

# THE UKRAINE LIST UKL #441

compiled by Dominique Arel  
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa  
www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca  
16 February 2010

---

## **\*\*Bandera-OUN Debate\*\***

- 1-UCC: Ukraine's President Recognizes Ukraine's Freedom Fighters
- 2-Edmonton Journal: David Marples, Hero of Ukraine Linked to Jewish Killings
- 3-Edmonton Journal: Marco Levytsky, Ukrainian Nationalists Played No Part in Massacre of 4,000 Jews
- 4-Edmonton Journal, Stephen Bandera, Family Name Cleared
- 5-Edmonton Journal: Zenon Kohut, Ukrainian Nationalism
- 6-John Paul Himka: Should Ukrainian Studies Defend the Heritage of OUN-UPA?
- 7-Zenon Kohut: Reply to John Paul Himka
- 8-John Paul Himka: Reply to Zenon Kohut

## **\*\*Famine Debate\*\***

- 9-Literary Review of Canada: Myrna Kostash, Genocide or "A Vast Tragedy"?
- 10-Ukrainian News: Jars Balan, A Reply to Myrna Kostash
- 11-Literary Review of Canada: Letters by Zenon Kohut, Paul Grod, J.M. Szul
- 12-Ukrainian News: John Paul Himka, Thinking about the Holodomor
- 13-Comment by Roman Serbyn

## **\*\*More on the Famine\*\***

- 14-Pressé Kiev: Holodomor and State Protocol (5 February) [UKL Translation]
- 15-Interfax: Kyiv Court Renders Verdict on Holodomor
- 16-NY Review of Books: Tim Snyder, Ukraine's Past on Trial
- 17-CIUS: Lecture by Andrea Graziosi

## **\*\*More on the OUN\*\***

- 18-Washington Post: Movement to Honor Members of War Underground Sets Off Debate
- 19-AAUS List: Alexandra Hrycak, On UPA and Lustration

20-New Religious Histories: Rethinking Religion and Secularization in 20th Century Ukraine and Russia, 25-27 March 2010, Penn State U

**\*\*Thanks to Jars Balan, Bhavna Dave, John Paul Himka, Alexandra Hrycak, Zenon Kohut, Maggie Paxson, Blair Ruble (Kennan Institute), Oxana Shevel, Mykola Soroka, Cathy Wanner, and Roman Zurba\*\***

---

## **#1**

Ukraine's President Recognizes Ukraine's Freedom Fighters  
Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC)

Winnipeg, MB, Canada - February 1, 2010 -Ukrainian Canadians welcome the long-overdue recognition of Ukraine's freedom fighters as "Heroes of Ukraine". Today's anniversary of the battle of Kruty (January 29, 1918) will remain historically memorable for the fact that outgoing President Yushchenko chose this date to recognize the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and a list of other military formations as "Heroes of Ukraine". This follows last week's specific recognition of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN who was assassinated in Munich by the KGB in 1959, as a "Hero of Ukraine" which was presented to his Ukrainian Canadian grandson Stepan Bandera.

"We commend President Victor Yushchenko for recognizing those who struggled and perished for Ukraine's independence," stated Paul Grod, National President of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. "President Yushchenko has made incredible progress in elevating the national consciousness of Ukrainians. It is critical now that Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament of Ukraine bring forth the appropriate legislation, regulations and educational programs to implement this decree."

With few veterans still alive the practical aspects of this gesture remain largely symbolic but would still allow the OUN-UPA veterans to receive a military pension comparable to Soviet war veterans. Aside from the social and education benefits that might pass to their children and grandchildren, the decree is also valuable for the moral if not "official rehabilitation" afforded to tens of thousands of such descendants whose lives were blighted by the scourge of soviet officialdom in the post war period of the 20th century.

The UCC calls upon the Government of Canada to make changes to Canada's War Veterans Allowance Act by expanding eligibility to include designated resistance groups such as OUN-UPA and to limit eligibility of Soviet War Veterans to those who served after 1941 when the Soviet Union switched from being allies of Nazi-Germany to become allies of Canada.

For more information please contact:

UCC Media Contact:  
Darla Penner  
Telephone: 204-942-4627  
Email: [dpenner@ucc.ca](mailto:dpenner@ucc.ca)  
Website: [www.ucc.ca](http://www.ucc.ca)

---

## **#2**

Hero of Ukraine Linked to Jewish Killings  
Honorary title sure to provoke divisions among Ukrainians today  
by David Marples  
Edmonton Journal, 7 February 2010

David Marples, a professor of history at the University of Alberta, is the author of *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (2008).

On Jan. 22, Ukraine's Unity Day, outgoing president Viktor Yushchenko formally designated Stepan Bandera a Hero of Ukraine. The award has aroused polarized reactions. The Winnipeg-based Ukrainian Canadian Congress has welcomed it. The Simon Wiesenthal Center in United States, conversely, expressed its "deep revulsion" at the award to a man linked to the deaths of "thousands of Jews."

Who was Stepan Bandera and why is he capable of arousing such emotions 50 years after his death?

He was born on Jan. 1, 1909, in the village of Staryi Uhryniv into the family of a Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest, in what was then the Austrian empire. His mother died when he was 13, and a sister in infancy. Three sisters were deported after the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland, and his father was executed by Stalin's NKVD.

Stepan first came to prominence under Polish rule. At the Paris peace treaties of 1918, western Ukrainian lands were divided between several powers, but mostly came under Polish rule. Eastern Ukraine became part of the U.S.S.R. from late 1922. The Poles promised to allow some autonomy to their huge Ukrainian minority in the east.

That promise was not kept. On the contrary, the region was pacified and settled with Polish colonists. A large Ukrainian democratic party sought to attain changes through the Polish parliament, but gradually extremists became more influential. By the 1930s, the prevailing ideology in Europe was fascism. Mussolini had been in power since 1922 in Italy, and by January 1933, Hitler had become chancellor of Germany. In 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was formed from a former Ukrainian military organization and led by Col. Evhen Konovalts. Its goal was to revise the results of the Paris and Riga peace treaties, based on 10 "commandments" that included such tenets as "Attain a Ukrainian state or die in battle for it," and "Aspire to strengthen the Ukrainian state even by means of enslaving foreigners." It was a typically fascist movement of the interwar period not dissimilar to the Italian version.

In 1931, Bandera became head of the OUN regional executive in Western Ukraine. The OUN carried out terrorist acts, assassinating a member of the Soviet Consulate in L'viv in response to Stalin's engineered famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1933, and the Polish Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934. Bandera was arrested for his part in the latter and sentenced to death after two long trials. The verdict was commuted to seven terms of life imprisonment and he spent over five years in Polish jails until released by the Germans, who invaded Poland on Sept. 1, 1939.

After a Soviet agent assassinated Konovalts in 1938, the OUN eventually split into two wings. In April 1941, Bandera was approved as leader of the revolutionary faction (OUN-B). The other faction was led by Andrii Melnyk (OUN-M).

Both groups collaborated with the Germans. Bandera saw a German invasion as the best hope for an independent Ukraine. The OUN-B also helped train two Ukrainian Wehrmacht battalions to advance eastward with the main German army. In late June 1941, the Nachtigall battalion followed the Germans into L'viv and the OUN-B declared the independence of Ukraine on the local radio.

Members of the OUN-B spearheaded pogroms in L'viv in the summer of 1941 when about 4,000 Jews were killed.

Hitler did not accept Ukrainian independence, and upon Bandera's refusal to withdraw the proclamation, confined him in Sachsenhausen camp near Berlin for the next three years. The Germans began mass arrests of OUN-B members by September 1941.

The OUN-B also had the key role in the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) under Roman Shukhevych, former commander of the Nachtigall battalion. UPA emerged in Volhynia, where in the spring and summer of 1943 it massacred 30,000 to 60,000 Poles, mainly elderly and children, in a fanatical bid to reclaim Ukrainian lands.

From 1944 to 1953, UPA and Soviet security forces fought a brutal battle in Western Ukraine (now under Soviet rule). In 1948-49, Stalin authorized mass deportations of Western Ukrainians to Gulag camps. Shukhevych was killed near L'viv in 1950. UPA was supplied in part by the CIA, but survived mainly through support of the local population.

Bandera played no role in this lengthy conflict. He had moved to Munich after the war and organized the now factionalized OUN abroad. His single overriding goal remained the attainment of an independent Ukraine. On the orders of the KGB, Bohdan Stashynsky assassinated Bandera on Oct. 15, 1959, at the entrance to his apartment building.

In the 21st century, his views seem archaic and dangerous. He embraced violence, terror and intolerance toward other ethnicities living on Ukrainian lands. But he lived through perhaps the bleakest times in Ukrainian history, when independence seemed a remote dream.

Yushchenko surely erred when he conferred on Bandera the title — paradoxically it sounds typically Soviet — Hero of Ukraine. Bandera was a Ukrainian patriot, but his elevation only provokes divisions in a society that has very disparate views of the recent past.

---

### **#3**

Ukrainian Nationalists Played No Part in Massacre of 4,000 Jews  
by Marco Levytsky, editor, Ukrainian News, Edmonton  
Letter to the Editor  
Edmonton Journal, 9 February 2010

Re: "Hero of Ukraine linked to Jewish killings; Honorary title sure to provoke divisions among Ukrainians today," by David Marples, Opinion, Feb. 7."

This headline is a Vladimir Putinstyle ex-KGB falsification, topping an article by David Marples which is misleading.

The statement that stands out in particular is the following: "Members of the OUN-B spearheaded pogroms in L'viv in the summer of 1941, when about 4,000 Jews were killed."

In February 2008, Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) archive representative Oleksander Ishchuk showed declassified documents which provide an objective basis to state that OUN (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) is not connected with any violent actions against the civilian population of L'viv on or after July 4, 1941.

The declassified documents of SBU indicate that from July 4-7, 1941, representatives of Gestapo who arrived in L'viv turned to the Ukrainian population, inciting them to carry out an anti-Jewish pogrom.

"The OUN leadership, having got to know about that, informed its members that it was a German provocation in order to compromise Ukrainians with massacres," the document reads.

Prior to the German invasion, the Soviet NKVD, in which Jews had disproportionate membership, was involved in the killing of 4,000 to 8,000 civilian prisoners -- a fact the Nazis hoped would provoke Ukrainian retaliation.

Furthermore, while the Israeli Holocaust Museum Yad Vashem has also attempted to pin the L'viv Massacres on Ukrainians, especially Roman Shukhevych, leader of the Nachtigall battalion and later the anti-Nazi, anti-Soviet Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the head of the Association of Jewish Communities and Organizations of Ukraine, Vaad Yosyp Zisels, asked Yad Vashem for documentary evidence to prove that claim and was unable to obtain it.

In a Jan. 27 story posted on the website of the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, which is run by the Ukrainian Catholic University, with which the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta -- where Marples serves as a research associate -- cooperates, noted that this proves the accusations against Shukhevych are "groundless."

He also called upon Ukrainians and Jews to give up the accusations and focus on developing new, harmonious relations. "If we, the Jews, continue to count how many Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazis and the Ukrainians continue to count how many Jews served in Cheka, GPU, NKVD, and KGB, we will forever stay in historical impasse where conflicts could easily erupt," noted Zisels.

-----

## **#4**

Family Name Cleared  
by Stephen Bandera  
Letter to the Editor  
Edmonton Journal, 9 February 2010

Stephen Bandera, one of Stepan Bandera's five grandchildren, Toronto

David Marples' column is a rehash of misinformation he's been passing off as academic research for more than a decade.

The statement, "Members of the OUN-B spearheaded pogroms in L'viv in the summer of 1941 when about 4,000 Jews were killed" is part of that misinformation.

The Soviet investigation into the killing of L'viv's Jews identified the "42 butchers of L'viv" responsible for the slaughter of the Jewish innocents in July of 1941. That list, compiled immediately after the Second World War and submitted to the Nuremberg military tribunals for prosecution, does not contain a single member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

Furthermore, Marples neglects to mention that Stepan Bandera's two brothers -- Oleksa and Vasyl -- were killed by the Nazis in Auschwitz. Their tattoo numbers were 51020 and 49271 respectively.

Our family cleared the Bandera name before the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada in 1985.

It's a shame The Journal is providing a forum for people to smear our family name. If Stepan Bandera was even guilty of half the crimes of which Marples and his ilk accuse him, then he would have been swinging from the gallows at Nuremberg 65 years ago.

