding of their territory to Myan-
mar by India.There is an emerging concern on the part of the Kukis as the situation
is becoming increasingly volatile.
For instance, just around 3 Km away from Moreh Township in Haolenphai, the
Myanmar Army intruded and prevented the villagers from constructing a house.
The villagers alleged that on March 3, 2017 the Myanmar Army had not only
vandalized the village saw mill and took away the machinery but even looted their
houses too.27 There have been apprehensive on the part of the Kukis that the dis-
puted land may be acquired by Myanmar very soon as they have already been car-
rying out construction work in the area and has repeatedly claimed Haolenphai to
be their territory. The villagers of Haolenphai alleged that the Indian Army, which
is guarding the international boundary area, is not providing any security as they
92 Ngamjahao Kipgen
remain mute spectators to the Myanmar Army who are constantly carrying out
construction work at the area. In the last two years the Indian Authority have not
taken any steps to stop the process of construction work such as shifting of bound-
ary pillar to Manipur territory and construction of cannel. The villagers fear that
they might lose the land of Haolenphai to Myanmar.
The border issue is a serious one but it has been rendered much graver by the
government of India’s unwillingness to acknowledge the border dispute. The bor-
der village (namely border number 75 and 76) like Haolenphai is a living testimony
wherein the incursion by Myanmar soldiers into India is witnessed on a regular
basis. ‘The Burmese army personnel come to our village and keep loitering in the
streets when it is dark, sometimes they come in vehicles. We are afraid to go out in
our own village,’ said L Haokip, a resident of Haolenphai village.28 The said area is
originally the ancestral land of the Kuki village and is claimed by Myanmar as their
territory. The area Chairman of Lhangcham decried the step-motherly treatment
by the Union government authorities and ignoring the woes of the villagers. ‘We
have been living in this land peacefully like our forefathers, we will not allow and
resist the Burmese intrusion in any possible manner and even at the cost of our
lives,’ he said.29
Mention may be made that way back in 2003, the then Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee proposed holding an India–ASEAN car rally at the ASEAN–India
Summit in Bali in 2003, to draw attention to India’s geographical proximity with
ASEAN countries. The ASEAN–India car rally became a reality on November 22,
2004, which was flagged off in Guwahati by Vajpayee’s successor, Manmohan Singh.
In his speech, the Indian prime minister referred to the ‘Northeast’ as a gateway to
‘Asian Century.’ The ASEAN–India car rally clearly reflects the existence of land
route connectivity that could facilitate free flow of trade, investment and tourism
between ASEAN and India. During the Second ASEAN–India car rally in 2012,
the Kukis, who are mainly settled in the Indo–Myanmar border region, under the
banner of Kuki State Demand Committee (KSDC), called for an indefinite block-
ade to press their demand for the creation of a separate Kuki state to be carved out
of ‘Kuki traditional lands’ (The Telegraph, 12 December 2012). KSDC also ‘threat-
ened to block the entry of the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Car
Rally into “Kuki areas” of Manipur’ (The Times of India, 13 February 2013). This
agitation has pointed out the existence of a number of ethnic groups who have
been ethnified by the British colonial rulers and the dissenting voices for their
rights and autonomy in the postcolonial period.
The present central government policy of making agreements with different
communities looks like ‘appeasement policy’ or ‘divide and rule’ and in the process
delays justice, through prolonged silence regarding the bones of contention between
different conflicting ethnic groups. On the other hand, the recent construction of
border fencing which actually cedes landholdings of the Kukis to appease Myanmar
does not augur well for ethnic minority people such as the Kuki-Chin group. This
kind of policy may create more political unrest in future.
Notes
1 The present-day Khampat is a big town inhabited by the Kuki-Chin tribes, each tribe
occupying different localities.
2 According to G. A. Grierson (1904, 126) the words Kuki and Chin are synonymous and
are both primarily used for many of the hill tribes in general. Kuki and Chin are, then,
like both sides of the same coin, combined as Kuki-Chin to cover a large internally
diverse ethnic group which, to make things even more difficult, lives interspersed with
other communities.
3 According to K. Zawla (1964) the Kuki-Chin people came to the Chindwin belt about
996 A.D.
4 In his Linguistic Survey of India (1904), G. A. Grierson gives a vivid account of the Kuki
country during the colonial period. Grierson has grouped the Kuki-Chin in family of
the Tibeto-Burman languages – largely based on historical, anthropological and linguis-
tic affinities of the ethnic group.
5 In Burma, according to the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896, by a notification in the
Burma Gazette (Christian 1942, 87), the term Chin includes Lushais, Kukis and Burmans
domiciled in the Chin Hills and any person who has adopted the customs and language
of the Chins and is habitually resident in the Chin Hills.
6 By ‘common principle,’ Shaw (1929) meant that all the groups under the Kuki fold have
common ancestry, similar custom and language.
7 National Archives of India, New Delhi, Foreign Department, External Affairs, Octo-
ber 1893, Nos. 33–34, dated Camp Falam, September 28, 1892.
8 The literal meaning of Chinlung is ‘the cave or the hole of the Chin,’ the same meaning
as the Burmese word for Chindwin, as in ‘Chindwin River,’ also ‘the hole of the Chin’ or
‘the river of the Chin’ (Lehman, 1963, 20). According to Rev. Liangkhaia, the inhabitants
of Chin Hills, Manipur, Mizoram and Cachar all came from the traditionally conjectured
place that is Chinlung (1976, 1). ‘Sinlung,’ according to Pu Rohauvung is a mythological
rock fortress from which no one could escape (cited in Sonpate, 1977, 13–14).
9 See also Macrae (1801, 197), Mackenzie (2005 [1884], 287), Carey and Tuck (1976
[1896], 228).
10 For Kukis’ settlement in Chindwin valley, see for instance, Lehman (1963), Vumson
(1986, 26–105), Lalthangliana (1976, 1–26).
11 Scholars such as Bhadra (1975), Chishti (2004), Dena (1984, 1991), Gangte (1993)
have written extensively on the Kuki Rising of 1917–1919. Also see Burma and Assam
Frontier, Kuki rising, 1917–1919, L/PS/10/724, Oriental and India Office Collections
(OIOC), British Library, London.
12 For details see Elly (1978 [1893]), reports about a series of raids and counter-attacks, p. 8.
13 This war is discussed in great detail by Kuki scholars who stress the sacrifices that their
heroes made to safeguard the community’s best interests, only to be defeated. See espe-
cially Haokip (1998, 75–160, 2008, 139–239); Guite and Thongkholal 2019.
14 Ethnically and historically, Chins and Burmans considered each other as different people,
with a distinct language and culture.
15 For the actual document see: www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/panglong_agreement.htm
(Retrieved October 10, 2009).
16 In fact, the Shan, Kachin, Karenni and Chin States were referred to as frontier areas and were
administered separately by the British. In other words, the ethnic minorities, literally, were
neither present nor participated in political discourse with the British nor with the Burman.
17 An excerpt of the Panglong Agreement, signed on 12 February 1947, reproduced by
Furnivall (1960, 94–96) and Khupzago (1988, 111–113).
18 It arose under the initiation of Colonel Son Kho Pau, Pu Dam Kho Hau, Pu Mang Khan
Pau, Pu Hrang Nawl, Pu Son Cin Lian and Pu Thual Zen.
19 Fredholm (1993, 180) provides much further details of various Chin groups active in
Burma.
94 Ngamjahao Kipgen
20 See “Chins of Three Nations Want Free Homeland.” (April 20, 1967). The Times of India, p. 9.
21 Document for Manipur Mizo Integration Council, signed by Holkhomang Haokip
(now Ex-MP) and General Secretary and KT Lalla, Chairman of the Council.
22 Interview with S.T. Thangboi, the President (since 1993) of KNF in Ebenezer camp,
Sadar Hills (Senapati district) during March 2009.
23 A nation may continue to be in its ancestral homeland and yet it may be ethnified by
the native dominant collectivity transforming the original inhabitants of a territory into
a minoritized and a marginalized collectivity (see Oommen 1997).
24 As Anderson explained, by ‘imagined’ he did not necessarily mean ‘invented’; rather,
people would define themselves as members of a nation ‘who will never know, most of
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion’ (1991, 6).
25 Interview with P. S. Haokip, the President of KNO in Churachandpur, during June 2010.
26 Also see Agreed Ground Rules for Implementation of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) with
the United Peoples Front (UPF) in Manipur, pp. 1–4, August 22, 2008, New Delhi.
27 “Haolenphai Fears of Losing Land to Myanmar,” Imphal, April 2, 2017, www.imphal-
times.com/news/item/8172-haolenphai-fears-of-losing-land-to-myanmar, accessed
November 20, 2017.
28 Interview with a resident of Haolenphai village during May 2017.
29 Interview with the Chairman of Lhangcham area during May 2017.
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PART II
Proximity to connectivity
India–Myanmar in perspective
6
INDIA–MYANMAR RELATIONS
A perspective from the border
Alana Golmei
India and Myanmar share a 1,640 km border running between India’s Northeast-
ern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Myanmar’s
Chin state, Kachin state and Sagaing division. Significantly, these border regions in
India and Myanmar are underdeveloped areas and are inhabited by ethnic com-
munities, with a history of continued unrest in both countries. From India’s view-
point, Myanmar as an immediate neighbor is of vital importance for defense and
internal security needs, stability and development in the Northeastern Region, and
expansion of its influence in the Bay of Bengal region and Southeast Asia. (Bhatia
2016, 162).
India’s relations with Myanmar have gathered a new momentum ever since
India embarked on what was called its ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) starting in the early
1990s, led by late former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. The hope was to con-
nect India better to the increasingly prosperous nations of the far east and find new
markets and new friends (Myint-U 2011, 236). The LEP was not just an external
economic policy blueprint or a journey of openness and global economic integra-
tion, it also marked a strategic shift in India’s vision and its place in the comity of
nations. This visionary policy created a new framework for deepening economic,
political, cultural and people-to-people ties between India and Myanmar in par-
ticular. Today, Myanmar has emerged as an important strategic partner for India. It
is, after all, a ‘land-bridge’ between India and Southeast Asia.
India sees Myanmar as a springboard for its engagement with Southeast and East
Asia and it remains a vital link in its strategic partnership with ASEAN. India sees
its partnership with Myanmar not merely as a reaffirmation of ties with neighbor-
ing countries or as an instrument of economic development, but also as an integral
part of its vision of a stable, secure and prosperous Asia and its surrounding Indian
Ocean and Pacific regions. There is a tendency in some quarters to think of the
LEP as something that was essentially exclusive or tailor-made for the Northeast.
102 Alana Golmei
This is clearly not the case.The LEP was an exhortation for India as a whole to turn
to Southeast Asia for its economic future, building on India’s cultural footprint that
went back for a millennia and driven by the geopolitical developments and realities
of the late 1980s and 1990s: continued tensions with Pakistan, the Iranian revolu-
tion and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that more or less closed off the west;
the rapid growth of the Tiger economies in East and Southeast Asia; India’s balance
of payments crisis and P.M. Narasimha Rao’s economic reforms; and the turmoil in,
and eventual collapse of, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was recognized from the
outset that the LEP could hugely benefit the Northeast by freeing it from barriers
of geography, history and politics. (Mukhopadhaya 2017).
The Act East Policy was set in motion by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the
East Asia Summit in Myanmar in November 2014 with the objective to promote
economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop strategic relationship with coun-
tries in the Asia-Pacific region and for continuous engagement at bilateral, regional
and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of
Northeastern Region. India’s Act East Policy is not a replacement of the LEP but
it is the consolidation, extension, expansion and diversification of India’s policy
to accord a high degree of importance to Southeast Asia and East Asia (Bhatia
2015, 6). With India continuing to build ties with ASEAN under New Delhi’s Act
East Policy, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj called for greater connectivity
between the northeastern states of India and southeast Asia. At an interactive session
with the Chief Ministers of the northeastern states on the Act East Policy, she said
that state governments of the northeastern region were active stakeholders in the
Policy (The Express News 2018, 5 May).
What implications would the bilateral relations between the two countries have
on these refugees who traverse these borderlands? In the context of increasing
subregional cooperation, India and Myanmar conceptualized and proposed several
bilateral ventures in the areas of ‘infrastructural development, communications, road
and rail connectivity.’ However, the main question that needs to be addressed is how
these connectivity projects impact the lives of people living in the India–Myanmar
borderlands. In a nutshell, the chapter argues that these mega projects would have
implications on the cross-border communities and would perhaps work in the favor
of cross-border communities only if the two countries are able to establish ‘vigorous
and meaningful people-to-people contacts in the India–Myanmar borderlands.’The
chapter discusses in detail the prospects and concerns of opening India–Myanmar
borders in the Naga areas, in the Manipur border areas and Mizoram.
The borderlands: linkages with border states

Geography and ethnic bonds are the oldest links between India and Myanmar.
A shared border and familial/tribal ties ensure certain uniqueness to India–Myanmar
relations if special attention is paid to Northeastern Region (Bhatia 2016, 162).
Communities in India’s border have strong historical and geographical link with
ethnic groups on the other sides of the border. These relations are rooted in shared
India–Myanmar relations 103
historical, ethnic, cultural and religious ties. Also the official policy of allowing
the local people to cross the border has facilitated their contacts (Fernandes et al.
2015, 168). For example, the Chin and Mizo people share similar historical, cultural
and religious backgrounds, which opened doors for most of the Chin economic
migrants, who crossed the India–Myanmar border for a better livelihood and future
in India. With an estimated population of 500,000, the Chin state is located in the
western part of Myanmar, bordered by Bangladesh and India in the west, Rakhine
state in the south, and Magwe and Sagaing Division in the east. According to the
latest report from the staff of Chin Human Rights Organization, approximately
50,000 Chin refugees are living in Mizoram at present.
Similarly in the Manipur border, the Kuki-Chin family speaks the same lan-
guage and practices the same religion, which enables them to integrate well in the
community. They are concentrated mainly in the southern parts of the state, espe-
cially in Churachandpur district and in the town of Moreh in Tengnoupal district
(before the recent creation of new districts, it was in Chandel district).
As such, the ethnological unit or origin and the relationships of the Chins of
Burma and India have been conspicuously transmitted through their culture, social
life, history, tradition, language, poetry and songs and customs as marked by their
uniform celebrations of National Festivals, etc. And the chain of their relation-
ship is circumscribed not only by geographical bounds but more often by racial
unity (ZRO 2005, 142). Now widely distributed and found in Myanmar, India and
Bangladesh, a Kuki-Chin and others who claim to have the same ethnic identity
have conceived the notion since a century ago that they had been scrambled and
scattered by the British by means of their imperialistic policy to the different direc-
tions in the regions, thus losing their independent entity with deeper agonies and
separation (Sangkima 2009, 110).
Nagaland is another border state with Myanmar connecting through Mon dis-
trict. Since there are more social connections between communities living across
the border, instead of seeking help from central Myanmar, it is more convenient
for those Nagas in Myanmar to seek support from Nagaland. One example is, dur-
ing an outbreak of deadly measles in the Naga inhabited areas in Myanmar, Nagas
in Myanmar sought help from the Indian side of the community. Not only Nagas
but different communities living on the Indian side of the border rendered help
mainly in the form of monetary support during that unfortunate outbreak in 2016.
Similarly, Mizo support was rendered to their Chin brethren during the storms that
affected Chin state in July 2015. According to informed sources, there is a US$
25 million, 5-year Border Area Development program in the Naga and Chin areas
of Myanmar that is intended to improve living conditions of Myanmar Naga and
Chin that is an important initiative used mainly for construction of schools, bridges
and roads.
Arunachal Pradesh is another state sharing a border with Myanmar, with
520 km. Unlike the border in Moreh in Manipur, which is very close and where
most villagers travel on foot, in Arunachal Pradesh people from Therimkan take 2
to 4 hours to reach the border and it takes more than 12 hours from Injan, while it
104 Alana Golmei
is only one hour from Khonsa and Chongkham (Walter Fernandes et al. 2015, 167).
There is a fairly big group of young persons from across the border in the villages of
Arunachal Pradesh; most statements about good quality schools and the possibility
of earning a higher income than on the Myanmar side of the border came from
them (Walter Fernandes et al. 2015, 174).
Several Northeastern Chief Ministers have taken the initiative to visit Myanmar
and hosted Chief Ministers of the border states of Myanmar, organized trade events
(Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya), and participated in each others’ cultural festivals such
as the Sangai festival of Manipur and the Hornbill festival of Nagaland (where
Prime Minister Modi received the Chief Ministers of Sagaing Region and Kachin
state in 2014). Musical troupes from Nagaland have performed in Southeast Asian
capitals, and rock bands from Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya have performed in
Yangon. Music festivals in Arunachal have also attracted rock bands from Myanmar
(Mukhopadhaya 2017).
Implications and role of Northeastern region

India’s growing engagement with Southeast Asia in general and Myanmar in par-
ticular has raised the stakes for the people of Northeast India. The region has the
potential to become India’s trade gateway to the ASEAN countries. India’s North-
east is expected to act as the strategic catalyst and a game changer. The Modi
Government’s Act East Policy has formally recognized the strategic importance of
the much-neglected Northeast. If this policy is implemented in right earnest, the
Northeast region can realize its potential as India’s strategic bridgehead and eco-
nomic corridors to Southeast Asia.
Ajay Gondane, former Joint Secretary, Border Connectivity, Ministry of Exter-
nal Affairs said,
India is making a conscious endeavour to strengthen connectivity in our

eastern neighborhood. The Indo–Myanmar friendship road is an illustrat-
ing case in point. The Sittwe to Paletwa Inland Water Transport is almost
complete, Imphal-Moreh Tamu road is in working condition, Land Customs
Stations in Awangkhu (Nagaland) will be revived while the Land Customs
Stations in Arunachal Pradesh have been identified though these are yet to
be operational.
(Gondane 2014, 7)
It is true that the policy has brought the Northeast of India in the forefront
of regional diplomacy, but it is only now that the real interests on and impor-
tance of the region are being realized. As part of the policy, the region emerged as
an important element in India’s bilateral relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh and
other Southeast Asian nations (Yhome 2015, 23).
Connectivity is of utmost interest as far as India’s engagement with the South-
east Asian countries is concerned. Over the years several bilateral ventures between
India and Myanmar have been conceptualized, proposed and announced in the
areas of infrastructural development, communications, road and rail connectivity
and other long-term projects by both India and Myanmar.
Border trade, infrastructural development and a host of possibilities promise a
bright future for the Northeast. However, connectivity projects will become con-
nectivity corridors only when people-to-people engagements become vigorous
and meaningful. People of Northeast India stand to benefit the most from the
connectivity corridors and civil society engagements. This will be of equal benefit
to the people of Myanmar, particularly those residing in the neighboring regions
of India.
The Northeast region is expected to benefit from the multi-pronged Look East/
Act East Policy. In fact, the road to development in India’s Northeast passes through
Myanmar. India has announced a target of increasing the share of manufacturing
in its GDP from 15 percent to 25 percent by 2025. Myanmar would play a critical
role if India hopes to fully integrate itself with Southeast Asia. It offers tremendous
potential and scope for all-round development of the Northeastern region, given
its proximity, historical ties and complementarities of varying nature with Myanmar
and other neighboring countries.The development of physical connectivity between
the North Eastern States and Myanmar therefore assumes paramount importance.
Connectivity: prospects and concerns

One of the landmark developments is the opening of the Indo–Myanmar inter-
national land border in August 2018. The opening of the land border marked the
abolishing of special land entry permission which was previously required for visi-
tors entering the country via land routes. The agreement on land border crossing
was signed between the two countries at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar during the visit
of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in May 2018. The opening ceremony
was held at land border point at Tamu-Moreh Manipur, and also Rikhawadar (Chin
state) and Zowkhawthar, Mizoram (The Indian Express 2018, 9 August).
Consequently, the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population and the
Myanmar Embassy in India announced in September 2018 that checkpoints along
the India–Myanmar border would begin using e-visas for travel between the two
countries. According to an official announcement, the system will start in Septem-
ber at two checkpoints: the Tamu-Moreh checkpoint, along India’s border with
Sagaing Region; and the Rih Khaw Dar-Zokhawthar checkpoint, along India’s
border with Chin State (The Irrawaddy 2018, 18 September) The Tamu-Moreh
checkpoint connects upper Sagaing Region with Manipur State of India. The Rih
Khaw Dar-Zokhawthar checkpoint connects Chin State with India’s Mizoram
State. Both have been important trade corridors for Indian and Myanmar nationals
travelling between the two countries for many years (ibid.).
The joint projects and initiatives including the transportation and infrastructure
projects require good understanding among the countries. Similarly, issues like bor-
der trade, drug trafficking and transborder militancy require removal of restrictions
106 Alana Golmei
FIGURE 6.1 Passenger terminal at Moreh in Manipur–Myanmar border.

Source: Photograph by Mr. David (Moreh) in October 2018
of various kinds and streamlining border management. Past experience suggests

that many of the well-intentioned policies failed to yield the desired effect in the
absence of sustained engagements with the Northeastern stakeholders.
While many ambitious projects have been drawn up and a few have even been
implemented, the Indian government has received much criticism for delays in the
execution of two of its flagship projects – the Trilateral Highway project that would
link India, Myanmar and Thailand and the Kaladan Multi-modal Transport project
that would link Kolkata via Sittwe with Mizoram (Bhatia 2016, 166).
(i) Nagaland border

Nagaland shares a border stretch of 215 km with Myanmar. A local journalist
observed during a visit to the border areas and shared the views with the author in
a discussion in the following words,
the economic development and stability in the north-eastern region and a

better infrastructure along its borders, is crucial for India’s Look East/Act
East policy to see the light of the day. Despite the realisation that infrastruc-
tural development at the borders is a necessity if India is sincerely looking
for stronger ties with Myanmar vis-a-vis the Look East/Act East Policy, the
development at the border is dismal. One can take the instance of Pangsha
village under Tuensang district of Nagaland connecting Myanmar. Despite
the existence of International Trade Centre (ITC) at Dan village along the
border near Pangsha village, there is no definite road system. When there is
no proper road connectivity, one cannot expect the people to carry on cross-
border trade activities. Owing to lack of road infrastructure, trade between
the two sides at the ITC is almost absent except for a short period only once
in a year when vegetables from nearby Naga villages in Myanmar and Indian
made goods from Nagaland side are sold/bought or bartered.
Even the very infrastructure of International Trade Center itself is a mere shed.
Since there is no proper road, bikes mostly China made have become very popu-
lar for commuting and transporting goods even though they are less in quantity.
Those who cannot afford bikes travel on foot all the way to Lahe or Khamti in
Myanmar, which are the only two trading towns in the Naga areas of Myanmar
(Sumi 2014, 55).
(ii) Manipur border

Manipur, which shares 398 km of international boundary with Myanmar, is one
of the most important strategic border states. A scholar from Manipur during his
interaction with the author when this research was conducted observed,
to make the Northeast partner and stakeholder in the Act East Policy, overland
transport system and institutions to allow investment, movement of people
and goods across the borders are required. But it cannot replace significance
of intra-Northeast transportation system. In other words, the central govern-
ment should make sincere efforts to maintain the National Highways prop-
erly. A stretch of dirt track with the official designation National Highway
does not change the realities on the ground.
Without connecting such missing links, talking about transnational connectivity

projects would be like imagining connectivity. After the Indo–Myanmar Friend-
ship Road, the trilateral highway project connecting Moreh (India) and Mae Sot
(Thailand) via Myanmar is the second most important overland connectivity pro-
ject. The first connects Tamu with Kaleywa on the Chindwin, while the latter
upgrades the road from Kaleywa to Yargyi connecting onward to Mandalay to
South Eastern Myanmar and Thailand (Puyam 2015, 15).
Unlike the Myanmar-China border and Myanmar-Thailand border, trade
across the Indo–Myanmar border is negligible. The negligible trade and economic
activities across the Indo–Myanmar border are to be traced to half-hearted efforts
because of security concerns. The ongoing extension of the road and repairing of
69 old bridges [may] should bring some positive changes.The Imphal-Mandalay bus
service is yet to be launched (Puyam 2015, 16).
108 Alana Golmei
A visit to Manipur in the Indo–Myanmar border to explore areas of cooperation

and to identify the stakeholders has an underlying message. There are huge gaps
between the government’s policy pronouncements and intent and the reality on the
ground. Given the background of neglect and indifference, the various stakeholders
have serious misgivings about any new initiative or policy.
The construction of fencing going on near Moreh in Manipur-Myanmar bor-
der, supposed to be major outlet to Southeast Asia, is at cross purposes with the Act
East Policy of the government. For a common man in the border, such a picture
of security fencing gave the prospect of militarization. Besides disrupting the local
cross-border markets it also divides border communities as the British colonialists
did to them earlier (Gangmei 2014, 65). The process of boundary demarcation
between Manipur and Burma began with the conclusion of the First Anglo-
Burmese War by the treaty of Yandaboo in 1826 and the subsequent agreement
FIGURE 6.2 Border fencing in Manipur–Myanmar border.

