Imperialism Ancient and Modern: a study

of British attitudes to the claims to Sovereignty

to the Northern Somali coastline

by DAVID HAMILTON

Among the officialBritishdocumentsrelatingto the various claims to territorial

sovereigntyin the Red Sea and along the Somali coast of the second half of the last
century,lies a fascinatingsheet of the smallest size of Foreign Officenotepaper.1
It records a question and two answers, writtenin 1879. just ten years after the
opening of the Suez Canal. Commenting upon Britain's policy of encouraging
Turkey to support Egypt's claim to the Somali coastline the Acting Senior Clerk,
Mr H. Clarke Jervoise(later Sir Harry), asks:
Does it not seem rather an inopportune moment to be urging the Porte to
assist the Khedive to obtain an extended territorialjuiisdiction when the rela-
tions between this countryand Egypt are so far from satisfactory?
In reply the Assistant Under-Secretaryof State for Foreign Affairs,Sir Julian
Pauncefote (later Lord Pauncefote of Preston), minuted at the bottom of the page:
It is a mere formalityand necessaryfor anti-slaverypurposes. J.P.
But the note must have passed on to the Secretary of State, for Lord Salisbury,
disagreeing,had turned it lengthwiseto write up the page, and in red:
No. It is no formalitybut it is our only securityagainst any other European
Power obtaining a footing opposite Aden. S. 30/5.
There are many remarkable things about this note- among them being the
merefact of its survivalamong the records. But above all it is intriguingthat at this
period, when the British Foreign Officewas at the height of its powers, the then
Senior Clerk to the Foreign Office should show serious doubts about a policy
actually being pursued, while the senior Civil Servant directlyconcerned and the
Ministerof State responsible should express quite differentreasons for pursuing it.
It is true that this apparent contrarinessmay be due as much to careless over-
simplificationas to genuine differencesof view, and perhaps that uncertaintiesof
thissort as to policies and theirmotives in internationalaffairs,although seldom so
clearlyrevealed, are more common than it is comfortingto suppose. Be that as it
may, the mere fact that such incertaintycould have existedat such a time and under

1. F.O. 78/3190: intheRedSea,Africa

"ClaimstoSovereignty andArabia(SomaliCoast),January
- June1879",at thePublicRecordsOffice,
1878 London.

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the Ministryof a man of the calibre of Lord Salisbury,and that evidence of it should
have been preserved,implies a situation that seems to call for some explanation.
Working mainly from contemporarycorrespondence and officialpapers at the
Public Records Officein London,2 this paper seeks to clarifysome of theimmediate
issues by consideringthe questions:
Firstly,what were the Egyptianclaims to sovereigntyon the Somali coast, and
upon what were theybased?
Secondly, what other nations had designs upon the coast?
Thirdly,what were British interestsin the matter,and how could support of
Egyptian claims advance those interests?
And lastly, why did Britain subsequently abandon this policy, to negotiate
a seriesof treaties3herselfin the 1880's withthe Somali tribesopposite Aden and
in the 1890's with various European Powers and with Ethiopia by which the
Somali deserts were crossed with a number of relativelyarbitraryinternational
boundaries.

The Basis for theEgyptian Claim

In the years following the opening of the Suez Canal, it became apparent to
the maritimenations using it that some reliable power should assume responsibility
forthe Somali coastline. It seemed intolerablethat thereshould be no-one capable of,
and officiallyresponsiblefor,lightingthe coast as an aid to navigation,and exercising
some control over the tribesmenof the region to safeguard life and propertyin the
event of shipwreck.The basis of the Egyptian claim to be that power lay in their
presence de facto on the coast, and was justifiedin an historical argumentwhich
asserts that from time ; inmemorial the coastal towns along the northernSomali
shores have been politically subject to the Arabian states by which theywere tradi-
tionallyfounded, that since the sixteenthcenturyArabia has been subject to Turkey
from whom, during the nineteenthcentury,Egypt acquired control of the western
shores of the Red Sea and along the Somali coast, exercisingit at firstin the name of
the Sultan of Turkey but, since the Firman of 1873, as a herediatrypart of the
Khedivate.

2. Documents in theseries"Claimsto Sovereignty in theRed Sea, Africa and Arabia(Soumali

Coast)"areboundtogether in generallychronological order,thetimeperiodcovered in each
volumebeingdetermined solelybythevolumeofdocumentation preserved duringthatperiod.
Sincevolumesareofuniform size,somecoverseveral years, othersonlya fewmonths: nonumber-
ingorindexsystem is employed so thereis no meansofreferring preciselytothelocation within
a volumethata particulardocument maybe found.
Manyofthedocuments referred tointhispaperareinmanuscript andbynowpresumably unique:
others, thosewhich
especially werewidely distributed at thetime, to students
willbe familiar of
theperiod.For thesakeofuniformity, reference to a particular document or pieceofcorres-
pondencequotedhereafter willbe primarily to itsauthor, anddate,withthenumber
description
ofthevolume inwhich itis locatedintheBritish archives followinginbrackets.
3. For thetextsofthesetreaties anda fulldiscussion ofthepolicies whichinspired themandthe
problemstheyhavecreated, seeTheSomali Peninsular: a NewLight onImperial Motives, Informa-
oftheSomaliaGovernment,
tionService 1962,andMesfin WoldeMariam,"TheEthio-Somalia
Boundary Dispute",inJournal ofModern African Studies , vol2, No. July1964.

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 The Somali coast has certainlyhad ties of dependency with Arabia since very
early times. Classical referencesinclude Herodotus, who makes mention4in the 4th
centuryB.C. of temporarysettlementsestablished down the East African coast by
Phoenicians; and Agatharkhides,a Greek geographer living in Alexandria in the
days of PtolemyPhilometer,tells us in 150 B.C.5 that the firstpermanentcolonisers
were the Sabeans from Southern Arabia, whom he describes as being
strong,warlike and expertseamen. They possess large ships and sail to the land
of the aromatic products6where theyfound colonies. ... It is theywho provide
the Phoenicians with an endless variety of merchandise and prodigous profits.
Some two hundred years later the importane"Periplus of the ErythraeanSea7"
was writtenin Greek by an unknown Alexandrian merchant. It is a kind of geo-
graphical and mercantileguide to the Red Sea, theEast African and Arabian coasts.
Part of paragraph 16, refening co the Somali coast, records:
The inhabitantsof this coast, men of huge stature,are given to piracy; theylive
each in theirown district,theirown masters. In accordance with some ancient
right,this districtis subject to the sovereigntyof the state that becomes most
powerfulin Arabia, and so is now ruled by the Mapharitic chieftain.From the
kingit is held tributaryby the people of Muza8 who send theremany ships with
Arab captains and agents who enjoy the friendshipof the natives, intermarry
withthem and thus become familiar with the coast and its language.
This description clearly implies a situation which, although it seemed scarcely
changed nearly 2,000 years later, was already a traditional state of affairswithina
decade or so of the death of Christ.Indeed, in May of 1879, in the lightof the looting
of arms fromS.S. "Voltigern" when she had run ashore near Alula only a few weeks
earlier, and with Sir Louis Mallet's recent defence of Turkish-Egyptianclaims to
sovereigntyover Zeila "in virtueof an annual payment of ancient date made by its
Chiefs to the Sheriffof Mocha"9 in mind, Lord Salisbury might feel the situation
had hardly changed at all!
But the years between had not been uneventful.Although the historyof this
part of the world forthe first1,500 years of the Christianera is only dimlyrecorded,
the main outline of eventsis clear. In the thirdand fourthcenturies A.D. the Ethio-
pian Kingdom of Axum was at the heightof its powers and extended for a time over
a considerable portion of south-westernArabia. It may be that Zeila, or Aulites

BookIV, p. 42.
4. Herodotus,
5. R. Reusch,
HistoryofEastAfrica (NewYork,1961),p. 45.
6. Theancient oftheSomalicoast; cinnamon
description andincensearestillwidely around
produced
CapeGuardafui.
7. ThePeriplus
oftheErythraean
Sea, fromthetranslationofDr.J.L. WhiteleyquotedinZoeMarsh,
EastAfricathroughContemporary Records (Cambridge,1961).
8. Probably
present-dayMocha,inYemen.
9. SirL. MalletoftheIndiaOffice(writing
incidentlyon behalfofLordSalisbury whowasthen
ofStateforIndia)to theForeign
Secretary Sept.25, 1874.(F.O. 78/3187).
Office,

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as it was then called, was founded duringthis period, for Burton writesthat it was
"in its earliest ages dependent upon the Kingdom of Axum".10
Christianityreached Ethiopia in the fourth centuryand, after being adopted
by the King of Axum and his court,spread rapidly.In the middle of the sixthcentury
an Axumite armyagain crossed the Red Sea and, afterconqueiing much of southern
Arabia, set up a numberof ChristianGovernors responsibleto Axum. But it was not
to last: by the end of the centurytheywere displaced by the Sassanid Persians who
swept in by sea fromthe south, and who themselvesonly lasted about 30 yearsbefore
the message of Islam arose to clear Arabia of its invaders; The Axumites retained
command of the Red Sea for a time, but by the eighthcenturyAdulis had been des-
troyed and they were forced back into the mountains, leaving the Red Sea under
Moslem control.11
Thereafter,the pattern becomes clearer: the Christians withdiawing to the
Ethiopian Highlands, and Arabia becoming permanentlyMoslem and "Arab" -
with the coastal strip and the Somali plains at the mercy sometimes of one and
sometimes of the other, but for the most part becoming Arabised and Moslem.
It is not quite clear when Islam came permanentlyto the Somali coast, but it
must have been during the Prophet's lifetime12or very soon after it: certainlyall
Somali genealogies go back to Arabian origins and to the Prophet's lineage,13the
common ancestor being Aqiil Abu Taalib, Mohammed's cousin who died in Mecca
in 620 A.D. Zeila was re-builtand revivedin the tenthcenturyby Arab immigrants14
on the site, it seems, of Aulites, a port of importance in much earlier times, as
previouslymentioned. Also, the Somali clan-familysystemmust have originatedat
about this time.15
The situation now settles into a long dimly-recordedperiod during which, as
Gibbon says "the ¿Ethiopians slept near a thousand years"16 and which, as far as
the Somalis were concerned, lasted through to modern times. But it was a fitful
- with consatntfeudingbetweenthe lowlands and the highlands,betweenthe
sleep
Moslems and the Christians. "There is someting almost monotonous", writesMiss
Perham, "almoat conventional about the records. Year after year the fortunesof
war swung this way and that over the borders; massacres and enslavements,trusts