-----

## **#5**

Ukrainian Nationalism  
By Zenon E. Kohut  
Letter to the Editor  
Edmonton Journal, 10 February 2010

Zenon E. Kohut, director, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton

Re: "Hero of Ukraine linked to Jewish killings; Honorary title sure to provoke divisions among Ukrainians today," by David Marples, Opinion, Feb. 7.

The pogrom of Jews in the summer of 1941 occurred under Nazi German occupation and was encouraged and initiated by German authorities.

Ukrainians were involved in the pogrom, but ultimate responsibility lies with German authorities. One might conclude otherwise from Marples's opinion piece.

Furthermore, the article implies that Stepan Bandera, the recipient of the Hero of Ukraine award, was somehow connected to this event. Bandera was not in Ukraine at the time the pogrom took place -- or at any time during the German-Soviet war -- and there is no document of which I am aware that links him to this tragic event.

Moreover, Marples's characterization of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as a typically fascist movement is also not correct. It was a national liberation movement whose ideology may have been influenced by fascism, but it was characterized as "integral nationalist" by John A. Armstrong, whose study, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, remains the best on the subject.

The history of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the Second World War is not without its dark pages, but we have to be careful about our allegations or inferences, especially as they may encourage the stereotyping of entire ethnic groups.

## #6

[The debate between John Paul Himka and Zenon Kohut has been taking place in an internet forum of about 30 scholars in the last week. It is reproduced on UKL with the permission of the authors – DA]

Should Ukrainian Studies Defend the Heritage of OUN-UPA?

John-Paul Himka  
Department of History and Classics  
University of Alberta

10 February 2010

I am moved to write this because of disputes that have erupted in Edmonton, where I live, over the heritage of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its armed forces (UPA). A colleague, David Marples, wrote an op-ed piece in *The Edmonton Journal* responding to Viktor Yushchenko's heroization of Stepan Bandera and OUN-UPA as he left office in crushing defeat. Dr. Marples explained why this was controversial and why the Canadian government should not endorse it, as the Ukrainian Canadian Congress has called upon the government to do.

Marples's article provoked letters to the *Journal* from pro-OUN elements in and outside of our community. One letter also came from Zenon Kohut, who signed himself as Director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta.

There are a number of problems with Zenon's letter, but here I will focus only on two that speak to the responsibility of intellectuals and scholars to their communities and to the public at large.

The first is the issue of the OUN's fascism. Dr. Kohut wrote that Dr. Marples's characterization of OUN as "a typically fascist movement" is "not correct." "It was," he writes, "a national liberation movement whose ideology may have been influenced by fascism, but it was characterized as 'integral nationalist' by John A. Armstrong, whose study, *Ukrainian Nationalism* remains the best on the subject."

This deliberate minimization of the fascism in OUN's legacy is misleading, especially when advanced in a context of whether this is a legacy we should be embracing or not.

OUN was indeed a typical fascist organization as shown by many of its features: its leader principle (Führerprinzip), its aspiration to ban all other political parties and movements, its fascist-style slogan (Slava Ukraini! Heroiam slava!), its red and black flag, its raised-arm salute, its xenophobia and antisemitism, its cult of violence, and its admiration of Hitler, Mussolini, and other leaders of fascist Europe. What's not fascist here?

A graduate student in my department, Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, has found in the archives in Kyiv letters that Yaroslav Stetsko wrote on 3 July 1941 to Mussolini, Pavelić, Franco, and Hitler, introducing himself as part of the New Europe. Numerous documents in unimpeachable collections link OUN with the hitlerites in June and July 1941.

Does the fact that OUN was also a national liberation movement make it not fascist? The Ustashe was also a national liberation movement – was it too not fascist? The Viet Cong was a national liberation movement – was it therefore not communist? What kind of logic is being used here? More peculiar logic: Dr. Kohut attempts to exculpate Bandera for responsibility for the 1941 pogroms by pointing out he was not even in Western Ukraine when they happened. Amazing. That kind of logic would also get Stalin off the hook for the Ukrainian famine.

Dr. Kohut defers to the authority of John A. Armstrong, who called OUN an integral nationalist movement. Armstrong wrote his book long before the archives were open and before the information revolution. He also based his study primarily on interviews with the leaders of OUN themselves. Is it too much to suspect that their interviews might have been self-serving? Armstrong admired the OUN leaders, as he admitted in his reminiscences of them published later. Armstrong was also very much a product of his time, which was the Cold War. The mood then was to downplay the crimes of all anti-Soviet forces. He never interviewed the victims of OUN-UPA, nor did he examine Polish-language sources.

In the mid-1980s the Solidarity underground in Poland wanted to publish texts about Ukrainian nationalism and requested through an intermediary, the late Janusz Radziejowski, that I convey to them copies of Armstrong's book as well as Alex Motyl's *Turn to the Right*. After reading them in Polish translation, Janusz wrote to me in 1988 that for all the scholarly value of these books, he was very disappointed that they took no cognizance of the tremendous tragedy of the Jews. I was incensed and wrote back to Janusz that UPA had nothing to do with the Holocaust. His responses got me thinking, however, and I slowly embarked on the path of research that has led me now to attempt to settle the question of OUN-UPA involvement in the Holocaust. I have only been horrified by what I have discovered.

So that is the first thing: OUN was fascist. True, after Stalingrad and after Kursk, OUN began to distance itself from fascism, particularly at its Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly in August 1943. (Bandera himself, however, remained true to the old ideology to the end.) OUN-UPA's words changed, but its practice remained fascist. July and August 1943 were the months of UPA's most intense murder of Poles in Volhynia, and in the following winter UPA and OUN security units systematically murdered Jewish survivors.

The second point in Dr. Kohut's letter that deserves discussion is his conclusion: "The history of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the Second World War is not without its dark pages, but we have to be careful about our allegations or inferences, especially as they may encourage the stereotyping of entire ethnic groups."

My basic issue is this: Which creates more of a stereotype – isolating and identifying the Ukrainian political movement which is responsible for the image of Ukrainians as fascist murderers or, in the name of Ukrainian studies, attempting to defend that movement with totally threadbare arguments? Or put another way: who discredits Ukraine – mass murderers of Poles, Jews, and others or those who condemn them and their deeds? I would think this is what is commonly called a no-brainer, but obviously it is not, so I will elaborate.

In late June and July 1941 OUN militias and "Sich" organizations went on a rampage in Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and Volhynia, killing Jews primarily, but also some



Poles and communists. Sometimes these militias did not do the killing themselves, but rounded up the victims for Germans and Romanians to execute by firing squad. These murders only occurred in territories that had two things in common: they were invaded in June-July 1941 and OUN was active there. That OUN militias were the culprits are proven by all manner of evidence – German reports, Jewish survivors’ testimonies, photographs and films, and postwar trials of former policemen in German service. To disprove the weight of this evidence, one would have to explain how all this evidence came into being and who actually did organize the pogroms and executions if not OUN.

In any case, many of the Jewish survivor testimonies, especially in cities and bigger towns where the perpetrators could enjoy some anonymity, just blame “the Ukrainians,” without being able to identify precisely which Ukrainians were persecuting them. Naturally, the victims were not privy to the inner workings of Ukrainian nationalist politics. They knew that they were being attacked by Ukrainian-speakers in the name of something Ukrainian. For them their attackers were “the Ukrainians.” I happen to know that these actions were put in motion by a certain group of Ukrainians, OUN. Why not make that differentiation? Why let the blame fall on the nation as a whole?

Why would anyone want to embrace the heritage of that group? Why would I, a person of Ukrainian ancestry and someone devoted to Ukrainian studies for forty years, not want to distance myself and my vision of Ukraine and Ukrainians from that of OUN? Why do I have to be shamed by the thoughtless statements of an official representative of Ukrainian studies? Dr. Kohut here certainly does not speak as my representative.

I understand that OUN has been a dominant force in the Ukrainian overseas diaspora. I know that many of us, I too, have family members in the older generation who were members or sympathizers of OUN. But shouldn’t we put paid to their legacy? Shouldn’t we understand that that generation made a bad choice? Shouldn’t we stop defending the indefensible? Shouldn’t we at least leave it aside and not treat it as some kind of sacred trust.

It is not as if the crimes and nature of OUN-UPA will remain hidden. The archives are not completely open, but many, many new documents are now available to researchers. In them you can find UPA internal reports on its murders of Poles and Jews, OUN leaflets from 1941 calling upon the population to murder Jews and other non-Ukrainians, films of boievyky beating Jews on the streets of Lviv at the end of June 1941, and much more.

Also, documentary evidence is accessible in a way it never was before. Seventy-two hundred Jewish survivor testimonies fit nicely on four disks. Holocaust researchers are beginning to learn the languages and history necessary to find out what happened in Western Ukraine. Some historians of Ukraine are also looking objectively at the Holocaust. Soon there will be no secrets, and flippant, superficial answers on the order of “Armstrong says” will not suffice. Instead, statements like Dr. Kohut’s will make Ukrainian studies look foolish at best, complicit in war crime and Holocaust denial at worst.

Scholars in Ukrainian studies should not pander to the keepers of OUN’s flame within Ukraine and the Ukrainian community in North America. They should not mislead the

public at large. Instead, they should have the civil courage and leadership necessary to educate those communities.

---

## **#7**

Reply by Zenon Kohut  
12 February 2010

Zenon E. Kohut, PhD  
Professor, Department of History and Classics  
Director, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies  
430 Pembina Hall  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, CANADA

Professor Himka asks whether Ukrainian studies should defend the heritage of the "OUN-UPA." There is, of course, no such monolithic entity as "Ukrainian studies." There are individual scholars in the field who are bound to have divergent views and emphasize different issues. In my view, the only role for "Ukrainian studies" with regard to this subject is to study it. I reject any advocacy role either for wholesale endorsement or, as in Professor Himka's case, condemnation of the "heritage of OUN-UPA."

My letter to the Edmonton Journal was a response to particular assertions in Professor Marples's article. It was not a general statement on what Professor Himka calls the "OUN-UPA." No such entity existed: there were two OUNs during World War II (a third was formed after the war), and the UPA included many people who did not belong to either OUN. This indicates the need to be careful about allegations and inferences, as noted in my letter.

Professor Himka's statement is a blanket condemnation of the "OUN-UPA" that reduces the activity of the Ukrainian wartime resistance to the wanton murder of Jews, Poles, and others. But any unbiased assessment would have to recognize some obvious achievements. The UPA waged an armed struggle for Ukrainian independence a task that required extraordinary courage and dedication, since assistance was not available from any state, and all weapons had to be captured from enemy forces. That struggle could not have continued for years after the end of World War II without substantial popular support.

My questioning of the designation "fascist" and suggesting that "integral nationalism" is more appropriate has aroused Professor Himka's particular ire. I am not a specialist on nationalism or World War II but do rely on the experts in the field. "Integral nationalism" is employed not only by the "cold warrior" John Armstrong but also by contemporary scholars such as Timothy Snyder and Peter Alter. The term itself was coined well before the Cold War by Carlton J. H. Hayes in his classic work on modern nationalism.

Moreover, Professor Himka's definition of fascism seems to include anyone who acted in a brutish or "fascistic" manner. By that definition, virtually every political movement in East Central Europe between 1921 and 1945, including Stalinism, could

be deemed "fascist," since there were no democratic options (save, briefly, Masaryk's Czechoslovakia).

Moreover, the nationalist movement undertook a revision of its ideology in the course of the war, and its writers produced the texts collected in *The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943-1951*, edited by Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera. These writings attest to an evolution toward social democracy and pluralism, most clearly manifested in the postwar activity of the OUN (abroad), whose publications contributed greatly to the political thinking and literary expression of the Ukrainian diaspora.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, political constraints on research and discussion of this period have largely disappeared, and much new evidence has become available.

Some of it is evidence of crimes committed by participants in the nationalist movement, and it is bound to arouse strong feelings and provoke controversy. Like any other evidence, it needs to be weighed as objectively as possible. The proper forum for this is academic discourse through publications, conferences, and discussions, without partisan moralizing.

---

## **#8**

Continuing the Debate  
by John-Paul Himka  
15 February 2010

Important issues of principle deserve thorough discussion, so I return here to the exchange among David Marples, Zenon Kohut, and myself by answering Zenon's letter of 12 February 2010 to this mailing group.

