

# Global Organized Crime Index 2021



**GLOBAL  
INITIATIVE**  
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL  
ORGANIZED CRIME





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# Foreword

## About the Global Organized Crime Index

The Global Organized Crime Index is the first tool of its kind designed to assess levels of organized crime and resilience to organized criminal activity. It includes in its rankings all the UN member states – 193 countries.

The results, which draw from a comprehensive dataset informed by experts worldwide, paint a worrying picture of the reach, scale and impact of organized crime. It is a sobering thought, for instance, that nearly 80% of the world's population today live in countries with high levels of criminality. It is equally alarming to consider that the exploitation of people, in the form of human trafficking, has become the most pervasive criminal economy in the world – a development that serves as a dark reminder of the dehumanizing impact of organized crime. Meanwhile, the Index highlights how state involvement in criminality is a deeply embedded phenomenon around the world: state officials and clientelist networks who hold influence over state authorities are now the most dominant brokers of organized crime, and not cartel leaders or mafia bosses, as one might be forgiven for thinking. And these are but a few stand-out examples of the findings of this Index.


This report introduces the Global Organized Crime Index and sets out the results and implications of the 2020 data, the year in which a new pandemic began to ravage the world. Of course, organized crime is not a new phenomenon, but it is now a more urgent issue than ever. Criminal networks and their impact have spread across the globe in the last two decades, driven by geopolitical, economic and technological forces. The analysis in this report conclusively demonstrates that organized crime is the most pernicious threat to human security, development and justice in the world today.

As a unique data-driven analytical tool, the Index provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the pervasiveness of criminal markets, the dynamics of criminal actors, and of countries' effectiveness in establishing the defence mechanisms and responses needed to ensure operational resilience to organized crime. The Index metrics are based on three constituent parts: the scope, scale and impact of specific criminal markets; the structure and influence of criminal actors; and the extent and effectiveness of countries' resilience measures – the antibodies that protect against the threat of organized crime. These three domains are used to assign each country a criminality score and a

resilience score using a scale of 1 to 10. The rich data, however, allows users to do more than just compare rankings, but to examine more closely the indicators affecting a country's criminality and resilience. It illustrates patterns and trends in criminality and resilience that prompt deeper investigation and analysis. The Index therefore allows for a nuanced assessment of countries' criminality, juxtaposed against their institutional and non-state reservoirs of resilience.

This is the first iteration of the Global Index. It will be updated every two years, providing longitudinal measurement and analysis to track criminality and resilience over time. It aims therefore to provide a global baseline assessment, with the intention that it will become a consistent and comprehensive resource that contextualizes and interprets evolving organized crime dynamics. The results of the Index point to a number of implications that will contribute to better policymaking and building effective, systematic responses to organized crime at national, regional and international levels. In brief, these necessary alternatives include the following:

- The scale of the problem must be acknowledged before it can be addressed effectively.
- Organized crime is a truly transnational phenomenon.
- Ending the impunity of state-embedded actors will enhance global resilience to criminality.
- Continuing to bolster democracy, especially in fragile states, is a viable and useful response.
- Working towards peace is crucial in reducing the opportunities for criminality to thrive.



**Mark Shaw**

Director, Global Initiative Against  
Transnational Organized Crime.

SECTION 1

# Overview

Measuring the global illicit economy





## The global illicit economy in 2020: a year of upheaval

The year 2020 shaped organized crime in many different ways. COVID-19 threw the world into disarray. From the confines of our homes and screens, we tracked the virus spreading from continent to continent, the cases mounting up, the death toll rising to reach almost 2 million in 2020 alone. But while the global illicit economy ground to a halt under lockdowns and travel restrictions, criminals were working out how to circumvent obstacles and exploit the situation. New opportunities soon became evident in the illicit trade in personal protective equipment, counterfeit medicines and fake vaccines, and in possibilities for corruption around public procurement.<sup>1</sup> Cybercriminal activity exploded, preying on the countless millions forced online for work, entertainment and commerce. Drug traffickers found novel ways of transporting their contraband, inserting their illicit goods into shipments of essential pandemic supplies that sailed through understaffed ports, while the loss of livelihoods caused by the anti-contagion measures increased the susceptibility of some of the world's most vulnerable people to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Later in the year, the price of oil collapsed, due in large part to decline in demand. This left ships carrying oil cargo vulnerable to piracy.<sup>2</sup>

But although the pandemic may have dominated headlines, it wasn't the only event in 2020 to have an impact on the illicit economy. It was a threshold year in many other respects. At the start of the year, authorities uncovered a large-scale subsidies fraud, whereby clans of the Sicilian mafia were found to have siphoned off millions of euros of agricultural funds from the European Union, highlighting a notable progression towards less risky, but more rewarding, profit-generating activities by one of the most notorious criminal groups in the world.<sup>3</sup>

In Asia, US officials negotiated an agreement with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan – a deal criticized by many. As this report was being finalized, the ramifications of that deal had become clear, with the Taliban taking advantage of the troop withdrawal and seizing control of the country again. The Taliban are known to be involved in extracting revenue from the heroin trade (taxing opium producers), but the greater risk is arguably the heightened insecurity that will result from the group's resumption of power, which may create opportunities for trafficking groups to consolidate their operations in the world's leading opium poppy-producing country.

From May 2020, the Black Lives Matter movement reverberated across the globe, sparking a debate on issues of power, race and inequality, and the relationship between law enforcement and marginalized communities. These broader societal issues also provide a criminological lens through which to examine responses to transnational organized crime, in particular where there is a disconnect between police and citizens, leaving communities vulnerable to criminal groups,<sup>4</sup> and in countries afflicted by gang violence.<sup>5</sup>

Several developments occurred in fragile states and conflict zones known to be key hubs in the global illicit economy. For example, in August, Mali's president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, was overthrown in a military coup, but the patronage networks and structural conditions that allow a whole host of illicit economies to thrive in Mali remained intact, and arguably even strengthened. The ongoing political crisis in Venezuela in 2020 also strengthened regional criminal groups, including those allegedly linked to the president, and expanded the country's role as a key entrepôt for illicit flows of arms and people. Venezuela's instability also risks having a knock-on destabilizing effect on other fragile states in the region. This report sheds light on the inter-relationships between fragile countries and regions, and their organized crime levels and resilience. As we discuss later, ending conflict is an important step in mitigating the impacts of organized crime and preventing it in the first place, but other than the Sudanese interim government and rebel groups reaching a peace agreement in October following the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir, there were not many examples of conflict resolution that 2020 can be remembered for.

Environmental crime issues also came to the fore in 2020. Illicit wildlife trafficking in particular became a major concern due to the theory that a trafficked wild animal, perhaps a pangolin, was the vector for the coronavirus making the species leap to humans. Meanwhile, swathes of the Amazon rainforest were destroyed by illegal loggers. The data in the Index points to a number of countries and regions that are hotspots in transnational environmental crime, such as wildlife trafficking, illegal logging and natural-resource smuggling.

The involvement of state actors in corrupt and illegal practices was also evident in 2020, serving to highlight the kinds of systemic corruption embedded in state structures and high political office worldwide that enables and feeds off global illicit flows, while undermining resilience. In many ways, the August Beirut explosion was seen as emblematic of the deep-rooted corruption within Lebanon's disintegrating state apparatus.

The role of state actors as vectors of organized crime by facilitating or taking part in illicit economies is underscored emphatically by the findings of this report.

In Brazil, attacks on politicians escalated during municipal elections in November 2020. Linked to political competition and organized crime, some killings were attributed to so-called militia groups – organized crime syndicates most prominent in Rio de Janeiro – and drug trafficking groups.<sup>6</sup>

Mexico, a country racked by violence and organized crime, was declared the most dangerous country in the world for journalists, with a rise in killings in 2020.<sup>7</sup> Journalists in Mexico are reportedly at greater risk of being killed than those in war zones.<sup>8</sup>

There were some small crumbs of good news in 2020. In July, law enforcement agencies in Europe dismantled an encrypted phone network widely used by criminal actors called EncroChat, resulting in some 800 initial arrests and seizures of substantial amounts of cash, drugs and weapons. A few months later, documents revealing the astronomical sums of money laundered in the global financial system were leaked – the so-called FinCEN files – shining a spotlight on the use of the international banking system by oligarchs and criminals across the globe. And in December 2020, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted to remove cannabis from Schedule IV of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.<sup>9</sup> While the move is unlikely to have any material impact on illicit markets, it does represent a shift in attitudes toward the substance, paving the way for further debate and reform.

However, the gains made by those perpetrating criminal activity were arguably much greater. In many respects, the global illicit economy simply continued along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy. The incidents such as those described above are therefore not



just isolated political-economic occurrences, but arguably part of a pattern of the ongoing devastating impact that organized crime leaves in its wake.<sup>10</sup>

Fundamentally, although the pandemic changed our perception of things, and affected some aspects of organized crime's logistical supply chains, nothing much really changed in 2020. Yes, COVID-19 was new, but arguably not different from other major shifts and disruptions felt by humankind. And, as with previous disruptions, organized crime adapted. Crises like the pandemic have occurred in the past, and there will be more major disruptors to come. Perhaps more than anything, COVID-19 allowed us to see the basic laws of organized crime in stark relief, against a new, radically different backdrop – and potentially pointed towards the best means of response. The pandemic shone a spotlight on the inequalities, vulnerabilities and systemic risk around the world, but it also showed us the need for global collaboration. The same can be said for organized crime – a truly global phenomenon that requires a collaborative global response.


Organized crime is a common denominator in many of the societal challenges outlined in this report: inequality; conflict; political instability; climate change; unregulated technology and financial markets; corruption; and forced migration. But because of its inherently clandestine nature, often little is known about how organized crime dynamics operate in each country, let alone their impact transnationally. Understanding therefore how crime behaves and changes is the crucial first step to formulating any meaningful global response. So it is essential to be able to measure it, which is where the core value of this Index, as an analytical tool, can be found.

Similarly, measures to combat organized crime are often inadequate or too slow to keep up with its fast-changing tactics, and often lack the appropriate mechanisms to evaluate their effectiveness. This inaugural Global Organized Crime Index is the first step towards rectifying this deficit by providing the evidence base designed to enable governments and practitioners to assess, measure and evaluate illicit markets and organized crime, and to think globally about how to address them. It aims to capture, to the fullest extent possible, the criminal dynamics and responses occurring amid a world undergoing profound upheaval. In this way, future iterations of the index will be able to inform analysis of global criminality and its impact for years to come.




FIGURE 1.1

# Notable global events in 2020 that shaped organized crime







## Key findings

The Global Organized Crime Index allows users to analyze, compare and contrast a range of indicators by country, region and continent. In compiling these indicators, several key findings emerged that shed light on the number of people affected by criminality, the scale and reach of criminal markets and the levels of resilience present in countries facing criminal threats.

### finding 1


**More than three-quarters of the world's population live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime.**

It is well known that crime has devastating consequences for those affected by it, but in many places the thinking remains that crime is limited a few run-down urban centres in various hotspots. But as the Index reveals, this is drastically off the mark. Crime is not a problem of the few: in assessing every country across the globe, we found that the vast majority of the world's population (79.2%) live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience (79.4%). Although countries with particularly acute criminality problems may not necessarily be the same as those with low levels of resilience, this strong population margin underscores both the ubiquity of

organized crime and the urgent need to implement measures to combat it. While organized crime so often targets the most susceptible communities, its impact ultimately raises the vulnerability of societies overall. The sheer scale and depth of criminal activity in our societies may have

profound and long-lasting consequences for society as a whole, making the world less secure and driving back development, as well as posing an existential threat to our natural environment. (For more detail, see the section 'Economic, geographic and political vulnerabilities'.)

**FIGURE 1.2**  
**Vulnerability classifications**




# finding 2

## Of all the continents, **Asia** has the highest levels of criminality.

Asia exhibits the highest levels of criminality overall (scoring 5.30 on the criminality scale), closely followed by Africa (5.17) and the Americas (5.06). To an extent, this is not surprising: Asia is the most populous continent, is rich with natural resources and home to some of the world's largest economic powerhouses. Western Asia (incorporating the Middle East for the purposes of this Index) in particular is a notoriously fragile region in which several countries have experienced or are experiencing either conflict or its immediate impact over the past decade, highlighting how important the combination of conflict, natural resources and weak democratic traditions are in creating vectors for organized crime. With a score of 5.78, it is the only region in Asia that ranks in the top five globally for criminality, underscoring the importance of delving beyond macro-level analysis. (See 'Continental overviews and results'.)

**FIGURE 1.3**  
**Criminality by continent**






# finding 3

**Human trafficking** is the **most pervasive** of all criminal markets globally.

Across the 10 criminal markets that the Index evaluates, human trafficking is the most pervasive criminal market globally, followed by the cannabis trade, arms trafficking, human smuggling and wildlife crimes. The human trafficking market has been fuelled by mass displacement, often overlapping with human smuggling, and caused by, among other factors, conflict, desperate socio-economic conditions and – not least of all – crime, especially

in Central America. While the pandemic may have presented some initial challenges to traffickers, it also allowed them to charge higher prices to overcome travel bans and movement restrictions, while in cases where movement was impossible, COVID-19 gave traffickers the opportunity to exploit their victims, who had no chance of escape. Trafficking also exploits non-displaced populations through practices such as forced labour, forced begging and organ trafficking, among other forms. (See ‘National, regional and continental context’.)


**FIGURE 1.4**  
**Criminal markets, global averages**



# finding 4

## Democracies have higher levels of resilience to criminality than authoritarian states.

**FIGURE 1.5**  
Resilience by regime type



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index

The Index results show that countries categorized as full democracies on average exhibit higher levels of resilience than authoritarian states. Good governance – exhibited by states that are participatory, accountable, effective and founded on the rule of law – sets the foundation on which to build and strengthen institutional and non-state frameworks to better society

and counter organized crime. The Index results support this: four out of the top five countries with the highest resilience – Finland, New Zealand, Denmark and Iceland – are also in the top 10 countries of the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2020. (See 'Democracy, development, fragility, corruption'.)


# finding 5

**State actors** are the **most dominant agents** in facilitating **illicit economies** and **inhibiting resilience to organized crime**.

State-embedded actors are the most dominant criminal actor type in the world. The degree to which criminality permeates state institutions varies, from low-level corruption to full state capture, but across the spectrum this involvement has implications for countries' capacity to respond to organized crime. One of the strongest

correlations emerging from the Index was found to be between the presence of state-embedded criminal actors and poor resilience which suggests that those actors may be undermining the capacity and resilience of the state to prevent illicit flows. (See 'Criminality, markets, actors and resilience: Understanding the relationships'.)


**FIGURE 1.6**  
Resilience vs state-embedded actors



# finding 6

Many **countries in conflict** and **fragile states** experience acute **vulnerability to organized crime.**

**FIGURE 1.7**  
Highest-scoring countries, criminality



As the Index results show, the countries with the highest criminality levels are those experiencing conflict or fragility. The Democratic Republic of Congo was identified as the country most affected by organized crime, followed by Colombia, Myanmar, Mexico and Nigeria. Other high-scoring countries include Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, where conflicts countries have decimated the formal economies, led to mass displacement and an influx of weapons. In conflict settings, states' attention and capacities may be diverted to war efforts, leaving social, economic and security institutions weakened, while resilience to organized crime declines. (See 'Continental overviews and results – Africa'.)







SECTION 2

# About the Index





# About

Based on the 2019 ENACT<sup>11</sup> Organised Crime Index for Africa, the tool comprises two composite metrics, evaluating 193 UN member state countries both according to their levels of criminality on a score from 1 to 10 (lowest to highest organized crime levels) and according to their resilience to organized crime from 1 to 10 (lowest to highest resilience levels). The Index is designed to provide metrics-based information that allows policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to be better informed in terms of developing strategies to counter organized crime in their countries and/or regions, as the Index is continually updated.

## THE KEY OBJECTIVES OF THE INDEX ARE TO:

- Provide constructive guidance to policymakers and regional bodies, so that they can prioritize interventions based on a multifaceted assessment of vulnerabilities.
- Catalyze attention to the growing threat presented by transnational crime.
- Guide responses to organized crime that are not solely criminal justice- or security-driven, but that also address the phenomenon from a socio-economic perspective.
- Provide stakeholders with the means to measure the efficacy of their interventions.
- Promote evidence-based research and analysis to those working directly on policy, with the aim of enhancing national, regional and global cooperation, and thereby mitigating the impact of organized crime.
- Provide insight into trends nationally, regionally and continentally, with future iterations offering a predictive function of organized-crime environments.

It draws upon a multi-year effort to develop the tool, and outlines the structure, process, methodology and results. Over 350 experts worldwide, as well as the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime's regional observatories, served as the information conduits through which the Index is established, and subsequently built upon.

# Index composition


## Criminality under the Index

While encompassing a range of activities, criminal markets, as a subcomponent of the Index's criminality measure, can be thought of as the political, social and economic systems surrounding all stages of the illicit trade and/or exploitation of commodities or people. Appendix 2 at the end of this report contains definitions of

these criminal markets, as used for the purpose of the Index; they are also downloadable from the website ([ocindex.net](http://ocindex.net)). Both the forms of organized crime, as well as their pervasiveness, are considered by classifying manifestations of crime within these illicit markets.

FIGURE 2.1

## Criminality indicators



### CRIMINAL ACTORS

- ▲ **CA1.** Mafia-style groups
- ▲ **CA2.** Criminal networks
- ▲ **CA3.** State-embedded actors
- ▲ **CA4.** Foreign actors

### CRIMINAL MARKETS

- ◆ **CM1.** Human trafficking
- ◆ **CM2.** Human smuggling
- ◆ **CM3.** Arms trafficking
- ◆ **CM4.** Flora crimes
- ◆ **CM5.** Fauna crimes
- ◆ **CM6.** Non-renewable resource crimes
- ◆ **CM7.** Heroin trade
- ◆ **CM8.** Cocaine trade
- ◆ **CM9.** Cannabis trade
- ◆ **CM10.** Synthetic drug trade

## Definition of organized crime

For the purpose of the Global Organized Crime Index, 'organized crime' is defined as illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

Together with these criminal markets, the Global Organized Crime Index also assesses the structure and influence of four types of criminal actors: mafia-style groups; criminal networks; state-embedded actors; and foreign criminal actors. Although it is impossible to fit each of the myriad of different types of criminal actors around the world neatly under a specific definition, these four criminal actor types assessed by the Index have certain broad, defining characteristics.

Mafia-style groups are clearly defined, organized criminal groups. This typology also includes militia and guerrilla groups that are primarily funded by illicit activities. There are four defining, although not exclusive, features of a mafia-style group: a known name, a defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Criminal networks, on the other hand, are loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not control territory and are not widely known by a name or with a known leader. Criminal networks are involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial control or any of the other defining features of mafia-style groups. State-embedded actors are those criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus, including officials from state institutions, such as law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. Finally, foreign actors encompass criminal actors of all types, both state and non-state, operating outside their home country.

## Resilience under the Index

A focus on criminality alone limits the perspective of the organized crime landscape, therefore necessitating a balanced approach by also looking at the quality and efficacy of countries' resilience – their defence mechanisms. Countries may have similar scores for criminality, but it is how they approach this problem that arguably matters most. Like criminality, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to resilience, and no assumptions can be made about what makes a country resilient. Just as conflict-ridden nations may not have the capacity to respond to a growing crime problem, stable and large economies attract organized crime, undermining their resilience efforts. Because criminality includes a wide range of illicit activities and actors, resilience measures to address these problems should be far-reaching and multi-sectoral.

## Definition of resilience


The Index defines ‘resilience’ as the ability to withstand and disrupt organized criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries’ measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

One important consideration when it comes to resilience is the way in which responses to organized criminal activities are implemented. A pillar around which the Index is based is that resilience measures must be in line with international human rights standards and principles.

Although the precise relationship between criminality and resilience cannot yet be seen, it is hoped that, over time, the Global Organized Crime Index will offer a means by which to systematically analyze and better understand these resilience dynamics, and help policymakers find means to foster them.

**FIGURE 2.2**  
**Resilience indicators**



- **R1.** Political leadership and governance
- **R2.** Government transparency and accountability
- **R3.** International cooperation
- **R4.** National policies and laws
- **R5.** Judicial system and detention
- **R6.** Law enforcement
- **R7.** Territorial integrity
- **R8.** Anti-money laundering
- **R9.** Economic regulatory capacity
- **R10.** Victim and witness support
- **R11.** Prevention
- **R12.** Non-state actors



# How to read the representations of this report

## Pyramid width and height

The **criminal markets** score is represented by the pyramid base size and the **criminal actors** score is represented by the pyramid height on a scale ranging from 1 to 10.




## Panel height

The **resilience** score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

## Global average score

The pyramid shape represents the criminality score, the simple average of the criminal markets and criminal actors scores. The global **criminality** score is **4.87**, composed of the global **criminal market** score of **4.65** and the global **criminal actor** score of **5.09**. The global **resilience** score is **4.82**.





SECTION 3

# Methodology





# Methodology

This is an abridged version of the methodology applied in the research to compile the Index. To read the methodology in full, it is downloadable from the website ([ocindex.net](https://ocindex.net)), as are the guiding questions that were used to assign and justify scores.

## Model

The Global Organized Crime Index is modelled on three constituent elements:

- Scope, scale and impact of 10 criminal markets
- Structure and influence of four types of criminal actors
- Countries' resilience to organized crime

These are used to assign each country a criminality score and a resilience score.

In the absence of a universal method to measure each organized crime type across the globe (e.g. through volume of commodities, value of commodities or actors involved), and in the face of data gaps and misinformation, the Index uses an alternative, commodity-driven assessment framework to measure illicit markets by a combination of scope and scale, value and impact. In this way, the Index aims to reconcile the information gaps other frameworks pose.

## Criminality score

All countries in the Index are assigned a criminality score, which comprises two subcomponents:

### Prevalence of criminal markets

(including the value and reach of each market)

- Value considerations
- Reach considerations (i.e. the non-monetary impact of each market)

### Structure and influence of criminal actors

Four typologies of criminal actors have been determined:

- Mafia-style groups
- Criminal networks
- State-embedded actors
- Foreign actors

While the delineation between these criminal actor categories may be obvious in some cases, often the nature of different criminal groups is less clear in certain contexts. For example, a range of actors may fall under 'mafia-style

groups', including street gangs, militias and terrorist organizations participating in illicit activities for profit. These actors may be involved in illicit activities across a criminal market supply chain and engage with other criminal groups, but are unique in their characteristics that primarily feature patron-client relationships, coercion, territorial control and more hierarchical structures. By contrast, looser style 'criminal networks' are characterized by the absence of the traits that form mafia-style groups and may include mobile gangs and local tribes or clans engaged in unsystematic smuggling activities, among others. Mafia-style groups and criminal networks can be thought of as operating along a spectrum and in some cases the differences between these typologies are minimal. As such, the Index draws expert knowledge of specific contexts to determine the designation of criminal actor types in every country so as to avoid double counting.

## Resilience score

While the criminality score allows users to identify the problem and its scale, the resilience score reflects the existence, capacity and effectiveness of country responses to organized crime. Resilience capacity and effectiveness are evaluated in an effort to assess the level at which states have established the appropriate legal, political and strategic frameworks to address organized crime. Under the resilience score, 12 'building blocks' (or indicators) of country resilience to organized crime are identified.


In measuring each resilience indicator, the Index asks two questions:

- Does the resilience measure or framework exist?
- Is the resilience measure or framework effective in combating the organized crime conditions in the country?

## Index scoring process

**FIGURE 3.1**

### Index scoring process



In scoring the different components of each country, experts were asked to treat countries representing source, transit and destination points for illicit flows equally. Recognizing the integral role of every stage of illicit supply chains, the Index refrains from giving too much weight to a particular stage in the illicit supply chain.

## Data collection

A process of literature review, analysis and verification was undertaken to determine criminality and resilience scores for each country. Data collection encountered a number of challenges, including availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. The GI-TOC Index team endeavoured to overcome such challenges by cross-checking data sources where available and identifying proxy indicators, as needed.

## Scoring thresholds – criminality

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
NON-EXISTENT TO LITTLE INFLUENCE			MODERATE INFLUENCE		SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE		SEVERE INFLUENCE		

Index scores for both components are based on a scale of 1 to 10. For criminality, a score of 1 signifies the best possible scenario, in which a market or actor type is either non-existent or negligible in their impact, or there is no evidence or information available to suggest that it exists; a score of 10 signifies the worst case, in which no aspect of society goes untouched by criminality. For resilience, the inverse applies: highly resilient countries have high scores, and vice versa. All parts of the Index are weighted equally.

## Scoring thresholds – resilience

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
NON-EXISTENT OR EXTREMELY INEFFECTIVE			MODERATELY EFFECTIVE		SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE		HIGHLY EFFECTIVE		

The first round of scores was generated by a group of experts largely drawn from the GI-TOC and its Network of Experts, based upon their own relevant expertise and the data provided from the data collection stage. The resultant

scores and justifications were then verified by a second, separate, set of experts with extensive knowledge in organized crime at a country level. In parallel to this second round of country scoring, a third set of experts – thematic experts with expertise in specific criminal markets for a particular region<sup>12</sup> – also verified the scores and justifications derived from the first rounds. A subsequent round of verification took place in a series of regional meetings to ensure that scores were accurate in geographic contexts and for regional comparisons. A final stage of score calibrations for global comparisons were guided by expert input from previous rounds and reviewed a final time by the GI-TOC regional observatories. Experts at all stages were provided with an overview of the structure and methodology of the Index, the country scores, justifications and the original data sets, and were asked to justify and substantiate any proposed score changes. The same guiding questions and scoring thresholds were provided to standardize the assessment process. (These documents are available on the website, [ocindex.net](http://ocindex.net).)

## Expert selection

The input provided by over 350 independent technical, thematic and geographic expert groups ensures credibility, accountability and transparency of the Index. The experts who were consulted throughout the various stages of producing the Index were selected as representatives from numerous areas of expertise. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into four general groups:

- A technical reference group, who were convened to advise on the practical steps to undertake in the expansion of the Index tool into its current global scope.
- Experts specializing in the study of organized crime in specific countries and/or regions.
- Thematic experts specializing in the study or understanding of specific forms of organized crime were consulted during the scoring and verification phases.
- A group of external regional experts with expertise in countries and/or regions beyond organized crime provided a final review and verification mechanism for the Index scores and justifications.





## Limitations

While acknowledging the wide range of various organized criminal activities that occur, the Index has restricted its scope to the aforementioned criminal markets in an effort to ensure data availability, minimize information gaps and accurately reflect real-world conditions. However, in future iterations of the Index, an expansion in number of criminal markets is envisaged. Notably, corruption is not included in the Index as a standalone criminal market, but rather is captured as an aggravating factor when determining the scores for each of the 10 criminal markets. Furthermore, corruption is also reflected in the criminal actors and resilience components of the Index as a cross-cutting theme.

The Index currently does not consider organized-crime activities that pose jurisdictional problems and/or cross-cutting illicit activities, including illicit financial flows, maritime piracy and cybercrime, among others. Such stateless crimes do not fall neatly into a state-based tool. It is clear, therefore, that there are numerous criminal markets that pose inherent problems when developing an index.





SECTION 4

# Global overview and analysis



# Global overview

## National, regional and continental context

The year 2020 was marked by several major challenges and stressors worldwide, while the global illicit economy has continued to accelerate, as it has over the last two decades, posing a threat to global security, development and democracy. The impact of organized crime has also become more far-reaching across the world in recent years, driven by geopolitical, economic and technological forces.<sup>13</sup> While the Global Organized Crime Index assigns a criminality and resilience score for every country, it is important to look beyond numbers when assessing organized crime in a given location. Contextual differences within and between countries inevitably shape how organized crime arises, how it is sustained and how it can be eliminated. It has been well documented for example, that organized crime groups exploit certain state conditions in order to carry out their activities.<sup>14</sup> Features such as conflict, lack of trust in state institutions, porous borders, and social and economic inequalities may all contribute to an environment in which organized crime flourishes. Similarly, economic growth and 'positive' development may also provide opportunities for organized crime.

The Index provides a standardized way to evaluate criminality and resilience across a spectrum of factors and environments, but it does so with a staunch understanding that countries start out on unequal footing, often through no fault of their own. For example, countries that are host to higher levels of biodiversity may find themselves more susceptible to environmental crimes, while those that neighbour countries in conflict may be more vulnerable to increased illicit cross-border flows.

There are no strict rules when it comes to vulnerability to organized crime, and what might make one country susceptible to criminality, may be immaterial to another. Larger countries may be more vulnerable to illicit flows because it is harder to patrol their borders, while on the other hand, the impact of organized crime may be greater on smaller nations. Under the Index, countries may be assigned the same scores, but for distinctly different reasons and therefore it is important to use scores as a starting point in which to delve into specific country and regional contexts.

Criminal markets, criminal actors and resilience are inextricably interlinked. Traditionally, organized crime activities have been described as being carried out by irregular actors operating outside of the state apparatus, serving as a corrosive force to state institutions and society at large. While this is often true, more recently there has been a growing acknowledgement of the role of the state itself perpetuating or directly engaging in organized criminal activities. As with other criminal actor types under the Index, the degree of



state involvement in illicit activities occurs on a spectrum, from low-level corruption to full state capture in which the state apparatus is the predominant, and sometimes sole, perpetrator of illegitimate violence, while able to exert a monopoly on illicit flows with impunity. For example, in authoritarian contexts, organized crime as a state function may leave little room for other criminal groups to operate, while in other instances, a state may franchise out its monopoly over resources or criminal markets to other criminal groups who act on its behalf. Under the Index, the degree to which organized crime has permeated the state is not only captured by the criminal actors' scores but may be reflected in the assessment of a country's resilience.

In a range of authoritarian contexts, the institutional environment that criminality has infiltrated has marked implications for a country's resilience to organized crime. From one perspective, a state's monopoly on political, economic and/or military power can imply that a country has high resilience to organized crime because of its capacity to defeat criminal groups. On the other hand, where the state itself perpetrates illicit activities, it can be argued that a country loses its resilience to organized crime because its engagement in criminal activities undermines its role as a primary provider of the fundamental building blocks of resilience, including the rule of law, and social, economic and political protections. Likewise, the way in which a country responds to organized crime can affect its overall resilience. Measures that aim to combat organized crime, but that do not meet internationally accepted human rights norms, standards and principles may in turn contribute to conditions that further embed criminality.

In response, the Index addresses these differences in country contexts through a breakdown of its criminality and resilience components. While some countries may feature a dominant criminal market or actor type, others may host a range of criminal markets or groups that operate with one another in complex environments. Similarly, resilience comprises a range of factors that touch on a country's political, legal, economic, security and social frameworks. In this way, the Index allows for a more nuanced assessment of criminality and resilience dynamics in countries where such differences are not always clear. For more information about each criminal market, actor typology and the resilience indicators that are used, see the appendix or the Index website ([ocindex.net](http://ocindex.net)). The next sections provide a snapshot of global trends by theme, criminal market and actor type, followed by a geographic breakdown and analysis of the Index results.




“

Under the Index, **countries may be assigned the same scores**, but for distinctly different reasons and therefore **it is important to use scores as a starting point in which to delve into specific country and regional contexts.**


FIGURE 4.1

## Criminality map



## Criminality

Although the Index is country-centric in the approach it takes to assessment and scoring, looking at an individual country and/or region offers a limited view of broader criminal dynamics and resilience capacity. When looking at the Index's results from a global perspective, users can pull out larger trends, particularly when organized crime is transnational in nature. Under the criminality component of the Index for example, the global average across all five continents was 4.87 out of 10, when averaging criminal markets and actors scores. While this middle-of-the-ground global score speaks to the range of criminality levels across the world, it does little to offer insights into the drivers behind criminality.



Global score for  
**Criminality**  
4.87


CRIMINALITY SCORES



**FIGURE 4.2**  
**Criminality**

Highest-scoring countries

Lowest-scoring countries






## Criminal markets

In breaking down criminality and looking at the 10 criminal markets covered, the global average was slightly lower at 4.65, with human trafficking determined to be the most pervasive worldwide (with a global average of 5.58). Indeed, human trafficking features in the top five criminal markets of every continent in the world. After the trafficking of people, the illicit cannabis trade and arms trafficking were assessed to be the second and third most pervasive markets worldwide, with global averages of 5.10 and 4.92, respectively.

**FIGURE 4.3**  
Criminal markets, global averages



The failure on the part of states to provide safe environments and stable economic livelihoods for millions of vulnerable populations in many countries creates conditions conducive to exploitation, as human traffickers exploit victims for profit both within national borders and abroad through sexual exploitation, forced labour/modern slavery, forced begging, organ trafficking and child soldier recruitment. The vast majority of victims are women and girls. Opportunities for human trafficking have increased with internet technology, which provides both a ready online market and, simultaneously, the means to exploit people with greater anonymity.<sup>15</sup>

The prevalence of human trafficking (5.58) is perhaps therefore unsurprising. The activities that fall under human trafficking mean that this market is present in a wide range of contexts, from both stable countries to those in conflict, often overlapping with other criminal markets, such as human smuggling. Likewise, the barriers to market entry are low, while the impact is high, as humans are the subject of exploitation.

