WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE

TECHNICAL NOTE

A BREAKDOWN OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' PUBLIC CLIMATE FINANCE CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE $100 BILLION GOAL

JULIE BOS AND JOE THWAITES

1. INTRODUCTION

Providing finance to help developing countries undertake climate action is both a moral responsibility and a legal obligation for developed countries. This is rooted in the fact that they are responsible for the majority of cumulative emissions since industrialization began (Ritchie 2019) and generally have greater capacity to provide support. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed countries are obligated to provide financial resources to meet some of the costs incurred by developing countries in undertaking certain obligations under the convention as well as to assist particularly vulnerable developing countries in meeting the costs of climate adaptation (UN 1992, Articles 4.3 and 4.4). As part of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries further committed to jointly mobilizing US$100 billion per year in climate finance for developing countries by 2020 (UNFCCC 2009, paragraph 8).

The $100 billion commitment, recognized in 2010 as part of the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010, paragraphs 98–99; see Box 1), has been key to building trust and solidarity between developed and developing countries. It also underpins the "grand bargain" behind the Paris Agreement: that developing countries would commit to more ambitious climate action but would require enhanced support from developed countries to do so. The Paris Agreement includes a provision that developed country Parties would continue their existing obligations

CONTENTS

Technical notes document the research or analytical methodology underpinning a publication, interactive application, or tool.

Suggested Citation: Bos, J. and J. Thwaites. 2021. "A Breakdown of Developed Countries' Climate Finance Contributions Towards the $100 Billion Goal." Technical Note. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available online at: https://doi.org/10.46830/writn.20.00145.

under the UNFCCC to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties, and it further states that developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance in a progression beyond previous efforts (UNFCCC 2015, Articles 9.1 and 9.3). The accompanying decision by the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC that adopted the Paris Agreement also included a commitment by developed country Parties to continue their existing collective mobilization goal (i.e., the $100 billion) through 2025 (UNFCCC 2015, paragraph 53).

BOX 1 | Formalizing the US$100 Billion Commitment

At the 16th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in 2010, Parties formally recognized the $100 billion commitment in Decision 1/CP.16:

- "98. *Recognizes* that developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries;
- 99. *Agrees* that, in accordance with paragraph 1(e) of the Bali Action Plan, funds provided to developing country Parties may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources."

Source: UNFCCC 2010, paragraphs 98–99.

Delivery on this climate finance goal will be key to unlocking more ambitious climate commitments from developing countries and ensuring progress in international climate negotiations. Developed countries' ability to deliver $100 billion in climate finance annually will also set the tone for deliberations on a future collective climate finance goal, from a floor of $100 billion, which governments decided in Paris in 2015 would be agreed upon before 2025 (UNFCCC 2015, paragraph 53). The $100 billion is a collective commitment by "developed countries," and meeting it will require them all to do their part. However, this is complicated by the developed countries not being clearly defined within the UNFCCC or its Paris Agreement (see Box 2).

Over the past decade, there have been several assessments of aggregate progress towards the goal (see Section 1.1), but until now, no data set has attempted to break down each country's full public financial contribution. This technical note aims to fill this gap, increasing transparency and accountability around progress towards the $100 billion commitment by breaking down how much each developed country has contributed in public climate finance for developing countries between 2013 and 2018,[1] the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available. We did not look at private mobilized finance because data on this are much less complete, with methodological challenges in tracking and attributing private mobilized finance to individual countries.

The six-year period 2013–18 spans three years on either side of the Paris Agreement, which was concluded in December 2015, allowing pre- and post-Paris trends to be assessed. We use the individual breakdowns to assess how countries' efforts compare using a variety of metrics. In the process of attempting to quantify and break down climate finance contributions, we identify several methodological barriers to providing fully comprehensive individual country breakdowns of public climate finance, and this technical note outlines these, our efforts to address them, and the outstanding barriers.

BOX 2 | Categorizing Developed and Developing Countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The US$100 billion commitment refers to finance from "developed country Parties" for "developing country Parties." These are not explicitly defined in Decision 1/CP.16.[a] Any accounting approach requires the delineation of the categories of *developed and developing* countries. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)[b] established two annexes:

- Annex I contains "developed country Parties and other Parties," including those "undergoing the process of transition to a market economy."
- Annex II contains "developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II" with "other developed Parties" referring to the noncountry European Economic Community (later superseded by the European Union). This group comprises countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992. The obligation to provide climate finance set out in Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the UNFCCC is assigned to Annex II Parties. All Annex II Parties are in Annex I, but not all Annex I Parties are in Annex II.
- All other Parties are deemed "non–Annex I Parties."

Figure B2.1 shows a map of UNFCCC Parties by annex.

FIGURE B2.1: MAP OF UNFCCC PARTIES



Notes: UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Holy See is an observer state.

Source: WRI, based on annexes in UN 1992.

BOX 2 | Categorizing Developed and Developing Countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (con't.)

The $100 billion commitment in Decision 1/CP.16 refers to the commitment being by "developed country Parties," but not "other developed Parties in Annex II," presumably excluding the European Union itself from the obligation (but not EU member states that are developed country Parties).

We therefore define *developed country Parties* as the 23 countries in Annex II of the UNFCCC:

Australia	Greece	Norway
Austria	Iceland	Portugal
Belgium	Ireland	Spain
Canada	Italy	Sweden
Denmark	Japan	Switzerland
Finland	Luxembourg	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
France	Netherlands	United States of America
Germany	New Zealand	

This is the same definition as used by the Overseas Development Institute[c] as well as peer-reviewed academic literature.[d] This differs from the OECD's approach, which, in addition to counting climate finance from Annex II Parties, also includes climate finance from other member states of the European Union not in Annex II (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia)[e] as well as Liechtenstein and Monaco, which are Annex I Parties not included in Annex II.[f]

We define *developing country Parties* as all the non–Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC. However, many countries include climate finance provided to Annex I Parties not included in Annex II, namely Eastern European countries and Turkey, in their UNFCCC reporting. Similarly, the OECD's climate finance reports include climate finance going to non–Annex I Parties but also countries in Annex I that are eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA): Belarus, Kosovo, Turkey, and Ukraine.[g] Turkey was originally included in Annex II but was deleted from it by an amendment that entered into force on June 28, 2002, pursuant to Decision 26/CP.7.[h] Turkey has since requested to be eligible to receive climate finance under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. We did not make adjustments to exclude climate finance received by Annex I countries; however, the absence of a clear definition of *developing countries* in the $100 billion commitment means that it is not clear whether all such flows should be counted towards the goal.

OECD Development Assistance Committee climate finance reporting, which is narrower in scope than the OECD climate finance reports, only includes finance to ODA-eligible countries, which excludes the following non–Annex I Parties: Andorra, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Chile (since 2018, when it graduated from ODA eligibility), Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis (since 2014, when it graduated from ODA eligibility), San Marino, Seychelles (since 2018, when it graduated from ODA eligibility), Singapore, State of Palestine, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay (since 2018, when it graduated from ODA eligibility).[i]

BOX 2 | Categorizing Developed and Developing Countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (con't.)

Figure B2.2 shows how the UNFCCC and OECD country categories do not fully align. Table A1 in the appendix lists all countries that are Parties to the UNFCCC by their UNFCCC annex as well as by their eligibility for ODA between 2013 and 2018.

FIGURE B2.2: HOW THE UNFCCC AND OECD COUNTRY CATEGORIES DO NOT FULLY ALIGN



Notes: ODA = official development assistance; UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Figure for illustrative purposes only, areas not to scale. The categorization misalignment is shown by the green and red triangles created by the UNFCCC country definitions crossing the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ODA eligibility boundary.

Source: WRI authors.

Notes:
a. UNFCCC 2010.
b. UN 1992.
c. Colenbrander et al. 2021.
d. Weikmans and Roberts 2019.
e. In 1992, when the UNFCCC was agreed upon, these countries were not members of the European Economic Community/European Union.
f. OECD 2015, 2019, 2020.
g. OECD 2020.
h. UNFCCC 2001.
i. OECD 2012, 2014, 2018a.

1.1 Existing Public Climate Finance Data Sources and Analysis

Ex post data on public climate finance provided individually by developed countries to developing countries comes through three main sources:

- Since 2014, all Annex I Parties[2] to the **UNFCCC** are required to submit **Biennial Reports (BRs)**, which include data in a common tabular format (CTF) on the climate finance they provide to developing countries (UNFCCC 2016, 2018b, 2020). Because these reports are due only on even-numbered years and cover a reporting period two and three years prior, it means that there is a lag in data availability. Thus, official data on 2019 and 2020 climate finance provision is not due to be reported to the UNFCCC until 2022.
- **Multilateral development banks (MDBs)** issue **annual joint climate finance reports**, which have been published every year since 2011 and include aggregate data on climate finance provided during the prior fiscal year (ADB 2016c; EBRD 2017, 2018, 2019; EIB 2014; World Bank 2015). This data covers their total climate finance provision and does not adjust to cover only the portion attributable to developed country inputs, which would be necessary for assessing progress towards the $100 billion goal.
- The **Creditor Reporting System (CRS)** of the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)** collates activity-level reporting on climate-related development assistance from countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as well as some multilateral institutions, including MDBs (OECD 2021a). Many countries base their biennial reporting to the UNFCCC on what they report through the OECD CRS, so there are some similarities in these data sets. Multilateral data in the CRS are available for both inflows from contributor countries and outflows to recipients.

Although the $100 billion commitment stated that it was a mobilization goal and that funding may come from both public and private sources, it left significant ambiguities, with no clear definition of what and how to account towards the goal (Bodnar et al. 2015). This is partly because the $100 billion was a political commitment, made in the polarized context of COP15 in Copenhagen. A variety of institutions have attempted to assess progress on the provision and/or mobilization of climate finance. These different assessments of progress have different scopes:

- The **UNFCCC's Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) has produced a Biennial Assessment (BA) and Overview of Climate Finance Flows** every two years since 2014, compiling data from BRs and MDB reporting (SCF 2014, 2016, 2018). It presents climate finance data from various channels and includes tables summarizing data from developed countries' BRs as well as their climate-marked ODA reported to the OECD. BAs are usually released shortly before COPs on even-numbered years, but due to COP26's postponement, the fourth BA, originally scheduled for 2020, will be published in 2021.
- The **OECD** has produced semiregular assessments (in 2015, 2019, and 2020) of progress towards the $100 billion goal. OECD figures include four mutually exclusive components: bilateral public climate finance (based on BRs to the UNFCCC), multilateral climate finance (based on data reported to the OECD DAC CRS) attributed to developed countries, bilateral export credits (based on data reported to the OECD Export Credit Group), and private finance mobilized by bilateral and multilateral public climate finance (reported to the OECD DAC CRS) attributed to developed countries (OECD 2015, 2019, 2020).
- **Oxfam** has produced Climate Finance Shadow Reports in 2016, 2018, and 2020 (Carty and Le Comte 2018; Carty et al. 2016, 2020). These reports adjust the BR data to count only the grant equivalent of loans reported and adjust the climate-specific share of development projects reported, which results in a lower estimate of climate-specific net financial assistance from developed to developing countries compared to donor self-reporting.
- The **United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) convened an independent expert group on climate finance** that released a report in 2020 (Bhattacharya et al. 2020) that assessed progress towards the $100 billion target. Drawing on the above three sources, it reviewed and collated different assessments and critiques of climate finance accounting and reporting, and it made projections of where climate finance flows might have reached in 2020.

- The **Center for Global Development (CGD)** produced a paper that compared country reporting of climate-specific finance as included in the OECD's reports against total development finance reported to the OECD to assess the extent to which climate finance provided since 2009 is "new and additional" (Mitchell et al. 2021).
- The **Overseas Development Institute (ODI)** produced a paper looking at ways to apportion responsibility among developed countries for the $100 billion climate finance goal (Colenbrander et al. 2021). It drew on OECD and Oxfam data on public climate finance provision in 2017–18, then compared this against a composite index that attempts to apportion climate finance responsibility based on developed countries' gross national income (GNI) in 2019, population in 2019, and cumulative carbon dioxide emissions between 1990 and 2018. The analysis focuses on Group of Seven (G7) countries plus Australia, with other developed countries grouped together.

These analyses are useful contributions to the literature on progress towards the $100 billion target. However, they have some limitations:

- The BA summarizes information provided through the BRs, OECD climate-marked ODA data, and MDB climate finance, but it makes only minor adjustments to the data (e.g., ensuring all data are converted to U.S. dollars). The assessment does not explicitly opine on progress towards the $100 billion goal, and due to different methodologies, the numbers from different sources cannot simply be summed together without risking double counting (for example, contributions to MDBs are included in some countries' BRs and also in MDB joint reporting). The BA does not exclude coal financing that has been included by Australia and Japan in their reporting to the UNFCCC.
- The OECD and Oxfam reports do adjust data to help reduce double counting, exclude coal financing included by Japan in their reporting to the UNFCCC, and take a position on progress towards the $100 billion goal. However, the OECD does not provide a breakdown of how much climate finance each country provides. Oxfam provides a partial breakdown of bilateral flows for selected countries, but not a full breakdown including multilateral flows and all developed countries.
- The OECD reports do adjust MDB climate finance outflows data to account only for developed countries' collective share, but they do not provide a country-by-country breakdown that can be added to each country's total climate finance.
- The independent report commissioned by the UNSG reviews the BA, OECD, and Oxfam reports. The report suggests that there may be some overreporting by developed countries of around $3–$4 billion per year. It also makes an informed projection of where climate finance towards the $100 billion goal might be in aggregate by 2020, but it does not provide country breakdowns (Bhattacharya et al. 2020).
- The CGD's analysis is based on OECD data, so it shares similar limitations. In addition, the CGD focuses only on climate finance inflows, so it does not fully capture developed countries' attributed shares of MDB climate finance outflows.
- The ODI analysis is based on OECD and Oxfam data, so it shares similar limitations. Although ODI does break down the contributions to G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Australia, these do not include shares of finance provided through MDBs.
- No existing analysis attributes the shares of climate finance from EU institutions to individual member states. Climate finance from EU institutions is often listed separately. However, since the European Union cannot raise its own resources through taxation, it is akin to other international institutions that rely on member states for core budgetary contributions. A full assessment of how much each individual developed country can claim to have provided as climate finance would require shares of climate finance from EU institutions to be attributed back to contributing developed country member states.

1.2 The World Resources Institute's Approach

The World Resources Institute (WRI) is filling a gap in the data by providing a detailed breakdown of how much public climate finance each country provides that might be counted towards the $100 billion commitment. Although the $100 billion is a collective goal, just as with collective mitigation targets such as 1.5°C or net zero, it depends on the actions of individual countries being

sufficient to add up to the total; therefore, transparent data on individual country contributions are vital. It is unlikely the $100 billion commitment was met on time in 2020 (Bhattacharya et al. 2020). By improving transparency around public climate finance provision, our aim is to improve the accountability of individual developed countries and assess which countries need to do more to ensure the commitment is delivered.

At WRI, we synthesized existing public climate finance reporting from Annex II Parties under the UNFCCC in their BRs, as well as MDBs in their reporting to the OECD CRS, and adjusted this data to help eliminate double counting. We built on methodologies used by the SCF and the OECD, and some of our aggregate numbers are likely to be similar to those of the BA's appendix table compiling CTF data and the OECD's climate finance reports. We also went a step further and provided a country-by-country breakdown that attributes climate finance through MDBs and the European Union to each individual Annex II contributor country. In this way, we provided an easily accessible snapshot of how much each Annex II country can claim to have provided as public climate finance to developing countries (see Box 2 for country definitions). Since we did not include private mobilized finance, our analysis did not attempt to assess overall progress towards the $100 billion goal. Table 1 shows how our analysis compares with previous analyses.

Table 1 | **Comparison of Existing Analyses of Public Climate Finance Relevant to the $100 Billion Goal**

	ADJUST DATA TO ACCOUNT FOR OVERLAPS BETWEEN BILATERAL, MULTILATERAL, AND MDB FINANCE SOURCES	ATTRIBUTE MDB SHARES TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES	ATTRIBUTE CLIMATE FINANCE PROVIDED THROUGH EU BACK TO MEMBER STATES	ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL PROGRESS TOWARDS US$100 BILLION GOAL	BREAKDOWN OF FINANCE BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY
OECD	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗
Oxfam	✓	✓	✗	✗ (Public finance only)	✗
Independent expert group tasked by UNSG	N/A	N/A	N/A	✓	✗
CGD	✓ (Uses OECD data)	✗	✗	✗	Partial (additionality assessments for selected countries)
ODI	✗	✗	✗	✗ (Public finance only, not including all multilateral flows)	Partial (only G7 and Australia)
WRI	✓	✓	✓	✗ (Public finance only)	✓

Notes: CGD = Center for Global Development; G7 = Group of Seven; MDB = multilateral development bank; ODI = Overseas Development Institute; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UNSG = United Nations Secretary-General.

Source: WRI authors based on Bhattacharya et al. (2020), Carty and Le Comte (2018), Carty et al. (2016, 2020), Colenbrander et al. (2021), Mitchell et al. (2021), OECD (2015, 2019, 2020), and SCF (2014, 2016, 2018).

Our analysis provided a breakdown of how much public climate finance each country has provided, through which channels (bilateral, climate-specific inflows to multilateral institutions and climate-specific outflows from MDBs attributed back to developed countries), and to which thematic areas (mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, and other) over the years 2013–18. We also compared country climate finance as a percent of GNI, per capita, and compared against a variety of climate finance effort-sharing approaches. The latter approaches were developed by different research institutions and nongovernmental organizations that use objective data to suggest potential equitable approaches to dividing effort towards meeting climate finance goals. When developed countries submit their fifth BRs, due in 2022, our methodology can also be applied to these new data to provide updated climate finance breakdowns for 2019 and 2020.

1.3 Limitations

In the process of accounting for a country's individual contribution to the $100 billion goal, we encountered several methodological barriers; thus, there are important limitations and caveats in our analysis (see Section 2.1, Methodological Challenges, for more detail). They span technical issues in how countries and institutions report climate finance and qualitative differences in what countries choose to report as climate finance. At the root of both is the fact that the original $100 billion commitment was not sufficiently clear on what counts towards the goal and how to account for it (Bodnar et al. 2015), and governments have been unable to reach agreement on clarifying these questions. The lack of consistency in reporting can have a significant impact on the amount of finance attributable to countries; for some of the higher-contributing countries, this amounts to billions of dollars a year. **When interpreting the data, it is important to bear in mind that approaches vary considerably between countries; whereas higher-reporting contributors may have a more liberal interpretation of what finance flows to include, lower-reporting contributors may have taken a more conservative approach.** Greater consistency in reporting approaches among contributors is important for building confidence in climate finance data and enabling a more accurate assessment of relative efforts. The enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement provides an opportunity to further advance this effort.

1.4 Structure

Section 2 provides a detailed methodology of adjustments made to the source data, and Section 3 contains analysis of the collated and adjusted data according to the thematic split between mitigation and adaptation and against various effort metrics. Section 4 contains brief conclusions.

2. DETAILED METHODOLOGY

In this section, we explain how we calculated and allocated public climate finance through the following sources: bilateral, climate-specific inflows to multilateral institutions and outflows from MDBs. Figure 1 outlines the key methodological steps of the climate finance breakdown, which are outlined in further detail in the subsections.

We did not normalize dollar amounts to a given year. The $100 billion target was due in 2020 and must continue through 2025, but the COP decision did not specify that amounts be pegged to inflation of a particular year, and no other assessments of climate finance towards the $100 billion have attempted to normalize amounts between years.

Figure 1 | **Methodological Steps Used to Derive Country Breakdown**



* When the numbers differed we used the numbers from the BA because these numbers are reviewed by the SCF experts

Notes: CRS = Creditor Reporting System; EU = European Union; GNI = gross national income; MDB = multilateral development bank; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; SCF = Standing Committee on Finance; UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Source: WRI authors.

2.1 Methodological Challenges

This technical note identified numerous issues with climate finance as currently reported, spanning both technical issues in how countries and institutions report climate finance qualitative differences in what countries choose to report as climate finance (Carty and Le Comte 2018; Carty et al. 2016, 2020; Roberts et al. 2021; SCF 2014, 2016, 2018; Weikmans and Roberts 2019). Below, we present the key issues and our approach to addressing them.