To begin with, Zenon denies that he is trying to speak in the name of Ukrainian studies more generally and states instead that he is just voicing his opinion as an individual scholar. If this is indeed the case, then I will explain what has misled me about his contributions to the current debates over twentieth-century Ukrainian history. Zenon's letter to the *Edmonton Journal* follows close on the heels of his letter to the *Literary Review of Canada* (<http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/letters/2009/12/>) in which he takes it upon himself to "correct" Myrna Kostash about the Holodomor. I had the distinct impression that Zenon is setting himself up as a kind of ideological watchdog, nipping at those who stray from the flock. This impression is reinforced by the circumstance that Zenon's sole claim to authority in these issues is his position as director of CIUS, since he has not, to my knowledge, independently researched either the famine or the Holocaust.

He also takes me to task for using the term "OUN-UPA." In fact, this was the term that was introduced by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) at the very beginning of this public discussion. In its press release of 1 February 2010 the UCC called upon "the Government of Canada to make changes to Canada's War Veterans Allowance Act by expanding eligibility to include designated resistance groups such as OUN-

UPA." This usage goes back to pronationalist circles in Ukraine itself. I actually do know that there were two OUNs. Both were antidemocratic, antisemitic, xenophobic, and admirers of the Italian fascists and German national socialists. Both were involved in atrocities, though the Bandera wing was much more deeply involved. Prof. Peter Potichnyj has been arguing for years that we should not use the term "OUN-UPA" because he would like to divorce the heritage of UPA from that of OUN. In fact, however, UPA remained under OUN command until it was dissolved.

Zenon would like me to see the positive sides of the OUNs and UPA, not just their mass murder of Poles and Jews.

One, he says, is that they fought for Ukrainian independence. This they did. But in their thinking, the Ukrainian state they fought for was not simply "independent," it was a "Ukraine for Ukrainians," an ethnically homogeneous state. That kind of independence, I submit, is problematic. The Red Army also posed as liberator of Ukraine from German occupation and restorer of the statehood of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In fact, the Stalinist regime had some of the same ideals as OUN-UPA: it was for Ukrainian sobornist' and also for ethnically cleansing Ukrainian territory. The Soviets did indeed forge a large Ukraine and removed almost the entire Polish, German, and Tatar populations. I certainly cannot think, and I doubt that Zenon thinks, that the Soviets' contribution toward Ukrainian state-making means we can now downplay Stalinist crimes in Ukraine. Perhaps whenever someone brings up the repression of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance of the 1920s, we should add: Well, we got Crimea out of it. Or if they talk about the Holodomor, we should say: Transcarpathia was united to Ukraine by Stalin just twelve years later.

Second, I should recognize that OUN-UPA had exceptional courage and dedication. I do not deny it. But I also remember what the historian Janusz Radziejowski wrote to me in 1988 when I raised exactly the same point to him: "For the evaluation of an ideological or national movement it is not military virtues that are decisive, but programmatic and political aspects. They say that the best soldiers were the Germans. They fought against a world that surpassed them many times in the number of soldiers and in equipment." Brave Hans fighting street by street in the bitter cold of Stalingrad cannot improve the ideological visage of German national socialism.

Third, OUN-UPA had substantial popular support. So did Hitler in Germany in 1941, so did Stalin in Eastern Ukraine in 1944, so did the Confederacy in the American South in 1861, and so on – this particular argument does not speak at all to the evaluation of a movement. OUN-UPA had substantial popular support among ethnic Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, but it was not popular among non-Ukrainians in Western Ukraine nor in the rest of Ukraine. The differential of its popularity is a direct result of the ideology it espoused and practiced.

As to integral nationalism versus fascism. I normally do not myself write about OUN-UPA as fascists or integral nationalists because in my historical writings I tend to make linguistically conservative choices. In almost all my writings I use the same term for OUN-UPA as they used for themselves, that is, "nationalists." But David Marples in his article classified them as fascists. When in response Zenon argued that it would be better to call them "integral nationalists," then this was an attempt to downplay their fascism. That was my objection. Armstrong's classification of OUN-UPA as integral nationalist is not a problem for me, especially since he also classified the Nazis as integral nationalists. My objection, I repeat, is to resorting to semantic

tricks in an effort to downplay the negative heritage of OUN-UPA.

Zenon feels I do not take into account the evolution of OUN into a more pluralist organization. I explained in my original letter to him that this change was simply on paper in 1943-44. Much of that "evolution" was aimed at gaining Allied, especially American, support. Even the most liberal wing of OUN, that grouped around Mykola Lebed in emigration, regularly falsified documents to whitewash the OUN and UPA past, and every once in a while Zenon's and my mutual friend, the late Ivan L. Rudnytsky, had to take them to task for totalitarian slippage. I think Suchasnist' and many Prolog publications made excellent contributions to Ukrainian intellectual and political life. If Zenon wanted to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Suchasnist' next year, I would not object in the least. But when he takes the part of the UCC's endorsement of OUN-UPA as a wider heritage and when he tries to downplay OUN-UPA's responsibility for war crimes, then I have to object.

I am puzzled furthermore by Zenon's insistence near the end of his response that the proper forum for this discussion is in academic venues, particularly publications and conferences. I must be missing something. I thought that outgoing President Yushchenko in Ukraine and the UCC in Canada were bringing the legacy of OUN-UPA into the public arena. I also thought that the current discussion began in a newspaper opinion piece by David Marples and in a letter to the editor by Zenon Kohut. So why should it not be continued as a public discussion?

As to scholarly conferences, not only I have been raising these issues at conferences in North America and Europe, but so have Omer Bartov, Marco Carynnyk, Sofia Grachova, Per Anders Rudling, Kai Struve, and others. I myself have a number of scholarly publications referring to the issue of the OUN-UPA heritage in relation to the Holocaust, including most recently Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust: Divergent Memories published by Heritage Press in Saskatoon at the end of last year. Many other scholars have pointed out the role of OUN-UPA in atrocities against Poles and Jews, including Karel C. Berkhoff, Franziska Bruder, Jeffrey Burds, Aleksandr Diukov, Gabriel Finder, Frank Golczewski, Ihor Iliushyn, Dieter Pohl, Alexander Prusin, Ewa Siemaszko, and Władysław Siemaszko. It is not as if this issue is terra incognita.

Finally, I have to respond to Zenon's parting shot, that I have engaged in "partisan moralizing." In my original response to Zenon's letter, I included no moral arguments whatsoever. Instead, I emphasized a pragmatic or strategic matter: It is not good for the Ukrainian community or for the Ukrainian studies community to encumber itself with the legacy of the Ukrainian nationalists of the 1940s because this legacy has such negative aspects permeating it.

But as they say, if you've got the name, you may as well have the game. There are compelling moral arguments for critically distancing oneself from the legacy of OUN-UPA. It is wrong to take part in the cover up or minimization of crimes of this nature. The murders themselves were horrible. I have nightmares from my research. These crimes can never be undone. The most that can be offered in compensation is to recognize them and regret them. Instead, we frequently encounter as justifications the very same way of thinking that set off the murders in the first place. Thus in his letter to the Edmonton Journal of 9 February 2010, also in response to David Marples's article, the editor of The Ukrainian News, Marco Levytsky, wrote that "prior to the German invasion, the Soviet NKVD, in which Jews had disproportionate membership, was involved in the killing of 4,000 to 8,000 civilian prisoners." Peter

Potichnyj told a correspondent of the Washington Post that Jews who managed to survive until 1943 in Ukraine had a choice of working for UPA or for the Soviet partisans. Viacheslav Viatrovych told an interviewer that UPA should not be condemned for killing civilians because it is hard to tell civilians apart from partisans. Such argumentation only continues the crimes. Then, too, there is the issue of making heroes out of people who have such crimes on their hands – certainly one should draw the line here. And what about the hypocrisy of demanding that the world recognize the famine of 1932-33 as a genocide at the same time as one refuses to give adequate recognition to what OUN and UPA did to Poles and Jews?

---

## #9

Genocide or "A Vast Tragedy"?

University students in an Alberta classroom try to decide.

by Myrna Kostash

Literary Review of Canada, December 2009

Myrna Kostash writes full time from her home in Edmonton. Her most recent book is *The Frog Lake Reader* (NeWest Press, 2009). She is grateful for the support of the Edmonton Arts Council in the writing of this essay.

From January to April 2009, I audited an undergraduate history class at the University of Alberta, taught by John-Paul Himka under the rubric "Topics in Ukrainian History." The topic we studied—the Great Famine of 1932–33 in Soviet Ukraine "in History and Memory"—had been virtually ignored by western historians until 1986 and the publication of works commemorating the event's 50th anniversary, although famine had killed seven times as many people as the much more familiar Great Terror of 1934–39. Famine in 1932 followed by Holodomor (death by starvation) in 1933 had been produced in the context of the staggering achievement of the Soviet economy, urban industrialization and the mass collectivization of the countryside.[1]

In spite of the determined resistance of peasants, by 1930 about 70 percent of farming households in Ukraine belonged to 28,000 collective farms. Then the horror began. Confiscation of food, brutalization of resisters including the so-called "women's revolts," deportation and execution of intellectuals and communist party skeptics, increasingly punitive quotas, party denials in the face of mass starvation, trauma and despair. Of the 30-some million Ukrainians alive in 1930, claims of 3.5 million to 7 million are estimated to have died by 1933.

That a catastrophe befell Soviet Ukraine—a territory stretching from Kharkiv, its capital, in the east, to the border with Polish Galicia in the west—has long been acknowledged internationally. The question that has never been resolved, however, is whether this was a case of deliberate genocide driven by Stalinist economic and social policies or simply a vast tragedy based on chaotic mismanagement, blinkered ideology and ruthless disregard for human life. [2]

I have a vivid memory from my adolescence of a book, which I found in my parents' library, called *Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book*, published in Toronto in 1953 by the Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror. It horrified me—narratives of appalling misery and brutality, including cannibalism,

shadowy black and white photographs of heaps of stiffened corpses by the railway tracks—but I did not believe any of it. It was too extreme. Now here it was again, on the required reading list of History 415, together with its 1987 riposte from Canadian Communist Party circles, Douglas Tottle's *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard*.

Harvard. The reference is to the 1986 publication of Robert Conquest's *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*. But even as Tottle was writing his book, in the atmosphere of glasnost and perestroika in Gorbachev's Soviet Union and the opening of previously restricted or sealed archives, reams of new scholarship, western and post-Soviet, began to be published and have not let up. For example, the most recent literature we read in History 415, from 2008, included opinions about the legal classification of genocide, the relative politics of Nazi and Soviet genocides and Himka's own article, "How Many Perished in the Famine and Why Does It Matter?"

The history is contentious and Himka cautioned us to "suspend our disbelief" about any one argument while giving the writer the chance to be heard. This was not easy to do, to judge from the sighs and groans of the students, who confessed to being "torn" by stories of suffering and "bored" by tables and graphs of deficits of food grains production. Himka: "We are not going to end this course with everyone in possession of the truth. This is the most post-modern topic you could study: it demands interpretation."

By the summer of 1932, workers in Soviet cities, already starving on rations of 200 grams of bread a day, rioted, abandoned work sites, sickened and died. In the villages of Ukraine, signs of famine were unmistakable: death rates were rising inexorably even as more and more furious decrees from Moscow demanded greater and greater deliveries—later, confiscations—of grain. By June 1933 in many regions no grain or flour was available at all: people dug up corpses of horses and ate, sickened and died. Decrees forbade movement off the collective farms: only "enemies of Soviet power" would try to leave. They died at the train stations. Children in crèches were fed grass, and died. Typhus raged around Kyiv. By 1934, some 3.5 million Soviet Ukrainians were dead.

What had happened? Despite the intense political and social drive for rapid industrialization, the state's procurement of grain for the towns repeatedly failed. Forced requisition from farmers and later from the collective farms was unrelenting but its management was chaotic and production declined. "Class enemies," especially in Ukraine, were everywhere, saboteurs and wreckers: they were deported to slave labour or shot, but still the starving died.

Several historiographical problems immediately present themselves in studying the documents of such a catastrophic event. Without access to archives, Himka pointed out, eyewitness testimonials of survivors are of critical importance for social history in reporting on the experience of the sufferers ("people do not experience themselves as a meta-narrative") while archives mainly collect the records of the perpetrators. We read the testimonials with increasing empathy and agitation but, although people may have a very clear recall of what happened to them, what they saw and what they heard, they are not good at understanding why this was happening. Or, as a student put it, "post-traumatic syndrome problematizes oral history."