10.R. Burton, FirstFootstepsin East Africa(London,1856),p.66.Butin a footnote onthesame

pageBurton comments that"theArabswereprobably theearliest
colonistsofthiscoast.Eventhe
Sawahil (Swahili?)peopleretain
a tradition
thattheir
forefathers
originatedintheSouth ofArabia".
11. M. Perham. TheGovernment (London1948),p. 29.
ofEthiopia
12. J. S. Trimingham; Islamin Ethiopia(Oxford,1952),p. 44,quotesMohammed as tellinghis
followers "If yougo to Abyssiniayouwillfinda Kingunderwhomnonearepersecuted", and
suggests thefirstrefugeeswenttherein 615A.D.
13. I. M. Lewis;A Pastoral Democracy 1961),pp.11-12.
(Oxford,
14. Ibid.,p 17.
15. Ibid.,p 4,asserts
that"manypeopleoftheDaroodclan-family countnotlessthanthirty named
generations to their
common ancestor"and(p 15)that"theearliest
mention ofa Somaliclanis
oftheHawiye whom theArabgeographerIbnSayid(1214-1287)describes their
invirtually present
situation,nearMerca,in southern Somalia.Thename'Somalia'itself doesnotoccuruntilthe
fifteenthcenturywhenitisrecorded inanEthiopie
hymn thevictories
celebrating oftheAbyssinian
KingNegusYeshaaq(1414-1429) overtheMoslem andpartlySomalistateofAdelbasedonZeila".
16. E. Gibbon, TheDeclineandFalloftheRoman Empire(London, 1909),V, 165.

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and treacheriesrecur. . ."n At times the Moslems penetratedfar into Ethiopia, and
at times the Christiansroved widely over the Somali peninsula. They sacked Zeila,
now the chiefport of entryfromArabia, on a numberof occasions; and, for a time
in 1445, reached as farsouth as the Webbi Shebelli River not so farfromMogadishu.
With the opening years of the sixteenth century,this interminable struggle
comes more into world focus. About 1500 the Ottoman Turks conquered the Yemen
and "took possession of Zeila",18 and at about the same timethe Portugueseappeared
bombarding Mogadishu in 1499, Zeila in 1516, and landing an embassy to the
Ethiopian King at Massawa in 1520. With the help of Turkishfirearmsand withboth
Arab and Turkish troops, the Imam of Zeila, Ahmed-el-Ghazi,19led his followers
into a holy war against Ethiopia which was to destroymost of the countryand which
lasted from1527 until1542 whenEmperor Claudius, now aided bythePortuguese and
theirfirearms,surprisedand shot the Imam near Lake Tana, and routed his forces.
Hereafter,having thus decisivelyhelped restore the status quo, the Portuguese
play only a minorrole in the story.In 1588, theywere much discomfortedwhen their
forceson the coast were overwhelmedand the Turks assumed virtualcontrol of the
Red Sea. They remained in Ethiopia until 1633, however, when they finallyleft
followingtheabdic. tionof EmperorSusenyosand thefailureoftheirattemptsto estab-
lish Catholicism as the officialreligion. Apart from the visits of a few individual
travellers20to the area, Euiope displayed littlefurtherinterestor concern for the
nexttwo hundredyears.
The Turks,fortheirpart, were destinedto stay much longer and to pi ly a much
more importantrole. In 1517 the Sultan, Selim I, had conquered Egypt, and in so
doing had acquired Egypt's interestin a great part of Arabia, including the holy
citiesof Mecca and Medina. He was also able to induce the Caliph, who had inherited
fromthe successors of Mohammed considerable, if undefined,authorityas Protector
of the Holy Places, to make over to him this office,togetherwith its symbols,the
Cloak and Standard of the Prophet, which he carried back with him to Constan-
tinople^ Thereafter.Selim and his successors claimed privileges of wide spiritual
authorityas Caliph, in addition to temporal authorityas Sultan.
It is not quite clear what Burton meant when he asserted that the Turks "took
possession of Zeila" followingtheirconquest of the Yemen. Certainlytheycould not
have done so at this time against the wishes of the inhabitantswithout a struggle,
and thereis no record of Zeila having been conquered by the Turks. The probability
is that, in theirconquest of the Yemen, they acquired suzeraintyover Zeila on the
basis of the same "ancient right" of which the Periplus spoke when the coast was a
dependency of whoever "becomes the most powerful in Arabia". We see that,
followingthe departureof the Portuguesein 1633, the Turks withdrewtheirgarrisons

17. Perham,Government , p. 36.

ofEthiopia
18. accordingtoBurton,FirstFootsteps, pp. 68-69.
19. theLeft-Handed,known alsoas Mohammed Grañ.
20. Thetwomostfamous areprobably
accounts thoseofJames Travels
Bruce, theSource
to Discover
oftheNile, (1763-1773):
andHenry Salt;A Voyage toAbyssinia
, (1814).
21. LordEversley, TheTurkishEmpire(London,1917),p. 112.

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at Suakin, Massawa and Zeila, in consequence of which, according to Hertslet,
Zeila "then fell under the rule of the Imam of Senna, in Arabia"22- where it was to
remain for some time to come.
Indeed, no substantiallynew elementsseem to appe r until the beginningof the
nineteenthcenturywhen Mehemet Ali becomes Pasha of Egypt,and so invigorated
that country that it soon began to rival its suzerain, Turkey. Since Egypt's claim
arises as an outcome of this rivalry,we must follow its ratherconfusingcourse with
some care, at least as it affectsthe sovereigntyof the Read Se and Somali coasts.
For the firstfew years of his reign,the Pasha was occupied withrestoringpeace
and bringingorder and prosperityto Egypt after the years of Mameluke misrule
and the shock of Napoleon's occupation from 1798 to 1801. Having proved his
abilityto administerand govern,Mehemet Ali soon became ambitious to extendhis
rule. In 1825 therewere rumorsthat his troops in the Hedjaz had receivedordersto
take possession of Aden, Mocha, and the other seaports of the Yemen. However,
on 9th June of that year Henry Salt, now BritishConsul at Alexandria, reported:23
I am happy to say that His Highness explicitlydisclaimed all intentionof taking
possession of any of the ports of the Imam, as well as of Aden. ... In these
sentimentsI believe him for the moment sincere. . . .
Consul Salt's reportgoes on to say that the Pasha had confidentlyadmittedthat the
Porte (i.e. the Turkish Government) had often urged him to take these ports, but
that he was unwilling to do anything"which might embroil him with our Indiau
Government".Indeed, it was rumoredin Alexandria that the Sultan issued a Firman
(officialdecree) in 1830 specificallyauthorizingthe Pasha to take possession of the
Yemen. In the event,however,Mehemet Ali's attentionwas now focused elsewhere,
and he was preparing for his forthcominginvasion of Syria in revolt against the
Sultan's suzerainty.When this occurred, in 1832, the Egyptian troops at Jedda also
rebelled.But as the Pasha soon made his peace withthe Sultan and became his loyal
subject once more, their rebellion merelysupplied the pretextfor Mehemet Ali to
send an expeditionagainst themthe followingyear, to subdue, thus,troops who had
joined a revolthe himselfhad started. And in 1835 considerablystrongerforcesunder
the Pasha's nephew, Ibrahim Pasha, landed in Arabia, and occupied Mocha
and "most of the seaboard towns". Mehemet Ali was thoughtto be planning a huge
expedition to sweep down south to conquer Aden, the Hadramout, and then on to
the Persian Gulf - though this was, once more, vigorouslydenied. There exists
independent confirmationof the position at this stage from a Captain James
Mackenzie, of the Bengal Light Cavalry, who travelledthroughArabia and Egyptin
1837, and reportedthat the Egyptianswere then controllingthe entireeastern coast

22. SirEdwardHertslet, Memorandum onTurkish Withrespect

, (1874),p. 2. (F.O. 78/3187).
Claims
to Massawa,Richard Pankhurst, andtheRedSea andGulfofAdenPortsin the
in "Ethiopia
NineteenthandTwentiethCenturies" Observer
inEthiopian , vol.VIII,No. 1,p. 38,saysthatthe
descendentsoftheoriginal
garrison on,
stayed eachfamilygetting untilatleasttheendofthe18th
a shareofthecustoms
century, byvirtue
duesestablished ofitsrelation to oneor moreofthe
garrison
original of400.He agrees, thatcontrol
however, shifted from ConstantinopletoArabia.
23. F.O. 78/3185. MemoonTurkish
seealsoHertslet, Claims, p. 4.

