

Interview with Professor Cynthia Enloe

RIS. *Can we begin with one of your own favourite questions? What in our field has most surprised you recently?*

CE. Perhaps it's how much is going on with feminist informed scholarship in lots of different parts of the world. For instance, I hadn't been aware of how much work was being done by Turkish feminist scholars, Japanese feminist scholars, and Korean feminist scholars. We all like to think this kind of feminist scholarly work is going on, but I don't think I fully understood how much there now is. That's very exciting and hopeful, but very surprising.

RIS. *If we can ask you about some of the formative influences upon you: you mention, at the beginning of your latest book, *Maneuvers*, your relationship with your mother. You write that your 'mother's life kept beckoning me to ask fresh questions'. You talked a little bit about her relationship with military things. How central was that relationship?*

CE. My mother and I almost never talked politics. She actually voted Republican most of her life, but she didn't vote Republican with as much emotion behind it as did my father when he voted Republican. My mother was never worried about my becoming increasingly feminist. She died in 1984 and by that time I had been doing feminist work one way or another for, oh, maybe five years. In her last year or so if one of her friends had asked her, 'Do you think Cynthia is becoming a feminist?' I think my mother would have said 'Oh yes' and I don't think it would have worried her. So it's in a broader sense that my mother has had a political influence on me. She really met and dealt with the world in such a different way than my father did. I'm in many ways my father's daughter except for the fact that I'm also my mother's daughter, and that is, for me, a saving grace. My father was very argumentative and I was the oldest child and my brother, who was younger, wasn't very interested in engaging in that kind of argument at supper. For her part, my mother enjoyed a more genuine, easy kind of conversation. So from early on, I was the one who was supposed to rise to the occasion and engage with my father at that level. I learned a lot of skills, not necessarily skills that one wants to learn. I think now that my mother's way of engaging with the world is more meaningful. It wasn't competitive. She was a facilitator, somebody who wants people to feel comfortable. My own efforts to re-understand my mother came out of my becoming a feminist. In the late 1970's and 1980's it was my feminist friends who really encouraged me to take my mother's life seriously. So when I went back and looked at those diaries she kept—this was just as I was starting to write the final draft of *Does Khaki Become You?*—diaries she began when she was fifteen and continued 'till the day she died when she was seventy-five, I looked at them through new eyes. My mother never wrote any-

thing indiscreetly. There is nothing ‘juicy’. But in the 1970s and 1980s feminist friends were pushing me to redefine what’s ‘political’, to break out of my narrow political science box. So I gradually began to reappraise my mother’s experiences as being something that could tell me about international relations.

RIS. *When your mother used the term ‘feminist’ in respect of your work, would she have used it positively or negatively? In the past, and still today, many women reject the term, and give it negative connotations.*

CE. I should think she was very proud of what I was doing. There was a kind of trust. She might have been a little nervous on behalf of me but I don’t ever remember her, in any way, being negative about it. I mean, I wasn’t living the life she’d lived, but I was living the life that a lot of her own college friends had chosen to live. My mother went to college in the mid-1920s in California; she went to the all-women’s Mills College. She had a lot of friends who either didn’t marry or married late and who had careers. She met a lot of women when she and my father were living in Germany during the rise of Hitler. My father, who was from Missouri, was going to medical school there at the time. My mother married him and lived in Germany from 1933 to 1936. The whole expatriate community there included, I now realise, a number of women who were studying medicine or having their own careers, and my mother was always very positive about those friends of hers. To tell you the truth, I think that once my father divorced her after twenty-five years of marriage (my mother had left her own waged job when she got married), she became even more convinced that young women of my generation should gain their own economic security. So she would never have encouraged me to stop working.

RIS. *So the presumption with which you grew up was that you would have a career—you would be a wage-earner and that you would, in all ways, pursue an independent path?*

CE. Well, that would have been my mother’s hope. I graduated from University in 1960. Before that I went to what the British would call a ‘comprehensive’ high school in my suburban New York town. I went to a women’s college, Connecticut College which was very good. Yet in 1960, it had the reputation amongst all the elite women’s colleges in the American Northeast of having the highest percentage of girls who got married! I don’t know if that’s the kind of reputation the school desired. So most of my classmates—many of whom were genuinely more scholarly than I was—got married quite soon after college. You know, I was in one wedding after the other, with all those dresses having shoes and bags dyed to match. On the other hand, I knew friends of my mother who’d never married. I had women teachers in high school and at college who had never married. I was taught politics by two women who hadn’t married, and they seemed to have been living very jolly, interesting lives.

RIS. *What led you to choose the study of Politics as a student?*

CE. I loved politics. I think that was being my father’s daughter in a way. I’m really a suburban kid! I grew up in Manhasset, Long Island. Every morning we got the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times* on our front doorstep. My mother and father both presumed if you read two daily New York papers, that you

were sort of up on things. I remember when Roosevelt died. I was six (there, now that's dating me). The next morning, my father coached me to go to school to be able when Miss Erikson would ask: 'Now children, who's the new President?'—to be able to say—'Harry Truman'. I always thought politics—in the conventional sense of 'politics'—were interesting. And that is my father's doing.

RIS. *So, was your early engagement with Politics as a field of study an extension of your sense of what it meant to be a 'citizen'? And then, you just kept pursuing it after your degree?*

CE. Yes. I mean I don't think there was anything else that I would have liked to do. It's kind of boring isn't it? I don't ever remember wondering, oh, should I choose Biology or Classics or English Lit? Studying politics was really something that felt very natural to me. What *did* change was what I imagined the study of 'politics' actually was.