Because there is virtually no photographic record of the 1932–33 famine, books keep reproducing the same handful of images from the famine of 1918–22. The opened archives still contain only two unsuppressed censuses from the period, which explains the bedevilled science of population statistics for the ex-Soviet Union. Many sources have yet to be tapped: Polish and Romanian journalism, and private correspondence of those who got away to the West. Much of what passes for scholarship of the famine is in fact competitive, not comparative, research that seeks to establish Ukraine as a victim nation, the target of Stalin's desire to wipe out the Ukrainian people.

So we read the texts with alertness as we asked the questions: for whom, why and how is something written? Tottle, echoing the Soviet line in 1987, acknowledged there was a famine but attributed it to drought, amateurish planning, sabotage and class struggle around the collectivization of agriculture. The testimonials in *Black Deeds* attribute mass death in Ukraine to Russian imperialism, Bolshevik Ukrainian turncoats and the ruthless party shock brigades with their diabolical iron rods prodding all the nooks and crannies of the houses already ransacked for their pathetic stores of grain.

The draconian 1932 Law of Protection of Socialist Property sentenced to death anyone caught stealing or hoarding collective grain. A student, "shocked" by the sheer repetitiousness of stories of suffering, summarized them as "We had some food, then they took it away, then they took more away, and then we starved."

Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow* occupied us for three weeks. Now fully vindicated by the survivors' accounts he depended on, he made the case for linking collectivization and "terror-famine," for Bolshevik ignorance of how agriculture works and, of course, for class hatred of the individual property owner.

Leninist doctrine, not economic theory, drove the party: 67 percent of those shot by court order were peasants, mainly the despised kulak or "rich" peasant who owned two or three cows and ten hectares of sowing area and was clearly enterprising and skilled. All of us students protested the irrationality of such policies—how can a state acquire grain if it shoots its most productive farmers?—but Himka assured us there was method in the madness: the party was "terrified" of the reappearance of a capitalist market in the countryside.

The sheer number of factors operating at once burdened us: the violence of seizing grain from peasants who consumed 80 percent of what they produced (the definition of subsistence and the reason Canada has farmers, not peasants), incompetent price policies, lack of tractors and, later, spare parts, faked trials of "wreckers," class warfare against "bourgeois" specialists, purge of activists, liquidation of the kulaks, peasant resistance (looting, burial of grain, assaults on party activists), introduction of internal passports and the re-enservment of the peasantry, armed guards in watchtowers over the fields, mass death ... not to mention Stalin's own personality, his paranoia about Polish plots on the Soviet Union and about the collusion of Ukrainian nationalists, including communists, with these plots. In spite of coercion, terror and deliberate impoverishment, it was the staggering, utter failure of policy that sobered us.

Conquest's book was biased, too "pro-Ukrainian," in one student's view. Another retorted: "Why does coming up strong on one side mean bias? A monstrous story demands it." "Is it 'one-sided' to be appalled by the Holocaust?" another chimed in,



finally mentioning the elephant in the room, that other 20th-century mass death. "But if I'm too skeptical of Conquest's narrative as one sided," said a fourth, "I'm worried about seeming to be a Holocaust denier." In for one genocide, in for them all?

With *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931–33*, by R.W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, we were finally clearly in the territory of post-Soviet-era scholarship, a book from the archives about Soviet agriculture, part of a huge project documenting Soviet economic history, category by category. The chapters proceed, dispassionately and thoroughly, from one crisis to the next, each one subdivided month by month: The Collection Plan, The Spring Sowing 1932, Excess Deaths by Region. It is history by incremental information, and I lament the loss of panoramic narrative to the minutiae of primary sources, as revealing and nuanced as these are. The minutiae allow us to see the twists and turns, the zig-zag of decision making, the shades of argument and the distribution of responsibility. "But where is the famine?" I asked. One student agreed—"This throwing around of stats about people dying felt cold and inhuman"—while another argued that "some stats are really significant and troubling, for example the plummeting birthrates that were shocking enough without the emotionalism." This is a book with hundreds of tables: number of households collectivized 1928–33, food consumption per collective farmer per day in the Odessa region, registered rural annualized monthly crude death rate, by region. We were a long way from grainy photographs of cannibals.

One student, who found Davies and Wheatcroft "not as bad as expected," now thought that reading Conquest seemed "like watching the History Channel, with his loaded language and moral judgements." Another saw the conclusions chapter by chapter "but not the Big Picture," to which Himka replied that "maybe this isn't about a Big Picture. Does 'history' really demonstrate anything? Sometimes history undemonstrates."

So, does history demonstrate a genocide in Ukraine from 1932 to 1933?

The question has become broadly politicized, from organizational websites claiming that the Holodomor was "an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people," to the passage in Canadian legislatures of bills condemning the famine as a genocide, to the Ukrainian government's criminalizing of "famine denial," to the Russian government's claim that the Famine (or, rather, famine) was the result of "Stalin's criminal policy" against the peasantry and not against any particular ethnic group.

What do the historians say? In an argument back and forth between Michael Ellman, on one side, and Davies and Wheatcroft, on the other, in *Europe-Asia Studies* in 2006, the case is made that, since Bolsheviks did not perceive famine as a humanitarian catastrophe but as a historical process of class struggle, as Ellman argued, why wouldn't Stalin, who used arrests, deportations and executions against the peasants, be prepared to starve them too? However, it is countered, "there are no serious grounds" that Stalin pursued any conscious or deliberate policy of starvation. In fact, wrote Davies and Wheatcroft, until 1932 Stalin was still convinced that his policies would raise the collectives' standard of living. They cite Conquest, who argued in 2003 that the famine was a crime of omission rather than commission, that Stalin put "Soviet interest rather than feeding the starving first."

Of course it all depends on what we mean by genocide. It can be approached archivally (the "no evidence" argument), or legalistically, in the context of national

and international criminal law that rests on "the intent to destroy" (except that the United Nations Convention on Genocide excludes "social" groups from its definition of target groups), or it can be approached politically, in terms of the famine's political context: the systematic Russification, the repression of Ukraine's cultural and intellectual resources, the closing of Ukraine's borders and refusal of international aid, all of them factors leading to underdevelopment of the group/nation over the decades. Himka: "Here you do find one of the cases for 'genocide.'" Genocide by subjugation if not eradication.

Another perspective is that of economist Amartya Sen, cited by the University of Ottawa's Dominique Arel in an unpublished 2007 paper that modern era famines are not caused by lack of food but by a breakdown in distribution (not enough access to food). And distribution is a political issue. The murderously high quotas for grain set by the Soviet state and the ensuing starvation of peasants demonstrated not so much the "intent to destroy" them as "reckless indifference" to their fate. Reckless indifference too is a choice.

On the last day of class, Himka called for a vote: "How many believe the famine was not genocide?" The question arose also from a parallel discussion: how do you measure genocide in the shadow of the Holocaust? Comparatively, only the Holocaust qualifies as the intent to exterminate an ethnic group; competitively, figures of 7 to 10 million dead in the Holodomor have been cited—"blithe claims," in Himka's words, "disrespectful to the dead, that people use ... in a ploy to gain the moral capital of victimhood or to score points in interethnic rivalry in North America ... The discussion of tragedies like these demands a certain moral probity."

All the same, however, as the class progressed through the reading list, the disparity in the weight of the Holocaust and Holodomor on western public consciousness, not to mention conscience, became troubling. As one student put it, "I've been bugged the whole time why the famine hasn't penetrated western awareness." The ghastly familiarity of images and stories of the Holocaust meant, to another, that the famine felt like a "pre-Holocaust. I feel that I've read this all before." But, she added, "the difference is that in Ukraine people died in their homes." There are no sites of mass death, at least not until mass graves have been opened, which they have not.

Compared to the reports of the Armenian and Jewish genocides, there was a decades-long delay in accounts of famine in the USSR reaching the west, and when they were received, they were often disbelieved. To this day, "strident" anti-communism is viewed with some suspicion compared to anti-fascism, which can never be "strident" enough.

"As an historian," Himka summarized, "he finds it very important to ask when and how? The West waged a huge war against Nazism, won it and purged it from Germany. The swastika is suppressed to this day. If there had been a hot war right after World War Two against the USSR, I'm sure the crimes of Stalin would have been treated the same way, with revulsion. And communism would not have appealed as a liberating ideology anymore. Communism can still advance an agenda of social justice but as soon as it says, 'only when such-and-such a group is eliminated,' it loses all liberatory possibility."

Compared to the global numbers of Holocaust memorials, museums, education centres and lists of names, not to mention the many thousands of published titles devoted to the murder of Europe's Jews, there has been little serious study of the

memory of the famine even among its survivors. Documentation of highly contested issues of policy has been accessible only for the last five years and is vulnerable to politicization where the genocide "campaign" detracts from serious scholarship and in any case is impossible to determine: "Only Ukrainians," said Himka, "believe that somewhere in a vault in Moscow is a file with the number of dead. Listen, even the Soviets didn't know." Ukraine's historical memory could not be aired for more than 50 years. And now that it is being articulated, its victims tend rather to think that what happened to them was a tragedy, not a crime.

So a vote was held among the nine of us: who believes the famine was not a genocide? Five, including me. Who believes it was? No one. Who abstains: Four, including Himka.

#### Notes

1. A Pravda editorial of January 1933 was titled, "Ukraine: The Deciding Factor in Grain Collection." Although Ukraine accounted for 27 percent of the total grain harvest of the Soviet Union, it was made to deliver 38 percent of its quotas (see Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History*, published by the University of Toronto Press in 1988).

2. The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as "any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

---

## #10

Gullible Leftists Play Into the Hands of Putin's Neo-Soviet Apologists  
A reply to Myrna Kostash and her "tragic" take on the Holodomor  
by Jars Balan

Ukrainian News/Ukraińs'ki visti (Edmonton), 28 December 2009-19 January 2010

Kule Ukrainian Canadian Studies Centre  
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta

In the December 2009 issue of the *Literary Review of Canada*, well-known Canadian author Myrna Kostash provides an account of an undergraduate course that she audited at the University of Alberta which examined the Great Famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine. In her article titled "Genocide or 'A Vast Tragedy'?" Kostash relates how at the end of the course, the instructor, Professor John-Paul Himka, invited his students to participate in a poll as to whether they thought the famine was an act of genocide. The piece concludes with Kostash's report on how the participants decided the question, a result she no doubt realized would be highly contentious with most of her fellow Ukrainian-Canadian community members. "So a vote was held among the nine of us: who believes the famine was not a genocide? Five, including me. Who believes it was? No one. Who abstains? Four, including Himka?"

How Kostash arrived at her decision is explained in her description of the ground that was covered in the course, highlighting some of the issues that the students grappled with and mentioning a number of sources that Professor Himka used to frame the discussion. But does the argument that the famine was not genocidal bear up against the findings of the latest scholarly research on the subject? And in relating details of the discussions that took place in the class, does Kostash not raise questions about how the sources were selected and presented?

Recently, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies sponsored several lectures by a distinguished Italian academic, Professor Andrea Graziosi of the University of Naples. He is widely recognized as a leading authority both on the Ukrainian famine and on the history of the Stalinist era. Professor Graziosi has worked extensively on documents from long-sealed Russian archives of the period, is not a nationalist of any kind and does not have a Ukrainian background that it could be argued might cloud his judgement. He has also thoroughly researched Joseph Stalin's understanding of the nationalities question and determined on the basis of compelling evidence that the Soviet dictator was neither a Ukrainophobe nor a narrow Russian chauvinist. (However, the same does not necessarily apply to some of Stalin's key lieutenants and many of the apparatchiks who implemented the Kremlin's murderous policies in Ukraine.) Be that as it may, Professor Graziosi has concluded that on the basis of the already substantial and constantly expanding body of evidence available to scholars, the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 was a genocide. Furthermore, according to Professor Graziosi, there is a growing consensus among serious scholars in the field about the genocidal character of the famine, even if some historians, like himself, are uncomfortable about applying what is essentially a legally defined term in the analysis of historical events.