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lineof the Red Sea, as well as its westernseaboard down to a point south of Suakin,
approximatelywhere the present Sudanese-Ethiopian border reaches the sea.24
Althoughtheyonly held it for a mile or so inland, this gave the Pasha command of
all commercefromthe Hedjaz and Yemen.
In 1838 the Britishacquired Aden, and thus a permanentbase for her interests
in thearea. In view of the risingpresence of Egyptianforces,the BritishGovernment
feltit necessarythe followingyear to warn the Pasha that "England could not see
withindifference any attemptto invade or conquer the countrylyingat or beyond
the mouth of the Red Sea"25- referringspecificallyto the Somali coast, it seems,
since the Pasha was given another, similar,warninglater that year concerning"the
independenceof native Chiefs in the vicinityof Aden".
In August 1840, the famous Red Sea hydrographer,Captain Robert Moresby
oftheIndian Navy, was sentto establishfriendlyrelationswiththe Chiefsof Tadjoura
and Zeila. On August 19th,he concluded a Treaty of Peace and Commerce withthe
Sultan of Tadjoura,26 which secured mutual promises of furtheringtrade and an
undertakingthat the Sultan would not enter into any treatyor pact, political or
commercial,withany othei European Power withou. firstbringingit to the notice of
the British authorities at Aden. In exchange, the East India Company promised
"that it would act in no manner which might have an evil tendency towards the
States of Tadjoura". At the same time, Captain Moresby bought the nearby island
of Mussa, forwhich he paid 1,100 German Crowns, 32 bags of rice,27"besides other
presentsof small value", but of which, apparently,the East India Company never
in fact took possession. The Sultan of Tadjoura at that timewas, it appears, paying
some 1,200 Crowns annually to the Sultan of Zeila as "a veryold standingcustom",28
but not, it was stressed,as a sign of dependence.
When Captain Moresby reached Zeila however he found the Sultan there
unwillingto make any treaty since "Zeila is entirelydependent upon Mocha".29
Now Mocha, it will be remembered,was in the hands of Egyptian forces,although
traditionallysubject to the rule of the Imam of Senna. And Senna was independent.

24.CaptainJames Mackenzie, ReportandMapoftheConquests ofMohammed Ali, Pashaof Egypt ,

ontheShores oftheRedSea, July 4, 1837.(F.O. 78/3185).
25. ForeignOfficeto Consul-GeneralinEgypt, May24,1838.(F.O. 78/3185).
26. SirCharlesAitcheson, A CollectionofTreaties relating , London,p. 177.see also Sir
to India
Edward Hertslet,
MapofAfrica byTreaty (London,1894.),I, 276;II, 832.
27. Although,
apparently attheSultan'sspecialrequestand"tosatisfy Moslem custom", theDeed of
onlyto 10bagsofrice.(Aitcheson
Salerefers op.cit,p. 178)
28 LieutenantBarker, ofH M S "Euphrates", whovisited thecoastat thesametime, reported that
"Weweregiven tounderstand that,though Tadjoura wasan independent state,stillthatitpaida
headtaxuponallslavessoldtotheSultanofZeila;that,inother respects,
Tadjoura wastributary
tono-one;thatthetaxwhich waslevied bytheSultanofZeilaappeared tobea remnant ofanold
customwhenZeilawastheprinciple cityonthecoast,andreceived regulartributefrom allother
states"
29 Hertslet,MemoonTurkish Claims, p. 12 (F.O. 78/3187)Moresby writesthat:"It appearsZeila
isentirely
dependent uponMocha,from which placea Governor andan armed force aresentfor
theprotectionoftheplace,forwhichtheinhabitants payyearly 500dollars.Nowthere areno
independentChiefsat Zeila or aboutit,wandering tribessurrounding theplace,which, like
is
Tadjoura, a market for
slaves".

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Senna's independence was clearly recognised by Egypt, for that same year, 1840,
Mehemet Ali sentan Ambassador to the Imam offering him firstmoneyand supplies
if he would drive the British out of Aden, in which case he would recognise the
Imam's rightto the territoryconquered. Secondly the Ambassador proposed that
"the Imam should make over his Sovereigntyof Senna to Mehemet Ali who, in
return would grant him a suitable pension for life",30which even more clearly
acknowledged Senna's sovereigntyand independence. The Imam rejected both
offersand so retained his independence, but he seems to have lost any ultimate
-
rightsto soveieigntyover Zeilathathe may have had perhaps because he was now
no longer the "most powerful" ruler in Arabia. At all events, when Moresby did
finallyachieve a Treaty with the Sultan of Zeila,31 he obtained it at Mocha, under
SheriffHussein, a vassal of the Pasha.32
During the 1840's and 1850's the spotlightturns once more upon the Turks,
who come more into the center of the stage and, for a time, assume the initiative.
Following his second bid to break with Turkey,Mehemet Ali was ultimatelyforced
by the concerted action of England, France and Russia not to only pay the annual
tributeto Turkey which symbolized his dependency,but to renounce all titlesand
claims to sovereigntyexcept that of the Pashalik of Egypt. It is said that the Agree-
ment of September 20, 1841, between the Pasha and the Greet Powers, broke the
old man's heart; certainly for some time to come the vigour seemed gone from
Egyptian ambitions, at least inasmuch as they affectedthe Somali cost.
Two years later a tax dispute in Jedda evoked sweeping Turkish claims to
sovereigntyover Abyssinia (as it was then called), the Yemen and other adjacent
territories.These arose from the Porte's interpretationof the scope of the Anglo-
Turkish Commercial Treaty of 1838, whose regulations,it was agreed, were to apply
"throughout the Turkish Empite, whether Turkey in Europe, or Turkey in Asai,
in Egypt or other African Possessions belonging to the Sublime Porte. . . ." The
question as to what these "other African Possessions" were, to which Britain had
given tacit recognition,soon became a matterof some moment,and was passed first
to the India Board and then to the Queen's Advocate.
The Turkish claim lay in part in the Sultan's titlesat the time that the treaty
was signed, which accorded to the Sultan sovereigntyover, amongst other places,
"all Arabia, Africa and Abyssinia".33The India Board and the Queen's Advocate,

30. Ibid.,p. 9.
31. Signedon Sept.3,1843,andgenerally similarto thatconcluded at Tadjoura.
32. Although Egyptian troopshad beenwithdrawn fromtheYemenin 1840,Egyptian authority
wasexercised through a Governor, SheriffHussein, whopaid90,000German Crowns annually
to thePashafor"theseaport townsoftheYemenandtheTehema". Hussein wasreputed tobe
veryhostile to all foreignersandespecially to theBritish.
33. Thetitles oftheSultanatthetimewere, inpart:"Moi qui,parla gracespéciale etla bontéinfinie
duTrèsHaut,etparlesmiracles éminens desProphètes,je suisle SultandesSultans, le Khakan
desKhakans, le distributeurdesCouronnes, l'ombrede Dieu surla terre, le serviteurdesplus
noblespermi lesvillesetleshabitations,la vénéableMecqueetla resplendissante Médine, quisont
lesKiblésdesMusulmans et l'autelverslequeltouslesfidèles se retournent;le protecteuretle
Gouverneur dela SainteJerusalem; l'Empereur des troisgrandesvillesde Constantinople,
d'Andrinople etdeBrouses ; leSouverain deDamas,deTripoli deSyrie,deCaire,de touteVArabie
deVAfrique, deBarca,de Kirvan,d'Alep,... deBagdad,... de VAbyssinie , d'Alger, de Tripoli,
. . . avecdesIlesetlesCôtes.. .

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Sir J. Dodson, were in substantial agreementthat, nevertheless,the Porte had no
claim over Abyssiniawhatever,nor any over the Yemen over than at Mocha. Neither
commentedupon the sovereigntyof the Somali coast, eitheras its being dependent
upon Mocha or in its own right,since no specificclaim to it had been made. It may
be relevant here to quote extracts from the findingsof the Queen's Advocate as
representinga careful Britishassessment of the situation as it then seemed to be:34
Abyssinia cannot be considered as now formingpart of the Turkish Empire. . . .
No authorityof any kind eitheras to the appointmentof Governors or other-
wise is, 01 has fora verylong timepast, been exercisedby the Turkish Govern-
ment.. . . The merefact of its being comprehendedamong the titlesof the Sultan
is a matterof veryslightimpoi tance.
With respectto the Yemen generally,it is to be observed that there can be no
doubt that it did, at one time, belong both de jure and de facto to the Turkish
Empire: but it appears . . . that in the year 1663, in the reign of Murad the
Fourth, the Ottoman army was defeated,and the dominion of the Yemen then
passed to the Seids, since which time, with the exception of temporarymilitary
occupation of some portions of it, it had been governed by the Imam of Senna
(the Chief of the Seids), who is described as in all respectsindependent,acknow-
ledgingno superior,temporal or spiritual.There can, therefore,in my opinion,
be no just pretenceforascribingto the Yemen a Turkish character.
As regardsMocha, which is situated in the Yemen, it appears ... to have been
seized by Toorche Bilmar, from whom it was afterwards,viz December 1833,
takenby the Bedouins, at the instigationof the Pasha of Egypt,and subsequently
delivered into the hands of Ibrahim Pasha, by whom it was held until the
evacuation of the Yemen by the troops of Mehemet Ali in 1840. SheriffHussein
was then appointed to rule over it, on condition of paying tributeto the Pasha,
which tribute,it is stated,has been regularlypaid. It must thereforebe admitted
that the Turkish Governmentpossess de facto some authorityover Mocha.
But both Arabia and the Yemen were soon to acquire more of a "Turkish
character",for, in 1847, Turkish troops were again sent to garrison Jedda, Mecca
and Medina, and in 1849 the Imam of Senna was persuaded to place himselfand his
territory under the sovereigntyof the Turkish Sultan. Despite the fact that only the
previous year the Imam's forces had defeated those of SheriffHussein and he had
retakenMocha, he signed an agreementin July 1849,35whereby:
First: That the countryheld by the Imam of Senna should continue under his
Government,but be considered as the territoryof the Porte, and under the
sovereigntyof the Turkish Sultan.
Secondly: That the revenues be divided, one half being paid into the Treasury
of the Sultan and the remainderapplied to benefitthe countryand maintain its
civil,judicial and militarylaw, and that 1000 soldiers of the Porte should be
placed in the fortressto maintain order and obedience fromunrulytribes.