Source: Photograph by author during her visit in 2015
in 1834 between the two parties (Piang 2008, 51). In this treaty the King of Ava
recognized Manipur’s independence, and in the agreement of 1834, Kabo Valley
was ceded to Burma and the boundary between Manipur and Burma was drawn
vaguely northward from the valley on the basis of the imaginary line of Pemberton
(Piang 2008, 52).
Recently, there was also a public outcry in Manipur over the construction of a
boundary pillar along the Indo–Myanmar border. According to local media reports,
the residents of the border village of Kwatha Khunou alleged that the Indian gov-
ernment moved a border pillar about 3 km into Manipur, triggering opposition
from several civil society organizations and political parties as it would mean ‘giv-
ing away’ the state’s land to Myanmar (The Wire 2018, 9 July). The external affairs
ministry has, however, denied the allegations.
(iii) Mizoram border

Like Manipur, Mizoram occupies an area of great strategic importance in the region
that shares a 404 km international border with Myanmar. Gautam Mukhopadhaya
(former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar) during a telephonic interview conducted
by the author for the research observed,
Mizoram has the potential to cater to the needs of Myanmar with regards
to education, health, power, consumer goods, markets and other goods and
services. Common ethnicity and languages among people of both sides of
the border from Arunachal to Mizoram provide an excellent foundation for
trade and economic and cultural cooperation that have not been tapped by
border states of the Centre.
There is an opportunity for closer connection between peoples on both sides

of the border. But there are also concerns as to whether the people will be able to
connect freely within the policy of the governments of India and Myanmar. One of
the factors is border fencing initiated by government of both the countries to con-
trol the movement of rebel groups and illegal migrants. However, ethnic groups and
tribes in the borders feel that erecting this fence will have a negative outcome as it
will divide many ethnic communities whose lands straddle the regions between the
two countries (Lalremruata 2015, 22–23).
The first border trade in Mizoram at Zokhawthar was started in 2004, for-
mally inaugurated after 11 years in 2015. However, there is a lack of infrastructural
development like bank facilities, internet connection, post office, etc. There is also
a major concern that the border trade may become a hub for smuggling drugs and
arms as well as other illegal items. Human trafficking is also another concern as
Southeast Asia continues to be a major hub for sex business and human traffick-
ing. Improving connectivity with high unemployment rate in the area can further
aggravate the situation as the Indo–Myanmar border is one of the prone areas for
such forms of trafficking. While the government is giving priority to connectivity,
110 Alana Golmei
they also need to focus on the health and welfare of the people. Communities and
tribes living in both sides of the border still lack health care facilities (ibid.).
Conclusions and perspectives

With the government of India implementing the Act East Policy and New Delhi
settling down to business, there is renewed hope for the people of Northeast India
for possible openings and economic advantages, particularly in the states along the
Indo–Myanmar borders. There is a great expectation that such an initiative will
entail a major shift in India’s economic and foreign policies viz. Asian countries to
the east, and the indigenous people in the region will reap the benefits by connect-
ing to them.
It is believed that local communities living on both sides of the border will
receive increased infrastructure development such as good roads, waterways, elec-
tricity, communication etc., which will further integrate them for economic and
cultural gains. There will be a great boost for border trade, which will become
useful outlets for Indian manufactured goods and will create employment oppor-
tunities and better livelihood and will wean away the youths in the region from
militancy. With links to Kunming via Stilwell road, Mandalay-Yangon via Moreh
and Zawkathar, and to Sittwe via Zochachhua by road and Kaladan riverways,
Northeast India will no more be landlocked. Thus the region will be set free from
FIGURE 6.3
Road construction Near Lawngtlai (Mizoram–Myanmar border) under
KMTTP.
Source: Photograph by Terah, CHRO in September 2018
isolation and boosted to interconnectivity.This will also strengthen cultural integra-

tion and common mutual interests of the communities on both sides of the borders
such as Lisu (Yobin), Naga, Kuki-Chin, Mizo/Zomi, Meitei and others (Gangmei
2014, 64, 66).
Said a local intellectual from Mizoram,
At present there is no significant development in the border area except for

the ongoing road construction in both Kaladan and Rih-Tiddim Falam road.
The Government of India should speed up and complete the work. Since it
will be connecting Kolkata and rest of Southeast Asia it will be very good for
the people in the state of Mizoram and the people are looking forward to it.
Clearance of trees, forest and cultivation areas have started already for build-
ing roads and pavements from the Myanmar side under the Kaladan Multimodal
Transit Project. Bungalows are also built and most of them have been completed
for road construction workers to reside in. Conditions of Rih-Tedim-Falam roads
are not good, though they have been expanded. Local people are facing difficulties
travelling in those areas as the conditions are not good during the rainy season, and
landslides on those newly built roads also often interrupt travel. The roads can be
used only during the dry season (Thantluang 2018, 11 September). Therefore con-
struction of roads and infrastructure development are yet to pick up momentum in
the border regions.
But according to official reports, three projects – Paletwa-Zorinpui in India–
Myanmar Border, 69 bridges along the Tamu-Kalewa stretch and a two-lane high-
way in the Kalewa-Yargyi section of the proposed India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT)
Trilateral Highway – have all been mobilized with a timeline to be finished in three
years.
In spite of initiatives by the government, still most of the people along Indo–
Myanmar border areas remain unaware and are not ready for the opportunity
thrown up under the Look East/Act East Policy. The same is being felt by those
residing on the Myanmar side of the border and although they agree that there has
been some development in the Indo–Myanmar border area including the opening
up of the border gate for a short-term visit, they are not aware of the exact initia-
tives of the government. ‘If possible from India, it would be very good if the gov-
ernment follows the international standard just like the Free Prior and Informed
Consent (FPIC) and have proper consultation with the local villagers so that they
will understand better what is happening around them’ as told to the author dur-
ing telephonic interview with Thantluang, CHRO based in Mizoram-Myanmar
border, displays this exact sentiment with regard to this situation.
A local from Moreh (Manipur-Myanmar border) observed,
Most of the people or communities have very little economic sense. They
are generally more wary of the demographical changes that will trigger than
the economic benefits that can be taken advantage of. The people’s sense of
112 Alana Golmei
identity and freedom is still strongly rooted in territory. So as long as they can
access their land unhindered, they will not object. However, if it affects their
access to their land and resources, as regulations from the state are bound
to, they will not be happy. They expressed inability to visualize the future.
In other words, there is a gap in their understanding of the project in terms
of its long-term impact on their land, culture, language, politics, and society.
A plausible conclusion to be derived from a discussion based on these matters

would be that development in all forms should be welcomed with speculative and
innovative thought. However, besides that, it is the prerogative and the right of the
people or citizens to [be investigative] question? of the proposed ideas and works
while they push for opportunity and advancement on society. In other words,
as much as development should come, stakeholders should always be taken into
account. Hence it becomes very important for the government and the authorities
to have transparency in their works and all ventures and to be in constant interac-
tion with the people so that they are kept aware of all initiatives by the government.
These steps in relationship building will further lead to trust and like-mindedness
among those who all have equal roles to play in pushing the visions of a better
tomorrow into a lived reality.
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7
INDIA–MYANMAR BORDERLAND
Pressing concerns in public health hazards
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Sreeparna Banerjee1
India shares a 1643 km long border with Myanmar in four northeastern states,
namely Arunachal (520 km), Nagaland (215 km), Manipur (398 km) and Mizoram
(510 km), with Myanmar’s Sagaing Region and Chin State. Borders between
India and Myanmar are not only porous but often cut across common cultural
and linguistic communities. The situation in and around the border has become
much more complex due to prolonged ethnic conflict coupled with poverty. The
porous international boundary has resulted in easy flow of arms, drugs, illegal
migrants and easy access of insurgents from bases established in the neighboring
countries like China, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Golden Triangle
constituted by Myanmar, Laos and Thailand in the vicinity results in the drug
trade spilling over into Northeast India, resulting in a high degree of drug addic-
tion, especially among the youth of this region. More so, the bordering areas of
both the countries face similar public health problems, especially in terms of
the threat posed by infectious border diseases like malaria, human immunodefi-
ciency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV AIDS)
and tuberculosis (TB). While malaria on both sides could be triggered by similar
climatic and ecological conditions, others like HIV and TB are more likely to be
caused by free movement of people across the border and other factors such as
unregulated drug-trafficking and involvement of refugee/migrant Chin/ Kuki
women in the sex industry. Against this backdrop this chapter seeks to iden-
tify correlation between migration and the spread of diseases especially HIV-
AIDS, HIV-hepatitis C and HIV-TB co-infection along the border areas, if any.
It also evaluates existing status of the said diseases among the bordering states of
Northeast India and Myanmar. Lastly, it attempts to address collaborative efforts
between both the nations for an effective border health infrastructure, manage-
ment and disease control strategy.
India–Myanmar borderland 115
Divided communities: dynamics of borderland

In order to understand the dynamics of India–Myanmar border and borderlands it
is important to take into account the divided communities and their social, cultural
and economic interactions between the Chin and Kachin states and the Sagain
region of Myanmar and the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland,
Manipur and Mizoram. Like most of the boundaries that India shares with its
neighbors, the India–Myanmar border is also an artificial line which is superim-
posed on the socio-cultural landscape of the borderland.
Myanmar was formed as a separate state from India in 1935. The decolonization
of the subcontinent in 1947 divided ethnic communities living along the Indo–
Myanmar border. These communities, or rather ethnic groups, felt a deep sense of
reservation since they became relegated to the status of ethnic minorities on both
side of the border. They also found the newly created boundary to be inconsistent
with the traditional limits of the region they inhabited (Kent 2017).
Sagaing Region bordering with Nagaland and Manipur has Bamar, Chin, Shan
and Naga population practicing Buddhism and Christianity. Chin State located
in Western Myanmar shares boundaries with Manipur in north and Mizoram in
the west. It is sparsely populated and remains one of the least developed areas of
Myanmar with a high rate of unemployment. Chin is the major ethnic group and
Christianity is the major religion. Chins and Manipuris have long ethnic linkages
since feudal era as parts of Chin Hills were under the suzerainty of Manipur and
vice versa. Hence, people on both sides of the border have ethnic, religious and cul-
tural ties since centuries. Due to historic ethnic linkages, people in border villages
own land/property and have socioeconomic interests across the borders. In some
instances, the imaginary borderline cuts across houses, land and villages. People,
especially those living on the Indian side, own land holdings including cultivated
lands and forested areas across the border and are completely dependent on such
areas for their livelihood. For instance, the Konyak tribal community chief ’s house
is divided between Nagaland and Hukong valley of Myanmar. Most shops are on
the Nagaland side of the border and people from Sagaing region travel there to buy
goods (Fernandez 2014).
These tribes, however, refuse to accept the artificial line and continue to main-
tain strong linkages with their kith and kin across the border. For instance, constant
movement as well as intermarriage exists across the border between the tribes living
in Myanmar and Arunachal Pradesh, especially more in Changlang than in Tirup
districts (ibid.).
To address their concerns and enable greater interaction among them, the Indian
and Myanmarese governments established the Free Movement Regime (FMR),
which allowed them to travel 16 km across the border on either side without any
visa requirements. From the Myanmar side, a lot of villagers come to the Indian
side to buy basic essentials. Even the border haats (rural markets) present play an
important role in the economic and social life of these people.
116 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, et al.
Currently the region representing the conjunction of India, China and Myanmar
is gaining more attention for a number of reasons.Violence has long been endemic
in the region since communities and people were left divided by the imposition
and policing of officially demarcated borders between India and Myanmar. The
nature of the porous border is also leading to increasing severity of transnational
challenges such as drug-trafficking, informal trade, insurgency, and the spread of
diseases. Given the dynamics of the border areas in terms of the age-old ties within
the two countries, this factor is being exploited by some of the ethnic militant
groups in Northeast India to seek shelter in Chin State and Sagaing Region for
their anti-India activities.
As a result, security as well as economic concerns linked to the insurgency, smug-
gling of arms and ammunition, illegal trade and other similar activities prompted
the decision in 2003 by India to fence the porous border between the two coun-
ties. But the work got stalled due to the protests raised by the local Tangkhul, Kuki
and Naga communities. According to them, a huge stretch of land would go to the
Myanmar territory. This will also create conflict among the Lushei, Nagas, Chins
and Kukis whose lands straddle the regions of both the countries. Thus to resolve
the boundary issue a joint survey was supposed to be conducted before fenc-
ing is undertaken. The opposition to the fencing of the Indo–Myanmar border
has continued ever since. The reality remains, despite the fact that the boundary
between India and Myanmar had been demarcated in 1967, there has been no
manifestation of the boundary line on the ground except for the presence of bor-
der pillars. According to MEA press release in 2013 there is no boundary dispute
between India and Myanmar. Nevertheless, nine unresolved boundary pillars (BP)
(MEA 2013) along the India–Myanmar Border in the Manipur sector does exist
though no steps have been taken to resolve that part as yet. The two sides hold
regular dialogue on issues related with boundary demarcation and border manage-
ment, through institutionalized mechanisms, such as Foreign Office Consultations,
National Level Meetings (NLM) and Sectoral Level Meetings (SLM). Meetings
are also held at the level of the Heads of Survey Department and Director (Sur-
vey), where issues related to boundary demarcation, joint survey, inspection and
maintenance of boundary pillars are, inter alia, discussed. As a result, the boundary
line cuts across houses and villages, thus dividing several tribes such as the Sing-
phos, Nagas, Kukis, Mizos, etc., and forcing them to reside as citizens of different
countries.
However, it is to be noted that the much-awaited step of streamlining the free
movement of people within 16 km along the border of Myanmar and India has
been deferred by the former on March 4, 2018. Though India was keen to sign
the agreement since 2017 but Myanmar citing “domestic compulsions” as reason
has asked more time before the agreement is sealed. Though publicly stated that
this MoU is aimed to enhance connectivity and increase interaction between the
border populations but in reality both the propositions remain very much active by
practice. This step is basically intended to secure the free movement of extremists
and smugglers across the border (The Hindu 4 March 2018).
Though the FMR is in place however, not many avail of such facilitation and
thus cross the border illegally. Some are unaware and others find it difficult to get
a permit in order to cross the border. On the other hand, the insurgents also use
this agreement to slip into Indian Territory for acquiring arms and planning attacks,
and then conveniently heading back to the Myanmar side. Also, taking advantage of
the FMR, a sizeable number of students living in these border lands in Myanmar
also study in schools on the Indian side of the border. Mizoram and Manipur also
face the problem of illegal and clandestine migration from Myanmar. Burmese
people frequently cross over to the Indian side of the border in search of economic
opportunities and work as labourers, coolies, street vendors and domestic workers
(Levesque and Rahman 2008). These migrants also constitute the floating popula-
tion, i.e. they come and go as they please without often intending to settle down
in India. Thus the FMR coupled with the divided community ties has transformed
migration into a continuous process.
Borderland, public health and migration

As per WHO, public health is defined as the science of protecting the safety and
improving the health of communities through education, policy making and research
for disease and injury prevention. Activities to strengthen public health capacities and
service aim to provide conditions under which people can maintain to be healthy,
improve their health and wellbeing, or prevent the deterioration of their health.
For almost a decade, the predominant trend in existing scholars has been to
emphasize the link between health hazards and international migration. It is inter-
esting to note that the economic question of facilitating mobility is subordinated by
nation-states to the political issue of migrants as new citizens (Ahanthem 2010) or
‘carriers of diseases.’ The emergence of border towns and the opening of economic
trading zones under the ambit of globalization have led to the increasing mobility
of capital, goods and labour across political boundaries. Thus, increased population
mobility and opening up of multiple channels of international trade and communi-
cation heighten the risk of the transmission of infectious and noninfectious diseases
across borders (Gushulak and Douglas 2003).
A pioneering study conducted by UNESCO and UNAIDS in 2000 sought to
demonstrate the impact of migrant population on the spread of HIV AIDS. The
study pointed out that migrant population are exposed to greater risks of health
hazards owing to the three factors namely economic transition and legal disabili-
ties experienced by them; inability of the host or the destination country health
services to respond to the practices of the migrant population and reduced access
of the migrants to availability and accessibility of health and other social welfare
services. Recent researches have reinforced this argument in a more nuanced man-
ner. It is now being argued that migration in itself may not cause public health
hazards but may contribute to the vulnerability of the migrants by exposing them
to discrimination, gender inequality, sexual violence and exploitation, poor living
conditions and lack of access to education, social services and healthcare facilities.
In this context it is interesting to note that the Chins who fled from Myanmar
due to increasing violence of the Myanmar army (Human Watch 2009, 9–17)
are currently living in the Indian state of Mizoram. The Mizos in Champai feel
that the Chins control trade in their area and fix the price of goods daily traded
across the border. While on the other hand the Chins who are known to be ille-
gal migrants or “economic migrants” (Basavapatna 2010) perceive that they are
exploited in host population and feel helpless. General perception of the locals
is also noteworthy here. To the locals these Chins are the carriers of infectious
diseases like HIV AIDS.
Attached to the threat of migration is the threat of HIV AIDS which is termed
as a travelling mobile disease (Banerjee 2010). As the north eastern region of India
seeks to build upon these existing linkages to facilitate greater integration with
Myanmar it faces the complex challenges of unregulated drugs and arms traffick-
ing, free movement of insurgent groups across the border and lastly, cross-border
transmission of lethal communicable/infectious diseases like HIV AIDS, TB and
Malaria. The FMR present increases the chances of migration and this makes it a
cyclic process.
HIV AIDS
In India’s Northeast
HIV AIDS constitutes one of the most potent non-traditional security threats
claiming millions of lives worldwide. Northeast India is an isolated and mountain-
ous area. It is a home to a wide range of different ethnic groups, each with its own
distinct culture, traditions and language. Many of these ethnic groups are in conflict
with the Indian government, demanding more autonomy or independence. Several
ethnic movements are in armed struggle, pressing for their political demands. Con-
flict and underdevelopment in the region have propelled drug consumption and
production which will be discussed in detail in our following section.
In India about 2.17 million people are living with HIV. As per India’s National
AIDS Control Organization (NACO 2017) report, the highest prevalence of the
disease has been recorded in India’s Northeastern states namely Nagaland (1.29%),
Mizoram (0.81%) and Manipur (0.60%). Injecting Drug Use (IDU) remains the
chief driver of HIV AIDS in these states (see Figure 7.1), thereby hinting at the
deeper social and economic roots of the disease. It must be noted that the HIV
prevalence among women who inject drugs was nearly twice or more than the
figures for their male counterparts (UNAIDS 2014).
It was also interesting to note that the role of migrants or rather single male
migrants (SMM) and long-distance truckers (LDT) is being acknowledged since
2006 to get an estimate of the epidemic among the bridge due to the clandestine
nature and thus remains untouched in the NACO report. Thus, despite being an
important driver of the HIV epidemic in India, data on migrant sexual behaviour
remains limited due to its clandestine nature in the northeast India.
IDU HIV Prevalence (%) 35

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2008-09
2010-11
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2017
Manipur Mizoram Nagaland
FIGURE 7.1 IDU HIV Prevalence in Northeast India.

Source: Figure prepared by researchers based on the HIV Sentinel Surveillance 2016–17,Technical Brief,
National AIDS Control Organization (NACO), Government of India, New Delhi, December 2017
2.5
ANC HIV Prevalence ()%
1.5
0.5
0
2008-09
2010-11
2012-13
2014-15
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2017
FIGURE 7.2 ANC HIV Prevalence in Northeast India.

It is well known that both women and homosexuals are regarded as the carri-
ers of this deadly disease. They are treated with suspicion and remain marginalized
in the society (Banerjee 2010. However it is noteworthy that in the northeast as
reflected in Figure 7.3 the current trend of HIV AIDS among female sex work-
ers is decreasing. But it also must be kept in mind that in several places, sex work
and drug use are interconnected. Many people who inject drugs either buy or sell
sex and vice versa (Banerjee 2010). Therefore, categorizing each group in water-
tight compartments seems difficult and overlapping within each category becomes
30
FSW HIV Prevalence (%)
25
20
15
10
5
0
2010-11
2008-09
2003
2005
2006
2004
2007
2017
FIGURE 7.3 FSW HIV Prevalence in Northeast India.

apparent. Though the systematic health checks and ART therapy seem to have
increased; the blame game and stigmatization has helped less to curb the infection
as a whole.
The next section will elaborate on the spread of HIV AIDS through the con-
sumption of drugs and will focus on the dynamics of India–Myanmar borderland
that may play an important role in this.
Influence of drugs: spread of HIV

A pioneering study conducted by the Institute of Narcotics Study and Analysis
(INSA), an Indian NGO reveals illicit poppy to have been grown in Manipur
(Churachandpur, Imphal, Ukhrul and Senapati districts), Nagaland (Mong and
Mokokchung districts) and Arunachal Pradesh (Lohit, Anjaw, Tirap, Changlang
and Yingkong districts) in Northeast India and Shan State, Kachin State and
Kayah State in Myanmar, all of which are conflict-ridden areas. Moreover, these
areas are inhabited by ethnic groups, mostly subsistence farmers, who resort
to illicit poppy cultivation as a means to compensate for food shortages while
also using it for both medicinal/ritualistic and consumption purposes (Kramer
Tom et al. 2014). In terms of consumption, use of heroin, an opiate drug pro-
cessed out of opium and known to generate euphoric effects, was prevalent till
the 1990s after which the consumption of amphetamine type substances (ATS)
became more popular. ATS contains ephedrine, also known as ‘yellow cannabis’
that causes psychotic disorders, leading to violent behaviour and the propensity
to indulge in criminal activities. Manipur is the chief conduit through which
large quantities of contraband ATS are trafficked from New Delhi into Burma
(Goswami 2014).
The state of Manipur is closer to the drug circuits of Shan Hills and Tiddim
Kachin.This provides an easy access and means of smuggling drugs to different part
of the world, making Manipur the transit state. Manipur has the highest estimated
adult HIV prevalence of 1.15 percent followed by Mizoram (0.80%) and Nagaland
(0.78%) (NACO 201617). Mandalay,Tiddim Tahang, Homatin, Kheinam and Tamu
are the main drug centers in Myanmar. It is from these centers that the heroin is
smuggled to other parts of the world through Manipur via the towns of Manipur
namely Behiang (Churchandpur District), New Samtal (Chandel District) and
Kamjong (Ukhrul District) (Singh and Singh 2014). HIV related to IDU is high
in Thoubal, Ukhrul, Churachandpur, Imphal West and Chandel districts. Some of
these districts share border with Myanmar.
The unfenced border between Mizoram and Myanmar serves as a two-way
route for cross-border drug trade based in Myanmar. There are two main routes
through which drugs are trafficked from Western Burma to the Indian north east-
ern states of Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland and vice versa. Of the two routes,
the more traversed one begins in Mandalay and meanders through Monewa and
Kalewa where it bifurcates in two directions: northward to the Tamu-Moreh border
crossing and eventually through the National Highway (NH-39) into Manipur;
southward through Rih-Champhai into Mizoram. The other route starts from
Bhamo in Kachin state down to Homalin in the Sagaing region from where it
enters Nagaland and further into Assam, Kolkata and rest of India (Chouvey 2013).
According to the newspaper reports in January 2018 around 6.035 kg of heroin,
13,400 methamphetamine tablets and 159,471 tablets of pseudo-ephedrine were
seized in 2017 in Mizoram which resulted in the death of 68 (Business Standard 15
January 2018). Heroin and other drugs are smuggled into Mizoram from Myanmar.
While pseudo-ephedrine tablets are being smuggled into Myanmar from India in
trucks to Guwahati from where they are taken to Manipur or Mizoram before
entering Myanmar. Karimganj and Silchar act as transit points in this regard. In
Myanmar they are manufactured into methamphetamine in clandestine laboratories
mostly run by militants gaining seed money which is later used to procure weapons
in the black market.This leaves a dark mark on the security system and check gates.
As the Government of India and Myanmar commit themselves to reviving the
Tamu-Monewa-Kalewa road to use it as an economic corridor, steps must be taken
to ensure stricter surveillance of the border by the narcotics department and the
Border Security Forces (BSF) so that movement of goods and people does not go
unmonitored. The same holds true for Rih-Tiddim road that is scheduled to be
completed by the end of 2019. To prevent the evolving economic corridor from
turning into a crime and trafficking corridor, it is incumbent upon both India and
Myanmar to work out a two-pronged strategy to regulate drug-trafficking and HIV
AIDS, with special focus on the border regions.
In Myanmar
Myanmar remains the hub of opium cultivation in Asia; the second largest producer
and exporter of illicit opium in the world after Afghanistan. Myanmar is an integral
part of the Golden Triangle that accounts for the highest percentage of opium
cultivation in Asia. The Golden Triangle refers to the region between the borders
of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. Within Myanmar, cultivation of opium is highest
in Kachin, North Shan, South Shan and East Shan. There are reports of new cul-
tivation areas opening up in Sagaing region that borders with the Indian states of
Manipur and Nagaland.
In 2017 it was estimated that there were 220,000 people living with HIV. The
UNAIDS 2017 report estimates people who inject drugs (34.9%) to be the chief
reason for this epidemic. Since age of infected population remained under 25, the
findings have bolstered the argument that the risk associated with injecting drug use
and HIV vulnerability should make the case for developing more youth-targeted
programs. Although the burden of HIV prevalence is traditionally limited to urban
towns and cities in Myanmar, injectable opium use is endemic with rates of high
HIV prevalence evident in the more rural northern and north eastern areas of the
country where the drug is produced. For example, in Waingmaw in Kachin State,
HIV prevalence among people who inject drugs was particularly high at 47 percent
during 2014.
Though migration did not feature as a separate category, but increasingly open
borders make Myanmar more vulnerable to HIV incidence with an increase of
migrants coming from bordering high prevalence countries. The 2014 census esti-
mated that over 11 million residents have migrated internally or externally. As HIV
testing is not a condition for entry, work or residence in Myanmar there is not much
comprehensive information available on HIV prevalence or risk behaviours associ-
ated with the migrant population. Nevertheless, in 2014, the IOM data project did
find that 18 percent of people identified as migrants in Mon and Kayin states were
HIV positive – although it is difficult to assess if the point of infection happened
within country (NSP on HIV and AIDS Myanmar 2016). However, it is broadly
assumed that migrants might face residency and social restrictions that limit their
access to HIV programming services, as well as other general forms of healthcare.
In 2016, the Government has pledged US$15 million for HIV treatment
including ARVs and other commodities and US$1 million for the procurement of
methadone. The Myanmar Health Sector Coordinating Committee (M-HSCC),
established as a part of the Nay Pyi Taw Accord in 2013, has the broad mandate
as the coordinating body for all public health sector issues (Ibid.). The current
National Strategy Plan for HIV also proposes developing specific packages for peo-
ple near transit points in addition to cross-border referral mechanisms and agree-
ments to strengthen access to health services in destination countries.
Though a lot of efforts are being made in order to combat this deadly disease
it cannot be ignored that Myanmar has one of the worst health indicators in the
world. The public health care system in the country is severely under-resourced.
The discrepancies in the access and coverage of healthcare facilities further accounts
for the poor health indices in the country. Therefore, an effective border health
management and disease control strategy is central to the Government of India’s
vision for greater connectivity and regional integration with her eastern neighbors.
Across-border women as HIV carriers

It is important to understand that women on either side of the border face the
stigma of being carriers and cause for the spread of this ‘deadly’ disease. Women
face the brunt of violence and borders encourage a regime of control, violence and
counter violence. The position thus is extremely vulnerable and should be dealt
with utmost care. According to Paula Banerjee (2010) the marginalized groups
such as the migrants, homosexuals as well as female sex workers have been the soft
targets in the anti HIV campaigns. Ironically though, women in Moreh who work
as sex workers explain their circumstance as one out of a lack of choice, they are
disapproving of women who come in from other districts or who cross over from
the border to take up sex as work (Ahanthem 2010). In Nagaland, women sex
workers are held in high risk groups. The transfer of HIV AIDS from husband to
wife is high in Myanmar, thus in many cases after the husband’s death the wife is
shunned from her husband’s as well as parents’ home due to the ignorance and fear
surrounding the HIV virus which causes AIDS (Strategic Information and M&E
Working Group 2010). Thus, the crisis of living in perpetual poverty, conflict, poor
infrastructure and development, compounded with a ready association for drug use
and its associated HIV/AIDS companion has only served to marginalize and isolate
the women further from the mainstream society. According to Chitra Ahanthem
(2010), women drug users refrain from providing their accounts for the fear of
being stigmatized in their community. Also, women who work at poppy plantation
along the porous boundary refused to share their narratives and took affront that
they ‘would be involved in such activities.’
While access to ART is becoming easier on both sides of the border, there are
still challenges in delivering treatment because of the shortage of staff; particularly
doctors. It is a poor scenario since district doctors are mostly irregular in attendance
at the district hospitals.Thus, the patients have to spend their money and sometimes
have to travel to city to get a health check up (Ahanthem 2010). Some patients,
especially widows, either take ART without informing doctors due to the fear of
stigmatization or stop taking ART due to side effects such as rashes, swollen face,
etc. (Kipgen 2012).Thus, it is important for health facilitators as well as government
officials to be welcoming to their patients and deal with their situation with utmost
empathy and care.
Increasing concerns in spread of HIV-Hepatitis C (HCV)