In 2020, there were an estimated 281 million international migrants globally. Human mobility has continued to be a major driver of organized crime, driven largely by instability, conflict, inequality and climate change. At the outbreak of the pandemic, many countries increased border controls but this has not deterred migration. If anything, the economic constraints brought on by the pandemic have most likely added to the pre-existing structural push factors that impel people to move elsewhere, often aided by smugglers and despite the risks of exploitation. Increased militarization of borders is also an opportunity for traffickers and smugglers, who profit from arranging cross-border movement. Rapid rates of rural-to-urban migration in many regions have also provided opportunities for traffickers seeking to exploit internal human displacement.

Although there is often an exploitative overlap in the people-focused markets of human trafficking and human smuggling, the disparity in global

pervasiveness between the two (human smuggling ranks fourth worldwide, with an average of 4.77) may be explained by the limited circumstances in which human smuggling can occur. While human trafficking occurs both within a country and transnationally, smuggling by definition necessitates the use of smugglers to bring individuals across a border in contravention of a country's laws.

As the second most pervasive criminal market globally, the cannabis trade (5.10) is a worldwide phenomenon. Although a small number of countries have approved legal, regulated recreational- and medicinal-use markets for cannabis since 2018 – and even in these cases a black market exists to some degree – in the vast majority it is still classified as an illicit narcotic. This continues to drive the black cannabis market, much of which is controlled by transnational criminal networks. Cannabis cultivation/production affects all regions of the globe, and the estimated number of users in 2019 was 200 million.<sup>16</sup> Although the number of cannabis seizures over recent years has been in decline, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime finds that there has been however an upward trend in trafficking of the drug.<sup>17</sup>

Notably, the other three drug markets rank significantly lower, with synthetic drugs at 4.62, cocaine at 4.52 and heroin at 3.97 globally. Unlike cannabis, which can be grown anywhere with ease and is comparably cheap, other drug markets entail higher costs and limited production sites, restricting their pervasiveness.

Despite the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty, arms trafficking is on the rise worldwide. The UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs said in 2020 that there were 1 billion small arms in circulation. While conflict zones attract stocks of weapons, these markets are not contained, and many of the weapons find their way into the hands of criminal groups. This is the case in places like Central America, the Balkans and parts of Africa, where weapons from earlier civil wars and independence conflicts are still in circulation


among criminal groups. Meanwhile, drug gangs in South Africa illicitly acquired guns sourced from the country's police armoury over a number of years – weapons that had been due for destruction – and this has helped fuel the abnormally high murder rate in the country.

The widespread nature and impact of arms trafficking (4.92) may also come as no surprise. Whether illegally produced, recycled from past conflicts, or diverted from government stockpiles, the circulation of arms not only fuels violence and conflict, but also contributes to furthering other illicit markets. Criminal actors use arms to exert or threaten violence to further their illicit businesses in the form of extortion and illicit taxation, while citizens may seek to arm themselves for protection, leading to increasingly weaponized communities. Countries where owning weapons is legal but poorly regulated have caused large spillovers into more vulnerable neighbouring countries and regions. The illicit arms trade also increases the power of armed groups over the state, and in some cases criminal actors and conflict actors become blurred, with armed non-state actors often controlling illicit markets.<sup>18</sup>

The lowest scoring criminal markets globally were flora crimes (3.88), the heroin trade (3.97), and non-renewable resource crimes, with a global average of 4.51. Flora and heroin markets do not feature in the top five markets in any continent. The lower prevalence of these markets may be because of environmental constraints over the sourcing of these products. For heroin, while dominant in some source economies, the drug's high cost, as well as a preference for other narcotics in certain destination markets, may explain its limited prevalence globally. Moreover, the very nature of commodities that fall under the trade in non-renewable resources and flora species means that their depletion or extinction may reduce the supply of these commodities and thus overall markets. Notably, another environmental criminal market, illicit trade in fauna, ranked higher worldwide (4.63), which may be a function of the diversity of animals and animal products – as well as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing – and of the wide variety of uses of fauna commodities, such as traditional medicines, food supplies and exotic pets.

## Criminal actors

**FIGURE 4.4**  
Criminal actors, global averages



As the second element of criminality under the Index, the average criminal actors score globally was 5.09, with state-embedded actors being identified as the foremost criminal actor type perpetuating criminality (5.76), followed by criminal networks (5.45), foreign criminal actors (5.27) and mafia-style groups (3.89).

Although mafia groups and organized crime are often thought of synonymously and as the dominant, almost definitional, form of criminal group, these findings show that it is not territorially-based groups that are seen to have the greatest impact. Instead, it is actors and networks with reach and influence over the state and state institutions that have drawn the highest scores. In recent times, clientelist links between criminal actors, big capital and civil servants risk becoming increasingly difficult to disentangle, and the distinctions between legal and illegal become murky over the last decade – a trend that continued to be evident through to 2020. Such profit-seeking connections compromise the state's ability to act coherently against organized crime while eroding democracy and citizens' security.<sup>19</sup>

In 112 out of the 193 countries, state-embedded actors were described as having a significant or severe influence on society and state structures, while 34 countries were rated as having moderate

levels of influence. Put another way, less than a quarter of countries worldwide are states in which state-embedded actors have no to little influence. While the degree of state actor involvement in organized crime may range from low-level corruption to high-level engagement by the state apparatus, generally the prominence of this actor type worldwide poses a significant problem. The involvement of state institutions in enabling illicit activity inevitably weakens countries' capacity to combat organized crime. Of the 16 countries in the world that scored a 9 or higher for state-embedded actors, 13 were identified as authoritarian under the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2020.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, of the 50 countries assessed to have state-embedded actors with a 'severe influence' (i.e. scoring 8 or higher), 33 (66%) are classified as 'authoritarian', eight are hybrid regimes, and eight are flawed democracies.

Criminal networks, as the second most pervasive criminal actor type worldwide, represent a common denominator in all regions as the conduits for illicit flows – both within countries and transnationally. This category's comparatively similar average to foreign criminal actors (which represents a composite of networks, mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors operating outside of their home country) reveals the



interconnectedness between domestic and foreign criminal groups as they work together along supply chains to move goods illicitly across source, transit and destination markets.

Finally, mafia-style groups, while traditionally most often associated with organized crime,

ranked the lowest globally among criminal actor types. One explanation could be that the need for territorial control and concomitant hierarchical structures may be in decline in an increasingly globalized criminal economy, where criminal actors are turning to farther-reaching network structures to undertake illicit activities.

**FIGURE 4.5**  
Criminal actors distribution by score range






FIGURE 4.6

## Resilience map



## Resilience

In assessing the 12 indicators, or building blocks, of resilience to organized crime collectively, the global average is just 4.82. When looking at the averages for each resilience indicator, none scored higher than 6. These numbers strongly suggest that to develop a sustainable solution to the impacts of organized crime, there needs to be greater focus on and investment in increasing resilience measures. Encouraging resilience at the community level also needs to be considered as a core element within an overall global strategy against organized crime, and not as a peripheral intervention.<sup>21</sup>




Global score for  
**Resilience**  
4.82

RESILIENCE SCORES



**FIGURE 4.7**  
**Resilience**

Highest-scoring countries



Lowest-scoring countries







FIGURE 4.8

## Resilience summary by indicator



While each resilience indicator is evaluated independently, natural groupings of resilience categories allow for trends analysis. For example, the 'leadership and governance' group of indicators (see Figure 4.8), when averaged together, scored higher (5.06) than the other groups, such as 'criminal justice and security' (4.87); 'economic and financial' systems (4.68); and 'civil society and social protection' (4.53). The results therefore show an overall emphasis on political and governance measures being used globally to combat organized crime, at the expense of others. Given the widespread impact of organized crime on all areas of society, a more balanced approach to implementing response measures to combat organized crime would ultimately be the most effective.

Governments direct a state's stance on organized crime, supporting its role in combating the phenomenon by laying the foundation to implement action. Factors such as the presence of organized crime issues on the political agenda, state fragility, the presence of appropriate legal frameworks to tackle organized crime and a country's role in the global community (among others) can reflect states' will to combat organized crime. Nevertheless, when looking at individual indicators, while an expressed desire to combat organized crime may be present, it is the effective implementation of response measures that ultimately raises or lowers resilience scores.

To illustrate this, 'international cooperation' was the highest scoring indicator globally, at 5.68,

while the ‘government transparency and accountability’ indicator represented the second lowest average (4.41). Ratifying international treaties and participation in global forums are important steps to building robust resilience frameworks against organized crime, but if shortcomings in the transparency and accountability of governance functions are present, these pose challenges to effective implementation of response measures.

Institutional-based indicators such as ‘judicial system and detention’ (4.59), ‘law enforcement’ (4.91), and ‘territorial integrity’ (5.12) collectively averaged the second highest for resilience, reflecting a global emphasis on criminal justice and security measures to combat organized crime. Having such structures in place is crucial in combating criminality, as border security, law enforcement agencies and a well-functioning judiciary and prison system can be thought of as the ‘first response’ to illicit activities and criminal actors. Nevertheless, they form a one-sided approach to criminality, and lack of funding, training and/or corruption in these institutions not only pose barriers to curbing criminality, but in many cases drive it.

Economic-focused resilience indicators, including ‘anti-money laundering’ and ‘economic regulatory capacity’ scored lower, both averaging 4.68. The nature of organized crime as a profit-driven endeavour means that even when criminal markets are not present in a country, its ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat the proceeds of crime can ultimately contribute to or bar criminality. Similarly, when sound economic regulations are in place, opportunities are made for legitimate businesses to expand and operate in fair way, free from distortion. On the other hand, in some cases, where such policies are too burdensome, this may incentivize individuals to turn to informal or illegitimate profit-making activities.

With the exception of the non-state actor indicator, the ‘civil society and social protection’ group of resilience indicators, including ‘victim and witness support’ and ‘prevention’, scored among the lowest of the resilience indicators, with global averages of 4.24 and 4.47, respectively. These results suggest that while there is a general tendency by countries to focus on criminal activities and perpetrators, little attention is given to those directly affected by criminality. Deficiencies in the safeguards that protect victims and the public at large can have untold, long-term effects on social cohesion and state fragility – conditions that criminal actors can exploit.

‘Non-state actors’, which encompass civil society and the media, was found to be a standout social indicator, averaging relatively high among the resilience indicators (4.88). Despite an emphasis globally on criminal justice and institutional responses to organized crime, such non-state actors play an instrumental role in supplementing government interventions, holding state institutions to account and driving more sustainable response measures to organized crime through local community engagement. Notably, in several countries around the world, non-state actors were assessed to be the strongest or only responders to organized crime, often operating in highly restricted contexts and where state institutions engage in or propagate criminal activities. However, as the indicator captures not only the strength of civil society actors themselves, but also the degree of freedom afforded to them by state actors in which to operate, there is an inverse correlation between state-embedded actors and non-state actors.<sup>22</sup> In other words, where actors embedded within the state are among the chief perpetrators of criminal activity, civil society actors routinely find themselves in the crosshairs of repressive government action.

## BOX 1

## Non-UN member states

Although the Global Organized Crime Index covers almost 99% of the global population, non-UN member states are not officially included in the Index. Non-member observer states, such as the Holy See and Palestine, as well as other partially recognized territories, such as the Republic of Kosovo<sup>23</sup> and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), are not included in the rankings.

However, it is clear that illicit economies and organized criminal actors do not respect the world's political borders, and any community can be afflicted by the scourge of organized crime. In fact, there may be reasons why territories not globally recognized as sovereign states may be even more susceptible to heightened levels of criminality. A defining characteristic of non-sovereign states is some form of territorial dispute and the negative ramifications that often accompany it, notably a fractured society, unstable politics and a fragile state. And given that conflict, fragility and organized crime often 'fit together in an uneasy triumvirate',<sup>24</sup> it is easy to see why organized crime permeates a number of non-UN member states.

Furthermore, a territory's isolation from the world stage, both politically and with regard to global

trade flows, can be detrimental to its economic prosperity, creating a fertile breeding ground for the shadow economy to thrive. In addition to the potential drivers of criminality stemming from these territories' status, not being recognized by most of the international community makes access to international cooperation tools far more difficult, which are crucial in the fight against organized crime.

The reasons behind what determines the extent to which organized crime can gain a foothold in any particular country are complex. However, what is clear is that non-UN member states do have particular geopolitical characteristics that may impact not only the scale of illicit flows entering and exiting the country, but also their governing authorities' abilities to mount an effective response to transnational organized crime. Of course, just as the characteristics of disputed territories can make them more susceptible to the influence of organized crime, often it is organized crime groups that are key determinants of the success or failure of separatist movements.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it would be unwise to study the phenomenon of mafias, illicit flows and organized criminality without considering the political context – including crucially the political history – of the territories that allows these to flourish.





SECTION 5

# Continental overviews and results






# Continental

## Regional insights

As illicit flows move across borders, how they impact and shape continental and regional criminal economies and society at large varies depending on whether areas serve as source, transit or destination markets, or a combination thereof. One key factor to consider with the continental analyses that follow is that countries with very high criminality and low resilience scores pull down regional and continental averages, just as stronger states raise them. While it is true that general continental and regional analysis is useful to understanding overall patterns of criminality and resilience, and contribute to policymaking at a larger scale, they serve as only one side of the coin. The more users disaggregate information, the more detailed and focused the analysis can be, which can serve strategic policymaking at a more operational level.

**FIGURE 5.1**

### Criminality scores by continent



CONTINENT	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
ASIA	5.30	5.21	5.38	4.46
AFRICA	5.17	4.94	5.40	3.80
AMERICAS	5.06	4.70	5.43	4.83
EUROPE	4.48	4.21	4.76	6.23
OCEANIA	3.07	2.98	3.16	5.46
<b>GLOBAL AVERAGE</b>	<b>4.87</b>	<b>4.65</b>	<b>5.09</b>	<b>4.82</b>

When looking at the five continents, the Index offers insight into regional dynamics. Asia was found to exhibit the highest levels of criminality (5.30), followed by Africa (5.17), the Americas (5.06), Europe (4.48) and Oceania (3.07). Asia hosts several distinct subregions, with some countries experiencing long-standing conflicts that help fuel markets, like arms and human trafficking, while others are sites of drug production and trade. Although Asia was the highest-scoring continent for criminality, a regional breakdown of the results suggests that hotbeds of organized crime are not centralized within one region but dispersed across the continents.

Africa is host to the greatest number of countries of all continents,<sup>26</sup> and has experienced unprecedented growth in terms of economics, infrastructure and technology over the last two decades. While these developments have contributed to the continent's growing prosperity, they have simultaneously created a conducive environment for organized crime. As elsewhere in the world, the continent's success comes hand in hand with opportunities for criminal actors to exploit. Criminal expansion is supported by areas on the continent where conflict and instability are present and compounded in countries that host weak and corruptible state institutions.

In some respects, Africa and Asia resemble each other. Just as both continents are geographically vast, with regions that are distinct in history, culture, ethnicity and language, both are also host to a range of pervasive criminal markets and actors. In particular, both Asia and Africa serve as major source markets for the world in terms of environmental commodities such as flora, wildlife and non-renewable resources, including fuel, minerals, precious metals and gemstones. Indeed, the Index results show that Africa and Asia were the only continents in the world to feature two environmental markets (fauna and non-renewable resource crimes) in their top five criminal markets.

The Americas, like Asia, are abundant in natural flora and fauna, while also boasting among the richest sources of non-renewable resources in the world, including precious metals and minerals. Most notably, the Americas are home to some of the most prevalent drug source markets globally. Of all the continents, the Americas was the only one to feature a drug market (cocaine) as the most pervasive across all 10 criminal markets. By comparison, Europe was identified by experts as being a major transit and destination point for a range of criminal markets and actors. A glance at the cocaine, synthetic drugs and heroin markets illustrates this: Europe was identified as one of the continents where these markets were the most pervasive, second only to the Americas or Asia. This suggests that whereas the markets in Asia and the Americas are widely known to be source regions for such narcotics, their flows lead to Europe as a transit and destination market.

Like Europe, Oceania also features three drug markets (synthetic drugs, cannabis and cocaine) in its top five most pervasive criminal markets, albeit on a far lower scale. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Oceania exhibits the lowest criminality in the world, which can be largely explained by its geographic isolation and small population.

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Hotbeds of organized crime  
**are not centralized within  
one region but dispersed  
across the continents.**

**BOX 2**


## Natural geography – a determining factor for criminality?

Countries around the world come in all shapes and sizes, from transcontinental behemoths, such as Russia, to micro-states like Monaco, and all manner of archipelagic, elongated and perforated states in between. But does a country's natural geography – be it an island, coastal or landlocked country – influence its levels of organized criminality, and, if so, to what extent?

Of the 193 countries included in this Index, just over a fifth (39) are island states.<sup>27</sup> There are also 43 landlocked nations, but the most common geography type is coastal states, accounting for over 57% (111) of countries.

**FIGURE 5.2**

### Does geography determine criminality?





Looking at the average criminality scores, island states are found to be least afflicted by organized crime by quite some margin, with an average score of 3.67; compare this with landlocked states, which have a score of 4.78, and coastal states, with the highest criminality score (5.33). Of the 20 lowest-scoring countries on the criminality metric, 11 are island states, predominantly those in Oceania. At the other end of the spectrum, the overwhelming majority of the highest-scoring countries are coastal states, which account for 80% of the top 20. Only one island state features among the top 20: the archipelagic state of the Philippines.

What could account for these differences? Islands are, as a general rule, smaller in geographic size and population. Assessing criminality therefore from the demand side of the equation, islands represent a considerably smaller potential consumption market for most illicit products.<sup>28</sup> Island states are also far less likely to face the risk of spillover of illicit economies or conflict, which often indirectly fuels criminality.<sup>29</sup> There is a converse factor, however, to this, namely that islands are sometimes exploited precisely because of their geographic isolation. Consider the role Cabo Verde plays in transnational drug flows, for example.

From the supply perspective, due to their size, most island states are also less likely to have an abundance of natural resources to be exploited. However, there are exceptions. Madagascar is a clear outlier in this respect, which is one of the planet's largest island nations and one of the world's richest countries in terms of biodiversity and concentration of endemic species. Madagascar's resources have meant that the country is perennially targeted for environmental organized crime.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, islands provides ample opportunity for illegal fishing and the human exploitation that is a common characteristic of the fishing sector.


Landlocked states do face spillover risk, of which the impact of Paraguay's contiguity with Brazil is a good example. Both are countries with very high levels of criminality. Furthermore, due to their lack of direct access to sea transport, landlocked countries have long been recognized as being at an economic disadvantage,<sup>31</sup> which may be one contributing factor to higher levels of criminality. However, like some islands, a number of landlocked nations are microstates, such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and San Marino, and thus benefit from many of the same conditions that could potentially insulate them from pervasive criminality. Of course, and this is valid for many island states too, while these small countries may not have the natural resources to exploit, it is often for this very reason that their economies rely instead on financial services, and why many of the world's tax havens and money laundering hubs are microstates and small island nations. Money laundering and illicit financial flows are not captured in the Index's criminality score as a standalone criminal market, therefore island states' and microstates' levels of criminality are likely to be underestimated.

Coastal states have the highest average criminality score and one of the most obvious potential explanations is access to international maritime trade and infrastructure. Apart from the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose coastline is very short, the next five countries with the highest criminality scores (Colombia, Myanmar, Mexico, Nigeria and Iran) all have extensive coastlines with advanced trade infrastructure. In 2019, maritime trade volumes reached in excess of 11 billion tonnes, and estimates suggest that more than 80% of global merchandise trade moves by sea.<sup>32</sup> As illicit trade uses the same supply routes and physical infrastructure as global licit trade, coastal states are inherently vulnerable to numerous illicit economies, from drug trafficking to human smuggling and illegal fishing.









Comparing criminal actor types also reveals some interesting continental results. State-embedded actors were found to be the most pervasive criminal actors in Asia, Africa and the Americas, while ranking third out the four typologies in Europe and Oceania. On these two continents, foreign criminal actors were identified as the most influential, largely in reference to groups from neighbouring countries with links to domestic actors. Criminal networks ranked second among the four criminal actor types across all five continents, underscoring their ubiquity. Finally, as mentioned previously, mafia-style groups, consisting of a range of different forms of groups, from militias to gangs, were identified as the least pervasive criminal actor type in four out of the five continents. Here the Americas are the exception, where there is a strong influence of drug cartels and other gangs operating in the countries on the continent.

In terms of resilience, it is important to approach the analysis of response frameworks as a function of the threat a particular country, region, or continent faces. Europe was found to exhibit the highest levels of resilience (6.23), followed by Oceania (5.46), the Americas (4.83), Asia (4.46) and Africa (3.80). While Oceania's high global ranking may be surprising, the continent also features the lowest criminality rates of the five. Furthermore, the continental average is somewhat skewed by the very high resilience scores for Australia and New Zealand. (Nevertheless, excluding these two countries, the continental average for Oceania would be 5.00, still placing it second of the five continents.)


In all five continents, the resilience indicators 'international cooperation' and 'national policies and laws' scored the highest among the 12 resilience blocks, highlighting the

readiness of states to collaborate and integrate international standards into their national frameworks on issues related to organized crime. Likewise, 'territorial integrity' scored in the top three resilience indicators on all continents except for the Americas, where 'non-state actors' ranked third, highlighting the strength and resilience of civil society and media actors working on organized crime issues on the continent, in what are often extremely difficult and dangerous environments.

Among the lower-scoring resilience blocks, 'victim and witness support' was the lowest in Africa, the Americas and Oceania. Other commonly low-scoring resilience blocks around the world included 'prevention', 'government transparency and accountability', and 'judicial system and detention'. How these indicator scores vary reveals that while countries overall are willing and able to cooperate with one another on broad organized crime challenges, national priorities differ in the approach taken to counter organized crime within their borders.


Although these results offer some broad-stroke insights into criminality and resilience dynamics, continental comparisons may be too vague for nuanced analysis, as these land masses are home to numerous countries, often very different historically, culturally, geographically and economically. When comparing large groupings of states, there is therefore some risk that results may be misinterpreted, as subregions with the highest criminality and lowest resilience scores skew the results for other countries on the same continent that otherwise fare well. As such, it is necessary to delve deeper into the regional groups for a more accurate comparative analysis.

# Asia



Asia overall score for  
**Criminality**  
5.30

CRIMINALITY SCORES



Asia overall score for  
**Resilience**  
4.46


RESILIENCE SCORES





Asia was thrust into the spotlight in early 2020 as the initial epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic and the continent to first impose the severe restrictions and border closures that were soon to sweep across the globe. But these measures didn't stop the illicit flows, the criminal economies or the most pernicious criminal actors.

**FIGURE 5.3**  
**Index scores, Asia**



REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
WESTERN ASIA	5.78	5.83	5.74	4.44
SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	5.45	5.44	5.47	4.58
SOUTHERN ASIA	5.30	5.26	5.34	4.03
EASTERN ASIA	4.85	4.62	5.08	5.50
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS	4.51	4.14	4.88	4.13
<b>ASIA AVERAGE</b>	<b>5.30</b>	<b>5.21</b>	<b>5.38</b>	<b>4.46</b>


The Index results show that the Asian continent, comprising 46 countries, features a range of crime markets and actors. However, as a global hub for all different types of exploitation, from forced labour and online child sexual exploitation to domestic modern slavery and forced recruitment for soldiers, Asia's most pervasive criminal market is human trafficking (6.33). With the continent having witnessed bust after bust of various synthetic drugs, from Captagon to methamphetamine, it is little surprise that the synthetic drug trade is Asia's second most pervasive criminal market. There is also a

high incidence of human smuggling (5.67), non-renewable resource crimes (5.35) and fauna crimes (5.32). Given the link between the wildlife trade and the pandemic, there appeared to be a shift in attitudes toward the illegal wildlife trade and the consumption of wildlife products more specifically. Overall, therefore, it is clear from the Index results that Asia is more severely affected by organized crime than any other continent. Indeed, Asia had the either the highest or second-highest average score for no fewer than seven of the 10 criminal markets.<sup>33</sup>

In line with global trends, state-embedded actors were identified as the most significant criminal actor type in Asia, followed by criminal networks (5.62), foreign criminal actors (5.12) and mafia-style groups (4.34). Given the widespread criminality across the continent, and in particular the involvement of state-embedded actors in much of it, it is perhaps not surprising therefore that Asia was assessed as having low resilience to organized crime. As borders were closed and travel restrictions imposed, territorial integrity (4.70) was among the higher scoring resilience indicators, after international cooperation (5.27) and national policies and laws (4.95).

Nevertheless, government transparency and accountability, the lowest-scoring indicator (3.99), is very poor, and in many ways the explosion at the Port of Beirut in August 2020 was the culmination of years of corruption and mismanagement. Elsewhere, necessary steps taken by Hong Kong authorities to stop the spread of COVID-19, driven in part by their past experience with SARS, may in some cases be seen as a risk factor for broader restrictions on civil society. In line with this, the 'non-state actors' indicator was among the lowest scoring across Asia, with a continental average of just 4.10.

**FIGURE 5.4**  
Criminal market scores, Asia




However, although Asia was found to have the highest criminality score of all continents, it is important to break down the analysis into the subregions to accurately identify crime trends and where the greatest harms are being felt. In fact, only one region on the continent – Western Asia – scored among the top five regions in the world for criminality, with a regional average of 5.78. A number of contextual factors can explain this, but, generally, countries in Western Asia, including Syria (with a criminality score of 6.84), Lebanon (6.76), Iraq (7.05), Iran (7.10), Turkey (6.89) and Yemen (6.13), make up part of a notoriously fragile region and have experienced either conflict or its immediate impact over the past decade. Against this tumultuous backdrop, the conditions for criminality to thrive become apparent, as the mass movement of drugs, weapons, armed groups and people across the entire region feed into illicit flows, fuelling source, transit and destination markets, and emboldening criminal actors along the way. Five countries in Western Asia rank among the top 10 countries in Asia for criminality.

By contrast, in South-eastern Asia (average 5.45), flora crimes (5.86), fauna crimes (7.09), human trafficking (6.14) and synthetic drugs (6.82) led the region's criminal markets, while the region's flora and fauna crimes were identified as highest-scoring criminal markets in the world. Illegal logging (primarily of indigenous hardwood) in source countries like Laos and Cambodia (both with flora scores of 8), has had a devastating impact on local ecosystems, with outward flows facilitated by corruption moving towards destination markets in other parts of the continent. The synthetic drug trade in the subregion was also found to be particularly pervasive, with Myanmar featuring the highest score globally at 9.5 (on par with Syria), along with Thailand and Laos (both an 8.0). The three countries form the Golden Triangle, frequently described as the foremost methamphetamine-producing area in the world. Neighbouring Philippines is also a major methamphetamine hub, scoring 9.0, the joint-second highest score globally.


One of the Asian regions to be home to a wide range of diverse illicit economies is Southern Asia.

The region's size and central location within the Asian continent makes the area a hotbed for illicit flows. February of 2020 marked the beginning of the end of US troops in Afghanistan, as US officials negotiated an agreement with the Taliban, a key player in the heroin trade emanating from the world's largest heroin producer. It is no surprise then that Southern Asia has the second-highest score for the heroin trade (5.94), after Central Asia and the Caucasus, a region in which almost all countries play an important role as transit points in transnational heroin flows given its contiguity with Afghanistan. Southern Asia is also one of the world's regions most affected by human trafficking (6.88), with six out of the eight countries in the region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Maldives) as having significant or severely pervasive human trafficking markets.

In Eastern Asia, the synthetic drug trade topped the list, with an average score of 6.30, followed by human trafficking at 6.0. Countries like China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia and Japan were identified as having large destination markets for methamphetamine (largely sourced from South-eastern Asia and beyond) and synthetic opioids such as Fentanyl.



**FIGURE 5.5**  
**Criminal actor scores, Asia**




Unlike the case for criminal markets, criminal actor scores were more evenly distributed among Asia's subregions. For example, all regions averaged 6.00 or above for 'state-embedded actors', with the exception of Eastern Asia, which followed closely behind at a 5.80. While the pervasiveness of this criminal actor-type varies from country to country, expert assessments tended to attribute higher scores to countries either with authoritarian leanings and where human rights standards were compromised or to those in which state actors either facilitate or take part in environmental crimes. Criminal networks averaged above 5.0 for all of Asia's subregions with the exception of Central Asia and the Caucasus (4.38), underscoring the interconnectedness of the countries, with a notably higher score for Western Asia (6.57). By contrast, no region scored above a 5.0 for mafia-style groups, while South-eastern Asia led the continent in its average for foreign criminal actors (6.18), where this actor type was

assessed by experts to have significant to severe influence in eight of the 11 countries.

In terms of resilience, no region in Asia was located in the top five; Southern Asia was assessed as being in the bottom five regions in the world for resilience to organized crime. Although 'international cooperation' for Southern Asia was assessed at a 5.06 (the highest in the region), the subregion had among the lowest scores continentally for 'victim and witness support' (3.19), 'judicial system and detention' and 'prevention' (both averaging at 3.50). Central Asia and the Caucasus was identified as having the second-lowest resilience scores on the continent, with no resilience indicator reaching as high as 5.0. Severe deficiencies in the judiciary, and political leadership and government transparency were identified as factors contributing to this overall low resilience average.



**FIGURE 5.6**  
**Resilience scores, Asia**



By contrast, Eastern Asia led the continent in overall resilience (with an average of 5.50), featuring the highest averages across all 12 indicators. Throughout 2020, South Korea was touted as one of the world's success stories in terms of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, acting swiftly to implement effective tracing systems, ensuring the trust of the population and cushioning the negative impacts of the disease on the economy. Other countries in the region, namely Japan, quickly closed their borders. The region as a whole was able to maintain a degree of stability throughout the year that was not experienced in other Asian regions. 'Territorial integrity' (6.70), 'international cooperation' (6.20) and 'national policies and laws' (6.20) were among the subregion's top-scoring resilience indicators. In South-eastern Asia, the strength of the region's


'economic regulatory capacity' was noted (5.05), but again it was 'international cooperation' (5.41) and 'national policies and laws' (5.32) that scored highest.

Western Asia led the continent in overall criminality, and ranked third out of the five subregions of Asia for resilience, with a regional average of 4.44. Consistent with continental trends, 'international cooperation' (5.29), 'national policies and laws' and 'territorial integrity' (both at a 4.75) were the highest averaging indicators for this subregion, while 'government transparency and accountability' (3.79), 'judicial system and detention' (3.96) and 'non-state actors' (4.14) were the lowest. Experts cited state-sanctioned crackdowns on civil society and the media as reasons for these low indicator scores.

# Africa


Africa overall score for  
**Criminality**  
5.17

CRIMINALITY SCORES



Africa overall score for  
**Resilience**  
3.80

RESILIENCE SCORES




Africa as a whole was far less affected by the pandemic in terms of the rates of infections and subsequent deaths than the rest of the world, for a number of reasons put forth by some health experts, including warmer climates, which may have impeded the viral spread, a younger population and, at least in some countries, effective community health systems built up over the years in response to the numerous communicable disease crises that have afflicted the continent, most recently Ebola fever.<sup>34</sup> Most important, perhaps, in some African states' success in curtailing the pandemic as much as they did was down to the alacrity and vigour with which governments responded to the initial outbreak. Many citizens of the continent were subjected

to severe restrictions on movement, as well as curfews and closure of borders.

However, these measures had negative knock-on effects too. The continental economy shrunk by 3.4% in 2020, the largest downturn on record and the first time Africa's economy had contracted in almost three decades.<sup>35</sup> Institutional responses to stop the spread of the virus have had a profound impact on movement, trade and business, and also affected black markets and shadow economies. As legitimate businesses suffered extensive losses, people turned to illicit activities for alternative sources of livelihoods, and those vulnerable to exploitation become even more so due to isolating restrictions put in place in the interest of public health.

**FIGURE 5.7**  
**Index scores, Africa**



REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
EAST AFRICA	5.66	5.19	6.13	3.54
WEST AFRICA	5.47	5.39	5.55	4.06
CENTRAL AFRICA	5.11	4.80	5.43	3.21
NORTH AFRICA	4.86	4.81	4.92	3.79
SOUTHERN AFRICA	4.67	4.43	4.91	4.18
<b>AFRICA AVERAGE</b>	<b>5.17</b>	<b>4.94</b>	<b>5.40</b>	<b>3.80</b>

Beyond COVID-19, the continent continued to see conflict, fragility and corruption in a number of countries. From inter-ethnic violence and the rise of jihadists in the Sahel, to the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau, conflicts in Ethiopia's Tigray region

and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and an insurgency in Mozambique – the instability faced by a number of African countries in 2020 has been another enabling factor to the expansion of organized crime activities.