34. Advisory
OpinionofQueen'sAdvocate, datedMay15,1844.
35. IndiaBoard.Aug.31,1849.(F.O. 78/3185).

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 Thirdly: That the Imam should receiveforhis personal expenses and to support
his dignity,3,700 German Crowns monthlyfromthe revenuesbeforededuction
for the Turkish Treasury is made.
The Political Agent at Aden, in reportingthis to the Bombay Government,36 pointed
out that the Imam was at the time veryshort of money and, as an inducement,had
received 25,000 German Crowns from the Turks over and above the monthly
retainer specified. He went on to say that the Imam "perfectlyunderstands the
Turkish character and is, I firmlybelieve, acting a wily part towards them . . ." -
which seems, in view of his rejection of Mehemet Ali's similar proposal only seven
years earlier, not altogether improbable!
On the Ethiopian shores of the Red Sea Turkish forces were also active. In
1849, Suakin and Massawa were restoredby Egypt to the Porte, and Turkishtroops
occupied Massawa; whereuponthe BritishConsul in Abyssinia wrote to the Foreign
Officeexpressingthe hope that it would issue a declaration to the effectthat "the
English Governmentdid not consider the possession of Massawa Island to involve
any authorityover the coast".37 Later that yeai Consul Plowden concluded a treaty
with the Emperor Theodore in which, amongst other things,theymutuallyagreed
"to keep open and secure the avenues of approach betwixt the sea-coast and
Abyssinia '38 But in all this, despite Plowden's efforts,39
it is clear that the British
Government recognised, de facto at least, Turkish authorityat Massawa. Indeed,
the extentof Britishrecognitionof Turkishauthorityover thecoast betweenMassawa
and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb can best be seen from noting Britishreaction to
French activitieson the coast at thistime.
In 1850, M. de Goutier, a formerFrench Consular Agent at Massawa, offered
to sell a concession which he claimed to have acquired, of territoryat Edd. In the
correspondence which led up to the BritishGovernment'srejectionof this offer,the
BritishAgent in Egypt commentedthat he did not consider Edd to be Turkish since
the original French pui chase had been fromAbyssinian Christians.But in 1851 and
1852, when there were more rumors of French designs upon territoryat Amphylal
and elsewhere along the south-wesern shores of the Red Sea, the BritishGovern-
ment advised the Porte to prevent French establishmentsin the Red Sea (meaning
anywherein the Red Sea). In 1859, the French Consular Agent at Aden, M. Lambert,
was drowned whilstsailing fromHodeida to Zeila in a boat belongingto the port of
Zeila. The French Governmentfirstsent a gunboat to arrestthe Governor of Zeila
and five or six others, and took them to Hodeida, whose Governor refusedto try

36. LetterdatedJuly27,1849(F.O. 78/3185).

37. Letterno.78,datedJan.28,1849from Adwa(F.O. 78/3185).
38. Treaties
Hertslet, , IX, 1.
39. enough
Fascinatingly itseems
Plowden's
pleawasheardandalmost
actedupon,forLordStratford
de Redcliffe,
BritishAmbassadorin Constantinople
wasinstructed,
in despatch no. 264,dated
Mar.6, 1856,tourgethePortetotransfer
MassawatotheEthiopians. . . butowingtodifficulties
inConstantinople at thetime,
andtosubsequent inEthiopia,
events no further stepsweretaken
in thematter.See also Pankhurst:
"EthiopiaandtheRed Sea", Ethiopia Ovserber
, vol.VIII,
no. 1,1964,pp.58-59.

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them,and then to Jedda, where the Governor-General of the Yemen a'so declined
to act in thematter.They thenappealed directlyto the Porte forredress,and received
30,000dollars in compensation. Thus by admittingin this way some responsibility,
theTurks obtained significantrecognitionfor a claim that they had not even made
at thattime.It was not until 1864, fiveyears later,that theysent troops to Zeila and
laid formalclaim to the whole Somali coast. And even then, the protestsfrom the
Britishauthoritiesat Aden were more against the restrictionsupon shippingand the
increasedtaxation upon merchandise passing through the Somali coast to Aden
imposed by the Turkish Governor, than upon the establishment of the garrison
itself.
Then, as ifthe occupation of Zeila was achievementenough, the spotlightshifted
once more back to the Egyptians. In May, 1865, a Firman was issued by Sultan
Abdul Aziz grantingIsmail Pasha, then Viceroy of Egypt,the administiation of the
portsof Massa wa and Suakin; the followingyear he issued another Firman assigning
to Ismail and to his descendents "the Government of Egypt, with the territories
whichare annexed to it, and its Dependencies with the Kaimakamates of Suakin
and Massawa".40
Four years later, in 1870, the Khedive of Egypt (as he now became called)
appointed a Governor withjurisdiction from Suez to Cape Guardafui, and sent a
warshipto visitthe coast. Although no record in the Britisharchives seem to confirm
this,therationale forthe appointmentseems clearlyto have been an assumption that
Zeila, and indeed the whole Somali coast, was included in the grant of the Kaima-
kamateof Massawa in the Firrranof 1866. Certainlyfroman Egyptianpoint of view
thereis some justificationfor this,for the troops occupyingZeila and the ships that
visitedthe coast will have come from,or at least through,Massawa, and the Egyp-
tian Governor of Zeila since 1866 will have been more in contact with Massawa
thanwithZeila's traditionalover-lordsin Mocha or Hodeida on the Arabian coast.
Furthermore,this view, that the Egyptian Government regarded Zeila as a
dependencyof Massawa, seems to have been accepted by the Turks. For, in April
1872, the Turks, advancing inland from Hodeida, captured Senna. Yet even now,
whenholdingboth Mocha, upon whichZeila was traditionallydependent,and Senna,
upon whichMocha was traditionallydependent,the Porte made no protestabout the
Egyptianappointment.Indeed, the followingyear, the Sultan issued another Firman
establishingthat the Egyptian succession now extended to "the Khedivate of Egypt
and its Dependencies, with the Kaimakamates of Suakin and Massawa and their
Dependencies".41
The two questions which immediatelyarise are : firstly,was the sovereigntythe
Sultan had acquired over Zeila by virtue of his conquest of Mocha and Senna
sufficiently tangible to be given away? And, secondly, was it in fact given away?
Like so many of the best questions, these appear to remain largelyunanswered. The
Britishneatly side-stepped the issue when, four years later, they negotiated an

40. Firman
ofMay27,1866.
41. Firman
ofJune8, 1873.

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Agreement42with the Egyptian Governmentproposing to recognize the jurisdiction
of the Khedive, under the suzeraintyof the Sublime Porte, over the Somali coast as
far as Ras Hafoun under certain conditions,the most importantof which were that
Berbera and Bulhar should be freeports and that importand export duties at Zeila
and Tadjoura should not exceed 5 % and 1 % respectively.Of this AgreementT. H.
43
Sanderson, in a Foreign OfficeMemorandum dated May 1, 1880, writes:
The concludingarticleof the Convention stipulatedthat it should definitely
come into operation as soon as the Sultan should have given formalassurance
to Her Majesty's Governmentrecognizing the Somali Coast as a dependency
of Egypt under the hereditaryrule of the Khedive, and engagingsimilarly that
no portionof it should be ceded on any pretencewhateverto any Foreign Power.
At the time of the conclusion of the Convention it was not thoughtoppor-
tune to make application to the Porte for the assurances in question, and the
whole matterstood over until October 1878, when Sir H. Layard was instructed
to bringthe Conventionto the knowledgeof the Porte,and to enterinto negotia-
tions for the formal deliveryof a declaration to the effectspecified.
From this time on he has been ineffectuallystrugglingto obtain this
declaration. . . .
Before turningto Britain's reasons for firstencouraging Egyptian claims (in
the 70's) and then for abandoning them (in the 80's), the position of other foreign
countries with interestsin, or designs upon, the Horn should be considered.

The Claims of otherEuropean Powers

In orderof appearance, thefirstupon the scene was the United States ofAmerica.
Her interestswere entirelycommercial and rather short-lived.However, is it an
interestingfact that America was the firstcountryto sign, in 1833, a commercial
treatywith Seyyid Said, Imam of Muscat and Sultan of Zanzibar: the Britishdid
not conclude a similar treatyuntil 1839, nor the French until 1844.44In 1840 the
volume of American trade with Zanzibar was greaterthan that of any other nation,
save onlyIndia withwhom, of course, Zanzibar, throughMuscat, had close and long-
standingcommercialties. In 1835, two American warshipsvisitedthe southerncoast
of Arabia, apparently seeking a spot where an agency or factorymight be set up.
But the project was not pursued and nothingcame of it. The trade with Zanzibar,
emanating mainly from Salem, Massachusetts, continued until the outbreak of the
American Civil War.
Next upon the scene were the French. French contact with the Somali coast
may be traced back to 1839, when Henri d'Hericourt landed at Tadjoura on the first

42. Agreement signedSept.7, 1877.

43. F.O. 78/3193.
44. SirReginaldCoupland,The Exploitation of East Africa (London,1939),p. 9.
, 1856-1890,
"Americans
SeealsoN. R. Bennett, inZanzibar
1825-1845, Notesand
inTanganyika
and1845-1865,
Records, Mar.andSept.,1961.