Reporting inconsistencies and errors

- Some countries made data calculation or data entry errors, such as adding values incorrectly, not converting from national currencies to U.S. dollars, or mixing national currency and U.S. dollar figures. We made simple adjustments for clear instances of data entry errors or omissions of currency conversions.

In case of discrepancies between the BRs and the BAs, we used the data presented in the BAs; as part of their compilation, BAs attempt to correct for data entry errors and inconsistencies in the CTFs. We sent calculations to representatives from all 23 Annex II countries included in our analysis, and if they identified issues, we corrected them (these are explained in more detail below).

- Countries report finance as "committed" or "disbursed." The OECD defines *commitment* as "a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organization" and *disbursement* as "the release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor" (OECD n.d.).

Some countries report both commitments and disbursements, and this can lead to double counting if countries report commitments in one year and disbursements to the same entity or project in the same or subsequent years. We corrected clear instances of this where countries reported committed and disbursed finance to multilateral institutions in the same year, as detailed below. We did not correct bilateral finance reporting; thus, for countries that report both commitments and disbursements, there is a risk of double counting, especially between years (i.e., if counted in one year when reported as committed, then again in a subsequent year when reported as disbursed). This is a key reporting issue with the UNFCCC BRs and merits further investigation.

Failure to report

- The United States has not submitted its third or fourth BRs—due in January 2018 and January 2020, respectively—to the UNFCCC. This means there is incomplete official climate finance data for the United States.
- Rather than attempt to estimate using other data sources, which would be inconsistent with other countries, we noted these data gaps; and where post-Paris averages were calculated for other countries, we presented only the 2016 amounts for the United States. If the United States submits its overdue BRs, we can update the U.S. calculations with the latest data.

Definitional issues

- The $100 billion commitment, in particular, and the UNFCCC, in general, has neither defined nor identified *developing countries*. Some countries include climate finance contributions to Annex I Parties in their reporting and may exclude non–Annex I countries that are not ODA eligible from their reporting (see Box 2 in Section 1 for further discussion).
- The UNFCCC does not give clear definitions of *multilateral and bilateral funding*, even though its reporting guidelines use these terms. Bilateral flows generally refer to funding from one government directly to another government or local institution in a developing country, such as nongovernmental organizations or researchers. Multilateral flows generally refer to funding that is delivered via an international institution, where resources from multiple contributors are pooled and subject to a shared governance structure before being allocated. Multilateral flows include funding to climate-specific funds such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund, UN agencies, and MDBs.
- The UNFCCC BR guidelines require Annex II Parties to submit this information through CTFs: one table for climate finance "contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels" and another for "contributions through multilateral channels" (UNFCCC 2012, Tables 7[b] and 7[a]). Although regional channels may include institutions that could be considered multilateral channels, we kept all data reported under Table 7(b) together to align with the UNFCCC approach.
- The BR CTF template lists a set of multilateral institutions in the multilateral finance table (7[a]);[3] however, some countries still list contributions to such multilateral entities in their bilateral reporting table (7[b]). We did not correct this because it does not affect country totals; however, this may be a reporting error and could skew the breakdown between bilateral and multilateral finance amounts.

Share of project cost counted

- For projects that target multiple development objectives beyond solely climate, countries take different approaches for what share of the cost to count as climate finance. Whereas some countries calculate the climate share on a project-by-project basis, others use fixed coefficients that range from 25 percent to 100 percent (OECD 2015; Weikmans and Roberts 2019). These choices can make a significant difference in the amounts that countries report as climate finance (Carty and Le Comte 2018; Carty et al. 2016, 2020).
- The lack of consistency in how countries reported their climate finance to the UNFCCC—with some countries reporting at the project level and others aggregating contributions—made it impossible to verify assumptions, and we were not able to make corrections in a fair way using BR data. This represents a key limitation of our analysis.

Accounting for different financial instruments

- Countries take different approaches in whether and how to report the value of nongrant instruments as climate finance. Some countries report mostly or entirely grant-based finance, whereas others report significant shares of loans. Other things being equal, governments that provide more grant finance are, in some senses, exerting more budgetary "effort" than governments that provide loans because the creditor government will eventually be repaid.
- Reporting currently only requires amounts to be reported at face value, regardless of instrument. "Grant-equivalent" accounting would result in countries with a high proportion of loans and other nongrant instruments reporting significantly lower sums (Carty and Le Comte 2018; Carty et al. 2016, 2020).
- Although methodologies exist for reporting the grant equivalence of loans, standardized methodologies for reporting the grant equivalence of equity, guarantees, and insurance do not yet exist.
- We did not convert for grant equivalence, but we did include Oxfam data on the share of grant-based finance in bilateral and multilateral inflows (Carty et al. 2020) alongside our figures, and we shaded tables and figures accordingly to illustrate qualitative differences in financial instruments.

Fossil fuel financing

- Some countries include support for fossil fuel projects in their climate finance reporting, but others have opposed such inclusion. Australia and Japan have argued in favor of the inclusion of high efficiency coal plant finance in their climate finance reporting (OECD 2015; TWG 2015). The lack of granular reporting transparency means it is difficult to verify whether countries report fossil fuel finance as climate finance.
- Oxfam estimated that Japan reported $1 billion in coal finance in 2017–18, with over $700 million reported by Japan for one coal-fired power plant in Bangladesh (Carty et al. 2020). The OECD's reports have excluded coal finance from their aggregate figures (OECD 2015, 2019, 2020).
- Due to limited project-level transparency in BRs, it is not possible to identify and exclude finance going to coal or other fossil fuel projects from our calculations. We added notes flagging that Japan have reported significant amounts of coal finance throughout our analysis because the exclusion of such financing would reduce their amounts.

Export credits

- Whereas some countries include export credit finance in their climate finance reporting, others do not.
- We did not adjust to remove export credits where countries choose to report this; however, there is not agreement about whether such credits should count towards the $100 billion commitment.

Financing for institutions in developed countries

- Some countries include support provided to researchers and nongovernmental organizations based in developed countries (including WRI) in what they report as climate finance.
- We did not adjust where countries choose to report this; however, it is not clear that this should count towards the $100 billion commitment.

Additionality

- There are a wide variety of interpretations of whether and how climate finance towards the $100 billion should be "new and additional" (Bodnar et al. 2015). Countries are asked to explain in their BRs how the finance they provide is new and additional.
- The CGD's paper estimates that as much as half of reported climate finance may not be additional to existing development assistance flows (Mitchell et al. 2021).
- We did not adjust for this; however, the question of additionality is subject to significant debate.

Accounting for contributions to multilateral institutions

- In their BRs, countries are required to report their contributions to multilateral institutions, or inflows. However, outflows from multilateral institutions to recipient countries may be larger, especially if the institutions provide outflows as loans or are able to raise additional resources from capital markets through bond issuances (particularly MDBs). Looking at inflows and outflows will therefore present different amounts (see Figure 2). To address this, we presented

two perspectives: climate-specific inflows, which include bilateral climate finance and multilateral climate finance, and total attributed climate finance, which adds the attributed MDB outflows (see Section 3.1, Total Public Climate Finance).

- It often takes time for a multilateral institution to program the financial resources it receives, so the year in which a contributor country reports a climate finance inflow to a multilateral institution can be different from the year in which this funding outflows to developing countries. This is not an issue for bilateral finance, which goes directly from the developed to the developing country (see line A in Figure 2). For multilateral contributions, however, it means the amounts will vary depending on whether you measure based on the year of inflow from a contributor country to a multilateral institution or the year of outflow from the multilateral institution to a developing country.
- Because MDBs raise significant amounts of funding from capital markets, such that their outflows of climate finance to developing countries are much larger than the inflows they receive from contributor countries, we measured MDB climate finance at the point of outflow (see line C in Figure 2 and MDB climate finance accounting below).
- For other multilateral institutions, we counted at the point of inflow, as reported in the BRs (see line B in Figure 2). Because most non-MDB multilateral institutions do not raise additional resources through capital markets, the discrepancy between inflows and outflows is not as large. However, some multilateral funds do use grant inflows to provide larger nongrant outflows, and our analysis did not capture this. There is also likely to be a temporal mismatch between the year an inflow is reported to a multilateral institution and the year finance outflows from the multilateral to a developing country. Looking at amounts for multiyear periods, as we did, can help address the latter issue to some extent.
- Some countries do not attribute climate-specific contributions to some multilateral institutions (such as the Global Environment Facility, which targets multiple environmental objectives) and so report this as being core/general funding; other countries report part or all of such contributions as being climate specific. This means countries can claim different portions as climate finance even when contributing to the same multilateral institutions. In the absence of climate-specific reporting, we were unable to correct this.

MDB climate finance accounting

- Although MDBs report on climate finance outflows in their joint climate finance reports, this data has quality and consistency issues. For example, MDBs do not disclose project-level data underpinning their joint reports, use fiscal years rather than calendar years, and measure at different points in the finance cycle (e.g., board approval, commitment, disbursement), which means actual dates of finance outflows can vary by years.
- We used the OECD CRS as our data source for MDB outflows because it provides more consistent, project-level data than MDBs, verified according to OECD reporting rules. The OECD CRS still has some limitations. It only includes ODA-eligible countries (which does not include all UNFCCC non–Annex I Parties eligible to receive climate finance) and some Annex I Parties (see Box 2 and Table A1). It also does not include data from the World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC) for 2018. This is due to IFC refusing to disclose its 2018 project-level public climate finance data to the OECD for alleged business-confidentiality reasons. Better transparency from IFC—especially because it is using public resources—would address this issue.
- We attributed the shares of MDB climate finance outflows back to individual contributor countries based on their shareholding in each MDB. We detail the methodology for attributing shares of this finance in Section 2.4 below.
- Countries vary in how they report contributions to MDBs in their BRs, with some reporting core (non-climate-specific) contributions to MDBs, some attempting to calculate and report only the climate-specific portion of their contribution, and others doing both. This results in wide variances in amounts reported. Since our analysis used MDB outflows attributed back to contributor countries, we subtracted MDB inflows reported in BRs except where it was clear that it was to a climate-specific MDB window or trust fund, not to the MDB's core resources.

Figure 2 | **Perspectives for Analyzing Climate Finance Flows**



Note: MDB = multilateral development bank.

Source: WRI authors.

We outline specific changes in detail under the "Reporting errors and corrections" headers in the following subsections. As part of WRI's review process, we sent our calculations to all developed country governments included in this analysis, MDBs, and other institutions involved in climate finance reporting. When countries or institutions notified us of errors or issues in how we used their reporting, we made efforts to adjust and correct these, which are also detailed in the following sections.

2.2 Bilateral Climate Finance

Sources

- Data from Table 7: Provision of Public Financial Support: Summary Information and Table 7(b): Provision of Public Financial Support: Contributions through Bilateral, Regional and Other Channels in Annex II Parties' CTFs submitted as part of their second (2013 and 2014), third (2015 and 2016), and fourth (2017 and 2018) BRs (UNFCCC 2016, 2018b, 2020)
- SCF 2016 (covering 2013 and 2014 data) and 2018 (covering 2015 and 2016 data) BA reports (SCF 2016, 2018)
- EU budget shares, 2013–18 (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019)
- Oxfam Climate Finance Shadow Reports for grant shares of bilateral finance, 2016–18 (Carty et al. 2020)

Data gaps

- At the time of publication, the United States had not submitted its third or fourth BRs. For 2015–16, numbers reported in the 2018 BA were used, which were based on preliminary data provided by the United States (SCF 2018). At the time of writing, there were no sources of U.S. data through the UNFCCC available for 2017 and 2018, so we did not include data on U.S. bilateral climate finance in those years. For the United States, the average for 2016–18 is its 2016 finance only, which may be an overestimate since U.S. bilateral climate finance contributions may have decreased in 2017 and 2018 (Thwaites 2018, 2019).

Adjustments

- For each country, we counted only the "climate-specific" total contributions reported through bilateral, regional, and other channels. For 2013–16, where there was a discrepancy between the BRs and the BAs, we used corrected data from the BAs. This raw data is shown in Table 3.

- The European Union is a Party to the UNFCCC, and it disburses climate finance itself (in addition to contributions from its member states). The European Union submits its own BR. Because the EU budget, and therefore its climate finance, comes from its member states' budgetary contributions, we allocated to each member state a proportion of their share of the EU budget (see Table 2). EU bilateral climate finance is allocated to the European countries based on their shares of the EU budget. EU climate finance comes partly from the core EU budget and partly from the European Development Fund (EU Council 2018). We used each member state's EU budget shares for the corresponding years to attribute EU climate finance to individual countries. A relatively small amount of climate finance reported in the EU BRs (less than $200 million annually) is excluded from our final calculations because it is attributable to non–Annex II countries that are EU member states. Bilateral climate finance flows after these adjustments are shown in Table 4 and Figure 3.
- All EU climate finance is earmarked as bilateral in its second and third BRs. However, within Table 7(b) (bilateral climate finance), the European Union also reports on its climate finance from the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is an MDB. The climate finance via the EIB is therefore subtracted from the European Union's total bilateral climate finance in 2013–16. In its fourth BR, the European Union correctly reports its climate finance through the EIB in Table 7(a) (multilateral climate finance), and adjustments are detailed in Section 2.3 on multilateral climate finance below.
- To account for qualitative differences in climate finance provided, we also included a column in Table 4 showing the share of bilateral grant-based finance provided by each country in the 2016–18 period, based on data kindly provided by Oxfam, as used in their Climate Finance Shadow Report (Carty et al. 2020). We then shaded Figure 3's post-Paris bars by the proportion of grant-based finance provided (in quintiles, with those providing 81–100 percent grants shaded darkest, and those providing 0–20 percent grants shaded lightest). Because the United States has not reported for the years 2017 and 2018, its grant share was based on its 2016 data only.

Reporting errors and corrections

- Germany (second and third BRs) and Luxembourg (second BR) did not convert any of their contributions in their CTFs from euros to U.S. dollars, as required in the CTFs. We used converted data from the 2016 and 2018 BAs instead.
- Luxembourg appears to report both commitments and disbursements for some of the same projects in the same year in its CTFs, which would double count the amounts. The government of Luxembourg did not respond to our review process or requests for clarification on this. The discrepancy in any single year was $10 million at most. We did not correct this because other countries may also be double counting commitments and disbursements across years. This warrants further scrutiny (see Section 2.1, Methodological Challenges).
- Switzerland (fourth BR) reported mobilized private climate finance in the bilateral table (7[b]) in the years 2017–18. We subtracted these amounts from Switzerland's total bilateral climate finance for 2017 and 2018 because our analysis does not include mobilized private climate finance.
- Several countries included climate finance to Annex I Parties in their BRs. It is not clear whether these countries can be defined as developing countries and, hence, whether climate finance channeled to them should be counted towards the $100 billion goal (see Box 2). However, we did not correct for potential reporting mistakes made in the bilateral table (7[b]) because countries do not report breakdowns consistently.
- Several countries included contributions to multilateral channels explicitly listed in Table 7(a) as bilateral contributions in Table 7(b). It is not possible to correct for this mistake, however, because countries do not consistently report their bilateral contributions in a disaggregated way. In cases where countries reported multilateral finance in the bilateral finance table, they do not appear to also report these contributions in the multilateral table (7[a]), so there was low likelihood of double counting.
- During the review process, representatives from New Zealand notified us that due to the timing of the biennial reporting, they were unable to attribute a

climate-specific proportion of some contributions to multilateral institutions and instead reported them in full as core/general; however, our methodology did not count these because we focused on climate-specific amounts. Other countries may have taken similar approaches, and this could result in not fully capturing some climate-relevant contributions to multilateral institutions.

Table 2 | **Contributions to the EU Budget, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Austria	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.6	2.6	2.7
Belgium	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.6	3.1	3.1
Denmark	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.1
Finland	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.7
France	17.6	16.8	16.0	18.3	17.1	16.8
Germany	21.0	22.2	20.5	19.0	20.6	20.7
Greece	1.4	1.6	1.0	1.4	1.3	1.2
Ireland	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.9	1.9
Italy	12.7	12.3	12.0	13.2	12.6	12.5
Luxembourg	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Netherlands	3.8	5.5	4.9	2.3	3.6	4.0
Portugal	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4
Spain	8.3	8.6	7.4	8.9	8.5	8.4
Sweden	3.0	3.3	3.0	2.4	2.8	2.7
United Kingdom	11.7	9.7	15.4	12.0	11.1	11.0
Total Annex II countries[a]	**91.5**	**91.6**	**91.6**	**90.7**	**90.6**	**90.5**

Note: a. The remaining share is from EU member states that are Annex I but not Annex II Parties: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Source: EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

Table 3 | **Raw Bilateral Climate Finance as Reported to the UNFCCC (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	TOTAL 2013–18
Australia	198.71	74.23	90.11	100.21	120.21	117.43	**700.89**
Austria	122.82	132.35	121.38	135.20	119.79	216.40	**847.94**
Belgium	58.51	53.14	44.18	52.31	91.47	75.57	**375.17**
Canada	59.02	68.12	38.60	46.69	216.75	397.86	**827.04**
Denmark	176.61	209.98	137.41	148.37	145.87	172.03	**990.27**
European Union	3,998.33	3,680.26	4,204.68	5,174.65	3,182.31	3,131.63	**23,371.86**
Finland	42.14	58.94	42.73	29.02	37.60	30.39	**240.82**
France	2,968.63	3,657.06	2,961.45	3,473.95	4,263.71	5,292.64	**22,617.44**
Germany	2,212.49	2,496.43	7,792.86	8,837.73	7,018.26	7,033.61	**35,391.38**
Greece	0.04	0.00	0.25	0.26	0.09	0.00	**0.64**
Iceland	0.87	3.72	10.24	10.80	14.21	16.97	**56.81**
Ireland	44.56	42.42	38.04	53.87	61.69	71.22	**311.80**
Italy	61.55	33.86	197.26	136.43	367.02	293.36	**1,089.48**
Japan[a]	8,072.52	8,211.65	8,838.37	10,697.52	9,554.28	10,822.16	**56,196.50**
Luxembourg	31.01	41.96	30.89	47.01	31.42	45.90	**228.19**
Netherlands	284.98	386.78	324.31	256.80	312.97	415.17	**1,981.01**
New Zealand	34.98	59.45	40.27	34.61	27.86	43.02	**240.19**
Norway	1,026.13	526.35	354.50	290.51	469.00	833.54	**3,500.03**
Portugal	21.21	12.22	4.68	2.21	2.44	1.94	**44.70**
Spain	337.30	523.85	498.26	550.13	473.14	675.27	**3,057.95**
Sweden	270.71	283.56	303.89	325.80	376.83	499.84	**2,060.63**
Switzerland	184.02	201.93	173.23	202.32	238.17	340.41	**1,340.08**
United Kingdom	716.98	773.85	1,168.90	1,054.86	962.90	1,268.34	**5,945.83**
United States[b]	2,219.99	2,328.59	2,502.99	1,897.60	Not reported[b]	Not reported[b]	**8,949.17**[b]
Total Annex II countries	**23,144.11**	**23,860.70**	**29,919.48**	**33,558.86**	**28,088.00**	**31,794.69**	**170,365.84**

Notes: a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only.

Source: SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020).