After Asia, Africa is the continent with the highest overall criminality score (5.17), a reflection of the highly pervasive and varied illicit economies that have taken root on the continent. Human trafficking is the criminal market with the greatest influence in Africa, with a continental average of 5.93. Of the 54 African countries, 30 were assessed as having a human trafficking market whose influence is either significant or severe, demonstrating the immense reach of this illicit economy, not least amid the pandemic when economic devastation across the continent made people increasingly vulnerable to trafficking.

In 2019, there were 25 recorded ongoing conflicts in Africa,<sup>36</sup> and conflict and instability were seemingly unimpeded by the pandemic throughout 2020, as countries continent-wide were hit by persistent armed attacks, government offensives and insurgencies. The relationship between organized crime and conflict can be described as mutually reinforcing. Illicit economies play a role in all stages of conflict, contributing to and sustaining it, and serving as an obstacle to sustainable peace. Likewise, conflict settings create opportunities for criminality to expand and exploit, as the trafficking of weapons, drugs and other commodities interweaves with emerging war economies. Meanwhile, institutions are unable to respond to inequalities and deteriorating political, health and socio-economic conditions, which also helps fuel criminality. These precise dynamics have been observed in Ethiopia in 2020, with the Tigray conflict curtailing the government's ability to respond effectively to the threat of organized crime.

A perpetual negative cycle of conflict impairing resilience and inciting organized crime may lead to high criminality and low resilience dynamics becoming entrenched. The Index findings show that countries experiencing protracted conflicts, including Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and as well as


countries in other continents, have the lowest levels of resilience.

In this context, arms trafficking was found to be the second-most pervasive criminal market across Africa as a whole (5.56), followed by non-renewable resource crimes (5.44) and fauna crimes (5.39). Along with Asia, Africa features two environmental markets in the top five most pervasive criminal markets, illustrating the prominence of these illicit activities, compared to drug markets, for example. Indeed, the criminal markets with the lowest continental averages were the heroin trade (3.81), the cocaine trade (4.10) and the synthetic drug trade (4.34). In line with global trends, the most influential criminal actor types in Africa were state-embedded actors (6.89), followed by criminal networks (5.96), foreign actors (5.63), and finally, with a much lower average score of 3.11, mafia-style groups.

Africa was identified by experts as having the least developed mechanisms and institutional frameworks to counter organized crime, with an average resilience score of 3.80. Within the continent, similar patterns to those visible globally emerge in terms of the highest- and lowest-performing resilience indicators, with 'international cooperation' topping the list (4.79), followed closely by 'national policies and laws' (4.61) and 'territorial integrity' (4.24). Notably, 'non-state actors', although with a low score (3.95), outperformed most other resilience indicators, reflecting at the same time the high levels of repression of civil society by governments across the continent and the vibrancy of civil society itself. In line with global trends, the social protection indicators were the lowest-scoring indicators in Africa, with 'victim and witness support' (2.81) and 'prevention' (3.08) scoring particularly poorly, which, along with 'government transparency and accountability' (3.30) made up the bottom three resilience indicators across the continent.



**FIGURE 5.8**  
Criminal market scores, Africa



Although the scores for certain markets, actors and resilience indicators were fairly consistent across the continent as a whole, some clear differences can be seen in the various regions. East Africa was identified as the region with the highest levels of criminality (5.66), driven not only by a wide range of extremely pervasive markets in countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, but also by the strength of different types of criminal actors in conflict-affected states such as Sudan and South Sudan. Human trafficking was by far the most far-reaching illicit economy in this subregion, with an average of 7.39. Arms trafficking (7.11) was also noted as

particularly pervasive, driven predominantly by the scores for conflict-torn Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, and the trafficking and circulation of small and light weapons. East Africa was one of only two African regions (the other being North Africa), in which human smuggling featured in the top three most prevalent criminal markets. Eritrea stands out as particularly affected by human smuggling, scoring 9.5, the highest score in the world for this market. As one of the largest refugee-producing countries in Africa, many Eritreans seek the help of smuggling networks, who often have links to the country's political and military class.

Similar patterns emerge in Central Africa, where most notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the expansion of local and foreign rebel groups has increased demand for illicit arms and ammunition trafficking. Moreover, Sahelian countries, including the Central African Republic and Chad, were identified as driving the high arms trafficking score (6.14) for the subregion. Non-renewable-resource crimes were also among the most pervasive criminal markets in Central Africa (6.05), again driven primarily by the illicit gold trade in the DRC and the Central African Republic, as well as by the extensive corruption and criminality entrenched in the oil and diamond sectors in countries such as Angola. As with East Africa, drug markets were among the lowest-scoring criminal economies overall, although experts noted that a number of countries faced acute problems in the form of Tramadol trafficking and the illicit cannabis trade.

Conversely, West Africa featured two drug markets in its top three highest-scoring criminal economies – the only region in Africa to do so. While the illicit cannabis trade (5.87) plays a key role in the region, the cocaine trade was identified as the most pervasive narcotics market in West Africa. The regional average of 6.00 is driven not only by the major cocaine hub of Nigeria, but by a number of smaller states such as Guinea-Bissau, where nearly the entire economy was described as revolving around the facilitation of international trafficking of drugs, as well as Guinea, Cabo Verde, Senegal, Gambia and Ghana, who also score above a 6.00 for the cocaine trade. A cluster of countries in the region have been described as forming a ‘cocaine corridor’ for drugs in transit to consumer markets, with Guinea-Bissau having long played an instrumental role as a hub in the drug flows in and out of the region.<sup>37</sup> The environmental criminal markets also featured heavily in the organized crime landscape of West Africa, with non-renewable resource crimes (5.80), fauna crimes (5.67) and flora crimes (5.50) all scoring relatively high, due in large part to the high levels of natural resources, biodiversity and forest cover, from countries on the west coast like Senegal and

Guinea-Bissau, to countries further east, such as Nigeria and Burkina Faso.

For Southern Africa, the region with the lowest criminality score on the continent, fauna crimes (5.35) were identified as posing a significant issue, not least due to the sheer number of illegally traded endangered animals and their parts, from elephant ivory and rhino horns to lion bones, pangolin scales and abalone (which has had profound social as well as environmental costs in South Africa, one of the few places in the world where the shellfish occurs naturally). Although poaching of rhinos generally declined across the region during the pandemic, population numbers for Kruger National Park in South Africa, which is home to the largest number of rhinos in Africa, show, previously, that the white rhino population had fallen by 67% between 2011 and 2019, and the number of critically endangered black rhino had decreased by 53%. Meanwhile, it is estimated in 2020 that 2.7 million pangolins are killed by poachers every year in Africa, principally destined for end markets in Asia.

Southern Africa was also the region by far the most affected by the heroin trade, the second most pervasive criminal market in the region, with an average score of 5.15. The heroin market was noted as particularly significant in the major trans-shipment and destination states of Mozambique and South Africa, where Afghan heroin is increasingly imported in large quantities, as well as Mauritius and Seychelles, small island states where heroin consumption is rising at an alarming rate, as it is in other countries of the region. At the other end of the spectrum, compared to certain other regions, such as East Africa, the human smuggling industry in Southern Africa was rather limited (3.54).


At the other end of the continent, the picture is the polar opposite. Human smuggling was the second-most pervasive criminal market in North Africa (6.92), which has witnessed a significant rise in the number of individuals seeking the help of smugglers to cross the Mediterranean in recent years. Libya

remains a major transit hub from migrants being smuggled from all across Africa, but experts identified Tunisia as an emerging significant source country (as well as continuing its longstanding role as a transit hub) for irregular migration to Italy. Furthermore, the increase in migration surges following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings has led to a heavily securitized approach to people smuggling on the part of the Algerian government, which may have strengthened the hand of smuggling networks operating in the southern part of the country.

Moreover, with Morocco identified as one of the major cannabis-producing countries in the world, almost every country in North Africa is significantly affected by the cannabis economy, which was assessed to be the most-pervasive criminal market in the region, with an average score of 6.92. Conversely, and in contrast to every other region in Africa, the flora crimes market in North Africa was described as negligible (1.92). The region has very little forest area, and therefore very little illegal logging activity occurs.

**FIGURE 5.9**


## Criminal actor scores, Africa



The Index data shows that, as with criminal markets, East Africa is home to the most influential criminal actors on the continent, driven predominantly by state-embedded actors. Overall, state-embedded actors scored 7.22 in the region and, as is the case with all five regions in Africa, these are the most pervasive criminal actors in the continent – with Central Africa (7.55) leading the way, followed by North Africa (7.17), West Africa (6.90) and Southern Africa (6.90). Criminal networks are also prevalent across all regions in Africa, but none more so than in East Africa (6.83) and West Africa (6.43). On the other hand, while Central Africa is home to countries with some of the highest levels of state capture in the world, criminal networks in numerous countries in the region are fairly weak. While mafia-style groups are the lowest-scoring

criminal actor type across the continent, there are several countries in Africa where highly organized gangs, armed groups and militias yield significant influence in the criminal landscape, many of whom have even been strengthened by the COVID-19 pandemic, capitalizing on openings in illicit markets and in doing so consolidating control over the communities in which they operate.<sup>38</sup> Finally, foreign criminal actors are present throughout most of the continent. Indeed, foreign actors have a significant or severe influence in half of the 54 African countries, and their influence is not limited to any one particular region: foreign actors score fairly high in most regions in Africa, but predominantly in West Africa (6.30), East Africa (6.00) and Southern Africa (5.54).

**FIGURE 5.10**  
**Resilience scores, Africa**





While other continents, most notably Oceania and the Americas, had a discernible peak in the distribution of resilience scores, the resilience curve for Africa is far flatter, reflecting the fact that African countries score particularly varied levels of resilience. At the same time, however, it is clear that as a whole, African states have far lower levels of resilience than countries in other corners of the globe. In Africa, as for the rest of the world, 2020 was a tumultuous year, witnessing the death of the president in Burundi, a military coup in Mali and the beginning of what has developed into an outright war as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive in the Tigray region. Central Africa (3.21) was the lowest-scoring region for resilience, not only in Africa but worldwide. In fact, Africa has three of the worst-performing regions in the world when it comes to resilience, with North Africa scoring 3.79 and East Africa 3.54.

In terms of the best-performing resilience indicators, little variation was seen between the African regions: 'international cooperation' and 'national policies and laws' featured among the highest-scoring indicators in all five regions. At the other end of the resilience scale, the social protection indicators, 'victim and witness support' and 'prevention' were among the lowest-performing indicators for all regions. In addition, the variation in the regional averages for the aforementioned indicators is fairly small.

The resilience indicator with the largest difference between the highest- and lowest-scoring regional averages was 'non-state actors'. The average for this indicator in East Africa was a mere 3.11, whereas civil society in West Africa plays – and crucially is allowed to play – a much more influential role, scoring 4.87, driven predominantly by high scores in countries such as Cabo Verde, Senegal and Ghana, which all score 7.0. Several countries in Southern Africa also boast a free media environment and an active civil society, not least South Africa (7.0). Finally, there was also considerable variation in the scores for 'government transparency and accountability' across Africa. In East Africa, several countries – notably Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia – received very poor scores and even the best-performing country only scored 5.0; conversely, a number of West African states received adequate scores for 'government transparency and accountability', including Cabo Verde, Ghana and Nigeria.

Nevertheless, there is significant scope for improvement across Africa, not just with regard to transparency and accountability – the lack of which was perhaps best epitomized by Tanzania's late president John Magufuli, a notorious coronavirus sceptic who refused to publish data on the COVID-19 situation in the country and who cracked down on those who sought to raise awareness of the virus – but for all of the building blocks needed to establish sustainable resilience to organized crime in Africa.



# Americas

Americas overall score for

**Criminality**

5.06

CRIMINALITY SCORES



1

10

Americas overall score for

**Resilience**


4.83

RESILIENCE SCORES



1


10



For citizens of the Americas, 2020 was an extremely dangerous year. Not only did almost a million people die from coronavirus throughout the year, but violence against civilians, from human rights defenders to environmental activists and journalists, was rife across the continent. At the outbreak of the pandemic, 28 activists were killed in the space of just a few months in Colombia.<sup>39</sup> In the United States, over a thousand civilians every year die at the hands of the police,<sup>40</sup> but it in 2020 it was the murder of one man, George Floyd, that triggered mass protests across the country, subsequently triggering the Black Lives Matter movement.<sup>41</sup>

The impact of the pandemic was felt acutely not just in the US, but also in Latin America, where Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Mexico were the five hardest-hit countries worldwide in terms of excess mortality.<sup>42</sup> Central American gangs, particularly in the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala), that extort payments from the local community, business and migrants, may also have seen their activities temporarily stymied by the pandemic, but it is likely also to have provided other opportunities for criminal groups to exploit.

**FIGURE 5.11**  
**Index scores, Americas**



REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
CENTRAL AMERICA	6.16	5.72	6.61	4.05
SOUTH AMERICA	5.51	5.19	5.82	4.86
NORTH AMERICA	4.58	4.48	4.69	6.92
CARIBBEAN	4.05	3.65	4.45	4.96
<b>AMERICAS AVERAGE</b>	<b>5.06</b>	<b>4.70</b>	<b>5.43</b>	<b>4.83</b>

Although it is not an issue occurring solely in South America, corruption that is endemic in the region came to the fore amid the pandemic, not least in Brazil where the Rio de Janeiro state governor, Wilson Witzel, was impeached (and subsequently removed from office in 2021) following accusations of embezzlement and other corrupt practices in the context of COVID-19-related public procurement.<sup>43</sup> Meanwhile, the US Federal Trade Commission reported that throughout 2020, American citizens lost over US\$211 million to

COVID-related scams and fraud revolving around stimulus payments.<sup>44</sup> Cybercrime more generally was arguably the criminal market to profit the most from the pandemic. Citizens across the Americas fell victim to all manner of ransomware attacks and phishing scams, from sophisticated attacks such as the Trickbot Trojan campaign in the US and the CovidLock app in Costa Rica, to rudimentary email phishing scams in Mexico and Guatemala.<sup>45</sup>

Brazil also witnessed another year of episodes of deadly police excursions into the country's *favelas*, the public health crisis seemingly doing nothing to stem police violence. Indeed, in the first four months of 2020, police killings had increased significantly in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, before the Supreme Court took the decision to ban police raids in the *favelas* during the pandemic.<sup>46</sup>

The pandemic precipitated the unusual phenomenon of major regional migration corridors – this time, however, flowing in reverse. Lack of economic opportunities, compounded by border closures and stringent anti-migrant measures, led to migrants from countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras seeking help from smugglers in order to return home from destination countries such as the US.<sup>47</sup> Organized crime is a phenomenon that has plagued the continent for decades, and the results of the Index suggest that there are no signs of the pervasive criminality afflicting the various regions of the Americas abating any time soon.

The Americas is the only continent where the most pervasive markets are drugs. The cocaine trade was identified as the continent's most prolific illicit market, with a continental average of 7.41 – the highest average score of any continent, for any of the 10 criminal markets. Although the cocaine market may have been disrupted by an initial pandemic-induced reduction in air and container traffic, by the end of the year drug trafficking organizations in South America were shipping as much cocaine as ever, perhaps even more. The cannabis trade is also widespread in the Americas, albeit to a far lesser extent,


scoring 5.81, with arms trafficking (5.40), human trafficking (5.19) and human smuggling (4.47) following in lesser degrees. But the monopoly that the cocaine and cannabis trades hold over the continent's criminal economies is such that there is comparably little room for the proliferation of other criminal markets, as seen elsewhere. Indeed, the Americas rank last among the five continents for the synthetic drug trade, and fourth in heroin trafficking and fauna crimes.

This concentration of drug markets also has implications for the nature of the continent's criminal actors. While state-embedded actors and criminal networks had the highest averages (in line with global trends), the Americas is the only continent in which mafia-style groups were not rated as the least pervasive actor type; this is most likely a result of the influence of drug cartels and gang activity. But amid the extraordinary levels of cartel and gang violence in the Americas, there are simultaneously hundreds of thousands of civil society activists and countless non-governmental organizations that have been built from the ground up. Indeed, the Americas are unique in being the only continent in the world where non-state actors were identified as being among the top three strongest resilience indicators (5.31), along with 'international cooperation' (5.80) and 'national policies and laws' (5.37). Among the lowest-scoring indicators, on the other hand, were 'victim and witness support' (4.30), 'judicial system and detention' (4.31) and 'economic regulatory capacity' (4.49).



FIGURE 5.12

## Criminal market scores, Americas



Two subregions of the Americas – Central and South America – were among the top five regions for overall criminality in the world (with criminality averages of 6.16 and 5.51, respectively). As the world’s source market for cocaine, coca cultivation is almost exclusively concentrated in the northern and western regions of South America, and this has been a driving force in the rise of powerful drug cartels and regional violence. Before the pandemic, cocaine production across Latin America was at record highs, and although disruptions were recorded as the virus spread and governments took restrictive action, production quickly rebounded

stronger than ever.<sup>48</sup> The cocaine market in South America (and in particular Colombia, which has been identified as having the most pervasive cocaine market in the world, at 9.5) has become so enduring that countries in neighbouring subregions have also been assessed as among the world’s major transit zones, including Mexico, Guatemala and Haiti, through which the drug is moved to destination markets in North America, Europe and beyond. In fact, seven out of the eight countries in the Central America region were assessed to have cocaine markets that had significant to severe influence, with scores of 7.00 or above.



Besides narcotics, however, South America also hosts a range of other criminal markets, including environmental crimes. The subregion scored the highest continentally for illicit trade in non-renewable resource crimes, for example, at 6.38. As a region rich in natural resources, gold trafficking was identified as a dominant illicit economy in Venezuela, Suriname and Peru. In July 2020, revelations that a government official in Brazil had deliberately abandoned the issuing of fines for illegal deforestation has been described as a 'flashpoint' for Brazil's deforestation crisis.<sup>49</sup> Brazil consistently scored among the highest in the region for illicit trade in flora, reflecting the illegal timber trade, which has resulted in deforestation of huge swathes of the Amazon. Similarly, trafficking of exotic wildlife has endangered the country's delicate ecosystems while threatening extinction for a number of species.

In addition to its cocaine trade (7.44), Central America was identified as being in the top three regions in the world for various criminal markets, including arms trafficking (with a regional average of 6.25), flora crimes (5.75), fauna crimes (5.88) and the cannabis trade (6.25). Central America also had the highest scores of all four subregions in the continent for human trafficking (6.44) and human smuggling (6.19). Mexico and Panama consistently scored among the highest in all 10 criminal markets in the region. Mexico has a well-consolidated weapons market and serves as a major conduit for arms flows to and from the US and across Central America, which has had a devastating impact on levels of gun violence and criminal armament. The country also hosts a number of environmental crime markets, including the timber industry, wildlife trafficking and fuel smuggling. Meanwhile, Panama scored the highest in the region for human trafficking (8.00), where it has been described as a transit and destination market for victims, including Venezuelan migrants, and children who fall victim to sexual exploitation and forced labour.


By contrast, the Caribbean had the lowest criminality average on the continent at 4.05, featuring the lowest sub-regional scores across the board, with the exception of arms trafficking (4.54), cocaine (6.62) and cannabis (6.08), where North America had the lowest average. The islands of the Caribbean play an integral role as a corridor for the illicit flow of drugs and arms from other subregions of the continent. In a year marked by heightened gang violence and a political crisis following the slide into rule by decree

in January, Haiti was among the highest-scoring countries in the region, across all 10 markets. Large numbers of migrants fleeing the country feed into the human smuggling and trafficking markets. Moreover, despite years of arms embargo, flows of illegally obtained weapons pass through Haiti, aided by border control deficiencies and corruption. Jamaica also scores high for arms trafficking and the cannabis trade. Arms fuel the country's devastatingly high homicide rate and drive other criminal markets. Similarly, despite the ambiguity surrounding the legality of the country's cannabis trade, experts noted an intersection with an escalation of violence in the country as well as

an overlap with other markets, including arms and human trafficking.

North America, the subregion comprising the US and Canada, averaged the third lowest in the Americas in overall criminality, at 4.48. The sheer size of these countries means that while a wide range of criminal markets exist, their overall impact on society remains limited to certain communities. Nevertheless, the US represents a huge source, transit and destination market, with experts identifying synthetic drugs, cocaine, heroin and arms trafficking as the most pervasive markets in the country.


**FIGURE 5.13**  
**Criminal actor scores, Americas**



In terms of criminal actors, the Americas had the highest average in the world (5.43), underscoring the strong influence and power of criminal groups operating on the continent. As mentioned, state-embedded criminal actors averaged the highest at 5.61, consistent with global trends. Criminal markets scored 5.46, followed by mafia-style groups (5.40) and foreign criminal actors (5.24). The pervasiveness of all four criminal actor types in a number of countries, along with a lower continental criminal markets average, means that criminal groups are the driving force of criminality on the continent. The example of

Honduras illustrates the potency of criminal actors. Groups such as Mara Salvatrucha 13 dominate the country's criminal landscape, engaging in extortion, drug trafficking and distribution, and money laundering. Alongside such groups, criminal networks such as the Tumbadores resemble modern-day pirates, who steal and resell drug shipments, largely along human smuggling routes. These criminal activities are facilitated by state-embedded actors as well as foreign criminal organizations notably from Colombia and Mexico. Similar criminal actor dynamics appear across the continent.

**FIGURE 5.14**  
**Resilience scores, Americas**



In terms of resilience, the Americas represents a spectrum of resilience capacities. For example, North America was in the top five regions for resilience, scoring 6.92 on average, while Central America scored the fifth lowest in the world, with an average resilience score of 4.05. No resilience indicator scored lower than 6.00 in North America, reflecting the US and Canada's roles as global political and economic leaders. Nevertheless, the US began the year with a presidential impeachment trial, and the instability was only exacerbated by COVID-19 and the nationwide mass protests in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. Moreover, the indictment in August of a close advisor to Trump

for fraud – the latest in a long list of individuals close to the Trump administration to be indicted, and subsequently convicted, in recent years – is an illustration of the decline in transparency at the highest levels of government. Indeed, the leadership and governance indicators were among the lowest scoring for the US. Drug overdose deaths reached a record high in the US in 2020, testimony to the 'deadly impact of the coronavirus pandemic's disruption to drug abuse treatment and prevention efforts',<sup>50</sup> while the FinCEN files leak exposed how systemic the use of the international banking system by criminals to move their illicit proceeds really is.

In the Caribbean and Central America, ‘international cooperation’ and ‘national policies and laws’ were the highest-scoring resilience indicators, while ‘economic regulatory capacity’ and ‘victim and witness support’ had the lowest averages, indicating the need to improve a number of economic and social deficiencies. In South America, ‘non-state actors’ was the highest-scoring resilience indicator (followed by international cooperation and national policies and laws), with countries such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay assessed as having a highly effective resilience capacity. Although the region is home to countless forces for good within civil society, they operate in what are often deadly environments, and the threats to their safety – and ultimately their lives – must not be overlooked. With the number of activists killed in 2020, it is no wonder Colombia’s UN envoy told the Security Council in July that the killing of human rights and community defenders, as well as of former combatants who have laid down their arms, continues to be the greatest threat to the consolidation of peace in the country.<sup>51</sup>







# Europe

Europe overall score for

**Criminality**

4.48

CRIMINALITY SCORES




Europe overall score for

**Resilience**

6.23

RESILIENCE SCORES




Although COVID-19 originated in Asia, Europe quickly became the new epicentre of the outbreak, and in the first half of 2020 the continent was ravaged by the virus. By the end of the year, almost 600 000 deaths had been confirmed in Europe. The health crisis was quickly followed by an economic crisis across many, if not most, European states, not least in Italy where mafia groups swiftly seized the opportunity to strengthen their hold over the communities in which they operate, handing out food packages and providing loans to struggling families and businesses alike – what has been dubbed ‘mafia welfare’.<sup>52</sup> Not all businesses suffered as the result of the pandemic, however, as companies in Europe benefited from the preferential treatment, cronyism and outright corruption exposed in countless scandals pertaining to personal protective equipment procurement, public contracts for track-and-trace systems and more.<sup>53</sup>

As elsewhere, while border closures and harsh lockdown measures took their toll on the formal

economy, the damaging impact on the continent’s illicit economies was far less prominent. And although Europe is one of the better-performing continents under the Index, both in terms of criminality, where it is the second-lowest-scoring continent (4.48) and resilience, where it is assessed to be the continent that is most resilient to organized crime (6.23), it is by no means immune to the phenomenon. The dismantling of the EncroChat encrypted phone network by European law enforcement agencies exposed the sheer extent of criminal behaviour that permeates the continent, revealing a litany of illicit activity from drug deals and money laundering to arms trafficking and corruption within police forces.<sup>54</sup> Malta is a prime example of how alleged corruption can destabilize a nation, as 2020 was the year in which former prime minister Joseph Muscat resigned and was officially questioned in connection with the investigation into the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia, the prominent anti-corruption investigative journalist murdered in 2017.

**FIGURE 5.15**  
Index scores, Europe





Europe is a destination market for a number of illicit economies, and home to several countries of origin or transit for various criminal markets. As with other parts of the world such as Africa and Asia (albeit to a lesser degree), human trafficking is the most pervasive criminal market in Europe, with an average score of 4.94. A number of European countries play a role in the human trafficking industry, from source countries to final destinations, as well as those that experience significant levels of internal trafficking, which partially explains the prevalence of this market. The next highest-scoring markets are cannabis (4.88), cocaine (4.83) and synthetic drugs (4.76), which clearly illustrates the importance of drug markets in Europe. Just below the synthetic drug trade is human smuggling (4.72), followed by the heroin trade (4.36) and arms trafficking (4.23). While some European countries do play a role in the transnational illegal wildlife trade, the three environmental crime markets included in the Index rank at the bottom for Europe: non-renewable resource crimes (3.35), fauna crimes (3.24) and flora crimes (2.75).


In contrast to many other continents, state-embedded actors in Europe are not the dominant criminal actor type, registering an average score of 4.58, ranking above only mafia-style groups, which were identified by experts to be the least influential type of criminal actor across the four typologies. In first and second place are foreign actors (5.38) and criminal networks (5.16), which, given the strong interaction and collaboration between the two actor types in Europe, is perhaps expected.

In terms of resilience rankings, Europe was by a considerable margin the highest-scoring continent, with an average resilience score of 6.23. As with every other continent, barring Oceania, the highest-scoring resilience indicator was 'international cooperation' (7.02), followed by 'national policies and laws' (6.70). In fact, of the 12 building blocks of resilience covered by the Index, no fewer than nine had an average score of 6.00 or higher in Europe, with 'territorial integrity', 'law enforcement', 'non-state actors', 'judicial system and detention', 'economic regulatory capacity', 'political leadership and governance' and 'victim and witness support' all scoring fairly well. The three indicators scoring below 6.00, and thus illustrating more scope for improvement, were 'prevention' (5.98), 'anti-money

laundering' (5.78) and 'government transparency and accountability' (5.78). It is noteworthy, however, that although these latter indicators are

Europe's worst-performing, they are nevertheless higher than the averages for any of the other four continents across the globe.

**FIGURE 5.16**  
**Criminal market scores, Europe**



As elsewhere, it is important to delve into regional nuances, given the significant variations of criminality and resilience scores across continents, and this is no less true for Europe. Turning first to the criminality component, for criminal markets, there was considerable disparity between the regions in Europe. On the one hand, the Baltic and Nordic states were assessed to have fairly


peripheral illicit economies, especially in regard to the environmental markets. On the other hand, there were a number of criminal markets that were identified as having considerable reach in Central and Eastern Europe, namely human trafficking (5.68) and human smuggling (5.59), as well as several of the drug markets.

In both Southern and Western Europe, the cocaine trade dominated, driven by the high scores assigned to gateway states, such as Italy and Spain, as well as a considerable number of major destination markets that make up the regions. Several large seizures of cocaine at European ports throughout 2020 underline the importance of maritime routes in the transnational cocaine trade, and the COVID-19 pandemic has precipitated a shift toward the increasing infiltration of cocaine into large consignments of legal goods. As Reitano and Shaw (2021) explain: 'If anything, the pandemic restrictions made it easier for trafficking groups to

get their product through points of entry. There was a decline in the capacity to search air freight and containers [...] because of social-distancing measures, sick personnel or the assignment of staff to other duties related to managing the pandemic. The need to keep trade moving and food and medicines supplied was also prioritised, with the result that searching and intelligence-led enforcement were reduced in some seaports. Some authorities created 'green lanes' at ports of entry and at border crossings to accelerate the processing of cargo shipments and to ensure their swift movement onto roads for distribution. That kept drugs moving too.'<sup>155</sup>

**FIGURE 5.17**

## Criminal actor scores, Europe



As with criminal markets, there was a marked variation in the ranking of various criminal actor types in Europe. Nowhere was this variation more pronounced than when comparing the strength of state-embedded actors in Central and Eastern Europe, a subregion that had an average of 6.76 (the second-highest score of any region after Western Asia), with Northern Europe, where the score was just 2.25. Aside from the notable exceptions of Romania and Poland, the remaining 16 countries in the region registered scores of 5.5

or above for state-embedded actors, with Belarus and Russia leading the way. Mafia-style groups also had an unequal distribution across the continent, with powerful groups identified in several countries in Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe, such as Italy, Spain, Montenegro, Albania and Serbia, among others. At the same time, mafia-style groups were found to be either non-existent or to have very limited influence in many countries across the continent, from small microstates in Western Europe, such as Andorra,




Liechtenstein and Luxembourg, to larger states further east, including Hungary, for example.

The Index results illustrate the influence yielded by foreign actors hailing both from other European neighbours as well as criminal actors from other continents. Economic powerhouses in Europe such as Spain and Italy were deemed extremely attractive environments for foreign organized criminal actors, due in part to their proximity to big players and as strategically important transport vectors in the transnational illicit economy. The other side of the coin, however, is that what is driving the high foreign actors' scores in a

number of other countries is the pervasiveness of the traditional Italian mafia groups themselves, most notably the 'Ndrangheta, either in terms of their direct involvement in the trade of illicit commodities, or their infiltration of the formal economy and banking sectors to launder their illicit proceeds, such as in the UK or Germany, for example. This is a feature of the global illicit economy that has been particularly exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, as criminal groups have preyed on vulnerable businesses crippled by coronavirus restrictions, extorting them or taking them over outright to then use as vehicles for laundering their illicit proceeds.

**FIGURE 5.18**  
**Resilience scores, Europe**



When it comes to resilience, Europe as a continent was assessed to be in the best position relative to the others. Not only was Europe the highest-scoring continent globally, but of all the regional groupings worldwide under the Index, the four European regions of Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe ranked second, third, sixth and eighth, respectively. With 14 of the 20 most resilient countries in the world hailing from Northern and Western Europe, these two regions dominate the top of the Index rankings. In line with global trends, the highest-scoring indicator for these subregions was ‘international cooperation’, scoring 8.50 and 7.95 respectively, perhaps best exemplified by the takedown in July 2020 of the EncroChat encrypted phone network of choice for criminal actors across the continent as a result of collaboration between police forces in several countries. ‘Territorial integrity’ and ‘national policies and laws’ also featured high on the list of resilience indicators in both regions, in addition to ‘economic regulatory capacity’ (8.06) in Northern Europe and ‘non-state actors’ (7.91) in Western Europe. The frameworks and mechanisms in place to combat money laundering, on the other hand, were identified as a weak spot in both Northern and Western Europe relative to the other resilience building blocks, with ‘anti-money laundering’ being assessed as the lowest-scoring resilience indicator at 7.00 and 6.41, respectively.

Southern Europe, while still outperforming the vast majority of the world’s regions, nevertheless had more countries with low resilience levels (as defined as below an average score of 5.5) than with high resilience. The moderately high resilience scores assigned to Spain (6.63), Portugal (6.46) and Italy (6.29) were counteracted by countries at the other end of the spectrum such as Cyprus (4.42), San Marino (5.13) and Malta (5.17). In this region, ‘international cooperation’ once again took the number one spot (6.88), driven first and foremost by Italy’s stellar engagement in cooperation with the international community, including through cross-border judicial and law-

enforcement cooperation. ‘National policies and laws’ was the second-highest-scoring indicator at 6.56, once more driven by the robust legislative frameworks in Spain and Italy. Furthermore, Southern Europe was the only region on the continent where ‘law enforcement’ was among the top three resilience indicators, scoring an average of 6.19. The variety and effectiveness of specialized law enforcement units across the region, including the Centre for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organized Crime in Spain, the Judicial Police in Portugal and the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, the Guardia di Finanza and the Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale<sup>56</sup> in Italy, contributed to the region’s high average for this indicator. Even in the best-performing countries, however, organized crime finds its way into the heart of law enforcement. In July 2020, an entire department of the Italian Carabinieri was dismantled after 10 officers were arrested on suspicion of a whole host of crimes, from drug dealing and extortion to abuse of power and even torture, which prosecutors said escalated during the country’s first COVID-19 lockdown.<sup>57</sup>

Aside from ‘prevention’, the worst-performing indicator in Southern Europe, ‘government transparency and accountability’ was identified as a significant obstacle to an effective response to organized crime in the region, scoring an average of just 4.88. While for most other indicators there was a clear divide between the highest- and lowest-performing countries in the region, low levels of transparency and mechanisms to ensure accountability appeared to be somewhat of an equalizer in Southern Europe, with no country scoring higher than 6. While the small states of San Marino (4), Monaco (4) and Malta (4.5) had particularly low scores, other countries such as Italy, Greece and Cyprus did not fare much better, each receiving a score of 5.


