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Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*

I

What difference do liberal principles and institutions make to the conduct of the foreign affairs of liberal states? A thicket of conflicting judgments suggests that the legacies of liberalism have not been clearly appreciated. For many citizens of liberal states, liberal principles and institutions have so fully absorbed domestic politics that their influence on foreign affairs tends to be either overlooked altogether or, when perceived, exaggerated. Liberalism becomes either unself-consciously patriotic or inherently “peace-loving.” For many scholars and diplomats, the relations among independent states appear to differ so significantly from domestic politics that influences of liberal principles and domestic liberal institutions are denied or denigrated. They judge that international relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics.¹

* This is the first half of a two-part article. The article has benefited from the extensive criticisms of William Ascher, Richard Betts, William Bundy, Joseph Carens, Felix Gilbert, Amy Gutmann, Don Herzog, Stanley Hoffman, Marion Levy, Judith Shklar, Mark Uhlig, and the Editors of *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. I have also tried to take into account suggestions from Fouad Ajami, Steven David, Tom Farer, Robert Gilpin, Ernest van den Haag, Germaine Hoston, Robert Jervis, Donald Kagan, Robert Keohane, John Rawls, Nicholas Rizopoulos, Robert W. Tucker, Richard Ullman, and the members of a Special Seminar at the Lehrman Institute, February 22, 1983. The essay cannot be interpreted as a consensus of their views.

1. The liberal-patriotic view was reiterated by President Reagan in a speech before the British Parliament on 8 June 1982. There he proclaimed “a global campaign for democratic development.” This “crusade for freedom” will be the latest campaign in a tradition that, he claimed, began with the Magna Carta and stretched in this century through two world wars and a cold war. He added that liberal foreign policies have shown “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” and that this crusade will strengthen the prospects for a world at peace (*New York Times*, 9 June 1982). The skeptical scholars and diplomats represent the predominant Realist interpretation of international relations. See ns. 4 and 12 for references.

Although liberalism is misinterpreted from both these points of view, a crucial aspect of the liberal legacy is captured by each. Liberalism is a distinct ideology and set of institutions that has shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to laissez faire. It defines much of the content of the liberal patriot's nationalism. Liberalism does appear to disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. Thus its foreign relations cannot be adequately explained (or prescribed) by a sole reliance on the balance of power. But liberalism is not inherently "peace-loving"; nor is it consistently restrained or peaceful in intent. Furthermore, liberal practice may reduce the probability that states will successfully exercise the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions that a world peace may well require in the nuclear age. Yet the peaceful intent and restraint that liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announces the possibility of a world peace this side of the grave or of world conquest. It has strengthened the prospects for a world peace established by the steady expansion of a separate peace among liberal societies.

Putting together these apparently contradictory (but, in fact, compatible) pieces of the liberal legacy begins with a discussion of the range of liberal principle and practice. This article highlights the differences between liberal practice toward other liberal societies and liberal practice toward nonliberal societies. It argues that liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in the first and has contributed to exceptional confusion in the second. Appreciating these liberal legacies calls for another look at one of the greatest of liberal philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for he is a source of insight, policy, and hope.

II

Liberalism has been identified with an essential principle—the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. This principle has generated rights and institutions.

A commitment to a threefold set of rights forms the foundation of liberalism. Liberalism calls for freedom from arbitrary authority, often called "negative freedom," which includes freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech, equality under the law, and the right to hold, and

therefore to exchange, property without fear of arbitrary seizure. Liberalism also calls for those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the “positive freedoms.” Such social and economic rights as equality of opportunity in education and rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective self-expression and participation, are thus among liberal rights. A third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee the other two. To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community.

These three sets of rights, taken together, seem to meet the challenge that Kant identified:

To organize a group of rational beings who demand general laws for their survival, but of whom each inclines toward exempting himself, and to establish their constitution in such a way that, in spite of the fact their private attitudes are opposed, these private attitudes mutually impede each other in such a manner that [their] public behavior is the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes.²

But the dilemma within liberalism is how to reconcile the three sets of liberal rights. The right to private property, for example, can conflict with equality of opportunity and both rights can be violated by democratic legislation. During the 180 years since Kant wrote, the liberal tradition has evolved two high roads to individual freedom and social order; one is *laissez-faire* or “conservative” liberalism and the other is social welfare, or social democratic, or “liberal” liberalism. Both reconcile these conflicting rights (though in differing ways) by successfully organizing free individuals into a political order.

The political order of *laissez-faire* and social welfare liberals is marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their authority free from all restraint

2. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace” (1795) in *The Philosophy of Kant*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1949), p. 453.

apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved.³ Most pertinently for the impact of liberalism on foreign affairs, the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor to the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military castes over foreign policy. Third, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production. Property is justified by individual acquisition (for example, by labor) or by social agreement or social utility. This excludes state socialism or state capitalism, but it need not exclude market socialism or various forms of the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

In order to protect the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, laissez-faire liberalism has leaned toward a highly constrained role for the state and a much wider role for private property and the market. In order to promote the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, welfare liberalism has expanded the role of the state and constricted the role of the market.⁴ Both, nevertheless, accept these four institutional re-

3. The actual rights of citizenship have often been limited by slavery or male suffrage, but liberal regimes harbored no principle of opposition to the extension of juridical equality; in fact, as pressure was brought to bear they progressively extended the suffrage to the entire population. By this distinction, nineteenth-century United States was liberal; twentieth-century South Africa is not. See Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: the Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

4. The sources of classic, laissez-faire liberalism can be found in Locke, the *Federalist Papers*, Kant, and Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Expositions of welfare liberalism are in the work of the Fabians and John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Amy Gutmann, *Liberal Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), discusses variants of liberal thought.

Uncomfortably paralleling each of the high roads are "low roads" that, while achieving certain liberal values, fail to reconcile freedom and order. An overwhelming terror of anarchy and a speculation on preserving property can drive laissez-faire liberals to support a law-and-order authoritarian rule that sacrifices democracy. Authoritarianism to preserve order is the argument of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. It also shapes the argument of right wing liberals who seek to draw a distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" dictatorships. The justification sometimes advanced by liberals for the former is that they can be temporary and educate the population into an acceptance of property, individual rights, and, eventually, representative government. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 34–45. Complementarily, when social inequalities are judged to be extreme, the welfare liberal can argue that establishing (or reestablishing) the foundations of liberal society requires a nonliberal method of reform, a second low road of redistributing authoritarianism. Aristide Zolberg reports a "liberal left" sensibility among

quirements and contrast markedly with the colonies, monarchical regimes, military dictatorships, and communist party dictatorships with which they have shared the political governance of the modern world.