RIS. *And what produced the big change? Was it life experience, or was it the result of scholarly reflection—the outcome of reading books?*

CE. My first academic job after getting my Ph.D. at Berkeley was at a big state university in Ohio called Miami University. This was 1967. They'd never had a woman in the Political Science department before and they actually called up Bob Scallapino, the senior Japanese politics specialist at Berkeley and asked, 'Will she make trouble?' And then, this is terrible, do you know what they said? 'No. Don't worry.' I thought, 'Oh! that's too bad'. Friends of mine were beginning to discover that there was this thing called the Women's Movement, but I wasn't part of the early Women's Movement. I'm afraid, I wasn't in on the movement's ground floor. I was just on its fringes in the early 1970s. I subscribed to *Ms* magazine when it first appeared as just an insert in *New York Magazine*. But feminism—and I scarcely knew then what that word meant—didn't affect any of my teaching, or any of my writing in those years. I don't think I ever even used the word 'woman' in my dissertation. It was on the ethnic politics of education in Malaysia. I realize now that it was a very gendered politics, but back then, in the midst of the allegedly radical '60s, I didn't notice it. I don't think any of the first four books I published had the 'W' word in it. *Ethnic Politics and Political Development* (1973), my first post-dissertation book, didn't. Nor did the *Comparative Politics of Pollution* (1975), which was a very early book looking at the politics of the environment in Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain. So I was a little slow. When, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, I did start paying serious attention to women's lives in my academic work, it was due to friends and then students nudging me, alerting me to all that I was missing. Feminist questions crept first into my teaching (by the late 1970s I was at Clark University) and then into my writing. Teaching before writing.

RIS. *Can we go back to your time at Berkeley? You credit your experiences at Berkeley with having moulded your work and career. How did that happen?*

CE. Berkeley in the 1960's was a very exciting place to be, especially with the launching of what became the Free Speech Movement on campus, a movement that

began one day as a protest initially against the bureaucratization of university life. The IBM card symbolized the villain. But of course, hundreds of us had already become politicized by civil rights activism and by participation in protests against growing US government military involvement in Vietnam. But it was more than this overt politics that made Berkeley such an exciting place for me in those years. There were poetry readings, foreign language films, classical concerts, theatre. You really could stumble upon Joan Baez singing out on Sproul Hall steps at lunch time and go to hear the great poet Denise Levertov later that night. On top of this, one of my best graduate student pals was a Vietnamese friend who raised my consciousness even before I went to Southeast Asia. Then, when I was in Malaysia in 1965–66 I became much more aware of and critical of US intervention in Asia. The Free Speech Movement only erupted after I returned to Berkeley in 1966.

Of course there were blatant gender politics in every department at Berkeley in the 1960s, but none of us thought to challenge—or even to be curious about—those. I was the first woman ever to be a Head TA for Aaron Wildavsky, then a ‘rising star’ in the field of American Politics. He was fast-talking, seemingly a kind of street-fighter sort of intellectual. There were 600 students and 25 TA’s for his ‘Intro to American Politics’ course. So the Head TA was handed a big operation to run. The Berkeley Political Science Department then had a 50 tenured faculty and not a single one was a woman (Hannah Pitkin wasn’t given a tenure track contract until later). So there were little firsts along the way, but I wasn’t smart enough to realise what that meant or why a first was a ‘first’. Even though it had zero feminist consciousness, the 1966–67 Free Speech Movement did help change my notions of the relationship between my studies and social action. A young women’s studies student asked me recently what I thought were the sexual politics of Berkeley’s radicalism at that time. It was a superb question and has made me think. It was very masculinist (though I didn’t have this concept back then) and it was quite heterosexist. Even though I was without the words to articulate any concerns about the student movement’s internal culture then, I did distance myself a little from that culture. I mean these were all my buddies who were quite involved and I supported boycotts of classes and carried picket signs, though I sort of stood back from the social life part of the movement. Being a TA, I had to make daily decisions based on political judgement. I picketed and boycotted classes. It split the Political Science department wide open; Sheldon Wolin and Norman Jacobson, two political theorists, were very much supportive of what became the agenda of the Free Speech Movement. On the other hand, people like Bob Scallapino were made very nervous about it; they thought it was a leftist version of McCarthyism. He and some of the other anti-FSM faculty had fought Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s just a dozen years earlier.

RIS. *You seemed almost to be sleepwalking into being a Southeast Asian specialist. Is this how you see it now?*

CE. Funny, isn’t it? Today I never call myself a ‘Southeast Asian specialist’ because that feels quite inaccurate. I am a member of the Asian Studies Association; I keep up with Malaysia; I teach the politics of Vietnam and the Philippines as a regular, undergraduate course. I also teach the politics of Japan. You know what happened? When I was an undergraduate at Connecticut College I went on one of those summer Washington internships, and I was assigned to the Department of

Agriculture. Now remember, I'm from New York suburbia; I mean I could tell forsythia from azaleas and grass from weeds, but that was about it! For that hot Washington summer, I was essentially a gofer. I learned a lot. The guys that I was assisting were visiting agricultural technicians from Ghana, Turkey and Indonesia. I was 20 years old; I could tell you the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems, but I knew nothing about the political life of any of these countries. The nice fisheries fellow from Indonesia took me under his wing, and for that whole summer he sort of tutored me in Indonesian politics. He was appalled at how little I knew—this would have been the summer of 1959, soon after the Indonesian Revolution. I didn't even know that Indonesia had had a revolution. I was pretty naive. I knew Russia had had one; I knew France had had one and I knew something was going on in Algeria, though mostly from the vantage point of De Gaulle. So two years later, in Berkeley, I signed up for a course on the politics of Southeast Asia taught by an Indonesia specialist, almost out of a sense of obligation to my fisheries friend, Gelar.

I didn't have a career mapped out for myself. I thought I was going to get a Masters in one year, and then I would go back East and teach in a private girl's school; that's what I thought of as a career. Then David Apter, at that time a brand new, comparative politics professor, asked me to come to his office one day after class and said to me: 'You are going on for a PhD'. I said, 'I am?' He said, 'Of course'. And so I did. I loved comparative politics, but instead of focusing on Indonesia, I moved over to Malaysia because nobody else seemed interested in Malaysia. In the mid-60s Indonesia was the 'hot' academic topic in Southeast Asia because it had had an anti-colonial revolution. But I didn't want to do what everybody else was doing. I thought, I'll take the country everyone else thinks is 'boring', which was Malaysia. It turned out to be so fruitful because one couldn't try to understand Malaysian politics without trying to make sense of ethnic politics.