Finally, Central and Eastern Europe, while outperforming most regions around the world, received the lowest average resilience score of the four European subregions, at 4.97. Several

countries in the region did perform fairly well, with Czech Republic (6.25), Poland (6.13) and Slovenia (6.08) all scoring at or around the European average. However, 12 of the 17 countries in the region were assessed as having low resilience, scoring below 5.5. Moldova, Belarus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all scored below 4.00, with Ukraine and Russia scoring only marginally higher, at 4.00 and 4.04, respectively. Experts noted that the relatively poor scores in this subregion were driven by a range of low-scoring indicators, particularly those assessing governments' ability and willingness to tackle organized crime in an open, transparent and effective manner. Indeed, 'government transparency and accountability' was the lowest-scoring resilience indicator in Central and Eastern Europe, at 4.26, with almost two-thirds of the countries in the region scoring 4.5 or lower. Similarly, 'political leadership and governance' also scored low across the region, in particular in the Western Balkan states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, as well as Belarus (where heavily disputed elections led to mass protests, arbitrary arrests and extreme violence), and Moldova and Ukraine. By contrast, 'international cooperation', which is recognized as a key pillar in the effective fight against transnational organized crime, scored relatively high across the region, with a regional average of 5.79, led by the Central European states of Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, which all scored 7.0 for the indicator. Overall, more than half of the countries in the region were assessed to have international cooperation frameworks that are sufficiently effective, scoring 6.0 or higher.

The dynamics surrounding organized crime and resilience to counter it in Central and Eastern Europe are by no means limited to official UN member states, of course. The example of Kosovo serves well to highlight the fact that organized crime can pervade all states, regardless of their political status. Indeed, the results show that Kosovo consistently featured among the highest-scoring criminal markets in Europe.<sup>58</sup>




# Oceania




Oceania overall score for  
**Criminality**  
3.07

CRIMINALITY SCORES



Oceania overall score for  
**Resilience**  
5.46

RESILIENCE SCORES




What makes Oceania – a continent comprising Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia – unique is that almost all states in the region are small, and small states have particular vulnerabilities. In Australia in June 2020, spurred by the Black Lives Matter movement, thousands of people took to the streets to protest against the disproportionate prison rates for indigenous people, while the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, which decimated the tourism industry upon which many states rely, risked provoking social unrest and political instability. As bushfires raged throughout Australia, it wasn't just the security threat posed by climate change that was highlighted in the region: the largest island

state in the world signed a security pact with Japan in the face of increasing shows of military strength on the part of China.

While in absolute terms, by global comparisons, organized crime levels in this region may be lower, the economic, political and societal impact of the phenomenon is significant. While Australasia and the Pacific island countries may not be as burdened by organized crime as the rest of the world, a number of illicit economies have already taken hold, and others are seemingly on the rise. Papua New Guinea's record drug bust of 500 kilograms of cocaine in 2020 following the crash-landing of a plane outside Port Moresby is a clear illustration of that.<sup>59</sup>

FIGURE 5.19

## Index scores, Oceania




REGION	CRIMINALITY	CRIMINAL MARKETS	CRIMINAL ACTORS	RESILIENCE
MELANESIA	3.61	3.44	3.78	4.71
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND	3.63	3.50	3.75	8.17
MICRONESIA	2.58	2.50	2.66	4.90
POLYNESIA	2.45	2.48	2.42	5.64
<b>OCEANIA AVERAGE</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>2.98</b>	<b>3.16</b>	<b>5.46</b>

Overall, however, Oceania's criminality is heavily skewed to lower scores because of the structure of the Index, whereby countries that feature a diverse range of criminal markets score higher than those that have fewer, but possibly more pervasive, criminal markets. Broadly speaking, this is the case for Oceania, where countries mostly feature only one or two prominent criminal markets. Thus, the continent scores the lowest globally in terms of overall criminality.

Among the countries in the region, two 'groupings' emerge when it comes to criminality, with country averages clustered either between 1.5 and 3.0, or if they have a slightly more pervasive criminality, between 3.0 and 4.0. No country in the region was identified as experiencing significant or extreme levels of criminality, although specific markets in particular countries were noted as quite pervasive.



**FIGURE 5.20**  
**Criminal market scores, Oceania**



Papua New Guinea is a notable exception, however. The country has an overall criminality score of 5.44, 1.29 points above the next highest-scoring country in Oceania, the Solomon Islands. Unlike other countries that either had no identifiable high-criminality markets or featured only one, Papua New Guinea was found to have several pervasive markets, including flora crimes (8.0), human trafficking (7.0), arms trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes and cannabis, all scoring at 5.50. This has the effect of raising the average scores for both Oceania as a whole and the subregion of Melanesia. Criminality-wise, two other countries in Melanesia also appeared to be outliers in a regional context – the Solomon Islands and Fiji – both of which experience


significantly higher levels of criminality than countries further north in Micronesia and to the east in Polynesia. One possible explanation for this would be the fact that island nations in Melanesia are much closer to the large regional destination markets for organized crime, Australia and New Zealand. As the last transit stages before reaching these large markets, organized crime groups are increasingly using Melanesian islands as transit hubs for arms, cocaine and synthetic drugs, which drives up overall crime levels. A clear illustration to justify this is the fact that both Fiji and Papua New Guinea score high for cocaine, 4.5 and 4, respectively, the second and third highest score in Oceania, after Australia.

Overall, Oceania comes in last for eight of the 10 criminal markets in a continental comparison. The illicit trade in fauna (4.93) and synthetic drugs (3.57) were the two exceptions, where the continent ranked third and fourth, respectively. While there are a number of native species in Oceania that are traded illegally, the high average score for the continent on fauna crimes is due almost entirely to IUU fishing. Countries in the region have extensive economic zones, which, because of lack of capacity to patrol, are

vulnerable to IUU fishing. Moreover, IUU fishing makes the negative impact of the illegal practice all the more felt across communities in Oceania. The synthetic drug trade score, on the other hand, reflects the fact that the region hosts one of the world's major consumer countries, namely Australia. Combined with the large demand for synthetic drugs in New Zealand, smaller island nations were identified as important emerging transport hubs in the synthetic drug trade.

**FIGURE 5.21**

### Criminal actor scores, Oceania




With regard to criminal actors, foreign actors (4.14) were identified as having the most extensive influence in Oceania, followed by criminal networks (3.82), state-embedded actors (3.14) and mafia-style groups (1.54). Experts noted that the higher score for foreign actors is mostly due to their involvement in illegal fishing. Interestingly, there were no mafia-style groups identified in any of the subregions in Oceania, except for Australia and New Zealand, where outlaw motorcycle groups and gangs were assessed to have a firm hold over crime markets. Melanesia was again identified as somewhat of an outlier in the wider region, holding the highest average score for all three remaining criminal actor types – criminal networks, and state-embedded and foreign actors. The stark difference in the score for foreign groups in Melanesia compared to Oceania's other three subregions supports the premise that the

subregion serves as a transit hub for different crime markets. Notably, however, there has been collaboration between foreign actors on the one hand and domestic groups on the other. This has not only developed criminal markets that foreign groups engage in but created new criminal opportunities for loose networks and state-embedded actors to exploit.

In terms of resilience, most countries in Oceania score around 5.00, with the notable exceptions of Australia and New Zealand, which feature higher average resilience scores – 7.96 and 8.38, respectively. Australia and New Zealand (8.17), and the Polynesia subregion (5.64) feature low-criminality and high-resilience, while the other two subregions have lower resilience to organized crime: Micronesia averages 4.90 on resilience, while Melanesia scores 4.71.

**FIGURE 5.22**  
Resilience scores, Oceania



Although Melanesia ranks higher for criminality than other subregions in Oceania and lowest on resilience within the continent, when compared to the global average countries in this continent nevertheless scored fairly well, with the exception of Papua New Guinea (3.42), the least resilient country in Oceania. Experts identified the biggest obstacle to a more coherent approach to tackling organized crime in the subregion to be lack of effective victim and witness support mechanisms. That indicator averaged a score of 3.50, followed by 'prevention' and 'economic regulatory capacity', both averaging 4.10.

Along with territorial integrity, anti-money laundering was also an area where experts noted that Melanesia requires significant improvements. In Vanuatu, for example, it was revealed only

in 2021 that the 'golden passports' scheme in operation in the country has allowed thousands of foreign nationals, including alleged gang members, cryptocurrency thieves and extortionists, to obtain citizenship in the island nation, permitting them to exploit the island's lax tax laws and launder illicit proceeds.<sup>60</sup>

For Micronesia, indicators such as 'victim and witness support' (3.00) and 'prevention' (3.63) scored lower, as did the ability of these island nations to adequately regulate and manage the economy (4.50). In Polynesia, the same three indicators appeared last, but in a different order. 'Economic regulatory capacity' in the subregion averaged 4.67, followed by 'victim and witness support' (4.83), 'prevention' and 'political leadership and governance' (both averaging a score of 5.00).







## SECTION 6

# Vulnerability classifications

Interpreting the criminality-  
resilience nexus







FIGURE 6.1

## Vulnerability classifications



With the ultimate objective of providing a solid platform on which policymakers can implement effective, tailor-made measures to address criminality in their respective countries and regions, the Index is designed to highlight not only areas that need to be improved, but also where successful measures against organized crime have been implemented.


**FIGURE 6.2**  
**Vulnerability classifications map**


The findings reveal a number of insights into criminal markets, criminal actors and resilience dynamics within national borders and transnationally. While scores and conclusions might be of most interest to some, the process itself of score interrogation and reflection contributes to the broader dialogue about the nature of organized crime and resilience that the Index aims to generate.

As previously mentioned, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' resilience framework against organized crime. The contextual differences between countries and regions mean that states must harmonize responses with their economic, cultural, geographic and political situations if they are to address the threats they face in an effective way. What may be a successful response in one country may have little to no effect in another, and even in the same country, response measures that may have worked in the past, may not fully address evolving criminal trends.

Whereas organized crime can be dynamic and fast-evolving, response measures, by contrast, are often slow endeavours. In the end, to have a long-term reduction of organized crime, states must garner the political will, engage in sustained debate, build the evidence base and provide room for non-state actors to contribute to the development and strengthening of multifaceted resilience frameworks that are proactive and address the root causes of organized crime.

Looking at either criminality dynamics or resilience frameworks in isolation limits stakeholders' understanding of the complexity of organized crime and the ability to determine whether responses are successful in addressing criminality in a given context. Therefore, the implications based on the analysis of where criminality and resilience meet may be the most relevant. Because the Index acknowledges that countries may start






out on an unequal footing, their current positions on a quadrant of criminality and resilience (see Figure 6.1) are perhaps less valuable than how they move over time, which will be captured in future iterations of the Index. The Index is therefore designed to provide policymakers and other stakeholders with more insight into emerging and evolving trends in criminality, as it will build on information over time.

By analyzing the distinct characteristics of countries that fall into each criminality–resilience quadrant and taking into account contextual specificities, policymakers can identify where common strengths and weaknesses lie, in order to develop tailor-made responses that address the criminality challenges faced by countries in each quadrant.

# Low criminality–high resilience

**FIGURE 6.3**  
Low criminality–high resilience



Of the 193 countries in the world, 50 (about 26%) currently fall within this quadrant. From each continent, these 50 countries can arguably be described as being in the most ideal situation when it comes to facing organized crime. While they differ in the kinds of vulnerabilities they individually face, and their economic capacity, these countries all nevertheless demonstrate that they have built effective resilience frameworks to respond to criminality within their borders, in line with international standards.

In Africa for example, five countries – Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda and Senegal – represent different corners of the African continent, but have each taken serious and appropriate steps to combat organized crime, including in the form of targeted organized crime strategies, resourcing law enforcement bodies, and the building of institutional and economic frameworks, among others. Although there is room for improvement in certain areas of resilience in each country, overall resilience measures are well-rounded and comprehensive. Notably, ‘non-state actors’ score a 6.00 or above in four of these countries, underscoring the undeniable importance of civil society, the media and the private sector in successfully building resilience to organized crime.

As the continent with one of the lowest overall criminality averages, it is unsurprising that a large proportion of countries (24) in Europe fall into this quadrant. What may be more telling are countries elsewhere that exhibit low criminality and high resilience, but that are located in regions that experience high criminality. For example, Costa Rica stands out markedly as the only country in this quadrant in Central America, the region with the highest criminality average worldwide. The issue of organized crime has been identified as a political priority for Costa Rica, which has established strong legal institutional frameworks, rooted in transparency. While Costa Rica’s lower economic resilience indicator scores suggest room for improvement, the country offers stronger social protections than its neighbours, including a dedicated office for victim support, three main crime prevention programmes and high levels of media freedom.

Other countries, including Jordan and Singapore, also appear in this quadrant – both positive outliers in their respective high-criminality regions. Both are more stable than their neighbours and have implemented institutional frameworks that allow for robust international cooperation mechanisms, comprehensive organized crime legislation and prevention initiatives.

One important consideration to take into account is that the assessment of a country’s resilience is associated with the criminal threat it faces. A look at Oceania illustrates this. While Samoa and Tuvalu do not feature the institutional strengths that other countries in the same continent have implemented to address a range of criminal activities, their dedication to curb IUU fishing, as the primary threat facing the region, is prioritized and sound.

Overall, lessons of best practices can be learned from the example of countries situated in this quadrant, and more efforts should be made to document and broadcast these success stories, enabling more countries to move into this quadrant. In the case of countries currently identified as having low criminality and high resilience, their position affords them the opportunity to serve as examples and leaders in their regions through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and engagement.





and low resilience. Prime examples of this are Greece, Angola, Bolivia and Djibouti.

Building border controls and law enforcement alone, however, does not enhance a country's overall capacity to respond to organized crime, particularly if criminality dynamics appear within a country's borders. It is therefore imperative that states take a holistic approach by reinforcing other institutional frameworks, including those that promote transparency and good governance, while providing the space for non-state actors to bring their unique strengths to tackle the root causes of crime.

Bolivia, for example, has lower levels of criminality than most countries in South America. It received


notably high scores only for levels of illegality in the timber industry, illegal mining and natural gas smuggling, and the cocaine trade, but received particularly low scores for the human smuggling, synthetic drugs, heroin and cannabis trades. The country has considerably lower levels of criminality than its immediate neighbours, although it ranks only 95th in the world for resilience. Bolivia was assessed as having effective resilience mechanisms in key areas such as national policies and laws, and prevention, but at the same time deficiencies in areas like the judiciary and detention system. Perhaps by prioritizing the strengthening of institutional and non-state frameworks identified by the Index as ineffective or moderately effective, Bolivia could become a regional powerhouse in the fight against organized crime.



# High criminality–high resilience

FIGURE 6.5

High criminality–high resilience



Perhaps the least intuitive vulnerability quadrant features countries with high levels of criminality, but that have also developed robust frameworks and mechanisms to counter organized crime. Only nine countries in the world, from all the continents, were found to have simultaneously high criminality and high resilience: Colombia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain and the United States. What is immediately striking about these countries is that the majority are among the economic powerhouses in their respective regions. The United States is the world’s largest economy; France, Italy and Spain are among the wealthiest countries in Europe, as are South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. In Latin America, Colombia and Ecuador both feature in the

top six countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP). Malaysia also has a strong and dynamic economy, although comparably lower than other countries in the continent, like Japan, South Korea and Indonesia. Although the countries located in the high criminality–high resilience quadrant account for only less than 5% of countries worldwide, cumulatively they account for over a third of global GDP.

Although the profiles of the countries located in this quadrant differ somewhat, with different criminal actor types dominating, they are alike in the sense that they all host a wide range of pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actor types. Whereas some of these countries are notable source countries for a whole host of criminal markets – none more so than the cocaine trade in Colombia – others, notably the wealthier European countries, are major destination countries in the transnational illicit economy, primarily the drug trade but also for other illicit industries, such as human trafficking and human smuggling.

But what clearly differentiates these major economies from countries such as Brazil, Mexico, China, Kenya and numerous others, is that they also have robust and effective mechanisms and institutions in place to tackle organized crime, albeit to varying degrees. Italy is a particularly interesting case, for various reasons. As the birthplace of the traditional mafia, Italy is home to among the most powerful organized crime groups, both domestically and overseas, having established strong working relationships with criminal organizations around the world, and infiltrating the country's political and economic landscape. However, as one of the first ever countries to take the fight against the mafia to the forefront of the political agenda since the



1980s, Italy's institutional and non-state response mechanisms have developed into some of the most sophisticated in the world.

While it may appear counterintuitive for a country to simultaneously have high levels of resilience to organized crime and experience high levels of organized crime, there are several potential explanations. Certain countries with large economies and highly developed trade infrastructure may be inherently vulnerable to organized crime due to the opportunities they present to criminal actors. In such countries, it is consequently very challenging to build up the necessary frameworks to bring levels of organized crime down to the lowest levels. Furthermore, pervasive criminality is a significant stressor on a country's resilience measures, and this can be seen in countries such as Nigeria, for example, which has extremely high levels of criminality and is constantly on the cusp of falling into a downward spiral. In countries in which resilience is constantly being shaped in an ad hoc manner, where resilience is not structural, or deeply rooted within state institutions, or where it is inelastic, there is the constant risk of the resilience mechanisms being overwhelmed. Thus, even in countries where resilience is at the higher end of the spectrum, complacency must be avoided to prevent the weight of the organized crime landscape from snapping the elastic band of resilience.

# High criminality–low resilience

FIGURE 6.6

## High criminality–low resilience



Spanning Europe, Asia, the Americas and Africa, the 57 countries in this quadrant exhibit significant vulnerabilities to organized crime. As they face potent criminality threats, deficiencies in resilience capacity make these countries especially vulnerable to criminality dynamics becoming further embedded, with long-term economic and social impacts.



Although not exclusively, countries in this quadrant tend to fall into two categories. Many in this quadrant, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mozambique, Syria and the Ukraine, to name but a few, are experiencing long-standing conflict and fragility, while other countries, Albania, Brazil, Mexico and Russia, among others, are more stable but their democratic values and upholding of the rule of law have been compromised, thereby reducing their ability to address organized crime effectively.



There is an enormous amount of research and literature on the crime–conflict nexus, and on how crime and conflict are mutually reinforcing. Conflict weakens social, economic and security institutions' ability to provide goods and services, allowing for criminal actors to fill these voids. At the same time, profit-making criminal activities may intertwine with war economies, facilitating the continuation of conflict. Therefore, in many ways, it is unsurprising that a number of fragile states and those experiencing conflict fall into this quadrant.

What may be less intuitive are those countries that are characterized as strong and stable, but nevertheless fail to adequately respond to the criminal threats they face. In some cases, low resilience capacity may be a product of lack of political will to prioritize organized crime issues, while, in others, responses to criminality either do not meet international human rights principles or it is the state itself that is engaged

in criminality, undermining its primary role as a protection provider. For example, the Philippines was assessed as falling into this latter category. The country faces a particularly pervasive synthetic drugs market, where the prevalence of methamphetamine use is estimated to be among the highest in the world. While the country has taken a strong stance against organized crime, experts assessed the implementation of the country's anti-drug policy (its 'war on drugs', which has included extra-judicial killings) as contrary to fundamental human rights principles.


There is a tendency in many of these countries to focus on traditional responses to criminality, such as criminal justice and security measures, but these efforts are inevitably compromised if there is a lack of adherence to the rule of law. Addressing resilience deficits, particularly those that centre on governance, would be a meaningful goal for such countries, but in many cases would be unrealistic to achieve without political will. States in this quadrant may therefore benefit from expanding the space in which civil society, the media and private sector can operate. Indeed, of the 57 countries in this quadrant, half were assessed to have the 'non-state actors' resilience indicator as either non-existent or extremely ineffective. Establishing other forms of resilience outside of institutional frameworks could therefore help counterbalance and, in some cases, encourage better state engagement.

**FIGURE 6.7**  
Criminality and resilience – country classifications




**Low criminality - high resilience (50 countries)**

● AD ANDORRA	● HR CROATIA	● KW KUWAIT	● RW RWANDA
● AR ARGENTINA	● CZ CZECH REPUBLIC	● LV LATVIA	● WS SAMOA
● AM ARMENIA	● DK DENMARK	● LI LIECHTENSTEIN	● SN SENEGAL
● AU AUSTRALIA	● EE ESTONIA	● LT LITHUANIA	● SG SINGAPORE
● AT AUSTRIA	● FI FINLAND	● LU LUXEMBOURG	● SI SLOVENIA
● BH BAHRAIN	● GE GEORGIA	● MU MAURITIUS	● LC ST. LUCIA
● BB BARBADOS	● DE GERMANY	● NL NETHERLANDS	● SE SWEDEN
● BE BELGIUM	● IS ICELAND	● NZ NEW ZEALAND	● CH SWITZERLAND
● BW BOTSWANA	● IE IRELAND	● NO NORWAY	● TV TUVALU
● CV CABO VERDE	● IL ISRAEL	● PL POLAND	● GB UNITED KINGDOM
● CA CANADA	● JP JAPAN	● PT PORTUGAL	● UY URUGUAY
● CL CHILE	● JO JORDAN	● QA QATAR	
● CR COSTA RICA	● KR KOREA, REP.	● RO ROMANIA	




## Low criminality - low resilience (77 countries)

● <b>DZ</b> ALGERIA	● <b>DM</b> DOMINICA	● <b>KG</b> KYRGYZSTAN	● <b>SM</b> SAN MARINO
● <b>AO</b> ANGOLA	● <b>DO</b> DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	● <b>LS</b> LESOTHO	● <b>ST</b> SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
● <b>AG</b> ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	● <b>EG</b> EGYPT	● <b>LR</b> LIBERIA	● <b>SC</b> SEYCHELLES
● <b>AZ</b> AZERBAIJAN	● <b>GQ</b> EQUATORIAL GUINEA	● <b>MW</b> MALAWI	● <b>SL</b> SIERRA LEONE
● <b>BS</b> BAHAMAS	● <b>ER</b> ERITREA	● <b>MV</b> MALDIVES	● <b>SK</b> SLOVAKIA
● <b>BD</b> BANGLADESH	● <b>SZ</b> ESWATINI	● <b>MT</b> MALTA	● <b>SB</b> SOLOMON ISLANDS
● <b>BY</b> BELARUS	● <b>ET</b> ETHIOPIA	● <b>MH</b> MARSHALL ISLANDS	● <b>LK</b> SRI LANKA
● <b>BZ</b> BELIZE	● <b>FJ</b> FIJI	● <b>FM</b> MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	● <b>KN</b> ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
● <b>BJ</b> BENIN	● <b>GA</b> GABON	● <b>MR</b> MAURITANIA	● <b>VC</b> ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
● <b>BT</b> BHUTAN	● <b>GM</b> GAMBIA	● <b>MD</b> MOLDOVA	● <b>SR</b> SURINAME
● <b>BO</b> BOLIVIA	● <b>GR</b> GREECE	● <b>MC</b> MONACO	● <b>TL</b> TIMOR-LESTE
● <b>BN</b> BRUNEI	● <b>GD</b> GRENADA	● <b>MN</b> MONGOLIA	● <b>TG</b> TOGO
● <b>BG</b> BULGARIA	● <b>GN</b> GUINEA	● <b>MA</b> MOROCCO	● <b>TO</b> TONGA
● <b>BF</b> BURKINA FASO	● <b>GW</b> GUINEA-BISSAU	● <b>NA</b> NAMIBIA	● <b>TT</b> TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
● <b>BI</b> BURUNDI	● <b>GY</b> GUYANA	● <b>NR</b> NAURU	● <b>TN</b> TUNISIA
● <b>KM</b> COMOROS	● <b>HU</b> HUNGARY	● <b>MK</b> NORTH MACEDONIA	● <b>TM</b> TURKMENISTAN
● <b>CG</b> CONGO, REP.	● <b>KZ</b> KAZAKHSTAN	● <b>OM</b> OMAN	● <b>UZ</b> UZBEKISTAN
● <b>CU</b> CUBA	● <b>KI</b> KIRIBATI	● <b>PW</b> PALAU	● <b>VU</b> VANUATU
● <b>CY</b> CYPRUS	● <b>KP</b> KOREA, DPR	● <b>PG</b> PAPUA NEW GUINEA	● <b>ZM</b> ZAMBIA



## High criminality - high resilience (9 countries)

● <b>CO</b> COLOMBIA	● <b>IT</b> ITALY	● <b>ZA</b> SOUTH AFRICA
● <b>EC</b> ECUADOR	● <b>MY</b> MALAYSIA	● <b>ES</b> SPAIN
● <b>FR</b> FRANCE	● <b>NG</b> NIGERIA	● <b>US</b> UNITED STATES




## High criminality - low resilience (57 countries)

● <b>AF</b> AFGHANISTAN	● <b>GT</b> GUATEMALA	● <b>ME</b> MONTENEGRO	● <b>SS</b> SOUTH SUDAN
● <b>AL</b> ALBANIA	● <b>HT</b> HAITI	● <b>MZ</b> MOZAMBIQUE	● <b>SD</b> SUDAN
● <b>BA</b> BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	● <b>HN</b> HONDURAS	● <b>MM</b> MYANMAR	● <b>SY</b> SYRIA
● <b>BR</b> BRAZIL	● <b>IN</b> INDIA	● <b>NP</b> NEPAL	● <b>TJ</b> TAJIKISTAN
● <b>KH</b> CAMBODIA	● <b>ID</b> INDONESIA	● <b>NI</b> NICARAGUA	● <b>TZ</b> TANZANIA
● <b>CM</b> CAMEROON	● <b>IR</b> IRAN	● <b>NE</b> NIGER	● <b>TH</b> THAILAND
● <b>CF</b> CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	● <b>IQ</b> IRAQ	● <b>PK</b> PAKISTAN	● <b>TR</b> TURKEY
● <b>TD</b> CHAD	● <b>JM</b> JAMAICA	● <b>PA</b> PANAMA	● <b>UG</b> UGANDA
● <b>CN</b> CHINA	● <b>KE</b> KENYA	● <b>PY</b> PARAGUAY	● <b>UA</b> UKRAINE
● <b>CD</b> CONGO, DEM. REP.	● <b>LA</b> LAOS	● <b>PE</b> PERU	● <b>AE</b> UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
● <b>CI</b> CÔTE D'IVOIRE	● <b>LB</b> LEBANON	● <b>PH</b> PHILIPPINES	● <b>VE</b> VENEZUELA
● <b>SV</b> EL SALVADOR	● <b>LY</b> LIBYA	● <b>RU</b> RUSSIA	● <b>VN</b> VIETNAM
● <b>GH</b> GHANA	● <b>MG</b> MADAGASCAR	● <b>SA</b> SAUDI ARABIA	● <b>YE</b> YEMEN
	● <b>ML</b> MALI	● <b>RS</b> SERBIA	● <b>ZW</b> ZIMBABWE
	● <b>MX</b> MEXICO	● <b>SO</b> SOMALIA	

## SECTION 7

# Criminality, markets, actors and resilience

Understanding  
the relationships






## Complex relationship between criminality and resilience

Levels of criminality and levels of resilience to organized crime move together in opposite directions. In other words, they are negatively correlated. That is what the results of this Index show, and that is what is to be expected. The higher a country's resilience to organized crime, the lower the likelihood it will experience organized crime; the less resilient a country is to organized crime, the more criminality it will be beset by.

But the relationship between criminality and resilience is not quite as simple, or linear, as it first seems. Globally, there are many countries that do not fit the pattern that is most intuitive. As mentioned in the quadrant analysis, Colombia, Italy, the United States – these are just a few of the countries that despite having robust mechanisms to counter organized crime, continue to be afflicted by pervasive illicit economies. There are even more countries in the opposite camp, those with low levels of resilience to organized crime but that are nonetheless not particularly affected by criminality broadly speaking. And the statistical analysis backs this up: the correlation between criminality and resilience is only  $-0.45$ .

**FIGURE 7.1**  
Criminality vs resilience





In Africa, there are many countries – more than half – that are less resilient, but do not exhibit high levels of criminality. A lot of these are developing countries, which constrains the state’s ability to put in place effective measures, but at the same time it means that they offer fewer incentives for organized crime to flourish. Alternatively, if we look at the issue from another perspective, countries that have not historically had extensive levels of criminality have not had the stimulus to develop adequate mechanisms to counter organized crime. Although far less common, there are also countries such as Nigeria and South Africa that are fairly resilient to organized crime, yet also suffer from significant levels of criminality. In Africa, therefore, the link between a country’s criminality score and resilience score is even less straightforward. Indeed, the correlation is weak, at just  $-0.29$ . In Europe, on the other hand, the relationship conforms far more to common expectations: higher resilience, less criminality and vice versa. In fact, Europe is the continent for which the correlation between criminality and resilience is highest ( $-0.56$ ).<sup>61</sup>

No better is this finding exemplified than by the drug markets. There appears to be no relationship between the heroin trade and overall resilience, or between the heroin trade and any of the individual resilience indicators. The cannabis trade

is also not correlated with overall resilience and has only a weak negative correlation with seven of the 12 resilience indicators. In fact, the cocaine trade appears to be positively correlated to a number of resilience indicators, albeit very weakly. These counterintuitive results may suggest the pervasiveness of the four drug markets is fairly independent of how resilient a country is to organized crime. Countries with high levels of resilience are just as likely to have pervasive drug markets as countries with low levels of resilience. One possible explanation is that the criminal market scores consider each country’s role as a source, transit and destination country. In the context of drug markets, producer and consumer countries might fall into very different resilience categories. For example, producer countries might have a low score on resilience to organized crime, while consumer countries might have a high score on resilience, which could explain the ambiguous relationships.

International cooperation is another area where the relationship with criminality is somewhat ambiguous. Countries with high levels of international cooperation do not necessarily have less pervasive criminal markets than countries with low levels of international cooperation. Colombia, for example, which has the highest score for international cooperation (9.0), also has



the second highest criminal market score (7.20). In fact, the three countries with the worst criminal market scores, Mexico, Colombia and Nigeria, all score 7.0 and above on 'international cooperation'. This, however, is not to say that international cooperation is of no tangible value in tackling organized crime. In fact, while many countries with robust international cooperation mechanisms are still affected by high levels of criminality, there are very few countries with poor international cooperation scores that do not suffer from at least moderate levels of organized crime. Of the 28 countries with international cooperation scores lower than 4, no fewer than 15 have high criminality. This finding, therefore, is rather an indication of the discrepancy between political rhetoric and tangible results in countering organized crime.

It is important to remember, however, that criminality comprises two separate subcomponents: not only does it capture the scope and scale of criminal markets in a country, but it also assesses the strength and influence of various types of criminal actors. And the results of the Index show that while the pervasiveness of illicit economies in a country is associated with resilience levels to a certain degree, it is actually the power of criminal actors that is more strongly related to a country's resilience to organized crime. And the one type of criminal actor at the root of that? State-embedded actors: countries in which state-embedded actors are less prominent are far more likely to have greater resilience to organized crime (the correlation is  $-0.74$ ). This is hardly surprising, given state actors' role in determining a country's policies and laws, but it does re-emphasize once more that one of the most significant impediments to an effective counter-organized crime strategy is the presence of criminal actors in state institutions.

### BOX 3

## Criminal markets and criminal actors

As logic dictates, when criminal groups exert strong influence over communities, criminal markets are more likely to be widespread. While this holds true for most countries, there are some exceptions. Jamaica and Somalia, for instance, have smaller criminal markets but much more dominant criminal actors. Thus, one might expect that the impact of criminal actors on society and the state would be far greater in both countries than that of the suite of markets considered by the Index. There

are two broad explanations here. First, the structure of the Index is such that countries with a range of moderately prevalent markets will come out worse than states with one or two extremely pervasive ones. Second, it might boil down to the simple fact that the criminal actor scores reflect all criminality in which groups are involved, while the criminal markets score stands only on 10 types of criminality, excluding crime types that may be quite pervasive in specific contexts.



## Crime convergence


Broadly speaking, there are two types of criminal markets: those that are almost ubiquitous, albeit to varying degrees of intensity, and what could be described as more 'niche' markets. Across the world, it is these former markets that where pervasive, are indicative of the prevalence of a broad range of illicit economies. Human trafficking in particular, but also human smuggling, arms trafficking and non-renewable-resource crimes are such markets. Indeed, the correlations between these four markets and the overall criminal market score are all high, ranging between 0.73 and 0.78. By contrast, the cocaine trade, for example, is only weakly correlated to criminal markets (0.34), which implies that the extent of the cocaine trade is independent of the existence or lack thereof of other criminal markets. It is entirely plausible that countries with large cocaine consumption markets are economically developed nations where demand for drugs is high, but resilience to other types of criminality is also stronger.