Hepatitis C or HCV is an emerging public health threat in Northeast India and
Myanmar that has close associations with HIV AIDS. HCV is a liver disease caused
by hepatitis C virus. According to WHO, HIV-affected IDUs are at high risk of
contracting HCV if they share needles.There is no vaccine for hepatitis C. Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by the Indian Council of Medical Research, 98 percent
of HIV positive people in Manipur’s Churachandpur district were co-infected with
hepatitis-C. Manipur is among the three northeastern states where hepatitis-C is
silently killing people. Nagaland and Mizoram are the other two states where the
prevalence rate of HIV and hepatitis-C co-infection is very high. Yaswant Rao
Gaitonde Center for Aids Research Education (YRGCARE), a Chennai based
NGO in collaboration with various NGOs based in Manipur like Social Aware-
ness Service Organization (SASO), Care Foundation, Manipur Network of Positive
People (MNP+) and also Manipur State AIDS Society are currently willingly to
treat people with hepatitis C in Manipur free of cost (Nagaland Post 13 May 2017).
Such initiative will enhance cooperation if it is extended to other states and also
people living across the border.
HIV-TB co-infection
According to the World Health Organization’s latest report on tuberculosis (TB),
India and Myanmar fall under the category of high-burden countries along with
Brazil, Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, the Philippine, Uganda and Vietnam.
The threat of TB looms large in India’s northeastern states of Nagaland, Mizoram
and Manipur. Nagaland has a high percentage of population suffering from TB. As
per the government estimate, the detection rate of TB in the year 2014 was 81 per-
cent as against the national target of 70 percent and the cure rate was 91 percent
as against the national target of 85 percent. While all that points to the success of
the Department of Health in meeting its target, recent researches present a dismal
picture. The link between people who use/inject illicit drugs (PWID) and their
chances of contracting TB is increasingly becoming visible, the reasons being pov-
erty, unemployment, malnutrition, social stigma and limited access to health care.
In addressing the challenge posed by HIV-TB co-infection in India, the National
AIDS Control Program (NACP) and the revised National TB Control Program
(RNTCP) started collaborative HIV/TB control activities in the six high-burden
states in 2001. Such joint efforts were further scaled up in 2007 within a National
Framework for collaborative HIV-TB activities. By 2012 the intensified HIV-TB
package achieved national coverage (TB India 2015).
A host of other actors such as medical associations, international NGOs and
faith-based organizations (FBOs) are engaged in TB control efforts.
Notwithstanding such measures being adopted by both the governments in
their respective domains, there have been little efforts toward building a systematic
framework for cross-border health infrastructure. Except for few NGOs such as the
Centre for Social Development (CSD) that has been working amongst border areas,
there is little or no initiative toward developing cross-border disease surveillance
mechanism. In the Myanmar side of the border, health organizations from Arakan,
Chin, Kuki and Naga ethnic groups are engaged in providing preventive services
and treatment for AIDS in the Sagaing region albeit on a limited basis. How-
ever, health workers on either side of the India-Burma border hardly coordinate
with each other. The Assam Rifle that has a formidable presence in the northeast
obstructs the activities of Burmese health workers by intimidating them or arresting
them on slightest suspicion of their involvement in the insurgencies (JHSPH 2007).
The paramilitary forces whose task is to curb insurgencies and drug-trafficking in

the border regions wrongly choose to assert their daunting presence in the region
by rounding up well-meaning health workers and in the process, undermines pros-
pects of meaningful cross-border exchanges.
Keeping these facts in consideration it is important to evaluate the government
mechanisms on both sides of the border in order to understand and observe any
negotiation to mitigate these issues.
Responses from the governments of India and Myanmar

In the wake of the political transition in Myanmar and the introduction of the
multiparty democracy in 2011, former President U Thein Sein prioritized the
upgradation of healthcare services. He emphasized the need to seek the coopera-
tion of local population in implementing health reforms. Since 2013 the Myanmar
Government has increased total expenditure on health from kyat 7,688 million in
2000–01 to kyat 652,745 million in 2014–15 (Ministry of Health 2014).
In implementing healthcare reforms, the former Myanmarese President U Thein
Sein sought financial assistance from India. During President U Thein Sein’s visit
to India in October 2011, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
Myanmar for the upgradation of the Yangon’s Children Hospital and Sittwe Gen-
eral Hospital. India offered US$ 7 million for the upgradation project that was to
be managed and overseen by Hospital Service Consultancy Corporation India ltd
(HSCC). India also facilitated in the construction of Monywa General Hospital.
The most recent endeavours made in the direction of building up collaboration
in the health sector has been the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding
between the Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India and the Ministry of Health
and Sports of the Government of Myanmar in the sphere of traditional medicine
on 29 August 2016. It is indeed a significant step toward creating a common frame-
work of knowledge and healing practices between the two neighbors.
In 2017, both sides have agreed to start consultations to establish and operate
a state-of-the-art hospital in Nay Pyi Taw in association with one of the leading
Indian hospital groups, based on modalities to be mutually decided (MEA 2017).
Thus, the above initiatives between both the nations remain generic and it is
indeed noteworthy that there have been no specific steps or initiatives taken to mit-
igate the major concern related to HIVAIDS and HIV-TBco-Infection. As India
is a cost-effective destination for well-developed medical facilities, state-of-the-art
medical facilities should be established in bordering areas along the India–Myanmar
border, which will benefit not only the people of the peripheries of India but also
the people of the other side of the border. Moreover, Indian government may
encourage the Northeastern states to tap potential of Healthcare tourism. There
is need for synergy between local government agencies and civil society groups/
NGOs/ FBOs/ UN Agencies working in these disease-affected areas in India in
preventing and controlling the spread of communicable diseases like HIV AIDS and
HIV-TB co-infection on a sustained and long-term basis.
In this regard there are some steps which can be taken for cross-border health
collaboration as well as cooperation.
• It is important to build a common framework of disease prevention and con-

trol strategy across the border with special reference to HIV AIDS, HCV, and
HIV-TB co-infection.
• It is needed to ensure availability of healthcare to people living in the hard to
reach areas.Well-equipped Primary Health Care Centers (PHCs) in the border
towns and villages can not only cater to the needs of the rural population in
remote areas but also address health problems of the poor Myanmarese nation-
als who often cross over to the Indian side of the border for treatment.
• Both India and Myanmar may take joint initiative to improve infrastructure of
border hospitals on both sides.
Note
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the ASEAN Studies Centre-sponsored
seminar on “Border and Connectivity: North-East India and South-East Asia” and pub-
lished as Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “Connecting Lives on India – Myanmar Border:
Issues in Migration and Public Health Hazards,” in K. Vidya Sagar Reddy and C. Joshua
Thomas (eds), Border and Connectivity: North-East India and South-East Asia (New Delhi:
Pentagon Press, 2019).
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8
EMPLOYING PROXIMITY
Boosting bilateral ties between India
and Myanmar
Pratnashree Basu
Regional connectivity can be viewed in terms of bridging domestic goals and

geopolitical ambitions. Physical connectivity i.e. connectivity through pipelines,
highways and sea routes is only one aspect of connectivity. Physical connectivity
should be made to work to the advantage of all stakeholders so that it is predicated
by policy connectivity, giving rise to a set of institutions with formal and informal
norms that facilitate and harmonize the flow of labour, capital and goods as well as
ensure the free movement of people.
Myanmar is India’s gateway to the southeast and this fact is one of the funda-
mental drivers of the Look East Policy and the now refurbished Act East policy.
Besides financial aid and cooperation in economic and energy sectors, India’s ties
with Myanmar leave a lot of room for development and cultivation. Ties between
the two countries based on a foundation of shared ethnic, cultural, religious and
historical ties date back centuries. Officially, bilateral relations got a start after the
signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1951 and a trade agreement in 1994. Despite
high-level visits and agreements on several bilateral projects, the development of
relations has remained a very gradual one due to political complexities, security
issues, difficult physical terrain and deplorable road links. Nevertheless, India’s
policy of ‘realpolitik’ and preference for ‘non-interference and active engagement’
with Myanmar through the major part of bilateral history has stood it in good
stead. In the absence of this approach, ties between the two may have become
non-recoverable.
While the last couple of decades have seen a significant improvement in bilat-
eral ties, there is much ground to be covered with respect to furthering bilateral
cooperation. The most important of these areas include cross-border infrastructural
development; trade and services; cooperation in technology and tourism. At the
heart of these areas of enhancing bilateral ties is the building of Indian presence in
Myanmar and vice versa.
130 Pratnashree Basu
This chapter will explore the possibilities of advancing bilateral engagement

in the above mentioned areas with a focus on the implementation of short-term
policy goals which would prove beneficial to the sustenance of long-term policy
goals. The chapter will highlight how, being neighbors, sharing a common histori-
cal past and cultural similarities present a useful opportunity for both countries to
employ their proximity to their advantage.
Geographical proximity
The significance of the geographical location of Myanmar is not lost among the
Indian intelligentsia. For years it has been acknowledged that the unique location
of Myanmar positions it as a bridge between the countries of South Asia and
Southeast Asia. Myanmar shares borders with India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Laos
and China and straddles South and Southeast Asia. The country’s unique loca-
tion has ensured its participation in regional and subregional blocks such as the
ASEAN, BIMSTEC and the GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region) Development
Program (Yhome 2008). The strategic significance of Myanmar has also been
highlighted by projects like the Asian Highway Network and the Trans-Asian
Railway.
However, political turmoil and protracted periods of instability have made
it difficult for the country to employ the benefits of its location not only to its
own advantage but also that of the neighborhood. Nevertheless, since the politi-
cal transition in Myanmar began, it has been regarded that the country will play a
fundamental role in reorienting Asia’s geography –
Burma, long seen in Western policy circles as little more than an intractable
human rights conundrum, may soon sit astride one of the world’s newest and
most strategically significant crossroads. Mammoth infrastructure projects are
taming a once inhospitable landscape. More importantly, Burma and adjacent
areas, which had long acted as a barrier between the two ancient civilizations,
are reaching demographic and environmental as well as political watersheds.
Ancient barriers are being broken, and the map of Asia is being redone.
(Myint-U 2011)
In the Look East Policy of the Indian government, now refurbished as the Act
East Initiative, Myanmar was to play a central role as a gateway to countries of
Southeast Asia. And indeed, Myanmar’s location makes it suitably poised to assume
the role of a confluence between countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia.
Connectivity and security

Physical connectivity through multi-modal links is essential for boosting commer-
cial ties as well as enhancing people to people relations. For functional and effective
connectivity links, there is a requirement of both the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ of
Employing proximity 131
connectivity (Osius 2013).The former refers to the physical links such as roads, rail-
way networks, bridges and so on; while the latter refers to the systems, procedures,
regulations and technology, which make the physical links serviceable. Both com-
plement each other and are equally important in the promotion and strengthening
of commercial, political and cultural ties.
There are about eight road connectivity projects between the two countries –
the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), the India-Myanmar-
Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, the Mekong-India Economic Corridor, the
Stilwell Road (the Ledo Road and the Burma Road), the Delhi-Hanoi Railway
Link, the Rhi-Tiddim Road in Myanmar, the BCIM Economic Corridor and
the Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo Friendship Road. Of these, only the Tamu-Kalewa-
Kalemyo Friendship Road one has been completed. Of these, the India-Myanmar-
Thailand Trilateral Highway is considered to be the most important one, which
may in future also be extended up to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Once com-
pleted, the Highway will function as not just a connectivity link but also an eco-
nomic and development corridor with special economic zones (Iyer 2017), which
would have the potential to transform local aspirations.
Being a multi-modal link covering a sea route, river route and land links, the
KMTTP is arguably the most prominent of these projects. However, it has faced
countless shifting deadlines and only construction of a jetty at the Sittwe port (pro-
viding a maritime link with the Kolkata port) has been completed. Coastal shipping
between the two countries has also been considered and a cargo ferry service began
operations in 2014 from Chennai to Yangon.
Connectivity through rail links also need to be considered as they will reduce
the duration of transport and would also be cost effective in comparison to trans-
port via road. Feasibility studies for a rail link between Jiribam in Manipur to
Mandalay in Myanmar have been conducted including studies on smaller sections
along this route, which is part of the Trans-Asian Railway Network. In 2013, the
Northeast Frontier Railway in India proposed a master plan to connect the north-
eastern states of the country with Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Many of these projects (especially road links) have faced difficulties such as land
issues, apprehensions regarding possible displacement, environmental concerns,
political repercussions and bureaucratic inertia. Hence, despite having been envi-
sioned and agreed to on chapter, the implementation of these connectivity pro-
jects has languished. In addition, in places where work is ongoing, the delays have
resulted in escalation of estimated costs of construction. Other problems such as the
difficulty of using feeder roads connecting infrastructure projects around the year
due to difficult terrain also contribute to extending the time allotted for comple-
tion of the projects.
Another vital mode of physical connectivity is the establishment of air links. An
increase in the number of direct flights is required to avoid longer flight durations
are longer for people travelling from either country. There is only one bi-weekly
direct flight service from Kolkata to Yangon and another weekly flight service from
New Delhi to Yangon via Gaya. Given that religious tourism (discussed later) can
be of great potential for enhancing bilateral ties, increasing flight services will make
it much easier for people to travel.
The issue of cross-border security is a two-pronged one. First, the northeastern
states of India, which share the land boundary with Myanmar, have been beset with
internal strife for decades and across the border, ethnic conflicts have also erupted
from time to time. Militant outfits from both sides have found refuge along the
border areas because of the difficult physical landscape, which makes it difficult for
security forces to have enough and effective monitoring.
Second, the border areas are located close to the ‘Golden Triangle,’ which is
notorious for the production and trade of drugs, illegal trade in small arms and
human trafficking. The region is also very prone to sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs). These have in turn resulted in a region that has lacked stability and the
establishment of institutions and processes that would enable the betterment of
education and enhancement of living conditions. Together with this, corruption
among government officials has also hindered efforts and measures that could have
been implemented to address these challenges.
Illegal migration and security along the border is arguably the most important,
yet often, sensitive issue for the two countries. In this regard, the northeastern
states of India and the bordering provinces in Myanmar need to engage closely to
ensure that cross-border relations are boosted. Measures also need to be put in place
by the two governments to enable security forces on both sides of the border to
strengthen their efforts toward curbing illegal migration, smuggling, trafficking in
small arms and informal trade. Effective procedures for these checks are necessary
as well. Security concerns therefore need the concerted and sustained efforts of the
two governments.
Leveraging the Free Movement Regime

The Free Movement Regime (FMR) permits people either side of the border to
enter and move freely within a distance of 16 km. The FMR has its advantages and
disadvantages. While it is susceptible to being misused by militants and smugglers
who gain easy access to either side of the border, at the same time, it is extremely
beneficial to people who inhabit these areas and share similar cultural histories,
especially the Naga, Meitei and Kuki tribes. In the border town of Zokhawtar for
instance, located in Mizoram is comprised of only a bridge diving two parts of
what is actually one large settlement. Since there are English medium schools on
the Indian side of the town, children from across the border are enrolled in these
schools and cross the bridge everyday to come and attend classes on the Indian side.
The FMR has made this possible.
In early 2017, reports surfaced that fencing along the Myanmarese side of the
border had begun. Authorities in Myanmar claimed that this was being done to
effectively manage the border areas. The Indian government however stated that
there was no proposal to fence the border. Earlier in 2003, fencing along the
Manipur section of the India–Myanmar border had been attempted following

bilateral discussion but construction was stopped following protests by locals.
Following this, a government panel was instituted by India to look into the gaps
in border relations between the two countries and despite security concerns such as
the influx of Rohingya refugees, it is expected that the FMR will remain in force
(Tripathi 2017). This has been done considering the close ethnic and cultural ties
that are shared by people living on either side of the border.The panel has proposed
the use of Aadhar identification cards by Indian nationals to prevent misappropria-
tion by refugees.
It is important to ensure that the FMR remains in place and supports the inter-
ests of the local inhabitants for whom it was instituted. Both countries should
therefore put in place supporting mechanisms that would facilitate free movement
as well as act as a check on the exploitation of the same for illegal purposes. Dia-
logue regarding the FMR should also involve local stakeholders so that policies are
comprehensive and accommodative of local interests.
India and Myanmar signed the Land Border Crossing Agreement in May 2018
(The Telegraph 2018). The agreement permits people (with valid passports and
visas) from either side of the border to cross to the other side for education, health,
tourism and pilgrimage. Being regarded as a landmark deal, the border agreement,
has been deferred several before being finally signed. It is an important step toward
facilitating people-to-people movement and cross-border interactions.
Infrastructural facilities at the border

While there are efforts toward the formalization of trade, for India and Myanmar,
non-tariff barriers including restrictions on tradable items have impeded such efforts.
Moreh and Zokhawtar in the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram have been
functioning border haats with their Myanmarese counterparts across the border –
Tamu and Rih, respectively. The Moreh-Tamu border point is the more active
one of the two and the Zokhawtar-Rih border point is quite recent. In both these
places however, there is need for infrastructural facilities such as banking, labora-
tory testing, warehousing, and screening, among others.The Indian government has
undertaken the development of the land customs station at Moreh to an Integrated
Check Post with contemporary facilities and regulatory measures for the preven-
tion of smuggling and informal trade. Facilities at the Integrated Check Post will
include sheds for Cargo inspection, passenger terminal building, warehouse/cold
storage, currency exchange, banks, and so on (Das 2016).
The lack of proper testing facilities at Moreh of food items being traded creates
delays as the items are sent to Imphal for testing and the process can take up to
two weeks. Often, samples are opened on the way to Imphal by security personnel
creating scope for contamination. Myanmar has requested India for technological
and financial assistance for expanding the existing mini lab at Tamu and establishing
another one at Rih (Das 2016).
Market access and economic connectivity

Although it is less than a decade that Myanmar has begun to undertake eco-
nomic reforms that would facilitate the opening up of the economy, The Sta-
bilization Program commenced by the government from the late 1980s paved
the way for an investment-friendly atmosphere with a market-based economy
by invigorating the local economy. Over the recent years, the GDP per capita
has risen gradually. In 2011, the government permitted selected private banks
to trade foreign currency and in 2012 a fresh Foreign Investment Law (FIL) was
signed, which resulted in a greater role of investments, allowed tax breaks, eased
procedural constraints and land leases of up to 50 years (Chaudhury, Basu and
Basu 2015).
Enhancing market access and invigorating the economy is however a painstak-
ing process in Myanmar as other countries are wary about the domestic political
scenario which can very quickly turn unfavorable to the interests of the market.
The reenactment of the new FIL was a welcome move but the right to evaluate
investment offers is reserved by the Myanmar Investment Commission, which is
not known for its transparency.
India and Myanmar set up a Joint Trade Committee in 2003 to take stock of
bilateral trade between the two, which was followed by a Bilateral Investment Pro-
motion Agreement (BIPA), and a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA)
in 2008. India has entered the Myanmarese market through sectors like healthcare,
pharmaceuticals, banking and infrastructure. India in turn offers a huge market for
companies in Myanmar and imports sizeable quantities of agricultural commodi-
ties. Nevertheless, bilateral trade continues to remain shy of expectations. This can
be attributed to lack of effective financial infrastructure, high currency exchange
rates in Myanmar, and cumbersome financial regulations. Poor connectivity links
between the two countries is another factor, which compounded the problem
(Chaudhury, Basu and Basu 2015).
An area in which the two countries can expand bilateral cooperation is the
banking sector, which in turn would facilitate investments and therefore boost
bilateral economic ties. Many Indian banks have opened their business in Myanmar
and despite there being operational challenges; it would in the long run be benefi-
cial. Efficient banking facilities, especially at border areas are imperative for curbing
informal trade.
Being a country rich in natural resources like wood, non-metallic minerals and
precious stones, it would be beneficial for the country to leverage the potential
offered by these resources which are high-end and therefore, lucrative. In addition,
Myanmar has a young labour pool and is located in a region that is both dynamic
and fast growing. Coupled with these, a stable political system and sound economic
policy mixes would provide the much needed fillip to spur the economy and
engage more constructively with the neighborhood (Anukoonwattaka and Mikic
2012). Robust trade relations and greater economic relations in turn help to ensure
safe and secure borders (Ghosh 2016).
Low hanging fruits

While infrastructural connectivity projects, dialogue on security issues and boosting
bilateral economic engagement are long-term goals, there also needs to be short-
term instruments of bilateral engagement which would be able to sustain the drive
toward the achievement of long the term goals. These are the in other words, the
‘low hanging fruits’ which facilitate regular interactions and streamline bilateral
engagement. Having these facilitators in place ensures that in times of political
uncertainty, bilateral ties are not pushed two steps behind.
For instance, even though India and Myanmar are next door neighbors, barring
the population living along the border (who share cultural and ethnic affinities),
there is a general lack of awareness and interest among the population in both these
countries about each other. A direct impact of this falls on the tourism industry.
Despite both countries possessing a huge potential for the development of bilateral
tourism, much of what does take place is limited to religious tourism. Other areas
in which bilateral cooperation can take place on a much more visible and regular
basis include exchange in services; cooperation in vocational training and educa-
tion; enhancing cross-border economic linkages and the establishment of digital
connectivity.
Low hanging fruits enable the utilization of simpler goals that can help the two
countries to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation. While not all of
these instruments may be easily achievable, it is imperative that the two countries
recognize the benefits that would accrue from developing these areas of coopera-
tion so that constructive dialogue and ensuing processes can be initiated.
Encouraging local interest and involvement

The creation of local stake is crucial for making the connectivity architecture a
sustainable one. Therefore there needs to be enabling mechanisms, which would
leverage the geographical advantages and thus in turn contribute to the successful
running of connectivity links (Basu 2015). To create local stake, the involvement
of state governments is very important. For instance, for the development of ties
among people, trade and services along the Myanmar-Mizoram border, the state
government of Mizoram needs to play an active role. Tourism, cross-border trade
and cooperation in services can be areas that would be useful in this regard. The
encouragement of local involvement and the establishment of processes that would
benefit the immediate neighborhoods on either side of the border would also
engage people meaningfully. In addition, this would also enable the border areas to
become more than just transit points for third-country trade.
Border haats(rural markets) which are already functional in certain points along
the Indo–Myanmar are a vital mode of engaging the local population. Set up within
5 km on either side of the international border these haats serve as markets for trad-
ing in local items and produce and also for trade in items from third countries such
as China. Border haats help in the enhancement of local trade and people-to-people
ties. Another significant purpose of these local markets is to reduce informal trade.
However, this purpose is also always served due to the restriction of items on the
list of goods that can be traded and due to challenges posed by non-tariff barriers.
The first such haat was set up in the Pangsau Pass in Arunachal Pradesh in
India and Sangaing region across the border in Myanmar. In addition to this, the
Moreh-Tamu and Zowkhatar-Rih border haats are also operational with the for-
mer being the busier one. The Myanmar government expressed interest in increas-
ing the number of these haats to support the socioeconomic development of people
in these areas (Business Standard 2017). In May 2017, a five-member team led by
Myanmar’s Ministry of Labour Affairs visited the Kasaba border haat in Tripura
on the India-Bangladesh border to study its functioning. The team also visited the
Akhaura Integrated Checkpost, which is second largest border trading zone on
the India-Bangladesh border. Four more haats on the Indian side in the state of
Mizoram – Hnahlan,Vaphai, Zote and Pangkhua and Darkhai, Leilet, Fartlang and
Thau on the corresponding side in Myanmar are also being planned (Northeast
Today 2017).
Spurring the growth of tourism

The northeastern states of India are well known for their scenic beauty and are also
home to many religious and historical sites of interest. On the other side of the
border, Myanmar too has beautiful destinations. Given that there are also pockets
of cultural similarities, it should be conducive to encourage cross-border tourism
among the two countries. For instance the RihDil lake, which is located just a few
kilometers across the border from the border town of Champhai (in Mizoram) is a
beautiful scenic and spiritual destination which can be developed as a tourist spot.
The lake holds a lot of spiritual as well as mythological significance for Mizos on
the Indian side of the border and would be a popular location for tourism. There
are also lesser-known places of historical interest for the people of either country.
These include, among others, the tomb of Bahadur Shah Zafar in Yangon and the
palace of Thibaw, the last king of Burma, located in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra.
Despite the fact that the government only authorizes tourists to visit specific
locations such as Bagan and Mandalay among others, Myanmar has a rapidly grow-
ing tourism market and this sector has the potential to contribute significantly to
the country’s economy.The tourism industry also promotes ecotourism and special
tourist packages like Art Cities of Myanmar, which are catered for unique experi-
ences. Myanmar has also been engaged in inter and intra-regional tourism devel-
opment efforts. It is estimated that over a million tourists came to Myanmar after
the country’s political landscape began to transform from 2011, which increased to
almost 5 million in 2015. These numbers are however deceptive (Janssen 2017) as
the majority of tourists coming into Myanmar comprise of day trippers from the
bordering areas of Thailand and China.
In 2017, the Indian government announced a visa-free policy for tourists
from Myanmar, following which, the number of tourists from Myanmar to India
increased by 10 percent from that of the previous year (Myanmar Times 2018).
Religious tourism is an important component of bilateral engagement in this
regard. Besides religious tourism, medical and adventure tourism also have a lot of
scope. Nevertheless, the number of travelers from India to Myanmar is much less
than those going to other countries of Southeast Asia because of the comparatively
higher costs of hotels in the country. An increase in the number of direct flights
from India to Myanmar can also help to boost bilateral tourism.
The rise of tourism declined in 2016 in the wake of conflicts between ethnic
groups and the military. The political climate in the country has a big impact on
the tourism industry and till such a time as the situation is quelled and there is
enough confidence in the sustenance of stability, the tourism sector will fail to
gather momentum. Additionally, enhancement of visibility and awareness about
the country is also required for generating interest among potential travelers. It is
an unfortunate predicament, as growth of this sector would have a direct impact
on the creation of jobs. The sector reportedly created an estimated 1.5 million jobs
in 2016.
Following the Land Border Crossing Agreement and the Cross-border Travel
Allowance Agreement signed between the two countries earlier in 2018, caravan
tour operators on both sides are positive about a rise in the number of tourists
from across the border in India through the Tamu-Moreh gate and Rikhawdar-
Zokhawthar gate. Caravan tour groups on either side take travelers on short trips to
locations across the border. Both governments are also expected to work out secu-
rity plans to be adhered to by these operators. According to the Ministry of Hotels
and Tourism in Myanmar, over 1500 travelers from India came to the country via
caravan tour groups and about 700 Myanmarese travelers went across the border to
India (Thu 2018).
The development of education and soft skills