RIS. *You mention Comparative Politics, and in the past you have sometimes described what you do as 'micro-comparative political analysis'. Is this still how you would describe yourself today, if forced to give yourself an academic label?*

CE. I think today I would say that I do feminist comparative politics with—thanks to all of you—an explicit, even intense, curiosity about when and how international dynamics shape the internal gendered politics of societies. If there is anything that I bring to bear on international relations, it is in part a curiosity about *intra*-societal political dynamics. I've never let go of that initial curiosity. At Clark University, we have a small political science department of nine; five Americanists, three comparativists, and just one whose post is officially labelled international relations. I'm not the international relations person. I'm one of the three comparative people. Every spring I teach the Introduction to Comparative Politics. I also teach on a two-year cycle, the Comparative Politics of Japan; the Comparative Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Gender; the Comparative Policy of Militarization; the Comparative Politics of Women; the Politics of Vietnam and the Philippines and a seminar on Women and the State. So I really am a comparativist, and I think that's stood me in good stead because the scholarship informed by feminist analysis emerged a lot earlier in comparative politics than it did in IR. The very first little piece I ever wrote using a feminist set of questions was on the sexual division of labour in a Levi's

jeans factory in Manila. But I thought I was writing about Philippines gendered politics (under Marcos), not about IR. The friends who read it at the time (in 1980) tended to be feminist social historians tracking the history of women as textile and garment workers since the early nineteenth century.

RIS. *One of the questions people always ask when they discuss your work is: how do you manage to do it all? You keep up with a wide range of countries and you have many interests; and of course, you write a great deal. Do you have research assistants, to keep you going?*

CE. No. I don't have research assistants and I've had grants only now and then. I think I've taken one partial unpaid leave apart from my sabbaticals in thirty years. Sabbaticals themselves are a privilege in the workaday world. So maybe there are two things which keep the generator fuelled. One, I do love what I'm doing. People who are ambivalent about what they are doing have a much harder time. I hate to use the word 'productive' because it sounds so capitalist, or state socialist, but it is harder to be productive if you really don't like what you're doing very much. The second thing is, I really like teaching. I like teaching a lot. Yet my teaching and my research don't feel competitive to me. I often work out in courses ideas and puzzles that will then become a book. Whereas I think some people, because of their job description, or because they're not very comfortable with teaching, find those two things pulling in opposite directions, and that's very draining. I've been very lucky that that is not so with me.

RIS. *In your latest book, Maneuvers, you talk of the importance of having 'non-American' readers in your mind's eye. You seem to have a 'special relationship' with Britain. Your first feminist book, Does Khaki Become You? was published in Britain in 1983 and you have often spoken of how important being conscious of a distinctive British perspective is to your work. How did Britain come to shape your critical thinking?*

CE. *Bananas* was the fourth book of mine to be initially published in Britain. The first was bought by Neil Middleton, who some of you might know. In the late '70s–early '80s Neil Middleton was a very well-known, deservedly well-known senior editor at Penguin. He published Susan George, Mary Kaldor and Teresa Hayter—all British and each of them exceptionally smart critical analysts of the international political economy. It was 1978–79 and I was writing a book called *Ethnic Soldiers* (1980)—this would have been about my third or fourth book, I guess, and I was looking at the way ethnicity works inside dozens of militaries (and police forces). It wasn't feminist. I wasn't asking any feminist questions. I had my eyes just on race and ethnicity. I didn't see men as men. I did most of the research at the little Richardson Institution, then officed on North Gower Street in London. Anyway, the Princeton UP editor, Sandy Thatcher, a wonderful guy, suggested I think about Penguin, London. So, I just sent it off. The manuscript just disappeared, you know, into the ether. About a year later I was in London and I got a call at the Y (I used to stay at the Y on Great Russell Street—one shared rooms; you woke up some mornings and you never knew who was going to be in the room with you; it was great). 'This is Neil Middleton at Penguin. Would you come round and talk to me.' I said, 'Sure'. When I arrived, Neil began apologizing, 'Oh, I'm terribly embarrassed.

I've had this manuscript for ages; I sent it out to a reviewer at Oxford and he really likes this book. Can we publish it?' It felt quite unreal, a Penguin editor asking me if they could publish something of mine! When I was in Malaysia, back in the 60s, there was a remnant of British colonial life, a department store called Robinsons. I used to go downtown in Kuala Lumpur to Robinsons every Saturday and treat myself to one or two new Penguin paperbacks. I can still feel the pleasure of seeing all those shelves lined with orange- and green-covered Penguins. Also, from my year after college of working at McGraw-Hill Publishers in New York I knew that if *Ethnic Soldiers* were published by Penguin it would come out as a 'trade edition', unlike most academic books (and unlike my own first three), and that meant that ordinary bookshops could afford to carry it. That was the first time that I realized, there in Neil's office, that I wanted to be read by people who walked into bookstores. I think since then, since 1980, all my books have come out in trade editions. It's one of the reasons I so enjoy my now eleven-year relationship with University of California Press. UCal has published *Bananas*, *Morning After*, and now *Maneuvers*, all as trade editions. None of us walking down the aisles at an ISA or BISA book exhibition would be able to tell the difference between a trade edition and a text edition. It's strictly a strategic discounting marketing decision made inside the publishing house. But a book assigned only a 20 per cent sellers' discount for bookshops—that's a 'text edition'—is a book that most bookshops cannot afford to carry. Caring about this has become part of my politics. So Neil took over *Ethnic Soldiers* and gave it a great cover. It didn't look like my earlier books; it looked something like a human might want to read. Next I published with Pluto Press: *Does Khaki Become You?* (1983). Then in 1989 *Bananas* came out with Pandora Press, another London-based press, this time a feminist press. Pandora then sold the US rights to the University of California Press, which agreed to publish it in their 'trade' list.