Table 4 | **Bilateral Climate Finance after the EU Allocation (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

							TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013–18	2013–15	2016–18	2016–18
Australia	198.71	74.23	90.11	100.21	120.21	117.43	**700.89**	121.02	112.61	99%
Austria	153.55	153.00	156.69	213.72	202.53	300.95	**1,180.45**	154.41	239.07	25%
Belgium	99.49	80.97	96.31	161.03	190.12	172.65	**800.57**	92.26	174.60	98%
Canada	59.02	68.12	38.60	46.69	216.75	397.86	**827.04**	55.25	220.43	38%
Denmark	203.50	227.04	167.68	202.73	209.51	237.80	**1,248.26**	199.41	216.68	98%
Finland	62.63	72.41	67.95	83.38	91.70	83.63	**461.70**	66.36	86.24	49%
France	3,194.01	3,807.88	3,230.50	4,026.63	4,807.88	5,818.76	**24,885.65**	3,396.73	4,884.42	3%
Germany	2,481.40	2,695.72	8,137.58	9,411.55	7,673.81	7,681.86	**38,081.93**	4,420.25	8,255.74	36%
Greece	17.97	14.36	17.07	42.54	41.46	37.58	**170.98**	15.46	40.53	100%
Iceland	0.87	3.72	10.24	10.80	14.21	16.97	**56.81**	4.94	13.99	100%
Ireland	59.93	53.19	59.90	102.19	122.15	130.72	**528.08**	56.58	118.35	100%
Italy	224.18	144.28	399.05	535.08	767.99	684.82	**2,755.40**	245.39	662.63	63%
Japan[a]	8,072.52	8,211.65	8,838.37	10,697.52	9,554.28	10,822.16	**56,196.50**	8,374.18	10,357.99	12%
Luxembourg	33.57	43.76	35.93	56.07	40.97	55.29	**265.59**	37.52	50.78	100%
Netherlands	333.64	436.15	406.71	326.26	427.53	540.44	**2,470.73**	387.95	431.41	100%
New Zealand	34.98	59.45	40.27	34.61	27.86	43.02	**240.19**	44.90	35.16	100%
Norway	1,026.13	526.35	354.50	290.51	469.00	833.54	**3,500.03**	635.66	531.02	75%
Portugal	37.86	24.79	26.54	47.51	47.00	45.78	**229.47**	28.59	46.76	100%
Spain	443.58	601.05	622.70	818.92	743.64	938.33	**4,168.22**	549.11	833.63	26%
Sweden	309.13	313.18	354.34	398.28	465.94	584.40	**2,425.26**	322.91	482.87	100%
Switzerland	184.02	201.93	173.23	202.32	214.60	228.23	**1,204.32**	186.39	215.05	98%
United Kingdom	866.80	860.93	1,427.86	1,417.27	1,316.14	1,612.82	**7,501.82**	1,039.95	1,448.74	91%
United States[b]	2,219.99	2,328.59	2,502.99	1,897.60	x[b]	x[b]	**8,949.17**	2,350.52	1,897.60	34%
Total Annex II countries	**20,317.48**	**21,002.75**	**27,255.12**	**31,123.44**	**27,765.29**	**31,385.01**	**158,849.08**	**22,779.60**	**30,091.25**	

Notes: For the average post-Paris column, increases compared to the average pre-Paris are colored green, and decreases compared to the average pre-Paris are colored red. For the share of grant finance post-Paris column, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only, and the average post-Paris for the United States is its contribution in 2016 only. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI authors' calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Figure 3 | **Bilateral Climate Finance by Country, Annual Averages Pre- and Post-Paris Agreement**



Notes: Post-Paris bar shading denotes the share of grants in climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the average post-Paris for the United States is its contribution in 2016 only.

Sources: WRI authors' calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

2.3 Multilateral Climate Finance Inflows to Institutions Other than MDBs

Sources

- Data from Table 7(a): Provision of Public Financial Support: Contribution through Multilateral Channels in Annex II Parties' CTFs submitted as part of their second (2013 and 2014), third (2015 and 2016), and fourth (2017 and 2018) BRs (UNFCCC 2016, 2018b, 2020)
- SCF 2016 (covering 2013 and 2014 data) and 2018 (covering 2015 and 2016 data) BA reports (SCF 2016, 2018)
- EU budget shares, 2013–18 (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019)
- Oxfam Climate Finance Shadow Report for grant shares of bilateral finance, 2016–18 (Carty et al. 2020)

Data gaps

- At the time of publication, the United States had not submitted its third or fourth BRs. For 2015–16, numbers reported in the 2018 BA are used, which were based on preliminary data provided by the United States (SCF 2018). At the time of writing, no U.S. data was available for 2017 and 2018 through the UNFCCC, so we did not include data on U.S. multilateral climate finance in those years. For the United States, the average for 2016–18 is its 2016 finance only, which may be an overestimate because U.S. multilateral climate finance contributions decreased in 2017 and 2018 (Thwaites 2018, 2019).

Adjustments

- For each country, we counted only the "climate-specific" contributions through multilateral channels, such as multilateral climate funds (such as the GCF, Adaptation Fund, or the Least Developed Countries Fund), regional development banks and specialized UN bodies. For the years 2013–16, where there was a discrepancy between the BRs and the BAs, we used corrected data from the BAs. This raw data is shown in Table 5.
- Because we calculated MDB finance separately (see Section 2.4 on MDBs below), for any country that included data in its BR on climate-specific contributions to the seven MDBs that receive contributions from Annex II countries and report to the OECD DAC,[4] we subtracted this from the multilateral total to avoid double counting. Table 7(b) includes the subheading "Multilateral financial institutions," which includes entries for the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), IFC, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, and "Other." We subtracted any climate-specific finance reported for these six entities, as well as climate-specific finance reported to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is not included as a predefined option in Table 7(b) but was included in the BRs by some countries. The "Other" category should include only regional development banks, trust funds connected to MDBs, and other multilateral financial institutions, however, some countries appeared to report contributions to the above MDBs under this subcategory (for example, contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) should be reported under "World Bank," but some countries reported them as "Other" multilateral contributions). Amounts reported as climate-specific contributions to the main MDBs are subtracted, but any contributions to specialized trust funds administered by the MDBs are left in because these are not included in MDB climate finance figures in the OECD CRS, which is the source used to calculate MDB climate finance outflows. Multilateral climate finance inflows after these adjustments are shown in Table 6 and Figure 4.
- To account for qualitative differences in climate finance provided, we also included a column in Table 6 showing the share of multilateral grant-based finance provided by each country in the 2016–18 period, based on data kindly provided by Oxfam, as used in their Climate Finance Shadow Report (Carty et al. 2020). We then shaded Figure 4's post-Paris bars by the proportion of grant-based finance provided (in quintiles, with those providing 81–100 percent grants shaded darkest, and those providing 0–20 percent grants shaded lightest). Because the United States had not reported for the years 2017 and 2018, its grant share was based on its 2016 data only.

Reporting errors and corrections

- Germany (second and third BRs) and Luxembourg (second BR) did not convert any of their contributions in their CTFs from euros to U.S. dollars, as required in the CTFs. We used converted data from the 2016 and 2018 BAs instead.
- France (third BR) and Italy (second BR) included different entries under the national currency and U.S. dollars portions of Table 7(a) rather than including the equivalent converted values. We used converted data from the 2016 and 2018 BAs instead.
- Because the "multilateral financial institutions" data is not broken out in the BA technical report, for the purposes of subtracting MDB contributions from overall multilateral finance, where France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg did not include conversions, OECD conversion rates for the corresponding years were used (OECD 2021b).
- Luxembourg reports both commitments and disbursements in the same year for the same multilateral institutions in its CTFs, which double counts the amounts. In some cases, Luxembourg reported the total amount committed to a multilateral channel in multiple years, which would also result

in double counting. These result in discrepancies of up to $80 million in a single year. These issues were not corrected in the BA, so we manually corrected this data.

- In its first and second BRs, the United States did not report any MDB climate-specific contributions, so no subtractions of MDB climate finance were necessary for calculating multilateral climate finance flows excluding MDBs. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted its third or fourth BRs. We therefore used provisional data provided by the United States to the UNFCCC for the 2018 BA for 2015 and 2016 (SCF 2018), and we assumed, in keeping with its previous reporting, that the United States also did not include climate-specific MDB contributions in this data.

Table 5 | **Raw Multilateral Climate Finance Inflows as Reported to the UNFCCC (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	TOTAL 2013-18
Australia	37.64	67.86	146.58	106.98	96.00	145.69	600.76
Austria	65.97	55.04	66.23	74.23	61.05	65.97	388.49
Belgium	46.41	75.04	8.01	59.32	26.82	19.69	235.29
Canada	8.38	2.20	2.94	142.69	60.88	47.05	264.15
Denmark	33.11	33.75	42.13	43.73	58.91	61.41	273.04
European Union	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,976.73	3,509.37	6,486.10
Finland	81.79	95.19	85.31	18.57	96.97	24.59	402.42
France	14.44	14.43	255.70	219.07	668.45	715.34	1,887.43
Germany	335.57	315.15	176.72	394.46	332.17	455.42	2,009.48
Greece	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.08	4.45	9.53
Iceland	6.56	7.18	0.64	0.43	2.55	2.56	19.92
Ireland	0.80	2.31	1.87	4.42	15.66	19.94	45.01
Italy	153.86	185.83	241.67	154.40	345.29	240.24	1,321.29
Japan	0.00	0.00	122.55	188.00	246.12	202.70	759.38
Luxembourg	6.73	12.45	58.69	96.78	80.10	83.32	338.07
Netherlands	95.49	135.62	243.44	256.13	152.18	239.04	1,121.90
New Zealand	0.00	0.00	2.53	0.54	0.00	1.11	4.18
Norway	243.51	440.87	185.43	132.57	0.00	0.00	1,002.38
Portugal	0.00	0.00	2.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.22
Spain	0.66	52.78	12.35	81.09	142.24	134.37	423.50
Sweden	70.63	19.61	59.81	119.34	180.79	184.80	634.98
Switzerland	97.15	97.08	131.17	136.32	131.99	112.10	705.79
United Kingdom	498.74	687.02	746.09	361.61	198.58	289.86	2,781.90
United States[a]	476.48	442.34	463.70	1,372.60	Not reported[a]	Not reported[a]	2,755.12[a]
Total	**2,273.91**	**2,741.75**	**3,055.77**	**3,963.29**	**5,878.56**	**6,559.04**	**24,472.33**

Notes: a. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only.

Source: SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020).

Table 6 | **Multilateral Climate Finance Inflows after the EU Allocation to Member States and Excluding MDBs (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

							TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013-18	2013-15	2016-18	2016-18
Australia	37.64	14.15	93.61	59.77	42.48	37.16	**284.82**	48.47	46.47	100%
Austria	11.95	1.53	27.76	36.52	17.87	4.81	**100.44**	13.75	19.73	77%
Belgium	46.41	75.04	8.01	59.32	26.82	19.69	**235.29**	43.15	35.28	100%
Canada	6.44	2.20	2.94	142.69	60.88	47.05	**262.21**	3.86	83.54	100%
Denmark	12.87	10.84	31.45	29.74	47.72	43.38	**176.00**	18.38	40.28	100%
Finland	37.63	68.16	60.09	6.02	6.87	10.97	**189.74**	55.29	7.95	45%
France	14.44	14.43	154.31	119.30	566.05	299.82	**1,168.35**	61.06	328.39	64%
Germany	335.57	309.84	176.72	394.46	332.17	455.42	**2,004.17**	274.04	394.01	100%
Greece	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.43	**0.74**	0.00	0.25	100%
Iceland	5.57	6.17	0.64	0.43	0.82	1.23	**14.86**	4.13	0.83	100%
Ireland	0.80	2.31	1.87	4.42	8.38	9.20	**26.99**	1.66	7.33	99%
Italy	30.46	61.95	146.19	95.45	249.30	131.11	**714.46**	79.53	158.62	100%
Japan	0.00	0.00	122.55	188.00	246.12	202.70	**759.38**	40.85	212.28	100%
Luxembourg	4.75	3.84	16.51	15.08	18.91	20.64	**79.72**	8.36	18.21	51%
Netherlands	54.18	41.35	54.62	94.58	86.06	83.31	**414.09**	50.05	87.98	100%
New Zealand	0.00	0.00	2.53	0.54	0.00	1.11	**4.18**	0.84	0.55	100%
Norway	153.37	175.41	154.84	79.79	0.00	0.00	**563.42**	161.21	26.60	100%
Portugal	0.00	0.00	2.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	**2.22**	0.74	0.00	N/A
Spain	0.66	52.78	5.99	8.73	26.88	60.50	**155.54**	19.81	32.04	74%
Sweden	70.63	19.61	59.81	119.34	115.02	107.67	**492.08**	50.02	114.01	100%
Switzerland	32.34	22.75	63.82	72.08	72.61	33.65	**297.26**	39.64	59.45	100%
United Kingdom	498.74	687.02	746.09	361.61	198.58	289.86	**2,781.90**	643.95	283.35	100%
United States[a]	476.48	442.34	463.70	1,372.60	x[a]	x[a]	**2,755.12**[a]	460.84	1,372.60[a]	56%[a]
Total Annex II countries	**1,830.92**	**2,011.72**	**2,396.27**	**3,260.47**	**2,123.86**	**1,859.72**	**13,482.97**	**2,079.64**	**2,414.69**	

Notes: For the average post-Paris column, increases compared to average pre-Paris are colored green, and decreases compared to average pre-Paris are colored red. For the share of grant finance post-Paris column, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between. Portugal did not report any multilateral finance in the period 2016–18, so grant share is not included.

a. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only and the average post-Paris for the United States is its contribution in 2016 only. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16); and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Figure 4 | **Multilateral Climate Finance Inflows (Excluding MDBs) by Country, Annual Average Pre- and Post-Paris Agreement**



Notes: Post-Paris bar shading denotes the share of grants in climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. The United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), so the average post-Paris for the United States is its contribution in 2016 only.

Sources: WRI authors, based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

2.4 MDB Outflows Attributed to Developed Country Contributors

Sources

- OECD DAC CRS multilateral climate finance outflows (OECD 2021a)
- Shareholder allocations from MDBs and subunits, detailed below (not all Annex II countries are shareholders in all MDBs; dashes in tables show nonshareholders)

Adjustments

- Counted MDB climate finance outflows from own resources reported to the OECD CRS for the seven MDBs that receive contributions from Annex II countries. Contributions from externally managed resources, such as multilateral climate funds that work through MDBs and MDB special trust funds and windows, are not included in this data set and are captured in BRs and as such, are counted as other multilateral climate finance inflows. This raw data is shown in Table 20.
- For each MDB, climate finance outflows are attributed to developed countries based on their percentage shareholding in each MDB, as a proxy for inflows (see Tables 7–19). This is a similar approach as used in Westphal et al. (2015). Where MDBs have units with different shareholder compositions (for example, the IDA, IBRD, and IFC in the World Bank Group), we attributed outflows back to contributors based on each unit's different shareholdings, where available. Since other countries, including developing countries, are also shareholders in MDBs, the sum of developed countries' shares does not equate to MDBs' total reported climate finance. This differs from the OECD's approach, which uses a more complex methodology developed by the Technical Working Group of 19 bilateral climate finance providers (OECD 2015, 2019, 2020; TWG 2015). This methodology accounts for the effect contributor country credit ratings have on MDBs' own credit ratings and therefore their ability to raise additional capital from bond markets. This accounting approach gives developed countries, which generally have stronger credit ratings, a greater attributed share of MDB outflows and has been controversial with developing countries. The underlying data sets used for such calculations are also not publicly available. For these reasons, we used the simpler shareholding approach to calculate developed countries' shares of MDB climate finance outflows. Specific details for each MDB's shareholding calculation are detailed below. MDB climate finance outflows allocated to countries according to this approach are shown in Table 21 and Figure 5.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

- Climate finance is allocated to individual developed countries based on the AfDB's subscribed capital shares and its African Development Fund (AfDF) subscribed capital shares (AfDB 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019).
- The AfDB holds around 0.4 percent of the subscribed capital shares in the AfDF. Due to this small shareholding, we did not allocate AfDB's shares in the AfDF back to shareholder countries.

Table 7 | **AfDB Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Belgium	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.65
Canada	3.84	3.82	3.82	3.88	3.88	3.88
Denmark	1.19	1.19	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.19
European Union	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49
France	3.78	3.78	3.76	3.77	3.77	3.80
Germany	4.13	4.15	4.13	4.15	4.16	4.18
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	2.44	2.44	2.43	2.43	2.44	2.45
Japan	5.53	5.53	5.50	5.51	5.52	5.55
Luxembourg	-	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Netherlands	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.89
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	1.17	1.17	1.16	1.18	1.18	1.19
Portugal	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Spain	1.09	1.09	1.08	1.07	1.07	1.07
Sweden	1.55	1.56	1.55	1.58	1.58	1.59
Switzerland	1.48	1.48	1.47	1.47	1.47	1.48
United Kingdom	1.69	1.69	1.75	1.76	1.77	1.82
United States	6.60	6.60	6.57	6.58	6.62	6.67
Total Annex II countries	**37.17**	**37.36**	**37.29**	**37.45**	**37.55**	**37.80**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: AfDB 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

Table 8 | **AfDB-AfDF Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	1.73	1.86	1.83	1.83	1.96	1.93
Belgium	1.96	2.05	2.01	2.01	2.00	1.97
Canada	6.93	6.85	6.73	6.73	6.66	6.56
Denmark	2.58	2.53	2.49	2.49	2.47	2.43
European Union	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Finland	1.99	2.15	2.11	2.11	2.07	2.04
France	10.01	10.11	9.93	9.93	9.94	9.98
Germany	10.06	10.30	10.12	10.12	10.49	10.32
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	6.53	6.46	6.35	6.35	6.39	6.29
Japan	10.86	10.57	10.38	10.38	10.16	10.23
Luxembourg	0.00	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.08
Netherlands	4.14	4.24	4.16	4.16	4.26	4.20
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	4.35	4.56	4.48	4.48	4.51	4.44
Portugal	0.63	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.63
Spain	2.46	2.14	2.27	2.27	2.04	2.06
Sweden	4.89	5.05	4.96	4.96	5.06	4.98
Switzerland	3.49	3.54	3.48	3.48	3.56	3.51
United Kingdom	8.79	9.98	9.81	9.81	10.35	10.16
United States	11.53	10.03	11.31	11.31	10.18	11.24
Total Annex II countries	**92.94**	**93.13**	**93.11**	**93.11**	**92.80**	**93.04**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: AfDB 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

- Climate finance is allocated to individual developed countries based on the ADB's subscribed capital shares (ADB 2014a, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a) and the its Asian Development Fund (ADF) effective amounts (ADB 2014b, 2015b, 2016b, 2017b, 2018b, 2019b).

Table 9 | **ADB Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	5.81	5.81	5.79	5.79	5.79	5.77
Austria	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Belgium	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Canada	5.25	5.25	5.24	5.23	5.23	5.22
Denmark	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Finland	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
France	2.34	2.34	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.32
Germany	4.34	4.35	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.32
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Italy	1.82	1.82	1.81	1.81	1.81	1.80
Japan	15.67	15.68	15.62	15.61	15.61	15.57
Luxembourg	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Netherlands	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.02
New Zealand	1.54	1.54	1.54	1.54	1.54	1.53
Norway	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Portugal	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.34
Spain	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Sweden	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Switzerland	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
United Kingdom	2.05	2.05	2.05	2.04	2.04	2.04
United States	15.56	15.57	15.51	15.61	15.61	15.57
Total Annex II countries	**59.19**	**59.21**	**59.01**	**59.05**	**59.05**	**59.15**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: ADB 2014a, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a..

Table 10 | **ADB-ADF Effective Amounts, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	7.67	7.65	7.57	7.54	7.94	7.90
Austria	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
Belgium	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.73	0.72
Canada	6.25	6.24	6.17	6.15	6.05	6.02
Denmark	0.74	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.76	0.78
European Union	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.59
France	4.37	4.36	4.31	4.30	4.19	4.17
Germany	5.97	5.96	5.89	5.87	5.75	5.72
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.32	0.32
Italy	3.69	3.69	3.65	3.63	3.55	3.53
Japan	38.32	38.25	37.85	37.70	38.33	38.15
Luxembourg	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18
Netherlands	2.44	2.43	2.41	2.40	2.30	2.29
New Zealand	0.56	0.56	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.55
Norway	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92
Portugal	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.27
Spain	1.33	1.32	1.31	1.69	1.41	1.41
Sweden	1.51	1.50	1.49	1.48	1.46	1.45
Switzerland	1.22	1.22	1.21	1.20	1.20	1.20
United Kingdom	4.99	4.98	4.93	4.91	5.03	5.01
United States	13.43	13.41	14.31	14.26	13.45	13.84
Total Annex II countries	**96.42**	**96.33**	**96.37**	**96.39**	**95.85**	**95.90**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: ADB 2014a, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a..

ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK

- Climate finance is allocated to individual developed countries based on the AIIB's subscribed capital shares (AIIB 2021).

Table 11 | **AIIB Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countris (Percent)**

	SINCE 2016
Australia	3.81
Austria	0.52
Belgium	0.29
Canada	1.03
Denmark	0.38
Finland	0.32
France	3.49
Germany	4.63
Greece	0.01
Iceland	0.02
Ireland	0.14
Italy	2.66
Japan	-
Luxembourg	0.07
Netherlands	1.07
New Zealand	0.48
Norway	0.57
Portugal	0.07
Spain	1.82
Sweden	0.65
Switzerland	0.73
United Kingdom	3.16
United States	-
Total Annex II countries	**25.91**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: AIIB 2021.

EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

- Climate finance is allocated to individual developed countries based on the EBRD's subscribed capital shares (EBRD n.d.).
- The European Union and the EIB are shareholders of the EBRD. To avoid double counting, we did not allocate EBRD climate finance shares back to the European Union and the EIB because they report themselves on these climate-specific contributions.

Table 12 | **EBRD Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	SINCE JULY 2013
Australia	1.01
Austria	2.30
Belgium	2.30
Canada	3.43
Denmark	1.21
Finland	1.26
France	8.60
Germany	8.60
Greece	0.66
Iceland	0.10
Ireland	0.30
Italy	8.60
Japan	8.60
Luxembourg	0.20
Netherlands	2.50
New Zealand	0.04
Norway	1.26
Portugal	1.29
Spain	3.43
Sweden	2.30
Switzerland	2.30
United Kingdom	8.60
United States	10.09
Total Annex II countries	**78.99**

Sources: EBRD n.d.

- Climate finance is allocated to individual developed countries based on the EIB's subscribed capital shares (EIB 2019).

Table 13 | **EIB Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013–18
Australia	-
Austria	2.22
Belgium	4.47
Canada	-
Denmark	2.26
Finland	1.27
France	16.11
Germany	16.11
Greece	1.21
Iceland	-
Ireland	0.57
Italy	16.11
Japan	-
Luxembourg	0.11
Netherlands	4.47
New Zealand	-
Norway	-
Portugal	0.78
Spain	9.67
Sweden	2.96
Switzerland	-
United Kingdom	16.11
United States	-
Total Annex II countries[a]	**94.43**

Notes: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.
a. The remaining share is from EU member states that are Annex I but not Annex II Parties: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Source: EIB 2019.

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP (IDBG)

- Climate finance is allocated to individual developed countries based on subscribed capital shares for the IDB (IDB 2014a, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2018, 2019) and its Fund for Special Operations (FSO) (IDB 2014b, 2015b, 2016b, 2017b), Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017), and IDB Invest (2018, 2019).

Table 14 | **IDB Ordinary Capital Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Belgium	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
Canada	6.29	4.93	4.00	4.00	3.97	3.97
European Union	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Finland	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
France	1.85	1.88	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90
Germany	1.85	1.88	1.90	1.90	1.91	1.91
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	1.85	1.88	1.96	1.97	1.97	1.97
Japan	4.89	4.96	5.00	5.00	5.02	5.02
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0.26	0.24	0.22	0.20	0.20	0.20
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Portugal	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Spain	1.85	1.93	1.96	1.97	1.97	1.97
Sweden	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
Switzerland	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.48
United Kingdom	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.99	0.99
United States	29.35	29.75	30.02	30.02	30.69	30.69
Total Annex II countries	**50.94**	**50.21**	**49.75**	**49.75**	**50.47**	**50.47**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: ADB 2014a, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a, 2019a..

Table 15 | **IDB FSO Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016
Australia	-	-	-	-
Austria	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
Belgium	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
Canada	3.21	3.22	3.23	3.23
Denmark	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
European Union	-	-	-	-
Finland	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
France	2.27	2.27	2.27	2.27
Germany	2.36	2.36	2.36	2.36
Greece	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-
Italy	2.22	2.22	2.22	2.22
Japan	6.09	6.09	6.09	6.09
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
New Zealand	-	-	-	-
Norway	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
Portugal	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Spain	2.21	2.21	2.21	2.21
Sweden	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Switzerland	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
United Kingdom	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
United States	49.57	49.57	49.57	49.56
Total Annex II countries	**72.48**	**72.49**	**72.49**	**72.49**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders..

Sources: IDB 2014b, 2015b, 2016b, 2017b.

Table 16 | **IIC and IDB Invest Subscribed Capital Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	0.49	0.49	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58
Belgium	0.24	0.24	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.12
Canada	0.00	0.21	0.26	2.70	2.70	2.73
Denmark	1.52	1.52	0.85	0.71	0.71	0.70
European Union	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	0.56	0.56	0.67	0.68	0.68	0.66
France	3.07	3.06	2.29	1.90	1.90	1.90
Germany	1.89	1.89	1.06	0.88	0.88	0.90
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	3.07	3.06	3.68	3.05	3.05	3.03
Japan	3.54	3.53	3.73	3.27	3.27	3.31
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	1.52	1.52	0.85	0.71	0.71	0.70
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	0.56	0.56	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.66
Portugal	0.26	0.26	0.31	0.26	0.26	0.25
Spain	3.54	3.53	4.25	4.60	4.60	4.55
Sweden	0.56	0.56	0.67	0.63	0.63	0.62
Switzerland	1.52	1.52	1.83	1.51	1.51	1.49
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-
United States	22.74	22.69	12.78	10.59	10.59	10.98
Total Annex II countries	**45.07**	**45.19**	**34.63**	**32.86**	**32.86**	**33.18**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholde

Sources: IIC 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; IDB Invest 2018, 2019.

WORLD BANK GROUP (WBG)

- The World Bank Group comprises four institutions that provide climate finance: the IBRD, IDA, IFC, and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). MIGA only provides guarantees, and the OECD CRS records MIGA's climate finance data under private mobilized finance, which is beyond the scope of this report. WBG institutions all have separate capital shareholder profiles. For each year, we used shareholder data from June (IBRD 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018; IDA 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018; IFC 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018).

Table 17 | **IBRD Subscribed Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	1.49	1.50	1.44	1.45	1.42	1.39
Austria	0.68	0.69	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.64
Belgium	1.75	1.68	1.71	1.70	1.68	1.64
Canada	3.15	3.02	2.78	2.67	2.62	2.56
Denmark	0.96	0.92	0.85	0.82	0.80	0.78
Finland	0.53	0.54	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.50
France	4.22	4.26	4.13	4.14	4.06	3.97
Germany	4.73	4.79	4.61	4.42	4.33	4.24
Greece	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.15
Iceland	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08
Ireland	0.28	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.34
Italy	2.54	2.64	2.59	2.65	2.84	2.78
Japan	8.94	8.57	7.89	7.58	7.42	7.26
Luxembourg	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.10
Netherlands	2.14	2.16	1.99	2.10	2.06	2.01
New Zealand	0.39	0.37	0.47	0.45	0.44	0.43
Norway	0.66	0.67	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.59
Portugal	0.30	0.28	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.33
Spain	1.71	2.19	2.11	2.02	1.98	1.94
Sweden	0.92	0.93	0.91	0.90	0.89	0.87
Switzerland	1.66	1.69	0.65	1.59	1.55	1.52
United Kingdom	4.22	4.26	4.13	4.14	4.06	3.97
United States	16.05	15.87	17.07	17.58	17.25	16.88
Total Annex II countries	**57.57**	**57.61**	**55.95**	**56.85**	**56.05**	**54.97**

Sources: IIC 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; IDB Invest 2018, 2019.

Table 18 | **IDA Subscribed Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	1.82	1.81	1.85	1.84	1.84	1.89
Austria	1.11	1.11	1.19	1.26	1.26	1.35
Belgium	1.81	1.80	1.83	1.82	1.82	1.84
Canada	4.56	4.51	4.57	4.51	4.51	4.55
Denmark	1.51	1.52	1.47	1.47	1.47	1.48
Finland	0.74	0.74	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.78
France	7.09	7.08	7.06	7.03	7.03	7.08
Germany	10.73	10.72	10.47	10.42	10.42	10.24
Greece	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Iceland	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
Ireland	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.30
Italy	4.26	4.28	3.78	3.77	3.77	3.96
Japan	18.23	18.05	17.64	17.95	17.95	17.43
Luxembourg	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.15
Netherlands	3.66	3.67	3.58	3.56	3.56	3.63
New Zealand	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Norway	1.62	1.61	1.59	1.57	1.57	1.62
Portugal	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12
Spain	1.41	1.41	1.26	1.74	1.74	1.73
Sweden	3.33	3.31	3.27	3.24	3.24	3.30
Switzerland	1.76	1.75	2.07	2.05	2.05	2.15
United Kingdom	11.14	11.49	12.23	11.61	11.61	11.98
United States	20.75	20.61	20.60	20.54	20.54	19.81
Total Annex II countries	**96.29**	**96.27**	**96.01**	**95.96**	**95.96**	**95.65**

Sources: IDA 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018.

Table 19 | **IFC Subscribed Shares, Annex II Countries (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Australia	1.97	1.89	1.84	1.84	1.84	1.84
Austria	0.82	0.79	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Belgium	2.11	2.02	1.97	1.97	1.97	1.97
Canada	3.38	3.25	3.17	3.17	3.17	3.17
Denmark	0.77	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72
Finland	0.65	0.63	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61
France	5.04	4.84	4.72	4.72	4.72	4.72
Germany	5.36	5.15	5.02	5.02	5.02	5.02
Greece	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Italy	3.38	3.25	3.17	3.17	3.17	3.17
Japan	5.87	6.49	6.33	6.33	6.33	6.33
Luxembourg	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Netherlands	2.34	2.24	2.19	2.19	2.19	2.19
New Zealand	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Norway	0.73	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
Portugal	0.35	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32
Spain	1.54	1.48	1.44	1.44	1.44	1.44
Sweden	1.12	1.07	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05
Switzerland	1.83	1.76	1.72	1.72	1.72	1.72
United Kingdom	5.04	4.84	4.72	4.72	4.72	4.72
United States	23.69	22.75	22.19	22.19	22.19	22.19
Total Annex II countries	**66.57**	**64.78**	**63.18**	**63.18**	**63.18**	**63.18**

Note: Dashes denote where countries were not shareholders.

Sources: IFC 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018.

Table 20 | **MDB Climate Finance Outflows as Reported in the OECD DAC CRS (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

MDB	MDB UNIT (IF APPLICABLE)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	TOTAL
AfDB	African Development Fund	729.81	710.94	383.93	199.94	544.88	422.16	2,991.66
	African Development Bank	243.20	825.40	459.82	731.07	727.88	859.78	3,847.16
ADB	Asian Development Bank Concessional	938.44	702.52	329.83	296.46	550.81	868.35	3,686.42
	Asian Development Bank Ordinary Capital Resources	1,780.43	1,419.15	1,564.02	1,847.41	4,010.00	3,619.66	14,240.66
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank	N/A	N/A	N/A	362.70	1,232.60	951.03	2,546.33
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	1,698.34	2,727.52	2,491.05	2,506.56	3,415.15	2,925.96	15,764.57
EIB	European Investment Bank	2,715.77	2,784.20	2,219.04	2,153.84	2,903.20	3,405.01	16,181.06
	Fund for Special Operations	27.22	65.68	191.44	383.63	N/A	N/A	667.97
	Inter-American Investment Corporation and Multilateral Investment Fund	1,094.68	1,944.81	1,649.46	1,319.78	N/A	N/A	6,008.73
IDBG	Inter-American Development Bank	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2,968.89	3,283.01	6,251.90
	IDB Invest	N/A	N/A	N/A	725.08	823.73	571.06	2,119.87
WBG	International Finance Corporation	1,657.94	1,892.69	1,763.42	2,425.12	3,492.92	Not reported	11,232.08
	International Development Association	2,251.23	4,544.32	2,558.11	2,948.88	5,362.06	6,696.05	24,360.65
	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2,692.77	4,346.92	4,307.72	4,898.61	5,182.01	6,908.22	28,336.25

Note: MDB = multilateral development bank; WBG = World Bank Group.

Sources: OECD 2021a.

Table 21 | **MDB Climate Finance Outflows Allocated to Countries (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

							TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013–18	2013–15	2016–18
Australia	306.27	347.02	282.60	338.17	593.49	565.95	**2,433.49**	311.96	499.20
Austria	185.99	251.06	199.88	219.04	320.23	322.93	**1,499.13**	212.31	287.40
Belgium	316.13	417.30	336.43	363.82	509.40	502.83	**2,445.92**	356.62	458.68
Canada	583.67	788.02	596.01	672.08	1,066.31	1,040.35	**4,746.45**	655.90	926.25
Denmark	191.19	260.62	193.45	211.82	307.79	317.95	**1,482.83**	215.09	279.19
Finland	126.79	170.37	133.57	147.12	215.76	209.56	**1,003.18**	143.58	190.81
France	1,126.07	1,486.45	1,155.00	1,250.38	1,826.81	1,849.92	**8,694.63**	1,255.84	1,642.37
Germany	1,279.06	1,725.10	1,307.30	1,413.22	2,133.39	2,176.22	**10,034.29**	1,437.15	1,907.61
Greece	53.31	65.04	53.45	55.36	75.51	76.18	**378.84**	57.26	69.01
Iceland	4.19	7.00	6.25	7.00	9.59	11.02	**45.04**	5.81	9.20
Ireland	44.13	58.92	49.03	53.91	79.31	88.47	**373.76**	50.69	73.89
Italy	945.31	1,209.44	948.27	1,021.21	1,482.29	1,508.02	**7,114.54**	1,034.34	1,337.17
Japan	1,680.92	2,262.64	1,645.38	1,843.97	2,970.47	3,089.61	**13,492.98**	1,862.98	2,634.68
Luxembourg	20.85	28.02	22.18	26.84	42.66	43.10	**183.65**	23.69	37.53
Netherlands	419.16	569.64	425.63	473.89	698.01	710.13	**3,296.45**	471.48	627.34
New Zealand	49.48	52.11	53.06	62.26	106.98	105.07	**428.95**	51.55	91.43
Norway	138.92	206.57	144.70	161.05	251.98	250.14	**1,153.36**	163.40	221.05
Portugal	70.48	92.71	76.62	81.64	113.83	118.43	**553.71**	79.94	104.63
Spain	484.26	627.42	508.45	577.53	803.23	830.22	**3,831.11**	540.04	737.00
Sweden	301.01	426.91	306.97	331.39	504.61	529.11	**2,400.00**	344.96	455.04
Switzerland	210.01	312.87	210.84	292.06	424.51	406.39	**1,856.68**	244.57	374.32
United Kingdom	1,193.77	1,650.61	1,258.82	1,337.77	2,006.01	2,114.90	**9,561.88**	1,367.73	1,819.56
United States	2,301.52	3,384.43	2,858.67	3,322.45	4,916.92	4,646.95	**21,430.94**	2,848.21	4,295.44
Total Annex II countries	**12,032.50**	**16,400.27**	**12,772.56**	**14,263.96**	**21,459.07**	**21,513.45**	**98,441.82**	**13,735.11**	**19,078.83**

Note: For the average post-Paris column, increases compared to average pre-Paris are colored green.

Source: *WRI calculations based on OECD (2021a) and MDB shareholder data.*

Figure 5 | **MDB Climate Finance by Country Share, Annual Averages Pre- and Post-Paris Agreement**



Source: WRI authors based on OECD (2021a) and MDB shareholder data.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1 Total Public Climate Finance

After performing the adjustments outlined in Section 2, it is then possible to analyze the breakdown of public climate finance provided by each country each year for the period 2013–18. We presented two ways of looking at the data:

- Perspective 1: Climate-specific finance inflows, which include bilateral climate finance and climate-specific contributions to multilateral entities (A + B in Figure 6). This aims to capture each country's direct climate-specific contributions from their national budgets. This is what many governments count in the scope of national climate finance pledges. It does not include core funding provided to MDBs, of which a portion is ultimately used for climate-specific activities.
- Perspective 2: Total attributed climate finance, which includes bilateral climate finance, climate-specific contributions to multilateral entities, and the attributed shares of MDB climate finance outflows (A + B + C in Figure 6). This aims to capture how much climate finance each country could ultimately claim credit for towards the $100 billion goal. It does not capture the full climate finance outflows from

non-MDB multilateral entities because complete data for all entities was not available. Instead, we used only inflows to these entities (as with Perspective 1 above), which is an imperfect approach because some multilateral entities can provide more funding as outflows than they receive as inflows (for example, when they make loans from grant-based contributions). In addition, many, if not most, multilateral institutions do not spend the money they receive from governments in the same year as they receive it, so there is a temporal mismatch. Looking at amounts for multiyear periods can help address the latter to some extent.

Below, we show the annual amounts, totals, and averages for the three years before (2013–15) and after (2016–18) the Paris Agreement was finalized at the end of 2015. We present data for both the climate-specific finance inflows perspective (Table 22 and Figure 7) and total attributed climate finance perspective (Table 23 and Figure 8). This provides a snapshot of the public climate finance each developed country has provided, with the pre- and post-Paris averages smoothing out any anomalously high or low years and enabling an assessment of whether each country's climate finance has risen since the Paris Agreement was finalized.

At the time of writing, the United States had still not submitted its third and fourth BRs, and although it supplied data on 2015 and 2016 climate finance to the UNFCCC for the third BA, no reporting was available for 2017 and 2018. Therefore, the U.S. average climate finance for 2016–18 for the inflows perspective is its 2016 finance only. For U.S. average climate finance for 2016–18 for the total attributed climate finance perspective, it is its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. Using only the 2016 bilateral and multilateral inflows climate finance for its 2016–18 averages may be an overestimate because U.S. bilateral and multilateral fund contributions are likely to have decreased in 2017 and 2018 (Thwaites 2018, 2019).

To account for qualitative differences in climate finance provided, we also included a column in Table 22 and Table 23 showing the share of bilateral and multilateral grant-based finance for the 2016–18 period, based on data kindly provided by Oxfam and used in its Climate Finance Shadow Report (Carty et al. 2020). We also shaded Figure 7 by the proportion of grant-based finance provided (in quintiles, with those providing 81–100 percent grants shaded darkest, and those providing 0–20 percent grants shaded lightest). Table 24 and Figure 9 show annual averages post-Paris for each country broken down by the three funding channels, with the bilateral and multilateral portions of the columns also shaded according to their quintile share of grant finance.

Figure 6 | **Perspectives for Analyzing Climate Finance Flows**



Note: MDB = multilateral development bank.

Source: Based on OECD (2018b), adapted by WRI.