Education lies at the heart of connectivity drives. Education and vocational pro-
grams for people on both sides of the border would contribute greatly to the overall
development of quality of life and usher new opportunities for the development of
these areas which at the moment are often not just remote in terms of distance but
also in terms of standards of living.
This is an important sector in which the Indian central and state governments
need to collaborate as it is the state-level governments which will be implement-
ing the policies. Besides student exchange programs, there can special short and
long-term courses in which teachers and scholars from India can be sent to institu-
tions in Myanmar. For instance, there are vocational training centers at Pakokku
and Myingyan set in by Hindustan Machine Tools International Ltd (HMTI) and
the Government of Myanmar, providing training on Machinist-Fitting, Machinist-
Turning/Milling, Tools and Die Making, Industrial Electricity, Sheet Metal and
Welding (Chaudhury, Basu and Basu 2015). Two other initiatives include the Lan-
guage Laboratories and E-Resource Center project trained officials in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Myanmar in foreign languages; and the establishment

of the India–Myanmar Center for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills
(IMCEITS) which provides short-term courses on Software and Application Pro-
gramming for student in Myanmar.
India’s northeastern states are home to a diverse range of educational institutions
including central universities and vocational institutes which provide quality edu-
cation and can be beneficial for students from Myanmar.There is a high demand of
academic, technical and professional training in Myanmar and young professionals
from India can find a lot of scope.
Digital connectivity
Cross-border fiber optic links providing high-speed broadband link for voice and
data transmission have been set up between India and Myanmar.The first one, run-
ning for a distance of 500 km, was set up from Moreh (in Manipur) to Mandalay in
2009. The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector has grown
rapidly in Myanmar after having remained underdeveloped for the major part of
the country’s history with sharp increases in growth since 2013 (Premawardhana
2017). The government rolled out a policy framework for the development of ICT
industry and introduced competition between foreign and domestic competitors.
Indeed, investors have been eyeing this sector in Myanmar as the country is among
the last untapped markets in Asia (Nam, Cham and Halili 2015)
In 2016, the first terrestrial optical fiber link between India and Myanmar operated
by Bharti Airtel (a leading global telecommunications company based in India) went
live. This is expected to heighten the growth of digital services. In late 2017, India
announced a credit line of USD 1 billion as part of the country’s Work Plan 2018,
for the development of digital connectivity infrastructure with CLMV (Cambodia,
Laos Myanmar and Vietnam) countries. Enhanced broadband penetration efforts are
already being undertaken with Myanmar with the help of India’s Gigabit Passive
Optical Network technology (The Financial Express 2018). The Plan also involves
cooperation in big data, cyber-security, cloud computing and e-governance. The
Myanmar government also formed a digital economy development committee in
2017 to work in tandem with the Indian government (Myanmar Times 2018).
Enhancement of digital infrastructure and establishment of processes that utilize
the same are essential to catch up and be at par with developments across the world.
While physical connectivity networks no doubt are the bedrock for the betterment
of commercial and people to people ties, in an age when much of world functions
and interacts through digital technology, it is imperative to develop and employ the
same. It is also vital that these efforts be buoyed by complementary policy, proce-
dural and regulatory regimes (Saran 2015).
Conclusion
Bilateral relations are also often impacted by what is often referred to as ‘a new
Great Game,’ which refers to the collision of geostrategic interests in Myanmar
between India and China (Gottschlich 2015). Myanmar is rich in energy resources,
which assumes significance for both India and China who are keen to diversify
their sources of energy as their economies expand. Yangon is also important for
Beijing to stimulate the growth of the latter’s landlocked western provinces which
border Myanmar (Credo 2015). Myanmar’s trade with China is much greater than
that with India. China has significant investments in Myanmar and plays a domi-
nant role in oil and gas, hydropower and infrastructure sectors in Myanmar. Beijing’s
presence in Myanmar, however, has not always been a welcome one as the country
seeks to balance its engagement with both China and India. On India’s part, there
needs to be clarity regarding policy, elimination of ambivalence and a long-term
understanding about the approach necessary to work with the reality of China’s
increasing presence in the country (Lall 2008).
In South and Southeast Asia, there is an invariable apprehension regarding
the expansion and nature of Beijing influence. When it comes to infrastructure
projects and financial assistance, the role of Japan must also be considered. While
China attracts much of the international attention for its projects like the Belt
and Road Initiative, it must be noted that Japan has been involved in the devel-
opment of infrastructure and resources in the region for decades spearheaded
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), and the Japan Infrastructure Initiative (Shepard 2018). Besides
geostrategic competition with China, it is also believed that the time has come
for Japan to reap the benefits of its long involvement in Myanmar (Strefford
2016). Interestingly, an ADB report (2017) estimated that developments in the
Asia-Pacific would require about $1.7 trillion per year through 2030 noting
that the demand for infrastructure will surpass the existing arrangements. In this
sense, as Shepard (2018) notes, ‘the Asian infrastructure investment game has only
just begun.’
Proximity is effective only when the benefits that it offers are realized, or con-
structive attempts are made for the same to be realized. While India and Myanmar
have undertaken several measures that seek to leverage the benefits that each has to
offer, there remains much more to be done. It is important in this context to sus-
tain the intent to strengthen bilateral ties and expand areas of cooperation. Political
relations between countries are never constant and there will be issues that need
ironing out.The long-term goals of enhancing physical connectivity links, boosting
commercial ties and enhancing people to people interaction need to be kept free
from being held hostage to temporary political circumstances.
As Myint-U (2011) writes,
The generation now coming of age is the first to grow up in an Asia that is
both postcolonial and (with a few small exceptions) postwar. New rivalries
may yet fuel 21st-century nationalisms and lead to a new Great Game, but
there is great optimism nearly everywhere, at least among the middle classes
and the elites that drive policy: a sense that history is on Asia’s side and a
desire to focus on future wealth, not hark back to the dark times that have
only recently been left behind.
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PART III
Changing political landscape
and India–Myanmar
cooperation
9
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION
‘Interests’ in reframing the peripheries
of India and Myanmar
Rakhee Bhattacharya
As the purpose and idea of a subregion in Asia has been augmented in the recent
past for both economic and security reasons, there was noticeable transformation
toward an engaging approach of the political economy of subregional cooperation
in India. Though this transformation in India can be referred back to early 1990s,
but the political vendetta on economic development since 2014 has started to push
the country more aggressively for such subregional cooperation and engagements.
This is to expand and integrate the economies across the borders through policy
channels of market, infrastructure and corridor network. As India is currently in the
group of fastest growing economies in the world, it has the challenge to sustain its
momentum of economic growth, market accessibility and capital investment. In this
context, the country in the last five years, has introduced a new set of pro-market
policies like Make in India, Start-up ventures and Ease of Doing Business. This is to
attract both local and global capital in various such economic activities, spreading
across its geographical areas. The policy aggression is seen even at the trans-border
level through an approach of cooperation and engagement for attaining marketable
surplus. In this context, India’s ‘Neighborhood first policy’ and ‘Act East Policy’ were
aimed toward renewed constructive engagements with Eastern and Southeastern
neighboring nations, and at multilateral levels, various subregional blocks like BIM-
STECK, BCIM, BBIN, ASEAN and others have regained significance in India’s
international relation studies. With this policy focus, India looks for larger potential
of market interplay and geo-economy at the subregional levels and in a process also
aims to become a leading power. By creating larger scope for economic engagements
within a subregion through the channels of transport network, labor mobility, higher
trade, institutional capacity and other economic flows with closer networks of physi-
cal, business, financial and human capital, India clearly aims to gain larger share in
regional power. In this regard, better and skilled regional diplomacy is increasingly
seem to have the potential to improve both bilateral and multilateral relations.Various
146 Rakhee Bhattacharya
channels other than State diplomacy, like non-state diplomacy, corporate diplomacy,
business diplomacy, NGO diplomacy and track two diplomacy are finding their
places in the larger lexicon of regional and economic diplomacy in India’s cur-
rent outward-looking and liberal macro-economic framework for framing sustain-
able subregions and neighborhood spaces. With its regional diplomacy taking a new
height, some of the neighbors like Myanmar and Bangladesh are gaining renewed
attention. This is most obviously for India’s Northeast, which shares long (1643 and
1879 km. respectively) borders with both the nations. Myanmar is more significant
and strategic for its geographical location, as it can provide an easy (and sustainable)
entry-exist and transit space to India via its Northeast for rest of Southeast Asia and
beyond. Having world’s most important sea lane, it can also provide a trans-Asian
maritime economic and connectivity network and can bring together the Asian
community on board for constructive engagements. Similarly, being the reservoir of
rich natural resources of mineral, oil and gas, Myanmar is a fresh site for the capitalist
economy, especially after its political transition and economic liberalization.
In the decolonization period, as Myanmar had faced several Western sanctions
due to its military junta regime, the nation was largely supported, protected and
subsequently exploited by China. In the passing time with its huge resource reserves
like oil, gas and forest, it easily became a periphery of China’s rising industrial
capitalism, and subsequently became a ‘dependent’ economy on advanced China.
With China in Myanmar, and making the later a peripheral site of the industrializa-
tion of the former with huge resource extraction, Myanmar was developed as an
‘underdeveloped,’ and became one of the world’s poorest nations over time. The
militarized political regime of Myanmar was also heavily aligned with China and
protected its ‘interests’ by being a major supplier of resources, and subsequently cre-
ating economic and social peripheralization within Myanmar.The country was also
exposed to vast illegal and crony economy in opium production and circulation
with a nexus of State apparatus, military power heads and China’s corporate houses.
All these have produced a complete economic stagnation in the Myanmar, while
Chinese economic growth became staggering. This over time has vastly affected
the people of Myanmar with multiple challenges of economic and human security
issues like high unemployment rate, low human development, high poverty, geo-
graphical isolation, loss of livelihood and injustice toward marginalized sections.
Myanmar’s formal economy in turn shared only about 0.10 percent of world econ-
omy, and ranked 158th out of 186 nations in the Economic Freedom Index till the
recent decade. Currently with the beginning of the process of political transition
toward democracy in the Myanmar since 2011, it has attracted worldwide attention.
It is also because of its strategic location, which has the potential to evolve an inner
and outer Asia for larger trade and circulation network.
These have pushed India to focus attention on the Myanmar within its larger
agenda of building neighborhood relation and subregional cooperation. India’s
Myanmar policy has become visibly proactive with a set of faster and deeper
engagements, mostly during the post-2014. Thus in the larger frame of regional
diplomacy on economic, political, cultural and strategic affairs, India has emphasized
Political economy of subregional cooperation 147
specifically on trade and investment promotion, aid and other financial flow man-
agement, tourism and institution creation, and management of all kinds of regula-
tory issues for an impactful policy of engagement in Myanmar. In this context, the
chapter aims to situate Myanmar in the evolving dynamics of India’s political econ-
omy of subregional cooperation by exploring and understanding its current policy
focus. It also studies how the internal dynamics in Myanmar is creating ‘interest
groups’ of various stakeholders in such subregional cooperation, which is interest-
ingly converging toward reframing the peripheries of both India and Myanmar
in an interface of geopolitics and geo-economics.
Idea of a subregion and India’s ‘Myanmar policy’

Currently India has been seen as a proactive Asian partner with its engaging foreign
policies. One of the agendas of such proactive policy is to create economic gain by
the means of trade, investment and business through all subregional, regional and
global markets; and the mechanism has been through ‘cooperative and support-
ive’ neighborly relation. This is being done by creating increasing and meaning-
ful dialogues and negotiations at various levels. With such idea of emerging Asian
subregion in the context of economic integration and security cooperation, vari-
ous peripheral spaces are also being re-imagined accordingly. India’s Northeastern
periphery in this regard is repositioning not only as a ‘new frontier’ but also as a
‘natural gateway’ toward achieving such goals. Scope for creating transit, routes,
connectivity through India’s Northeast is transforming its narrative of ‘isolation,’
and this geographical space is now re-imagined as paramount to the idea of subre-
gion and its integrated and connected development projects.
India’s Act East Policy is providing space for such larger subregional diplomacy
and creation of external markets for economic integration. Southeast Asia, East Asia,
and Sub-Himalayan region are seen important spaces to remap such concept of
subregion, and India’s Northeast is seen more as a connecting space for many geo-
economic projects than an isolated and geopolitical space. In this context Myanmar,
the immediate neighbor of the Northeast has also gained manifold attention in
India’s foreign policy. With Myanmar’s first political change in 2011, India started
to become a supportive partner toward such political change; and in the follow-
ing year in 2012, the country’s former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh visited
Myanmar and signed several Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for vari-
ous collaborative assignments. Finally with the power shifts in India in 2014 and
in Myanmar in 2015, India reiterated its position to play a ‘constructive role to
consolidate the democracy’ of Myanmar through various State level visits and to
‘support at every step’ toward political change in Myanmar.This objective is to for-
mulate an India–Myanmar policy in a broader, inclusive and long-term frame and
moving beyond sheer bilateral trade relation. Needless to say, economic and trade
engagements between these two nations in the past have been significantly low, as
the issues of security and cross-border violence amongst various ethnic groups have
largely affected and destabilized India’s Northeast for a prolonged period. Table 9.1
TABLE 9.1 India’s trade trend with Myanmar and ASEAN (Rs crores)
1997–98 2006–07 2010–11 2014–15
Mym ASEAN Mym ASEAN Mym ASEAN Mym ASEAN
Export 138.26 9160.32 633.74 57076.46 1459.03 116657.85 4739.34 195736.75

Share 0.14 7.09 0.11 9.82 0.13 10.26 0.25 10.31
Growth 14.21 −11.10 29.31 23.82 48.17 35.80 −1.38 −2.22
Import 832.53 12622.80 3540.94 81918.77 4651.15 139439.32 7476.53 273431.55
Share 0.54 8.19 0.42 9.74 0.28 8.28 0.27 9.99
Growth 32.35 21.19 52.06 70.01 −23.68 14.09 −10.90 9.55
Total 1015.79 21783.13 4174.69 138995.24 6110.18 256097.17 12215.88 469168.30
Share 0.36 7.68 0.30 9.84 0.22 9.08 0.26 10.12
Growth 28.66 5.13 48.11 47.42 −13.85 23.05 −7.44 4.31
Source: Export-Import Data Bank, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India, at www.dgft.gov.in/
brings out such insignificant shares of trade between India and Myanmar during
India’s neoliberal period since 1990s.
India in the past mostly emphasized on regional security cooperation with
Myanmar as part of its bilateral relation for a long period; and the historic surgi-
cal strikes like Operation Blue Bird in 1995 to the current one in 2015 show the
consistency in such bilateralism. As the current initiative is moving toward deeper
economic engagements, there are several areas where India has started to extend
support. This is to address Myanmar’s internal socioeconomic situation, specifically
in the areas of health, capacity building and maritime security. India started to cre-
ate physical, economic, social and educational infrastructures in Myanmar, which
eventually is expected to strengthen its own position in the country compared to
China. Thus for supporting Myanmar to develop an indigenous industrialization
and entrepreneurship, India has created Industrial Training Centers in its Pakokku
and Myingyan and proposed two more at Monywa and Thaton respectively. The
Myanmar-India Entrepreneurship Development Center and the Center for English
Language Training at Yangon have also been upgraded by India currently to share
the knowledge and skill capacity. This knowledge and skill development is essential
for Myanmar to go beyond China’s network and connect to the global network.
The step toward industrial development is similarly expected to reduce Myan-
mar’s externalities and ‘dependency’ on China’s economy in the long run. Cor-
respondingly for a sustainable agrarian development, India has extended support
and cooperation in agricultural research and education in Myanmar. It has prom-
ised to operationalize an Advanced Center for Agricultural Research and Educa-
tion at the Yezin Agricultural University and a Rice Bio Park at the Department
of Agricultural Research in Myanmar. A flood management policy has also been
initiated by India in Myanmar’s agricultural belt of Rakhine state. For other cen-
tral economic areas like trade, India has extended willingness to share knowledge
skills to Myanmar for achieving better negotiation mechanism in international
trade relation by creating trade training institute in the country and by imparting
training on complex understanding of the WTO trade negotiation. Similarly for
technological advancement, India has opened Myanmar Institute of Information
Technology and India–Myanmar Center for Enhancement of IT skills. India has
also extended policy support to Myanmar’s feeble social sector. For example, to
overcome the challenges of the devastated health sector of Myanmar, India has
completed an upgradation of Yangon Children’s Hospital and Sittwe General Hos-
pital and another Monywa General Hospital is under construction. It also aims to
establish one state-of-the-art hospital in Nay Pyi Taw in association with one of the
leading Indian hospital groups. Such large-scale Indian investment in both social
and economic sectors of Myanmar and by creating number of institutions and ini-
tiating capacity building process is for making the country self-reliant and a com-
peting player in the subregional dynamics in Asia. This in the long run is expected
to reduce China’s policy of aggressive and extractive capitalism in Myanmar, which
had largely made it a peripheral site with huge economic impoverishment. Such
ambitious economic expansionism of China, as argued by Bhattacharjee, generally
cares very little for human wellbeing and rights including within its own bordering
areas, and India’s deep and evolving bilateralism with Myanmar is significant. China
so far has gained trust and business in Myanmar mostly by supporting its authori-
tarian regime (Bhattacharjee 2018), and had deeply affected its socio-economic
landscape. This needs transformation through a democratic approach, and India’s
evolving support is significant now for Myanmar. Unlike China, India’s approach is
to build up cooperation in the line of equitable benefits for long-term relation and
trust. Such persistent political and economic engagements with diplomatic consen-
sus to defend the idea of equitable benefit will help to change India’s prolonged
estranged policy to an engaged policy toward Myanmar. Here India’s Northeastern
periphery is seen as an important geographical space for various larger economic
cooperation and agglomeration with the restoration of the ‘natural relation’ of both
the nations across their borders. A distributive and dependency-reducing (Axline
1977) trade and economic relation in this perceived subregion can not only help
Myanmar to unshackle from Chinese capitalism, but also can impart a region-wide
benefit for fair distribution. By dispersing economic surplus through any number
of measures like redistribution of benefits, pay-offs or compensation of losses in the
peripheral spaces (like Myanmar and India’s Northeast), which are some of the nat-
ural consequences of political fragility and weak bargaining power; such perceived
subregional cooperation can potentially create a sustainable future for Asia. In the
wave of current bilateralism between India and Myanmar, the nations are working
to reaffirm their shared commitments to deepen such subregional cooperation for
maximizing their ‘mutuality of interests.’ This is also to ensure equitable share of
benefits in the areas of trade, transport and energy cooperation. Thus agreeing to
such mutuality, the two nations not only aim for long-term bilateral relation, but
also have underpinned the importance of the subregional cooperation, which will
help to improve the lives and livelihoods of people in this contiguous space. Both
the nations now aim to set an example of ‘good neighborliness in the region’ and to
progress together with shared interests and in a mutually beneficial interdependent

environment. They have taken a drive for ‘common aspirations for peace, collective
prosperity and development of the region and beyond.’
In a more nuanced context of India’s Myanmar policy, a special attention always
is given to its Northeast, be it security or economy for the very crucial reason of
geographical proximity. For a long period of time the Northeast was imagined as
a problematic frontier and was a geopolitical theater in the State affairs not only
for India but for the entire subregion of China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and
Nepal having cross-border support and connections to make the space ethnically
charged and politically unstructured and fragile, and by creating threat to India’s
national security. These were suitable grounds to imagine the Northeast a security-
sensitive, a ‘sub-complex’ space, and a ‘geo-body’ for militancy and violence. As the
administrative boundary between India and Myanmar (Burma) was drawn by the
British government, it had unfortunately divided the homelands of many ethnic
groups in the region and subsequently their voices and demand were sub-merged
in the larger national interests of territoriality and security. The security dilemma
especially, as pointed out by Choudhuri, in the Northeast has many times forced
India to negotiate with Myanmar’s military junta regime. The strategy has worked
to some extent, especially to ‘batter Naga insurgents’ by the joint actions of the
armies of India and Myanmar (Choudhuri 2012). The prolonged conflicts in the
region have extensively damaged various cross-border (official) economic engage-
ments like trade and commerce, though various unofficial exchanges remained
functional, mostly to sustain everyday life of the people across this fluid borders
(Bhattacharya 2014). Currently Myanmar’s political change and economic lib-
eralization are seen as the opportunities for India’s Northeast, which may help
to transform such prolonged cross-border issues and illegalities to a defined and
constructive engagements. Given the ‘mutuality of interests’ of the people and the
States, it therefore goes without saying that the Indo–Myanmar relation is impera-
tive to normalize the cross-border relations. This can also ensure human security
to this subregion, especially to the people of about 240 border villages who have
been living in persistent threats of conflicts and militarization for a long period of
time.To create such cross-border relation, India commenced an official border trade
with Myanmar way back in the 1995 during its first phase of the Look East Policy
through the custom posts at Moreh in Manipur and Zowkhathar in Mizoram cor-
responding to Tamu and Rhi in Myanmar with 22 initially and extending up to 40
permissible items at 5 percent duty. This was expected to enhance official border
trade (overland trade by exchange of commodities) between the nations. The offi-
cial border trade figures of the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region
(MDoNER) however shows a decline in border trade till 2010–11 with merely Rs
4.16 crores. The amount became half from Rs 8.82 crores in 2006–07, which was
about Rs 87 crores in 1997–98 immediately after the route was formalized (Report
2005). This figure has ranked India as the lowest border trade partner of Myanmar,
and issues of insurgency, illegal extortion and infrastructure deficits have been cited
as the factors for such declining trade, especially in Moreh border of Manipur.
The unofficial border trade figure between India–Myanmar however continues

to be much higher as worth of Rs 22,00 crores (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade
1998). This figure, according to the study of Downie, now runs in tens of billions
(Downie 2015). However the report of the Ministry of External Affairs, Govern-
ment of India mentions that the border trade with Myanmar had made a quantum
jump during the year 2014–15 touching US$ 56.89 million from US$ 15.4 mil-
lion in 2010–11 (Report 2015b). The small town Moreh is the most significant
space for such cross-border trade which shares about 99 percent of formal overland
trade through Asian Highway 1, followed by Champai route through Mizoram
and Longwa route through Nagaland. Another study of Ch. Priyoranjan Singh of
Manipur University, shows some contrast scenario, as it points out that the number
of traders in Moreh has gone down drastically over time, and presently only three
traders are working in the border from about 40 traders who obtained licenses in
1995 at the beginning. Also in this border trade activity, the people of Manipur
have a marginal role to play, while the most powerful traders are from Myanmar
side mostly selling the Chinese and Southeast Asian goods at cheaper rates (see
Downie 2015). China on the contrary is making maximum surplus trade with
Myanmar across its Ruili border, followed by Thailand and Bangladesh. Myanmar’s
formal border trade with China in the year 2007 shows a staggering figure of US
$ 977.49 million followed by Thailand with US $ 304.96, Bangladesh with US $
32.43. India is at the bottom with US $ 15.11. After eight years in 2015, the figures
still showed that China tops the list sharing 87 percent of total border trade with
Myanmar, followed by Thailand with 12 percent, and India and Bangladesh with
0.8 percent and 0.2 percent respectively (Report 2015a). In the context of China’s
dominance in the border trade activity with Myanmar, India’s challenge is huge to
expand its scale and volume. It needs to open and operationalize more formal trade
routes and create various commerce centers like border haats in several border areas
like Avangkhu and Lungwa in Nagaland, Pangsau pass of Arunachal Pradesh and
Behiang, Skip and Tusom in Manipur with a large number of products, preferably
made within the region. More aggressive and sustained measures can improve the
volume of the formal border trade between the two nations. In the 6th meeting
of the Myanmar-India Joint Trade Committee held in New Delhi in June, 2017,
both the countries have rightly agreed to have regular meetings and interactions
of Border Trade Committee and Border Haats Committee to ensure actions on
the ground. Both the nations also have agreed to facilitate cross border movements
across the common land border with various modes of transportation to promote
bilateral trade and tourism.This is also to improve market accessibility by removing
various trade barriers. A coordinated bus service between the two countries from
Imphal in India to Mandalay in Myanmar has commenced recently as part of their
bilateralism and to make the Northeastern region most important geography for
such renewed cross-border relation.The two more land border-crossing agreements
were passed recently for the Moreh-Tamu and Zokhawthar-Rhikhawdar passages.
Construction of a rail link between Tamu and Mandalay in Myanmar is also taken
up, while air connectivity has been explored to enhance people-to-people contacts
as well as promote greater tourism networks. Both the Department of Civil Avia-
tion (DCA) of Myanmar and the Airport Authority of India are working together
to develop Pakokku and Kalay Airports with financial and technical assistance from
India. India eventually aims to extend customized training and capacity building
programs to the Air Traffic Controllers of Myanmar.
Reframing the peripheries or change

in geopolitical theater?
As many of these policy initiatives have centralized India’s Northeast both for
enhancing bilateralism and creating subregionalism, there is a renewed imagina-
tion of the Indian State to reframe its Northeast as a connected geography. Such
an imagination is aiming to replace the stereotypical narrative of the Northeast as
an ‘isolated periphery’ by reframing it as an economic ‘core.’ In this context, both
connectivity and corridor making are essentialized with the huge circulation of
capital from both the developmental State and the global agents. This is to create
linkages at trans-border level, where the Northeastern borderland and its borders
are expected to play a role for economic integration at subregional level. This is
ushering a new dynamics for subregional economy across the borders by enhanc-
ing market linkages and creating trade surplus. India has proposed to create Special
Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Sittwe area in the Rakhine state of Myanmar to
facilitate cross-border trade with power and agricultural products. Both India and
Myanmar have underlined the need for greater integration of power and energy
supply networks across their peripheral spaces of the Northeast and the Rakhine
state. Myanmar has agreed to India’s exploration and production of surplus energy
by engaging and operationalizing its petrochemicals and petroleum companies,
which also will support creating infrastructure of the LPG terminals in Myanmar.
In this regard, both the countries have agreed to have Numaligarh Oil Refinery of
India and Parami Energy Group of Myanmar to supply diesel to Myanmar across
the land border and to provide cheaper and more reliable access to petroleum
products in the Northern part of Myanmar. The countries have also agreed to
collaborate in storage and retail marketing of petroleum products in Myanmar.
The first consignment of the high-speed diesel has already reached Myanmar in
September 2017. Such interplay in energy sector is creating a deep nuance in the
bilateralism between India and Myanmar. But on a cautious note, such bilateralism
is also creating a scope for extractive capitalism in this subregion, and therefore
needs a deeper understanding for long-term implications. Currently this bilateral-
ism is seen important for the local economies of the Northeast and the Rakhine
state and their integration process in the subregional economy.
In the context of the changing dynamics of the Northeast as a ‘natural gateway’
of the Southeast and East Asia, there is a push for perceiving a peaceful space. This
is a prerequisite for any cross-border economic engagements. India is therefore cur-
rently negotiating with its age-old and much contested security measures like the
Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA). With a gradual repealing of the AFSPA
from states of Northeast (Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya) and by ‘observing closely’

the law and order situations in other states of the region, India aims to send a sig-
nal of peace and stability in the Northeast to its neighboring nations. There is also
larger consensus within the Northeast to address the crises of livelihood and eco-
nomic security issues by creating indigenous capacity and capitalism. As develop-
mental State is creating space for new normal for the investors with infrastructural
network in the Northeast along with the intense role of regional diplomacy focus-
ing on geography, resource and economy as major game-changers, this periphery
of India is no longer fervently imagined a geopolitical theater.
The effort to transform the narrative of the Northeast from the domain of
geopolitics to geo-economics raises the question as where can be the new geopo-
litical theater in this subregion now? The current situation of conflicts, instability
and up-rises in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, which is also a reservoir of huge natural
resources and has a very strategic location have drawn the attention and debates
from various corners. Being geographically the most strategic space, which can
potentially connect both South Asia and Southeast Asia even through coastal belts
of the India Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, this is perceived to be a new geopolitical
theater of the subregion. In the backdrop of a weak and evolving democracy in the
Myanmar’s political discourse, the coercion of ultra-nationalist group and military
regime in the Rakhine state in the recent times has made this a visibly volatile and
conflict prone space. The ongoing critical war against the Rohingya community
of this area therefore necessarily demands a fresh articulation and understanding at
length. With such resource reserve and State’s interests, Rakhine state of Myanmar
has become a new ‘sub-complex’ in this entire subregion. It has attracted attention
for both economic prospects and military operation. The issue of ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’ by the State apparatus has put Myanmar at the epicenter of the global watch
on human rights violation and has attracted worldwide debates. This has thrown a
deep challenge to its ongoing democratization process and its political representa-
tives. Global political pressure has built up through the condemnation and fresh
sanctions in Myanmar. State sponsored violence and militarization over marginal-
ized Rohingya community in the Rakhine state proves the role and voice of the
dominant force in the Myanmar’s political discourse. Why did such violence take
place and what was the driving force of such episode of eviction of the Rohingya
community? According to A. Khan, the State coercion in the Rakhine state was
primarily for its ‘resourcefulness and geostrategic location,’ which has also attracted
the attention of the neighboring nations China and India and their corporate capi-
talist groups. As significance of the Rakhine state is assessed with its vast surplus
land, new investors are looking for grabbing such land. The eviction of the local
community and destruction of their traditional agricultural practices therefore is
essential for many big economic projects. Thus the collusive force of various inter-
ested agencies of State, multinational corporates and elite actors have aimed to evict
such small Rohingya landholders. They are the most marginalized community in
Myanmar now and State has already destroyed their 362 villages, evicted more than
7 lakh people, and gave clearance to about 48 new investment projects in this same
area (Khan 2018). Both India and China are interested in various mega economic
and infrastructural projects for creating a trade network, and establishing SEZs in
this area.This is also expected to enhance economic growth in the Myanmar. In this
context, displacement of Rohingya community is ‘seem to be planned’ action of
the State (Khan 2018). Myanmar has already agreed to move ahead with the deep
sea port and SEZ of 1737 hectare projects with China in Kyaukphyu region of
Rakhine state, which was initiated in 2013.The first phase of Kyaukphyu Deep Sea
Port Project expects total investment of US$ 1.3 billion, where China will share the
maximum capital, and the rest by Myanmar. The projects of such scale also aim for
China-Myanmar economic corridor through this Rakhine region. Similarly India
also has plans to set up SEZ in Sittwe of Rakhine State, where it has already built
a port. This SEZ is likely to be located about 37 miles upstream of Sittwe town in
Ponnagyun Township. Such long-term plans for mega economic projects has been
pushing Myanmar to create land bank in this strategic space Rakhine, and the
mass eviction of Rohingya community was essentialised within a securitized frame.
New threat perception has been created by the Myanmar State on ‘Rohingya mili-
tancy group’ called Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the militarization in the
Rakhine state is toward creating a new ‘geopolitical headquarter’ of this subregion.
India remained ‘complicit’ about this issue, though has been otherwise supportive
to Myanmar’s democratic transition process.This could be for its economic interests
in the Rakhine state and for larger bilateral relation of constructing a subregion
having Myanmar as a pivotal nation. At this hour, therefore, Rakhine state is seen
as a new ‘geopolitical theater,’ which can facilitate various such connectivity and
economic projects to flourish (Khan 2018).
Democracy-development debate in the subregion