RIS. *The British—and especially London—publishing connection (three publishers beginning with 'P') will be particularly interesting for BISA members, and perhaps not suspected.*

CE. This British connection has both personal and intellectual/political dimensions. Both became important to me initially that year—1975—when I worked on *Ethnic Soldiers* at the Richardson Institute. Mike Nicholson was the director. Zoe Fairbairns was in the basement hatching what would become the Feminist Library. Nira Yuval-Davis, who's become a prominent feminist sociologist of ethnicity and nationalism, was there. Later I shared an office with then fresh-out-of-Cambridge END activist Dan Smith. It really affected me, trying out ideas with British colleagues. I always see it as a sort of protective, intellectually protective device not to think that you're writing first for an American audience. I think it's very dangerous intellectually to be an American writer because it's too easy to stand in the United States and see the world from New York or Boston or Chicago. The American brand of parochialism (and arrogance) is so risky.

RIS. *We would like to shift attention now to the approach you adopt in your books, and a comment we have sometimes heard from students when they've read your best-known and best-loved book, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* (1989). This view is that you provide the reader with a fascinating account of the effects of gender on the world of*

international politics, but you do not give an explanation of why and how it is the way it is. Would you agree with such a description of your approach?

CE. What I was trying to do—not only in *Bananas*, but more particularly with the two books that have followed, *The Morning After* (1993) and *Maneuvers* (2000), is to explore not only effects, but also causalities. In *Maneuvers*, my newest, I'm more self-conscious than I have been in any book so far about political causality. It's a mistake, I think, to portray feminist analyses as merely about impacts—for example, revealing the effects of war on women, or of international debt on women. That, in fact, is significant to reveal. But most feminist analyses reveal *more* than impacts. For instance, *Bananas* tries to show why the colonial project occurred the way it did. *Bananas* and *Maneuvers* both seek to show why states are so needful of ideas about masculinity and femininity. That's making a theoretical argument about causality.

There are two recent International Relations books that have grown directly out of *Bananas*. The first is by Christine Chin, published by Columbia University Press (1999). It won a prize last year at the ISA. Christine explores the stake that the Malaysian state has developed in facilitating the international import of women to work as maids. Christine demonstrates that the Malaysian state under Mahatir has designed a gendered manipulation of immigration and labour law as part of its security strategy, to maintain the loyalties of the expanding Malaysian middle class. Suddenly Filipinos cleaning middle class kitchens in Kuala Lumpur take on significance for anyone seeking to explain the constructions of state security in contemporary Southeast Asia. Another recent book that takes some of the hunches introduced in *Bananas*, and then digs deeper is Katherine Moon's *Sex Among Allies* (also published by Columbia University Press, 1997). Kathy has asked why the elites of two states—the US and the South Korean—saw their respective state securities dependent upon their joint capacity to control the prostitution industry around the US military bases. She found the minutes of the Nixon-era American negotiating team conducting alliance negotiations with officials in Seoul. The minutes—and her follow-up interviews—clearly show that these two governments were attempting to reorganize prostitution so it would defuse racial conflict between black and white American soldiers. Each state's diplomatic and military authorities, for their own reasons, had a stake in making sure that certain Korean women were sexually available to certain American men. Kathy Moon thus takes a hunch offered in *Bananas* and uses it to shed new explanatory light on the waging of the Cold War. Both the Chin and the Moon books reveal causality in IR. That makes each of them theoretically significant.

RIS. *Where does gender fit in your view of causality? Putting it at its most simple and basic, what makes the world of international politics go round? In particular, what makes 'states' act the way they do?*

CE. Half the time, state officials (I like to think about particular people making decisions rather than monolithic states operating) are operating out of a desire to preserve state security; and that means that notions of state security drive their attempts to manipulate ideas about masculinity and femininity. Under other conditions, though, it appears to be their worries about masculinity and the proper ordering of relationships between men and women that seems to drive state

policymaking. I'm an empiricist insofar as I want scholars to go out there and see which of these two causal possibilities is at work in a given state at a particular time. I am not interested in asserting, 'Oh, it's always a concern for male privilege that drives big officials', or 'It's always concerns of state security that makes a state official try to manipulate masculinity and femininity'. What I do assert these days, though, is: 'Always ask the question: under what condition do state officials invest state resources in the manipulation of masculinity and femininity?' The necessary corollary question then to be asked is: 'When do state officials try to manipulate women as people?' What worries me is that so few people, until recently, have asked these questions. This lack has produced a very naïve understanding of how state power works and how interstate relations work.

RIS. *One of the things that strikes us in your work, certainly in *Maneuvers*, is the tension you describe between feminism and patriotism. Is it possible, in your view, to be a feminist and a patriot?*

CE. Oh! Patriotism! Many women themselves have a very ambivalent relationship to patriotism precisely because the conventional prescriptions for the woman-as-patriot are grounded in notions of feminine respectability. In exposing this ambivalence and its causes, feminists have made the very model of the patriot less tenable. Most militarizing states need women to seek to be patriots, yet need them to do so without stepping over the bounds of 'proper' femininity, since that would then dispirit a lot of men, who would feel that their own masculine turf is being challenged. In a patriarchal state, a woman, thus, can aspire to be a 'patriotic mother' but not a 'patriotic citizen'. On the other hand, we have now increasing historical documentation of women who have challenged this orthodox, gendered idea of patriotism. These are women, for example, who have sought to be voters in the name of patriotism. I'm very interested in the development of the Kuwaiti women's suffrage movement before and after the Gulf War because it reveals exactly this sort of deliberate resistance to the standard feminized version of patriotism. Then, we have other women who challenge patriotism altogether. Take your compatriot, Virginia Woolf. Woolf's *Three Guineas* (1938) to me is one of the most exciting, difficult and worthy-of-rereading books of political theorizing. I come back to *Three Guineas* at the conclusion of *Maneuvers*. I think I've now read *Three Guineas* maybe eight times. I've gone through two whole paperbacks; each is now falling apart, marked up with various coloured inks. Woolf dug deep into the very idea of the patriot and found it so corrupted by its patriarchal foundations that, she argued, it was not worthy of either aspiration or reform. It's an astounding book, really.