In relating how she formed her contrary opinion, Kostash makes a number of statements that suggest she has muddled notions about how awareness and understanding of the Holodomor has changed over time. Take, for instance, the following remarks: "the Great Famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine ... [was] virtually ignored by western historians until 1986..."; "That a catastrophe befell Soviet Ukraine ... has long been acknowledged internationally"; and "Compared to the reports of the Armenian and Jewish genocides, there was a decades-long delay in accounts of famine in the USSR reaching the west, and when they were received, they were often disbelieved." Given that scholarly and public attitudes toward the Holodomor are still evolving in both Ukraine and internationally, it is a shame that Kostash didn't devote her article to a discussion of how positions and perceptions have developed from flat denials and deliberate obfuscations to belated if often grudging admissions that mass starvations occurred in Ukraine as a direct result of Stalinist policy. Indeed, her own take on the Holodomor is derived from that formulated during glasnost in the Gorbachev era, an interpretation that has since been adopted by most contemporary mainstream Russian scholars along with a shrinking number of Ukrainians who are still heavily influenced by the political culture of the late Soviet Union. It would have been appropriate for her to have frankly acknowledged this and useful to let LRC readers know that for a host of political and legal reasons—Russia is the successor state to the USSR, and therefore could be sued by survivors or their descendants—it is unlikely that today's Kremlin or most Russians will admit to the Holodomor being a genocide, now or in the foreseeable future.

Kostash goes on to make the dubious assertion that the Ukrainian famine has become "politicized," a problem she attributes to "Ukrainian nationalists" (a term of

opprobrium) and their sympathizers, while characterizing as "serious scholars" those who do not accept that the Holodomor was a genocide. Her contention is patently ridiculous besides being consistent with the position taken by the Russian government in its international campaign to thwart Ukraine's efforts to have the Holodomor recognized as a genocide. This is, of course, the same government that routinely "tolerates" the murders of journalists and human rights activists while threatening with arrest any scholars inside or outside of Russia who dispute the Kremlin's official Soviet version of World War II history.

It should be unnecessary to point out that politics were responsible for the man-made famine in Ukraine, for the attendant massive purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and for the wide-ranging pogroms that concomitantly decimated the ranks of the cultural figures and intellectuals who championed the Ukrainian national renaissance of the 1920s. It was a political decision of the Kremlin to order the complete liquidation of an independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine, but to only cripple and bring to heel the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Politics were also behind decades of Soviet denials and disinformation about the famine, just as it was naive and cynical politics that influenced Communist sympathizers in the West to join in a chorus to cover up the truth about the Holodomor. And it was political calculations that likewise led to the concessions made about the Holodomor shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, not to mention the stubborn refusal to allow that Ukrainians were singled out for special punishment and aggressive Russification for resisting the dictates of Moscow.

Finally, politics still play a major role in the Kremlin's current insistence that the Russian people were equal victims of the famine and Stalinist tyranny (they weren't), at the same that official Moscow rehabilitates Stalin as an "effective manager" and a "great wartime leader." In short, the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 has always been a politically charged event and it remains a potent and politically loaded issue, especially for Russians and as they try to come to terms with Russia's often bloody imperial legacy.

One of the books used on the course was a classic piece of Soviet propaganda by the late trade union activist, Douglas Tottle, titled *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard*, published by the Communist Party's Progress Books in 1987. In it, Tottle exposes some of the questionable evidence brought forward over the years when details about the famine were being suppressed, distorted with lies, and deflected with red herrings. The book itself, like all skilful works of propaganda, is a mixture of fact, conjecture and misinformation. Its' obvious goal was to risibly portray the claim that the famine was a genocide as a fabrication by "Ukrainian nationalists" who wanted to divert attention from their own alleged complicity in Nazi war crimes during the Second World War. Nowhere does Kostash ask how a Quebec-born Winnipeg trade unionist ended up producing a tract that among other things sought to challenge and dismiss someone like Robert Conquest, the highly-respected author of more than twenty books including *The Great Terror*, *Russia after Khrushchev*, *Inside Stalin's Secret Police*, *Stalin and the Kirov Murder* and other major works devoted to Soviet history and literature. One wonders how Tottle, in the only book he ever wrote, was able to identify and cite carefully selected and obscure Ukrainian-language sources without extensive help from KGB "experts" whose job it was to discredit the "Ukrainian nationalists" in the West that were such unrelenting critics of the Soviet Union. The lurid cover of the book alone, featuring a tube of ink with a swastika on it, should have been enough warning that its ultimate intent was to refine and update the denial of the Holodomor

while smearing the Ukrainians in the West who were responsible for drawing world attention to it. That even the pro-Soviet Association of United Ukrainian Canadians refused to go along with a request from the Communist Party to publish the book under an AUUC imprint (as the late Peter Krawchuk revealed in his memoirs), should have been an indication of its tainted contents and reason enough to give it short shrift on the course.

It is unfortunate but perhaps not fortuitous that Kostash's article appeared hard on the heels of the annual Ukrainian commemorations of the Holodomor. It is similarly regrettable that she published her musings in a prestigious Canadian periodical read by intellectuals and opinion-makers—many of whom will now probably regard the Ukrainian famine as having been caused by a "tragic" combination of Soviet bungling and brutality, rather than as the attack on the Ukrainian nation that it was. Then again, maybe her intent was both personal and political. Was she trying to distance herself from Ukraine's efforts to construct an independent narrative of Ukrainian history that rejects, on solid grounds, decades of disavowals concerning the famine—that it was caused by drought, "sabotage" by rich peasants, or regrettable "mistakes" made in implementing forced collectivization—including the latest fall-back argument that the Holodomor was not consciously used by Stalin to gut the Ukrainian nation and leave it an empty shell? Or was she merely seeking to demonstrate her ostensible journalistic objectivity by dismissing as over-wrought and suspect "Ukrainian nationalist" propaganda all of the evidence that the famine had a genocidal bent. At the very least, as a responsible journalist, Kostash should have taken the time to ask some of the many Ukrainian scholars in her circle of friends why they regard the famine to have been deliberately employed by Moscow to kill two birds with one stone: namely, to break the especially fierce resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry to collectivization and at the same time to cut the legs out from under the national movement in Soviet Ukraine.

In the early 1930s the Soviet Union was on the verge of bankruptcy and experiencing a deepening domestic crisis as Stalin resorted to evermore repressive methods to maintain his hold on power while forging ahead in industrializing and radically transforming Soviet society with a reckless disregard for the human cost. He obviously viewed developments in Ukraine, the second largest republic after Russia, as a serious threat to the continuation of the revolutionary Bolshevik experiment in the former Russian Empire in its Soviet reincarnation. Stalin didn't need to be a Russian nationalist to decide that it was necessary to strike a calculated blow against what he perceived, justifiably or not, to be the dangerous rise of separatist and anti-Soviet sentiment among Ukrainians. The unique punitive measures applied in Ukraine and in territories heavily inhabited by Ukrainians, such as the Kuban region, all point to the chilling conclusion that he knew exactly what he was doing when he used famine as another weapon in the arsenal that he unleashed in a multi-pronged and genocidal campaign. To argue otherwise is to ignore overwhelming facts about the known history of the USSR, and to play into the hands of the neo-Soviet apologists who are flourishing in Putin's Russia and have obviously found allies among gullible leftists in the West.

## #11

Re: "Genocide or 'A Vast Tragedy'?" by Myrna Kostash  
Letters published in The Literary Review of Canada, January 2010

[1]

Zenon E. Kohut Director, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta

Myrna Kostash poses the question of whether to interpret the Great Famine of 1932–33 as "Genocide or 'A Vast Tragedy'?" In examining this important question, it is fruitful to consider the views of the person who developed the concept and coined the term "genocide." As such, Raphael Lemkin is considered the intellectual father of the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide. In the 1950s he had written but not published a "History of Genocide." In this work he devotes a chapter to "Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine." He argues that the decimation of the Ukrainian national elites, the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the starvation of the Ukrainian farming population and its replacement with non-Ukrainians from Russia are integral components of the same genocidal process.

A similar line of argument has been adopted by Andrea Graziosi of the University of Naples, widely recognized as a leading international expert on the Stalin era. In a lecture last November at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Graziosi placed the Ukrainian famine within the larger context of general Soviet policies and famines. However, he also identified some particular measures taken against the peasantry in Ukraine and the Kuban region (inhabited largely by Ukrainians) that led to an exceptionally large number of deaths there. These included the confiscation of private food stocks and a decree forbidding and preventing peasants from Ukraine and the Kuban from leaving for other areas of the USSR in search of food.

Graziosi also pointed to the following measures taken against Ukrainians in this period or immediately afterward: the persecution and physical destruction of the republic's nationally conscious intelligentsia and middle-level national cadres, the reversal of a policy that favoured Ukrainian language and culture in Ukraine and the total abolition of that policy in Russia, and the mass purge of the Bolshevik Party in Soviet Ukraine. All these factors, as well as other special measures taken against Ukraine's peasantry and its political and cultural elites, have prompted Graziosi to conclude that the 1932–33 Ukrainian-Kuban famine fits the definition of genocide specified in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, especially article 2, section C, which states that among genocidal acts are those "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."

[2]

Paul Grod  
President, Ukrainian Canadian Congress Winnipeg, Manitoba

What is troubling about Myrna Kostash's essay on the Holodomor is that it gives credence to the scribblings of a pro-Soviet apologist such as Doug Tottle, akin to offering up Ernst Zundel's screeds as fair commentary on the Holocaust. Simultaneously her piece and the course she describes both fail to take into account the perspective of Dr. Raphael Lemkin, the father of the United Nations genocide convention. In 1953 Lemkin wrote: "the Ukrainian is not and never has been a

Russian. His culture, his temperament, his language, his religion, are all different ... to eliminate [Ukrainian] nationalism ... the Ukrainian peasantry was sacrificed ... a famine was necessary for the Soviet and so they got one to order ... if the Soviet program succeeds completely, if the intelligentsia, the priest, and the peasant can be eliminated [then] Ukraine will be as dead as if every Ukrainian were killed, for it will have lost that part of it which has kept and developed its culture, its beliefs, its common ideas, which have guided it and given it a soul, which, in short, made it a nation ... This is not simply a case of mass murder. It is a case of genocide, of the destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation."

While it is important for undergraduate students to consider controversial issues without fear of reprisal, having them "vote" on whether the Holodomor was genocidal is sophomoric and morally repugnant. As for the contemporary Holodomor deniers and their enablers cited by Kostash and approvingly introduced by John-Paul Himka, their philistine musings pale in significance when compared to the far more insightful perspective of the man who actually gave the world the term "genocide."

We'll stick with Lemkin's finding that the Great Famine—the Holodomor—was an act of genocide.

[3]

J.M. Szul Toronto, Ontario

I found Ms. Kostash's essay interesting and thought provoking. It certainly challenges common diaspora thinking of the Famine in Ukraine.

Discussion of the Famine in Ukraine raises interesting issues. Some who present the case to view the Famine as a genocide use language that blames Communists, Russians, and other groups for the tragedy. At times, the language of blame drowns out the sympathy for those that died tragically. There are calls for justice to be meted out to still-living perpetrators or supporters of the ancien régime. For them, framing the events of the famine as genocide is important.

Discussion of the famine even entered the politics of the Toronto school board's planning of the curriculum on genocide. Those of Ukrainian descent were asked to lobby the Toronto District School Board to include the Ukrainian Famine as one of the examples of genocide in its genocide curriculum. The latter focussed on the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. Some Ukrainians felt that the 1932-33 famine should have been included. Ukrainians felt left out. It is self-evident that it is not possible to study all "genocides" in detail. If the model of study includes analysis of examples in detail, then some will be studied more than others.

This of course presumes that those that consider which "genocides" to study accept the famine as genocide.

At the end of the day, a tragedy took place. Many people died. It is important to honour the memory of all those that died so tragically. If it is possible to prevent such tragedies, it is important to try. As to the question of whether the events reflected a "genocide or vast tragedy," more knowledgeable people than I are debating this question. Ms. Kostash was brave in posing the question.



## #12

Thinking about the Holodomor  
by John-Paul Himka  
Ukrainian News/Ukrains'ki visti (Edmonton), 20 January 2010

Department of History and Classics, and Research Program on Religion and Culture,  
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta

Last winter I taught an undergraduate seminar on the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 at the University of Alberta. Auditing that class was Myrna Kostash, the well known writer, who over ten years previously had done a CBC Ideas program about one of my seminars on the Jewish Holocaust. She thought she could create something out of this rich topic as well. This past December she published a beautifully written and thoughtful piece on my class in the Literary Review of Canada.

The article – and my class as well – came under criticism from a number of my colleagues in Ukrainian studies as well as from some members of the community. I am very grateful to the editor of Ukrainian News, Marco Levytsky, for allowing me to say some things in reply.