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 ofhisjourneys to Shoa, to the court of King Sählä Sellasé.45 D'Hericourt's account
ofhisjourneysshow thathe became the King's close friendand that he obtained from
him,in 1842, the Treaty of Freidnship between Ethiopia and France which paved
the way for the Franco-Ethiopian commerce upon which Obock was later to be
founded and upon which Djibuti still stands. At the time, however, his dreams
inspiredlittle interest.
Two Frenchmen,MM Combes and Tamisier, bought a strip of land at Edd,
some 70 miles south of Massawa, in 1840.46It was this titlethat de Goutier offered
to the BritishGovernmentin 1850, having acquired itfrom Combes and Tamisier.
But since he could pursuade neitherthe Britishnor anyone else to buy it, the scheme
lapsed. In 1856, the French Government made its firstovert move by instructing
M. Lambert to make enquiries as to the possibilityof securinga French station in
the vicinityof Aden. In Julyof the followingyear, it was reported that the French
had bought Edd47 (possibly as a new purchase, but more probably the report refers
merelyto a revivalof interestin the originalconcession of Combes and Tamisier).
When they tried to occupy it in September,however, theywere refusedpossession
by the Danakil villagers. Then, in 1859, came reports that a French company in
Constantinoplewas sending someone to the Red Sea to purchase "an island called
Socotra, which commands its mouth, and which belongs to an Arab Chief".48
In December of that year, the French merchant ship "Le Yemen" visited
Massawa and Zula, ostensiblyto land an expeditionto Emperor Theodore. But when
theBritishResident at Aden visitedDisseh (near Zula) a month later,he found clear
signs of a íecent French survey of the island. The acting Chief told him that the
French had been thereand told the people that the island and the mainland around
Zula was now French, "although theywere not told who it was that had made over
the island to the French Government".4oThey were promised, however, that the
island would greatlyprosper fromthe trade withAbyssinia which the French would
shortlyestablish. At the time it appeared that the islanders paid no taxes, eitherto
the Porte or to the Na'ib of Arkiko (the mainland town opposite Massawa). and
that they believed in a Finnan of Sultan Selim to their ancestor Sheikh Adam,
conceding Disseh's independence.
Of all this Lord Crowley, Ambassador in Paris, wrote to the Foreign Office:50
M. Thouvenal, having seen in the public papers that Captain Roussel had

45. Rochetd'Hericourt,Voyage surla CôteOrientale de la MerRouge , danslepays ďAdel et le

Royaume deChoa,(Paris,1841): andSecondVoyage surlesdeur rivesdelaMerRouge ,(Paris,
1846).
46. Hertslet:
Memo,onTurkish Claims, p. 34,(F.O. 78/3187) quoting ConsulPlowden. Pankhurstin
EthiopiaObserver
, vol. VIII, no. 1, p. 42,quoting Ferretand Galinier, namesthepurchasers
Combes andBroquand, andtheformer French Consulas De Goutin.
47. CoghlantotheGovt,ofBombay, no. 517,ofJuly 4, 1859.(F.O. 78/3186).
48. On learningofthis,theBritish Foreign OfficecabledSirH. Bulwar, theAmbassador in Con-
stantinople, andtothepoint,
shortly "MakethePorterefuse theisland":towhich Bulwar replied,
"FuadPashathinks thattheisland. . . belongs totheImamofMuscat, butthatifitturnsoutthat
thePortehasjurisdictionoverit,hewillgivetheorderrequired". (F.O. 78/3186).
49. Hertslet,
Memo,onTurkish Claims, p. 4. (F.O. 78/3187)'
50. CrowleytoLordJohnRussell, May25,1860.(F.O. 78/3186).

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 taken possession of the Island of Disseh in the Red Sea, took occasion, while
the Ministerswere assembled in Council in the Emperor's presence,to ask the
Ministerof Marine what foundationtherewas for the report.Admiral Hamelin
admittedits accuracy. M. Thouvenal then,appealing to the Emperor, said that
it was very extraordinarythat a transaction of this nature and importance,
and which related to foreignmatters,should have been accomplished without
any previous communication with the Ministerfor Foreign Affairs,who might
be called upon at any moment for an explanation on the subject.
M. Thouvenal went on to say that, on seeing the repoit in the papeis, he
had made enquiries in his Department,but had not been able to findany trace
of any correspondencerelatingto it betweenhis predecessorand the Ministerof
Marine, and that most assuredlyhad any question been put to him by the British
Ambassador regardingthe truthof the statement,he should at once have denied
it. He argued that the taking of possession of this island was a most impolitic
act; that, if it was intended as a demonstrationagainst England, it would fail
of effect,and might possibly induce the British Government to endeavour to
obtain possession of other ports on the Red Sea ; and that,moreover,the Porte
had ceitain prescriptiveright of sovereigntyin those waters, and that the
Commercial Treaties between France and Turkey were applicable to them.
The Emperor observed that he did not consider the matterto be of much
importance,and with that the conversation dropped.
A few days later M. Thouvenal admitted,however,that the French Government
had some idea of forminga coaling station in the Red Sea. In December Lord
Crowley again called on M. Thouvenal to ascertain the views of the French Govern-
ment in regard to Abyssinia and the westerncoast of the Red Sea, and found him
"very ignorant" on the subject. Apparently he admitted his ignorance and Lord
Crowley concluded that the French Governmentreally had no fixedpolicy for the
region beyond a vague desire to "appear to be the protectoi of the Roman Catholic
religion", which would seem to be only marginallyrelevant!
Yet, in that same month, December, 1860, one M. Lamoureux, the agent of a
company newly formed under the Imperial guarantee for navigating the Red Sea
and fartherEast, passed throughAden and announced that in addition to the long
contemplated settlementat Disseh, it was intended to form another one on the
African coast opposite Perim Island.51
But it was not to be; for on December 14, the Kaimakam of Massawa sent a
Governor and some soldiers to Disseh to take possession of the island and to hoist
the Turkish flag. Captain Cameron, visitingthe area in March 1862, reportedthat
the Turkish flag was flyingat Disseh, Adulis and Edd, with Governors appointed
at Disseh and Adulis, and a Sheikh placed in power at Edd.52

51. Hertslet,Memo,onTurkish Claims

, p. 44-45.(F.O. 78/1387).
52. ConsulCameron to ForeignOffice,
May20, 1862.In concludinghisreport
Cameron
stresses
that"It is theadvancementof Turkey at theexpense ofAbyssinia".

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 There followsan even more intriguingepisode. The men whom two years before
theFrench had accused of murderingM. Lambert were returnedto Zeila in the care
of the Chief Dragoman of the French Embassy in Constantinople, M. Shaeffer.
Shaefferhad passed throughEgypt under an assumed name "to escape the jealous
observationof British agents", and carried with him a considerable sum of money.
Although, as we have seen, by their demand of the Porte for compensation for
Lambert's death, the French Government clearly recognized Turkish sovereignty
in the area, Shaeffertook the opportunityof buying from the Sultan of Tadjoura
and Rahaita the harbor of Obock and its adjoining plains for 10,000 dollars.53The
land was not occupied; and, apart from a survey of the harbor in 1864, the only
tangiblesign of French interestin theirpurchase was a tricolorleftwith an elderly
Dankali who was carefullyinstructedto raise it should anyone visitthe port.
Then in January1869, two Frenchmen,MM Mass and Poilex, purchased from
the Sheikh of the Hakurni tribe for 80,000 dollars a spot on the Arabian coast
opposite Perim Island called Sheikh Seyd Bunder, or more commonly Sheikh Said,
to establisha factorythere.It subsequentlytranspiredthatthe harborwas too shallow
to be serviceable and the project was abandoned. But in the controversyover the
sale, the Turks claimed sovereigntyover the place and forbade the sale: in this way
theywere supported by the British Resident at Aden and Subadar Ranco Jaslou,
the Indian commanding officerat Perim. Sheikh Ali Tarbat of the Hakurni was
astonishedat this,and declared that "the territoryhad neverbeen governed by any-
one but himselfand his ancestors".54For its part, the Company, with a beautiful
piece of Frenchlogic,was ready"to admit the validityof the opposition of the Porte
withreferenceto suzerainty,(yet) it maintained that it was no less incontestablethat
the proprietaryrightsof the Sheikh could not be disputed". Somewhat later, M.
Aubert,Secretaryof the French Embassy at Constantinople,argued to Lord Lyons
that the sovereigntyof the Sultan over these remote regions was far from being
established,and, at all events,that the European Guarantee of the integrityof the
Ottoman Empire, established at the Congress of Paris in 1856, could not be held to
extendindefinitely in directionsin which the frontierwas not distinctlymentioned.55
And with this succession of seeminglyempty purchases, French interestin the
Horn ended forthe timebeing, her energiesnow being consumed by the war of 1870
withPrussia and its aftermath.Indeed, the decade ended with France expressly
56
renouncingher interestsin the area in a notificationdated December 25, 1880,
announcing that no sovereigntyhad ever been exercised and that no trading con-
cessions could be granted. This did not by any means terminateFrench interestor
activityin the Horn, but it does indicate that at the time that Clarke Jervoise's
question was put, the French were not active in the region.

53. OnMar.11,1862.SeeSirEdward Hertslet: MapofAfrica , 3rd ed. (London,1909),

byTreaty
II, 6ff.
54. Hertslet,Memo,on Turkish claims, p. 56. (F.O. 78/3187).
55. Letterfrom SirH. Elliot,no.703,July8, 1870.(F.O. 78/3186).
56. Hertslet,MapofAfrica byTreaty, I, 272.