RIS. *Some of these ideas which you elaborate upon could be regarded as dangerous or subversive in many ways, and yet you raise issues in what might be described as a gentle way. Is there a tension between these very powerful arguments over the causes and effects of militarization and yet your reasoned approach? What inspires this approach?*

CE. What a great question. Yes, I want to be read. I want to be heard. I'm always writing for multiple audiences. This goes back to my being so excited about Neil

Middleton taking the *Ethnic Soldiers* manuscript and publishing it as an ordinary, trade paperback. I've really wanted to write so that multiple audiences, readers who are at different stages of their own political thinking, will find the book digestible. But 'digestible' doesn't, for me, mean bland. I'm eager for readers to think their own thoughts about what I offer up; I hope they'll write in the margins, and tussle ideas and information, maybe reject parts of it, yet be curious about other parts of it, even go on to then launch their own explorations to see if my hunches do hold water. This approach to writing comes out of being a teacher. I mean, when you're in a classroom, you know that some students are just going to latch on to your ideas. They're ready; they're there; that's the reason they chose this course. Then there will be other students—in the United States it's the kids in the back row with their baseball caps on backwards, sliding so far down in their seats that you can barely see the tops of their heads—whose initial attitude seems to be, 'I'm cool, I'm detached, you're not going to phase me'. Well, I'm after that kid; I'm never going to let him or her go. And so I write so that at least that sceptic, that 'why the hell am I being asked to read a book about women' reader, will be engaged despite themselves. I want to provide a basis for the reader to get far enough into the feminist discussion that they can start making their own decisions about what is worthy of further thought. I don't come on like gangbusters for that reason. There can, of course, be times when you want to have an abrasive effect; it's just not usually my mode. On the other hand, I wouldn't have been pushed to develop the consciousness (it's still evolving)—the mid-level consciousness—I now have if there hadn't been a lot more outspoken radical people, particularly in Britain, Ireland, Canada, Chile and in the United States, around me. If those people hadn't been out there, wielding that kind of beyond-the-pale language and launching respectability-be-damned action, I probably wouldn't have been pushed to even my currently modest level of political consciousness.

RIS. *Would you please identify who those important people were?*

CE. I've been deeply affected by the women activist-thinkers at Greenham Common. When I was writing *Does Khaki Become You?* for Pluto Press, it was going to be published first in Britain, before it even had an American publisher. This was the early 1980s and I wanted *Khaki* to be written in a way that would contribute to the intense intellectual conversation—about what is the 'political', about what notions of womanhood the Cold War relied upon—that the Greenham women had launched. At the same time in Britain I was reading, listening to, being influenced by feminist social historians and journalists such as Dale Spender, Bea Campbell, Judy Lown, Sheila Rowbotham, and Hilary Wainwright. In both Britain and the US, I've been affected by people who aren't in the social sciences, who are activists, essayists, journalists, and artists, for instance, the American essayist and poet Adrienne Rich. They have had the curiosity and skills to reveal things about the nuances of gendered power that even social scientists too often miss. You can't talk about patriarchy, of course, unless you can figure out how racism and ethnicized nationalism rely on certain relations between women and men. So people like Barbara Smith, the American lesbian black feminist writer, and Kate Rushin, the black poet, have had a big effect on me, I think. And with virtually all of these intellectuals, I always know I'm more tame than they are.

RIS. *Is there a problem or a tension for International Relations in the relationship between feminist theorizing and feminist activism?*

CE. I'm not sure if there is a problem. Certainly there are several enterprises of explanation going on at different levels simultaneously. I think we all are fortunate, in a way, that we get to take part in a number of conversations at the same time. One of the reasons I talk about activists a lot in *Maneuvers* and my other most recent writings is that I want us all to re-imagine just *where* theorizing takes place. I've been made very nervous in recent years by an image of who does theorizing—and where—that has gotten so rarefied. It's an image that I think is naïve. In reality, the exploration of causality and building of explanation usually are happening in a lot of places. Thinkers not published by university presses or not seeking tenure are the intellectuals who created such profound concepts as 'rape as an instrument of war'. Intellectual/activist feminists in the Philippines, South Korea, Chile and Serbia have taught me so much about, for example, the genderings of the state/regime/nation interactions.

RIS. *Your central question in Bananas is 'Where are the women?' But then, what do you do about their being where they are? What sorts of politics does that knowledge lead to?*

CE. The first thing that at least partially answering that core question did for me was to change my notion of how power works. That's because I was compelled to *then* ask the necessary follow-up questions: 'How did those women get there?' and 'Who has a stake in their being there?' When I began to see the necessity of asking all three of these questions, I started to realize that my writings and my teachings for the prior fifteen years had all underestimated how power works. Taking women's lives seriously made me see that the world, both in terms of societal and international relations, is nowhere near as 'natural' as I previously had imagined it was. And that fresh understanding began to make me feel more responsible. I mean, as just an individual citizen, I find that (I know it sounds like an extreme case), it's just unacceptable to learn that some Rwandan women, especially Tutsi women, in 1994 were forced to have to become 'wives' of certain Hutu militiamen, and then for me to treat that information merely as fodder for my own analysis. Making this form of sexual coercion analytically visible *is* important since most of the reporting about the genocide didn't talk about it at all. Is this making sense? That is, my trying to make sense of the political lives of women who I had never even bothered to notice before, does change my relationship to them. Employing a feminist analysis in trying to make sense of international politics, therefore, has infused my academic life with a far greater sense of accountability. Take another, seemingly very different, sort of example. I'm kind of a classic American breakfast diner. I eat bananas on top of my breakfast cereal, and I also have very high standards. This is a bit embarrassing. I actually do shop for the bananas that are a perfect yellow, with a touch of green. I buy bananas with Dole and Del Monte stickers on them, and I buy them in air conditioned supermarkets. I haven't stopped eating bananas, but I'm now much more aware that, as an ordinary, humdrum consumer, I'm actually connected to a woman in Honduras or Costa Rica who is standing ankle-deep in some pesticide to wash these bananas so that they look nice to me there in my Boston supermarket.