The domestic successes of liberalism have never been more apparent. Never have so many people been included in, and accepted the domestic hegemony of, the liberal order; never have so many of the world's leading states been liberal, whether as republics or as constitutional monarchies. Indeed, the success of liberalism as an answer to the problem of masterless men in modern society is reflected in the growth in the number of liberal regimes from the three that existed when Kant wrote to the more than forty that exist today. But we should not be complacent about the domestic affairs of liberal states. Significant practical problems endure: among them are enhancing citizen participation in large democracies, distributing "positional goods" (for example, prestigious jobs), controlling bureaucracy, reducing unemployment, paying for a growing demand for social services, reducing inflation, and achieving large scale

TABLE I

<i>Period</i>	<i>Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union (By date "liberal")^a</i>	<i>Total Number</i>
18th century	Swiss Cantons ^b French Republic 1790–1795 the United States ^b 1776–	3
1800–1850	Swiss Confederation, the United States France 1830–1849 Belgium 1830– Great Britain 1832– Netherlands 1848– Piedmont 1848– Denmark 1849–	8

U.S. scholars of African politics that justified reforming dictatorship. (See *One Party Government in the Ivory Coast* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969], p. viii.) And the argument of "reforming autocracy" can be found in J. S. Mill's defense of colonialism in India.

TABLE I (cont.)

<i>Period</i>	<i>Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union (By date "liberal")^a</i>	<i>Total Number</i>
1850-1900	Switzerland, the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands Piedmont - 1861, Italy 1861 - Denmark -1866 Sweden 1864- Greece 1864- Canada 1867- France 1871- Argentina 1880- Chile 1891-	13
1900-1945	Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada Greece -1911, 1928-1936 Italy -1922 Belgium -1940; Netherlands -1940; Argentina -1943 France -1940 Chile -1924, 1932 Australia 1901- Norway 1905-1940 New Zealand 1907- Colombia 1910-1949 Denmark 1914-1940 Poland 1917-1935 Latvia 1922-1934 Germany 1918-1932 Austria 1918-1934 Estonia 1919-1934 Finland 1919- Uruguay 1919-	29

	Costa Rica 1919–	
	Czechoslovakia 1920–1939	
	Ireland 1920–	
	Mexico 1928–	
	Lebanon 1944–	
1945–	Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, Mexico	49
	Uruguay –1973;	
	Chile –1973;	
	Lebanon –1975	
	Costa Rica –1948, 1953–	
	Iceland 1944–	
	France 1945–	
	Denmark 1945–	
	Norway 1945–	
	Austria 1945–	
	Brazil 1945–1954, 1955–1964	
	Belgium 1946–	
	Luxemburg 1946–	
	Netherlands 1946–	
	Italy 1946–	
	Philippines 1946–1972	
	India 1947–1975, 1977–	
	Sri Lanka 1948–1961, 1963–1977, 1978–	
	Ecuador 1948–1963, 1979–	
	Israel 1949–	
	West Germany 1949–	
	Peru 1950–1962, 1963–1968, 1980–	
	El Salvador 1950–1961	
	Turkey 1950–1960, 1966–1971	
	Japan 1951–	
	Bolivia 1956–1969	
	Colombia 1958–	
	Venezuela 1959–	
	Nigeria 1961–1964, 1979–	
	Jamaica 1962–	
	Trinidad 1962–	

TABLE I (cont.)

Period	<i>Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union (By date "liberal")^a</i>	<i>Total Number</i>
	Senegal 1963–	
	Malaysia 1963–	
	South Korea 1963–1972	
	Botswana 1966–	
	Singapore 1965–	
	Greece 1975–	
	Portugal 1976–	
	Spain 1978–	
	Dominican Republic 1978–	

a. I have drawn up this approximate list of "Liberal Regimes" according to the four institutions described as essential: market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or monarchical), representative, government. This latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively, either potentially or actually, elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (that is, 30 percent) or open to "achievement" by inhabitants (for example, to poll-tax payers or householders) of the national or metropolitan territory. Female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded; and representative government is internally sovereign (for example, including and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years).

Sources: Arthur Banks and W. Overstreet, eds., *The Political Handbook of the World*, 1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980); Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *A Year Book of the Commonwealth 1980* (London: HMSO, 1980); *Europa Yearbook*, 1981 (London: Europa, 1981); W. L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1968); Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981); and *Freedom at Issue*, no. 54 (Jan.-Feb. 1980).

b. There are domestic variations within these liberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. These lists also exclude ancient "republics," since none appear to fit Kant's criteria. See Stephen Holmes, "Aristippus in and out of Athens," *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 1 (March 1979).

c. Selected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million.

restructuring of industries in response to growing foreign competition.⁵ Nonetheless, these domestic problems have been widely explored though they are by no means solved. Liberalism's foreign record is more obscure and warrants more consideration.

5. Fred Hirsch, *The Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).

III

In foreign affairs liberalism has shown, as it has in the domestic realm, serious weaknesses. But unlike liberalism's domestic realm, its foreign affairs have experienced startling but less than fully appreciated successes. Together they shape an unrecognized dilemma, for both these successes and weaknesses in large part spring from the same cause: the international implications of liberal principles and institutions.

The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory.⁶ When states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants and educational exchanges among scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and commitments that bolsters sentiments of public respect.

These conventions of mutual respect have formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal democracies of a remarkably effective kind. *Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.*⁷ No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states. Indeed, threats of war also have been regarded as illegitimate. A liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has ex-

6. Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) offers a clear and insightful discussion of liberal ideas on intervention and nonintervention.

7. There appear to be some exceptions to the tendency for liberal states not to engage in a war with each other. Peru and Ecuador, for example, entered into conflict. But for each, the war came within one to three years after the establishment of a liberal regime, that is, before the pacifying effects of liberalism could become deeply ingrained. The Palestinians and the Israelis clashed frequently along the Lebanese border, which Lebanon could not hold secure from either belligerent. But at the beginning of the 1967 War, Lebanon seems to have sent a flight of its own jets into Israel. The jets were repulsed. Alone among Israel's Arab neighbors, Lebanon engaged in no further hostilities with Israel. Israel's recent attack on the territory of Lebanon was an attack on a country that had already been occupied by Syria (and the P.L.O.). Whether Israel actually will withdraw (if Syria withdraws) and restore an independent Lebanon is yet to be determined.