Reframing of peripheral spaces of India’s Northeast and Myanmar’s Rakhine state
with various subregional connectivity and economic projects are significant and
seen as gateways for subregional cooperation. The impending Trilateral Highway
of India to connect its Manipur with Myanmar and Thailand, and Kaladan Multi
Modal Transport Transit project on the Sittwe Port to connect its Mizoram with
Myanmar through the Bay of Bengal are crucial to make such subregional dream a
reality. On the other side, the Paletwa Inland Water Transport Terminal project along
with six more cargo barges, which were handed over to Myanmar Port Authority
and Inland Water Transport are also significant connectivity infrastructural projects
for such subregional cooperation. The two sides have agreed to enter into a MoU
on appointing a port operator that may include both sides to be responsible for the
operation and maintenance of the port in keeping with the practice that has been
adopted at other international ports in Myanmar. This would enable the Port and
International Water Transport infrastructure to be used commercially to promote
not only trade but also to develop the surrounding areas of the projects, like the
road from Paletwa to Zorinpui, which is under construction. The reconstruction
of bridges on the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa Road and on the Kalewa-Yargyi sector
of the Trilateral Highway on the other side is also on progress for such connec-
tivity network. With such emerging idea of a connected geography, there is no
denial of the fact that this spatial intersect is evolving with the potential of creating
a subregion in this part of Asia. This is also to compete with China’s interests in
the Rakhine state, as it is investing heavily in the projects to improve the Sittwe–
Kunming route. This planned and ‘systemic project’ of China which ‘aims to pro-
mote connectivity of Asia’ is a sign of its renewed economic diplomacy to control
over the Myanmar periphery.To encounter such ambition of China, India’s push for
such subregional cooperation is justified, and involves a perceived opportunity cost
of participation of the member nations in their different proposals and negotiations.
If India can succeed in such subregional game with cooperation from neighbor-
ing nations, including Myanmar, there can be a consensus of some ‘like-minded’
(Lu, Eder and Kiri 1998) States in Asia for constructive engagements within a
democratic frame. In the decolonization period this could never be imagined for
any long-term cooperation with regional forces, as the neighbors remained mostly
‘unfriendly’ on various territorialities and ethno-centric issues. The idea of such
subregional cooperation can therefore help to create an ‘economic territory of dif-
ferent kind’ (Ghosh 2012). This subregional forum needs to create multiple mech-
anisms other than connectivity infrastructure to make various peripheral spaces
competitive. This is to prevent the threat of new core-periphery disequilibrium
and any asymmetric power relation in both decision making processes and control-
ling capital flows, which tends to create various enclaves of capitalism within such
peripheral spaces.
Having such nuanced peripheral issues in the subregional forum, this emerg-
ing democratic space needs to play a stronger role toward connected development.
The approach toward building a long-term relation on various essential develop-
ment agendas can be helpful for the partnering nations of the subregion to achieve
such connected development. Democracy, which is synonymous with free human
choice and voice, individual sovereignty and equality, has a causal relationship with
progressive economic development. Many democratic institutes therefore can cre-
ate such connected development projects with a net positive effect on progressive
growth which is necessarily inclusive in nature. In many practicing democracies
(mostly developing nations), economic elites manage to retain disproportionate
wealth and influence, and preserve the profit-seeking anti-poor biases. This distorts
the idea and spirit of democracy, denying its social justice, and depriving many by
excluding their voices and rights. This is primarily because the practicing devel-
opment model is mostly the conventional Postwar Western capitalist model and
is premised on rational individual, capital formation and idea of inequality. Such
economic development which necessarily influences political discourse tends to
create chaos and denies egalitarian frame, and distorts democracy to function sub-
optimally. To attend a causal relationship between economic development and
political democracy, the existing approaches to developmentalism need to be reex-
amined. Here one can cite the case of Myanmar, which is evolving with some
intriguing situation, where the military junta regime has dominated the power
structure of the country for about half a century, and is currently changing toward
a ‘flawed democracy.’ The military regime has substantially destroyed the political
structure with various intra-ethnic conflicts; and crippled country’s formal, trans-
parent and even rational structure of the economy for long period with multiple
coercion and cronyism. The parallel shadow economy has resulted skewed distribu-
tion of national wealth and abject poverty. The political democracy in Myanmar
now has begun with the challenge of restoring such long standing issues along
with peace and stability in the country by containing its internal conflicts. In the
year 2015, the country had called for a Nation-wise Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
between the representatives from 16 ethnic armed organizations, the Army and
Myanmar State for a political settlement. Myanmar President Thein Sein mentioned
at a draft signing ceremony of this agreement that ‘the people need peace, they
desire peace, and they expect peace,’ and therefore signing a full agreement is essen-
tial for the country (Kipgen 2015). This was a significant step for Myanmar, which
is deeply divided across ethnic lines and has been in turbulence for long time. With
such significant political step in the domestic front, it has sent a positive signal to the
world community for trans-border economic cooperation and engagement.
India has been proactive in Myanmar’s journey toward democratic transition. It
also supported the other neighbor Bangladesh, which apparently can be beneficial
for its Northeast. With the political changes in these two neighbouring nations, a
democratic trans-border space can be an emerging possibility. This entire region
has about 257 million population with huge reserve of natural resources and mul-
tiple transit and connecting points and routes for trans-border economic oppor-
tunities. The whole region has been conflict prone for a very long time, and thus
was affected severely with economic and human security issues. About 70 million
people in this region are living below poverty line (27%) and about 160 million
people are displaced with land and livelihood threats (Report 2015). This figure is
expected to be manifold due to a Rohingya displacement in Myanmar. All pov-
erty, hunger, malnutrition will now intensify human security issue in the region.
The indices for Sustainable Development in India, Myanmar and Bangladesh are
respectively 110, 117 and 118. This is out of 149 Nations in 2016, where issues of
health, hunger and malnutrition already were on top. Myanmar’s ultra-nationalist
approach and discrimination against communities also have affected many Indians
in Myanmar. About 4 lakhs Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) have faced similar State
persecution, many of whom are stateless now, which include communities from
Bihar, Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. As the situation demands a
change, its democratization process is expected to play an important role to create
a space for political dialogue. Unfortunately the country is failing to contain such
issues, and its democratization process has so far not been able to deal with these
issues. In this situation, India needs to be more persuasive and purposive in dem-
onstrating the power of democracy and needs to push its relation with Myanmar
through its various time-tested democratic institutional mechanism. If Myanmar
fails to create a space of congeniality, the idea of subregional forum is going to
remain in dystopia.
Concluding observations
The journey toward such endeavour on subregional cooperation needs to continue
more vigorously amidst conflicts and uncertainty in the political discourses of the
neighbouring nations of Asia. Economic engagement is certainly a powerful mech-
anism to end cross-border conflicts, illegal trade, trafficking, and border disputes
with the neighboring nations. As pointed out by Kulkarni, the political boundaries
curved out of geography of this region had always remained barriers to overcome
the issues of socioeconomic underdevelopment caused by the historical discourse.
The initiatives and engagements in trade, transport and technology can help the
region’s geography to become an ally to create a new history of shared prosperity,
progress and peace, while reviving the age-old cultural and civilizational ties of this
region (Kulkarni 2015). India has become proactive with its engaged economic
diplomacy and with its Act East Policy frame since 2014 to outmanoeuvre China,
resolve its Northeast’s internal issue, and turn this entire security-sensitive region to
a vibrant economic hub. India’s economic diplomacy in this regard has undergone
paradigm shifts from focusing on sheer trade diplomacy to expanding networks and
promoting various constructive engagements (Rana and Chatterjee 2011). With
such strategic shifts, the conduct of economic diplomacy within government also
has become increasingly large in size with various departments interfacing with
their foreign counterparts and seeking facilitation and support of country’s missions.
Such dispersal mechanism now needs to reach effectively to transform the narrative
of India’s Northeast. On the other hand, in the non-state space, multinational cor-
porations has also been powerful pressure groups with profound penetration into
systems of international economic policy formulation. Apart from this, research
institutions, media, environmental groups and other non-governmental organiza-
tions are also currently influencing the shape of the international economic agenda.
In this expanding space, the role of the diplomats are also challenging to facilitate
and support such efforts of various non-state and business groups (Rao 2011). For
larger subregional interests, India also needs to find synergies through diplomatic
push with other countries that have a strong presence and interests in Myanmar
at this hour including Japan and Thailand. Japan, in particular, has intensified its
relations with India and also increased its presence in Myanmar, and its approach is
similar to India in terms of the conditions for assistance it imposes. Faced with the
assertiveness of China, as reported, both India and Japan therefore have started 2 + 2
dialogue mechanism in 2018 for peace, stability and prosperity in Indo-Pacific sub-
region.They are also aiming to work together on rule-based and inclusive approach
in this subregion through enhancing communication and connectivity for flow of
trade, people, technology and ideas for a ‘shared prosperity.’This has great substance,
purpose and meaning to India’s Act East Policy (The Indian Express 2018). In the
context of growing India-Japan relation, Japan also aims to provide connectivity
assistance to India between its Northeast and Myanmar. Similar synergies can also
be found with countries like Singapore that have a growing presence in Myanmar.
These synergies can ensure that no single country will influence Myanmar. It also
can ensure the prospect of equitable share of influence in the subregional coopera-
tion and partnership and can promote the idea of complementarities with a bottom-
up approach toward the idea of new subregionalism in this part of Asia. According
to Dent and Huang (2002), the five driving forces which are important for any new
(sub)regionalism are economic complementarities, geographical proximity, politi-
cal and economic framework, infrastructural linkage and market accessibility of the
countries. These driving forces help in attaining closer integration and cooperation
to achieve prosperity. For example, the Asian subregion BIMSTECK is the home of
1.5 billion people and constitutes 21 percent of the global population, and has more
than 2.5 trillion-dollar economy.This subregion is also a home of several million peo-
ple who live in the darkness of poverty, victims of nature’s fury, impoverished due to
lack of human development. The challenge of the member nations of this subregion
therefore is to transform such darkness through meaningful cooperation, and by shar-
ing the prosperity across various weaker and peripheral spaces.
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Bhattacharya, Rakhee (2014). Northeastern India and Its Neighbours: Negotiating Security and
Development. New Delhi: Routledge, p. 223.
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(24).
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Ministries.” The Indian Express, October 30.
10
ACT EAST POLICY AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF MYANMAR
AND NORTHEAST INDIA REGION
Nehginpao Kipgen
It is important to understand the process of foreign policy making and how foreign
policy is formulated and adopted by governments. It is equally intriguing to study
why some issues are prioritized over the others. There is a general tendency that
when a new political party comes to power or when a new coalition government
is formed, the new leader or leaders would review foreign policy agendas of the
previous government and formulate new policy priorities. Such policy can be the
work of a strong leader or a collective effort of a group of leaders or experts. In
international politics, heads of state and government usually pursue foreign poli-
cies on the basis of some dominant theories of International Relations, such as
Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. But it is evident that these IR theories
do not work equally and or efficiently for all states, especially in this 21st-century
globalized world. Nevertheless, policy makers and practitioners have tried to adopt
different theories or systems in their foreign policy-making process. One among
them is actor-specific theory, which argues that all that happens between nations or
across nations are grounded on human decision makers who are acting singly or in
groups (Hudson 2005). These decision makers can be head of state or government
and or a group of ministers or experts.
Hermann and Hermann in their work Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and
How: An Empirical Inquiry suggest three types of ultimate decision-making units: a
predominant leader, single group, and multiple autonomous actors. A predominant
leader is an individual who has the power to make choice or decision as well as
the ability to stifle the opposition, which requires strong leadership quality and
personality. A single group would mean a group of individuals making decisions as
a single unit in face-to-face interaction and have the power to obtain compliance.
Multiple autonomous actors refer to different individuals, groups or coalitions in
which if some or all agree that they can act together for the government but no
one by itself has the power to decide and force compliance on others. Since they
160 Nehginpao Kipgen
are autonomous to each other, there is no overarching unit among the members.
For example, in the context of the American political system, the president may
take a decision spontaneously when responding to an unexpected question dur-
ing a press conference, which is the role of a prominent leader. And for a military
issue, the Joint Chiefs of Staff may take a collective decision as a single group. But
when it comes to issues such as treaty with a foreign government, the decision
would involve the president, members of his executive branch, and the support of
the Senate, which are multiple autonomous actors (Hermann and Hermann 1989).
The objective of this chapter is to examine the circumstances under which
the Indian government adopted the Look East Policy (LEP) under the Congress
government in the early 1990s, and why the Bharatiya Janata Party government
changed or renamed it as Act East Policy (AEP) in 2014.While the historical devel-
opment of AEP is studied, emphasis is given to understand the role of Myanmar and
Northeast India, which shares direct border with Myanmar and serves as a connect-
ing route to Southeast Asia. The chapter argues that Myanmar and Northeast India
are crucial for the success of AEP.
LEP and ASEAN

The concept of India’s LEP went back as far as the Sino-Indian war of 1962. China
and India had competition in South and East Asia. China expanded its trade and
economic ties with Asian nations. In doing so, China became the closest ally and
supporter of the Myanmar military junta, which was isolated by the international
community, particularly the Western democracies, in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-
democracy uprising that believed to have killed thousands of people, mostly stu-
dents, and the subsequent nullification of the 1990 general election results. China
also established closer ties with India’s neighbor and rival, Pakistan, and also com-
peted for influence in Bangladesh and Nepal. The LEP officially started in 1991
during the Indian National Congress (INC) government under Prime Minister
Pamulaparti Venkata (P.V.) Narasimha Rao (1991–1996), and it was subsequently
pursued by successive governments – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)–led National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
(1998–2004), Congress Party–led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government
under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004–2014), and BJP–led NDA govern-
ment under Narendra Modi from 2014 onwards. One policy practitioner listed out
six phases in India’s outreach to the East: from ancient times to the medieval period;
colonial phase; Nehru era; post-Nehru years; LEP of Narasimha Rao (1992–94
onwards); and AEP of the Modi government from November 2014 onwards (Bha-
tia 2018).
India became an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sectoral dia-
logue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1996. Since 2002, India has
had annual summits with ASEAN. The ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA)
is a free trade area among the 10-member states of ASEAN and India. The initial
framework agreement was signed on October 8, 2003 in Bali, Indonesia and the
Act East Policy 161
final agreement was signed on August 13, 2009, and came into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2010. India hosted the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in New
Delhi from December 20–21, 2012. As of 2011–2012, the two-way trade between
ASEAN and India stood at US$79.86 billion surpassing the US$70 billion target.
During the 12th ASEAN-India Summit in Myanmar in November 2014, which
was held on the sidelines of the 25th ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi announced the change of LEP to AEP (Sasi 2014).The leaders reiterated their
commitment to reach the ASEAN-India trade target of US$100 billion by 2015.
The following year in 2013, the total trade between ASEAN and India reached
US$67.9 billion. The 12th ASEAN-India Summit signed two milestone agree-
ments: the agreement on trade in services and the agreement on investment of the
framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation between ASEAN
and India during the 46th ASEAN economic ministers meeting and related meet-
ings held in Nay Pyi Taw from August 25–28, 2014. The leaders also underscored
the importance of India’s cooperation in implementing the ASEAN Agreement
on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and the ASEAN
Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (Min-
istry of External Affairs, Government of India 2014). In January 2018, ASEAN and
India celebrated 25 years of their relations. At the commemorative summit, the
leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen ties and called for enhancement
in trade, investment and connectivity. Prime Minister Modi expressed his desire to
deepen cooperation in the maritime domain, such as disaster relief efforts, security
cooperation, freedom of navigation, rules-based order for the oceans and seas in
accordance with international law (Toh 2018).
The philosophy behind LEP was a strategy to work with Asian partners to
expand engagement with the rest of the world. The aim was that India’s future
economic and political interests would be better served by greater integration with
East and Southeast Asian nations. Cooperation with ASEAN, formed in 1967, was
India’s recognition of the region’s increasing importance strategically and economi-
cally. In other words, the LEP was not merely an economic policy, but was a stra-
tegic shift in India’s vision of the world. It was a policy of economic liberalization,
expansion of regional markets for trade, investments and industrial development.
The LEP was aimed at setting a new course of action from the Cold War era, during
which India was part of the nonaligned movement, while the world was literally
divided into two super blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The
policy was also intended to check and or counterbalance China’s growing strategic
and military influence in the region (Kipgen 2016). Rajiv Bhatia,1 observed that
the main drivers behind Prime Minister Rao’s LEP were the process of economic
liberalization, challenges posed by insurgency, and the imperative to wean Myanmar
away from exclusive dependence on China. He said the AEP was a shift from a pri-
marily economic policy to a strategic one, complemented by an expansion of the
geography covered from ASEAN to the Indo-Pacific region (Bhatia 2018).
During my interview with Gautam Mukhopadhaya2 in Yangon, the ambassador
said the concept of India’s LEP was not in the context of Myanmar. Myanmar was
a ‘marginal player’ and it was ‘incidental’ when the policy initially started. He said
that the LEP is in the context of India’s broader foreign policy. India saw that East
and Southeast Asia were growing which coincided with India’s ‘economic opening’
period. India was looking for ‘economic opportunities, foreign investments, learn-
ing from each other, partnership trade, and market access.’ The diplomat said the
role of China and India’s competition in Myanmar has been ‘overemphasized by
some scholars’ (Personal Interview on February 27, 2014).
LEP and Myanmar

Traditionally, India supported the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Such
support was evident especially in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-democracy upris-
ing, during which tens of thousands of Myanmar democracy activists and the
country’s ethnic minorities fled the country. Not only do India and Myanmar
have a shared border, but the two countries are home to millions of people from
the same ethnic community, separated during the creation of India and Myanmar
in 1947 and 1948 respectively. Examples are the Kachins, the Kukis, the Nagas
and the Shans, who live side by side along the India–Myanmar border region. The
nature of engagement between Myanmar and India has shifted significantly in the
last three decades. During the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, when thousands of
Myanmar people were killed and several tens of thousands fled the country, India
was one of the first countries to welcome refugees into its own territory. India
provided provisions and other logistical support for the Myanmar people in exile
to continue their pro-democracy activities within India. New Delhi was also vocal
about human rights and democratic reforms by openly criticizing the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the then military government (Kipgen
2009).With the introduction of LEP, India’s foreign policy toward Myanmar shifted
from pro-democracy to pro-military regime, and the support for democracy move-
ment gradually faded. The policy shift began during the Congress government and
the BJP-led NDA government continued to pursue the same policy. This was an
evidence of a broader support for LEP across the Indian political spectrum.
Myanmar’s importance to LEP is defined by different factors, including its
shared history, culture, ethnic relations and religious ties. The two countries share
1,643-kilometer border in four Northeast Indian states – Arunachal Pradesh
(520 km), Manipur (398 km), Mizoram (510 km) and Nagaland (215 km) (Singh
2018). An estimate of about 2.5 million people of Indian origin live in Myanmar.
The two countries also share the waters of Bay of Bengal, including the strategi-
cally important Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Myanmar serves as gateway to other
ASEAN nations, and also provides a geographical contiguity to the Asia-Pacific
region. Due to its geographical proximity, Myanmar also provides India a transit
route to Southern China (Routray 2011). One scholar on Southeast Asian studies,
G.Vijayachandra Naidu,3 said, Myanmar is important for India in spreading its cul-
ture, trade, commerce, philosophy and other religious practices to the other South-
east Asian countries. There have been strong people-to-people relations between
Act East Policy 163
peoples of Northeast India and Myanmar since ancient times in which Buddhism
has played an important role. The cultural similarities between them have signifi-
cantly contributed to the development of economic cooperation apart from cul-
tural relations. He also emphasized the importance of India’s institutional linkages
with ASEAN member states through track II diplomacy (Naidu 2018).
India was gradually fascinated by the rising trade and economic opportunities
in Southeast Asia. The role of Myanmar in LEP became more significant when
Myanmar took ASEAN membership in 1997. Subsequently, India instituted two
institutional projects with Myanmar as its primary geographical node:the Bangladesh-
India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in 1997
and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) in 2000. On the other hand, China
also launched the Kunming Initiative Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar in 1999.
The launch of such multilateral projects was welcomed by Myanmar since it pro-
vided an opportunity to revive regional diplomatic and commercial ties after years
of isolation. The construction of infrastructure programs like the Trans-Asia High-
way Project paved the way for regional cooperation (Egreteau 2008).
During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Myanmar in 2014, the two
countries signed an agreement to construct 71 bridges along the road where the
Indian buses will ply. The Myanmar government has started construction of two
bridges, and the Indian government has sanctioned $55 million for construct-
ing the remaining 69 bridges (Laithangbam 2016). Still, there is ample scope to
develop India’s relationship with Myanmar. A number of projects have commenced,
of which the major ones are the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project, which
will connect Calcutta with Sittwe port in Rakhine state, and the India-Myanmar-
Thailand Trilateral Highway. Infrastructure at border post like Moreh-Tamu is in
dire need of repair.The first bus service between Imphal and Mandalay, a distance of
580 kilometers, started its first trial run on December 9, 2015, although the initial
goal was to start in 2012–13 (Roy 2015). Apart from its strategic and economic
importance, Myanmar is also important to India for the fact that it is a member of
the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Coopera-
tion (BIMSTEC), along with Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and
Nepal. Interestingly, both Myanmar and India are also part of the Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM).
Myanmar’s response to the LEP

With the aim of improving bilateral ties with India, Myanmar President Thein Sein
made a three-day visit to India from October 12–15 in 2011. Thein Sein’s first visit
as president of a nominal civilian government was significant for two reasons. First,
the new government, although still dominated by former military generals, was
seeking to improve Myanmar’s international image by implementing democratic
reforms. Second, the Myanmar government irked the Chinese government, India’s
traditional rival, by suspending a US$3.6 billion-worth hydroelectric project in
Kachin state, which it announced on September 30, 2011. So, it was important for
Myanmar to have India as its important ally. India has invested in technology and
transportation developmental projects, with a target of US$3 billion bilateral trade
by 2015 (Kipgen 2011).
During Sein’s visit, the two countries held discussion on a wide range of issues,
including cooperation on tackling insurgency problems in Northeast India. Nay
Pyi Taw sought New Delhi’s recognition and support over its democratic reform
process. The visit took place at a time when there was glimmers of hope for demo-
cratic change in Myanmar under the Union Solidarity and Development Party
(USDP), a political party backed by former military generals. The visit was consid-
ered mutually beneficial and important for the two nations to strengthen their stra-
tegic partnership. Ahead of the high-level visit, the two countries had engaged in a
series of low-level meetings. At the request of the Indian government, the Myanmar
army, in the first week of September 2011, reportedly attacked the camps of North-
east Indian insurgents based in Sagaing region, Northwest Myanmar (Chakrabarty
2011). During those years, India was criticized by the Myanmar opposition and
the Western democracies for not speaking out on human rights and democratic
reforms. In order to strengthen bilateral relations, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
made a three-day visit to Myanmar in May 2012. As part of mending relations with
the democratic forces, Congress President Sonia Gandhi, through Prime Minis-
ter Manmohan Singh, invited the Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi
to visit India. Subsequently, Suu Kyi paid a week-long visit to India in Novem-
ber 2012 (Press Trust of India 2012).
During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Myanmar in May 2012, the
two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements: memorandum of under-
standing regarding US$500 million Line of Credit; air services agreement between
India and Myanmar; memorandum of understanding on India–Myanmar border
area development; memorandum of understanding on establishment of a joint trade
and investment forum; memorandum of understanding on the establishment of
Advance Center for Agriculture Research and Education (ACARE); memoran-
dum of understanding on establishment of rice bio park at the Department of Agri-
cultural Research in Nay Pyi Taw; memorandum of understanding toward setting
up of Myanmar Institute of Information Technology; memorandum of understand-
ing on cooperation between Dagon University and Calcutta University; memoran-
dum of understanding on cooperation between Myanmar Institute of Strategic and
International Studies and Indian Council of World Affairs; agreement on coopera-
tion between the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies and the
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses; Cultural Exchange Program (2012–
2015); and memorandum of understanding on establishing border haats across the
border between the two countries (Singh 2012).
Still, there is ample scope to develop India’s economic and other ties with
Myanmar. While India has been helping Myanmar build institutional capacity and
in the development of areas such as information technology, this often gets over-
shadowed by assistance from other countries – especially China, with cumulative
foreign direct investment in Myanmar reaching US$14 billion in June 2014. On
Act East Policy 165
the other hand, some of the major projects initiated by China include the Myitsone
dam,Tarpein hydroelectric project, Kyaukphyu-Kunming oil pipeline, Letpadaung-
taung copper mine, and the Tagaung nickel mine. China’s trade with Myanmar
was US$6 billion in 2013, while India–Myanmar trade was US$2 billion. India’s
investment in Myanmar was more than US$270 million in August 2013, yet it was
nowhere close to China’s investment.
To further enhance bilateral ties, an 11-member team from Myanmar made
a goodwill mission to Manipur state in April 2013. The Manipur state govern-
ment from the Indian side and the Sagaing region government from Myanmar side
reached certain bilateral agreements: Manipur to supply 2/3-megawatt power for
use in Tamu township, with approval from the Indian central government; Manipur
to set up coal-based thermal power plant at Moreh.The Myanmar government will
provide the coal for the said thermal plant; Manipur government to install high
tension power lines and transformers in Tamu township in Sagaing region.The two
governments agreed to develop the Manipur-Myanmar connecting road into an
all-weather road; and Myanmar to open a Consulate General office in Manipur at
the earliest possible (Sangai Express 2013).
The Congress-led UPA’s engagements with Myanmar was further strength-
ened by its successor BJP-led NDA government. In 2016, at the invitation of
President Pranab Mukherjee, Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw visited India from
August 23–30. Among others, the two sides agreed to promote trade and expand
cooperation especially in agriculture, banking, power, energy sectors; an arrange-
ment for supply of pulses from Myanmar to India that would be mutually beneficial
to farmers of both countries; to encourage people-to-people contact and facilitate
movement of people across land borders of the two countries by setting up immi-
gration facilities at Tamu-Moreh and Rhi-Zowkhathar border crossing points at
an early date. The two countries also signed a memorandum of understanding on
cooperation in the field of traditional systems of medicine, renewable energy, the
construction and upgradation of bridges and approach road in the Tamu-Kyigone-
Kalewa section of the trilateral highway and the Kalewa-Yagyi section of the tri-
lateral highway in Myanmar (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
2016).
Myanmar president’s visit to India was reciprocated by the Indian prime minis-
ter’s visit to Myanmar a year later. At the invitation of President Htin Kyaw, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi visited Myanmar from September 5–7, 2017. Among oth-
ers, the leaders of both countries emphasized the need to enhance air connectivity
to boost people-to-people contacts as well as promote greater tourism, trade and
investment flows; and agreed that a Detailed Project Report (DPR) would be
prepared by the Airports Authority of India through close cooperation with the
Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) of Myanmar for developing the Pakokku
Airport or Kalay Airport with financial and technical assistance from India; and the
centrality of culture in further deepening the close bonds of peoples of the two
countries through the Cultural Exchange Program for the period of 2017–2020,
which would promote cultural exchanges between the Northeastern states of India
and the bordering states of Myanmar. The two countries also agreed to explore
the feasibility of constructing a rail link between Tamu and Mandalay in Myanmar
(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2017).
A high-level visit was from May 10–11, 2018 when Sushma Swaraj, External
Affairs Minister of India, called on Myanmar’s President Win Myint, State Counse-
lor Aung San Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services, Senior
General Min Aung Hlaing. During the meetings, the leaders discussed boundary
and border related issues, peace and security matters, developments in the Rakh-
ine state, including return of displaced persons, India’s development assistance to
Myanmar, ongoing projects, and other issues of mutual interest. The two countries
also signed seven agreements and or memorandum of understanding: agreement
on land border crossing, memorandum of understanding on restoration and pres-
ervation of earthquake-damaged pagodas in Bagan, memorandum of understand-
ing on assistance to the joint ceasefire monitoring committee, memorandum of
understanding on training of Myanmar foreign service officers, memorandum of
understanding on setting up industrial training center (ITC) at Monywa, memo-
randum of understanding on ITC at Thaton, and exchange of letters on extending
a maintenance contract for ITC Myingyan (Ministry of External Affairs, Govern-
ment of India 2018).
Though India’s engagement with Myanmar was part and partial of the broader
LEP agenda, its fundamental objectives were: to seek Myanmar government’s help
in tackling insurgency problems in Northeast India; to limit or counter China’s
growing influence in the region; and to expand India’s international market in
Southeast Asia via Myanmar. By engaging Myanmar, the intent was to maximize
India’s security and its national interests. Myanmar serves as India’s gateway to the
other ten member states of ASEAN. Because of its strategic location and geographi-
cal proximity to China, it is crucial for India to befriend Myanmar, regardless of
which group or party is in power. Myanmar is of immense strategic importance to
India from the security perspective because it has a direct bearing on the security
situation in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland.
Peace in these four Northeastern states is somehow dependent on Myanmar, albeit
Nay Pyi Taw denies providing refuge to any anti-India elements from gaining
ground within its territory.
Myanmar-India military cooperation