And I'm aware now of the Central American and US corporate and state wielders of power who put her there. If I do decide to boycott certain companies' bananas, I now will have to think about that Central American woman banana worker's own location and any little ripples my actions might set off in her life.

RIS. *At the end of Maneuvers you pose five of the puzzles which your recent work has uncovered. Do you have any answers to those puzzles? In particular, you raise a question about the incidence of rape in warfare and whether we can mobilize support for women raped by soldiers without allowing those women who have endured rape to be turned into new symbols of national humiliation. Do you have any answers for puzzles such as this one?*

CE. Writing a concluding chapter—you probably find this too—is always tough. You feel you've already written eight chapters and the reader has gotten the message, and so, you think, 'I just want to go off and have a cappuccino'. Conclusions shouldn't sound too satisfied, all the edges rounded off. So I tried to come up with a format for the conclusion of *Maneuvers* which would energize me to write it and readers to read it. Out of all that's been explored, and I hope revealed, in *Maneuvers*, I've pinpointed dilemmas that maybe other people haven't defined in quite the same way. One of those dilemmas, I realized, was how does one make visible mass rapes of women by men as a systematic weapon of war in a way that does not turn those raped women into new commodities: commodities for our angst; commodities for human rights activism; commodities, especially, for galvanizing the next generations of nationalists. Each one of these dilemmas posed at the end of *Maneuvers* has serious implications for both scholars and practitioners, people working for Oxfam, staff people for UNHCR, UNIFEM, the UN High Commission for Refugees, as well as independent activists and commentators. More and more I find that feminist academics working on militarism—but also those researching the international politics of poverty and debt—are at the junctures where policy practitioners, activists and scholars meet. Being there, trying to be useful in these interchanges is energizing and very stretchy. I'm not a public policy practitioner, and I've only made policy inside of my own university. But nowadays I'm trying to work out those dilemmas by posing them as sharply as possible and engaging with a broad range of other people in unravelling them, for instance, feminists working now in Kosovo, Liberia and Sri Lanka. Not to see these as dilemmas is to miss the risks, to underestimate the negative consequences of a thoughtless decision. There's so much I've still got to learn. I've listened to people who are really smart out there. They are working with international agencies; they're doing a really difficult new kind of international activist work. The very intensity of the work they're doing can make them miss the dilemmas and thus the risks.

RIS. *In terms of people listening to other people, do you think the 'Gender and International Relations' project is going anywhere? Are different groups of people seriously listening to each other?*

CE. Oh yeah! I'm not sanguine, but just listen to what's going on in the hallways or in the conference rooms here at the ISA this week: a lot of new younger scholars doing fresh things with an explicit gender curiosity. I was just on a panel where an

economist, a feminist economist at the University of Michigan, was doing a gendered analysis of the World Bank's new development paradigm. She demonstrated how this new economic theory allows the Bank's economists to feel comfortable with taking gender on board where they didn't before. One of the striking things to me is how the 'gender and IR' scholars move easily back and forth between theory and empirical research—sometimes it's the same person doing both, sometimes it's theorists and empirical researchers on the same panels, in conversation.

RIS. *Do you think this work is really doing anything on a significant scale to transform the way people think? Is it a dialogue of the deaf, between specialists in gender and those of a traditional Political Science/IR persuasion?*

CE. You'd have to talk about what's going on journal by journal, department by department, university by university: who in each is embracing not just gender analysis, but is rethinking what one needs to study (and to teach) to make sense of 'politics'. My own political science department is as small in faculty numbers (and as large in student majors) as it was ten years ago, but collectively, our notion of what is 'political' has expanded remarkably. The slowness, though, of intellectual change in political science is a bit frustrating. It's embarrassing if you listen to publishers and editors talk about which of the many academic conferences they'd most like to go to; they rarely put a political science meeting at the top of their wish list. They choose, say, the anthropology meetings, and there's a reason: they don't seem to think the intellectual atmosphere among political scientists is as vibrant as it might be. It's the scholars doing gender and politics, gender and IR work who are changing this. They're doing a lot to make the ISA a much more lively place to be. For instance, these are the panels and plenaries which are attracting people not only in Political Science, but also in Anthropology, History, Economics and Sociology, because feminist analysis is so interdisciplinary in its approach and in the questions it asks about international politics.

Today, almost no Political Science department worth its salt doesn't have somebody doing gender research and/or gender teaching. If you went into a Political Science or International Politics department that didn't have any offerings on gender, you'd think they were a kind of backwater department. In this sense, the people doing gender and IR have had a genuine impact. But in many departments (and on many journals and assessment committees) there's still a tendency towards tokenism: for instance, thinking that hiring one gender scholar in a department of 12 or 20 passes for real intellectual commitment. It doesn't. Here in Britain it's the research assessment committees responsible for IR and Politics that is the arena to watch: for instance, is *The International Feminist Journal of Politics* on the list of serious scholarly publishing vehicles? Is *Signs*?

RIS. *It is very interesting that the illustrations you give, such as the World Bank, rely on empirical research for their significance. There is a widespread perception these days, in Britain at least, that 'Gender and IR' is pretty much being taken over by people who are post-modernist/post-structuralist in inspiration, and do not do traditional empirical research. Citing Foucault is deemed by these writers as more authoritative than citing a World Bank report. What is your view?*

CE. No. Actually, in the gender and IR circles people doing theory and people doing empirical research are in constant communication: all talking to each other; on the same editorial boards; jointly organizing conferences. There isn't a divide. Ann Tickner reads—and shares conversations—with Kathy Moon. Jindy Pettman, Gillian Youngs and Kathy Jones jointly edit the wonderful, lively *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, Jindy being more empirically inclined, Gillian and Kathy more oriented to theory. Similarly, Sandy Whitworth, whose earlier book was on a gender analysis of the ILO and whose new book is an empirical investigation of the struggles over masculinity and femininity inside of militarized peace-keeping forces, has been an intellectual ally for years of theorists Spike Peterson and Marysia Zalewski, working together to create the ISA's Gender and Feminist Theory section.