There have been many studies exploring the phenomenon of crime convergence – the extent to which there is an overlap between various forms of organized crime, as well as the networks involved in them. The most obvious example of an overlap in criminal markets is between human trafficking and human smuggling (see Figure 7.2). While these illegal industries are two separate and distinct types of organized crime, the lines between them are often blurred. There is considerable evidence to suggest that what may begin as human smuggling very often transforms into various manifestations of human trafficking, and that those travelling across borders irregularly aided by smuggling networks are simultaneously highly vulnerable to trafficking along the way.<sup>62</sup> The Index results lend further credence to this, as the correlation between the two is 0.77. Of course, not all countries follow the pattern, in particular in Africa. Guinea, for example, is a country where forced begging, child labour, trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and many other forms of trafficking are rife, but where the human smuggling industry is fairly underdeveloped.

Another sphere in which there is considerable convergence is the environmental crimes sector, more specifically between flora crimes and fauna crimes. Of the 13 countries scoring 8 or above for flora crimes, almost 70% also had a score of 7 or higher for fauna crimes. In other words, countries with pervasive illegal logging, for example, are also far likelier to play an important role in the illegal wildlife trade, a finding backed up by the strong correlation between these two criminal markets (0.71). A reason for the strong association between the two might be the geographic overlap of source countries. Simply put, countries with high biodiversity in flora might also have high diversity in fauna, thus, attracting illicit trade in both. Yet not all countries fit the mould. Countries might score high for one but not the other if there are destination markets only for one, for instance. While these two criminal markets are strongly correlated with each other, their relationship to other criminal markets, with the exception of non-renewable resources, is weak or non-existent. The moderate correlation between flora and non-renewable resources (0.48), as well as fauna and non-renewable resources (0.43), suggests that the exploitation of and illicit trade in different types of natural resources tend to overlap geographically.

Another moderately strong relationship is found between arms trafficking, and human smuggling (0.63) and human trafficking (0.66). Looking at countries that score high across all three markets, it is evident that armed conflict is the common denominator. This set of countries includes Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan among others, where arms trafficking has a severe influence on nearly all elements of society (8.5 and above), and human trafficking and smuggling are equally pervasive (with scores between 8.0 and 9.5). Armed conflict forces people to flee and seek assistance from human smugglers in the process, making them vulnerable to human trafficking. At the same time, criminal actors might profit from and perpetuate all three illicit markets.


**FIGURE 7.2**  
**Human trafficking vs human smuggling**



What about the drug markets? The relationship between the four drugs markets and other criminal markets is less straightforward. For the most part, whether a country plays a major role in the context of any particular drug market does not tell us much about the propensity for other forms of organized crime to proliferate in that country. This is particularly true for cocaine. The weak – and in most instances non-existent – correlations between the cocaine trade and other criminal markets are an indication of that.

Even between the drug markets, there isn't much evidence to suggest that there is a particularly clear pattern of movement. There are no links at all between the cocaine trade and the heroin or the synthetic drug trade, and the relationships between most of the other drug markets are

not much stronger. There are two pairs of drug markets, however, that stand out: cannabis and cocaine, and heroin and synthetic drugs. Both these pairs have moderate positive correlations, which could be explained by the fact that either the producer countries or destination markets for these related drugs are similar, but it may lend also further support to the argument that there is an increasing overlap in the routes and actors used for these pairs. The criminal actors involved in trafficking heroin and synthetic drugs, for example, may be one and the same.<sup>63</sup> While the Index offers no definitive reasons as to why countries with more pervasive cocaine markets are more likely to have larger cannabis markets, or why significant heroin hotspots also tend to feature a high degree of synthetic drug activity, they do raise some important questions.



## Who is doing what?

Around the world, criminal networks are ubiquitous, from wildlife poachers in East Africa, to arms traffickers in Western Asia and drug syndicates in Central America. These groups are the conduits for moving goods illicitly, regardless of the commodity, on a global scale. Indeed, criminal networks are the actor type that shows the strongest correlation with the overall criminal markets score (0.75). In other words, criminal networks appear to be a common denominator across most illicit economies.

There may also be certain types of organized crime that particular criminal actors are more easily able to engage in. To take the non-renewable-resource sector, for instance, it is fairly logical that state-embedded actors may play a key role in criminal activity surrounding the market, given that a large proportion of oil companies and precious metal mines, for example, around the world are state-owned. Arguably, therefore, when state entities are the only actor type to exert oversight over the sector, it allows them more opportunity for misconduct, including corruption or outright involvement in illegal extraction and smuggling of resources. Indeed, the correlation between state-embedded actors and non-renewable-resource crimes is among the highest (0.63).

Foreign criminal actors are also an influential component of the organized crime landscape in many countries, and arguably increasingly so since the new millennium. With the globalization of criminal actors came the globalization of crime. But the



relationship between the prevalence of foreign criminal actors in a country and particular illicit economies is complex. Human trafficking may be controlled by domestic actors in one part of the world but by syndicates operating transnationally in another; the illicit trade in synthetic drugs in one border community may be dominated by trafficking networks across the border, whereas the drugs may be distributed at retail level by street gangs in another country. The key point here is that there isn't any clear pattern with regard to the kinds of activities in which foreign criminal actors are involved. Indeed, the data shows that correlations between foreign actors and most criminal markets are weak. This may suggest that foreign actors are not necessarily

attracted to countries where criminal markets are already firmly established. This is in line with the weak to moderate relationships between foreign actors and other criminal actor types included in the Index, especially mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors, suggesting that foreign actors do not necessarily always complement other criminal actor types. One possible explanation may be that foreign criminal actors are influential primarily in the early stages of the development of a criminal market, when they are needed to break into the international market. Over time, local criminal actors become stronger and crowd out foreign criminal actor groups, unless there are certain conditions present, such as a large number of expatriates, for example.

## Multifaceted response required

Whether it is in the context of tackling climate change, poverty, conflict, radicalization or any of the myriad social ills that plague the earth, experts often agree that what is required is a multifaceted response to ensure effectiveness. Combating organized crime is no different. Although all countries perform better in some respects than in others in terms of combating organized crime, a clearly identifiable pattern is that strong performances in some resilience indicators are closely linked to better performances in other areas, leading to an overall more robust resilience to criminality. This is corroborated by the strong correlations not only between the 12 resilience indicators and a country's overall resilience score, but among the resilience indicators themselves, which lends support to the notion that building effective resilience to organized crime requires a multi-sectoral approach to ensure success.

The strongest pairwise correlation is between 'political leadership and governance', and 'government transparency and accountability' (0.87). Although there is a strong overlap between these two indicators, in that the absence of corruption and state involvement in criminality

are crucial elements in the success of both, the strong relationship between these two may also indicate that a political leadership stance against organized crime is considered more effective in countries where government transparency is higher. 'Victim and witness support', and 'prevention' are also strongly correlated (0.85). Both indicators reflect government taking the protection of its citizens seriously, by providing them with care and protective services. This close relationship suggests that governments that focus on one are likely to make an effort to improve the other as well.

In the case of 'non-state actors', besides the space that authorities allow for the media and NGOs to function freely, this indicator also takes into account the vibrancy of civil society and their ability to function despite existing pressure from governments. There are numerous examples of countries with weak state structures, institutions and frameworks that nonetheless are home to dedicated social activists, community leaders and journalists, from Burkina Faso and the DRC to Belarus, Mexico, Haiti and Myanmar, to name but a few.

SECTION 8

# Susceptibility to organized crime and drivers of resilience



# Susceptib

## Economic, geographic and political vulnerabilities

The Global Organized Crime Index is the first tool of its kind that allows us to examine the pervasiveness of criminal markets and criminal actor types per country, as well as the strength and effectiveness of resilience mechanisms. However, the rich dataset allows us to go much further than just assessing the scores – the lay of the land, so to speak – and actually probe further by examining what may be the key factors associated with levels of criminality and resilience. This section examines the relationship between the headline scores of the Index and several key economic and geographic indicators. For example, are richer nations more likely to experience higher levels of organized crime? Do poorer countries tend to have less robust institutional frameworks to combat it? Do smaller and larger countries differ from one another in any meaningful way with regard to the pervasiveness of illicit economies?

### What makes a country more vulnerable to organized crime?

One of the key findings of this research is that nearly 80% of the world's population live in countries with high levels of criminality while nearly 80% live in countries with low resilience to organized crime. That is not to say, however, that population size is a determining factor of criminality, but rather a matter of impact. Populations that live in an environment with a high incidence of organized crime are particularly vulnerable to criminal influence, which, if not addressed adequately, can permeate the political, social, economic and security spheres of communities, becoming embedded in societies and leaving little room for formal, legal and legitimate activities to gain traction.

The relationship between certain macroeconomic indicators, such as unemployment or inequality, and organized crime is fairly straightforward: tackle the former, and you are likely to see a reduction in the latter.<sup>64</sup> But the impact of other indicators on levels of criminality in a country may be more ambiguous. Do wealthier nations, for example, tend to attract more organized crime than their developing counterparts? Rich countries are likely to have a number of characteristics that may make them more susceptible to criminal exploitation, such as an abundance of natural resources, or highly developed trade infrastructure, for example. On the other hand, however, they are also better equipped to tackle organized crime, and have at their disposal the resources to prevent it in the first place by reducing the incentives – or the need – to engage in organized crime. That said, the types of crimes that often plague wealthy nations, such as economic crimes, are not yet specifically captured by this Index. Their inclusion may, in turn, tip the scales of criminality.



Looking at the global picture, the Index data suggests that there is no relationship between the size of an economy and the level of criminality that economy will experience.<sup>65</sup> In other words, on average, richer nations are no more or less likely to have a high criminality score than less wealthy states. However, examining each continent separately, the picture looks somewhat varied.<sup>66</sup> Whereas for the Americas and Asia, the global finding of no statistically significant relationship between GDP and criminality holds; within Africa and Europe, however, the results suggest that there is a positive correlation between the two indicators. In Africa and Europe, therefore, larger economies tend to experience higher levels of organized crime. Indeed, of the 15 largest economies in Africa, nine have a criminality score of above 6, including the DRC, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, and Libya, among others. Similarly, a number of the largest European economies also have relatively pervasive illicit economies and influential criminal actors, not least Russia, but also Italy, France and Spain, among others. This notwithstanding, the correlation coefficients for Africa and Europe are fairly weak (0.35 and 0.31, respectively), which suggests that higher GDP does not always necessarily indicate higher criminality, for which some of the opposing forces described above may be partial explanations. Indeed, there are a number of exceptions, such as Montenegro and Central African Republic, whose economies rank among the smallest in their continents, yet they experience among the highest levels of criminality.

Can a relationship between GDP per capita and criminality be detected? Is the prosperity of the average person in a country somehow linked to its levels of criminality? This time, there is a negative – albeit weak ( $-0.35$ ) – relationship between the two, meaning that on average, higher levels of wealth per capita are associated with lower levels of organized crime in a country. This may be explained by the fact that citizens with less disposable income may be less able to access formal economic opportunities, leaving them with little choice but to engage in the informal sector, which is often highly interlinked with organized criminal activity. Nevertheless, the weak correlation suggests there are other forces at play. Individuals with higher earnings, for example, may have the funds to purchase expensive illicit commodities, such as cocaine, heroin and exotic wildlife species. Moreover, as with GDP, there is a degree of variation across the continents. In Europe, for example, the strength of the relationship can be described as moderate, whereas in the Americas, there is in fact no statistically significant correlation.

Geographic and demographic indicators were also assessed to examine the degree to which land and population size could be factors that influence levels of criminality. While the results find a positive relationship between these indicators and criminality, the strength of the relationships is very weak. Nevertheless, examining the world's smallest countries does provide some interesting results.

**BOX 4**

## Small states and low criminality

Small states, as measured by their land size, do appear to be less prone to organized crime.<sup>67</sup> Most small states (93%) fall within the 'low criminality' category, with an overall average score of 3.54, which is substantially lower than the global average of 4.87. This is driven by the fact that criminal markets and criminal actors are assessed to be far less pervasive in small states. Countries like Liechtenstein (1.88), Luxembourg (2.36) and Monaco (2.43), for example, all have very low criminality scores. But why do these microstates appear to be less vulnerable to organized crime?

Firstly, small states may be less attractive to criminal groups in the first place. Due to their limited land size, they may have fewer natural resources to exploit than larger countries (see page 54 for a related discussion on island states, which share many of the same characteristics, and often in fact constitute, small states). Almost two-thirds of small states score either 1 or 1.5 for flora crimes, with only four countries scoring 4 or higher. The picture is similar with regard to non-renewable resource crimes, where half of the countries score 1.5 or below. In other words, the non-renewable resource market is non-existent in half of the world's small states. It is important to note, however, that where states have few natural resources to exploit, including arable land for example, their economies often rely almost exclusively on service industries. Highly developed financial and banking sectors, in turn, are facilitators of illicit financial flows, which are not included as a standalone criminal market in the Index. As a result, the full extent of criminality in small states, many of which, such as Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Malta and the Seychelles, are among the world's largest money laundering hubs, is not captured under the Index.

In addition to the fact that smaller nations are less likely to have natural resources to exploit, they

are also likely to have far smaller consumption markets for illicit goods, by virtue of their smaller populations. Moreover, the fact that these countries have smaller diasporas and smaller communities as a whole means that it is generally more difficult to conceal criminal activity among the legitimate. It is for this reason, perhaps, that in those small states that are in fact prone to organized crime, the criminality tends to follow a top-down development path catalyzed by systematic clientelism and patronage networks, which often develop into outright corrupt practices and other forms of criminality.

Together, these factors are considerable limitations in small countries on the profits available to criminal actors. Furthermore, from an enforcement perspective, state surveillance may be stronger in these tiny nations. Shorter land borders and coastlines, a smaller surface area, and a potentially higher population density may mean that small states are simply easier to monitor by security agencies than larger countries, constraining transnational organized crime groups' ability to penetrate them.

There are, however, a few exceptions. Lebanon and Jamaica, for example, are both small states that experience considerable levels of organized criminality, scoring 6.76 and 5.91 respectively. Some countries, while limited in size, may be more vulnerable to organized crime due to their geographic positioning, either because they are surrounded by states heavily affected by organized crime, or because they are strategically located along major illicit trade routes (as is the case with the two examples above). Furthermore, the impact of criminality may be felt more acutely in small states, as the ramifications can quickly spread across the entire country.



Africa meanwhile appears to stand out as the only continent in which both greater land area and larger populations are fairly strongly associated with higher criminality. In other words, while in most regions around the world countries are no more or less likely to be afflicted by organized crime, regardless of their land size or population, in Africa, larger countries, and countries with bigger populations are more likely to score higher on the criminality component of the Index. One explanation may be that biodiversity

in Africa is greater than in other continents, so it is only logical that bigger countries would have a greater abundance of biodiversity and natural resources, which means there is greater opportunity for criminal exploitation. Moreover, weaker governance and heightened insecurity in parts of Africa, in addition to hostile natural geography, may predispose larger countries on the continent to be more difficult to control, with territory that makes them harder to patrol.

**FIGURE 8.1**  
**Correlation coefficients between criminality and selected indicators, by continent**



Source: World Bank


Note: Only statistically significant correlations are reported.

## Are certain types of countries more resilient?

Turning to the resilience component, the results of the correlation analysis illustrate a slightly different picture. While the relationship between GDP and criminality is negligible throughout most of the world, there is a positive relationship between GDP and resilience, albeit a very weak one (0.20). This is driven primarily by the countries in Africa, however. In short, only in Africa are countries with larger economies likely to have higher resilience; in other continents, there is no such association. Some of the world's largest economic powerhouses do have high levels of resilience to organized crime. The United States is one example. The country's wealth and role as a global leader have meant that it has the resources to strengthen responses to organized crime, despite the range of illicit activities occurring within its borders. Although this can help explain the United States' higher resilience score, the same cannot be said for other global economic leaders, such as China and Russia, for example, which have low resilience as well as high criminality.

However, when looking at GDP per capita, the opposite is true. The overall correlation between the latter and resilience is moderately strong, at 0.59, and this relationship holds across the Americas, Asia and Europe. There are various potential explanations for this finding. In countries in which the provision of basic services, such as clean water, food, education and healthcare, are guaranteed for the overwhelming majority of the population, governments have greater time and resources at their disposal to dedicate to the strengthening of institutional and non-state frameworks that counter organized crime. There may also be indirect mechanisms that could partially explain the strong link. For example, that democracies tend to have higher GDP per capita, and democracies on average have much higher levels of resilience, could be one plausible thesis (see the following section for further exploration of the links between the Index's headline scores and levels of democracy, as well as other indicators). In Africa, however, there is no correlation between the average wealth of citizens and their country's resilience to organized crime.

**FIGURE 8.2**  
Resilience by income group



Source: World Bank

Finally, unlike for criminality, the results from the correlation analysis show that there is no correlation between either land area or population size and resilience. Countries of all shapes and sizes have managed to build up robust mechanisms to combat organized crime, from Singapore and Iceland to Canada and Australia, just as countries with relatively low levels of resilience have considerable differences in terms of size and population, such as the Democratic Republic of

Congo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example. The Americas, however, are somewhat of an outlier in this respect, in that the results show a positive correlation, albeit a weak one, between resilience and land area (0.37). That is to say, larger countries across the Americas tend to have higher levels of resilience, with Canada, the United States and Argentina the obvious driving force – although these are likely to have high resilience for reasons other than their size.

**FIGURE 8.3**  
**Correlation coefficients between resilience and selected indicators, by continent**



Source: World Bank

Note: Only statistically significant correlations are reported.

# Democracy, development, fragility, corruption

The previous section outlined how the Index allows us to examine potential relationships between criminality, resilience and a number of economic, geographic and demographic indicators. Correlations between the Index's headline scores and other global indices were also tested to explore any potentially interesting findings. These allow us to examine whether organized crime links to issues such as corruption and fragility, and whether democratic states are more resilient to organized crime than authoritarian states. For this analysis, the following indices were assessed:

- Human Development Index 2019
- Democracy Index 2020
- Freedom in the World Index 2021
- Global Peace Index 2020
- Corruption Perceptions Index 2020
- Fragile States Index 2021

## Crime thrives in all manner of places

Looking first at the criminality component of the Index, a notable finding is that while there is a negative correlation with the Human Development Index, the relationship is fairly weak ( $-0.35$ ). This lends credence to the notion that organized crime is a highly complex phenomenon that exploits a host of different conditions. Thus, while the results suggest that less developed countries do tend to have somewhat higher levels of organized crime, the variation between them is considerable. This in part can be due to the substantial number of different factors, both on the supply and demand side of illicit economies that make countries vulnerable to organized criminal activity.

Meanwhile, the Index results show that countries categorized as full democracies exhibit higher

levels of resilience than authoritarian states. The correlation with the Democracy Index, however, is also weak ( $-0.38$ ), suggesting that high levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of criminality in a country, but that the relationship between the two is by no means unambiguous. There are several Western democracies that also have high levels of criminality, including Spain, France, the United States and Italy; and other nations around the world, notably Panama, which scores a high 7.18 on the Democracy Index, but which also has a high criminality score of 6.68 on the Index. Finally, the strength of the relationship between criminality and the Freedom in the World Index is also similar ( $-0.37$ ). That index ranks countries and territories on the basis of their political rights and civil liberties. In other words, the greater the political rights and civil liberties of citizens in a country, the less likely organized crime is to be pervasive.

Regarding the link between organized crime, conflict and fragility, the argument is often made that organized crime is a key factor in creating the conditions for the onset of civil conflict, mass protests, violence and generally fractious societies.<sup>68</sup> Using the Index dataset, we can see that criminality is in fact moderately correlated with peace and fragility ( $-0.63$  and  $0.57$ , respectively). Examining the criminality rankings, a significant proportion of countries scoring highest – most notably countries in Africa and the Middle East – are those that are currently, or have been until very recently, in conflict. The DRC, the country with the highest criminality score, has been mired in violence, instability and conflict for the best part of the past 25 years. Meanwhile, several other countries featuring in the top 20 for criminality, including Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Central African Republic, Syria and Libya, are also experiencing or have experienced conflict in recent times. Moreover, of the 20 worst-performing countries in the Fragile States Index, 16 are assessed to have high levels of criminality. The reasons for which fragility has not translated into diffuse criminal markets in the remaining four

countries in that index are not obvious and are likely to be different depending on the nation, but possible explanations are the degree of authoritarianism, or simply the small size of some of those countries. The Global Peace Index provides a similar picture: Malaysia is the only country in the 20 best-performing countries to have a high criminality score on the Index.

Lastly, corruption is perhaps one of the major enabling factors of organized crime. The analysis shows that there is a moderate positive correlation (0.57) between criminality and perceptions of corruption, as captured by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Corruption and organized crime have long been understood to go hand in hand,<sup>69</sup> so these results are to be expected. From low-level corruption in law enforcement bodies, to impunity within the judicial system resulting from bribery, all the way up to political elites' direct involvement in illicit economies, corruption is often the lifeblood of organized criminal activity. Therefore, that the correlation between the criminality score and the Corruption Perceptions Index is only moderately positive may appear somewhat weaker than expected, for which there may be several potential reasons. Firstly, the Corruption Perceptions Index is, as the name suggests, a perceptions-based index, ranking countries according to how pervasive corruption is *perceived* to be by experts and businesspeople, rather than measuring it according to any objective measures. Furthermore, the index captures several aspects of corruption that are covered not by the Global Organized Crime Index's criminality component, but by the resilience component (which will be explored in the subsequent section), such as the effective prosecution of corruption officials or effective oversight mechanisms.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, the positive correlation between the two indicators does lend further evidence to the interconnectedness of organized crime and corruption. Indeed, the state-embedded actors indicator of the Index has a strong positive correlation with the Corruption Perceptions Index, at 0.82.

Although the correlations between criminality and the above-mentioned indices are statistically

significant and moderately strong, they are by no means indicative of an unambiguously direct linear relationship. This is perhaps a reflection of the complexity of the phenomenon of organized crime, which to a certain degree can take hold in countries of all shapes and sizes, with all manner of political systems and varying degrees of stability. For example the differing nature of countries as either origin, transit or destination states (or a combination of the three) is likely to be an important factor in the absence of a standout and clear-cut explanation for which conditions make a country more likely to suffer from higher levels of organized crime.

## Good governance and political stability are key to enhancing resilience

The relationships discernible between resilience and the selected indices listed above are much stronger. A key finding of the analysis is that the (negative) correlation between resilience and organized crime and corruption is very strong (-0.90). Countries with high levels of perceived corruption are therefore highly likely to also have low levels of resilience. This is due in large part to the very wide gamut that corruption runs, from the highest levels of government to the judiciary, prison systems, border control and other law enforcement agencies, as it eroded the frameworks and mechanisms needed to combat organized crime effectively.

A similarly strong negative correlation is found between resilience and state fragility (-0.87). Countries mired in conflict, or facing extreme political, security and social pressures, are much less likely to have high levels of resilience to organized crime for several possible reasons. At the most basic level, if a country is engaged in a civil conflict, for example, the state's overriding priority will in all likelihood be to tackle the immediate threat of violence. Furthermore, if there is an ongoing struggle between the government and other armed factions, effective control over territory as well as social cohesion are likely to be weakened, both of which are key in developing an effective




response to organized crime. These hypotheses are also supported by the finding of a strong positive correlation between resilience and peace (0.69).

Resilience also has a strong relationship with human development, with a correlation of 0.77. This finding suggests that although organized crime can affect countries at all levels of human development, countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index rankings are far less likely to be resilient to organized crime. Whether resilience to organized crime leads to a higher Human Development Index score or vice versa is not clear, but what is apparent is the strong link between the two.

Finally, are democracies more resilient to organized crime than states with more authoritarian tendencies? Are countries where, for example, political rights and civil liberties are plentiful better equipped to tackle organized criminal activity?

The correlation between the Democracy Index and the resilience score is strong, at 0.79, suggesting that the higher the levels of democracy, the better the resilience score. Likewise, with a correlation coefficient of 0.75, it is clear that levels of freedom enjoyed by citizens is strongly associated with resilience to organized crime. Perhaps the most obvious explanation for this strong relationship is the degree of transparency manifested by governments. Countries exhibiting lack of transparency at the upper echelons of the political elite are inherently more susceptible to individuals embedded within the state engaging in illicit activity. Furthermore, as the bastion of liberal democracies, freedom of the press is likely to be an important driver of the strong relationship. A free press that is able to robustly question, investigate, report on and hold to account political and criminal elites (and the overlap between the two) is much more common in democratic states than in authoritarian ones.

**FIGURE 8.4**  
**Resilience by regime type**



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index

Figure 8.4, which is a distribution of the Index resilience scores by regime type, illustrates the clear pattern of democratic states having higher resilience than authoritarian ones. Of the top 20 countries in the resilience ranking, 15 are classified as full democracies by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, two are not included in that index, and the remaining three countries that are included – Estonia, Singapore and Latvia – are considered flawed democracies.<sup>71</sup> At the other end of the resilience spectrum, 82% of countries with the 20 lowest resilience scores are authoritarian states. However, there is a considerable degree of variation within the regime types, in particular when one moves away from either extremity of the resilience scale. A number of Gulf countries, for example, which are classified as authoritarian states, also receive a high resilience score on the Index, as do other nations in Africa and the Middle East, such as Rwanda and Jordan. Another country that appears to buck the trend is Suriname which, while appearing in the top 30% of the Democracy Index scores, has one of the lowest resilience scores in the world. Similarly, compared to the other states around the world classified as full democracies, Costa Rica has a relatively low resilience score.

A state's political and governance systems may have important structural consequences in terms of its ability to mount an effective response to organized crime. One unique characteristic of the United States, for example, is the independence and distribution of power among its governance structures. Whereas in many other countries regional and local governance structures are tasked with certain roles and duties, their powers are limited by the purview of national government. By contrast, the United States (as well as many other countries around the world) is founded on the principles of federalism, whereby powers are shared between the federal and state governments.


These dynamics create another duality that poses challenges to scoring under the Index.

For example, the US was assigned a state-embedded actors score of 5, capturing the spectrum of state engagement in illicit activities, from isolated cases of corruption to direct engagement in illicit activities, from local officials up to the highest echelons of the federal government. These dynamics have important implications for a state's resilience. For example, the US scored 5.5 on 'government transparency and accountability'. This mid-point score reflects both the strengths and deficiencies of the country's institutions at all levels. As the Index captured the year 2020, during which much attention was focused on the previous administration and allegations of corruption at the federal level, experts noted the importance and value brought by officials at state and local levels.

The purpose of the analysis presented in this section is not to conclusively determine causal mechanisms explaining levels of criminality and resilience in a country. However, the robust dataset provided by the Index does allow users to start thinking in greater depth about what kinds of factors may play a role in organized crime and the state's ability to counter it. The results suggest that while there are certain country characteristics – economic, political and geographic – that may be associated with higher criminality, such as lower GDP per capita or a larger population, the phenomenon of organized crime is so complex and nuanced that there is no definitive explanation for the different strengths and vulnerabilities across the world. Where certain factors may be strongly associated with a particular level of criminality in one region, they may have no bearing on criminality in another. These results serve to emphasize the need for on-the-ground analysis and tailored responses to the issue of illicit economies and organized criminal actors.

FIGURE 8.5

## Correlation coefficients between Global Organized Crime Index resilience scores and selected external indices




Source: Transparency International; The Fund for Peace; Freedom House; United Nations Development Programme; Vision of Humanity (Institute for Economics and Peace); Economist Intelligence Unit



SECTION 9

# Implications





# Implications

The ubiquity and adaptability of organized crime have had a profound impact on societies all over the world. Organized crime diverts funds that could be used to provide goods and services; it exploits natural resources; threatens fragile ecosystems; preys on the vulnerabilities of local populations; and fuels violence and conflict. At the same time, illicit activities may be a source of alternative livelihoods for some in the face of limited legitimate economic opportunities and lack of service provision. Although criminality dynamics vary from country to country and region to region, it is clear that the effects of organized crime are multidimensional and complex. These complex dynamics became even more pronounced amid the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The findings of the Global Organized Crime Index have several important implications, but it is the degree to which the issues outlined in this report are taken on board by policymakers and the entire international community that will be key in determining the success or failure of the global response to organized crime going forward.

## implication 1

The **scale of the problem must be acknowledged** before it can be effectively addressed.

With over 75% of the global population living in countries plagued with high levels of criminality, it is irrefutable that the threat posed by organized crime is among the world's most pressing security issues. Moreover, just as many people – over three-quarters of the world's citizens – are living in countries whose institutions, frameworks and mechanisms tasked with countering organized crime are highly fragile. A better evidence base is of paramount importance in ensuring that the scope of the global organized crime threat can no longer be ignored. Although an increasing number of countries are recognizing organized crime as a threat to national and international security, a major escalation in the political will to prioritize transnational organized crime is still required, now more than ever.



# implication 2

## **Organized crime is a truly transnational phenomenon.**

Several regions around the world are disproportionately affected by illicit economies and the scourge of mafias, criminal networks and state-embedded criminal actors. For a number of historical, geographic, economic and political reasons, certain countries, regions and indeed continents are home to far greater levels of organized crime than others. At the same time, it is clear that no country is immune to the menace of organized crime, and in every corner of the world there are nefarious actors involved in any number of criminal markets, from human trafficking (the most pervasive criminal market globally, according to the findings of this index), to drug trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering,

illegal fishing and so many more. Furthermore, even those states somewhat spared from the heightened levels of criminality and violence so often seen in other countries, illicit economies can quickly spread across borders. As such, no country should consider itself immune to the threat, and preventive measures should be taken as soon as possible to ensure countries are in a position to mitigate the threat of organized crime should it materialize. A key implication, therefore, is that such a transnational threat requires a transnational response. No country is immune, and no country can fight organized crime alone either, and international cooperation needs to be scaled up across the globe.

# implication 3

## **Ending the impunity of state-embedded actors will enhance global resilience to criminality.**

Criminal actors come in all forms, but the Index shows statistically that those exerting the greatest influence on societies around the world are state-embedded criminal actors, which has disastrous implications for a country's ability to tackle to organized crime. Governments and state officials have very little incentive to inhibit the proliferation of illicit economies if they are the same entities and individuals not just benefiting from them, but in many cases actually controlling them. Even in cases where the criminality may not extend to the very

highest echelons of government, countries all over the world still face the insidious threat of low-level corrupt practices permeating the state apparatus. In such instances, even if top government officials ostensibly champion the fight against organized crime, institutions and mechanisms can still be fatally undermined at the lower levels, from the judicial system to regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies. This weakens the implementation of resilience frameworks, especially if governance structures are opaque.

## implication 4

### **Continuing to bolster democracy, especially in fragile states, is a viable and useful response.**

It is an undeniable fact that countries that have put in place the most effective mechanisms to tackle organized crime are democratic states. And the findings of this study corroborate this: democracies have statistically higher levels of resilience to criminality than authoritarian states. Good governance, characterized as states that are participatory, accountable, effective and founded on the rule of law, sets the foundation on which to build and strengthen institutional and non-state frameworks to better society and counter organized crime. Where

transparency and accountability are absent, a cloak of invisibility is draped over a nation, allowing state-embedded actors to act with impunity, siphoning off public funds and profiting from illicit economies at the expense of the well-being of their citizens. Removing the ability of governments with authoritarian tendencies to operate under the radar, control or protect illicit economies with the institutions of the state, reducing corrupt practices and allowing civil society to operate are all important steps in enhancing a country's resilience to organized crime.

## implication 5

### **Working towards peace is crucial in reducing the opportunities for criminality to thrive.**

The pervasiveness of illicit economies is often a driver of conflict, instability and state fragility, but the relationship between the two can, and should, be viewed from the opposite perspective. Conflict settings, where often there is a power vacuum, are acutely vulnerable environments for organized crime to take hold and thrive. The trafficking of illicit goods, for example, entwines with existing and emerging war economies, providing a criminal

economic 'solution' to shortages in goods and services. Not only does organized crime flourish in settings of civil war, territorial disputes and other forms of conflict, but the resultant insecurity also constrains a state's ability to respond to organized crime. To break the vicious cycle of heightened crime-weakened response, it is imperative that solutions for long-term peace are prioritized.

SECTION 10



# Global Organized Crime Index website






# Global Or

A dedicated website – [ocindex.net](https://ocindex.net) – has been created to present the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The website has a home page featuring a criminality heatmap. The ‘Heatmap Scores’ webpage allows users to visualize the scores map for the 10 criminal markets, four criminal actor types and 12 resilience indicators included in the Index, in addition to the aggregate component and subcomponent scores. Furthermore, the website allows for a side-by-side comparison of any of the Index’s scores, both aggregated and disaggregated.



## Sort and compare


While responses differ from country to country, organized crime is nevertheless a global problem. Under the criminality and resilience components of the Index, countries are ranked based on their scores in order to offer users the option for comparative analysis across the globe. Above all, country rankings are meant to start a conversation among policymakers and regional bodies, encouraging them to delve deeper into how and why organized crime affects their respective countries, and learn from one another in order to develop effective resilience strategies.