TABLE 2
International Wars Listed Chronologically*

British-Maharattan (1817-1818)	Spanish-Santo Dominican (1863-1865)
Greek (1821-1828)	Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864)
Franco-Spanish (1823)	Lopez (1864-1870)
First Anglo-Burmese (1823-1826)	Spanish-Chilean (1865-1866)
Javanese (1825-1830)	Seven Weeks (1866)
Russo-Persian (1826-1828)	Ten Years (1868-1878)
Russo-Turkish (1828-1829)	Franco-Prussian (1870-1871)
First Polish (1831)	Dutch-Achinese (1873-1878)
First Syrian (1831-1832)	Balkan (1875-1877)
Texan (1835-1836)	Russo-Turkish (1877-1878)
First British-Afghan (1838-1842)	Bosnian (1878)
Second Syrian (1839-1840)	Second British-Afghan (1878-1880)
Franco-Algerian (1839-1847)	Pacific (1879-1880)
Peruvian-Bolivian (1841)	British-Zulu (1879)
First British-Sikh (1845-1846)	Franco-Indochinese (1882-1884)
Mexican-American (1846-1848)	Mahdist (1882-1885)
Austro-Sardinian (1848-1849)	Sino-French (1884-1885)
First Schleswig-Holstein (1848-1849)	Central American (1885)
Hungarian (1848-1849)	Serbo-Bulgarian (1885)
Second British-Sikh (1848-1849)	Sino-Japanese (1894-1895)
Roman Republic (1849)	Franco-Madagascan (1894-1895)
La Plata (1851-1852)	Cuban (1895-1898)
First Turco-Montenegrin (1852-1853)	Italo-Ethiopian (1895-1896)
Crimean (1853-1856)	First Philippine (1896-1898)
Anglo-Persian (1856-1857)	Greco-Turkish (1897)
Sepoy (1857-1859)	Spanish-American (1898)
Second Turco-Montenegrin (1858-1859)	Second Philippine (1899-1902)
Italian Unification (1859)	Boer (1899-1902)
Spanish-Moroccan (1859-1860)	Boxer Rebellion (1900)
Italo-Roman (1860)	Ilinden (1903)
Italo-Sicilian (1860-1861)	Russo-Japanese (1904-1905)
Franco-Mexican (1862-1867)	Central American (1906)
Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863)	Central American (1907)
Second Polish (1863-1864)	Spanish-Moroccan (1909-1910)
	Italo-Turkish (1911-1912)

* The table is reprinted by permission from Melvin Small and J. David Singer from *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 79-80. This is a partial list of international wars fought between 1816 and 1980. In Appendices A and B of *Resort to*

First Balkan (1912–1913)	Korean (1950–1953)
Second Balkan (1913)	Algerian (1954–1962)
World War I (1914–1918)	Russo-Hungarian (1956)
Russian Nationalities (1917–1921)	Sinai (1956)
Russo-Polish (1919–1920)	Tibetan (1956–1959)
Hungarian-Allies (1919)	Sino-Indian (1962)
Greco-Turkish (1919–1922)	Vietnamese (1965–1975)
Riffian (1921–1926)	Second Kashmir (1965)
Druze (1925–1927)	Six Day (1967)
Sino-Soviet (1929)	Israeli-Egyptian (1969–1970)
Manchurian (1931–1933)	Football (1969)
Chaco (1932–1935)	Bangladesh (1971)
Italo-Ethiopian (1935–1936)	Philippine-MNLF (1972—)
Sino-Japanese (1937–1941)	Yom Kippur (1973)
Changkufeng (1938)	Turco-Cypriot (1974)
Nomohan (1939)	Ethiopian-Eritrean (1974—)
World War II (1939–1945)	Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975—)
Russo-Finnish (1939–1940)	Timor (1975—)
Franco-Thai (1940–1941)	Saharan (1975—)
Indonesian (1945–1946)	Ogaden (1976—)
Indochinese (1945–1954)	Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978–1979)
Madagascan (1947–1948)	Sino-Vietnamese (1979)
First Kashmir (1947–1949)	Russo-Afghan (1979—)
Palestine (1948–1949)	Irani-Iraqi (1980—)
Hyderabad (1948)	

panded despite numerous particular conflicts of economic and strategic interest.

During the nineteenth century the United States and Britain negotiated the northern frontier of the United States. During the American Civil

Arms, Small and Singer identify a total of 575 wars in this period; but approximately 159 of them appear to be largely domestic, or civil wars.

This definition of war excludes covert interventions, some of which have been directed by liberal regimes against other liberal regimes. One example is the United States' effort to destabilize the Chilean election and Allende's government. Nonetheless, it is significant (as will be apparent below) that such interventions are not pursued publicly as acknowledged policy. The covert destabilization campaign against Chile is recounted in U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile*, 1963–73, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

The argument of this article (and this list) also excludes civil wars. Civil wars differ from

War the commercial linkages between the Lancashire cotton economy and the American South and the sentimental links between the British aristocracy and the Southern plantocracy (together with numerous disputes over the rights of British shipping against the Northern blockade) brought Great Britain and the Northern states to the brink of war, but they never passed over that brink. Despite an intense Anglo-French colonial rivalry, crises such as Fashoda in 1898 were resolved without going to war. Despite their colonial rivalries, liberal France and Britain formed an entente before World War I against illiberal Germany (whose foreign relations were controlled by the Kaiser and the Army). During 1914–15 Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with illiberal Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under the Triple Alliance to either support its allies or remain neutral. Instead, Italy, a liberal regime, joined the alliance with France and Britain that would prevent it from having to fight other liberal states, and declared war on Austria and Germany, its former allies. And despite generations of Anglo-American tension and British restrictions on American trade, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917. Nowhere was this special peace among liberal states more clearly proclaimed than in President Woodrow Wilson's "War Message" of 2 April 1917: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."⁸

international wars not in the ferocity of combat but in the issues that engender them. Two nations that could abide one another as independent neighbors separated by a border might well be the fiercest of enemies if forced to live together in one state, jointly deciding how to raise and spend taxes, choose leaders, and legislate fundamental questions of value. Notwithstanding these differences, no civil wars that I recall upset the argument of liberal pacification.