RIS. *When people are labelling various feminisms, where do you fit in: would you say your political stance is fundamentally liberal? Is the drive for equality between people the way to resolve the political issues that your work throws into relief?*

CE. Ah! 'Fundamentally'. Well, I think if one is born and raised in pretty mainstream America, which I was, it is very hard to escape the liberal culture (I mean liberal as in Locke, not liberal as in Democrats vs. Republicans); in many ways I'm very affected by that American culture. So I think it would be disingenuous of me to say that I wasn't, in some significant part, always a liberal. In the narrower, more parochial sense of liberal, the way it's used in contemporary America, since I was raised in a Republican household, I have had to *become* what Americans today call a liberal. But in terms of what is meant by being a classical liberal—finding it easy to focus on individuals, finding equality an appealing aspiration, valuing limitations on state power essential for achieving human liberty—I do think I've internalized much of that world view.

On the other hand, in researching and teaching politics, and especially learning from feminists, I've become wide awake to the flaws and limitations integral to that liberalism. In my own work I've had to think through these critiques, particularly in order to figure out how to make sense of the debates over my writings about militarization. For instance, I have deliberately avoided putting women-in-the-military at the analytical centre because to have privileged that one aspect of militarization would have fallen into a naïve form of liberal thinking. But I've had conversations with women in lots of different militaries, and one has to be able, in a respectful way, to respond to their strenuous strategies to halt intra-military sexism, while one still makes visible the deeper politics of militarism. Equality inside a military is not enough to pursue because, too often, such a pursuit silences debates about militarism. I think it's a good thing that I've been constantly put in positions where I have to make clear why I think that sexism—and racism—inside any military should be made visible, should be resisted, should be overturned because, in countries such as the United States, Indonesia, Chile, and Britain, the military is a very powerful state institution. You can't allow any powerful state institution to normalize sexism. You can't.

RIS. *You seem to talk completely unselfconsciously about women. Not all feminist scholars would. Do you ever put inverted commas around the word 'woman'?*

CE. No. You mean, like Christine Sylvester? I tend not to—Christine and I are good friends, and I know why she is doing it, and in her new book on Zimbabwe, she does it all the way through in a very provocative way. I am by no means essentialist in my thinking; I never have been. Very, very few feminist scholars are. Human actors identified as men, and human actors identified as women are not essentially—that is a-socially, a-culturally—‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’. If there are terms that need to be sceptically highlighted with inverted commas at the top of that list it would be ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’. On the other hand, in virtually every society analysed, women as a group are treated as if they are not just a distinct category but an ideologically-loaded category.

RIS. *Right! And you have said somewhere that you are a non-universalist.*

CE. Yes! I mean, I grew up as a suburban white Anglo-American bourgeois girl. How could I imagine that that’s typical of all women? I just couldn’t. So one of the things I’ve learned always to ask when trying to make sense of the politics of Nike in Indonesia or the politics of NATO in Kosovo is: how is the broad category of the ‘feminine’ wielded by those with power at the same time (usually) as categories of class and race/ethnicity are used to manipulate subgroups of women?

RIS. *Might your work in future explore the effects of gender on men? That is, looking at men as victims of gendered constructions?*

CE. Men, in fact, increasingly, figure explicitly in my work. One can see this in *The Morning After*, and particularly in *Maneuvers*. In both books I’ve tried to examine how multiple masculinities get manipulated, the manipulators’ motives, and the consequences for international politics—in industrialization policy, in nationalist movements, in war-waging efforts, in trade negotiations, in the formulation of weapons policy. But I am very wary of any scholarly attempt to analyse the politics of masculinity that concentrates solely on the actions and experiences of men. Remember, I did that, four books worth. I know now it is not analytically productive. I honestly think that when and where masculinity is politically wielded, can be understood only if one takes women’s lives seriously. Women and ideas about femininity are manipulated usually by political actors intent upon persuading men to behave in certain ways. Just think of all you learn about states’ anxieties about masculinity from paying attention to military wives!

RIS. *This is moving toward several policy-relevant questions. You’re attacking militarism; it’s a theme that has run through your work. In a piece published in *The Review of International Studies* not long ago—‘Women and War: Ten Years On’—Jean Elshstein argued that force can sometimes be used for good. Do you agree with such a view? If so—if force can be used for good—then we obviously need a military organization. How do you begin to square all this—the new lure of wielding violence in the name of humanitarianism and the historic threat of militarism?*

CE. Um! I don’t think I have ever said outright that all states should not have militaries. What I’ve been more concerned about is the way in which the rationalization of the use of force has been used to justify militarism, which in turn

normalizes and legitimizes secrecy, hierarchy, masculinism, and a culture of threat. In Haiti in the mid-90s when the military regime was being ousted largely with American military support, the American Ambassador became the most powerful person in Haiti. When the newly installed Aristide regime proposed to do away with a military under the new government—following the Costa Rican model—the American Ambassador reputedly warned ‘You will not be recognized as a mature, respected state in the international community unless you have an army’. That the very status of a ‘mature’ state—a status bestowed by an international elite—should rest on a state having an institutionalized military does make me nervous; adopting such an international assumption militarizes not only the status of statehood, but the potent concept of ‘maturity’.