One of the critical responses, by Jars Balan, appeared in the 28 December – 19 January issue of Ukrainian News under the title "Gullible Leftists Play into the Hands of Putin's Neo-Soviet Apologists." I don't know whether Mr. Balan picked this title himself, or whether the editor chose it, but I do know that it perfectly captures the spirit of the piece, with its name-calling and guilt by association.

A few words about the actual course I taught. I announced in the departmental course guide that I would be offering an undergraduate seminar on the famine and the debates surrounding it. Given the immense efforts of the Ukrainian community in 2008 to raise awareness of the famine, I expected the class to fill up immediately. Instead, when January rolled around, I was surprised to see that only six undergraduates had enrolled. I was very grateful for the presence of Ms. Kostash as an auditor and of one of my PhD students who did extra work and took the course for graduate credit.

By contrast, in this year's departmental course guide I announced for January an advanced undergraduate class on the Holocaust. It had already filled to capacity (55) by last October. To me this contrast in interest constitutes a danger signal. Either the Ukrainian community has lost the student-age generation or it has communicated to them that the famine is something we light candles about and demonstrate about, but not something we think about.

Luckily, I've been around the University of Alberta a long time, and they let my class on the famine proceed in spite of the low enrollment. In that class I tried to present the students with a wide spectrum of viewpoints. One of my reasons for offering the class in the first place was to show students how complicated and controversial history can get.

Mr. Balan and some other commentators are very upset that I assigned Doug Tottle's pro-Soviet diatribe. I make no apologies for that. It was part of the debate in the 1980s. It was written to undermine the tremendous efforts of the diaspora at that time to promote knowledge of the famine (at this time not yet enshrined as a

genocide). I also assigned two of the major achievements of the 1980s campaign: Robert Conquest's book *Harvest of Sorrow* and Slavko Nowytski's film *Harvest of Despair*. In fact, I showed *Harvest of Despair* on the first day of class.

What did the students think of Tottle? Without prompting, because I like to let the students speak first, they expressed almost the exact same view as Mr. Balan did in his "Gullible Leftists" article. They distrusted the rhetoric and logic and found it incredibly one-sided. Several students had googled Doug Tottle and also discovered that he was a very murky personality, but certainly not someone who had personally demonstrated any qualifications or abilities to write such a detailed analysis of the famine.

One can do as Mr. Balan would like, that is, suppress certain books so that students are not exposed to them, or one can do what I like to do, that is, have students read critically and collectively, then guide them in discussion to see different perspectives. I have several times assigned students *Mein Kampf* to expose them to national socialist thinking. A lot of them resented me for assigning such a convoluted book, but none of them became Nazis.

I also assigned to the class what I considered to be the very best formulations of the case that the famine was a genocide, among them Andrea Graziosi's. Mr. Balan and a number of other critics have been citing Prof. Graziosi as the academic authority for their point of view and imply that I or the class or Ms. Kostash was unaware of his arguments.

I, on the other hand, have the strong impression that these critics only recently learned of Prof. Graziosi's views, namely when he lectured in Edmonton in November 2009. (Incidentally, although I was abroad last semester, I helped facilitate his lecture in the Department of History and Classics.) Graziosi's arguments have been available to scholars since at least 2005, when I first encountered them. Already in 2007 I published a piece in a leading Soviet studies journal which stated: "Andrea Graziosi has made a subtle and compelling case that the famine, properly understood, did constitute a genocide."

Yet the class also read studies based on the same evidence adduced by Graziosi which did not come to the conclusion that the famine was a genocide. The most important of these was R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft's *Years of Hunger*. I didn't want to burden the students with the entire text of Terry Martin's *Affirmative Action Empire* so I only assigned them an article where Martin summarizes his interpretation (which is the closest to my own).

I cannot summarize all the points of this complex debate here, but I will mention two that seem to count for more in forming opinions against the genocidal interpretation.

The first is that the famine was to a large extent caused by the catastrophic effect of collectivization on agricultural production. Mr. Balan, and others I have had exchanges with, like to parody this position, saying that this is to ascribe the murder of millions to mere bungling and bureaucratic errors, in other words, it trivializes the famine.

I look at it differently. A massive, reckless social experiment attempted within the span of a few years to transform tens of millions of subsistence farmers into workers

in a state-run agribusiness of immense proportions. In the course of this mad scheme, productivity plunged.

A few examples: the regime never succeeded in mechanizing the sowing process during collectivization; the tractors originally distributed deteriorated quickly because of lack of spare parts and of repair shops; the harvests declined every year, putting mounting pressure on the seed grain and grain to feed the collective farm animals and workers; many peasants had slaughtered their animals rather than give them to the collective farm, and now the remaining animals were losing weight and the draught animals losing strength; in an effort to increase the wheat crop, the authorities at times abandoned crop rotation and fallowing practices and instead planted more wheat in the same place the following year; the crop came up with many weeds, and this slowed down the threshing and demanded more labor, while the laborers were getting fewer and fewer calories into their bodies.

Although the Soviets exported grain, they exported much much less than they had planned, and they also had to reduce their target for grain requisitions from Ukraine several times. These facts are fully documented in the archives.

I am far from saying that this accounts entirely for the way that the famine affected Ukraine and Kuban, which were singled out for particularly ruthless treatment because of Stalin's campaign against what he perceived as Ukrainian nationalism. Yet for scholars familiar with the history of Soviet agricultural transformation in the 1930s, the idea that this famine was deliberately unleashed to suppress a particular nation flies in the face of what they can see was a spiralling descent into agricultural crisis.

The second point that seems to weigh in the balance for those unconvinced of the genocide interpretation is the extent to which the famine affected also non-Ukrainian areas. Mr. Balan is, of course, correct when he writes that the Russian people were not equal victims of the famine. But they too experienced excess mortality in 1932-33, especially the Don Cossacks. This is borne out by the same kind of eyewitness testimony that diaspora Ukrainians relied upon before the opening of the archives as well as by what those archives reveal.

I have a lot more I would like to say about the famine and how it is represented by the Ukrainian and Ukrainian studies communities, but I do not want to abuse the space that Mr. Levytsky has allotted me for a response.

Let me just close with an alternative way to call attention to the famine without tying it to what I think is a self-defeating and self-deluding campaign for recognition as genocide. Last February I held a lecture during International Week at the university and spoke to a crowd of hundreds on the topic "How Do States Cause Famines." The lecture was very well received.

In it, I talked first about collectivization and how it brought the Soviet agricultural economy to collapse. Then I explained that most of the consequences were borne by the Ukrainians, a politically restive nationality. I started with these issues because I knew them in depth. But then I tied them to issues in the modern world, pointing to radical agricultural experiments in Tanzania and Zimbabwe and how they brought their societies to the verge of starvation, and then how resulting famines and food shortages were displaced onto secessionist minorities in Ethiopia and political opponents in Zimbabwe.

A very similar approach is being pursued by the new Kule Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Alberta. The visionary philanthropists Peter and Doris Kule have donated \$4 million to found an institute to deal with big questions in the humanities, social sciences, and fine arts, but based on the Ukrainian historical experience. As university president Indira Samarasekera said: "Kule Institute scholars will undertake wide-ranging and diverse research on topics echoed by the Ukrainian experience, topics such as political oppression, multiculturalism, minorities, cultural identity, religious persecution, and the politics of famine and food distribution." I think this is the way forward.

---

## **#13**

Comment by Roman Serbyn  
16 February 2010

I did not intend to stray into this discussion until I read John-Paul's flippant moralizing at the end of his letter:

"And what about the hypocrisy of demanding that the world recognize the famine of 1932-33 as a genocide at the same time as one refuses to give adequate recognition to what OUN and UPA did to Poles and Jews?"

This is a non sequitur. The recognition of one crime is not contingent on the recognition of another. Each crime is judged on its own attributes. Furthermore, these crimes are not related. And then what exactly does "adequate recognition" mean? I have been active for some time in promoting the recognition of the Ukrainian genocide of the 1930s in academic and political circles. Must I preface every communication with an "adequate recognition" of "what OUN and UPA did to Poles and Jews"? And what would be "adequate" so as not to be accused of hypocrisy? This type of fizzly reasoning does not help the discussion.

John-Paul has turned his arbitrary linking of the Ukrainian genocide with the atrocities committed during WWII against Poles and Jews into a sort of an ideological postulate, which he raises every time he speaks about the famine. Accusing Zenon of being an ideological watchdog seems to be a mirror-image of John-Paul's own crusade.

John-Paul does not recognize the Ukrainian famine as genocide. That is his right. With the academic freedom that Canadian professors enjoy he can pass on his opinions to his students. If the result of the curiously phrased vote ("Who believes that the famine was NOT a genocide?") at the end of his seminar on the Ukrainian famine is any indication of how he steered the discussions, he was quite successful in putting doubts in the students' minds about the Ukrainian genocide (5 positive answers to his negative question, no negative answers, and four abstentions – including John-Paul's). From Myrna Kostash's description of the students' participation in the discussions, the result of the vote appear surprising, to say the least.

Jean-Paul accuses Zenon of taking upon himself to "correct" Myrna. My reading of Myrna's account suggests that the criticism concerns more the lecturer than the reporter. It is not Student Kostash but Professor Himka who put Douglas Tottle's

slick piece of propaganda, "Fraud, Famine and Fascism. The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard" (reminiscent of Arthur R. Butz's "The Hoax of the Twentieth Century") on the reading list and devoted a whole session to it.

It is also curious that John-Paul devoted two whole sessions to Davies' and Wheatcroft's excellent study, which gave a valuable and detailed account of the economic history of the famine, but did not provide the necessary tools for the analysis of the question of genocide, but at the same time so little time was assigned to the discussion of the question of genocide. At least there is no mention in the online course outline of any separate discussion of the UN Convention on Genocide, which after all provides the basic notions and gives the definition of genocide on which international law is based today.

Nor is there any reference to Raphael Lemkin, the intellectual father of the Genocide convention, who coined the term and conceived the notion (Axis Rule in Occupied Europe) and then applied both the terms of the convention and his own conceptualization to the Ukrainian case (Soviet Genocide in Ukraine) to come up with an innovative analysis of the Ukrainian genocide consisting of a four-pronged attack against the Ukrainian NATION (not just Ukrainian peasants!):

- 1) destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia,
- 2) destruction of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church,
- 3) destruction of the "large ass of independent peasants who are the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit of Ukraine"
- 4) the addition to Ukraine of foreign peoples to destroy the ethnic unity and mix nationalities.

As Lemkin realized 56 years ago, the Ukrainian genocide was NOT JUST the a partial destruction of Ukrainian peasants (Lemkin makes an interesting and apt comparison of the Jewish and Ukrainian genocides, which John-Paul could have developed in his seminar!), nor were Ukrainian farmers targeted just for their socio-economic function. Had John-Paul provided his students with sufficient tools for the discussion of the issue of genocide and not just the famine, and had he posed the final question less tendentiously, then perhaps the students would have gotten a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of what the Ukrainian tragedy had been, and the result of the vote would have been different.

---

## **#14**

Presse Kiev

Media Digest, French Embassy in Ukraine

[excertps translated by Dominique Arel for UKL]

-Kommersant, "President Yushchenko had modified the State Protocol by making it mandatory for foreign leaders in official visit in Ukraine to honor the memory of the victims of the Holodomor. Foreign state leaders from now on will have to lay a wreath on the Holodomor memorial." "This step was previously a right, and not an obligation for foreign leaders", notes the newspaper (5 February 2010).

## **#15**

Sentence to Stalin, His Comrades for Organizing Holodomor Takes Effect in Ukraine  
Interfax, 21 January 2010

Kyiv- The decision made by the Kyiv Court of Appeals, which found former leaders of the USSR and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic guilty of organizing the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine, became effective on January 21.

The decision has taken effect after not having been contested in the Supreme Court for seven days, the Ukrainian Security Service press service told Interfax on Thursday.

The Kyiv Court of Appeal, in a ruling on January 13, accused Joseph Stalin and other leaders of the former Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine of organizing a mass famine in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933 that the court qualified as genocide, the Ukrainian Security Service said in a press release.

The court charged Joseph Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Stanislav Kosior, Pavel Postyshev, Vlas Chubar and Mendel Khatayevich with genocide, but, due to their deaths, quashed proceedings against them launched by the Security Service in May 2009.