8. Imperial Germany is a difficult case. The Reichstag was not only elected by universal male suffrage but, by and large, the state ruled under the law, respecting the civic equality and rights of its citizens. Moreover, Chancellor Bismarck began the creation of a social welfare society that served as an inspiration for similar reforms in liberal regimes. However, the constitutional relations between the imperial executive and the representative legislature were sufficiently complex that various practices, rather than constitutional theory, determined the actual relation between the government and the citizenry. The emperor appointed and could dismiss the chancellor. Although the chancellor was responsible to the Reichstag, a defeat in the Reichstag did not remove him nor did the government absolutely depend on the Reichstag for budgetary authority. In practice, Germany was a liberal state under republican law for domestic issues. But the emperor's direct authority

Statistically, war between any two states (in any single year or other short period of time) is a low probability event. War between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, may be somewhat more probable. The apparent absence of war among the more clearly liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost two hundred years thus has some significance. Politically more significant, perhaps, is that, when states are forced to decide, by the pressure of an impinging world war, on which side of a world contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side, despite the real complexity of the historical, economic and political factors that affect their foreign policies. And historically, we should recall that medieval and early modern Europe were the warring cockpits of states, wherein France and England and the Low Countries engaged in near constant strife. Then in the late eighteenth century there began to emerge liberal regimes. At first hesitant and confused, and later clear and confident as liberal regimes gained deeper domestic foundations and longer international experience, a pacific union of these liberal states became established.

over the army, the army's effective independence from the minimal authority of the War Ministry, and the emperor's active role in foreign affairs (including the influential separate channel to the emperor through the military attachés) together with the tenuous constitutional relationship between the chancellor and the Reichstag made imperial Germany a state divorced from the control of its citizenry in foreign affairs.

This authoritarian element not only influenced German foreign policymaking, but also shaped the international political environment (a lack of trust) the Reich faced and the domestic political environment that defined the government's options and capabilities (the weakness of liberal opinion as against the exceptional influence of junker militaristic nationalism). Thus direct influence on policy was but one result of the authoritarian element. Nonetheless, significant and strife-generating episodes can be directly attributed to this element. They include Tirpitz's approach to Wilhelm II to obtain the latter's sanction for a veto of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's proposals for a naval agreement with Britain (1909). Added to this was Wilhelm's personal assurances of full support to the Austrians early in the Sarajevo Crisis and his, together with Moltke's, erratic pressure on the Chancellor throughout July and August of 1914, which helped destroy whatever coherence German diplomacy might otherwise have had, and which led one Austrian official to ask, "Who rules in Berlin? Moltke or Bethmann?" (Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1964], pp. xxviii and chap. 6). For an excellent account of Bethmann's aims and the constraints he encountered, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," *Central European History* 2 (1969).

The liberal sources of Italy's decision are pointed out in R. Vivarelli's review of Hugo Butler's *Gaetano Salvemini und die Italienische Politik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* in the *Journal of Modern History* 52, no. 3 (September 1980): 541.

The quotation from President Wilson is from Woodrow Wilson, *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Albert Shaw (New York: The Review of Reviews, 1924), p. 378.

The Realist model of international relations, which provides a plausible explanation of the general insecurity of states, offers little guidance in explaining the pacification of the liberal world. Realism, in its classical formulation, holds that the state is and should be formally sovereign, effectively unbounded by individual rights nationally and thus capable of determining its own scope of authority. (This determination can be made democratically, oligarchically, or autocratically.) Internationally, the sovereign state exists in an anarchical society in which it is radically independent; neither bounded nor protected by international "law" or treaties or duties, and hence, insecure. Hobbes, one of the seventeenth-century founders of the Realist approach drew the international implications of Realism when he argued that the existence of international anarchy, the very independence of states, best accounts for the competition, the fear, and the temptation toward preventive war that characterize international relations. Politics among nations is not a continuous combat, but it is in this view a "state of war . . . a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known."⁹

In international relations theory, three "games" explain the fear that Hobbes saw as a root of conflict in the state of war. First, even when states share an interest in a common good that could be attained by cooperation, the absence of a source of global law and order means that no one state can count upon the cooperative behavior of the others. Each state therefore has a rational incentive to defect from the cooperative enterprise even if only to pursue a good whose value is less than the share that would have been obtained from the successful accomplishment of the cooperative enterprise (this is Rousseau's "stag dilemma"). Second, even though each state knows that security is relative to the armaments level of potential adversaries and even though each state seeks to minimize its arms expenditure, it also knows that, having no global guarantee of security, being caught unarmed by a surprise attack is worse than bearing the costs of armament. Each therefore arms; all are worse off (this is the "security dilemma," a variant of the "prisoner's dilemma"). Third, heavily armed states rely upon their prestige, their credibility, to deter states from testing the true quality of their arms in battle, and credibility is measured by a record of successes. Once a posture of confrontation is assumed, backing down, although rational for both together,

9. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Penguin, 1980), I, chap. 13, 62; p. 186.

is not rational (first best) for either individually if there is some chance that the other will back down first (the game of “chicken”).¹⁰

Specific wars therefore arise from fear as a state seeking to avoid a surprise attack decides to attack first; from competitive emulation as states lacking an imposed international hierarchy of prestige struggle to establish their place; and from straightforward conflicts of interest that escalate into war because there is no global sovereign to prevent states from adopting that ultimate form of conflict resolution. Herein lie Thucydides’s trinity of “security, honor, and self-interest” and Hobbes’s “diffidence,” “glory,” and “competition” that drive states to conflict in the international state of war.¹¹

Finding that all states, including liberal states, do engage in war, the Realist concludes that the effects of differing domestic regimes (whether liberal or not) are overridden by the international anarchy under which all states live.¹² Thus Hobbes does not bother to distinguish between “some council or one man” when he discusses the sovereign. Differing domestic regimes do affect the quantity of resources available to the state as Rousseau (an eighteenth-century Realist) shows in his discussion of Poland, and Morgenthau (a twentieth-century Realist) demonstrates in his discussion of morale.¹³ But the ends that shape the international state of war are decreed for the Realist by the anarchy of the international order and the fundamental quest for power that directs the policy of all States, irrespective of differences in their domestic regimes. As Rousseau argued, international peace therefore depends on the abolition of international relations either by the achievement of a world state or by a radical isolationism (Corsica). Realists judge neither to be possible.

10. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 1 (January 1978).

11. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian Wars*, trans. Rex Warner (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1954) I:76; and Hobbes, *Leviathan*, I, chap. 13, 61, p. 185. The coincidence of views is not accidental; Hobbes translated Thucydides. And Hobbes’s portrait of the state of nature appears to be drawn from Thucydides’s account of the revolution in Corcyra.

12. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 1959), pp. 120–23; and see his *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). The classic sources of this form of Realism are Hobbes and, more particularly, Rousseau’s “Essay on St. Pierre’s Peace Project” and his “State of War” in *A Lasting Peace* (London: Constable, 1917), E. H. Carr’s *The Twenty Year’s Crisis: 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1951), and the works of Hans Morgenthau.

13. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, trans. Willmoore Kendall (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 132–35.