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 By contrast,the Italians were just commencingtheir activities.It appears that
early in 1870 the Rubattino Steam Packet Company bought from the Sultan of
Rahaita some propertyat Assab for 8,200 dollars in order to set up a coaling depot
for the steamers they planned to run throughthe Suez Canal to India and the Far
East. It was at this moment that Raouf Pasha was appointed EgyptianGovernor of
all the African coast from Suez to Cape Guardafili, and an Egyptian warship,the
"Khartoum", was sent to investigate.The Egyptians found and entered an unin-
habited hut at Assab, apparently manhandled a few of the local inhabitants,and
removed an Italian flag.57The Italians made no attempt to returnto Assab until
1879. In April of that year, the It lian corvette"Rapido" visited the area with an
exploration prrtysent by the Italian Geographical Society under Captain Martini.
In May, the frigate"Victor Pisani" visitedBerbera withtheDuke of Genoa on board.
During the summer Assab was occupied, and, in November, Commander Rubattino
announced that Assab Bay had been bought by his company for their shipping
services withinthe Red Sea and to the East, and that the Government"never had
an idea of obtainingthe cession of it" : he thenwent on to "express thehope thatthe
Italian Government will grant (his Company) that protection which all Italians
owning propertyand engaging in commerce abroad have the rightto expect".58
Two days later Sir A. Paget, BritishAmbassador in Rome, wroteto the Foreign
Office confirmingthat the Italian Government had informed him that they felt
"bound to affordthis encouragementand support to Signor Rubattino in a district
where there was no sort of protectionfor life and property",and that they were
thereforesending two warships,one of them an Ironclad, to the Red Sea.59 But the
Minister of Foreign Affairsmade "the most positive declaration, several times
repeated, that Signor Rubattino's intended establishmentat Assab Bay was not a
Governmententerprise,that the Governmenthad no connection withit furtherthan
what was stated,and that theyhad no idea of raisinga question as to the sovereignty
of the districtin question . . and that theyhad no political objects in view."
On January 20, 1880, H.M.S. "Seagull" visited Assab and found the Italian
men-of-war"Esploratore" and "Ischia" and a steamer belonging to the Rubattino
Company. There was no sign of militaryoccupation and only the Italian merchant
ensign was flyingon shore. In the early part of the month an Egyptianwarship had
visited the Bay, and her Captain had raised no objection to the proceedingsof the
Italians. A pier was being run out, a condenser capable of distillingtwo tons of
water a day had been landed and a bakery had been established. In Commander
Heron's opinion it was possible that the Italians might eventually make a good
trading-placeof Assab and that was all that theyappeared then to be attempting.
In March however,it was learned that theyhad alreadybought the island opposite
Assab for 7 000 dollars in January,and that theywere negotiatingfor fiveor six of

Memo,onTurkish
57. Hertslet, Claims, pp.52-53.(F.O. 78/3187).
58. Letterto Corriere
Mercantile
, Nov.18,1879.
59. SirA. Pagetto LordSalisbury, no.443,Nov.20,1879;alsoquotedin Correspondence
despatch
totheItalianOccupation
relating ofAssabBay, Political
andSecretDept.,ForeignOffice,
May
14,1880,p. 5. (78/3193).

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thelargestislands in the Bay with the Sultan of Rahaita. All this caused quite a stir
in Aden and when Captain Hunter, the Resident's Assistant, went to Assab that
monthhe came to the definiteconclusion that "the development of trade is but a
flimsy excuse". Suspicious of everyone,he reported:60
Whoever findsthe money, all the superintendenceis performedby officers
of the "Esploratore" and the "Ischia", and the men of those vessels were
engaged in lime-pointingthe outside of Mr Sapeto's house. . . .
The capabilities of the place are great,and in time of war it could be con-
vertedinto a farmore commodious rendez-vousforvesselsof war than Aden
Altogetherthe place is so well suited for warlike and so ill-adapted for peaceful
purposes, that it is hard to believe that the presentenergyand expenditurefor
Messrs Sapeto and Amezaga had theirsole object in the harmless desire of Mr
Rubattino to possess a coaling station of his own in the Red Sea.
FurthermoreI saw at Assab a brotherof Ali Tarbat, the Hakurnee Sheikh
who sold Sheikh Said to the French. Any day the Porte may allow some other
Foreign Power to quietly buy that place from the local Sheikh unless steps be
taken to preventit.
The Contract of Sale between Rubattino's agents and Sultans Abdullah
Schiahim, Hassan-Eben-Ahmed, and Ibrahim-Eben-Ahmedoffersnothingto show
that the Italian Governmentwas a a party to the trans:ction, although it is stated
thatthe purchasersare to have "the fullpower to establish themselvesas theythink
best,and to hoistthenational flagin token of theirabsolute ownership('padronanza')
of the place".
In other documents,61however, the right of acquisition was defended by the
Italian Government as an Affair of State rather than merely a private contract,
and, in a despatch of May 19, 1881, M. Visconti Venosta stated that though Signor
Rubattino had become "the private proprietorof the territoryof Assab, the Royal
Governmenthad become its Sovereign". Assab was formallytransferredfrom the
Rubattino Company to the Italian Governmentby an Agreementsigned in Rome on
March 10, 1882.62

BritishInterestsin theArea
What now were the British interestsin the region: and how could they be
furtheredby support of Egypt against these incursions?
Throughout the period we are considering,Britain's interestswere dominated
by two main themes; firstly,to keep open and maintain the trade routes to India,
and secondly, from the opening of the nineteenthcenturyonwards, to secure the

60. Letterfrom Aden,no. 14,Mar.25,1880:Correspondence relatingtoItalianOccupation

ofAssab
Bay, pp.15-19.(F.O. 78/3193).
61. Correspondence
relating to theItalianOccupation
ofAssabBay, p. 22. (F.O. 78/3193).See also
Italian
ProceedingsontheAfrican CoastoftheRedSea, Political andSecret Office,
Dept.,Foreign
Sept.19, 1881.(F.O. 78/3366).
62. C. Rosetti,
Storiadiplomatica (Torino,1901),p. 20.
dell'Etiopia

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abolition of the Slave Trade. And her policy was as pragmatic as could be: she
sought to achieve these ends indirectlyby influencingwhatever native rulers she
might find with whatever degree of advice, persuasion or coercion seemed neces-
sary, and, further,at the minimumpossible cost to herself.
Until Napoleon's finaldefeat in 1815, Britain had been much preoccupied with
the need to control the Indian Ocean in order to protecther rapidlyexpandingtrade
with India fromthe actions of the French or, earlier,the Dutch fleets,or of pirates.
With this menace largelydisposed of, she now turnedher attentionwith increasing
vigorto the abolition of the Slave Trade. Of the position up to the middle of thelast
century,Sir Reginald Coupland writes:63
By the abolition of Slavery in the British Isles in 1772-4, of the British Slave
Trade in 1808, and of Slavery in the British Colonies in 1834, by cajoling,
badgering and bribingother European nations to enact laws against the Slave
Trade and to enforce,or allow Britainto enforce,theirexecution,and by main-
tainingnaval patrols for the preventionof slave smugglingon both sides of the
Atlantic,the Britishpeople- and from 1790 onwards it was a genuinelypopular
movement- had done all theycould do to destroythe slave systemin the West.
In the East it was more old-established,more widespread and more difficult
to combat; but from 1807 onwards a series of attacks was made on it. The
prohibitionof the Slave Trade was enforcedin BritishIndia, and the protected
Indian rulers on the north-westcoast induced to follow suit; treatiesfor the
suppressionof the Trade were concluded with Persia and the Arab tribesof the
Persian Gulf; and in 1843 the legal status of Slavery was abolished in British
India. But these repressivemeasures were only concerned with the countries
into which slaves were imported; and no effortto end the Trade could succeed
unless measures were also taken in the countries of export. As long, in fact,as
slaves were obtainable, somehow or other theywould be obtained, at any rate
in countriesless amenable to Britishcontrol than India, whatevertreatiesmight
be signed or orders issued by theirsignatories.
Along the East African coast slavery was gradually controlled and finally
abolished by regularlyapplying pressureupon the Sultans of Zanzibar to enact the
requisite legislation, which the Britishwould then enforce by means of the Royal
Navy. Along the Somali coasts, and in the Red Sea, the problem was harder still,
for neitherthe Porte nor the Khedive nor the local Chieftainswere very ready to
consider abolishing an institutionwhich was at one time theirmost lucrativesource
of revenue,and upon whichArab society had been based since the dawn of history.
The firstBritishsettlementof any sort in this area was duringthe war against
Napoleon when British troops occupied Perim Island for a time in 1799. In 1827
H.M.S. "Tamar" visited Berbera to investigatethe looting of the brig "Marianne"
aftershe had run aground nearby two years previously.Before leaving,however,her
captain concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the Habr Awal,