According to the findings of a forensic investigation by the Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Studies of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the famine, known as Holodomor, claimed 3.94 million lives in Ukraine.

Russian historians mainly disagree with the allegations of the genocide of the people of Ukraine in the 1930s, saying the Holodomor hurt millions of people not only in Ukraine, but also in Povolzhye and some other regions of the USSR.

---

## **#16**

Ukraine's Past on Trial  
by Timothy Snyder  
New York Review of Books, 5 February 2010  
<<http://www.nybooks.com/authors/11193>>

Stalin is guilty. On January 13, four days before the first round of Ukraine's presidential elections, a Kiev court condemned him and six other Soviet high officials for genocide committed against the Ukrainian nation during the famine in 1932-1933. All seven men, of course, are long dead—but the history at issue in the case is very much alive.

The famine certainly did happen, and it was deliberate. In the course of Stalin's first Five-Year Plan for the industrialization of the Soviet Union, farms were collectivized so that their yields could be appropriated by the state. The resistance of peasants was broken by tens of thousands of executions and millions of deportations. Collective agriculture proved inefficient, especially during the violent transition. When Soviet Ukraine began to suffer a famine in 1932, Stalin ordered the seizure of grain, the slaughter of livestock, the isolation of Ukrainian villages from the outside world, and the sealing of the Ukrainian Republic's borders.

The victims of the famine died slowly, in humiliation and in agony. Peasants made their way to cities, where they starved on the sidewalks. In the countryside, people ate grass and roots and worms. Women prostituted themselves for bread. Children in orphanages drank each others' blood and ate their own excrement. Mothers asked children to eat their bodies when they died. Roving groups of bandits kidnapped the weak and vulnerable and sold their flesh. In spring 1933, the villages went quiet. The cattle and horses and chickens were gone. The cats and the dogs, too, had been eaten. The birds stayed away. Burial crews took the dead (and the dying). Those crews kept no good records, and Stalin suppressed the next census. Historians estimate that more than three million people died in Soviet Ukraine.

Then came the Great Terror of 1937-1938, which struck Ukraine with particular force. The "kulaks," a Russian word for prosperous peasants, were the first target. Very often these were Ukrainians, people who had somehow survived collectivization, famine, or the Gulag. They were condemned by an "operational troika"—a party member, a state police officer, and a prosecutor. The troikas would review hundreds of files a day and almost always issue one of two verdicts: death or the Gulag. A minute-long examination of a file was the entire judicial process; the defendants were not present, they did not hear the case, they had no legal defense. If they were sentenced to death, they were taken to a forest, or a field, or a garage, and shot. If they were sentenced to the Gulag, they learned the verdict on the train to Siberia. Of the 681,692 recorded death sentences in the Great Terror, 123,421 were carried out in Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet death pits are still being discovered.

The outgoing Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, welcomes the Kiev court's verdict against Stalin. Having placed fifth in the first round of the elections on January 17, he knows his term of office will soon come to an end. Yushchenko has worked hard to institutionalize a Ukrainian national memory these last five years, and knows that neither Viktor Yanukovich nor Julia Tymoshenko, the two presidential candidates competing in the run-off election on February 7, will take anti-Stalinism to such lengths—not least because it annoys Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In Russia, in contrast to Ukraine, Stalin still enjoys a certain popularity; and some politicians have assailed the court ruling as a provocation. This would only be true insofar as Russians choose to identify themselves with Soviet leaders: most of the defendants (including Stalin himself) were neither Russians nor born within Russia's present boundaries. The difference in attitudes towards the Stalinist past is in some measure the result of Yushchenko's preoccupation with history. He seems to hope that this verdict will make the label of genocide impossible to undo, since it "shifts any discussion of the famine in Ukraine from the political to the legal realm."

Should history be a matter of law? This trial, approved by Yushchenko and arranged by the Security Service of Ukraine, summons the spirit of Stalinism that it was meant to dispel. Rather than a regular judicial proceeding, the trial was conducted by a modernized troika: a Security Service officer, a prosecutor, and a judge, meeting in closed chambers for a single day, then passing judgment on ghosts. The Ukrainian Security Service, which pressed the charges, is the institutional successor of the Soviet state police of the 1930s. Perhaps this explains why none of the seven defendants were officers of the OGPU, as the Soviet state police was known then? The OGPU were closely involved in the famine as well as in the Great Terror. Vsevolod Balyts'kyi, the head of the Ukrainian branch of the OGPU in those days, might have been considered alongside Molotov and the other five identified in the

trial as Stalin's fellow perpetrators. He threatened local officials with the Gulag, forcing them to collect grain from the starving; and he sealed the internal borders of the republic so that they could not beg in other parts of the Soviet Union.

In this trial, the Security Service of Ukraine served (by its own account) as censor, researcher, friend of the court, and spokesperson. Its directors decided which archival records were classified; then assembled 320 volumes of these to make its case, then proposed how the court might evaluate that material; and finally publicized the verdict as a press release. Thus carried out, the trial exhibited an unfortunate tendency of the post-Communist world: the placing of responsibility for historical research, criminal prosecution, and national memory within a single institution (or a group of closely allied institutions). Until now, access to archives in Ukraine has been easier than in Russia, which means that some young historians are writing dissertations about the Soviet Union in Kiev rather than Moscow. But this verdict is a worrying sign of a new orthodoxy.

There is a better way than legal séances to spread knowledge of the horrors of the twentieth century: keep archives open. There is also a better way to draw attention to Stalinism: treat it as European history. President Yushchenko has called for an international tribunal to judge Stalinist crimes in Ukraine. Simpler would be cooperation among the national memory institutes of post-Communist Europe: rotation of their staff historians from country to country, sharing of documents from archive to archive, and joint research on repressive policies. Without such ventilation, the memory ministries can lurch towards Orwellian nationalism. The European Union, which often fails to take account of historical differences between eastern and western Europe, might fund such cooperation, as a kind of Marshall Plan of the mind. Only international discussion can balance European history, and only a balanced history can serve European understanding.

---

## **#17**

Lecture by Italian Scholar Represents a Milestone in the Study of the Holodomor  
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 11 December 2009

The great Ukrainian-Kuban famine of 1932–33—the Holodomor—was one of the determinative events of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it was largely ignored by scholars until the last few years of the existence of the Soviet Union. One of the scholars who began studying the famine in the late 1980s was Andrea Graziosi, now an internationally recognized specialist on the Soviet state and its policies toward the peasantry and one of the world's leading authorities on the Holodomor. From November 14 to 21 he visited Toronto and Edmonton to lecture on "The Holodomor and the Soviet Famines, 1931–33."

The title of the lecture is indicative of Dr. Graziosi's comprehensive approach to the study of the Holodomor in Soviet Ukraine and the Kuban within the context of Soviet state policy toward the peasantry from 1917 to 1933 and, more particularly, the pan-Soviet famines of 1931–33, including the Kazakhstan famine-cum-epidemics of 1931–33. During the lecture, he analyzed the common causes of these famines and posited that the Ukrainian famine was the culminating act in a great war of the Soviet state and the Communist Party against the peasantry that began in 1917. Outlining the policies of the Soviet leaders and their consequences for the Soviet



peasantry as a whole, Dr. Graziosi also took account of specific conditions in the non-Russian regions of the USSR that led the Stalin regime to treat them differently.

Focusing on the Holodomor, he identified some of its special features and national characteristics. Particularly telling, in his view, were Moscow's exclusive policies taken against the peasantry in Ukraine and the Kuban region in the North Caucasus, which led to an exceptionally large number of deaths there. If the mortality rate in the countryside in 1926 can be assigned the number 100 per 1,000 rural inhabitants, in 1933 it was almost 400 per 1,000 in Soviet Ukraine, while in the Russian SFSR it was about 140 per 1,000. Excluding Kazakhstan, then part of Russia, and the North Caucasus, where there was a large Ukrainian population, the death rate in the Russian republic in 1933 was about 110 per 1,000 rural inhabitants. An important factor in the high death rate was the decree forbidding and preventing peasants from Ukraine and the Kuban to leave for other areas of the USSR in search of food.

Dr. Graziosi also pointed to other measures taken against Ukrainians in this period or immediately afterward. These included the mass purge of the Bolshevik Party in Soviet Ukraine, the persecution and physical destruction of the republic's nationally conscious intelligentsia and middle-level national cadres, and the reversal of Ukrainization policies in Ukraine and their total abolition in the Russian SFSR. All these factors, as well as other special measures taken against Ukraine's peasantry and its political and cultural elites, have prompted scholars and legal experts to raise the question of whether the Holodomor is a case of or an integral part of a genocide.

Dr. Graziosi has concluded that the Holodomor was a genocide and that the 1932–33 Ukrainian-Kuban famine fits the definition of genocide specified in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, especially Article 2, Section C, which states that among genocidal acts are those "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." He noted that his own views on this question have evolved, for during the initial years of his study of the Holodomor he was not convinced of its genocidal nature. Dr. Graziosi believes that in time more and more scholars will come to the same conclusion as he did. While the prospect of a scholarly consensus promotes optimism with regard to general recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, Dr. Graziosi also believes that the Russian government will never acknowledge it as such, since this might provoke demands for monetary reparations to survivors and their descendants.

Dr. Graziosi delivered his two lectures on the famine at the universities of Toronto and Alberta. The Toronto lecture, which took place on November 17, was co-sponsored by the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine at the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto; the Toronto office of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (Toronto Branch); and the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies. The Edmonton lecture, which took place on November 20, was sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. Dr. Graziosi also lectured at both universities on "Stalin's Foreign and Domestic Policies: Dealing with the National Question in an Imperial Context, 1901–1926."

Andrea Graziosi is currently professor of history at the University of Naples "Federico II" and president (2007–11) of the Italian Society for the Study of Contemporary History ([www.sissco.it](http://www.sissco.it)). He also serves on the editorial boards of a number of French, English, Italian, Ukrainian, and American specialized journals. Since 1992 he

has been a co-editor of the Moscow-based series *Dokumenty sovetskoi istorii* (Documents of Soviet History; 15 volumes in print) and is a member of the editorial board of the series *Istoriia stalinizma* (History of Stalinism). His research interests have been largely in Soviet history, with a focus on the period leading up to the establishment of the Soviet state, its consolidation, and the triumph of Stalinism. Some of the topics he has researched in depth include the industrialization policies of the Soviet state, the Soviet state and the peasantry, the 1932–33 famine in Ukraine and the Kuban region, other famines that took place in the Soviet Union, Stalinism, and Soviet nationality policies.

Dr. Graziosi has worked in the archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry, which resulted in the book *Lettere da Kharkov. La carestia in Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, 1932–33* (Letters from Kharkiv: Famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus in the Dispatches of Italian Diplomats, 1923–33; Turin, 1991 and Kharkiv, 2007) and in the Russian State Archives and former Communist Party Archives in Moscow. The results of this research, combined with data from previously available sources and new archival discoveries made by colleagues in Russia and other countries formerly under Soviet rule, have found their way into many of his publications, including *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996 and Moscow, 2001); *Bol'sheviki i krest'iane na Ukraine, 1918–1919 gody* (Bolsheviks and Peasants in Ukraine, 1918–1919; Moscow, 1997); *A New, Peculiar State. Explorations in Soviet History* (Westport, Conn., 2000); *Guerra e rivoluzione in Europa 1905–1956* (War and Revolution in Europe, 1905–1956; Bologna, 2002; Kyiv and Moscow, 2005); *L'URSS di Lenin e Stalin, 1914–1945* (The USSR of Lenin and Stalin, 1914–1945; Bologna, 2007); *L'URSS dal trionfo al degrado, 1945–1991* (The USSR from Triumph to Degeneration, 1945–1991; Bologna, 2008); and *Stalinism, Collectivization and the Great Famine* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).

Andrea Graziosi's lecture on the Holodomor represented a milestone in its study. He noted that over the past twenty years most of the important official documents concerning the Holodomor have been brought to light. His lecture combined an account of general scholarly accomplishments in researching the subject with his own analysis, which delineated the overall policy of the Soviet state toward the peasantry and specified the critical national factors that made the Holodomor so devastating in Ukraine and the Kuban. The lecture was recorded in both video and audio formats at the University of Alberta. The audio version can be accessed by visiting the following page on the CIUS website: <http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/Links-of-Interest.htm/>.