Table 22 | **Climate-Specific Finance Inflows from Annex II Countries: Bilateral and Multilateral Inflows (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

							TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013–18	2013–15	2016–18	2016–18
Australia	236.35	88.38	183.72	159.98	162.69	154.59	**985.71**	169.48	159.09	100%
Austria	165.50	154.53	184.45	250.24	220.40	305.77	**1,280.89**	168.16	258.80	40%
Belgium	145.89	156.01	104.32	220.35	216.94	192.34	**1,035.86**	135.41	209.88	99%
Canada	65.46	70.32	41.54	189.38	277.63	444.91	**1,089.25**	59.11	303.98	55%
Denmark	216.37	237.87	199.13	232.48	257.24	281.18	**1,424.26**	217.79	256.96	99%
Finland	100.25	140.56	128.05	89.40	98.57	94.60	**651.44**	122.95	94.19	47%
France	3,208.45	3,822.31	3,384.81	4,145.92	5,373.93	6,118.58	**26,054.00**	3,471.85	5,212.81	10%
Germany	2,816.97	3,005.56	8,314.30	9,806.01	8,005.98	8,137.28	**40,086.10**	4,712.28	8,649.76	39%
Greece	17.97	14.36	17.07	42.54	41.77	38.01	**171.72**	16.47	40.78	100%
Iceland	6.44	9.89	10.88	11.23	15.03	18.20	**71.67**	9.07	14.82	100%
Ireland	60.73	55.50	61.77	106.62	130.53	139.92	**555.07**	59.33	125.69	100%
Italy	254.64	206.23	545.23	630.53	1,017.29	815.93	**3,469.85**	335.37	821.25	79%
Japan[a]	8,072.52	8,211.65	8,960.92	10,885.52	9,800.41	11,024.86	**56,955.88**	8,415.03	10,570.26	14%
Luxembourg	38.32	47.59	52.45	71.15	59.88	75.93	**345.31**	46.12	68.99	67%
Netherlands	387.82	477.50	461.32	420.84	513.59	623.75	**2,884.82**	442.22	519.39	100%
New Zealand	34.98	59.45	42.80	35.15	27.86	44.13	**244.37**	45.74	35.71	100%
Norway	1,179.50	701.76	509.34	370.30	469.00	833.54	**4,063.46**	796.87	557.62	77%
Portugal	37.86	24.79	28.76	47.51	47.00	45.78	**231.69**	30.47	46.76	100%
Spain	444.25	653.84	628.68	827.65	770.52	998.83	**4,323.76**	575.59	865.66	38%
Sweden	379.76	332.80	414.14	517.62	580.95	692.06	**2,917.34**	375.57	596.88	100%
Switzerland	216.36	224.68	237.05	274.40	287.21	261.88	**1,501.58**	226.03	274.50	98%
United Kingdom	1,365.54	1,547.95	2,173.95	1,778.88	1,514.72	1,902.68	**10,283.72**	1,695.81	1,732.09	93%
United States[b]	2,696.47	2,770.93	2,966.69	3,270.20	x[b]	x[b]	**11,704.29**[b]	2,811.36	3,270.20[b]	43%[b]
Total Annex II countries	**22,148.40**	**23,014.47**	**29,651.39**	**34,383.91**	**29,889.15**	**33,244.73**	**172,332.04**	**24,938.08**	**32,505.93**	

Notes: For the average post-Paris column, increases compared to average pre-Paris are colored green, and decreases compared to average pre-Paris are colored red. For the share of grant finance post-Paris column, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only, and the average post-Paris and share of grant finance for the United States includes only its contributions in 2016. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Table 23 | **Total Attributed Climate Finance from Annex II Countries, All Channels: Bilateral and Multilateral Inflows and MDB Outflows (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

							TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INFLOWS, POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013–18	2013–15	2016–18	2016–18
Australia	542.62	435.40	466.32	498.15	756.18	720.54	**3,419.20**	481.44	658.29	100%
Austria	351.49	405.59	384.34	469.28	540.63	628.69	**2,780.02**	380.47	546.20	40%
Belgium	462.03	573.31	440.75	584.17	726.35	695.17	**3,481.77**	492.03	668.56	99%
Canada	649.13	858.33	637.56	861.46	1,343.95	1,485.26	**5,835.70**	715.01	1,230.23	55%
Denmark	407.56	498.50	392.58	444.29	565.03	599.13	**2,907.09**	432.88	536.15	99%
Finland	227.05	310.94	261.62	236.52	314.33	304.16	**1,654.62**	266.53	285.00	47%
France	4,334.51	5,308.75	4,539.81	5,396.31	7,200.75	7,968.50	**34,748.63**	4,727.69	6,855.18	10%
Germany	4,096.03	4,730.66	9,621.60	11,219.23	10,139.37	10,313.49	**50,120.39**	6,149.43	10,557.37	39%
Greece	71.27	79.40	70.51	97.90	117.28	114.19	**550.56**	73.73	109.79	100%
Iceland	10.63	16.89	17.13	18.23	24.62	29.22	**116.71**	14.88	24.02	100%
Ireland	104.86	114.42	110.80	160.52	209.84	228.39	**928.83**	110.03	199.58	100%
Italy	1,199.95	1,415.67	1,493.50	1,651.74	2,499.58	2,323.95	**10,584.40**	1,369.71	2,158.42	79%
Japan[a]	9,753.44	10,474.29	10,606.30	12,729.49	12,770.87	14,114.47	**70,448.86**	10,278.01	13,204.95	14%
Luxembourg	59.17	75.61	74.63	97.99	102.54	119.03	**528.96**	69.80	106.52	67%
Netherlands	806.98	1,047.14	886.95	894.73	1,211.60	1,333.88	**6,181.28**	913.69	1,146.73	100%
New Zealand	84.46	111.56	95.86	97.41	134.84	149.20	**673.32**	97.29	127.15	100%
Norway	1,318.42	908.34	654.05	531.35	720.98	1,083.68	**5,216.81**	960.27	778.67	77%
Portugal	108.34	117.50	105.38	129.15	160.83	164.21	**785.40**	110.40	151.40	100%
Spain	928.51	1,281.25	1,137.13	1,405.18	1,573.75	1,829.05	**8,154.87**	1,115.63	1,602.66	38%
Sweden	680.76	759.71	721.12	849.01	1,085.56	1,221.17	**5,317.34**	720.53	1,051.91	100%
Switzerland	426.37	537.55	447.89	566.46	711.72	668.27	**3,358.26**	470.60	648.82	98%
United Kingdom	2,559.31	3,198.56	3,432.77	3,116.65	3,520.73	4,017.58	**19,845.60**	3,063.55	3,551.65	93%
United States[b]	4,997.99	6,155.36	5,825.36	6,592.65	4,916.92[b]	4,646.95[b]	**33,135.23**[b]	5,659.57	7,565.64[b]	43%[b]
Total Annex II countries	**34,180.90**	**39,414.73**	**42,423.94**	**48,647.87**	**51,348.23**	**54,758.18**	**270,773.86**	**38,673.19**	**51,584.76**	

Notes: For the average post-Paris column, increases compared to average pre-Paris are colored green, and decreases compared to average pre-Paris are colored red. For the share of grant finance post-Paris column, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between.

a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only, and the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Source: WRI calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (n.d.), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Figure 7 | Climate-Specific Finance Inflows by Country: Bilateral and Multilateral Inflows



Notes: Post-Paris bar shading denotes the share of grants in climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Figure 8 | **Total Attributed Climate Finance by Country: Bilateral and Multilateral Inflows and MDB Outflows**



Notes: Post-Paris bar shading denotes the share of grants in climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan includes coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Table 24 | Climate Finance by Country and Channel, Annual Averages Post-Paris Agreement, 2016–18 (U.S. Dollars, Millions)

	ANNUAL AVERAGE BILATERAL CLIMATE FINANCE	ANNUAL AVERAGE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS	ANNUAL AVERAGE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS	ANNUAL AVERAGE CLIMATE FINANCE ALL CHANNELS (2016-18)	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE, BILATERAL	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE, MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS
Australia	112.61	46.47	499.20	**658.29**	99%	100%
Austria	239.07	19.73	287.40	**546.20**	25%	77%
Belgium	174.60	35.28	458.68	**668.56**	98%	100%
Canada	220.43	83.54	926.25	**1,230.23**	38%	100%
Denmark	216.68	40.28	279.19	**536.15**	98%	100%
Finland	86.24	7.95	190.81	**285.00**	49%	45%
France	4,884.42	328.39	1,642.37	**6,855.18**	3%	64%
Germany	8,255.74	394.01	1,907.61	**10,557.37**	36%	100%
Greece	40.53	0.25	69.01	**109.79**	100%	100%
Iceland	13.99	0.83	9.20	**24.02**	100%	100%
Ireland	118.35	7.33	73.89	**199.58**	100%	99%
Italy	662.63	158.62	1,337.17	**2,158.42**	63%	100%
Japan[a]	10,357.99	212.28	2,634.68	**13,204.95**	12%	100%
Luxembourg	50.78	18.21	37.53	**106.52**	100%	51%
Netherlands	431.41	87.98	627.34	**1,146.73**	100%	100%
New Zealand	35.16	0.55	91.43	**127.15**	100%	100%
Norway	531.02	26.60	221.05	**778.67**	75%	100%
Portugal	46.76	0.00	104.63	**151.40**	100%	N/A
Spain	833.63	32.04	737.00	**1,602.66**	26%	74%
Sweden	482.87	114.01	455.04	**1,051.91**	100%	100%
Switzerland	215.05	59.45	374.32	**648.82**	98%	100%
United Kingdom	1,448.74	283.35	1,819.56	**3,551.65**	91%	100%
United States[b]	1,897.60[b]	1,372.60[b]	4,295.44	**7,565.64**[b]	34%[b]	56%[b]
Total Annex II countries	**30,091.25**	**2,414.69**	**19,078.83**	**51,584.76**		

Notes: For the bilateral, multilateral, MDB, and total columns, increases compared to average pre-Paris are colored green, and decreases compared to average pre-Paris are colored red. For the share of grant finance post-Paris columns, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between. Portugal did not report any multilateral finance in the period 2016–18, so grant share is not included.

a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the total for the United States is for 2013–16 only. the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF third Biennial Assessment (2016) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Figure 9 | **Climate Finance by Country and Channel, Annual Averages Post-Paris Agreement (2016–18)**



Notes: Bilateral and multilateral bar shading denotes the share of grants in climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF third Biennial Assessment (2016) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

3.2 Thematic Breakdown (Adaptation, Mitigation, Crosscutting, and Other)

The Paris Agreement includes the goal that "the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation" (UNFCCC 2015, Article 9.4). Using the above data sources, we provided a breakdown of how climate finance was distributed between mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, and "other" for the climate-specific inflows perspective (bilateral and multilateral climate-specific inflows).

Sources

- Data from Table 7 in Annex II Parties' CTFs submitted as part of their second (2013 and 2014), third (2015 and 2016), and fourth (2017 and 2018) BRs (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020)

Data gaps

- At the time of publication, the United States had not submitted its third or fourth BRs. For 2015–16, numbers reported in the third BA are used, which was based on preliminary data provided by the United States (SCF 2018). The United States did not provide a breakdown of its multilateral climate finance in the preliminary data provided for the third BA, so we were also unable to include a thematic breakdown of multilateral climate finance in 2015 and 2016. At the time of writing, there were no sources of U.S. data through the UNFCCC available for 2017 and 2018, so we did not include data on U.S. bilateral climate finance in those years.

Adjustments

- Bilateral climate finance: Table 7 of the BR CTFs breaks down the bilateral climate finance in these categories: mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, and other. These numbers were transcribed for each country. Crosscutting refers to finance that targets both mitigation and adaptation objectives. The "other" category has been used in a variety of ways by different countries. Some countries used this to report finance for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+), though for 2017 and 2018 almost all countries stopped using the category, likely in response to criticisms about the lack of transparency, instead allocating such finance to one of the other three categories.
- Climate finance from the European Union is also allocated to its member states, using the budget share methodology outlined in the bilateral section above.
- Multilateral climate funds: Table 7 of the BR CTFs breaks down the multilateral climate finance in the categories: mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, and other. These numbers were transcribed for each country. Because these tables include climate finance to MDBs, and since MDB climate finance is addressed separately, any climate-specific general finance to MDBs reported in Table 7(a): Provision of Public Financial Support: Contribution through Multilateral Channels is then subtracted from the multilateral climate finance for each thematic area (mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, and other).
- During the review process, representatives from Australia notified us that the thematic breakdowns for 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 in their CTFs were inaccurate and that their full BR had more updated figures, so we used those (totals for climate finance remain unchanged).
- The thematic breakdown of climate finance inflows after these adjustments is shown in Table 25 and Figure 10.

Table 25 | Thematic Breakdown of Climate-Specific Finance Inflows by Country (Percent)

	2013				2014				2015				2016				2017				2018				TOTAL 2016–18			
Thematic Area	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**	**M**	**A**	**C**	**O**
Australia	21	27	51	0	0	46	54	0	7	44	49	0	5	29	66	0	15	52	34	0	13	65	22	0	10	46	44	0
Austria	67	9	24	0	65	10	26	0	66	11	23	0	45	14	41	0	44	22	35	0	62	21	17	0	51	19	30	0
Belgium	26	43	20	11	12	33	54	0	29	45	26	0	21	48	31	0	21	50	29	0	14	56	30	0	19	51	30	0
Canada	5	84	11	0	4	90	6	0	4	87	9	0	5	24	71	0	8	30	62	0	38	14	47	0	22	21	57	0
Denmark	25	11	65	0	26	10	64	0	23	13	61	3	25	26	48	0	29	29	41	0	38	27	35	0	31	28	41	0
Finland	22	21	56	0	31	26	43	0	23	17	60	0	33	34	33	0	25	32	42	0	24	23	53	0	27	29	43	0
France	74	18	8	0	79	11	11	0	57	25	18	0	65	15	19	0	68	19	13	0	49	23	28	0	60	20	20	0
Germany	35	33	12	20	29	37	13	21	56	8	5	31	62	18	12	8	61	21	19	0	54	22	25	0	59	20	18	3
Greece	30	33	37	0	29	28	44	0	34	36	30	0	32	44	24	0	25	43	32	0	21	37	42	0	26	42	32	0
Iceland	1	11	87	0	6	18	77	0	19	57	24	0	34	53	13	0	23	51	26	0	21	56	23	0	25	53	22	0
Ireland	13	58	29	0	9	59	31	1	16	56	28	0	16	61	21	2	12	46	42	0	10	24	67	0	12	42	45	1
Italy	24	28	47	0	24	16	60	0	23	22	55	0	25	38	37	0	14	26	61	0	17	30	53	0	18	30	52	0
Japan[a]	78	20	2	0	89	9	1	0	84	12	4	0	91	5	4	0	86	8	7	0	84	12	4	0	87	8	5	0
Luxembourg	11	43	46	0	22	23	55	0	17	28	55	0	21	25	54	0	20	32	48	0	18	38	44	0	19	32	49	0
Netherlands	29	16	55	0	26	40	34	0	15	40	44	0	13	48	39	0	15	45	39	0	17	42	41	0	15	44	40	0
New Zealand	30	32	4	34	61	17	2	20	47	41	12	0	54	33	13	0	27	50	23	0	27	40	33	0	36	41	24	0
Norway	5	0	94	0	2	0	98	0	53	7	10	30	63	7	9	21	81	12	8	0	86	6	7	1	79	8	8	5
Portugal	68	16	16	0	59	19	22	0	39	28	32	0	34	43	23	0	27	44	29	0	21	39	39	0	28	42	31	0
Spain	66	19	15	0	83	7	10	0	69	12	19	0	67	23	10	0	61	20	19	0	60	15	25	0	62	19	19	0
Sweden	22	33	46	0	15	33	52	0	23	30	47	0	17	45	37	0	19	40	41	0	20	43	37	0	19	43	38	0
Switzerland	33	57	10	0	39	51	10	0	32	41	26	0	37	38	26	0	30	45	25	0	35	52	13	0	34	45	21	0
United Kingdom	22	21	44	13	10	19	58	13	20	17	28	35	29	32	19	20	38	42	20	0	38	39	23	0	35	38	21	7
United States[b]	83	15	3	0	82	15	3	0	83	11	6	0	70	23	7	0	x[b]				x[b]				70	23	7	0
Total Annex II countries	**60**	**21**	**16**	**3**	**64**	**16**	**16**	**4**	**62**	**14**	**12**	**12**	**67**	**16**	**13**	**4**	**64**	**19**	**17**	**0**	**59**	**21**	**20**	**0**	**63**	**19**	**17**	**1**

Notes: M = mitigation, A = adaptation, C = crosscutting, O = other.

a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so these years are not included. In addition, U.S. 2015 and 2016 finance flows reported to the Biennial Assessment did not provide a breakdown of multilateral finance, so these years cover only the bilateral breakdown for the United States. The "total post-Paris" for the United States includes only its bilateral contributions in 2016.

Sources: WRI calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, common tabular format tables 7 and 7(b) (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019).

Figure 10 | **Climate Finance Thematic Breakdown by Country, Post-Paris Agreement (2016–18)**



Notes: a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so these years are not included. U.S. finance flows reported to the Biennial Assessment for 2016 did not provide a breakdown of multilateral finance, so this year covers only the U.S. bilateral breakdown.

Sources: WRI authors based on SCF third Biennial Assessment (2016) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2018; UNFCCC 2020). EU allocations to member states are based their shares of the EU budget (EU 2017, 2018, 2019)

3.3 Percentage of GNI and Per Capita Share Analysis

Sources

- World Development Indicators from the World Bank, total population and GNI in current U.S. dollars (World Bank 2021)
- Oxfam Climate Finance Shadow Report for grant shares of bilateral finance, 2016–18 (Carty et al. 2020)

Approach

- To compare each country's climate finance provision, we calculated total attributed climate finance provision as a percentage of their GNI and per capita. We divided climate finance for each country by its GNI (Table 27) and population (Table 29) in the corresponding year, and we also provided annual averages for the three years before (2013–15) and after (2016–18) the Paris Agreement was finalized at the end of 2015. Table 28 and Figure 11 show countries' climate finance as a share of their GNI, and Table 30 and Figure 12 show countries' climate finance per capita.
- To provide a benchmark to assess country efforts, we calculated what an equal percentage share of GNI and per capita level of climate finance from each Annex II country would be necessary to achieve an overall climate finance goal. Because our analysis of climate finance attributable to each country only included public finance, but the $100 billion goal can also include mobilized private finance, we created four stylized scenarios for the proportion of the goal that could be met with public finance. There is a general expectation that the share of public climate finance in fulfilling the $100 billion commitment needs to be higher than the 2018 level of around $60 billion. We set the low-end scenario at $70 billion public finance, with $80 billion and $90 billion as the midrange, and a high-end scenario of all $100 billion being met with public funding. Given that the $100 billion commitment is a floor and not a ceiling for climate finance provision, the higher-range scenarios could be useful for exploring the level of public finance effort needed towards a total mobilization effort that well exceeds $100 billion a year, especially considering calls for developed countries to do more in future years to make up for a likely shortfall towards the $100 billion goal in 2020.[5]
- To calculate the fixed GNI and per capita benchmarks, we followed three steps. First, we calculated the percentage of each country's GNI and population against the total GNI and population, respectively, for all Annex II countries (all averaged over the period 2016–18). Second, we multiplied this percentage by the total finance needed for each scenario—$70 billion, $80 billion, $90 billion, and $100 billion—giving the amount each country would need to provide. Third, the amount for each country, divided by its average GNI and population, respectively, over the period 2016–18, yields the same benchmark amount for every country (see Table 26). These benchmarks provide potential targets for countries. However, because there are significant per capita income differences between Annex II countries, an equal per capita climate finance contribution may not be an equitable way of sharing effort.

Table 26 | **GNI and Per Capita Climate Finance Benchmarks for Annex II Countries under Different Public Finance Scenarios**

	EQUAL GROSS NATIONAL INCOME SHARE FROM ANNEX II COUNTRIES (%)	EQUAL PER CAPITA SHARE FROM ANNEX II COUNTRIES (US$)
$70 billion public finance scenario	0.15	74.51
$80 billion public finance scenario	0.18	85.16
$90 billion public finance scenario	0.20	95.80
$100 billion public finance scenario	0.22	106.45

Source: *WRI calculations based on World Bank (2021).*

Table 27 | **GNI (Current U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

							SHARE OF ANNEX II COUNTRIES' TOTAL POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2016–18
Australia	1,536,980	1,429,083	1,324,064	1,180,244	1,293,973	1,389,127	**2.84%**
Austria	431,229	442,579	378,058	395,198	414,599	454,258	**0.93%**
Belgium	534,493	545,897	468,690	480,572	509,690	546,514	**1.13%**
Canada	1,819,073	1,774,391	1,532,290	1,509,573	1,630,712	1,694,106	**3.55%**
Denmark	354,464	365,834	311,964	320,813	336,416	364,913	**0.75%**
Finland	272,399	277,245	236,746	241,828	255,175	276,862	**0.57%**
France	2,874,043	2,913,984	2,490,863	2,523,562	2,654,458	2,841,459	**5.90%**
Germany	3,819,178	3,961,736	3,437,023	3,552,144	3,759,608	4,060,013	**8.36%**
Greece	239,573	238,635	196,862	195,230	203,984	216,983	**0.45%**
Iceland	15,288	16,897	16,544	19,827	23,966	24,926	**0.05%**
Ireland	201,257	218,187	224,070	245,118	266,555	300,179	**0.60%**
Italy	2,137,604	2,159,322	1,823,207	1,881,183	1,972,528	2,108,430	**4.38%**
Japan	5,328,796	5,024,973	4,558,091	5,088,187	5,040,348	5,135,479	**11.22%**
Luxembourg	41,235	43,911	37,619	38,640	41,383	45,178	**0.09%**
Netherlands	888,800	888,776	765,852	771,941	840,156	923,173	**1.86%**
New Zealand	183,260	192,720	171,232	181,819	194,716	196,958	**0.42%**
Norway	529,073	515,102	402,696	387,033	416,066	452,694	**0.92%**
Portugal	223,343	224,899	193,967	201,275	216,162	235,329	**0.48%**
Spain	1,345,710	1,364,378	1,194,851	1,235,120	1,312,248	1,422,925	**2.92%**
Sweden	597,818	592,528	507,679	518,717	549,762	565,750	**1.20%**
Switzerland	703,030	712,235	695,948	674,974	687,537	713,007	**1.53%**
United Kingdom	2,729,205	3,001,243	2,861,593	2,629,567	2,634,442	2,816,806	**5.94%**
United States	17,175,898	18,057,489	18,704,317	19,045,164	19,830,277	20,837,347	**43.90%**
Total Annex II countries	**43,981,750**	**44,962,044**	**42,534,228**	**43,317,730**	**45,084,760**	**47,622,417**	**100.00%**

Source: *World Bank 2021.*

Table 28 | **Climate Finance as Share of GNI (Percent)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS 2013–15	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS 2016–18	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INFLOWS, POST-PARIS 2016–18
Australia	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05	100%
Austria	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.13	40%
Belgium	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.10	0.13	99%
Canada	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.08	55%
Denmark	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.16	0.13	0.16	99%
Finland	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.11	47%
France	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.27	0.28	0.17	0.26	10%
Germany	0.11	0.12	0.28	0.32	0.27	0.25	0.17	0.28	39%
Greece	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05	100%
Iceland	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.10	100%
Ireland	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.07	100%
Italy	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.07	0.11	79%
Japan[a]	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.21	0.26	14%
Luxembourg	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.17	0.25	67%
Netherlands	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.13	100%
New Zealand	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.07	100%
Norway	0.25	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.24	0.20	0.18	77%
Portugal	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.07	100%
Spain	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.12	38%
Sweden	0.11	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.20	0.22	0.13	0.19	100%
Switzerland	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.09	98%
United Kingdom	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.13	93%
United States[b]	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02[b]	0.02[b]	0.03	0.03[b]	43%
Total Annex II countries	**0.08**	**0.09**	**0.10**	**0.11**	**0.11**	**0.11**	**0.09**	**0.11**	

Notes: For the share of grant finance post-Paris columns, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so 2017 and 2018 amounts for the United States only includes their attributed share of MDB climate finance outflows, and the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Sources: WRI authors, calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020). GNI data are from World Bank (2021).