## Country summaries

In addition to the scores and rankings, the Global Organized Crime Index website allows users access to country summaries that explain the context behind each country's scores. These summaries provide the background informing each country's criminality and resilience, and the subcomponents (i.e. criminal markets and criminal actors) and resilience indicators, while highlighting key trends based on expert assessments.



## Make your own comparisons

The Global Organized Crime Index offers a holistic framework of a country's overall relationship to organized crime. At the same time, its subcomponents and indicators allow users to disaggregate such information and determine correlations with various impact areas in any given country and/or region. Policymakers and other users are able to compare data geographically, substantively and, with future iterations of the Index, temporally, so that they can identify key trends over time.










## APPENDIX 1

# Results interpretation – Considerations



# Results in

## Information availability

As a data-driven tool, the Index aims to standardize the complex concepts of criminality and resilience across 193 countries around the world. While standardization promotes comparative analysis and easy interpretation, it does not come without challenges. The collection of data may vary across countries in terms of availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. These issues are even more pronounced, given the inherently clandestine nature of organized crime that the Index captures. While the Index endeavours to overcome such challenges by expert cross-checks and triangulating sources, another challenge arises when there is abundant information on a particular country or component.

Research and information promote greater understanding of the organized crime situation in a given country and its resilience, informing better policymaking and responses. Nevertheless, for comparative tools such as the Index, an information bias – where more information is published on some areas rather than others – may risk skewing results and/or interpretation of findings. In other words, an organized crime problem may appear to be more acute in countries where more information, research and reporting have occurred. One of the main goals of the Index is to highlight areas where information is lacking in an effort to promote further research. It is important for stakeholders to accept indices for what they are and the information they provide as supplementary to other means of gathering information.

Similarly, instances arise where published information and evidence are lacking but experts with in-depth knowledge of a specific context acknowledge that problems exist. In such cases, the Index as an expert-led assessment heavily relies on expert knowledge in evaluating country contexts.

## Diversity in the Index components

Countries that differ in their criminality and resilience may nevertheless be assigned the same scores, while those that host a particularly acute organized crime problem may appear to score lower than other countries. These results can be explained by the structure of the Index. Because overall criminality and resilience scores are assigned based on a simple average of their respective composite indicators, countries that have a diverse range of criminal markets and criminal actors will score higher than those that have fewer, albeit more pervasive, criminal characteristics. The same can be said to



describe resilience indicators. Overall resilience scores will be dependent on countries' ability to tackle the organized crime situation in their

country based on a holistic and multifaceted approach, rather than a criminal justice- or economically-driven approach.

## Limitations

Recognizing the difficulties in creating a tool that studies a subject matter that is incredibly varied and inherently clandestine, the Index, framed as an expert-led assessment, naturally comes with limitations and potential biases. Nevertheless, the Global Organized Crime Index can be described as a worthwhile exercise, although with certain limitations, that we hope will become a catalyst for further debate.

On a methodological note, there are considerations that must be taken into account when interpreting the scores. First and foremost, the Index relies heavily on individual expert knowledge and experience, which introduces the possibility for an implicit bias, where experts' personal convictions might affect their judgement. The ramifications in this case are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, experts might have been too critical, given their knowledge of a specific country's deficiencies, and on the other, they might have been tempted to be too lenient. Although the latter was presumed more probable prior to the evaluation rounds, it was observed that experts tended to be more critical and often held countries, especially developed ones, to a higher standard. Throughout the development of the tool, we have attempted to control that bias by providing preliminary country profiles as a basis on which experts could make their assessments as well as specifying scoring thresholds to guide the scoring process, as outlined in the methodology section. In addition, all countries underwent a number of anonymous verification rounds, comparing the scores across indicators and regions in an attempt to account for the implicit bias.

Experts in the initial scoring round provided scores that were presented to experts in the following geographic and thematic scoring rounds. This

opened the possibility for a confirmation bias, where experts would confirm the scores assigned in previous rounds. To address this, an additional score verification round was carried out, where groups of representatives from numerous areas of expertise came together in moderated regional discussions to debate and scrutinize the scores and justifications for each country.

In addition, as one aspect of the Index tool is to help policymakers improve their approach to organized crime, it is fundamental to understand where harms for different markets are coming from. It is undeniable that many of the harms associated with specific markets stem from existing policies. One example for that is the cannabis trade. Policies related to the policing and use of cannabis differ from country to country, and even within countries. Thus, evaluating the impact associated with that market has been rather ambiguous. While an increasing number of states are moving to decriminalize or legalize cannabis, there is some room for illegality, like trafficking cannabis to countries with stricter policies, for instance. Thus, to be as consistent as possible, the importance of capturing that aspect of illegality when evaluating the market was emphasized to expert scorers. Still, consistency in that case has been difficult to achieve.

Another critical issue of concern during the scoring process was the debate on the harm and impact of markets, namely whether harms are comparable across markets. Here lies another limitation of the tool – the weighing of different components of the Index. Currently, as has been already specified, indicators are weighed evenly. Nevertheless, four of the 10 markets are drug-related, which puts implicit weight on the impact

of drugs, which, depending on the context, may pose issues. Environmental criminal markets in Europe, for example, are almost non-existent. Yet they are weighted equally with more pervasive markets, such as human trafficking and the synthetic drug trade. That has, on a number of occasions, raised the obvious question among experts on European organized crime whether this approach was justified. However, environmental crime has had a significant impact in Africa and Oceania, for instance, where it has endangered entire ecosystems and even threatened the very existence of coastal communities. Arguably, the impact of environmental crime markets has been more severe there than human smuggling, for example, which is perceived as problematic in a European context.

Thus, the current weighting of indicators might lead to some curious results. What often occurs is that two countries that perhaps would not be expected to rank on the same level criminality-wise, turn out to be very similar to one another. This is where we advise caution and recommend readers to look at the disaggregated scores, as we have stressed in the beginning of the report, because countries might have similar or the same overall ranking but for different reasons.

The Index has been somewhat limited in its scope as well, currently covering only 10 criminal markets. It is therefore arguable that the criminality score does not paint a full picture

of the organized crime landscape in a particular country and across regions. It is our hope that, in due time, more criminal markets will be included in the Index and the tool will be able to provide a more comprehensive account of the phenomenon across the globe.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has been the overarching theme of 2020, having an effect on all aspects of life, including organized crime. Yet, the dynamics brought about by the pandemic were difficult to untangle, not least because of scarcity of information in the first months of the pandemic. As borders closed in early 2020 and air travel was restricted, it was thought that organized crime would suffer significant financial losses, similar to the legal economy, and shrink. Criminal actors, however, quickly adapted to the situation and while there was some displacement in criminal activities, some illicit flows continued to operate rather well. A case in point is the drug trade, which, driven by high demand, continued to function, facilitated by the mostly unaffected maritime trade. Nevertheless, as the Index was developed as the pandemic unfolded, we recognize that its full effects on organized crime would be properly evaluated at a later stage. Therefore, we consider the COVID-19 pandemic as an obstacle that to an extent impeded the proper data collection and analysis, and by extension the conclusions that could be drawn.

## APPENDIX 2

# Definitions





# Definitio

## Defining organized crime

An index is a composite measure of variables using various data points. In the context of measuring organized crime, the parameters that this index relies on are informed by definitions of organized crime, and related activities and concepts.

Organized crime, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Although there is an awareness that the phenomenon exists everywhere, there are multiple forms of crime, enabled by different actors that fluctuate and adapt to various environments. In 2003, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the principal international instrument against organized crime, came into force, compelling member states to consider defining organized crime. Unable to reach a consensus, however, the UNTOC does not actually provide a definition of organized crime, but rather offers clarity on two constants within the broad context of organized crime.

The terms ‘organized criminal group’ and ‘serious offence’, outlined in the convention, offer the basic conditions for an activity to be deemed to be organized crime and the flexibility to address the widest possible range of concerns. For example, an organized criminal group may refer to a broad range of criminal associations, from hierarchal structures to loosely connected networks. Likewise, the convention’s focus on the term ‘serious offence’ ensures a distinction is maintained between low-level criminality and organized criminal activity. Moreover, the convention specifically speaks to activities that are profit-driven, allowing for policies and responses to distinguish organized crime from solely politically motivated actions, such as terrorism. Today the consensus among the convention’s member states is increasingly to refrain from definitional debates surrounding the term ‘organized crime’ and accept that it is flexible, that it refers to a broad spectrum of ever-changing activities and circumstances, and that there are many ways in which the label ‘organized crime’ can be understood and conceptualized. Nevertheless, for an index to offer true insight and value,

some form of definition is essential. While relying (though not exclusively) on international instruments to define various criminal markets, the Index considers both transnational organized crimes as well organized criminal activities occurring within state boundaries.

### **ORGANIZED CRIME**

For the purpose of the Global Organized Crime Index, ‘organized crime’ is defined as illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

By defining organized crime in this way, the Index allows for a wide range of activities and perpetrators to be considered and measured. One key point to note in this definition is the issue of legality. Activities that are not designated as illegal or that have been legalized in a country fall outside of the scope of the assessment of that particular country, even if considered illegal in another. At the same time, activities that are not illegal but that violate international human rights standards are included under the Index.

## Criminal market definitions

### People

#### HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Drawing from a range of sources, the Index covers human trafficking within a modern slavery context and includes the trafficking of organs. In line with common interpretations of human trafficking, this criminal market does not require the movement of individuals, and includes men, women and children. When movement is involved, it may include both cross-border and internal flows (such as from rural to urban locations). For the purposes of the Index, human trafficking includes activity, means and purpose, and reflects all stages of the illicit activity, from recruitment and transfer, to harbouring and receipt of persons. To distinguish this market from that of human smuggling, trafficking in persons involves a form of coercion, deception, abduction or fraud, and is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim's consent. In line with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC, exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

#### HUMAN SMUGGLING

Under the Index, human smuggling requires the criminalization of the illegal entry, transit or

residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organized criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit. Activity in this criminal economy reflects all stages of the illicit activity, including producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents when committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants. Although distinct crimes, human smuggling may turn into trafficking when the element of exploitation is involved.

### Trade

#### ARMS TRAFFICKING

The trafficking of arms involves the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of arms, their parts and components and ammunition across national borders, as well as intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. 'Firearms' refers to any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas, as per the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UNTOC. 'Small arms' and 'light weapons' refer to a range of specific weapons, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey. Often the



trafficking of arms facilitates the commission of other organized crime activities.

## Environment

### FLORA CRIMES

Crimes related to flora involve the illicit trade as well as possession of species covered by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), as well as other species protected under national law.

### FAUNA CRIMES

Like flora crimes, crimes involving fauna species reflect the poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES, as well as any other species protected by national law. The Index also considers protected marine species, and IUU fishing falls under this category.

### NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES

The Index includes the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources. It also covers any illicit activities related to the trade of such products, including price misinvoicing. The Index covers commodities including, but not limited to, oil, gold, gas, gemstones, diamonds and precious metals.

## Drugs

### HEROIN TRADE

The Index covers the production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Synthetic opioids are considered under the synthetic drugs category (see below).

### COCAINE TRADE

Like heroin, the production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives are covered by the

Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market.

### CANNABIS TRADE

The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Recognizing the growing legalization of cannabis production, sale and consumption across countries, the Index focused solely on areas where an activity was criminalized and/or where criminal groups were involved in the supply chain.

### SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE

As with other illicit drug markets, the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs are covered by the Index. Notably, synthetic opioids, such as Tramadol, as well as amphetamine-type stimulants, methamphetamines and Fentanyl are included in this criminal market, as well as any other narcotic included in the 1972 Protocol, Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Consumption of such drugs, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Notably, 'substandard and falsified medical products', as outlined by the World Health Organization, have been excluded.

## Criminal actor definitions

### MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS

Refers to clearly defined, organized criminal groups. This typology also includes militia and guerrilla groups that are primarily funded by illicit activities. There are four defining features of a mafia-style group: a known name, a defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

### CRIMINAL NETWORKS

Refers to a loose network of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not control territory and are not widely known by a name or with a known leader. Criminal networks are involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial control or any of the other defining

features of mafia-style groups. In essence, criminal networks and entrepreneurs are defined by their failure to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

### STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS

Refers to criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus.

### FOREIGN ACTORS

Refers to state and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. This can include not just foreign nationals, but also various diaspora groups that have created roots in the country over multiple generations.

## Resilience indicator definitions

### Leadership and governance

#### POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Refers to the role a state's government plays in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness in doing so. Strong political leadership and governance indicate higher state resilience to organized crime.

Governments orient citizens toward a state's stance on organized crime, championing its role in combating the phenomenon by laying the foundation to implement action. The platform

in which anti-organized crime rhetoric is made reflects to some degree the level of prioritization of organized crime on the national agenda.

Governance serves as a function of the relationship between the state and its governed populations. Leaders send messages that are seen as legitimate, and in turn unify society. People's confidence in those who govern them can be directly linked to conflict in a society. The presence of organized crime can tangibly reduce the capacity for governance and the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the population.

When there is no or little confidence in government, society can become unstable, creating (further) opportunities for organized crime to fill the void between the state and its populations.

#### RESILIENCE

The Index defines 'resilience' as the ability to withstand and disrupt organized criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries' measures taken by both the state and non-state actors.

## GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Refers to the degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities – in other words, whether or not the state creates opportunities for the reduction of state corruption and to obscure the illegitimate control over power or resources, including resources linked to organized crime.

As representatives of their citizens, governments are entrusted with powers to oversee and maintain the rule and order of societies. When this contract is abused, it both undermines citizens' trust in state institutions (which may lead to vulnerabilities to organized crime) and can imply state collusion in organized crime. Efforts to increase transparency, such as adequately resourcing anti-corruption measures, work to close opportunities in which organized criminals may exert their influence. Thus, the more transparent governments are, the more resilient a state is to organized crime.

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Refers to the structures and processes of interaction, policymaking and concrete implementation by countries beyond the national level in order to respond to organized crime. Strong international cooperation indicates high state resilience to organized crime.

As organized crime is increasingly a transnational phenomenon, with actors and supply chains able to span national and continental boundaries, it is essential that states work together on a global scale to combat the threat.

The ratification and (timeliness of ratification) of relevant international organized crime treaties implies state willingness to effectuate responses to organized crime, in line with international standards. These treaties are:

- The UNTOC and its three protocols
- The UN Convention against Corruption
- The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988

- The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
- The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
- The Arms Trade Treaty
- CITES

At the international level, for states parties, these instruments constitute sufficient legal grounds to carry out response measures to organized crime. Such responses include cooperation in criminal matters, particularly mutual legal assistance, extradition, the transfer of sentenced prisoners and transborder asset confiscation. The presence of such structures and policies, and evidence of their effective use, implies higher state resilience to organized crime.

## NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS

International cooperation is an essential component to combating organized crime because it sets the basis for national responses. Thus, national policies and laws refers to state legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. National organized crime strategies and legislation are adapted to the needs of the state, its legal tradition and social, economic cultural and geographic conditions. As such, the presence of these reflects higher state resilience to organized crime.

## Criminal justice and security

### JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION

Refers to a state's judiciary's power to effectively try to enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases. The ability of a country's judicial system to do so depends on whether it is adequately resourced and operates independently and effectively at all points along the juridical chain.

Although passing judgment on cases is its primary function, the ability to enforce is also an essential component of a judiciary's activities. Things such as evidence that key organized crime criminals are successfully prosecuted and, in particular,

the degree of organized crime influence from within the prison system, are factors to consider in assessing a state's judicial capacity. Where the prison system is notably captured by organized crime, this should significantly impact the score.

Thus, while having more resources and independence to pass judgment on organized crime cases implies higher state resilience, high impunity implies lower state resilience.

### **LAW ENFORCEMENT**

Refers to the state's ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures regarding organized crime. As the front line of a state's criminal justice system, law enforcement and intelligence are often in direct contact with organized criminal activities. In order to bring criminal perpetrators to justice, the capacity of a state's law enforcement to combat organized crime rests on things such as whether it is adequately resourced, and whether the state has invested in law enforcement mechanisms that are specifically organized-crime-focused. It can therefore be said that higher law enforcement capacity makes a state more resilient to organized crime.

### **TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**

Refers to the degree to which states are able to control their territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities, including border control personnel capacity.

A country's physical location and geography may increase the risk of exploitation by organized criminal groups. As lengthy borders are less likely to be regulated, criminals are more likely to take advantage of the vast expanse by smuggling illicit commodities and people unnoticed. Moreover, the level of a state's economic engagement internationally, marked by things such as its port and airport infrastructure, can increase the feasibility with which to move goods and people (both legitimately and illegally) between countries.

As such, the greater resources and structures put in place by states to manage their territorial integrity against organized crime, the higher its resilience.

## **Economic and financial**

### **ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING**

Refers to a state's ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

Profits that criminals make from organized crime are often concealed by being funnelled through legitimate businesses. Through the development of anti-money laundering mechanisms, states become more resilient to the threat of money laundering, which potentially underlies all forms of organized crime.

The Financial Action Task Force is a policymaking body that has developed a series of recommendations that are recognized as the international standard for combating money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They form the basis for a coordinated response to these threats to the financial system.

States are assessed through mutual country evaluations to determine their level of compliance with these international standards. The higher compliance, the more resilient states are to organized crime.

### **ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY**

Refers to the ability to control and manage the economy, and to regulate financial and economic transactions (both nationally and internationally) so that trade is able to flourish within the confines of the rule of law. In other words, whether an actor has put into place and can effectively oversee the mechanisms that ensure economic transactions and businesses operate in a predictable, fair way, free from distortion, including criminal activities such as extortion and illicit taxation.

When actors are able to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, it allows for options and opportunities for legitimate, regulated business to expand. This, in turn, reduces the



incentive for informal, illegal business to arise, or for criminal groups to unduly influence economic forces, through alternative regulation, extortion or criminal practice.

States under protracted sanctions by the international community have been shown to develop illicit means by which to circumvent or soften the impact of those sanctions.

The larger the number of sound economic regulations that are in place and the lower number of (and duration of) sanctions placed on a state, the higher resilience a country has to organized crime.

## Civil society and social protection

### VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT

Refers to the existence of assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime (for example, human trafficking, drug trafficking, extortion or fraud).

Support mechanisms, treatment programmes for victims, as well as resources allocated to these initiatives create an environment in which citizens are able to recover more quickly from the effects of organized criminal activities.

Moreover, initiatives such as witness protection programmes are essential, and often the only way to successfully prosecute organized criminals. The more such support programmes are put in place, the more resilient states are to organized crime.

### PREVENTION

Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. While prevention considers mainly state initiatives, these frameworks often use a holistic approach to preventive measures through community outreach, recognizing that citizens that are engaged in prevention to organized crime help make the state more resilient.

Through prevention, states can build safeguards to protect against organized crime by effecting behavioural change in vulnerable groups and reducing the demand for illicit activities. Thus, the more robust a state's prevention scheme is, the more resilient it is to organized crime.

### NON-STATE ACTORS

From a resilience perspective, non-state actors play a role in responding to organized crime to supplement government care and by ensuring 'checks and balances' against governments to ensure resilience to organized crime. The non-state actors indicator is also a measure of the degree to which civil society organizations are able and allowed to play a role in responding to organized crime across the spectrum, from victim support to crime prevention.

Civil society organizations are engaged in local communities, where ownership of initiatives against organized crime is formed, leading to more sustainable response measures. Similarly, the media is critical in the role it plays holding governments to account and provides a voice for communities by mobilizing civil society against the threat of organized crime among local populations. Thus, the more civil society capacity a state has, the more resilient it is to organized crime.

APPENDIX 3

# Ranking tables



# Ranking

## Criminality scores

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
1. CONGO, DEM. REP.	7.75	38. UGANDA	6.14
2. COLOMBIA	7.66	39. YEMEN	6.13
3. MYANMAR	7.59	40. NICARAGUA	6.06
4. MEXICO	7.56	41. CHINA	6.01
5. NIGERIA	7.15	41. GHANA	6.01
6. IRAN	7.10	41. NIGER	6.01
7. AFGHANISTAN	7.08	41. SAUDI ARABIA	6.01
8. IRAQ	7.05	45. MONTENEGRO	6.00
9. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	7.04	46. EL SALVADOR	5.94
10. HONDURAS	6.98	46. MALAYSIA	5.94
11. KENYA	6.95	48. JAMAICA	5.91
12. TURKEY	6.89	49. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	5.89
13. PHILIPPINES	6.84	49. MALI	5.89
13. SYRIA	6.84	51. CHAD	5.86
15. LEBANON	6.76	52. CAMBODIA	5.83
16. PARAGUAY	6.70	53. ITALY	5.81
17. PANAMA	6.68	54. SOMALIA	5.79
18. VENEZUELA	6.64	55. SPAIN	5.78
19. SOUTH AFRICA	6.63	56. THAILAND	5.76
20. LIBYA	6.55	57. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	5.75
21. MOZAMBIQUE	6.53	58. HAITI	5.73
22. BRAZIL	6.50	59. FRANCE	5.66
23. GUATEMALA	6.48	59. ZIMBABWE	5.66
24. SUDAN	6.46	61. ALBANIA	5.63
25. INDONESIA	6.38	62. TAJIKISTAN	5.61
26. PERU	6.35	63. MADAGASCAR	5.59
27. SOUTH SUDAN	6.34	64. INDIA	5.53
28. CAMEROON	6.31	65. LAOS	5.51
29. PAKISTAN	6.28	66. UNITED STATES	5.50
29. VIETNAM	6.28	67. BURKINA FASO	5.49
31. ECUADOR	6.25	68. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.45
32. RUSSIA	6.24	69. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.44
33. SERBIA	6.21	70. BULGARIA	5.43
34. UKRAINE	6.18	71. SIERRA LEONE	5.40
35. NEPAL	6.16	72. KYRGYZSTAN	5.33
36. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.15	72. TOGO	5.33
36. TANZANIA	6.15	74. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.31

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
75. ANGOLA	5.29	115. ROMANIA	4.59
76. BENIN	5.25	116. SWEDEN	4.56
77. QATAR	5.21	117. PORTUGAL	4.55
78. GUINEA	5.20	118. JAPAN	4.53
- KOSOVO	5.19	119. ALGERIA	4.51
79. EGYPT	5.16	119. BURUNDI	4.51
80. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	5.15	119. MAURITIUS	4.51
81. KUWAIT	5.14	122. HUNGARY	4.50
82. GUYANA	5.10	123. MOLDOVA	4.45
83. AZERBAIJAN	5.08	124. ISRAEL	4.41
83. BELARUS	5.08	125. ARGENTINA	4.38
85. CROATIA	5.06	125. MAURITANIA	4.38
86. LIBERIA	5.05	127. BELGIUM	4.34
87. CONGO, REP.	5.03	127. ERITREA	4.34
88. COSTA RICA	4.99	127. SWITZERLAND	4.34
89. BANGLADESH	4.98	130. NAMIBIA	4.33
90. UZBEKISTAN	4.96	131. BOLIVIA	4.30
91. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4.94	132. SLOVENIA	4.29
92. GREECE	4.93	133. KAZAKHSTAN	4.26
92. ZAMBIA	4.93	134. CYPRUS	4.19
94. KOREA, REP.	4.91	135. SOLOMON ISLANDS	4.15
95. GABON	4.90	136. OMAN	4.14
95. GERMANY	4.90	137. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	4.11
95. IRELAND	4.90	138. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	4.10
95. SURINAME	4.90	139. ST. LUCIA	4.09
99. UNITED KINGDOM	4.89	140. MALDIVES	4.06
100. BAHRAIN	4.83	141. AUSTRIA	4.04
100. GAMBIA	4.83	141. CABO VERDE	4.04
102. SENEGAL	4.81	143. MONGOLIA	4.01
103. ETHIOPIA	4.79	143. POLAND	4.01
103. MOROCCO	4.79	145. AUSTRALIA	4.00
105. KOREA, DPR	4.78	146. DJIBOUTI	3.99
106. JORDAN	4.71	147. TIMOR-LESTE	3.96
107. NETHERLANDS	4.69	148. FIJI	3.90
107. SLOVAKIA	4.69	148. LESOTHO	3.90
109. MALTA	4.65	150. COMOROS	3.86
110. BELIZE	4.64	150. DENMARK	3.86
110. SRI LANKA	4.64	152. MALAWI	3.83
112. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.63	153. NORWAY	3.81
113. TURKMENISTAN	4.61	154. BAHAMAS	3.79
114. CHILE	4.60	154. TUNISIA	3.79

COUNTRY	SCORE
156. TONGA	3.78
157. BOTSWANA	3.71
158. BHUTAN	3.69
159. RWANDA	3.68
159. SEYCHELLES	3.68
161. CANADA	3.66
162. ESWATINI	3.63
163. ESTONIA	3.60
164. LATVIA	3.51
165. CUBA	3.44
166. ICELAND	3.39
167. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	3.34
168. LITHUANIA	3.31
169. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	3.30
169. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	3.30
171. ARMENIA	3.26
172. NEW ZEALAND	3.25
173. BARBADOS	3.21
174. SINGAPORE	3.13
175. GRENADA	3.05
176. SAN MARINO	3.01
177. ANDORRA	2.96
177. GEORGIA	2.96
179. PALAU	2.94
180. BRUNEI	2.76
181. FINLAND	2.71
182. URUGUAY	2.69
183. DOMINICA	2.63
184. MONACO	2.43
185. LUXEMBOURG	2.36
186. KIRIBATI	2.35
187. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.31
188. VANUATU	2.20
189. SAMOA	2.04
190. LIECHTENSTEIN	1.88
191. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1.78
192. NAURU	1.76
193. TUVALU	1.54



## Criminal market scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES
1. MEXICO	8.00	7.5	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.0
2. COLOMBIA	7.20	7.5	7.0	8.0	6.0	7.0
3. NIGERIA	7.05	7.5	6.0	8.0	6.0	6.5
3. MYANMAR	7.05	6.5	7.5	8.0	7.0	8.0
5. IRAN	6.95	7.5	8.0	8.0	4.5	4.0
6. SAUDI ARABIA	6.90	8.5	7.5	8.0	5.0	7.0
6. AFGHANISTAN	6.90	8.5	8.0	8.5	6.0	4.0
8. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	6.75	8.5	6.5	6.5	5.5	7.5
9. KENYA	6.65	7.5	7.0	7.5	6.0	7.0
10. TANZANIA	6.55	6.5	6.5	5.5	7.5	8.0
11. BRAZIL	6.50	5.0	4.0	8.0	8.5	8.5
11. CONGO, DEM. REP.	6.50	7.0	5.5	9.0	8.5	8.0
13. THAILAND	6.40	6.5	7.0	5.5	6.5	8.0
13. TURKEY	6.40	7.0	9.0	9.0	4.0	3.0
15. PANAMA	6.35	8.0	5.5	6.5	6.0	8.0
15. IRAQ	6.35	8.0	8.5	9.0	1.5	4.5
17. INDIA	6.30	7.0	6.0	5.5	5.5	8.0
17. PHILIPPINES	6.30	7.0	5.0	7.5	7.0	7.5
17. PAKISTAN	6.30	8.0	7.0	8.0	4.5	5.0
20. MALAYSIA	6.25	6.5	7.0	5.5	6.0	8.0
20. CAMEROON	6.25	6.5	5.5	6.5	7.0	7.5
22. PERU	6.20	7.0	6.0	5.5	7.0	5.5
23. KUWAIT	6.15	8.0	6.5	6.5	5.5	6.0
23. GHANA	6.15	6.5	5.0	5.0	6.5	6.0
23. CAMBODIA	6.15	7.5	6.5	5.0	8.0	8.0
23. MALI	6.15	7.0	6.0	8.0	5.0	5.5
27. RUSSIA	6.10	6.5	6.0	4.5	7.5	7.5
27. LIBYA	6.10	9.5	8.0	9.5	1.0	3.5
29. VIETNAM	6.05	6.5	7.0	4.0	6.5	8.5
29. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.05	6.5	6.5	7.0	6.0	6.5
29. MOZAMBIQUE	6.05	4.0	5.0	5.5	8.0	8.0
29. SYRIA	6.05	8.5	8.5	9.0	1.5	3.5
33. SOUTH AFRICA	6.00	4.5	4.0	8.0	3.5	7.5
33. ECUADOR	6.00	6.0	5.5	7.5	6.0	6.0
33. INDONESIA	6.00	6.5	6.0	4.5	7.5	8.0
36. GUATEMALA	5.95	6.5	7.0	7.0	4.0	4.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE
1. MEXICO	8.00	7.5	8.0	9.0	8.0	9.0
2. COLOMBIA	7.20	9.0	5.0	9.5	8.0	5.0
3. NIGERIA	7.05	8.0	6.0	6.5	8.0	8.0
3. MYANMAR	7.05	6.5	9.5	3.5	4.5	9.5
5. IRAN	6.95	8.5	9.0	5.5	6.0	8.5
6. SAUDI ARABIA	6.90	7.0	6.5	5.5	6.5	7.5
6. AFGHANISTAN	6.90	8.0	9.5	1.0	7.0	8.5
8. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	6.75	6.0	7.0	6.0	6.5	7.5
9. KENYA	6.65	7.0	7.5	6.0	6.5	4.5
10. TANZANIA	6.55	6.5	7.5	5.0	7.0	5.5
11. BRAZIL	6.50	8.0	2.0	9.0	8.0	4.0
11. CONGO, DEM. REP.	6.50	9.0	4.0	4.5	7.0	2.5
13. THAILAND	6.40	6.0	7.5	4.0	5.0	8.0
13. TURKEY	6.40	9.5	8.0	4.0	5.0	5.5
15. PANAMA	6.35	6.0	5.0	8.5	5.0	5.0
15. IRAQ	6.35	9.0	6.0	5.0	6.0	6.0
17. INDIA	6.30	7.0	6.5	3.5	7.5	6.5
17. PHILIPPINES	6.30	8.0	4.0	3.5	4.5	9.0
17. PAKISTAN	6.30	5.5	8.5	3.0	7.0	6.5
20. MALAYSIA	6.25	5.5	6.5	5.0	5.0	7.5
20. CAMEROON	6.25	7.5	4.5	3.5	7.0	7.0
22. PERU	6.20	9.0	3.5	9.0	5.5	4.0
23. KUWAIT	6.15	6.0	5.0	4.5	6.5	7.0
23. GHANA	6.15	7.5	6.0	6.5	5.5	7.0
23. CAMBODIA	6.15	8.0	4.0	2.5	4.5	7.5
23. MALI	6.15	7.5	3.0	6.0	7.0	6.5
27. RUSSIA	6.10	5.0	7.0	4.5	5.0	7.5
27. LIBYA	6.10	8.5	2.5	4.0	7.5	7.0
29. VIETNAM	6.05	6.0	7.0	4.0	4.5	6.5
29. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.05	7.5	3.5	5.0	6.0	6.0
29. MOZAMBIQUE	6.05	8.0	7.5	3.5	4.0	7.0
29. SYRIA	6.05	7.0	3.0	2.5	7.5	9.5
33. SOUTH AFRICA	6.00	7.5	7.5	5.5	3.5	8.5
33. ECUADOR	6.00	6.5	6.0	7.0	4.0	5.5
33. INDONESIA	6.00	7.5	3.5	4.0	6.5	6.0
36. GUATEMALA	5.95	2.5	7.5	8.5	6.5	6.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES
37. CHINA	5.90	6.5	6.0	2.5	8.5	9.0
37. LEBANON	5.90	8.5	6.5	7.5	1.5	3.0
37. PARAGUAY	5.90	7.0	6.0	8.5	6.0	6.5
37. NIGER	5.90	7.0	7.0	8.0	2.0	4.5
41. QATAR	5.80	8.0	6.0	6.5	5.0	6.5
42. FRANCE	5.70	6.0	6.5	6.0	4.0	5.5
42. HONDURAS	5.70	6.5	6.5	6.0	7.0	6.0
42. NEPAL	5.70	7.0	6.5	6.0	7.0	7.0
42. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.70	7.5	4.5	8.5	6.5	8.0
46. BAHRAIN	5.65	7.5	5.5	5.5	4.0	6.0
46. UGANDA	5.65	7.0	5.0	6.5	6.0	6.5
46. LAOS	5.65	6.5	6.5	4.5	8.0	8.0
46. VENEZUELA	5.65	7.5	7.5	8.0	2.5	2.5
50. UKRAINE	5.60	7.0	6.5	8.0	6.5	4.0
51. SERBIA	5.55	5.0	6.5	7.5	4.0	4.0
51. SUDAN	5.55	8.0	7.5	8.5	1.5	5.5
53. UNITED STATES	5.50	5.5	4.5	6.5	2.5	5.5
53. NICARAGUA	5.50	6.0	5.5	6.0	6.0	6.0
55. HAITI	5.45	6.5	6.5	5.5	6.5	4.0
56. BURKINA FASO	5.35	6.0	4.0	8.0	4.0	6.0
56. CHAD	5.35	7.0	7.0	8.0	1.5	3.5
58. SPAIN	5.30	7.0	7.0	4.0	3.5	5.0
58. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	5.30	6.0	6.0	4.0	4.5	4.0
58. MADAGASCAR	5.30	6.0	3.0	4.5	7.5	7.0
58. KOREA, DPR	5.30	8.0	6.5	9.0	1.0	3.0
58. SOUTH SUDAN	5.30	8.5	5.5	8.0	7.5	7.0
63. ITALY	5.25	7.0	6.5	5.5	2.5	3.5
63. ALBANIA	5.25	5.0	6.5	4.5	4.5	3.5
63. BENIN	5.25	6.0	4.0	5.5	6.0	5.5
66. ANGOLA	5.20	6.0	4.0	6.0	7.0	4.5
66. ZIMBABWE	5.20	5.5	3.5	4.0	5.5	7.5
68. GAMBIA	5.15	7.0	5.0	2.5	7.0	3.5
68. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	5.15	5.5	7.0	6.0	4.5	4.0
68. GUINEA	5.15	7.0	3.0	6.0	4.5	6.0
71. BULGARIA	5.10	6.0	5.0	3.5	5.5	5.0
71. LIBERIA	5.10	6.0	3.0	4.5	5.5	6.0
71. TAJIKISTAN	5.10	6.5	6.0	4.0	2.5	3.5
74. BELGIUM	5.05	5.0	5.5	5.5	2.5	3.5
74. ROMANIA	5.05	6.5	5.5	3.5	6.0	5.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE
37. CHINA	5.90	4.5	6.5	3.5	4.0	8.0
37. LEBANON	5.90	5.0	4.0	6.0	9.0	8.0
37. PARAGUAY	5.90	3.5	1.0	7.0	9.0	4.5
37. NIGER	5.90	7.5	3.0	6.0	7.0	7.0
41. QATAR	5.80	5.0	4.5	4.0	6.0	6.5
42. FRANCE	5.70	4.5	6.0	6.5	6.5	5.5
42. HONDURAS	5.70	5.0	2.0	7.5	7.5	3.0
42. NEPAL	5.70	6.5	4.5	3.5	5.0	4.0
42. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.70	9.0	1.5	1.5	3.0	7.0
46. SAUDI ARABIA	5.65	6.5	5.0	4.0	6.0	6.5
46. UGANDA	5.65	7.0	5.0	3.5	6.0	4.0
46. LAOS	5.65	1.5	7.0	2.5	4.0	8.0
46. VENEZUELA	5.65	9.0	2.0	9.0	7.0	1.5
50. UKRAINE	5.60	7.0	5.0	3.5	5.0	3.5
51. SERBIA	5.55	4.0	7.0	5.5	6.0	6.0
51. SUDAN	5.55	7.5	2.0	2.5	8.0	4.5
53. UNITED STATES	5.50	4.5	6.5	7.0	5.0	7.5
53. NICARAGUA	5.50	6.0	2.5	7.5	6.0	3.5
55. HAITI	5.45	6.0	2.0	8.0	6.0	3.5
56. BURKINA FASO	5.35	8.5	4.0	4.0	3.0	6.0
56. CHAD	5.35	7.0	2.0	4.5	6.0	7.0
58. SPAIN	5.30	2.0	6.5	7.0	7.0	4.0
58. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	5.30	4.5	6.5	8.0	5.0	4.5
58. MADAGASCAR	5.30	7.5	7.0	2.5	6.0	2.0
58. KOREA, DPR	5.30	7.0	3.5	2.0	6.0	7.0
58. SOUTH SUDAN	5.30	8.0	2.0	1.5	4.0	1.0
63. ITALY	5.25	5.5	4.5	7.5	5.0	5.0
63. ALBANIA	5.25	5.5	6.0	7.0	7.0	3.0
63. BENIN	5.25	5.0	4.5	6.0	4.0	6.0
66. ANGOLA	5.20	8.5	3.0	6.0	4.5	2.5
66. ZIMBABWE	5.20	8.0	4.0	3.0	6.0	5.0
68. GAMBIA	5.15	4.5	4.5	6.5	7.0	4.0
68. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	5.15	3.0	6.0	4.5	5.5	5.5
68. GUINEA	5.15	6.5	2.5	7.0	4.5	4.5
71. BULGARIA	5.10	5.0	6.0	4.0	5.0	6.0
71. LIBERIA	5.10	6.5	5.0	5.5	6.0	3.0
71. TAJIKISTAN	5.10	7.0	8.5	2.0	6.0	5.0
74. BELGIUM	5.05	3.0	4.0	7.5	6.5	7.5
74. ROMANIA	5.05	4.0	5.5	5.5	4.5	4.5