First, at the level of the strategic decisionmaker, Realists argue that a liberal peace could be merely the outcome of prudent diplomacy. Some, including Hobbes, have argued that sovereigns have a natural duty not to act against “the reasons of peace.”¹⁴ Individuals established (that is, should establish) a sovereign to escape from the brutalities of the state of nature, the war of all against all, that follows from competition for scarce goods, scrambles for prestige, and fear of another’s attack when there is no sovereign to provide for lawful acquisition or regularized social conduct or personal security. “Dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was sought for safety’s sake”; the natural duty of the sovereign is therefore the safety of the people. Yet prudent policy cannot be an enforceable right of citizens because Hobbesian sovereigns, who remain in the state of nature with respect to their subjects and other sovereigns, cannot themselves be subjects.

Nevertheless, the interstate condition is not necessarily the original brutality only now transposed to the frontiers. The sovereign is personally more secure than any individual in the original state of nature and soldiers too are by nature timorous. Unlike individuals, states are not equal; some live more expansively by predominance, others must live only by sufferance. Yet a policy of safety is not a guarantee of peace. The international condition for Hobbes remains a state of war. Safety enjoins a prudent policy of forewarning (spying) and of arming oneself to increase security against other sovereigns who, lacking any assurance that you are not taking these measures, also take them. Safety also requires (morally) taking actions “whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the lessening of the power of foreigners whom they [the sovereign] suspect, whether by slight or force.”¹⁵ If preventive wars are prudent, the Realists’ prudence obviously cannot account for more than a century and a half of peace among independent liberal states, many of which have crowded one another in the center of Europe.

Recent additions to game theory specify some of the circumstances under which prudence could lead to peace. Experience; geography; expectations of cooperation and belief patterns; and the differing payoffs to cooperation (peace) or conflict associated with various types of military technology all appear to influence the calculus.¹⁶ But when it comes to

14. Hobbes, “De Cive,” *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes* (London: J. Bohn, 1841), 2: 166–67.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

16. Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 172–86.

acquiring the techniques of peaceable interaction, nations appear to be slow, or at least erratic, learners. The balance of power (more below) is regarded as a primary lesson in the Realist primer, but centuries of experience did not prevent either France (Louis XIV, Napoleon I) or Germany (Wilhelm II, Hitler) from attempting to conquer Europe, twice each. Yet some, very new, black African states appear to have achieved a twenty-year-old system of impressively effective standards of mutual toleration. These standards are not completely effective (as in Tanzania's invasion of Uganda); but they have confounded expectations of a scramble to redivide Africa.¹⁷ Geography—"insular security" and "continental insecurity"—may affect foreign policy attitudes; but it does not appear to determine behavior, as the bellicose records of England and Japan suggest. Beliefs, expectations, and attitudes of leaders and masses should influence strategic behavior. A survey of attitudinal predispositions of the American public indicate that a peaceable inclination would be enhanced by having at the strategic helm a forty-five-year-old, black, female, pediatrician of Protestant or Jewish faith, resident in Bethesda, Maryland.¹⁸ Nevertheless, it would be difficult to determine if liberal leaders have had more peaceable attitudes than leaders who lead nonliberal states. But even if one did make that discovery, he also would have to account for why these peaceable attitudes only appear to be effective in relations with other liberals (since wars with nonliberals have not been uniformly defensive).

More substantial contributions have been made in the logic of game theory decision under differing military technologies. These technologies can alter the payoffs of the "security dilemma": making the costs of noncooperation high, reducing the costs of being unprepared or surprised, reducing the benefits of surprise attack, or increasing the gains from cooperation. In particular, Jervis recently has examined the differing effects of situations in which the offense or the defense has the advantage and in which offensive weapons are or are not distinguishable from defensive weapons. When the offense has the advantage and weapons are indistinguishable, the level of insecurity is high, incentives for preemptive attack correspondingly are strong. When offensive weapons do not have an advantage and offensive weapons are distinguishable the incentives

17. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why West Africa's Weak States Persist," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (October 1982).

18. Interpreted from Michael Haas, *International Conflict* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 80-81, 457-58.

for preemptive attack are low, as are the incentives for arms races. Capable of signalling with clarity a nonaggressive intent and of guaranteeing that other states pose no immediate strategic threat, statesmen should be able to adopt peaceable policies and negotiate disputes. But, this cannot be the explanation for the liberal peace. Military technologies changed from offensive to defensive and from distinguishable to nondistinguishable, yet the pacific union persisted and persisted only among liberal states. Moreover, even the “clearest” technical messages appear subject to garbling. The pre-1914 period, which objectively represented a triumph of the distinguishable defense (machine guns, barbed wire, trench warfare) over the offensive, subjectively, as Jervis notes, was a period which appeared to military leaders to place exceptional premiums on the offensive and thus on preemptive war.¹⁹

Second, at the level of social determinants, some might argue that relations among any group of states with similar social structures or with compatible values would be peaceful.²⁰ But again, the evidence for feudal societies, communist societies, fascist societies, or socialist societies does not support this conclusion. Feudal warfare was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobility. There have not been enough truly totalitarian, fascist powers (nor have they lasted long enough) to test fairly their pacific compatibility; but fascist powers in the wider sense of nationalist, capitalist, military dictatorships fought each other in the 1930s. Communist powers have engaged in wars more recently in East Asia. And we have not had enough socialist societies to consider the relevance of socialist pacification. The more abstract category of pluralism does not suffice. Certainly Germany was pluralist when it engaged in war with liberal states in 1914; Japan as well in 1941. But they were not liberal.

And third, at the level of interstate relations, neither specific regional

19. Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 186–210, 212. Jervis examines incentives for cooperation, not the existence or sources of peace.

20. There is a rich contemporary literature devoted to explaining international cooperation and integration. Karl Deutsch’s *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) develops the idea of a “pluralistic security community” that bears a resemblance to the “pacific union,” but Deutsch limits it geographically and finds compatibility of values, mutual responsiveness, and predictability of behavior among decision-makers as its essential foundations. These are important but their particular content, liberalism, appears to be more telling. Joseph Nye in *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971) steps away from the geographic limits Deutsch sets and focuses on levels of development; but his analysis is directed toward explaining integration—a more intensive form of cooperation than the pacific union.

attributes nor historic alliances or friendships can account for the wide reach of the liberal peace. The peace extends as far as, and no further than, the relations among liberal states, not including nonliberal states in an otherwise liberal region (such as the north Atlantic in the 1930s) nor excluding liberal states in a nonliberal region (such as Central America or Africa).