Figure 11 | **Climate Finance as Share of GNI, Pre- and Post-Paris Agreement**



Notes: GNI = gross national income. Post-Paris bar shading denotes the share of grants in bilateral and multilateral climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Source: WRI authors, based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020). GNI data are from World Bank (2021).

Table 29 | **Population**

							SHARE OF ANNEX II COUNTRIES' TOTAL POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2016–18
Australia	23,128,129	23,475,686	23,815,995	24,190,907	24,601,860	24,982,688	2.62%
Austria	8,479,823	8,546,356	8,642,699	8,736,668	8,797,566	8,840,521	0.94%
Belgium	11,159,407	11,209,057	11,274,196	11,331,422	11,375,158	11,427,054	1.21%
Canada	35,082,954	35,437,435	35,702,908	36,109,487	36,543,321	37,057,765	3.89%
Denmark	5,614,932	5,643,475	5,683,483	5,728,010	5,764,980	5,793,636	0.61%
Finland	5,438,972	5,461,512	5,479,531	5,495,303	5,508,214	5,515,525	0.59%
France	65,998,687	66,312,067	66,548,272	66,724,104	66,864,379	66,965,912	7.12%
Germany	80,645,605	80,982,500	81,686,611	82,348,669	82,657,002	82,905,782	8.80%
Greece	10,965,211	10,892,413	10,820,883	10,775,971	10,754,679	10,732,882	1.14%
Iceland	323,764	327,386	330,815	335,439	343,400	352,721	0.04%
Ireland	4,623,816	4,657,740	4,701,957	4,755,335	4,807,388	4,867,316	0.51%
Italy	60,233,948	60,789,140	60,730,582	60,627,498	60,536,709	60,421,760	6.44%
Japan	127,445,000	127,276,000	127,141,000	126,994,511	126,785,797	126,529,100	13.49%
Luxembourg	543,360	556,319	569,604	582,014	596,336	607,950	0.06%
Netherlands	16,804,432	16,865,008	16,939,923	17,030,314	17,131,296	17,231,624	1.82%
New Zealand	4,442,100	4,509,700	4,595,700	4,693,200	4,793,900	4,841,000	0.51%
Norway	5,079,623	5,137,232	5,188,607	5,234,519	5,276,968	5,311,916	0.56%
Portugal	10,457,295	10,401,062	10,358,076	10,325,452	10,300,300	10,283,822	1.10%
Spain	46,620,045	46,480,882	46,444,832	46,484,062	46,593,236	46,797,754	4.96%
Sweden	9,600,379	9,696,110	9,799,186	9,923,085	10,057,698	10,175,214	1.07%
Switzerland	8,089,346	8,188,649	8,282,396	8,373,338	8,451,840	8,514,329	0.90%
United Kingdom	64,128,273	64,602,298	65,116,219	65,611,593	66,058,859	66,460,344	7.03%
United States	315,993,715	318,301,008	320,635,163	322,941,311	324,985,539	326,687,501	34.58%
Total Annex II countries	**920,900,829**	**925,751,049**	**930,490,653**	**935,354,228**	**939,588,442**	**943,306,134**	**100.00%**

Source: *World Bank 2021.*

Table 30 | Climate Finance per Capita (U.S. Dollars)

							ANNUAL AVERAGE PRE-PARIS	ANNUAL AVERAGE POST-PARIS	SHARE OF GRANT FINANCE, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INFLOWS, POST-PARIS
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2013–15	2016–18	2016–18
Australia	23.46	18.55	19.58	20.59	30.74	28.84	20.53	**26.72**	100%
Austria	41.45	47.46	44.47	53.71	61.45	71.12	44.46	**62.09**	40%
Belgium	41.40	51.15	39.09	51.55	63.85	60.84	43.88	**58.75**	99%
Canada	18.50	24.22	17.86	23.86	36.78	40.08	20.19	**33.57**	55%
Denmark	72.59	88.33	69.07	77.56	98.01	103.41	76.66	**93.00**	99%
Finland	41.74	56.93	47.74	43.04	57.07	55.15	48.81	**51.75**	47%
France	65.68	80.06	68.22	80.87	107.69	118.99	71.32	**102.52**	10%
Germany	50.79	58.42	117.79	136.24	122.67	124.40	75.66	**127.77**	39%
Greece	6.50	7.29	6.52	9.08	10.91	10.64	6.77	**10.21**	100%
Iceland	32.83	51.59	51.77	54.35	71.69	82.83	45.40	**69.62**	100%
Ireland	22.68	24.57	23.56	33.76	43.65	46.92	23.60	**41.44**	100%
Italy	19.92	23.29	24.59	27.24	41.29	38.46	22.60	**35.67**	79%
Japan[a]	76.53	82.30	83.42	100.24	100.73	111.55	80.75	**104.17**	14%
Luxembourg	108.89	135.91	131.02	168.36	171.95	195.78	125.28	**178.70**	67%
Netherlands	48.02	62.09	52.36	52.54	70.72	77.41	54.16	**66.89**	100%
New Zealand	19.01	24.74	20.86	20.76	28.13	30.82	21.54	**26.57**	100%
Norway	259.55	176.81	126.05	101.51	136.63	204.01	187.47	**147.38**	77%
Portugal	10.36	11.30	10.17	12.51	15.61	15.97	10.61	**14.70**	100%
Spain	19.92	27.57	24.48	30.23	33.78	39.08	23.99	**34.36**	38%
Sweden	70.91	78.35	73.59	85.56	107.93	120.01	74.28	**104.50**	100%
Switzerland	52.71	65.65	54.08	67.65	84.21	78.49	57.48	**76.78**	98%
United Kingdom	39.91	49.51	52.72	47.50	53.30	60.45	47.38	**53.75**	93%
United States[b]	15.82	19.34	18.17	20.41	15.13[b]	14.22[b]	17.77	**16.59**[b]	43%
Total Annex II countries	**37.12**	**42.58**	**45.59**	**52.01**	**54.65**	**58.05**	**41.76**	**54.90**	

Notes: For the share of grant finance post-Paris columns, coloring denotes grant share: 100 percent is shaded dark blue and 0 percent is light blue, with gradations by percentage in between.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so 2017 and 2018 amounts for the United States only include their attributed share of MDB climate finance outflows, and the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18. The U.S. grant share is for its 2016 finance only.

Source: WRI authors, calculations based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020). Population data are from World Bank (2021).

Figure 12 | **Climate Finance per Capita, Pre- and Post-Paris Agreement**



Notes: Post-Paris bar shading denotes the share of grants in bilateral and multilateral climate finance provided by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the average post-Paris for the United States includes only its bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2016 plus its average of MDB climate finance contributions for 2016–18.

Source: WRI authors, based on SCF second and third Biennial Assessments (2013–16) and developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (2017–18) (SCF 2016, 2018; UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020). Population data are from World Bank (2021).are from World Bank (2021).

3.4 Effort-Sharing Analysis

Sources

- Oxfam Germany potential distribution key (Kowalzig 2019)
- ODI composite index shares (Colenbrander et al. 2021)
- WRI indicative minimum threshold shares (Waslander and Quijano Vallejos 2018; WRI 2018)
- Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich; ETH Zurich), static and dynamic climate finance allocation mechanisms (Egli and Stünzi 2019)
- Oxfam Climate Finance Shadow Report for grant shares of bilateral finance, 2016–18 (Carty et al. 2020)

Approach

- The $100 billion is a collective commitment and there has been no agreement within the UNFCCC or among developed countries about how to share the effort towards meeting the goal. International institutions, such as the United Nations (for its general budget) and the European Union, employ gross national income-based effort-sharing methodologies to determine budget contributions (EU 2019; UNGA 2018). The European Union also uses a GNI-based effort-sharing formula to determine how to allocate emissions reduction targets among its member states (EU 2009). Building on these examples, a variety of researchers have proposed approaches for how climate finance efforts could be equitably divided among developed countries based on objective data, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (a measure of responsibility for climate change), gross domestic product (GDP) or GNI (a measure of financial capacity/ability to pay), population (a measure of human capital), and ODA contributions (a measure of willingness to pay).
- **Oxfam Germany's potential distribution key for GCF replenishment:** Oxfam Germany calculated a potential distribution approach for countries to pledge to the GCF replenishment; it did so by calculating each country's share of the Annex II countries' total nominal GDP (2018), cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (1990–2016), and ODA (2014–17) and then averaging the three so they are given equal weight (Kowalzig 2019). The published table in Kowalzig (2019) only includes selected Annex II countries; the author kindly supplied the breakdowns for all other Annex II countries.
- **ODI's composite index:** ODI developed a composite index based on calculating each country's share of the Annex II countries' total GNI (2019), population (2019), and cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (1990–2018) and then averaging the three so they are given equal weight (Colenbrander et al. 2021). ODI only provided shares for the G7 plus Australia, so we replicated the calculations for all Annex II countries. ODI included Turkey in its calculations of Annex II country totals, but we excluded Turkey because it was removed from the list of Annex II Parties in 2002 pursuant to Decision 26/CP.7 (UNFCCC 2001).
- **WRI's indicative minimum thresholds:** To help inform the GCF's first replenishment process in 2019, WRI developed the indicative minimum threshold (IMT) formula for calculating the minimum share of effort each developed country could consider undertaking (Waslander and Quijano Vallejos 2018). The IMT shares are calculated based on each developed country's share of the GNI, averaged over 2011–16; the share of cumulative GHG emissions, based on averaged 1850–2016 and 1990–2016 cumulative data; and a scaling factor of GHG emissions per capita, depending on whether the contributor is above or below the average emissions of the 23 developed countries. The scaling factor is designed to incentivize countries to undertake domestic mitigation action by reducing the IMT for countries whose per capita emissions are below the group average and increasing the IMT for countries whose per capita emissions are above the group average. It also provides a level of fairness for countries that may have high aggregate emissions but larger populations. The full methodology for calculating the IMT can be found in Appendix A of Waslander and Quijano Vallejos (2018). We used the more up-to-date shares than appear in the publication, which underpin the online GCF Contributions Calculator 1.0 (WRI 2018).

- **ETH Zurich's static and dynamic climate finance allocation mechanisms:** Other effort-sharing analyses rely solely on historic and contemporary data, but researchers at ETH Zurich developed an approach that also incorporates forward-looking data (Egli and Stünzi 2019). They began by calculating a static allocation mechanism based on a country's share of GDP (2017) and cumulative GHGs (1990–2014), similar to the approaches taken by other organizations. They then developed a dynamic allocation mechanism that extended the period of emissions covered out to 2030, using each countries' unconditional emissions reduction commitments included in their first round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement to project their cumulative emissions. They also extended wealth calculations out to 2030 by incorporating both GDP growth projections and subtracting the cost of projected climate damages to each country. The published paper applied the calculations for a broader group of countries than the scope of our study (all Annex I Parties plus Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovinia, Israel, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and San Marino), and the authors kindly provided recalculated percentage shares only for the group of Annex II Parties.
- Table 31 provides an overview of different proposed methodologies.
- Table 32 shows the percentage share results. Although there are some variances, which can be significant for smaller countries, there is a significant degree of alignment for the major economies.

Table 31 | **Comparison of Climate Finance Effort-Sharing Approach Methodologies**

	WEALTH	EMISSIONS	POPULATION	WILLINGNESS
Oxfam distribution key	Share of GDP (2018)	Share of carbon dioxide (1990–2016)	N/A	Share of ODA (2014–17)
ODI composite index shares	Share of GNI (2019)	Share of carbon dioxide (1990–2019)	Share of population (2019)	N/A
WRI indicative minimum shares	Share of GNI (average of 2011–16)	Share of GHGs (average of 1850–2016 and 1990–2016)	Scaled up or down if per capita GHGs are above or below Annex II countries' average (2011–16)	N/A
ETH Zurich static allocation mechanism	Share of GDP (2017)	Share of GHGs (1990–2014)	N/A	N/A
ETH Zurich dynamic allocation mechanism	Share of GDP after accounting for forecasted growth and climate damages (2030)	Share of GHGs accounting for unconditional emissions reduction commitments in first NDCs being met (1990–2030)	N/A	N/A

Notes: GDP = gross domestic product; GHG = greenhouse gas; GNI = gross national income; NDC = nationally determined contribution; ODA = official development assistance.

Source: WRI authors, based on Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019), Kowalzig (2019), and Waslander and Quijano Vallejos (2018).

Table 32 | **Comparison of Climate Finance Effort-Sharing Approach Results (Percentage Shares)**

	OXFAM POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTION KEY	ODI COMPOSITE INDEX	WRI INDICATIVE MINIMUM THRESHOLD	ETH ZURICH STATIC ALLOCATION MECHANISM	ETH ZURICH DYNAMIC ALLOCATION MECHANISM
Australia	2.93	2.92	3.78	3.67	**3.78**
Austria	0.86	0.83	0.72	0.79	**0.74**
Belgium	1.26	1.13	1.16	1.08	**1.03**
Canada	3.84	4.15	4.96	4.67	**4.77**
Denmark	1.03	0.61	0.63	0.66	**0.63**
Finland	0.67	0.55	0.76	0.57	**0.54**
France	5.53	5.46	4.61	5.04	**4.88**
Germany	10.56	8.29	8.65	8.07	**7.62**
Greece	0.51	0.80	0.56	0.69	**0.70**
Iceland	0.04	0.04	0.31	0.03	**0.03**
Ireland	0.58	0.51	0.71	0.64	**0.52**
Italy	3.86	4.80	3.44	4.28	**3.95**
Japan[a]	9.81	11.77	9.46	11.72	**10.73**
Luxembourg	0.18	0.08	0.40	0.11	**0.11**
Netherlands	2.43	1.75	1.91	1.80	**1.66**
New Zealand	0.36	0.42	0.75	0.48	**0.47**
Norway	1.46	0.60	0.63	0.72	**0.73**
Portugal	0.42	0.69	0.42	0.54	**0.49**
Spain	2.48	3.49	2.16	3.00	**2.87**
Sweden	1.97	0.90	0.82	0.89	**0.88**
Switzerland	1.47	0.94	0.86	0.92	**0.89**
United Kingdom	7.72	5.85	6.45	5.58	**5.30**
United States	40.05	43.41	45.88	44.04	**46.67**
Total Annex II countries	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

Notes: ETH Zurich = Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich); ODI = Overseas Development Institute; WRI = World Resources Institute.

Source: WRI authors, calculated based on approaches used by Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019), Kowalzig (2019), and WRI (2018).

- We compared our total attributed climate finance breakdowns against these shares. Although some analyses were developed to inform the GCF's replenishment, the shares from these calculations are based on universal data and can be applied more broadly to assessing public climate finance efforts, such as public finance contributions towards the $100 billion goal.
- Our analysis of climate finance attributable to each country only includes public finance, whereas the $100 billion goal can also include mobilized private finance. As introduced in Section 3.3, we created four stylized scenarios for the proportion of the goal that could be met with public finance. There is a general expectation that the share of public climate finance in fulfilling the $100 billion commitment needs to be higher than the 2018 level of around $60 billion. We set the low-end scenario at $70 billion public finance and a high-end scenario of all $100 billion being met with public funding. Given that the $100 billion commitment is a floor and not a ceiling for climate finance provision, the higher-range scenarios could be useful for exploring the level of public finance effort needed towards a total mobilization effort that well exceeds $100 billion a year, especially in light of calls for developed countries to do more in future years to make up for a likely shortfall towards the $100 billion goal in 2020.[6] For each scenario, we multiplied the total amount of public finance by each country's percentage share under the different effort-sharing analyses to get their share in dollars (see Table 33). We plotted the low-end ($70 billion) and high-end scenarios ($100 billion public finance) as points alongside bars showing each country's total climate finance in 2018, which was the highest year for every country except the United States, which has not reported bilateral and multilateral inflows data for 2017 and 2018 to the UNFCCC; for the United States, we used its 2016 data instead (see Figure 13).
- We then calculated for 2018 provision how much each country was exceeding or falling short of its idealized share under different effort sharing approaches in absolute terms for the low-end ($70 billion public finance) and high-end scenarios ($100 billion public finance). Positive amounts denote countries that were already providing more than their indicative share under a particular effort sharing approach for the given scenario, negative amounts in red denote countries below their share under a particular effort sharing approach for the given scenario (see Table 34 and Figures 14 and 15).

Table 33 | Climate Finance Compared to Different Effort-Sharing Approaches, 2018 (U.S. Dollars, Millions)

	TOTAL ATTRIBUTED CLIMATE FINANCE, ALL CHANNELS	LOW-END ($70 BILLION PUBLIC FINANCE) SCENARIO				HIGH-END ($100 BILLION PUBLIC FINANCE) SCENARIO			
	2018	Oxfam shares	ODI shares	WRI shares	ETH Zurich dynamic shares	Oxfam shares	ODI shares	WRI shares	ETH Zurich Dynamic Shares
Australia	720.54	2,048.51	2,044.56	2,644.69	2,646.25	2,926.44	2,920.79	3,778.13	3,780.35
Austria	628.69	599.64	579.32	504.12	514.70	856.63	827.60	720.17	735.28
Belgium	695.17	881.29	789.82	812.93	719.51	1,258.99	1,128.32	1,161.33	1,027.87
Canada	1,485.26	2,685.62	2,907.88	3,469.69	3,340.19	3,836.59	4,154.11	4,956.69	4,771.70
Denmark	599.13	722.84	426.78	442.88	442.81	1,032.63	609.69	632.68	632.59
Finland	304.16	469.15	387.07	532.68	379.58	670.22	552.96	760.98	542.26
France	7,968.50	3,873.94	3,819.20	3,226.97	3,415.02	5,534.19	5,455.99	4,609.96	4,878.60
Germany	10,313.49	7,391.91	5,805.87	6,053.50	5,334.88	10,559.88	8,294.10	8,647.85	7,621.26
Greece	114.19	354.43	557.64	391.82	492.68	506.33	796.63	559.74	703.83
Iceland	29.22	27.84	27.26	213.55	20.65	39.77	38.94	305.08	29.50
Ireland	228.39	405.33	355.87	493.72	361.09	579.05	508.38	705.32	515.84
Italy	2,323.95	2,698.98	3,357.88	2,408.20	2,767.98	3,855.69	4,796.97	3,440.29	3,954.26
Japan[a]	14,114.47	6,866.39	8,241.15	6,619.12	7,512.03	9,809.13	11,773.07	9,455.88	10,731.47
Luxembourg	119.03	123.64	58.94	283.22	78.66	176.63	84.20	404.60	112.37
Netherlands	1,333.88	1,702.94	1,227.67	1,333.70	1,163.39	2,432.77	1,753.81	1,905.29	1,661.99
New Zealand	149.20	251.40	291.23	521.74	327.88	359.15	416.04	745.34	468.40
Norway	1,083.68	1,024.83	423.08	439.95	509.33	1,464.04	604.40	628.50	727.61
Portugal	164.21	297.06	484.44	292.90	344.45	424.38	692.05	418.44	492.07
Spain	1,829.05	1,735.22	2,442.99	1,511.26	2,007.05	2,478.89	3,489.99	2,158.95	2,867.22
Sweden	1,221.17	1,376.19	628.33	572.34	617.72	1,965.98	897.62	817.62	882.45
Switzerland	668.27	1,026.36	658.14	601.68	626.47	1,466.22	940.20	859.55	894.95
United Kingdom	4,017.58	5,403.50	4,094.48	4,516.51	3,711.70	7,719.29	5,849.26	6,452.16	5,302.44
United States[b]	6,592.65[b]	28,032.98	30,390.41	32,112.83	32,665.99	40,047.11	43,414.87	45,875.47	46,665.71
Total Annex II countries	**54,758.18**	**70,000.00**	**70,000.00**	**70,000.00**	**70,000.00**	**100,000.00**	**100,000.00**	**100,000.00**	**100,000.00**

Notes: ETH Zurich = Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich); ODI = Overseas Development Institute; WRI = World Resources Institute.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so we used its 2016 climate finance instead.