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES
74. SIERRA LEONE	5.05	5.0	4.0	3.5	6.5	6.5
77. NETHERLANDS	5.00	5.5	4.5	5.0	3.0	4.0
77. SENEGAL	5.00	5.0	5.0	4.5	7.5	7.0
77. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.00	5.5	6.5	4.5	4.0	3.5
77. MONTENEGRO	5.00	4.5	5.5	6.0	3.0	4.5
77. EL SALVADOR	5.00	7.0	6.5	7.0	5.0	5.5
77. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.00	7.0	4.0	5.5	8.0	5.0
77. YEMEN	5.00	8.5	7.5	9.0	2.5	4.0
- KOSOVO	5.00	6.0	5.5	5.5	4.0	4.0
84. ETHIOPIA	4.95	6.0	6.5	7.0	3.5	5.5
84. MOROCCO	4.95	5.5	6.5	3.0	3.0	4.5
84. BANGLADESH	4.95	8.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	5.0
84. EGYPT	4.95	5.5	5.5	7.0	1.0	5.0
88. OMAN	4.90	6.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
88. TOGO	4.90	6.0	3.5	4.0	5.0	6.0
88. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.90	5.5	2.5	5.5	8.5	5.5
91. COSTA RICA	4.85	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	6.0
92. GERMANY	4.80	5.5	7.0	6.0	1.5	3.5
92. CONGO, REP.	4.80	6.5	4.5	5.0	8.0	7.0
92. GABON	4.80	5.5	5.5	4.5	8.5	7.0
95. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.75	5.0	5.0	4.5	3.0	5.5
95. CROATIA	4.75	4.5	6.0	3.5	5.0	2.5
95. HUNGARY	4.75	6.0	6.0	3.5	3.5	4.5
98. GUYANA	4.70	5.5	4.0	5.0	4.5	3.5
99. ALGERIA	4.65	4.5	6.5	5.0	2.0	4.5
99. SRI LANKA	4.65	5.5	6.0	5.0	3.0	4.5
101. BOLIVIA	4.60	5.0	2.0	4.0	7.0	5.0
101. ZAMBIA	4.60	5.0	3.0	4.0	8.0	4.5
103. IRELAND	4.55	4.5	4.0	4.0	2.0	4.0
103. JORDAN	4.55	6.5	5.5	6.5	3.5	3.5
103. UZBEKISTAN	4.55	7.5	6.0	3.0	3.0	3.5
103. SURINAME	4.55	4.0	4.0	5.5	5.0	3.5
107. CHILE	4.45	4.0	4.5	5.5	4.0	4.5
107. SOMALIA	4.45	8.0	7.5	8.5	6.0	4.5
109. UNITED KINGDOM	4.40	6.0	5.0	3.5	2.5	4.0
109. POLAND	4.40	5.5	4.5	3.5	2.0	2.5
109. MAURITIUS	4.40	4.5	3.5	2.0	2.0	3.0
109. KYRGYZSTAN	4.40	6.5	4.5	3.0	2.0	3.5
109. BELARUS	4.40	7.0	5.5	6.5	3.0	2.0
109. BELIZE	4.40	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.5	4.5



COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE
74. SIERRA LEONE	5.05	6.5	2.0	4.5	7.0	5.0
77. NETHERLANDS	5.00	4.0	4.0	7.0	5.5	7.5
77. SENEGAL	5.00	3.5	2.5	6.5	6.0	2.5
77. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.00	3.0	6.5	5.0	6.0	5.5
77. MONTENEGRO	5.00	3.5	5.5	7.5	5.5	4.5
77. EL SALVADOR	5.00	1.5	1.5	7.0	7.0	2.0
77. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.00	5.5	1.0	4.0	5.5	4.5
77. YEMEN	5.00	7.0	2.5	2.0	3.0	4.0
- KOSOVO	5.00	4.5	6.5	4.5	5.5	4.0
84. ETHIOPIA	4.95	5.5	3.0	4.0	5.5	3.0
84. MOROCCO	4.95	3.0	3.0	6.0	9.0	6.0
84. BANGLADESH	4.95	3.5	4.5	3.0	4.0	6.5
84. EGYPT	4.95	4.0	5.5	2.0	7.0	7.0
88. OMAN	4.90	5.5	5.0	3.0	4.5	6.0
88. TOGO	4.90	6.0	3.0	5.0	6.5	4.0
88. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.90	1.0	5.0	8.0	5.5	2.0
91. COSTA RICA	4.85	6.5	1.0	7.0	4.5	3.5
92. GERMANY	4.80	2.5	4.5	6.5	5.0	6.0
92. CONGO, REP.	4.80	3.5	2.5	5.0	4.0	2.0
92. GABON	4.80	3.0	2.5	2.5	4.0	5.0
95. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.75	3.0	4.5	4.5	6.0	6.5
95. CROATIA	4.75	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.5	5.5
95. HUNGARY	4.75	3.5	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.5
98. GUYANA	4.70	8.5	2.5	8.0	3.0	2.5
99. ALGERIA	4.65	6.5	2.0	3.5	6.5	5.5
99. SRI LANKA	4.65	3.0	6.0	3.0	5.5	5.0
101. BOLIVIA	4.60	8.0	2.0	8.5	2.5	2.0
101. ZAMBIA	4.60	5.5	4.0	3.0	5.0	4.0
103. IRELAND	4.55	5.0	5.5	6.5	5.0	5.0
103. JORDAN	4.55	1.5	3.5	3.0	6.0	6.0
103. UZBEKISTAN	4.55	6.5	6.5	1.5	4.0	4.0
103. SURINAME	4.55	9.0	1.5	8.5	2.5	2.0
107. CHILE	4.45	2.0	2.0	7.0	6.5	4.5
107. SOMALIA	4.45	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
109. UNITED KINGDOM	4.40	2.0	4.5	6.5	4.5	5.5
109. POLAND	4.40	5.5	4.0	4.5	5.5	6.5
109. MAURITIUS	4.40	4.0	8.0	3.5	5.5	8.0
109. KYRGYZSTAN	4.40	5.5	7.0	2.0	5.5	4.5
109. BELARUS	4.40	5.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	5.0
109. BELIZE	4.40	3.0	3.5	4.5	5.5	3.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES
109. BURUNDI	4.40	8.5	5.5	8.0	2.0	4.5
116. TURKMENISTAN	4.35	8.5	5.0	2.0	2.0	3.0
117. SWITZERLAND	4.30	5.0	3.0	6.5	1.5	3.0
118. SWEDEN	4.25	4.5	5.5	6.0	2.0	3.5
118. SLOVAKIA	4.25	5.5	3.5	4.5	3.5	3.0
118. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4.25	6.0	4.0	6.0	1.0	2.0
121. ISRAEL	4.20	5.5	2.5	5.5	1.5	2.0
121. JAMAICA	4.20	5.0	3.0	8.5	1.5	2.0
121. TUNISIA	4.20	4.0	7.0	5.0	3.5	3.5
124. KAZAKHSTAN	4.15	5.5	4.0	2.0	2.0	5.0
124. MALAWI	4.15	4.5	3.5	4.5	4.0	6.0
124. AZERBAIJAN	4.15	4.5	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.5
127. PORTUGAL	4.10	4.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5
127. RWANDA	4.10	5.0	2.5	5.0	3.0	5.0
127. GREECE	4.10	5.5	7.5	3.5	2.0	2.5
130. JAPAN	4.05	5.0	4.5	3.0	4.0	6.0
130. MALTA	4.05	5.0	4.0	2.5	1.0	5.0
130. ERITREA	4.05	9.0	9.5	6.5	1.5	2.0
133. NORWAY	4.00	5.0	3.5	3.5	2.5	4.0
133. CUBA	4.00	6.0	6.0	1.5	4.0	3.0
133. MAURITANIA	4.00	7.5	6.0	4.0	1.0	3.5
136. KOREA, REP.	3.95	6.0	4.5	3.5	4.0	4.5
136. AUSTRIA	3.95	4.5	5.0	6.5	2.0	2.5
136. SLOVENIA	3.95	4.0	5.5	3.5	2.0	3.0
136. BAHAMAS	3.95	4.5	5.0	4.5	1.0	4.5
140. MONGOLIA	3.90	4.5	3.0	3.5	5.5	4.5
140. NAMIBIA	3.90	3.5	2.5	3.0	6.5	4.5
140. MOLDOVA	3.90	7.5	4.0	5.0	2.5	2.0
143. DENMARK	3.85	4.0	4.5	4.0	1.5	2.0
143. COMOROS	3.85	5.0	5.5	3.5	3.0	5.5
143. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.85	4.5	2.0	5.0	8.5	5.0
146. BOTSWANA	3.80	4.5	3.0	3.0	2.0	7.5
146. FIJI	3.80	5.0	3.5	2.0	3.0	4.5
148. AUSTRALIA	3.75	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.5
148. ARGENTINA	3.75	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5
148. BHUTAN	3.75	5.0	3.0	2.0	7.0	5.5
151. CABO VERDE	3.70	4.5	2.0	2.5	2.5	4.0
152. LATVIA	3.65	4.5	3.5	3.5	1.0	2.0
153. SEYCHELLES	3.60	4.0	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.0
153. DJIBOUTI	3.60	6.0	7.0	6.0	2.0	4.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE
109. BURUNDI	4.40	4.0	3.0	2.5	3.5	2.5
116. TURKMENISTAN	4.35	7.0	6.5	1.5	4.0	4.0
117. SWITZERLAND	4.30	7.0	2.5	5.5	5.5	3.5
118. SWEDEN	4.25	2.0	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5
118. SLOVAKIA	4.25	3.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.5
118. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	4.25	2.0	3.0	7.5	7.0	4.0
121. ISRAEL	4.20	5.5	3.0	4.5	6.5	5.5
121. JAMAICA	4.20	1.0	3.0	6.0	9.0	3.0
121. TUNISIA	4.20	5.0	2.0	3.0	5.0	4.0
124. KAZAKHSTAN	4.15	4.5	6.5	2.5	4.5	5.0
124. MALAWI	4.15	4.0	4.5	2.5	6.0	2.0
124. AZERBAIJAN	4.15	6.0	6.0	3.0	5.0	4.0
127. PORTUGAL	4.10	3.0	4.5	5.0	4.5	4.5
127. RWANDA	4.10	8.0	3.0	2.5	4.0	3.0
127. GREECE	4.10	3.0	6.0	3.5	5.0	2.5
130. JAPAN	4.05	3.0	2.0	3.0	4.5	5.5
130. MALTA	4.05	5.0	3.0	5.0	4.5	5.5
130. ERITREA	4.05	2.0	3.0	1.5	4.0	1.5
133. NORWAY	4.00	3.5	5.0	4.5	4.0	4.5
133. CUBA	4.00	4.0	2.5	4.0	5.0	4.0
133. MAURITANIA	4.00	3.5	1.5	4.5	6.5	2.0
136. KOREA, REP.	3.95	2.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	5.0
136. AUSTRIA	3.95	2.0	4.5	3.5	4.5	4.5
136. SLOVENIA	3.95	2.5	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5
136. BAHAMAS	3.95	2.0	4.0	7.0	4.0	3.0
140. MONGOLIA	3.90	4.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	6.0
140. NAMIBIA	3.90	4.0	3.0	4.5	3.0	4.5
140. MOLDOVA	3.90	3.0	3.0	2.5	4.5	5.0
143. DENMARK	3.85	2.0	5.0	5.5	5.0	5.0
143. COMOROS	3.85	1.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	6.0
143. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.85	6.0	1.5	1.5	3.5	1.0
146. BOTSWANA	3.80	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.5
146. FIJI	3.80	2.0	2.0	4.5	5.0	6.5
148. AUSTRALIA	3.75	2.0	3.5	5.0	3.5	7.0
148. ARGENTINA	3.75	3.0	2.0	6.5	6.5	3.0
148. BHUTAN	3.75	4.5	2.0	1.5	4.0	3.0
151. CABO VERDE	3.70	1.0	4.0	7.0	5.0	4.5
152. LATVIA	3.65	2.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.0
153. SEYCHELLES	3.60	1.0	7.5	3.0	3.0	2.5
153. DJIBOUTI	3.60	2.0	2.5	1.5	3.5	1.5

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING	ARMS TRAFFICKING	FLORA CRIMES	FAUNA CRIMES
155. SOLOMON ISLANDS	3.55	4.0	2.0	3.0	8.0	7.5
155. TIMOR-LESTE	3.55	4.0	5.0	4.0	3.0	5.0
155. LESOTHO	3.55	4.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	2.5
158. CYPRUS	3.50	5.5	6.0	2.5	2.5	3.0
158. MALDIVES	3.50	6.0	5.5	2.0	1.0	5.0
160. ESTONIA	3.45	4.5	3.0	3.0	1.5	1.5
160. CANADA	3.45	3.5	4.0	2.5	2.0	3.0
162. ARMENIA	3.40	3.5	2.0	2.5	4.0	4.5
163. TONGA	3.30	3.5	1.0	5.0	1.0	3.5
164. NEW ZEALAND	3.25	3.5	3.5	3.0	2.0	3.5
164. SINGAPORE	3.25	5.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	5.0
164. ESWATINI	3.25	4.0	3.0	4.0	2.0	2.0
167. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	3.20	3.0	2.5	5.0	1.5	2.0
168. BRUNEI	3.15	4.5	4.0	2.5	3.0	4.0
169. GEORGIA	3.05	3.5	2.0	2.0	3.5	3.5
169. ST. LUCIA	3.05	4.0	1.5	5.0	2.0	1.0
169. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	3.05	4.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	3.5
172. LITHUANIA	3.00	3.5	2.5	2.5	1.0	2.0
172. PALAU	3.00	4.0	3.0	1.5	1.0	6.5
174. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	2.85	2.5	1.0	4.0	1.0	2.0
174. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	2.85	5.0	3.0	1.5	1.0	6.5
174. GRENADA	2.85	2.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	2.5
177. FINLAND	2.80	3.0	2.5	2.5	1.0	1.5
178. URUGUAY	2.75	3.0	2.0	2.5	1.0	3.5
178. DOMINICA	2.75	2.5	2.5	5.0	1.0	1.0
180. ICELAND	2.65	4.0	3.0	1.5	1.0	1.5
181. ANDORRA	2.55	2.5	3.0	3.0	1.0	1.0
181. BARBADOS	2.55	3.5	2.0	4.0	1.0	1.0
183. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.50	4.5	2.0	1.5	1.0	6.5
184. SAMOA	2.45	3.5	2.0	3.0	1.5	2.0
184. KIRIBATI	2.45	4.5	1.5	2.0	1.0	6.5
186. VANUATU	2.40	2.5	1.5	1.5	3.0	5.5
187. LUXEMBOURG	2.35	3.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.5
188. LIECHTENSTEIN	2.00	2.0	1.5	2.5	1.5	1.5
189. SAN MARINO	1.90	2.0	1.5	3.0	1.0	1.0
190. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1.80	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.5	2.0
191. TUVALU	1.70	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	5.0
192. NAURU	1.65	1.5	2.5	1.0	1.0	3.0
193. MONACO	1.60	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	HEROIN TRADE	COCAINE TRADE	CANNABIS TRADE	SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE
155. SOLOMON ISLANDS	3.55	2.5	1.0	2.5	3.5	1.5
155. TIMOR-LESTE	3.55	2.0	2.5	2.5	3.5	4.0
155. LESOTHO	3.55	5.5	3.5	5.5	4.5	3.0
158. CYPRUS	3.50	2.0	2.0	4.5	4.0	3.0
158. MALDIVES	3.50	1.0	6.0	3.5	3.0	2.0
160. ESTONIA	3.45	3.0	3.0	3.5	5.0	6.5
160. CANADA	3.45	3.0	5.0	3.5	3.0	5.0
162. ARMENIA	3.40	3.5	4.0	2.0	4.0	4.0
163. TONGA	3.30	2.0	1.5	4.0	5.0	6.5
164. NEW ZEALAND	3.25	1.5	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.5
164. SINGAPORE	3.25	1.5	4.0	3.0	2.0	5.0
164. ESWATINI	3.25	3.0	3.0	3.0	5.5	3.0
167. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	3.20	2.0	1.0	7.0	7.0	1.0
168. BRUNEI	3.15	2.0	2.5	1.5	3.5	4.0
169. GEORGIA	3.05	3.0	3.5	2.0	3.5	4.0
169. ST. LUCIA	3.05	1.0	1.0	7.0	7.0	1.0
169. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	3.05	1.5	3.0	6.0	5.0	1.5
172. LITHUANIA	3.00	2.0	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.0
172. PALAU	3.00	1.5	1.5	3.0	3.0	5.0
174. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	2.85	1.0	1.0	7.5	7.5	1.0
174. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	2.85	1.0	1.0	3.0	3.5	3.0
174. GRENADA	2.85	3.0	1.0	6.5	7.0	1.5
177. FINLAND	2.80	2.0	3.5	4.0	3.5	4.5
178. URUGUAY	2.75	1.0	2.0	5.0	4.0	3.5
178. DOMINICA	2.75	1.0	1.0	6.0	5.0	2.5
180. ICELAND	2.65	1.0	1.5	4.5	4.0	4.5
181. ANDORRA	2.55	3.5	2.0	3.5	4.5	1.5
181. BARBADOS	2.55	2.0	1.0	5.5	4.5	1.0
183. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.50	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	2.5
184. SAMOA	2.45	2.0	1.0	2.5	4.5	2.5
184. KIRIBATI	2.45	2.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	1.0
186. VANUATU	2.40	1.5	1.5	2.0	3.0	2.0
187. LUXEMBOURG	2.35	1.5	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.0
188. LIECHTENSTEIN	2.00	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0	2.0
189. SAN MARINO	1.90	1.5	2.0	3.5	2.5	1.0
190. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1.80	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	1.0
191. TUVALU	1.70	1.0	1.0	1.5	2.5	1.5
192. NAURU	1.65	3.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
193. MONACO	1.60	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.0



## Criminal actor scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS
1. CONGO, DEM. REP.	9.00	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0
2. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	8.38	9.0	8.0	8.5	8.0
3. HONDURAS	8.25	8.5	8.0	8.5	8.0
4. COLOMBIA	8.13	9.5	9.0	7.0	7.0
4. MYANMAR	8.13	9.0	7.5	8.5	7.5
6. IRAQ	7.75	6.5	7.5	8.0	9.0
7. SYRIA	7.63	4.5	9.0	10.0	7.0
7. LEBANON	7.63	6.0	7.0	9.5	8.0
7. VENEZUELA	7.63	9.5	5.0	9.0	7.0
7. JAMAICA	7.63	8.0	7.5	8.0	7.0
11. PARAGUAY	7.50	6.0	7.5	8.0	8.5
12. TURKEY	7.38	8.0	7.5	9.0	5.0
12. PHILIPPINES	7.38	8.0	6.0	8.0	7.5
12. SUDAN	7.38	6.5	7.5	8.0	7.5
12. SOUTH SUDAN	7.38	4.5	8.0	9.0	8.0
16. NIGERIA	7.25	5.5	9.0	7.5	7.0
16. IRAN	7.25	7.0	7.5	9.5	5.0
16. AFGHANISTAN	7.25	7.5	8.5	9.0	4.0
16. KENYA	7.25	7.0	7.5	8.0	6.5
16. SOUTH AFRICA	7.25	7.0	7.0	7.5	7.5
16. YEMEN	7.25	8.0	7.0	6.0	8.0
22. MEXICO	7.13	9.0	9.0	7.0	3.5
22. SOMALIA	7.13	9.5	7.5	7.0	4.5
24. PANAMA	7.00	7.5	7.0	7.5	6.0
24. LIBYA	7.00	8.0	7.5	8.5	4.0
24. MOZAMBIQUE	7.00	3.5	8.0	9.0	7.5
24. GUATEMALA	7.00	7.5	6.0	7.0	7.5
24. MONTENEGRO	7.00	7.5	7.0	7.5	6.0
29. SERBIA	6.88	6.0	7.0	8.0	6.5
29. EL SALVADOR	6.88	9.5	6.5	7.0	4.5
31. INDONESIA	6.75	6.0	7.5	7.5	6.0
31. UKRAINE	6.75	6.0	7.0	8.0	6.0
33. NEPAL	6.63	4.5	6.5	8.5	7.0
33. UGANDA	6.63	5.0	7.0	7.5	7.0
33. NICARAGUA	6.63	5.0	6.5	9.0	6.0
33. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	6.63	4.0	6.5	8.0	8.0


COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS
37. BRAZIL	6.50	7.5	6.5	8.5	3.5
37. PERU	6.50	6.0	8.0	7.0	5.0
37. VIETNAM	6.50	6.0	7.0	7.0	6.0
37. ECUADOR	6.50	6.5	5.5	6.5	7.5
41. CAMEROON	6.38	4.0	7.5	8.0	6.0
41. RUSSIA	6.38	4.5	7.5	8.5	5.0
41. CHAD	6.38	5.5	6.5	8.5	5.0
41. ITALY	6.38	9.0	3.0	6.5	7.0
45. PAKISTAN	6.25	6.0	7.5	7.0	4.5
45. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.25	3.0	7.0	7.0	8.0
45. SPAIN	6.25	6.0	6.5	5.0	7.5
45. KYRGYZSTAN	6.25	5.5	6.5	8.5	4.5
49. CHINA	6.13	7.0	7.5	7.0	3.0
49. NIGER	6.13	4.0	7.0	8.5	5.0
49. ZIMBABWE	6.13	3.5	7.5	8.0	5.5
49. TAJIKISTAN	6.13	5.5	5.0	9.0	5.0
53. HAITI	6.00	8.0	6.0	7.0	3.0
53. ALBANIA	6.00	7.0	7.5	7.0	2.5
53. GUINEA-BISSAU	6.00	1.0	8.0	8.5	6.5
53. AZERBAIJAN	6.00	5.5	5.5	7.5	5.5
57. GHANA	5.88	3.0	6.5	7.5	6.5
57. MADAGASCAR	5.88	4.0	5.0	7.5	7.0
57. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.88	1.0	8.0	8.0	6.5
57. KOREA, REP.	5.88	6.5	6.0	4.5	6.5
61. TANZANIA	5.75	3.0	7.0	7.0	6.0
61. BULGARIA	5.75	4.5	6.5	7.5	4.5
61. SIERRA LEONE	5.75	3.5	5.5	7.0	7.0
61. TOGO	5.75	1.0	7.0	7.5	7.5
61. BELARUS	5.75	4.0	5.0	9.0	5.0
61. GREECE	5.75	3.0	6.5	7.5	6.0
67. MALAYSIA	5.63	4.5	5.5	6.0	6.5
67. MALI	5.63	3.0	7.0	8.5	4.0
67. FRANCE	5.63	6.0	6.5	3.0	7.0
67. BURKINA FASO	5.63	3.5	6.5	6.5	6.0
67. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.63	4.0	6.5	6.0	6.0
67. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	5.63	6.0	5.0	5.0	6.5
73. CAMBODIA	5.50	2.5	4.0	8.5	7.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS
73. UNITED STATES	5.50	5.0	6.5	5.0	5.5
73. GUYANA	5.50	3.0	5.0	8.0	6.0
76. LAOS	5.38	1.5	6.0	6.0	8.0
76. ANGOLA	5.38	3.0	5.5	8.0	5.0
76. EGYPT	5.38	3.0	5.5	8.0	5.0
76. CROATIA	5.38	4.0	6.5	6.5	4.5
76. UZBEKISTAN	5.38	5.0	4.5	7.0	5.0
76. UNITED KINGDOM	5.38	4.0	6.5	3.0	8.0
- KOSOVO	5.38	3.0	6.0	7.0	5.5
82. BENIN	5.25	1.0	6.0	6.0	8.0
82. GUINEA	5.25	1.0	5.0	8.0	7.0
82. CONGO, REP.	5.25	3.0	6.0	8.0	4.0
82. ZAMBIA	5.25	3.0	5.0	6.0	7.0
82. IRELAND	5.25	6.0	5.5	3.0	6.5
82. SURINAME	5.25	2.5	5.0	8.0	5.5
82. MALTA	5.25	1.5	7.0	7.5	5.0
89. SAUDI ARABIA	5.13	3.0	6.5	8.0	3.0
89. THAILAND	5.13	1.5	5.0	6.5	7.5
89. COSTA RICA	5.13	6.5	6.0	1.5	6.5
89. SLOVAKIA	5.13	3.0	6.0	6.5	5.0
89. ST. LUCIA	5.13	5.0	4.0	5.5	6.0
94. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	5.00	5.0	5.5	5.5	4.0
94. LIBERIA	5.00	3.0	6.0	6.0	5.0
94. BANGLADESH	5.00	5.5	5.5	7.0	2.0
94. GERMANY	5.00	5.0	6.5	2.0	6.5
94. GABON	5.00	1.0	5.0	8.0	6.0
94. PORTUGAL	5.00	4.5	6.0	4.5	5.0
94. JAPAN	5.00	6.5	5.5	3.0	5.0
94. MOLDOVA	5.00	4.0	4.0	7.0	5.0
94. ARGENTINA	5.00	4.0	6.0	5.0	5.0
94. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	5.00	1.0	6.5	6.5	6.0
104. JORDAN	4.88	1.5	7.0	6.5	4.5
104. BELIZE	4.88	6.5	3.5	4.5	5.0
104. TURKMENISTAN	4.88	3.0	3.5	8.5	4.5
104. SWEDEN	4.88	5.5	5.5	2.5	6.0
104. CYPRUS	4.88	3.5	5.0	4.0	7.0
109. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	4.75	1.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
109. INDIA	4.75	3.5	6.0	6.0	3.5
109. CHILE	4.75	4.0	5.5	4.5	5.0
109. MAURITANIA	4.75	2.5	4.5	7.0	5.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS
109. NAMIBIA	4.75	3.0	5.0	5.0	6.0
109. SOLOMON ISLANDS	4.75	1.0	4.5	7.0	6.5
115. QATAR	4.63	1.0	6.0	6.0	5.5
115. SENEGAL	4.63	2.5	5.5	4.5	6.0
115. ETHIOPIA	4.63	2.0	6.5	4.0	6.0
115. MOROCCO	4.63	1.0	6.5	7.0	4.0
115. SRI LANKA	4.63	4.0	5.0	7.0	2.5
115. MAURITIUS	4.63	2.0	6.0	6.0	4.5
115. BURUNDI	4.63	1.0	4.5	9.0	4.0
115. ISRAEL	4.63	5.5	4.0	5.0	4.0
115. ERITREA	4.63	1.0	5.5	9.5	2.5
115. SLOVENIA	4.63	3.0	4.5	6.0	5.0
115. MALDIVES	4.63	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.5
126. GAMBIA	4.50	1.0	6.5	6.5	4.0
126. CZECH REPUBLIC	4.50	3.0	5.0	5.5	4.5
128. NETHERLANDS	4.38	4.5	6.0	2.5	4.5
128. ALGERIA	4.38	1.0	5.0	7.0	4.5
128. SWITZERLAND	4.38	4.5	4.0	1.5	7.5
128. KAZAKHSTAN	4.38	3.5	4.0	6.0	4.0
128. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	4.38	1.0	2.5	9.0	5.0
128. CABO VERDE	4.38	2.5	4.0	4.0	7.0
128. DJIBOUTI	4.38	1.5	5.0	5.0	6.0
128. TIMOR-LESTE	4.38	5.0	4.0	4.5	4.0
136. KOREA, DPR	4.25	1.0	2.0	10.0	4.0
136. HUNGARY	4.25	1.0	4.0	7.0	5.0
136. AUSTRALIA	4.25	5.0	6.0	2.0	4.0
136. LESOTHO	4.25	1.0	5.0	6.0	5.0
136. TONGA	4.25	1.0	4.5	5.0	6.5
141. KUWAIT	4.13	1.0	6.0	6.0	3.5
141. ROMANIA	4.13	4.0	5.0	3.5	4.0
141. AUSTRIA	4.13	2.0	4.0	4.0	6.5
141. MONGOLIA	4.13	2.0	4.5	4.5	5.5
141. ICELAND	4.13	4.5	5.0	2.0	5.0
141. SAN MARINO	4.13	2.0	4.0	4.5	6.0
147. BAHRAIN	4.00	1.0	6.0	4.0	5.0
147. BOLIVIA	4.00	3.5	2.0	6.0	4.5
147. FIJI	4.00	1.0	6.5	3.0	5.5
147. ESWATINI	4.00	1.5	5.5	5.0	4.0
151. DENMARK	3.88	5.0	4.0	2.0	4.5
151. COMOROS	3.88	1.0	4.5	6.0	4.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	CRIMINAL NETWORKS	STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	FOREIGN ACTORS
151. CANADA	3.88	5.0	4.0	2.0	4.5
151. BARBADOS	3.88	5.0	4.5	4.0	2.0
155. SEYCHELLES	3.75	2.0	4.5	4.5	4.0
155. ESTONIA	3.75	3.0	5.0	2.0	5.0
155. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	3.75	2.0	5.0	2.0	6.0
155. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	3.75	1.0	5.5	3.0	5.5
159. BELGIUM	3.63	3.0	4.5	2.0	5.0
159. POLAND	3.63	2.0	5.5	3.5	3.5
159. NORWAY	3.63	4.5	4.0	2.0	4.0
159. BAHAMAS	3.63	3.5	2.0	3.0	6.0
159. BOTSWANA	3.63	1.0	5.5	3.0	5.0
159. BHUTAN	3.63	4.0	3.5	3.0	4.0
159. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	3.63	3.0	3.0	3.0	5.5
159. LITHUANIA	3.63	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.0
167. MALAWI	3.50	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0
168. OMAN	3.38	1.0	5.0	4.0	3.5
168. TUNISIA	3.38	1.0	4.0	5.5	3.0
168. LATVIA	3.38	3.5	3.5	2.0	4.5
168. ANDORRA	3.38	1.0	4.0	1.5	7.0
172. RWANDA	3.25	1.0	3.0	5.0	4.0
172. NEW ZEALAND	3.25	4.5	3.5	1.5	3.5
172. GRENADA	3.25	4.0	2.0	3.0	4.0
172. MONACO	3.25	1.0	3.0	3.5	5.5
176. ARMENIA	3.13	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.0
177. SINGAPORE	3.00	3.0	3.5	1.5	4.0
178. CUBA	2.88	4.0	2.5	4.0	1.0
178. GEORGIA	2.88	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0
178. PALAU	2.88	1.0	4.0	2.0	4.5
181. FINLAND	2.63	3.0	3.0	1.5	3.0
181. URUGUAY	2.63	1.5	4.5	2.0	2.5
183. DOMINICA	2.50	1.0	5.0	1.5	2.5
184. BRUNEI	2.38	1.0	2.5	2.0	4.0
184. LUXEMBOURG	2.38	1.0	2.0	1.5	5.0
186. KIRIBATI	2.25	1.0	4.0	1.5	2.5
187. MARSHALL ISLANDS	2.13	1.0	2.0	2.0	3.5
188. VANUATU	2.00	1.0	1.0	2.5	3.5
189. NAURU	1.88	1.0	1.0	3.5	2.0
190. LIECHTENSTEIN	1.75	1.0	1.5	1.5	3.0
190. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1.75	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
192. SAMOA	1.63	1.0	2.0	1.5	2.0
193. TUVALU	1.38	1.0	1.0	1.5	2.0