The military relation between India and Myanmar, especially between the Indian
Army and the Myanmar Army, became significant since the early 1990s, with
India as the supplier and Myanmar on the receiving end. With the inception
of LEP, the Congress government began to supply weaponry and equipment
including 105 mm guns, T-55 tanks, light helicopters, transport planes, artillery
ammunition and some naval craft. Later, the BJP-led NDA government sup-
plied infantry and artillery weapons to Myanmar, including imported weapons.
This was evident when some of the weapons having batch numbers from the lot
Act East Policy 167
imported from Sweden fell into the hands of the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA), which led to adverse international publicity and consequent embarrass-
ment for India (Sen 2013).
In 2006, the Indian army provided special warfare training to the Myanmar
army. The Indian army supplied a few light artillery guns and armored personal
carriers. The Indian Air Force chief offered his Myanmar counterpart generous air
force support in upgrading avionics of fighter aircraft in Myanmar’s inventory. In
August 2012 when Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Sen-
ior General Min Aung Hlaing visited India, the Indian government again offered
to train Myanmar army personnel (Sakhuja 2012). The increasing importance of
military ties was further evidenced by the joint exercise of warships and the coor-
dination of patrol in the Bay of Bengal for the first time in March 2013 (Pandit
2013). By providing military trainings and supplying weaponry and equipment, the
Indian government anticipated the Myanmar army to take actions on the North-
east insurgents, which have bases inside Myanmar. New Delhi has been seeking
Nay Pyi Taw’s cooperation and assistance to neutralize the Indian insurgent groups.
However, there has been little success on this front, as the armed groups continue
to operate within Myanmar.
Taking military cooperation to a higher level, India and Myanmar conducted a
joint military training exercise in November 2017. Calling it the India–Myanmar
Bilateral Military Exercise 2017 (IMBAX-2017), the exercise aimed to train offic-
ers of the Myanmar Army in various United Nations peacekeeping roles and tasks
(Parashar 2017). The military exercise was followed by a naval exercise by the two
countries in March-April 2018, characterized as India–Myanmar Naval Exercise
2018 (IMNEX-18).The naval exercise included briefings, practical demonstrations,
cross-deck visits, and sporting events, featuring fleet maneuvers, gun firings, and
coordinated anti-submarine exercises (Parameswaran 2018). But because of the
increased interactions between Myanmar and China, especially in the domain of
economic assistance and developmental projects including China’s Belt and Road
Initiative, the ability of Myanmar to effectively protect India’s interests against
China has come into question.
Despite increased military-to-military cooperation, insurgency problems remain
a challenge and a threat to the full realization of peace and prosperity in Northeast
India. On many occasions and at different levels of bilateral meetings, the issue of
insurgency problems has been raised. For example, the matter was raised during
the Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s four-day visit to Myanmar
in August 2014. During her meetings with Myanmar President Thein Sein and
Foreign Minister Wunna Maung, Swaraj said India was gravely concerned with the
Northeast India armed groups having bases inside Myanmar and asked the Myanmar
government to take necessary action against them. The Myanmar leadership said
it would not allow its territories to be used for terrorist activities (Press Trust of
India 2014). The reported surgical attack on Northeast insurgents inside Myanmar
territory in June 2015 by the Indian commandos was one such culmination of
improved political and military ties between India and Myanmar.
LEP and Northeast India

The idea of the inclusion of ‘Northeast Development Concern’ as an important
component of the LEP came up in 1997 following a report – Transforming the
Northeast: High Level Commission Report – to the Prime Minister dated March 7,
1997. The Northeast India region provides a unique platform in terms of growth
opportunities it offers by inter-locking the region with neighboring countries of
South and Southeast Asia.There is also a potential to develop the region to become
India’s economic powerhouse considering its rich natural resources, such as energy,
oil, natural gas, coal, limestone and other minerals, as well as the availability of water
resources in the Brahmaputra river and its tributaries (Kalita 2018). The LEP was
an integral part of ‘NER Vision 2020,’ which was a roadmap planned by the Indian
government for the development of the Northeast region.The document of ‘India’s
Vision of 2020’ was aimed at making the Northeast a prosperous region which
would help in contributing toward the growth of India’s national economy and
provide productive opportunities (Bhaumik 2009). The Northeast being a priority
for the government of India today, this seems to be a justifiable reason for the inclu-
sion of Northeast in the LEP. Clearly, this demonstrates a development concern for
the Northeast. Integration aims to increase trading opportunities for the Northeast
region with the promising markets of the East and Southeast Asia. International
trade is expected to play the role of an engine of growth so as to transform the
Northeast into a highly modernized industrial region.
But looking at the existing ground reality, the growth of border trade and tour-
ism between the Northeastern region and neighboring countries has been con-
siderably slow. One lingering problem that hinders development of the region is
security concerns – both external and internal. For example, China even today does
not openly accept Tawang district in Arunachal Pradesh as part of India. Insurgent
outfits are internationally well connected. The porous borders are frequently used
by the insurgents to escape from the Indian army. These outfits have their hideouts
in the neighboring countries. LEP aims at the creation of an enabling environment
so as to end the landlocked situation and isolation of the Northeastern region by
opening up its borders and integrating the region’s economy through improved
trade and connectivity between Northeast India and Southeast Asian countries.
But except the opening up of border trade between India and Myanmar at Moreh
and Champhai and the much-hyped 165-km–long Indo–Myanmar friendship
road connecting Tamu and Kalaymyo-Kalewa, no significant developments have
materialized.
Discussing the importance of Northeast India for the success of AEP,Temjenme-
ren Ao4 said that given its geographical proximity along with the shared and deep-
rooted cultural linkages, the Northeast region is strategically significant for AEP,
which in turn would help in the development and growth of the region. He said
that there is persisting challenges of underdevelopment on account of poor con-
nectivity, due to the difficult topography of the region, and the issue of land owner-
ship that causes the prevailing poor coverage of surface roads, railway lines, and air
Act East Policy 169
connectivity in the region. He emphasized the need to acknowledge Northeast’s

vast potential of it becoming an export hub and providing employment opportuni-
ties in manufacturing, agro-based, and services related industries.Therefore, ‘to look
at the Northeast region as a mere transit route to ASEAN nations would grossly
undermine its potential’ and that ‘development can charter the way forward for
peace, stability, and growth in the region as India continues with its outreach into
Southeast Asia and beyond’ (Ao 2018).
While connectivity is important for the development of Northeast region as
well as for the success of AEP, some put emphasis on the need to balance with
the importance of productivity of the region. Gautam Mukhopadhaya5 empha-
sized that productivity of the region is important, particularly agriculture and the
allied sectors on which 70–80 percent of the population of the region depends.
The necessary steps need to be taken so that the region becomes a net contribu-
tor to the economy. He suggested that India needs to invest in the agriculture and
the allied sectors taking the entire region between Northeast India and Vietnam
as one region taking advantage of existing and planner connectivity and regional
trade arrangements, and cognizance of the development deficit between India and
the CLMV countries – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. He even sug-
gested that such investments extending from the Northeast India to Vietnam in
partnership with countries of the region and India’s strategic partners in Asia ‘could
conceivably be the only way India could respond to the Chinese challenge in infra-
structure, manufacturing, exports, financial power and real estate development and
thus have geopolitical significance’ (Mukhopadhaya 2018).
Increased regional and international trade can shape the future destiny of the
Northeast region by providing the scope for industrialization and growth. But mere
facilitation of trade through the region with the neighboring countries will have
only marginal impact on the economy unless the region can be converted into
a production hub. For this the central government and the various state govern-
ments of the region must adopt proactive role. Instead of providing tax holidays for
investment in the region, the governments should provide infrastructures including
improved connectivity, political stability and good governance.The economic inte-
gration of states in the region is necessary to maximize the benefits from investment
in various economic activities. Special export processing zones should be created
in the region in such a way that investors find sufficient inducement to invest in
locating production plans in the region.
Greater participation of the local people in production and distribution activi-
ties, and the education sector should be given prime importance. However, the vast
rural masses have to be brought into the process of industrialization for political
viability of the trade as a strategy of industrializing the region. For this utmost
importance should be given to raise the agricultural productivity in the region
with proper flood control measures and other steps. As it had happened in the past,
without a parallel agricultural revolution in the region, trade alone will not be suf-
ficient to transform the region into a sustainable development path. The growth in
trading activities alone will largely benefit those people who are from outside the
region and who are also economically more powerful to exploit the resources of
the region.
Prioritizing a few projects in the Northeast region is not enough. The central
government should also boost the local economy of these states by encouraging
industrial growth and creating a strong service sector by promoting tourism in the
region. The state and central governments should cooperate to promote tourism
and investment, and consider hosting large-scale investor summits and trade fairs
with a focus on attracting investors from Southeast Asia. The government should
focus on developing its soft power regionally. For example, there should be greater
investment in sports and sports infrastructure, and the Indian government should
consider establishing sports tournaments between the Northeastern states and
Myanmar, and at some stage even other countries in Southeast Asia. This would
enhance people-to-people contact and has the potential to increase the influence
and spread of India’s soft power. The central government should also consider the
views of state governments in the region in both economic and foreign policy
matters. This is particularly important in the context of trade with Myanmar and
Bangladesh, as well as infrastructure projects where any of the states of the North-
east is involved. A successful AEP will only be possible if New Delhi invests not just
economically but also politically in India’s Northeastern region.
Conclusions
A government official working on the issue said, there is an urgent need for India
to develop stronger relations with its Eastern neighbors by introducing shorter
and frequent flights between specific states in Northeast India and neighboring
countries, such as Myanmar and Bangladesh. Due to its centrality in India’s strate-
gic interest, New Delhi should remain concerned with landmark developments in
Myanmar’s political structure, in its economy and in its socio-cultural environment.
But the implementation of roadway projects is facing difficulty due to terrain and
insurgency-related problems in the region. Moreover, there are also other problems,
such as drugs, commercial smuggling and gun-running that hamper development
(Doraiswami 2018)6
Regardless of which political party or coalition government comes to power in
India, it is likely that AEP will remain an important front in India’s foreign policy.
Similarly, the Myanmar government (democratic or hybrid regime or military or
any authoritarian regime) will continue to maintain bilateral ties with India largely
because of economic and political reasons. A country’s national and security inter-
ests primarily shape its foreign policy. The LEP was basically a goal change of the
Indian government in the aftermath of the Cold War era. India shifted its policy
from pro-democracy to pro-military junta as it best served the country’s national
and security interests. Myanmar diligently maneuvered India’s political gesture by
playing a balancing game between India and China. The LEP (now AEP) has been
a mutually beneficial transaction for economic and political reasons between New
Delhi and Nay Pyi Taw.
Act East Policy 171
As much as Myanmar is India’s gateway to its AEP, the Northeast region is

a gateway for India to Myanmar. Therefore, the support and cooperation of the
Northeastern states is essential in effectively linking India with the rest of Southeast
Asian nations through Myanmar. Reliable road connectivity, such as regular bus and
train service, introduction of visa on arrival facility at the border towns, frequent
flight services from the region to Myanmar and other Southeast Asian nations, edu-
cational exchanges and enhancing people-to-people relation in different capacities
are essential for the success of AEP. Moreover, the policy needs to focus on tangible
results not only in economy but also on security and strategic domain, and invest-
ment in its extended neighborhood in light of China’s increased assertiveness in
the region, as well as greater cooperation and collaboration with Myanmar and
Northeast India.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks the research contribution of Shagun Nayar, a student pursuing
her master’s degree in diplomacy, law and business, and Ankit Malhotra, a student
pursuing his bachelor’s degree in global affairs at Jindal School of International
Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University. Under the supervision of the author, the
students worked as Research Assistant and Intern respectively at the Center for
Southeast Asian Studies during the 2018 fall semester.
Notes
1 Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program at Gateway House,
India and former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar (2002–2005).
2 The interview was conducted at the Ambassador’s official residence in Yangon on Febru-
ary 27, 2014.The transcripts of all interviews used in this chapter are based on the author’s
conversations and do not necessarily ascribe official judgements or opinions in case of any
disagreements.
3 G. Vijayachandra Naidu is Professor, Center for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of Interna-
tional Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
4 Temjenmeren Ao is Research Fellow, Southeast Asia at the Indian Council of World
Affairs, New Delhi, India and hails from Nagaland, a Northeastern state of India.
5 Gautam Mukhopadhaya is former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar (2013–2016).
6 Vikram Doraiswami is Joint Secretary (Ministry of External Affairs) for Myanmar and
Bangladesh.
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11
INDIA–MYANMAR RELATIONS
Political transition and shared borderlands
K. Yhome
Since 2011, Myanmar has witnessed major changes in the country’s internal politi-
cal and socioeconomic landscapes as well as in its external relations with the outside
world, having huge implications on the borderlands. Internally, the changes have
brought about notional end to the over four-decade long military rule and set
in motion a process of re-establishing a democratic system of government in the
country. As the process unfolded, it created the historic victory of National League
for Democracy (NLD) in 2015, but at the same time, it also unleashed new politi-
cal forces in the form of ultra-nationalists that threatens to destabilise the fragile
social fabric of the country. Externally, the process opened up more room in the
country’s foreign engagements that allowed multiple external players to re-enter
and engage with the country. However, the continuing conflicts in the borderlands
have not only hampered the democratization process but also economic develop-
ment efforts. Under the circumstances, the future direction of Myanmar’s internal
politics and foreign policy is less clear than it was five years ago when the country
initiated reforms as the international community finds itself divided.
It is within this changing context that India–Myanmar ties have been evolving
with Myanmar’s internal and external dynamics having direct and indirect implica-
tions on India’s relations with Myanmar and on their shared borderlands. As political
changes redefine Myanmar, the likely implications on India–Myanmar borderlands
need re-assessment: How does Myanmar’s democratic transition in the context of
continuing conflicts and violence impact India–Myanmar borderlands? What are
the opportunities and challenges for India and Myanmar in addressing the emerg-
ing issues in their shared borderlands? Importantly, the issues confronting Myanmar,
internally and externally, are interrelated and the progress in one influences the other.
In keeping with the theme of the book, this chapter takes up the three key issues
–the ethno-religious question, security challenges and connectivity prospects to
understand the emerging difficulties and potentials in India–Myanmar borderlands.
Myanmar’s transition to democracy: an overview

After decades of military rule accompanied by violent suppression of democratic
movements, Myanmar’s military ruling elites began to take some concrete steps
toward political reforms with the adoption of a new constitution in 2008. This
new constitution enshrined a democratic system of polity, often described as a
‘hybrid system’ and/or a ‘dual system’ because of the power sharing arrangement
it envisaged between the civilian and the military. (Diamond 2012; Blaževiè 2016).
Under the new constitution, the country held its first general elections in 20 years
in 2010, and again in 2015 that witnessed the victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and her
party the NLD. Three issues have dominated the political discourse in the reforms
period, namely diversification of foreign relations, finding a solution to the decade-
old ethnic conflicts and economic development of the country that has fallen way
behind under the military rule. As the country’s reform unfolded, visible positive
progress could be seen on many fronts, but the changes also created unintended
consequences.
Internal political transformation has been accompanied by diversification of
Myanmar’s foreign policy. Guided by its desire to reduce dependence on China, a
major recalibration of the country’s external engagements has been geared toward
re-engaging actors both within the region and beyond. The re-orientation of pol-
icy allowed several major powers to return to the country as the Western powers
lifted economic sanctions, which also allowed international institutions such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to return with financial and
technical assistance in the country. Myanmar also began to play a more active role
in regional affairs as it positioned itself to re-integrate with the region. In 2014,
Myanmar was chair of the regional bloc Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). It hosted the third summit of the subregional grouping, the Bay of Ben-
gal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
the same year.
One of the economic priorities of Myanmar in the reforms period been has
to play catch-up with its neighbors. A major focus of the economic reforms was
the need to develop and modernize the country’s old infrastructure. In 2012, the
country adopted a new investment law and created the Myanmar Investment Com-
mission. A new Special Economic Zones (SEZs) law was also enacted with a focus
on port-led development. As the country’s diversifies economic engagements and
with new foreign investment flowing in, growth rate recorded over 6 percent in the
reform period with the Asian Development Bank projecting the country’s growth
rate to reach 7.2 percent in 2019 (The Irrawaddy, 11 April 2018). To be able to
continue to expand and strengthen engagements with the outside world and to
achieve rapid economic development, one of the pre-conditions has been to main-
tain peace and stability in the borderlands. Toward this end, a key focus has been to
find a lasting solution to the decade-old ethnic conflicts in the country. The Thein
Sein government initiated the ethnic peace process soon after assuming power and
negotiated ceasefire with several ethnic armed groups.When the Aung San Suu Kyi
176 K. Yhome
government came to power it accorded the ethnic peace process a priority. Despite
these efforts, finding peace in the troubled borderlands remain elusive. Adding
to the troubled peace process, new conflicts involving the Rohingya Muslims in
Rakhine state have raised several questions on the country’s democratic future. It is
against this backdrop that India’s relations with Myanmar and the implications of
these developments on the borderlands are examined here.
India welcomed the political transition in Myanmar and expressed its readiness
to support and assist the country in its democratic transition process. Myanmar’s
democratization allowed Delhi to deepen engagement with Naypyidaw without
the need to concern with the country’s political divide between the military and the
pro-democracy forces that had limited its engagements with the country in the past
(Bhatia 2016). India–Myanmar relations also benefited from Naypyidaw’s new for-
eign policy orientation in the reforms era that was marked by frequent exchanges
of high-level visits to strengthen ties. Naypyidaw’s strategic decision to minimize
its dependence on China also found India a viable option in achieving that end.
Like other countries, India also leveraged the opening up of Myanmar to deepen
economic and security ties as well as to revitalize India’s eastward drive in deepen-
ing relations with the ASEAN nations. It was not a coincidence that Prime Minister
Narendra Modi launched the “Act East” policy in Naypyidaw during its visit to
Myanmar to participate in the India-ASEAN summit in 2014. India has also been
involved in infrastructure development in Myanmar under its development coop-
eration to assist in capacity building and development of infrastructure to meet
the country’s growing demands as well as to connect the country with the wider
region.
The ethnic question: an elusive peace process

and refugee issues
Myanmar’s ethnic question is as old as the modern state of the country. Armed
conflicts between the government forces and the ethnic armed groups have marked
the country’s politico-security landscape since the country’s independence (Smith
1999). Much before the struggle for power between military and the pro-democracy
forces that came to characterise the country’s politics, the political history of Myanmar
has revolved around the conflict between the Bamar Buddhist majority community
and the various ethnic minorities, a saga that refuses to die. This has earned the
country with the reputation of running ‘the world’s longest ethnic insurgency.’ The
country has been unable to find a system where the various ethnic groups can co-
exist with each other. The problem lies in the ruling elites’ inability to accept that
the country is a multiracial, multilinguistic, multireligious nation. The 2008 Con-
stitution guarantees a secular and federal nation, however, in practice, the ethno-
religious question remains a challenge for the country with little headway made
in finding a solution. On the contrary, the reforms opened up space for extremist
forces along ethno-religious lines to express themselves violently with grave impli-
cations on the social fabric and security of the country and the region.
The military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) that won

the 2010 elections initiated the ‘new peace process’ with the hope of finding a solu-
tion to the decades old conflicts soon after assuming office in March 2011 under
the leadership of Thein Sein (Oo Min 2014). Though regarded as an important
part of the country’s democratic transition, progress in the ethnic peace process met
major setbacks with renewed fighting between the military forces and the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) in 201, ending a 14-year ceasefire. To the credit
of the Thein Sein government, after several rounds of peace talks, the Myanmar
government signed bilateral ceasefire agreements with 14 major armed groups in
2013 (Oo Naing 2013). The government also institutionalised the peace process by
creating two union-level peace committees – the Union Peace-Making Central
Committee (UPCC) headed by the President and the Union Peace-Making Work
Committee (UPWC) under the leadership of the first Vice-President (BNI 2014).
To consolidate the peace process, nationwide ceasefire talks were initiated in
November 2013 between the government’s UPWC and the ethnic armed groups’
National Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT). After a yearlong negotiation
between the two sides, a preliminary draft of the NCA was signed in March 2015.
Subsequently, on October 15, 2015, the Myanmar government and the ethnic
armed groups entered into the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the
aim ‘to secure an enduring peace based on the principles of dignity and justice,
through an inclusive political dialogue process involving all relevant stakeholders’
(Oo Naing 2013). Out of 21 major ethnic armed groups, eight signed the NCA,
namely Kayin National Union (KNU), Kayin National Liberation Army (KNLA)-
Peace Council, Pa-O Nationalities Liberation Organization (PNLO), All Burma
Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF), Arakan Lib-
eration Party (ALP), Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) and Restoration
Council of Shan State (RCSS)/Shan State Army-South (SSA-S). Describing the
event as a major step in the road to future peace in Myanmar, President Thein Sein
said ‘[r]eform would not succeed without peace’ (Xinhua, 15 October 2015).
That left out seven major ethnic groups who expressed unreadiness to sign the
NCA, namely, Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Kayinni National Pro-
gressive Party (KNPP), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), New Mon
State Party (NMSP), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K),
Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State
Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) and United Wa State Army (UWSA). Apart from
these, another six ethnic armed groups who were not invited to the NCA event,
were involved in the peace talks –the government agreed to begin political dialogue
with Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), Arakan National Council and Wa National
Organization, while it decided to hold separate talks with Kokang’s Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Arakan Army (AA).The Ta’ang
National Liberation Army (TNLA) was already in talks with the government.
When the new NLD government came power in March 2016 after winning
a landslide victory in the 2015 general elections, the new leadership relaunched
the peace process under the ‘21st Century Panglong Conference’ with the aim to
178 K. Yhome
revive the spirit of the 1947 Panglong Agreement that called for mutual respects
and equality. The first 21st-Century Panglong conference was held on October 15,
2016 where the Myanmar government announced its ‘Seven Steps Roadmap for
National Reconciliation and Union Peace’ (GNLM 2016). In a positive develop-
ment, two more ethnic armed groups (the NMSP and the LDU) joined the NCA,
taking the total signatories to ten by February 2018. Even as the peace process has
continued with successive governments giving priority, several challenges remain in
taking it to the next level of political dialogue.The complexity of the issue involves
not just the problem of dealing with several stakeholders but to a large extent the
reservations on the part of the ruling elites to redefine the national identity and
sharing of resources. Sai Oo, Director of the Pyidaungsu Institute, sums up the sta-
tus of peace process by comparing it under the USDP government and the NLD
government as follows:
The military is still very powerful in the negotiations. The election victory
of the National League for Democracy (NLD) created a lot of expectations.
After a while we all realised that the NLD still has many things to learn in
order to fulfil its role as the government. It is still in a quite weak position.
Under the [Thein Sein] government, the peace process had a slightly bet-
ter position because there was a kind of informal dialogue. Under the NLD
government, the military treats the peace process as a security issue. That is a
significant change.
(Grein, February 2018)
The formation of the Federal Political Negotiating and Consultative Committee