At this level, Raymond Aron has identified three types of interstate peace: empire, hegemony, and equilibrium.²¹ An empire generally succeeds in creating an internal peace, but this is not an explanation of peace among independent liberal states. Hegemony can create peace by overawing potential rivals. Although far from perfect and certainly precarious, United States hegemony, as Aron notes, might account for the interstate peace in South America in the postwar period during the height of the cold war conflict. However, the liberal peace cannot be attributed merely to effective international policing by a predominant hegemon—Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the postwar period. Even though a hegemon might well have an interest in enforcing a peace for the sake of commerce or investments or as a means of enhancing its prestige or security; hegemons such as seventeenth-century France were not peace-enforcing police, and the liberal peace persisted in the interwar period when international society lacked a predominant hegemonic power. Moreover, this explanation overestimates hegemonic control in both periods. Neither England nor the United States was able to prevent direct challenges to its interests (colonial competition in the nineteenth century, Middle East diplomacy and conflicts over trading with the enemy in the postwar period). Where then was the capacity to prevent all armed conflicts between liberal regimes, many of which were remote and others strategically or economically insignificant? Liberal hegemony and leadership are important (see Section V below), but they are not sufficient to explain a liberal peace.

Peace through equilibrium (the multipolar classical balance of power or the bipolar “cold war”) also draws upon prudential sources of peace.

21. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (New York: Praeger, 1968) pp. 151–54. Progress and peace through the rise and decline of empires and hegemonies has been a classic theme. Lucretius suggested that they may be part of a more general law of nature: “Augescunt aliae gentes, aliae miniuntur/Inque brevis spatio mutantur saecula animantum,/Et quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt.” [Some peoples wax and others wane/And in a short space the order of living things is changed/And like runners hand on the torch of life.] *De Rer. Nat.* ii, 77–79.

An awareness of the likelihood that aggressive attempts at hegemony will generate international opposition should, it is argued, deter these aggressive wars. But bipolar stability discourages polar or superpower wars, not proxy or small power wars. And multipolar balancing of power also encourages warfare to seize, for example, territory for strategic depth against a rival expanding its power from internal growth.²² Neither readily accounts for general peace or for the liberal peace.

Finally, some Realists might suggest that the liberal peace simply reflects the absence of deep conflicts of interest among liberal states. Wars occur outside the liberal zone because conflicts of interest are deeper there. But this argument does nothing more than raise the question of why liberal states have fewer or less fundamental conflicts of interest with other liberal states than liberal states have with nonliberal, or nonliberal states have with other nonliberals. We must therefore examine the workings of liberalism among its own kind—a special pacification of the “state of war” resting on liberalism and nothing either more specific or more general.

22. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chap. 8; and Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1967), chap. 3.

One of the most thorough collective investigations of the personal, societal, and international systemic sources of war has been the Correlates of War Project. See especially Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982) for a more comprehensive list and statistical analysis of wars. J. David Singer (“Accounting for International War: The State of the Discipline,” *Journal of Peace Research* 18, no. 1 [1981]) drew the following conclusions: “The exigencies of survival in an international system of such inadequate organization and with so pervasively dysfunctional a culture require relatively uniform response (p. 11). . . . domestic factors are negligible;” war “cannot be explained on the basis of relatively invariant phenomena” (p. 1).

Michael Haas, *International Conflict*, discovers that, at the systemic level, “collective security, stratification, and hegemonization systems are likely to avoid a high frequency in violent outputs” (p. 453); but “no single [causal] model was entirely or even largely satisfactory” (p. 452). At the social level, war correlates with variables such as: “bloc prominence, military mobilizations, public perceptions of hostility toward peoples of other countries, a high proportion of gross national product devoted to military expenditures . . .” (p. 461). These variables appear to describe rather than explain war. A cluster analysis he performs associates democracy, development, and sustained modernization with the existence of peaceful countries (pp. 464–65). But these factors do not correlate with pacification during the period 1816–1965 according to M. Small and J. D. Singer, “The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 50, no. 4 (Summer 1976).

Their conclusions follow, I think, from their homogenization of war and from their attempt to explain all wars, in which a myriad of states have engaged. I attempt to explain an interstate peace, which only liberal regimes, a particular type of state and society, have succeeded in establishing.

IV

Most liberal theorists have offered inadequate guidance in understanding the exceptional nature of liberal pacification. Some have argued that democratic states would be inherently peaceful simply and solely because in these states citizens rule the polity and bear the costs of wars. Unlike monarchs, citizens are not able to indulge their aggressive passions and have the consequences suffered by someone else. Other liberals have argued that laissez-faire capitalism contains an inherent tendency toward rationalism, and that, since war is irrational, liberal capitalisms will be pacifistic. Others still, such as Montesquieu, claim that “commerce is the cure for the most destructive prejudices,” and “Peace is the natural effect of trade.”²³ While these developments can help account for the liberal peace, they do not explain the fact that liberal states are peaceful only in relations with other liberal states. France and England fought expansionist, colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century (in the 1830s and 1840s against Algeria and China); the United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1848 and intervened again in 1914 under President Wilson. Liberal states are as aggressive and war prone as any other form of government or society in their relations with nonliberal states.

Immanuel Kant offers the best guidance. “Perpetual Peace,” written in 1795, predicts the ever-widening pacification of the liberal pacific union, explains that pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that Perpetual Peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three “definitive articles” of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical “treaty” of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established.

The First Definitive Article holds that the civil constitution of the state must be republican. By republican Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A basically private property and market-oriented economy

23. The incompatibility of democracy and war is forcefully asserted by Paine in *The Rights of Man*. The connection between liberal capitalism, democracy, and peace is argued by, among others, Joseph Schumpeter in *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: Meridian, 1955); and Montesquieu, *Spirit of the Laws* I, bk. 20, chap. 1. This literature is surveyed and analyzed by Albert Hirschman, “Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?” *Journal of Economic Literature* 20 (December 1982).

partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical freedom—the legal equality of citizens as subjects—on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator making laws that apply to all citizens equally including himself. And tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he does not also administer.²⁴

Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the “pacific union” described in the Second Definitive Article of the Eternal Peace. The pacific union is limited to “a treaty of the nations among themselves” which “maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands.” The world will not have achieved the “perpetual peace” that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until “very late and after many unsuccessful attempts.” Then right conceptions of the appropriate constitution, great and sad experience, and good will will have taught all the nations the lessons of peace. Not until then will individuals enjoy perfect republican rights or the full guarantee of a global and just peace. But in the meantime, the “pacific union” of liberal republics “*steadily expands* [my emphasis]” bringing within it more and more republics (despite republican collapses, backsliding, and war disasters) and creating an ever expanding separate peace.²⁵ The pacific union is neither a single peace treaty ending one war nor a world state

24. Two classic sources that examine Kant’s international theory from a Realist perspective are Stanley Hoffmann, “Rousseau on War and Peace” in the *State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965) and Kenneth Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism, and War,” *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (June 1962). I have benefited from their analysis and from those of Karl Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948); F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chap. 4; W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), chap. 1; and particularly Patrick Riley, *Kant’s Political Philosophy* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983). But some of the conclusions of this article differ markedly from theirs.