But coming to grips with the use of state force isn’t, we all know, easy. In the midst of the 1991–95 war in Bosnia, amongst people of good will, and a lot of them feminists, there were intense debates about what we should be pushing our respective governments to do. In the US, it was the Republicans in Congress who did not want the US military to be sent in to Bosnia in any alliance configuration. They opposed interventionist humanitarian operations; only direct US national security, they argued, could justify deployment, and that deployment had to be under American command. No ‘blue-helmeted’ American soldiers. I remember at the time being so frustrated with that Republican parochialness. It felt like a very masculinist form of protecting the US military. So there I was in 1994, rooting for going to Bosnia with some kind of force, some kind of military operation, yet thinking of all the risks this would entail—not the sort of risks, though, that Colin Powell and his Republican congressional supporters had in mind! I admit that I was quite torn about that. Oddly, the post-Gulf War ‘Powell Doctrine’ rests on the militarized notion that any US foreign policy must make the protection of the American soldiers its top priority. That doctrine may reduce the number of US state interventions overseas, but it makes a militarized criterion the determiner of US civilian government foreign policy decisions.

RIS. *It sounds as though you were in support of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia. Was this the case?*

CE. No. I actually do not think that the military interventions in Bosnia 1994–95, and in Serbia 1999, were politically identical. I did think that the US and European initial embrace of the KLA in 1999 was disastrous. I was watching the emergence of the KLA and its masculinized, militarized politics just as I was writing *Maneuvers*. It was a politics that sidetracked 1990s ethnic Albanian local political efforts to develop a different kind of Kosovo nationalist masculine identity, one that allowed for a genuine inclusion of activist women. The NATO military/political strategy devised in 1999 was one which privileged instead a masculinist, militarized politics among Kosovar Albanians, one that only now is being challenged locally.

RIS. *You make it plain, though, that you have concerns about the US global role and, specifically its physical and ideological influence after the end of the Cold War.*

CE. I think the US global role should not be what it is today. I have begun to do some writing to explore the current widespread American cultural anxiety about the

United Nations. I'm pretty sure that that anxiety—and contempt—is gendered. It is being fuelled in part by elite and popular uncertainty about American masculinity. Sovereignty and isolationism—they are obviously important to think about—but if we are uncurious about the politics of masculinity, we won't get to the bottom of this, the American fear of donning a blue helmet.

RIS. *Why is that? Would it make them look too boyish, and not sufficiently fearsome? 'Blue does not become them'?*

CE. One has to think historically and cross-nationally. For instance, what seems to be true of senior US military commanders and civilian Republican senators today, does not seem to be true of the Fijians. The popularly accepted proof of ethnic Fijian men's masculinity is to have been on a UN peacekeeping operation, wearing the tell-tale blue helmet. Not Indian Fijian masculinity, but ethnic Fijian masculinity. This, in turn, is not unconnected to the increasing militarization of Fijian domestic politics since the early 1990s. Generalizing from the American case is never a good idea.

RIS. *Our question to you about the global role of the United States raises the old question about drawing a line between one's role as a scholar and one's role as a citizen. Does this old problem present you, given your explicitness about working as a feminist scholar, with a particular problem? Do you worry about it?*

CE. Most of the time it doesn't feel worrisome to me, so long as one is open to, and part of a critical conversation. What would be more worrisome would be if—in one's academic life, or in one's activism—one got closed off from an on-going intellectual growth and the sort of open serious discussion that allows for criticism. Also, in fact, I'm just an ordinary academic, right? I mean, I'm not very often 'on the barricades'. That's nothing to be proud of either. Maybe the reason oftentimes my work is taken to be somehow engaged with activism is because a lot of my stuff isn't read just by academics. So it's the readership that actually changes the perception of my work. I do though, feel accountable to my students and my colleagues, but also to people who are outside of academia. So perhaps, in addition to the extra-academic readership, it's this sense of accountability that makes me feel as though I'm engaged with activists.

RIS. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases draws the reader into wanting to do something. As you say there—more elegantly than this paraphrase—the personal is the (politically) international. Our students have asked us, so let us now put you on the spot: What would an Enlo-esque defence policy look like?*

CE. People wanting to do something—in some ways, I think that is part of being a citizen as student/scholar/teacher. Of course, it's both terribly rewarding, but also nervous-making to think that someone is going to do something with what you taught! It may not always be what you had in mind, and it may be years later.

As far as 'a Cynthia Enloe defence policy' goes: thank God I'll never be a defence minister, but what I would hope is that in such a policy process there would be open, unpatriarchal discussion of what the gendered stakes of each policy alternative

would be. I know that would be extremely hard to do. But it seems to me it would make for a much more honest and productive foreign policy (the larger arena in which defence policy is crafted) to have these things that are left unsaid yet so powerful up on the table for explicit assessment.

RIS. *Finally, the question academics always ask each other: what are you working on now, and what do you plan to do next?*

CE. As many of us do, I've got several things on the burners simultaneously. They are on the two tracks of politics I've been following for some years—one in international political economy, the other in the international politics of militarization. The first is my ongoing interest in women working in export factories, specifically women in the international politics of sneakers. I don't wear Nikes, but I keep pretty close track of Nike—and Reebok and Adidas—in the politics of Indonesia, Korea, China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the US. Probably the most reprinted article I've ever written is the one I did on the gendered global politics of sneakers (*Ms* magazine, March/April, 1995). Because the international political economy of any commercial product—copper, shipbuilding, diamonds, jeans, electronics, bananas—is gendered and yet always in transition, I've made this one of my continuing interests in both my teaching and my writing.

Then there's militarization. I'm especially curious these days about how humanitarian aid programmes in conflict and post-conflict societies can become subtly militarized. For instance, which departments of which NGOs or which government aid agencies are most likely to find themselves adopting the military's agenda and priorities? What I'm curious about is why this is so seductive and what this seduction does to privilege masculinity and marginalize certain men and most women in democratizing efforts.

So—I have plenty to feed my curiosity and keep me on my toes!

R.I.S. interviewers: Professor Ken Booth, Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Professor Michael Cox

The interview was conducted in February 2001 at the Annual Convention of the ISA in Chicago