63. R. Coupland,
EastAfrica
anditsInvaders 1956),pp. 10-11.
(Oxford,

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which included a clause under which the Habr Awal agreed to suppress the Slave
Trade. In 1835, a detachmentof Britishtroops was posted on Socotra, but was with-
drawnwhen the Sultan of Kisseen refusedto sell the island; then,in 1838, the British
acquiredAden and establishedtherea coaling station and naval base.
Since then, at least until the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Britishinterests
seemprimarilyto have consistedin keepingfreeand open lines of commercebetween
Adenand theSomali coast whichsuppliedmost of itsfreshfoodstuffs, protectingship-
ping,preventingthe looting of ships wrecked along these wild coasts, and restricting
the trafficin slaves: in short,in promotingtrade generally.
Like the true gentlemenwho seeks to protect every woman from every man
excepthimself,Britainconceived that the best way of achieving these objectives was
-
by preservingthe status quo by which was meant respectingthe independence of
those people traditionallyindependent and sustaining the ties of allegiance and
dependencyfor the rest as formed throughoutthe centuries,and resistingthereby
theincursionof all new, and possibly disruptive,forces. It will be rememberedhow,
soon after acquiring Aden, Britain warned both Egypt and Turkey not to extend
theirclaims to sovereigntybeyond the Red Sea. In her treatiesof 1827, 1840, 1855 and
1866withChiefsalong the Somali coast64Britainsoughtgenerallyto establishfriendly
links,to acquire the rightto install a Britishagent, to encourage trade both by sea
with Aden and with the interior,to prohibit trafficin slaves, and, probably most
importantof all, to preventother European Powers concluding independenttreaties
"whichmightbe detrimentalor injurious to Britishinterests"withoutfirstinforming
the authoritiesat Aden. In 1847, the Foreign Officeinformed the Porte65that it
would not sanction Egyptian encroachmentsupon Abyssinia, nor to occupy Suakin
or Massa wa. Yet fiveyears later,as we have seen, followingthe effortsof de Goutier
to sell the supposed concession at Edd, the Porte was advised by the BritishGovern-
mentto preventFrench establishmentsin the Red Sea. Then, for a time at least, it
looked as if the problem of keeping other European Powers out of the region had
resolved itself,when all of them agreed at the Congress of Paris of 1856 to respect
theintegrity of the Ottoman Empire. This seemed to ensurethe statusquo.
But it was not reallyas easy as that: for while the European Powers agreed not
to encroach upon the territoriesof the Porte, the Porte was not so restricted,and
only two years later Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, Political Resident at Aden, felt it
necessaryto warn the BritishConsul-General in Egypt:66
The territorialpretensionsof the Porte are boundless: the Sultan is ever ready
to assume the Sovereigntyof any Mohammedan Country. This disposition
should not be lost sight of, as awkward complications may hereafterarise if
any act of ours should ever give an implied recognition of such pretensions.
But not only did the local Britishofficialssuspect the Ottoman authorities of
seekingto expand theirjurisdiction,theyalso startedto doubt the efficacyof relying

64. Aitcheson,
Collection pp.154,178-184.
ofTreaties,
65. Despatchno. 312,Dec. 6, 1847.(F.O. 78/3185).
66. Coghlanto Consul-General,Dec. 28, 1858.(F.O. 78/3186).

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solely upon the Porte for the maintenance of peace and good order. In May 1859,
the Acting Consul-General in Egypt wrote to the Foreign Office,in connectionwith
the settingup of telegraph stations in the area:67
I avail myselfof this opportunityto call the attentionof Her Majesty's Govern-
mentto the advisableness not only of keepinga sufficient naval forcein the Red
Sea, but of causing the principal ports to be frequentlyvisitedby small cruisers.
The Governments,both Turkishand Egyptians,are veryweak in that direction;
and there is too much fanaticism on the part of the Mussulman populations
to allow of theirbeing leftlong without the appearance of a controllingforce,
that may hold themin respect,at least on the sea board.
Rather than take action herself,however,to enforcethe "respect" the Consul-
General thought necessary,Britain continued her policy of obtaining her ends by
indirect pressure and suggestion, and through rather than against the Ottoman
authorities.Thus it was the Turks who countered the French attemptsof the 1860's
to establish themselvesin the Red Sea or at Obock : but, in encouragingthemto do
so, the Britishfound themselvesforced to acquiesce in Turkish occupation of Zeila
and to recognise, de facto at least, theirclaims to the whole coast.
For most of the decade followingthe appointmentof Raouf Pasha as Governor
of the African Coast fromSuez to Cape Guardafili,in 1870, Her Majesty's Govern-
ment was unable to decide whetheror not to recognize the appointment,and the
claim to sovereigntythat it implied. In April of that year, therewas correspondence
between the Political Resident at Aden and Djemali Bey, the officerin command
of the Egyptianwarship "Khartoum", as to the ship's purposes on the coast. Djemali
Bey argued that his visit was at the request of the natives to effecta reconciliation
betweena numberof the tribes,and that "as the countryhad fromtimeimmemorial
belonged to the Sublime Porte and the inhabitants were Ottoman subjects, there
could be no question of conqueringthe country".In June,CharifPasha sent General
Stanton, the Consul-General in Egypt, copies of this correspondence asking him
to submit the case to Her Majesty's Government "with the view of removingany
doubts which the Governor of Aden mightentertainas to the rightsof the Egyptian
Government over that territory".General Stanton forwarded the correspondence
to Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Officeon June 3, 187068 - and over four years
later had still received no reply.
And by 1874 the Egyptians were much more fiirmlyestablished.The Sultan's
Firman of June 8, 1873, confirmed,in the Khedive's opinion, Egypt's right to the
coast with its grant of "Suakin and Massaws and their Dependencies".69 In the
autumn of that year, H.M.S. "Dalhousie" reported that, on visiting Berbera she
found the Egyptian corvette "Arkha" well established there, and was offered
assistance "as if the territorybelonged to the Egyptians".70At that verymoment,
in fact,Raouf Pasha's troops were on theirway to Harar, wheretheywere to conquer

67. Consul-General
Acting Walneto LordMalmesbury, May28, 1859.(F.O. 78/3186).
68. to LordClarendon,
Stanton no. 60,June3, 1870.(F.O. 78/3186).
69. to LordDerby,no. 78,Sept.15,1874.(F.O. 78/3187).
Stanton
70. Memo
Hertslet, . on Turkish
Claims,p. 61. (F.O. 78/3187).

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the Province and establish a substantial garrison. What now should Britain do?
Should she recognize the Khedive's authority,or should be still insist that the
Egyptians have no rightsoutside the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb ? And what should
happen to the French claims ? A decision would soon have to be made.
An indication as to the directionthat Sir Edward Hertsletthoughtthe decision
should take may be gained from the fact that the very last sentence of his long
"Memorandum on the Turkish Claims to Sovereigntyover the Eastern Shores of the
Red Sea and the whole of Arabia; and on the Egyptian Claims to the whole of the
Western Shore of the same Sea, including the African Coast from Suez to Cape
Guardafui" of March 5, 1874, already much quoted in this paper, suggests:71
If our men-of-warmore frequentlyvisitedMassa wa, Suakin, Zeila and Tadjoura,
and the otherports on that coast, an appreciable effectmightsoon be produced
in checkingthe Slave Trade in the Red Sea and its neighbourhood.
The uncertaintyof their position at this time is reflectedin Lord Tentenden's
minutesof a meetingat the Foreign Officeon June2, to co-ordinatepolicy between
the Foreign and Indian Offices,at which it was decided that:72
Looking at the great difficultieswhich surround the question of the Turkish
claims to sovereigntyand our relationswiththe Somalis and otherindependent
tribes,the best way will be to have a comprehensivestatementdrawn up at the
India Officeshowing what our Treaty rightsare, and which are those on which
we lay stress.. . .
On September25, Sir Louis Mallet wrote to the Foreign Officeto express the
views of the Secretaryof State for India, then still Lord Salisbury, on the matter.
He concluded:73
As far, therefore,as the informationnow before him enables him to judge,
Lord Salisburyis inclinedto adhere to the opinion thatthe extensionof Egyptian
power over the Somali coast, with especial referenceto Bulhar and Berbera,
is not under existingcircumstancesto be desired; for it cannot be looked upon
at present as tendingto the suppression of the Slave Trade or the diminution
of Ottoman influencein the neighbourhood of Aden.
This lettermust, however, have crossed with a despatch from General Stanton
in Egyptwhich was to turnthe decision in the otherdirection.Afterstatingthe basis
of the Egyptian case, Stanton goes on to stressthe need for, and the benefitsthat
mightaccrue from,"the establishmenton the Somali coast of a regular administra-
tion capable of suppressingthe inter-tribalfeuds which have hithertopreventedany
extensionof commercein those regions". And he submitsthat the Egyptian Govern-
mentis perhaps best qualified to fulfilthat role. He points out that trade with Aden
has gone up slightlyin 1874, and that the Egyptians are preparinga trade mission

71. F.O. 78/3186.

72. Present SirL. Mallet,
wereSirH. Rawlinson,
atthismeeting MrAitcheson
Col.Pelly, andMajor
Burns from andLordTenterden
theIndiaOffice, andMrBourke oftheForeign
Office.
73. SirL. MallettotheForeign Sept.15,1874.(F.O. 78/3187).
Office,

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to go up to Harar- which, he feels, should prove that "the fears entertainedby the
Governmentof India thatthe occupation of Berbera by the Egyptianswould endanger
the supply of provisions drawn by Aden fromthe Somali country,are chimerical".
Indeed he points out that, by the Commercial Treaty now in force between Great
Britainand the Porte, which is also bindingupon Egypt,the dutycharged should be
only 1 % instead of the 5 % now prevailing. He even suggests that the Egyptians
mightagree to declare Berbera and the otherports as "freeports", should theForeign
Officewish it.
With regard to the Slave Trade, he points out that the Agreementswith the
Chiefs of the Habr Awal and other tribesfor the suppression of this trade, have in
fact had littleeffect.He thus goes on to urge:
As His Highness the Khedive is preapred to conclude a convention with
Her Majesty's Government to prohibit the export of slaves from Egyptian
territory,it would at least appear that the Egyptian occupation of thiscoast
would hardly have the disastrous effect,with referenceto the Slave Trade,
contemplated by Sir Bartle Frere: it would, I imagine on the contrary,tend
ratherto the suppression of this trafficin these regions by the substitution,in
lieu of the present divided authority,of a strong Governmentwhich could be
held responsible for the acts of its subjects and for the due performanceof its
treatyobligations in this importantmatter.
The policy of the Egyptian Governmentis now far different and far more
enlightenedthan was the case in Mehemet Ali's time, when the countrywas in
a state of great disorganisationand when commercial relationswith the rest of
the world were barely developed, and the reasons which then induced Her
Majesty's Governmentto resistany extensionof Ottoman territorybeyond the
Straitsof Bab-el-Mandeb can now, as far as commercialinterestsare concerned,
hardly be said to exist.
Furthermore,he feltthat "the Egyptian Governmentwould be more ready to listen
to and act on the representationof Her Majesty's Governmentand to give greater
trading facilitiesto Her Majesty's subjects, than other Powers who m ght become
possessed of chat countryin the event of the Egyptian claim being disallowed. . . ."
Under these circumstancesI would venturewith great deferenceto submit
that both for Political and Commercial reasons as well as with a view to the
suppression of the East African Slave Trade, the rightof the Egyptian Govern-
mentto the Somali countryshould be recognisedby Her Majesty's Government,
under the conditions that Berbera should be declared free,that facilitiesshould
be given for opening up commercial relations between Abyssinia and the
Egyptian porte, and that the Egyptian Governmentshould enterinto a formal
engagement to prohibit the export of Slaves and to use every endeavour to
suppress the Slave Trade within its territory.
Stanton prevailed. Lord Derby's minute on the letteritselfbegan:
I am very much disposed, like Lord Tenterden, to think that General
Stanton takes the rightview . . .