## Resilience scores

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. FINLAND	8.42	9.0	8.5	9.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
1. LIECHTENSTEIN	8.42	9.0	8.0	7.5	9.0	9.0	8.0
3. NEW ZEALAND	8.38	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.0	8.5
4. DENMARK	8.21	9.0	9.0	8.5	9.0	7.5	8.0
5. ICELAND	8.04	7.0	7.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5
6. AUSTRALIA	7.96	8.0	8.5	9.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
7. NORWAY	7.92	8.0	8.5	9.0	8.5	8.0	8.5
8. UNITED KINGDOM	7.88	8.0	7.5	8.0	8.5	8.5	7.5
9. ESTONIA	7.83	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.0	8.0	7.0
10. ANDORRA	7.75	7.0	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
10. URUGUAY	7.75	8.0	9.0	9.0	7.0	7.0	8.0
12. SINGAPORE	7.71	7.5	7.5	9.0	8.5	9.0	9.0
13. GERMANY	7.67	7.0	7.5	8.0	8.0	7.5	7.5
14. KOREA, REP.	7.54	8.0	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.0
15. LUXEMBOURG	7.50	8.0	6.5	9.0	7.0	7.5	7.0
16. SWEDEN	7.46	7.0	9.0	8.5	7.0	7.0	6.5
16. JAPAN	7.46	6.0	7.5	9.0	7.5	8.0	7.5
18. NETHERLANDS	7.42	7.5	8.0	8.0	7.5	7.5	7.5
18. AUSTRIA	7.42	7.0	6.5	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.5
18. LATVIA	7.42	7.5	6.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5
21. IRELAND	7.38	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	7.0
22. CANADA	7.25	7.5	7.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	7.0
23. LITHUANIA	7.21	7.5	7.0	7.5	7.0	7.5	7.0
24. SWITZERLAND	7.13	9.0	6.5	7.5	6.5	7.0	7.5
25. BELGIUM	7.00	7.0	7.0	8.0	7.0	6.0	7.0
26. FRANCE	6.83	6.0	7.0	8.5	7.5	6.5	7.0
27. SPAIN	6.63	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	8.0
28. UNITED STATES	6.58	4.5	5.5	7.0	6.5	6.0	8.0
29. PORTUGAL	6.46	7.0	5.5	7.5	7.0	5.5	7.5
30. CHILE	6.42	7.0	7.0	8.0	6.0	6.0	4.0
31. ARGENTINA	6.33	7.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	6.0	6.5
31. CABO VERDE	6.33	6.5	6.0	8.5	7.0	7.0	6.0
33. ITALY	6.29	6.5	5.0	8.5	8.0	5.0	7.5
34. CZECH REPUBLIC	6.25	6.0	5.5	7.0	6.5	6.5	7.0
35. POLAND	6.13	5.5	4.0	7.0	7.0	5.5	6.5
36. SLOVENIA	6.08	6.0	5.0	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.0
37. TUVALU	6.04	5.5	5.5	5.0	6.5	8.0	7.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
1. FINLAND	8.42	9.0	8.5	9.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
1. LIECHTENSTEIN	8.42	9.5	5.0	8.5	9.5	9.5	8.5
3. NEW ZEALAND	8.38	8.5	8.0	8.5	8.5	8.0	8.5
4. DENMARK	8.21	8.5	5.5	8.5	7.5	8.5	9.0
5. ICELAND	8.04	8.5	8.0	8.5	7.0	7.5	8.5
6. AUSTRALIA	7.96	9.0	7.0	7.0	7.5	7.5	8.0
7. NORWAY	7.92	8.0	7.0	7.5	7.5	7.0	7.5
8. UNITED KINGDOM	7.88	8.5	6.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	9.0
9. ESTONIA	7.83	8.0	7.5	8.0	7.5	8.0	7.5
10. ANDORRA	7.75	8.0	6.0	8.0	8.5	8.0	8.5
10. URUGUAY	7.75	7.0	7.0	8.0	7.5	7.0	8.5
12. SINGAPORE	7.71	8.0	7.0	8.0	7.0	9.0	3.0
13. GERMANY	7.67	9.0	6.5	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
14. KOREA, REP.	7.54	7.0	7.0	6.5	6.5	8.0	8.0
15. LUXEMBOURG	7.50	8.0	6.0	8.0	7.0	8.0	8.0
16. SWEDEN	7.46	8.0	7.5	7.5	6.0	7.0	8.5
16. JAPAN	7.46	8.5	8.0	8.0	5.5	6.0	8.0
18. NETHERLANDS	7.42	6.0	6.5	6.5	8.0	8.0	8.0
18. AUSTRIA	7.42	8.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	8.0	7.0
18. LATVIA	7.42	8.5	5.5	8.0	7.5	7.5	7.0
21. IRELAND	7.38	8.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	5.5	7.0
22. CANADA	7.25	6.0	6.5	7.5	8.5	6.0	8.0
23. LITHUANIA	7.21	8.0	6.5	7.5	7.0	6.5	7.5
24. SWITZERLAND	7.13	8.5	5.0	6.0	8.0	6.0	8.0
25. BELGIUM	7.00	6.0	7.0	7.0	7.5	6.5	8.0
26. FRANCE	6.83	5.0	8.0	8.0	5.0	6.5	7.0
27. SPAIN	6.63	5.5	6.5	6.0	6.5	5.0	7.0
28. UNITED STATES	6.58	6.5	6.5	8.0	7.0	6.0	7.5
29. PORTUGAL	6.46	6.0	6.5	5.5	7.0	5.5	7.0
30. CHILE	6.42	4.0	6.5	7.0	7.0	6.5	8.0
31. ARGENTINA	6.33	6.0	7.0	6.0	6.0	5.5	8.0
31. CABO VERDE	6.33	7.5	5.0	6.0	3.5	6.0	7.0
33. ITALY	6.29	6.5	5.5	5.0	5.5	5.5	7.0
34. CZECH REPUBLIC	6.25	7.0	6.0	6.0	5.5	6.0	6.0
35. POLAND	6.13	7.5	7.0	7.5	5.0	6.0	5.0
36. SLOVENIA	6.08	7.5	6.5	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
37. TUVALU	6.04	6.5	6.0	6.0	4.5	5.0	7.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT
38. ISRAEL	6.00	6.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	5.0	5.5
39. JORDAN	5.92	7.0	5.0	8.0	6.5	4.5	7.0
40. COLOMBIA	5.83	7.0	5.5	9.0	7.0	5.5	6.0
40. MALAYSIA	5.83	4.5	5.5	7.0	7.0	5.0	5.5
42. SOUTH AFRICA	5.79	6.0	5.5	6.5	6.5	6.0	5.0
43. ECUADOR	5.71	5.0	5.5	6.0	6.5	5.5	6.0
43. ARMENIA	5.71	6.0	6.0	6.5	6.0	4.5	6.0
43. BARBADOS	5.71	5.5	7.0	7.0	6.0	4.5	6.5
43. GEORGIA	5.71	5.0	6.5	7.0	6.5	3.5	6.5
47. MAURITIUS	5.67	6.0	6.0	6.5	6.0	5.5	5.5
47. SAMOA	5.67	4.5	5.0	5.0	6.5	6.0	6.5
49. ST. LUCIA	5.63	7.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.0	4.5
49. BOTSWANA	5.63	6.0	5.0	8.0	6.0	6.5	5.0
51. QATAR	5.58	5.0	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.5
51. CROATIA	5.58	5.0	5.5	6.5	6.0	5.0	6.0
51. SENEGAL	5.58	5.5	4.0	6.0	6.5	5.0	6.0
51. ROMANIA	5.58	5.5	5.5	6.5	6.0	6.0	5.5
55. KUWAIT	5.54	5.0	4.5	6.0	5.5	5.5	6.0
55. BAHRAIN	5.54	6.0	5.0	7.0	5.5	5.0	5.0
57. NIGERIA	5.50	5.5	5.0	7.0	7.0	4.5	4.5
57. COSTA RICA	5.50	7.0	6.5	6.0	6.5	5.0	5.0
57. RWANDA	5.50	5.5	5.5	5.0	6.0	5.0	7.0
60. CHINA	5.46	6.0	4.0	6.0	7.0	5.0	5.5
60. JAMAICA	5.46	5.0	5.5	6.5	5.5	4.0	6.0
60. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	5.46	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.5	6.0	4.5
63. GHANA	5.38	5.5	5.5	6.5	5.0	5.0	4.5
63. ETHIOPIA	5.38	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	5.0	4.0
63. SLOVAKIA	5.38	5.5	5.0	7.0	6.5	5.0	5.5
63. CUBA	5.38	6.5	2.5	6.5	6.0	3.0	7.0
63. MONACO	5.38	3.5	4.0	5.0	6.0	8.0	7.0
68. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	5.33	5.5	5.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	6.0
68. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	5.33	6.5	5.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	6.0
68. VANUATU	5.33	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.5	7.0	6.5
71. BULGARIA	5.29	4.5	5.0	6.5	6.0	5.5	5.5
72. INDIA	5.25	4.0	5.5	7.5	4.5	5.0	5.5
72. GREECE	5.25	5.5	5.0	6.5	6.0	4.5	5.0
72. OMAN	5.25	4.5	4.5	6.5	6.5	5.5	7.5
72. FIJI	5.25	6.0	5.5	5.0	5.5	4.5	5.0
76. KENYA	5.21	5.0	4.5	7.0	6.0	5.5	4.5

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
38. ISRAEL	6.00	3.5	7.0	7.0	6.0	6.0	8.0
39. JORDAN	5.92	6.0	6.5	4.0	4.5	6.5	5.5
40. COLOMBIA	5.83	4.5	6.0	5.0	3.5	4.5	6.5
40. MALAYSIA	5.83	5.5	5.5	7.0	6.0	6.0	5.5
42. SOUTH AFRICA	5.79	6.0	6.0	6.0	4.0	5.0	7.0
43. ECUADOR	5.71	4.5	7.0	5.5	5.0	5.0	7.0
43. ARMENIA	5.71	5.5	6.0	5.5	5.5	5.0	6.0
43. BARBADOS	5.71	6.0	5.0	3.5	5.5	6.0	6.0
43. GEORGIA	5.71	5.0	5.0	5.0	7.0	5.5	6.0
47. MAURITIUS	5.67	5.5	3.5	7.0	5.5	5.0	6.0
47. SAMOA	5.67	7.5	6.0	3.0	5.0	6.0	7.0
49. ST. LUCIA	5.63	5.5	4.0	5.5	5.0	6.0	4.0
49. BOTSWANA	5.63	5.0	4.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	6.0
51. QATAR	5.58	7.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	4.5
51. CROATIA	5.58	6.5	6.5	4.5	5.5	5.0	5.0
51. SENEGAL	5.58	6.5	5.0	5.5	5.0	5.0	7.0
51. ROMANIA	5.58	6.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
55. KUWAIT	5.54	5.5	5.5	6.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
55. SAUDI ARABIA	5.54	6.5	5.5	6.0	5.5	5.5	4.0
57. NIGERIA	5.50	4.5	5.0	6.5	5.0	5.0	6.5
57. COSTA RICA	5.50	5.0	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.0	6.5
57. RWANDA	5.50	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.5	5.0	3.5
60. CHINA	5.46	7.0	6.0	7.0	4.0	6.0	2.0
60. JAMAICA	5.46	6.5	4.5	4.5	5.0	6.0	6.5
60. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	5.46	6.0	5.5	4.0	3.0	6.0	6.0
63. GHANA	5.38	6.0	6.0	6.0	3.5	4.0	7.0
63. ETHIOPIA	5.38	6.0	7.0	6.0	4.5	5.0	5.0
63. SLOVAKIA	5.38	6.0	5.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.0
63. CUBA	5.38	8.0	5.5	5.5	4.0	7.0	3.0
63. MONACO	5.38	6.0	4.5	4.0	8.0	4.5	4.0
68. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	5.33	5.5	4.0	5.5	6.5	6.5	3.0
68. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)	5.33	6.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	5.5	6.0
68. VANUATU	5.33	5.0	4.0	3.5	5.0	3.5	6.0
71. BULGARIA	5.29	6.5	6.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	4.0
72. INDIA	5.25	6.5	6.0	5.0	3.5	5.0	5.0
72. GREECE	5.25	5.5	5.5	5.5	4.0	5.0	5.0
72. OMAN	5.25	5.5	5.0	4.5	4.0	4.0	5.0
72. FIJI	5.25	4.5	6.0	6.0	4.0	5.0	6.0
76. KENYA	5.21	6.0	6.0	5.0	3.0	3.5	6.5



COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT
76. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.21	5.0	4.5	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
76. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	5.21	5.0	5.0	6.5	7.0	3.5	5.5
76. SOLOMON ISLANDS	5.21	5.0	4.5	5.5	4.5	5.5	6.0
76. BAHAMAS	5.21	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	3.5	6.0
76. TONGA	5.21	5.0	5.5	6.5	6.0	4.0	5.0
82. MALTA	5.17	4.5	4.5	7.5	6.0	4.5	4.0
83. SAN MARINO	5.13	4.0	4.0	5.5	5.5	6.5	5.0
84. HUNGARY	5.08	4.5	3.5	5.0	5.5	5.0	6.0
84. MONGOLIA	5.08	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.5	4.0	5.0
84. DOMINICA	5.08	3.5	4.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.5
87. BRAZIL	5.04	3.0	4.5	7.5	4.5	3.0	5.0
87. ALBANIA	5.04	5.5	4.5	6.5	6.0	5.0	5.5
87. MARSHALL ISLANDS	5.04	5.5	4.5	5.0	6.0	6.5	4.0
90. GAMBIA	5.00	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.5
90. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	5.00	6.0	5.0	6.0	6.5	7.0	4.5
92. NAMIBIA	4.96	5.0	5.0	7.0	6.5	4.5	4.5
93. SERBIA	4.92	4.5	4.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
93. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	4.92	6.0	5.0	7.0	7.0	6.0	5.0
95. BOLIVIA	4.88	5.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	3.5	5.0
96. PANAMA	4.83	4.5	4.0	6.0	6.0	3.0	4.5
96. TUNISIA	4.83	4.5	5.0	5.0	6.5	4.5	4.5
98. KAZAKHSTAN	4.71	5.0	4.0	5.5	5.5	5.0	4.5
99. VIETNAM	4.67	5.0	4.5	5.5	5.5	4.0	4.5
99. THAILAND	4.67	5.0	4.5	6.0	5.5	4.0	5.0
99. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4.67	5.0	3.0	7.0	5.0	4.0	4.5
99. GRENADA	4.67	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	6.0
99. NAURU	4.67	5.0	4.5	6.0	6.5	6.0	5.5
104. MOROCCO	4.63	4.5	3.5	6.0	6.0	4.0	5.5
104. ALGERIA	4.63	4.5	4.0	5.0	6.0	4.0	6.0
106. PERU	4.58	3.0	5.5	5.0	6.0	6.0	5.0
106. BHUTAN	4.58	6.0	6.0	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.0
106. SEYCHELLES	4.58	5.0	5.0	6.0	5.5	6.0	4.0
106. BRUNEI	4.58	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.0	5.0
110. PALAU	4.54	6.5	5.5	6.0	5.5	3.0	5.0
111. DJIBOUTI	4.50	4.5	3.0	6.5	5.5	4.0	4.0
112. MEXICO	4.46	3.0	4.0	7.0	6.0	4.0	5.0
112. MONTENEGRO	4.46	3.5	4.0	5.5	5.0	4.5	3.5
114. GUATEMALA	4.42	3.5	4.0	5.5	5.5	4.0	5.0
114. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	4.42	4.5	4.0	6.0	4.5	5.5	5.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
76. NORTH MACEDONIA	5.21	6.0	5.5	4.5	5.0	5.0	6.0
76. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	5.21	5.0	6.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
76. SOLOMON ISLANDS	5.21	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	6.5	5.5
76. BAHAMAS	5.21	5.0	4.5	4.0	6.5	5.0	4.0
76. TONGA	5.21	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	6.0
82. MALTA	5.17	4.5	4.5	6.5	7.5	4.0	4.0
83. SAN MARINO	5.13	6.0	4.0	5.5	5.5	4.5	5.5
84. HUNGARY	5.08	7.0	5.5	4.5	4.5	6.0	4.0
84. MONGOLIA	5.08	5.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	6.5	6.5
84. DOMINICA	5.08	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	6.0	5.0
87. BRAZIL	5.04	5.5	6.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	6.5
87. ALBANIA	5.04	5.5	4.0	4.0	4.5	5.0	4.5
87. MARSHALL ISLANDS	5.04	5.5	4.0	6.0	3.5	4.0	6.0
90. GAMBIA	5.00	6.5	5.5	5.5	2.5	3.5	6.5
90. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS	5.00	6.0	5.5	2.0	2.5	4.0	5.0
92. NAMIBIA	4.96	3.5	4.5	5.0	4.0	4.0	6.0
93. SERBIA	4.92	6.0	5.5	5.0	4.0	5.5	3.5
93. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	4.92	5.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	5.0
95. BOLIVIA	4.88	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.0	6.0	4.5
96. PANAMA	4.83	6.0	4.5	6.0	4.0	4.0	5.5
96. TUNISIA	4.83	5.5	5.5	4.0	4.5	3.0	5.5
98. KAZAKHSTAN	4.71	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.5
99. VIETNAM	4.67	5.0	5.5	5.0	5.0	4.5	2.0
99. THAILAND	4.67	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.0	3.5
99. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4.67	5.5	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0
99. GRENADA	4.67	6.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	3.0
99. NAURU	4.67	7.5	6.0	4.0	2.0	1.0	2.0
104. MOROCCO	4.63	6.0	3.5	4.5	4.5	4.0	3.5
104. ALGERIA	4.63	6.5	4.5	4.5	3.0	4.0	3.5
106. PERU	4.58	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	4.5
106. BHUTAN	4.58	3.5	4.0	5.0	3.5	4.0	3.5
106. SEYCHELLES	4.58	4.5	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	4.0
106. BRUNEI	4.58	5.5	5.5	6.5	3.5	4.5	3.5
110. PALAU	4.54	4.0	4.5	4.0	2.0	4.0	4.5
111. DJIBOUTI	4.50	6.0	5.0	5.5	3.0	4.0	3.0
112. MEXICO	4.46	3.0	4.0	5.0	3.5	4.0	5.0
112. MONTENEGRO	4.46	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.5
114. GUATEMALA	4.42	3.5	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0
114. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	4.42	4.0	5.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	4.5

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT
114. ANGOLA	4.42	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.0	3.5	4.5
114. CYPRUS	4.42	5.0	5.0	6.5	6.0	4.0	5.5
- KOSOVO	4.42	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
118. INDONESIA	4.33	4.0	3.5	5.5	5.0	3.5	4.0
118. ZAMBIA	4.33	4.0	3.0	5.0	6.5	5.0	4.0
118. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	4.33	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	3.0	4.0
118. KIRIBATI	4.33	5.5	5.5	5.5	6.0	4.0	5.0
122. SAUDI ARABIA	4.29	3.0	3.5	5.0	4.5	3.0	4.5
122. GUYANA	4.29	5.0	3.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	2.5
122. MALAWI	4.29	5.0	4.5	4.5	5.5	4.0	4.0
125. KYRGYZSTAN	4.17	3.5	3.0	4.5	5.0	3.0	3.5
126. PHILIPPINES	4.13	3.0	3.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	2.0
126. BANGLADESH	4.13	3.5	4.0	5.5	5.0	3.0	4.0
128. AZERBAIJAN	4.08	3.5	3.5	5.5	4.0	2.5	4.0
129. RUSSIA	4.04	4.0	3.0	4.5	5.5	4.0	4.5
129. TANZANIA	4.04	5.5	2.0	4.0	5.5	5.0	4.0
129. EGYPT	4.04	3.5	3.0	4.5	4.5	3.5	5.0
129. SRI LANKA	4.04	4.0	3.5	5.5	5.5	3.5	3.5
133. LEBANON	4.00	4.5	3.5	6.5	4.0	4.0	3.5
133. PAKISTAN	4.00	3.5	3.5	5.0	5.0	3.0	4.0
133. UKRAINE	4.00	3.5	4.0	5.5	4.0	4.5	3.5
133. TOGO	4.00	3.0	3.0	5.5	4.5	3.5	4.0
137. UGANDA	3.96	5.0	2.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0
138. HONDURAS	3.92	2.5	3.5	5.5	4.0	3.0	4.5
138. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	3.92	3.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	3.5	3.5
138. CAMBODIA	3.92	4.5	3.5	5.0	4.5	4.0	4.5
141. MALDIVES	3.88	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	3.0	4.0
142. IRAQ	3.79	4.5	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.5
142. BELARUS	3.79	3.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	5.0
142. UZBEKISTAN	3.79	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.5
145. NEPAL	3.71	2.5	2.0	4.5	3.5	3.0	4.5
145. EL SALVADOR	3.71	2.5	3.0	5.5	5.0	2.0	3.0
145. MOLDOVA	3.71	3.5	3.5	4.5	5.0	3.0	3.5
148. TIMOR-LESTE	3.67	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.5	4.0	4.5
148. LESOTHO	3.67	4.0	3.5	6.0	5.5	3.0	3.0
150. BURKINA FASO	3.63	3.5	4.0	5.5	5.0	4.0	3.0
151. TURKEY	3.54	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.5	2.0	3.0
151. BENIN	3.54	4.0	4.5	4.0	3.0	3.0	4.0
153. IRAN	3.50	3.0	2.5	4.5	4.0	3.5	3.5

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
114. ANGOLA	4.42	6.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.0
114. CYPRUS	4.42	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.0	3.5	4.0
- KOSOVO	4.42	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.5	4.0	6.0
118. INDONESIA	4.33	4.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	4.5	4.0
118. ZAMBIA	4.33	3.5	5.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	5.0
118. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	4.33	4.0	2.5	5.0	4.0	4.5	5.5
118. KIRIBATI	4.33	4.0	4.0	3.0	1.0	3.0	5.5
122. SAUDI ARABIA	4.29	5.0	5.5	5.0	4.5	5.0	3.0
122. GUYANA	4.29	5.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
122. MALAWI	4.29	3.0	6.0	4.0	2.0	3.5	5.5
125. KYRGYZSTAN	4.17	4.5	3.0	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.5
126. PHILIPPINES	4.13	4.0	5.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	3.0
126. BANGLADESH	4.13	5.0	4.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.0
128. AZERBAIJAN	4.08	5.0	4.5	4.0	4.0	5.0	3.5
129. RUSSIA	4.04	5.5	4.0	4.0	2.5	3.5	3.5
129. TANZANIA	4.04	4.5	5.5	5.0	3.0	3.0	1.5
129. EGYPT	4.04	6.0	6.0	4.5	3.0	2.5	2.5
129. SRI LANKA	4.04	4.0	5.0	5.0	3.0	2.5	3.5
133. LEBANON	4.00	3.0	3.0	2.0	5.0	3.5	5.5
133. PAKISTAN	4.00	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.5
133. UKRAINE	4.00	2.0	4.0	4.5	3.5	4.0	5.0
133. TOGO	4.00	4.0	3.0	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.5
137. UGANDA	3.96	5.5	3.0	3.5	2.0	4.0	4.5
138. HONDURAS	3.92	4.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	4.5	4.5
138. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	3.92	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	4.5
138. CAMBODIA	3.92	4.5	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	2.5
141. MALDIVES	3.88	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	5.0
142. IRAQ	3.79	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	4.0	4.5
142. BELARUS	3.79	4.5	4.5	5.0	3.0	5.0	3.0
142. UZBEKISTAN	3.79	4.5	3.5	4.5	4.0	5.0	3.5
145. NEPAL	3.71	4.0	3.0	4.5	4.5	3.5	5.0
145. EL SALVADOR	3.71	5.0	4.0	2.0	4.0	4.5	4.0
145. MOLDOVA	3.71	2.0	3.5	4.0	5.0	3.0	4.0
148. TIMOR-LESTE	3.67	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	4.5
148. LESOTHO	3.67	2.5	5.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	4.0
150. BURKINA FASO	3.63	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	5.0
151. TURKEY	3.54	6.5	2.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5
151. BENIN	3.54	3.5	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	4.5
153. IRAN	3.50	5.5	2.5	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	LAW ENFORCEMENT
154. SIERRA LEONE	3.46	3.5	3.5	4.0	2.5	2.0	4.0
155. MYANMAR	3.42	3.0	3.0	5.0	4.5	3.5	4.0
155. LAOS	3.42	3.0	2.5	3.5	4.0	3.0	4.0
155. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	3.42	3.0	2.0	4.5	5.0	4.5	3.0
158. PARAGUAY	3.38	2.0	3.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
158. MADAGASCAR	3.38	4.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.5
160. MOZAMBIQUE	3.29	3.0	3.5	5.0	5.5	2.0	2.0
161. CONGO, REP.	3.25	3.0	1.5	5.0	5.0	2.0	4.5
161. ESWATINI	3.25	3.0	2.5	5.0	4.0	2.5	3.0
163. NIGER	3.21	3.5	2.5	5.5	4.0	2.5	4.0
164. ZIMBABWE	3.17	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
164. LIBERIA	3.17	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.0
164. GABON	3.17	2.0	2.0	5.0	4.0	3.0	4.5
167. CAMEROON	3.13	2.0	1.5	5.0	4.5	2.5	4.0
167. BELIZE	3.13	5.0	2.5	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.5
169. MAURITANIA	3.08	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	2.5	3.0
170. SUDAN	2.96	3.0	2.0	5.0	4.5	3.5	3.5
171. GUINEA	2.83	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.5
172. AFGHANISTAN	2.67	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.0	3.0
172. HAITI	2.67	2.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.0
172. TAJIKISTAN	2.67	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.0
175. NICARAGUA	2.46	2.0	1.0	2.5	3.5	2.5	3.0
175. CHAD	2.46	3.5	2.5	5.0	2.5	2.0	2.5
177. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.42	2.0	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
178. MALI	2.38	2.0	3.0	4.0	2.5	2.5	2.0
178. COMOROS	2.38	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	2.0
180. ERITREA	2.33	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.5	2.0	3.0
181. CONGO, DEM. REP.	2.29	1.0	1.0	4.0	3.0	2.5	1.5
182. SURINAME	2.25	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
183. TURKMENISTAN	2.17	2.0	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.0	2.0
183. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.17	1.5	1.0	2.0	5.5	2.0	2.0
185. BURUNDI	2.08	2.5	1.0	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5
186. YEMEN	2.00	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	1.5	2.0
187. KOREA, DPR	1.96	3.5	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5
188. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.92	1.5	1.5	3.0	2.5	2.0	1.5
188. VENEZUELA	1.92	2.0	1.5	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.5
190. SYRIA	1.88	2.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	1.5	2.0
191. SOUTH SUDAN	1.83	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0
192. SOMALIA	1.67	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5
193. LIBYA	1.54	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.0	1.5	1.5



COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	PREVENTION	NON-STATE ACTORS
154. SIERRA LEONE	3.46	4.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	4.0	5.0
155. MYANMAR	3.42	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	4.0
155. LAOS	3.42	2.5	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5
155. PAPUA NEW GUINEA	3.42	3.0	4.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.0
158. PARAGUAY	3.38	5.0	2.5	4.0	2.0	3.0	5.0
158. MADAGASCAR	3.38	5.0	5.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	3.0
160. MOZAMBIQUE	3.29	3.5	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	3.0
161. CONGO, REP.	3.25	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	3.0
161. ESWATINI	3.25	3.5	4.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	2.5
163. NIGER	3.21	4.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.5
164. ZIMBABWE	3.17	5.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	4.0
164. LIBERIA	3.17	4.0	3.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	4.0
164. GABON	3.17	4.5	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.5	2.5
167. CAMEROON	3.13	2.0	3.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5.0
167. BELIZE	3.13	2.0	2.0	1.5	3.0	3.0	4.0
169. MAURITANIA	3.08	4.5	4.0	3.0	1.5	2.0	2.5
170. SUDAN	2.96	2.5	4.0	2.5	1.0	2.0	2.0
171. GUINEA	2.83	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.5	1.5	3.0
172. AFGHANISTAN	2.67	3.0	3.0	3.5	2.0	2.0	2.0
172. HAITI	2.67	2.0	3.0	2.0	1.5	3.0	4.5
172. TAJIKISTAN	2.67	2.5	3.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.0
175. NICARAGUA	2.46	2.5	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.5	2.0
175. CHAD	2.46	3.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0
177. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.42	3.0	2.5	1.5	1.0	1.5	3.0
178. MALI	2.38	1.5	2.5	2.0	1.5	2.0	3.0
178. COMOROS	2.38	3.0	4.0	3.0	1.5	1.5	2.0
180. ERITREA	2.33	7.0	3.0	2.5	1.0	2.0	1.0
181. CONGO, DEM. REP.	2.29	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	5.0
182. SURINAME	2.25	2.0	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	4.0
183. TURKMENISTAN	2.17	2.0	3.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0
183. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.17	3.5	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.0
185. BURUNDI	2.08	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.5
186. YEMEN	2.00	2.0	2.0	2.5	1.0	2.0	2.0
187. KOREA, DPR	1.96	6.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.5
188. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.92	1.5	2.0	1.5	3.0	1.0	2.0
188. VENEZUELA	1.92	3.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	4.0
190. SYRIA	1.88	1.5	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.0
191. SOUTH SUDAN	1.83	1.5	1.5	2.5	1.0	1.5	2.0
192. SOMALIA	1.67	1.5	2.5	1.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
193. LIBYA	1.54	1.5	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.5

# Notes

1. See, for example, INTERPOL, Global operation sees a rise in fake medical products related to COVID-19, 19 March 2020, <https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2020/Global-operation-sees-a-rise-in-fake-medical-products-related-to-COVID-19>; EUROPOL, How COVID-19-related crime infected Europe during 2020, 12 November 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/how-covid-19-related-crime-infected-europe-during-2020>; Lyes Tagziria, #CovidCrimeWatch – Autumn, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 9 December 2020, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/covidcrimewatch-autumn/>; Rachel Bleetman, The public sector battle against two pandemics: COVID-19 and public procurement corruption, International Federation of Accountants, 13 January 2021, <https://www.ifac.org/knowledge-gateway/contributing-global-economy/discussion/public-sector-battle-against-two-pandemics-covid-19-and-public-procurement-corruption>.
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### **ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE**

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with over 500 Network Experts around the world. The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organized crime.

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