Sources: WRI authors, calculated based on approaches used by Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019); Kowalzig (2019), and WRI (2018). The 2018 climate finance data are calculated based on developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Table 34 | **Climate Finance above/below Different Effort-Sharing Approaches, 2018 (U.S. Dollars, Millions)**

	TOTAL ATTRIBUTED CLIMATE FINANCE, ALL CHANNELS	LOW-END ($70 BILLION PUBLIC FINANCE) SCENARIO				HIGH-END ($100 BILLION PUBLIC FINANCE) SCENARIO			
	2018	Oxfam shares	ODI shares	WRI shares	ETH Zurich dynamic shares	Oxfam shares	ODI shares	WRI shares	ETH Zurich Dynamic Shares
Australia	720.54	-1,327.97	-1,324.02	-1,924.15	-1,925.71	-2,205.90	-2,200.26	-3,057.59	-3,059.81
Austria	628.69	29.06	49.38	124.57	114.00	-227.93	-198.90	-91.48	-106.59
Belgium	695.17	-186.12	-94.65	-117.76	-24.34	-563.81	-433.14	-466.16	-332.70
Canada	1,485.26	-1,200.35	-1,422.61	-1,984.42	-1,854.93	-2,351.33	-2,668.85	-3,471.43	-3,286.44
Denmark	599.13	-123.71	172.35	156.25	156.32	-433.50	-10.56	-33.55	-33.46
Finland	304.16	-164.99	-82.91	-228.52	-75.42	-366.05	-248.80	-456.81	-238.09
France	7,968.50	4,094.56	4,149.30	4,741.53	4,553.48	2,434.30	2,512.50	3,358.54	3,089.90
Germany	10,313.49	2,921.58	4,507.62	4,260.00	4,978.61	-246.38	2,019.40	1,665.64	2,692.24
Greece	114.19	-240.24	-443.45	-277.63	-378.49	-392.14	-682.44	-445.55	-589.64
Iceland	29.22	1.38	1.96	-184.34	8.57	-10.56	-9.73	-275.86	-0.28
Ireland	228.39	-176.95	-127.48	-265.33	-132.70	-350.66	-280.00	-476.93	-287.45
Italy	2,323.95	-375.03	-1,033.93	-84.25	-444.03	-1,531.74	-2,473.02	-1,116.34	-1,630.31
Japan[a]	14,114.47	7,248.08	5,873.32	7,495.35	6,602.45	4,305.34	2,341.40	4,658.59	3,383.01
Luxembourg	119.03	-4.61	60.08	-164.19	40.37	-57.60	34.82	-285.57	6.66
Netherlands	1,333.88	-369.06	106.21	0.18	170.48	-1,098.89	-419.93	-571.41	-328.11
New Zealand	149.20	-102.21	-142.04	-372.54	-178.69	-209.95	-266.85	-596.14	-319.21
Norway	1,083.68	58.85	660.60	643.73	574.36	-380.36	479.29	455.18	356.07
Portugal	164.21	-132.85	-320.23	-128.69	-180.24	-260.17	-527.84	-254.22	-327.86
Spain	1,829.05	93.83	-613.95	317.79	-178.00	-649.84	-1,660.94	-329.90	-1,038.17
Sweden	1,221.17	-155.01	592.84	648.84	603.46	-744.81	323.56	403.55	338.72
Switzerland	668.27	-358.09	10.13	66.59	41.80	-797.96	-271.93	-191.28	-226.68
United Kingdom	4,017.58	-1,385.92	-76.91	-498.93	305.87	-3,701.71	-1,831.69	-2,434.58	-1,284.86
United States[b]	6,592.65[b]	-21,440.33	-23,797.76	-25,520.19	-26,073.35	-33,454.46	-36,822.22	-39,282.83	-40,073.06
Total Annex II countries	**54,758.18**								

Notes: ETH Zurich = Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich); ODI = Overseas Development Institute; WRI = World Resources Institute. Negative amounts are in red.

a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so we used its 2016 climate finance instead.

Sources: WRI authors, calculated based on approaches used by Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019), Kowalzig (2019), and WRI (2018). The 2018 climate finance data are calculated based on developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).

Figure 13 | **Climate Finance Compared to Different Effort-Sharing Approaches, 2018**



Notes: ETH Zurich = Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich); ODI = Overseas Development Institute; WRI = World Resources Institute. Bar shading denotes the share of grants in bilateral and multilateral climate finance provided in 2016–18 by quintile: darker is higher share, lighter is lower share.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the graph uses U.S. climate finance in 2016, the latest year for which reporting is available.

Sources: WRI authors, calculated based on approaches used by Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019), Kowalzig (2019), and WRI (2018). The 2018 climate finance data are calculated based on developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2019). Grant shares are from Carty et al. (2020).Population data are from World Bank (2021).are from World Bank (2021).

Figure 14 | **Climate Finance above/below Different Effort-Sharing Approaches for the Low-End ($70 Billion) Public Finance Scenario, 2018**



Notes: ETH Zurich = Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich); ODI = Overseas Development Institute; WRI = World Resources Institute.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the graph uses U.S. climate finance in 2016, the latest year for which reporting is available.

Sources: WRI authors, calculated based on approaches used by Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019), Kowalzig (2019), and WRI (2018. The 2018 climate finance data are calculated based on developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2019).

Figure 15 | Climate Finance above/below Different Effort-Sharing Approaches for the High-End ($100 Billion) Public Finance Scenario, 2018



Notes: ETH Zurich = Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich); ODI = Overseas Development Institute; WRI = World Resources Institute.
a. Japan included coal-related finance in their climate finance reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
b. At the time of writing, the United States had not submitted reporting on its 2017 and 2018 climate finance to the UNFCCC, so the graph uses U.S. climate finance in 2016, the latest year for which reporting is available.

Sources: Calculated based on approaches used by Colenbrander et al. (2021), Egli and Stünzi (2019), Kowalzig (2019), and WRI (2018). The 2018 climate finance data are calculated based on developed countries' fourth Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2020), OECD (2021a), and MDB shareholder data. EU allocations to member states are based on their shares of the EU budget (EU 2019).

4. CONCLUSIONS

Our methodology sought to fill a gap left by other analyses of climate finance towards the $100 billion a year commitment, which focus on aggregate total climate finance provided by all developed countries. We calculated country-by-country breakdowns for their reported climate finance provision each year between 2013 and 2018, including bilateral finance, multilateral climate-specific finance inflows, share of MDB climate finance outflows, and share of climate finance from the European Union, if applicable.

We presented two perspectives: climate-specific inflows, which aim to capture each country's direct climate-specific contributions from their national budgets, and total attributed climate finance, which includes shares of MDB climate finance outflows. This aims to capture how much climate finance each country could ultimately claim credit for towards the $100 billion goal. Using the climate-specific inflows perspective, we were able to compare each country's share of mitigation and adaptation finance through bilateral and multilateral climate-specific channels. Using the total attributed climate finance, it was possible to compare efforts in nominal terms as well as across a variety of other metrics that attempted to standardize comparison: on a per capita basis, as a percentage of GNI, and progress against different effort-sharing approaches based on objective data.

The data sets we have created can be used to develop comparisons of country efforts towards meeting the $100 billion goal. We plan to use this data in infographics and potentially interactive tools, and we encourage others to explore the data and use it to make the case for greater quantity and quality of climate finance. Our methodology can also be applied to future climate finance reporting when it becomes available to cover additional years.

It is important to note that this data is based on country self-reporting, with significant differences in what and how countries report climate finance (see Section 2.1, Methodological Challenges). Comparisons between countries therefore need to consider how the differences in reporting approaches and the quality of finance provided affect the totals climate finance reported. Whereas some countries are more stringent about which projects to report as climate relevant and about how to quantify the climate-specific proportions of projects, others take a more generous approach. Countries also vary in the composition of their climate finance, with some countries providing more of their finance as grants while others provide a majority as loans and other nongrant instruments. Countries using a substantial share of nongrant instruments would see their reported climate finance amounts drop significantly if grant-equivalent accounting is used—in some cases, by half. A grant-equivalent accounting approach could provide a more comparable assessment of governmental budgetary efforts, and this could be explored in future research. We also encountered a number of reporting errors and a lack of disaggregated reporting data, which made verification of discrepancies challenging.

This highlights the importance of all countries and multilateral institutions continuing to take steps to improve the quality, transparency, and consistency of their climate finance reporting. In particular, more granular and detailed reporting would allow data to be more easily verified and adjusted to present a more consistent assessment of country contributions. It would also help build trust between contributors and recipients.

APPENDIX A: A COMPARISON OF UNFCCC AND OECD COUNTRY CATEGORIES

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Afghanistan			✓			✓
Albania			✓			✓
Algeria			✓			✓
Andorra			✓		✓	
Angola			✓			✓
Antigua and Barbuda			✓			✓
Argentina			✓			✓
Armenia			✓			✓
Australia	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Austria	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Azerbaijan			✓			✓
Bahamas			✓		✓	
Bahrain			✓		✓	
Bangladesh			✓			✓
Barbados			✓		✓	
Belarus		✓				✓
Belgium	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Belize			✓			✓
Benin			✓			✓
Bhutan			✓			✓
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)			✓			✓
Bosnia and Herzegovina			✓			✓
Botswana			✓			✓
Brazil			✓			✓
Brunei Darussalam			✓		✓	

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Bulgaria		✓			✓	
Burkina Faso			✓			✓
Burundi			✓			✓
Cabo Verde			✓			✓
Cambodia			✓			✓
Cameroon			✓			✓
Canada	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Central African Republic			✓			✓
Chad			✓			✓
Chile			✓		✓	✓
China			✓			✓
Colombia			✓			✓
Comoros			✓			✓
Congo			✓			✓
Cook Islands			✓			✓
Costa Rica			✓			✓
Côte d'Ivoire			✓			✓
Croatia		✓			✓	
Cuba			✓			✓
Cyprus		✓			✓	
Czechia		✓		✓	✓	
Democratic People's Republic of Korea			✓			✓
Democratic Republic of the Congo			✓			✓
Denmark	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Djibouti						✓
Dominica			✓			✓

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Dominican Republic			✓			✓
Ecuador			✓			✓
Egypt			✓			✓
El Salvador			✓			✓
Equatorial Guinea			✓			✓
Eritrea			✓			✓
Estonia		✓			✓	
Eswatini			✓			✓
Ethiopia			✓			✓
European Union	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Fiji			✓			✓
Finland	✓	✓		✓	✓	
France	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Gabon			✓			✓
Gambia			✓			✓
Georgia			✓			✓
Germany	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Ghana			✓			✓
Greece	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Grenada			✓			✓
Guatemala			✓			✓
Guinea			✓			✓
Guinea-Bissau			✓			✓
Guyana			✓			✓
Haiti			✓			✓
Holy See (observer state)					✓	

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Honduras			✓			✓
Hungary		✓		✓	✓	
Iceland	✓	✓		✓	✓	
India			✓			✓
Indonesia			✓			✓
Iran (Islamic Republic of)			✓			✓
Iraq			✓			✓
Ireland	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Israel			✓		✓	
Italy	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Jamaica			✓			✓
Japan	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Jordan			✓			✓
Kazakhstan			✓			✓
Kenya			✓			✓
Kiribati			✓			✓
Kuwait			✓		✓	
Kyrgyzstan			✓			✓
Lao People's Democratic Republic			✓			✓
Latvia		✓			✓	
Lebanon			✓			✓
Lesotho			✓			✓
Liberia			✓			✓
Libya			✓			✓
Liechtenstein		✓			✓	

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Lithuania		✓			✓	
Luxembourg	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Madagascar			✓			✓
Malawi			✓			✓
Malaysia			✓			✓
Malawi			✓			✓
Malaysia			✓			✓
Maldives			✓			✓
Mali			✓			✓
Malta		✓			✓	
Marshall Islands			✓			✓
Mauritania			✓			✓
Mexico			✓			✓
Micronesia (Federated States of)			✓			✓
Monaco		✓			✓	
Mongolia			✓			✓
Montenegro			✓			✓
Morocco			✓			✓
Mozambique			✓			✓
Myanmar			✓			✓
Namibia			✓			✓
Nauru			✓			✓
Nepal			✓			✓
Netherlands	✓	✓		✓	✓	
New Zealand	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Nicaragua			✓			✓

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Niger			✓			✓
Nigeria			✓			✓
Niue			✓			✓
Norway	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Oman			✓		✓	
Pakistan			✓			✓
Palau			✓			✓
Panama			✓			✓
Papua New Guinea			✓			✓
Paraguay			✓			✓
Peru			✓			✓
Philippines			✓			✓
Poland		✓		✓	✓	
Portugal	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Qatar			✓		✓	
Republic of Korea			✓	✓	✓	
Republic of Moldova			✓			✓
Romania		✓			✓	
Russian Federation		✓			✓	
Rwanda			✓			✓
Saint Kitts and Nevis			✓		✓	✓
Saint Lucia			✓			✓
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines			✓			✓
Samoa			✓			✓
San Marino			✓		✓	
São Tomé and Príncipe			✓			✓

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Saudi Arabia			✓		✓	
Senegal			✓			✓
Serbia			✓			✓
Seychelles			✓		✓	✓
Sierra Leone			✓			✓
Singapore			✓		✓	
Slovakia		✓		✓	✓	
Slovenia		✓		✓	✓	
Solomon Islands			✓			✓
Somalia			✓			✓
South Africa			✓			✓
South Sudan			✓			✓
Spain	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Sri Lanka			✓			✓
State of Palestine			✓		✓	
Sudan			✓			✓
Suriname			✓			✓
Sweden	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Switzerland	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Syrian Arab Republic			✓			✓
Tajikistan			✓			✓
Thailand			✓			✓
The Republic of North Macedonia			✓			✓
Timor-Leste			✓			✓
Togo			✓			✓
Tonga			✓			✓

Table A1 | **Status of Countries in the UNFCCC and OECD ODA Categories (cont.)**

	UNFCCC STATUS			OECD ODA STATUS		
	ANNEX II	ANNEX I	NON-ANNEX I	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBER (ODA CONTRIBUTORS)	ODA INELIGIBLE (2013-18)	ODA ELIGIBLE (2013-18)
Trinidad and Tobago			✓		✓	
Tunisia			✓			✓
Turkey		✓				✓
Turkmenistan			✓			✓
Tuvalu			✓			✓
Uganda			✓			✓
Ukraine		✓				✓
United Arab Emirates			✓		✓	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	✓	✓		✓	✓	
United Republic of Tanzania			✓			✓
United States of America	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Uruguay			✓		✓	✓
Uzbekistan			✓			✓
Vanuatu			✓			✓
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)			✓			✓
Viet Nam			✓			✓
Yemen			✓			✓
Zambia			✓			✓
Zimbabwe			✓			✓
Number of countries in category	**24**	**43**	**154**	**30**	**61**	**141**

Notes: ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
a. Graduated from ODA eligibility in 2014.
b. Graduated from ODA eligibility in 2018.

Sources: WRI authors, based on OECD (2012, 2014, 2018a) and UNFCCC (2018a).

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Asian Development Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfDF	African Development Fund
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
BA	Biennial Assessment
BR	Biennial Report
CGD	Center for Global Development
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CTF	common tabular format
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EIB	European Investment Bank
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ETH Zurich	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich)
FSO	Fund for Special Operations
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	gross domestic product
GHG	greenhouse gas
GNI	gross national income
G7	Group of Seven
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDBG	Inter-American Development Bank Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IIC	Inter-American Investment Corporation
IMT	indicative minimum threshold
MDB	multilateral development bank
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NDC	nationally determined contribution
ODA	official development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
WBG	World Bank Group

ENDNOTES

1 The period 2010–12 was the "Fast-Start Finance" period, covered by a previous WRI and ODI analysis (Fransen et al. 2013).

2 Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, the European Union, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

3 The multilateral climate change funds listed are as follows: 1. Global Environment Facility, 2. Least Developed Countries Fund, 3. Special Climate Change Fund, 4. Adaptation Fund, 5. Green Climate Fund, 6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities. The multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks, listed are as follows: 1. World Bank, 2. International Finance Corporation, 3. African Development Bank, 4. Asian Development Bank, 5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 6. Inter-American Development Bank. The specialized United Nations bodies listed are as follows: 1. United Nations Development Programme (specific programs), 2. United Nations Environment Programme (specific programs) (UNFCCC 2012).

4 The African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, Inter-American Development Bank Group, and World Bank Group.

5 In its first Climate Vulnerable's Finance Summit, the V20 group of finance ministers from climate-vulnerable countries stated in its communique, "We are specifically demanding a joint 'Delivery Plan' from the developed nations to concretely demonstrate how the $100 billion in annual climate finance will be met over the 5 years' period from 2020 to 2024 with in total a minimum of $500 billion of climate finance provided" (V20 2021).

6 As discussed earlier, in its first Climate Vulnerable's Finance Summit, the V20 group of finance ministers from climate-vulnerable countries stated in its communique, "We are specifically demanding a joint 'Delivery Plan' from the developed nations to concretely demonstrate how the $100 billion in annual climate finance will be met over the 5 years' period from 2020 to 2024 with in total a minimum of $500 billion of climate finance provided" (V20 2021).

REFERENCES

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2014a. "Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power." In *Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2013: Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Growth in Asia and the Pacific*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/42741/oi-appendix1.pdf.

ADB. 2014b. "Special Purpose Statement of Resources." In *Asian Development Bank Financial Report 2013: Management's Discussion and Analysis and Annual Financial Statements*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/42741/adb-financial-report-2013.pdf.

ADB. 2015a. "Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power." In *Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2014: Improving Lives throughout Asia and the Pacific*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/158032/oi-appendix1.pdf.

ADB. 2015b. "Special Purpose Statement of Resources." In *Asian Development Bank Financial Report 2014: Management's Discussion and Analysis and Annual Financial Statements*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/158032/adb-financial-report-2014.pdf.

ADB. 2016a. "Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power." In *Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2015: Scaling Up to Meet New Development Challenges*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/218696/oi-appendix1.pdf.

ADB. 2016b. "Special Purpose Statement of Resources." In *Asian Development Bank Financial Report 2015: Management's Discussion and Analysis and Annual Financial Statements*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/182852/adb-financial-report-2015.pdf.

ADB. 2016c. *2015 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/189560/mdb-joint-report-2015.pdf.

ADB. 2017a. "Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power." In *Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2016: 50 Years of ADB—Improving Lives for a Better Future*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/414776/oi-appendix1.pdf.

ADB. 2017b. "Special Purpose Statement of Resources." In *Asian Development Bank Financial Report 2016: Management's Discussion and Analysis and Annual Financial Statements*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/414776/adb-financial-report-2016.pdf.

ADB. 2018a. "Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power." In *Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2017: Sustainable Infrastructure for Future Needs*. Manila: ADB. https://data.adb.org/node/4306/download.

ADB. 2018b. "Special Purpose Statement of Resources." In *Asian Development Bank Financial Report 2017: Management's Discussion and Analysis and Annual Financial Statements*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/411996/adb-financial-report-2017.pdf.

ADB. 2019a. "Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power." In *Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2018: Working Together for a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific*. Manila: ADB. https://data.adb.org/node/7091/download.