---

## **#18**

In Ukraine, Movement to Honor Members of WWII Underground Sets Off Debate  
by John Pancake

Washington Post, 6 January 2010

LVIV, UKRAINE -- In World War II, members of the Ukrainian underground fought to make their vision of an independent nation real. They battled Hitler and Stalin. Ultimately they lost, and the Soviets took control of most of Eastern Europe after the war.

The Ukrainians finally achieved independence when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Now many in this fledgling nation would like to formally recognize those earlier nationalists -- the "brave defenders of the Motherland," as President Viktor Yushchenko has called them. Newly introduced legislation would honor members of the underground and provide them with benefits accorded to war veterans.

But the movement to pay tribute to the insurgent fighters has set off a national debate about exactly what happened more than six decades ago. Many say the underground collaborated with the Nazis, killed thousands of Jews and perpetrated a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Poles.

The legacy of the underground flows through Ukrainian culture today. Its best-known banner -- a red-and-black flag -- is seen at the rallies of nationalist politicians. In this western Ukrainian city, where the insurgency was active, members of the underground are buried in elaborate marble tombs in a historic cemetery. Street vendors sell memorabilia commemorating the resistance. There is even an underground-themed restaurant outfitted as a bunker. In one corner, diners can do target practice using a picture of Stalin.

While those involved in the debate over the underground are somewhat polarized, they agree on one thing: It's complicated.

To begin with, the underground was made up of many factions, subfactions and rivals. In hindsight, some look better than others. Meanwhile, for the majority of Ukrainian families, the experience of "the Great Patriotic War" was fighting with the Red Army to defend the homeland. Some descendants of Red Army soldiers view members of the underground as traitors.

The effort to recognize the insurgents also is taking place against the backdrop of centuries of persecution of Jews in Ukraine, where pogroms were common.

The Cossack chieftain Bogdan Khmelnytsky, whose statue stands in the Ukrainian capital, fought for independence during the 17th century. But he also presided over the killings of tens of thousands of Jews, said Rabbi Alexander Dukhovny, head of the Religious Union for Progressive Jewish Congregations of Ukraine. "Was he a hero or an anti-hero? Even after 350 years, it is difficult to know," Dukhovny said.

Considerable research on the underground is underway in Ukraine and Canada, a center of the Ukrainian diaspora.

One of the key figures involved in the research is Peter J. Potichnyj. Born in a Ukrainian family in a village in what was then eastern Poland, Potichnyj experienced the horrors of the war firsthand. Soviet secret police executed his father. Poles massacred most of the people in his village.

In 1945, at age 14, he joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or UPA, and fought against the Soviets until 1947. He eventually became a historian at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, and helped edit 77 volumes about the Ukrainian underground.

Potichnyj, 79, said that although the underground may have had brief strategic alliances with the Germans, it was mostly fighting the Soviets. He said much of the anti-underground talk these days is orchestrated from Russia.

"You know the Russians don't want to admit there were people fighting them -- not because they were cooperating with the Germans but because they were fighting for their own culture and the liberation of their own countries," he said.

As for the killings of Jews and Poles, Potichnyj argues that no matter where guerrillas fight for liberation, it's a messy affair. The Poles provoked the Ukrainians, he said.

"With respect to Jews," he said, "obviously, in the situation there must have taken place some killing of the Jews, although in 1943, when the UPA was quite strong, there were hardly any Jews left because the Germans had, unfortunately, killed them all off. But there were some remnants, and the remnants were either working with the Ukrainian underground or they were working with the Soviets." Those allied with the Red partisans were obviously enemies of the underground, he said.

Potichnyj said the underground made a terrible mistake in not condemning the Germans' efforts to exterminate the Jews. But he strongly denies that there is any document showing that the underground ordered the "systematic" killing of Jews.

John-Paul Himka, a historian at the University of Alberta, believes there was a systematic killing of Jews in some Ukrainian areas. Himka has written extensively on the Holocaust and Ukrainian history. He said he has read hundreds of accounts, composed in different places and at different times, of Jews who survived; many mention killings by the Ukrainian militia.

Of the plan to honor UPA fighters, he says: "This is really a problem area because they killed so many people, civilians." In addition to Jews, he said, they killed 60,000 to 100,000 Poles, as well as political opponents, Orthodox clergymen, teachers of Russian and many prisoners of war from eastern Ukraine. He estimates that UPA fighters killed several thousand Jews, "but perhaps the number was much higher."

"Although what UPA did to the Jews may not have been, in the larger scheme of things, a major contribution to the Holocaust, it remains a large and inexpugnable stain on the record of the Ukrainian national insurgency," he said.

Olexiy Haran, a professor of comparative politics at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, said Russian "propaganda" distorted the extent of the atrocities. The Ukrainian insurgents were fighting for independence, he insists.

"I believe that these people deserve to be veterans, maybe with the exception of those who committed crimes," he said. "This was guerrilla warfare, and it's difficult to imagine guerrillas without atrocities."

Many academics say the debate over the underground is part of a larger tug of war over Ukraine's national identity. Russia ruled most of what is now Ukraine for more than three centuries. But relations between the countries have been testy, and since Yushchenko's election in late 2004, Ukraine has distanced itself from Russia while moving toward the West.

Yaakov Bleich, whose title is chief rabbi of Ukraine, said of Yushchenko's effort to legitimize the insurgents: "His goals are noble; the means stink."

"What I mean is that we all understand that Yushchenko is trying to build up national pride, and we all understand that that is needed," Bleich said. "After 350 years that the Ukrainian people were subjugated, they have to rebuild national pride.

"But should we take things that are controversial -- heroes that are still of questionable repute -- and use them to do that?" he said. "At this point you have people out there living today [who suffered], and the image is one that would hurt people. The Ukrainian insurgents fought alongside the fascists. And maybe their intentions were good, but I will say that the road to hell is paved with good intentions."

---

## **#19**

From: Alexandra Hrycak

Date: Thursday, January 7, 2010

Subject: Re: [aaus-list] Washington Post: Debate on OUN-UPA in WWII

The opening up of discussion of UPA atrocities would be a great opportunity to introduce the notion of lustration for all who were involved in atrocities during the Soviet era. The state in Ukraine (as well as Russia and other post-Soviet countries) now pays veterans benefits to veterans of the Soviet army, as well as retirees of the KGB, many of whom participated in atrocities on an immense scale. Some state leaders, such as Putin, are associated directly with the Soviet era secret police leadership, which committed crimes against humanity. Perhaps what could be done is "lustration" - as happened in the Czech republic and Poland. Lustration would involve a period when each person's record would be scrutinized by a jury or some other official body and all the atrocities they committed would be acknowledged but they would not be punished in any conventional sense (e.g. through fines or imprisonment). In the Czech republic, such individuals no longer are allowed to hold public office - something that would be quite controversial in the former Soviet Union -- but they are not persecuted or denied their rights.

Whenever I have been present in Ukraine on "Victory day" when the Soviet partisans and Soviet soldiers are widely treated as heroes, I am reminded of my Estonian mother's story of how her best friend, at age 15, was gang raped by Soviet soldiers in front of her whole family. Such gang rapes were widespread in the Baltics, where Soviet soldiers were encouraged to dominate the local population in violent ways as a symbol of their "victory". Gang rapes by Soviet soldiers were common as well as in Germany, after "Victory" was declared at the end of the war. Historians are now finding similar practices were used to impose Soviet rule in Western Ukraine, although I have not heard gang rape by Soviet soldiers discussed as widely as it has in East Germany and the Baltics. It is high time in Ukraine for the broader population to face all the bloody atrocities of the 20th century - only then can they start anew and build a country based upon new principles. Germany has done a great deal to face its past - and it has been very successful, much more so than the post-Soviet countries.

---

## #20

New Religious Histories:

Rethinking Religion and Secularization in 20th Century Ukraine and Russia

March 25-27, 2010

Penn State University

This workshop seeks to explore the myriad forms of religious expression and religious practice that occurred in Soviet society in light of the secularist policies of the Soviet state. The goal is to consider how particularities of Soviet secularism, including its periods of intensification and relaxation, shaped the forms religious expressions took in Soviet Russia and Ukraine. Studies of secularization have traditionally focused on the formation of policies, rather than on how those policies were experienced and variably implemented across regions, over time, and in response to perceptions of local religious practice. The edited volume of essays that will emerge from this workshop on the intersection of religious practice and Soviet secularizing policies will complement other historiographies of religiosity in the region as well as studies of how specific denominations and the believers within them adapted to the conditions set in Soviet society.

4:00 Thursday, March 25, 2010, 102 Weaver

Inaugural Woskob Annual Lecture in Ukrainian Studies

Serhii Plokhyy, Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History, Harvard University

The Echoes of Yalta: Ukraine and The Religious Division of Europe, 1945-1946

6:00 -7:30 pm Dinner, Nittany Lion Inn, Writing Room 1

7:30 – 9:30 Film Screening, “No. 4 Street of Our Lady” with film maker Judy Maltz Carnegie Cinema. The film tells the story of a woman in Sokal, then Eastern Poland, now Ukraine, who hid three Jewish families and a German soldier during World War II.

Friday, March 26, 2010

8:30-9:00 Breakfast, 102 Weaver Building

9:00-10:00 Olga Bertelsen, Penn State, History

Total Liberty for Wolves is Death to the Lambs: Persecutions of Jewish Political Parties in the 1920s and 1930s

Discussant: Greg Freeze, Brandeis, History

10:00-11:00 John-Paul Himka, University of Alberta, History and Classics  
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Holocaust

Discussant: Greg Eghghian, Penn State, History and Science, Technology and Society

11:00-11:15 BREAK

11:15-12:15 Scott Kenworthy, Miami University of Ohio, History and Religious Studies  
The Revival of Monastic Life in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra after World War II

Discussant: Gregg Roebber, Penn State, History and Religious Studies

12:15-1:45 LUNCH

1:45-2:45 Nadieszda Kizenko, University at Albany, History  
Confession in Modern Russia and Ukraine

Discussant: Vera Shevzov, Smith College, History

2:45-3:45 Stella Rock, Keston Center for Religion, Politics, and Society  
Has Moscow not forgotten St Seraphim?' Public and private defiance of Soviet anti-pilgrimage measures in Russia

Discussant: Linda Ivanits, Penn State, Slavic Languages and Literatures

3:45-4:00 BREAK

4:00- 5:00 Olena Panych, Donetsk Christian University  
Space and Time of Suffering: Soviet Past in the Memoirs and Narratives of Evangelical Christian Baptists

Discussant: Catherine Wanner, Penn State, History

6:00 DINNER at Cathy Wanner's house, 241 Waring Ave.

Saturday, March 27, 2010

8:30-9:00 Breakfast

9:00-10:00 Zoe Knox, University of Leicester  
Jehovah's Witnesses and Soviet Secularisation: The Clash between Watch Tower Theology and Soviet Ideology in the Post-War Period

Discussant: Roger Finke, Penn State, Sociology

10:00-11:00 Viktor Yelensky, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy.  
Revival before Revival: Popular and Institutionalized Religion in Ukraine on the Eve of the Collapse of Communism

Discussant: Philip Jenkins, Penn State, History

11:00-11:15 BREAK

11:15-12:15 Catherine Wanner, Penn State, History  
The Legacy of Soviet Practices of Secularization and Sacralization

Discussant: Jaime Haight, Penn State, Sociology

12:15-1:15 Roundtable on Poetry and the Sacred  
Olha Tytarenko, University of Toronto, The Antichrist in Russian Literary  
Consciousness

Michael Naydan, Penn State, Ukrainian Poets Writing God: Skovoroda, Tychyna,  
Antonych and Barka

Slava Yastremski, Bucknell University, The Religious Writings of Olga Sedakova

LUNCH

Brief Discussion of Publication Plans

---

UKL 441, 16 February 2010

Fair Use Notice: MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL THAT IS REDISTRIBUTED FOR PERSONAL, SCHOLARLY USE ONLY. UKL is a single emission e-mail to a limited number of scholars and professionals in the area of Ukrainian studies who have requested receipt of the list for scholarly and educational purposes. UKL is distributed on a completely volunteer basis. The UKL editor believes that the use of copyrighted materials therein constitutes "fair use" of any such material and is governed by appropriate Canadian and International law.

Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies  
University of Ottawa  
559 King Edward Ave.  
Ottawa ON K1N 6N5  
CANADA  
tel 613 562 5800 ext. 3692  
fax 613 562 5351

For a free subscription to UKL, write to [darel@uottawa.ca](mailto:darel@uottawa.ca), indicating your occupation and postal address.