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And in reply to Mallet's letterof September 25, but with Stanton's considerations
muchin mind,Lord Tenterdenwrote tersely,but firmly:
I see nothing in this letter to alter my opinion as to the correctness of
General Stanton's views.
The India Officeconcurred, and, for good or will, a decision had been made; the
decision which, fiveyears later, Mr Clarke Jervoisewas to call in question.
Although endorsed, as we have seen, by both the Under-Secretaryof State and
theSecretaryof State, the policy was not, of course, to last. As a resultof the Arabi
rebellionin Egypt and the Mahdi risingin the Sudan, Britain came to play an in-
creasinglydirect and militantrole in the area, occupying Egypt in 1882, the Sudan
the followingyear, and, after the overthrowby Menilek's troops of the Egyptian
forcesin Harar, to negotiate a series of treatiesherself,in 1884-86, with the Somali
peoples opposite Aden, and in the 90's with France and Italy and with Ethiopia, to
establish her protectorateover what is now northernSomalia.
It may now be seen that the northernSomali coast has been subject to outside
interferenceand control- of a sort which we would today call imperialistic- for
an extraordinarilylong time. Furthermorethe tale confirmsconsiderationsof trade,
religionand territorialexpansion as being among the main motives for such inter-
ferencewith astonishing consistencyover twentyor more centuries.
In using as our yardstickBritishattitudesto the claims to sovereigntyover the
northernSomali coastline, we begin with the British felt "need" for responsible
governmentalong these importantand dangerous shores. As Pankhurstpoints out,74
the firstBritishtreatywith the Somali tribes in 1827, and with the Sultan of Aden
in 1838, followed in each case the plunderingof ships wrecked on their respective
coasts, which seemed, to the British,quite literallyintolerable. But implicitin this
assumption of the need for responsible governmentis the view that governmenton
thecoast priorto thiswas eitherirresponsibleor non-existent - as
assumption which,
as most sociological and anthropological commentators, from Burton to Lewis
and Drysdale, point out, is far from justified. Traditional Somali government,
exercisedwithinitsnomadic and clan-familyframework,is, indeed,probably amongst
the most democratic in the world. Burton described the Somalis as "a fierceand
turbulentrace of Republicans" : he found every decision to be made only afterfull
and publ'C discussion in which all adult men have an equal say. The systemitselfis
one which recognises no permanentand all-embracingleaders,who might assume
even in paît a monarchical,aristocraticor dictatorialrole: everyman elected to lead
is electedto lead fora particularperiod and in a particular sphere of public concern.
Lewis submitsthat75whilstSomali political contractmay not correspondin all respects
to any one of the many doctrinesof the Social Contract of the political philosophers,
it does, nevertheless, "include essentially contractual elements having closest

74. Pankhurst,
Ethiopia , vol.VIII,no. 1,pp.42,41.
Observer
75. Lewis,A Pastoral
Democracy, p. 196.

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affinitieswith those political theorieswhich saw the origins of political union in an
egalitarian social contract".76
What is at stake, then, is not so much the degree of the government'sactivity
or responsibility,per se, as the extentto which its responsibilityis relevantto and
co-operative with the needs of other governments.There is little doubt as to he
existence,duringthe nineteenthcentury,and exerciseof governmentin the northern
Somali-lands, nor even, withinits own frame of reference,as to its responsibility.
Its weakness lay, rather,in the fact that it offeredthe outside world no visiblecentral
authority,nor was thereany earnestof desireto accord to foreignerswho mightcome,
by design or accident, to their shores, the respect and safety that had come to be
regarded as a near-internationalright.
To what extentthis excessiveinsularityof governmentmay have been a feature
forcingthe Sabeans "to found colonies" along the coast in ancient times,we cannot,
of course, now tell. But we may suppose that it may have been a factor,forwe know
that these early colonies were founded forpurposes of trade; and regularestablished
trade requires a definite measure of "responsible" government,providing and
guaranteeingsafetyand securityto the lives and propertyof the traders.It may even
be that such insularityof "native" government,rather than its non-existenceor
irresponsibility,has been a peisistentcause, and to some extenteven a justification,
of imperialismin many parts of the world'
Trade has been, of course, a prime motive for teriitorialaggression of various
sorts which we today would call imperialiststic,from the early Sabean colonies
until the present day. Lord Salisbury's insistence that the reason for supporting
Egyptianpresence in the area in 1879 was "our only securityagainst any otherEuro-
pean Power obtaining a footing opposite Aden" was, presumably, to safeguard
Aden's food supplies, whilst at the same time ensuring British supremacy in 1he
region without herselfhaving to acquire directlyadditional responsibilities.And
Britain's interestin Aden lay, similarly,in its location as a coaling and naval station
vital to the expansion, then, of trade and Empire in India and the Far East, and,
increasingly,as a tradingcentrein its own right.
Religion has been another consistentfactor since at least the sixteenthcentury,
when the Ottoman, and Moslem, Turks 'took possession of Zeila" and established
themselvesalong the coast and in the Red Sea. In this connection it is significant
that since the region was already Moslem, the Turks withdrewactive control of
theirgarrisonsat Suakin, Massawa and Zeila followingthe departureof the Catholic
Portuguese in 1633. To what extent the Britishanti-slaverymovement of the nine-
teenth centurymay be termed "religious" is hard to determine.Dr Eric Williams,
and otherscholars more recently,have argued that the Abolition Movement,at least
as regardsthe AtlanticSlave Trade, was economically motivated.77Be that as it may,
it can hardlybe said that Britain's interestin destroyingthe East Africanslave trade
was primarilyeconomic, since few British,or even British-protected persons were in
any direct way involved. The evidence that by the second half of the last century

76. Ibid.,p. 3.
77. E. E. Williams, andSlavery
Capitalism (ChapelHill,1944).

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theBritishconscience was considerablydisturbedby the continual existenceof slave-
tradingin East African and Arab waters is considerable. The connection between
the Society for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, the church and missionary
movementas a whole, and what might be called the British national conscience,
seems sufficiently close to warrant the suggestion that Britain's interference"for
anti-slaverypurposes" was but a nineteenth-century liberal-humanitarianmani-
festationof religiously-motivated imperialistictendencies.
And, lastly, the most simple explanation for imperialism,the straightforward
desireforland, has likewisebeen a consistentfactor- but witha distinctivevariation.
So harsh and unattractiveis the Somali hinterlandthat the various imperial Powers,
perhapsfromthe Sabeans of old and certainlyfromthe Turks in the sixteenthcentury
to the British in the nineteenth,have regularly been satisfied by meiely keeping
possible rivals out. Justas the Turks withdrewas soon as the Portuguese departed in
the seventeenthcentury,so Lord Salisbury was primarilyconcerned not so much
withconquering the area as with preventingother Powers fromdoing so.
Thus it may well be, followingProfessorEisenstadt's line of thought,78that it
is not so much a country'seconomic viabilityas its capacity to accept and absorb
new and changingpressuresand obligationsimposed upon it fromthe outside world,
whichdeterminesits ability,and perhaps even its right,to stand alone. Such a thesis
would go far towards explaining the consistencyand persistence of outside inter-
ferenceexperiencedby the Somalis in the past, as to the exercise of governmentin
the area, and would go some way to support the ratherobvious thoughtthat foreign
interference in the area may not end for some time to come. It is all too easy to see
how the attemptsby other Powers to pursue theirnational interestsas regardstrade,
religionand/orideology, and territorialsecurityand perhaps even aggrandisement,
could continue to be factors in shaping the futureof the Somali Horn unless and
untilthe Governmenttherecan not meiely achieve economic viability,but sufficient
internalstrengthand externalrespect to dominate the conflictbetween the interests
of the outside woild and of the indigeneous people. Such a Governmentwould have
to be strongand wealthyenough to meet,withoutquestion, everyobligation that the
outside world mightimpose, and to match, primarilyfromits own resources,every
threatthat the outside world mightpresent- whichptrhaps suggeststhe imperative
need for largerunits in Africa: forthe question arises veryquickly,in this case as in
severalothersin the continent,as to whetherthe climate,land and population of the
area concernedmakes possible, even under ideal conditions, the creation and main-
enance of so stronga government.

78. Professor
S. N. Eisenstadt, attheConference
Address
Opening Changein
onSocialandPolitical
in Washington,
Africa,
French-speaking Aug.17-21,1964.

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