(FPNCC), a coalition of seven armed groups including AA, KIO/KIA, MNDAA,
TNLA, SSPP/SSA, NDAA and UWSA in April 2017 have further complicated
the peace process as many members of the Committee have not signed the NCA
as active conflict with the Myanmar army still continued. Recently, a couple of
developments suggest that the Myanmar government has made some progress in
involving the rebels that are still outside the peace process. In September 2018,
the Myanmar government’s peace negotiators met representatives of three ethnic
armed groups – TNLA, AA and MDDAA in Kunming, China (The Myanmar
Times, 6 September 2018). Earlier in July 2018, all the members of the Committee
attended the third Panglong Conference as special guests (The Myanmar Times
16 July 2018). Both the events were facilitated by China (The Myanmar Times 21
May 2018).
As the government put in place mechanisms to take forward the peace process,
the opening up of democratic space allowed long-suppressed voices to manifest
themselves in violent conflicts. Failure to take forward the peace process and the
rise of ultra-nationalists manifested in the form of renewed conflicts in different
parts of the country. The worst affected as a result of this phenomenon has been
the Rohingya Muslims community in Rakhine state in western Myanmar border-
ing Bangladesh. The rise of ultra-nationalism among the Bamar Buddhist forces
coupled with historical animosities along ethno-religious lines that had long char-
acterized relationship between the ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingyas
erupted into bloody communal violence in Rakhine state and spread to other parts
of the country (Ibrahim 2017). In the aftermath of the military operation targeting
the Rohingyas, triggered by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) insurgent
group’s attacks on police and army outposts, pushed hundreds and thousands of
Rohingyas to neighboring Bangladesh. By late 2017, the number of Rohingyas
fleeing Myanmar reached over 700,000 in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
Myanmar’s continued internal conflicts and efforts to find peace have attracted
much attention and concern among the international community. Concerns over
human rights violations turned into condemnation and threat of sanctions as the
international community come down heavily on Myanmar. A UN-fact finding
mission in its report strongly condemned the atrocities perpetrated against minor-
ities and accused Myanmar of ‘genocidal intent’ against the Rohingyas (UNHRC.
18 Sept 2018). The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)–appointed Inde-
pendent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar in its report called for
the UN Security Council (UNSC) to set up an ad hoc tribunal to try suspects
or refer them to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, impose
an arms embargo on Myanmar and subject its officials to targeted sanctions and
travel bans. Even as the UN report has yet again brought into focus the gravity of
the issue before the international community, the veto-wielding members have
often found themselves divided on Myanmar with China and Russia protecting
it from any harsh action. The UN mission hinges its recommendations largely on
the threat of legal action raising the question if international pressure on Myan-
mar would be effective in finding a lasting resolution in a divided UNSC. On
the other hand, the wider societal challenge in Myanmar needs urgent attention.
Punishing the guilty needs to go hand-in-hand with finding ways in resolving the
deep-rooted ethnic and religious animosities in the country. As the international
community takes measures to punish the perpetrators of violence, it is equally
important to help build social coexistence as a long-term guarantee to avoid
renewed conflicts.
In the past, blanket economic sanctions by the Western countries on Myanmar
had little impact in inducing a behavioural change among Myanmar military ruling
elites. Last year, the US reimposed targeted sanctions on Myanmar, the effectiveness
of which remains to be seen. The UN report recommends travel bans and targeted
sanctions against Myanmar’s military generals. Such measures may have symbolic
significance, particularly if they come from the UN. The UN report has charged
Myanmar’s top military brass of the “gravest crimes” and blamed the country’s de
facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to use her “moral authority” to protect
civilians. With the top military and civilian leadership under the scanner, both may
work in unison to minimise the impact of the report. Thus, the country’s internal
politics has not been adversely affected by the report. Even as Myanmar rejected
the UN report, the ICC has initiated a preliminary investigation into the Rohingya
refugee crisis to determine whether a full investigation could be initiated based
180 K. Yhome
on the available evidences (The Guardian 19 Sept. 2018). The outcome of which
remains to be seen.
India’s role and interests

India supports the country’s ethnic peace process as part of the wider political
change. India has two direct interests in Myanmar’s ethnic peace process. First, any
political settlement involving the ethnic groups in Myanmar through the ongoing
peace process would have immense impact on its side of the shared border where
cross-border insurgency movements remain a challenge owing to ethnic groups
inhabiting both sides of the border. Moreover, Myanmar’s ethnic insurgent groups
play a crucial role in providing safe havens for Indian ethnic insurgents from where
they receive trainings and arms. India’s strengthening border security cooperation
with Myanmar aims at tackling cross-border insurgency (this aspect is taken up in
detail in a later section on security). Second, India’s position has been that a stable
and strong Myanmar is in its long-term interests. The prolonged ethnic conflicts in
Myanmar provide room for external players to play a role in the country, a factor
that is not in Myanmar and India’s long-term interests. China has and continues to
have strong ties with the ethnic armed groups of Myanmar. These considerations
have shaped India’s approach toward the current ethnic peace process in Myanmar.
New Delhi’s approach comprises both political and socioeconomic elements.
At the political level, India has extended support to Myanmar’s ethnic peace
process in terms of sharing experiences both officially as well as from behind the
scene. While New Delhi has refrained from imposing its views on Myanmar, it has
shared its experiences at the request of Naypyidaw. India’s role has been in creating
a conducive environment for the peace talks between the Myanmar government
and the ethnic armed groups. To this end, Zoramthanga, former rebel leader and
chief minister of Mizoram, has played a role in mediating between the Myanmar
government and the ethnic armed groups. No official title was designated such as
‘special envoy’ or ‘emissary’ by the government of India, but his involvement has
been viewed in that capacity in Myanmar (BNI January 2017). In January 2015,
Zoramthanga travelled to Thailand and Myanmar and met both sides includ-
ing Myanmar government’s chief negotiator Aung Min and N’ban La, chairman
of the United Nationalities Federation Council (UNFC) (The Indian Express 9
March 2015).
The Indian government was aware of the visit but considered it an involvement
at the personal capacity as New Delhi did not want to be seen playing a role in
Myanmar’s internal affairs. One of the reasons for the Indian government’s hesita-
tion was because no official invitation had come from the Myanmar government to
take part in the peace talks then. Zoramthanga’s involvement have been a result of
invitation from Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. In fact, Zoramthanga had earlier
received invitation to play the role of a peace broker in 2011 from Kachin lead-
ers. However, his active involvement began only in 2015. Earlier, Dessislava Rous-
sanova, one of the team members of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair
on brokering peace in Myanmar had approached Zoramthanga to play a role in

Myanmar’s peace process in October 2014. India’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace
process received the official sanction from Myanmar when Aung Ming wrote to
India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval for help in the peace process on Feb-
ruary 26, 2015. The Indian government soon assigned a senior government official
to travel with Zoramthanga to Bangkok to meet ethnic rebel leaders and later
travelled to Naypyidaw to meet Aung Min and other government officials (The
Indian Express 9 March 2015). Assessing the role of Mr. Zoramthanga, a document
prepared by Burma News International observes:
Another possible contribution [in] breaking the deadlock between the two
sides was the invitation of the Mizo National Front leader Mr Zoramthanga
to serve as an interlocutor to [build] trust between the [two] sides in early
2015. Although [he] was not directly involved in [actual] talks, he may have
been instrumental in boosting confidence in the peace process
(BNI January 2017).
India sent representatives to attend the signing ceremony of the NCA in Octo-
ber 2015 as one of the ‘international witnesses’ along with together with China,
Japan, Thailand, UN and EU. NSA Doval and R N Ravi, the Indian government’s
interlocutor for the Naga peace talks in India represented the Indian government
along with Zoramthanga at the ceremony (The Indian Express 15 October 2015).
The joint statement issued during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Myan-
mar in September 2017 stated:
The Prime Minister of India appreciated the measures taken by the Gov-
ernment of Myanmar towards peace and national reconciliation and com-
mended the on-going peace process of the Government of Myanmar. He
noted that peace and stability in Myanmar are of the highest priority to India
and reiterated India’s continued support to the Government of Myanmar in
consolidating democratic institutions in Myanmar and for the emergence of
a democratic Federal Republic.
(MEA, GoI. 6 September 2017)
Taking India’s interest and involvement in Myanmar’s peace process to a higher

level, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on assistance to the Joint Ceasefire
Monitoring Committee was signed when Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma
Swaraj visited Myanmar in May 2018 (MEA, GoI. 11 May 2018). India also wel-
comed the joining of two more ethnic armed groups in the NCA in February 2018
(Mint. 14 February 2018), this further demonstrates India’s ‘continued support to
the peace process in Myanmar’ (MEA, GoI. 13 February 2018). Delhi has long
opposed unilateral actions against Myanmar, although it has supported UN ini-
tiatives. India was part of a UNSC delegation that visited Myanmar in May 2018
along with three other neighbors – China, Laos, and Thailand.When the UNHRC
182 K. Yhome
passed the resolution extending the mandate of the fact-finding mission on Myan-
mar in September 2017, India did not openly disassociate itself from the resolution,
even as it argued for ‘constructive engagement’ as a preferred approach to protect
and promote human rights.The UN report has not changed India’s official position
on Myanmar and Delhi is likely to continue its constructive engagement with the
country. Even so, given the magnitude of the allegations made by the UN report,
external pressures on India in its bilateral dealings with Myanmar when the issue
comes up in UN bodies cannot be ruled out.
At the socioeconomic front, India’s involvement in the ethnic peace process
and refugee issue has been aimed at assisting Myanmar in improving the socioeco-
nomic conditions that would have a long-term positive impact. Toward this end, In
December 2012, the then Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid vis-
ited Rakhine State and announced a US$ 1-million package of relief assistance to
Myanmar. On December 20, 2017, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankhar visited Myan-
mar and signed an MoU on Rakhine State Development Program with Myanmar’s
Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement aimed at ‘socio-economic
development and livelihood initiatives in Rakhine State’ that included ‘a project
to build prefabricated housing in Rakhine State to meet the immediate needs of
returning people’ (Reuters 21 December 2017). Under the MoU, India pledged
US$25 million for a five-year development project in Rakhine State. The MoU
was operationalized during the visit of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s
visit to Myanmar in May 2018. Myanmar’s ethnic peace process and the emergence
of renewed conflicts have presented both opportunities and challenges for India in
transforming the shared borderlands. However, the efforts to find political settle-
ment to the complex ethno-religious issues in Myanmar are still far from achieving
the desired goals. India would continue to strengthen the mechanisms created to
support the peace process and continue to nudge the Myanmar regime for speedy
and safe repatriation of Rohingyas.
Connectivity: crossroads of Asia and India’s

gateway to the East
Located at the crossroads of Asia linking South, Southeast and East Asia, Myanmar
is the gateway for exchanges of ideas, people and goods throughout history. It had
served as a conduit for trade and cultures between civilizations and the country
emerged as a global trading hub during the British colonial rule (Myint-U 2011).
After a decade since independence of the country in 1948, the country increasingly
turned inward overwhelmed by internal challenges and the military coup of 1962
further isolated the country from the outside world. The current efforts to recon-
nect with the region and the world is thus an effort to rediscover the past routes that
once linked the country to the world. Some initiatives to connect with the neigh-
bors began with limited opening up of the economy in the 1990s under the mili-
tary regime. However, it was only in the reforms period that major policy measures
were initiated to modernize and develop connectivity infrastructure of the country.
As part of the country’s plan to rebuild the economy, the significance of devel-
oping connectivity infrastructure emerged as a key priority. As part of the eco-
nomic reforms in the 1990s, Myanmar adopted a new port development policy.
The process of privatization and decentralization of the management and opera-
tion of ports was initiated to attract the private sector in port development (Elly,
Ganbat and Nam June 2015). In the period since the country began transitioning
to democracy, new laws on Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and foreign investment
have been enacted to support the development of the port industry. Myanmar
has created three SEZs, namely, the Dawei SEZ in southern Tanintharyi region;
the Kyaukphyu Economic and Technological Zone in western Rakhine state (a
Chinese-led project that plans to build an industrial park and a deep-water port, the
starting point of pipeline linking the coastal area with China’s inland cities); and the
Thilawa SEZ near Yangon, a Japan-driven project.The SEZs have been created near
the ports with the intention to develop these ports. Myanmar actively participates
in the various regional and subregional connectivity projects and plans as a member
of ASEAN; the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Modal Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC); the South Asian Subregional Economic Cooperation
(SASEC); the member of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS); the Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation (LMC) as well as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC).
In a significant development, on September 9, 2018, Myanmar signed a
MoU with China agreeing to establish the China-Myanmar Economic Corri-
dor (CMEC) as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (The Irrawaddy 13
September 2018). The estimated 1,700-km–long corridor will connect Kunming,
the capital city of China’s Yunnan Province, to Myanmar’s major economic cent-
ers – first to Mandalay in central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and west to
the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Myanmar joined the Chinese BRI
when State Counselor Suu Kyi attended the Belt and Road Forum for Inter-
national Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017. A MoU on ‘Cooperation within
the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road Initiative’ was signed during the visit. Under the BRI scheme, two eco-
nomic corridors – the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar-Economic Corridor
(BCIM-EC) and the China-Indochina-Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC)
involve Myanmar, owing to its geographic location. Both Beijing and Naypyidaw
recognize Myanmar’s critical role in pushing forward these BRI projects. Beijing
proposed the China-Myanmar-Economic Economic (CMEC) as part of the BRI
at a time when Myanmar was increasingly under international pressure owing to its
conduct on the Rohingya crisis. Beijing is aware that Myanmar needs its political
and diplomatic support to fend off mounting international scrutiny.
Concerns remain about the implications of the troubled China-Myanmar bor-
derlands on the mega-infrastructure projects under the BRI scheme. Ahead of the
third round of peace talks under the government’s 21st-Century Panglong Con-
ference scheduled for June 11 to 16, 2018, Beijing has reassured Naypyidaw that
it would continue to “keep helping and supporting” the country’s peace process
(Radio Free Asia 5 July 2018). The deal to establish the CMEC has raised concerns
184 K. Yhome
in Myanmar over financing issues (The Irrawaddy 17 September 2018). Naypy-

idaw may seek alternative options to reduce dependence on Chinese investment.
However, with its internal conflicts in the borderlands and the need to ward off
international pressures, Naypyidaw is currently going along with Beijing’s initia-
tives. This would be accompanied by growing concerns and more questions on
whether Naypyidaw’s only option is to accept Chinese initiatives without having
any initiative of its own.

India has been playing its part in the development of connectivity infrastructure
in Myanmar both to help the country’s efforts to improve domestic connectivity
as well as to link itself with Myanmar and beyond (Seshadri 2014; Yhome 2015).
Sharing long land and maritime boundaries, several interconnected economic and
strategic factors drive India’s cross-border connectivity initiatives with Myanmar.
Cross-border connectivity with Myanmar allows India to link itself by creating
alternative routes to access its landlocked region. Moreover, alternative routes to
India’s underdeveloped border regions ease the pressure on the strategic Siliguri
corridor, the narrow land of strip that connects the Northeast region with the rest
of the country. For some time now, there is a recognition that economic devel-
opment of border areas requires transnational cooperation. Security interests also
motivate improvement of border connectivity, as better infrastructure enhances
effective border management.
A key cross-border connectivity project is the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilat-
eral Highway, jointly being developed by the three countries to connect Moreh
in India’s bordering state of Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand through Myan-
mar. Reconstruction work of 69 bridges on the Tamu-Kalewa-Kyigone sector
and the 120-km–long Kalewa-Yargi sector currently being undertaken by India
are expected to be completed by 2020–21. India along with the Mekong nations
plan to extend the highway to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in the second phase.
The Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project is another major cross-border
connectivity project that India has been developing jointly with Myanmar. The
sea-river-land project will connect Kolkata to Sittwe in Rakhine state by sea;
through the Kaladan river to Paletwa in Chin state of Myanmar; and from there
to Zorinpui in India’s bordering state of Mizoram. The project will facilitate the
emergence of a development corridor in Myanmar and promote movement of
cargo from one part of India to another. Expected to be completed by 2020, the
project’s key components, including the port in Sittwe, the Inland Water Terminal
in Paletwa and the river channel, are all completed. Work is currently underway
on the 109 km road from Zorinpui to Paletwa. Myanmar has proposed the Sittwe
Economic Zone in Rakhine state where India has developed the port and from
where the Kaladan multi-modal connectivity project plans to connect the Indian
Northeast region with the bay. The SEZ plan in Sittwe is yet to take off (The
Myanmar Times, 30 June 2014).
India has extended financial support for micro development assistance that
includes construction of roads and bridges in Myanmar’s Chin State and Naga self-
administered zone such as the assistance of US$ 5 million each year for five years
under India’s Border Area Development Scheme for infrastructure development in
the border areas. India has been involved in developing other road projects, such as
the 80 km road connecting Tedim in Chin state to Rihkhawdar (Rih) in Myanmar-
India border with the intention to spur development in remote border regions of
Myanmar and facilitate border trade and commerce between the two countries.
Two cross-border railway lines to connect the two countries are been considered.
Surveys have been conducted between Imphal, the capital city of Manipur, and
Moreh on the India–Myanmar border with the aim of ultimately extending the line
to the towns of Tamu and Kalay in Myanmar. Another route, recently proposed, is
from Tripura via Mizoram to Myanmar. The first optical fiber link between Imphal
and Mandalay city in central Myanmar was operationalized in 2009. This Indian-
funded project was executed by India’s public sector Telecommunications Consult-
ants India Limited (TCIL). In 2017 India began supplying cross-border electricity
of 2–3 MW from Moreh to Tamu through a 11 kV transmission line. In September
the same year, India also started exporting petroleum products to Myanmar using
the land route at Moreh.The public sector Numaligarh Refinery Ltd in the North-
eastern state of Assam started exporting of high-speed diesel (HSD) after it signed
a sale-purchase agreement with a Myanmar company. There are plans to export
5,000 MT of HSD per month to Myanmar by road, and at a later stage to explore
the possibility of laying a pipeline to export diesel to Myanmar.
The completion of the Rs. 13.60 billion Integrated Check Post (ICP) at Moreh
and the recent agreement on land border crossing between India and Myanmar
for international entry and exit is likely to boost movement of people and goods
across the border. There are plans to now open a second ICP at Kawripuichhuah
in Mizoram. The Moreh land border crossing point may help expedite the much-
anticipated bus service between Imphal and Mandalay, a project that has been in the
pipeline since 2003. One of the issues for the delay in operationalizing the service
has been the lack of proper border immigration facilities.
According to official figures, India’s current commitment for connectivity pro-
jects in Myanmar stands at US$ 844 million (Embassy of India 2017). India has
also been tapping loans from multilateral institutions and key partners for financ-
ing various cross-border connectivity projects including from the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank and Japan. India has its own share of problems in
connecting itself with Myanmar. Poor infrastructure in India’s eastern seaboard,
the Northeast region and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has contributed to
delay in the development of cross-border infrastructure with Myanmar. Lack of
financial support and bureaucratic delays, further delay completion of projects. The
India-funded Kalewa-Yargi sector took two years from the date of inviting tenders
to actual work on the ground. With no serious complexities seemingly present
in terms of land acquisition and availability of labour or construction materials,
the lengthy processes of decision making involving different ministries delays the
186 K. Yhome
process. External factors, such as political instability and delays in decision making
on the part of Myanmar, have also affected effective implementation of projects.
For instance, Myanmar is yet give its final approval for the Rih-Tedim road project.
Apart from these challenges, there are a few inexplicable questions about actions
taken – and indeed not taken – by New Delhi. A case in point is India’s lack of
interest in Myanmar’s Dawei deep sea port project. The Dawei port could emerge
as the hub for the Mekong-India Economic Corridor, a project that finds mention
only in official joint statements, much like the Delhi-Hanoi Railway Link project.
Also, it seems that in Delhi’s official circles, the issue of re-opening the historic
Stilwell Road (that connects Assam with northern Myanmar through Arunachal
Pradesh) continues to remain trapped in the past with little movement beyond the
same old security argument. Even so, Myanmar’s opening up has boosted the pros-
pects of creating cross-border connectivity and India has benefited as it provided
enormous opportunities for India to connect with the country and through Myan-
mar to the wider region. The growing connectivity interests through Myanmar
have also generated concerns within the country, as discussed above. Myanmar’s
growing wariness toward China’s investments in infrastructure development is an
opportunity for India to leverage with its approach to developing sustainable infra-
structure projects as an alternative option.
Security: old and new issues

For decades, the Myanmar government’s main security challenge has been internal
driven, owing to the existence of several ethnic armed groups fighting the central
government for greater autonomy. Myanmar’s security threat perceptions have been
rapidly evolving in the past three decades. From an internally oriented security
posture that focused largely on counterinsurgency, it transformed to an externally
driven maritime security posture, both real and perceived (Yhome March 2018).
Even so, renewed conflicts in the borderlands remain a major challenge for Myanmar
as new dimensions of ethnic armed groups re-emerged in the form of remobiliza-
tion of ethnic armed groups pose serious security challenges not only to Myanmar
but to the wider region. A new security threat that has been added to the increased
security challenges is the emergence of the Rohingya insurgent group, ARSA, with
reports of global terror groups based in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Singh 2016).The
October 2017 attacks on border police posts along Myanmar-Bangladesh border by
the Rohingya insurgent have heightened the security challenge emanating across
the border using the maritime route.
The sources of border security challenges in the reform period continue to
come from ethnic armed groups who still are outside the peace process and many
of the related border security problems including narcotics production and smug-
gling in the borderlands continue unabated. Drugs production and smuggling have
long been associated several ethnic armed groups of Myanmar. In recent years,
according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), Myanmar appears
to have successfully reduced poppy cultivation by 25 percent between 2015 and
2017 (UNODC 2017). However, the production of synthetic drugs, such as meth-
amphetamine, has increased (Frontier Myanmar 21 May 2018). As noted earlier,
renewed conflicts broke out between the Tatmadaw and the KIA in Kachin state
the year the peace initiative was launched in 2011.
Since then, rebel groups in northern Myanmar has been engaged in military
conflicts with the government troops which further intensified in 2015 when the
Kokang (an ethnic Chinese) rebel group, MNDAA attacked the Myanmar mili-
tary in northern Shan State. Conflicts further escalated in 2016 when four armed
groups – the MNDAA, the TNLA, the AA and the KIA – formed the Northern
Alliance-Burma (NAB) organized several coordinated attacks on the Myanmar
army causing heavy casualties on both sides and forced several thousand civilians
flee to China to take refuge, while another hundred thousand internally displaced
in bordering Shan Stata (Aljazeera 20 December 2016). According to an observer,
the reasons behind the renewed conflicts relates ‘to direct military operations, pro-
tection or interdiction of economic interests, protection of civilians, or retribution
attacks’ and, in addition to this, it may also have been triggered by ‘military pres-
sure to force the EAOs to sign the ceasefire accord’ (Mathieson, September 2017).
Although the Myanmar military has long fought insurgency, analysts see the for-
mation of the NAB as ‘Myanmar’s first effective battlefield coalition of insurgents’
and this may have long-term implications on the Myanmar military’s counterin-
surgency strategy as it ‘threatens to up-end the strategy of divide and rule’ (Davis
6 April 2017).

India’s security interests in Myanmar are primarily concerned with maintaining
security and stability along the long-shared land and maritime boundaries in the
Bay of Bengal. Ensuring that Myanmar’s territory is not used by insurgents and
criminals against India and to create a stable environment for socioeconomic
development in the shared borderlands. These factors drive India’s security and
defense cooperation with Myanmar and a sector that has witnessed a growing
trajectory in the reforms period. One of the high points of the border security
cooperation between India and Myanmar during the reform period was the ‘Spe-
cial Operation’ undertaken by the India army along India–Myanmar borderlands
in June 2015 against camps of Indian militants. The operation generated some
diplomatic goof-up when high-level officials in the government claimed that the
attack was inside Myanmar’s territory, it was later clarified by the Indian govern-
ment that the Indian army did not enter Myanmar’s territory and the opera-
tion was carried out after the Myanmar authorities were taken into confidence
(Mint 28 September 2017). The Special Operation was in retaliation to an ambush
by the Northeast insurgents on a convoy of Indian army that killed 15 soldiers
and injured several others in Chandel District of Manipur. The United Libera-
tion Front of Western Southeast Asia (UNLFW), a newly floated group claimed
responsivity (TOI, 5 June 2015).
188 K. Yhome
The UNLFW is a conglomerate of Khaplang faction of the National Socialist

Council of Nagaland (NSCN) that abrogated the ceasefire with the Government of
India and along with the United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent) which is
also known as anti-talk ULFA, Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front
of Boroland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization with its head-
quarters in Taga in Maynmar’s Sagiang State. The Front was formed in June 2015
(The First Post, 5 June 2015), according to ULFA leader Paresh Baruah, “to bring all
revolutionary groups of the region fighting against India on a common platform”
(Bhattacharyya 2014, 213). Baruah also claimed that the Front enjoys support from
other ‘fourteen organizations’ but the Front did ‘not to bring groups from Nepal,
Sri Lanka and other countries because our struggle is not against those govern-
ments,’ Baruah claimed (Bhattacharyya 2014, 213). NSCN leader SS Khaplang
was the founder chairman of the Front and continued till his death in June 2017.
Khango Konak, who had taken over as chairman of the NSCN(K) after SS
Khaplang was made the new chairman of the Front in October 2017.
The Front’s activities have been on the rise in recent years with ambush on
Indian army vehicles as its main target that included the ambush in Tinsukia district
of Assam that killed three jawans and injured four others (The Hindu, 19 Novem-
ber 2016). Though formation of umbrella organizations among Northeastern
insurgent groups is not new, the emergence of the Front is seen as the immediate
security threat at a time when the process of peace talks with other ethnic armed
groups have been institutionalized. According to media reports citing Indian secu-
rity and intelligence agencies, the idea of establishing the Front was first mooted in
Ruili in China’s Yunnan Province bordering Myanmar in 2011 (TOI, 5 June 2015.
There is a strong view in India that China’s growing strategic interests in the wider
region would keep Beijing to have ‘direct and indirect dealings with Indian insur-
gents . . . as part of its overall policy toward India’(The Wire. 13 June 2015). An
analyst points out that ‘[i]t is evident that Chinese security services, at the very least,
turn a blind eye to the presence and gun-running activities of Indian rebels in Yun-
nan’ as a ‘certain degree of turmoil in India’s northeast serves China’s interests in
the region’ (Linter, 8 July 2018).
In another significant development with huge political and security implications
was the NSCN-K ‘impeachment’ of its chairman Khango Konyak, who was them
replaced by Yung Aung, who is a Burmese Naga and nephew of SS Khaplang in
August 2018 (TNIE, 8 August 2018). Khango Konyak is a Naga from the Indian
side, while Yung Aung is a Naga from Myanmar. While the reasons for the split
is not immediately clear, there has been speculation in the Indian media about
the possible role played by India and Myanmar in splitting the two groups along
nationality line citing the examples of the ULFA split between ‘pro-talks’ faction
and ‘anti-talks’ faction (TOI, 3 October 2018). The NSCN-K (Khango) faction
alleges that Yung Aung entered into a ‘treacherous deal’ with the Myanmar military,
(TOI, 3 October 2018), though details of such supposed deal is not available.What-
ever be the reason for the spilt, with both countries pushing for settlement with
their respective ethnic armed groups, these developments are generally viewed as
paving the way to take the process forward as this allows both countries to deal with
the two factions under their respective sovereign jurisdiction.
It is within this evolving cross-border security and stability context that India
and Myanmar have scale-up their border security cooperation in the reform period.
Border security has long posed a challenge along the over 1600 km shared bor-
derlands as it is often used by ethnic armed groups to carry out militant activities.
Along the porous border, cross-border ethnic linkages are a day-to-day affair by
taking advantage of mechanism such as the ‘Free Movement Regime’ that allows
ethnic communities living on either side of the border to travel 16 km into the
other side without a visa. Military-to-military cooperation between India and
Myanmar have been strengthened in recent years with the establishment of various
mechanisms including regular exchange of high-level military officials, coordinated
operations, capacity building, border management, border fencing, etc. In 2014, the
two countries agreed to step up cooperation in border security and signed an MoU
that provides:
a framework for security cooperation and exchange of information between