Kant’s republican constitution is described in Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 437 and analyzed by Riley, *Kant’s Political Philosophy*, chap. 5.

25. Kant, “Universal History,” *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 123. The pacific union follows a process of “federalization” such that it “can be realized by a gradual extension to all states, leading to eternal peace.” This interpretation contrasts with those cited in n. 24. I think Kant meant that the peace would be established among liberal regimes and would expand as new liberal regimes appeared. By a process of gradual extension the peace would become global and then perpetual; the occasion for wars with nonliberals would disappear as nonliberal regimes disappeared.

or state of nations. The first is insufficient; the second and third are impossible or potentially tyrannical. Kant develops no organizational embodiment of this treaty, and presumably he does not find institutionalization necessary. He appears to have in mind a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law set forth in the Third Definitive Article.²⁶

The Third Definitive Article of the Eternal Peace establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The cosmopolitan law “shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” In this he calls for the recognition of the “right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives upon the soil of another [country],” which “does not extend further than to the conditions which enable them [the foreigners] to attempt the developing of intercourse [commerce] with the old inhabitants.” Hospitality does not require extending either the right to citizenship to foreigners or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this right. Hospitality does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas, without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions).²⁷

Kant then explains each of the three definitive articles for a liberal peace. In doing so he develops both an account of why liberal states do maintain peace among themselves and of how it will (by implication, has) come about that the pacific union will expand. His central claim is that a natural evolution will produce “a harmony from the very disharmony of men against their will.”²⁸

26. Kant’s “Pacific Union,” the *foedus pacificum*, is thus neither a *pactum pacis* (a single peace treaty) nor a *civitas gentium* (a world state). He appears to have anticipated something like a less formally institutionalized League of Nations or United Nations. One could argue that these two institutions in practice worked for liberal states and only for liberal states. But no specifically liberal “pacific union” was institutionalized. Instead liberal states have behaved for the past 180 years as if such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of Perpetual Peace had been signed. This follows Riley’s views of the legal, not the organizational, character of the *foedus pacificum*.

27. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” pp. 444–47.

28. Kant, the fourth principle of “The Idea for a Universal History” in *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 120. Interestingly, Kant’s three sources of peace (republicanism, respect, and commerce) parallel quite closely Aristotle’s three sources of friendship (goodness, pleasure or appreciation, and utility). See *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 8, chap. 3, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1955).

The first source derives from a political evolution, from a *constitutional law*. Nature (providence) has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant, who once taught geography, reports on the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.) “Asocial sociability” draws men together to fulfill needs for security and material welfare as it drives them into conflicts over the distribution and control of social products. This violent natural evolution tends toward the liberal peace because “asocial sociability” inevitably leads toward republican governments and republican governments are a source of the liberal peace.

Republican representation and separation of powers are produced because they are the means by which the state is “organized well” to prepare for and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals (by authority derived from representation, by general laws, and by nondespotic administration). States which are not organized in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus cede rights of representation to their subjects in order to strengthen their political support or to obtain tax revenue. This argument provides a plausible, logical connection between conflict, internal and external, and republicanism; and it highlights interesting associations between the rising incidence of international war and the increasing number of republics.

Nevertheless, constant preparation for war can enhance the role of military institutions in a society to the point that they become the society’s rulers. Civil conflict can lead to praetorian coups. Conversely, an environment of security can provide a political climate for weakening the state by constitutional restraints.²⁹ Significantly, the most war-affected states have not been liberal republics.³⁰ More importantly, the argument is so indistinct as to serve only as a very general hypothesis that mobilizing self-interested individuals into the political life of states in an insecure world will eventually engender pressures for republican participation. Kant needs no more than this to suggest that republicanism and a liberal peace are possible (and thus a moral obligation). If it is possible, then sometime over the course of history it may be inevitable. But attempting

29. The “Prussian Model” suggests the connection between insecurity, war, and authoritarianism. See *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*, ed. Arnold Wolfers and Laurence Martin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), “Introduction,” for an argument linking security and liberalism.

30. Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 176–79.

to make its date of achievement predictable—projecting a steady trend—he suggests, may be asking too much. He anticipates backsliding and destructive wars, though these will serve to educate the nations to the importance of peace.³¹

Kant shows how republics, once established, lead to peaceful relations. He argues that once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and once the habit of respect for individual rights is engrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. The fundamental reason is this:

If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it.³²

31. Kant, "The Idea for a Universal History," p. 124.

32. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in *The Enlightenment*, ed. Peter Gay (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), pp. 790–92.

Gallie in *Philosophers of Peace and War* criticizes Kant for neglecting economic, religious, nationalistic drives toward war and for failing to appreciate that "regimes" make war in order to enhance their domestic political support. But Kant holds that these drives should be subordinated to justice in a liberal society (he specifically criticizes colonial wars stimulated by rapaciousness). He also argues that *republics* derive their legitimacy from their accordance with law and representation, thereby freeing them from crises of domestic political support. Kant thus acknowledges both Gallie's sets of motives for war but argues that they would not apply within the pacific union.

One could add to Kant's list another source of pacification specific to liberal constitutions. The regular rotation of office in liberal democratic polities is a nontrivial device that helps ensure that personal animosities among heads of government provide no lasting, escalating source of tension.

These domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce Kant's "caution" in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. To see how this removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source.

Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, *international law* adds a second source—a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations that asocial sociability encourages is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states—an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soul-less despotism." Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states "as culture progresses and men gradually come closer together toward a greater agreement on principles for peace and understanding."³³ As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends. In short, domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial.³⁴

33. Kant, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 454. These factors also have a bearing on Karl Deutsch's "compatibility of values" and "predictability of behavior" (see n. 20).

34. A highly stylized version of this effect can be found in the Realist's "Prisoner's

Lastly, *cosmopolitan law*, adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the “spirit of commerce” sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war.

Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Since keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus avoiding a challenge to another liberal state’s security or even enhancing each other’s security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is that the international market removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes; states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. Furthermore, the interdependence of commerce and the connections of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational, bureaucratic, and domestic organizations create interests in favor of ac-

Dilemma” game. There a failure of mutual trust and the incentives to enhance one’s own position produce a noncooperative solution that makes both parties worse off. Contrarily, cooperation, a commitment to avoid exploiting the other party, produces joint gains. The significance of the game in this context is the character of its participants. The “prisoners” are presumed to be felonious, unrelated apart from their partnership in crime, and lacking in mutual trust—competitive nation states in an anarchic world. A similar game between fraternal or sororal twins—Kant’s republics—would be likely to lead to different results. See Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (April 1968), for an exposition of the role of presumptions; and “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978), for the factors Realists see as mitigating the security dilemma caused by anarchy.

Also, expectations (including theory and history) can influence behavior, making liberal states expect (and fulfill) pacific policies toward each other. These effects are explored at a theoretical level in R. Dacey, “Some Implications of ‘Theory Absorption’ for Economic Theory and the Economics of Information” in *Philosophical Dimensions of Economics*, ed. J. Pitt (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1980).

commodation and have ensured by their variety that no single conflict sours an entire relationship.³⁵

No one of these constitutional, international or cosmopolitan sources is alone sufficient, but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace. Liberal states have not escaped from the Realists' "security dilemma," the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. But the effects of international anarchy have been tamed in the relations among states of a similarly liberal character. Alliances of purely mutual strategic interest among liberal and nonliberal states have been broken, economic ties between liberal and nonliberal states have proven fragile, but the political bond of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.

V

Where liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states. It has failed on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide international economic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis. It failed in the 1930s to provide military aid or political mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, or to Czechoslovakia, which was caught in a dilemma of preserving national security or acknowledging the claims (fostered by Hitler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determination. Farsighted and constitutive measures have only been provided by the liberal international order when one liberal state stood preeminent among the rest, prepared and able to take measures, as did the United States following World War II, to sustain economically and politically the foundations of liberal society beyond its borders. Then measures such as the British Loan, the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, the IMF, and the liberali-

35. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), chaps. 1–2, and Samuel Huntington and Z. Brzezinski, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1963, 1964), chap. 9. And see Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970) for a detailed case study of interliberal politics.

zation of Germany and Japan helped construct buttresses for the international liberal order.³⁶

Thus, the decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership may pose dangers for the liberal world. This danger is not that today's liberal states will permit their economic competition to spiral into war, but that the societies of the liberal world will no longer be able to provide the mutual assistance they might require to sustain liberal domestic orders in the face of mounting economic crises.

These dangers come from two directions: military and economic. Their combination is particularly threatening. One is the continuing asymmetry of defense, with the United States (in relation to its GNP) bearing an undue portion of the common burden. Yet independent and more substantial European and Japanese defense establishments pose problems for liberal cooperation. Military dependence on the United States has been one of the additional bonds helpful in transforming a liberal peace into a liberal alliance. Removing it, without creating a multilaterally directed and funded organization among the liberal industrial democracies, threatens to loosen an important bond. Economic instabilities could make this absence of a multilateral security bond particularly dangerous by escalating differences into hostility. If domestic economic collapses on the pattern of the global propagation of depressions in the 1930s were to reoccur, the domestic political foundations of liberalism could fall. Or, if international economic rivalry were to continue to increase, then consequent attempts to weaken economic interdependence (establishing closed trade and currency blocs) would break an important source of liberal accommodation.³⁷ These dangers would become more significant if independent and substantial military forces were established. If liberal assumptions of the need to cooperate and to accommodate disappear, countries might fall prey to a corrosive rivalry that destroys the pacific union.

Yet liberals may have escaped from the single, greatest, traditional danger of international change—the transition between hegemonic leaders. When one great power begins to lose its preeminence and to slip into

36. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle, "Politicization in the World Economy" in Hirsch, Doyle and Edward Morse, *Alternatives to Monetary Disorder* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/McGraw-Hill, 1977).

37. Robert Gilpin, "Three Models of the Future," *International Organization* 29, no. 1 (Winter 1975).

mere equality, a warlike resolution of the international pecking order becomes exceptionally likely. New power challenges old prestige, excessive commitments face new demands; so Sparta felt compelled to attack Athens, France warred Spain, England and Holland fought with France (and with each other), and Germany and England struggled for the mastery of Europe in World War I. But here liberals may again be an exception, for despite the fact that the United States constituted Britain's greatest challenger along all the dimensions most central to the British maritime hegemony, Britain and the United States accommodated their differences.³⁸ After the defeat of Germany, Britain eventually, though not without regret, accepted its replacement by the United States as the commercial and maritime hegemon of the liberal world. The promise of a peaceable transition thus may be one of the factors helping to moderate economic and political rivalries among Europe, Japan, and the United States.

Consequently, the quarrels with liberal allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan Administrations should not be attributed solely to the personal weaknesses of the two presidents or their secretaries of state. Neither should they be attributed to simple failures of administrative coordination or to the idiosyncracies of American allies. These are the normal workings of a liberal alliance of independent republics. There is no indication that they involve a dissolution of the pacific union; but there is every indication that, following the decline in American preponderance, liberal states will be able to do little to reestablish the union should the international economic interdependence that binds them dissolve and should the domestic, liberal foundations of its central members collapse. But should these republican foundations and commercial sources of in-

38. George Liska identifies this peaceful, hegemonic transition as exceptional in *Quest for Equilibrium: America and the Balance of Power on Land and Sea* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), chap. 4, p. 75. Wilson's speeches, including his "War Message," suggest the importance of ideological factors in explaining this transition: "Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the *existence* [emphasis supplied] of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people." This quotation is from Woodrow Wilson, *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Albert Shaw (New York: The Review of Reviews, 1924), p. 378. Ross Gregory in *The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1971) offers an interpretation along these lines, combining commercial, financial, strategic, and ideological factors in his account of the policy which brought the United States onto a collision course with Germany.

terdependence remain firm, then the promise of liberal legacies among liberal regimes is a continuing peace, even when the leadership of the liberal world changes hands.

When in *The Snows of Kilimanjaro*, Julian (F. Scott Fitzgerald) tells his friend (Hemingway), "The very rich are different from you and me," his friend replies, "Yes, they have more money." But the liberals are fundamentally different. It is not just, as the Realists might argue, that they have more or less resources, better or worse morale. Their constitutional structure makes them—realistically—different. They have established peace among themselves. But the very features which make their relations to fellow liberals differ from the state of war that all other states inhabit also make their relations with nonliberals differ from the prudent, strategic calculation that Realists hope will inform the foreign policies of states in an insecure world. These failings are the subject of the second part of this article.