ADB. 2019b. "Special Purpose Statement of Resources." In A*sian Development Bank Financial Report 2018: Management's Discussion and Analysis and Annual Financial Statements*. Manila: ADB. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/496016/adb-financial-report-2018.pdf.

AfDB (African Development Bank). 2014. *African Development Bank Annual Report 2013*. Tunis: Department of Development Research, AfDB. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/annual-report-2013-48189.

AfDB. 2015. *African Development Bank Annual Report 2014*. Abidjan: Department of Development Research, AfDB. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/annual-report-2014-53328.

AfDB. 2016. *African Development Bank Annual Report 2015*. Abidjan: Department of Development Research, AfDB. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/afdb-annual-report-2015-88761.

AfDB. 2017. *African Development Bank Annual Report 2016: Financial Management and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2016*. Abidjan: Department of Development Research, AfDB. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/AfDB_Financial_Report_2016_EN.pdf.

AfDB. 2018. *African Development Bank Annual Report 2017: Financial Management and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2017*. Abidjan: Department of Development Research, AfDB. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/AfDB_Financial_Report_2017_EN.pdf.

AfDB. 2019. *African Development Bank Financial Report 2018: Financial Management and Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2018*. Abidjan: AfDB. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/financial-report-2018.

AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). 2021. "Members and Prospective Members of the Bank." August 24. https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html.

Bhattacharya, A., R. Calland, A. Averchenkova, L. Gonzalez, L. Martinez-Diaz, and J. Van Rooij. 2020. *Delivering on the $100 Billion Climate Finance Commitment and Transforming Climate Finance*. New York: Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance, United Nations Secretary-General. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf.

Bodnar, P., J. Brown, and S. Nakhooda. 2015. "What Counts: Tools to Help Define and Understand Progress towards the $100 Billion Climate Finance Commitment." Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. https://www.wri.org/research/what-counts-tools-help-define-and-understand-progress-towards-100-billion-climate-finance.

Carty, T., J. Kowalzig, and A. Peterson. 2016. *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2016: Lifting the Lid on Progress towards the $100 Billion Commitment*. Oxford, UK: Oxfam. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2016.

Carty, T., J. Kowalzig, and B. Zagema. 2020. *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020: Assessing Progress towards the $100 Billion Commitment.* Oxford, UK: Oxfam. https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621066/bp-climate-finance-shadow-report-2020-201020-en.pdf.

Carty, T., and A. Le Comte. 2018. *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2018: Assessing Progress towards the $100 Billion Commitment*. Oxford, UK: Oxfam. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2018.

Colenbrander, S., Y. Cao, and L. Pettinotti. 2021. "A Fair Share of Climate Finance? An Initial Effort to Apportion Responsibility for the $100 Billion Climate Finance Goal." ODI Emerging Analysis Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/Emerging_analysis_-_apportioning_the_100_billion_climate_finance_goal_rev2607_8kc1Pmt.pdf.

EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 2017. *2016 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. London: EBRD. https://www.ebrd.com/documents/climate-finance/2016-joint-report-on-multilateral-development-banks-climate-finance.pdf.

EBRD. 2018. *2017 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. London: EBRD. https://www.ebrd.com/2017-joint-report-on-mdbs-climate-finance.

EBRD. 2019. *2018 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. London: EBRD. https://www.ebrd.com/2018-joint-report-on-mdbs-climate-finance.

EBRD. n.d. "EBRD Shareholders and Board of Governors." https://www.ebrd.com/shareholders-and-board-of-governors.html. Accessed September 8, 2021.

Egli, F., and A. Stünzi. 2019. "A Dynamic Climate Finance Allocation Mechanism Reflecting the Paris Agreement." *Environmental Research Letters* 14 (11): 114024. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab443b.

EIB (European Investment Bank). 2014. *Joint Report on MDB Climate Finance 2013*. Luxembourg: EIB. https://www.eib.org/attachments/documents/joint_report_on_mdb_climate_finance_2013.pdf.

EIB. 2019. *Financial Report 2018*. Luxembourg: EIB. https://www.eib.org/attachments/general/reports/eib_financial_report_2018_en.pdf.

EU (European Union). 2009. "Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC." *Official Journal of the European Union* 140/16 (May). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0028&from=EN.

EU. 2014. *EU Budget 2013: Financial Report*. Brussels: European Union. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c025d261-c65d-4a91-a9f9-12c6e6a77c7a.

EU. 2015. *EU Budget 2014: Financial Report*. Brussels: European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/2014/lib/financial_report_2014_en.pdf.

EU. 2016. *EU Budget 2015: Financial Report.* Brussels: European Union. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/af9650e2-bd17-11e6-a237-01aa75ed71a1.

EU. 2017. *EU Budget 2016: Financial Report*. Brussels: European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2017/financial-report_en.pdf.

EU. 2018. *EU Budget 2017: Financial Report.* Brussels: European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2018/financial-report_en.pdf.

EU. 2019. *EU Budget 2018: Financial Report.* Brussels: European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/about_the_european_commission/eu_budget/financial_report_web.pdf.

EU Council. 2018. "Climate Finance: Council Adopts Conclusions ahead of COP24 Conference." Press Release, November 6. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/11/06/2018-ecofin-climate-finance-conclusions/.

Fransen, T., S. Nakhooda, T. Kuramochi, A. Caravani, A. Prizzon, N. Shimizu, H. Tilley, A. Halimanjaya, and B. Welham. 2013. *Mobilising International Climate Finance: Lessons from the Fast-Start Finance Period*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute; London: Overseas Development Institute; Kanagawa, Japan: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. https://www.wri.org/research/mobilising-international-climate-finance.

IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 2013. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2013*. Washington, DC: IBRD. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/109961586359945945/IBRD-Financial-Statements-June-2013.pdf.

IBRD. 2014. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2014*. Washington, DC: IBRD. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/280321586359845072/IBRD-Financial-Statements-June-2014.pdf.

IBRD. 2015. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2015*. Washington, DC: IBRD. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/933611586359723822/IBRD-Financial-Statements-June-2015.pdf.

IBRD. 2016. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2016*. Washington, DC: IBRD. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/536371586359630422/IBRD-Financial-Statements-June-2016.pdf.

IBRD. 2017. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2017*. Washington, DC: IBRD. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/395711586359521179/IBRD-Financial-Statements-June-2017.pdf.

IBRD. 2018. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2018*. Washington, DC: IBRD. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/653521565271152351/IBRD-Financial-Statements-June-2018.pdf.

IDA (International Development Association). 2013. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2013*. Washington, DC: IDA. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/937621586358888249/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2013.pdf.

IDA. 2014. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2014*. Washington, DC: IDA. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/932381586358707781/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2014.pdf.

IDA. 2015. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2015*. Washington, DC: IDA. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/660501586358616454/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2015.pdf.

IDA. 2016. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2016*. Washington, DC: IDA. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/823381586356976283/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2016.pdf.

IDA. 2017. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2017*. Washington, DC: IDA. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/152931586356333188/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2017.pdf.

IDA. 2018. *Management's Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements June 30, 2018*. Washington, DC: IDA. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/315531585750105810/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2018.pdf.

IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). 2014a. *Inter-American Development Bank 2013 Annual Report: The Year in Review*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2013-The-Year-in-Review.pdf.

IDB. 2014b. I*nter-American Development Bank 2013 Financial Statement*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2013-Financial-Statements.pdf.

IDB. 2015a. *Inter-American Development Bank 2014 Annual Report: The Year in Review*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2014-The-Year-in-Review.pdf.

IDB. 2015b. *Inter-American Development Bank 2014 Financial Statement*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2014-Financial-Statements.pdf.

IDB. 2016a. *Inter-American Development Bank 2015 Annual Report: The Year in Review*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2015-The-Year-in-Review.pdf.

IDB. 2016b. *Inter-American Development Bank 2015 Financial Statement*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2015-Financial-Statements.pdf.

IDB. 2017a. *Inter-American Development Bank 2016 Annual Report: The Year in Review*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2016-The-Year-in-Review.pdf.

IDB. 2017b. *Inter-American Development Bank 2016 Financial Statement*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2016-Financial-Statements.pdf.

IDB. 2018. *Inter-American Development Bank 2017 Annual Report: The Year in Review*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American-Development-Bank-Annual-Report-2017-The-Year-in-Review.pdf.

IDB. 2019. *Inter-American Development Bank 2018 Annual Report: The Year in Review*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Inter-American_Development_Bank_Annual_Report_2018_The_Year_in_Review_en_en.pdf.

IDB Invest. 2018. *Annual Report 2017*. Washington, DC: IDB Invest. https://www.idbinvest.org/en/publications/2017-annual-report.

IDB Invest. 2019. *Annual Report 2018*. Washington, DC: IDB. https://www.idbinvest.org/en/publications/annual-report-2018.

IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2013. *Management's Discussion and Analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2013*. Washington, DC: IFC. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187871544075371014/pdf/132673-FY13-ENGLISH-IFC-Financial-Statement-PUBLIC.pdf.

IFC. 2014. *Management's Discussion and Analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2014*. Washington, DC: IFC. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c48966f0-5747-4407-994e-29a441510705/IFC+-+FY14+Q1-Q4+-+MDA+and+Consolidated+Financial+Statements+-+FINAL.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mN23mwE.

IFC. 2015. *Management's Discussion and Analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2015*. Washington, DC: IFC. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/46f470fb-8a6d-4c41-a397-4a37b9571c87/IFC+-+FY15+Q1-Q4+-+MDA+and+Financial+Statements+-+FINAL.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mMGbLH0.

IFC. 2016. *Management's Discussion and Analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2016*. Washington, DC: IFC. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/e98cafca-d809-4e37-803b-7bcbfa78aeb1/IFC+FY16+MDA+and+FS_Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mMGdZnX.

IFC. 2017. *Management's Discussion and Analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2017*. Washington, DC: IFC. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1653c590-623c-4f00-bb90-b18b6ea58d75/IFC+FY17+MDA+and+FS_Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mMGdZQx.

IFC. 2018. *Management's Discussion and Analysis and Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2018*. Washington, DC: IFC. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f1226405-5844-4d45-8849-612126d02b52/IFC+FY18+MDA+and+FS_Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mMGdNOj.

IIC (Inter-American Investment Corporation). 2014. *2013 Audited Financial Statements.* Washington, DC: IIC. https://www.idbinvest.org/en/publications/financial-statements-2013.

IIC. 2015. *Audited Financial Statements as of December 31, 2014 and 2013*. Washington, DC: IIC. https://idbinvest.org/en/publications/2014-financial-statements.

IIC. 2016. *2015 Annual Report*. Washington, DC: IIC. https://www.idbinvest.org/en/publications/2015-annual-report.

IIC. 2017. *2016 Annual Report*. Washington, DC: IIC. https://www.idbinvest.org/en/publications/2016-annual-report.

Kowalzig, J. 2019. "Refilling the Green Climate Fund: Will Rich Countries' Pledges Match Expectations?" Deutsche Klimafinanzierung, May 13. https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/2019/05/13/will-pledges-green-climate-fund-match-expectations/.

Mitchell, I., E. Ritchie, and A. Tahmasebi. 2021. "Is Climate Finance towards $100 Billion 'New and Additional'?" Policy Paper 205. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/climate-finance-towards-100-billion-new-and-additional.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2012. *DAC List of ODA Recipients: Effective for Reporting on 2012 and 2013 Flows*. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC List used for 2012 and 2013 flows.pdf.

OECD. 2014. DAC List of ODA Recipients: *Effective for Reporting on 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 Flows*. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC_List_ODA_Recipients2014to2017_flows_En.pdf.

OECD. 2015. *Climate Finance in 2013–14 and the USD 100 Billion Goal: A Report by the OECD in Collaboration with Climate Policy Initiative*. Paris: OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264249424-en.

OECD. 2018a. *DAC List of ODA Recipients: Effective for Reporting on Aid in 2018 and 2019*. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-List-of-ODA-Recipients-for-reporting-2018-and-2019-flows.pdf.

OECD. 2018b. *Methodological Note on the OECD-DAC Climate-Related Development Finance Databases*. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/METHODOLOGICAL_NOTE.pdf.

OECD. 2019. *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–17*. Paris: OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/39faf4a7-en.

OECD. 2020. *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–18*. Paris: OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/f0773d55-en.

OECD. 2021a. "Climate Change: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics – Imputed Multilateral Shares" OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/climate-change.htm. Updated May 2021.

OECD. 2021b. "Exchange Rates." https://doi.org/10.1787/037ed317-en. Accessed September 1.

OECD. n.d. *DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts*. Paris: OECD. Accessed September 1, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm.

Ritchie, H. 2019. "Who Has Contributed Most to Global CO_2 Emissions?" Our World in Data. 2019. https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2.

Roberts, J.T., R. Weikmans, S.A. Robinson, D. Ciplet, M. Khan, and D. Falzon. 2021. "Rebooting a Failed Promise of Climate Finance." *Nature Climate Change* 11 (3): 180–82. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-00990-2.

SCF (Standing Committee on Finance). 2014. *2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report*. Bonn, Germany: SCF, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/2014_biennial_assessment_and_overview_of_climate_finance_flows_report_web.pdf.

SCF. 2016. *2016 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report.* Bonn, Germany: SCF, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/2016_ba_technical_report.pdf.

SCF. 2018. *2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Technical Report*. Bonn, Germany: SCF, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018%20BA%20Technical%20Report%20Final%20Feb%202019.pdf.

Thwaites, J. 2018. "US 2018 Budget and Climate Finance: It's Bad, but Not as Bad as You Might Think." *Insights* (blog), March 23. https://www.wri.org/insights/us-2018-budget-and-climate-finance-its-bad-not-bad-you-might-think.

Thwaites, J. 2019. "US Climate Finance Improves with 2019 Budget, but There's Still a Long Way to Go." *Insights* (blog), February 20. https://www.wri.org/insights/us-climate-finance-improves-2019-budget-theres-still-long-way-go.

TWG (Technical Working Group). 2015. "Accounting for Mobilized Private Climate Finance: Input to the OECD-CPI Report." Paris: TWG. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/41225.pdf.

UN (United Nations). 1992. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. New York: UN. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 2001. *COP Decision 26/CP.7: Amendment to the List in Annex II to the Convention*. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC.

UNFCCC. 2009. COP Decision 2/CP.15: *Copenhagen Accord*. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4.

UNFCCC. 2010. *COP Decision 1/CP.16: Cancun Agreements*. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC.

UNFCCC. 2012. *COP Decision 19/CP.18: Common Tabular Format for "UNFCCC Biennial Reporting Guidelines for Developed Country Parties*." Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC.

UNFCCC. 2015. *COP Decision 1/CP.21: Adoption of the Paris Agreement.* Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2.

UNFCCC. 2016. "Second Biennial Reports—Annex I." https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-convention/national-communications-and-biennial-reports-annex-i-parties/biennial-report-submissions/second-biennial-reports-annex-i.

UNFCCC. 2018a. "Parties." August 7. https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states.

UNFCCC. 2018b. "Third Biennial Reports—Annex I." https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-convention/national-communications-and-biennial-reports-annex-i-parties/biennial-report-submissions/third-biennial-reports-annex-i.

UNFCCC. 2020. "Fourth Biennial Reports—Annex I." https://unfccc.int/BRs.

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2018. *Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations*. A/RES/73/271. New York: UNGA. https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/271.

V20 (Vulnerable 20 Group of Ministers of Finance). 2021. "1st Climate Vulnerable's Finance Summit Communiqué." July 8. https://www.v-20.org/activities/ministerial/1st-climate-vulnerables-finance-summit-communique.

Waslander, J., and P. Quijano Vallejos. 2018. "Setting the Stage for the Green Climate Fund's First Replenishment." Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. https://www.wri.org/research/setting-stage-green-climate-funds-first-replenishment.

Weikmans, R., and J.T. Roberts. 2019. "The International Climate Finance Accounting Muddle: Is There Hope on the Horizon?" *Climate and Development* 11 (2): 97–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1410087.

Westphal, M.I., P. Canfin, A. Ballesteros, and J. Morgan. 2015. "Getting to $100 Billion: Climate Finance Scenarios and Projections to 2020." Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. https://www.wri.org/research/getting-100-billion-climate-finance-scenarios-and-projections-2020.

World Bank. 2015. *2014 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance.* Washington, DC: World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Climate/mdb-climate-finance-2014-joint-report-061615.pdf.

World Bank. 2021. *World Development Indicators*. (Database.) Washington, DC: World Bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. Accessed August 6, 2021.

WRI (World Resources Institute). 2018. "Green Climate Fund Contributions Calculator 1.0." https://www.wri.org/upload/gcf-calculator/index.html.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are pleased to acknowledge our institutional strategic partners, who provide core funding to WRI: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. This work was also made possible through the support of the IKEA Foundation.

We thank the many people who contributed to discussions and provided helpful ideas as we developed this technical note as well as those who put time and thought into reviewing drafts and providing valuable feedback and suggestions.

We particularly acknowledge Giulia Christianson and Lorena Gonzalez for providing continuous guidance and strategic advice with this research.

We thank our colleagues at WRI who provided thoughtful review comments: Skylar Bee, Christina Chan, Giulia Christianson, Nathan Cogswell, Yamide Dagnet, Taryn Fransen, Lorena Gonzalez, and Gregory Taff.

We are grateful to the following external experts who provided valuable review comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this guide: Tracy Carty, Raju Pandit Chhetri, Janine Felson, Jan Kowalzig, Federico Mazza, Rob Moore, Padraig Oliver, David Ryfisch, and Charlene Watson.

We also thank representatives of contributor countries and international financial institutions who provided feedback on the data, including: Jonathan Beynon, Gabriela Blatter, Sonja Djukic, Stephen Hammer, Amy Lewis, and Lyndsay Rae.

We benefited enormously from data and insights provided by Tracy Carty, Jan Kowalzig, and Bertram Zagema at Oxfam; Sarah Colenbrander at ODI; and Florian Egli and Anna Stünzi at ETH Zurich. We also thank Jane Ellis, Chiara Falduto, and Raphaël Jachnik at the OECD for having provided technical feedback.

Our thanks go to Gregory Taff and Emilia Suarez for shepherding the publication through the review process, and to William Berek for checking the data and calculations. We also wish to acknowledge those who provided valuable support in editing, graphic design, and layout, as well as communications and outreach for its release: Lauri Scherer, Jenna Park, Hayden Higgins, and Romain Warnault.

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of WRI and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of reviewers or funders. Any omissions, inaccuracies, or errors are our own.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Julie Bos is a research analyst within WRI's Sustainable Finance Center. She works on topics related to international climate finance, both in the public and private sectors.

Contact: julie.bos@wri.org

Joe Thwaites is an associate with WRI's Sustainable Finance Center. He works on enhancing the climate finance ambition of developed countries, supporting climate-vulnerable countries in their engagement in international financial policymaking, and ensuring a just transition in the shift from fossil to clean financing.

Contact: joe.thwaites@wri.org

ABOUT WRI

World Resources Institute is a global research organization that turns big ideas into action at the nexus of environment, economic opportunity, and human well-being.

Our Challenge
Natural resources are at the foundation of economic opportunity and human well-being. But today, we are depleting Earth's resources at rates that are not sustainable, endangering economies and people's lives. People depend on clean water, fertile land, healthy forests, and a stable climate. Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a sustainable planet. We must address these urgent, global challenges this decade.

Our Vision
We envision an equitable and prosperous planet driven by the wise management of natural resources. We aspire to create a world where the actions of government, business, and communities combine to eliminate poverty and sustain the natural environment for all people.

Our Approach
COUNT IT
We start with data. We conduct independent research and draw on the latest technology to develop new insights and recommendations. Our rigorous analysis identifies risks, unveils opportunities, and informs smart strategies. We focus our efforts on influential and emerging economies where the future of sustainability will be determined.

CHANGE IT
We use our research to influence government policies, business strategies, and civil society action. We test projects with communities, companies, and government agencies to build a strong evidence base. Then, we work with partners to deliver change on the ground that alleviates poverty and strengthens society. We hold ourselves accountable to ensure our outcomes will be bold and enduring.

SCALE IT
We don't think small. Once tested, we work with partners to adopt and expand our efforts regionally and globally. We engage with decision-makers to carry out our ideas and elevate our impact. We measure success through government and business actions that improve people's lives and sustain a healthy environment.