Indian and Myanmar security agencies. A key provision is that of conduct of
coordinated patrols on their respective sides of the international border and
the maritime boundary by the Armed Forces of the two countries. Both sides
have agreed to exchange information in the fight against insurgency, arms
smuggling and drug, human and wildlife trafficking.
(MEA, GoI. 10 May, 2014)
The MoU also spelled out ‘the level and frequency of meetings between the Armed
Forces, Drug Control Agencies and Wildlife Crime Control agencies’(MEA, GoI.
10 May, 2014).
Conclusion
The preceding discussion demonstrates how the three issues –the ethnic ques-
tion, connectivity and security play a key role in maintaining peace, stability and
the prospects of prosperity in the India–Myanmar borderlands. It also explicates
how internal developments in Myanmar pertaining to these issues have direct and
indirect implications on India’s ties with Myanmar and on their shared borderlands.
Myanmar’s opening up has provided opportunities for India to strengthen ties with
the country that is visible in the steady progress in political, economic and security
cooperation. Deepening cooperation would open up new avenues for coopera-
tion between the two countries to strengthen ties, but Myanmar’s continued inter-
nal conflicts present challenges as well. One the one hand, India’s role in assisting
Myanmar’s domestic transformation strengthens ties with the country, while on
the other hand, the same internal difficulties cast a shadow over the potentials of
deepening ties between the two countries. That said, India’s options are limited
and the most practical approach is a sustained engagement with and assistance to
190 K. Yhome
Myanmar as the transformation unfolding inside the country, particularly in the

borderlands. This is not only for the interests of its neighbor but also for India’s
interests. A peaceful and prosperous Myanmar is in India’s long-term interests.
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INDEX
across-border women as HIV carriers 123 Asia: and borders 64

Act East Policy (AEP) 7, 11, 15, 44, 52, 69, Asia-Pacific region 7, 15, 102, 139, 162
75 – 76, 102; LEP and ASEAN 160 – 162; Assam Rifles 22, 36, 74
LEP and Myanmar 162 – 163; LEP and Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Northeast India 168 – 170; Myanmar- (ASEAN) 49, 50, 51, 55, 101, 102, 126,
India military cooperation 166 – 167; 144; 101; LEP and 160 – 162
Myanmar’s response to LEP 163 – 166 Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) 90
Advanced Center for Agricultural Research Aye Chan 45
and Education (Yezin Agricultural
University) 148 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar-
Afghanistan 102, 121 Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) 183
Agier, Michel 4 Baruah, Paresh 188
Ahanthem, Chitra 123 Baruah, Sanjib 79
All Burma Students’ Democratic Front Baud, M. 80, 83
(ABSDF) 177 Bay of Bengal 44
Anglo-Chin war of 1889 – 90 85 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Anglo-Kuki war 1917 – 1919 84 Technical and Economic Cooperation
Anglo-Kuki wars of 1845 – 71 85 (BIMSTEC) 130, 144, 175, 183
Anglo-Nepal Treaty 26 BBIN 144
Annan, Kofi 49 BCIM 144
Anti-communist Freedom Organization 86 Beijing Review 8
Aoling festival 67 – 68 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 139,
Arakan 45 – 46, 47, 48, 49 167, 183
Arakan Army (AA) 73 – 76, 177 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 160
Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) 177 Bhatia, Rajiv 161
Arakan National Council 177 bilateral relations: implications 102; of
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) Myanmar with India 10, 40, 44 – 56;
48, 49 Treaty of Friendship and 129
Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) Blair, Tony 180
152 – 153 border haats 115, 133, 135 – 136, 151
Arunachal Pradesh 71 – 72, 103; Chinese borderlands 64 – 65; dynamics of 115 – 117;
occupation of Thagla Ridge 26 linkages with border states 102 – 104;
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster migration and 117 – 118; and mobility
Management and Emergency Response 65; public health and 117 – 118
(AADMER) 161 ‘borderland societies’ 80
Index 195
Border Roads Organization 26 cross-border movement 44; free 9; large-

borders: and Asia 64; defined 64; local scale 11, 44; militarized practices
resistance 25, 34, 36 – 37; militarization of preventing 25
the borderlands 24 – 25; political partition Cross-border Travel Allowance Agreement 137
26; theoretical aspect 23 – 25
Boundary Commission 82 Dalton, E. T. 81
British Burma 84 Davies, H.R. 8
British colonialists 79 Dean, Karin 82
British Empire 85 democracy: multiparty 125; Myanmar’s
British government: and Burma 29 – 30; transition to 175 – 176; political 155 – 156
Hill tribes and 39; occupation of Upper democracy-development debate 154 – 156
Burma 30 Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA)
British India 29 – 30, 82 177
Buddhists 45, 47, 54; in Mizoram 71; Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) of
Rakhine 71; Zakai 71 Myanmar 165
Detailed Project Report (DPR) 34
Cambodia 124, 131, 138, 169, 184 digital connectivity 138
Carey, B. S. 81, 83 divided communities 115 – 117
C&C Constructions 75 Doval, Ajit 181
Cederlof, G. 79 Dragon King 47
Chakmas 72 drugs: HIV and 120 – 122; influence of
China: border trade with Myanmar 120 – 122
8; economic expansionism of 149;
Myanmar’s trade with 139; old Eastern Naga People’s Organization
commercial trade routes between Burma (ENPO) 70 – 71
and 79–80; old commercial trade routes Edgar, J. Ware 31, 32
between India and 79–80; Rohingya education: development of 137–138; ethnic
exodus and 51; toys and trinkets minorities and 3–4; free 68; primary 12, 63
made in 8 ‘Elimination of Trafficking in Women and
China-Indochina-Peninsula Economic Children’ 3
Corridor (CIPEC) 183 Emergency Immigration Act 46, 47
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor Encyclopaedia Britannica 83
(CMEC) 183 Enloe, Cynthia 28
Chin Baptist Association (CBA) 87 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 50
Chin Human Rights Organization 13, 103 ethnicity: an elusive peace process and
Chin Liberation Front 86 refugee issues 176 – 180; borderlands
Chin National Front (CNF) 177 and 29 – 33; inter-linkages between
Chin National Front/Chin National Army connectivity and 38; inter-linkages
(CNF/CNA) 86 between security and 38; Kuki-Chin
Chin people 13, 32, 33, 84 – 86 ethnic nationalist movement and 84 – 87
Chin People’s Freedom League 86 ethnic minorities: Aung San and 40n5; British
Chin People’s Movement 86 and 93n16; Chin as 33; LEP and Myanmar
Chin Special Division 32 and 162; Panglong Peace Conference and
Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh) 80 7; political domination and marginalization
Chongthu Baptist Association (CHBA) 87 and 6; education and 3–4
Christianity: Chin people and 84, 115; ethnic relations: in borderlands between
and Hraltes 31; and Nagaland 65; Naga India and Myanmar 32
population practicing 115; and Paitoos ethnic separatism 6
31; and Saihreems 31; and Thados 31 ethnogenesis 80
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) 8 ethnohistory 80
concertina wire fencing 27 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 2
connectivity: crossroads of Asia and India’s European Union 3, 49, 51, 56
gateway to the East 182 – 184; digital 138;
and security 130 – 132 fencing of border 22, 33 – 35
crisis: background of, in Rakhine 44 – 46; in First Kuki War of Independence 85
Rakhine 44 – 56 First Zomi World Convention 32
196 Index
Foreigners Act 54 India 102; ASEAN-India summit 7; as

Fraser, N. 88 ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner
free education 68 160 – 161; Free Movement Regime
Free Movement Regime (FMR) 25, 27, (FMR) 27; HIV AIDS in Northeast
131, 132 – 133 118 – 120; idea of a subregion and
FRONTEX 3 ‘Myanmar policy’ of 147 – 152;
frontier culture 45 – 46 Instrument of Rectification and
Frontier Enquiry Commission 85 30 – 31; Myanmar’s bilateral relations
Frontier Nagaland 71 with 44 – 56; Operation Insaniyat
53; Partition of India 82; Rakhine
Gandhi, Sonia 164 humanitarian crisis and 52 – 53;
Gangte, T. S. 88 responses from the governments of
Gangte Baptist Association (GBA) 87 125 – 126; Rohingya humanitarian crisis
Geertz, Clifford 83 and 53 – 56; role and interests 180 – 182,
geographical proximity 130 – 134; 184 – 186, 187 – 189; see also India–
connectivity and security 130 – 132; Myanmar relations
infrastructural facilities at the border India–Myanmar Bilateral Military Exercise
133; leveraging Free Movement Regime 2017 (IMBAX-2017) 167
(FMR) 132 – 133; market access and India–Myanmar border 26, 29; construction
economic connectivity 134 of fences 22, 33 – 35; fencing of 22,
GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region) 33 – 35; porosity of 21 – 22, 25, 39
Development Program 130 India–Myanmar borderland: across-border
Gondane, Ajay 104 women as HIV carriers 123; borderland,
Govajang 38, 40; border fencing 34 – 35 public health and migration 117 – 118;
Government of Burma Act, 1935 29 divided communities 115 – 117; dynamics
Grandi, Filippo 50 of borderland 115 – 117; and ethnicity,
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 183 historical background 29 – 33; HIV
Great Kuki Invasion 85 AIDS 118 – 120; HIV-TB co-infection
Great War 85 124 – 125; influence of drugs 120 – 122;
Grierson, G. A. 81, 84 integration of 28 – 29, 33; local
Guterres, António 49, 50, 51 resistance 25, 34, 36 – 37; overview 114;
re-bordering practices 33 – 38; responses
Hamilton-Buchanan, Francis 45 from the governments of India and
Haokip, L. 92 Myanmar 125 – 126; spread of HIV
Haokip, P. S. 88, 90, 94n25 120 – 122; spread of HIV-Hepatitis C
Haokip, Pu Thangkholun 88 (HCV) 123 – 124
Haokip, Seilen 90 – 91 India–Myanmar Center for Enhancement
Hastings, Warren 81 of Information Technology Skills
Hermann, Charles F. 159 (IMCEITS) 138
Hermann, Margaret G. 159 India–Myanmar Friendship Road 27 – 28
Hill Tribal Council 35 India–Myanmar Naval Exercise 2018
Hindustan Machine Tools International Ltd (IMNEX-18) 167
137 India–Myanmar relations: borderlands
HIV AIDS 118 – 120 102 – 104; connectivity 105 – 110,
HIV-Hepatitis C (HCV) 123 – 124 182 – 184; crossroads of Asia and India’s
HIV-TB co-infection 124 – 125 gateway to the East 182 – 184; elusive
Hmaungbuchhuah 71 – 76; Rakhine peace process and refugee issues
Budhists 71; Zakai Budhists 71 176 – 180; ethnicity and 176 – 180;
Hornbill festival of Nagaland 104 implications and role of Northeastern
Htin Kyaw, U 48, 165 region 104 – 105; India’s role and
Human Immuno deficiency Virus (HIV): interests 180 – 182, 184 – 186, 187 – 189;
across-border women as carriers of 123; linkages with border states 102 – 104;
influence of drugs 120 – 122; in Myanmar Manipur border 107 – 109; Mizoram
121 – 122; spread of 120 – 122 border 109 – 110; Myanmar’s transition
humanitarian crisis 44, 49, 51, 52, 53, 56 to democracy 175 – 176; Nagaland
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 48 border 106 – 107; overview 101 – 102,
Index 197
174; prospects and concerns 105 – 110; Konyak, Khango 189

security, old and new issues 186 – 187 Kookies see Kuki-Chins
India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Kuki Baptist Convention (KBC) 87
Highway project 55 Kuki Chiefs Association 35
Indian National Congress 160 Kuki-Chin Baptist Union (KCBU) 87
Indo–Myanmar border: ‘free-border regime’ Kuki-Chin ethno-nationalist movement
63; overview 63 84 – 87
Indo–Myanmar borderlands: colonial Kuki-Chin insurgency 87 – 88
record and rule 80 – 83; current border Kuki-Chin-Mizo ethnic group 73
impasse and conclusion 91 – 92; historical Kuki-Chins 31 – 32, 79, 103; historical
connection and territoriality of Kuki- connection and territoriality of
Chins 83 – 84; Kuki-Chin ethno- 83 – 84
nationalist movement 84 – 87; Kuki-Chin Kuki National Assembly (KNA) 86, 88
insurgency 87 – 88; open borderland Kuki National Organization (KNO) 90
and fixed boundaries 80 – 83; political Kuki rising (1917–1919) 84
negotiations and challenges 90 – 91; Kukis 81; advent of the British colonialists
politics of contiguous homeland and and 82; cross-border 31; domiciled in
ethnic contestation 88 – 90 the Chin Hills 93n5; Great War and 85;
infrastructural facilities, at borders 133 Kuki State Demand Committee (KSDC)
In Search of Identity (Haokip) 87 92; local self-regulatory powers of 85;
Institute for Defense Studies and Nagas and 89 – 90; NSCN (IM) ‘ethnic
Analyses 164 cleansing’ policy against 89; Shakespear
Instrument of Rectification 30 – 31 on 31; Thadou Kukis 34 – 35
insurgency: ethnic, in Burma 86; Kuki- Kuki State Demand Committee
Chin 87 – 88; Nagaland’s Mon district (KSDC) 92
and 65 – 66; tackling, in Northeast India Kuki Students’ Organization (KSOD) 35, 89
164, 167 Kumar, Girish 38
integration of borderlands 28 – 29, 33 Kwatha Khunou 35 – 38, 108; border pillars
International Criminal Court (ICC) 179 35 – 38; conflicts 35 – 38
International Trade Centre (ITC) 107 Kyaw, Htin 48
Jaishankar, S. 53, 182 Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) 177

Japan 139, 157 – 158, 181, 185 Lai community 73
Japan Infrastructure Initiative 139 Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) 183
Japan International Cooperation Agency Land Border Crossing Agreement 137
(JICA) 139 Laos 114, 122, 130 – 131, 138, 169, 184
Jindal, O.P. 171 Linguistic Survey of India,The (Grierson) 81,
Junta regime 47, 55 93n4
local resistance at borders 25, 34, 36 – 37
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) Longwa 65 – 71; ‘Act East Policy’ 69; Ang
177 – 178 (chief) of 70; Aoling festival 67 – 68;
Kaladan multi modal project 40 cardamom cultivation 67; and Indo–
Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Myanmar border 66; and insurgency 65;
Project (KMTTP) 55, 75, 76, 131 Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) 66 – 67;
Kale-Kabaw valley 79 population 66
Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) 7 Look East policy (LEP) 7, 55; and ASEAN
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 6 160 – 162; and Myanmar 162 – 163;
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) 6 Myanmar’s response to 163 – 166; and
Kayin National Liberation Army 177 Northeast India 168 – 170
Kayin National Union (KNU) 177 Lushais 32
Kayinni National Progressive Party (KNPP)
177 Mackenzie, Alexander 39
Khurshid, Salman 182 Macron, Emmanuel 50
KNA/Kuki National Organization (KNA/ Manipur (India) 102, 104, 107 – 109
KNO) 87 Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms
Kom-Rem Baptist Association (KRBCA) 87 Act 1960 90
198 Index
Manipur Mizo Integration Council Naga Min operation 47

(MMIC) 86 Nagas 68 – 70, 76n1, 102, 103; immigrated
market access and economic connectivity 134 from Borneo 76n1; Kukis and 89 – 90;
May, Theresa 51 Manipur as Naga territory 89; tribes
Mayu Frontier 44 – 45 65, 71
Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 67, 70 Naidu, G.Vijayachandra 162
Meghalaya (India) 26, 104, 153 National Ceasefire Coordination Team 177
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) 183 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 160
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 53 National Democratic Alliance Army
Migrant Smuggling Protocol 2 (NDAA) 177
migration: borderland and 117 – 118; public National Democratic Front of Bodoland
health and 117 – 118; Rohingya 46 – 49; (NDFB Songhbhijit) 7
through the US–Mexico border 3; National Democratic Front of Boroland
undocumented 3, 9 (NDFB) 188
military operations 47, 49, 50 Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim–
Min Aung Hlaing 166 – 167 Isaac Muivah (NSCN-IM) 89
Ministry of Development of North Eastern National League for Democracy (NLD)
Region (MDoNER) 150 7, 55
Ministry of Forests and Environment 34 National Reconciliation and Union
Ministry of Home Affairs, India 33 – 34 Peace 178
Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways, National Registration Certificates 46
India 75 National Socialist Council of Nagaland
Mizo National Front (MNF) 86, 87 (NSCN) 65 – 67, 70
Mizoram (India) 102, 103; border 109 – 110; National Socialist Council of Nagaland-
formation as separate state 32 Khaplang (NSCN-K) 6 – 7, 177
Mizoram Thalai Kristian Pawl (MTKP) 74 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
Modi, Narendra 52 – 53, 102, 104, 160 – 161, 177
165, 176 Naypyidaw 68, 69, 176, 180
Moreh (India) 33, 103, 107, 110; population Nay Pyi Taw Accord 122, 161
33; resistance in 33 – 38; socio-cultural Nehru, Jawaharlal 86
relations 33 – 38 ‘Neighborhood First’ policy 11, 44, 52
Mrauk-U Township 48 Ne Win 46
Mujahidin, Aqa Mul 46, 48 New Mon State Party (NMSP) 177
Mukherjee, Pranab 165 Northeastern region 104 – 105
Mukhopadhaya, Gautam 109, 113, 161, 169 Northeast India 80; LEP and 168 – 170
Muslim enclave 45 NSCN-K (Khaplang faction) 66 – 67
Myanmar 65, 102, 169; Army 74; bilateral Numaligarh Refinery Ltd 185
relations with India 44–56; free education
in schools 68; government 180; HIV Opening to the Southwest: An Expert
in 121–122; LEP and 162–163; opium Opinion 8
export 69–70; responses from the Operation Insaniyat 53
governments of 125–126; response to the opium export: and Myanmar 69; and
LEP 163–166; Rohingya settlements 74; NSCN (K) 69
Sittwe Port 75; transition to democracy Organization of Islamic Cooperation 50
175–176; see also India–Myanmar relations
Myanmar-India military cooperation Pakistan 25, 27, 50, 102, 160, 186
166 – 167 Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) 177
Myanmar Institute of Strategic and Panglong Conference Agreement 85
International Studies 164 Pa-O Nationalities Liberation Organization
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance (PNLO) 177
Army (MNDAA) 177 Passports Act 54
Patkai Bum see Patkai hills
Nagaland 106; border 106 – 107; and Patkai hills 29
Christianity 65; ‘Little Republics’ peace process and refugee issues 176 – 180
(villages) 69; opium imported from Pemberton, R. B. 83
Myanmar 70 Pemberton line 30
Index 199
political economy of subregional Scorched Earth 49

cooperation: democracy-development Second World War 46
debate in subregion 154 – 156; idea of security: connectivity and 130 – 132; new
subregion and India’s ‘Myanmar policy’ issues 186 – 187; old issues 186 – 187
147 – 152; overview 145 – 147; reframing Shakespear, J. Lt. Col. 31, 83
the peripheries or change in geopolitical Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) 177
theater 152 – 154 Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State
postcolonial nation-state building 38 – 40 Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) 177
primary education 12, 63 Shaw, William 81, 83
Primary Health Care Centers (PHCs) 126 Short Account of the Kuki-Lushai Tribes on the
primordial identities 83 North East Frontier, A (Soppitt) 81
proximity: development of education and Singh, Biren 38
soft skills 137 – 138; digital connectivity Singh, Ibobi 37
138; encouraging local interest and Singh, Manmohan 71, 92, 147, 160, 164
involvement 135 – 136; geographical smuggling 9, 22, 109, 116, 121, 132–133, 186
130 – 134; low hanging fruits 135 – 138; soft skills 137 – 138
spurring the growth of tourism 136 – 137 Soppitt, C. A. 81
public health 117 – 118 South Asia 25 – 29; attempts at integration
Pu Tial Khal 86 of borderlands 28 – 29; cross-border ties
Pyi Thar Ya 47 27 – 29
South Asian Subregional Economic
Rakhine 103; crisis in 44 – 56; India’s Cooperation (SASEC) 183
assistance for developing 53; India’s Southeast Asia 3, 5, 8, 12, 55, 84, 101 – 102,
response to, crisis 52 – 56 104 – 105, 108 – 111, 139, 146
Rakhine Budhists 71, 73 sovereignty 2, 23, 56, 155
Rakhines 46, 47 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 175
Rakhine State Development Program State Law and Order Restoration Council
53, 182 (SLORC) 47, 162
Ranganathan, Sripriya 38 Suu Kyi, Aung San 49, 50, 54, 55, 164, 183
Ravi, R. N. 181 Swaraj, Sushma 53, 79, 102, 166
re-bordering practices 33 – 38
Reddy, A.V. Dharma 38 Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
refugee issues, and peace process 176 – 180 177
Restoration Council of Shan State Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road 27 – 28
(RCSS) 177 Tatmadaw 68
Rhi-Tiddim road project 55 Temjenmeren, Ao 168, 173n4
Rih-Tedim road project. 111, 186 Thadou Baptist Association (TBA) 87
Rijiju, Kiren 52 Thadou Kukis 34 – 35
Rohingya migration 46 – 49 Thantluang, Terah 111
Rohingyas 11, 44, 179; border controls Thein Sein 177, 178
49; and ethnic cleansing 49, 50, 51, Thokchom, Khelen 34
52; exodus of, from Myanmar 46 – 48; Thomsing, T.H. 34
human trafficking 48, 55; illegal migrants Thong Sei 86
48, 52; public discourse on 52; response Thuantak,Vumkhohau 85
to, crisis 49 – 52; violence against 47 – 48, tourism: proximity and 136 – 137; spurring
49, 50, 51; waves of, migration 46 – 49 the growth of 136 – 137
Rohingya settlements 74 Trafficking Protocol 2
Rohingya Solidarity Organization 48 Trans-Asian Highway 40
Roussanova, Dessislava 180 Treaty of Friendship, 1950 26
Rural Peoples Development Federation True News Information Team 48
34, 35 Trump, Donald 51
Tuck, H. N. 81, 83
Sagaing Region 104 – 105, 114 – 116, 122,
124, 164 – 165 UNAIDS 117, 122
Sangai festival of Manipur 104 undocumented migration 3, 9
Schendel, Willem van 26 – 27 UNESCO 117
200 Index
U.N. General Assembly 50, 51 Vaiphei Baptist Association

UN Human Rights Council 179 (VBA) 87
Union Peace-Making Central Committee Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 92, 160
(UPCC) 176 van Schendel, W. 80, 82 – 83
Union Peace-Making Work Committee Vietnam 51, 124, 131, 138, 169
(UPWC) 177
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) Walker, Andrew 64
7, 188 Wa National Organization 177
United Liberation Front of Western Wang Yi 51
Southeast Asia (UNLFW) 187 – 188 Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How:
United Nationalities Federation Council An Empirical Inquiry (Hermann and
(UNFC) 180 Hermann) 159
United Nations Refugee Agency World Health Organization 124
(UNHCR) 49 Wunna Maung 167
United People’s Front (UPF) 90
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 160 Yezin Agricultural University 148
United Wa State Army (UWSA) 177 Young Lai Association (YLA) 74
UN Office on Drugs and Crimes Yung Aung 188
(UNODC) 186
U.N. Principals 50 Zafar, Bahadur Shah 136
U.N. Security Council 50, 51, 56, 179 Zakai Budhists 71, 73
U.N. Special Envoy 51 Zakai language 72
Upper Burma 80 Zale’n-gam 88
US Customs and Border Protection (CBS) 2 Zomi Liberation Front (ZLF) 87
US Department of Homeland Security Zomi Re-Unification Organisation 113
(DHS) 2 Zoramthanga 180 – 181

India and Myanmar Borderlands Ethnicity Security and Connectivity - Pahi Saikia Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

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INDIA AND MYANMAR

Edited by Pahi Saikia and Anasua Basu

List of illustrations vii

1 Conceptualizing India and Myanmar borderlands: ethnicity,

2 State-territoriality, circulation of socio-cultural relations

3 Crisis in the Rakhine state of Myanmar: bilateral relations

4 Reality on the Indo–Myanmar border: field observations

5 Territoriality, ethnic contestation and insurgency in the

6 India–Myanmar relations: a perspective from the border 101

7 India–Myanmar borderland: pressing concerns in public

8 Employing proximity: boosting bilateral ties between India

9 Political economy of subregional cooperation: ‘interests’

10 Act East Policy and the importance of Myanmar and

11 India–Myanmar relations: political transition and shared

Sreeparna Banerjee is a research assistant at the Observer Research Foundation

Apurba K. Baruah is former Professor of Political Science and former National

Pratnashree Basu is Associate Fellow with ORF’s Neighbourhood Regional

Rajeev Bhattacharyya is a senior journalist and author based in Guwahati, Assam,

Nehginpao Kipgen is Associate Professor, Assistant Dean (International Collabo-

Ngamjahao Kipgen is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Indian Institute of

Ingudam Yaipharemba Singh is a guest faculty in the Department of National

K. Yhome is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi,

in western Europe, is that ‘it controlled a well-defined continuous territory’ which

This volume is an outcome of a national seminar on “India–Myanmar Bilateral

Pahi Saikia and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

reflection of ivory tower thinking but is fomented by real world phenomena

contact between peoples and cultures as well as socioeconomic linkages. Transna-

to the state conceptions of territoriality and citizenship. It is important to examine

India–Myanmar borderlands in perspective

do borderlands in India and Myanmar negotiate with these transformations and

ethnicity, security and connectivity. Documentary evidence, interview narratives

Overview of the chapters

In post-colonial states, particularly South Asia, nation-state building practices

It also analyzes the reconstruction of ethno-political identities vis-à-vis state-

had an impact on ethnic categorization, belonging and political choices of border-

International Relations or Foreign Policy. The volume has an international appeal

The preceding incidents indicate how international borders and boundaries

intricately linked to the discourse of ‘territorialization, a process, which Newman

Strategic borderland regimes in South Asia: an overview

Before partition the Bengal-Assam-Arakan region had been integrated into

FIGURE 2.1 India–Myanmar Friendship Road.

FIGURE 2.2 Movement of people on the India–Myanmar Border (along FMR).

A wide-ranging survey of state militaries, past and present, reveals that in a

resources of the dominant ethnicity, distribution of economic resources and poli-

Borderlands and ethnicity: historical background

civil liberties, forced labor, unlawful detention, intimidation, extrajudicial killings

Re-bordering practices in India–Myanmar borderlands:

Another interview narrative revealed the following:

Another participant added,

Other than Khunou, half of Molphei, a Kuki village inhabited by Thadou

Summary and final thoughts

edges of the nation-state, in the India–Myanmar borderlands and the hegemonic

autonomy for ethnic minorities. Failure of implementation of the Panglong Agreement

Government of India (2001). Reforming the National Security System-Recommendations of the

Background of the problem

Waves of Rohingya migration

TABLE 3.1 Year-wise exodus of Rohingyas from Myanmar

Year Number of Displaced

Response to the Rohingya crisis

A European parliament resolution called upon the military to immediately

António Guterres appoint a special envoy to Myanmar (The Guardian, 24 Decem-

Behind India’s response

Borders and borderlands: a theoretical overview

FIGURE 4.1 A village in Longwa.

List of illustrations vii

6 India–Myanmar relations: a perspective from the border 101